diff --git a/backend/.env.example b/backend/.env.example
index c4fd6a89..123bf3da 100644
--- a/backend/.env.example
+++ b/backend/.env.example
@@ -4,6 +4,12 @@
 # Server Configuration
 PORT=8000
 
+# Comma-separated CIDRs of trusted reverse proxies (e.g. your hosting
+# platform's egress ranges). X-Forwarded-For is ONLY honored from these
+# addresses, so rate limiting cannot be bypassed by spoofing the header.
+# Leave unset when the server is directly reachable.
+# REVERSE_PROXY_CIDR=10.0.0.0/8
+
 # Base URL for constructing absolute URLs (e.g. for image uploads)
 # In production, set this to your actual domain like https://preppilot-backend.onrender.com
 # BASE_URL=https://preppilot-backend.onrender.com
diff --git a/backend/middlewares/rateLimiter.js b/backend/middlewares/rateLimiter.js
index f3ff22aa..cbf952c9 100644
--- a/backend/middlewares/rateLimiter.js
+++ b/backend/middlewares/rateLimiter.js
@@ -1,9 +1,18 @@
 const rateLimit = require('express-rate-limit');
 
+// Rate-limit key derived from the trusted client IP. req.ip honors
+// X-Forwarded-For only from the configured trusted proxy CIDR(s); without one
+// it is the direct socket address, so a spoofed header cannot rotate the limit
+// bucket. The library's ipKeyGenerator helper masks IPv6 addresses to a subnet
+// so IPv6 callers cannot dodge limits by rotating addresses.
+const ipKeyGenerator = (req) =>
+  rateLimit.ipKeyGenerator(req.ip || req.socket?.remoteAddress || "unknown");
+
 // Login endpoint: strict brute-force protection (10 attempts per 15 minutes)
 const loginLimiter = rateLimit({
     windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, // 15 minutes
     max: 10, // Limit each IP to 10 login attempts per window
+    keyGenerator: ipKeyGenerator,
     message: { error: 'Too many login attempts. Your account is temporarily locked. Please try again after 15 minutes.' },
     standardHeaders: true, // Return rate limit info in the `RateLimit-*` headers
     legacyHeaders: false, // Disable the `X-RateLimit-*` headers
@@ -14,6 +23,7 @@ const loginLimiter = rateLimit({
 const authLimiter = rateLimit({
     windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, // 15 minutes
     max: 50, // Limit each IP to 50 requests per `window`
+    keyGenerator: ipKeyGenerator,
     message: { error: 'Too many registration or authentication attempts, please try again after 15 minutes.' },
     standardHeaders: true, // Return rate limit info in the `RateLimit-*` headers
     legacyHeaders: false, // Disable the `X-RateLimit-*` headers
@@ -24,6 +34,7 @@ const authLimiter = rateLimit({
 const aiLimiter = rateLimit({
     windowMs: 60 * 60 * 1000, // 1 hour
     max: 20, // Limit each IP to 20 requests per `window` (here, per hour)
+    keyGenerator: ipKeyGenerator,
     message: { error: 'AI generation limit reached (20 requests per hour) to prevent API abuse. Please try again later.' },
     standardHeaders: true, // Return rate limit info in the `RateLimit-*` headers
     legacyHeaders: false, // Disable the `X-RateLimit-*` headers
@@ -33,6 +44,7 @@ const aiLimiter = rateLimit({
 const generalLimiter = rateLimit({
     windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, // 15 minutes
     max: 100, // Limit each IP to 100 requests per `window` (here, per 15 minutes)
+    keyGenerator: ipKeyGenerator,
     message: { error: 'Too many requests, please try again after 15 minutes.' },
     standardHeaders: true, // Return rate limit info in the `RateLimit-*` headers
     legacyHeaders: false, // Disable the `X-RateLimit-*` headers
@@ -42,6 +54,7 @@ const generalLimiter = rateLimit({
 const sensitiveAuthLimiter = rateLimit({
     windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, // 15 minutes
     max: 10, // Limit each IP to 10 sensitive account requests per window
+    keyGenerator: ipKeyGenerator,
     message: { error: 'Too many sensitive account action attempts, please try again after 15 minutes.' },
     standardHeaders: true, // Return rate limit info in the `RateLimit-*` headers
     legacyHeaders: false, // Disable the `X-RateLimit-*` headers
diff --git a/backend/server.js b/backend/server.js
index 1a6341b8..e321c0db 100644
--- a/backend/server.js
+++ b/backend/server.js
@@ -29,7 +29,18 @@ const { generalHeaders, sensitiveRouteHeaders } = require("./middlewares/securit
 const { uploadsStaticHeaders } = require("./middlewares/uploadMiddleware");
 const app = express();
 
-app.set("trust proxy", 1);
+// Trust X-Forwarded-For only when it comes from a known reverse proxy. The
+// previous blanket `trust proxy: 1` let any client spoof the header and rotate
+// their IP on every request, defeating every rate limiter. With no CIDR
+// configured the header is ignored entirely and req.ip is the direct socket
+// address, so it cannot be reset by the caller.
+const reverseProxyCidrs = (process.env.REVERSE_PROXY_CIDR || "")
+  .split(",")
+  .map((cidr) => cidr.trim())
+  .filter(Boolean);
+if (reverseProxyCidrs.length > 0) {
+  app.set("trust proxy", reverseProxyCidrs);
+}
 app.use(generalHeaders);
 const isDev = process.env.NODE_ENV !== "production";
 const originEnvList = [
diff --git a/backend/tests/rateLimiter.xff.bypass.unit.test.js b/backend/tests/rateLimiter.xff.bypass.unit.test.js
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..43c7f132
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/tests/rateLimiter.xff.bypass.unit.test.js
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll } from "vitest";
+import express from "express";
+import request from "supertest";
+import { loginLimiter } from "../middlewares/rateLimiter.js";
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Rate-limit bypass fix (issue #1438): with no trusted reverse proxy
+// configured, a client-supplied X-Forwarded-For header must NOT rotate the
+// rate-limit bucket. req.ip stays the direct socket address, so the 11th login
+// attempt is still rejected even while spoofing a different IP each request.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+let app;
+
+beforeAll(() => {
+  app = express();
+  app.use(express.json());
+  app.post("/login", loginLimiter, (req, res) => res.status(200).json({ ok: true }));
+});
+
+describe("login limiter keyed on the trusted client IP", () => {
+  it("rejects the 11th attempt even when X-Forwarded-For is rotated per request", async () => {
+    const statuses = [];
+    for (let i = 0; i <= 10; i++) {
+      const res = await request(app)
+        .post("/login")
+        .set("X-Forwarded-For", `203.0.113.${i}`)
+        .send({ email: `user${i}@example.com`, password: "wrong" });
+      statuses.push(res.status);
+    }
+
+    // The first 10 requests pass through to the handler (200), proving the
+    // spoofed header did not create a fresh bucket for each attempt.
+    for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+      expect(statuses[i]).toBe(200);
+    }
+    // The 11th attempt is rejected by loginLimiter (max: 10).
+    expect(statuses[10]).toBe(429);
+  });
+});