Codeman can run a session's agent on a remote host over SSH instead of the
local machine. The agent (Claude, OpenCode, Codex, Antigravity, Gemini, Pi, Grok, or a plain shell)
runs inside a tmux server on the remote host, so it survives the SSH
connection dropping; Codeman attaches to it the same way it attaches to a local
managed session.
This document covers the data model, the shell-safe SSH command construction
(COD-107), the durable-launch design (COD-104), and the operational caveats.
For the local session/mux machinery this builds on, see the Mux and
Session entries in CLAUDE.md → Architecture.
A developer box (AA-DESKTOP) often needs to drive an agent on another machine —
a NAS, a build server, a host reachable only through a jump box or a
cloudflared SOCKS5 proxy. Rather than wrap ssh by hand per host, Codeman
stores reusable remote hosts + remote cases and reproduces the exact
connection the operator already uses (ssh-aa-desktop-style configs:
custom port, identity file, -J jump host, -o ProxyCommand).
Types live in src/types/session.ts; persistence in src/remote-hosts.ts.
| Type | Role |
|---|---|
RemoteSshOptions |
The HOW-to-reach fields, shared by host + session: identityFile, socksProxy (host:port), jumpHost ([user@]host[:port]), extraSshOptions (KEY=VALUE[]). Every field optional — all-absent reproduces port-22, default-identity, directly-SSH-able behavior. |
RemoteHost (extends RemoteSshOptions) |
A saved host: id, label, host, username, port?, commands? (per-mode launch command override). |
RemoteCase |
A working directory on a host: name, type: 'remote', hostId, remotePath. |
SessionRemote (extends RemoteSshOptions) |
The resolved bundle stamped onto a live session: host coordinates + remotePath + commands, plus owned? and remoteSessionName? (COD-105 — see Ownership). Built by toSessionRemote(host, case) (sets owned: true) for the launch path, or toAttachedSessionRemote(host, name, path) (sets owned: false) for the attach path. Both copy the advanced SSH options through so every connection is identical. |
RemoteCommandMode |
Extract<SessionMode, 'shell' | 'claude' | 'opencode' | 'codex' | 'gemini' | 'antigravity' | 'pi' | 'grok' | 'deepseek' | 'omp'> — the modes that can run remotely. |
RemoteSessionInfo (COD-105) |
One discovered remote tmux session: name (always codeman-*), attached (a client is connected), created (epoch s), windows. Returned by listRemoteCodemanSessions(). |
Persistence is two flat JSON arrays in the instance data dir:
~/.codeman/remote-hosts.json—readRemoteHosts()/writeRemoteHosts()~/.codeman/remote-cases.json—readRemoteCases()/writeRemoteCases()
(Paths via remoteHostsPath() / remoteCasesPath(); both honor CODEMAN_INSTANCE
because the config dir is the instance data dir.)
On the live Session, the remote rides as _remote?: SessionRemote. When
attaching, resolveMuxAttachCwd() forces the cwd to /tmp for remote sessions —
the local working directory is meaningless on the remote box.
All SSH command lines flow through one function so user-controlled fields are escaped once and the launch + prereq probe can never drift apart:
// src/remote-hosts.ts
buildSshConnectionArgs(remote: RemoteSshOptions & Pick<RemoteHost, 'port'>): string[]It returns the ordered leading tokens of an ssh command line (no -t, no
target, no remote command):
ssh -o BatchMode=yes
[-p <port>]
[-i <abs-identity>] # ~ / $HOME expanded, then shellescaped
[-J <jumpHost>] # shellescaped, single token
[-o ProxyCommand=nc -X 5 -x <socks> %h %p] # ONE shellescaped -o token
[-o <KEY=VALUE>] … # each extra option, shellescaped
Rules that keep this safe — do not bypass them by hand-building an ssh line elsewhere:
- Every user-controlled value (
-i,-J,-o, ProxyCommand) is POSIX single-quoteshellescaped ('…'with embedded'\''). The helper mirrors the one intmux-manager.ts. ~/$HOMEinidentityFileis expanded at build time (expandIdentityPath), before escaping — ssh does not expand~inside-i, and the escaped value never reaches a shell that would.- The ProxyCommand is one shellescaped
-o KEY=VALUEtoken, so its spaces and the%h/%pplaceholders reach ssh as a single argument.%h %psurvive verbatim — ssh expands them to the real host/port, not the shell. - Empty options ⇒
['ssh', '-o BatchMode=yes'](+-ponly when set) — byte-identical to the historical behavior.
Token construction is unit-tested independently of any live connection (see
test/ for buildSshConnectionArgs / buildRemoteTmuxCheckCommand cases).
buildRemoteLaunchCommand({ mode, remote, sessionId }) in tmux-manager.ts
builds the command that launches (or reattaches to) the remote session:
ssh -o BatchMode=yes -t <connection-args> user@host \
'tmux -L codeman-remote new-session -A -s codeman-ssh-<id8> -c <remotePath> "cd <remotePath> && exec <cli>" \; \
set -t codeman-ssh-<id8> status off \; set -t codeman-ssh-<id8> mouse off \; \
set -t codeman-ssh-<id8> prefix C-q \; set -s escape-time 0 \; \
set -t codeman-ssh-<id8> window-size latest'
Key points:
new-session -A -s codeman-ssh-<id8>= attach-if-exists-else-create, so a reconnect (same deterministicremoteTmuxSessionName(sessionId)—codeman-ssh-+ the first 8 chars of the session id) lands back in the same remote session rather than spawning a duplicate. This is what makes the remote agent survive an SSH drop. The name deliberately failsSAFE_MUX_NAME_PATTERNso a Codeman running ON the remote host never adopts it.-L codeman-remote= a DEDICATED socket for sessions launched by remote Codemans, NOT the canonical-L codemansocket the remote host's own Codeman uses. Options are set per-session (set -t), never-g, so a shared remote tmux server's other sessions are untouched (#145 hardening). Note the asymmetry: discovery/attach (COD-105) target the canonical-L codemansocket — they join sessions the remote's own Codeman manages, while owned durable launches live on-L codeman-remote.exec <cli>replaces the pane shell with the agent, so the pane PID is the agent. The per-mode command comes fromremote.commands?.[mode]ordefaultRemoteCommandForMode(mode)(exec claude/exec opencode/exec codex/exec gemini/exec agy/exec bash -l).⚠️ claude and omp no longer take that path: both have their own arm inbuildRemoteLaunchCommandso a respawn can continue the same conversation (see Respawn / reattach continuation), and because the claude arm is ana || bpair under-c, its pane PID is the login shell, not the agent.- The whole tmux invocation is a single shell-quoted ssh argument, and the
pane command is independently quoted, so a
remotePathwith spaces is safe. - Connection options come from the same
buildSshConnectionArgs(remote)as the prereq probe;-tis inserted right afterssh -o BatchMode=yes, preserving historical token order.
Because durable remote sessions require tmux on the remote host,
checkRemoteTmuxAvailable(host) runs command -v tmux over SSH before
creating a remote case/session and returns a structured, never-throwing result:
- empty stdout / non-zero exit → "remote host
<host>needs tmux installed for durable remote sessions" - stderr present → "could not verify tmux on remote host
<host>:<stderr>" (a real connection failure, surfaced to the operator) - success →
{ ok: true, tmuxPath }
It connects with the identical options as the launch
(buildRemoteTmuxCheckCommand reuses buildSshConnectionArgs and inserts
-o ConnectTimeout=10), so a proxied/custom-port/identity host that the launch
can reach also passes the probe (and vice-versa).
Test-mode short-circuit: under VITEST the probe returns
{ ok: true, tmuxPath: '(test-mode)' } without opening a socket — mirroring
TmuxManager's no-op-shell-under-VITEST (IS_TEST_MODE). Without it, remote-case
create-path tests would hit a real ~10s ssh timeout. Only the live probe is
skipped; command construction is still asserted by unit tests.
COD-104 (above) was Phase 1 — Codeman launches a remote session and owns it.
COD-105 is Phase 2 — Codeman can also discover codeman-* tmux sessions
already running on a remote host (created by the remote's own Codeman or another
instance) and attach to one it didn't launch. Ownership decides what happens
when the tab closes.
SessionRemote.owned carries this:
owned: true(or absent — legacy/COD-104 sessions persisted before this field) — we launched it viabuildRemoteLaunchCommandand may explicitly kill it.owned: false— discovered + attached; another Codeman owns the remote session.remoteSessionNameholds its existing tmux name. Closing the tab detaches, never kills.
listRemoteCodemanSessions(host) lists the remote's codeman-* sessions:
buildRemoteListSessionsCommand()runstmux -L codeman list-sessions -F "…"over SSH (connection args from the sharedbuildSshConnectionArgs, so discovery connects identically to launch/probe).2>/dev/nullswallows tmux's "no server running" stderr.parseRemoteSessionList()is a pure, unit-tested parser.⚠️ Quirk: the remote tmux's-F "…\t…"format emits the literal two-character\t, not a real tab (verified on tmux next-3.7), so the parser splits on/\\t|\t/(literal backslash-t or a real tab, for builds that do expand it). It keeps onlycodeman-*names, coerces types, and skips malformed lines.listRemoteCodemanSessions()never throws — unreachable host / no tmux / no sessions all map to[]. Like the prereq probe, it no-ops to[]underVITESTso a request path never opens a real ssh connection.
Discovery is explicit — the UI has a "Discover existing sessions" button per host; Codeman never auto-discovers on host select.
buildRemoteSessionCommand(mode, remote, sessionId) in tmux-manager.ts picks the
remote command line by ownership:
owned === false→buildRemoteAttachCommand(remote, name)— emitsssh … -t … 'tmux -L codeman attach -t <remoteSessionName>'. It usesattach, NOTnew-session -A, so it only joins an existing session and never creates one.- owned (default) →
buildRemoteLaunchCommand(the COD-104 path above).
TmuxManager.killSession() has an early return for non-owned remote sessions:
it tears down only the LOCAL pane holding the ssh client (tmux -L codeman kill-session on this host's socket). Killing the local ssh sends SIGHUP to the
remote tmux attach, which detaches — the durable remote session survives.
The early return is a structural guarantee that no code path can ever issue a
remote kill-session for a session we don't own — the only kill-session run is
on the local socket, which never reaches the remote socket.
A dropped connection or a dead pane must reconnect to the same conversation, not launch a fresh one — the whole point of a durable remote session.
- Claude: the launch command is idempotent —
claude --session-id <id> || claude --resume <id>(seebuildRemoteLaunchCommand's claude branch). The first run creates the conversation under the deterministic session id; every later reattach/respawn re-runs the same line,--session-idfails ("already in use"), and the||fallback resumes it. - OMP:
omphas no equivalent idempotent single-line form, soSession._pinOmpRespawnId()resolves and pins an explicit--resume <id>before a respawn (mirroring the local/docker builders, rendered through the samebuildSpawnCommandFromRegistryengine — not a hand-rolled command and notappendResumeFlag(), which is docker-only and cannot work here: appending a flag after the quoted-c 'omp'hands the id to the login shell as$0instead of toomp).⚠️ The resolver only ever reads THIS host's local~/.omp/agent/sessions/, which is meaningless for a remote session — the conversation and its session file live on the remote host, under the remote user's home. For a remote session,_pinOmpRespawnId()therefore skips local resolution entirely and falls back toomp's own ambiguous--continue(ompConfig.continueSession), which the remote pane command already renders. This is a known, accepted degradation versus the local/docker paths' exact--resumepin — safe in practice because each remote respawn talks to exactly one remote pane's own omp history, so "most recent" is normally correct, but it can drift the same way--continuealways could if two remote sessions ever share one remote directory.
remoteAutoReconnect (default ON) watches for a dropped SSH connection and
reconnects with bounded backoff. It must never revive a session whose agent
exited cleanly (Ctrl-C, Ctrl-D, exit) — that tears down the durable remote
tmux session itself, and a transport-level isPaneDead() cannot tell that apart
from a plain network drop. remoteTmuxSessionAlive() (#355) resolves this by
probing the remote host directly: tmux -L codeman-remote has-session -t codeman-ssh-<id8> over the same buildSshConnectionArgs as launch, classified
by exit status alone (classifyRemoteAliveExit: 0 = alive, ssh's 255 or
a timeout = unknown, anything else = gone) — has-session prints nothing on
success, so reading stdout would misclassify every live session as gone. An
unreachable host answers "unknown", which also means do not revive. The answer
is cached per session and cleared whenever the pane is next seen alive, so a
stale true from one transport drop can never revive the NEXT clean exit.
A remote case's workingDir is an absolute path on the remote host
(Session.workingDir = RemoteCase.remotePath), so the file routes cannot use local
fs: a local realpathSync on a remote-only path fails by construction, which is why
previewing a file used to answer 404 File not found for a case that was working
perfectly (#415). src/remote-files.ts is the one module that reads remote bytes,
and it follows the same rule as the launch path: every ssh command line comes from
buildSshConnectionArgs() — never a hand-built ssh line.
| Request | What happens |
|---|---|
GET /api/sessions/:id/file-raw |
Streamed over ssh (cat, or tail -c +N | head -c L for a Range); the same 200/206/416 contract as a local file, so <video>/<audio> seeking works |
GET /api/sessions/:id/file-content |
cat into memory, capped by the existing text limit; edit=1 answers 400 (see below) and editable is always false |
PUT /api/sessions/:id/file-content |
400 before any path is looked at: the guard sits AHEAD of the local path validation, because with a same-named directory on the Codeman host (an sshfs mount) the write would otherwise land on the local twin |
GET /api/sessions/:id/file-preview |
Non-office files redirect to file-raw (which works remotely); docx/pptx answer 400 |
GET /api/sessions/:id/file-thumbnail |
400 for remote files |
POST /api/sessions/:id/attachments |
Registers an absolute path that lives on the remote host (a clicked link pointing outside the case directory) by probing it there |
GET /api/sessions/:id/attachments/:attachmentId/raw |
Streams the registered remote file over ssh, same 200/206/416 contract; preview (office) and thumbnail answer 400 |
GET /api/sessions/:id/attachments/:attachmentId, GET …/attachments (history) |
Size/mtime/existence resolved over ssh, so a remote entry is not reported missing; the history list resolves EVERY entry in one batched probe, never one connection per entry |
/tmp scratchpad capture, a screenshot elsewhere in the home dir):
the frontend's _isExternalPreviewPath() sends every absolute path that is not under
workingDir there, so fixing only file-raw would leave exactly that half broken.
Guard order is deliberately the same as locally, and the checks are not weakened by the transport:
- Ownership (
findSessionOrFail/ the scope helper) — unchanged. - Lexical containment of
workingDir + path— a../escape is refused before any connection is opened. - ONE ssh round trip that returns
realpathandstatfor the path and the workspace root (remoteProbePaths). Resolving the root remotely is what keeps the boundary honest for a symlinkedremotePath. The probe usesreadlink -fwhen available; on a host without it (macOS before 12.3) a POSIX fallback canonicalizes the directory chain withcd -P/pwd -Pand then follows the LAST component with plainreadlinkfor a bounded number of hops.⚠️ The fallback fails closed: a path it cannot fully resolve (a loop, areadlinkfailure, the hop cap) is reported as unresolvable and answers 404, never as its own unresolved string. An earlier version resolved only the directory chain, sows/notes.txt -> ~/.ssh/id_rsapassed containment under the link's own path whilecatfollowed it to the key. Records come back NUL-separated and index-keyed (<index>|kind|size|mtime|realPath, after a leading NUL that fences off any login banner), so a filename containing a newline cannot shift the alignment. - Containment of the remote realpath against the remote root. The sensitive-path
blocklist then applies on whichever routes already apply it locally (
/api/download, attachment registration, edit mode — where resolving symlinks first is what makes it meaningful); the remote branch neither drops a guard the local path has nor invents a stricter one. One entry of that blocklist is host-bound by construction: the three home-anchored members (~/.claude.json,~/.claude/settings.json,~/.claude/settings.local.json) are compared against the Codeman host's home directory, so they do not match a remote home at a different path. Everything else in the list is depth-anchored (/.ssh/,/.aws/credentials,/.claude/.credentials.json,/etc/shadow, ...) and applies to a remote path unchanged. - Size cap (
CODEMAN_MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES) applied to the remote size, before the body is requested.
The path arrives from the browser (?path=) and is interpolated as a single
shellescape-quoted token, in a command that is itself shellescaped into the ssh
line; BatchMode=yes means a host needing a passphrase fails fast instead of hanging.
A failed connection is reported as 502 with the remote reason — never a 404, which
used to make an unreachable host look like a typo in the agent's output. The reason is
the first stderr line, the timeout, or the exit code; never Node's Command failed: …
message, which would carry the identity-file path and the probe script into the body.
Connections are bounded. Every probe and buffered read runs through a small global
semaphore (src/remote-ssh-limiter.ts, default 4, CODEMAN_MAX_REMOTE_FILE_SSH), the
attachment-history list resolves its whole history in one batched probe instead of one
handshake per entry, and probes are chunked at 40 paths per round trip. Terminal output
in a remote session is written on the remote host, so a prompt-injected agent printing
hundreds of codeman://attach links used to make the server fork one ssh per link,
each holding a 20 s probe timeout, and a 100-entry history re-listed on every
attachment:detected event tripped OpenSSH's default MaxStartups 10:30:100. Streams
(file-raw, by-id raw) are not counted: one is held per browser request for the life
of a playback, and each is gated behind a counted probe anyway.
sshfs mount of the
remote tree at the identical path. Serving the local twin instead would silently hand
back a DIFFERENT filesystem's bytes under a name the user believes is the remote file
(a stale mount, a different checkout, a leftover file), and the failure would be
invisible. An existing mount therefore stops being load-bearing for previews and
downloads but is harmless, and a missing remote file stays a 404 even if the mount
still has it.
Not available over ssh (by choice, not by accident): editing a file (writes would
need SFTP; docs/file-viewer-edit-plan.md §6), office-document previews and
generated thumbnails (both need the bytes on the server's disk — no remote file is ever
spilled onto the server), the file-tree/picker listings, and tail-file. Those routes
are still local-only, so with an sshfs mount in place they read the mounted copy —
the two views can only disagree when that mount is stale. Docker cases are unaffected:
their workspace is bind-mounted at the same absolute path, so local fs reads real bytes.
session.remote): a remote session never falls back to local
fs, and a local session never opens an ssh connection — including for attachment
records, which are keyed to the session that registered them.
Routes are registered in src/web/routes/case-routes.ts:
| Method | Path | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
GET |
/api/remote-hosts |
List saved hosts |
POST |
/api/remote-hosts |
Create a host |
PUT |
/api/remote-hosts/:id |
Update a host |
DELETE |
/api/remote-hosts/:id |
Delete a host |
GET |
/api/remote-hosts/:hostId/sessions |
Discover codeman-* sessions on the host (COD-105; listRemoteCodemanSessions, never errors) |
POST |
/api/cases/remote-link |
Link a case to a remote host (creates the RemoteCase) |
Attaching to a discovered session is a session-create path, not a host route:
POST /api/sessions accepts attachRemoteSession: { hostId, remoteSessionName }
(schema in schemas.ts; remoteSessionName must match ^codeman-[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$),
which session-routes.ts turns into a non-owned (owned: false) session.
Frontend touchpoints: the remote-host management UI is in session-ui.js /
panels-ui.js; a remote session is created by picking a remote host/case in the
session-create flow, or via the per-host "Discover existing sessions" button →
Attach action (creates an owned: false session).
identityFileis a path only — never key bytes. Codeman stores the path and passes it tossh -i; the key never enters Codeman's state or the wire.- The injection surface is the SSH option fields. The single-source
buildSshConnectionArgs+shellescapediscipline (COD-107) is the control — audit any new code path that constructs an ssh command to route through it rather than concatenating options inline. BatchMode=yesmeans no interactive password/passphrase prompts — remote hosts must be reachable with key-based or agent auth (or an unencrypted key the agent has loaded). A host needing a passphrase will fail the probe with an ssh diagnostic rather than hang.
CLAUDE.md→ Architecture → Remote row, and the Remote sessions (SSH) Key Pattern.docs/security-architecture.md— overall network/auth model.- COD-104 (tmux prereq + durable launch), COD-105 (discover + attach, detach-not-kill ownership), COD-107 (shell-safe connection args).