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Release keys

client-update.pub is the Ed25519 public key that is compiled into the client and the coordinator. A client installs an update only if its signature verifies against this key, so only whoever holds the matching private key can ship updates to devices. The client runs as LocalSystem, which is why this check matters.

This repository includes the project's public client key. Keep its existing private half when packaging updates for enrolled devices. Builds made without the public file have no update key and refuse client updates.

Create the key pair (once, by the owner)

  1. Generate the pair and write the public half into the repository:

    cargo run -p release-tool -- keygen --public-out release-keys/client-update.pub
    
  2. The command prints the private key once. Store it outside the repository in a protected key file or secret manager, and use the GitHub Actions repository secret SC_UPDATE_SIGNING_KEY for CI. The tool never writes the private key to a file automatically. Never include it in source or release artifacts.

  3. Commit release-keys/client-update.pub.

CI can check that the secret still matches the committed key: release-tool public-key (with SC_UPDATE_SIGNING_KEY set) prints the public key for comparison with the file.

The Manager uses a separate Tauri updater key. Its public half is committed at crates/manager/updater.pub; see the Manager signing instructions.

Rotate the key

Clients trust only the public key they were built with, so a new key cannot simply replace the old one:

  1. Generate a new pair and commit the new client-update.pub.
  2. Build a release containing the NEW public key but sign it with the OLD private key. Devices accept it because it verifies against the old key they carry.
  3. Once the devices run that release, set the secret SC_UPDATE_SIGNING_KEY to the new private key; later releases are signed with the new key.

Replacing the secret before step 2 has reached the devices strands them: they would reject every update signed with the new key.