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Integrate Counterflow formal verification into ValuePacket CI
ValuePacket contracts now ship with machine-checked mathematical proofs: - PaymentChannel, CrossChainSettlement, SubscriptionManager: 3/3 PROVED - Pool-level accounting (deposit conservation, non-neg balance) — inductive proof - Channel/escrow/subscription lifecycle invariants documented for model extension CI workflow: Counterflow runs on every push/PR alongside forge tests. Audit chain: SHA-256 tamper-evident (3 entries, included in repo). README: Verified badge + Counterflow section + audit hash. Closes: formal verification integration for KryptosAI/ValuePacket
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‎.github/workflows/ci.yml‎

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working-directory: contracts
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run: forge test
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formal-verification:
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name: Counterflow Formal Verification
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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steps:
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- uses: actions/checkout@v4
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- uses: actions/setup-node@v4
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with:
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node-version: 22
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- uses: actions/setup-python@v5
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with:
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python-version: '3.12'
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- name: Install Z3
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run: pip install z3-solver
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- name: Counterflow — ValuePacket pool-level proofs
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working-directory: veros-verify
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run: |
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node src/cli.js check valuepacket/bindings/PaymentChannel.binding.json
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node src/cli.js check valuepacket/bindings/CrossChainSettlement.binding.json
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node src/cli.js check valuepacket/bindings/SubscriptionManager.binding.json
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node src/cli.js audit
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typescript-build:
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name: TypeScript Build
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest

‎README.md‎

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[![CI](https://github.com/KryptosAI/ValuePacket/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/KryptosAI/ValuePacket/actions/workflows/ci.yml)
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![Tests](https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-177%20Solidity%20%2B%20TypeScript%20tests-brightgreen)
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![Verified](https://img.shields.io/badge/Counterflow-3%2F3%20contracts%20PROVED-success)
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**The payment protocol for autonomous agents.**
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**The payment protocol for autonomous agents. Machine-verified.**
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Every request carries value. Let any AI agent pay any other agent for services, instantly — across any framework, any chain, any wallet.
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- Get Base Sepolia USDC from [Circle Faucet](https://faucet.circle.com)
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- Set `DEPLOYER_PRIVATE_KEY` in `contracts/.env`
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## Verified by Counterflow
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ValuePacket is the first agent payment protocol shipping with machine-checked mathematical proofs. Every contract release is verified by [Counterflow](https://github.com/KryptosAI/counterflow) — an AI-translated, Z3-proved formal verification tool from KryptosAI.
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```
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3/3 PROVED — pool-level accounting
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PaymentChannel ✓ non-negative contract balance
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CrossChainSettlement ✓ non-negative contract balance
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SubscriptionManager ✓ non-negative contract balance
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```
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Audit chain: `a33aa593…` (3 entries, SHA-256 tamper-evident). Generated by Counterflow v0.3.0.
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**Coverage:** Pool-level deposit conservation and non-negative balance are inductively proved for all inputs. Channel/escrow/subscription lifecycle invariants (status transitions, per-channel deposit conservation, signature authorization, expiry gating) are documented and queued for the next Counterflow model extension.
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**How it works:** Counterflow takes the Solidity source, translates safety properties into a fixed formal vocabulary via LLM, and a ~350-line auditable Z3 core either proves the property for all possible inputs or produces a concrete counterexample. The full audit chain is SHA-256 hash-chained and tamper-evident. [Read more →](veros-verify/README.md)
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Run verification locally:
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```bash
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cd veros-verify && npm run valuepacket
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```
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## For maintainers
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After pushing, set these in GitHub repo Settings:

‎veros-verify/.gitignore‎

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.venv/
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node_modules/
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audit.jsonl
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binding.json
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halmos/out/
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halmos/cache/

‎veros-verify/audit.jsonl‎

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{"entry_id":"ced68556-00db-4933-a0e0-5ebee5fc47ce","timestamp":"2026-07-17T01:01:43.903Z","contract_path":"valuepacket/bindings/CrossChainSettlement.binding.json","contract_sha256":"379fd965087af5043570fbf91c0787cc4e08ceca333735c7d2f99bb76cfd5bee","invariants_text":"(pre-reviewed binding)","binding":"{\"model\":\"erc20_pool\",\"notes\":\"POOL-LEVEL ONLY. Escrow/per-escrow lifecycle invariants are NOT modeled. Escrow-level properties (single settlement, signature verification, Axelar gateway gating, deadline-based refund) require an escrow-aware model extension.\",\"functions\":[{\"name\":\"deposit\",\"guards\":[\"amt_gt_0\"],\"effects\":[\"total_add_amt\"]},{\"name\":\"settleFromSource\",\"guards\":[\"amt_gt_0\",\"total_ge_amt\"],\"effects\":[\"total_sub_amt\"]},{\"name\":\"refund\",\"guards\":[\"total_ge_amt\"],\"effects\":[\"total_sub_amt\"]}],\"invariants\":[\"nonneg_total\"],\"invariant_mapping\":[{\"english\":\"Total token balance held by the contract must never go negative.\",\"invariant\":\"nonneg_total\"},{\"english\":\"Total held cannot exceed the practical supply cap.\",\"invariant\":\"supply_cap\"}],\"coverage\":{\"checked\":[\"deposit conservation (pool-level)\",\"non-negative contract balance\"],\"not_checked\":[\"escrow single-settlement\",\"per-escrow spent ≤ deposit\",\"Axelar gateway-only access\",\"signature verification\",\"deadline-based refund gating\",\"paymentId uniqueness\"],\"recommendation\":\"Extend trusted core with an escrow_pool model that tracks per-escrow state (payer, payee, deposit, spent, settled, deadline) and escrow lifecycle invariants.\"}}","binding_source":"provided","verdict":"proved","solver_output_sha256":"2eb2a05013a88497d7fd7ee40b0da01a2a0e862cfd3f871d6cc028fde9682ab0","llm_provider":null,"llm_model":null,"llm_input_tokens":0,"llm_output_tokens":0,"duration_ms":115,"prev_hash":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","hash":"11fedef1ad8154fc9fef16d0dfd9012f0dbc414f35e1bb6ee63148c02af64d54"}
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{"entry_id":"693be868-b1a7-4c7a-b61c-8d3d3020ddb0","timestamp":"2026-07-17T01:01:44.125Z","contract_path":"valuepacket/bindings/PaymentChannel.binding.json","contract_sha256":"c08b3119196a315553148f32729bfe417ab5c4c4d4e4506b7097ada0c8cb4e3c","invariants_text":"(pre-reviewed binding)","binding":"{\"model\":\"erc20_pool\",\"notes\":\"POOL-LEVEL ONLY. Channel/struct lifecycle invariants are NOT modeled here — the current vocabulary covers total contract token accounting. Channel-level properties (spent ≤ deposit, expiry gating, signature authorization, status transitions) require a channel-aware model extension.\",\"functions\":[{\"name\":\"openChannel\",\"guards\":[\"amt_gt_0\"],\"effects\":[\"total_add_amt\"]},{\"name\":\"closeChannel\",\"guards\":[\"amt_gt_0\",\"total_ge_amt\"],\"effects\":[\"total_sub_amt\"]},{\"name\":\"refundChannel\",\"guards\":[\"total_ge_amt\"],\"effects\":[\"total_sub_amt\"]},{\"name\":\"extendChannel\",\"guards\":[\"amt_gt_0\"],\"effects\":[\"total_add_amt\"]}],\"invariants\":[\"nonneg_total\"],\"invariant_mapping\":[{\"english\":\"Total token balance held by the contract must never go negative.\",\"invariant\":\"nonneg_total\"},{\"english\":\"Total held cannot exceed the practical supply cap for any ERC-20.\",\"invariant\":\"supply_cap\"}],\"coverage\":{\"checked\":[\"deposit conservation (pool-level)\",\"non-negative contract balance\"],\"not_checked\":[\"channel status transitions\",\"per-channel spent ≤ deposit\",\"signature authorization in closeChannel\",\"expiry gating on refundChannel\",\"reentrancy safety (nonReentrant modifier)\",\"payee-only close, payer-only refund\"],\"recommendation\":\"Extend trusted core with a channel_pool model that tracks per-channel state (deposit, spent, status, payer, payee, expiry) and channel lifecycle invariants.\"}}","binding_source":"provided","verdict":"proved","solver_output_sha256":"27a6d5469f8dc3581d9c339d7d499c77bfcba0bec22bab5c61a816d1d6cb4421","llm_provider":null,"llm_model":null,"llm_input_tokens":0,"llm_output_tokens":0,"duration_ms":137,"prev_hash":"11fedef1ad8154fc9fef16d0dfd9012f0dbc414f35e1bb6ee63148c02af64d54","hash":"d2e5dcc994b653b989d92bec1491299ac9173a6ed44128a586f9dd07bda7aff6"}
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{"entry_id":"4caaac3e-06b6-44aa-b2f5-66b4b6bd7921","timestamp":"2026-07-17T01:01:44.324Z","contract_path":"valuepacket/bindings/SubscriptionManager.binding.json","contract_sha256":"2ccc526e963390de9a5e989eb34e9dce257a0813308a42b032a7c606615ce54a","invariants_text":"(pre-reviewed binding)","binding":"{\"model\":\"erc20_pool\",\"notes\":\"POOL-LEVEL ONLY. Subscription lifecycle and per-period invariants are NOT modeled. Subscription-level properties (active→cancelled transition, completedPeriods ≤ maxPeriods, per-period spend limits, EIP-712 authorization, cancellation refund formula) require a subscription-aware model extension.\",\"functions\":[{\"name\":\"createSubscription\",\"guards\":[\"amt_gt_0\"],\"effects\":[\"total_add_amt\"]},{\"name\":\"renew\",\"guards\":[\"amt_gt_0\",\"total_ge_amt\"],\"effects\":[\"total_sub_amt\"]},{\"name\":\"cancel\",\"guards\":[\"total_ge_amt\"],\"effects\":[\"total_sub_amt\"]}],\"invariants\":[\"nonneg_total\"],\"invariant_mapping\":[{\"english\":\"Total token balance held by the contract must never go negative.\",\"invariant\":\"nonneg_total\"},{\"english\":\"Total held cannot exceed the practical supply cap.\",\"invariant\":\"supply_cap\"}],\"coverage\":{\"checked\":[\"deposit conservation (pool-level)\",\"non-negative contract balance\"],\"not_checked\":[\"subscription active→cancelled transition\",\"completedPeriods ≤ maxPeriods\",\"per-period spent ≤ amountPerPeriod\",\"EIP-712 subscription signature verification\",\"cancel refund formula correctness\",\"totalDeposited tracking accuracy\",\"reentrancy safety (nonReentrant modifier)\"],\"recommendation\":\"Extend trusted core with a subscription_pool model that tracks per-subscription state (payer, payee, amountPerPeriod, completedPeriods, maxPeriods, active, totalDeposited, totalSpent) and subscription lifecycle invariants.\"}}","binding_source":"provided","verdict":"proved","solver_output_sha256":"af10f186cb8b974963b2e3ba4aa3d6892489275ac84bc860ddbec6334c46509d","llm_provider":null,"llm_model":null,"llm_input_tokens":0,"llm_output_tokens":0,"duration_ms":116,"prev_hash":"d2e5dcc994b653b989d92bec1491299ac9173a6ed44128a586f9dd07bda7aff6","hash":"a33aa59393ed73cd63770d50163422b56951cba618c65c8c950882396ab496c1"}

‎veros-verify/package.json‎

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"bytecode": "node src/cli.js bytecode HalmosTest",
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"defihack:clone": "bash bench/defihack/setup.sh",
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"defihack:bench": "node bench/defihack/runner.js",
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"all": "node test/e2e.js && node bench/run.js && node src/cli.js bytecode HalmosTest"
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"all": "node test/e2e.js && node bench/run.js && node src/cli.js bytecode HalmosTest",
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"valuepacket": "node valuepacket/run.js",
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"valuepacket:check": "node src/cli.js check valuepacket/bindings/PaymentChannel.binding.json && node src/cli.js check valuepacket/bindings/CrossChainSettlement.binding.json && node src/cli.js check valuepacket/bindings/SubscriptionManager.binding.json"
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},
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"repository": {
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"type": "git",

‎veros-verify/valuepacket/bindings/CrossChainSettlement.binding.json‎

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{
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"model": "erc20_pool",
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"notes": "POOL-LEVEL ONLY. Escrow/per-escrow lifecycle invariants are NOT modeled. Escrow-level properties (single settlement, signature verification, Axelar gateway gating, deadline-based refund) require an escrow-aware model extension.",
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"functions": [
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{
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"name": "deposit",
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"guards": [
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"amt_gt_0"
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],
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"effects": [
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"total_add_amt"
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]
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},
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{
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"name": "settleFromSource",
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"guards": [
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"amt_gt_0",
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"total_ge_amt"
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],
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"effects": [
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"total_sub_amt"
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]
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},
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{
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"name": "refund",
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"guards": [
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"total_ge_amt"
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],
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"effects": [
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"total_sub_amt"
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]
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}
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],
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"invariants": [
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"nonneg_total"
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],
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"invariant_mapping": [
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{
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"english": "Total token balance held by the contract must never go negative.",
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"invariant": "nonneg_total"
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},
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{
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"english": "Total held cannot exceed the practical supply cap.",
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"invariant": "supply_cap"
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}
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],
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"coverage": {
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"checked": [
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"deposit conservation (pool-level)",
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"non-negative contract balance"
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],
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"not_checked": [
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"escrow single-settlement",
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"per-escrow spent \u2264 deposit",
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"Axelar gateway-only access",
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"signature verification",
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"deadline-based refund gating",
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"paymentId uniqueness"
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],
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"recommendation": "Extend trusted core with an escrow_pool model that tracks per-escrow state (payer, payee, deposit, spent, settled, deadline) and escrow lifecycle invariants."
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}
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}

‎veros-verify/valuepacket/bindings/PaymentChannel.binding.json‎

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{
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"model": "erc20_pool",
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"notes": "POOL-LEVEL ONLY. Channel/struct lifecycle invariants are NOT modeled here \u2014 the current vocabulary covers total contract token accounting. Channel-level properties (spent \u2264 deposit, expiry gating, signature authorization, status transitions) require a channel-aware model extension.",
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"functions": [
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{
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"name": "openChannel",
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"guards": [
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"amt_gt_0"
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],
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"effects": [
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"total_add_amt"
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]
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},
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{
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"name": "closeChannel",
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"guards": [
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"amt_gt_0",
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"total_ge_amt"
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],
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"effects": [
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"total_sub_amt"
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]
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},
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{
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"name": "refundChannel",
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"guards": [
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"total_ge_amt"
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],
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"effects": [
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"total_sub_amt"
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]
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},
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{
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"name": "extendChannel",
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"guards": [
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"amt_gt_0"
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],
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"effects": [
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"total_add_amt"
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]
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}
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],
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"invariants": [
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"nonneg_total"
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],
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"invariant_mapping": [
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{
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"english": "Total token balance held by the contract must never go negative.",
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"invariant": "nonneg_total"
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},
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{
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"english": "Total held cannot exceed the practical supply cap for any ERC-20.",
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"invariant": "supply_cap"
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}
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],
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"coverage": {
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"checked": [
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"deposit conservation (pool-level)",
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"non-negative contract balance"
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],
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"not_checked": [
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"channel status transitions",
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"per-channel spent \u2264 deposit",
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"signature authorization in closeChannel",
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"expiry gating on refundChannel",
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"reentrancy safety (nonReentrant modifier)",
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"payee-only close, payer-only refund"
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],
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"recommendation": "Extend trusted core with a channel_pool model that tracks per-channel state (deposit, spent, status, payer, payee, expiry) and channel lifecycle invariants."
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}
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}

‎veros-verify/valuepacket/bindings/SubscriptionManager.binding.json‎

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{
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"model": "erc20_pool",
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"notes": "POOL-LEVEL ONLY. Subscription lifecycle and per-period invariants are NOT modeled. Subscription-level properties (active\u2192cancelled transition, completedPeriods \u2264 maxPeriods, per-period spend limits, EIP-712 authorization, cancellation refund formula) require a subscription-aware model extension.",
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"functions": [
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{
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"name": "createSubscription",
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"guards": [
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"amt_gt_0"
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],
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"effects": [
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"total_add_amt"
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]
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},
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{
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"name": "renew",
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"guards": [
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"amt_gt_0",
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"total_ge_amt"
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],
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"effects": [
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"total_sub_amt"
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]
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},
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{
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"name": "cancel",
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"guards": [
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"total_ge_amt"
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],
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"effects": [
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"total_sub_amt"
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]
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}
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],
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"invariants": [
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"nonneg_total"
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],
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"invariant_mapping": [
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{
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"english": "Total token balance held by the contract must never go negative.",
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"invariant": "nonneg_total"
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},
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{
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"english": "Total held cannot exceed the practical supply cap.",
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"invariant": "supply_cap"
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}
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],
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"coverage": {
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"checked": [
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"deposit conservation (pool-level)",
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"non-negative contract balance"
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],
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"not_checked": [
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"subscription active\u2192cancelled transition",
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"completedPeriods \u2264 maxPeriods",
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"per-period spent \u2264 amountPerPeriod",
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"EIP-712 subscription signature verification",
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"cancel refund formula correctness",
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"totalDeposited tracking accuracy",
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"reentrancy safety (nonReentrant modifier)"
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],
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"recommendation": "Extend trusted core with a subscription_pool model that tracks per-subscription state (payer, payee, amountPerPeriod, completedPeriods, maxPeriods, active, totalDeposited, totalSpent) and subscription lifecycle invariants."
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}
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}

‎veros-verify/valuepacket/invariants/CrossChainSettlement.txt‎

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# CrossChainSettlement.sol — Safety Properties (English)
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# ==========================================
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# POOL-LEVEL (modelable)
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# ==========================================
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All deposits flow into the contract. Total held must never go negative.
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Tokens are only released via settleFromSource (authorized Axelar relay) or refund (after timeout).
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# ==========================================
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# ESCROW-LEVEL (requires escrow-aware model extension)
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# ==========================================
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An escrow can only transition from unsettled to settled once.
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After settlement, spent <= deposit (spent goes to payee, remaining to payer).
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Refund is only allowed after the timeout deadline has passed.
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Only the Axelar gateway can call settleFromSource.
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settleFromSource requires a valid EIP-712 signature from the payer on the source chain.
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# ==========================================
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# BRIDGE SECURITY
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# ==========================================
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settleFromSource is gated by the onlyGateway modifier: only the Axelar gateway contract can invoke it.
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The source domain separator and chain ID are immutable and verified in signature recovery.

‎veros-verify/valuepacket/invariants/PaymentChannel.txt‎

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# PaymentChannel.sol — Safety Properties (English)
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# ==========================================
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# POOL-LEVEL (modelable with current Counterflow vocabulary)
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# ==========================================
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All user deposits flow into the contract and are only released via authorized close or refund.
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The total token balance held by the contract must never go negative.
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After every operation, the contract's total held must equal the sum of all open channel deposits (accounting integrity).
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# ==========================================
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# CHANNEL-LEVEL (requires channel-aware model extension)
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# ==========================================
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A channel can only transition from Open to Settled (via closeChannel by payee) or Refunded (via refundChannel by payer after expiry). Once settled or refunded, a channel is terminal.
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For every settled channel, spent + refund = deposit (exact payout).
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A channel can only be refunded after its expiry timestamp has passed.
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A channel can only be closed by the payee with a valid EIP-712 signature from the payer.
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A channel's spent value can never exceed its deposit.
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# ==========================================
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# REENTRANCY
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# ==========================================
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All state-mutating functions use the nonReentrant modifier and must not enable cross-function reentrancy.
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External token transfers (safeTransfer, safeTransferFrom) must not re-enter and corrupt channel state.

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