Use Honeypots

[weasel3]

Consider updating _docs/extend/improvements.md, because ...

Consider leaving a relatively easy accessible loaded honeypot-wallet on each supposedly secure location (e.g. a paper printed with the seed and QR-Code of the xpriv/xpub for quick sweep-access).
When using a m-of-n multisig constallation with passphrase for the real funds, load up each single wallet originating from each cosigner's seeds (w/o passphrase) with "f*ck-up-money" and set up a notification process when the honeypot is emptied (e.g. IFTTT).
Do the same with the multisig-wallet w/o the passphrase and the trap is set.

Drawbacks:

• a honeypot could trigger an attacker to "go for more"
• a honeypot could be identified as such from the attacker and not be emptied, leaving the originator in a false sense of security

[bitcoinhodler]

This is an interesting idea. Glacier doesn't use xpubs or xprvs today, but each paper packet does include one WIF private key. The user could load up that key's corresponding P2PKH address with a small amount of funds and set an alarm if those funds ever move.

Each paper packet also includes the multisig redeem script and P2SH address, so an attacker can easily see the funds available in the multisig wallet, and that might make it obvious that the P2PKH funds are a honeypot.