From a0d7c3342f8d8ee23f389331baf1251219262b94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dutchman101 Date: Mon, 10 Jun 2024 19:51:00 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] Revert "Temporarily revert this month's updates & changes to cURL and mbedTLS" This is planned; refer to the description of commit afd6c2a for details. Actually, in the meanwhile, botder has found a proper fix for the SSL bug. Even though for good measure server builds were let to generate, a rebase with the fix will follow this "Revert the revert", and later builds will also have fixed fetchRemote (https), but without downgraded cURL & mbedTLS which would otherwise be a security risk. This reverts commit afd6c2a1868e7410a4a747b50c3db6baef0f81d8. --- vendor/curl/CHANGES | 13489 +++++++-------- vendor/curl/COPYING | 2 +- vendor/curl/RELEASE-NOTES | 875 +- vendor/curl/include/curl/curl.h | 86 +- vendor/curl/include/curl/curlver.h | 8 +- vendor/curl/include/curl/mprintf.h | 18 +- vendor/curl/include/curl/multi.h | 14 + vendor/curl/include/curl/system.h | 12 +- vendor/curl/include/curl/typecheck-gcc.h | 1 + vendor/curl/include/curl/urlapi.h | 4 + vendor/curl/lib/altsvc.c | 37 +- vendor/curl/lib/asyn-ares.c | 164 +- vendor/curl/lib/asyn-thread.c | 286 +- vendor/curl/lib/base64.c | 2 +- vendor/curl/lib/bufq.c | 23 +- vendor/curl/lib/bufq.h | 9 +- vendor/curl/lib/bufref.c | 6 +- vendor/curl/lib/c-hyper.c | 329 +- vendor/curl/lib/c-hyper.h | 8 +- vendor/curl/lib/cf-h1-proxy.c | 134 +- vendor/curl/lib/cf-h2-proxy.c | 25 +- vendor/curl/lib/cf-haproxy.c | 29 +- vendor/curl/lib/cf-https-connect.c | 6 +- vendor/curl/lib/cf-socket.c | 219 +- vendor/curl/lib/cf-socket.h | 26 +- vendor/curl/lib/cfilters.c | 103 +- vendor/curl/lib/cfilters.h | 50 +- vendor/curl/lib/config-os400.h | 10 +- vendor/curl/lib/config-plan9.h | 2 +- vendor/curl/lib/config-riscos.h | 5 +- vendor/curl/lib/config-win32.h | 59 - vendor/curl/lib/config-win32ce.h | 9 - vendor/curl/lib/conncache.c | 15 +- vendor/curl/lib/conncache.h | 2 +- vendor/curl/lib/connect.c | 109 +- vendor/curl/lib/connect.h | 3 +- vendor/curl/lib/content_encoding.c | 91 +- vendor/curl/lib/cookie.c | 46 +- vendor/curl/lib/curl_addrinfo.c | 18 +- vendor/curl/lib/curl_des.c | 2 +- vendor/curl/lib/curl_get_line.c | 55 +- vendor/curl/lib/curl_get_line.h | 7 +- vendor/curl/lib/curl_gethostname.c | 2 +- vendor/curl/lib/curl_multibyte.c | 17 - vendor/curl/lib/curl_ntlm_wb.c | 500 - vendor/curl/lib/curl_path.c | 68 +- vendor/curl/lib/curl_path.h | 2 +- vendor/curl/lib/curl_printf.h | 4 + vendor/curl/lib/curl_rtmp.c | 54 +- vendor/curl/lib/curl_rtmp.h | 2 + vendor/curl/lib/curl_sasl.c | 29 +- vendor/curl/lib/curl_setup.h | 153 +- vendor/curl/lib/curl_setup_once.h | 8 +- vendor/curl/lib/curl_sha512_256.c | 850 + vendor/curl/lib/curl_sha512_256.h | 44 + vendor/curl/lib/curl_threads.c | 3 +- vendor/curl/lib/curl_trc.c | 110 +- vendor/curl/lib/curl_trc.h | 108 +- vendor/curl/lib/curlx.h | 1 - vendor/curl/lib/cw-out.c | 474 + vendor/curl/lib/{curl_ntlm_wb.h => cw-out.h} | 36 +- vendor/curl/lib/dict.c | 29 +- vendor/curl/lib/dllmain.c | 81 + vendor/curl/lib/doh.c | 469 +- vendor/curl/lib/doh.h | 43 +- vendor/curl/lib/dynbuf.c | 7 +- vendor/curl/lib/dynbuf.h | 4 +- vendor/curl/lib/easy.c | 184 +- vendor/curl/lib/easygetopt.c | 2 +- vendor/curl/lib/easyif.h | 2 +- vendor/curl/lib/easyoptions.c | 7 +- vendor/curl/lib/file.c | 150 +- vendor/curl/lib/fopen.c | 5 + vendor/curl/lib/formdata.c | 10 +- vendor/curl/lib/ftp.c | 638 +- vendor/curl/lib/ftplistparser.c | 2 +- vendor/curl/lib/getinfo.c | 35 +- vendor/curl/lib/gopher.c | 20 +- vendor/curl/lib/hash.c | 57 +- vendor/curl/lib/hash.h | 16 +- vendor/curl/lib/headers.c | 102 +- vendor/curl/lib/headers.h | 7 + vendor/curl/lib/hostasyn.c | 11 +- vendor/curl/lib/hostip.c | 80 +- vendor/curl/lib/hostip.h | 41 +- vendor/curl/lib/hsts.c | 63 +- vendor/curl/lib/http.c | 3402 ++-- vendor/curl/lib/http.h | 86 +- vendor/curl/lib/http2.c | 612 +- vendor/curl/lib/http_aws_sigv4.c | 24 +- vendor/curl/lib/http_chunks.c | 524 +- vendor/curl/lib/http_chunks.h | 67 +- vendor/curl/lib/http_negotiate.c | 25 +- vendor/curl/lib/http_ntlm.c | 5 - vendor/curl/lib/http_proxy.c | 6 +- vendor/curl/lib/idn.c | 86 +- vendor/curl/lib/idn.h | 7 +- vendor/curl/lib/if2ip.c | 22 +- vendor/curl/lib/if2ip.h | 6 +- vendor/curl/lib/imap.c | 135 +- vendor/curl/lib/inet_ntop.c | 4 +- vendor/curl/lib/inet_pton.c | 7 +- vendor/curl/lib/inet_pton.h | 3 - vendor/curl/lib/krb5.c | 120 +- vendor/curl/lib/ldap.c | 33 +- vendor/curl/lib/llist.c | 16 + vendor/curl/lib/llist.h | 2 + vendor/curl/lib/md4.c | 10 +- vendor/curl/lib/memdebug.c | 37 +- vendor/curl/lib/memdebug.h | 2 +- vendor/curl/lib/mime.c | 301 +- vendor/curl/lib/mime.h | 16 +- vendor/curl/lib/mprintf.c | 1222 +- vendor/curl/lib/mqtt.c | 51 +- vendor/curl/lib/mqtt.h | 1 + vendor/curl/lib/multi.c | 818 +- vendor/curl/lib/multihandle.h | 44 +- vendor/curl/lib/multiif.h | 56 +- vendor/curl/lib/netrc.c | 10 +- vendor/curl/lib/noproxy.c | 3 +- vendor/curl/lib/openldap.c | 44 +- vendor/curl/lib/pingpong.c | 299 +- vendor/curl/lib/pingpong.h | 22 +- vendor/curl/lib/pop3.c | 119 +- vendor/curl/lib/pop3.h | 3 +- vendor/curl/lib/progress.c | 10 +- vendor/curl/lib/progress.h | 3 +- vendor/curl/lib/rand.c | 6 +- vendor/curl/lib/request.c | 409 + vendor/curl/lib/request.h | 227 + vendor/curl/lib/rtsp.c | 305 +- vendor/curl/lib/rtsp.h | 2 +- vendor/curl/lib/sendf.c | 1506 +- vendor/curl/lib/sendf.h | 264 +- vendor/curl/lib/setopt.c | 212 +- vendor/curl/lib/setopt.h | 7 +- vendor/curl/lib/setup-vms.h | 4 +- vendor/curl/lib/setup-win32.h | 62 +- vendor/curl/lib/share.c | 8 +- vendor/curl/lib/smb.c | 61 +- vendor/curl/lib/smb.h | 1 + vendor/curl/lib/smtp.c | 388 +- vendor/curl/lib/smtp.h | 13 - vendor/curl/lib/sockaddr.h | 2 +- vendor/curl/lib/socketpair.c | 24 +- vendor/curl/lib/socketpair.h | 28 +- vendor/curl/lib/socks.c | 91 +- vendor/curl/lib/socks_gssapi.c | 9 +- vendor/curl/lib/socks_sspi.c | 12 +- vendor/curl/lib/strcase.c | 4 +- vendor/curl/lib/strdup.c | 12 +- vendor/curl/lib/strdup.h | 2 +- vendor/curl/lib/strerror.c | 61 +- vendor/curl/lib/strtoofft.c | 21 +- vendor/curl/lib/system_win32.c | 31 +- vendor/curl/lib/system_win32.h | 30 +- vendor/curl/lib/telnet.c | 131 +- vendor/curl/lib/tftp.c | 22 +- vendor/curl/lib/transfer.c | 1213 +- vendor/curl/lib/transfer.h | 62 +- vendor/curl/lib/url.c | 406 +- vendor/curl/lib/url.h | 6 +- vendor/curl/lib/urlapi-int.h | 3 +- vendor/curl/lib/urlapi.c | 354 +- vendor/curl/lib/urldata.h | 429 +- vendor/curl/lib/vauth/cleartext.c | 11 +- vendor/curl/lib/vauth/digest.c | 69 +- vendor/curl/lib/vauth/digest_sspi.c | 4 + vendor/curl/lib/vauth/krb5_gssapi.c | 3 +- vendor/curl/lib/vauth/krb5_sspi.c | 3 +- vendor/curl/lib/vauth/ntlm.c | 6 +- vendor/curl/lib/vauth/ntlm_sspi.c | 8 +- vendor/curl/lib/vauth/vauth.h | 6 +- vendor/curl/lib/version.c | 74 +- vendor/curl/lib/vquic/curl_msh3.c | 129 +- vendor/curl/lib/vquic/curl_ngtcp2.c | 1260 +- vendor/curl/lib/vquic/curl_osslq.c | 2332 +++ vendor/curl/lib/vquic/curl_osslq.h | 51 + vendor/curl/lib/vquic/curl_quiche.c | 600 +- vendor/curl/lib/vquic/vquic-tls.c | 342 + vendor/curl/lib/vquic/vquic-tls.h | 99 + vendor/curl/lib/vquic/vquic.c | 46 +- vendor/curl/lib/vquic/vquic.h | 6 +- vendor/curl/lib/vquic/vquic_int.h | 8 +- vendor/curl/lib/vssh/libssh.c | 120 +- vendor/curl/lib/vssh/libssh2.c | 150 +- vendor/curl/lib/vssh/wolfssh.c | 46 +- vendor/curl/lib/vtls/bearssl.c | 294 +- vendor/curl/lib/vtls/cipher_suite.c | 716 + vendor/curl/lib/vtls/cipher_suite.h | 46 + vendor/curl/lib/vtls/gtls.c | 491 +- vendor/curl/lib/vtls/gtls.h | 40 +- vendor/curl/lib/vtls/keylog.c | 1 + vendor/curl/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c | 350 +- vendor/curl/lib/vtls/mbedtls_threadlock.c | 12 +- vendor/curl/lib/vtls/mbedtls_threadlock.h | 4 +- vendor/curl/lib/vtls/openssl.c | 1025 +- vendor/curl/lib/vtls/openssl.h | 51 + vendor/curl/lib/vtls/rustls.c | 321 +- vendor/curl/lib/vtls/schannel.c | 154 +- vendor/curl/lib/vtls/schannel_int.h | 10 + vendor/curl/lib/vtls/schannel_verify.c | 4 +- vendor/curl/lib/vtls/sectransp.c | 65 +- vendor/curl/lib/vtls/vtls.c | 189 +- vendor/curl/lib/vtls/vtls.h | 6 +- vendor/curl/lib/vtls/vtls_int.h | 10 +- vendor/curl/lib/vtls/wolfssl.c | 207 +- vendor/curl/lib/vtls/x509asn1.c | 902 +- vendor/curl/lib/warnless.h | 14 - vendor/curl/lib/ws.c | 421 +- vendor/curl/lib/ws.h | 15 +- vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/README.md | 5 - .../{vs2010 => vs2013}/Hacl_Curve25519.h | 0 .../everest/{vs2010 => vs2013}/inttypes.h | 0 .../everest/{vs2010 => vs2013}/stdbool.h | 0 .../everest/library/Hacl_Curve25519_joined.c | 9 + .../mbedtls/3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m/p256-m.c | 1514 ++ .../mbedtls/3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m/p256-m.h | 135 + .../p256-m/p256-m_driver_entrypoints.c | 312 + .../p256-m/p256-m_driver_entrypoints.h | 219 + vendor/mbedtls/LICENSE | 351 + vendor/mbedtls/README.md | 109 +- vendor/mbedtls/configs/README.txt | 26 - .../mbedtls/configs/config-ccm-psk-dtls1_2.h | 30 +- .../mbedtls/configs/config-ccm-psk-tls1_2.h | 23 +- vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-mini-tls1_1.h | 90 - vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-no-entropy.h | 29 +- vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-suite-b.h | 33 +- .../mbedtls/configs/config-symmetric-only.h | 34 +- vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-tfm.h | 68 + vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-thread.h | 24 +- .../configs/crypto-config-ccm-aes-sha256.h | 25 + vendor/mbedtls/configs/ext/config_tfm.h | 13 + .../ext/crypto_config_profile_medium.h | 132 + .../ext/mbedtls_entropy_nv_seed_config.h | 13 + .../tfm_mbedcrypto_config_profile_medium.h | 573 + vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aes.h | 110 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/arc4.h | 144 - vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aria.h | 39 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1.h | 94 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h | 73 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/base64.h | 20 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/bignum.h | 99 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/block_cipher.h | 76 + vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/blowfish.h | 287 - vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/build_info.h | 176 + vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/camellia.h | 35 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ccm.h | 296 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/certs.h | 250 - vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chacha20.h | 37 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chachapoly.h | 33 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/check_config.h | 656 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cipher.h | 524 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cmac.h | 60 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h | 2545 --- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/compat-2.x.h | 46 + .../mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h | 457 + .../mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h | 888 + .../mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_from_legacy.h | 349 + .../config_adjust_psa_superset_legacy.h | 142 + .../include/mbedtls/config_adjust_ssl.h | 81 + .../include/mbedtls/config_adjust_x509.h | 25 + vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h | 822 +- .../mbedtls/include/mbedtls/constant_time.h | 31 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h | 140 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/debug.h | 190 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/des.h | 29 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/dhm.h | 256 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h | 123 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h | 341 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h | 86 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecp.h | 465 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/entropy.h | 85 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/entropy_poll.h | 108 - vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/error.h | 45 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/gcm.h | 176 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/havege.h | 79 - vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hkdf.h | 20 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h | 71 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/lms.h | 440 + .../mbedtls/{config.h => mbedtls_config.h} | 1825 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md.h | 245 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md2.h | 304 - vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md4.h | 309 - vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md5.h | 149 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md_internal.h | 89 - .../include/mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h | 30 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net.h | 35 - vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h | 33 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/nist_kw.h | 23 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/oid.h | 161 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pem.h | 56 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pk.h | 612 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs11.h | 253 - vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h | 66 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h | 83 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs7.h | 240 + vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform.h | 86 +- .../mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_time.h | 43 +- .../mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h | 100 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/poly1305.h | 41 +- .../mbedtls/include/mbedtls/private_access.h | 20 + vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h | 576 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ripemd160.h | 129 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/rsa.h | 548 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha1.h | 162 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha256.h | 179 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha3.h | 172 + vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha512.h | 193 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl.h | 2922 +++- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h | 104 +- .../include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h | 354 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h | 42 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h | 1340 -- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h | 119 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/threading.h | 68 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/timing.h | 85 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h | 44 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509.h | 257 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crl.h | 54 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h | 400 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h | 144 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/xtea.h | 138 - vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/build_info.h | 20 + vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto.h | 1071 +- .../include/psa/crypto_adjust_auto_enabled.h | 21 + .../psa/crypto_adjust_config_key_pair_types.h | 91 + .../psa/crypto_adjust_config_synonyms.h | 39 + .../include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h | 192 +- .../psa/crypto_builtin_key_derivation.h | 118 + .../include/psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h | 63 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_compat.h | 456 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_config.h | 83 +- .../include/psa/crypto_driver_common.h | 14 +- .../psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h | 92 +- .../crypto_driver_contexts_key_derivation.h | 52 + .../psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h | 20 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_extra.h | 1607 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_legacy.h | 88 + vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_platform.h | 51 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h | 107 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h | 461 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_struct.h | 423 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_types.h | 65 +- vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_values.h | 479 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/aes.c | 1015 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/aesce.c | 618 + vendor/mbedtls/library/aesce.h | 136 + vendor/mbedtls/library/aesni.c | 83 +- .../{include/mbedtls => library}/aesni.h | 75 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/alignment.h | 684 + vendor/mbedtls/library/arc4.c | 192 - vendor/mbedtls/library/aria.c | 118 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/asn1parse.c | 90 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/asn1write.c | 199 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/base64.c | 58 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/base64_internal.h | 45 + vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum.c | 1373 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_core.c | 895 + vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_core.h | 763 + vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod.c | 394 + vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod.h | 452 + vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw.c | 276 + vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw.h | 416 + .../mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h | 34 + vendor/mbedtls/library/block_cipher.c | 203 + .../mbedtls/library/block_cipher_internal.h | 99 + vendor/mbedtls/library/blowfish.c | 656 - .../{include/mbedtls => library}/bn_mul.h | 409 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/camellia.c | 84 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/ccm.c | 649 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/certs.c | 1746 -- vendor/mbedtls/library/chacha20.c | 53 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/chachapoly.c | 47 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/check_crypto_config.h | 92 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/cipher.c | 654 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.c | 1411 +- .../cipher_wrap.h} | 72 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/cmac.c | 114 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/common.h | 556 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/constant_time.c | 864 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/constant_time_impl.h | 556 + .../mbedtls/library/constant_time_internal.h | 680 +- .../mbedtls/library/constant_time_invasive.h | 51 - vendor/mbedtls/library/ctr.h | 35 + vendor/mbedtls/library/ctr_drbg.c | 244 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/debug.c | 118 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/debug_internal.h | 172 + vendor/mbedtls/library/des.c | 32 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/dhm.c | 129 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/ecdh.c | 77 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c | 252 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/ecjpake.c | 281 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/ecp.c | 1394 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves.c | 4148 ++++- vendor/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves_new.c | 6036 +++++++ .../ecp_internal_alt.h} | 24 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/ecp_invasive.h | 296 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/entropy.c | 162 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c | 120 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.h | 64 + vendor/mbedtls/library/error.c | 296 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/gcm.c | 776 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/havege.c | 238 - vendor/mbedtls/library/hkdf.c | 14 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/hmac_drbg.c | 53 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/lmots.c | 778 + vendor/mbedtls/library/lmots.h | 288 + vendor/mbedtls/library/lms.c | 761 + vendor/mbedtls/library/md.c | 926 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/md2.c | 359 - vendor/mbedtls/library/md4.c | 463 - vendor/mbedtls/library/md5.c | 88 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/md_psa.h | 26 + vendor/mbedtls/library/md_wrap.h | 46 + vendor/mbedtls/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c | 20 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/mps_common.h | 20 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/mps_error.h | 16 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.c | 20 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.h | 16 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.c | 20 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.h | 16 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/net_sockets.c | 37 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/nist_kw.c | 265 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/oid.c | 727 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/padlock.c | 37 +- .../{include/mbedtls => library}/padlock.h | 40 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/pem.c | 153 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/pk.c | 1203 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/pk_ecc.c | 255 + vendor/mbedtls/library/pk_internal.h | 207 + vendor/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.c | 1655 +- .../pk_internal.h => library/pk_wrap.h} | 68 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/pkcs11.c | 233 - vendor/mbedtls/library/pkcs12.c | 233 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/pkcs5.c | 161 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/pkcs7.c | 773 + vendor/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c | 993 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.c | 837 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.h | 121 + vendor/mbedtls/library/platform.c | 42 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/platform_util.c | 180 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/poly1305.c | 33 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto.c | 8636 +++++++--- vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_aead.c | 479 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_aead.h | 374 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c | 236 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_cipher.h | 37 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_client.c | 59 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_core.h | 669 +- .../mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_core_common.h | 52 + .../library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c | 1868 --- .../library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h | 2845 +++- .../psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c | 256 + .../psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.h | 31 + vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c | 288 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h | 71 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c | 321 + vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.h | 131 + vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_hash.c | 280 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_hash.h | 25 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_invasive.h | 42 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_its.h | 14 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_mac.c | 17 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_mac.h | 14 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_pake.c | 571 + vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_pake.h | 159 + .../mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h | 151 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c | 439 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h | 138 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_se.c | 17 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_se.h | 27 +- .../library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c | 266 +- .../library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h | 136 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_storage.c | 35 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_storage.h | 27 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_its_file.c | 32 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_util.c | 602 + vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_util_internal.h | 100 + vendor/mbedtls/library/ripemd160.c | 94 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/rsa.c | 1485 +- .../{rsa_internal.c => rsa_alt_helpers.c} | 150 +- .../rsa_alt_helpers.h} | 30 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/rsa_internal.h | 121 + vendor/mbedtls/library/sha1.c | 121 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/sha256.c | 655 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/sha3.c | 721 + vendor/mbedtls/library/sha512.c | 767 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_cache.c | 437 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c | 2199 ++- .../library/ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h | 154 + vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_client.c | 1017 ++ vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_client.h | 22 + vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_cookie.c | 180 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_debug_helpers.h | 83 + .../library/ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c | 251 + vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_misc.h | 2983 ++++ vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c | 2802 ++-- vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_ticket.c | 282 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c | 13984 +++++++++------- .../library/{ssl_cli.c => ssl_tls12_client.c} | 2394 +-- .../library/{ssl_srv.c => ssl_tls12_server.c} | 2529 ++- vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_client.c | 3181 ++++ vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c | 1853 ++ vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_invasive.h | 23 + vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c | 1840 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h | 533 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_server.c | 3599 ++++ vendor/mbedtls/library/threading.c | 52 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/timing.c | 448 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/version.c | 14 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/version_features.c | 715 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/x509.c | 1098 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/x509_create.c | 283 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/x509_crl.c | 53 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c | 1194 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/x509_csr.c | 309 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/x509_internal.h | 86 + vendor/mbedtls/library/x509write.c | 174 + vendor/mbedtls/library/x509write_crt.c | 263 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/x509write_csr.c | 67 +- vendor/mbedtls/library/xtea.c | 236 - vendor/mbedtls/premake5.lua | 123 +- 523 files changed, 124247 insertions(+), 68394 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 vendor/curl/lib/curl_ntlm_wb.c create mode 100644 vendor/curl/lib/curl_sha512_256.c create mode 100644 vendor/curl/lib/curl_sha512_256.h create mode 100644 vendor/curl/lib/cw-out.c rename vendor/curl/lib/{curl_ntlm_wb.h => cw-out.h} (60%) create mode 100644 vendor/curl/lib/dllmain.c create mode 100644 vendor/curl/lib/request.c create mode 100644 vendor/curl/lib/request.h create mode 100644 vendor/curl/lib/vquic/curl_osslq.c create mode 100644 vendor/curl/lib/vquic/curl_osslq.h create mode 100644 vendor/curl/lib/vquic/vquic-tls.c create mode 100644 vendor/curl/lib/vquic/vquic-tls.h create mode 100644 vendor/curl/lib/vtls/cipher_suite.c create mode 100644 vendor/curl/lib/vtls/cipher_suite.h delete mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/README.md rename vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/{vs2010 => vs2013}/Hacl_Curve25519.h (100%) rename vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/{vs2010 => vs2013}/inttypes.h (100%) rename vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/{vs2010 => vs2013}/stdbool.h (100%) create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m/p256-m.c create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m/p256-m.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m_driver_entrypoints.c create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m_driver_entrypoints.h delete mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/configs/README.txt delete mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-mini-tls1_1.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-tfm.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/configs/crypto-config-ccm-aes-sha256.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/configs/ext/config_tfm.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/configs/ext/crypto_config_profile_medium.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/configs/ext/mbedtls_entropy_nv_seed_config.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/configs/ext/tfm_mbedcrypto_config_profile_medium.h delete mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/arc4.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/block_cipher.h delete mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/blowfish.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/build_info.h delete mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/certs.h delete mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/compat-2.x.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_from_legacy.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_superset_legacy.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_ssl.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_x509.h delete mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/entropy_poll.h delete mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/havege.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/lms.h rename vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/{config.h => mbedtls_config.h} (75%) delete mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md2.h delete mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md4.h delete mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md_internal.h delete mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net.h delete mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs11.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs7.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/private_access.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha3.h delete mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h delete mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/xtea.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/build_info.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_auto_enabled.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_config_key_pair_types.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_config_synonyms.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_key_derivation.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_key_derivation.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_legacy.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/aesce.c create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/aesce.h rename vendor/mbedtls/{include/mbedtls => library}/aesni.h (70%) create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/alignment.h delete mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/arc4.c create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/base64_internal.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_core.c create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_core.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod.c create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw.c create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/block_cipher.c create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/block_cipher_internal.h delete mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/blowfish.c rename vendor/mbedtls/{include/mbedtls => library}/bn_mul.h (75%) delete mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/certs.c rename vendor/mbedtls/{include/mbedtls/cipher_internal.h => library/cipher_wrap.h} (66%) create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/constant_time_impl.h delete mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/constant_time_invasive.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/ctr.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/debug_internal.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves_new.c rename vendor/mbedtls/{include/mbedtls/ecp_internal.h => library/ecp_internal_alt.h} (93%) create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.h delete mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/havege.c create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/lmots.c create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/lmots.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/lms.c delete mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/md2.c delete mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/md4.c create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/md_psa.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/md_wrap.h rename vendor/mbedtls/{include/mbedtls => library}/padlock.h (72%) create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/pk_ecc.c create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/pk_internal.h rename vendor/mbedtls/{include/mbedtls/pk_internal.h => library/pk_wrap.h} (63%) delete mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/pkcs11.c create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/pkcs7.c create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_core_common.h delete mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_pake.c create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_pake.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_util.c create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_util_internal.h rename vendor/mbedtls/library/{rsa_internal.c => rsa_alt_helpers.c} (95%) rename vendor/mbedtls/{include/mbedtls/rsa_internal.h => library/rsa_alt_helpers.h} (90%) create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/rsa_internal.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/sha3.c create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_client.c create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_client.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_debug_helpers.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_misc.h rename vendor/mbedtls/library/{ssl_cli.c => ssl_tls12_client.c} (65%) rename vendor/mbedtls/library/{ssl_srv.c => ssl_tls12_server.c} (68%) create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_client.c create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_invasive.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_server.c create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/x509_internal.h create mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/x509write.c delete mode 100644 vendor/mbedtls/library/xtea.c diff --git a/vendor/curl/CHANGES b/vendor/curl/CHANGES index f9066e7682..3e4b10e081 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/CHANGES +++ b/vendor/curl/CHANGES @@ -6,10369 +6,10704 @@ Changelog -Version 8.5.0 (6 Dec 2023) +Version 8.8.0 (22 May 2024) -Daniel Stenberg (6 Dec 2023) +Daniel Stenberg (22 May 2024) - RELEASE-NOTES: synced - The curl 8.5.0 release. +- THANKS: add contributors from 8.8.0 -Dan Fandrich (5 Dec 2023) +Nathan Moinvaziri (21 May 2024) -- github/labeler: switch from the beta to labeler v5 +- url: remove duplicate call to Curl_conncache_remove_conn when pruning - Some keys were renamed and the dot option was made default. + - remove unnecessary prunedead struct from prune_dead_connections + - rename extract_if_dead to prune_if_dead for clarity - Closes #12458 + Closes #13710 -Daniel Stenberg (5 Dec 2023) +Joseph Chen (21 May 2024) -- DEPRECATE: remove NTLM_WB in June 2024 +- curl_setup.h: add support for IAR compiler - Ref: https://curl.se/mail/lib-2023-12/0010.html + Closes #13728 - Closes #12451 +Stephen Farrell (21 May 2024) -Jacob Hoffman-Andrews (4 Dec 2023) +- docs/ECH: typo/clarification -- rustls: implement connect_blocking + Closes #13727 - Closes #11647 +Viktor Szakats (21 May 2024) -Daniel Stenberg (4 Dec 2023) +- hash: delete unused debug function -- examples/rtsp-options.c: add + It had no use in the curl codebase and was also protected by the macro + `AGGRESSIVE_TEST` (renamed in 2020), also with no local reference. - Just a bare bones RTSP example using CURLOPT_RTSP_SESSION_ID and - CURLOPT_RTSP_REQUEST set to CURL_RTSPREQ_OPTIONS. + Added in ca6e77083768858aa34207f8c5dce38b3c05336d (2002-11-11) - Closes #12452 + Closes #13729 -Stefan Eissing (4 Dec 2023) +Stefan Eissing (21 May 2024) -- ngtcp2: ignore errors on unknown streams +- content_encoding: reject transfer-encoding after chunked - - expecially in is_alive checks on connections, we might - see incoming packets on streams already forgotten and closed, - leading to errors reported by nghttp3. Ignore those. + reject a response that applies a transfer-encoding after a 'chunked' + encoding. RFC 9112 ch. 6.1 required chunked to be the final encoding. - Closes #12449 + Closes #13733 -Daniel Stenberg (4 Dec 2023) +- http: HEAD response body tolerance -- docs: make all examples in all libcurl man pages compile + - as reported in #13725, some servers wrongly send body bytes in + responses to a HEAD request. This used to be tolerated in curl + 8.4 and before and leads to failed transfers in newer versions. + - restore previous behaviour for HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2: + * 1.1: do not add 'Transfer-Encoding' writers from HEAD + responses. RFC 9112 says they do not apply. + * 2: when the transfer expects 'no_body', to not report stream + resets as error when all response headers have been received. - Closes #12448 + Reported-by: Jeroen Ooms + Fixes #13725 + Closes #13732 -- checksrc.pl: support #line instructions +Viktor Szakats (20 May 2024) - makes it identify the correct source file and line +- tests: fix TFTP test 2305 on Windows -- GHA/man-examples: verify libcurl man page examples + Ref: #13692 + Closes #13724 -- verify-examples.pl: verify that all man page examples compile clean +Jay Satiro (20 May 2024) -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced +- openssl: revert keylog_callback support for LibreSSL -Graham Campbell (2 Dec 2023) + - Revert to the legacy TLS 1.2 key logging code for LibreSSL. -- http3: bump ngtcp2 and nghttp3 versions + - Document SSLKEYLOGFILE for LibreSSL is TLS 1.2 max. - nghttp3 v1.1.0 - ngtcp2 v1.1.0 + Prior to this change if the user specified a filename in the + SSLKEYLOGFILE environment variable and was using LibreSSL 3.5.0+ then + an empty file would be created and no keys would be logged. - In docs and CI + This is effectively a revert of e43474b4 which changed openssl.c to use + SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback for LibreSSL 3.5.0+. Unfortunately LibreSSL + added that function only as a stub that doesn't actually do anything. - Closes #12446 + Reported-by: Gonçalo Carvalho -- CI/quiche: use `3.1.4+quic` consistently in CI workflows + Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/13672 + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/13682 - Closes #12447 +renovate[bot] (19 May 2024) -Viktor Szakats (2 Dec 2023) +- GHA: pin dependencies -- test1545: disable deprecation warnings + Closes #13712 - Fixes: - https://ci.appveyor.com/project/curlorg/curl/builds/48631551/job/bhx74e0i66yr - p6pk#L1205 +Viktor Szakats (19 May 2024) - Same with details: - https://ci.appveyor.com/project/curlorg/curl/builds/48662893/job/ol8a78q9gmil - b6wt#L1263 - ``` - tests/libtest/lib1545.c:38:3: error: 'curl_formadd' is deprecated: since 7.56 - .0. Use curl_mime_init() [-Werror=deprecated-declarations] - 38 | curl_formadd(&m_formpost, &lastptr, CURLFORM_COPYNAME, "file", - | ^~~~~~~~~~~~ - [...] - ``` +- appveyor: drop unnecessary `--clean-first` cmake option - Follow-up to 07a3cd83e0456ca17dfd8c3104af7cf45b7a1ff5 #12421 + In CI all machines are fresh on startup, making the `clean` operation + unnecessary. This can save some time/energy for each job run. - Fixes #12445 - Closes #12444 + Closes #13707 -Daniel Stenberg (2 Dec 2023) +- cmake: merge two `if(BUILD_TESTING)` branches -- INSTALL: update list of ports and CPU archs + Closes #13708 -- symbols-in-versions: the CLOSEPOLICY options are deprecated +Tatsuhiro Tsujikawa (19 May 2024) - The were used with the CURLOPT_CLOSEPOLICY option, which *never* worked. +- GHA: bump nghttp2 to v1.62.1 -z2_ (1 Dec 2023) + Use gcc-12 explicitly to compile C++20 source files. -- build: fix builds that disable protocols but not digest auth + Closes #13702 - - Build base64 functions if digest auth is not disabled. +Viktor Szakats (19 May 2024) - Prior to this change if some protocols were disabled but not digest auth - then a build error would occur due to missing base64 functions. +- GHA: add NetBSD, OpenBSD, FreeBSD/arm64 and OmniOS jobs - Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/12440 - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12442 + Add these jobs to GHA: + - NetBSD, cmake-unity, clang, OpenSSL, x86_64, with tests, w/o python, + no parallelism (was flaky sometimes) + - OpenBSD, cmake-unity, clang, LibreSSL, x86_64, with tests, + with python, -j8, TFTP results ignored due to #13623. + - FreeBSD, cmake-unity and autotools, clang, OpenSSL, arm64 + (Tests disabled for arm64, because they are slow. It's available for + x86_64 with python, -j12.) + Configuration matches our existing Cirrus CI one. + - OmniOS, autotools, gcc, OpenSSL, x86_64, with tests, -j12. -Michał Antoniak (1 Dec 2023) + All build with websockets and examples. -- connect: reduce number of transportation providers + Closes #13583 - Use only the ones necessary - the ones that are built-in. Saves a few - bytes in the resulting code. +- GHA: disable TFTP test on native Windows - Closes #12438 + Some TFTP tests seem to enter into a loop and maybe hang? -David Benjamin (1 Dec 2023) + E.g. 1007, 1009, 1238 -- vtls: consistently use typedef names for OpenSSL structs + Try fixing it by skipping all TFTP tests. - The foo_st names don't appear in OpenSSL public API documentation. The - FOO typedefs are more common. This header was already referencing - SSL_CTX via . There is a comment about avoiding - , but OpenSSL actually declares all the typedefs in - , which is already included by (and - every other OpenSSL header), so just use that. Though I've included it - just to be explicit. + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/actions/runs/9141987545/job/25137038249?pr= + 13698 - (I'm also fairly sure including already triggers the - Schannel conflicts anyway. The comment was probably just out of date.) + Also drop mingw-w64 test exclusions copy-pasted from MSYS jobs. - Closes #12439 + Possibly related: cffbcc3110c1eda2e333f9cfe2e269154618793a #5364 -Lau (1 Dec 2023) + Close #13699 -- libcurl-security.3: fix typo +renovate[bot] (18 May 2024) - Fixed minimal typo. +- GHA: pin dependencies - Closes #12437 + Closes #13691 -Stefan Eissing (1 Dec 2023) +Viktor Szakats (18 May 2024) -- ngtcp2: fix races in stream handling +- cmake: do not pass linker flags to the static library tool - - fix cases where ngtcp2 invokes callbacks on streams that - nghttp3 has already forgotten. Ignore the NGHTTP3_ERR_STREAM_NOT_FOUND - in these cases as it is normal behaviour. + Do not add linker flags to the global CMake static library tool (aka + "static linker") (e.g. `ar`) flags list. They don't mix well. This was + only done after successfully detecting GSSAPI. - Closes #12435 + Linker flags seen on Old Linux CI: + ``` + -- |GSS_LINKER_FLAGS|-Wl,--enable-new-dtags -Wl,-rpath -Wl,/usr/lib/x86_64-li + nux-gnu/heimdal| + -- |CMAKE_STATIC_LINKER_FLAGS| -Wl,--enable-new-dtags -Wl,-rpath -Wl,/usr/lib + /x86_64-linux-gnu/heimdal| + ``` + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/actions/runs/9138988036/job/25130791712#ste + p:6:85 -Emanuele Torre (1 Dec 2023) + Causing: + ``` + /usr/bin/ar qc libcurltool.a -Wl,--enable-new-dtags -Wl,-rpath -Wl,/usr/lib/ + x86_64-linux-gnu/heimdal + CMakeFiles/curltool.dir/slist_wc.c.o CMakeFiles/curltool.dir/tool_binmode.c + .o CMakeFiles/curltool.dir/tool_bname.c.o + [...] + CMakeFiles/curltool.dir/tool_writeout_json.c.o CMakeFiles/curltool.dir/tool + _xattr.c.o CMakeFiles/curltool.dir/var.c.o + CMakeFiles/curltool.dir/__/lib/base64.c.o CMakeFiles/curltool.dir/__/lib/dy + nbuf.c.o + /usr/bin/ar: invalid option -- 'W' + Usage: /usr/bin/ar [emulation options] [-]{dmpqrstx}[abcDfilMNoPsSTuvV] [--pl + ugin ] [member-name] [count] archive-file file... + /usr/bin/ar -M [now - c->timestamp; + | ^~~ + curl/lib/hostip.c: In function 'Curl_hostcache_prune': + curl/lib/hostip.c:241:10: note: 'now' was declared here + 241 | time_t now; + | ^~~ + In function 'hostcache_timestamp_remove', + inlined from 'fetch_addr' at curl/lib/hostip.c:310:8: + curl/lib/hostip.c:205:23: error: 'user.now' may be used uninitialized [-Werro + r=maybe-uninitialized] + 205 | time_t age = prune->now - c->timestamp; + | ~~~~~^~~~~ + curl/lib/hostip.c: In function 'fetch_addr': + curl/lib/hostip.c:304:33: note: 'user' declared here + 304 | struct hostcache_prune_data user; + | ^~~~ + In file included from curl/_bld/lib/CMakeFiles/libcurl_object.dir/Unity/unity + _0_c.c:40: + curl/lib/cf-socket.c: In function 'cf_socket_send': + curl/lib/cf-socket.c:1294:10: error: 'c' may be used uninitialized [-Werror=m + aybe-uninitialized] + 1294 | if(c >= ((100-ctx->wblock_percent)*256/100)) { + | ~~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + curl/lib/cf-socket.c:1292:19: note: 'c' was declared here + 1292 | unsigned char c; + | ^ + In file included from curl/_bld/lib/CMakeFiles/libcurl_object.dir/Unity/unity + _0_c.c:364: + In function 'tftp_state_timeout', + inlined from 'tftp_multi_statemach' at curl/lib/tftp.c:1230:27: + curl/lib/tftp.c:1208:5: error: 'current' may be used uninitialized [-Werror=m + aybe-uninitialized] + 1208 | if(current > state->rx_time + state->retry_time) { + | ^ + curl/lib/tftp.c: In function 'tftp_multi_statemach': + curl/lib/tftp.c:1192:10: note: 'current' was declared here + 1192 | time_t current; + | ^~~~~~~ + ``` + Ref: https://ci.appveyor.com/project/curlorg/curl/builds/49792835/job/91c8dj5 + qb36spfe0#L112 + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/actions/runs/9082968838/job/24960616145#ste + p:12:62 - Reported-by: yushicheng7788 on github - Based-on-work-by: yushicheng7788 on github - Fixes #12410 - Closes #12421 + Ref: #13592 + Closes #13643 -- test1477: verify that libcurl-errors.3 and public headers are synced +Andrew (16 May 2024) - The script errorcodes.pl extracts all error codes from all headers and - checks that they are all documented, then checks that all documented - error codes are also specified in a header file. +- wakeup_create: use FD_CLOEXEC/SOCK_CLOEXEC - Closes #12424 + for `pipe()`/`socketpair()` -- libcurl-errors.3: sync with current public headers + Fixes #13618 + Closes #13625 - Closes #12424 +Stefan Eissing (16 May 2024) -Stefan Eissing (28 Nov 2023) +- rustls: fix partial send handling -- test459: fix for parallel runs + When TLS bytes could not completely sent off, the amount of plain bytes + already added to rustls were forgotten. This lead to send those byte + duplicate, corrupting the request send to the server. - - change warniing message to work better with varying filename - length. - - adapt test output check to new formatting + Closes #13676 - Follow-up to 97ccc4479f77ba3191c6 - Closes #12423 +- pytest: add DELETE tests, check server version -Daniel Stenberg (27 Nov 2023) + - add tests for DELETE working + - check apache version in keepalive test + - fix some comments -- tool_cb_prg: make the carriage return fit for wide progress bars + Closes #13679 - When the progress bar was made max width (256 columns), the fly() - function attempted to generate its output buffer too long so that the - trailing carriage return would not fit and then the output would show - wrongly. The fly function is called when the expected total transfer is - unknown, which could be one or more progress calls before the actual - progress meter get shown when the expected transfer size is provided. +Juliusz Sosinowicz (16 May 2024) - This new take also replaces the msnprintf() call with a much simpler - memset() for speed. +- vquic-tls: use correct cert name check API for wolfSSL - Reported-by: Tim Hill - Fixes #12407 - Closes #12415 + wolfSSL_X509_check_host checks the peer name against the alt names and + the common name. -- tool_parsecfg: make warning output propose double-quoting + Fixes #13487 + Closes #13680 - When the config file parser detects a word that *probably* should be - quoted, mention double-quotes as a possible remedy. +Viktor Szakats (16 May 2024) - Test 459 verifies. +- cmake: initialize `BUILD_TESTING` before first use - Proposed-by: Jiehong on github - Fixes #12409 - Closes #12412 + Before this patch `BUILD_TESTING` was used once, then initialized, then + used again. This caused the `curlu` library not being built when relying + on an implicit `BUILD_TESTING=ON` setting, and ending up with a link + error when building the `testdeps` target. -Jay Satiro (26 Nov 2023) + It did not cause issues when `BUILD_TESTING` was explicitly set. -- curl.rc: switch out the copyright symbol for plain ASCII + Move the initialization before the first use to fix it. - .. like we already do for libcurl.rc. + Regression from aace27b0965c10394544d1dacc9c2cb2fe0de3d3 #12287 + Closes #13668 - libcurl.rc copyright symbol used to cause a "non-ascii 8-bit codepoint" - warning so it was switched to ascii. +Daniel Stenberg (16 May 2024) - Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/1ca62bb5#commitcomment-133474972 +- libtest: 2308 verifies CURLE_WRITE_ERROR after write callback error - Suggested-by: Robert Southee + Verifies that the issue in #13669 actually is fixed. This return code is + what the CURLOPT_WRITEFUNCTION manpage documents should be returned. - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12403 + This code is mostly from the + Source-written-by: Trumeet on github + Closes #13671 -Daniel Stenberg (26 Nov 2023) +Antoine Bollengier (16 May 2024) -- conncache: use the closure handle when disconnecting surplus connections +- socketpair: fix compilation when USE_UNIX_SOCKETS is not defined - Use the closure handle for disconnecting connection cache entries so - that anything that happens during the disconnect is not stored and - associated with the 'data' handle which already just finished a transfer - and it is important that details from the unrelated disconnect does not - taint meta-data in the data handle. + Closes #13666 - Like storing the response code. +Stefan Eissing (16 May 2024) - This also adjust test 1506. Unfortunately it also removes a key part of - the test that verifies that a connection is closed since when this - output vanishes (because the closure handle is used), we don't know - exactly that the connection actually gets closed in this test... +- rustsls: fix error code on receive - Reported-by: ohyeaah on github - Fixes #12367 - Closes #12405 + - use CURLE_RECV_ERROR instead of CURLE_READ_ERROR when receiving + data fails. -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced + Closes #13670 -Stefan Eissing (24 Nov 2023) +Max Dymond (16 May 2024) -- quic: make eyeballers connect retries stop at weird replies +- ci: disable Renovate dashboard - - when a connect immediately goes into DRAINING state, do - not attempt retries in the QUIC connection filter. Instead, - return CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY - - When eyeballing, interpret CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY as an - inconclusive answer. When all addresses have been attempted, - rewind the address list once on an inconclusive answer. - - refs #11832 where connects were retried indefinitely until - the overall timeout fired + The Renovate dashboard insists on an open issue, + which is a problem. Disable the dashboard. Status + can still be seen at https://developer.mend.io/github/curl/curl. - Closes #12400 + Fixes #13630 + Closes #13673 -Daniel Stenberg (24 Nov 2023) +Daniel Stenberg (16 May 2024) -- CI: verify libcurl function SYNPOSIS sections +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced - With the .github/scripits/verify-synopsis.pl script +renovate[bot] (16 May 2024) - Closes #12402 +- GHA: update awslabs/aws-lc to v1.27.0 -- docs/libcurl: SYNSOPSIS cleanup + Closes #13667 - - use the correct include file - - make sure they are declared as in the header file - - fix minor nroff syntax mistakes (missing .fi) +Daniel Stenberg (15 May 2024) - These are verified by verify-synopsis.pl, which extracts the SYNPOSIS - code and runs it through gcc. +- curl_easy_pause.md: use correct defines in example - Closes #12402 + Spotted-by: Harry Sintonen + Closes #13664 -- sendf: fix comment typo +Viktor Szakats (15 May 2024) -- fopen: allocate the dir after fopen +- appveyor: more tidy-ups - Move the allocation of the directory name down to after the fopen() call - to allow that shortcut code path to avoid a superfluous malloc+free - cycle. + - use `--disable` when calling `curl --version`. Just in case. - Follow-up to 73b65e94f35311 + - use single-quotes for a constant. - Closes #12398 + Closes #13662 -Stefan Eissing (24 Nov 2023) +- reuse: migrate standalone license file to dep5 -- transfer: cleanup done+excess handling + Follow-up to 73a36021207284ad2b4340ffde34a51b0ba4d47a + Closes #13660 - - add `SingleRequest->download_done` as indicator that - all download bytes have been received - - remove `stop_reading` bool from readwrite functions - - move excess body handling into client download writer +- appveyor: guard against crash-build with VS2008 - Closes #12371 + The combination of `-DDEBUGBUILD`, a shared `curl.exe`, and the VS2008 + compiler creates a `curl.exe` segfaulting on startup: -Daniel Stenberg (23 Nov 2023) + ``` + + _bld/src/curl.exe --version + ./appveyor.sh: line 122: 793 Segmentation fault "${curl}" --version + Command exited with code 139 + ``` + Ref: https://ci.appveyor.com/project/curlorg/curl/builds/49817266/job/651iy6q + n1e238pqj#L191 -- fopen: create new file using old file's mode + Add job that triggers the issue and add the necessary logic to skip + running the affected `curl.exe`. - Because the function renames the temp file to the target name as a last - step, if the file was previously owned by a different user, not ORing - the old mode could otherwise end up creating a file that was no longer - readable by the original owner after save. + Ref: #13592 + Closes #13654 - Reported-by: Loïc Yhuel - Fixes #12299 - Closes #12395 +renovate[bot] (15 May 2024) -- test1476: require proxy +- GHA: pin dependencies - Follow-up from 323df4261c3542 + Closes #13628 - Closes #12394 +Orgad Shaneh (15 May 2024) -- fopen: create short(er) temporary file name +- socket: remove redundant call to getsockname - Only using random letters in the name plus a ".tmp" extension. Not by - appending characters to the final file name. + The result "add" is unused. - Reported-by: Maksymilian Arciemowicz + Closes #13655 - Closes #12388 +renovate[bot] (15 May 2024) -Stefan Eissing (23 Nov 2023) +- CI: renovate updates -- tests: git ignore generated second-hsts.txt file + - GHA: update actions/checkout action to v4 + - GHA: update wolfSSL/wolfssh to v1.4.17 + - GHA: update wolfSSL/wolfssl to v5.7.0 + - Update the regex config in renovate.json - File is generated in test lib1900 + Closes #13632 + Closes #13641 + Closes #13658 + Closes #13659 - Follow-up to 7cb03229d9e9c5 +Max Dymond (15 May 2024) - Closes #12393 +- ci: fix renovate config for WolfSSL/WolfSSH tagging scheme -Viktor Szakats (23 Nov 2023) + WolfSSL/WolfSSH use a different versioning scheme; + stable builds end with `-stable`. Renovate requires + some extra configuration to extract the version + from these types of tags. -- openssl: enable `infof_certstack` for 1.1 and LibreSSL 3.6 + Closes #13644 - Lower the barrier to enable `infof_certstack()` from OpenSSL 3 to - OpenSSL 1.1.x, and LibreSSL 3.6 or upper. +- ci: set semantic type as CI and include digests as CI operations - With the caveat, that "group name" and "type name" are missing from - the log output with these TLS backends. + Replace "chore" with "ci" for renovate's semantic + type, and include digests with "pin" and + "pinDigest" as ci operations. - Follow-up to b6e6d4ff8f253c8b8055bab9d4d6a10f9be109f3 #12030 + Closes #13644 - Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg - Closes #12385 +Daniel Stenberg (15 May 2024) -Daniel Stenberg (23 Nov 2023) +- DEPRECATE.md: TLS libraries without 1.3 support -- urldata: fix typo in comment + curl drops support for TLS libraries without TLS 1.3 capability after + May 2025. -- CI: codespell + It requires that a curl build using the library should be able to + negotiate and use TLS 1.3, or else it is not good enough. We support a + vast amount of other TLS libraries that are likely to satisfy users + better. - The list of words to ignore is in the file - .github/scripts/codespell-ignore.txt + Closes #13544 - Closes #12390 +- Revert "ci: update nghttp2/nghttp2 to v1.62.0" -- lib: fix comment typos + This reverts commit 14f2c767555b7598d7783ccd9093670b84d28488. - Five separate ones, found by codespell + We need to also upgrade the C++ compiler for that bump to work. - Closes #12390 + Closes #13656 -- test1476: verify cookie PSL mixed case +renovate[bot] (15 May 2024) -- cookie: lowercase the domain names before PSL checks +- Dockerfile: update debian digest to 911821c - Reported-by: Harry Sintonen + Closes #13629 - Closes #12387 +- ci: update gnutls/gnutls to v3.8.5 -Viktor Szakats (23 Nov 2023) + Closes #13640 -- openssl: fix building with v3 `no-deprecated` + add CI test +- ci: update awslabs/aws-lc to v1.26.0 - - build quictls with `no-deprecated` in CI to have test coverage for - this OpenSSL 3 configuration. + Closes #13647 - - don't call `OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms()`, `OpenSSL_add_all_digests()`. - The caller code is meant for OpenSSL 3, while these two functions were - only necessary before OpenSSL 1.1.0. They are missing from OpenSSL 3 - if built with option `no-deprecated`, causing build errors: - ``` - vtls/openssl.c:4097:3: error: call to undeclared function 'OpenSSL_add_all_ - algorithms'; ISO C99 and later do not support implicit function declaration - s [-Wimplicit-function-declaration] - vtls/openssl.c:4098:3: error: call to undeclared function 'OpenSSL_add_all_ - digests'; ISO C99 and later do not support implicit function declarations [ - -Wimplicit-function-declaration] - ``` - Ref: https://ci.appveyor.com/project/curlorg/curl-for-win/builds/48587418?f - ullLog=true#L7667 +- ci: update cloudflare/quiche to v0.21.0 - Regression from b6e6d4ff8f253c8b8055bab9d4d6a10f9be109f3 #12030 - Bug: https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/12380#issuecomment-1822944669 - Reviewed-by: Alex Bozarth + Closes #13648 - - vquic/curl_ngtcp2: fix using `SSL_get_peer_certificate` with - `no-deprecated` quictls 3 builds. - Do it by moving an existing solution for this from `vtls/openssl.c` - to `vtls/openssl.h` and adjusting caller code. - ``` - vquic/curl_ngtcp2.c:1950:19: error: implicit declaration of function 'SSL_g - et_peer_certificate'; did you mean 'SSL_get1_peer_certificate'? [-Wimplicit - -function-declaration] - ``` - Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/actions/runs/6960723097/job/18940818625#s - tep:24:1178 +- ci: update libressl-portable/portable to v3.9.2 - - curl_ntlm_core: fix `-Wunused-parameter`, `-Wunused-variable` and - `-Wunused-function` when trying to build curl with NTLM enabled but - without the necessary TLS backend (with DES) support. + Closes #13649 - Closes #12384 +- ci: update nghttp2/nghttp2 to v1.62.0 -- curl.h: delete Symbian OS references + Closes #13650 - curl deprecated Symbian OS in 3d64031fa7a80ac4ae3fd09a5939196268b92f81 - via #5989. Delete references to it from public headers, because there - is no fresh release to use those headers with. +- ci: update ngtcp2/nghttp3 to v1.3.0 - Reviewed-by: Dan Fandrich - Reviewed-by: Jay Satiro - Closes #12378 + Closes #13651 -- windows: use built-in `_WIN32` macro to detect Windows +- ci: update ngtcp2/ngtcp2 to v1.5.0 - Windows compilers define `_WIN32` automatically. Windows SDK headers - or build env defines `WIN32`, or we have to take care of it. The - agreement seems to be that `_WIN32` is the preferred practice here. - Make the source code rely on that to detect we're building for Windows. + Closes #13652 - Public `curl.h` was using `WIN32`, `__WIN32__` and `CURL_WIN32` for - Windows detection, next to the official `_WIN32`. After this patch it - only uses `_WIN32` for this. Also, make it stop defining `CURL_WIN32`. +Max Dymond (14 May 2024) - There is a slight chance these break compatibility with Windows - compilers that fail to define `_WIN32`. I'm not aware of any obsolete - or modern compiler affected, but in case there is one, one possible - solution is to define this macro manually. +- ci: handle git submodules for mbedTLS - grepping for `WIN32` remains useful to discover Windows-specific code. +- ci: reconfigure renovate - Also: + - set prefix for github actions updates to be gha: + - set prefix for other renovate actions to be ci: + - disable debian updates in linux-old.yml - - extend `checksrc` to ensure we're not using `WIN32` anymore. +Viktor Szakats (14 May 2024) - - apply minor formatting here and there. +- tidy-up: whitespace [ci skip] - - delete unnecessary checks for `!MSDOS` when `_WIN32` is present. +- warnless: delete orphan declarations - Co-authored-by: Jay Satiro - Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Follow-up to 358f7e757781857c4b498a68634726609fa3884a #11932 + Closes #13639 - Closes #12376 +Daniel Stenberg (14 May 2024) -Stefan Eissing (22 Nov 2023) +- BUG-BOUNTY.md: clarify the third party situation -- url: ConnectionExists revisited + We do not pay bounties for problems in other libraries. - - have common pattern of `if not match, continue` - - revert pages long if()s to return early - - move dead connection check to later since it may - be relatively expensive - - check multiuse also when NOT building with NGHTTP2 - - for MULTIUSE bundles, verify that the inspected - connection indeed supports multiplexing when in use - (bundles may contain a mix of connection, afaict) + Closes #13560 - Closes #12373 +Stefan Eissing (14 May 2024) -Daniel Stenberg (22 Nov 2023) +- http tests: in CI skip test_02_23* for quiche -- CURLMOPT_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS: make sure the set value is within range + For unknown reasons, these tests fail in CI often, but run fine locally. + Skip them in CI to avoid unrelated PRs to have failures. - ... or use the default value. + Closes #13638 - Also clarify the documentation language somewhat. +Daniel Gustafsson (14 May 2024) - Closes #12382 +- hsts: explicitly skip blank lines -- urldata: make maxconnects a 32 bit value + Keep blank lines or lines containing only whitespace to make it all + the way to the more expensive sscanf call in hsts_add. - "2^32 idle connections ought to be enough for anybody" + Closes: #13603 + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg - Closes #12375 +- autotools: Only probe for SGI MIPS compilers on IRIX -- FEATURES: update the URL phrasing + MIPSPro and the predecessor compiler which was part of the IDO (IRIS + Development Option) were only ever shipped on the SGI IRIX operating + system (with MIPSPro on 6.0+ which was released in 1994). Limit the + autoconf check to IRIX when probing for these compilers to save some + cycles on other platforms. - The URL is length limited since a while back so "no limit" simply is not - true anymore. Mention the URL RFC standard used instead. + Closes: #13611 + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg - Closes #12383 +Viktor Szakats (14 May 2024) -- wolfssh: remove redundant static prototypes +- tests: fix test 1167 to skip digit-only symbols - vssh/wolfssh.c:346:18: error: redundant redeclaration of ‘wscp_recv’ [-We - rror=redundant-decls] + This avoids mistaking symbols with their numeric value when using + certain C preprocessors which output these numeric values at the + beginning of the line as part of an expression. - Closes #12381 + Seen on OpenBSD 7.5 + clang. -- setopt: remove superfluous use of ternary expressions + Example `test1167.pl -v` output, before this patch: + ``` + Source: cpp /home/runner/work/curl/curl/tests/../include/curl/curl.h + Symbol: 20000 + Line #3835: 20000 + 142, + [...] + Bad symbols in public header files: + 20000 + [...] + ``` + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/actions/runs/9069136530/job/24918015357#ste + p:3:7513 - Closes #12374 + Ref: #13583 + Closes #13634 -- mime: store "form escape" as a single bit +Daniel Stenberg (14 May 2024) - Closes #12374 +- lib: call Curl_strntolower instead of doing crafted loops -- setopt: check CURLOPT_TFTP_BLKSIZE range on set + Closes #13627 - ... instead of later when the transfer is about to happen. +- setopt: acknowledge errors proper for CURLOPT_COOKIEJAR - Closes #12374 + Error out on error, do not continue. -Viktor Szakats (21 Nov 2023) + Closes #13624 -- build: add more picky warnings and fix them +- vtls: remove duplicate assign - Enable more picky compiler warnings. I've found these options in the - nghttp3 project when implementing the CMake quick picky warning - functionality for it [1]. + Curl_ssl_peer_cleanup() already clears the ->sni field, no point in + assigning it again. - `-Wunused-macros` was too noisy to keep around, but fixed a few issues - it revealed while testing. + Spotted by CodeSonar - - autotools: reflect the more precisely-versioned clang warnings. - Follow-up to 033f8e2a08eb1d3102f08c4d8c8e85470f8b460e #12324 - - autotools: sync between clang and gcc the way we set `no-multichar`. - - autotools: avoid setting `-Wstrict-aliasing=3` twice. - - autotools: disable `-Wmissing-noreturn` for MSYS gcc targets [2]. - It triggers in libtool-generated stub code. + Closes #13626 - - lib/timeval: delete a redundant `!MSDOS` guard from a `WIN32` branch. +Max Dymond (13 May 2024) - - lib/curl_setup.h: delete duplicate declaration for `fileno`. - Added in initial commit ae1912cb0d494b48d514d937826c9fe83ec96c4d - (1999-12-29). This suggests this may not be needed anymore, but if - it does, we may restore this for those specific (non-Windows) systems. - - lib: delete unused macro `FTP_BUFFER_ALLOCSIZE` since - c1d6fe2aaa5a26e49a69a4f2495b3cc7a24d9394. - - lib: delete unused macro `isxdigit_ascii` since - f65f750742068f579f4ee6d8539ed9d5f0afcb85. - - lib/mqtt: delete unused macro `MQTT_HEADER_LEN`. - - lib/multi: delete unused macro `SH_READ`/`SH_WRITE`. - - lib/hostip: add `noreturn` function attribute via new `CURL_NORETURN` - macro. - - lib/mprintf: delete duplicate declaration for `Curl_dyn_vprintf`. - - lib/rand: fix `-Wunreachable-code` and related fallouts [3]. - - lib/setopt: fix `-Wunreachable-code-break`. - - lib/system_win32 and lib/timeval: fix double declarations for - `Curl_freq` and `Curl_isVistaOrGreater` in CMake UNITY mode [4]. - - lib/warnless: fix double declarations in CMake UNITY mode [5]. - This was due to force-disabling the header guard of `warnless.h` to - to reapply it to source code coming after `warnless.c` in UNITY - builds. This reapplied declarations too, causing the warnings. - Solved by adding a header guard for the lines that actually need - to be reapplied. - - lib/vauth/digest: fix `-Wunreachable-code-break` [6]. - - lib/vssh/libssh2: fix `-Wunreachable-code-break` and delete redundant - block. - - lib/vtls/sectransp: fix `-Wunreachable-code-break` [7]. - - lib/vtls/sectransp: suppress `-Wunreachable-code`. - Detected in `else` branches of dynamic feature checks, with results - known at compile-time, e.g. - ```c - if(SecCertificateCopySubjectSummary) /* -> true */ - ``` - Likely fixable as a separate micro-project, but given SecureTransport - is deprecated anyway, let's just silence these locally. - - src/tool_help: delete duplicate declaration for `helptext`. - - src/tool_xattr: fix `-Wunreachable-code`. - - tests: delete duplicate declaration for `unitfail` [8]. - - tests: delete duplicate declaration for `strncasecompare`. - - tests/libtest: delete duplicate declaration for `gethostname`. - Originally added in 687df5c8c39c370a59999b9afc0917d808d978b7 - (2010-08-02). - Got complicated later: c49e9683b85ba9d12cbb6eebc4ab2c8dba68fbdc - If there are still systems around with warnings, we may restore the - prototype, but limited for those systems. - - tests/lib2305: delete duplicate declaration for - `libtest_debug_config`. - - tests/h2-download: fix `-Wunreachable-code-break`. +- Group all non-major updates together to reduce PR spam - [1] https://github.com/ngtcp2/nghttp3/blob/a70edb08e954d690e8fb2c1df999b5a056 - f8bf9f/cmake/PickyWarningsC.cmake - [2] https://ci.appveyor.com/project/curlorg/curl/builds/48553586/job/3qkgjaui - qla5fj45?fullLog=true#L1675 - [3] https://github.com/curl/curl/actions/runs/6880886309/job/18716044703?pr=1 - 2331#step:7:72 - https://github.com/curl/curl/actions/runs/6883016087/job/18722707368?pr=1 - 2331#step:7:109 - [4] https://ci.appveyor.com/project/curlorg/curl/builds/48555101/job/9g15qkrr - iklpf1ut#L204 - [5] https://ci.appveyor.com/project/curlorg/curl/builds/48555101/job/9g15qkrr - iklpf1ut#L218 - [6] https://github.com/curl/curl/actions/runs/6880886309/job/18716042927?pr=1 - 2331#step:7:290 - [7] https://github.com/curl/curl/actions/runs/6891484996/job/18746659406?pr=1 - 2331#step:9:1193 - [8] https://github.com/curl/curl/actions/runs/6882803986/job/18722082562?pr=1 - 2331#step:33:1870 +- Add the remainder of the workflows - Closes #12331 +- Add some basic versioning for some workflows to check whether this is detecte + d properly -Daniel Stenberg (21 Nov 2023) +renovate[bot] (13 May 2024) -- transfer: avoid unreachable expression +- Add renovate.json - If curl_off_t and size_t have the same size (which is common on modern - 64 bit systems), a condition cannot occur which Coverity pointed - out. Avoid the warning by having the code conditionally only used if - curl_off_t actually is larger. +Daniel Stenberg (13 May 2024) + +- vauth: make two functions void that always just returned OK + + Removes the need to check return values when they can never fail. + + Pointed out by CodeSonar + + Closes #13621 + +- setopt: remove check for 'option' that is always true + + - make sure that passing in option set to NULL clears the fields + correctly + + - remove the weird second take if Curl_parse_login_details() returns + error + + Follow-up to 7333faf00bf25db7cd1e0012d6b140 + + Spotted by CodeSonar + + Closes #13619 + +Viktor Szakats (13 May 2024) + +- tests: tidy up types in server code + + Cherry-picked from #13489 + Closes #13610 + +Daniel Stenberg (13 May 2024) + +- setopt: make the setstropt_userpwd args compulsory + + They were always used so no point in allowing them to be optional. + + follow-up to 0e37b42dc956bd8a + + Closes #13608 + Reviewed-by: Daniel Gustafsson + +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced + +Daniel Gustafsson (13 May 2024) + +- websocket: Avoid memory leak in error path + + In the errorpath for randstr being too long to copy into the buffer + we leak the randstr when returning CURLE_FAILED_INIT. Fix by using + an explicit free on randstr in the errorpath. + + Closes: #13602 + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + +- hsts: Remove single-use single-line function + + The hsts_entry() function contains of a single line and is only + used in a single place in the code, so move the allocation into + hsts_create instead to improve code readability. C code usually + don't use the factory abstraction for object creation, and this + small example wasn't following our usual code style. + + Closes: #13604 + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + +Viktor Szakats (12 May 2024) + +- lib: bump hash sizes to `size_t` + + Follow-up to cc907e80a2498c0599253271a6f657f614b52a4e #13502 + Cherry-picked from #13489 + Closes #13601 + +- tests: make the unit test result type `CURLcode` + + Before this patch, the result code was a mixture of `int` and + `CURLcode`. + + Also adjust casts and fix a couple of minor issues found along the way. + + Cherry-picked from #13489 + Closes #13600 + +- appveyor: tidy-ups + + - delete a duplicate line. + - simplify a `make` call. + - merge two `if` branches. + - reorder autotools options for clarity. + - add `--enable-warnings` where missing (it's also the default.) + - add empty lines to YAML for readability. + - use lowercase install prefix/directory. + + Closes #13598 + +Daniel Stenberg (12 May 2024) + +- docs/cmdline-opts: mention STARTTLS for --ssl and --ssl-reqd + + ... since users might look for those terms in the manpage. + + Closes #13590 + +- setopt: warn on Curl_set*opt() uses not using the return value + + And switch the invokes that would "set" NULL to instead just plainly + free the pointer, as those were otherwise the invokes that would ignore + the return code. And possibly confuse static code analyzers. + + Closes #13591 + +Orgad Shaneh (12 May 2024) + +- autotools: delete unused functions + + Closes #13605 + +Viktor Szakats (11 May 2024) + +- examples: fix/silence `-Wsign-conversion` + + - extend `FD_SET()` hack to all platforms (was only Cygwin). + Warnings may also happen in other envs, e.g. OmniOS. + Ref: https://github.com/libssh2/libssh2/actions/runs/8854199687/job/2431676 + 2831#step:3:2021 + + - tidy-up `CURLcode` vs `int` use. + + - cast an unsigned to `long` before passing to `curl_easy_setopt()`. + + Cherry-picked from #13489 + Follow-up to 3829759bd042c03225ae862062560f568ba1a231 #12489 + Closes #13501 + +Orgad Shaneh (11 May 2024) - Follow-up to 1cd2f0072fa482e25baa2 +- cmake: fix `HAVE_IOCTLSOCKET_FIONBIO` test with gcc 14 - Closes #12370 + The function signature has had u_long flags since ever. This is how it + is defined in the documentation, and implemented in MinGW. -Stefan Eissing (21 Nov 2023) + The code that uses ioctlsocket in nonblock.c also has unsigned long. -- transfer: readwrite improvements + Error: + CurlTests.c:275:41: error: passing argument 3 of 'ioctlsocket' from incompati + ble pointer type [-Wincompatible-pointer-types] + 275 | if(0 != ioctlsocket(0, FIONBIO, &flags)) + | ^~~~~~ + | | + | int * + In file included from CurlTests.c:266: + /opt/mxe/usr/i686-w64-mingw32.static/include/winsock2.h:1007:76: note: expect + ed 'u_long *' {aka 'long unsigned int *'} but argument is of type 'int *' + 1007 | WINSOCK_API_LINKAGE int WSAAPI ioctlsocket(SOCKET s,__LONG32 cmd,u_ + long *argp); + | ~~ + ~~~~~~^~~~ - - changed header/chunk/handler->readwrite prototypes to accept `buf`, - `blen` and a `pconsumed` pointer. They now get the buffer to work on - and report back how many bytes they consumed - - eliminated `k->str` in SingleRequest - - improved excess data handling to properly calculate with any body data - left in the headerb buffer - - eliminated `k->badheader` enum to only be a bool + Closes #13578 - Closes #12283 +Jay Satiro (10 May 2024) -Daniel Stenberg (21 Nov 2023) +- ftp: fix build for CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced + This is a follow-up to b7c7dffe which changed the FTP state change + verbose debug text (aka infof) to tracing debug text (aka trc). -Jiří Hruška (21 Nov 2023) + Prior to this change if libcurl was without DEBUGBUILD and built with + CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS (ie --disable-verbose) the build would + error. -- transfer: avoid calling the read callback again after EOF + Caught by Circle CI job openssl-no-verbose. - Regression since 7f43f3dc5994d01b12 (7.84.0) +- lib: clear the easy handle's saved errno before transfer - Bug: https://curl.se/mail/lib-2023-11/0017.html + - Clear data->state.os_errno before transfer. - Closes #12363 + - Explain the change in behavior in the CURLINFO_OS_ERRNO doc. -Daniel Stenberg (21 Nov 2023) + - Add to the CURLINFO_OS_ERRNO doc the list of libcurl network-related + errors that may cause the errno to be saved. -- doh: provide better return code for responses w/o addresses + data->state.os_errno is saved before libcurl returns a network-related + failure such as connection failure. It is accessible to the user via + CURLINFO_OS_ERRNO so they can get more information about the failure. - Previously it was wrongly returning CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY when the - response did not contain any addresses. Now it more accurately returns - CURLE_COULDNT_RESOLVE_HOST. + Prior to this change it wasn't cleared before transfer, so if a user + retrieved the saved errno it could be from a previous transfer. That is + because an errno is not always saved for network-related errors. - Reported-by: lRoccoon on github + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/13574 - Fixes #12365 - Closes #12366 +Stefan Eissing (10 May 2024) -Stefan Eissing (21 Nov 2023) +- ftp: add tracing support -- HTTP/2, HTTP/3: handle detach of onoing transfers + - add `Curl_trc_feat_ftp` for tracing via trace config + - add macro CURL_TRC_FTP(data, fmt, ...) + - replace DEBUGF(infof()) statements in ftp.c by CURL_TRC_FTP() + - always trace FTP connection state - - refs #12356 where a UAF is reported when closing a connection - with a stream whose easy handle was cleaned up already - - handle DETACH events same as DONE events in h2/h3 filters + Closes #13580 - Fixes #12356 - Reported-by: Paweł Wegner - Closes #12364 +Daniel Stenberg (10 May 2024) -Viktor Szakats (20 Nov 2023) +- http: remove redundant check -- autotools: stop setting `-std=gnu89` with `--enable-warnings` + Spotted by CodeSonar - Do not alter the C standard when building with `--enable-warnings` when - building with gcc. + Closes #13582 - On one hand this alters warning results compared to a default build. - On the other, it may produce different binaries, which is unexpected. +Viktor Szakats (10 May 2024) - Also fix new warnings that appeared after removing `-std=gnu89`: +- ldap: fix unused variables (seen on OmniOS) - - include: fix public curl headers to use the correct printf mask for - `CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T` and `CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_TU` with mingw-w64 - and Visual Studio 2013 and newer. This fixes the printf mask warnings - in examples and tests. E.g. [1] + ``` + ../../lib/ldap.c: In function 'ldap_do': + ../../lib/ldap.c:380:11: error: unused variable 'ldap_ca' [-Werror=unused-v + ariable] + 380 | char *ldap_ca = conn->ssl_config.CAfile; + | ^~~~~~~ + ../../lib/ldap.c:379:9: error: unused variable 'ldap_option' [-Werror=unuse + d-variable] + 379 | int ldap_option; + | ^~~~~~~~~~~ + ``` + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/actions/runs/9033564377/job/24824192730#ste + p:3:6059 - - conncache: fix printf format string [2]. + Ref: #13583 + Closes #13588 - - http2: fix potential null pointer dereference [3]. - (seen on Slackware with gcc 11.) +Daniel Stenberg (10 May 2024) - - libssh: fix printf format string in SFTP code [4]. - Also make MSVC builds compatible with old CRT versions. +- url: make parse_login_details use memdup0 - - libssh2: fix printf format string in SFTP code for MSVC. - Applying the same fix as for libssh above. + Also make the user and password arguments mandatory, since all code + paths in libcurl used them anyway. - - unit1395: fix `argument is null` and related issues [5]: - - stop calling `strcmp()` with NULL to avoid undefined behaviour. - - fix checking results if some of them were NULL. - - do not pass NULL to printf `%s`. + Adapted unit test case 1620 to the new rules. - - ci: keep a build job with `-std=gnu89` to continue testing for - C89-compliance. We can apply this to other gcc jobs as needed. - Ref: b23ce2cee7329bbf425f18b49973b7a5f23dfcb4 (2022-09-23) #9542 + Closes #13584 - [1] https://dev.azure.com/daniel0244/curl/_build/results?buildId=18581&view=l - ogs&jobId=ccf9cc6d-2ef1-5cf2-2c09-30f0c14f923b - [2] https://github.com/curl/curl/actions/runs/6896854263/job/18763831142?pr=1 - 2346#step:6:67 - [3] https://github.com/curl/curl/actions/runs/6896854253/job/18763839238?pr=1 - 2346#step:30:214 - [4] https://github.com/curl/curl/actions/runs/6896854253/job/18763838007?pr=1 - 2346#step:29:895 - [5] https://github.com/curl/curl/actions/runs/6896854253/job/18763836775?pr=1 - 2346#step:33:1689 +Orgad Shaneh (10 May 2024) - Closes #12346 +- digest: replace strcpy for empty string with simple assignment -- autotools: fix/improve gcc and Apple clang version detection + Closes #13586 - - Before this patch we expected `n.n` `-dumpversion` output, but Ubuntu - may return `n-win32` (also with `-dumpfullversion`). Causing these - errors and failing to enable picky warnings: - ``` - ../configure: line 23845: test: : integer expression expected - ``` - Ref: https://github.com/libssh2/libssh2/actions/runs/6263453828/job/1700789 - 3718#step:5:143 +Viktor Szakats (10 May 2024) - Fix that by stripping any dash-suffix and handling a dotless (major-only) - version number by assuming `.0` in that case. +- autotools: fix `HAVE_IOCTLSOCKET_FIONBIO` test for gcc 14 - `9.3-posix`, `9.3-win32`, `6`, `9.3.0`, `11`, `11.2`, `11.2.0` - Ref: https://github.com/mamedev/mame/pull/9767 + ``` + conftest.c:152:41: error: passing argument 3 of 'ioctlsocket' from incompatib + le pointer type [-Wincompatible-pointer-types] + 152 | if(0 != ioctlsocket(0, FIONBIO, &flags)) + | ^~~~~~ + | | + | int * + ``` - - fix Apple clang version detection for releases between - 'Apple LLVM version 7.3.0' and 'Apple LLVM version 10.0.1' where the - version was under-detected as 3.7 llvm/clang equivalent. + Reported-by: LigH + Fixes #13579 + Closes #13587 - - fix Apple clang version detection for 'Apple clang version 11.0.0' - and newer where the Apple clang version was detected, instead of its - llvm/clang equivalent. +- CI: ignore test 286 on Appveyor gcc 7 build - - display detected clang/gcc/icc compiler version. + Disabled earlier for gcc 9 builds. gcc 7 uses the same runner and + prone to similar intermittent failures. - Via libssh2: - - https://github.com/libssh2/libssh2/commit/00a3b88c51cdb407fbbb347a2e38c5c7d - 89875ad - https://github.com/libssh2/libssh2/pull/1187 - - https://github.com/libssh2/libssh2/commit/89ccc83c7da73e7ca3a112e3500081319 - 42b592e - https://github.com/libssh2/libssh2/pull/1232 + Follow-up to f1e05a6e6e7225fa09952abb2c935ae1abe44f45 #12106 #12040 + Closes #13575 - Closes #12362 +Daniel Stenberg (10 May 2024) -- autotools: delete LCC compiler support bits +- cf-socket: don't try getting local IP without socket - Follow-up to fd7ef00f4305a2919e6950def1cf83d0110a4acd #12222 + In cf_tcp_connect(), it might fail and not get a socket assigned to + ctx->sock but set_local_ip() is still called which would make + getsockname() get invoked with a negative file desriptor and fail. - Closes #12357 + By adding this check, set_local_ip() will now instead blank out the + fields correctly. -- cmake: add test for `DISABLE` options, add `CURL_DISABLE_HEADERS_API` + Spotted by CodeSonar - - tests: verify CMake `DISABLE` options. + Closes #13577 - Make an exception for 2 CMake-only ones, and one more that's - using a different naming scheme, also in autotools and source. +- tool_getparam: remove two redundant conditions - - cmake: add support for `CURL_DISABLE_HEADERS_API`. + When getstr() does not return error, it returns a valid pointer. - Suggested-by: Daniel Stenberg - Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12345#pullrequestreview-1736238641 + Spotted by CodeSonar - Closes #12353 + Closes #13576 -Jacob Hoffman-Andrews (20 Nov 2023) +Stefan Eissing (10 May 2024) -- hyper: temporarily remove HTTP/2 support +- quiche: trust its timeout handling - The current design of the Hyper integration requires rebuilding the - Hyper clientconn for each request. However, building the clientconn - requires resending the HTTP/2 connection preface, which is incorrect - from a protocol perspective. That in turn causes servers to send GOAWAY - frames, effectively degrading performance to "no connection reuse" in - the best case. It may also be triggering some bugs where requests get - dropped entirely and reconnects take too long. + - set the idle timeout transport parameter + in milliseconds as documented by quiche + - do not calculate the idle timeout, rely on + quiche handling it - This doesn't rule out HTTP/2 support with Hyper, but it may take a - redesign of the Hyper integration in order to make things work. + Closes #13581 - Closes #12191 +Daniel Stenberg (10 May 2024) -Jay Satiro (20 Nov 2023) +- dmaketgz: accept a SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH as an second argument -- schannel: fix unused variable warning + to make it easier to reproduce a tarball - Bug: https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12349#issuecomment-1818000846 - Reported-by: Viktor Szakats + Closes #13573 - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12361 +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced -Daniel Stenberg (19 Nov 2023) +Stefan Eissing (10 May 2024) -- url: find scheme with a "perfect hash" +- h3/ngtcp2: improve error handling - Instead of a loop to scan over the potentially 30+ scheme names, this - uses a "perfect hash" table. This works fine because the set of schemes - is known and cannot change in a build. The hash algorithm and table size - is made to only make a single scheme index per table entry. + - identify ngtcp2 and nghttp3 error codes that are fatal + - close quic connection on fatal errors + - refuse further filter operations once connection is closed + - confusion about the nghttp3 API. We should close the QUIC stream on + cancel and not use the nghttp3 calls intended to be invoked when the + QUIC stream was closed by the peer. - The perfect hash is generated by a separate tool (scripts/schemetable.c) + Closes #13562 - Closes #12347 +Jay Satiro (10 May 2024) -- scripts: add schemetable.c +- docs: fix some CURLINFO examples - This tool generates a scheme-matching table. + - improve getinfo result check for example sections: + CURLINFO_ACTIVESOCKET, CURLINFO_LASTSOCKET, CURLINFO_SSL_VERIFYRESULT, + CURLINFO_PROXY_SSL_VERIFYRESULT - It iterates over a number of different initial and shift values in order - to find the hash algorithm that needs the smallest possible table. + - fix getinfo result check for example sections: + CURLINFO_NUM_CONNECTS, CURLINFO_OS_ERRNO - The generated hash function, table and table size then needs to be used - by the url.c:Curl_getn_scheme_handler() function. + - fix verify result check for example sections: + CURLINFO_PROXY_SSL_VERIFYRESULT -Stefan Eissing (19 Nov 2023) + Bug: https://github.com/curl/curl/discussions/13557#discussion-6625507 + Reported-by: farazrbx@users.noreply.github.com -- vtls/vquic, keep peer name information together + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/13559 - - add `struct ssl_peer` to keep hostname, dispname and sni - for a filter - - allocate `sni` for use in VTLS backend - - eliminate `Curl_ssl_snihost()` and its use of the download buffer - - use ssl_peer in SSL and QUIC filters +Daniel Stenberg (9 May 2024) - Closes #12349 +- KNOWN_BUGS: gssapi library name + version is missing in curl_version_info() -Viktor Szakats (18 Nov 2023) + Closes #13492 + Closes #13570 -- build: always revert `#pragma GCC diagnostic` after use +- krb5: use dynbuf - Before this patch some source files were overriding gcc warning options, - but without restoring them at the end of the file. In CMake UNITY builds - these options spilled over to the remainder of the source code, - effecitvely disabling them for a larger portion of the codebase than - intended. + Closes #13568 - `#pragma clang diagnostic` didn't have such issue in the codebase. +- managen: fix the option sort order - Reviewed-by: Marcel Raad - Closes #12352 + ... it used to strip off the .d file extension to sort correctly but + ever since the extension changed to .md the operation failed and the + sort got wrong. -- tidy-up: casing typos, delete unused Windows version aliases + Follow-up to 2494b8dd5175cee7f2e - - cmake: fix casing of `UnixSockets` to match the rest of the codebase. + Closes #13567 - - curl-compilers.m4: fix casing in a comment. +Stefan Eissing (8 May 2024) - - setup-win32: delete unused Windows version constant aliases. +- GHA: repair the linux-old job - Reviewed-by: Marcel Raad - Closes #12351 + package libc6_2.28-10+deb10u2_amd64.deb changed to + libc6_2.28-10+deb10u3_amd64.deb -- keylog: disable if unused + Closes #13564 - Fully disable keylog code if there is no TLS or QUIC subsystem using it. +Viktor Szakats (8 May 2024) - Closes #12350 +- appveyor: make gcc 6 mingw64 job build-only -- cmake: add `CURL_DISABLE_BINDLOCAL` option + This job has proven to be the flakiest of all, and it's also the oldest + Windows runner we had tests running on: 'Visual Studio 2015', that is + running on Windows Server 2012 R2: + https://www.appveyor.com/docs/windows-images-software/ - To match similar autotools option. + Turn off tests on this job to help stabilizing CI runs. - Default is `ON`. + This was also one of the slowest running job amongst the AppVeyor CI ones. - Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg - Closes #12345 + Flakiness data: + https://testclutch.curl.se/static/reports/summary.html + Entries: + Appveyor / CMake, mingw-w64, gcc 6, Debug, x86, Schannel, Static, no-unity + (curl) [current] + Appveyor / CMake, mingw-w64, gcc 6, Debug, x86, Schannel, Static (curl) [fo + rmer] -- url: fix `-Wzero-length-array` with no protocols + Closes #13566 - Fixes: - ``` - ./lib/url.c:178:56: warning: use of an empty initializer is a C2x extension [ - -Wc2x-extensions] - 178 | static const struct Curl_handler * const protocols[] = { - | ^ - ./lib/url.c:178:56: warning: zero size arrays are an extension [-Wzero-length - -array] - ``` +Stefan Eissing (8 May 2024) - Closes #12344 +- unit2604: use alloc instead of overlong string const -- url: fix builds with `CURL_DISABLE_HTTP` + Closes #13563 - Fixes: - ``` - ./lib/url.c:456:35: error: no member named 'formp' in 'struct UrlState' - 456 | Curl_mime_cleanpart(data->state.formp); - | ~~~~~~~~~~~ ^ - ``` +Daniel Gustafsson (8 May 2024) - Regression from 74b87a8af13a155c659227f5acfa78243a8b2aa6 #11682 +- bufq: remove duplicate word in comment - Closes #12343 + Inspired by 13552. -- http: fix `-Wunused-parameter` with no auth and no proxy + Closes: #13554 + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg - ``` - lib/http.c:734:26: warning: unused parameter 'proxy' [-Wunused-parameter] - bool proxy) - ^ - ``` +Viktor Szakats (8 May 2024) - Reviewed-by: Marcel Raad - Closes #12338 +- lib/cf-h1-proxy: silence compiler warnings (gcc 14) -Daniel Stenberg (16 Nov 2023) + They came up ealier with gcc 12 (Windows), but apparently gcc 14 is + still reporting them, also under Linux. -- TODO: Some TLS options are not offered for HTTPS proxies + ``` + /home/runner/work/curl-for-win/curl-for-win/curl/lib/cf-h1-proxy.c: In functi + on 'cf_h1_proxy_close': + /home/runner/work/curl-for-win/curl-for-win/curl/lib/cf-h1-proxy.c:1060:17: w + arning: null pointer dereference [-Wnull-dereference] + 1060 | cf->connected = FALSE; + /home/runner/work/curl-for-win/curl-for-win/curl/lib/cf-h1-proxy.c:1061:8: wa + rning: null pointer dereference [-Wnull-dereference] + 1061 | if(cf->ctx) { + | ~~^~~~~ + In function 'tunnel_free', + inlined from 'cf_h1_proxy_destroy' at /home/runner/work/curl-for-win/curl + -for-win/curl/lib/cf-h1-proxy.c:1053:3: + /home/runner/work/curl-for-win/curl-for-win/curl/lib/cf-h1-proxy.c:198:27: wa + rning: null pointer dereference [-Wnull-dereference] + 198 | struct h1_tunnel_state *ts = cf->ctx; + | ^~ + ``` + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl-for-win/actions/runs/8985369476/job/2467921 + 9528#step:3:6320 - Closes #12286 - Closes #12342 + Fixes #13237 + Closes #13555 -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced +Michał Antoniak (8 May 2024) -- duphandle: make dupset() not return with pointers to old alloced data +- mbedtls: support TLS 1.3 - As the blob pointers are to be duplicated, the function must not return - mid-function with lingering pointers to the old handle's allocated data, - as that would lead to double-free in OOM situations. + Closes #13539 - Make sure to clear all destination pointers first to avoid this risk. +Daniel Stenberg (8 May 2024) - Closes #12337 +- version: use msnprintf instead of strncpy -Viktor Szakats (16 Nov 2023) + - to ensure a terminating null byte + - to avoid zero-padding the target -- http: fix `-Wunused-variable` compiler warning + debug code only - Fix compiler warnings in builds with disabled auths, NTLM and SPNEGO. + Closes #13549 - E.g. with `CURL_DISABLE_BASIC_AUTH` + `CURL_DISABLE_BEARER_AUTH` + - `CURL_DISABLE_DIGEST_AUTH` + `CURL_DISABLE_NEGOTIATE_AUTH` + - `CURL_DISABLE_NTLM` on non-Windows. +- curl_path: make Curl_get_pathname use dynbuf - ``` - ./curl/lib/http.c:737:12: warning: unused variable 'result' [-Wunused-variabl - e] - CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; - ^ - ./curl/lib/http.c:995:18: warning: variable 'availp' set but not used [-Wunus - ed-but-set-variable] - unsigned long *availp; - ^ - ./curl/lib/http.c:996:16: warning: variable 'authp' set but not used [-Wunuse - d-but-set-variable] - struct auth *authp; - ^ - ``` + ... instead of malloc and memcpy - Regression from e92edfbef64448ef461117769881f3ed776dec4e #11490 + - unit test 2604 verifies Curl_get_pathname() - Fixes #12228 - Closes #12335 + Closes #13550 -Jay Satiro (16 Nov 2023) +- lib: make protocol handlers store scheme name lowercase -- tool: support bold headers in Windows + - saves a lowercase operation when the "[scheme]_proxy" name is + generated + - appears less "shouting" + - update test 970, 972, 1438 and 1536 - - If virtual terminal processing is enabled in Windows then use ANSI - escape codes Esc[1m and Esc[22m to turn bold on and off. + Closes #13553 - Suggested-by: Gisle Vanem +- lib: remove two instances of "only only" messages - Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/discussions/11770 + Fixes #13551 + Reported-by: Lucas Nussbaum + Closes #13552 - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12321 +Pavel Pavlov (7 May 2024) -Viktor Szakats (15 Nov 2023) +- asyn-thread: fix curl_global_cleanup crash in Windows -- build: fix libssh2 + `CURL_DISABLE_DIGEST_AUTH` + `CURL_DISABLE_AWS` + - Make sure that asynchronous resolves handled by Winsock are stopped + before WSACleanup is called. - Builds with libssh2 + `-DCURL_DISABLE_DIGEST_AUTH=ON` + - `-DCURL_DISABLE_AWS=ON` in combination with either Schannel on Windows, - or `-DCURL_DISABLE_NTLM=ON` on other operating systems failed while - compiling due to a missing HMAC declaration. + This is implemented by ensuring that when Curl_resolver_kill is called + (eg via multi_done) it will cancel the Winsock asynchronous resolve and + wait for the cancellation to complete. Winsock runs the asynchronous + completion routine immediately when a resolve is canceled. + + Prior to this change it was possible that during curl_global_cleanup + "a DNS resolver thread created by GetAddrInfoExW did not terminate yet, + however curl is already shutting down, deinitializing Winsock with + WSACleanup() leading to an access violation." - The reason is that HMAC is required by `lib/sha256.c` which publishes - `Curl_sha256it()` which is required by `lib/vssh/libssh2.c` when - building for libssh2 v1.8.2 (2019-05-25) or older. + Background: - Make sure to compile the HMAC bits for a successful build. + If libcurl is built with the asynchronous threaded resolver option for + Windows then it resolves in one of two ways. For Windows 8.1 and later, + libcurl resolves by using the Winsock asynchronous resolver which does + its own thread management. For older versions of Windows, libcurl + resolves by creating a separate thread that calls getaddrinfo. This + change only affects the former and it's already handled for the latter. - Both HMAC and `Curl_sha256it()` rely on the same internals, so splitting - them into separate sources isn't practical. + Reported-by: Ch40zz@users.noreply.github.com - Fixes: - ``` - [...] - In file included from ./curl/_x64-win-ucrt-cmake-llvm-bld/lib/CMakeFiles/libc - url_object.dir/Unity/unity_0_c.c:310: - ./curl/lib/sha256.c:527:42: error: array has incomplete element type 'const s - truct HMAC_params' - 527 | const struct HMAC_params Curl_HMAC_SHA256[] = { - | ^ - ./curl/lib/curl_sha256.h:34:21: note: forward declaration of 'struct HMAC_par - ams' - [...] - ``` + Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/13509 + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/13518 - Regression from e92edfbef64448ef461117769881f3ed776dec4e #11490 +Jay Satiro (7 May 2024) - Fixes #12273 - Closes #12332 +- asyn-thread: fix Curl_thread_create result check -Daniel Stenberg (15 Nov 2023) + - Compare to curl_thread_t_null instead of 0 for error. -- duphandle: also free 'outcurl->cookies' in error path + Currently for both supported thread libraries (pthreads and Windows) + curl_thread_t_null is defined as 0. However, the pattern throughout the + code is to check against curl_thread_t_null and not 0 since for + posterity some thread library may not use 0 for error. - Fixes memory-leak when OOM mid-function + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/13542 - Use plain free instead of safefree, since the entire struct is - freed below. +- curl_multibyte: remove access() function wrapper for Windows - Remove some free calls that is already freed in Curl_freeset() + - Remove curlx_win32_access() which was a wrapper to use access() in + Windows. - Closes #12329 + This is a follow-up to 602fc213, one of two commits which removed + access() calls from the codebase and banned use of the function. -Viktor Szakats (15 Nov 2023) + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/13529 -- config-win32: set `HAVE_SNPRINTF` for mingw-w64 +Daniel Gustafsson (6 May 2024) - It's available in all mingw-w64 releases. We already pre-fill this - detection in CMake. +- tls: Remove EXAMPLEs from deprecated options - Closes #12325 + CURLOPT_EGDSOCKET and CURLOPT_RANDOM_FILE are both completely dead + so remove their example sections since the code there is useless. + There is still a way to inject a random file for OpenSSL older than + 1.1.0 but it's not what the example showed (and it's not even done + with this option) so we refrain from documenting it here. -- sasl: fix `-Wunused-function` compiler warning + Closes: #13540 + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg - In builds with disabled auths. +- tests: Only require EXAMPLE for non-deprecated options - ``` - lib/curl_sasl.c:266:17: warning: unused function 'get_server_message' [-Wunus - ed-function] - static CURLcode get_server_message(struct SASL *sasl, struct Curl_easy *data, - ^ - 1 warning generated. - ``` - Ref: https://github.com/curl/trurl/actions/runs/6871732122/job/18689066151#st - ep:3:3822 + Manpages which document deprecated CURLOPT_ or CURLINFO_ are not + required to have an EXAMPLE section since they might effectively + be dead no-ops which we don't want to trick users into believing + they can use by copying example code. - Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg - Closes #12326 + Closes: #13540 + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg -- build: picky warning updates +Daniel Stenberg (6 May 2024) - - cmake: sync some picky gcc warnings with autotools. - - cmake, autotools: add `-Wold-style-definition` for clang too. - - cmake: more precise version info for old clang options. - - cmake: use `IN LISTS` syntax in `foreach()`. +- EXPERIMENTAL: add graduation requirements for each feature - Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg - Reviewed-by: Marcel Raad - Closes #12324 + Starting now, experimental features should have a set of documentated + requirements of what is needed for the feature to graduate. -Daniel Stenberg (15 Nov 2023) + This adds requirements to all existing experiments. -- urldata: move cookielist from UserDefined to UrlState + Closes #13541 - 1. Because the value is not strictly set with a setopt option. +Ivan (6 May 2024) - 2. Because otherwise when duping a handle when all the set.* fields are - first copied and an error happens (think out of memory mid-function), - the function would easily free the list *before* it was deep-copied, - which could lead to a double-free. +- misc: fix typos, quoting and spelling - Closes #12323 + Fix wording of comments, and misquotings where `' is markdown parsed + where it shouldn't be, and remove a misspelled preprocessor comment + which really isn't needed (and removing it makes it match surrounding + code better). -Viktor Szakats (14 Nov 2023) + Closes: #13538 + Reviewed-by: Daniel Gustafsson -- autotools: avoid passing `LDFLAGS` twice to libcurl +Daniel Gustafsson (6 May 2024) - autotools passes `LDFLAGS` automatically linker commands. curl's - `lib/Makefile.am` customizes libcurl linker flags. In that - customization, it added `LDFLAGS` to the custom flags. This resulted in - passing `LDFLAGS` _twice_ to the `libtool` command. +- tests: Mark tftpd timer function as noreturn - Most of the time this is benign, but some `LDFLAGS` options can break - the build when passed twice. One such example is passing `.o` files, - e.g. `crt*.o` files necessary when customizing the C runtime, e.g. for - MUSL builds. + This avoids the below compiler warning: - Passing them twice resulted in duplicate symbol errors: - ``` - libtool: link: clang-15 --target=aarch64-unknown-linux-musl [...] /usr/lib/a - arch64-linux-musl/crt1.o [...] /usr/lib/aarch64-linux-musl/crt1.o [...] - ld.lld-15: error: duplicate symbol: _start - >>> defined at crt1.c - >>> /usr/lib/aarch64-linux-musl/crt1.o:(.text+0x0) - >>> defined at crt1.c - >>> /usr/lib/aarch64-linux-musl/crt1.o:(.text+0x0) - [...] - clang: error: linker command failed with exit code 1 (use -v to see invocatio - n) - ``` + tftpd.c:280:1: warning: function 'timer' could be declared with + attribute 'noreturn' [-Wmissing-noreturn] - This behaviour came with commit 1a593191c2769a47b8c3e4d9715ec9f6dddf5e36 - (2013-07-23) as a fix for bug https://curl.haxx.se/bug/view.cgi?id=1217. - The patch was a works-for-me hack that ended up merged in curl: - https://sourceforge.net/p/curl/bugs/1217/#06ef - With the root cause remaining unclear. + Closes: #13534 + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg - Perhaps the SUNPro 12 linker was sensitive to `-L` `-l` order, requiring - `-L` first? This would be unusual and suggests a bug in either the - linker or in `libtool`. +- doh: Remove unused function prototype - The curl build does pass the list of detected libs via its own - `LIBCURL_LIBS` variable, which ends up before `LDFLAGS` on the `libtool` - command line, but it's the job of `libtool` to ensure that even - a peculiar linker gets the options in the expected order. Also because - autotools passes `LDFLAGS` last, making it hardly possible to pass - anything after it. + Closes: #13536 + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg - Perhaps in the 10 years since this issue, this already got a fix - upstream. +Daniel Stenberg (6 May 2024) - This patch deletes `LDFLAGS` from our customized libcurl options, - leaving a single copy of them as passed by autotools automatically. +- doh: cleanups in ECH related functions - Reverts 1a593191c2769a47b8c3e4d9715ec9f6dddf5e36 - Closes #12310 + - make local_decode_rdata_name use dynbuf instead of calloc + memcpy + - avoid extra memdup in local_decode_rdata_alpn + - no need to if() before free() + - use memdup instead of calloc + memcpy in Curl_doh_decode_httpsrr -- autotools: accept linker flags via `CURL_LDFLAGS_{LIB,BIN}` + Reviewed-by: Stephen Farrell + Closes #13526 - To allow passing `LDFLAGS` specific to libcurl (`CURL_LDFLAGS_LIB`) and - curl tool (`CURL_LDFLAGS_BIN`). +Viktor Szakats (5 May 2024) - This makes it possible to build libcurl and curl with a single - invocation with lib- and tool-specific custom linker flags. +- libssh2: delete redundant feature guard - Such flag can be enabling `.map` files, a `.def` file for libcurl DLL, - controlling static/shared, incl. requesting a static curl tool (with - `-static-libtool-libs`) while building both shared and static libcurl. + Delete `HAVE_LIBSSH2_VERSION` (equivalent to + `LIBSSH2_VERSION_NUM` > 0x010100) guard surrounding + a `LIBSSH2_VERSION_NUM` > 0x010B00 one. - curl-for-win uses the above and some more. + Reviewed-by: Daniel Gustafsson + Closes #13537 - These options are already supported in `Makefile.mk`. CMake has built-in - variables for this. +Jan Venekamp (5 May 2024) - Closes #12312 +- tool_cfgable: free {proxy_}cipher13_list on exit -Jay Satiro (14 Nov 2023) + Author: Jan Venekamp + Reviewed-by: Daniel Gustafsson + Closes: #13531 -- tool_cb_hdr: add an additional parsing check +RainRat (4 May 2024) - - Don't dereference the past-the-end element when parsing the server's - Content-disposition header. +- doh: Fix typo in comment - As 'p' is advanced it can point to the past-the-end element and prior - to this change 'p' could be dereferenced in that case. + Closes: #13504 + Author: RainRat on Github + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Reviewed-by: Daniel Gustafsson - Technically the past-the-end element is not out of bounds because dynbuf - (which manages the header line) automatically adds a null terminator to - every buffer and that is not included in the buffer length passed to - the header callback. +Christian Schmitz (4 May 2024) - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12320 +- dynbuf: Fix returncode on memory error -Philip Heiduck (14 Nov 2023) + Curl_dyn_vaddf should return a proper error code in case allocating + memory failed. -- .cirrus.yml: freebsd 14 + Closes: #13533 + Author: Christian Schmitz + Reviewed-by: Daniel Gustafsson - ensure curl works on latest freebsd version +Daniel Stenberg (3 May 2024) - Closes #12053 +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced -Daniel Stenberg (13 Nov 2023) +Jan Venekamp (2 May 2024) -- easy: in duphandle, init the cookies for the new handle +- bearssl: use common code for cipher suite lookup - ... not the source handle. + Take advantage of the Curl_cipher_suite_walk_str() and + Curl_cipher_suite_get_str() functions introduced in commit fba9afeb. - Closes #12318 + This also fixes CURLOPT_SSL_CIPHER_LIST not working at all for bearssl + due to commit ff74cef5. -- duphandle: use strdup to clone *COPYPOSTFIELDS if size is not set + Closes #13464 - Previously it would unconditionally use the size, which is set to -1 - when strlen is requested. +Daniel Stenberg (2 May 2024) - Updated test 544 to verify. +- curl.h: change CURL_SSLVERSION_* from enum to defines - Closes #12317 + C++20 and later compilers emit a deprecation warning if values from two + different enums are combined with a bitwise operation the way the + CURL_SSLVERSION_* values were previously created. -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced + Reported-by: Michael Kaufmann + Fixes #13510 + Closes #13511 -- curl_easy_duphandle.3: clarify how HSTS and alt-svc are duped +- configure: error on missing perl if docs or manual is enabled - Closes #12315 + Fixes #13508 + Reported-by: Harmen Stoppels + Closes #13514 -- urldata: move hstslist from 'set' to 'state' +- tool_cb_rea: limit rate unpause for -T . uploads - To make it work properly with curl_easy_duphandle(). This, because - duphandle duplicates the entire 'UserDefined' struct by plain copy while - 'hstslist' is a linked curl_list of file names. This would lead to a - double-free when the second of the two involved easy handles were - closed. + To avoid getting stuck in a busy-loop when nothing is read from stdin, + this function now checks the call rate and might enforce a short sleep + when called repeatedly without uploading anything. It is a crude + work-around to avoid a 100% busy CPU. - Closes #12315 + Reported-by: magisterquis on hackerone + Fixes #13174 + Closes #13506 -- test1900: verify duphandle with HSTS using multiple files +Viktor Szakats (1 May 2024) - Closes #12315 +- appveyor: enable websockets for VS2017 jobs -Goro FUJI (13 Nov 2023) + Follow-up to eb4fe6c6340c3d5b0c347c6e30be004d4f9117d7 #13232 + Closes #13513 -- http: allow longer HTTP/2 request method names +Daniel Stenberg (30 Apr 2024) - - Increase the maximum request method name length from 11 to 23. +- if2ip: make the buf_size arg a size_t - For HTTP/1.1 and earlier there's not a specific limit in libcurl for - method length except that it is limited by the initial HTTP request - limit (DYN_HTTP_REQUEST). Prior to fc2f1e54 HTTP/2 was treated the same - and there was no specific limit. + sizes should be size_t - According to Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) the longest - registered method is UPDATEREDIRECTREF which is 17 characters. + Ref: #13489 + Closes #13505 - Also there are unregistered methods used by some companies that are - longer than 11 characters. +- cf-https-connect: use timeouts as unsigned ints - The limit was originally added by 61f52a97 but not used until fc2f1e54. + To match the type used in 'set.happy_eyeballs_timeout'. - Ref: https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-methods/http-methods.xhtml + Ref: #13489 + Closes #13503 - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12311 +- hash: change 'slots' to size_t from int -Jay Satiro (12 Nov 2023) + - an unsigned type makes more sense + - size_t seems suitable + - on 64 bit args, the struct alignment makes the new Curl_hash remain + the same size -- CURLOPT_CAINFO_BLOB.3: explain what CURL_BLOB_COPY does + Closes #13502 - - Add an explanation of the CURL_BLOB_COPY flag to CURLOPT_CAINFO_BLOB - and CURLOPT_PROXY_CAINFO_BLOB docs. +Viktor Szakats (30 Apr 2024) - All the other _BLOB option docs already have the same explanation. +- libssh2: replace `access()` with `stat()` - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12277 + Prefer `stat()` to verify the presence of key files. -Viktor Szakats (11 Nov 2023) + This drops the last uses of `access()` in the codebase, which was + reported to cause issues in some cases. -- tidy-up: dedupe Windows system libs in cmake + Also add `access()` to the list of banned functions in checksrc. - Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg - Closes #12307 + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/13412#issuecomment-2065505415 + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/13482#issuecomment-2078980522 + Ref: #13497 + Co-authored-by: Jay Satiro + Closes #13498 -Junho Choi (11 Nov 2023) +Daniel Stenberg (30 Apr 2024) -- ci: test with latest quiche release (0.19.0) +- multi: remove useless assignment - Closes #12180 + Spotted by CodeSonar -- quiche: use quiche_conn_peer_transport_params() + Closes #13500 - In recent quiche, transport parameter API is separated - with quiche_conn_peer_transport_params(). - (https://github.com/cloudflare/quiche/pull/1575) - It breaks with bulding with latest(post 0.18.0) quiche. +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced - Closes #12180 +fuzzard (29 Apr 2024) -Daniel Stenberg (11 Nov 2023) +- cmake: FindNGHTTP2 add static lib name to find_library call -- Makefile: generate the VC 14.20 project files at dist-time + Add the static library name, nghttp2_static as a name to search. - Follow-up to 28287092cc5a6d6ef8 (#12282) + This provides cmake parity with the winbuild Makefile.vc allowing + the cmake build to find and allow the link to static nghttp2 library. - Closes #12290 +Viktor Szakats (29 Apr 2024) -Sam James (11 Nov 2023) +- DISTROS: add patch and issues link for curl-for-win -- misc: fix -Walloc-size warnings + curl-for-win sometimes includes curl patches that were already merged in + master, but not yet part of a stable release. - GCC 14 introduces a new -Walloc-size included in -Wextra which gives: + Also include the Issues link. Build-specific issues are handled there. - ``` - src/tool_operate.c: In function ‘add_per_transfer’: - src/tool_operate.c:213:5: warning: allocation of insufficient size ‘1’ fo - r type ‘struct per_transfer’ with size ‘480’ [-Walloc-size] - 213 | p = calloc(sizeof(struct per_transfer), 1); - | ^ - src/var.c: In function ‘addvariable’: - src/var.c:361:5: warning: allocation of insufficient size ‘1’ for type - struct var’ with size ‘32’ [-Walloc-size] - 361 | p = calloc(sizeof(struct var), 1); - | ^ - ``` + Ref: #13493 + Closes #13499 - The calloc prototype is: - ``` - void *calloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size); - ``` +Daniel Stenberg (29 Apr 2024) - So, just swap the number of members and size arguments to match the - prototype, as we're initialising 1 struct of size `sizeof(struct - ...)`. GCC then sees we're not doing anything wrong. +- mime: avoid using access() - Closes #12292 + If stat() fails, there is no point in calling access() -Mark Gaiser (11 Nov 2023) + Also: return error immediately if the stat() fails. -- IPFS: bugfixes + Ref: #13482 + Closes #13497 - - Fixed endianness bug in gateway file parsing - - Use IPFS_PATH in tests where IPFS_DATA was used - - Fixed typos from traling -> trailing - - Fixed broken link in IPFS.md +Stefan Eissing (29 Apr 2024) - Follow-up to 859e88f6533f9e +- tests: add SNI and peer name checks - Reported-by: Michael Kaufmann - Bug: https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12152#issuecomment-1798214137 - Closes #12305 + - connect to DNS names with trailing dot + - connect to DNS names with double trailing dot + - rustls, always give `peer->hostname` and let it + figure out SNI itself + - add SNI tests for ip address and localhost + - document in code and TODO that QUIC with ngtcp2+wolfssl + does not do proper peer verification of the certificate + - mbedtls, skip tests with ip address verification as not + supported by the library -Daniel Stenberg (11 Nov 2023) + Closes #13486 -- VULN-DISCLOSURE-POLIC: remove broken link to hackerone +Daniel Stenberg (29 Apr 2024) - It should ideally soon not be done from hackerone anyway +- curl_getdate.md: document two-digit year handling - Closes #12308 + Mentioned-by: Paul Gilmartin + Ref: https://curl.se/mail/archive-2024-04/0014.html + Closes #13494 -Andrew Kurushin (11 Nov 2023) +Viktor Szakats (29 Apr 2024) -- schannel: add CA cache support for files and memory blobs +- cmake: add `BUILD_EXAMPLES` option to build examples - - Support CA bundle and blob caching. + You can enable it with `-DBUILD_EXAMPLES=ON`. - Cache timeout is 24 hours or can be set via CURLOPT_CA_CACHE_TIMEOUT. + To match autotools' `make examples` feature. + Windows (static) builds not tested. - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12261 + Also enable examples in a pair of CI jobs. -Daniel Stenberg (10 Nov 2023) + Apply related updates to the macOS CI workflow: + - drop unused `CXX` envs. + - drop no longer needed `-Wno-error=undef -Wno-error=conversion` flags. + - pass `-Wno-deprecated-declarations` to GCC too (for `BUILD_EXAMPLES`). + - document why `-Wno-deprecated-declarations` is necessary. -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced + Closes #13491 -Charlie C (10 Nov 2023) +Stefan Eissing (26 Apr 2024) -- cmake: option to disable install & drop `curlu` target when unused +- http3: quiche+ngtcp2 improvements - This patch makes the following changes: - - adds the option `CURL_DISABLE_INSTALL` - to disable 'install' targets. - - Removes the target `curlu` when the option `BUILD_TESTING` is set to - `OFF` - to prevent it from being loaded in Visual Studio. + - quiche: error transfers that try to receive on a closed + or draining connection + - ngtcp2: use callback for extending max bidi streams. This + allows more precise calculation of MAX_CONCURRENT as we + only can start a new stream when the server acknowledges + the close - not when we locally have closed it. + - remove a fprintf() from h2-download client to avoid excess + log files on tests timing out. - Closes #12287 + Closes #13475 -Kai Pastor (10 Nov 2023) +- vtls: TLS session storage overhaul -- cmake: fix multiple include of CURL package + - add session with destructor callback + - remove vtls `session_free` method + - let `Curl_ssl_addsessionid()` take ownership + of session object, freeing it also on failures + - change tls backend use + - test_17, add tests for SSL session resumption - Fixes errors on second `find_package(CURL)`. This is a frequent case - with transitive dependencies: - ``` - CMake Error at ...: - add_library cannot create ALIAS target "CURL::libcurl" because another - target with the same name already exists. - ``` + Closes #13386 + +- multi: multi_wait improvements - Test to reproduce: - ```cmake - cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 3.27) # must be 3.18 or higher + - only call `multi_getsock()` once for all transfers + - realloc pollset array on demand + - fold repeated sockets - project(curl) + Closes #13150 - set(CURL_DIR "example/lib/cmake/CURL/") - find_package(CURL CONFIG REQUIRED) - find_package(CURL CONFIG REQUIRED) # fails +Philip Heiduck (25 Apr 2024) - add_executable(main main.c) - target_link_libraries(main CURL::libcurl) - ``` +- ci: remove microsoft-prod.list - Ref: https://cmake.org/cmake/help/latest/release/3.18.html#other-changes - Ref: https://cmake.org/cmake/help/v3.18/policy/CMP0107.html - Ref: #12300 - Assisted-by: Harry Mallon - Closes #11913 + This is added by default, and it is often broken, but we don't need + anything from it. -Viktor Szakats (8 Nov 2023) + Closes #13473 -- tidy-up: use `OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER` +Evgeny Grin (Karlson2k) (25 Apr 2024) - Uniformly use `OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER` to check for OpenSSL version. - Before this patch some places used `OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR`. +- curl_setup.h: detect 'inline' support - Also fix `lib/md4.c`, which included `opensslconf.h`, but that doesn't - define any version number in these implementations: BoringSSL, AWS-LC, - LibreSSL, wolfSSL. (Only in mainline OpenSSL/quictls). Switch that to - `opensslv.h`. This wasn't causing a deeper problem because the code is - looking for v3, which is only provided by OpenSSL/quictls as of now. + Closes #13355 - According to https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/17517, the macro - `OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER` is safe to use and not deprecated. +Daniel Stenberg (25 Apr 2024) - Reviewed-by: Marcel Raad - Closes #12298 +- multi: avoid memory-leak risk -Daniel Stenberg (8 Nov 2023) + 'newurl' is allocated in some conditions and used in a few scenarios, + but there were theoretical combinations in which it would not get freed. + Move the free to happen unconditionally. Never triggered by tests, but + spotted by Coverity. -- resolve.d: drop a multi use-sentence + Closes #13471 - Since the `multi:` keyword adds that message. +Johann Sebastian Schicho (25 Apr 2024) - Reported-by: 積丹尼 Dan Jacobson - Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/discussions/12294 - Closes #12295 +- sendf: Curl_cwriter_write: remove comment disallowing zero length writes -- content_encoding: make Curl_all_content_encodings allocless + They are needed to pass CLIENTWRITE_EOS. - - Fixes a memory leak pointed out by Coverity - - Also found by OSS-Fuzz: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail? - id=63947 - - Avoids unncessary allocations + Closes #13477 - Follow-up ad051e1cbec68b2456a22661b +Stefan Eissing (25 Apr 2024) - Closes #12289 +- CI: macos fixes for new ARM GHA images -Michael Kaufmann (7 Nov 2023) + - based on #13478 with additions from #13476 + - make homebrew install path flexible + - fix OpenSSL pkgconfig files libdir + - add path to --with-libssh2 target + - disable gcc securetransport due to linker + errors (missing symbols), probably because + the os version is no longer low enough -- vtls: use ALPN "http/1.1" for HTTP/1.x, including HTTP/1.0 + Assisted-by: Viktor Szakats - Some servers don't support the ALPN protocol "http/1.0" (e.g. IIS 10), - avoid it and use "http/1.1" instead. + Closes #13479 - This reverts commit df856cb5c9 (#10183). +- content_encoding: ignore duplicate chunked encoding - Fixes #12259 - Closes #12285 + - ignore duplicate "chunked" transfer-encodings from + a server to accomodate for broken implementations + - add test1482 and test1483 -Daniel Stenberg (7 Nov 2023) + Reported-by: Mel Zuser + Fixes #13451 + Closes #13461 -- Makefile.am: drop vc10, vc11 and vc12 projects from dist +Daniel Stenberg (25 Apr 2024) - They are end of life products. Support for generating them remain in the - repo for a while but this change drops them from distribution. +- tool: move tool_ftruncate64 to tool_util.c - Closes #12288 + ... and the prototype to tool_setup.h, to make them both available more + widely and accurately. -David Suter (7 Nov 2023) + Follow-up to 00bef95946d3511 -- projects: add VC14.20 project files + Fixes #13458 + Closes #13459 - Windows projects included VC14, VC14.10, VC14.30 but not VC14.20. - OpenSSL and Wolf SSL scripts mention VC14.20 so I don't see a reason why - this is missing. Updated the templates to produce a VC14.20 project. - Project opens in Visual Studio 2019 as expected. +Viktor Szakats (24 Apr 2024) - Closes #12282 +- lib: silence `-Wsign-conversion` in base64, strcase, mprintf -Daniel Stenberg (7 Nov 2023) + Closes #13467 -- curl: move IPFS code into src/tool_ipfs.[ch] +- CI: retain failure code after `./configure` with Circle CI - - convert ensure_trailing into ensure_trailing_slash - - strdup the URL string to own it proper - - use shorter variable names - - combine some expressions - - simplify error handling in ipfs_gateway() - - add MAX_GATEWAY_URL_LEN + proper bailout if maximum is reached - - ipfs-gateway.d polish and simplification - - shorten ipfs error message + make them "synthetic" + Suggested-by: Dan Fandrich + Follow-up to 43299e93c06b96fea8a8dc9b1c2e49c82bc21801 #13462 + Follow-up to d7332e3e46c3ef401b34e6a1a129eb4dd846c452 #12635 + Closes #13468 - Closes #12281 +Daniel Stenberg (24 Apr 2024) -Viktor Szakats (6 Nov 2023) +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced -- build: delete support bits for obsolete Windows compilers +Jan Venekamp (24 Apr 2024) - - Pelles C: Unclear status, failed to obtain a fresh copy a few months - ago. Possible website is HTTP-only. ~10 years ago I left this compiler - dealing with crashes and other issues with no response on the forum - for years. It has seen some activity in curl back in 2021. - - LCC: Last stable release in September 2002. - - Salford C: Misses winsock2 support, possibly abandoned? Last mentioned - in 2006. - - Borland C++: We dropped Borland C++ support in 2018. - - MS Visual C++ 6.0: Released in 1998. curl already requires VS 2010 - (or possibly 2008) as a minimum. +- mbedTLS: implement CURLOPT_SSL_CIPHER_LIST option - Closes #12222 + Use a lookup list to set the cipher suites, allowing the + ciphers to be set by either openssl or IANA names. -- build: delete `HAVE_STDINT_H` and `HAVE_INTTYPES_H` + To keep the binary size of the lookup list down we compress + each entry in the cipher list down to 2 + 6 bytes using the + C preprocessor. - We use `stdint.h` unconditionally in all places except one. These uses - are imposed by external dependencies / features. nghttp2, quic, wolfSSL - and `HAVE_MACH_ABSOLUTE_TIME` do require this C99 header. It means that - any of these features make curl require a C99 compiler. (In case of - MSVC, this means Visual Studio 2010 or newer.) + Closes #13442 - This patch changes the single use of `stdint.h` guarded by - `HAVE_STDINT_H` to use `stdint.h` unconditionally. Also stop using - `inttypes.h` as an alternative there. `HAVE_INTTYPES_H` wasn't used - anywhere else, allowing to delete this feature check as well. +Viktor Szakats (24 Apr 2024) - Closes #12275 +- CI: show more failed `config.log` on Circle CI -Daniel Stenberg (6 Nov 2023) + Show last 1000 lines of `config.log` if `./configure` fails. This was + already done for one job, this patch extends it to all. -- tool_operate: do not mix memory models + Ref: #13438 + Closes #13462 - Make sure 'inputpath' only points to memory allocated by libcurl so that - curl_free works correctly. +Daniel Stenberg (24 Apr 2024) - Pointed out by Coverity +- telnet: check return code from fileno() - Follow-up to 859e88f6533f9e1f890 + and return error if necessary - Closes #12280 + Spotted by CodeSonar -Stefan Eissing (6 Nov 2023) + Closes #13457 -- lib: client writer, part 2, accounting + logging +Viktor Szakats (24 Apr 2024) - This PR has these changes: +- tls: fix SecureTransport + BearSSL cmake unity builds - Renaming of unencode_* to cwriter, e.g. client writers - - documentation of sendf.h functions - - move max decode stack checks back to content_encoding.c - - define writer phase which was used as order before - - introduce phases for monitoring inbetween decode phases - - offering default implementations for init/write/close + Avoid clashing static function names by namespacing them. - Add type paramter to client writer's do_write() - - always pass all writes through the writer stack - - writers who only care about BODY data will pass other writes unchanged + Pointed-out-by: Jan Venekamp + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/13442#discussion_r1576350700 + Closes #13450 - add RAW and PROTOCOL client writers - - RAW used for Curl_debug() logging of CURLINFO_DATA_IN - - PROTOCOL used for updates to data->req.bytecount, max_filesize checks and - Curl_pgrsSetDownloadCounter() - - remove all updates of data->req.bytecount and calls to - Curl_pgrsSetDownloadCounter() and Curl_debug() from other code - - adjust test457 expected output to no longer see the excess write +Jay Satiro (24 Apr 2024) - Closes #12184 +- dllmain: Call OpenSSL thread cleanup for Windows and Cygwin -Daniel Stenberg (6 Nov 2023) + - Call OPENSSL_thread_stop on thread termination (DLL_THREAD_DETACH) + to prevent a memory leak in case OpenSSL is linked statically. -- VULN-DISCLOSURE-POLICY: escape sequences are not a security flaw + - Warn in libcurl-thread.3 that if OpenSSL is linked statically then it + may require thread cleanup. - Closes #12278 + OpenSSL may need per-thread cleanup to stop a memory leak. For Windows + and Cygwin if libcurl was built as a DLL then we can do that for the + user by calling OPENSSL_thread_stop on thread termination. However, if + libcurl was built statically then we do not have notification of thread + termination and cannot do that for the user. -Viktor Szakats (6 Nov 2023) + Also, there are several other unusual cases where it may be necessary + for the user to call OPENSSL_thread_stop, so in the libcurl-thread + warning I added a link to the OpenSSL documentation. -- rand: fix build error with autotools + LibreSSL + Co-authored-by: Viktor Szakats - autotools unexpectedly detects `arc4random` because it is also looking - into dependency libs. One dependency, LibreSSL, happens to publish an - `arc4random` function (via its shared lib before v3.7, also via static - lib as of v3.8.2). When trying to use this function in `lib/rand.c`, - its protoype is missing. To fix that, curl included a prototype, but - that used a C99 type without including `stdint.h`, causing: + Reported-by: southernedge@users.noreply.github.com + Reported-by: zmcx16@users.noreply.github.com - ``` - ../../lib/rand.c:37:1: error: unknown type name 'uint32_t' - 37 | uint32_t arc4random(void); - | ^ - 1 error generated. - ``` + Ref: https://www.openssl.org/docs/man3.0/man3/OPENSSL_thread_stop.html#NOTES - This patch improves this by dropping the local prototype and instead - limiting `arc4random` use for non-OpenSSL builds. OpenSSL builds provide - their own random source anyway. + Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/12327 + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12408 - The better fix would be to teach autotools to not link dependency libs - while detecting `arc4random`. +Jan Venekamp (24 Apr 2024) - LibreSSL publishing a non-namespaced `arc4random` tracked here: - https://github.com/libressl/portable/issues/928 +- rustls: remove incorrect SSLSUPP_TLS13_CIPHERSUITES flag - Regression from 755ddbe901cd0c921fbc3ac5b3775c0dc683bc73 #10672 + The rustls backend advertises SSLSUPP_TLS13_CIPHERSUITES, but + the code does not actually seem to support it (yet?). Removed + the flag and corrected documentation. - Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg - Fixes #12257 - Closes #12274 + Closes #13452 -Daniel Stenberg (5 Nov 2023) +Stefan Eissing (24 Apr 2024) -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced +- quiche: expire all active transfers on connection close -- strdup: do Curl_strndup without strncpy + - when a connection close is detected, all ongoing transfers + need to expire bc no more POLL events are likely to happen + for them. - To avoid (false positive) gcc-13 compiler warnings. + Fixes #13439 + Reported-by: Jay Satiro + Closes #13447 - Follow-up to 4855debd8a2c1cb +Dan Fandrich (23 Apr 2024) - Assisted-by: Jay Satiro - Reported-by: Viktor Szakats - Fixes #12258 +- tests: fix feature case in test1481 -Enno Boland (5 Nov 2023) + This test was being skipped everywhere because the feature never + matched. -- HTTP: fix empty-body warning + Closes #13445 - This change fixes a compiler warning with gcc-12.2.0 when - `-DCURL_DISABLE_BEARER_AUTH=ON` is used. +Gusted (23 Apr 2024) - /home/tox/src/curl/lib/http.c: In function 'Curl_http_input_auth': - /home/tox/src/curl/lib/http.c:1147:12: warning: suggest braces around emp - ty body in an 'else' statement [-Wempty-body] - 1147 | ; - | ^ +- tool_operate: don't truncate the etag save file by default - Closes #12262 + This fixes a regression of 75d79a4486b279100209ddf8c7fdb12955fb66e9. The + code in tool-operate truncated the etag save file, under the assumption + that the file would be written with a new etag value. However since + 75d79a4486b279100209ddf8c7fdb12955fb66e9 that might not be the case + anymore and could result in the file being truncated when --etag-compare + and --etag-save was used and that the etag value matched with what the + server responded. Instead the truncation should not be done when a new + etag value should be written. -Daniel Stenberg (5 Nov 2023) + Test 3204 was added to verify that the file with the etag value doesn't + change the contents when used by --etag-compare and --etage-save and + that value matches with what the server returns on a non 2xx response. -- openssl: identify the "quictls" backend correctly + Closes #13432 - Since vanilla OpenSSL does not support the QUIC API I think it helps - users to identify the correct OpenSSL fork in version output. The best - (crude) way to do that right now seems to be to check if ngtcp2 support - is enabled. +Abdullah Alyan (22 Apr 2024) - Closes #12270 +- tests: enable test 1117 for hyper -Mark Gaiser (5 Nov 2023) + Closes #13436 -- curl: improved IPFS and IPNS URL support +Daniel Stenberg (22 Apr 2024) - Previously just ipfs:// and ipns:// was supported, which is - too strict for some usecases. +- sendf: useless assignment in cr_lc_read() - This patch allows paths and query arguments to be used too. - Making this work according to normal http semantics: + Spotted by CodeSonar - ipfs:///foo/bar?key=val - ipns:///foo/bar?key=val + Closes #13437 - The gateway url support is changed. - It now only supports gateways in the form of: +- tool_paramhlp: remove duplicate assign - http:///foo/bar - http:// + Spotted by CodeSonar - Query arguments here are explicitly not allowed and trigger an intended - malformed url error. + Closes #13433 - There also was a crash when IPFS_PATH was set with a non trailing - forward slash. This has been fixed. +- transfer: remove useless assignment - Lastly, a load of test cases have been added to verify the above. + in Curl_xfer_recv_resp - Reported-by: Steven Allen - Fixes #12148 - Closes #12152 + Spotted by CodeSonar -Harry Mallon (5 Nov 2023) + Closes #13435 -- docs: KNOWN_BUGS cleanup +- http: acknowledge a returned error code - * Remove other mention of hyper memory-leaks from `KNOWN_BUGS`. - Should have been removed in 629723ecf22a8eae78d64cceec2f3bdae703ec95 + ... and do not overwrite it with a new value that could then hide the + problem. - * Remove mention of aws-sigv4 sort query string from `KNOWN_BUGS`. - Fixed in #11806 + Spotted by CodeSonar - * Remove mention of aws-sigv4 query empty value problems + Closes #13434 - * Remove mention of aws-sigv4 missing amz-content-sha256 - Fixed in #9995 +- tool_operate: init vars unconditionally in post_per_transfer -- http_aws_sigv4: canonicalise valueless query params + In case of (the unlikely) early return, they could otherwise remain + uninitialized - Fixes #8107 - Closes #12244 + Spotted by CodeSonar -Michael Kaufmann (4 Nov 2023) + Closes #13430 -- docs: preserve the modification date when copying the prebuilt man page +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced - The previously built man page "curl.1" must be copied with the original - modification date, otherwise the man page is never updated. +- urlapi: allow setting port number zero - This fixes a bug that has been introduced with commit 2568441cab. + Also set and check errno when strtoul() parsing numbers for better error + checking. - Reviewed-by: Dan Fandrich - Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Updated test 1560 - Closes #12199 + Closes #13427 -Daniel Stenberg (4 Nov 2023) +- http_aws_sigv4: remove useless assignment -- docs: remove bold from some man page SYNOPSIS sections + This code assigned the variable the same value it already had - In the name of consistency + Spotted by CodeSonar - Closes #12267 + Closes #13426 -- openssl: two multi pointer checks should probably rather be asserts +- file: remove useless assignment - ... so add the asserts now and consider removing the dynamic checks in a - future. + This code assigned the variable the same value it already had. - Ref: #12261 - Closes #12264 + Spotted by CodeSonar -boilingoden (4 Nov 2023) + Closes #13425 -- docs: add supported version for the json write-out +- test2406: verify -f with HTTP/2 - xref: https://curl.se/changes.html#7_70_0 +Stefan Eissing (19 Apr 2024) - Closes #12266 +- http2 + ngtcp2: pass CURLcode errors from callbacks -Viktor Szakats (3 Nov 2023) + - errors returned by Curl_xfer_write_resp() and the header variant are + not errors in the protocol. The result needs to be returned on the + next recv() from the protocol filter. -- appveyor: make VS2008-built curl tool runnable + - make xfer write errors for response data cause the stream to be + cancelled - By linking the CRT statically. This avoids the error about missing - runtime DLL `MSVCR90.dll` when running the freshly built `curl.exe`. + - added pytest test_02_14 and test_02_15 to verify that also for + parallel processing - Closes #12263 + Reported-by: Laramie Leavitt + Fixes #13411 + Closes #13424 -Stefan Eissing (3 Nov 2023) +Daniel Stenberg (19 Apr 2024) -- url: proxy ssl connection reuse fix +- request: make Curl_req_init return void - - tunnel https proxy used for http: transfers does - no check if proxy-ssl configuration matches - - test cases added, test_10_12 fails on 8.4.0 + Since it could not return error and therefore this change removes dead + code for the caller. - Closes #12255 + Spotted by CodeSonar. -Jay Satiro (3 Nov 2023) + Closes #13423 -- curl_sspi: support more revocation error names in error messages +- multi: remove the unused Curl_preconnect function - - Add these revocation errors to sspi error list: - CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_DLL, CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK, - CRYPT_E_REVOCATION_OFFLINE and CRYPT_E_NOT_IN_REVOCATION_DATABASE. + The implementation has been removed, no point in keeping it around. - Prior to this change those error codes were not matched to their macro - name and instead shown as "unknown error". + Follow-up to 476adfeac019ed - Before: + Closes #13422 - schannel: next InitializeSecurityContext failed: - Unknown error (0x80092013) - The revocation function was - unable to check revocation because the revocation server was offline. +- Curl_creader_read: init two variables to avoid using them uninited - After: + Spotted by CodeSonar - schannel: next InitializeSecurityContext failed: - CRYPT_E_REVOCATION_OFFLINE (0x80092013) - The revocation function was - unable to check revocation because the revocation server was offline. + Closes #13419 - Bug: https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/12239 - Reported-by: Niracler Li +- http: reject HTTP major version switch mid connection - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12241 + A connection that has seen an HTTP major version now refuses any other + major HTTP version in future responses. Previously, a HTTP/1.x + connection would just silently accept HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 in the status + lines as long as it had support for those built-in. It would then just + lead to confusion and badness. -- strdup: don't allow Curl_strndup to read past a null terminator + Indirectly Spotted by CodeSonar which identified a duplicate assignment + in this function. - - Use malloc + strncpy instead of Curl_memdup to dupe the string before - null terminating it. + Add test 471 to verify - Prior to this change if Curl_strndup was passed a length longer than - the allocated string then it could copy out of bounds. + Closes #13421 - This change is for posterity. Curl_strndup was added in the parent - commit and currently none of the calls to it pass a length that would - cause it to read past the allocated length of the input. +- mqtt: when Curl_xfer_recv returns error, don't use nread - Follow-up to d3b3ba35. + A returned error code makes other return value unreliable, and in this + case potentially uninitialized. On error, do not read other return + values like the nread counter. - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12254 + Spotted by CodeSonar -Daniel Stenberg (2 Nov 2023) + Closes #13418 -- lib: add and use Curl_strndup() +- ftp: fix socket leak on rare error - The Curl_strndup() function is similar to memdup(), but copies 'n' bytes - then adds a terminating null byte ('\0'). + In the function AcceptServerConnect() the newly created socket would + leak if Curl_conn_tcp_accepted_set() returns error. Which basically + should never happen. - Closes #12251 + Spotted by CodeSonar. -- CURPOST_POSTFIELDS.3: add CURLOPT_COPYPOSTFIELDS in SEE ALSO + Closes #13417 -Stefan Eissing (2 Nov 2023) +- urlapi: remove unused flags argument from Curl_url_set_authority -- pytest: use lower count in repeat tests + The function is only called from a single place (for HTTP/2 server push) + so might as well just assume this fixed option every time. - - lower large iteration counts in some tests somewhat for - the same coverage with less duration + Closes #13409 - Closes #12248 +- github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE: tweak the commericual support text -Daniel Stenberg (2 Nov 2023) +- github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE: link the GitHub discussions too -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced + ... and move the feature request line to the bottom. -- docs: clarify that curl passes on input unfiltered +- curl_url_get.md: clarify queries and fragments and CURLU_GET_EMPTY - ... for several options. + Follow-up to 3eac21d86bc5 - Reported-by: Ophir Lojkine + Closes #13407 - Closes #12249 +Stefan Eissing (18 Apr 2024) -- urlapi: when URL encoding the fragment, pass in the right length +- tests: check caddy server version to match test expectations - A benign bug because it would only add an extra null terminator. + - new caddy servers no longer return 200 on POSTs, but 405 + as they should - Made lib1560 get a test that runs this code. + Closes #13405 - Closes #12250 +Daniel Stenberg (18 Apr 2024) -Stefan Eissing (2 Nov 2023) +- curl_url_set.md: extended -- vtls: late clone of connection ssl config + Closes #13404 - - perform connection cache matching against `data->set.ssl.primary` - and proxy counterpart - - fully clone connection ssl config only when connection is used +- urlapi: add CURLU_GET_EMPTY for empty queries and fragments - Closes #12237 + By default the API inhibits empty queries and fragments extracted. + Unless this new flag is set. -- msh3: error when built with CURL_DISABLE_SOCKETPAIR set + This also makes the behavior more consistent: without it set, zero + length queries and fragments are considered not present in the URL. With + the flag set, they are returned as a zero length strings if they were in + fact present in the URL. - Reported-by: Gisle Vanem - Closes #12252 - Fixes #12213 + This applies when extracting the individual query and fragment + components and for the full URL. -Daniel Stenberg (2 Nov 2023) + Closes #13396 -- hsts: skip single-dot hostname +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced - Reported-by: Maksymilian Arciemowicz +- lib1560: test with leading zeroes and more IPv4 versions - Closes #12247 + Inspired by WHATWG URL Spec test inputs -- vtls: fix build without proxy + Closes #13400 - Follow-up to bf0e278a3c54bc7fee7360da17c +Christian Schmitz (17 Apr 2024) - closes #12243 +- smtp: result of Curl_bufq_cread was not used -- docs/example/keepalive.c: show TCP keep-alive options + return the result back to the caller. - Closes #12242 + Closes #13398 -- lib1560: verify appending blank URL encoded query string +Daniel Stenberg (17 Apr 2024) -- urlapi: skip appending NULL pointer query +- urlapi: fix relative redirects to fragment-only - Reported-by: kirbyn17 on hackerone + Using the URL API for a redirect URL when the redirected-to string + starts with a hash, ie is only a fragment, the API would produce the + wrong final URL. - Closes #12240 + Adjusted test 1560 to test for several new redirect cases. -- lib1560: verify setting host to "" with and without URL encode + Closes #13394 -- urlapi: avoid null deref if setting blank host to url encode +Jiwoo Park (17 Apr 2024) - Reported-by: kirbyn17 on hackerone +- url: fix use of an uninitialized variable - Closes #12240 + Closes #13399 -- dynbuf: assert for NULL pointer inputs +Patrick Monnerat (17 Apr 2024) - Help us catch more mistakes. +- os400: sync with latest changes - Closes #12238 + - Conversion support for new version info character field rtmp_version. + - New ILE/RPG declarations. -- HTTP3: ngtcp2 builds are no longer experimental + Closes #13402 - The other HTTP/3 backends are still experimental. +Daniel Stenberg (17 Apr 2024) - Closes #12235 +- ngtcp2: fix macro use -Stefan Eissing (31 Oct 2023) + macro "H3_STREAM_CTX" requires 2 arguments, but only 1 given -- vtls: cleanup SSL config management + Follow-up to c6655f7029ec5c128561e3ecf1f93db3ed0432a4 - - remove `Curl_ssl_get_config()`, no longer needed + Closes #13401 - Closes #12204 +Christian Schmitz (17 Apr 2024) -Daniel Stenberg (31 Oct 2023) +- sendf: fix two typos in comments -- libcurl-thread.3: simplify the TLS section + The parameters are named data, not date. - All TLS libraries curl can use are threadsafe since OpenSSL 1.1.x, August - 2016. + Closes #13393 - Closes #12233 +- lib: silence warnings on comma misuse -- configure: better --disable-http + Building curl with -Wcomma, I see warnings about "possible misuse of + comma operator here" and moving fields assignment out of the for() fixes + it. - - disable HTTPS-proxy as well, since it can't work without HTTP + Closes #13392 - - curl_setup: when HTTP is disabled, also disable all features that are - HTTP-only +Stefan Eissing (17 Apr 2024) - - version: HTTPS-proxy only exists if HTTP support exists +- http/2, http/3: decouple stream state from easy handle - Closes #12223 + - add `Curl_hash_offt` as hashmap between a `curl_off_t` and + an object. Use this in h2+h3 connection filters to associate + `data->id` with the internal stream state. + - changed implementations of all affected connection filters + - removed `h2_ctx*` and `h3_ctx*` from `struct HTTP` and thus + the easy handle + - solves the problem of attaching "foreign protocol" easy handles + during connection shutdown -- http: consider resume with CURLOPT_FAILONERRROR and 416 to be fine + Test 1616 verifies the new hash functions. - Finding a 'Content-Range:' in the response changed the handling. + Closes #13204 - Add test case 1475 to verify -C - with 416 and Content-Range: header, - which is almost exactly like test 194 which instead uses a fixed -C - offset. Adjusted test 194 to also be considered fine. +Daniel Stenberg (17 Apr 2024) - Fixes #10521 - Reported-by: Smackd0wn - Fixes #12174 - Reported-by: Anubhav Rai - Closes #12176 +- ROADMAP: remove completed entries, mention websocket -Stefan Eissing (30 Oct 2023) +- THANKS-filter: name fixes -- GHA: fix checkout of quictls repository to use correct branch name +Christian Schmitz (17 Apr 2024) - Follow-up to c868b0e30f10cd0ac7 +- winbuild: add ENABLE_WEBSOCKETS option - Closes #12232 + Closes #13232 -Daniel Stenberg (30 Oct 2023) +Daniel Stenberg (17 Apr 2024) -- docs/example/localport.c: show off CURLOPT_LOCALPORT +- dmaketgz: compacter - Closes #12230 + Removes the need for disabling shellcheck warnings. -- docs/examples/interface.c: show CURLOPT_INTERFACE use + Follow-up to d28f74913c2 + Proposed-by: Viktor Szakats + Closes #13391 - Although super simple. +Dan Fandrich (16 Apr 2024) - Closes #12229 +- tests: Fix uninitialized value warning -Viktor Szakats (30 Oct 2023) + The check for an option must be predicated on options existing at all. -- build: fix compiler warning with auths disabled + Follow-up to f7cc9e91 +Christian Schmitz (17 Apr 2024) + +- idn: add native AppleIDN (icucore) support for macOS/iOS + + I implemented the IDN functions for macOS and iOS using Unicode + libraries coming with macOS and iOS. + + Builds and runs here on macOS 14.2.1. Also verified to load and + run on older macOS version 10.13. + + Build requires macOS SDK 13 or equivalent. + + Set `-DUSE_APPLE_IDN=ON` CMake option to enable it. + With autotools and other build tools, set these manual options: ``` - ./curl/lib/http.c:979:12: warning: unused function 'is_valid_auth_separator' - [-Wunused-function] - static int is_valid_auth_separator(char ch) - ^ - 5 warnings generated. + CPPFLAGS=-DUSE_APPLE_IDN + LIBS=-licucore ``` - Follow-up to e92edfbef64448ef461117769881f3ed776dec4e #11490 + Completes TODO 1.6. - Closes #12227 + TODO: add autotools option and feature-detection. -- build: require Windows XP or newer - - After this patch we assume availability of `getaddrinfo` and - `freeaddrinfo`, first introduced in Windows XP. Meaning curl - now requires building for Windows XP as a minimum. + Refs: #5330 #5371 + Co-authored-by: Viktor Szakats + Closes #13246 - TODO: assume these also in autotools. +Stefan Eissing (16 Apr 2024) - Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12221#issuecomment-1783761806 - Closes #12225 +- http3: extend download abort tests, fixes in ngtcp2 -- appveyor: bump one job to OpenSSL 3.1 (was 1.1.1) + - fix flow handling in ngtcp2 to ACK data on streams + we abort ourself. + - extend test_02_23* cases to also run for h3 + - skip test_02_23* for OpenSSL QUIC as it gets stalled + on progressing the connection - Use 3.1 with the modern runner image. + Closes #13374 - We still use 1.1.1 in 8 jobs. +Daniel Stenberg (16 Apr 2024) - 1.1.1 is EOL since 2023-09-11: - https://www.openssl.org/blog/blog/2023/03/28/1.1.1-EOL/ +- tests: add -q as first option when invoking curl for tests - Also: - - add missing SSL-backend to job descriptions. - - tidy up CPU in job descriptions. + To reduce the risk that the user running the tests has a .curlrc present + that messes things up. - Closes #12226 + Support 'option="no-q"' for the tag to switch it off on demand. + Use this new feature in test 433 and 436. -Daniel Stenberg (30 Oct 2023) + Ref: #13284 + Closes #13387 -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced +- dmaketgz: release tarball generation using docker -- GHA: bump ngtcp2, nghttp3, nghttp2 and quictls versions + For easier reproducibility. - ngtcp2 1.0.1 - nghttp3 1.0.0 - nghttp2 1.58.0 - quictls 3.1.4+quic + Mention using this script in RELEASE-PROCEDURE - also sync HTTP3.md with these changes + Closes #13388 - Closes #12132 +Viktor Szakats (16 Apr 2024) -Kareem (29 Oct 2023) +- cmake: update ECH code and minor fixups -- wolfssl: add default case for wolfssl_connect_step1 switch + - `openssl_check_symbol_exists()` expects a 4th argument now. + Follow-up to edc2702a1fe3a4a5386ffd9aa4f240f0c0197fa2 #13373 - Closes #12218 + - minor comment/script touch-ups. + Follow-up to a362962b7289ec02b412890c9515657cf0ed50ac #11922 -Jay Satiro (29 Oct 2023) + - fix indentation. -- curl_setup: disallow Windows IPv6 builds missing getaddrinfo + Closes #13383 - - On Windows if IPv6 is enabled but getaddrinfo is missing then #error - the build. +- tests: fix shellcheck issues in `ech_tests.sh` - curl can be built with IPv6 support (ENABLE_IPV6) but without the - ability to resolve hosts to IPv6 addresses (HAVE_GETADDRINFO). On - Windows this is highly unlikely and should be considered a bad build - configuration. + Add double-quotes where missing. - Such a bad configuration has already given us a bug that was hard to - diagnose. See #12134 and #12136 for discussion. + Follow-up to a362962b7289ec02b412890c9515657cf0ed50ac #11922 + Closes #13382 - Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/12134 - Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12136 +- dist: add ECH files to tarball - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12221 + Also sort `EXTRA_DIST` list in `tests/Makefile.am` and make it diffable. -Nico Rieck (29 Oct 2023) + Follow-up to a362962b7289ec02b412890c9515657cf0ed50ac #11922 + Closes #13381 -- openssl: make CURLSSLOPT_NATIVE_CA import Windows intermediate CAs +- openvms: look for `USE_IPV6` in `config.h` (was: `ENABLE_IPV6`) - - If CURLSSLOPT_NATIVE_CA on Windows then import from intermediate CA - "CA" store after importing from root CA "ROOT" store. + The OpenVMS script `config_h.com` is parsing the config header + generated by autotools. Let's make it look for the macro name we now + use universally across the codebase. - This change allows curl to work in situations where a server does not - send all intermediate certs and they are present in the "CA" store (the - store with intermediate CAs). This is already allowed by the Schannel - backend. + Follow-up to e411c98f702f0fb38dceec95e7507ef15a00d12c #13349 + Closes #13360 - Also this change makes partial chain verification possible for those - certs since we allow partial chain verification by default for OpenSSL - (unless CURLSSLOPT_NO_PARTIALCHAIN). This is not allowed by the Schannel - backend. +daniel-j-h (16 Apr 2024) - Prior to this change CURLSSLOPT_NATIVE_CA only imported "ROOT" certs. +- Dockerfile: for release automation and reproducibility - Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/12155 - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12185 + Closes #13250 -Viktor Szakats (28 Oct 2023) +Stefan Eissing (16 Apr 2024) -- Makefile.mk: fix `-rtmp` option for non-Windows [ci skip] +- cw-out: improved error handling -Daniel Stenberg (28 Oct 2023) + - remember error encountered in invoking write callback and always fail + afterwards without further invokes -- asyn-ares: handle no connection in the addrinfo callback + - check behaviour in test_02_17 with h2-pausing client - To avoid crashing. + Reported-by: Pavel Kropachev + Fixes #13337 + Closes #13340 - Follow-up from 56a4db2 - Closes #12219 +Daniel Stenberg (16 Apr 2024) -Jay Satiro (28 Oct 2023) +- version: add "ECH" as a feature -- hostip6: fix DEBUG_ADDRINFO builds + If available - - Removed unused and incorrect parameter from dump_addrinfo(). + Follow-up to a362962b7 + Closes #13378 - Bug: https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/56a4db2e#commitcomment-131050442 - Reported-by: Gisle Vanem +- CURLOPT_ECH: polish - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12212 + - remove the pointer to build instructions, it won't work in manpages + - add see-also + - minor white space edits -Viktor Szakats (28 Oct 2023) + Closes #13379 -- Makefile.mk: restore `_mingw.h` for default `_WIN32_WINNT` +Viktor Szakats (16 Apr 2024) - In 8.4.0 we deleted `_mingw.h` as part of purging old-mingw support. - Turns out `_mingw.h` had the side-effect of setting a default - `_WIN32_WINNT` value expected by `lib/config-win32.h` to enable - `getaddrinfo` support in `Makefile.mk` mingw-w64 builds. This caused - disabling support for this unless specifying the value manually. +- tidy-up: whitespace [ci skip] - Restore this header and update its comment to tell why we continue - to need it. +- mbedtls: fix building with v3 in CMake Unity mode - This triggered a regression in official Windows curl builds starting - with 8.4.0_1. Fixed in 8.4.0_6. (8.5.0 will be using CMake.) + Before this patch the internal feature detection macro + `HAS_MBEDTLS_RESULT_CODE_BASED_FUNCTIONS` was defined in three files, + with an incomplete logic in one of them. In Unity mode that spilled + into another source file and broke the build. - Regression from 38029101e2d78ba125732b3bab6ec267b80a0e72 #11625 + Closes #13377 - Reported-by: zhengqwe on github - Helped-by: Nico Rieck - Fixes #12134 - Fixes #12136 - Closes #12217 +- cmake: add librtmp/rtmpdump option and detection -- hostip: silence compiler warning `-Wparentheses-equality` + Add CMake option `USE_LIBRTMP`. Disabled by default. - Seen with LLVM 17. + This library requires OpenSSL TLS-backend when linked statically. - ``` - hostip.c:1336:22: warning: equality comparison with extraneous parentheses [- - Wparentheses-equality] - 1336 | (a->ai_family == PF_INET)) { - | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~ - hostip.c:1336:22: note: remove extraneous parentheses around the comparison t - o silence this warning - 1336 | (a->ai_family == PF_INET)) { - | ~ ^ ~ - hostip.c:1336:22: note: use '=' to turn this equality comparison into an assi - gnment - 1336 | (a->ai_family == PF_INET)) { - | ^~ - | = - 1 warning generated. - ``` + Follow-up to 6eb9e65781fa1fd8a0bcfe0715187a3a35f09ae4 #13364 + Closes #13373 - Follow-up to b651aba0962bb31353f55de4dc35f745952a1b10 #12145 +Stephen Farrell (16 Apr 2024) - Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg - Closes #12215 +- TLS: add support for ECH (Encrypted Client Hello) -Stefan Eissing (27 Oct 2023) + An EXPERIMENTAL feature used with CURLOPT_ECH and --ech. -- doh: use PIPEWAIT when HTTP/2 is attempted + Closes #11922 - Closes #12214 +Daniel Stenberg (15 Apr 2024) -Daniel Stenberg (27 Oct 2023) +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced -- setopt: remove outdated cookie comment +- multi: introduce SETUP state for better timeouts - Closes #12206 + Since we can go to the CONNECT state from PENDING, potentially multiple + times for a single transfer, this change introdues a SETUP state that + happens before CONNECT when doing a new transfer. -Stefan Eissing (27 Oct 2023) + Now, doing a redirect on a handle goes back to SETUP (not CONNECT like + before) and we initilize the connect timeout etc in SETUP. Previously, + we would do it in CONNECT but that would make it unreliable in cases + where a transfer goes in and out between CONNECT and PENDING multiple + times. -- cfilter: provide call to tell connection to forget a socket + SETUP is transient, so the handle never actually stays in that state. - - fixed libssh.c workaround for a socket being closed by - the library - - eliminate the terrible hack in cf-socket.c to guess when - this happened and try not closing the socket again. - - fixes race in eyeballing when socket could have failed to - be closed for a discarded connect attempt + Additionally: take care of timeouts of PENDING transfers in + curl_multi_perform() - Closes #12207 + Ref: #13227 + Closes #13371 -- url: protocol handler lookup tidy-up +Tal Regev (15 Apr 2024) - - rename lookup to what it does - - use ARRAYSIZE instead of NULL check for end - - offer alternate lookup for 0-terminated strings +- cmake: forward `USE_LIBRTMP` option to C - Closes #12216 + Define in C `USE_LIBRTMP` if user requested it from cmake. -Viktor Szakats (27 Oct 2023) + Closes #13364 -- build: variadic macro tidy-ups +Daniel Stenberg (15 Apr 2024) - - delete unused `HAVE_VARIADIC_MACROS_C99/GCC` feature checks. - (both autotools and CMake.) - - delete duplicate `NULL` check in `Curl_trc_cf_infof()`. - - fix compiler warning in `CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS` builds. - ``` - ./lib/cf-socket.c:122:41: warning: unused parameter 'data' [-Wunused-parame - ter] - static void nosigpipe(struct Curl_easy *data, - ^ - ``` - - fix `#ifdef` comments in `lib/curl_trc.{c,h}`. - - fix indentation in some `infof()` calls. +- curl_version_info: provide librtmp version - Follow-up to dac293cfb7026b1ca4175d88b80f1432d3d3c684 #12167 + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/13364#issuecomment-2054151942 + Reported-by: talregev on github + Closes #13368 - Cherry-picked from #12105 - Closes #12210 +blankie (15 Apr 2024) -- cmake: speed up threads setup for Windows +- docs: clarify CURLOPT_MAXFILESIZE and CURLOPT_MAXFILESIZE_LARGE - Win32 threads are always available. We enabled them unconditionally - (with `ENABLE_THREADED_RESOLVER`). CMake built-in thread detection - logic has this condition hard-coded for Windows as well (since at least - 2007). + The bounds of the size parameter were not specified, and nor was it + specified how to disable the maximum file size check. - Instead of doing all the work of detecting pthread combinations on - Windows, then discarding those results, skip these efforts and assume - built-in thread support when building for Windows. + The documentation also incorrectly stated that CURLOPT_MAXFILESIZE + always returns CURLE_OK and that CURLOPT_MAXFILESIZE_LARGE only returns + CURLE_OK or CURLE_UNKNOWN_OPTION. - This saves 1-3 slow CMake configuration steps. + It also did not mention what the default value is, which is zero. This + commit updates the documentation to make note of all these things. - Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg - Closes #12202 + Closes #13372 -- cmake: speed up zstd detection +Patrick Monnerat (15 Apr 2024) - Before this patch we detected the presence of a specific zstd API to - see if we can use the library. zstd published that API in its first - stable release: v1.0.0 (2016-08-31). +- OS400: post-shellcheck changes adjustments - Replace that method by detecting the zstd library version instead and - accepting if it's v1.0.0 or newer. Also display this detected version - and display a warning if the zstd found is unfit for curl. + Build scripts must be executed by the os/400 shell (sh), not bash which + is a PASE program. - We use the same version detection method as zstd itself, via its public - C header. + Shell function get_make_vars() escaping reworked to match $() subcommand + construct. - This deviates from autotools which keeps using the slow method of - looking for the API by building a test program. The outcome is the same - as long as zstd keeps offering this API. + Follow-up to 8a622baf9e9233241bbe93d6599c99cb46478614 + Closes #13366 - Ref: https://github.com/facebook/zstd/commit/5a0c8e24395079f8e8cdc90aa1659cd5 - ab1b7427 (2016-08-12, committed) - Ref: https://github.com/facebook/zstd/releases/tag/v0.8.1 (2016-08-18, first - released) - Ref: https://github.com/facebook/zstd/releases/tag/v1.0.0 +Viktor Szakats (15 Apr 2024) - Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg - Closes #12200 +- OS400: tidy-up -Daniel Stenberg (26 Oct 2023) + Drop/fixup mods trying to make some syntax highlighters happier. -- openssl: fix infof() to avoid compiler warning for %s with null + Follow-up to 8a622baf9e9233241bbe93d6599c99cb46478614 #13309 + Closes #13362 - vtls/openssl.c: In function ‘ossl_connect_step2’: - ../lib/curl_trc.h:120:10: error: ‘%s’ directive argument is null [-Werror - =format-overflow=] - 120 | Curl_infof(data, __VA_ARGS__); } while(0) - | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - vtls/openssl.c:4008:5: note: in expansion of macro ‘infof’ - 4008 | infof(data, "SSL connection using %s / %s / %s / %s", - | ^~~~~ - vtls/openssl.c:4008:49: note: format string is defined here - 4008 | infof(data, "SSL connection using %s / %s / %s / %s", - | ^~ +Daniel Stenberg (15 Apr 2024) - Follow-up to b6e6d4ff8f253c8b8055bab - Closes #12196 +- multi: timeout handles even without connection -Stefan Eissing (26 Oct 2023) + When there is a "change" in a multi handle and pending handles are moved + back to the main list to be retested if they can proceed further (for + example a previous transfer completed or a connection has a confirmed + multiplexed state), the timeout check in multi_runsingle() would not + trigger because it required an established connection. -- lib: apache style infof and trace macros/functions + This could make a pending tranfer go back to pending state even though + it had been "in progress" for a longer time than permitted. By removing + the requirement for an associated connection, the timeout check will be + done proper even for transfers that has not yet been assigned one. - - test for a simplified C99 variadic check - - args to infof() in --disable-verbose are no longer disregarded but - must compile. + Ref #13227 + Reported-by: Rahul Krishna M + Closes #13276 - Closes #12167 - Fixes #12083 - Fixes #11880 - Fixes #11891 +Patrick Monnerat (15 Apr 2024) -Daniel Stenberg (26 Oct 2023) +- mprintf: check fputc error rather than matching returned character -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced + OS/400 ascii fputc wrapper deviates from the posix standard by the + fact that it returns the ebcdic encoding of the original ascii + character. Testing for a matching value for success will then always + fail. -Stefan Eissing (26 Oct 2023) + This commit replaces the chariacter comparison by an explicit error + return check. -- urldata: move async resolver state from easy handle to connectdata + Follow-up to ef2cf58 + Closes #13367 - - resolving is done for a connection, not for every transfer - - save create/dup/free of a cares channel for each transfer - - check values of setopt calls against a local channel if no - connection has been attached yet, when needed. +Viktor Szakats (14 Apr 2024) - Closes #12198 +- ci: add CMake build variation, fixup libssh detection in `linux-old` -Daniel Stenberg (26 Oct 2023) + To test without c-ares and hit `easy_lock.h` on an old system. Use this + new build step to introduce small variations, and also test libssh2. -- CURLOPT_WRITEFUNCTION.3: clarify what libcurl returns for CURL_WRITEFUNC_ERRO - R + Also add workaround to existing job to enable libssh. (CMake's generic + auto-detection doesn't seem to work here.): + ``` + CMake Warning at CMakeLists.txt:908 (find_package): + Could not find a package configuration file provided by "libssh" with any + of the following names: - It returns CURLE_WRITE_ERROR. It was not previously stated clearly. + libsshConfig.cmake + libssh-config.cmake + ``` + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/actions/runs/8661316091/job/23750974358#ste + p:5:69 - Reported-by: enWILLYado on github - Fixes #12201 - Closes #12203 + Closes #13361 -Viktor Szakats (25 Oct 2023) +- lib: merge `ENABLE_QUIC` C macro into `USE_HTTP3` -- autotools: update references to deleted `crypt-auth` option + Before this patch `lib/curl_setup.h` defined these two macros right + next to each other, then the source code used them interchangeably. - Delete leftovers of the `crypt-auth` `./configure` option and - add the new ones that replaced them. + After this patch, `USE_HTTP3` guards all HTTP/3 / QUIC features. + (Like `USE_HTTP2` does for HTTP/2.) `ENABLE_QUIC` is no longer used. - Follow-up to e92edfbef64448ef461117769881f3ed776dec4e #11490 + This patch doesn't change the way HTTP/3 is enabled via autotools + or CMake. Builders who enabled HTTP/3 manually by defining both of + these macros via `CPPFLAGS` can now delete `-DENABLE_QUIC`. - Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg - Closes #12194 - -Stefan Eissing (25 Oct 2023) - -- lib: introduce struct easy_poll_set for poll information - - Connection filter had a `get_select_socks()` method, inspired by the - various `getsocks` functions involved during the lifetime of a - transfer. These, depending on transfer state (CONNECT/DO/DONE/ etc.), - return sockets to monitor and flag if this shall be done for POLLIN - and/or POLLOUT. - - Due to this design, sockets and flags could only be added, not - removed. This led to problems in filters like HTTP/2 where flow control - prohibits the sending of data until the peer increases the flow - window. The general transfer loop wants to write, adds POLLOUT, the - socket is writeable but no data can be written. - - This leads to cpu busy loops. To prevent that, HTTP/2 did set the - `SEND_HOLD` flag of such a blocked transfer, so the transfer loop cedes - further attempts. This works if only one such filter is involved. If a - HTTP/2 transfer goes through a HTTP/2 proxy, two filters are - setting/clearing this flag and may step on each other's toes. - - Connection filters `get_select_socks()` is replaced by - `adjust_pollset()`. They get passed a `struct easy_pollset` that keeps - up to `MAX_SOCKSPEREASYHANDLE` sockets and their `POLLIN|POLLOUT` - flags. This struct is initialized in `multi_getsock()` by calling the - various `getsocks()` implementations based on transfer state, as before. - - After protocol handlers/transfer loop have set the sockets and flags - they want, the `easy_pollset` is *always* passed to the filters. Filters - "higher" in the chain are called first, starting at the first - not-yet-connection one. Each filter may add sockets and/or change - flags. When all flags are removed, the socket itself is removed from the - pollset. + Closes #13352 - Example: +- build: prefer `USE_IPV6` macro internally (was: `ENABLE_IPV6`) - * transfer wants to send, adds POLLOUT - * http/2 filter has a flow control block, removes POLLOUT and adds - POLLIN (it is waiting on a WINDOW_UPDATE from the server) - * TLS filter is connected and changes nothing - * h2-proxy filter also has a flow control block on its tunnel stream, - removes POLLOUT and adds POLLIN also. - * socket filter is connected and changes nothing - * The resulting pollset is then mixed together with all other transfers - and their pollsets, just as before. + Before this patch, two macros were used to guard IPv6 features in curl + sources: `ENABLE_IPV6` and `USE_IPV6`. This patch makes the source use + the latter for consistency with other similar switches. - Use of `SEND_HOLD` is no longer necessary in the filters. + `-DENABLE_IPV6` remains accepted for compatibility as a synonym for + `-DUSE_IPV6`, when passed to the compiler. - All filters are adapted for the changed method. The handling in - `multi.c` has been adjusted, but its state handling the the protocol - handlers' `getsocks` method are untouched. + `ENABLE_IPV6` also remains the name of the CMake and `Makefile.vc` + options to control this feature. - The most affected filters are http/2, ngtcp2, quiche and h2-proxy. TLS - filters needed to be adjusted for the connecting handshake read/write - handling. + Closes #13349 - No noticeable difference in performance was detected in local scorecard - runs. +Dan Fandrich (12 Apr 2024) - Closes #11833 +- DISTROS: mark rolling release distros -Daniel Stenberg (25 Oct 2023) + These are ones that are unlikely to have back-ported curl patches. -- tests/README: SOCKS tests are not using OpenSSH, it has its own server + Closes #13353 - Follow-up to 04fd67555cc +Daniel Stenberg (12 Apr 2024) - Closes #12195 +- mbedtls: cut off trailing newlines from debug logs -Jacob Hoffman-Andrews (25 Oct 2023) + To avoid double newlines in the output. -- tets: make test documentation more user-friendly + Reported-by: Gisle Vanem + Fixes #13321 + Closes #13356 - Put the instructions to run tests right at the top of tests/README.md. +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced - Give instructions to read the runtests.1 man page for information - about flags. Delete redundant copy of the flags documentation in the - README. +Stefan Eissing (12 Apr 2024) - Add a mention in README.md of the important parallelism flag, to make - test runs go much faster. +- CURLINFO_REQUEST_SIZE: fixed, add tests for transfer infos reported - Move documentation of output line format into the runtests.1 man page, - and update it with missing flags. + - tests for 'size_request' and other stats reported, for + presence and consistency - Fix the order of two flags in the man page. + Reported-by: Jonatan Vela + Fixes #13269 + Closes #13275 - Closes #12193 +Viktor Szakats (11 Apr 2024) -Viktor Szakats (24 Oct 2023) +- dist: add files missing from release tarball -- cmake: pre-fill rest of detection values for Windows + Closes #13346 - The goal of this patch is to avoid unnecessary feature detection work - when doing Windows builds with CMake. Do this by pre-filling well-known - detection results for Windows and specifically for mingw-w64 and MSVC - compilers. Also limit feature checks to platforms where the results are - actually used. Drop a few redundant ones. And some tidying up. +- ci: parallelize more, tidy up cmake commands (distcheck, macos) - - pre-fill remaining detection values in Windows CMake builds. + Also enable `-DCURL_WERROR=ON` in the Linux cmake build test. - Based on actual detection results observed in CI runs, preceding - similar work over libssh2 and matching up values with - `lib/config-win32.h`. + Closes #13343 - This brings down CMake configuration time from 58 to 14 seconds on the - same local machine. +Toon Claes (11 Apr 2024) - On AppVeyor CI this translates to: - - 128 seconds -> 50 seconds VS2022 MSVC with OpenSSL (per CMake job): - https://ci.appveyor.com/project/curlorg/curl/builds/48208419/job/4gw66ecr - jpy7necb#L296 - https://ci.appveyor.com/project/curlorg/curl/builds/48217440/job/8m4fwrr2 - fe249uo8#L186 - - 62 seconds -> 16 seconds VS2017 MINGW (per CMake job): - https://ci.appveyor.com/project/curlorg/curl/builds/48208419/job/s1y8q5iv - lcs7ub29?fullLog=true#L290 - https://ci.appveyor.com/project/curlorg/curl/builds/48217440/job/pchpxyjs - yc9kl13a?fullLog=true#L194 +- docs: add CURLOPT_NOPROGRESS to CURLOPT_XFERINFOFUNCTION example - The formula is about 1-3 seconds delay for each detection. Almost all - of these trigger a full compile-link cycle behind the scenes, slow - even today, both cross and native, mingw-w64 and apparently MSVC too. - Enabling .map files or other custom build features slows it down - further. (Similar is expected for autotools configure.) + It's important to set `CURLOPT_NOPROGRESS` to `0` if you want your + transfer callback function, set by `CURLOPT_XFERINFOFUNCTION`, getting + called. To emphasize this to the users, add this to the code example. - - stop detecting `idn2.h` if idn2 was deselected. - autotools does this. + Closes #13348 - - stop detecting `idn2.h` if idn2 was not found. - This deviates from autotools. Source code requires both header and - lib, so this is still correct, but faster. +RainRat (11 Apr 2024) - - limit `ADDRESS_FAMILY` detection to Windows. +- misc: fix typos - - normalize `HAVE_WIN32_WINNT` value to lowercase `0x0a12` format. + Closes #13344 - - pre-fill `HAVE_WIN32_WINNT`-dependent detection results. - Saving 4 (slow) feature-detections in most builds: `getaddrinfo`, - `freeaddrinfo`, `inet_ntop`, `inet_pton` +Colin Leroy-Mira (11 Apr 2024) - - fix pre-filled `HAVE_SYS_TIME_H`, `HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H`, - `HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY` for mingw-w64. - Luckily this do not change build results, as `WIN32` took - priority over `HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY` with the current source - code. +- file: add support for getting basic directory listings - - limit `HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME_MONOTONIC_RAW` and - `HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME_MONOTONIC` detections to non-Windows. - We're not using these in the source code for Windows. + Not supported on Windows (yet) - - reduce compiler warning noise in CMake internal logs: - - fix to include `winsock2.h` before `windows.h`. - Apply it to autotools test snippets too. - - delete previous `-D_WINSOCKAPI_=` hack that aimed to fix the above. - - cleanup `CMake/CurlTests.c` to emit less warnings. + Closes #13137 - - delete redundant `HAVE_MACRO_SIGSETJMP` feature check. - It was the same check as `HAVE_SIGSETJMP`. +Viktor Szakats (11 Apr 2024) - - delete 'experimental' marking from `CURL_USE_OPENSSL`. +- ci: add curl-for-win builds: Linux MUSL, macOS, Windows - - show CMake version via `CMakeLists.txt`. - Credit to the `zlib-ng` project for the idea: - https://github.com/zlib-ng/zlib-ng/blob/61e181c8ae93dbf56040336179c9954078b - d1399/CMakeLists.txt#L7 + Linux MUSL (llvm/clang), macOS Apple clang, Windows (llvm/clang). - - make `CMake/CurlTests.c` pass `checksrc`. + Configured with HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 and other dependencies (the default + curl-for-win) for a comprehensive build test. - - `CMake/WindowsCache.cmake` tidy-ups. + ``` + curl 8.8.0-DEV (x86_64-unknown-linux-musl) libcurl/8.8.0-DEV LibreSSL/3.9.1 z + lib/1.3.1 brotli/1.1.0 zstd/1.5.6 libpsl/0.21.5 libssh2/1.11.0 nghttp2/1.61.0 + ngtcp2/1.4.0 nghttp3/1.2.0 + Protocols: dict file ftp ftps gopher gophers http https imap imaps ipfs ipns + mqtt pop3 pop3s rtsp scp sftp smb smbs smtp smtps telnet tftp ws wss + Features: alt-svc AsynchDNS brotli HSTS HTTP2 HTTP3 HTTPS-proxy IPv6 Largefil + e libz NTLM PSL SSL threadsafe UnixSockets zstd + + curl 8.8.0-DEV (x86_64-apple-darwin) libcurl/8.8.0-DEV LibreSSL/3.9.1 zlib/1. + 3.1 brotli/1.1.0 zstd/1.5.6 libpsl/0.21.5 libssh2/1.11.0 nghttp2/1.61.0 ngtcp + 2/1.4.0 nghttp3/1.2.0 + Protocols: dict file ftp ftps gopher gophers http https imap imaps ipfs ipns + ldap ldaps mqtt pop3 pop3s rtsp scp sftp smb smbs smtp smtps telnet tftp ws w + ss + Features: alt-svc AsynchDNS brotli HSTS HTTP2 HTTP3 HTTPS-proxy IPv6 Largefil + e libz NTLM PSL SSL threadsafe UnixSockets zstd + + curl 8.8.0-DEV (x86_64-w64-mingw32) libcurl/8.8.0-DEV LibreSSL/3.9.1 zlib/1.3 + .1 brotli/1.1.0 zstd/1.5.6 WinIDN libpsl/0.21.5 libssh2/1.11.0 nghttp2/1.61.0 + ngtcp2/1.4.0 nghttp3/1.2.0 + Protocols: dict file ftp ftps gopher gophers http https imap imaps ipfs ipns + ldap ldaps mqtt pop3 pop3s rtsp scp sftp smb smbs smtp smtps telnet tftp ws w + ss + Features: alt-svc AsynchDNS brotli HSTS HTTP2 HTTP3 HTTPS-proxy IDN IPv6 Kerb + eros Largefile libz NTLM PSL SPNEGO SSL SSPI threadsafe UnixSockets zstd + ``` - - replace `WIN32` guard with `_WIN32` in `CMake/CurlTests.c`. + Limited to x64, because for build testing the additional CPUs don't add + much value compared to the extra build time. They can be enabled easily + if deemed useful. - Closes #12044 + To the extent of curl-for-win configuration options, it's trivial to add + further build combinations. -Jay Satiro (24 Oct 2023) + Closes #13335 -- page-footer: clarify exit code 25 +- OS400: fix shellcheck warnings in scripts - - Clarify that curl tool exit code 25 means an upload failed to start. + - use `$()` instead of backticks, and re-arrange double-quotes inside. + - add missing `|| exit 1` to `cd` calls. (could be dropped by using `set -eu` + .) + - add `-n` to a few `if`s. + - shorten redirections by using `{} >` (as shellcheck recommended). + - silence warnings where variables were detected as unused (SC2034). + - a couple misc updates to silence warnings. + - switch to bash shebang for `-ot` feature. + - split two lines to unbreak syntax highlighting in my editor. (`$(expr \`, ` + $(dirname \`) - Exit code 25 is equivalent to CURLE_UPLOAD_FAILED (25). Prior to this - change the documentation only mentioned the case of FTP STOR failing. + Also enable CI checks for OS/400 shell scripts. - Reported-by: Emanuele Torre + Ref: #13307 + Closes #13309 - Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/blob/curl-8_4_0/docs/libcurl/libcurl-errors - .3#L113-L115 +Stefan Eissing (11 Apr 2024) - Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/12189 - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12190 +- lib: add Curl_xfer_write_resp_hd -Daniel Stenberg (24 Oct 2023) + Add method in protocol handlers to allow writing of a single, + 0-terminated header line. Avoids parsing and copying these lines. -- scripts/cijobs.pl: adjust for appveyor + Closes #13165 - Follow-up to a1d73a6bb +- llist: add Curl_llist_append() -Alex Bozarth (24 Oct 2023) + - use for better readability in all places where the "insert_next" + actually performs an append to the list + - add some tests in unit1300 -- OpenSSL: Include SIG and KEM algorithms in verbose + Closes #13336 - Currently the verbose output does not include which algorithms are used - for the signature and key exchange when using OpenSSL. Including the - algorithms used will enable better debugging when working on using new - algorithm implementations. Know what algorithms are used has become more - important with the fast growing research into new quantum-safe - algorithms. +- gnutls: lazy init the trust settings - This implementation includes a build time check for the OpenSSL version - to use a new function that will be included in OpenSSL 3.2 that was - introduced in openssl/openssl@6866824 + - delay loading of trust anchors and CRLs after the ClientHello + has been sent off + - add tracing to IO operations + - on IO errors, return the CURLcode of the underlying filter - Based-on-patch-by: Martin Schmatz - Closes #12030 + Closes #13339 -Daniel Stenberg (23 Oct 2023) +Marcel Raad (10 Apr 2024) -- http2: provide an error callback and failf the message +- http_negotiate: fix `CURL_DISABLE_PROXY` build - Getting nghttp2's error message helps users understand what's going - on. For example when the connection is brought down due a forbidden - header is used - as that header is then not displayed by curl itself. + `proxyuserpwd` was removed from `dynamically_allocated_data` in commit + f46385d36df. - Example: + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/13334 - curl: (92) Invalid HTTP header field was received: frame type: 1, - stream: 1, name: [upgrade], value: [h2,h2c] +Viktor Szakats (10 Apr 2024) - Ref: #12172 - Closes #12179 +- quic: fixup duplicate static function name (for cmake unity) -Turiiya (23 Oct 2023) + Visible in daily curl-for-win builds: + https://github.com/curl/curl-for-win/actions/runs/8621925870 -- BINDINGS: add V binding + ``` + lib/vquic/curl_ngtcp2.c:1916:12: error: redefinition of 'ossl_new_session_cb' + static int ossl_new_session_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *ssl_sessionid) + ^ + lib/vtls/openssl.c:2978:12: note: previous definition is here + static int ossl_new_session_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *ssl_sessionid) + ^ + ``` + https://github.com/curl/curl-for-win/actions/runs/8621925870/job/23631885439# + step:3:6965 - Closes #12182 + Follow-up to 3210101088dfa3d6a125d213226b092f2f866722 #13172 + Closes #13332 -Daniel Stenberg (22 Oct 2023) +- appveyor: make VS2010 job build-only, enable Schannel, fix compiler warnings -- configure: check for the fseeko declaration too + Tests were consistently flaky for a while. - ... and make the code require both symbol and declaration. + Also fix compiler warnings in `CertOpenStore()` calls for old MSVC compilers: + ``` + C:/projects/curl/lib/vtls/schannel.c(688): + warning C4306: 'type cast' : conversion from 'int' to 'LPCSTR' of greater s + ize + C:/projects/curl/lib/vtls/schannel_verify.c(642): + warning C4306: 'type cast' : conversion from 'int' to 'LPCSTR' of greater s + ize + ``` + Ref: https://ci.appveyor.com/project/curlorg/curl/builds/49580310/job/ywu2y44 + kymgc0nif#L106 - This is because for Android, the symbol is always present in the lib at - build-time even when not actually available in run-time. + Closes #13330 - Assisted-by: Viktor Szakats - Reported-by: 12932 on github - Fixes #12086 - Closes #12158 +Daniel Stenberg (10 Apr 2024) -Viktor Szakats (22 Oct 2023) +- projects: drop MSVC project files for recent versions -- cmake: fix OpenSSL quic detection in quiche builds + We encourage users to generate visual studio project files using CMake. - An orphan call to `CheckQuicSupportInOpenSSL()` remained after a recent - update when checking QUIC for quiche. Move back QUIC detection to - a function and fixup callers to use that. Also make sure that quiche - gets QUIC from BoringSSL, because it doesn't support other forks at this - time. + We keep project files in git for ancient visual studio versions that + cmake cannot generate files for, but we no longer ship the project files + in the tarballs. - Regression from dee310d54261f9a8416e87d50bccfe2cbe404949 #11555 + appveyor: switch VisualStudioSolution job to VC12 (Visual Studio 2013) - Reported-by: Casey Bodley - Fixes #12160 - Closes #12162 + Co-Authored-by: Viktor Szakats + Co-Authored-by: Jay Satiro -Daniel Stenberg (22 Oct 2023) + Closes #13311 -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced +Viktor Szakats (9 Apr 2024) - bump to 8.5.0 for pending release +- cmake: use namespaced custom target names -Dan Fandrich (21 Oct 2023) + Rename custom target to namespaced (unique) names to avoid colliding + with 3rd-party projects (e.g. libzip) built together with curl. -- test3103: add missing quotes around a test tag attribute + Reported-by: hammlee96 on github + Fixes #13324 + Closes #13326 -Loïc Yhuel (21 Oct 2023) +- appveyor: re-enable OpenSSL 3, bump to 3.2.1 -- tool: fix --capath when proxy support is disabled + Ref: b62454a875d70f93ab5347c050903596feb45a23 #13266 + Closes #13329 - After 95e8515ca0, --capath always sets CURLOPT_PROXY_CAPATH, which fails - with CURLE_UNKNOWN_OPTION when proxy support is disabled. +Stefan Eissing (9 Apr 2024) - Closes #12089 +- CI: upgrade openssl version to 3.3.0 for openssl-quic -Daniel Stenberg (21 Oct 2023) + Closes #13328 -- openldap: move the alloc of ldapconninfo to *connect() +Daniel Stenberg (9 Apr 2024) - Fixes a minor memory leak on LDAP connection reuse. +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced - Doing the allocation already in *setup_connection() is wrong since that - connect struct might get discarded early when an existing connection is - reused instead. + Bump to 8.8.0-DEV - Closes #12166 +- curl_multi_waitfds.md: add protocol mention -- openldap: set the callback argument in oldap_do + Follow-up to 02beac6bb6b - ... to make sure it has the current 'data' pointer and not a stale old - one. +Dmitry Karpov (9 Apr 2024) - Reported-by: Dan Fandrich - Closes #12166 +- lib: add curl_multi_waitfds -- gnutls: support CURLSSLOPT_NATIVE_CA + New function call, similar to curl_multi_fdset() - Remove the CURL_CA_FALLBACK logic. That build option was added to allow - primarily OpenSSL to use the default paths for loading the CA certs. For - GnuTLS it was instead made to load the "system certs", which is - different and not desirable. + Closes #13135 - The native CA store loading is now asked for with this option. +Viktor Szakats (9 Apr 2024) - Follow-up to 7b55279d1d856 +- dist: verify tarball reproducibility in CI - Co-authored-by: Jay Satiro + Closes #13327 - Closes #12137 +Stefan Eissing (9 Apr 2024) -Stefan Eissing (21 Oct 2023) +- tests: stabilitze test_02_23* -- RTSP: improved RTP parser + - h2-download now always opens the output file on first write callback + invocation, if it will pause the transfer or not. + - Checks on output files then does not depend on the amount of data curl + has collected for the first write. - - fix HTTP header parsing to report incomplete - lines it buffers as consumed! - - re-implement the RTP parser for interleave RTP - messages for robustness. It is now keeping its - state at the connection - - RTSP protocol handler "readwrite" implementation - now tracks if the response is before/in/after - header parsing or "in" a bod by calling - "Curl_http_readwrite_headers()" itself. This - allows it to know when non-RTP bytes are "junk" - or HEADER or BODY. - - tested with #12035 and various small receive - sizes where current master fails + Closes #13323 - Closes #12052 +- tls: fix compile issues on old-linux CI -- http2: header conversion tightening + Follow-up to 3210101088dfa + Closes #13325 - - fold the code to convert dynhds to the nghttp2 structs - into a dynhds internal method - - saves code duplication - - pacifies compiler analyzers +Viktor Szakats (9 Apr 2024) - Closes #12097 +- dist: add reproducible dir entries to tarballs -Daniel Stenberg (21 Oct 2023) + In the initial implementation of reproducible tarballs, they were + missing directory entries, while .zip archives had them. It meant + that on extracting the tarball, on-disk directory entries got the + current timestamp. -- curl_ntlm_wb: fix elif typo + This patch fixes this by including directory entries in the tarball, + with reproducible timestamps. It also moves sorting inside tar, + to ensure reproducible directory entry timestamps on extract + (without the need of `--delay-directory-restore` option, when + extracting with GNU tar. BSD tar got that right by default.) - Reported-by: Manfred Schwarb - Follow-up to d4314cdf65ae - Bug: https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/d4314cdf65aee295db627016934bd9eb621a - b077#r130551295 + GNU tar 1.28 (2014-07-28) introduced `--sort=`. -Dan Fandrich (20 Oct 2023) + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/13299#discussion_r1555957350 + Follow-up to 860cd5fc2dc8e165fadd2c19a9b7c73b3ae5069d #13299 + Closes #13322 -- test1683: remove commented-out check alternatives +Stefan Eissing (9 Apr 2024) - Python precheck/postcheck alternatives were included but commented out. - Since these are not used and perl is guaranteed to be available to run - the perl versions anyway, the Python ones are removed. +- tls: use shared init code for TCP+QUIC -Daniel Stenberg (20 Oct 2023) + Closes #13172 -- hostip: show the list of IPs when resolving is done +Daniel Stenberg (9 Apr 2024) - Getting 'curl.se' today then gets this verbose output which might help - debugging connectivity related matters. +- .mailmap: update Gisle's preferred email - * Host curl.se:80 was resolved. - * IPv6: 2a04:4e42::347, 2a04:4e42:200::347, 2a04:4e42:400::347, - 2a04:4e42:600::347, 2a04:4e42:800::347, 2a04:4e42:a00::347, - 2a04:4e42:c00::347, 2a04:4e42:e00::347 - * IPv4: 151.101.193.91, 151.101.1.91, 151.101.65.91, 151.101.129.91 +Jan Macku (9 Apr 2024) - Co-authored-by: Jay Satiro - Closes #12145 +- doc: pytest `--repeat` -> `--count` -rilysh (20 Oct 2023) + Pytest doesn't have a `--repeat` option, but it does have a `--count` + option. -- docs: fix function typo in curl_easy_option_next.3 + ``` + --count=COUNT Number of times to repeat each test + ``` - Closes #12170 + Closes #13218 -Daniel Stenberg (20 Oct 2023) +Daniel Stenberg (9 Apr 2024) -- vssh: remove the #ifdef for Curl_ssh_init, use empty macro +- src/Makefile.am: access curl.txt using a relative path, not abs - In the same style as other init calls + ... to make it work when mounted using different mount points. Like when + generated/used inside and outside of a docker image. -- easy: remove duplicate wolfSSH init call + Closes #13320 - It is already done in Curl_ssh_init() where it belongs. +- build: remove MacOSX-Framework script - Closes #12168 + I don't think this is much used these days. -- socks: make SOCKS5 use the CURLOPT_IPRESOLVE choice + Also remove the libcurl.plist file used (only) by this script - Fixes #11949 - Reported-by: Ammar Faizi - Closes #12163 + Closes #13313 -- urldata: move the 'internal' boolean to the state struct +- release-tools.sh: store the timestamp and release tag too - ... where all the other state bits for the easy handles live. + When maketgz invokes this script to generate the docs/RELEASE-TOOLS.md + file that gets bundled in the release, it now also passes on the exact + timestamp and version number so that those details also get mentioned in + the document. They will help users reproduce an identical tarball. - Closes #12165 + Closes #13319 -- url: don't touch the multi handle when closing internal handles +Viktor Szakats (8 Apr 2024) - Reported-by: Maksymilian Arciemowicz - Closes #12165 +- GHA: disable permissions where missing -Faraz Fallahi (19 Oct 2023) + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Closes #13306 -- getenv: PlayStation doesn't have getenv() +Stefan Eissing (8 Apr 2024) - Closes #12140 +- CI: update component versions -Daniel Stenberg (19 Oct 2023) + - ngtcp2: v1.4.0 + - nghttp3: v1.2.0 + - nghttp2: v1.61.0 + - mod_h2: v2.0.27 -- transfer: only reset the FTP wildcard engine in CLEAR state + Closes #13316 - To avoid the state machine to start over and redownload all the files - *again*. +Jérôme Leclercq (8 Apr 2024) - Reported-by: lkordos on github - Regression from 843b3baa3e3cb228 (shipped in 8.1.0) - Bisect-by: Dan Fandrich - Fixes #11775 - Closes #12156 +- CMake: check fseeko after detecting HAVE_FILE_OFFSET_BITS -Stefan Eissing (19 Oct 2023) + Closes #13264 -- GHA: move mod_h2 version in CI to v2.0.25 +Stefan Eissing (8 Apr 2024) - Closes #12157 +- http2: emit RST when client write fails -Daniel Stenberg (19 Oct 2023) + - When the writing of response data fails, reset the stream + and do not return a callback error to nghttp2. That would + be a fatal error for the connection and harm other requests. + - add test cases for various abort scenarios -- ntlm_wb: use pipe instead of socketpair when possible + Reported-by: Konstantin Kuzov + Fixes #13292 + Closes #13298 - Closes #12149 +Kailun Qin (8 Apr 2024) -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced +- mbedtls: call mbedtls_ssl_setup() after RNG callback is set -- asyn-thread: use pipe instead of socketpair for IPC when available + Since mbedTLS v3.6.0, the RNG check added in ssl_conf_check() will fail + if no RNG is provided when calling mbedtls_ssl_setup(). - If pipe() is present. Less overhead. + Therefore, mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng() needs to be called before the SSL + context is passed to mbedtls_ssl_setup(). - Helped-by: Viktor Szakats - Closes #12146 + Ref: https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/commit/b422cab052b51ec84758638d6783d + 6ba4fc60613 -Dan Fandrich (17 Oct 2023) + Signed-off-by: Kailun Qin + Closes #13314 -- tests: Fix Windows test helper tool search & use it for handle64 +Daniel Stenberg (8 Apr 2024) - The checkcmd() and checktestcmd() functions would not have worked on - Windows due to hard-coding the UNIX PATH separator character and not - adding .exe file extension. This meant that tools like stunnel, valgrind - and nghttpx would not have been found and used on Windows, and - inspection of previous test runs show none of those being found in pure - Windows CI builds. +- NTLM_WB: drop support - With this fixed, they can be used to detect the handle64.exe program - before attempting to use it. When handle64.exe was called - unconditionally without it existing, it caused perl to abort the test - run with the error + The feature has not worked for months and has been marked as DEPRECATED + for six+ months. - The running command stopped because the preference variable - "ErrorActionPreference" or common parameter is set to Stop: - sh: handle64.exe: command not found + Closes #13249 - Closes #12115 +- curl_trc: fix build error when lacking verbose messages -Daniel Stenberg (17 Oct 2023) + Follow-up from 0b28ece657b2273 + Closes #13312 -- multi: use pipe instead of socketpair to *wakeup() +Viktor Szakats (8 Apr 2024) - If pipe() is present. Less overhead. +- contrithanks: honor `CURLWWW` variable - Closes #12142 + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Closes #13315 -Jay Satiro (17 Oct 2023) +- GHA: add shellcheck job and fix warnings, shell tidy-ups -- build: fix 'threadsafe' feature detection for older gcc + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Closes #13307 - - Add 'threadsafe' to the feature list shown during build if POSIX - threads are being used. +- dist: do not require Perl in `maketgz` - This is a follow-up to 5adb6000 which added support for building a - thread-safe libcurl with older versions of gcc where atomic is not - available but pthread is. + Perl remains required for the tarball build process. - Reported-by: Dan Fandrich - Co-authored-by: Dan Fandrich + Follow-up to 860cd5fc2dc8e165fadd2c19a9b7c73b3ae5069d #13299 - Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/12125 - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12127 + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Closes #13310 -Daniel Stenberg (16 Oct 2023) +Daniel Stenberg (8 Apr 2024) -- test729: verify socks4a with excessive proxy user name length +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced -- socks: better buffer size checks for socks4a user and hostname +- docs/cmdline-opts: invoke managen using a relative path - Also limit the proxy user name to 255 bytes, which is the same limit as - in SOCKS5. + ... no need to use an absolute path, that makes the build unncessarily + fail if invoked using a different mount point. managen now takes options + to find the input files. - Reported-by: sd0 on hackerone - Closes #12139 + Update test1478 to provide the dir arguments to managen -- curl.h: on FreeBSD include sys/param.h instead of osreldate.h + Closes #13281 - Should things build on Playstation as well +- GHA: add valgrind to a wolfSSL build - Fixes #12107 - Reported-by: Faraz Fallahi - Closes #12123 + Closes #13274 -Marcin Rataj (16 Oct 2023) +Viktor Szakats (7 Apr 2024) -- tool_operate: fix links in ipfs errors +- dist: `set -eu`, fix shellcheck, make reproducible and smaller tarballs - URL fragment links generated from headers in - https://curl.se/docs/ipfs.html are lowercase. + - set bash `-eu` and fix fallouts. + - fix shellcheck warnings. + - set and use `SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH` for reproducibility. + Authored-by: Daniel J. H. + Ref: #13280 + - set `TZ=UTC` and `LC_ALL=C` for reproducibility. + - make file timestamps in tarball/zip reproducible. + - make directory timestamps in zip reproducible. + - make timestamps of tarballs/zip reproducible. + - make file order in tarball/zip reproducible. + - omit extra file metadata from zip for reproducibility. + - use maximum zip compression. + - use POSIX `ustar` tarball format to avoid supply chain vulnerability: + https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2021/q4/0 + - make uid/gid in tarball reproducible. + - omit owner user/group names from tarball for reproducibility and privacy. + - omit current timestamp from .gz header for reproducibility. + - display SHA-256 hashes of produced tarballs/zip. + - fix whitespace. - Closes #12133 + `.tar.gz` also became smaller in the process: 4,462,311 -> 4,148,249 bytes (8 + .7.1) -Viktor Szakats (15 Oct 2023) + Requires GNU tar, GNU date, `sha256sum`. -- cmake: replace `check_library_exists_concat()` + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Ref: #13250 + Closes #13299 - The idea of `check_library_exists_concat()` is that it detects an - optional component and adds it to the list of libs that we also use in - subsequent component checks. This caused problems when detecting - components with unnecessary dependencies that were not yet built. +Gisle Vanem (7 Apr 2024) - CMake offers the `CMAKE_REQUIRED_LIBRARIES` variable to set libs used - for component checks, which we already use in most cases. That left 4 - uses of `check_library_exists_concat()`. Only one of these actually - needed the 'concat' feature (ldap/lber). +- tests/http: fix compiler warning - Delete this function and replace it with standard - `check_library_exists()` and manual management of our `CURL_LIBS` - list we use when linking build targets. And special logic to handle the - ldap/lber case. + - Init result code variable to fix clang warning that it may be used + uninitialized. - (We have a similar function for headers: `check_include_file_concat()`. - It works, but problematic for performance reasons and because it hides - the actual headers required in `check_symbol_exists()` calls.) + Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/13301 + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/13304 - Ref: #11537 #11558 - Fixes #11285 - Fixes #11648 - Closes #12070 +Stefan Eissing (6 Apr 2024) -LoRd_MuldeR (15 Oct 2023) +- vquic: use new curl_int64_t type -- tool_cb_wrt: fix write output for very old Windows versions + - add curl_int64_t signed 64-bit type for lib use - - Pass missing parameter for 'lpNumberOfCharsWritten' to WriteConsoleW() - function. + - define CURL_PRId64, CURL_PRIu64 format ids - Apparently this parameter was *not* optional on older Windows versions. + - use curl_int64_t in vquic - Issue observed on Windows XP SP2. Issue not observed on Windows 7 SP1. - So at some point between those two Microsoft changed the behavior. + curl_int64_t signed complements the existing curl_uint64_t unsigned. - Prior to this change, on those versions if parameter is NULL then the - function call fails with error ERROR_INVALID_ACCESS. + Note that `curl_int64_t` and `int64_t` are assignable from each other + but not identical. Some platforms with 64 long type defint int64_t as + "long long" (staring at macOS) which messes up things like pointers and + format identifiers. - Regression since af3f4e41. + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/13293 - Ref: https://github.com/MicrosoftDocs/Console-Docs/issues/299 +Jay Satiro (5 Apr 2024) - Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/12131 - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12130 +- lib: use multi instead of multi_easy for the active multi -Jay Satiro (15 Oct 2023) + - Use data->multi and not data->multi_easy to refer to the active multi. -- tool_urlglob: fix build for old gcc versions + The easy handle's active multi is always data->multi. - - Don't use __builtin_mul_overflow for GCC 4 and earlier. + This is a follow up to 757dfdf which changed curl so that an easy handle + used with the easy interface and then multi interface cannot have two + different multi handles associated with it at the same time + (data->multi_easy from the easy interface and data->multi from the multi + interface). - The function was added in GCC 5. + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12665 - Ref: https://gcc.gnu.org/gcc-5/changes.html +Viktor Szakats (5 Apr 2024) - Reported-by: Dan Fandrich +- tidy-up: whitespace [ci skip] - Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/12124 - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12128 +Daniel Stenberg (5 Apr 2024) -Carlos Henrique Lima Melara (14 Oct 2023) +- makefile: remove the sorting from the vc-ide action -- docs/libcurl: fix three minor man page format mistakes + This target generates the MSVC project files. This change removes the + extra sorting and instead makes the script use the order of the files as + listed in the variables - which are mostly sorted anyway. - Reported-by: Samuel Henrique + This is an attempt to make the project file generation more easily + reproducible. - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12126 + Ref: #13250 + Closes #13294 -Jay Satiro (14 Oct 2023) +Gisle Vanem (5 Apr 2024) -- tests/server: add more SOCKS5 handshake error checking +- bearssl: fix compiler warnings - - Add additional checking for missing and too-short SOCKS5 handshake - messages. + "variables may be uninitialized when used" - Prior to this change the SOCKS5 test server did not check that all parts - of the handshake were received successfully. If those parts were missing - or too short then the server would access uninitialized memory. + Fixes #13290 + Closes #13297 - This issue was discovered in CI job 'memory-sanitizer' test results. - Test 2055 was failing due to the SOCKS5 test server not running. It was - not running because either it crashed or memory sanitizer aborted it - during Test 728. Test 728 connects to the SOCKS5 test server on a - redirect but does not send any data on purpose. The test server was not - prepared for that. +Daniel Stenberg (5 Apr 2024) - Reported-by: Dan Fandrich +- DISTROS: Cygwin updates - Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/12117 - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12118 + Brought-by: Brian Inglis + Fixes #13258 + Co-authored-by: Viktor Szakats + Closes #13279 -Daniel Stenberg (14 Oct 2023) +Stefan Eissing (5 Apr 2024) -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced +- lib: add trace support for client reads and writes -Sohom Datta (14 Oct 2023) + - add `CURL_TRC_READ()` and `CURL_TRC_WRITE()` + - use in generic client writers and readers, as well + as http headers, chunking and websockets -- tool_getparam: limit --rate to be smaller than number of ms + Closes #13223 - Currently, curl allows users to specify absurd request rates that might - be higher than the number of milliseconds in the unit (ex: curl --rate - 3600050/h http://localhost:8080 does not error out despite there being - only 3600000ms in a hour). +Michał Antoniak (5 Apr 2024) - This change adds a conditional check before the millisecond calculation - making sure that the number is not higher than the numerator (the unit) - If the number is higher, curl errors out with PARAM_NUMBER_TOO_LARGE +- urldata: remove fields not used depending on used features - Closes #12116 + Reduced size of dynamically_allocated_data structure. -Daniel Stenberg (14 Oct 2023) + Reduced number of stored values in enum dupstring and enum dupblob. This + affects the reduced array placed in the UserDefined structure. -- opts: fix two minor man page format mistakes + Closes #13188 -Jay Satiro (14 Oct 2023) +Viktor Szakats (5 Apr 2024) -- curl_trc: remove a bad assertion +- cmake: enable `-pedantic-errors` for clang when `CURL_WERROR=ON` - - Remove DEBUGASSERT that an internal handle must not have user - private_data set before calling the user's debug callback. + clang doesn't have the issues of GCC and old CMake versions. - This is a follow-up to 0dc40b2a. The user can distinguish their easy - handle from an internal easy handle by setting CURLOPT_PRIVATE on their - easy handle. I had wrongly assumed that meant the user couldn't then - set CURLOPT_PRIVATE on an internal handle as well. + Note: This introduces asymmetry with autotools, which only enables + this for GCC. - Bug: https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12060#issuecomment-1754594697 - Reported-by: Daniel Stenberg + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Closes #13286 - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12104 +- cmake: fix `CURL_WERROR=ON` for old CMake and use it in GHA/linux-old -Dan Fandrich (13 Oct 2023) + - cmake: fix `-pedantic-errors` for old CMake with `CURL_WERROR=ON` set. -- test613: stop showing an error on missing output file + `-pedantic-errors` option throws a warning with GCC (all versions) and + makes `check_symbol_exists()` fail in CMake versions older than + v3.23.0 (2022-03-29), when CMake introduced a workaround: - This test would show an error message if the output was missing during - the log post-processing step, but the message was not captured by the - test harness and wasn't useful since the normal golden log file - comparison would the problem more clearly. + https://gitlab.kitware.com/cmake/cmake/-/issues/13208 + https://gitlab.kitware.com/cmake/cmake/-/commit/eeb45401163d831b8c841ef6eba + 81466b4067b68 + https://gitlab.kitware.com/cmake/cmake/-/commit/1ab7c3cd28b27ca162c4559e102 + 6e5cad1898ade -Stefan Eissing (13 Oct 2023) + Follow-up to 3829759bd042c03225ae862062560f568ba1a231 #12489 -- quic: manage connection idle timeouts + - set `CURL_WERROR=ON` for the `linux-old` job in CI. - - configure a 120s idle timeout on our side of the connection - - track the timestamp when actual socket IO happens - - check IO timestamp to our *and* the peer's idle timeouts - in "is this connection alive" checks + Closes #13282 - Reported-by: calvin2021y on github - Fixes #12064 - Closes #12077 +- lib: use `#error` instead of invalid syntax in `curl_setup_once.h` -Dan Fandrich (13 Oct 2023) + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Closes #13287 -- CI: ignore test 286 on Appveyor gcc 9 build +Daniel Stenberg (5 Apr 2024) - This test fails sometimes with a super fast retry loop due to what may - just be a compiler bug. The test results are ignored on the one CI job - where it occurs because there seems to be nothing we can do to fix it. +- GHA: on macOS remove $HOME/.curlrc - Fixes #12040 - Closes #12106 + A recent image upgrade added a $HOME/.curlrc by default using --ipv4. -Viktor Szakats (13 Oct 2023) + Ref: https://github.com/actions/runner-images/pull/9586 + Fixes #13284 + Closes #13285 -- lib: fix gcc warning in printf call +Viktor Szakats (4 Apr 2024) - Do not pass NULL to printf %s. +- cmake: fixup `DEPENDS` filename - Seen with gcc 13.2.0 on Debian: + Fixing: ``` - .../curl/lib/connect.c:696:27: warning: '%s' directive argument is null [-Wfo - rmat-overflow=] + make[2]: Circular docs/curl-config.1 <- docs/curl-config.1 dependency dropped + . + make[2]: Circular docs/mk-ca-bundle.1 <- docs/mk-ca-bundle.1 dependency dropp + ed. ``` - Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl-for-win/actions/runs/6476161689/job/1758442 - 6483#step:3:11104 + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/actions/runs/8559617487/job/23456740844?pr= + 13282#step:6:18 - Ref: #10284 - Co-authored-by: Jay Satiro - Closes #12082 + Follow-up to 5023ffad2c27d4b916ddb91800f99ecc5d3aad07 #13197 + Closes #13283 -Alex Klyubin (13 Oct 2023) +- GHA: enable unity mode for cmake jobs + tidy-ups -- http2: safer invocation of populate_binsettings + Unity mode is not supported by CMake v3.7.2 used in linux-old, but + enable it anyway for consistency and to kick in automatically once + migrating to a newer old Linux in the future. - populate_binsettings now returns a negative value on error, instead of a - huge positive value. Both places which call this function have been - updated to handle this change in its contract. + Also: + - replace `CMAKE_COMPILE_WARNING_AS_ERROR` with `CURL_WERROR`. + - delete default build option `PICKY_COMPILER=ON`. - The way populate_binsettings had been used prior to this change the huge - positive values -- due to signed->unsigned conversion of the potentially - negative result of nghttp2_pack_settings_payload which returns negative - values on error -- are not possible. But only because http2.c currently - always provides a large enough output buffer and provides H2 SETTINGS - IVs which pass the verification logic inside nghttp2. If the - verification logic were to change or if http2.c started passing in more - IVs without increasing the output buffer size, the overflow could become - reachable, and libcurl/curl might start leaking memory contents to - servers/proxies... + Closes #13277 - Closes #12101 +Dan Fandrich (4 Apr 2024) -Daniel Stenberg (13 Oct 2023) +- CI: Add CI build on Debian stretch to test old support -- openssl: avoid BN_num_bits() NULL pointer derefs + This version still has ELTS support and contains some old versions of + key components like cmake to help prevent us from breaking that support. - Reported-by: icy17 on github - Fixes #12099 - Closes #12100 + Closes #13029 -- wolfssl: require WOLFSSL_SYS_CA_CERTS for loading system CA +Stefan Eissing (4 Apr 2024) - This define is set in wolfssl's options.h file when this function and - feature is present. Handles both builds with the feature explicitly - disabled and wolfSSL versions before 5.5.2 - which introduced this API - call. +- request: paused upload on completed download, assess connection - Closes #12108 + A transfer with a completed download that is still uploading needs to + check the connection state when it is PAUSEd, since connection + close/errors would otherwise go unnoticed. -- tool_urlglob: make multiply() bail out on negative values + Reported-by: Sergey Bronnikov + Fixes #13260 + Closes #13271 - - Does not work correctly with negative values - - use __builtin_mul_overflow() on gcc +Daniel Stenberg (4 Apr 2024) - Reported-by: Torben Dury - Closes #12102 +- url: do not URL decode proxy crendentials -Loïc Yhuel (13 Oct 2023) + The two options CURLOPT_PROXYUSERNAME and CURLOPT_PROXYPASSWORD set the + actual names as-is, not URL encoded. -- cmake: fix CURL_DISABLE_GETOPTIONS + Modified test 503 to use percent-encoded strings in the credential + strings that should be passed on as-is. - - Add CURL_DISABLE_GETOPTIONS to curl_config.h.cmake. + Reported-by: Sergey Ogryzkov + Fixes #13265 + Closes #13270 - Prior to this change the option had no effect because it was missing - from that file. +Viktor Szakats (4 Apr 2024) - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12091 +- appveyor: enable cmake unity mode by default -- easy_lock: add a pthread_mutex_t fallback + Leave one non-unity cmake job. This makes the jobs finish slightly + quicker, while giving more coverage for unity issues. - This allows to keep the init threadsafe with gcc < 4.9.0 (no C11 - atomics). + Before: + https://ci.appveyor.com/project/curlorg/curl/builds/49496977 + https://ci.appveyor.com/project/curlorg/curl/builds/49500372 + After: + https://ci.appveyor.com/project/curlorg/curl/builds/49500338 - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12090 + Also fixup unrelated whitespace. -Viktor Szakats (12 Oct 2023) + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Closes #13217 -- CI: add autotools, out-of-tree, debug build to distro check job +Daniel Stenberg (4 Apr 2024) - Add a job that builds curl from a generated source tarball sample, with - autotools, out-of-tree, in debug mode. +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced - Ref: #12085 - Closes #12088 +Viktor Szakats (4 Apr 2024) -Daniel Stenberg (12 Oct 2023) +- cmake: speed up libcurl doc building again -- http: avoid Expect: 100-continue if Upgrade: is used + This time limit the number of files per command to avoid exceeding + limitations of certain OS/shell envs. - Reported-by: Daniel Jelinski - Fixes #12022 - Closes #12062 + Such known env is Windows with the `cmd.exe` shell, which features an + 8K command-line length limit to this day. -Jan Alexander Steffens (heftig) (12 Oct 2023) + Allowlisting `UNIX` to have no limit and using a limit of 200 for other + envs to be safe. If there is a way to detect `cmd.exe` and/or we know + which precise envs are sensitive to this, we can tweak these conditions + further. -- docs: use SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH for generated manpages + Even with the low limit, this patch reduces external commands by 200x, + making builds much faster. - This should make builds from Git reproducible. + Ref: #12762 2620aa930bc73af1e4c70b10e3125b957b96ecfb (initial) + Ref: #13047 f03c85635f35269f1f45b983bf216624f541760a (revert) - Closes #12092 + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Closes #13207 -Daniel Stenberg (12 Oct 2023) +- cmake: tidy-up to use `WORKING_DIRECTORY` -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Closes #13206 - Bumped to 8.4.1 +- cmake: generate misc manpages and install `mk-ca-bundle.pl` -Viktor Szakats (12 Oct 2023) + - install `mk-ca-bundle.pl` like autotools does. -- cmake: fix `HAVE_H_ERRNO_ASSIGNABLE` detection + - generate and install `mk-ca-bundle.1` and `curl-config.1` like + autotools. This fixes tests 1140 and 1173. - Fix `HAVE_H_ERRNO_ASSIGNABLE` to not run, only compile its test snippet, - aligning this with autotools. This fixes an error when doing - cross-builds and also actually detects this feature. It affected systems - not allowlisted into this, e.g. SerenityOS. + Reported-by: Dan Fandrich + Fixes #13194 - We used this detection result to enable `HAVE_GETADDRINFO_THREADSAFE`. + - add option `BUILD_MISC_DOCS` to control building the above two + manpages. Enabled by default. - Follow-up to 04a3a377d83fd72c4cf7a96c9cb6d44785e33264 #11979 - Ref: #12095 (closed in favour of this patch) - Ref: #11964 (effort to sync cmake detections with autotools) + - appveyor: stop disabling tests 1140 and 1173. - Reported-by: Kartatz on Github - Assisted-by: Kartatz on Github - Fixes #12093 - Closes #12094 + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Closes #13197 -- build: add `src/.checksrc` to source tarball +Fabian Keil (4 Apr 2024) - Regression from e5bb88b8f824ed87620bd923552534c83c2a516e #11958 +- wolfssl: plug memory leak in wolfssl_connect_step2() - Bug: https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11958#issuecomment-1757079071 - Reported-by: Romain Geissler - Fixes #12084 - Closes #12085 + Fixes: -Version 8.4.0 (11 Oct 2023) + test 2034...[simple HTTPS GET with DER public key pinning] + ==61829== 22,610 (3,744 direct, 18,866 indirect) bytes in 1 blocks are d + efinitely lost in loss record 51 of 54 + ==61829== at 0x484BB74: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:446) + ==61829== by 0x4B53A80: wolfSSL_Malloc (memory.c:344) + ==61829== by 0x4C1C8E1: wolfSSL_X509_new (x509.c:5326) + ==61829== by 0x4C3977D: d2i_X509orX509REQ (x509.c:3628) + ==61829== by 0x4C1D1F4: wolfSSL_X509_d2i (x509.c:3664) + ==61829== by 0x4C1C37B: wolfSSL_X509_dup (x509.c:13425) + ==61829== by 0x4C197DB: wolfSSL_get_peer_certificate (ssl.c:18765) + ==61829== by 0x33297C: wolfssl_connect_step2 (wolfssl.c:875) + ==61829== by 0x331669: wolfssl_connect_common (wolfssl.c:1287) + ==61829== by 0x3303E9: wolfssl_connect_nonblocking (wolfssl.c:1319) + ==61829== by 0x32FE89: ssl_connect_nonblocking (vtls.c:510) + ==61829== by 0x32DBE5: ssl_cf_connect (vtls.c:1679) + ==61829== by 0x27ABD7: Curl_conn_cf_connect (cfilters.c:307) + ==61829== by 0x27D9CF: cf_setup_connect (connect.c:1199) + ==61829== by 0x27ABD7: Curl_conn_cf_connect (cfilters.c:307) + ==61829== by 0x283CEA: cf_hc_baller_connect (cf-https-connect.c:135) -Daniel Stenberg (11 Oct 2023) + Closes #13272 -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced +Viktor Szakats (3 Apr 2024) -- THANKS: add contributors from 8.4.0 +- appveyor: OpenSSL 3 no longer found by CMake, revert to 1.1.1 -Jay Satiro (11 Oct 2023) + OpenSSL moved directories, and bumped versions in AppVeyor CI. -- socks: return error if hostname too long for remote resolve + Downgrading is not an ideal solution, but however trivial the solution + may be, I failed to come with anything that made CMake recognize either + OpenSSL 3.1 or 3.2. - Prior to this change the state machine attempted to change the remote - resolve to a local resolve if the hostname was longer than 255 - characters. Unfortunately that did not work as intended and caused a - security issue. + Possibly caused by: + https://github.com/appveyor/build-images/commit/702e8cdca01f28f6a40687783f493 + c786cebbe2c + https://github.com/appveyor/build-images/pull/149 - Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2023-38545.html + Closes #13266 -Stefan Eissing (10 Oct 2023) +hongfei.li (3 Apr 2024) -- CI: remove slowed-network tests +- winbuild: use $(RC) correctly - - remove these tests as they are currently not reliable in our CI - setups. + Cloes #13267 - curl handles the test cases, but CI sometimes fails on these due to - additional conditions. Rather than mix them in, an additional CI job - will be added in the future that is specific to them. +Daniel Stenberg (3 Apr 2024) - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12075 +- dist: remove the curl-config.1 from the tarball -Jay Satiro (10 Oct 2023) + The markdown file is already there and the .1 file gets generated in the + build. -- libcurl-env-dbg.3: move debug variables from libcurl-env.3 + Ref: #13250 + Closes #13268 - - Move documentation of libcurl environment variables used only in debug - builds from libcurl-env into a separate document libcurl-env-dbg. +- curl_global_trace.md: shorten the description - - Document more debug environment variables. + Closes #13263 - Previously undocumented or missing a description: +- test1901: verify chunked POST from callback with CURLOPT_POSTFIELDSIZE set - CURL_ALTSVC_HTTP, CURL_DBG_SOCK_WBLOCK, CURL_DBG_SOCK_WPARTIAL, - CURL_DBG_QUIC_WBLOCK, CURL_DEBUG, CURL_DEBUG_SIZE, CURL_GETHOSTNAME, - CURL_HSTS_HTTP, CURL_FORCETIME, CURL_SMALLREQSEND, CURL_SMALLSENDS, - CURL_TIME. + Follow-up to 721941aadf4ad - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11811 + Ref: #13257 + Closes #13262 -Dan Fandrich (9 Oct 2023) +Stefan Eissing (2 Apr 2024) -- test670: increase the test timeout +- http: with chunked POST forced, disable length check on read callback - This should make it more immune to loaded servers. + - when an application forces HTTP/1.1 chunked transfer encoding + by setting the corresponding header and instructs curl to use + the CURLOPT_READFUNCTION, disregard any POST length information. + - this establishes backward compatibility with previous curl versions - Ref: #11328 + Applications are encouraged to not force "chunked", but rather + set length information for a POST. By setting -1, curl will + auto-select chunked on HTTP/1.1 and work properly on other HTTP + versions. -Stefan Eissing (9 Oct 2023) + Reported-by: Jeff King + Fixes #13229 + Closes #13257 -- MQTT: improve receive of ACKs +Jay Satiro (1 Apr 2024) - - add `mq->recvbuf` to provide buffering of incomplete - ACK responses - - continue ACK reading until sufficient bytes available - - fixes test failures on low network receives +- INSTALL-CMAKE.md: explain `cmake -G ` - Closes #12071 + - Explain that CMake's -G option can be used to specify which build + system to generate files for. -Viktor Szakats (9 Oct 2023) + Example: cmake ../curl -G "MinGW Makefiles" -- quic: fix BoringSSL build + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12224#issuecomment-2026813645 - Add guard around `SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites()` use. + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/13244 - Bug: https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12065#issuecomment-1752171885 +Daniel Stenberg (1 Apr 2024) - Follow-up to aa9a6a177017e4b74d33cdf85a3594900f4a7f81 +- libcurl-opts: mention pipelining less - Co-authored-by: Jay Satiro - Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg - Closes #12067 + libcurl has not supported HTTP pipelining since many years. Remove a few + (more) mentions of the feature. -Stefan Eissing (9 Oct 2023) + Closes #13254 -- test1540: improve reliability +Daniel McCarney (31 Mar 2024) - - print that bytes have been received on pausing, but not how many +- m4: reposition USE_RUSTLS="yes" for pkg-config - Closes #12069 + It's necessary to set this var to "yes" _after_ AC_DEFINE and AC_SUBST + in order for a later `test` to pass so that `check_for_ca_bundle=1` ends + up being set. This is in turn required for the default CA certificate + bundle to be set when building w/ rustls & pkg-config. -- test2302: improve reliability + Reported-by: Matt Jolly + Fixes #13248 + Closes #13251 - - make result print collected write data, unless - change in meta flags is detected - - will show same result even when data arrives via - several writecb invocations +Daniel Stenberg (31 Mar 2024) - Closes #12068 +- maketgz: put docs/RELEASE-TOOL.md into the tarball -Daniel Stenberg (9 Oct 2023) + Generated with scripts/release-tools.sh -- curl_easy_pause: set "in callback" true on exit if true + The script lists the exact Debian package names and version numbers for + the tools that are used to generate the tarball. - Because it might have called another callback in the mean time that then - set the bit FALSE on exit. + Closes #13239 - Reported-by: Jay Satiro - Fixes #12059 - Closes #12061 +- cd2nroff/manage: use UTC when SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH is set -Viktor Szakats (8 Oct 2023) + Make them independent of the TZ setting. Also set a date string like + YYYY-MM-DD to avoid a local month name in the date. -- h3: add support for ngtcp2 with AWS-LC builds + Reported-by: Carlos Henrique Lima Melara + Fixes #13242 + Closes #13243 - ``` - curl 8.4.0-DEV (x86_64-apple-darwin) libcurl/8.4.0-DEV (SecureTransport) AWS- - LC/1.15.0 nghttp2/1.56.0 ngtcp2/0.19.1 nghttp3/0.15.0 - Release-Date: [unreleased] - Protocols: dict file ftp ftps gopher gophers http https imap imaps ldap ldaps - mqtt pop3 pop3s rtsp smb smbs smtp smtps telnet tftp ws wss - Features: alt-svc AsynchDNS HSTS HTTP2 HTTP3 HTTPS-proxy IPv6 Largefile Multi - SSL NTLM SSL threadsafe UnixSockets - ``` +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced - Also delete an obsolete GnuTLS TODO and update the header comment in - `FindNGTCP2.cmake`. +- docs/MAIL-ETIQUETTE: convert to markdown - Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg - Closes #12066 + To render nicer. To get spellchecked. -- build: do not publish `HAVE_BORINGSSL`, `HAVE_AWSLC` macros + Closes #13247 - Syncing this up with CMake. +- reuse: add copyright + license info to individual docs/*.md files - Source code uses the built-in `OPENSSL_IS_AWSLC` and - `OPENSSL_IS_BORINSSL` macros to detect BoringSSL and AWS-LC. No help is - necessary from the build tools. + Instead of use 'docs/*.md' in dep5. For clarity and avoiding a wide- + matching wildcard. - The one use of `HAVE_BORINGSSL` in the source turned out to be no longer - necessary for warning-free BoringSSL + Schannel builds. Ref: #1610 #2634 + + Remove mention of old files from .reuse/dep5 + + add info to .github/dependabot.yml + + make scripts/copyright.pl warn on non-matching patterns - autotools detects this anyway for display purposes. - CMake detects this to decide whether to use the BoringSSL-specific - crypto lib with ngtcp2. It detects AWS-LC, but doesn't use the detection - result just yet (planned in #12066). + Closes #13245 - Ref: #11964 +- test470: warn about unicode quote character read from config file - Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg - Reviewed-by: Jay Satiro - Closes #12065 + Idea-by: Emanuele Torre -Marc Hoersken (8 Oct 2023) +- test469: verify warning when argument has unicode quote -- CI: move distcheck job from Azure Pipelines to GitHub Actions +- tool_getparam: output warning for leading unicode quote character - This will allow for more trigger excludes within Azure Pipelines. + ... in the option argument. - Also fixes seemingly broken check with scripts/installcheck.sh. - Ref: 190374c74ec4e5247d9066544c86e8d095e1d7b5 + Typically this is a mistake done when copying example command lines from + online documentation using the wrong quote character. - Assisted-by: Philip Heiduck - Closes #9532 + Presumably there are also other potential quote characters that might be + used, and this check is done without even knowing that unicode is used! -Daniel Stenberg (8 Oct 2023) + Reported-by: Sanjay Pujare + Fixes #13214 + Closes #13215 -- url: fall back to http/https proxy env-variable if ws/wss not set +- tool: follow-up getenv fix - Reported-by: Craig Andrews - Fixes #12031 - Closes #12058 + Remove a double free. Change the IPFS env use to a plain getenv() simply + because coverity gets confused. -Stefan Eissing (8 Oct 2023) + Follow-up to 9126b141c9398fe + Closes #13241 -- cf-socket: simulate slow/blocked receives in debug +- idn: make Curl_idnconvert_hostname() use Curl_idn_decode() - add 2 env variables for non-UDP sockets: - 1. CURL_DBG_SOCK_RBLOCK: percentage of receive calls that randomly - should return EAGAIN - 2. CURL_DBG_SOCK_RMAX: max amount of bytes read from socket + In the name of less code duplication - Closes #12035 + Closes #13236 -- http2: refused stream handling for retry +- curl-confopts.m4: define CARES_NO_DEPRECATED when c-ares is used - - answer HTTP/2 streams refused via a GOAWAY from the server to - respond with CURLE_RECV_ERROR in order to trigger a retry - on another connection + Starting in 1.28.0 c-ares added deprecation warnings for some API calls + libcurl uses. - Reported-by: black-desk on github - Ref #11859 - Closes #12054 + Closes #13240 -Jay Satiro (8 Oct 2023) +- vquic: use CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T for 64 bit printf output -- CURLOPT_DEBUGFUNCTION.3: warn about internal handles + Reported-by: Keitagit-kun on github + Fixes #13224 + Closes #13231 - - Warn that the user's debug callback may be called with the handle - parameter set to an internal handle. +- openldap: create ldap URLs correctly for IPv6 addresses - Without this warning the user may assume that the only handles their - debug callback receives are the easy handles on which they set - CURLOPT_DEBUGFUNCTION. + Reported-by: Sergio Durigan Junior + Fixes #13228 + Closes #13235 - This is a follow-up to f8cee8cc which changed DoH handles to inherit - the debug callback function set in the user's easy handle. As a result - those handles are now passed to the user's debug callback function. +- curl: use curl_getenv instead of the curlx_ version - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12034 + The curlx one was once introduced when we still considered dropping the + libcurl function at some point. To reduce confusion and to make it + easier to understand when curl_free() should be used, use the actual + libcurl function call directly instead. -- url: fix typo + Closes #13230 -Daniel Stenberg (8 Oct 2023) +Evgeny Grin (Karlson2k) (30 Mar 2024) -- test458: verify --expand-output, expanding a file name accepting option +- curl_sha512_256: do not use workaround for NetBSD when not needed - Verifies the fix in #12055 (commit f2c8086ff15e6e995e1) + Assisted-by: riastradh on github + Assisted-by: Michael Kaufmann + Closes #13225 -- tool_getparam: accept variable expansion on file names too +Matt Jolly (30 Mar 2024) - Reported-by: PBudmark on github - Fixes #12048 - Closes #12055 +- m4: fix rustls pkg-config codepath -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced + The previous pkg-config code would successfully detect rustls but did + not set all appropriate variables and call the right macros to properly + configure cURL. -- multi: do CURLM_CALL_MULTI_PERFORM at two more places + Reported-by: kpcyrd on github + Fixes #13200 + Closes #13202 - ... when it does a state transition but there is no particular socket or - timer activity. This was made apparent when commit b5bb84c removed a - superfluous timer expiry. +Daniel McCarney (30 Mar 2024) - Reported-by: Dan Fandrich. - Fixes #12033 - Closes #12056 +- deps: update librustls 0.12.0 -> 0.13.0 -Viktor Szakats (7 Oct 2023) + This commit updates the optional rustls-ffi librustls dependency from + 0.12.0 to 0.13.0. This version is based on the latest available rustls + release (0.23.4). -- GHA/linux: mbedtls 3.5.0 + minor dep bumps + The breaking API changes from 0.12.0 to 0.13.0 are in API surface unused + by curl, so this is an in-place update without any code changes. - Closes #12057 + The `RUSTLS.md` documentation is updated to reflect the new version in + use, and to clarify that `cbindgen` isn't required to build `librustls` + - it's only used by developers to update the vendored `rustls.h` header + file maintained upstream. -Dan Fandrich (7 Oct 2023) + Closes #13238 -- CI: bump OpenLDAP package version on FreeBSD +Daniel Stenberg (28 Mar 2024) - The old one is no longer available. +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced -Marc Hoersken (7 Oct 2023) +- tool_xattr: "guess" URL scheme if none is provided -- docs/libcurl/opts/Makefile.inc: add missing manpage files + ... when figuring out the source URL to store. - Detected with #9532 + Reported-by: Dagfinn Ilmari Mannsåker + Fixes #13205 + Closes #13221 -Dan Fandrich (7 Oct 2023) +- tool_xattr: in debug builds, act normally if CURL_FAKE_XATTR is not set -- tests: fix a race condition in ftp server disconnect + Closes #13220 - If a client disconnected and reconnected quickly, before the ftp server - had a chance to respond, the protocol message/ack (ping/pong) sequence - got out of sync, causing messages sent to the old client to be delivered - to the new. A disconnect must now be acknowledged and intermediate - requests thrown out until it is, which ensures that such synchronization - problems can't occur. This problem could affect ftp, pop3, imap and smtp - tests. +Stefan Eissing (28 Mar 2024) - Fixes #12002 - Closes #12049 +- content_encoding: brotli and others, pass through 0-length writes -Viktor Szakats (7 Oct 2023) + - curl's transfer handling may write 0-length chunks at the end of the + download with an EOS flag. (HTTP/2 does this commonly) -- appveyor: bump mingw-w64 job to gcc 13 (was: 8) + - content encoders need to pass-through such a write and not count this + as error in case they are finished decoding - This sets gcc 6, 7, 9, 13 in our test mix (was: 6, 7, 8, 9). - Adding a modern gcc version to the tests. + Fixes #13209 + Fixes #13212 + Closes #13219 - (The gcc 8 job used to take around 50 minutes. The new image with gcc 13 - finished in 32, 35, 34 minutes in the 3 test runs so far.) +Tobias Stoeckmann (28 Mar 2024) - It also adds a modern CMake version and OS env to our mingw-w64 builds. +- libssh2: set length to 0 if strdup failed - Closes #12051 + Internally, libssh2 dereferences the NULL pointer if length is non-zero. + The callback function cannot return the error condition, so at least + prevent subsequent crash. -David Benjamin (6 Oct 2023) + Closes #13213 -- openssl: use X509_ALGOR_get0 instead of reaching into X509_ALGOR +Daniel Stenberg (28 Mar 2024) - While the struct is still public in OpenSSL, there is a (somewhat - inconvenient) accessor. Use it to remain compatible if it becomes opaque - in the future. +- RELEASE-PROCEDURE: mention an initial working build - Closes #12038 + This is the step that was not done and caused the 8.7.0 mishap (it + lacked the correctly generated hugehelp file). -Daniel Stenberg (6 Oct 2023) + Remove the mention of the copyright script as this is verified by a CI + job these days: the REUSE one. -- curl_easy_pause.3: mention it works within callbacks + Closes #13216 - Reported-by: Maxim Dzhura - Bug: https://curl.se/mail/lib-2023-10/0010.html - Closes #12046 +Paul Howarth (28 Mar 2024) -- curl_easy_pause.3: mention h2/h3 buffering +- curl_sha512_255: fix detection of OpenSSL 1.1.1 or later - Asked-by: Maxim Dzhura - Ref: https://curl.se/mail/lib-2023-10/0011.html + Use the same OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER comparison as in lib/vtls/openssl.c. - Closes #12045 + Closes #13208 -Viktor Szakats (6 Oct 2023) +Robert Moreton (28 Mar 2024) -- cmake: re-add missed C89 headers for specific detections +- cf-socket: remove references to l_ip, l_port - We removed C89 `setjmp.h` and `signal.h` detections and excluded them - from the global header list we use when detecting functions [1]. Then - missed to re-add these headers to the specific functions which need - them to be detected [2]. Fix this omission in this patch. + Fixes #13210 + Closes #13211 - [1] Follow-up to 3795fcde995d96db641ddbcc8a04f9f0f03bef9f #11951 - [2] Follow-up to 96c29900bcec32dd6bc8e9857c8871ff4b8b8ed9 #11940 +Daniel Stenberg (28 Mar 2024) - Closes #12043 +- openssl: do not set SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS -Daniel Stenberg (6 Oct 2023) + While it might save some memory, it causes OpenSSL to instead do a huge + amount of allocations. -- multi: set CURLM_CALL_MULTI_PERFORM after switch to DOING_MORE + Ref: #13136 + Closes #13203 - Since there is nothing to wait for there. Avoids the test 1233 hang - reported in #12033. +- curl: make --help adapt to the terminal width - Reported-by: Dan Fandrich - Closes #12042 + Instead of assuming and working with 80 colums, try figuring out what + width is actually used. -Dan Fandrich (5 Oct 2023) + Ref: #13141 -- test1903: actually verify the cookies after the test + Closes #13171 - The test otherwise could do just about anything (except leak memory in - debug mode) and its bad behaviour wouldn't be detected. Now, check the - resulting cookie file to ensure the cookies are still there. +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced - Closes #12041 + and bump to 8.7.2 for now -- test: add missing s +- configure: make --disable-docs imply --disable-manual - The tests will otherwise fail if curl has them disabled. + Because when the docs is not built, the necesary curl.txt file is not + present so then the manual cannot get built. -- test1906: set a lower timeout since it's hit on Windows + Reported-by: Harry Sintonen + Closes #13191 - msys2 builds actually hit the connect timeout in normal operation, so - lower the timeout from 5 minutes to 5 seconds to reduce test time. +Chris Webb (27 Mar 2024) - Ref: #11328 - Closes #12036 +- cmdline-docs: fix make install with configure --disable-docs -Daniel Stenberg (5 Oct 2023) + make -C docs/cmdline-opts install depends on all-am, which in turn + depends on $(MANS), unconditionally defined to be $(man_MANS). -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced + As with CLEANFILES, only add curl.1 to man_MANS when BUILD_DOCS is true + so we don't try to build curl.1 unnecessarily. -Jay Satiro (5 Oct 2023) + Closes #13198 -- idn: fix WinIDN null ptr deref on bad host +Version 8.7.1 (27 Mar 2024) - - Return CURLE_URL_MALFORMAT if IDN hostname cannot be converted from - UTF-8 to UTF-16. +Daniel Stenberg (27 Mar 2024) - Prior to this change a failed conversion erroneously returned CURLE_OK - which meant 'decoded' pointer (what would normally point to the - punycode) would not be written to, remain NULL and be dereferenced - causing an access violation. +- RELEASE-PROCEDURE: remove old release dates, add new pending ones - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11983 +Version 8.7.0 (27 Mar 2024) -Dan Fandrich (4 Oct 2023) +Daniel Stenberg (27 Mar 2024) -- tests: close the shell used to start sshd +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced - This shell isn't needed once sshd starts, so use "exec" so it doesn't - stick around. + curl 8.7.0 release - Closes #12032 +- THANKS: new contributors from the 8.7.0 release -Daniel Stenberg (4 Oct 2023) +- CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS.md: used for MQTT as well -- base64: also build for curl + Closes #13189 - Since the tool itself now uses the base64 code using the curlx way, it - needs to build also when the tool needs it. Starting now, the tool build - defines BULDING_CURL to allow lib-side code to use it. +- http: remove stale comment about rewindbeforesend - Follow-up to 2e160c9c6525 + ... because that struct field exists no more. - Closes #12010 + Follow-up to 14bcea074a782272. -Eduard Strehlau (4 Oct 2023) + Closes #13187 -- tests: Fix zombie processes left behind by FTP tests. +- DISTROS: add document with distro pointers - ftpserver.pl correctly cleans up spawned server processes, - but forgets to wait for the shell used to spawn them. - This is barely noticeable during a normal testrun, - but causes process exhaustion and test failure - during a complete torture run of the FTP tests. + Lots of organizations distribute curl packages to end users. This is a + collection of pointers to where to learn more about curl on and with + each distro. - Fixes #12018 - Closes #12020 + Assisted-by: Alan Coopersmith + Assisted-by: Andrew Kaster + Assisted-by: Andy Fiddaman + Assisted-by: Arjan van de Ven + Assisted-by: Brian Clemens + Assisted-by: chrysos349 on github + Assisted-by: Dan Fandrich + Assisted-by: Dan McDonald + Assisted-by: Gaelan Steele + Assisted-by: graywolf on github + Assisted-by: Jan Macku + Assisted-by: John Marshall + Assisted-by: Jonathan Perkin + Assisted-by: Kevin Daudt + Assisted-by: Marcus Müller + Assisted-by: Michał Górny + Assisted-by: Outvi V + Assisted-by: Ross Burton + Assisted-by: Sean Molenaar + Assisted-by: Till Wegmüller + Assisted-by: Viktor Szakats + Assisted-by: Winni Neessen -Dan Fandrich (4 Oct 2023) + Closes #13178 -- github/labeler: improve labeler matches +Fabian Keil (25 Mar 2024) -- test574: add a timeout to the test +- wolfSSL: do not call the stub function wolfSSL_BIO_set_init() - This one hangs occasionally, so this will speed up a test run and allow - logs to be seen when it does. + Calling the function isn't necessary and causes the build + to fail when wolfSSL has been compiled with NO_WOLFSSL_STUB: - Closes #12025 + Making all in opts + CCLD curl + ld: error: undefined symbol: wolfSSL_BIO_set_init + >>> referenced by wolfssl.c:235 (vtls/wolfssl.c:235) + >>> libcurl_la-wolfssl.o:(wolfssl_bio_cf_create) in archiv + e ../lib/.libs/libcurl.a + cc: error: linker command failed with exit code 1 (use -v to see invocat + ion) + *** Error code 1 -- tests: propagate errors in libtests + Closes #13164 - Use the test macros to automatically propagate some errors, and check - and log others while running the tests. This can help in debugging - exactly why a test has failed. +Daniel Stenberg (25 Mar 2024) -- tests: set --expect100-timeout to improve test reliability +- cmdline-opts: shorter help texts - On an overloaded server, the default 1 second timeout can go by without - the test server having a chance to respond with the expected headers, - causing tests to fail. Increase the 1 second timeout to 99 seconds so - this failure mode is no longer a problem on test 1129. Some other tests - already set a high value, but make them consistently 99 seconds so if - something goes wrong the test is stalled for less time. + In an effort to increase the readability of the "--help all" output on + narrow (80 column) terminals. - Ref: #11328 + Co-authored-by: Jay Satiro -- CI: ignore the "flaky" and "timing-dependent" test results in CMake + Closes #13169 - This was already done for automake builds but CMake builds were missed. - Test 1086 actually causes the test harness to crash with: +Matt Jolly (25 Mar 2024) - Warning: unable to close filehandle DWRITE properly: Broken pipe at C:/projec - ts/curl/tests/ftpserver.pl line 527 +- curl-rustls.m4: add pkg-config support to rustls detection - Rather than fix it now, this change leaves test 1086 entirely skipped on - those builds that show this problem. + Based on the existing openssl pkg-config detection, this commit tries to + use pkg-config to find `rustls` then falls back to the current approach + if that fails. - Follow-up to 589dca761 + We use the following logic: - Ref: #11865 + - if no path is provided, just use pkg-config, if it's not there we have + a problem! + - if a path is provided, try pkg-config + + if pkg-config fails, try and find rustls directly -Viktor Szakats (4 Oct 2023) + Closes #13179 -- cmake: improve OpenLDAP builds +Mohammadreza Hendiani (25 Mar 2024) - - cmake: detect OpenLDAP based on function `ldap_init_fd`. - autotools does this. autotools also publishes this detection result - in `HAVE_LDAP_INIT_FD`. We don't mimic that with CMake as the source - doesn't use this value. (it might need to be remove-listed in - `scripts/cmp-config.pl` for future OpenLDAP test builds.) - This also deletes existing self-declaration method via the - CMake-specific `CURL_USE_OPENLDAP` configuration. +- TODO: update 13.11 with more information - - cmake: define `LDAP_DEPRECATED=1` for OpenLDAP. - Like autotools does. This fixes a long list of these warnings: - ``` - /usr/local/opt/openldap/include/ldap.h:1049:5: warning: 'LDAP_DEPRECATED' i - s not defined, evaluates to 0 [-Wundef] - ``` + Closes #13173 - - cmake: delete LDAP TODO comment no longer relevant. +Daniel Stenberg (23 Mar 2024) - Also: +- docs/libcurl: generate PROTOCOLS from meta-data - - autotools: replace domain name `dummy` with `0.0.0.0` in LDAP feature - detection functions. + Remove the PROTOCOLS section from the source files completely and + instead generate them based on the header data in the curldown files. - Ref: #11964 (effort to sync cmake detections with autotools) + It also generates TLS backend information for options marked for TLS as + protocol. - Closes #12024 + Closes #13175 -- cmake: fix unity builds for more build combinations +- CURLMOPT_MAX*: mention what happens if changed mid-transfer - By using unique static function/variable names in source files - implementing these interfaces. + For CURLMOPT_MAXCONNECTS and CURLMOPT_MAX_HOST_CONNECTIONS - - OpenLDAP combined with any SSH backend. + Ref: #13158 + Closes #13176 - - MultiSSL with mbedTLS, OpenSSL, wolfSSL, SecureTransport. +- docs/libcurl: add TLS backend info for all TLS options - Closes #12027 + All man pages that are listed to be for TLS now must also specify + exactly what TLS backends the option works for, or use All if they all + work. -Daniel Stenberg (4 Oct 2023) + cd2nroff makes sure this is done and that the listed backends exist. -- tests: remove leading spaces from some tags + Closes #13168 - The threee tags ``, `` and `` were frequently used - with a leading space that this removes. The reason this habbit is so - widespread in testcases is probably that they have been copy and pasted. +- docs/libcurl: cleanups - Hence, fixing them all now might curb this practice from now on. + - CURLINFO_TLS_SESSION.md: remove mention of NSS + - CURLINFO_TLS_SSL_PTR.md: remove NSS leftover + - CURLOPT_CAINFO.md: drop mention of backends not supporting this + - CURLOPT_CAPATH.md: wolfSSL also supports this - Closes #12028 + Closes #13166 -Viktor Szakats (4 Oct 2023) +- docs: make each libcurl man specify protocol(s) -- GHA: bump actions/checkout + The mandatory header now has a mandatory list of protocols for which the + manpage is relevant. - Follow-up to 2e0fa50fc16b9339f51e0a7bfff0352829323acb #11964 - Follow-up to c39585d9b7ef3cbfc1380812dec60e7b275b6af3 #12000 + Most man pages already has a "PROTOCOLS" section, but this introduces a + stricter way to specify the relevant protocols. - Closes #12023 + cd2nroff verifies that at least one protocol is mentioned (which can be + `*`). -- spelling: fix codespell 2.2.6 typos + This information is not used just yet, but A) the PROTOCOLS section can + now instead get generated and get a unified wording across all manpages + and B) this allows us to more reliably filter/search for protocol + specific manpages/options. - Closes #12019 + Closes #13166 -Daniel Stenberg (3 Oct 2023) +Stefan Eissing (21 Mar 2024) -- GHA: add workflow to compare configure vs cmake outputs +- http2, http3: only return CURLE_PARTIAL_FILE when bytes were received - Uses scripts/cmp-config.pl two compare two curl_config.h files, - presumbly generated with configure and cmake. It displays the - differences and filters out a lot of known lines we ignore. + - should resolve spurious pytest failures when stream were reset + right after response header were received - The script also shows the matches that were *not* used. Possibly - subjects for removal. + Clsoes #13151 - Closes #11964 +- http: separate response parsing from response action -- appveyor: enable test 571 + - move code that triggers on end-of-response into separate function from + parsing + - simplify some headp/headerlen usage + - add `httpversion` to SingleRequest to indicate the version of the + current response - Follow-up from 8a940fd55c175f7 / #12013 + Closes #13134 - Closes #12017 +Daniel Stenberg (21 Mar 2024) -Viktor Szakats (3 Oct 2023) +- http2: remove the third (unused) argument from http2_data_done() -- build: alpha-sort source files for lib and src + Closes #13154 - Closes #12014 +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced -- cmake: delete old `HAVE_LDAP_URL_PARSE` logic +Evgeny Grin (Karlson2k) (21 Mar 2024) - Left there by accident after adding proper detection for this. +- RELEASE-NOTES: corrected - Follow-up to 772f0d8edf1c3c2745543f42388ccec5a16ee2c0 #12006 + Corrected link for item 118 - Ref: #11964 (effort to sync cmake detections with autotools) + Closes #13157 - Closes #12015 +Daniel Stenberg (19 Mar 2024) -Stefan Eissing (3 Oct 2023) +- CURLOPT_INTERFACE.md: remove spurious amp, add see-also -- tests: increase lib571 timeout from 3s to 30s + Closes #13149 - - 3s is too short for our CI, making this test fail occasionally - - test usually experiences no delay run locally, so 30s wont hurt +Stefan Eissing (19 Mar 2024) - Closes #12013 +- http: improve response header handling, save cpu cycles -Viktor Szakats (3 Oct 2023) + Saving some cpu cycles in http response header processing: + - pass the length of the header line along + - use string constant sizeof() instead of strlen() + - check line length if prefix is possible + - switch on first header char to limit checks -- cmake: fix unity with Windows Unicode + TrackMemory + Closes #13143 - Found the root cause of the startup crash in unity builds with Unicode - and TrackMemory enabled at the same time. +Daniel Stenberg (19 Mar 2024) - We must make sure that the `memdebug.h` header doesn't apply to - `lib/curl_multibyte.c` (as even noted in a comment there.) In unity - builds all headers apply to all sources, including `curl_multibyte.c`. - This probably resulted in an infinite loop on startup. +- tool_getparam: accept a blank -w "" - Exclude this source from unity compilation with TrackMemory enabled, - in both libcurl and curl tool. Enable unity mode for a debug Unicode - CI job to keep it tested. Also delete the earlier workaround that - fully disabled unity for affected builds. + Added test 468 to verify. - Follow-up to d82b080f6374433ce7c98241329189ad2d3976f8 #12005 - Follow-up to 3f8fc25720900b14b7432f4bd93407ca15311719 #11095 + Regression from 07bcae89d5d00 (shipped in 8.6.0) + Reported-by: Thomas Pyle + Fixes #13144 + Closes #13145 - Closes #11928 +Evgeny Grin (Karlson2k) (18 Mar 2024) -- cmake: disable unity mode with Windows Unicode + TrackMemory +- curl_sha512_256: work around a NetBSD bug - "TrackMemory" is `ENABLE_DEBUG=ON` (aka `ENABLE_CURLDEBUG=ON`, - aka `-DCURLDEBUG`). + Based on Michael Kaufmann analysis and suggestion - There is an issue with memory tracking and Unicode when built in "unity" - mode, which results in the curl tool crashing right on startup, even - without any command-line option. Interestingly this doesn't happen under - WINE (at least on the system I tested this on), but consistenly happens - on real Windows machines. Crash is 0xC0000374 heap corruption. Both - shared and static curl executables are affected. + Closes #13133 - This limitation probably won't hit too many people, but it remains - a TODO to find and fix the root cause and drop this workaround. +Stefan Eissing (18 Mar 2024) - Example builds and runs: - https://ci.appveyor.com/project/curlorg/curl/builds/48169111/job/17cptxhtpubd - 7iwj#L313 (static) - https://ci.appveyor.com/project/curlorg/curl/builds/48169111/job/76e1ge758tby - qu9c#L317 (shared) +- http: expect 100 rework - Follow-up to 3f8fc25720900b14b7432f4bd93407ca15311719 #11095 + Move all handling of HTTP's `Expect: 100-continue` feature into a client + reader. Add sending flag `KEEP_SEND_TIMED` that triggers transfer + sending on general events like a timer. - Ref: #11928 - Closes #12005 + HTTP installs a `CURL_CR_PROTOCOL` reader when announcing `Expect: + 100-continue`. That reader works as follows: -- cmake: tidy-up `NOT_NEED_LBER_H` detection + - on first invocation, records time, starts the `EXPIRE_100_TIMEOUT` + timer, disables `KEEP_SEND`, enables `KEEP_SEND_TIMER` and returns 0, + eos=FALSE like a paused upload. - Follow-up to 772f0d8edf1c3c2745543f42388ccec5a16ee2c0 #12006 + - on subsequent invocation it checks if the timer has expired. If so, it + enables `KEEP_SEND` and switches to passing through reads to the + underlying readers. -- appveyor: rewrite batch in PowerShell + CI improvements + Transfer handling's `readwrite()` will be invoked when a timer expires + (like `EXPIRE_100_TIMEOUT`) or when data from the server arrives. Seeing + `KEEP_SEND_TIMER`, it will try to upload more data, which triggers + reading from the client readers again. Which then may lead to a new + pausing or cause the upload to start. - 1. Rewrite in PowerShell: + Flags and timestamps connected to this have been moved from + `SingleRequest` into the reader's context. - - rewrite MS-DOS batch build script in PowerShell. - - move some bash operations into native PowerShell. - - fixups for PowerShell insisting on failure when a command outputs - something to stderr. - - fix to actually run `curl -V` after every build. - (and exclude ARM64 builds.) - - also say why we skipped `curl -V` if we had to skip. - - fix CMake warnings about unused configuration variables, by adapting - these dynamically for build cases. - - dedupe OpenSSL path into a variable. - - disable `test1451` failing with a warning anyway due to missing python - impacket. (after trying and failing to install impacket) - PowerShell promotes these warnings to errors by PowerShell. We can also - suppress they wholesale if they start causing issues in the future, - like we already to with `autoreconf` and `./configure`. + Closes #13110 - PowerShell is better than MS-DOS batches, so the hope is this makes it - easier to extend and maintain the AppVeyor build logic. POSIX/bash isn't - supported inline by AppVeyor on Windows build machines, but we are okay - to keep it in an external script, so it's also an option. +- mbedtls: fix pytest for newer versions - 2. CI improvements: + Fix the expectations in pytest for newer versions of mbedtls - - enable tests for a "unity" build job. - - speed-up CI initialization by using shallow clones of the curl repo. - - speed-up CMake MSVC jobs with `TrackFileAccess=false`. - - enable parallelism in `VisualStudioSolution` builds. - - display CMake version before builds. - - always show the CPU in job names. - - tell which jobs are build-only in job names. - - move `TESTING:` value next to `DISABLED_TESTS:` in two jobs. - - add `config.log` (autotools) to dumped logs (need to enable manually). + Closes #13132 - 3. Style: +Daniel Stenberg (15 Mar 2024) - - use single-quotes in YAML like we do in other CI YAML files. - It also allows to drop quoting characters and lighter to write/read. - (keep double quotes for PowerShell strings needing expansion.) +- ipv6.md: mention IPv4 mapped addresses - Closes #11999 + Reported-by: Josh Soref + Assisted-by: Jay Satiro + Fixes #13112 + Closes #13131 -- cmake: fix `HAVE_LDAP_SSL`, `HAVE_LDAP_URL_PARSE` on non-Windows +Stefan Eissing (15 Mar 2024) - - set `HAVE_LDAP_URL_PARSE` if `ldap_url_parse` function exists. - Before this patch we set it based it on the presence of `stricmp`, - which correctly enabled it on e.g. Windows, but was inaccurate for - other platforms. +- http: revisit http_perhapsrewind() - - always set `HAVE_LDAP_SSL` if an LDAP backend is detected and - LDAPS is not explicitly disabled. This mimics autotools behaviour. - Previously we set it only for Windows LDAP. After this fix, LDAPS is - correctly enabled in default macOS builds. + - use facilities provided by client readers better + - work also for non-uploading requests like GET/HEAD + - update documentation - - enable LDAP[S] for a CMake macOS CI job. Target OS X 10.9 (Mavericks) - to avoid deprecation warnings for LDAP API. + Closes #13117 - - always detect `HAVE_LDAP_SSL_H`, even with LDAPS explicitly disabled. - This doesn't make much sense, but let's do it to sync behaviour with - autotools. +- test 1541: verify getinfo values on first header callback - - fix benign typo in variable name. + Reported-by: chensong1211 on github + Ref: #13125 + Closes #13128 - Ref: #11964 (effort to sync cmake detections with autotools) +- TLS: start shutdown only when peer did not already close - Closes #12006 + - When curl sees a TCP close from the peer, do not start a TLS shutdown. + TLS shutdown is a handshake and if the peer already closed the + connection, it is not interested in participating. -- autotools: restore `HAVE_IOCTL_*` detections + Reported-by: dfdity on github + Assisted-by: Jiří Bok + Assisted-by: Pēteris Caune + Fixes #10290 + Closes #13087 - This restores `CURL_CHECK_FUNC_IOCTL` detection. I deleted it in - 4d73854462f30948acab12984b611e9e33ee41e6 and - c3456652a0c72d1845d08df9769667db7e159949 (2022-08), because the - `HAVE_IOCTL` result it generated was unused in the source. But, - I did miss the fact that this had two dependent checks: - `CURL_CHECK_FUNC_IOCTL_FIONBIO`, - `CURL_CHECK_FUNC_IOCTL_SIOCGIFADDR` that we do actually need: - `HAVE_IOCTL_FIONBIO`, `HAVE_IOCTL_SIOCGIFADDR`. +Daniel Stenberg (14 Mar 2024) - Regression from 4d73854462f30948acab12984b611e9e33ee41e6 +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced - Ref: #11964 (effort to sync cmake detections with autotools) +- curl: make --libcurl output better CURLOPT_*SSLVERSION - Closes #12008 + The option is really two enums ORed together, so it needs special + attention to make the code output nice. -Daniel Stenberg (2 Oct 2023) + Added test 1481 to verify. Both the server and the proxy versions. -- RELEASE-PROCEDURE.md: updated coming release dates + Reported-by: Boris Verkhovskiy + Fixes #13127 + Closes #13129 -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced +- GHA/linux: add sysctl trick to work-around GitHub runner issue -Viktor Szakats (1 Oct 2023) + The GitHub image runner update from 20240304.1.0 to 20240310.1 + introduces a problem for clang-14. The issue is caused by + incompatibility between llvm 14 provided in ubuntu-22.04 image and the + much newer kernel configured with high-entropy ASLR. -- cmake: pre-cache `HAVE_POLL_FINE` on Windows + As a work-around, we issue a sysctl command to lower the entropy and get + clang-14 to work again. - Windows doesn't support `poll()`, so we can safely skip checking for - fine poll. + URL: https://github.com/actions/runner-images/issues/9491 - Closes #12003 + Closes #13124 -- gha: bump actions to latest versions +- SPONSORS: describe the basics - - actions@checkout@v4 (from v3 and v2) + Closes #13119 - - fsfe/reuse-action@v2 (from v1) +- GOVERNANCE: document the core team - Closes #12000 + Closes #13118 -Stefan Eissing (30 Sep 2023) +Jay Satiro (13 Mar 2024) -- h2: testcase and fix for pausing h2 streams +- vquic-tls: fix the error code returned for bad CA file - - refs #11982 where it was noted that paused transfers may - close successfully without delivering the complete data - - made sample poc into tests/http/client/h2-pausing.c and - added test_02_27 to reproduce + - Return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE if wolfSSL encounters a problem + reading the cert file or path. - Closes #11989 - Fixes #11982 - Reported-by: Harry Sintonen + This is a follow-up to the parent commit aedbbdf1. -Viktor Szakats (30 Sep 2023) + Reported-by: Karthikdasari0423@users.noreply.github.com -- cmake: validate `CURL_DEFAULT_SSL_BACKEND` config value + Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/13115 - Before this patch CMake builds accepted any value and it was used at - runtime as-is. This patch make sure that the selected default backend - is also enabled in the build. It also enforces a full lowercase value. +Daniel Stenberg (12 Mar 2024) - This improves reproducibility and brings CMake in sync with autotools - which already worked like described above. +- vquic-tls: return appropirate errors on wolfSSL errors - Follow-up to 26c7feb8b9d51a57fab3325571b4bbfa03b11af0 #11774 + Reported-by: Dexter Gerig + Closes #13107 - Closes #11998 +Viktor Szakats (12 Mar 2024) -- autotools: adjust `CURL_CA_PATH` value to CMake +- tidy-up: one comment and EOF newlines - autotools was using the same value as CMake, but with an ending - slash. Delete the ending slash to match configurations. + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Closes #13108 - Ref: #11964 (effort to sync cmake detections with autotools) +Daniel Stenberg (12 Mar 2024) - Closes #11997 +- cmdline-opts: language cleanups -- cmake: detect `sys/wait.h` and `netinet/udp.h` + Use imperative mood consistently for the first sentence describing an + option. - Ref: #11964 (effort to sync cmake detections with autotools) + "Set this" instead "tell curl to set" or "this sets..." - Closes #11996 + Plus some extra cleanups and rephrasing. -Daniel Stenberg (30 Sep 2023) + Closes #13106 -- lib: provide and use Curl_hexencode +- managen: remove space before protocols - Generates a lower case ASCII hex output from a binary input. + For options that are listed for specific protocols, the protocols (shown + first within parentheses) are now output without the leading space in the + manpage output. - Closes #11990 + Closes #13105 -- configure: check for the capath by default +Jay Satiro (12 Mar 2024) - ... if the chosen TLS backend supports it: OpenSSL, GnuTLS, mbedTLS or wolfSS - L +- mbedtls: properly cleanup the thread-shared entropy - cmake: synced + - Store the state of the thread-shared entropy for global init/cleanup. - Assisted-by: Viktor Szakats - Closes #11987 + - Use curl's thread support of mbedtls for all Windows builds instead of + just when the threaded resolver is used via USE_THREADS_WIN32. -- wolfssl: ignore errors in CA path + Prior to this change on global cleanup curl builds that have curl thread + support for mbedtls freed the entropy (8b1d2298) but failed to mark that + it had been freed, which caused problems on subsequent init + transfer. - The default wolfSSL_CTX_load_verify_locations() function is quite picky - with the certificates it loads and will for example return error if just - one of the certs has expired. + Bug: https://github.com/curl/curl/discussions/11919#discussioncomment-8687105 + Reported-by: awesomekosm@users.noreply.github.com - With the *_ex() function and its WOLFSSL_LOAD_FLAG_IGNORE_ERR flag, it - behaves more similar to what OpenSSL does by default. + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/13071 - Even the set of default certs on my Debian unstable has several expired - ones. +Daniel Stenberg (12 Mar 2024) - Assisted-by: Juliusz Sosinowicz - Assisted-by: Michael Osipov +- tool_getparam: handle non-existing (out of range) short-options - Closes #11987 + ... correctly, even when they follow an existing one without a space in + between. -- create-dirs.d: clarify it also uses --output-dirs + Verify with test 467 - Reported-by: Robert Simpson - Fixes #11991 - Closes #11995 + Follow-up to 07dd60c05b + Reported-by: Geeknik Labs + Fixes #13101 + Closes #13102 -Viktor Szakats (30 Sep 2023) +Stefan Eissing (11 Mar 2024) -- appveyor: fix yamlint issues, indent +- lib: move 'done' parameter to SingleRequests - Also: - - use double quotes in all batch if statements. + A transfer may do several `SingleRequest`s for its success. This happens + regularly for authentication, follows and retries on failed connections. + The "readwrite()" calls and functions connected to those carried a `bool + *done` parameter to indicate that the current `SingleRequest` is over. + This may happen before `upload_done` or `download_done` bits of + `SingleRequest` are set. - Closes #11994 + The problem with that is now `write_resp()` protocol handlers are + invoked in places where the `bool *done` cannot be passed up to the + caller. Instead of being a bool in the call chain, it needs to become a + member of `SingleRequest`, reflecting its state. -- cmake: detect `HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME_MONOTONIC_RAW` + This removes the `bool *done` parameter and adds the `done` bit to + `SingleRequest` instead. It adds `Curl_req_soft_reset()` for using a + `SingleRequest` in a follow up, clearing `done` and other + flags/counters. - Based on existing autotools logic. + Closes #13096 - Ref: #11964 (effort to sync cmake detections with autotools) +- request: clarify message when request has been sent off - Closes #11981 + Change the "uploaded and fine" message for requests without a body -- cmake: detect `HAVE_GETADDRINFO_THREADSAFE` + Reported-by: Karthikdasari0423 on github + Fixes #13093 + Closes #13095 - Based on existing autotools logic. +Daniel Stenberg (11 Mar 2024) - autotools checks for old versions of the allowlisted target OSes and - disables this feature when seeing them. In CMake we assume we're running - on newer systems and enable regardless of OS version. +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced - autotools always runs all 3 probes for non-fast-tracked systems and - enables this feature if any one of them was successful. To save - configuration time, CMake stops at the first successful check. +Stefan Eissing (9 Mar 2024) - OpenBSD is not fast-tracked and then gets blocklisted as a generic BSD - system. I haven't double-checked if this is correct, but looks odd. +- lib: keep conn IP information together - Ref: #11964 (effort to sync cmake detections with autotools) + new struct ip_quadruple for holding local/remote addr+port - Closes #11979 + - used in data->info and conn and cf-socket.c + - copy back and forth complete struct + - add 'secondary' to conn + - use secondary in reporting success for ftp 2nd connection -- cmake: fix `HAVE_WRITABLE_ARGV` detection + Reported-by: DasKutti on github + Fixes #13084 + Closes #13090 - Move detection before the creation of detection results in - `curl_config.h`. +Daniel Stenberg (8 Mar 2024) - Ref: #11964 (effort to sync cmake detections with autotools) +- scripts/managen: the new name and home for the manpage generator - Closes #11978 + It was previously docs/cmdline-opts/gen.pl -- appveyor: minor improvements + Closes #13089 - - run `curl -V` after builds to see if they run and with what features. - Except for one job where a CRT DLL is missing. And ARM64 which should - fail, but is silently not launched instead. +- VULN-DISCLOSURE-POLICY.md: update detail about CVE requests - - copy libcurl DLL next to curl tool and tests binaries in shared mode. - This makes it possible to run the tests. (We don't run tests after - these builds yet.) + curl is a CNA now - - list the DLLs and EXEs present after the builds. + Closes #13088 - - add `DEBUG` variable for CMake builds to allow disabling it, for - testing non-debug builds. (currently enabled for all) +Stefan Eissing (8 Mar 2024) - - add commented lines that dump CMake configuration logs for debugging - build/auto-detection issues. +- lib: client reader polish - - add gcc version to jobs where missing. + - seek_func/seek_client, use transfer values only + - remove copies held in `struct connectdata`, use only + ever `data->set.seek_func` + - resolves possible issues in multiuse connections + - new mime post reader eliminates need to ever overwriting this - - switch a job to the native MSYS2 mingw-w64 toolchain. This adds gcc 9 - to the build mix. + - websockets, remove empty Curl_ws_done() function - - make `SHARED=OFF` and `OPENSSL=OFF` defaults global. + Closes #13079 - - delete a duplicate backslash. +Marcel Raad (8 Mar 2024) - Closes #11976 +- lib1598: fix `CURLOPT_POSTFIELDSIZE` usage -- configure: replace adhoc domain with `localhost` in tests + It requires a `long` argument. - Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg - Closes #11988 + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/13085 -- tidy-up: use more example domains +Daniel Stenberg (8 Mar 2024) - Also make use of the example TLD: - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.example +- docs/cmdline-opts: drop the curl.1 from the dist tarball - Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg - Closes #11992 + Since it is no longer needed for building tool_hugehelp.c and all the + docs is available in readable markdown format in the tarball, the peeps + that don't want to build the manpage still do good. -Dan Fandrich (29 Sep 2023) + Removing it also fixes the complexity of out-of-tree builds when the + curl.1 exists in the source tree. -- runtests: display the test status if tests appear hung +- test1140/1173: extend wildcards to find curl.1 - It sometimes happens that a test hangs during a test run and never - returns. The test harness will wait indefinitely for the results and on - CI servers the CI job will eventually be killed after an hour or two. - At the end of a test run, if results haven't come in within a couple of - minutes, display the status of all test runners and what tests they're - running to help in debugging the problem. + ... in its new build path. - This feature is really only kick in with parallel testing enabled, which - is fine because without parallel testing it's usually easy to tell what - test has hung. + Also update the test scripts to be more precise in error messages to + help us understand CI errors better. - Closes #11980 + Follow-up to f03c85635f35269f1 + Ref: #13029 + Closes #13083 -- github/labeler: remove workaround for labeler +- http2: minor tweaks to optimize two struct sizes - This was added due to what seemed to be a bug regarding the sync-labels: - config option, but it looks like it wasn't necessary. + - use BIT() instead of bool + - place the struct fields in (roughly) size order - Follow-up to b2b0534e7 + Closes #13082 -Viktor Szakats (29 Sep 2023) +- buildconf.bat: remove outdated groff/nroff use -- docs: upgrade an URL to HTTPS in `BINDINGS.md` [ci skip] + - don't try to generate the real hugehelp file, because it requires + curl.txt which needs a build + - don't attempt to do anything in a c-ares subdirectory -Daniel Stenberg (29 Sep 2023) + Follow-up to f03c85635f35269 + Closes #13078 -- docs: replace made up domains with example.com +- http2: memory errors in the push callbacks are fatal - in FAQ and MANUAL.md + Use the correct nghttp2 error code accordingly. - - example.com was made for this purpose. + Closes #13081 - - reduces the risk that one of those domains suddenly start hosting - something nasty and we provide links to them +Viktor Szakats (7 Mar 2024) - Closes #11986 +- mkhelp: rename variable to fix compiler warnings -Michael Osipov (29 Sep 2023) + ``` + src\tool_operate.c(541,33): warning C4459: declaration of 'm' hides global de + claration [_bld\src\curl.vcxproj] + _bld\src\tool_hugehelp.c(8,27): + see declaration of 'm' + src\tool_paramhlp.c(307,14): warning C4459: declaration of 'm' hides global d + eclaration [_bld\src\curl.vcxproj] + src\tool_progress.c(118,16): warning C4459: declaration of 'm' hides global d + eclaration [_bld\src\curl.vcxproj] + src\tool_writeout.c(288,31): warning C4459: declaration of 'm' hides global d + eclaration [_bld\src\curl.vcxproj] + ``` + Ref: https://ci.appveyor.com/project/curlorg/curl/builds/49348159/job/51ee75c + d2n0wj6lc#L614 -- acinclude.m4: Document proper system truststore on FreeBSD + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Closes #13077 - The default system truststore on FreeBSD has been /etc/ssl/certs for many - years now. It is managed canonically through certctl(8) and contains hashed - symlinks for OpenSSL and other TLS providers. - The previous ones require security/ca_root_nss which might not be installed o - r - will not contain any custom CA certificates. +Daniel Stenberg (7 Mar 2024) - Closes #11985 +- KNOWN_BUGS: POP3 issue when reading small chunks -Daniel Stenberg (29 Sep 2023) + Closes #12063 -- FAQ: How do I upgrade curl.exe in Windows? +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced - This is a growing question, better answer it here to get somewhere to - point users to. +Robert Moreton (7 Mar 2024) - Closes #11984 +- asyn-ares: fix data race warning -Viktor Szakats (28 Sep 2023) + - Store the c-ares version during global init. -- cmake: pre-cache `HAVE_BASENAME` for mingw-w64 and MSVC + Prior to this change several threads could write the same data to a + static int variable at the same time. Though in practice it's not a + problem ThreadSanitizer may warn. - `basename` is present in mingw-w64, missing from MSVC. Pre-cache - accordingly to make configure faster. + Reported-by: Nikita Taranov + Assisted-by: Jay Satiro - Notice that `basename` has a bug so we later disable it even with - mingw-w64: - https://github.com/curl/curl/blob/781242ffa44a9f9b95b6da5ac5a1bf6372ec6257/li - b/curl_setup.h#L820-L825 + Fixes #13065 + Closes #13000 - Closes #11974 +Stefan Eissing (7 Mar 2024) -Daniel Stenberg (28 Sep 2023) +- hyper: implement unpausing via client reader -- cmake: add missing checks + Just a tidy up to contain 'ifdef' pollution of common + code parts with implementation specifics. - - check for arc4random. To make rand.c use it accordingly. - - check for fcntl - - fix fseek detection - - add SIZEOF_CURL_SOCKET_T - - fix USE_UNIX_SOCKETS - - define HAVE_SNPRINTF to 1 - - check for fnmatch - - check for sched_yield - - remove HAVE_GETPPID duplicate from curl_config.h - - add HAVE_SENDMSG + - remove the ifdef hyper unpausing in easy.c + - add hyper client reader for CURL_CR_PROTOCOL phase + that implements the unpause method for calling + the hyper waker if it is set - Ref: #11964 + Closes #13075 - Co-authored-by: Viktor Szakats - Closes #11973 +- ngtcp2: no recvbuf for stream -- configure: remove unused checks + - write response data directly to the transfer via + `Curl_xfer_write_resp()` like we do in HTTP/2. - - for sys/uio.h - - for fork - - for connect + Closes #13073 - Ref: #11964 +- docs/cmdline-opts/.gitignore: ignore curl.txt - Closes #11973 + Closes #13076 -- lib: remove TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME +Evgeny Grin (Karlson2k) (7 Mar 2024) - It is not used in any code anywhere. +- sha512_256: add support for GnuTLS and OpenSSL - Ref: #11964 - Closes #11975 + This is a follow-up for PR #12897. -- docs: update curl man page references + Add support for SHA-512/256 digest calculation by TLS backends. + Currently only OpenSSL and GnuTLS (actually, nettle) support + SHA-512/256. - Detected by the manpage-syntax update + Closes #13070 - Closes #11963 +- digest: add check for hashing error -- manpage-syntax: verify curl man page references + Closes #13072 - 1. References to curl symbols are now checked that they indeed exist as - man pages. This for \f references as well as the names referenced in the - SEE ALSO section. +Viktor Szakats (7 Mar 2024) - Allowlist curl.1 since it is not always built in builds +- cmake: enable `ENABLE_CURL_MANUAL` by default - 2. References to curl symbols that lack section now causes warning, since tha - t - will prevent them from getting linked properly + Meaning `curl.1` and `src/tool_hugehelp.c` are built by default, + and `--manual` in curl tool is also enabled by default. - 3. Check for "bare" references to curl functions and warn, they should be - references + This syncs behaviour with autotools. - Closes #11963 + For a reproducible `curl.1`, `SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH` needs to be set + to a consistent date, e.g. the timestamp of `CHANGES`. -- cmake: add check for suseconds_t + A pre-built manual (e.g. the one distributed in the official source + tarball) will be ignored and rebuilt after this patch, unless + explicitly disabling this option. - And fix the HAVE_LONGLONG define + Fixes #13028 + Closes #13069 - Ref: #11964 - Closes #11977 +Stefan Eissing (7 Mar 2024) -Viktor Szakats (28 Sep 2023) +- http2: push headers better cleanup -- tidy-up: whitespace fixes + - provide common cleanup method for push headers - Closes #11972 + Closes #13054 -- cmake: detect TLS-SRP in OpenSSL/wolfSSL/GnuTLS +Daniel Stenberg (7 Mar 2024) - With new option `CURL_DISABLE_SRP=ON` to force-disable it. - To match existing option and detection logic in autotools. +- GIT-INFO: convert to markdown - Also: - - fix detecting GnuTLS. - We assume `nettle` as a GnuTLS dependency. - - add CMake GnuTLS CI job. - - bump AppVeyor CMake OpenSSL MSVC job to OpenSSL 1.1.1 (from 1.0.2) - TLS-SRP fails to detect with 1.0.2 due to an OpenSSL header bug. - - fix compiler warning when building with GnuTLS and disabled TLS-SRP. - - fix comment typos, whitespace. + Closes #13074 - Ref: #11964 +Richard Levitte (7 Mar 2024) - Closes #11967 +- cmake: fix libcurl.pc and curl-config library specifications -- tool: use our own stderr variable + Letting CMake figure out where libraries are located gives you full + paths. When generating libcurl.pc and curl-config, getting libraries as + full paths is unusual when one expects to get a list of -l. - Earlier this year we changed our own stderr variable to use the standard - name `stderr` (to avoid bugs where someone is using `stderr` instead of - the curl-tool specific variable). This solution needed to override the - standard `stderr` symbol via the preprocessor. This in turn didn't play - well with unity builds and caused curl tool to crash or stay silent due - to an uninitialized stderr. This was a hard to find issue, fixed by - manually breaking out one file from the unity sources. + To meet expectations, an effort is made to convert the full paths into + -l, possibly with -L before it. - To avoid two these two tricks, this patch implements a different - solution: Restore using our own local variable for our stderr output and - leave `stderr` as-is. To avoid using `stderr` by mistake, add a - `checksrc` rule (based on logic we already used in lib for `strerror`) - that detects any `stderr` use in `src` and points to using our own - variable instead: `tool_stderr`. + Fixes #6169 + Fixes #12748 + Closes #12930 - Follow-up to 06133d3e9b8aeb9e9ca0b3370c246bdfbfc8619e - Follow-up to 2f17a9b654121dd1ecf4fc043c6d08a9da3522db +Daniel Stenberg (7 Mar 2024) - Closes #11958 +- test463: HTTP with -d @file with file containing CR, LF and null byte -Loïc Yhuel (28 Sep 2023) +- paramhlp: fix CRLF-stripping files with "-d @file" -- connect: only start the happy eyeballs timer when needed + All CR and LF bytes should be stripped, as documented, and all other + bytes are inluded in the data. Starting now, it also excludes null bytes + as they would otherwise also cut the data short. - The timeout is only used when there is a second address family, for the - delayed eyeballer. + Reported-by: Simon K + Fixes #13063 + Closes #13064 - Closes #11939 +Viktor Szakats (7 Mar 2024) -Daniel Stenberg (28 Sep 2023) +- cmake: fix `CURL_WINDOWS_SSPI=ON` with Schannel disabled -- tool_operate: free 'gateway' correctly + Prior to this change `CURL_WINDOWS_SSPI` was accidentally forced `OFF` + when building without the Schannel TLS backend. - Pointed out by Coverity. The fix in 93885cf3a8d4e was incomplete. + This in turn may have caused Kerberos, SPNEGO and SSPI features + disappearing even with `CURL_WINDOWS_SSPI=ON` set. - Also removed repeated wording in IPFS related error messages. + This patch fixes it by using the `CURL_USE_SCHANNEL` setting as a + default for `CURL_WINDOWS_SSPI`, but allowing a manual override. - Closes #11969 + Also update the option text to better tell its purpose. -Stefan Eissing (28 Sep 2023) + Thanks-to: Andreas Loew + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Ref: #13056 + Closes #13061 -- lib: move handling of `data->req.writer_stack` into Curl_client_write() +Jay Satiro (6 Mar 2024) - - move definitions from content_encoding.h to sendf.h - - move create/cleanup/add code into sendf.c - - installed content_encoding writers will always be called - on Curl_client_write(CLIENTWRITE_BODY) - - Curl_client_cleanup() frees writers and tempbuffers from - paused transfers, irregardless of protocol +- KNOWN_BUGS: FTPS server compatibility on Windows with Schannel - Closes #11908 + - Remove "2.12 FTPS with Schannel times out file list operation" -Loïc Yhuel (28 Sep 2023) + - Remove "7.12 FTPS directory listing hangs on Windows with Schannel" -- multi: round the timeout up to prevent early wakeups + - Add "7.12 FTPS server compatibility on Windows with Schannel" - Curl_timediff rounds down to the millisecond, so curl_multi_perform can - be called too early, then we get a timeout of 0 and call it again. + This change adds a more generic bug description that explains FTPS with + the latest curl and Schannel is not widely used and may have more bugs + than other TLS backends. - The code already handled the case of timeouts which expired less than - 1ms in the future. By rounding up, we make sure we will never ask the - platform to wake up too early. + The two removed FTPS Schannel bugs can't be reproduced any longer and + were likely fixed by 24d6c288. - Closes #11938 + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/5284 + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/9161 + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/12894 -Daniel Stenberg (28 Sep 2023) + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/13032 -- RELEASE-NOTES: spell out that IPFS is via gateway +- trace-config.md: remove the mutexed options list -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced + - Remove the rendered manpage message that says: + "[--trace-config] is mutually exclusive to --trace and -v, --verbose". -- tool_operate: avoid strlen() -1 on zero length content from file + Actually it can be used with either of those options, which are mutually + exclusive to each other but not to --trace-config. - Follow-up to 65b563a96a226649ba12cb1e + Ref: https://curl.se/docs/manpage.html#--trace-config - Closes #11959 + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/13031 -- tool_operate: fix memory mixups +Daniel Stenberg (6 Mar 2024) - Switch to plain getenv() from curl_getenv() to avoid the allocation and - having to keep track of which free() or curl_free() that need to be - used. +- mkhelp: simplify the generated hugehelp program - Coverity found issues and a memory leak. + Use a plain array and puts() every line, also allows us to provide the + strings without ending newlines. - Follow-up to 65b563a96a226649ba12cb1e + - merge blank lines into the next one as a prefixed newline. + - turn eight consecutive spaces into a tab (since they can only be on the + left side of text) + - the newly generated tool_hugehelp is 3K lines shorter and 50K smaller + - modifies the top logo layout a little by reducing the indent - Closes #11959 + Closes #13047 -Viktor Szakats (27 Sep 2023) +- docs: ascii version of manpage without nroff -- curl-functions.m4: fixup recent bad edits + Create ASCII version of manpage without nroff - Follow-up to 96c29900bcec32dd6bc8e9857c8871ff4b8b8ed9 #11940 + - build src/tool_hugegelp.c from the ascii manpage + - move the the manpage and the ascii version build to docs/cmdline-opts + - remove all use of nroff from the build process + - should make the build entirely reproducible (by avoiding nroff) - Closes #11966 + - partly reverts 2620aa9 to build libcurl option man pages one by one + in cmake because the appveyor builds got all crazy until I did -Daniel Stenberg (27 Sep 2023) + The ASCII version of the manpage -- curl-functions.m4: fix include line + - is built with gen.pl, just like the manpage is + - has a right-justified column making the appearance similar to the previous + version + - uses a 4-space indent per level (instead of the old version's 7) + - does not do hyphenation of words (which nroff does) - This made the getaddrinfo detection fail, but we did not spot it in the - CI because it graciously falled back to using legacy functions instead! + History - Follow-up to 96c29900bcec (#11940) + We first made the curl build use nroff for building the hugehelp file in + December 1998, for curl 5.2. - Closes #11965 + Closes #13047 -- inet_ntop: add typecast to silence Coverity +Stefan Eissing (6 Mar 2024) - CID 1024653: Integer handling issues (SIGN_EXTENSION) +- lib: add `void *ctx` to reader/writer instances - Suspicious implicit sign extension: "src[i]" with type "unsigned char - const" (8 bits, unsigned) is promoted in "src[i] << (1 - i % 2 << 3)" to - type "int" (32 bits, signed), then sign-extended to type "unsigned long" - (64 bits, unsigned). If "src[i] << (1 - i % 2 << 3)" is greater than - 0x7FFFFFFF, the upper bits of the result will all be 1. + - `struct Curl_cwriter` and `struct Curl_creader` now carry a + `void *ctx` member that points to the instance as allocated. + - using `r->ctx` and `w->ctx` as pointer to the instance specific + struct that has been allocated - 111 words[i/2] |= (src[i] << ((1 - (i % 2)) << 3)); + Reported-by: Rudi Heitbaum + Fixes #13035 + Closes #13059 - The value will not be greater than 0x7FFFFFFF so this still cannot - happen. +- http: fix dead code in setting post client reader - Also, switch to ints here instead of longs. The values stored are 16 bit - so at least no need to use 64 bit variables. Also, longs are 32 bit on - some platforms so this logic still needs to work with 32 bits. + - postsize was always 0, thus the check's else never happened + after the mime client reader was introduced - Closes #11960 + Follow-up to 0ba47146f7ff3d + Closes #13060 -- docs: adapt SEE ALSO sections to new requirements +- http2: fix push discard - To please manpage-syntax.pl used by test 1173 + - fix logic in discarding a failed pushed stream so that + stream context is properly cleaned up - Closes #11957 + Closes #13055 -- manpage-syntax.pl: verify SEE ALSO syntax +- transfer.c: break receive loop in speed limited transfers - - Enforce a single reference per .BR line - - Skip the quotes around the section number for example (3) - - Insist on trailing commas on all lines except the last - - Error on comma on the last SEE ALSO entry + - the change breaks looping in transfer.c receive for transfers that are + speed limited on having gotten *some* bytes. + - the overall speed limit timing is done in multi.c - - List the entries alpha-sorted, not enforced just recommended + Reported-by: Dmitry Karpov + Bug: https://curl.se/mail/lib-2024-03/0001.html + Closes #13050 - Closes #11957 +- mime: add client reader -- connect: expire the timeout when trying next + Add `mime` client reader. Encapsulates reading from mime parts, getting + their length, rewinding and unpausing. - ... so that it gets called again immediately and can continue trying - addresses to connect to. Otherwise it might unnecessarily wait for a - while there. + - remove special mime handling from sendf.c and easy.c + - add general "unpause" method to client readers + - use new reader in http/imap/smtp + - make some mime functions static that are now only used internally - Fixes #11920 - Reported-by: Loïc Yhuel - Closes #11935 + In addition: + - remove flag 'forbidchunk' as no longer needed -- http: remove wrong comment for http_should_fail + Closes #13039 - Reported-by: Christian Schmitz - Ref: #11936 - Closes #11941 +Daniel Stenberg (5 Mar 2024) -Dan Fandrich (26 Sep 2023) +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced -- tool_setopt: remove unused function tool_setopt_flags +- TODO: remove "build HTTP/3 with OpenSSL and nghttp3 using cmake" - This function is identical to tool_setopt_bitmask except that it treats - the argument as unsigned. + Follow-up to 8e741644a229c37 - Closes #11943 +Tal Regev (5 Mar 2024) -Viktor Szakats (26 Sep 2023) +- cmake: add USE_OPENSSL_QUIC support -- cmake: add feature checks for `memrchr` and `getifaddrs` + Closes #13034 - - `HAVE_MEMRCHR` for `memrchr`. - - `HAVE_GETIFADDRS` for `getifaddrs`. - This was present in `lib/curl_config.h.cmake` but missed the detection - logic. +Stefan Eissing (5 Mar 2024) - To match existing autotools feature checks. +- TIMER_STARTTRANSFER: set the same for everyone - Closes #11954 + - set TIMER_STARTTRANSFER on seeing the first response bytes + in the download client writer, not coming from a CONNECT + - initialized the timer the same way for all protocols + - remove explicit setting of TIMER_STARTTRANSFER in file.c + and c-hyper.c -- cmake: move global headers to specific checks + Closes #13052 - Before this patch we added standard headers unconditionally to the - global list of headers used for feature checks. This is unnecessary - and also doesn't help CMake 'Generate' performance. This patch moves - these headers to each feature check where they are actually needed. - Stop using `stddef.h`, as it seems unnecessary. +Michael Kaufmann (5 Mar 2024) - I've used autotools' `m4/curl-functions.m4` to figure out these - dependencies. +- http: better error message for HTTP/1.x response without status line - Also delete checking for the C89 standard header `time.h`, that I - missed in the earlier commit. + If a response without a status line is received, and the connection is + known to use HTTP/1.x (not HTTP/0.9), report the error "Invalid status + line" instead of "Received HTTP/0.9 when not allowed". - Ref: 96c29900bcec32dd6bc8e9857c8871ff4b8b8ed9 #11940 + Closes #13045 - Closes #11951 +Viktor Szakats (5 Mar 2024) -- src/mkhelp: make generated code pass `checksrc` +- KNOWN_BUGS: fix typo - Closes #11955 + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Closes #13051 + +Sebastian Neubauer (5 Mar 2024) + +- smpt: fix starttls + + In cases where the connection was fast, curl sometimes failed to open a + connection. This fixes a regression of c2d973627bab12abc5486a3f3. + + The regression triggered in these steps: + + 1. Create an smtp connection + 2. Use STARTTLS + 3. Receive the response + 4. We are inside the loop in `smtp_statemachine`, calling + `smtp_state_starttls_resp` + 5. In the good flow, we exit the loop, re-enter `smtp_statemachine` and + run `smtp_perform_upgrade_tls` at the start of the function. + + In the bad flow, we stay in the while loop, calling + `Curl_pp_readresp`, which reads part of the TLS handshake and things + go wrong. + + The reason is that `Curl_pp_moredata` changed behavior and always + returns `true`, so we stay in the loop in `smtp_statemachine`. With a + slow connection `Curl_pp_readresp` cannot read new data and returns + `CURL_AGAIN`, so we leave the loop and re-enter `smtp_statemachine`. + + With a fast connection, `Curl_pp_readresp` reads new data from the tcp + connection, which is part of the TLS handshake. + + The fix is in `Curl_pp_moredata`, which needs to take the final line + into account and return `false` if only the final line is stored. + + Closes #13048 + +Stefan Eissing (5 Mar 2024) + +- lib: enhance client reader resume + rewind + + - update client reader documentation + - client reader, add rewind capabilities + - tell creader to rewind on next start + - Curl_client_reset() will keep reader for future rewind if requested + - add Curl_client_cleanup() for freeing all resources independent of + rewinds + - add Curl_client_start() to trigger rewinds + - move rewind code from multi.c to sendf.c and make part of + "cr-in"'s implementation + - http, move the "resume_from" handling into the client readers + - the setup of a HTTP request is reshuffled to follow: + * determine method, target, auth negotiation + * install the client reader(s) for the request, including crlf + conversions and "chunked" encoding + * apply ranges to client reader + * concat request headers, upgrades, cookies, etc. + * complete request by determining Content-Length of installed + readers in combination with method + * send + - add methods for client readers to + * return the overall length they will generate (or -1 when unknown) + * return the amount of data on the CLIENT level, so that + expect-100 can decide if it want to apply itself + * set a "resume_from" offset or fail if unsupported + - struct HTTP has become largely empty now + - rename `Client_reader_*` to `Curl_creader_*` + + Closes #13026 + +Viktor Szakats (5 Mar 2024) + +- openssl-quic: fix BIO leak and Windows warning + + Caused by an accidentally duplicated line in + d6825df334def106f735ce7e0c1a2ea87bddffb0. -- tests: show which curl tool `runtests.pl` is using + ``` + .../lib/vquic/curl_osslq.c:1095:30: warning: implicit conversion loses intege + r precision: 'curl_socket_t' (aka 'unsigned long long') to 'int' [-Wshorten-6 + 4-to-32] + 1095 | bio = BIO_new_dgram(ctx->q.sockfd, BIO_NOCLOSE); + | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~^~~~~~ + 1 warning and 2 errors generated. + ``` - To help debugging when there is issue finding or running it. + Reviewed-by: Stefan Eissing + Closes #13043 - Closes #11953 +- openssl-quic: fix unity build, casing, indentation -- CI/azure: make `MAKEFLAGS` global to parallelize all jobs + - rename static functions to avoid duplicate symbols in unity mode. + - windows -> Windows/window in error message and comment. + - fix indentation. - https://dev.azure.com/daniel0244/curl/_build/results?buildId=17528 (before) - https://dev.azure.com/daniel0244/curl/_build/results?buildId=17545 (after, wi - th -j3) + Reviewed-by: Stefan Eissing + Closes #13044 - Closes #11952 +Daniel Stenberg (5 Mar 2024) -- CI/azure: migrate old mingw MSYS1 jobs to MSYS2 +- gen.pl: make the "manpageification" faster - Also delete an accidental variable reference. + The function that replaces occurances of "--longoption" with "-Z, + --longoption" etc with the proper highlight applied, no longer loops + over the options. - Follow-up to 38029101e2d78ba125732b3bab6ec267b80a0e72 + Closes #13041 - Closes #11945 +- CONTRIBUTE: update the section on documentation format -Daniel Stenberg (26 Sep 2023) + ... since most of it is markdown now. -- docs: add see also curl_multi_get_handles to some man pages + Closes #13046 - Assisted-by: Jay Satiro +- smtp: free a temp resource - Closes #11942 + The returned address needs to be freed. -Viktor Szakats (26 Sep 2023) + Follow-up to e3905de8196d67b89df1602feb84c1f993211b20 + Spotted by Coverity -- cmake: assume `_fseeki64` and no `fseeko` on Windows + Closes #13038 - `_fseeki64` is present in mingw-w64 1.0 (2011-09-26) headers, and - at least Watcom C 1.9 (2010) headers and MSVS 2008 [1]. +- _VARIABLES.md: improve the description - `fseeko` is not present in any of these. + Closes #13040 - (mingw-w64 1.0 also offers `fseeko64`.) +dependabot[bot] (4 Mar 2024) - [1] https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11944#issuecomment-1734995004 +- build(deps): bump fsfe/reuse-action from 2 to 3 - Follow-up to 9c7165e96a3a9a2d0b7059c87c699b5ca8cdae93 #11918 + Bumps [fsfe/reuse-action](https://github.com/fsfe/reuse-action) from 2 to 3. + - [Release notes](https://github.com/fsfe/reuse-action/releases) + - [Commits](https://github.com/fsfe/reuse-action/compare/v2...v3) - Closes #11950 + --- + updated-dependencies: + - dependency-name: fsfe/reuse-action + dependency-type: direct:production + update-type: version-update:semver-major + ... -- build: delete checks for C89 standard headers + Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] - Delete checks and guards for standard C89 headers and assume these are - available: `stdio.h`, `string.h`, `time.h`, `setjmp.h`, `stdlib.h`, - `stddef.h`, `signal.h`. +Stefan Eissing (4 Mar 2024) - Some of these we already used unconditionally, some others we only used - for feature checks. +- pytest: adapt to API change - Follow-up to 9c7165e96a3a9a2d0b7059c87c699b5ca8cdae93 #11918 (for `stdio.h` i - n CMake) + - pytest has changed the signature of the hook pytest_report_header() + for some obscure reason and that change landed in our CI now - Closes #11940 + - remove the changed param that we never used anyway -Stefan Eissing (26 Sep 2023) + Closes #13037 -- multiif.h: remove Curl_multi_dump declaration +Daniel Stenberg (4 Mar 2024) - Follow-up to d850eea2 which removed the Curl_multi_dump definition. +- cookie: if psl fails, reject the cookie - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11946 + A libpsl install without data and no built-in database is now considered + bad enough to reject all cookies since they cannot be checked. It is + somewhat of a user error, but still. -Jay Satiro (26 Sep 2023) + Reported-by: Dan Fandrich + Closes #13033 -- config-win32: define HAVE__FSEEKI64 +Stefan Eissing (4 Mar 2024) - Follow-up to 9c7165e9 which added an fseeko wrapper to the lib that - calls _fseeki64 if it is available. +- lib: further send/upload handling polish - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11944 + - Move all the "upload_done" handling to request.c -- docs: explain how PINNEDPUBLICKEY is independent of VERIFYPEER + - add possibility to abort sending of a request + - add `Curl_req_done_sending()` for checks + - transfer.c: readwrite_upload() now clean - - Explain that peer verification via CURLOPT_PINNEDPUBLICKEY takes place - even if peer verification via CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER is turned off. + - removing data->state.ulbuf and data->req.upload_fromhere - The behavior is verified by test2048. + - as well as data->req.upload_present + - set data->req.upload_done on having read all from + the client and completely flushed the send buffer - Bug: https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/2935#issuecomment-418371872 - Reported-by: claudiusaiz@users.noreply.github.com + - tftp, remove setting of data->req.upload_fromhere - Bug: https://github.com/curl/curl/discussions/11910 - Reported-by: Hakan Sunay Halil + - serves no purpose as `upload_present` is not set + and the data itself is directly `sendto()` anyway - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11930 + - smtp, make upload EOB conversion a client reader + - xfer_ulbuf addition -Stefan Eissing (26 Sep 2023) + - add xfer_ulbuf for borrowing, similar to xfer_buf + - use in file upload + - use in c-hyper body sending -- openssl: improve ssl shutdown handling + - h1-proxy, remove init of data->state.uilbuf that is never used + - smb, add own send_buf instead of using data->state.ulbuf - - If SSL shutdown is not finished then make an additional call to - SSL_read to gather additional tracing. + Closes #13010 - - Fix http2 and h2-proxy filters to forward do_close() calls to the next - filter. +Daniel Stenberg (4 Mar 2024) - For example h2 and SSL shutdown before and after this change: +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced - Before: +kpcyrd (3 Mar 2024) - Curl_conn_close -> cf_hc_close -> Curl_conn_cf_discard_chain -> - ssl_cf_destroy +- rustls: fix two warnings related to number types - After: + Reported-by: Gisle Vanem + Follow-up to #12989 + Closes #13017 - Curl_conn_close -> cf_hc_close -> cf_h2_close -> cf_setup_close -> - ssl_cf_close +Stefan Eissing (3 Mar 2024) - Note that currently the tracing does not show output on the connection - closure handle. Refer to discussion in #11878. +- bufq: writing into a softlimit queue cannot be partial - Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/discussions/11878 + - when unable to obtain a new chunk on a softlimit bufq, + this is an allocation error and needs to be reported as + such. + - writes into a soflimit bufq never must be partial success - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11858 + Reported-by: Dan Fandrich + Fixes #13020 + Closes #13023 -Loïc Yhuel (26 Sep 2023) +Dan Fandrich (2 Mar 2024) -- multi: fix small timeouts +- configure: Don't build shell completions when disabled - Since Curl_timediff rounds down to the millisecond, timeouts which - expire in less than 1ms are considered as outdated and removed from the - list. We can use Curl_timediff_us instead, big timeouts could saturate - but this is not an issue. + With the recent changes to completion file building, the files were + built always and only installation was selectively disabled. Now, when + they are disabled they aren't even built, avoiding a build-time error in + environments where it's not possible to run the curl binary that was + just created (e.g. if library paths were not set up correctly). - Closes #11937 + Follow-up to 0f7aba83c -Viktor Szakats (25 Sep 2023) + Reported-by: av223119 on github + Fixes #13027 + Closes #13030 -- cmake: fix stderr initialization in unity builds +Jay Satiro (2 Mar 2024) - Before this patch, in certain build configurations the curl tool may - not have displayed anything (debug, macOS), or crashed at startup - (debug, Windows). +- cmdline-opts/_EXITCODES: sync with libcurl-errors - Follow-up to 3f8fc25720900b14b7432f4bd93407ca15311719 - Necessary after 2f17a9b654121dd1ecf4fc043c6d08a9da3522db + - Add error code 100 (CURLE_TOO_LARGE) to the list of error codes that + can be returned by the curl tool. - Closes #11929 + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/13015 -- cmake: fix missing `zlib.h` when compiling `libcurltool` +Stefan Eissing (1 Mar 2024) - Came up while testing debug/testing build for Windows. I'm not sure why - it didn't come up in earlier tests with similar config. - `tool_hugehelp.c` might indeed require `zlib.h` and without linking - `CURL_LIBS` to the `curltool` target, CMake doesn't seem to add detected - dependency headers to the compiler command. +- hyper: disable test1598 due to lack of trailer support - ``` - [ 25%] Building C object src/CMakeFiles/curltool.dir/tool_hugehelp.c.obj - cd .../curl/bld-cmake-llvm-x64/src && /usr/local/opt/llvm/bin/clang - --target=x86_64-w64-mingw32 --sysroot=/usr/local/opt/mingw-w64/toolchain-x8 - 6_64 - -DCURLDEBUG -DCURL_STATICLIB -DHAVE_CONFIG_H -DUNICODE -DUNITTESTS -D_UNICO - DE - -I.../curl/include -I.../curl/lib -I.../curl/bld-cmake-llvm-x64/lib - -I.../curl/bld-cmake-llvm-x64/include -I.../curl/src -Wno-unused-command-li - ne-argument - -D_UCRT -DDEBUGBUILD -DHAS_ALPN -DUSE_MANUAL=1 -fuse-ld=lld -Wl,-s -static - -libgcc - -lucrt [...] -O3 -DNDEBUG -municode -MD - -MT src/CMakeFiles/curltool.dir/tool_hugehelp.c.obj - -MF CMakeFiles/curltool.dir/tool_hugehelp.c.obj.d - -o CMakeFiles/curltool.dir/tool_hugehelp.c.obj -c .../curl/bld-cmake-llvm-x - 64/src/tool_hugehelp.c - .../curl/bld-cmake-llvm-x64/src/tool_hugehelp.c:6:10: fatal error: 'zlib.h' f - ile not found - 6 | #include - | ^~~~~~~~ - ``` + Follow-up to 50838095 - Follow-up to 39e7c22bb459c2e818f079984989a26a09741860 + Closes #13016 - Closes #11927 +Dan Fandrich (1 Mar 2024) -- cmake: fix duplicate symbols when linking tests +- ftp: Mark a const buffer as const - The linker resolves this automatically in non-unity builds. In unity - builds the linker cannot drop a single object with the duplicates, - resulting in these errors. The root issue is that we started including - certain objects both via both libcurlu and libcurltool libs. +- appveyor: Properly skip if only CircleCI is changed - Regression from 39e7c22bb459c2e818f079984989a26a09741860 +- docs: Update minimal binary size in INSTALL.md - Windows errors: - ``` - [ 3%] Linking C executable unit1303.exe - [ 3%] Building C object tests/server/CMakeFiles/rtspd.dir/__/__/lib/curl_mul - tibyte.c.obj - ../../lib/libcurlu-d.a(unity_0.c.obj): In function `curlx_convert_UTF8_to_wch - ar': - C:/projects/curl/lib/curl_multibyte.c:44: multiple definition of `curlx_conve - rt_UTF8_to_wchar' - ../../src/libcurltool-d.a(unity_0.c.obj):C:/projects/curl/lib/curl_multibyte. - c:44: first defined here - ../../lib/libcurlu-d.a(unity_0.c.obj): In function `curlx_convert_wchar_to_UT - F8': - C:/projects/curl/lib/curl_multibyte.c:66: multiple definition of `curlx_conve - rt_wchar_to_UTF8' - ../../src/libcurltool-d.a(unity_0.c.obj):C:/projects/curl/lib/curl_multibyte. - c:66: first defined here - ../../lib/libcurlu-d.a(unity_0.c.obj): In function `curlx_win32_open': - C:/projects/curl/lib/curl_multibyte.c:92: multiple definition of `curlx_win32 - _open' - ../../src/libcurltool-d.a(unity_0.c.obj):C:/projects/curl/lib/curl_multibyte. - c:92: first defined here - ../../lib/libcurlu-d.a(unity_0.c.obj): In function `curlx_win32_fopen': - C:/projects/curl/lib/curl_multibyte.c:120: multiple definition of `curlx_win3 - 2_fopen' - ../../src/libcurltool-d.a(unity_0.c.obj):C:/projects/curl/lib/curl_multibyte. - c:120: first defined here - ../../lib/libcurlu-d.a(unity_0.c.obj): In function `curlx_win32_stat': - [...] - ``` - Ref: https://ci.appveyor.com/project/curlorg/curl/builds/48110107/job/nvlhpt9 - aa4ehny5q#L247 + Include more options to reduce binary size. - macOS errors: - ``` - [ 56%] Linking C executable unit1302 - duplicate symbol '_curlx_sotouz' in: - ../../lib/libcurlu.a(unity_0_c.c.o) - ../../src/libcurltool.a(unity_0_c.c.o) - duplicate symbol '_curlx_sitouz' in: - ../../lib/libcurlu.a(unity_0_c.c.o) - ../../src/libcurltool.a(unity_0_c.c.o) - duplicate symbol '_curlx_uztosz' in: - ../../lib/libcurlu.a(unity_0_c.c.o) - ../../src/libcurltool.a(unity_0_c.c.o) - [...] - ``` - with config: - ``` - -DCMAKE_UNITY_BUILD=ON \ - -DENABLE_DEBUG=ON -DBUILD_TESTING=ON -DCMAKE_C_FLAGS=-DDEBUGBUILD \ - -DBUILD_SHARED_LIBS=ON \ - -DBUILD_STATIC_LIBS=OFF - ``` +- configure: Don't make shell completions without perl - Closes #11926 + The code that attempted to skip building the shell completions didn't + work properly and tried to build them even if perl wasn't available. + This step, as well as the install step, is now properly skipped without + perl. -- cmake: lib `CURL_STATICLIB` fixes (Windows) + Follow-up to 89733e2dd - - always define `CURL_STATICLIB` when building libcurl for Windows. + Closes #13022 - This disables `__declspec(dllexport)` for exported libcurl symbols. - In normal mode (hide symbols) these exported symbols are specified - via `libcurl.def`. When not hiding symbols, all symbols are exported - by default. +RainRat (1 Mar 2024) - Regression from 1199308dbc902c52be67fc805c72dd2582520d30 +- misc: Fix typos in docs and lib - Fixes #11844 + This fixes miscellaneous typos and duplicated words in the docs, lib + and test comments and a few user facing errorstrings. - - fix to omit `libcurl.def` when not hiding private symbols. + Author: RainRat on Github + Reviewed-by: Daniel Gustafsson + Reviewed-by: Dan Fandrich + Closes: #13019 - Regression from 2ebc74c36a19a1700af394c16855ce144d9878e3 +Dan Fandrich (29 Feb 2024) - - fix `ENABLED_DEBUG=ON` + shared curl tool Windows builds by also - omitting `libcurl.def` in this case, and exporting all symbols - instead. This ensures that a shared curl tool can access all debug - functions which are not normally exported from libcurl DLL. +- configure: build & install shell completions when enabled - - delete `INTERFACE_COMPILE_DEFINITIONS "CURL_STATICLIB"` for "objects" - target. + The --with-fish-functions-dir and --with-zsh-functions-dir options + currently have no effect on a normal build because the scripts/ directory + where they're used is not built. Add scripts/ to a normal build and + change the completion options to default to off to preserve the existing + behaviour. - Follow-up to 2ebc74c36a19a1700af394c16855ce144d9878e3 + Closes: #12906 - - delete duplicate `BUILDING_LIBCURL` definitions. +- github/labeler: improve the match patterns - - fix `HIDES_CURL_PRIVATE_SYMBOLS` to not overwrite earlier build settings. +Stefan Eissing (28 Feb 2024) - Follow-up to 1199308dbc902c52be67fc805c72dd2582520d30 +- tests: add test1598 for POST with trailers - Closes #11914 + - test POST fields with trailers and chunked encoding -Daniel Stenberg (25 Sep 2023) + Ref: #12938 + Closes #13009 -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced +Daniel Stenberg (28 Feb 2024) -Dan Fandrich (25 Sep 2023) +- cmdline-opts/_VERSION: provide %VERSION correctly -- tests: fix log directory path in IPFS tests + ... so that it does not get included verbatim in the output. Fixes a + regression shipped in 8.6.0. - Hard-coding the log directory name fails with parallel tests. + Also fix a format mistake in form.md - Follow-up to 65b563a96 + Closes #13008 - Ref: #8805 +Stefan Eissing (28 Feb 2024) -Daniel Stenberg (25 Sep 2023) +- lib: Curl_read/Curl_write clarifications -- curl_multi_get_handles: get easy handles from a multi handle + - replace `Curl_read()`, `Curl_write()` and `Curl_nwrite()` to + clarify when and at what level they operate + - send/recv of transfer related data is now done via + `Curl_xfer_send()/Curl_xfer_recv()` which no longer has + socket/socketindex as parameter. It decides on the transfer + setup of `conn->sockfd` and `conn->writesockfd` on which + connection filter chain to operate. + - send/recv on a specific connection filter chain is done via + `Curl_conn_send()/Curl_conn_recv()` which get the socket index + as parameter. + - rename `Curl_setup_transfer()` to `Curl_xfer_setup()` for + naming consistency + - clarify that the special CURLE_AGAIN hangling to return + `CURLE_OK` with length 0 only applies to `Curl_xfer_send()` + and CURLE_AGAIN is returned by all other send() variants. + - fix a bug in websocket `curl_ws_recv()` that mixed up data + when it arrived in more than a single chunk (to be made + into a sperate PR, also) - Closes #11750 + Added as documented [in + CLIENT-READER.md](https://github.com/curl/curl/blob/5b1f31dfbab8aef467c419c68 + aa06dc738cb75d4/docs/CLIENT-READERS.md). -Stefan Eissing (25 Sep 2023) + - old `Curl_buffer_send()` completely replaced by new `Curl_req_send()` + - old `Curl_fillreadbuffer()` replaced with `Curl_client_read()` + - HTTP chunked uploads are now formatted in a client reader added when + needed. + - FTP line-end conversions are done in a client reader added when + needed. + - when sending requests headers, remaining buffer space is filled with + body data for sending in "one go". This is independent of the request + body size. Resolves #12938 as now small and large requests have the + same code path. -- http: h1/h2 proxy unification + Changes done to test cases: - - use shared code for setting up the CONNECT request - when tunneling, used in HTTP/1.x and HTTP/2 proxying - - eliminate use of Curl_buffer_send() and other manipulations - of `data->req` or `data->state.ulbuf` + - test513: now fails before sending request headers as this initial + "client read" triggers the setup fault. Behaves now the same as in + hyper build + - test547, test555, test1620: fix the length check in the lib code to + only fail for reads *smaller* than expected. This was a bug in the + test code that never triggered in the old implementation. - Closes #11808 + Closes #12969 -Natanael Copa (25 Sep 2023) +Daniel Gustafsson (28 Feb 2024) -- lib: use wrapper for curl_mime_data fseek callback +- curldown: Fix email address in Copyright - fseek uses long offset which does not match with curl_off_t. This leads - to undefined behavior when calling the callback and caused failure on - arm 32 bit. + The curldown conversion accidentally replaced daniel@haxx.se with + just daniel.se. This reverts back to the proper email address in + the curldown docs as well as in a few other stray places where it + was incorrect (while unrelated to curldown). - Use a wrapper to solve this and use fseeko which uses off_t instead of - long. + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Closes: #12997 - Thanks to the nice people at Libera IRC #musl for helping finding this - out. +Daniel Stenberg (28 Feb 2024) - Fixes #11882 - Fixes #11900 - Closes #11918 +- getparam: make --ftp-ssl work again -- configure: sort AC_CHECK_FUNCS + Follow-up to 9e4e527 which accidentally broke it - No functional changes. + Reported-by: Jordan Brown + Fixes #13006 + Closes #13007 -Daniel Stenberg (25 Sep 2023) +- KNOWN_BUGS: IMAPS connection fails with rustls error -- warnless: remove unused functions + Closes #10457 - Previously put there for use with the intel compiler +- KNOWN_BUGS: FTPS upload, FileZilla, GnuTLS and close_notify - Closes #11932 + Closes #11383 -- GHA/linux: run singleuse to detect single-use global functions +- KNOWN_BUGS: Implicit FTPS upload timeout - Use --unit for configure --enable-debug builds + Closes #11720 - Closes #11932 +- KNOWN_BUGS: HTTP/2 prior knowledge over proxy -- singleuse: add scan for use in other source codes + Closes #12641 - This should reduce false-positive to almost zero. Checks for presence in - unit tests if --unit is specified, which is intended for debug builds - where unit testing is enabled. +- TODO: build HTTP/3 with OpenSSL and nghttp3 using cmake - Closes #11932 + Closes #12988 -- multi: remove Curl_multi_dump +- TODO: Select signature algorithms - A debug-only function that is basically never used. Removed to ease the - use of the singleuse script to detect non-static functions not used - outside the file where it is defined. + Closes #12982 - Closes #11931 +- examples: use present tense in comments -Viktor Szakats (24 Sep 2023) + remove "will" and some other word fixes -- tests: fix compiler warnings + Closes #13003 - Seen with llvm 17 on Windows x64. +- docs: more language cleanups - ``` - .../curl/tests/server/rtspd.c:136:13: warning: no previous extern declaration - for non-static variable 'logdir' [-Wmissing-variable-declarations] - 136 | const char *logdir = "log"; - | ^ - .../curl/tests/server/rtspd.c:136:7: note: declare 'static' if the variable i - s not intended to be used outside of this translation unit - 136 | const char *logdir = "log"; - | ^ - .../curl/tests/server/rtspd.c:137:6: warning: no previous extern declaration - for non-static variable 'loglockfile' [-Wmissing-variable-declarations] - 137 | char loglockfile[256]; - | ^ - .../curl/tests/server/rtspd.c:137:1: note: declare 'static' if the variable i - s not intended to be used outside of this translation unit - 137 | char loglockfile[256]; - | ^ - .../curl/tests/server/fake_ntlm.c:43:13: warning: no previous extern declarat - ion for non-static variable 'logdir' [-Wmissing-variable-declarations] - 43 | const char *logdir = "log"; - | ^ - .../curl/tests/server/fake_ntlm.c:43:7: note: declare 'static' if the variabl - e is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit - 43 | const char *logdir = "log"; - | ^ - .../curl/src/tool_doswin.c:350:8: warning: possible misuse of comma operator - here [-Wcomma] - 350 | ++d, ++s; - | ^ - .../curl/src/tool_doswin.c:350:5: note: cast expression to void to silence wa - rning - 350 | ++d, ++s; - | ^~~ - | (void)( ) - ``` + - present tense + - avoid bad words - ``` - .../curl/tests/libtest/lib540.c:146:27: warning: result of comparison 'long' - > 2147483647 is always false [-Wtautological-type-limit-compare] - 146 | int itimeout = (L > (long)INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : (int)L; - | ~ ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - 1 warning generated. + Closes #13003 - .../curl/tests/libtest/libntlmconnect.c:195:31: warning: result of comparison - 'long' > 2147483647 is always false [-Wtautological-type-limit-compare] - 195 | int itimeout = (timeout > (long)INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : (int)timeo - ut; - | ~~~~~~~ ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - 1 warning generated. +Daniel Gustafsson (27 Feb 2024) - .../curl/tests/libtest/lib591.c:117:31: warning: result of comparison 'long' - > 2147483647 is always false [-Wtautological-type-limit-compare] - 117 | int itimeout = (timeout > (long)INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : (int)timeo - ut; - | ~~~~~~~ ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - 1 warning generated. - .../curl/tests/libtest/lib597.c:99:31: warning: result of comparison 'long' > - 2147483647 is always false [-Wtautological-type-limit-compare] - 99 | int itimeout = (timeout > (long)INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : (int)timeo - ut; - | ~~~~~~~ ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - 1 warning generated. - ``` +- setopt: Fix disabling all protocols - Seen on macOS Intel: - ``` - .../curl/tests/server/sws.c:440:64: warning: field precision should have type - 'int', but argument has type 'size_t' (aka 'unsigned long') [-Wformat] - msnprintf(logbuf, sizeof(logbuf), "Got request: %s %.*s HTTP/%d.%d" - , - ~~^~ - 1 warning generated. - ``` + When disabling all protocols without enabling any, the resulting + set of allowed protocols remained the default set. Clearing the + allowed set before inspecting the passed value from --proto make + the set empty even in the errorpath of no protocols enabled. - Closes #11925 + Co-authored-by: Dan Fandrich + Reported-by: Dan Fandrich + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Closes: #13004 -Jay Satiro (24 Sep 2023) +Andreas Kiefer (27 Feb 2024) -- url: fix netrc info message +- fopen: fix narrowing conversion warning on 32-bit Android - - Fix netrc info message to use the generic ".netrc" filename if the - user did not specify a netrc location. + This was fixed in commit 06dc599405f, but came back in commit + 03cb1ff4d62. - - Update --netrc doc to add that recent versions of curl on Windows - prefer .netrc over _netrc. + When building for 32-bit ARM or x86 Android, `st_mode` is defined as + `unsigned int` instead of `mode_t`, resulting in a + `-Wimplicit-int-conversion` clang warning because `mode_t` is + `unsigned short`. Add a cast to silence the warning, but only for + 32-bit Android builds, because other architectures and platforms are + not affected. - Before: - * Couldn't find host google.com in the (nil) file; using defaults + Ref: https://android.googlesource.com/platform/bionic/+/refs/tags/ndk-r25c/li + bc/include/sys/stat.h#86 + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12998 - After: - * Couldn't find host google.com in the .netrc file; using defaults +Stefan Eissing (27 Feb 2024) - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11904 +- lib: Curl_read/Curl_write clarifications -Dan Fandrich (23 Sep 2023) + - replace `Curl_read()`, `Curl_write()` and `Curl_nwrite()` to + clarify when and at what level they operate + - send/recv of transfer related data is now done via + `Curl_xfer_send()/Curl_xfer_recv()` which no longer has + socket/socketindex as parameter. It decides on the transfer + setup of `conn->sockfd` and `conn->writesockfd` on which + connection filter chain to operate. + - send/recv on a specific connection filter chain is done via + `Curl_conn_send()/Curl_conn_recv()` which get the socket index + as parameter. + - rename `Curl_setup_transfer()` to `Curl_xfer_setup()` for + naming consistency + - clarify that the special CURLE_AGAIN hangling to return + `CURLE_OK` with length 0 only applies to `Curl_xfer_send()` + and CURLE_AGAIN is returned by all other send() variants. + - fix a bug in websocket `curl_ws_recv()` that mixed up data + when it arrived in more than a single chunk -- wolfssh: do cleanup in Curl_ssh_cleanup + The method for sending not just raw bytes, but bytes that are either + "headers" or "body". The send abstraction stack, to to bottom, now is: - Closes: #11921 + * `Curl_req_send()`: has parameter to indicate amount of header bytes, + buffers all data. + * `Curl_xfer_send()`: knows on which socket index to send, returns + amount of bytes sent. + * `Curl_conn_send()`: called with socket index, returns amount of bytes + sent. -Daniel Stenberg (24 Sep 2023) + In addition there is `Curl_req_flush()` for writing out all buffered + bytes. -- tool_listhelp: regenerated + `Curl_req_send()` is active for requests without body, + `Curl_buffer_send()` still being used for others. This is because the + special quirks need to be addressed in future parts: - Polished the --ipfs-gateway description + * `expect-100` handling + * `Curl_fillreadbuffer()` needs to add directly to the new + `data->req.sendbuf` + * special body handlings, like `chunked` encodings and line end + conversions will be moved into something like a Client Reader. - Fixed the --trace-config description + In functions of the pattern `CURLcode xxx_send(..., ssize_t *written)`, + replace the `ssize_t` with a `size_t`. It makes no sense to allow for negativ + e + values as the returned `CURLcode` already specifies error conditions. This + allows easier handling of lengths without casting. - The script also fixed some other small mistakes + Closes #12964 - Closes #11923 +Daniel Stenberg (27 Feb 2024) -Viktor Szakats (23 Sep 2023) +- multi: make add_handle free any multi_easy -- Makefile.mk: always set `CURL_STATICLIB` for lib (Windows) + If the easy handle that is being added to a multi handle has previously + been used for curl_easy_perform(), there is a private multi handle here + that we can kill off. While it flushes some caches etc for the easy + handle would it be used for an easy interface transfer again after being + used in the multi stack, this cleanup simplifies behavior and uses less + memory. - Also fix to export all symbols in Windows debug builds, making - `-debug-dyn` builds work with `-DCURL_STATICLIB` set. + Closes #12992 - Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11914 (same for CMake) +- docs: use present tense - Closes #11924 + avoid "will", detect "will" as a bad word in the CI -Daniel Stenberg (23 Sep 2023) + Also line wrapped a bunch of paragraphs -- quic: set ciphers/curves the same way regular TLS does + Closes #13001 - for OpenSSL/BoringSSL +- CURLOPT_SSL_CTX_FUNCTION.md: no promises of lifetime after return - Fixes #11796 - Reported-by: Karthikdasari0423 on github - Assisted-by: Jay Satiro - Closes #11836 + ... and cleanup other language. -- test457: verify --max-filesize with chunked encoding + Closes #12999 -- lib: let the max filesize option stop too big transfers too +Stefan Eissing (27 Feb 2024) - Previously it would only stop them from getting started if the size is - known to be too big then. +- lib: send rework - Update the libcurl and curl docs accordingly. + Curl_read/Curl_write clarifications - Fixes #11810 - Reported-by: Elliot Killick - Assisted-by: Jay Satiro - Closes #11820 + - replace `Curl_read()`, `Curl_write()` and `Curl_nwrite()` to 1clarify + when and at what level they operate -Viktor Szakats (23 Sep 2023) + - send/recv of transfer related data is now done via + `Curl_xfer_send()/Curl_xfer_recv()` which no longer has + socket/socketindex as parameter. It decides on the transfer setup of + `conn->sockfd` and `conn->writesockfd` on which connection filter + chain to operate. -- mingw: delete support for legacy mingw.org toolchain + - send/recv on a specific connection filter chain is done via + `Curl_conn_send()/Curl_conn_recv()` which get the socket index as + parameter. - Drop support for "old" / "legacy" / "classic" / "v1" / "mingw32" MinGW: - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MinGW, https://osdn.net/projects/mingw/ - Its homepage used to be http://mingw.org/ [no HTTPS], and broken now. - It supported the x86 CPU only and used a old Windows API header and - implib set, often causing issues. It also misses most modern Windows - features, offering old versions of both binutils and gcc (no llvm/clang - support). It was last updated 2 years ago. + - rename `Curl_setup_transfer()` to `Curl_xfer_setup()` for naming + consistency - curl now relies on toolchains based on the mingw-w64 project: - https://www.mingw-w64.org/ https://sourceforge.net/projects/mingw-w64/ - https://www.msys2.org/ https://github.com/msys2/msys2 - https://github.com/mstorsjo/llvm-mingw - (Also available via Linux and macOS package managers.) + - clarify that the special CURLE_AGAIN handling to return `CURLE_OK` + with length 0 only applies to `Curl_xfer_send()` and CURLE_AGAIN is + returned by all other send() variants. - Closes #11625 + SingleRequest reshuffling -Mark Gaiser (23 Sep 2023) + - move functions into request.[ch] + - differentiate between reset and free + - add Curl_req_done() to perform last actions + - add a send `bufq` to SingleRequest for future use in keeping upload data -- curl: add support for the IPFS protocols: + Closes #12963 - - ipfs:// - - ipns:// +Daniel Stenberg (26 Feb 2024) - This allows you tu use ipfs in curl like: - curl ipfs:// - and - curl ipns:// +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced - For more information consult the readme at: - https://curl.se/docs/ipfs.html +- http_chunks: remove unused 'endptr' variable - Closes #8805 + Closes #12996 -Daniel Stenberg (23 Sep 2023) +Louis Solofrizzo (26 Feb 2024) -- bufq: remove Curl_bufq_skip_and_shift (unused) +- lib: initialize output pointers to NULL before calling strto[ff,l,ul] - Closes #11915 + In order to make MSAN happy: -- scripts/singleuse.pl: add curl_global_trace + ==2200945==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value + #0 0x596f3b3ed246 in curlx_strtoofft [...]/libcurl/src/lib/strtoofft.c:23 + 9:11 + #1 0x596f3b402156 in Curl_httpchunk_read [...]/libcurl/src/lib/http_chunk + s.c:149:12 + #2 0x596f3b348550 in readwrite_data [...]/libcurl/src/lib/transfer.c:607: + 11 + [...] -Viktor Szakats (22 Sep 2023) + ==2202041==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value + #0 0x5a3fab66a72a in Curl_parse_port [...]/libcurl/src/lib/urlapi.c:547:8 + #1 0x5a3fab650645 in parse_authority [...]/libcurl/src/lib/urlapi.c:796:1 + 2 + #2 0x5a3fab6740f6 in parseurl [...]/libcurl/src/lib/urlapi.c:1176:16 + #3 0x5a3fab664fc5 in parseurl_and_replace [...]/libcurl/src/lib/urlapi.c: + 1342:12 + [...] -- cmake: fix unity symbol collisions in h2 builds + ==2202320==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value + #0 0x569076a0d6b0 in ipv4_normalize [...]/libcurl/src/lib/urlapi.c:683:12 + #1 0x5690769f2820 in parse_authority [...]/libcurl/src/lib/urlapi.c:803:1 + 0 + #2 0x569076a160f6 in parseurl [...]/libcurl/src/lib/urlapi.c:1176:16 + #3 0x569076a06fc5 in parseurl_and_replace [...]/libcurl/src/lib/urlapi.c: + 1342:12 + [...] - Regression from 331b89a319d0067fa1e6441719307cfef9c7960f + Signed-off-by: Louis Solofrizzo + Closes #12995 - Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg - Reviewed-by: Jay Satiro - Closes #11912 +Stefan Eissing (26 Feb 2024) -Daniel Stenberg (22 Sep 2023) +- lib: move client writer into own source -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced + Refactoring of the client writer that passes the data to the + client/application's callback functions. -Dan Fandrich (21 Sep 2023) + - split out into own source cw-out.[ch] from sendf.c -- github/labeler: improve the match patterns + - move tempwrite and tempcount from data->state into the context of the + client writer - This includes new rules for setting the appleOS and logging labels and - matches on some example files. Also, enable dot mode for wildcard - matches in the .github directory. + - redesign the 3 tempwrite dynbufs as a linked list of dynbufs. On + paused transfers, this allows to "record" interleaved HEADER/BODY + chunks to be "played back" in the same order on unpausing. -Daniel Stenberg (21 Sep 2023) + - keep the overall size limit of all buffered data to DYN_PAUSE_BUFFER. + On exceeding that, return CURLE_TOO_LARGE instead of + CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY as before. -- upload-file.d: describe the file name slash/backslash handling + - add method to be called when a transfer is DONE to allow writing of + any data still buffered - Closes #11911 + - when paused, record HEADER writes exactly as they come for later + playback. HEADERs are documented to be written one-by-one. -Jakub Jelen (21 Sep 2023) + Closes #12898 -- libssh: cap SFTP packet size sent +- urldata: move authneg bit from conn to Curl_easy - Due to libssh limitations + - from `conn->bits.authneg` to `data->req.authneg` + - this is a property of the request about to be made + and not a property of the connection + - in multiuse connections, transfer could step on each others + toes here potentially. - Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen + Closes #12949 - Closes #11804 +- c-hyper: add header collection writer in hyper builds -Daniel Stenberg (21 Sep 2023) + Closes #12880 -- curl.h: mark CURLSSLBACKEND_NSS as deprecated since 8.3.0 +- http: move headers collecting to writer - Closes #11905 + - add a client writer that does "push" response + headers written to the client if the headers api + is enabled + - remove special handling in sendf.c + - needs to be installed very early on connection + setup to catch CONNECT response headers -- mailmap: unify Michael Osipov under a single email + Closes #12880 -Ted Lyngmo (21 Sep 2023) +- sendf: Curl_client_write(), make passed in buf const -- docs: use CURLSSLBACKEND_NONE +Michał Antoniak (26 Feb 2024) - [ssl] use CURLSSLBACKEND_NONE instead of (curl_sslbackend)-1 in - documentation and examples. +- lib: remove curl_mimepart object when CURL_DISABLE_MIME - Signed-off-by: Ted Lyngmo + Remove curl_mimepart object from UserDefined structure when + CURL_DISABLE_MIME flag is active. Reduce size of UserDefined structure. - Closes #11909 + Also remove unreachable code: when CURL_DISABLE_MIME is set, httpreq can + never have HTTPREQ_POST_MIME value and the same goes for the + CURL_DISABLE_FORM_API flag and the HTTPREQ_POST_FORM value -Dan Fandrich (21 Sep 2023) + Closes #12948 -- github/labeler: give the sync-labels config item a default value +kpcyrd (26 Feb 2024) - This shouldn't be necessary and is likely a bug with this beta version - of the labeller. +- rustls: make curl compile with 0.12.0 - Also, fix the negative matches for the documentation label. + Closes #12989 - Follow-up to dd12b452a - Closes #11907 +Daniel Stenberg (26 Feb 2024) -- github/labeler: fix up more the labeler config format +- strtoofft: fix the overflow check - The new version didn't like the workaround we had for a bug in the - previous labeler version, and it should no longer be needed. + ... to not rely on wrapping, since it is an undefined behavior that is + not what always might happen. This is in our private strtoff() parser + function, used only on platforms without a native version. - Follow-up to dd12b452a - Closes #11906 + Reported-by: vulnerabilityspotter on hackerone + Closes #12990 -- github/labeler: fix indenting to try to appease labeller +- libssh/libssh2: return error on too big range - Follow-up to dd12b452a + If trying to get the range 0 - 2^63 and the remote file is 2^63 bytes or + larger. -Jay Satiro (21 Sep 2023) + Fixes #12983 + Closes #12984 -- libssh2: fix error message on failed pubkey-from-file +Scott Talbert (24 Feb 2024) - - If libssh2_userauth_publickey_fromfile_ex returns -1 then show error - message "SSH public key authentication failed: Reason unknown (-1)". +- setopt: fix check for CURLOPT_PROXY_TLSAUTH_TYPE value - When libssh2_userauth_publickey_fromfile_ex returns -1 it does so as a - generic error and therefore doesn't set an error message. AFAICT that is - not documented behavior. + Prior to this change CURLOPT_PROXY_TLSAUTH_TYPE would return + CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT on any type other than NULL. Since there is + only one type of TLS auth and it is also the default (SRP) the TLS auth + would work anyway. - Prior to this change libcurl retrieved the last set error message which - would be from a previous function failing. That resulted in misleading - auth failed error messages in verbose mode. + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12981 - Bug: https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/11837#issue-1891827355 - Reported-by: consulion@users.noreply.github.com +Jay Satiro (24 Feb 2024) - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11881 +- mprintf: fix format prefix I32/I64 for windows compilers -Stefan Eissing (21 Sep 2023) + - Support I32 & I64 (eg: %I64d) for all Win32 builds. -- pytest: exclude test_03_goaway in CI runs due to timing dependency + Prior to this change mprintf support for the I format prefix, which is a + Microsoft extension, was dependent on the compiler used. - Closes #11860 + When Borland compiler support was removed in fd7ef00f the prefix was + then no longer supported for that compiler; however since it's still + possible to build with Borland I'm restoring support for the prefix in + this way. -- lib: disambiguate Curl_client_write flag semantics + Reported-by: Paweł Witas - - use CLIENTWRITE_BODY *only* when data is actually body data - - add CLIENTWRITE_INFO for meta data that is *not* a HEADER - - debug assertions that BODY/INFO/HEADER is not used mixed - - move `data->set.include_header` check into Curl_client_write - so protocol handlers no longer have to care - - add special in FTP for `data->set.include_header` for historic, - backward compatible reasons - - move unpausing of client writes from easy.c to sendf.c, so that - code is in one place and can forward flags correctly + Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/12944 + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12950 - Closes #11885 +Daniel Stenberg (23 Feb 2024) -Patrick Monnerat (21 Sep 2023) +- cd2nroff: gen: make `\>` in input to render as plain '>' in output -- tftpd: always use curl's own tftp.h + The same (copy and pasted) fix/mistake as in gen.pl - Using the system's provided arpa/tftp.h and optimizing, GCC 12 detects - and reports a stringop-overread warning: +- gen: make `\>` in input to render as plain '>' in output - tftpd.c: In function ‘write_behind.isra’: - tftpd.c:485:12: warning: ‘write’ reading between 1 and 2147483647 bytes f - rom a region of size 0 [-Wstringop-overread] - 485 | return write(test->ofile, writebuf, count); - | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - In file included from tftpd.c:71: - /usr/include/arpa/tftp.h:58:30: note: source object ‘tu_data’ of size 0 - 58 | char tu_data[0]; /* data or error stri - ng */ - | ^~~~~~~ + Reported-by: Gisle Vanem + Fixes #12977 + Closes #12978 - This occurs because writebuf points to this field and the latter - cannot be considered as being of dynamic length because it is not - the last field in the structure. Thus it is bound to its declared - size. +Fabrice Fontaine (23 Feb 2024) - This commit always uses curl's own version of tftp.h where the - target field is last in its structure, effectively avoiding the - warning. +- configure.ac: find libpsl with pkg-config - As HAVE_ARPA_TFTP_H is not used anymore, cmake/configure checks for - arpa/tftp.h are removed. + Find libpsl with pkg-config to avoid static build failures. - Closes #11897 + Ref: http://autobuild.buildroot.org/results/1fb15e1a99472c403d0d3b1a688902f32 + e78d002 -Dan Fandrich (20 Sep 2023) + Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine + Closes #12947 -- test1474: make precheck more robust on non-Solaris systems +Daniel Stenberg (23 Feb 2024) - If uname -r returns something odd, perl could return an error code and - the test would be erroneously skipped. The qx// syntax avoid this. +- BUG-BOUNTY.md: clarify that the curl security team decides - Followup to 08f9b2148 + Closes #12975 -- github/labeler: switch to the 5 beta version +- THANKS: add bug reporter from #740 - This version adds an important feature that will allow more PRs to be - labelled. Rather than being limited to labeling PRs with files that - match a single glob, it can now label them if multiple changed files - match any one of a number of globs. + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/740 -Daniel Stenberg (20 Sep 2023) +Stefan Eissing (22 Feb 2024) -- lib: enable hmac for digest as well +- multi: fix multi_sock handling of select_bits - Previously a build that disabled NTLM and aws-sigv4 would fail to build - since the hmac was disabled, but it is also needed for digest auth. + - OR the event bitmask to data->state.select_bits instead of overwriting + them. They are cleared again on use. - Follow-up to e92edfbef64448ef + Reported-by: 5533asdg on github + Fixes #12971 + Closes #12972 - Fixes #11890 - Reported-by: Aleksander Mazur - Closes #11896 +Daniel Stenberg (22 Feb 2024) -- idn: if idn2_check_version returns NULL, return error +- curlver: bump to 8.7.0 for next release - ... this avoids a NULL dereference for this unusual case. +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced - Reported-by: s0urc3_ on hackerone - Closes #11898 +- write-out: add '%{proxy_used}' -- http: fix CURL_DISABLE_BEARER_AUTH breakage + Returns 1 if the previous transfer used a proxy, otherwise 0. Useful to + for example determine if a `NOPROXY` pattern matched the hostname or + not. - When bearer auth was disabled, the if/else logic got wrong and caused - problems. + Extended test 970 and 972 - Follow-up to e92edfbef64448ef461 - Fixes #11892 - Reported-by: Aleksander Mazur - Closes #11895 +- CURLINFO_USED_PROXY: return bool whether the proxy was used -Michael Osipov (20 Sep 2023) + Adds test536 to verify -- wolfssl: allow capath with CURLOPT_CAINFO_BLOB + Closes #12719 - Remain consistent with OpenSSL. While CAfile is nulled as documented - with CURLOPT_CAINFO_BLOB, CApath remains intact. +- sha512_256: remove the cast macro, minor language/format edits - Closes #11886 + Follow-up to cbe41d151d6a100c -- wolfssl: use ssl_cafile/ssl_capath variables consistent with openssl.c + Closes #12966 - Closes #11886 +Stefan Eissing (20 Feb 2024) -Dan Fandrich (19 Sep 2023) +- DoH: add trace configuration -- test1474: disable test on NetBSD, OpenBSD and Solaris 10 + - refs #12397 where it is dicussed how to en-/disable verbose output + of DoH operations + - introducing `struct curl_trc_feat` to track a curl feature for + tracing + - adding `data->state.feat` optionally pointing to the feature a + transfer belongs to + - adding trace functions and verbosity checks on features + - using trace feature in DoH code + - documenting `doh` as feature for `--trace-config` - These kernels only send a fraction of the requested amount of the first - large block, invalidating the assumptions of the test and causing it to - fail. + Closes #12411 - Assisted-by: Christian Weisgerber - Ref: https://curl.se/mail/lib-2023-09/0021.html - Closes #11888 +- websocket: fix curl_ws_recv() -Ryan Schmidt (20 Sep 2023) + - when data arrived in several chunks, the collection into + the passed buffer always started at offset 0, overwriting + the data already there. -- cmake, configure: also link with CoreServices + adding test_20_07 to verify fix - When linking with CoreFoundation, also link with CoreServices which is - apparently required to avoid an NSInvalidArgumentException in software - linking with libcurl on macOS Sonoma 14 and later. + - debug environment var CURL_WS_CHUNK_SIZE can be used to + influence the buffer chunk size used for en-/decoding. - Fixes #11893 - Closes #11894 + Closes #12945 -Marc Hoersken (19 Sep 2023) +Evgeny Grin (Karlson2k) (20 Feb 2024) -- CI/azure: remove pip, wheel, cryptography, pyopenssl and impacket +- digest: support SHA-512/256 - These dependencies are now already included in the Docker image. + Also fix the tests. New implementation tested with GNU libmicrohttpd. + The new numbers in tests are real SHA-512/256 numbers (not just some + random ;) numbers ). - Ref: https://github.com/mback2k/curl-docker-winbuildenv/commit/2607a31bcab544 - b41d15606e97f38cf312c1ce56 +- tests: add SHA-512/256 unit test - Closes #11889 +- SHA-512/256: implement hash algorithm -Daniel Stenberg (19 Sep 2023) + Closes #12897 -- wolfssl: if CURLOPT_CAINFO_BLOB is set, ignore the CA files +- curl_setup.h: add curl_uint64_t internal type - Ref: #11883 - Reported-by: Michael Osipov - Closes #11884 + The unsigned version of curl_off_t basically -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced +Daniel Stenberg (20 Feb 2024) -- test3103: CURLOPT_COOKIELIST test +- docs: dist curl*.1 and install without perl -- cookie: set ->running in cookie_init even if data is NULL + Drop docs/mk-ca-bundle.1 from the tarball. It can be generated at will. - This is a regression introduced in b1b326ec500 (shipped in curl 8.1.0) + Closes #12959 + Fixes #12921 + Reported-by: Michael Forney - Test 3103 verifies. +Stefan Eissing (20 Feb 2024) - Fixes #11875 - Reported-by: wangp on github - Closes #11876 +- OpenSSL QUIC: adapt to v3.3.x -- test498: total header size for all redirects is larger than accepted + - set our idle timeout as transport parameter + - query negotiated idle timeout for connection alive checks + - query number of available bidi streams on a connection + - use write_ex2 with SSL_WRITE_FLAG_CONCLUDE to signal + EOF on last chunk write, so stream close does not + require an additional QUIC packet -- http: use per-request counter to check too large headers + Closes #12933 - Not the counter that accumulates all headers over all redirects. +Ramiro Garcia (19 Feb 2024) - Follow-up to 3ee79c1674fd6 +- MANUAL.md: fix typo - Do a second check for 20 times the limit for the accumulated size for - all headers. + Closes #12965 - Fixes #11871 - Reported-by: Joshix-1 on github - Closes #11872 +Daniel Stenberg (19 Feb 2024) -Jay Satiro (18 Sep 2023) +- BINDINGS: add mcurl, the python binding -- THANKS: add Eric Murphy + Ref: #12956 + Closes #12962 - He reported #11850 (quiche build error) but I forgot to add a - 'reported-by' entry in the fix 267e14f1. +- mk-ca-bundle.md: cleanups and polish -Daniel Stenberg (18 Sep 2023) + Closes #12958 -- h2-proxy: remove left-over mistake in drain_tunnel() +- spellcheck.yml: remove .1/.3 handling, clean all man page .md files - Left-over from 331b89a319 + Since we generate all .1 and .3 files from markdown now, we can limit + the spellcheck to the markdown versions only. - Reported-by: 南宫雪珊 + Closes #12960 - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11877 +- libcurl-docs: cleanups -vvb2060 (18 Sep 2023) + CURLMOPT_SOCKETDATA.md: fix typo + CURLMOPT_TIMERDATA.md: fix typo + CURLOPT_COOKIELIST.m: quote strings + CURLOPT_PREREQFUNCTION.md: quote variable names + CURLOPT_TCP_NODELAY.md: rephrased to please spell checker + CURLOPT_WILDCARDMATCH.md: rephrased + libcurl-tutorial.md: use correct option name + curl_global_init_mem.md: quote headers + curl_easy_getinfo.md: use correct symbol names in headers + curl_global_trace.md: quote some headers + curl_ws_meta.md: quote struct field names + libcurl-env.md: quote headers -- lib: failf/infof compiler warnings +- cd2nroff: remove backticks from titles - Closes #11874 +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced -Daniel Stenberg (17 Sep 2023) +Stefan Eissing (18 Feb 2024) -- rand: fix 'alnum': array is too small to include a terminating null character +- http_chunks: fix the accounting of consumed bytes - It was that small on purpose, but this change now adds the null byte to - avoid the error. + Prior to this change chunks were handled correctly although in verbose + mode libcurl could incorrectly warn of "Leftovers after chunking" even + if there were none. - Follow-up to 3aa3cc9b052353b1 + Reported-by: Michael Kaufmann - Reported-by: Dan Fandrich - Ref: #11838 - Closes #11870 + Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/12937 + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12939 -Mathias Fuchs (16 Sep 2023) +- file: use xfer buf for file:// transfers -- cmake: fix the help text to the static build option in CMakeLists.txt + - For file:// transfers use the multi handle's transfer buffer for + up- and downloads. - Closes #11843 + Prior to this change a6c9a33 (precedes 8.6.0) changed the file:// + transfers to use a smaller stack based buffer, and that caused a + significant performance decrease in Windows. -John Haugabook (16 Sep 2023) + Bug: https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/12750#issuecomment-1920103086 + Reported-by: edmcln@users.noreply.github.com -- MANUAL.md: change domain to example.com + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12932 - Closes #11866 +Karthikdasari0423 (18 Feb 2024) -Daniel Stenberg (16 Sep 2023) +- HTTP3.md: always run nghttp3 submodule init -- doh: inherit DEBUGFUNCTION/DATA + - For consistency change all 'build nghttp3' commands to run submodule + init after cloning, even if the branch does not have submodules. - When creating new transfers for doing DoH, they now inherit the debug - settings from the initiating transfer, so that the application can - redirect and handle the verbose output correctly even for the DoH - transfers. + Follow-up to 5a4b2f93 and 4f794558. - Reported-by: calvin2021y on github - Fixes #11864 - Closes #11869 + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12928 -Dan Fandrich (16 Sep 2023) +LeeRiva (18 Feb 2024) -- http_aws_sigv4: fix sorting with empty parts +- CURLOPT_POSTQUOTE.md: fix typo - When comparing with an empty part, the non-empty one is always - considered greater-than. Previously, the two would be considered equal - which would randomly place empty parts amongst non-empty ones. This - showed as a test 439 failure on Solaris as it uses a different - implementation of qsort() that compares parts differently. + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12926 - Fixes #11855 - Closes #11868 +Evgeny Grin (Karlson2k) (18 Feb 2024) -- CI: ignore the "flaky" and "timing-dependent" test results +- checksrc.pl: fix handling .checksrc with CRLF - CI builds will now run these tests, but will ignore the results if they - fail. The relevant tests are ones that are sensitive to timing or - have edge conditions that make them more likely to fail on CI servers, - which are often heavily overloaded and slow. + - When parsing .checksrc chomp the (CR)LF line ending. - This change only adds two additional tests to be ignored, since the - others already had the flaky keyword. + Prior to this change on Windows checksrc.pl would not process the + symbols in .checksrc properly, since many git repos in Windows use auto + crlf to check out files with CRLF line endings. - Closes #11865 + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12924 -- runtests: eliminate a warning on old perl versions +Richard Levitte (18 Feb 2024) - The warning "Use of implicit split to @_ is deprecated" showed between - perl versions about 5.8 through 5.11. +- cmake: fix install for older CMake versions -- tests: log the test result code after each libtest + - Generate the docs install list by using a foreach loop instead of + LIST:TRANSFORM since older CMake can't handle the latter. - This makes it easier to determine the test status. Also, capitalize - FAILURE and ABORT messages in log lines to make them easier to spot. + Reported-by: Dan Fandrich -Harry Sintonen (16 Sep 2023) + Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/12920 + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12922 -- misc: better random strings +Stefan Eissing (16 Feb 2024) - Generate alphanumerical random strings. +- vtls: fix tls proxy peer verification - Prior this change curl used to create random hex strings. This was - mostly okay, but having alphanumerical random strings is better: The - strings have more entropy in the same space. + - When verifying a proxy certificate for an ip address, use the correct + ip family. - The MIME multipart boundary used to be mere 64-bits of randomness due - to being 16 hex chars. With these changes the boundary is 22 - alphanumerical chars, or little over 130 bits of randomness. + Prior to this change the "connection" ip family was used, which was not + necessarily the same. - Closes #11838 + Reported-by: HsiehYuho@users.noreply.github.com -Daniel Stenberg (15 Sep 2023) + Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/12831 + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12931 -- cookie: reduce variable scope, add const +Dan Fandrich (15 Feb 2024) -- cookie: do not store the expire or max-age strings +- CI: Bump the Circle CI base Ubuntu image to the latest 20.04 - Convert it to an expire time at once and save memory. + The previous ones are going to be removed soon, plus the new ones + include all the fixes since then. - Closes #11862 +Jay Satiro (13 Feb 2024) -- cookie: remove unnecessary struct fields +- transfer: improve Windows SO_SNDBUF update limit - Plus: reduce the hash table size from 256 to 63. It seems unlikely to - make much of a speed difference for most use cases but saves 1.5KB of - data per instance. + - Change the 1 second SO_SNDBUF update limit from per transfer to per + connection. - Closes #11862 + Prior to this change many transfers over the same connection could cause + many SO_SNDBUF updates made to that connection per second, which was + unnecessary. -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12911 - Bumped to 8.4.0, the next presumed version +- schannel: fix hang on unexpected server close -Dan Fandrich (14 Sep 2023) + - Treat TLS connection close (either due to a close_notify from the + server or just closed due to receiving 0) as pending data. -- test2600: remove special case handling for USE_ALARM_TIMEOUT + This is because in some cases schannel_recv knows the connection is + closed but has to return actual pending data so it can't return 0 or an + error to indicate no more data. In this case schannel_recv must be + called again, which only happens if readwrite_data sees that there is + still pending data. - This was originally added to handle platforms that supported only 1 - second granularity in connect timeouts, but after some recent changes - the test currently permafails on several Windows platforms. + Prior to this change if the total size of the body that libcurl expected + to receive from the server was unknown then it was possible under some + network conditions that libcurl would hang waiting to receive more data, + when in fact a close_notify alert indicating no more data would be sent + was already processed. - The need for this special-case was removed in commit 8627416, which - increased the connect timeout in all cases to well above 1 second. + Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/12894 + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12910 - Fixes #11767 - Closes #11849 +Daniel Stenberg (10 Feb 2024) -Daniel Stenberg (14 Sep 2023) +- KNOWN_BUGS: FTP upload fails if remebered dir is deleted -- SECURITY-PROCESS.md. call it vulnerability disclosure policy + Closes #12181 + Closes #12923 - SECURITY-PROCESS.md -> VULN-DISCLOSURE-POLICY.md +Michał Antoniak (10 Feb 2024) - This a name commonly used for a document like this. This name helps - users find it. +- mbedtls: use mbedtls_ssl_conf_{min|max}_tls_version - Closes #11852 + ... instead of the deprecated mbedtls_ssl_conf_{min|max}_version -Junho Choi (14 Sep 2023) + Closes #12905 -- quiche: fix build error with --with-ca-fallback +Dan Fandrich (9 Feb 2024) - - Fix build error when curl is built with --with-quiche - and --with-ca-fallback. +- CI: bump to actions/cache@v4 to avoid warning - - Add --with-ca-fallback to the quiche CI job. +Evgeny Grin (Karlson2k) (9 Feb 2024) - Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/11850 - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11847 +- test1165: improve pattern matching -Jay Satiro (14 Sep 2023) + * Fix excluded digits at the end of the symbols ('CURL_DISABLE_POP3' + was checked as 'CURL_DISABLE_POP') -- escape: replace Curl_isunreserved with ISUNRESERVED + Closes #12903 - - Use the ALLCAPS version of the macro so that it is clear a macro is - being called that evaluates the variable multiple times. +Dan Fandrich (9 Feb 2024) - - Also capitalize macro isurlpuntcs => ISURLPUNTCS since it evaluates - a variable multiple times. +- scripts: Fix cijobs.pl for Azure and GHA - This is a follow-up to 291d225a which changed Curl_isunreserved into an - alias macro for ISUNRESERVED. The problem is the former is not easily - identified as a macro by the caller, which could lead to a bug. + The spacing in the yaml files changed. - For example, ISUNRESERVED(*foo++) is easily identifiable as wrong but - Curl_isunreserved(*foo++) is not even though they both are the same. +Daniel Stenberg (9 Feb 2024) - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11846 +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced -Dan Fandrich (13 Sep 2023) +- TODO: use pkg-config to find libpsl -- tests: increase the default server logs lock timeout + Closes #12919 - This timeout is used to wait for the server to finish writing its logs - before checking them against the expected values. An overloaded machine - could take more than the two seconds previously allocated, so increase - the timeout to 5 seconds. +- TODO: avoid nroff - Ref: #11328 - Closes #11834 + Instead of adjusting roffit, skip the nroff step. -- tests: increase TEST_HANG_TIMEOUT in two tests + Closes #12919 - These tests had a 5 second timeout compared to 60 seconds for all other - tests. Make these consistent with the others for more reliability on - heavily-loaded machines. +Dan Fandrich (9 Feb 2024) - Ref: #11328 +- Revert "CI: run Circle macOS builds on x86 for now" -- test1056: disable on Windows + This reverts commit 2683de3078eadc86d9b182e7417f4ee75a247e2c. + ARM resources are now available in Circle CI, so run these builds on ARM + again. This platform needs explicit paths set to libpsl and its + dependency icu4c. - This test relies on the IPv6 scope field being ignored when connecting to - ipv6-localhost (i.e. [::1%259999] is treated as [::1]). Maybe this is a bit - dodgy, but it works on all our test platforms except Windows. This - test was disabled manually on all Windows CI builds already, so instead - add an incompatible feature and precheck so it's skipped on Windows - everywhere automatically. + Follow-up to 2683de30 -- test587: add a slight delay after test + Closes #12635 - This test is designed to connect to the server, then immediately send a - few bytes and disconnect. In some situations, such as on a loaded - server, this doesn't give the server enough time to write its lock file - before its existence is checked. The test harness then fails to find the - server's input log file (because it hasn't been written yet) and fails - the test. By adding a short delay after the test, the HTTP server has - enough time to write its lock file which gives itself more time to write - its remaining files. +Viktor Szakats (9 Feb 2024) - Ref: #11328 +- cmake: add warning for using TLS libraries without 1.3 support -- tests: stop overriding the lock timeout + Closes #12900 - These tests reduce the server lock wait timeout which can increase - flakiness on loaded machines. Since this is merely an optimization, - eliminate them in favour of reliability. +Daniel Stenberg (9 Feb 2024) - Ref: #11328 +- configure: add warning for using TLS libraries without 1.3 support -- tests: add some --expect100-timeout to reduce timing dependencies + Closes #12900 - These tests can fail when the test machine is so slow that the test HTTP - server didn't get a chance to complete before the client's one second - 100-continue timeout triggered. Increase that 1 second to 999 seconds so - this situation doesn't happen. +Michał Antoniak (9 Feb 2024) - Ref: #11328 +- mbedtls: fix building when MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO flag is defined -- test661: return from test early in case of curl error + Closes #12904 -- tests: add the timing-dependent keyword on several tests +Stefan Eissing (9 Feb 2024) - These are ones likely to fail on heavily-loaded machines that alter the - normal test timing. Most of these tests already had the flaky keyword - since this condition makes them more likely to fail on CI. +- ftp: fix socket wait activity in ftp_domore_getsock -- test1592: greatly increase the maximum test timeout + - when waiting on the data connection, always add the control socket to + the pollset on state STOP or let the pingpong add the socket according + to its needs. - It was too short to be reliable on heavily loaded CI machines, and - as a fail-safe only, it didn't need to be short. + Reported-by: Fabian Vogt + Fixes #12901 + Closes #12913 - Ref: #11328 +Daniel Stenberg (9 Feb 2024) -- test: minor test cleanups +- dist: make sure the http tests are in the tarball - Remove an obsolete block of code in tests 2032 & 576. - Add a comment in test 1474. + Fixes #12914 + Reported-by: Fabian Vogt + Closes #12917 -- tests: quadruple the %FTPTIME2 and %FTPTIME3 timeouts +Stefan Eissing (9 Feb 2024) - This gives more of a margin for error when running on overloaded CI - servers. +- multi: add xfer_buf to multi handle - Ref: #11328 + - can be borrowed by transfer during recv-write operation + - needs to be released before borrowing again + - adjustis size to `data->set.buffer_size` + - used in transfer.c readwrite_data() -- tests: improve SLOWDOWN test reliability by reducing sent data + Closes #12805 - These tests are run in SLOWDOWN mode which adds a 10 msec delay after - each character output, which means it takes at least 1.6 seconds (and - 320 kernel calls) just to get through the long welcome banner. On an - overloaded system, this can end up taking much more than 1.6 seconds, - and even more than the 7 or 16 second curl timeout that the tests rely - on, causing them to fail. Reducing the size of the welcome banner drops - the total number of characters sent before the transfer starts by more - than half, which reduces the opportunity for test-breaking slowdowns by - the same amount. +Daniel Stenberg (9 Feb 2024) - Ref: #11328 +- write-out.md: clarify error handling details -- test650: fix an end tag typo + - it gets used even if the transfer fails -Jay Satiro (13 Sep 2023) + - it does not cause error to be returned even if it fails -- tool_cb_wrt: fix debug assertion + Closes #12909 - - Fix off-by-one out-of-bounds array index in Windows debug assertion. +Stefan Eissing (8 Feb 2024) - Bug: https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/af3f4e41#r127212213 - Reported-by: Gisle Vanem +- ftp: do lineend conversions in client writer -Daniel Stenberg (13 Sep 2023) + - remove the ftp special handling from sendf.c + - let ftp_do() add a client writer that does + the linened conversions + - change the lineend conversion to no longer + modify the passed buffer, but write smaller + chunks to the next cwriter instead. The + inefficiency of this will be mitigated once + we add output buffering for all client writes. -- ctype: add ISUNRESERVED() + Closes #12878 - ... and make Curl_isunreserved() use that macro instead of providing a - separate funtion for the purpose. +- ftp: tracing improvements - Closes #11840 + - trace socketindex for connection filters when not the first + - trace socket fd in tcp + - trace pollset adjusts in vtls -Version 8.3.0 (13 Sep 2023) + Closes #12902 -Daniel Stenberg (13 Sep 2023) +Karthikdasari0423 (8 Feb 2024) -- RELEASE-NOTES: syn ced +- HTTP3.md: adjust the OpenSSL QUIC install instructions - curl 8.3.0 release + tried installing with old steps but failed + tried with newly added setps and able to build + ``` + root@ubuntu:~/curl# ./src/curl -V + /root/curl/src/.libs/curl: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libssl.so.3: version `OPENSS + L_3.2.0' not found (required by /root/curl/lib/.libs/libcurl.so.4) + root@ubuntu:~/curl# + ``` + ``` + root@ubuntu:~/curl# ./src/curl -V + curl 8.6.1-DEV (x86_64-pc-linux-gnu) libcurl/8.6.1-DEV OpenSSL/3.2.0 zlib/1.2 + .11 brotli/1.0.9 libpsl/0.21.0 nghttp3/1.1.0 OpenLDAP/2.5.16 + Release-Date: [unreleased] + Protocols: dict file ftp ftps gopher gophers http https imap imaps ipfs ipns + ldap ldaps mqtt pop3 pop3s rtsp smb smbs smtp smtps telnet tftp + Features: alt-svc AsynchDNS brotli HSTS HTTP3 HTTPS-proxy IPv6 Largefile libz + NTLM PSL SSL threadsafe TLS-SRP UnixSockets + root@ubuntu:~/curl# + ``` -- THANKS: contributors from 8.3.0 + Closes #12896 -Thorsten Klein (12 Sep 2023) +Daniel Stenberg (8 Feb 2024) -- cmake: set SIZEOF_LONG_LONG in curl_config.h +- TODO: align the TOC with the header - in order to support 32bit builds regarding wolfssl CTC_SETTINGS +- docs: make sure curl.1 is included in dist tarballs - Closes #11839 + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/12832#issuecomment-1933271873 -Jay Satiro (12 Sep 2023) + Closes #12892 -- curl_ngtcp2: fix error message +Karthikdasari0423 (8 Feb 2024) -- http_aws_sigv4: handle no-value user header entries +- HTTP3.md: remove quiche word in Openssl 3.2 - - Handle user headers in format 'name:' and 'name;' with no value. + Closes #12893 - The former is used when the user wants to remove an internal libcurl - header and the latter is used when the user actually wants to send a - no-value header in the format 'name:' (note the semi-colon is converted - by libcurl to a colon). +Daniel Stenberg (7 Feb 2024) - Prior to this change the AWS header import code did not special case - either of those and the generated AWS SignedHeaders would be incorrect. +- curl: when allocating variables, add the name into the struct - Reported-by: apparentorder@users.noreply.github.com + This saves the name from being an extra separate allocation. - Ref: https://curl.se/docs/manpage.html#-H + Closes #12891 - Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/11664 - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11668 +- lib582: remove code causing warning that is never run -Dan Fandrich (11 Sep 2023) + The previous realloc code in this code could trigger a compiler warning, + but since that code path cannot happen in normal circumstances it now + instead exits with an error message there. -- CI: run pytest with the -v option + Ref: #12887 + Closes #12890 - This lists of the test cases being run so it can be tracked over time. +Stefan Eissing (7 Feb 2024) - Closes #11824 +- vtls: revert "receive max buffer" + add test case -Daniel Stenberg (11 Sep 2023) + - add test_05_04 for requests using http/1.0, http/1.1 and h2 against an + Apache resource that does an unclean TLS shutdown. + - revert special workarund in openssl.c for suppressing shutdown errors + on multiplexed connections + - vlts.c restore to its state before 9a90c9dd64d2f03601833a70786d485851bd1b53 -- HTTP3: the msquic backend is not functional + Fixes #12885 + Fixes #12844 - I ask that we do not submit bugs for this backend just yet as we know it - does not fully work. + Closes #12848 - Closes #11831 - Closes #11819 +Daniel Stenberg (7 Feb 2024) -- aws_sigv4: the query canon code miscounted URL encoded input +- tests: support setting/using blank content env variables - Added some extra ampersands to test 439 to verify "blank" query parts + - test450: remove --config from the keywords + - test2080: change return code + - test428: add --config as a keyword + - test428: disable on Windows due to CI problems - Follow-up to fc76a24c53b08cdf +- curl: exit on config file parser errors - Closes #11829 + Like when trying to import an environment variable that does not exist. -vvb2060 (11 Sep 2023) + Also fix a bug for reading env variables when there is a default value + set. -- quic: don't set SNI if hostname is an IP address + Bug: https://curl.se/mail/archive-2024-02/0008.html + Reported-by: Brett Buddin - We already do this for TLS connections. + Add test 462 to verify. - RFC 6066 says: Literal IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are not permitted in - "HostName". + Closes #12862 - Ref: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6066#section-3 +Daniel Szmulewicz (7 Feb 2024) - Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/11827 - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11828 +- CURLOPT_WRITEFUNCTION.md: typo fix -Daniel Stenberg (10 Sep 2023) + The maximum amount of body data that is passed to the write + callback is defined in the curl.h header file -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced + Closes #12889 -Benoit Pierre (10 Sep 2023) +Daniel Stenberg (7 Feb 2024) -- configure: fix `HAVE_TIME_T_UNSIGNED` check +- lib: convert Curl_get_line to use dynbuf - The syntax was incorrect (need a proper main body), and the test - condition was wrong (resulting in a signed `time_t` detected as - unsigned). + Create the line in a dynbuf. Aborts the reading of the file on + errors. Avoids having to always allocate maximum amount from the + start. Avoids direct malloc. - Closes #11825 + Closes #12846 -Daniel Stenberg (9 Sep 2023) +- KNOWN_BUGS: unicode on Windows -- THANKS-filter: pszlazak on github + Closes #11461 + Closes #12231 + Closes #12883 -pszlazak (9 Sep 2023) +- tool_operate: change precedence of server Retry-After time -- include.d: explain headers not printed with --fail before 7.75.0 + - When calculating the retry time, no longer allow a server's requested + Retry-After time to take precedence over a longer retry time (either + default algorithmic or user-specified). - Prior to 7.75.0 response headers were not printed if -f/--fail was used - and an error was reported by server. This was fixed in ab525c0 - (precedes 7.75.0). + Prior to this change the server's Retry-After time took precedence over + curl's retry time in all cases, but that's not always practical for + short Retry-After times depending on how busy the server is. - Closes #11822 + Bug: https://curl.se/mail/archive-2024-01/0022.html + Reported-by: Dirk Hünniger -Daniel Stenberg (8 Sep 2023) + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12871 -- http_aws_sigv4: skip the op if the query pair is zero bytes +- cmdline-docs: quote and angle bracket cleanup - Follow-up to fc76a24c53b08cdf + - make sure angle brackets are escaped + - remove a lot of superfluous double quotes + - replace several double quotes with backticks - Spotted by OSS-Fuzz + To make nicer-looking markdown. - Bug: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=62175 - Closes #11823 + Closes #12884 -- cmdline-docs: use present tense, not future +- badwords: use hostname, not host name - + some smaller cleanups + and username, filename - consistently. Fixed the patterns in + badwords.txt to catch these. - Closes #11821 + Closes #12888 -- cmdline-docs: make sure to phrase it as "added in ...." +Viktor Szakats (6 Feb 2024) - References to things that were added or changed in a specific version - should be specified as "(added in [version]) for two reasons: +- cmake: fix function description in comment [ci skip] - 1 - consistency + Closes #12879 - 2 - to allow gen.pl to strip them out if deemed referring to too old - versions +Daniel Stenberg (6 Feb 2024) - Closes #11821 +- header.md: remove backslash, make nicer markdown -Jay Satiro (8 Sep 2023) + - remove a leftover backslash before a dash + - use backticks for "code" strings -- docs: mark --ssl-revoke-best-effort as Schannel specific + Closes #12877 - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11760 +- docs: add mk-ca-bundle.1 to dist -Nathan Moinvaziri (8 Sep 2023) + ... which also makes it get built. But don't build this or curl-config.1 + if build docs is disabled. -- schannel: fix ordering of cert chain info + Closes #12875 - - Use CERT_CONTEXT's pbCertEncoded to determine chain order. +Stefan Eissing (6 Feb 2024) - CERT_CONTEXT from SECPKG_ATTR_REMOTE_CERT_CONTEXT contains - end-entity/server certificate in pbCertEncoded. We can use this pointer - to determine the order of certificates when enumerating hCertStore using - CertEnumCertificatesInStore. +- https-proxy: use IP address and cert with ip in alt names - This change is to help ensure that the ordering of the certificate chain - requested by the user via CURLINFO_CERTINFO has the same ordering on all - versions of Windows. + - improve info logging when peer verification fails to indicate + if DNS name or ip address has been tried to match + - add test case for contacting https proxy with ip address + - add pytest env check on loaded credentials and re-issue + when they are no longer valid + - disable proxy ip address test for bearssl, since not supported there - Prior to this change Schannel certificate order was reversed in 8986df80 - but that was later reverted in f540a39b when it was discovered that - Windows 11 22H2 does the reversal on its own. + Ref: #12831 + Closes #12838 - Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/9706 +Jiawen Geng (6 Feb 2024) - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11632 +- docs: add necessary setup for nghttp3 -Chris Talbot (8 Sep 2023) + Now nghttp3 has submodules + https://github.com/ngtcp2/nghttp3/blob/main/.gitmodules -- digest: Use hostname to generate spn instead of realm + Closes #12859 - In https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2831#section-2.1.2 +Peter Krefting (6 Feb 2024) - digest-uri-value should be serv-type "/" host , where host is: +- version: allow building with ancient libpsl - The DNS host name or IP address for the service requested. The - DNS host name must be the fully-qualified canonical name of the - host. The DNS host name is the preferred form; see notes on server - processing of the digest-uri. + The psl_check_version_number() API was added in libpsl 0.11.0. CentOS 7 + ships with version 0.7.0 which lacks this API. Revert to using the older + versioning API if we detect an old libpsl version. - Realm may not be the host, so we must specify the host explicitly. + Follow-up to 72bd88adde0e8cf6e63644a7d6df1da01a399db4 + Bug: https://curl.se/mail/archive-2024-02/0004.html + Reported-by: Scott Mutter + Closes #12872 - Note this change only affects the non-SSPI digest code. The digest code - used by SSPI builds already uses the hostname to generate the spn. +Daniel Stenberg (6 Feb 2024) - Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/11369 +- TODO: Support latest rustls - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11395 + Closes #12737 + Closes #12874 -Daniel Stenberg (7 Sep 2023) +- docs: make curldown do angle brackets like markdown -- docs: remove use of the word 'very' + Make sure we use \< and \> in markdown all over so that it renders + correctly, on GitHub and elsewhere. cd2nroff now outputs a warning if it + finds an unescaled angle bracket. - It is mostly superfluous. proselint would complain. + Ref: #12854 + Closes #12869 - Closes #11818 +- docs: fix the --disable-docs for autotools -- curl_multi_remove_handle.3: clarify what happens with connection + Follow-up to 541321507e386 - Closes #11817 + Closes #12870 - RELEASE-NOTES: synced -- test439: verify query canonization for aws-sigv4 +- libcurl-security.md: Active FTP passes on the local IP address -- tool_operate: make aws-sigv4 not require TLS to be used + Reported-by: Harry Sintonen + Closes #12867 - Maybe not used too often, but we want it for testing and it should work. +Stefan Eissing (5 Feb 2024) -- http_aws_sigv4: canonicalize the query +- configure: do not link with nghttp3 unless necessary - Percent encoding needs to be done using uppercase, and most - non-alphanumerical must be percent-encoded. + Fixes #12833 + Closes #12864 + Reported-by: Ryan Carsten Schmidt - Fixes #11794 - Reported-by: John Walker - Closes #11806 +Daniel Stenberg (5 Feb 2024) -Wyatt O'Day (7 Sep 2023) +- THANKS: add Dmitry Tretyakov -- lib: add ability to disable auths individually + ... since I missed to give credit to the report in the fix of #12861 - Both with configure and cmake +Stefan Eissing (5 Feb 2024) - Closes #11490 +- openssl-quic: check on Windows that socket conv to int is possible -Stefan Eissing (7 Sep 2023) + Fixes #12861 + Closes #12865 -- ngtcp2: fix handling of large requests +Daniel Stenberg (5 Feb 2024) - - requests >64K are send in parts to the filter - - fix parsing of the request to assemble it correctly - from several sends - - open a QUIC stream only when the complete request has - been collected +- tool_cb_hdr: only parse etag + content-disposition for 2xx - Closes #11815 + ... and ignore them for other response codes. -- openssl: when CURLOPT_SSL_CTX_FUNCTION is registered, init x509 store before + Reported-by: Harry Sintonen + Closes #12866 - - we delay loading the x509 store to shorten the handshake time. - However an application callback installed via CURLOPT_SSL_CTX_FUNCTION - may need to have the store loaded and try to manipulate it. - - load the x509 store before invoking the app callback +- md4: include strdup.h for the memdup proto - Fixes #11800 - Reported-by: guoxinvmware on github - Cloes #11805 + Reported-by: Erik Schnetter + Fixes #12849 + Closes #12863 -Daniel Stenberg (7 Sep 2023) +Joel Depooter (5 Feb 2024) -- krb5: fix "implicit conversion loses integer precision" warnings +- docs: add missing slashes to SChannel client certificate documentation - conversions to/from enum and unsigned chars + When setting the CURLOPT_SSLCERT option to a certificate thumprint, it + is required to have a backslash between the "store location", "store + name" and "thumbprint" tokens. These slashes were present in the + previous documentation, but were missed in the transition to markdown + documentation. - Closes #11814 + Closes #12854 -Stefan Eissing (7 Sep 2023) +Stefan Eissing (5 Feb 2024) -- pytest: improvements +- HTTP/2: write response directly - - set CURL_CI for pytest runs in CI environments - - exclude timing sensitive tests from CI runs - - for failed results, list only the log and stat of - the failed transfer + - use the new `Curl_xfer_write_resp()` to write incoming responses + directly to the client + - eliminates `stream->recvbuf` + - memory consumption on parallel transfers minimized - - fix type in http.c comment + Closes #12828 - Closes #11812 +Daniel Stenberg (5 Feb 2024) -- CI: move on to ngtcp2 v0.19.1 +- cookie.md: provide an example sending a fixed cookie - Closes #11809 + Closes #12868 -Dan Fandrich (5 Sep 2023) +Lars Kellogg-Stedman (5 Feb 2024) -- CI: run Circle macOS builds on x86 for now +- ALTSVC.md: correct a typo - The ARM machines aren't ready for us and requesting them now causes - warnings e-mails to be sent to some PR pushers. + The ALPN documentation erroneously referred to a "host number" instead + of a "port number". - Ref: #11771 + Closes #12852 -Viktor Szakats (5 Sep 2023) +Boris Verkhovskiy (5 Feb 2024) -- http3: adjust cast for ngtcp2 v0.19.0 +- proxy1.0.md: fix example - ngtcp2 v0.19.0 made size of `ecn` member of `ngtcp2_pkt_info` - an `uint8_t` (was: `uint32_t`). Adjust our local cast accordingly. + Closes #12856 - Fixes: - ``` - ./curl/lib/vquic/curl_ngtcp2.c:1912:12: warning: implicit conversion loses in - teger precision: 'uint32_t' (aka 'unsigned int') to 'uint8_t' (aka 'unsigned - char') [-Wimplicit-int-conversion] - pi.ecn = (uint32_t)ecn; - ~ ^~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ``` +Chris Webb (5 Feb 2024) - Also bump ngtcp2, nghttp3 and nghttp2 to their latest versions in our - docs and CI. +- configure: add --disable-docs flag - Ref: https://github.com/ngtcp2/ngtcp2/commit/80447281bbc94af53f8aa7a4cfc19175 - 782894a3 - Ref: https://github.com/ngtcp2/ngtcp2/pull/877 - Closes #11798 + Building man pages from curldown sources now requires perl. Add a + --disable-docs flag to configure to enable building and installing + without documentation where perl is not available or man pages are not + required. This is selected automatically (with a warning) when perl is + not found by configure. -Stefan Eissing (5 Sep 2023) + Fixes #12832 + Closes #12857 -- http: fix sending of large requests +Faraz Fallahi (5 Feb 2024) - - refs #11342 where errors with git https interactions - were observed - - problem was caused by 1st sends of size larger than 64KB - which resulted in later retries of 64KB only - - limit sending of 1st block to 64KB - - adjust h2/h3 filters to cope with parsing the HTTP/1.1 - formatted request in chunks +- connect.c: fix typo - - introducing Curl_nwrite() as companion to Curl_write() - for the many cases where the sockindex is already known + Closes #12858 - Fixes #11342 (again) - Closes #11803 +Daniel Stenberg (1 Feb 2024) -- pytest: fix check for slow_network skips to only apply when intended +- sendf: ignore response body to HEAD - Closes #11801 + and mark the stream for close, but return OK since the response this far + was ok - if headers were received. Partly because this is what curl has + done traditionally. -Daniel Stenberg (5 Sep 2023) + Test 499 verifies. Updates test 689. -- curl_url_get/set.3: add missing semicolon in SYNOPSIS + Reported-by: Sergey Bronnikov + Bug: https://curl.se/mail/lib-2024-02/0000.html + Closes #12842 -- CURLOPT_URL.3: explain curl_url_set() uses the same parser +- ftp: treat a 226 arriving before data as a signal to read data -- CURLOPT_URL.3: add two URL API calls in the see-also section + For active mode transfers. -Dan Fandrich (4 Sep 2023) + Due to some interesting timing, curl can sometimes get the 226 (transfer + complete) over the control channel first, before the data connection + signals readability. If this happens, use that as a signal to check the + data connection. -- CI: add a 32-bit i686 Linux build + Additionally, set the socket filter in listen mode *before* the + PORT/EPRT command is issued, to reduce the risk that the little time gap + could interfere. - This is done by cross-compiling under regular x86_64 Linux. Since the - kernel offers backwards compatibility, the binaries can be tested as - normal. + This issue never reproduced for me on Debian and takes several hundred + rounds for me to trigger on my mac. - Closes #11799 + Reported-by: Stefan Eissing + Fixes #12823 + Closes #12841 -- tests: fix a type warning on 32-bit x86 +Patrick Monnerat (1 Feb 2024) -Viktor Szakats (4 Sep 2023) +- OS400: avoid using awk in the build scripts -- tests: delete stray `.orig` file + Awk is a PASE program and its use may cause a failure depending on the + CCSID of the calling script (IBM bug?). - Follow-up to 331b89a319d0067fa1e6441719307cfef9c7960f - Closes #11797 + For this reason, revert to an sed-only solution to extract the exported + symbols from the header files. -Daniel Stenberg (4 Sep 2023) + Closes #12826 + +Jan Macku (1 Feb 2024) + +- docs: remove `mk-ca-bundle.1` from `man_MANS` + + It was accidentally added in https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12730 + + Co-authored-by: Lukáš Zaoral + Signed-off-by: Jan Macku + + Follow-up to eefcc1bda4bccd800f5a56a0fe17a2f44a96e88b + Closes #12843 + +Daniel Stenberg (1 Feb 2024) - RELEASE-NOTES: synced -Viktor Szakats (4 Sep 2023) + and bump to 8.6.1 for now -- lib: silence compiler warning in inet_ntop6 +- cmdline-docs/Makefile: avoid using a fixed temp file name - ``` - ./curl/lib/inet_ntop.c:121:21: warning: possible misuse of comma operator her - e [-Wcomma] - cur.base = i, cur.len = 1; - ^ - ./curl/lib/inet_ntop.c:121:9: note: cast expression to void to silence warnin - g - cur.base = i, cur.len = 1; - ^~~~~~~~~~~~ - (void)( ) - ``` + By appending the pid number two different runs at the same time will not + trample over the same file. - Closes #11790 + Reported-by: Jon Rumsey + Fixes #12829 + Closes #12839 -Daniel Stenberg (4 Sep 2023) +- asyn-thread: use wakeup_close to close the read descriptor -- transfer: also stop the sending on closed connection + Reported-by: Dan Fandrich + Ref: #12834 + Closes #12836 - Previously this cleared the receiving bit only but in some cases it is - also still sending (like a request-body) when disconnected and neither - direction can continue then. +Stefan Eissing (1 Feb 2024) - Fixes #11769 - Reported-by: Oleg Jukovec - Closes #11795 +- ntml_wb: fix buffer type typo -John Bampton (4 Sep 2023) + Closes #12825 -- docs: change `sub-domain` to `subdomain` +Daniel Stenberg (1 Feb 2024) - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subdomain +- tool_operate: do not set CURLOPT_QUICK_EXIT in debug builds - Closes #11793 + Since it allows (small) memory leaks that interfere with torture tests + and regular memory-leak checks. -Stefan Eissing (4 Sep 2023) + Reported-by: Dan Fandrich + Fixes #12834 + Closes #12835 -- multi: more efficient pollfd count for poll +Boris Verkhovskiy (31 Jan 2024) - - do not use separate pollfds for sockets that have POLLIN+POLLOUT +- form-string.md: correct the example - Closes #11792 + Closes #12822 -- http2: polish things around POST +Version 8.6.0 (31 Jan 2024) - - added test cases for various code paths - - fixed handling of blocked write when stream had - been closed inbetween attempts - - re-enabled DEBUGASSERT on send with smaller data size +Daniel Stenberg (31 Jan 2024) - - in debug builds, environment variables can be set to simulate a slow - network when sending data. cf-socket.c and vquic.c support - * CURL_DBG_SOCK_WBLOCK: percentage of send() calls that should be - answered with a EAGAIN. TCP/UNIX sockets. - This is chosen randomly. - * CURL_DBG_SOCK_WPARTIAL: percentage of data that shall be written - to the network. TCP/UNIX sockets. - Example: 80 means a send with 1000 bytes would only send 800 - This is applied to every send. - * CURL_DBG_QUIC_WBLOCK: percentage of send() calls that should be - answered with EAGAIN. QUIC only. - This is chosen randomly. +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced - Closes #11756 + curl 8.6.0 -Daniel Stenberg (4 Sep 2023) +- THANKS: new contributors from 8.5.0 -- docs: add curl_global_trace to some SEE ALSO sections +Jay Satiro (31 Jan 2024) - Closes #11791 +- cd2nroff: use perl 'strict' and 'warnings' -- os400: fix checksrc nits + - Use strict and warnings pragmas. - Closes #11789 + - If open() fails then show the reason. -Nicholas Nethercote (3 Sep 2023) + - Set STDIN io layer :crlf so that input is properly read on Windows. -- hyper: remove `hyptransfer->endtask` + - When STDIN is used as input, the filename $f is now set to "STDIN". - `Curl_hyper_stream` needs to distinguish between two kinds of - `HYPER_TASK_EMPTY` tasks: (a) the `foreach` tasks it creates itself, and - (b) background tasks that hyper produces. It does this by recording the - address of any `foreach` task in `hyptransfer->endtask` before pushing - it into the executor, and then comparing that against the address of - tasks later polled out of the executor. + Various error messages in single() use $f for the filename and this way + it is not undefined when STDIN. - This works right now, but there is no guarantee from hyper that the - addresses are stable. `hyper_executor_push` says "The executor takes - ownership of the task, which should not be accessed again unless - returned back to the user with `hyper_executor_poll`". That wording is a - bit ambiguous but with my Rust programmer's hat on I read it as meaning - the task returned with `hyper_executor_poll` may be conceptually the - same as a task that was pushed, but that there are no other guarantees - and comparing addresses is a bad idea. + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12819 - This commit instead uses `hyper_task_set_userdata` to mark the `foreach` - task with a `USERDATA_RESP_BODY` value which can then be checked for, - removing the need for `hyptransfer->endtask`. This makes the code look - more like that hyper C API examples, which use userdata for every task - and never look at task addresses. +Daniel Stenberg (30 Jan 2024) - Closes #11779 +- cd2nroff: fix duplicate output issue -Dave Cottlehuber (3 Sep 2023) + Assisted-by: Jay Satiro + Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl-www/issues/321 + Closes #12818 -- ws: fix spelling mistakes in examples and tests +- lib: error out on multissl + http3 - Closes #11784 + Since the QUIC/h3 code has no knowledge or handling of multissl it might + bring unintended consequences if we allow it. -Daniel Stenberg (3 Sep 2023) + configure, cmake and curl_setup.h all now reject this combination. -- tool_filetime: make -z work with file dates before 1970 + Assisted-by: Viktor Szakats + Assisted-by: Gisle Vanem + Ref: #12806 + Closes #12807 - Fixes #11785 - Reported-by: Harry Sintonen - Closes #11786 +Patrick Monnerat (29 Jan 2024) -Dan Fandrich (1 Sep 2023) +- OS400: sync ILE/RPG binding -- build: fix portability of mancheck and checksrc targets + Also do not force git CRLF line endings on *.cmd files for OS400. - At least FreeBSD preserves cwd across makefile lines, so rules - consisting of more than one "cd X; do_something" must be explicitly run - in a subshell to avoid this. This problem caused the Cirrus FreeBSD - build to fail when parallel make jobs were enabled. + Closes #12815 -- CI: adjust labeler match patterns for new & obsolete files +Viktor Szakats (28 Jan 2024) -- configure: trust pkg-config when it's used for zlib +- build: delete/replace 3 more clang warning pragmas - The library flags retrieved from pkg-config were later thrown out and - harded-coded, which negates the whole reason to use pkg-config. - Also, previously, the assumption was made that --libs-only-l and - --libs-only-L are the full decomposition of --libs, which is untrue and - would not allow linking against a static zlib. The new approach is - better in that it uses --libs, although only if --libs-only-l returns - nothing. + - tool_msgs: delete redundant `-Wformat-nonliteral` suppression pragma. - Bug: https://curl.se/mail/lib-2023-08/0081.html - Reported-by: Randall - Closes #11778 + - whitespace formatting in `mprintf.h`, lib518, lib537. -Stefan Eissing (1 Sep 2023) + - lib518: fix wrong variable in `sizeof()`. -- CI/ngtcp2: clear wolfssl for when cache is ignored + - lib518: bump variables to `rlim_t`. + Follow-up to e2b394106d543c4615a60795b7fdce04bd4e5090 #1469 - Closes #11783 + - lib518: sync error message with lib537 + Follow-up to 365322b8bcf9efb6a361473d227b70f2032212ce -Daniel Stenberg (1 Sep 2023) + - lib518, lib537: replace `-Wformat-nonliteral` suppression pragmas + by reworking test code. -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced + Follow-up to 5b286c250829e06a135a6ba998e80beb7f43a734 #12812 + Follow-up to aee4ebe59161d0a5281743f96e7738ad97fe1cd4 #12803 + Follow-up to 09230127589eccc7e01c1a7217787ef8e64f3328 #12540 + Follow-up to 3829759bd042c03225ae862062560f568ba1a231 #12489 -Nicholas Nethercote (1 Sep 2023) + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Closes #12814 -- hyper: fix a progress upload counter bug +Richard Levitte (27 Jan 2024) - `Curl_pgrsSetUploadCounter` should be a passed a total count, not an - increment. +- cmake: freshen up docs/INSTALL.cmake - This changes the failing diff for test 579 with hyper from this: - ``` - Progress callback called with UL 0 out of 0[LF] - -Progress callback called with UL 8 out of 0[LF] - -Progress callback called with UL 16 out of 0[LF] - -Progress callback called with UL 26 out of 0[LF] - -Progress callback called with UL 61 out of 0[LF] - -Progress callback called with UL 66 out of 0[LF] - +Progress callback called with UL 29 out of 0[LF] - ``` - to this: - ``` - Progress callback called with UL 0 out of 0[LF] - -Progress callback called with UL 8 out of 0[LF] - -Progress callback called with UL 16 out of 0[LF] - -Progress callback called with UL 26 out of 0[LF] - -Progress callback called with UL 61 out of 0[LF] - -Progress callback called with UL 66 out of 0[LF] - +Progress callback called with UL 40 out of 0[LF] - ``` - Presumably a step in the right direction. + - Turn docs/INSTALL.cmake into a proper markdown file, + docs/INSTALL-CMAKE.md + - Move things around to divide the description into configuration, + building and installing sections + - Mention the more modern cmake options to configure, build and install, + but also retain the older variants as fallbacks - Closes #11780 + Closes #12772 -Daniel Stenberg (1 Sep 2023) +Viktor Szakats (27 Jan 2024) -- awssiv4: avoid freeing the date pointer on error +- build: delete/replace clang warning pragmas - Since it was not allocated, don't free it even if it was wrong syntax + - delete redundant warning suppressions for `-Wformat-nonliteral`. + This now relies on `CURL_PRINTF()` and it's theoratically possible + that this macro isn't active but the warning is. We're ignoring this + as a corner-case here. - Bug: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=61908 + - replace two pragmas with code changes to avoid the warnings. - Follow-up to b137634ba3adb + Follow-up to aee4ebe59161d0a5281743f96e7738ad97fe1cd4 #12803 + Follow-up to 09230127589eccc7e01c1a7217787ef8e64f3328 #12540 + Follow-up to 3829759bd042c03225ae862062560f568ba1a231 #12489 - Closes #11782 + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Closes #12812 -Stefan Eissing (1 Sep 2023) +Daniel Stenberg (27 Jan 2024) -- CI: ngtcp2-linux: use separate caches for tls libraries +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced - allow ever changing master for wolfssl +- http: only act on 101 responses when they are HTTP/1.1 - Closes #11766 + For 101 responses claiming to be any other protocol, bail out. This + would previously trigger an assert. -- replace `master` as wolfssl-version with recent commit + Add test 1704 to verify. -- wolfssl, use master again in CI + Bug: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=66184 + Closes #12811 - - with the shared session update fix landed in master, it - is time to use that in our CI again +Scarlett McAllister (27 Jan 2024) -Nicholas Nethercote (31 Aug 2023) +- _VARIABLES.md: add missing 'be' into the sentence -- tests: fix formatting errors in `FILEFORMAT.md`. + Closes #12809 - Without the surrounding backticks, these tags get swallowed when the - markdown is rendered. +Stefan Eissing (27 Jan 2024) - Closes #11777 +- mqtt, remove remaining use of data->state.buffer -Viktor Szakats (31 Aug 2023) + Closes #12799 -- cmake: add support for `CURL_DEFAULT_SSL_BACKEND` +Daniel Stenberg (27 Jan 2024) - Allow overriding the default TLS backend via a CMake setting. +- x509asn1: switch from malloc to dynbuf - E.g.: - `cmake [...] -DCURL_DEFAULT_SSL_BACKEND=mbedtls` + Closes #12808 - Accepted values: bearssl, gnutls, mbedtls, openssl, rustls, - schannel, secure-transport, wolfssl +- x509asn1: make utf8asn1str() use dynbuf instead of malloc + memcpy - The passed string is baked into the curl/libcurl binaries. - The value is case-insensitive. + Closes #12808 - We added a similar option to autotools in 2017 via - c7170e20d0a18ec8a514b4daa53bcdbb4dcb3a05. +- x509asn1: reduce malloc in Curl_extract_certinfo - TODO: Convert to lowercase to improve reproducibility. + Using dynbuf - Closes #11774 + Closes #12808 -- sectransp: fix compiler warnings +Jay Satiro (27 Jan 2024) - https://github.com/curl/curl-for-win/actions/runs/6037489221/job/16381860220# - step:3:11046 - ``` - /Users/runner/work/curl-for-win/curl-for-win/curl/lib/vtls/sectransp.c:2435:1 - 4: warning: unused variable 'success' [-Wunused-variable] - OSStatus success; - ^ - /Users/runner/work/curl-for-win/curl-for-win/curl/lib/vtls/sectransp.c:3300:4 - 4: warning: unused parameter 'sha256len' [-Wunused-parameter] - size_t sha256len) - ^ - ``` +- THANKS: add Alexander Bartel and Brennan Kinney - Closes #11773 + They reported and investigated #10259 which was fixed by 7b2d98df. -- tidy-up: mostly whitespace nits + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/10259 - - delete completed TODO from `./CMakeLists.txt`. - - convert a C++ comment to C89 in `./CMake/CurlTests.c`. - - delete duplicate EOLs from EOF. - - add missing EOL at EOF. - - delete whitespace at EOL (except from expected test results). - - convert tabs to spaces. - - convert CRLF EOLs to LF in GHA yaml. - - text casing fixes in `./CMakeLists.txt`. - - fix a codespell typo in `packages/OS400/initscript.sh`. +Daniel Stenberg (26 Jan 2024) - Closes #11772 +- krb5: add prototype to silence clang warnings on mvsnprintf() -Dan Fandrich (31 Aug 2023) + "error: format string is not a string literal" -- CI: remove Windows builds from Cirrus, without replacement + Follow-up to 09230127589eccc7 which made the warning appear - If we don't do this, all coverage on Cirrus will cease in a few days. By - removing the Windows builds, the FreeBSD one should still continue - as before. The Windows builds will need be moved to another service to - maintain test coverage. + Assisted-by: Viktor Szakats + Closes #12803 - Closes #11771 +- x509asn1: remove code for WANT_VERIFYHOST -- CI: switch macOS ARM build from Cirrus to Circle CI + No code ever sets this anymore since we dropped gskit - Cirrus is drastically reducing their free tier on Sept. 1, so they will - no longer perform all these builds for us. All but one build has been - moved, with the LibreSSL one being dropped because of linking problems - on Circle. + Follow-up to 78d6232f1f326b9ab4d - One important note about this change is that Circle CI is currently - directing all these builds to x86_64 hardware, despite them requesting - ARM. This is because ARM nodes are scheduled to be available on the - free tier only in December. This reduces our architectural diversity - until then but it should automatically come back once those machines are - enabled. + Closes #12804 -- CI: use the right variable for BSD make +- socks: reduce the buffer size to 600 (from 8K) - BSD uses MAKEFLAGS instead of MAKE_FLAGS so it wasn't doing parallel - builds before. + This is malloc'ed memory and it does not more. Test 742 helps us verify + this. -- CI: drop the FreeBSD 12.X build + Closes #12789 - Cirrus' new free tier won't let us have many builds, so drop the - nonessential ones. The FreeBSD 13.X build will still give us the most - relevant FreeBSD coverage. +Stefan Eissing (26 Jan 2024) -- CI: move the Alpine build from Cirrus to GHA +- file+ftp: use stack buffers instead of data->state.buffer - Cirrus is reducing their free tier to next to nothing, so we must move - builds elsewhere. + Closes #12789 -Stefan Eissing (30 Aug 2023) +- vtls: receive max buffer -- test_07_upload.py: fix test_07_34 curl args + - do not only receive one TLS record, but try to fill + the passed buffer + - consider <4K remaning space is "filled". - - Pass correct filename to --data-binary. + Closes #12801 - Prior to this change --data-binary was passed an incorrect filename due - to a missing separator in the arguments list. Since aacbeae7 curl will - error on incorrect filenames for POST. +Daniel Stenberg (26 Jan 2024) - Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/11761 - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11763 +- docs: do not start lines/sentences with So, But nor And -Nicholas Nethercote (30 Aug 2023) + Closes #12802 -- tests: document which tests fail due to hyper's lack of trailer support. +- docs: remove spurious ampersands from markdown - Closes #11762 + They were leftovers from the nroff conversion. -- docs: removing "pausing transfers" from HYPER.md. + Follow-up to eefcc1bda4bccd800f5a5 - It's a reference to #8600, which was fixed by #9070. + Closes #12800 - Closes #11764 +Patrick Monnerat (26 Jan 2024) -Patrick Monnerat (30 Aug 2023) +- sasl: make login option string override http auth -- os400: handle CURL_TEMP_PRINTF() while building bind source + - Use http authentication mechanisms as a default, not a preset. - Closes #11547 + Consider http authentication options which are mapped to SASL options as + a default (overriding the hardcoded default mask for the protocol) that + is ignored if a login option string is given. -- os400: build test servers + Prior to this change, if some HTTP auth options were given, sasl mapped + http authentication options to sasl ones but merged them with the login + options. - Also fix a non-compliant main prototype in disabled.c. + That caused problems with the cli tool that sets the http login option + CURLAUTH_BEARER as a side-effect of --oauth2-bearer, because this flag + maps to more than one sasl mechanisms and the latter cannot be cleared + individually by the login options string. - Closes #11547 + New test 992 checks this. -- tests: fix compilation error for os400 + Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/10259 + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12790 - OS400 uses BSD 4.3 setsockopt() prototype by default: this does not - define parameter as const, resulting in an error if actual parameter is - const. Remove the const keyword from the actual parameter cast: this - works in all conditions, even if the formal parameter uses it. +Stefan Eissing (26 Jan 2024) - Closes #11547 +- socks: use own buffer instead of data->state.buffer -- os400: make programs and command name configurable + Closes #12788 - Closes #11547 +Daniel Stenberg (26 Jan 2024) -- os400: move build configuration parameters to a separate script +- socks: fix generic output string to say SOCKS instead of SOCKS4 - They can then easily be overriden in a script named "config400.override" - that is not part of the distribution. + ... since it was also logged for SOCKS5. - Closes #11547 + Closes #12797 -- os400: implement CLI tool +- test742: test SOCKS5 with max length user, password and hostname - This is provided as a QADRT (ascii) program, a link to it in the IFS and - a minimal CL command. + Adjusted the socksd server accordingly to allow for configuring that + long user name and password. - Closes #11547 + Closes #12797 -Matthias Gatto (30 Aug 2023) +Stefan Eissing (25 Jan 2024) -- lib: fix aws-sigv4 having date header twice in some cases +- ssh: use stack scratch buffer for seeks - When the user was providing the header X-XXX-Date, the header was - re-added during signature computation, and we had it twice in the - request. + - instead of data->state.buffer - Reported-by: apparentorder@users.noreply.github.com + Closes #12794 - Signed-off-by: Matthias Gatto +Daniel Stenberg (25 Jan 2024) - Fixes: https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/11738 - Closes: https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11754 +- krb5: access the response buffer correctly -Jay Satiro (30 Aug 2023) + As the pingpong code no longer uses the download buffer. -- multi: remove 'processing: ' debug message + Folllow-up to c2d973627bab12ab + Pointed-out-by: Stefan Eissing + Closes #12796 - - Remove debug message added by e024d566. +Stefan Eissing (25 Jan 2024) - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11759 +- mqtt: use stack scratch buffer for recv+publish -- ftp: fix temp write of ipv6 address + - instead of data->state.buffer - - During the check to differentiate between a port and IPv6 address - without brackets, write the binary IPv6 address to an in6_addr. + Closes #12792 - Prior to this change the binary IPv6 address was erroneously written to - a sockaddr_in6 'sa6' when it should have been written to its in6_addr - member 'sin6_addr'. There's no fallout because no members of 'sa6' are - accessed before it is later overwritten. +- telnet, use stack scratch buffer for do - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11747 + - instead of data->state.buffer -- tool: change some fopen failures from warnings to errors + Closes #12793 - - Error on missing input file for --data, --data-binary, - --data-urlencode, --header, --variable, --write-out. +- http, use stack scratch buffer - Prior to this change if a user of the curl tool specified an input file - for one of the above options and that file could not be opened then it - would be treated as zero length data instead of an error. For example, a - POST using `--data @filenametypo` would cause a zero length POST which - is probably not what the user intended. + - instead of data->state.buffer - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11677 + Closes #12791 -- hostip: fix typo +- ntlm_wb: do not use data->state.buf any longer -Davide Masserut (29 Aug 2023) + Closes #12787 -- tool: avoid including leading spaces in the Location hyperlink +- gitignore: the generated `libcurl-symbols.md` - Co-authored-by: Dan Fandrich + Closes #12795 - Closes #11735 +Daniel Stenberg (25 Jan 2024) -Daniel Stenberg (29 Aug 2023) +- tool: fix the listhelp generation command -- SECURITY-PROCESS.md: not a sec issue: Tricking user to run a cmdline + The previous command line to generate the tool_listhelp.c source file + broke with 2494b8dd5175cee7. - Closes #11757 + Make 'make listhelp' invoked in src/ generate it. Also update the + comment in the file to mention the right procedure. -- connect: stop halving the remaining timeout when less than 600 ms left + Closes #12786 - When curl wants to connect to a host, it always has a TIMEOUT. The - maximum time it is allowed to spend until a connect is confirmed. +- http: check for "Host:" case insensitively - curl will try to connect to each of the IP adresses returned for the - host. Two loops, one for each IP family. + When checking if the user wants to replace the header, the check should + be case insensitive. - During the connect loop, while curl has more than one IP address left to - try within a single address family, curl has traditionally allowed (time - left/2) for *this* connect attempt. This, to not get stuck on the - initial addresses in case the timeout but still allow later addresses to - get attempted. + Adding test 461 to verify - This has the downside that when users set a very short timeout and the - host has a large number of IP addresses, the effective result might be - that every attempt gets a little too short time. + Found-by: Dan Fandrich + Ref: #12782 + Closes #12784 - This change stop doing the divided-by-two if the total time left is - below a threshold. This threshold is 600 milliseconds. +Tatsuhiro Tsujikawa (25 Jan 2024) - Closes #11693 +- configure: add libngtcp2_crypto_boringssl detection -- asyn-ares: reduce timeout to 2000ms + If OpenSSL is found to be BoringSSL or AWS-LC, and ngtcp2 is requested, + try to detect libngtcp2_crypto_boringssl. - When UDP packets get lost this makes for slightly faster retries. This - lower timeout is used by @c-ares itself by default starting next - release. + Reported-by: ウさん + Fixes #12724 + Closes #12769 - Closes #11753 +Daniel Stenberg (25 Jan 2024) -John Bampton (29 Aug 2023) +- http: remove comment reference to a removed solution -- misc: remove duplicate words + Follow-up to 58974d25d - Closes #11740 + Closes #12785 -Daniel Stenberg (29 Aug 2023) +Stefan Eissing (25 Jan 2024) -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced +- pytest: Scorecard tracking CPU and RSS -- wolfSSL: avoid the OpenSSL compat API when not needed + Closes #12765 - ... and instead call wolfSSL functions directly. +Graham Campbell (25 Jan 2024) - Closes #11752 +- GHA: bump ngtcp2, gnutls, mod_h2, quiche -Viktor Szakats (28 Aug 2023) + - ngtcp2 to v1.2.0 + - gnutls to 3.8.3 + - mod_h2 to 2.0.26 + - quiche to 0.20.0 -- lib: fix null ptr derefs and uninitialized vars (h2/h3) + Closes #12778 + Closes #12779 + Closes #12780 + Closes #12781 - Fixing compiler warnings with gcc 13.2.0 in unity builds. +Daniel Stenberg (25 Jan 2024) - Assisted-by: Jay Satiro - Assisted-by: Stefan Eissing - Closes #11739 +- ftpserver.pl: send 213 SIZE response without spurious newline -Jay Satiro (28 Aug 2023) +- pingpong: stop using the download buffer -- secureserver.pl: fix stunnel version parsing + The pingpong logic now uses its own dynbuf for receiving command + response data. - - Allow the stunnel minor-version version part to be zero. + When the "final" response header for a commanad has been received, that + final line is left first in the recvbuf for the protocols to parse at + will. If there is additional data behind the final response line, the + 'overflow' counter is indicate how many bytes. - Prior to this change with the stunnel version scheme of . - if either part was 0 then version parsing would fail, causing - secureserver.pl to fail with error "No stunnel", causing tests that use - the SSL protocol to be skipped. As a practical matter this bug can only - be caused by a minor-version part of 0, since the major-version part is - always greater than 0. + Closes #12757 - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11722 +- gen.pl: remove bold from .IP used for ## -- secureserver.pl: fix stunnel path quoting + Reported-by: Viktor Szakats + Fixes #12776 + Closes #12777 - - Store the stunnel path in the private variable $stunnel unquoted and - instead quote it in the command strings. +Viktor Szakats (24 Jan 2024) - Prior to this change the quoted stunnel path was passed to perl's file - operators which cannot handle quoted paths. For example: +- cmake: rework options to enable curl and libcurl docs - $stunnel = "\"/C/Program Files (x86)/stunnel/bin/tstunnel\""; - if(-x $stunnel or -x "$stunnel") - # false even if path exists and is executable + Rework CMake options for building/using curl tool and libcurl manuals. - Our other test scripts written in perl, unlike this one, use servers.pm - which has a global $stunnel variable with the path stored unquoted and - therefore those scripts don't have this problem. + - rename `ENABLE_MANUAL` to `ENABLE_CURL_MANUAL`, meaning: + to build man page and built-in manual for curl tool. - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11721 + - rename `BUILD_DOCS` to `BUILD_LIBCURL_DOCS`, meaning: + to build man pages for libcurl. -Daniel Stenberg (28 Aug 2023) + - `BUILD_LIBCURL_DOCS` now works without having to enable + `ENABLE_CURL_MANUAL` too. -- altsvc: accept and parse IPv6 addresses in response headers + - drop support for existing CMake-level `USE_MANUAL` option to avoid + confusion. (It used to work with the effect of current + `ENABLE_CURL_MANUAL`, but only by accident.) - Store numerical IPv6 addresses in the alt-svc file with the brackets - present. + Assisted-by: Richard Levitte + Ref: #12771 + Closes #12773 - Verify with test 437 and 438 +Daniel Stenberg (24 Jan 2024) - Fixes #11737 - Reported-by: oliverpool on github - Closes #11743 +- urlapi: remove assert -- libtest: use curl_free() to free libcurl allocated data + This assert triggers wrongly when CURLU_GUESS_SCHEME and + CURLU_NO_AUTHORITY are both set and the URL is a single path. - In several test programs. These mistakes are not detected or a problem - as long as memdebug.h is included, as that provides the debug wrappers - for all memory functions in the same style libcurl internals do it, - which makes curl_free and free effectively the same call. + I think this assert has played out its role. It was introduced in a + rather big refactor. - Reported-by: Nicholas Nethercote - Closes #11746 + Follow-up to 4cfa5bcc9a -Jay Satiro (28 Aug 2023) + Reported-by: promptfuzz_ on hackerone + Closes #12775 -- disable.d: explain --disable not implemented prior to 7.50.0 +Patrick Monnerat (24 Jan 2024) - Option -q/--disable was added in 5.0 but only -q was actually - implemented. Later --disable was implemented in e200034 (precedes - 7.49.0), but incorrectly, and fixed in 6dbc23c (precedes 7.50.0). +- tests: avoid int/size_t conversion size/sign warnings - Reported-by: pszlazak@users.noreply.github.com + Closes #12768 - Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/11710 - Closes #11712 +Daniel Stenberg (24 Jan 2024) -Nicholas Nethercote (28 Aug 2023) +- GHA: add a job scanning for "bad words" in markdown -- hyper: fix ownership problems + This means words, phrases or things we have decided not to use - words that + are spelled right according to the dictionary but we want to avoid. In the + name of consistency and better documentation. - Some of these changes come from comparing `Curl_http` and - `start_CONNECT`, which are similar, and adding things to them that are - present in one and missing in another. + Closes #12764 - The most important changes: - - In `start_CONNECT`, add a missing `hyper_clientconn_free` call on the - happy path. - - In `start_CONNECT`, add a missing `hyper_request_free` on the error - path. - - In `bodysend`, add a missing `hyper_body_free` on an early-exit path. - - In `bodysend`, remove an unnecessary `hyper_body_free` on a different - error path that would cause a double-free. - https://docs.rs/hyper/latest/hyper/ffi/fn.hyper_request_set_body.html - says of `hyper_request_set_body`: "This takes ownership of the - hyper_body *, you must not use it or free it after setting it on the - request." This is true even if `hyper_request_set_body` returns an - error; I confirmed this by looking at the hyper source code. +Viktor Szakats (23 Jan 2024) - Other changes are minor but make things slightly nicer. +- cmake: speed up curldown processing, enable by default - Closes #11745 + - cmake: enable `BUILD_DOCS` by default (this controls converting and + installing `.3` files from `.md` sources) -Daniel Stenberg (28 Aug 2023) + - cmake: speed up generating `.3` files by using a single command per + directory, instead of a single command per file. This reduces external + commands by about a thousand. (There remains some CMake logic kicking + in resulting in 500 -one per file- external `-E touch_nocreate` calls.) -- multi.h: the 'revents' field of curl_waitfd is supported + - cd2nroff: add ability to process multiple input files. - Since 6d30f8ebed34e7276 + - cd2nroff: add `-k` option to use the source filename to form the + output filename. (instead of the default in-file `Title:` line.) - Reported-by: Nicolás Ojeda Bär - Ref: #11748 - Closes #11749 + Follow-up to 3f08d80b2244524646ce86915c585509ac54fb4c + Follow-up to ea0b575dab86a3c44dd1d547dc500276266aa382 #12753 + Follow-up to eefcc1bda4bccd800f5a56a0fe17a2f44a96e88b #12730 -Gerome Fournier (27 Aug 2023) + Closes #12762 -- tool_paramhlp: improve str2num(): avoid unnecessary call to strlen() +Richard Levitte (23 Jan 2024) - Closes #11742 +- docs: install curl.1 with cmake as well -Daniel Stenberg (27 Aug 2023) + Closes #12759 -- docs: mention critical files in same directories as curl saves +Daniel Stenberg (23 Jan 2024) - ... cannot be fully protected. Don't do it. +- osslq: remove the TLS library from the version output - Co-authored-by: Jay Satiro - Reported-by: Harry Sintonen - Fixes #11530 - Closes #11701 + Since we only support using a single TLS library at any one time, we + know that the TLS library for QUIC is the same that is also shown for + regular TLS. -John Hawthorn (26 Aug 2023) + Fixes #12763 + Reported-by: Viktor Szakats + Closes #12767 -- OpenSSL: clear error queue after SSL_shutdown +Stefan Eissing (23 Jan 2024) - We've seen errors left in the OpenSSL error queue (specifically, - "shutdown while in init") by adding some logging it revealed that the - source was this file. +- CI: remove unnecessary OpenSSL 3 option `enable-tls1_3` - Since we call SSL_read and SSL_shutdown here, but don't check the return - code for an error, we should clear the OpenSSL error queue in case one - was raised. + .. and switch OpenSSL 3 libdir from lib64 to lib for consistency. - This didn't affect curl because we call ERR_clear_error before every - write operation (a0dd9df9ab35528eb9eb669e741a5df4b1fb833c), but when - libcurl is used in a process with other OpenSSL users, they may detect - an OpenSSL error pushed by libcurl's SSL_shutdown as if it was their - own. + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12758 - Co-authored-by: Satana de Sant'Ana +- GHA: bump nghttp2 version to v1.59.0 - Closes #11736 + - Switch to v1.59.0 for GHA CI jobs that use a specific nghttp2-version. -Alexander Kanavin (25 Aug 2023) + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12766 -- tests: update cookie expiry dates to far in the future +Daniel Stenberg (23 Jan 2024) - This allows testing Y2038 with system time set to after that, so that - actual Y2038 issues can be exposed, and not masked by expiry errors. +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced - Fixes #11576 - Closes #11610 +- docs/cmdline: change to .md for cmdline docs -John Bampton (25 Aug 2023) + - switch all invidual files documenting command line options into .md, + as the documentation is now markdown-looking. -- misc: fix spelling + - made the parser treat 4-space indents as quotes - Closes #11733 + - switch to building the curl.1 manpage using the "mainpage.idx" file, + which lists the files to include to generate it, instead of using the + previous page-footer/headers. Also, those files are now also .md + ones, using the same format. I gave them underscore prefixes to make + them sort separately: + _NAME.md, _SYNOPSIS.md, _DESCRIPTION.md, _URL.md, _GLOBBING.md, + _VARIABLES.md, _OUTPUT.md, _PROTOCOLS.md, _PROGRESS.md, _VERSION.md, + _OPTIONS.md, _FILES.md, _ENVIRONMENT.md, _PROXYPREFIX.md, + _EXITCODES.md, _BUGS.md, _AUTHORS.md, _WWW.md, _SEEALSO.md -Daniel Stenberg (25 Aug 2023) + - updated test cases accordingly -- cmdline-opts/page-header: clarify stronger that !opt == URL + Closes #12751 - Everything provided on the command line that is not an option (or an - argument to an option) is treated as a URL. +dependabot[bot] (23 Jan 2024) - Closes #11734 +- CI: bump actions/cache from 3 to 4 -- tests/runner: fix %else handling + Bumps [actions/cache](https://github.com/actions/cache) from 3 to 4. + - [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/cache/releases) + - [Changelog](https://github.com/actions/cache/blob/main/RELEASES.md) + - [Commits](https://github.com/actions/cache/compare/v3...v4) - Getting the show state proper for %else and %endif did not properly work - in nested cases. + --- + updated-dependencies: + - dependency-name: actions/cache + dependency-type: direct:production + update-type: version-update:semver-major + ... - Follow-up to 3d089c41ea9 + Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] + Closes #12756 - Closes #11731 +Daniel Stenberg (23 Jan 2024) -Nicholas Nethercote (25 Aug 2023) +- openssl: when verifystatus fails, remove session id from cache -- docs: Remove mention of #10803 from `KNOWN_BUGS`. + To prevent that it gets used in a subsequent transfer that skips the + verifystatus check since that check can't be done when the session id is + reused. - Because the leaks have been fixed. + Reported-by: Hiroki Kurosawa + Closes #12760 -- c-hyper: fix another memory leak in `Curl_http`. +Viktor Szakats (23 Jan 2024) - There is a `hyper_clientconn_free` call on the happy path, but not one - on the error path. This commit adds one. +- cmake: add option to disable building docs - Fixes the second memory leak reported by Valgrind in #10803. +Richard Levitte (23 Jan 2024) - Fixes #10803 - Closes #11729 +- cmake: use curldown to build man pages -- c-hyper: fix a memory leak in `Curl_http`. + This throws away the previous HTML and PDF producers, to mimic what + Makefile.am does as faithfully as possible. - A request created with `hyper_request_new` must be consumed by either - `hyper_clientconn_send` or `hyper_request_free`. + Closes #12753 - This is not terrifically clear from the hyper docs -- - `hyper_request_free` is documented only with "Free an HTTP request if - not going to send it on a client" -- but a perusal of the hyper code - confirms it. +Daniel Stenberg (23 Jan 2024) - This commit adds a `hyper_request_free` to the `error:` path in - `Curl_http` so that the request is consumed when an error occurs after - the request is created but before it is sent. +- mksymbolsmanpage.pl: provide references to where the symbol is used - Fixes the first memory leak reported by Valgrind in #10803. +- docs: introduce "curldown" for libcurl man page format - Closes #11729 + curldown is this new file format for libcurl man pages. It is markdown + inspired with differences: -Daniel Stenberg (25 Aug 2023) + - Each file has a set of leading headers with meta-data + - Supports a small subset of markdown + - Uses .md file extensions for editors/IDE/GitHub to treat them nicely + - Generates man pages very similar to the previous ones + - Generates man pages that still convert nicely to HTML on the website + - Detects and highlights mentions of curl symbols automatically (when + their man page section is specified) -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced + tools: -John Bampton (25 Aug 2023) + - cd2nroff: converts from curldown to nroff man page + - nroff2cd: convert an (old) nroff man page to curldown + - cdall: convert many nroff pages to curldown versions + - cd2cd: verifies and updates a curldown to latest curldown -- misc: spellfixes + This setup generates .3 versions of all the curldown versions at build time. - Closes #11730 + CI: -Daniel Stenberg (25 Aug 2023) + Since the documentation is now technically markdown in the eyes of many + things, the CI runs many more tests and checks on this documentation, + including proselint, link checkers and tests that make sure we capitalize the + first letter after a period... -- tests: add support for nested %if conditions + Closes #12730 - Provides more flexiblity to test cases. +Viktor Szakats (22 Jan 2024) - Also warn and bail out if there is an '%else' or %endif' without a - preceeding '%if'. +- libssh2: use `libssh2_session_callback_set2()` with v1.11.1 - Ref: #11610 - Closes #11728 + To avoid a local hack to pass function pointers and to avoid + deprecation warnings when building with libssh2 v1.11.1 or newer: + ``` + lib/vssh/libssh2.c:3324:5: warning: 'libssh2_session_callback_set' is depreca + ted: since libssh2 1.11.1. Use libssh2_session_callback_set2() [-Wdeprecated- + declarations] + lib/vssh/libssh2.c:3326:5: warning: 'libssh2_session_callback_set' is depreca + ted: since libssh2 1.11.1. Use libssh2_session_callback_set2() [-Wdeprecated- + declarations] + ``` + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl-for-win/actions/runs/7609484879/job/2072082 + 1100#step:3:4982 -- time-cond.d: mention what happens on a missing file + Ref: https://github.com/libssh2/libssh2/pull/1285 + Ref: https://github.com/libssh2/libssh2/commit/c0f69548be902147ce014ffa40b8db + 3cf1d4b0b4 + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Closes #12754 - Closes #11727 +Daniel Stenberg (22 Jan 2024) -Christian Hesse (24 Aug 2023) +- transfer: make the select_bits_paused condition check both directions -- docs/cmdline-opts: match the current output + If there is activity in a direction that is not paused, return false. - The release date has been added in output, reflect that in documentation. + Reported-by: Sergey Bronnikov + Bug: https://curl.se/mail/lib-2024-01/0049.html + Closes #12740 - Closes #11723 +Stefan Eissing (22 Jan 2024) -Daniel Stenberg (24 Aug 2023) +- http3: initial support for OpenSSL 3.2 QUIC stack -- lib: minor comment corrections + - HTTP/3 for curl using OpenSSL's own QUIC stack together + with nghttp3 + - configure with `--with-openssl-quic` to enable curl to + build this. This requires the nghttp3 library + - implementation with the following restrictions: + * macOS has to use an unconnected UDP socket due to an + issue in OpenSSL's datagram implementation + See https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/23251 + This makes connections to non-reponsive servers hang. + * GET requests will send the indicator that they have + no body in a separate QUIC packet. This may result + in processing delays or Transfer-Encodings on proxied + requests + * uploads that encounter blocks will use 100% cpu as + detection of these flow control issue is not working + (we have not figured out to pry that from OpenSSL). -- docs: rewrite to present tense + Closes #12734 - ... instead of using future tense. +Viktor Szakats (22 Jan 2024) - + numerous cleanups and improvements - + stick to "reuse" not "re-use" - + fewer contractions +- cmake: fix `ENABLE_MANUAL` option - Closes #11713 + Fix the `ENABLE_MANUAL` option. Set it to default to `OFF`. -- urlapi: setting a blank URL ("") is not an ok URL + Before this patch `ENABLE_MANUAL=ON` was a no-op, even though it was the + option designed to enable building and using the built-in curl manual. + (`USE_MANUAL=ON` option worked for this instead, by accident). - Test it in 1560 - Fixes #11714 - Reported-by: ad0p on github - Closes #11715 + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12730#issuecomment-1902572409 + Closes #12749 -- spelling: use 'reuse' not 're-use' in code and elsewhere +Mohammadreza Hendiani (19 Jan 2024) - Unify the spelling as both versions were previously used intermittently +- TODO: update broken link to ratelimit-headers draft - Closes #11717 + Closes #12741 -Michael Osipov (23 Aug 2023) +Daniel Stenberg (19 Jan 2024) -- system.h: add CURL_OFF_T definitions on HP-UX with HP aCC +- cmake: when USE_MANUAL=YES, build the curl.1 man page - HP-UX on IA64 provides two modes: 32 and 64 bit while 32 bit being the - default one. Use "long long" in 32 bit mode and just "long" in 64 bit - mode. + Fixes KNOWN_BUG 15.4 - Closes #11718 + Closes #12742 -Dan Fandrich (22 Aug 2023) +- cmdline-opts/write-out.d: remove spurious double quotes -- tests: don't call HTTP errors OK in test cases +Stefan Eissing (19 Jan 2024) - Some HTTP errors codes were accompanied by the text OK, which causes - some cognitive dissonance when reading them. +- rtsp: Convert assertion into debug log -- http: close the connection after a late 417 is received + Bug: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=65934 - In this situation, only part of the data has been sent before aborting - so the connection is no longer usable. + - write excess bytes to the client where the standard excess bytes + checks will report any wrongness and fail the transfer - Assisted-by: Jay Satiro - Fixes #11678 - Closes #11679 + Fixes #12738 + Closes #12739 -- runtests: slightly increase the longest log file displayed +Daniel Stenberg (19 Jan 2024) - The new limit provides enough space for a 64 KiB data block to be logged - in a trace file, plus a few lines at the start and end for context. This - happens to be the amount of data sent at a time in a PUT request. +- headers: remove assert from Curl_headers_push -- tests: add delay command to the HTTP server + The fuzzer managed to reach the function without a terminating CR or LF + so let's handle it normally. While there, remove the goto. - This adds a delay after client connect. + Bug: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=65839 -Daniel Stenberg (22 Aug 2023) + Closes #12721 -- cirrus: install everthing with pkg, avoid pip +- curl_easy_getinfo.3: remove the wrong time value count - Assisted-by: Sevan Janiyan + It said "six" time values but they are eight by now. Remove the mention + of the amount. - Closes #11711 + Closes #12727 -- curl_url*.3: update function descriptions +Viktor Szakats (18 Jan 2024) - - expand and clarify several descriptions - - avoid using future tense all over +- mbedtls: fix `-Wnull-dereference` and `-Wredundant-decls` - Closes #11708 + - Silence warning in mbedTLS v3.5.1 public headers: + ``` + ./mbedtls/_x64-linux-musl/usr/include/psa/crypto_extra.h:489:14: warning: r + edundant redeclaration of 'psa_set_key_domain_parameters' [-Wredundant-decls] + ./mbedtls/_x64-linux-musl/usr/include/psa/crypto_struct.h:354:14: note: pre + vious declaration of 'psa_set_key_domain_parameters' was here + ``` + Ref: https://github.com/libssh2/libssh2/commit/ecec68a2c13a9c63fe8c2dc457ae + 785a513e157c + Ref: https://github.com/libssh2/libssh2/pull/1226 -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced + - Fix compiler warnings seen with gcc 9.2.0 + cmake unity: + ``` + ./curl/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c: In function 'mbedtls_bio_cf_read': + ./curl/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c:189:11: warning: null pointer dereference [-Wnull + -dereference] + 189 | nread = Curl_conn_cf_recv(cf->next, data, (char *)buf, blen, &res + ult); + | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + ~~~~ + ./curl/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c: In function 'mbedtls_bio_cf_write': + ./curl/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c:168:14: warning: null pointer dereference [-Wnull + -dereference] + 168 | nwritten = Curl_conn_cf_send(cf->next, data, (char *)buf, blen, & + result); + | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + ~~~~~~~ + ``` -Stefan Eissing (21 Aug 2023) + - delete stray `#else`. -- CI/cirrus: disable python install on FreeBSD + Closes #12720 - - python cryptography package does not build build FreeBSD - - install just mentions "error" - - this gets the build and the main test suite going again +Daniel Stenberg (17 Jan 2024) - Closes #11705 +- docs: cleanup nroff format use -- test2600: fix flakiness on low cpu + - remove use of .BI for code snippet + - stop using .br, just do a blank line + - remove use of .PP + - remove use for .sp + - remove backslash in .IP + - use .IP instead of .TP - - refs #11355 where failures to to low cpu resources in CI - are reported - - vastly extend CURLOPT_CONNECTTIMEOUT_MS and max durations - to test cases - - trigger Curl_expire() in test filter to allow re-checks before - the usual 1second interval + Closes #12731 - Closes #11690 +Stefan Eissing (17 Jan 2024) -Maksim Sciepanienka (20 Aug 2023) +- test2307: fix expected failure code after ws refactoring -- tool_urlglob: use the correct format specifier for curl_off_t in msnprintf + Fixes #12722 + Closes #12728 - Closes #11698 +Jay Satiro (17 Jan 2024) -Daniel Stenberg (20 Aug 2023) +- cf-socket: show errno in tcpkeepalive error messages -- test687/688: two more basic --xattr tests + - If the socket keepalive options (TCP_KEEPIDLE, etc) cannot be set + then show the errno in the verbose error messages. - Closes #11697 + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/discussions/12715#discussioncomment-8151652 -- cmdline-opts/docs: mentioned the negative option part + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12726 - ... for --no-alpn and --no-buffer in the same style done for other --no- - options: +- tool_getparam: stop supporting `@filename` style for --cookie - "Note that this is the negated option name documented." + The `@filename` style was never documented for --cookie + but prior to this change curl would accept it anyway and always treat a + @ prefixed string as a filename. - Closes #11695 + That's a problem if the string also contains a = sign because then it is + documented to be interpreted as a cookie string and not a filename. -Emanuele Torre (19 Aug 2023) + Example: -- tool/var: also error when expansion result starts with NUL + `--cookie @foo=bar` - Expansions whose output starts with NUL were being expanded to the empty - string, and not being recognised as values that contain a NUL byte, and - should error. + Before: Interpreted as load cookies from filename foo=bar. - Closes #11694 + After: Interpreted as cookie `@foo=bar` (name `@foo` and value `bar`). -Daniel Stenberg (19 Aug 2023) + Other curl options with a data/filename option-value use the `@filename` + to distinguish filenames which is probably how this happened. The + --cookie option has never been documented that way. -- tests: add 'large-time' as a testable feature + Ref: https://curl.se/docs/manpage.html#-b - This allows test cases to require this feature to run and to be used in - %if conditions. + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12645 - Large here means larger than 32 bits. Ie does not suffer from y2038. +Stefan Eissing (16 Jan 2024) - Closes #11696 +- websockets: refactor decode chain -- tests/Makefile: add check-translatable-options.pl to tarball + - use client writer stack for decoding frames + - move websocket protocol handler to ws.c - Used in test 1544 + Closes #12713 - Follow-up to ae806395abc8c +- websockets: check for negative payload lengths -- gen.pl: fix a long version generation mistake + - in en- and decoding, check the websocket frame payload lengths for + negative values (from curl_off_t) and error the operation in that case + - add test 2307 to verify - Too excessive escaping made the parsing not find the correct long names - later and instead add "wrong" links. + Closes #12707 - Follow-up to 439ff2052e219 +Daniel Stenberg (16 Jan 2024) - Reported-by: Lukas Tribus - Fixes #11688 - Closes #11689 +- docs: mention env vars not used by schannel -- lib: move mimepost data from ->req.p.http to ->state + Ref: #12704 - When the legacy CURLOPT_HTTPPOST option is used, it gets converted into - the modem mimpost struct at first use. This data is (now) kept for the - entire transfer and not only per single HTTP request. This re-enables - rewind in the beginning of the second request instead of in end of the - first, as brought by 1b39731. + Co-authored-by: Jay Satiro - The request struct is per-request data only. + Closes #12711 - Extend test 650 to verify. +- tool_operate: make --remove-on-error only remove "real" files - Fixes #11680 - Reported-by: yushicheng7788 on github - Closes #11682 + Reported-by: Harry Sintonen + Assisted-by: Dan Fandrich -Patrick Monnerat (17 Aug 2023) + Closes #12710 -- os400: do not check translatable options at build time +Jay Wu (16 Jan 2024) - Now that there is a test for this, the build time check is not needed - anymore. +- url: don't set default CA paths for Secure Transport backend - Closes #11650 + As the default for this backend is the native CA store. -- test1554: check translatable string options in OS400 wrapper + Closes #12704 - This test runs a perl script that checks all string options are properly - translated by the OS400 character code conversion wrapper. It also - verifies these options are listed in alphanumeric order in the wrapper - switch statement. +Lin Sun (16 Jan 2024) - Closes #11650 +- asyn-ares: with modern c-ares, use its default timeout -Daniel Stenberg (17 Aug 2023) + Closes #12703 -- unit3200: skip testing if function is not present +Daniel Stenberg (15 Jan 2024) - Fake a successful run since we have no easy mechanism to skip this test - for this advanced condition. +- tool_operate: stop setting the file comment on Amiga -- unit2600: fix build warning if built without verbose messages + - the URL is capped at 80 cols, which ruins it if longer + - it does not strip off URL credentials + - it is done unconditonally, not on --xattr + - we don't have Amiga in the CI which makes fixing it blindly fragile -- test1608: make it build and get skipped without shuffle DNS support + Someone who builds and tests on Amiga can add it back correctly in a + future if there is a desire. -- lib: --disable-bindlocal builds curl without local binding support + Reported-by: Harry Sintonen + Closes #12709 -- test1304: build and skip without netrc support +Stefan Eissing (15 Jan 2024) -- lib: build fixups when built with most things disabled +- rtsp: deal with borked server responses - Closes #11687 + - enforce a response body length of 0, if the + response has no Content-lenght. This is according + to the RTSP spec. + - excess bytes in a response body are forwarded to + the client writers which will report and fail the + transfer -- workflows/macos.yml: disable zstd and alt-svc in the http-only build + Follow-up to d7b6ce6 + Fixes #12701 + Closes #12706 - Closes #11683 +Daniel Stenberg (14 Jan 2024) -Stefan Eissing (17 Aug 2023) +- version: show only the libpsl version, not its dependencies -- bearssl: handshake fix, provide proper get_select_socks() implementation + The libpsl version output otherwise also includes version number for its + dependencies, like IDN lib, but since libcurl does not use libpsl's IDN + functionality those components are not important. - - bring bearssl handshake times down from +200ms down to other TLS backends - - vtls: improve generic get_select_socks() implementation - - tests: provide Apache with a suitable ssl session cache + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl-for-win/issues/63 + Closes #12700 - Closes #11675 +Brad Harder (14 Jan 2024) -- tests: TLS session sharing test +- curl.h: CURLOPT_DNS_SERVERS is only available with c-ares - - test TLS session sharing with special test client - - expect failure with wolfSSL - - disable flaky wolfSSL test_02_07b + Closes #12695 - Closes #11675 +Daniel Stenberg (14 Jan 2024) -Daniel Stenberg (17 Aug 2023) +- cmdline-opts/gen.pl: error on initital blank line -- CURLOPT_*TIMEOUT*: extend and clarify + After the "---" separator, there should be no blank line and this script + now errors out if one is detected. - Closes #11686 + Ref: #12696 + Closes #12698 -- urlapi: return CURLUE_BAD_HOSTNAME if puny2idn encoding fails +- cf-h1-proxy: no CURLOPT_USERAGENT in CONNECT with hyper - And document it. Only return out of memory when it actually is a memory - problem. + Follow-up to 693cd1679361828a which was incomplete - Pointed-out-by: Jacob Mealey - Closes #11674 + Ref #12680 + Closes #12697 -Mathew Benson (17 Aug 2023) +- curl_multi_fdset.3: remove mention of null pointer support -- cmake: add GnuTLS option + ... since this funtion has not supported null pointer fd_set arguments since + at least 2006. (That's when I stopped my git blame journey) - - Option to use GNUTLS was missing. Hence was not able to use GNUTLS - with ngtcp2 for http3. + Fixes #12691 + Reported-by: sfan5 on github + Closes #12692 - Closes #11685 +Mark Huang (14 Jan 2024) -Daniel Stenberg (16 Aug 2023) +- docs/cmdline: remove unnecessary line breaks -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced + Closes #12696 -- http: remove the p_pragma struct field +Daniel Stenberg (14 Jan 2024) - unused since 40e8b4e52 (2008) +- transfer: remove warning: Value stored to 'blen' is never read - Closes #11681 + Detected by scan-build -Jay Satiro (16 Aug 2023) + Follow-up from 1cd2f0072f -- CURLINFO_CERTINFO.3: better explain curl_certinfo struct + Closes #12693 - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11666 +Stefan Eissing (13 Jan 2024) -- CURLINFO_TLS_SSL_PTR.3: clarify a recommendation +- lib: replace readwrite with write_resp - - Remove the out-of-date SSL backend list supported by - CURLOPT_SSL_CTX_FUNCTION. + This clarifies the handling of server responses by folding the code for + the complicated protocols into their protocol handlers. This concerns + mainly HTTP and its bastard sibling RTSP. - It makes more sense to just refer to that document instead of having - a separate list that has to be kept in sync. + The terms "read" and "write" are often used without clear context if + they refer to the connect or the client/application side of a + transfer. This PR uses "read/write" for operations on the client side + and "send/receive" for the connection, e.g. server side. If this is + considered useful, we can revisit renaming of further methods in another + PR. - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11665 + Curl's protocol handler `readwrite()` method been changed: -- write-out.d: clarify %{time_starttransfer} + ```diff + - CURLcode (*readwrite)(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, + - const char *buf, size_t blen, + - size_t *pconsumed, bool *readmore); + + CURLcode (*write_resp)(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *buf, size_t ble + n, + + bool is_eos, bool *done); + ``` - sync it up with CURLINFO_STARTTRANSFER_TIME_T + The name was changed to clarify that this writes reponse data to the + client side. The parameter changes are: + + * `conn` removed as it always operates on `data->conn` + * `pconsumed` removed as the method needs to handle all data on success + * `readmore` removed as no longer necessary + * `is_eos` as indicator that this is the last call for the transfer + response (end-of-stream). + * `done` TRUE on return iff the transfer response is to be treated as + finished + + This change affects many files only because of updated comments in + handlers that provide no implementation. The real change is that the + HTTP protocol handlers now provide an implementation. + + The HTTP protocol handlers `write_resp()` implementation will get passed + **all** raw data of a server response for the transfer. The HTTP/1.x + formatted status and headers, as well as the undecoded response + body. `Curl_http_write_resp_hds()` is used internally to parse the + response headers and pass them on. This method is public as the RTSP + protocol handler also uses it. + + HTTP/1.1 "chunked" transport encoding is now part of the general + *content encoding* writer stack, just like other encodings. A new flag + `CLIENTWRITE_EOS` was added for the last client write. This allows + writers to verify that they are in a valid end state. The chunked + decoder will check if it indeed has seen the last chunk. + + The general response handling in `transfer.c:466` happens in function + `readwrite_data()`. This mainly operates now like: -Daniel Stenberg (15 Aug 2023) + ``` + static CURLcode readwrite_data(data, ...) + { + do { + Curl_xfer_recv_resp(data, buf) + ... + Curl_xfer_write_resp(data, buf) + ... + } while(interested); + ... + } + ``` -- transfer: don't set TIMER_STARTTRANSFER on first send + All the response data handling is implemented in + `Curl_xfer_write_resp()`. It calls the protocol handler's `write_resp()` + implementation if available, or does the default behaviour. - The time stamp is for measuring the first *received* byte + All raw response data needs to pass through this function. Which also + means that anyone in possession of such data may call + `Curl_xfer_write_resp()`. - Fixes #11669 - Reported-by: JazJas on github - Closes #11670 + Closes #12480 -trrui-huawei (15 Aug 2023) +Daniel Stenberg (13 Jan 2024) -- quiche: enable quiche to handle timeout events +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced - In parallel with ngtcp2, quiche also offers the `quiche_conn_on_timeout` - interface for the application to invoke upon timer - expiration. Therefore, invoking the `on_timeout` function of the - Connection is crucial to ensure seamless functionality of quiche with - timeout events. +- TODO: TFTP doesn't convert LF to CRLF for mode=netascii - Closes #11654 + Closes #12655 + Closes #12690 -- quiche: adjust quiche `QUIC_IDLE_TIMEOUT` to 60s +- gen: do italics/bold for a range of letters, not just single word - Set the `QUIC_IDLE_TIMEOUT` parameter to match ngtcp2 for consistency. + Previously it would match only on a sequence of non-space, which made it + miss to highlight for example "public suffix list". -Daniel Stenberg (15 Aug 2023) + Updated the recent cookie.d edit from 5da57193b732 to use bold instead + of italics. -- KNOWN_BUGS: LDAPS requests to ActiveDirectory server hang + Closes #12689 - Closes #9580 +- docs: describe and highlight super cookies -- imap: add a check for failing strdup() + Reported-by: Yadhu Krishna M -- imap: remove the only sscanf() call in the IMAP code + Closes #12687 - Avoids the use of a stack buffer. +- configure: when enabling QUIC, check that TLS supports QUIC - Closes #11673 + Most importantly perhaps is when using OpenSSL that the used + build/flavor has the QUIC API: the vanilla OpenSSL does not, only + BoringSSL, libressl, AWS-LC and quictls do. -- imap: use a dynbuf in imap_atom + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/5d044ad9480a9f556f4b6a252d7533b1ba7f + e57e#r136780413 - Avoid a calculation + malloc. Build the output in a dynbuf. + Closes #12683 - Closes #11672 +Stefan Eissing (11 Jan 2024) -Marin Hannache (14 Aug 2023) +- vquic: extract TLS setup into own source -- http: do not require a user name when using CURLAUTH_NEGOTIATE + - separate ngtcp2 specific parts out + - provide callback during init to allow ngtcp2 to apply its defaults - In order to get Negotiate (SPNEGO) authentication to work in HTTP you - used to be required to provide a (fake) user name (this concerned both - curl and the lib) because the code wrongly only considered - authentication if there was a user name provided, as in: + Closes #12678 - curl -u : --negotiate https://example.com/ +Sergey Markelov (11 Jan 2024) - This commit leverages the `struct auth` want member to figure out if the - user enabled CURLAUTH_NEGOTIATE, effectively removing the requirement of - setting a user name both in curl and the lib. +- multi: remove total timer reset in file_do() while fetching file:// - Signed-off-by: Marin Hannache - Reported-by: Enrico Scholz - Fixes https://sourceforge.net/p/curl/bugs/440/ - Fixes #1161 - Closes #9047 + The total timer is properly reset in MSTATE_INIT. MSTATE_CONNECT starts + with resetting the timer that is a start point for further multi states. + If file://, MSTATE_DO calls file_do() that should not reset the total + timer. Otherwise, the total time is always less than the pre-transfer + and the start transfer times. -Viktor Szakats (13 Aug 2023) + Closes #12682 -- build: streamline non-UWP wincrypt detections +Daniel Stenberg (11 Jan 2024) - - with CMake, use the variable `WINDOWS_STORE` to detect an UWP build - and disable our non-UWP-compatible use the Windows crypto API. This - allows to drop two dynamic feature checks. +- http_proxy: a blank CURLOPT_USERAGENT should not be used in CONNECT - `WINDOWS_STORE` is true when invoking CMake with - `CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME` == `WindowsStore`. Introduced in CMake v3.1. + Extended test 80 to verify this. - Ref: https://cmake.org/cmake/help/latest/variable/WINDOWS_STORE.html + Reported-by: Stefan Eissing + Fixes #12680 + Closes #12681 - - with autotools, drop the separate feature check for `wincrypt.h`. On - one hand this header has been present for long (even Borland C 5.5 had - it from year 2000), on the other we used the check result solely to - enable another check for certain crypto functions. This fails anyway - with the header not present. We save one dynamic feature check at the - configure stage. +- sectransp: do verify_cert without memdup for blobs - Reviewed-by: Marcel Raad - Closes #11657 + Since the information is then already stored in memory, this can avoid + an extra set of malloc + free calls. -Nicholas Nethercote (13 Aug 2023) + Closes #12679 -- docs/HYPER.md: update hyper build instructions +- hsts: remove assert for zero length domain - Nightly Rust and `-Z unstable-options` are not needed. + A zero length domain can happen if the HSTS parser is given invalid + input data which is not unheard of and is done by the fuzzer. - The instructions here now match the hyper docs exactly: - https://github.com/hyperium/hyper/commit/bd7928f3dd6a8461f0f0fdf7ee0fd95c2f15 - 6f88 + Follow-up from cfe7902111ae547873 - Closes #11662 + Bug: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=65661 -Daniel Stenberg (13 Aug 2023) + Closes #12676 -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced +- headers: make sure the trailing newline is not stored -- urlapi: CURLU_PUNY2IDN - convert from punycode to IDN name + extended test1940 to verify blank header fields too - Asssisted-by: Jay Satiro - Closes #11655 + Bug: https://curl.se/mail/lib-2024-01/0019.html + Reported-by: Dmitry Karpov + Closes #12675 -- spellcheck: adapt to backslashed minuses +- curl_easy_header.3: tiny language fix - As the curl.1 has more backslashed minus, the cleanup sed lines xneed to - adapt. + Closes #12672 - Adjusted some docs slighly. +- examples/range.c: add - Follow-up to 439ff2052e + Closes #12671 - Closes #11663 +- examples/netrc.c: add -- gen: escape more minus + Closes #12671 - Detected since it was still hard to search for option names using dashes - in the middle in the man page. +- examples/ipv6.c: new example showing IPv6-only internet transfer - Closes #11660 + Closes #12671 -- cookie-jar.d: enphasize that this option is ONLY writing cookies +- examples/address-scope.c: renamed from ipv6.c - Reported-by: Dan Jacobson - Tweaked-by: Jay Satiro - Ref: #11642 - Closes #11661 + It shows address scope use really -Nicholas Nethercote (11 Aug 2023) + Closes #12671 -- docs/HYPER.md: document a workaround for a link error +Stefan Eissing (9 Jan 2024) - Closes #11653 +- multi: pollset adjust, init with FIRSTSOCKET during connect -Jay Satiro (11 Aug 2023) + - `conn->sockfd` is set by `Curl_setup_transfer()`, but that + is called *after* the connection has been established + - use `conn->sock[FIRSTSOCKET]` instead -- schannel: verify hostname independent of verify cert + Follow-up to a0f94800d507de + Closes #12664 - Prior to this change when CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER (verifypeer) was off - and CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST (verifyhost) was on we did not verify the - hostname in schannel code. +Daniel Stenberg (9 Jan 2024) - This fixes KNOWN_BUG 2.8 "Schannel disable CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER and - verify hostname". We discussed a fix several years ago in #3285 but it - went stale. +- WEBSOCKET.md: remove dead link - Assisted-by: Daniel Stenberg +- CI: spellcheck/appveyor: invoke configure --without-libpsl - Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/mail/lib-2018-10/0113.html - Reported-by: Martin Galvan + Follow-up to 2998874bb61ac6 - Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/3285 +- cmdline/docs/*.d: switch to using ## instead of .IP - Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/3284 - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/10056 + To make the editing easier. To write and to read. -Daniel Stenberg (11 Aug 2023) + Closes #12667 -- curl_quiche: remove superfluous NULL check +- gen.pl: support ## for doing .IP in table-like lists - 'stream' is always non-NULL at this point + Warn on use of .RS/.IP/.RE - Pointed out by Coverity + Closes #12667 - Closes #11656 +Jay Satiro (9 Jan 2024) -- curl/urlapi.h: tiny typo +- cookie.d: Document use of empty string to enable cookie engine -- github/labeler: make HYPER.md set Hyper and not TLS + - Explain that --cookie "" can be used to enable the cookie engine + without reading any initial cookies. -- docs/cmdline-opts/gen.pl: hide "added in" before 7.50.0 + As is documented in CURLOPT_COOKIEFILE. - 7.50.0 shipped on Jul 21 2016, over seven years ago. We no longer need - to specify version changes for earlier releases in the generated output. + Ref: https://curl.se/libcurl/c/CURLOPT_COOKIEFILE.html - This ups the limit from the previous 7.30.0 (Apr 12 2013) + Bug: https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/12643#issuecomment-1879844420 + Reported-by: janko-js@users.noreply.github.com - This hides roughly 35 "added in" mentions. + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12646 - Closes #11651 +Daniel Stenberg (9 Jan 2024) -Jay Satiro (10 Aug 2023) +- setopt: use memdup0 when cloning COPYPOSTFIELDS -- bug_report: require reporters to specify curl and os versions + Closes #12651 - - Change curl version and os sections from single-line input to - multi-line textarea. +- telnet: use dynbuf instad of malloc for escape buffer - - Require curl version and os sections to be filled out before report - can be submitted. + Previously, send_telnet_data() would malloc + free a buffer every time + for escaping IAC codes. Now, it reuses a dynbuf for this purpose. - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11636 + Closes #12652 -Daniel Stenberg (9 Aug 2023) +- CI: install libpsl or configure --without-libpsl in builds -- gen.pl: replace all single quotes with aq + As a follow-up to the stricted libpsl check in configure - - this prevents man from using a unicode sequence for them - - which then allows search to work properly +- configure: make libpsl detection failure cause error - Closes #11645 + To force users to explictily disable it if they really don't want it + used and make it harder to accidentally miss it. -Viktor Szakats (9 Aug 2023) + --without-libpsl is the option to use if PSL is not wanted. -- cmake: fix to use variable for the curl namespace + Closes #12661 - Replace (wrong) literal with a variable to specify the curl - namespace. +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced - Follow-up to 1199308dbc902c52be67fc805c72dd2582520d30 #11505 +- pop3: replace calloc + memcpy with memdup0 - Reported-by: balikalina on Github - Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/1199308dbc902c52be67fc805c72dd25825 - 20d30#r123923098 - Closes #11629 + ... and make sure to return error on out of memory. -- cmake: allow `SHARE_LIB_OBJECT=ON` on all platforms + Closes #12650 - 2ebc74c36a19a1700af394c16855ce144d9878e3 #11546 introduced sharing - libcurl objects for shared and static targets. +- lib: add debug log outputs for CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT - The above automatically enabled for Windows builds, with an option to - disable with `SHARE_LIB_OBJECT=OFF`. + Closes #12658 - This patch extend this feature to all platforms as a manual option. - You can enable it by setting `SHARE_LIB_OBJECT=ON`. Then shared objects - are built in PIC mode, meaning the static lib will also have PIC code. +- mime: use memdup0 instead of malloc + memcpy - [EXPERIMENTAL] + Closes #12649 - Closes #11627 +- tool_getparam: move the --rate logic into set_rate() -- cmake: assume `wldap32` availability on Windows +- tool_getparam: switch to an enum for every option - This system library first shipped with Windows ME, available as an extra - install for some older releases (according to [1]). The import library - was present already in old MinGW 3.4.2 (year 2007). + To make the big switch much easier to read/understand and to make it + easier to add new options. - Drop the feature check and its associated `HAVE_WLDAP32` variable. +- tool_getparam: build post data using dynbuf (more) - To manually disable `wldap32`, you can use the `USE_WIN32_LDAP=OFF` - CMake option, like before. +- tool_getparam: replace malloc + copy by dynbuf for --data - [1]: https://dlcdn.apache.org/httpd/binaries/win32/LEGACY.html +- tool_getparam: make data_urlencode avoid direct malloc - Reviewed-by: Jay Satiro - Closes #11624 + use aprintf() instead -Daniel Stenberg (9 Aug 2023) +- tool_getparam: move the --url-query logic into url_query() -- page-header: move up a URL paragraph from GLOBBING to URL + This function is not doing post at all so it was always weirdly placed. -- variable.d: output the function names table style +- tool_getparam: move the --data logic into set_data() - Also correct the url function name in the header +- tool_getparam: unify the cmdline switch() into a single one - Closes #11641 + - easier to follow, easier to modify, easier to extend, possibly slightly + faster -- haproxy-clientip.d: remove backticks + - each case now has the long option as a comment - This is not markdown +- tool_getparam: bsearch cmdline options - Follow-up to 0a75964d0d94a4 + - the option names are now alpha sorted and lookup is a lot faster - Closes #11639 + - use case sensitive matching. It was previously case insensitive, but that + was not documented nor tested. -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced + - remove "partial match" feature. It was not documented, not tested and + was always fragile as existing use could break when we add a new + option -- gen.pl: escape all dashes (ascii minus) to avoid unicode hyphens + - lookup short options via a table - Reported-by: FC Stegerman - Fixes #11635 - Closes #11637 + Closes #12631 -- cmdline-opts/page-header: reorder, clean up +Gabe (8 Jan 2024) - - removed some unnecessary blurb to focus - - moved up the more important URL details - - put "globbing" into its own subtitle and moved down a little - - mention the online man page in the version section +- COPYING: update copyright year - Closes #11638 + Closes #12654 -- c-hyper: adjust the hyper to curlcode conversion +Stefan Eissing (8 Jan 2024) - Closes #11621 +- url: init conn->sockfd and writesockfd to CURL_SOCKET_BAD -- test2306: make it use a persistent connection + Also add more tracing to test 19 - + enable verbose already from the start + Follow-up to a0f9480 - Closes #11621 + Fixes #12657 + Closes #12659 -eppesuig (8 Aug 2023) +Daniel Stenberg (8 Jan 2024) -- list-only.d: mention SFTP as supported protocol +- connect: remove margin from eyeballer alloc - Closes #11628 + Presumably leftovers from debugging -Daniel Stenberg (8 Aug 2023) + Closes #12647 -- request.d: use .TP for protocol "labels" +- ftp: only consider entry path if it has a length - To render the section nicer in man page. + Follow-up from 8edcfedc1a144f438bd1cdf814a0016cb - Closes #11630 + Bug: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=65631 -- cf-haproxy: make CURLOPT_HAPROXY_CLIENT_IP set the *source* IP + Avoids a NULL pointer deref. - ... as documented. + Closes #12648 - Update test 3201 and 3202 accordingly. +Stefan Eissing (7 Jan 2024) - Reported-by: Markus Sommer - Fixes #11619 - Closes #11626 +- transfer: adjust_pollset improvements -- page-footer: QLOGDIR works with ngtcp2 and quiche + - let `multi_getsock()` initialize the pollset in what the + transfer state requires in regards to SEND/RECV + - change connection filters `adjust_pollset()` implementation + to react on the presence of POLLIN/-OUT in the pollset and + no longer check CURL_WANT_SEND/CURL_WANT_RECV + - cf-socket will no longer add POLLIN on its own + - http2 and http/3 filters will only do adjustments if the + passed pollset wants to POLLIN/OUT for the transfer on + the socket. This is similar to the HTTP/2 proxy filter + and works in stacked filters. - It previously said "both" backends which is confusing as we currently - have three... + Closes #12640 - Closes #11631 +Daniel Stenberg (6 Jan 2024) -Stefan Eissing (8 Aug 2023) +- ftp: use memdup0 to store the OS from a SYST 215 response -- http3: quiche, handshake optimization, trace cleanup + avoid malloc + direct buffer fiddle - - load x509 store after clienthello - - cleanup of tracing + Closes #12639 - Closes #11618 +- ftp: use dynbuf to store entrypath -Daniel Stenberg (8 Aug 2023) + avoid direct malloc -- ngtcp2: remove dead code + Closes #12638 - 'result' is always zero (CURLE_OK) at this point +Lealem Amedie (6 Jan 2024) - Detected by Coverity +- wolfssl: load certificate *chain* for PEM client certs - Closes #11622 + Closes #12634 -Viktor Szakats (8 Aug 2023) +Stefan Eissing (4 Jan 2024) -- openssl: auto-detect `SSL_R_TLSV13_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED` +- http: adjust_pollset fix - OpenSSL 1.1.1 defines this macro, but no ealier version, or any of the - popular forks (yet). Use the macro itself to detect its presence, - replacing the hard-wired fork-specific conditions. + do not add a socket for POLLIN when the transfer does not want to send + (for example is paused). - This way the feature will enable automatically when forks implement it, - while also shorter and possibly requiring less future maintenance. + Follow-up to 47f5b1a - Follow-up to 94241a9e78397a2aaf89a213e6ada61e7de7ee02 #6721 + Reported-by: bubbleguuum on github + Fixes #12632 + Closes #12633 - Reviewed-by: Jay Satiro - Closes #11617 +Daniel Stenberg (3 Jan 2024) -- openssl: use `SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites` with LibreSSL 3.4.1 +- tool: make parser reject blank arguments if not supported - LibreSSL 3.4.1 (2021-10-14) added support for - `SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites`. + Already in the getstr() function that clones the input argument. - Ref: https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/LibreSSL/libressl-3.4.1-relnotes.txt + Closes #12620 - Reviewed-by: Jay Satiro - Closes #11616 +dependabot[bot] (3 Jan 2024) -- openssl: use `SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback` with LibreSSL 3.5.0 +- build(deps): bump github/codeql-action from 2 to 3 - LibreSSL 3.5.0 (2022-02-24) added support for - `SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback`. + Bumps [github/codeql-action](https://github.com/github/codeql-action) from 2 + to 3. + - [Release notes](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/releases) + - [Changelog](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md) + - [Commits](https://github.com/github/codeql-action/compare/v2...v3) - Ref: https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/LibreSSL/libressl-3.5.0-relnotes.txt + --- + updated-dependencies: + - dependency-name: github/codeql-action + dependency-type: direct:production + update-type: version-update:semver-major + ... - Reviewed-by: Jay Satiro - Closes #11615 + Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] -- cmake: drop `HAVE_LIBWINMM` and `HAVE_LIBWS2_32` feature checks + Closes #12625 - - `HAVE_LIBWINMM` was detected but unused. The `winmm` system library is - also not used by curl, but it is by its optional dependency `librtmp`. - Change the logic to always add `winmm` when `USE_LIBRTMP` is set. This - library has been available since the early days of Windows. +- build(deps): bump actions/checkout from 3 to 4 - - `HAVE_LIBWS2_32` detected `ws2_32` lib on Windows. This lib is present - since Windows 95 OSR2 (AFAIR). Winsock1 already wasn't supported and - other existing logic already assumed this lib being present, so delete - the check and replace the detection variable with `WIN32` and always - add `ws2_32` on Windows. + Bumps [actions/checkout](https://github.com/actions/checkout) from 3 to 4. + - [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/checkout/releases) + - [Changelog](https://github.com/actions/checkout/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md) + - [Commits](https://github.com/actions/checkout/compare/v3...v4) - Closes #11612 + --- + updated-dependencies: + - dependency-name: actions/checkout + dependency-type: direct:production + update-type: version-update:semver-major + ... -Daniel Gustafsson (8 Aug 2023) + Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] -- crypto: ensure crypto initialization works + Closes #12624 - Make sure that context initialization during hash setup works to avoid - going forward with the risk of a null pointer dereference. +- build(deps): bump actions/upload-artifact from 3 to 4 - Reported-by: Philippe Antoine on HackerOne - Assisted-by: Jay Satiro - Assisted-by: Daniel Stenberg + Bumps [actions/upload-artifact](https://github.com/actions/upload-artifact) f + rom 3 to 4. + - [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/upload-artifact/releases) + - [Commits](https://github.com/actions/upload-artifact/compare/v3...v4) - Closes #11614 + --- + updated-dependencies: + - dependency-name: actions/upload-artifact + dependency-type: direct:production + update-type: version-update:semver-major + ... -Viktor Szakats (7 Aug 2023) + Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] -- openssl: switch to modern init for LibreSSL 2.7.0+ + Closes #12627 - LibreSSL 2.7.0 (2018-03-21) introduced automatic initialization, - `OPENSSL_init_ssl()` function and deprecated the old, manual init - method, as seen in OpenSSL 1.1.0. Switch to the modern method when - available. +- build(deps): bump actions/download-artifact from 3 to 4 - Ref: https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/LibreSSL/libressl-2.7.0-relnotes.txt + Bumps [actions/download-artifact](https://github.com/actions/download-artifac + t) from 3 to 4. + - [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/download-artifact/releases) + - [Commits](https://github.com/actions/download-artifact/compare/v3...v4) - Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg - Closes #11611 + --- + updated-dependencies: + - dependency-name: actions/download-artifact + dependency-type: direct:production + update-type: version-update:semver-major + ... -Daniel Stenberg (7 Aug 2023) + Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] -- gskit: remove + Closes #12626 - We remove support for building curl with gskit. +Stefan Eissing (3 Jan 2024) - - This is a niche TLS library, only running on some IBM systems - - no regular curl contributors use this backend - - no CI builds use or verify this backend - - gskit, or the curl adaption for it, lacks many modern TLS features - making it an inferior solution - - build breakages in this code take weeks or more to get detected - - fixing gskit code is mostly done "flying blind" +- http3/quiche: fix result code on a stream reset - This removal has been advertized in DEPRECATED in Jan 2, 2023 and it has - been mentioned on the curl-library mailing list. + - fixes pytest failures in test 07_22 + - aligns CURLcode values on stream reset with ngtcp2 - It could be brought back, this is not a ban. Given proper effort and - will, gskit support is welcome back into the curl TLS backend family. + Closes #12629 - Closes #11460 +Daniel Stenberg (2 Jan 2024) -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced +- setopt: clear mimepost when formp is freed -Dan Fandrich (7 Aug 2023) + A precaution to avoid a possibly dangling pointer left behind. -- THANKS-filter: add a name typo + Reported-by: Thomas Ferguson + Fixes #12608 + Closes #12621 -Stefan Eissing (7 Aug 2023) +Andy Alt (2 Jan 2024) -- http3/ngtcp2: shorten handshake, trace cleanup +- CI: Add dependabot.yml - - shorten handshake timing by delayed x509 store load (OpenSSL) - as we do for HTTP/2 - - cleanup of trace output, align with HTTP/2 output + This will cause dependabot to open a PR when various actions are + updated, provided that the action maintainer has issued a release. - Closes #11609 + Closes #12623 -Daniel Stenberg (7 Aug 2023) +Gisle Vanem (2 Jan 2024) -- headers: accept leading whitespaces on first response header +- content_encoding: change return code to typedef'ed enum - This is a bad header fold but since the popular browsers accept this - violation, so does curl now. Unless built with hyper. + ... to work around a clang ubsan warning. - Add test 1473 to verify and adjust test 2306. + Fixes #12618 + Closes #12622 - Reported-by: junsik on github - Fixes #11605 - Closes #11607 +Daniel Stenberg (2 Jan 2024) -- include/curl/mprintf.h: add __attribute__ for the prototypes +- tool: prepend output_dir in header callback - - if gcc or clang is used - - if __STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L, which means greater than C90 - - if not using mingw - - if CURL_NO_FMT_CHECKS is not defined + When Content-Disposition parsing is used and an output dir is prepended, + make sure to store that new file name correctly so that it can be used + for setting the file timestamp when --remote-time is used. - Closes #11589 + Extended test 3012 to verify. -- tests: fix bad printf format flags in test code + Co-Authored-by: Jay Satiro + Reported-by: hgdagon on github + Fixes #12614 + Closes #12617 -- tests: fix header scan tools for attribute edits in mprintf.h +- test1254: fix typo in name plus shorten it -- cf-socket: log successful interface bind +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced - When the setsockopt SO_BINDTODEVICE operation succeeds, output that in - the verbose output. +Viktor Szakats (2 Jan 2024) - Ref: #11599 - Closes #11608 +- schannel: fix `-Warith-conversion` gcc 13 warning -- CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER.3: mention it does not load CA certs when disabled + ``` + lib/vtls/schannel.c:1201:22: warning: conversion to 'unsigned int' from 'int' + may change the sign of the result [-Warith-conversion] + 1201 | *extension_len = *list_len + + | ^ + ``` - Ref: #11457 - Closes #11606 + Closes #12616 -- CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER.3: add two more see also options +- asyn-thread: silence `-Wcast-align` warning for Windows - CURLINFO_CAINFO and CURLINFO_CAPATH + Seen with llvm/clang 17: + ``` + lib/asyn-thread.c:310:5: warning: cast from 'PCHAR' (aka 'char *') to 'struct + thread_sync_data *' increases required alignment from 1 to 8 [-Wcast-align] + 310 | CONTAINING_RECORD(overlapped, struct thread_sync_data, w8.overlap + ped); + | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + ~~~~ + .../llvm-mingw/aarch64-w64-mingw32/include/winnt.h:717:48: note: expanded fro + m macro 'CONTAINING_RECORD' + 717 | #define CONTAINING_RECORD(address,type,field) ((type *)((PCHAR)(addre + ss) - (ULONG_PTR)(&((type *)0)->field))) + | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + ``` - Closes #11603 + Follow-up to a6bbc87f9e9ffb46a1801dfb983e7534825ed56b #12482 -- KNOWN_BUGS: aws-sigv4 does not behave well with AWS VPC Lattice + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12482#issuecomment-1873017261 + Closes #12615 - Closes #11007 +Daniel Stenberg (2 Jan 2024) -Graham Campbell (6 Aug 2023) +- tool_listhelp: regenerate after recent .d updates -- CI: use openssl 3.0.10+quic, nghttp3 0.14.0, ngtcp2 0.18.0 + Makes it survive test 1478 - Closes #11585 + Closes #12612 -Daniel Stenberg (6 Aug 2023) +- test1478: verify src/tool_listhelp.c -- TODO: add *5* entries for aws-sigv4 + Verify that the source file on disk is identical to the output of gen.pl + listhelp, as otherwise they are out of sync and need attention. - Closes #7559 - Closes #8107 - Closes #8810 - Closes #9717 - Closes #10129 + Closes #12612 -- TODO: LDAP Certificate-Based Authentication +- testutil: make runtests support %include - Closes #9641 + Using this instruction, a test case can include the contents of a file + into the test during the preprocessing. -Stefan Eissing (6 Aug 2023) + Closes #12612 -- http2: cleanup trace messages +- runtests: for mode="text" on , fix newlines on both parts - - more compact format with bracketed stream id - - all frames traced in and out + Closes #12612 - Closes #11592 +Jay Satiro (2 Jan 2024) -Daniel Stenberg (6 Aug 2023) +- quiche: return CURLE_HTTP3 on send to invalid stream -- tests/tftpd+mqttd: make variables static to silence picky warnings + Prior to this change if a send failed on a stream in an invalid state + (according to quiche) and not marked as closed (according to libcurl) + then the send function would return CURLE_SEND_ERROR. - Closes #11594 + We already have similar code for ngtcp2 to return CURLE_HTTP3 in this + case. -- docs/cmdline: remove repeated working for negotiate + ntlm + Caught by test test_07_upload.py: test_07_22_upload_parallel_fail. - The extra wording is added automatically by the gen.pl tool + Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/12590 + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12597 - Closes #11597 +Daniel Stenberg (1 Jan 2024) -- docs/cmdline: add small "warning" to verbose options +- cmdline-opts: update availability for the *-ca-native options - "Note that verbose output of curl activities and network traffic might - contain sensitive data, including user names, credentials or secret data - content. Be aware and be careful when sharing trace logs with others." + Closes #12613 - Closes #11596 +Patrick Monnerat (31 Dec 2023) -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced +- openldap: fix STARTTLS -- pingpong: don't use *bump_headersize + It was not working anymore since introduction of connection filters. - We use that for HTTP(S) only. + Also do not attempt to recover from a failing TLS negotiation with + CURLUSESSL_TRY. - Follow-up to 3ee79c1674fd6 + Closes #12610 - Closes #11590 +Daniel Stenberg (31 Dec 2023) -- urldata: remove spurious parenthesis to unbreak no-proxy build +- haproxy-clientip.d: document the arg - Follow-up to e12b39e13382 + The arg keyword was missing and therefore not present in the man page. - Closes #11591 + Closes #12611 -- easy: don't call Curl_trc_opt() in disabled-verbose builds +annalee (29 Dec 2023) - Follow-up to e12b39e133822c6a0 +- configure: fix no default int compile error in ipv6 detection - Closes #11588 + Closes #12607 -- http: use %u for printfing int +Dan Fandrich (28 Dec 2023) - Follow-up to 3ee79c1674fd6f99e8efca5 +- CI: Fix use of any-glob-to-all-files in the labeler - Closes #11587 + Despite its name, this atom acts like one-glob-to-all-files and a + different syntax with braces must be used to get + any-glob-to-all-files semantics. Unfortunately, this makes the file + completely unreadable. -Goro FUJI (3 Aug 2023) + Ref: https://github.com/actions/labeler/issues/731 -- vquic: show stringified messages for errno +Daniel Stenberg (29 Dec 2023) - Closes #11584 +- CURLOPT_AUTOREFERER.3: mention CURLINFO_REFERER -Stefan Eissing (3 Aug 2023) +- CURLINFO_REFERER.3: clarify that it is the *request* header -- trace: make tracing available in non-debug builds + That libcurl itself sent in the most recent request - Add --trace-config to curl + Closes #12605 - Add curl_global_trace() to libcurl +Jay Satiro (28 Dec 2023) - Closes #11421 +- system_win32: fix a function pointer assignment warning -Daniel Stenberg (3 Aug 2023) + - Use CURLX_FUNCTION_CAST to suppress a function pointer assignment + warning. -- TODO: remove "Support intermediate & root pinning for PINNEDPUBLICKEY" + a6bbc87f added lookups of some Windows API functions and then cast them + like `*(FARPROC*)&Curl_funcname = address`. Some versions of gcc warn + about that as breaking strict-aliasing rules so this PR changes those + assignments to use CURLX_FUNCTION_CAST. - See also https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/7507 + Bug: https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12581#issuecomment-1869804317 + Reported-by: Marcel Raad -- TODO: add "WebSocket read callback" + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12602 - remove "Upgrade to websockets" as we already have this +- verify-examples.pl: fail verification on unescaped backslash - Closes #11402 + - Check that all backslashes in EXAMPLE are properly escaped. -- test497: verify rejecting too large incoming headers + eg manpage must always use `\\n` never `\n`. -- http: return error when receiving too large header set + This is because the manpage requires we always double blackslash to show + a single backslash. Prior to this change an erroneous single backslash + would pass through and compile even though it would not show correctly + in the manpage. - To avoid abuse. The limit is set to 300 KB for the accumulated size of - all received HTTP headers for a single response. Incomplete research - suggests that Chrome uses a 256-300 KB limit, while Firefox allows up to - 1MB. + Co-authored-by: Daniel Stenberg - Closes #11582 + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12588 -Stefan Eissing (3 Aug 2023) + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12589 -- http2: upgrade tests and add fix for non-existing stream +- vtls: fix missing multissl version info - - check in h2 filter recv that stream actually exists - and return error if not - - add test for parallel, extreme h2 upgrades that fail if - connections get reused before fully switched - - add h2 upgrade upload test just for completeness + - Fix erroneous buffer copy logic from ff74cef5. - Closes #11563 + Prior to this change the MultiSSL version info returned to the user + was empty. -Viktor Szakats (3 Aug 2023) + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12599 -- tests: ensure `libcurl.def` contains all exports +Daniel Stenberg (27 Dec 2023) - Add `test1279` to verify that `libcurl.def` lists all exported API - functions found in libcurl headers. +- KNOWN_BUGS: [RTSP] Some methods do not support response bodies - Also: + Closes #12414 - - extend test suite XML `stdout` tag with the `loadfile` attribute. +Patrick Monnerat (27 Dec 2023) - - fix `tests/extern-scan.pl` and `test1135` to include websocket API. +- openldap: fix an LDAP crash - - use all headers (sorted) in `test1135` instead of a manual list. + Reported-by: Ozan Cansel + Fixes #12593 + Closes #12600 - - add options `--sort`, `--heading=` to `tests/extern-scan.pl`. +Daniel Stenberg (27 Dec 2023) - - add `libcurl.def` to the auto-labeler GHA task. +- getinfo: CURLINFO_QUEUE_TIME_T - Follow-up to 2ebc74c36a19a1700af394c16855ce144d9878e3 + Returns the time, in microseconds, during which this transfer was held + in a waiting queue before it started "for real". A transfer might be put + in a queue if after getting started, it cannot create a new connection + etc due to set conditions and limits imposed by the application. - Closes #11570 + Ref: #12293 + Closes #12368 -Daniel Stenberg (2 Aug 2023) +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced -- url: change default value for CURLOPT_MAXREDIRS to 30 +Jay Satiro (26 Dec 2023) - It was previously unlimited by default, but that's not a sensible - default. While changing this has a remote risk of breaking an existing - use case, I figure it is more likely to actually save users from loops. +- examples/sendrecv: fix comment line length - Closes #11581 + Caught by checksrc. -- lib: fix a few *printf() flag mistakes +Haydar Alaidrus (23 Dec 2023) - Reported-by: Gisle Vanem - Ref: #11574 - Closes #11579 +- CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS.3: fix incorrect C string escape in example -Samuel Chiang (2 Aug 2023) + - Escape inner quotes with two backslashes. -- openssl: make aws-lc version support OCSP + Two backslashes escapes the backslash for the man page and will show as + a single backslash. - And bump version in CI + eg: "{\\"name\\": \\"daniel\\"}" shows as "{\"name\": \"daniel\"}". - Closes #11568 + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12588 -Daniel Stenberg (2 Aug 2023) +Viktor Szakats (23 Dec 2023) -- tool: make the length argument an int for printf()-.* flags +- appveyor: tidy-ups - Closes #11578 + - replace two remaining backslashes with forward slashes. + - tidy up the way we form and pass `TFLAGS`. -- tool_operate: fix memory leak when SSL_CERT_DIR is used + Follow-up to 2d4d0c1fd32f5cc3f946c407c8eccd5477b287df #12572 - Detected by Coverity + Closes #12582 - Follow-up to 29bce9857a12b6cfa726a5 +Stefan Eissing (22 Dec 2023) - Closes #11577 +- transfer: fix upload rate limiting, add test cases -- tool/var: free memory on OOM + - add test cases for rate limiting uploads for all + http versions + - fix transfer loop handling of limits. Signal a re-receive + attempt only on exhausting maxloops without an EAGAIN + - fix `data->state.selectbits` forcing re-receive to also + set re-sending when transfer is doing this. - Coverity detected this memory leak in OOM situation + Reported-by: Karthikdasari0423 on github + Fixes #12559 + Closes #12586 - Follow-up to 2e160c9c652504e +Daniel Stenberg (22 Dec 2023) - Closes #11575 +- mbedtls: free the entropy when threaded -Viktor Szakats (2 Aug 2023) + The entropy_free was never done for threaded builds, causing a small + (fixed) memory leak. -- gha: bump libressl and mbedtls versions + Reported-by: RevaliQaQ on github + Fixes #12584 + Closes #12585 - Closes #11573 +Stefan Eissing (22 Dec 2023) -Jay Satiro (2 Aug 2023) +- http2: improved on_stream_close/data_done handling -- schannel: fix user-set legacy algorithms in Windows 10 & 11 + - there seems to be a code path that cleans up easy handles without + triggering DONE or DETACH events to the connection filters. This + would explain wh nghttp2 still holds stream user data + - add GOOD check to easy handle used in on_close_callback to + prevent crashes, ASSERTs in debug builds. + - NULL the stream user data early before submitting RST + - add checks in on_stream_close() to identify UNGOOD easy handles - - If the user set a legacy algorithm list (CURLOPT_SSL_CIPHER_LIST) then - use the SCHANNEL_CRED legacy structure to pass the list to Schannel. + Reported-by: Hans-Christian Egtvedt + Fixes #10936 + Closes #12562 - - If the user set both a legacy algorithm list and a TLS 1.3 cipher list - then abort. +Daniel Stenberg (22 Dec 2023) - Although MS doesn't document it, Schannel will not negotiate TLS 1.3 - when SCHANNEL_CRED is used. That means setting a legacy algorithm list - limits the user to earlier versions of TLS. +- mprintf: overhaul and bugfixes - Prior to this change, since 8beff435 (precedes 7.85.0), libcurl would - ignore legacy algorithms in Windows 10 1809 and later. + In a test case using lots of snprintf() calls using many commonly used + %-codes per call, this version is around 30% faster than previous + version. - Reported-by: zhihaoy@users.noreply.github.com + It also fixes the #12561 bug which made it not behave correctly when + given unknown %-sequences. Fixing that flaw required a different take on + the problem, which resulted in the new two-arrays model. - Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/10741 - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/10746 + lib557: extended - Verify the #12561 fix and test more printf features -Daniel Stenberg (2 Aug 2023) + unit1398: fix test: It used a $ only for one argument, which is not + supported. -- variable.d: setting a variable again overwrites it + Fixes #12561 + Closes #12563 - Reported-by: Niall McGee - Bug: https://twitter.com/niallmcgee/status/1686523075423322113 - Closes #11571 +Viktor Szakats (21 Dec 2023) -Jay Satiro (2 Aug 2023) +- appveyor: replace PowerShell with bash + parallel autotools -- CURLOPT_PROXY_SSL_OPTIONS.3: sync formatting + PowerShell works (after a steep development curve), but one property of + it stuck and kept causing unresolvable usability issues: With + `$ErrorActionPreference=Stop`, it does abort on failures, but shows only + the first line of the error message. In `Continue` mode, it shows the + full error message, but doesn't stop on all errors. Another issue is + PowerShell considering any stderr output as if the command failed (this + has been improved in 7.2 (2021-Nov), but fixed versions aren't running + in CI and will not be for a long time in all test images.) - - Re-wrap CURLSSLOPT_ALLOW_BEAST description. + Thus, we're going with bash. -Daniel Stenberg (2 Aug 2023) + Also: + - use `-j2` with autotools tests, making them finish 5-15 minutes per + job faster. + - omit `POSIX_PATH_PREFIX`. + - use `WINDIR`. + - prefer forward slashes. -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced + Follow-up to: 75078a415d9c769419aed4153d3d525a8eba95af #11999 + Ref: #12444 -- resolve: use PF_INET6 family lookups when CURL_IPRESOLVE_V6 is set + Fixes #12560 + Closes #12572 - Previously it would always do PF_UNSPEC if CURL_IPRESOLVE_V4 is not - used, thus unnecessarily asking for addresses that will not be used. +Pavel Pavlov (21 Dec 2023) - Reported-by: Joseph Tharayil - Fixes #11564 - Closes #11565 +- asyn-thread: use GetAddrInfoExW on >= Windows 8 -- docs: link to the website versions instead of markdowns + For doing async DNS resolution instead of starting a thread for each + request. - ... to make the links work when the markdown is converted to webpages on - https://curl.se + Fixes #12481 + Closes #12482 - Reported-by: Maurício Meneghini Fauth - Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl-www/issues/272 - Closes #11569 +Daniel Stenberg (21 Dec 2023) -Viktor Szakats (1 Aug 2023) +- strerror: repair get_winsock_error() -- cmake: cache more config and delete unused ones + It would try to read longer than the provided string and crash. - - cache more Windows config results for faster initialization. + Follow-up to ff74cef5d4a0cf60106517a1c7384 + Reported-by: calvin2021y on github + Fixes #12578 + Closes #12579 - - delete unused config macros `HAVE_SYS_UTSNAME_H`, `HAVE_SSL_H`. +- CURLOPT_SSH_*_KEYFILE: clarify - - delete dead references to `sys/utsname.h`. + Closes #12554 - Closes #11551 +ivanfywang (21 Dec 2023) -- egd: delete feature detection and related source code +- ngtcp2: put h3 at the front of alpn - EGD is Entropy Gathering Daemon, a socket-based entropy source supported - by pre-OpenSSL v1.1 versions and now deprecated. curl also deprecated it - a while ago. + Closes #12576 - Its detection in CMake was broken all along because OpenSSL libs were - not linked at the point of feature check. +Daniel Stenberg (21 Dec 2023) - Delete detection from both cmake and autotools, along with the related - source snippet, and the `--with-egd-socket=` `./configure` option. +- test460: verify a command line using --expand with no argument - Closes #11556 + This verifies the fix for #12565 -Stefan Eissing (1 Aug 2023) +- tool_getparam: do not try to expand without an argument -- tests: fix h3 server check and parallel instances + This would lead to a segfault. - - fix check for availability of nghttpx server - - add `tcp` frontend config for same port as quic, as - without this, port 3000 is bound which clashes for parallel - testing + Fixes #12565 + Reported-by: Geeknik Labs + Closes #12575 - Closes #11553 +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced -Daniel Stenberg (1 Aug 2023) + Bumped version to 8.6.0 because of changes -- docs/cmdline-opts: spellfixes, typos and polish +- Makefile.am: fix the MSVC project generation - To make them accepted by the spell checker + It made the vcxproj files not get included in dist tarballs. - Closes #11562 + Regression since 74423b5df4c8117891eb89 (8.5.0) -- CI/spellcheck: build curl.1 and spellcheck it + Reported-by: iAroc on github + Fixes #12564 + Closes #12567 - Added acceptable words +zengwei2000 (21 Dec 2023) - Closes #11562 +- altsvc: free 'as' when returning error -Alexander Jaeger (1 Aug 2023) + Closes #12570 -- misc: fix various typos + Signed-off-by: zengwei - Closes #11561 +Viktor Szakats (20 Dec 2023) -Daniel Stenberg (1 Aug 2023) +- build: fix `-Wconversion`/`-Wsign-conversion` warnings -- http2: avoid too early connection re-use/multiplexing + Fix remaining warnings in examples and tests which are not suppressed + by the pragma in `lib/curl_setup.h`. - HTTP/1 connections that are upgraded to HTTP/2 should not be picked up - for reuse and multiplexing by other handles until the 101 switching - process is completed. + Silence a toolchain issue causing warnings in `FD_SET()` calls with + older Cygwin/MSYS2 builds. Likely fixed on 2020-08-03 by: + https://cygwin.com/git/?p=newlib-cygwin.git;a=commitdiff;h=5717262b8ecfed0f7f + ab63e2c09c78991e36f9dd - Lots-of-debgging-by: Stefan Eissing - Reported-by: Richard W.M. Jones - Bug: https://curl.se/mail/lib-2023-07/0045.html - Closes #11557 + Follow-up to 2dbe75bd7f3c36837aa06fd87a442bdf3fb7faef #12492 -- Revert "KNOWN_BUGS: build for iOS simulator on macOS 13.2 with Xcode 14" + Closes #12557 - This reverts commit 2e8a3d7cb73c85a9aa151e263315f8a496dbb9d4. +- build: fix some `-Wsign-conversion`/`-Warith-conversion` warnings - It's a user error for supplying incomplete information to the build system. + - enable `-Wsign-conversion` warnings, but also setting them to not + raise errors. + - fix `-Warith-conversion` warnings seen in CI. + These are triggered by `-Wsign-converion` and causing errors unless + explicitly silenced. It makes more sense to fix them, there just a few + of them. + - fix some `-Wsign-conversion` warnings. + - hide `-Wsign-conversion` warnings with a `#pragma`. + - add macro `CURL_WARN_SIGN_CONVERSION` to unhide them on a per-build + basis. + - update a CI job to unhide them with the above macro: + https://github.com/curl/curl/actions/workflows/linux.yml -> OpenSSL -O3 - Reported-by: Ryan Schmidt - Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/11215#issuecomment-1658729367 + Closes #12492 -Viktor Szakats (1 Aug 2023) +- cmake: tidy-up `OtherTests.cmake` -- cmake: add support for single libcurl compilation pass + - make more obvious which detection uses which prep steps. + - merge and streamline conditions. + - these should not alter detection results. - Before this patch CMake builds used two separate compilation passes to - build the shared and static libcurl respectively. This patch allows to - reduce that to a single pass if the target platform and build settings - allow it. + Also align log output messages from + `Macros.cmake` / `curl_internal_test` with rest of the build. - This reduces CMake build times when building both static and shared - libcurl at the same time, making these dual builds an almost zero-cost - option. + Closes #12551 - Enable this feature for Windows builds, where the difference between the - two passes was the use of `__declspec(dllexport)` attribute for exported - API functions for the shared builds. This patch replaces this method - with the use of `libcurl.def` at DLL link time. +- appveyor: switch to out-of-tree builds - Also update `Makefile.mk` to use `libcurl.def` to export libcurl API - symbols on Windows. This simplifies (or fixes) this build method (e.g. - in curl-for-win, which generated a `libcurl.def` from `.h` files using - an elaborate set of transformations). + With cmake and autotools. - `libcurl.def` has the maintenance cost of keeping the list of public - libcurl API symbols up-to-date. This list seldom changes, so the cost - is low. + Closes #12550 - Closes #11546 +Daniel Stenberg (19 Dec 2023) -- cmake: detect `SSL_set0_wbio` in OpenSSL +- DEPRECATE.md: mention that NTLM_WB no longer works - Present in OpenSSL 1.1.0 and BoringSSL. - Missing from LibreSSL 3.8.0. + Ref: #12479 + Closes #12553 - Follow-up to f39472ea9f4f4e12cfbc0500c4580a8d52ce4a59 +- CURLOPT_SERVER_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_MS: add - While here, also fix `RAND_egd()` detection which was broken, likely all - along. This feature is probably broken with CMake builds and also - requires a sufficiently obsolete OpenSSL version, so this part of the - update was not tested. + Proposed-by: Yifei Kong + Ref: https://curl.se/mail/lib-2023-11/0023.html + Closes #12369 - Closes #11555 +Viktor Szakats (18 Dec 2023) -- cmake: fixup H2 duplicate symbols for unity builds +- build: more `-Wformat` fixes - Closes #11550 + - memdebug: update to not trigger `-Wformat-nonliteral` warnings. + - imap: mark `imap_sendf()` with `CURL_PRINTF()`. + - tool_msgs: mark static function with `CURL_PRINTF()`. -Pablo Busse (1 Aug 2023) + Follow-up to 3829759bd042c03225ae862062560f568ba1a231 #12489 -- openssl: Support async cert verify callback + Closes #12540 - - Update the OpenSSL connect state machine to handle - SSL_ERROR_WANT_RETRY_VERIFY. +- windows: delete redundant headers - This allows libcurl users that are using custom certificate validation - to suspend processing while waiting for external I/O during certificate - validation. + `winsock2.h` pulls in `windows.h`. `ws2tcpip.h` pulls in `winsock2.h`. + `winsock2.h` and `ws2tcpip.h` are also pulled by `curl/curl.h`. - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11499 + Keep only those headers that are not already included, or the code under + it uses something from that specific header. -Jay Satiro (1 Aug 2023) + Closes #12539 -- tool_cb_wrt: fix invalid unicode for windows console +- cmake: prefill/cache `HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE` - - Suppress an incomplete UTF-8 sequence at the end of the buffer. + Also add missing include to `OtherTests.cmake`. It didn't cause an issue + because the parent already included this earlier by chance. - - Attempt to reconstruct incomplete UTF-8 sequence from prior call(s) - in current call. + Closes #12537 - Prior to this change, in Windows console UTF-8 sequences split between - two or more calls to the write callback would cause invalid "replacement - characters" U+FFFD to be printed instead of the actual Unicode - character. This is because in Windows only UTF-16 encoded characters are - printed to the console, therefore we convert the UTF-8 contents to - UTF-16, which cannot be done with partial UTF-8 sequences. +Daniel Stenberg (18 Dec 2023) - Reported-by: Maksim Arhipov +- runner.pm: fix perl warning when running tests - Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/9841 - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/10890 + Use of uninitialized value $runner::gdbthis in numeric eq (==) at runner. + pm -Daniel Stenberg (1 Aug 2023) + Follow-up from 3dcf301752a09d9 -- sectransp: prevent CFRelease() of NULL + Closes #12549 - When SecCertificateCopyCommonName() returns NULL, the common_name - pointer remains set to NULL which apparently when calling CFRelease() on - (sometimes?) crashes. +- runtests: support -gl. Like -g but for lldb. - Reported-by: Guillaume Algis - Fixes #9194 - Closes #11554 + Follow-up to 63b5748 -Jay Satiro (1 Aug 2023) + Invokes the test case via lldb instead of gdb. Since using gdb is such a + pain on mac, using lldb is sometimes less quirky. -- vtls: clarify "ALPN: offers" message + Closes #12547 - Before: - * ALPN: offers h2,http/1.1 +- curl.h: add CURLE_TOO_LARGE - After: - * ALPN: curl offers h2,http/1.1 + A new error code to be used when an internal field grows too large, like + when a dynbuf reaches its maximum. Previously it would return + CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY for this, which is highly misleading. - Bug: https://curl.se/mail/lib-2023-07/0041.html - Reported-by: Richard W.M. Jones - Closes #11544 + Ref: #12268 + Closes #12269 -Daniel Stenberg (1 Aug 2023) +- CI/circleci: disable MQTT in the HTTP-only build -- urlapi: make sure zoneid is also duplicated in curl_url_dup + And remove the use of configure options that don't actually exist - Add several curl_url_dup() tests to the general lib1560 test. + Closes #12546 - Reported-by: Rutger Broekhoff - Bug: https://curl.se/mail/lib-2023-07/0047.html - Closes #11549 +Yedaya Katsman (18 Dec 2023) -Sergey (1 Aug 2023) +- tests: respect $TMPDIR when creating unix domain sockets -- urlapi: fix heap buffer overflow + When running on termux, where $TMPDIR isn't /tmp, running the tests + failed, since the server config tried creating sockets in /tmp, without + checking the temp dir config. Use the TMPDIR variable that makes it find + the correct directory everywhere [0] - `u->path = Curl_memdup(path, pathlen + 1);` accesses bytes after the null-ter - minator. + [0] https://perldoc.perl.org/File::Temp#tempfile - ``` - ==2676==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x04d48c75 a - t pc 0x0112708a bp 0x006fb7e0 sp 0x006fb3c4 - READ of size 78 at 0x04d48c75 thread T0 - #0 0x1127089 in __asan_wrap_memcpy D:\a\_work\1\s\src\vctools\asan\llvm\c - ompiler-rt\lib\sanitizer_common\sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:840 - #1 0x1891a0e in Curl_memdup C:\actions-runner\_work\client\client\third_p - arty\curl\lib\strdup.c:97 - #2 0x18db4b0 in parseurl C:\actions-runner\_work\client\client\third_part - y\curl\lib\urlapi.c:1297 - #3 0x18db819 in parseurl_and_replace C:\actions-runner\_work\client\clien - t\third_party\curl\lib\urlapi.c:1342 - #4 0x18d6e39 in curl_url_set C:\actions-runner\_work\client\client\third_ - party\curl\lib\urlapi.c:1790 - #5 0x1877d3e in parseurlandfillconn C:\actions-runner\_work\client\client - \third_party\curl\lib\url.c:1768 - #6 0x1871acf in create_conn C:\actions-runner\_work\client\client\third_p - arty\curl\lib\url.c:3403 - #7 0x186d8dc in Curl_connect C:\actions-runner\_work\client\client\third_ - party\curl\lib\url.c:3888 - #8 0x1856b78 in multi_runsingle C:\actions-runner\_work\client\client\thi - rd_party\curl\lib\multi.c:1982 - #9 0x18531e3 in curl_multi_perform C:\actions-runner\_work\client\client\ - third_party\curl\lib\multi.c:2756 - ``` + Closes #12545 - Closes #11560 +Viktor Szakats (17 Dec 2023) -Daniel Stenberg (31 Jul 2023) +- ssh: fix namespace of two local macros -- curl: make %output{} in -w specify a file to write to + Avoid using the libssh and libssh2 macro namespaces by prefixing + these local macro names with `CURL_`. - It can be used multiple times. Use %output{>>name} to append. + Follow-up to 413a0fedd02c8c6df1d294534b8c6e306fcca7a2 #12346 - Add docs. Test 990 and 991 verify. + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Closes #12544 - Idea: #11400 - Suggested-by: ed0d2b2ce19451f2 - Closes #11416 +- cmake: whitespace tidy-up in `OtherTests.cmake` -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced + Closes #12538 -- tool: add "variable" support +Mark Sinkovics (16 Dec 2023) - Add support for command line variables. Set variables with --variable - name=content or --variable name@file (where "file" can be stdin if set - to a single dash (-)). +- cmake: fix generation for system name iOS - Variable content is expanded in option parameters using "{{name}}" - (without the quotes) if the option name is prefixed with - "--expand-". This gets the contents of the variable "name" inserted, or - a blank if the name does not exist as a variable. Insert "{{" verbatim - in the string by prefixing it with a backslash, like "\\{{". + This PR fixes a problem that happens during CMake configuration when + the `CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME` set to `iOS` and not `Darwin`. This value is + available (as far as I remember) version 3.14. The final solution + (thanks to @vszakats) is to use `APPLE` which contains all the Apple + platforms https://cmake.org/cmake/help/latest/variable/APPLE.html. - Import an environment variable with --variable %name. It makes curl exit - with an error if the environment variable is not set. It can also rather - get a default value if the variable does not exist, using =content or - @file like shown above. + This issue was found when during vcpkg installation. Running command + `vcpkg install curl:arm64-ios` and `vcpkg install curl:x64-ios` failed + with message: + ``` + CMake Error: try_run() invoked in cross-compiling mode, please set the follow + ing cache variables appropriately: + HAVE_H_ERRNO_ASSIGNABLE_EXITCODE (advanced) + ``` + After this fix, I was able to compile the compile the binary without + any issue. - Example: get the USER environment variable into the URL: + In addition to that fix, this PR also contains an simplification to + check if the platform is not APPLE. - --variable %USER - --expand-url = "https://example.com/api/{{USER}}/method" + Co-authored-by: Viktor Szakats + Closes #12515 - When expanding variables, curl supports a set of functions that can make - the variable contents more convenient to use. It can trim leading and - trailing white space with "trim", output the contents as a JSON quoted - string with "json", URL encode it with "url" and base 64 encode it with - "b64". To apply functions to a variable expansion, add them colon - separated to the right side of the variable. They are then performed in - a left to right order. +Daniel Stenberg (16 Dec 2023) - Example: get the contents of a file called $HOME/.secret into a variable - called "fix". Make sure that the content is trimmed and percent-encoded - sent as POST data: +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced - --variable %HOME=/home/default - --expand-variable fix@{{HOME}}/.secret - --expand-data "{{fix:trim:url}}" - https://example.com/ +Baruch Siach (16 Dec 2023) - Documented. Many new test cases. +- gnutls: fix build with --disable-verbose - Co-brainstormed-by: Emanuele Torre - Assisted-by: Jat Satiro - Closes #11346 + infof() parameters must be defined event with --disable-verbose since + commit dac293cfb702 ("lib: apache style infof and trace + macros/functions"). -- KNOWN_BUGS: cygwin: make install installs curl-config.1 twice + Move also 'ptr' definition under !CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS. - Closes #8839 + Fixes the following build failure: -- KNOWN_BUGS: build for iOS simulator on macOS 13.2 with Xcode 14 + In file included from ../lib/sendf.h:29, + from vtls/gtls.c:44: + vtls/gtls.c: In function 'Curl_gtls_verifyserver': + vtls/gtls.c:841:34: error: 'version' undeclared (first use in this function); + did you mean 'session'? + 841 | gnutls_protocol_get_name(version), ptr); + | ^~~~~~~ - Closes #11215 + Closes #12505 -- KNOWN_BUGS: cmake outputs: no version information available +Viktor Szakats (16 Dec 2023) - Closes #11158 +- build: delete unused `HAVE_{GSSHEIMDAL,GSSMIT,HEIMDAL}` -- KNOWN_BUGS: APOP authentication fails on POP3 + Stop setting `HAVE_GSSHEIMDAL`, `HAVE_GSSMIT` and `HAVE_HEIMDAL`. + There was no place in the build system or source code that used them. - Closes #10073 + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Closes #12506 -- KNOWN_BUGS: hyper is slow +- build: remove redundant `CURL_PULL_*` settings - Closes #11203 + These macros were not propagated to the source code from CMake. -Patrick Monnerat (31 Jul 2023) + autotools set only one of them (`CURL_PULL_SYS_POLL_H`), initially to + address an AIX issue [1]. This later broke when introducing `system.h` + [2] without the logic it enabled. A subsequent fix [3] re-added the + logic, and also enabled it for AIX before its use, directly in + `system.h`. -- configure, cmake, lib: more form api deprecation + [1] 2012-11-23: 665adcd4b7bcdb7deb638cdc499fbe71f8d777f2 + [2] 2017-03-29: 9506d01ee50d5908138ebad0fd9fbd39b66bd64d #1373 + [3] 2017-08-25: 8a84fcc4b59e8b78d2acc6febf44a43d6bc81b59 #1828 #1833 - Introduce a --enable-form-api configure option to control its inclusion - in builds. The condition name defined for it is CURL_DISABLE_FORM_API. + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Closes #12502 - Form api code is dependent of MIME: configure and CMake handle this - dependency automatically: CMake by making it a dependent option - explicitly, configure by inheriting the MIME value by default and - rejecting explicit incompatible values. +- system.h: sync mingw `CURL_TYPEOF_CURL_SOCKLEN_T` with other compilers - "form-api" is now a new hidden test feature. + Align mingw with the other Windows compilers and use the `int` type for + `CURL_TYPEOF_CURL_SOCKLEN_T` (and thus for `curl_socklent_t`). This + makes it unnecessary to make a mingw-specific trick and pull all Windows + headers early just for this type definition. This type is specific to + Windows, not to the compiler. mingw-w64's Windows header maps it to + `int` too. - Update libcurl modules to respect this option and adjust tests - accordingly. + With this we also delete all remaining uses of `CURL_PULL_WS2TCPIP_H`. - Closes #9621 + [ The official solution is to use `socklen_t` for all Windows compilers. + In this case we may want to update `curl/curl.h` to pull in Windows + headers before `system.h`. ] -Daniel Stenberg (31 Jul 2023) + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Reviewed-by: Jay Satiro + Closes #12501 + +- windows: simplify detecting and using system headers + + - autotools, cmake: assume that if we detect Windows, `windows.h`, + `winsock2.h` and `ws2tcpip.h` do exist. + - lib: fix 3 outlier `#if` conditions to use `USE_WINSOCK` instead of + looking for `winsock2.h`. + - autotools: merge 3 Windows check methods into one. + - move Watt-32 and lwIP socket support to `setup-win32.h` from + `config-win32.h`. It opens up using these with all build tools. Also + merge logic with Windows Sockets. + - fix to assume Windows sockets with the mingw32ce toolchain. + Follow-up to: 2748c64d605b19fb419ae56810ad8da36487a2d4 + - cmake: delete unused variable `signature_call_conv` since + eb33ccd5332435fa50f1758e5debb869c6942b7f. + - autotools: simplify `CURL_CHECK_WIN32_LARGEFILE` detection. + - examples/externalsocket: fix header order. + - cmake/OtherTests.cmake: delete Windows-specific `_source_epilogue` + that wasn't used anymore. + - cmake/OtherTests.cmake: set `WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN` for test + `SIZEOF_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE`. + + After this patch curl universally uses `_WIN32` to guard + Windows-specific logic. It guards Windows Sockets-specific logic with + `USE_WINSOCK` (this might need further work). -- mailmap: add Derzsi Dániel + Reviewed-by: Jay Satiro + Closes #12495 + +- build: enable missing OpenSSF-recommended warnings, with fixes + + https://best.openssf.org/Compiler-Hardening-Guides/Compiler-Options-Hardening + -Guide-for-C-and-C++.html + as of 2023-11-29 [1]. + + Enable new recommended warnings (except `-Wsign-conversion`): + + - enable `-Wformat=2` for clang (in both cmake and autotools). + - add `CURL_PRINTF()` internal attribute and mark functions accepting + printf arguments with it. This is a copy of existing + `CURL_TEMP_PRINTF()` but using `__printf__` to make it compatible + with redefinting the `printf` symbol: + https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-3.0.4/gcc_5.html#SEC94 + - fix `CURL_PRINTF()` and existing `CURL_TEMP_PRINTF()` for + mingw-w64 and enable it on this platform. + - enable `-Wimplicit-fallthrough`. + - enable `-Wtrampolines`. + - add `-Wsign-conversion` commented with a FIXME. + - cmake: enable `-pedantic-errors` the way we do it with autotools. + Follow-up to d5c0351055d5709da8f3e16c91348092fdb481aa #2747 + - lib/curl_trc.h: use `CURL_FORMAT()`, this also fixes it to enable format + checks. Previously it was always disabled due to the internal `printf` + macro. -Derzsi Dániel (31 Jul 2023) + Fix them: -- wolfssl: support loading system CA certificates + - fix bug where an `set_ipv6_v6only()` call was missed in builds with + `--disable-verbose` / `CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS=ON`. + - add internal `FALLTHROUGH()` macro. + - replace obsolete fall-through comments with `FALLTHROUGH()`. + - fix fallthrough markups: Delete redundant ones (showing up as + warnings in most cases). Add missing ones. Fix indentation. + - silence `-Wformat-nonliteral` warnings with llvm/clang. + - fix one `-Wformat-nonliteral` warning. + - fix new `-Wformat` and `-Wformat-security` warnings. + - fix `CURL_FORMAT_SOCKET_T` value for mingw-w64. Also move its + definition to `lib/curl_setup.h` allowing use in `tests/server`. + - lib: fix two wrongly passed string arguments in log outputs. + Co-authored-by: Jay Satiro + - fix new `-Wformat` warnings on mingw-w64. - Closes #11452 + [1] https://github.com/ossf/wg-best-practices-os-developers/blob/56c0fde3895b + fc55c8a973ef49a2572c507b2ae1/docs/Compiler-Hardening-Guides/Compiler-Options- + Hardening-Guide-for-C-and-C%2B%2B.md -Viktor Szakats (30 Jul 2023) + Closes #12489 -- nss: delete more NSS references +- Makefile.mk: drop Windows support - Fix the distcheck CI failure and delete more NSS references. + And DLL-support with it. This leaves `Makefile.mk` for MS-DOS and Amiga. - Follow-up to 7c8bae0d9c9b2dfeeb008b9a316117d7b9675175 + We recommend CMake instead. With unity mode it's much faster, and about + the same without. - Reviewed-by: Marcel Raad + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12221#issuecomment-1783761806 Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg - Closes #11548 + Closes #12224 -Daniel Stenberg (29 Jul 2023) +Daniel Stenberg (16 Dec 2023) -- nss: remove support for this TLS library +- cmdline-docs: use .IP consistently - Closes #11459 + Remove use of .TP and some .B. The idea is to reduce nroff syntax as + much as possible and to use it consistently. Ultimately, we should be + able to introduce our own easier-to-use-and-read syntax/formatting and + convert on generation time. -Ryan Schmidt (29 Jul 2023) + Closes #12535 -- macOS: fix target detection more +Tatsuhiko Miyagawa (16 Dec 2023) - Now SCDynamicStoreCopyProxies is called (and the required frameworks are - linked in) on all versions of macOS and only on macOS. Fixes crash due - to undefined symbol when built with the macOS 10.11 SDK or earlier. +- http: fix off-by-one error in request method length check - CURL_OSX_CALL_COPYPROXIES is renamed to CURL_MACOS_CALL_COPYPROXIES and - is now only defined when SCDynamicStoreCopyProxies will actually be - called. Previously, it was defined when ENABLE_IPV6 was not defined but - SCDynamicStoreCopyProxies is not called in that case. + It should allow one more byte. - TARGET_OS_OSX is only defined in the macOS 10.12 SDK and later and only - when dynamic targets are enabled. TARGET_OS_MAC is always defined but - means any Mac OS or derivative including macOS, iOS, tvOS, and watchOS. - TARGET_OS_IPHONE means any Darwin OS other than macOS. + Closes #12534 - Follow-up to c73b2f82 +Daniel Stenberg (15 Dec 2023) - Fixes #11502 - Closes #11516 +- curl: show ipfs and ipns as supported "protocols" -Daniel Stenberg (29 Jul 2023) + They are accepted schemes in URLs passed to curl (the tool, not the + library). -- tool_operate: allow SSL_CERT_FILE and SSL_CERT_DIR + Also makes curl-config show the same list. - ... used at once. + Co-Authored-by: Jay Satiro + Reported-by: Chara White + Bug: https://curl.se/mail/archive-2023-12/0026.html + Closes #12508 - Reported-by: Gabriel Corona - Fixes #11325 - Closes #11531 +- Revert "urldata: move async resolver state from easy handle to connectdata" -Thomas M. DuBuisson (29 Jul 2023) + This reverts commit 56a4db2e4e2bcb9a0dcb75b83560a78ef231fcc8 (#12198) -- CI: remove Lift's configuration + We want the c-ares channel to be held in the easy handle, not per + connection - for performance. - The Lift tool is being retired. Their site reads: + Closes #12524 - "Sonatype Lift will be retiring on Sep 12, 2023, with its analysis - stopping on Aug 12, 2023." +Viktor Szakats (15 Dec 2023) - Closes #11541 +- openssl: re-match LibreSSL deinit with init -Nathan Moinvaziri (29 Jul 2023) + Earlier we switched to use modern initialization with LibreSSL v2.7.0 + and up, but did not touch deinitialization [1]. Fix it in this patch. -- Revert "schannel: reverse the order of certinfo insertions" + Regression from bec0c5bbf34369920598678161d2df8bea0e243b #11611 - This reverts commit 8986df802db9b5338d9d50a54232ebae4dbcf6dd. + [1] https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11611#issuecomment-1668654014 - Windows does not guarantee a particular certificate ordering, even - though TLS may have its own ordering/relationship guarantees. Recent - versions of Windows 11 reversed the ordering of ceritifcates returned by - CertEnumCertificatesInStore, therefore this commit no longer works as - initially intended. libcurl makes no guarantees about certificate - ordering if the operating system can't. + Reported-by: Mike Hommey + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Fixes #12525 + Closes #12526 - Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/9706 +Daniel Stenberg (14 Dec 2023) - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11536 +- libssh: supress warnings without version check -wangzhikun (29 Jul 2023) + Define unconditionally. -- winbuild: improve check for static zlib + Follow-up from d21bd2190c46ad7fa - - Check for zlib static library name zlibstatic.lib. + Closes #12523 - zlib's static library has a different name depending on how it was - built. zlibstatic.lib is output by cmake. zlibstat.lib is output by - their pre-generated Visual Studio project files (in the contrib - directory) and defines ZLIB_WINAPI (ie it's meant to use stdcall - instead of cdecl if you end up exporting the zlib functions). +- hostip: return error immediately when Curl_ip2addr() fails - Prior to this change the makefile only checked for the latter. + Closes #12522 - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11521 +Theo (14 Dec 2023) -Daniel Stenberg (29 Jul 2023) +- libssh: improve the deprecation warning dismissal -- configure: use the pkg-config --libs-only-l flag for libssh2 + Previous code was compiler dependant, and dismissed all deprecation warnings + indiscriminately. - ... instead of --libs, as that one also returns -L flags. + libssh provides a way to disable the deprecation warnings for libssh only, an + d + naturally this is the preferred way. - Reported-by: Wilhelm von Thiele - Fixes #11538 - Closes #11539 + This commit uses that, to prevent the erroneous hiding of potential, unrelate + d + deprecation warnings. -Viktor Szakats (29 Jul 2023) + Fixes #12519 + Closes #12520 -- cmake: support building static and shared libcurl in one go +Daniel Stenberg (14 Dec 2023) - This patch adds the ability to build a static and shared libcurl library - in a single build session. It also adds an option to select which one to - use when building the curl executable. +- test1474: removed - New build options: - - `BUILD_STATIC_LIBS`. Default: `OFF`. - Enabled automatically if `BUILD_SHARED_LIBS` is `OFF`. - - `BUILD_STATIC_CURL`. Default: `OFF`. - Requires `BUILD_STATIC_LIBS` enabled. - Enabled automatically if building static libcurl only. - - `STATIC_LIB_SUFFIX`. Default: empty. - - `IMPORT_LIB_SUFFIX`. Default: `_imp` if implib filename would collide - with static lib name (typically with MSVC) in Windows builds. - Otherwise empty. + The test was already somewhat flaky and disabled on several platforms, + and after 1da640abb688 even more unstable. - Also: +- readwrite_data: loop less - - Stop setting the `CURL_STATICLIB` macro via `curl_config.h`, and pass - it directly to the compiler. This also allows to delete a condition - from `tests/server/CMakeLists.txt`. + This function is made to loop in order to drain incoming data + faster. Completely removing the loop has a measerably negative impact on + transfer speeds. - - Complete a TODO by following the logic used in autotools (also for - `LIBCURL_NO_SHARED`), and set `-DCURL_STATICLIB` in `Cflags:` of - `libcurl.pc` for _static-only_ curl builds. + Downsides with the looping include - - Convert an existing CI test to build both shared and static libcurl. + - it might call the progress callback much more seldom. Especially if + the write callback is slow. - Closes #11505 + - rate limiting becomes less exact -Stefan Eissing (28 Jul 2023) + - a single transfer might "starve out" other parallel transfers -- CI/awslc: add cache for build awslc library + - QUIC timers for other connections can't be maintained correctly - Closes #11535 + The long term fix should be to remove the loop and optimize coming back + to avoid the transfer speed penalty. -- GHA/linux.yml: add caching + This fix lower the max loop count to reduce the starvation problem, and + avoids the loop completely for when rate-limiting is in progress. - Closes #11532 + Ref: #12488 + Ref: https://curl.se/mail/lib-2023-12/0012.html + Closes #12504 -Daniel Stenberg (27 Jul 2023) +Stefan Eissing (14 Dec 2023) -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced +- lib: eliminate `conn->cselect_bits` - Bump working version to 8.3.0 + - use `data->state.dselect_bits` everywhere instead + - remove `bool *comeback` parameter as non-zero + `data->state.dselect_bits` will indicate that IO is + incomplete. -- url: remove infof() output for "still name resolving" + Closes #12512 - The message does not help and might get spewed a lot during times. +- connect: refactor `Curl_timeleft()` - Reported-by: yushicheng7788 on github - Fixes #11394 - Closes #11529 + - less local vars, "better" readability + - added documentation -- KNOWN_BUGS: cygwin: "WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!" + Closes #12518 - Closes #11244 +Dmitry Karpov (14 Dec 2023) -Stefan Eissing (27 Jul 2023) +- cookie: avoid fopen with empty file name -- CI: quiche updates + Closes #12514 - - remove quiche from standard `linux` workflow - - add mod_h2 caching to quiche workflow - - rename quiche to quiche-linux - - move version definitions into env section +Viktor Szakats (13 Dec 2023) - Closes #11528 +- tests/server: delete workaround for old-mingw -- http2: disable asssertion blocking OSSFuzz testing + mingw-w64 1.0 comes with w32api v3.12, thus doesn't need this. - - not clear how this triggers and it blocks OSSFuzz testing other - things. Since we handle the case with an error return, disabling the - assertion for now seems the best way forward. + Follow-up to 38029101e2d78ba125732b3bab6ec267b80a0e72 #11625 - Fixes #11500 - Closes #11519 + Reviewed-by: Jay Satiro + Closes #12510 -- http2: fix in h2 proxy tunnel: progress in ingress on sending +- cmake: delete obsolete TODOs more [ci skip] - - depending on what is tunneled, the proxy may never get invoked for - receiving data explicitly. Not progressing ingress may lead to stalls - due to missed WINDOW_UPDATEs. + - manual completed: 898b012a9bf388590c4be7f526815b5ab74feca1 #1288 + - soname completed: 5de6848f104d7cb0017080e31216265ac19d0dde #10023 + - bunch of others that are completed + - `NTLM_WB_ENABLED` is implemented in a basic form, and now also + scheduled for removal, so a TODO at this point isn't useful. - CI: - - add a chache for building mod_h2 + And this 'to-check' item: - Closes #11527 + Q: "The cmake build selected to run gcc with -fPIC on my box while the + plain configure script did not." -- CI ngtcp2+quictls: use nghttpx cache as in quiche build + A: With CMake, since 2ebc74c36a19a1700af394c16855ce144d9878e3 #11546 + and fc9bfb14520712672b4784e8b48256fb29204011 #11627, we explicitly + enable PIC for libcurl shared lib. Or when building libcurl for + shared and static lib in a single pass. We do this by default for + Windows or when enabled by the user via `SHARE_LIB_OBJECT`. + Otherwise we don't touch this setting. Meaning the default set by + CMake (if any) or the toolchain is used. On Debian Bookworm, this + means that PIC is disabled for static libs by default. Some platforms + (like macOS), has PIC enabled by default. + autotools supports the double-pass mode only, and in that case + CMake seems to match PIC behaviour now (as tested on Linux with gcc.) -Jay Satiro (27 Jul 2023) + Follow-up to 5d5dfdbd1a6c40bd75e982b66f49e1fa3a7eeae7 #12500 -- bearssl: don't load CA certs when peer verification is disabled + Reviewed-by: Jay Satiro + Closes #12509 - We already do this for other SSL backends. +Stefan Eissing (12 Dec 2023) - Bug: https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11457#issuecomment-1644587473 - Reported-by: kyled-dell@users.noreply.github.com +- CLIENT-WRITERS: design and use documentation - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11497 + Closes #12507 -Daniel Stenberg (26 Jul 2023) +Viktor Szakats (12 Dec 2023) -- easy: remove #ifdefs to make code easier on the eye +- cmake: delete obsolete TODO items [ci skip] - Closes #11525 + There is always room for improvement, but CMake is up to par now with + autotools, so there is no longer a good reason to keep around these + inline TODO items. -Stefan Eissing (26 Jul 2023) + Answering one of questions: -- GHA: adding quiche workflow + Q: "The gcc command line use neither -g nor any -O options. As a + developer, I also treasure our configure scripts's --enable-debug + option that sets a long range of "picky" compiler options." - - adding separate quiche workflow to also build nghttpx server for testing + A: CMake offers the `CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE` variable to control debug info + and optimization level. E.g.: + - `Release` = `-O3` + no debug info + - `MinSizeRel` = `-Os` + no debug info + - `Debug` = `-O0` + debug info - Closes #11517 + https://stackoverflow.com/questions/48754619/what-are-cmake-build-type-deb + ug-release-relwithdebinfo-and-minsizerel/59314670#59314670 + https://cmake.org/cmake/help/latest/manual/cmake-buildsystem.7.html#defaul + t-and-custom-configurations -Version 8.2.1 (26 Jul 2023) + For picky warnings we have the `PICKY_COMPILER` options, enabled by + default. -Daniel Stenberg (26 Jul 2023) + Closes #12500 -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced +Stefan Eissing (11 Dec 2023) - curl 8.2.1 release +- CONNECTION-FILTERS: update documentation -- THANKS: add contributors from 8.2.1 + Closes #12497 -- docs: provide more see also for cipher options +Daniel Stenberg (11 Dec 2023) - More cross references. Hide nroff errors. +- lib: reduce use of strncpy - Closes #11513 + - bearssl: select cipher without buffer copies + - http_aws_sigv4: avoid strncpy, require exact timestamp length + - http_aws_sigv4: use memcpy isntead of strncpy + - openssl: avoid strncpy calls + - schannel: check for 1.3 algos without buffer copies + - strerror: avoid strncpy calls + - telnet: avoid strncpy, return error on too long inputs + - vtls: avoid strncpy in multissl_version() -- docs: mark two TLS options for TLS, not SSL + Closes #12499 - Closes #11514 +- CI/distcheck: run full tests -Brad Harder (25 Jul 2023) + To be able to detect missing files better, this now runs the full CI + test suite. If done before, it would have detected #12462 before + release. -- curl_multi_wait.3: fix arg quoting to doc macro .BR + Closes #12503 - Closes #11511 +- docs: clean up Protocols: for cmdline options -Daniel Stenberg (24 Jul 2023) + ... and some other minor polish. -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced + Closes #12496 -Viktor Szakats (24 Jul 2023) +- cmdline/gen: fix the sorting of the man page options -- cmake: update ngtcp2 detection + They were previously sorted based on the file names, which use a .d + extension, making "data" get placed after "data-binary" etc. Making the + sort ignore the extention fixes the ordering. - Replace `OpenSSL` with `quictls` to follow the same change - in the v0.17.0 ngtcp2 release. + Reported-by: Boris Verkhovskiy + Bug: https://curl.se/mail/archive-2023-12/0014.html + Closes #12494 - Follow-up to e0093b4b732f6495b0fb1cd6747cbfedcdcf63ed +Daniel Gustafsson (9 Dec 2023) - Closes #11508 +- doh: remove unused local variable -Stefan Eissing (24 Jul 2023) + The nurl variable is no longer used during probing following + a refactoring, so remove. -- http: VLH, very large header test and fixes + Closes #12491 - - adding tests using very large passwords in auth - - fixes general http sending to treat h3 like h2, and - not like http1.1 - - eliminate H2_HEADER max definitions and use the commmon - DYN_HTTP_REQUEST everywhere, different limits do not help - - fix http2 handling of requests denied by nghttp2 on send - to immediately report the refused stream +Jay Satiro (8 Dec 2023) - Closes #11509 +- build: fix Windows ADDRESS_FAMILY detection -Andrei Rybak (23 Jul 2023) + - Include winsock2.h for Windows ADDRESS_FAMILY detection. -- CONTRIBUTE: drop mention of copyright year ranges + Prior to this change cmake detection didn't work because it included + ws2def.h by itself, which is missing needed types from winsock2.h. - Year ranges in copyrights were dropped in commits [1] and [2]. - Verification of year ranges in copyrights was dropped from script - 'scripts/copyright.pl' in commit [3]. However, the corresponding - passages in file 'docs/CONTRIBUTE.md' weren't updated. + Prior to this change autotools detection didn't work because it did not + include any Windows header. - Drop mentions of copyright year ranges from 'docs/CONTRIBUTE.md'. + In both cases libcurl would fall back on unsigned short as the address + family type, which is the same as ADDRESS_FAMILY. - [1] 2bc1d775f (copyright: update all copyright lines and remove year - ranges, 2023-01-02) - [2] c46761bd8 (tests/http: remove year ranges from copyrights, - 2023-03-14) - [3] 0e293bacb (copyright.pl: cease doing year verifications, 2023-01-28) + Co-authored-by: Viktor Szakats - Closes #11504 + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12441 -- CONTRIBUTE: fix syntax in commit message description +Daniel Stenberg (8 Dec 2023) - File 'docs/CONTRIBUTE.md' includes a description of how one should write - commit messages in the curl project. Different possible parts of the - message are enclosed in square brackets. One exception is the section - describing how the curl project doesn't use "Signed-off-by" commit - trailers [1], which is enclosed in an opening curly brace paired with a - closing square bracket. +- lib: rename Curl_strndup to Curl_memdup0 to avoid misunderstanding - Fix the enclosing square brackets in description of "Signed-off-by" - trailers in commit messages in file 'docs/CONTRIBUTE.md'. + Since the copy does not stop at a null byte, let's not call it anything + that makes you think it works like the common strndup() function. - [1] See description of option '--signoff' in Git documentation: - https://git-scm.com/docs/git-commit + Based on feedback from Jay Satiro, Stefan Eissing and Patrick Monnerat - Closes #11504 + Closes #12490 -Daniel Stenberg (23 Jul 2023) +- convsrctest.pl: removed: not used, not shipped in tarballs -- src/mkhelp: strip off escape sequences +- tests: rename tests scripts to the test number - At some point the nroff command stopped stripping off escape sequences, - so then this script needs to do the job instead. + It is hard to name the scripts sensibly. Lots of them are similarly + named and the name did not tell which test that used them. - Reported-by: VictorVG on github - Fixes #11501 - Closes #11503 + The new approach is rather to name them based on the test number that + runs them. Also helps us see which scripts are for individual tests + rather than for general test infra. -- KNOWN_BUGS: building for old macOS fails with gcc + - badsymbols.pl -> test1167.pl + - check-deprecated.pl -> test1222.pl + - check-translatable-options.pl -> test1544.pl + - disable-scan.pl -> test1165.pl + - error-codes.pl -> test1175.pl + - errorcodes.pl -> test1477.pl + - extern-scan.pl -> test1135.pl + - manpage-scan.pl -> test1139.pl + - manpage-syntax.pl -> test1173.pl + - markdown-uppercase.pl -> test1275.pl + - mem-include-scan.pl -> test1132.pl + - nroff-scan.pl -> test1140.pl + - option-check.pl -> test1276.pl + - options-scan.pl -> test971.pl + - symbol-scan.pl -> test1119.pl + - version-scan.pl -> test1177.pl - Closes #11441 + Closes #12487 -Jacob Hoffman-Andrews (22 Jul 2023) +Michał Antoniak (8 Dec 2023) -- rustls: update rustls-ffi 0.10.0 +- sendf: fix compiler warning with CURL_DISABLE_HEADERS_API - This brings in version 0.21.0 of the upstream rustls implementation, - which notable includes support for IP address certificates. + fix MSVC warning C4189: 'htype': local variable is initialized but not + referenced - when CURL_DISABLE_HEADERS_API is defined. - Closes #10865 + Closes #12485 -Brad Harder (22 Jul 2023) +Viktor Szakats (8 Dec 2023) -- websocket: rename arguments/variables to match docs +- tidy-up: whitespace - Pedantry/semantic-alignment between functions, docs, comments with - respect to websocket protocol code; No functional change intended. + Closes #12484 - * "totalsize", "framesize" becomes "fragsize" (we deal in frame fragments). +Stefan Eissing (7 Dec 2023) - * "sendflags" becomes "flags" +- test_02_download: fix paramters to test_02_27 - * use canonical CURL *handle + - it is a special client that only ever uses http/2 - Closes #11493 + Closes #12467 -Jan Macku (21 Jul 2023) +Michał Antoniak (7 Dec 2023) -- bug_report: use issue forms instead of markdown template +- vtls: remove the Curl_cft_ssl_proxy object if CURL_DISABLE_PROXY - Issue forms allow you to define web-like input forms using YAML - syntax. It allows you to guide the reporter to get the required - information. + Closes #12459 - Signed-off-by: Jan Macku - Closes #11474 +Daniel Stenberg (7 Dec 2023) -Daniel Stenberg (21 Jul 2023) +- lib: strndup/memdup instead of malloc, memcpy and null-terminate -- TODO: Obey Retry-After in redirects + - bufref: use strndup + - cookie: use strndup + - formdata: use strndup + - ftp: use strndup + - gtls: use aprintf instead of malloc + strcpy * 2 + - http: use strndup + - mbedtls: use strndup + - md4: use memdup + - ntlm: use memdup + - ntlm_sspi: use strndup + - pingpong: use memdup + - rtsp: use strndup instead of malloc, memcpy and null-terminate + - sectransp: use strndup + - socks_gssapi.c: use memdup + - vtls: use dynbuf instead of malloc, snprintf and memcpy + - vtls: use strdup instead of malloc + memcpy + - wolfssh: use strndup - (remove "Set custom client ip when using haproxy protocol" which was - shipped in 8.2.0) + Closes #12453 - Mentioned-by: Yair Lenga - Closes #11447 +- strdup: remove the memchr check from Curl_strndup -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced + It makes it possible to clone a binary chunk of data. -Oliver Roberts (21 Jul 2023) + Closes #12453 -- amissl: fix AmiSSL v5 detection +- ftp: handle the PORT parsing without allocation - Due to changes in the AmiSSL SDK, the detection needed adjusting. + Also reduces amount of *cpy() calls. - Closes #11477 + Closes #12456 -Alois Klink (21 Jul 2023) +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced -- unittest/makefile: remove unneeded unit1621_LDADD + Bumped to 8.5.1 - The `unit1621_LDADD` variable has the exact same value as the `LDADD` - flag in `Makefile.am`, except without `@LDFLAGS@ @LIBCURL_LIBS@`. +- url: for disabled protocols, mention if found in redirect - This was originally added by [98e6629][], but I can't see any reason - why it exists, so we should remove it to clean things up. + To help users better understand where the URL (and denied scheme) comes + from. Also removed "in libcurl" from the message, since the disabling + can be done by the application. - [98e6629]: https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/98e6629154044e4ab1ee7cff8351c7 - ebcb131e88 + The error message now says "not supported" or "disabled" depending on + why it was denied: - Closes #11494 + Protocol "hej" not supported + Protocol "http" disabled -- unittest/makefile: remove unneeded unit1394_LDADD + And in redirects: - These custom `unit1394_LDADD` and similar automake overrides are no - longer neded. They were originally added by added by [8dac7be][] for - metalink support, but are no longer after [265b14d][] removed metalink. + Protocol "hej" not supported (in redirect) + Protocol "http" disabled (in redirect) - [8dac7be]: https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/8dac7be438512a8725d3c71e9139bd - fdcac1ed8c - [265b14d]: https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/265b14d6b37c4298bd5556fabcbc37 - d36f911693 + Reported-by: Mauricio Scheffer + Fixes #12465 + Closes #12469 - Closes #11494 +Stefan Eissing (6 Dec 2023) -- cmake: add `libcurlu`/`libcurltool` for unit tests +- sectransp_ make TLSCipherNameForNumber() available in non-verbose config - Add a `libcurlu`/`libcurltool` static library that is compiled only for - unit tests. We use `EXCLUDE_FROM_ALL` to make sure that they're not - built by default, they're only built if unit tests are built. + Reported-by: Cajus Pollmeier + Closes #12476 + Fixes #12474 - These libraries allow us to compile every unit test with CMake. +YX Hao (6 Dec 2023) - Closes #11446 +- lib: fix variable undeclared error caused by `infof` changes -Daniel Stenberg (21 Jul 2023) + `--disable-verbose` yields `CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS` defined. + `infof` isn't `Curl_nop_stmt` anymore: dac293c. -- test979: test -u with redirect to (the same) absolute host + Follow-up to dac293c - Verifies #11492 + Closes #12470 -- transfer: do not clear the credentials on redirect to absolute URL +Viktor Szakats (6 Dec 2023) - Makes test 979 work. Regression shipped in 8.2.0 from commit - dd4d1a26959f63a2c +- tidy-up: fix yamllint whitespace issues in labeler.yml - Fixes #11486 - Reported-by: Cloudogu Siebels - Closes #11492 + Follow-up to bda212911457c6fadfbba50be61afc4ca513fa56 #12466 -Jon Rumsey (20 Jul 2023) + Reviewed-by: Dan Fandrich + Closes #12475 -- os400: correct EXPECTED_STRING_LASTZEROTERMINATED +- tidy-up: fix yamllint whitespace issues - Correct EXPECTED_STRING_LASTZEROTERMINATED to account for - CURLOPT_HAPROXY_CLIENT_IP which requires EBCDIC to ASCII conversion when - passed into curl_easy_setopt(). + Closes #12466 - Closes #11476 +Chris Sauer (6 Dec 2023) -Oliver Roberts (20 Jul 2023) +- cmake: fix typo -- amissl: add missing signal.h include + Follow-up to aace27b + Closes #12464 - In some environments, signal.h is already included, but not in others - which cause compilation to fail, so explictly include it. +Daniel Stenberg (6 Dec 2023) - Closes #11478 +- dist: add tests/errorcodes.pl to the tarball -- amigaos: fix sys/mbuf.h m_len macro clash + Used by test 1477 - The updated Curl_http_req_make and Curl_http_req_make2 functions spawned - a parameter called m_len. The AmigaOS networking headers, derived from - NetBSD, contain "#define m_len m_hdr.mh_len" which clashes with - this. Since we do not actually use mbuf, force the include file to be - ignored, removing the clash. + Reported-by: Xi Ruoyao + Follow-up to 0ca3a4ec9a7 + Fixes #12462 + Closes #12463 - Closes #11479 +Dan Fandrich (6 Dec 2023) -Daniel Stenberg (20 Jul 2023) +- github/labeler: update a missed key in the v5 upgrade -- socks: print ipv6 address within brackets + Follow-up to ce03fe3ba - Fixes #11483 - Closes #11484 +Version 8.5.0 (6 Dec 2023) -Christian Schmitz (20 Jul 2023) +Daniel Stenberg (6 Dec 2023) -- libcurl-errors.3: add CURLUE_OK +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced - Closes #11488 + The curl 8.5.0 release. -Oliver Roberts (20 Jul 2023) +Dan Fandrich (5 Dec 2023) -- cfilters: rename close/connect functions to avoid clashes +- github/labeler: switch from the beta to labeler v5 - Rename `close` and `connect` in `struct Curl_cftype` for - consistency and to avoid clashes with macros of the same name - (the standard AmigaOS networking connect() function is implemented - via a macro). + Some keys were renamed and the dot option was made default. - Closes #11491 + Closes #12458 -Stefan Eissing (20 Jul 2023) +Daniel Stenberg (5 Dec 2023) -- http2: fix regression on upload EOF handling +- DEPRECATE: remove NTLM_WB in June 2024 - - a regression introduced by c9ec85121110d7cbbbed2990024222c8f5b8afe5 - where optimization of small POST bodies leads to a new code path - for such uploads that did not trigger the "done sending" event - - add triggering this event for early "upload_done" situations + Ref: https://curl.se/mail/lib-2023-12/0010.html - Fixes #11485 - Closes #11487 - Reported-by: Aleksander Mazur + Closes #12451 -Daniel Stenberg (19 Jul 2023) +Jacob Hoffman-Andrews (4 Dec 2023) -- configure: check for nghttp2_session_get_stream_local_window_size +- rustls: implement connect_blocking - The http2 code uses it now. Introduced in nghttp2 1.15.0 (Sep 2016) + Closes #11647 - Fixes #11470 - Reported-by: Paul Howarth - Closes #11473 +Daniel Stenberg (4 Dec 2023) -Stefan Eissing (19 Jul 2023) +- examples/rtsp-options.c: add -- quiche: fix segfault and other things + Just a bare bones RTSP example using CURLOPT_RTSP_SESSION_ID and + CURLOPT_RTSP_REQUEST set to CURL_RTSPREQ_OPTIONS. - - refs #11449 where a segfault is reported when IP Eyeballing did - not immediately connect but made several attempts - - The transfer initiating the eyeballing was initialized too early, - leadding to references to the filter instance that was then - replaced in the subsequent eyeball attempts. That led to a use - after free in the buffer handling for the transfer - - transfers are initiated now more lazy (like in the ngtcp2 filter), - when the stream is actually opened - - suppress reporting on quiche event errors for "other" transfers - than the current one to not fail a transfer due to faults in - another one. - - revert recent return value handling for quiche_h3_recv_body() - to not indicate an error but an EAGAIN situation. We wish quiche - would document what functions return. + Closes #12452 - Fixes #11449 - Closes #11469 - Reported-by: ウさん +Stefan Eissing (4 Dec 2023) -Daniel Stenberg (19 Jul 2023) +- ngtcp2: ignore errors on unknown streams -- hostip: return IPv6 first for localhost resolves + - expecially in is_alive checks on connections, we might + see incoming packets on streams already forgotten and closed, + leading to errors reported by nghttp3. Ignore those. - Fixes #11465 - Reported-by: Chilledheart on github - Closes #11466 + Closes #12449 -Harry Sintonen (19 Jul 2023) +Daniel Stenberg (4 Dec 2023) -- tool: fix tool_seek_cb build when SIZEOF_CURL_OFF_T > SIZEOF_OFF_T +- docs: make all examples in all libcurl man pages compile - - a variable was renamed, and some use of it wasn't. this fixes the - build. + Closes #12448 - Closes #11468 +- checksrc.pl: support #line instructions -Stefan Eissing (19 Jul 2023) + makes it identify the correct source file and line -- quiche: fix lookup of transfer at multi +- GHA/man-examples: verify libcurl man page examples - - refs #11449 where weirdness in quiche multi connection tranfers was - observed - - fixes lookup of transfer for a quiche event to take the connection - into account - - formerly, a transfer with the same stream_id, but on another connection - could be found +- verify-examples.pl: verify that all man page examples compile clean - Closes #11462 +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced -Daniel Stenberg (19 Jul 2023) +Graham Campbell (2 Dec 2023) -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced +- http3: bump ngtcp2 and nghttp3 versions - bump to 8.2.1 + nghttp3 v1.1.0 + ngtcp2 v1.1.0 -John Haugabook (19 Jul 2023) + In docs and CI -- ciphers.d: put URL in first column + Closes #12446 - This makes the URL turn into a link properly when "webified". +- CI/quiche: use `3.1.4+quic` consistently in CI workflows - Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl-www/issues/270 - Closes #11464 + Closes #12447 -Version 8.2.0 (19 Jul 2023) +Viktor Szakats (2 Dec 2023) -Daniel Stenberg (19 Jul 2023) +- test1545: disable deprecation warnings -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced + Fixes: + https://ci.appveyor.com/project/curlorg/curl/builds/48631551/job/bhx74e0i66yr + p6pk#L1205 - 8.2.0 release + Same with details: + https://ci.appveyor.com/project/curlorg/curl/builds/48662893/job/ol8a78q9gmil + b6wt#L1263 + ``` + tests/libtest/lib1545.c:38:3: error: 'curl_formadd' is deprecated: since 7.56 + .0. Use curl_mime_init() [-Werror=deprecated-declarations] + 38 | curl_formadd(&m_formpost, &lastptr, CURLFORM_COPYNAME, "file", + | ^~~~~~~~~~~~ + [...] + ``` -- THANKS-filter: strip out "GitHub" + Follow-up to 07a3cd83e0456ca17dfd8c3104af7cf45b7a1ff5 #12421 -- THANKS: add contributors from 8.2.0 + Fixes #12445 + Closes #12444 -- RELEASE-PROCEDURE.md: adjust the release dates +Daniel Stenberg (2 Dec 2023) -Stefan Eissing (17 Jul 2023) +- INSTALL: update list of ports and CPU archs -- quiche: fix defects found in latest coverity report +- symbols-in-versions: the CLOSEPOLICY options are deprecated - Closes #11455 + The were used with the CURLOPT_CLOSEPOLICY option, which *never* worked. -Daniel Stenberg (17 Jul 2023) +z2_ (1 Dec 2023) -- quiche: avoid NULL deref in debug logging +- build: fix builds that disable protocols but not digest auth - Coverity reported "Dereference after null check" + - Build base64 functions if digest auth is not disabled. - If stream is NULL and the function exits, the logging must not deref it. + Prior to this change if some protocols were disabled but not digest auth + then a build error would occur due to missing base64 functions. - Closes #11454 + Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/12440 + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12442 -Stefan Eissing (17 Jul 2023) +Michał Antoniak (1 Dec 2023) -- http2: treat initial SETTINGS as a WINDOW_UPDATE +- connect: reduce number of transportation providers - - refs #11426 where spurious stalls on large POST requests - are reported - - the issue seems to involve the following - * first stream on connection adds up to 64KB of POST - data, which is the max default HTTP/2 stream window size - transfer is set to HOLD - * initial SETTINGS from server arrive, enlarging the stream - window. But no WINDOW_UPDATE is received. - * curl stalls - - the fix un-HOLDs a stream on receiving SETTINGS, not - relying on a WINDOW_UPDATE from lazy servers + Use only the ones necessary - the ones that are built-in. Saves a few + bytes in the resulting code. - Closes #11450 + Closes #12438 -Daniel Stenberg (17 Jul 2023) +David Benjamin (1 Dec 2023) -- ngtcp2: assigning timeout, but value is overwritten before used +- vtls: consistently use typedef names for OpenSSL structs - Reported by Coverity + The foo_st names don't appear in OpenSSL public API documentation. The + FOO typedefs are more common. This header was already referencing + SSL_CTX via . There is a comment about avoiding + , but OpenSSL actually declares all the typedefs in + , which is already included by (and + every other OpenSSL header), so just use that. Though I've included it + just to be explicit. - Closes #11453 + (I'm also fairly sure including already triggers the + Schannel conflicts anyway. The comment was probably just out of date.) -- krb5: add typecast to please Coverity + Closes #12439 -Derzsi Dániel (16 Jul 2023) +Lau (1 Dec 2023) -- wolfssl: support setting CA certificates as blob +- libcurl-security.3: fix typo - Closes #11445 + Fixed minimal typo. -- wolfssl: detect when TLS 1.2 support is not built into wolfssl + Closes #12437 - Closes #11444 +Stefan Eissing (1 Dec 2023) -Graham Campbell (15 Jul 2023) +- ngtcp2: fix races in stream handling -- CI: bump nghttp2 from 1.55.0 to 1.55.1 + - fix cases where ngtcp2 invokes callbacks on streams that + nghttp3 has already forgotten. Ignore the NGHTTP3_ERR_STREAM_NOT_FOUND + in these cases as it is normal behaviour. - Closes #11442 + Closes #12435 -Daniel Stenberg (15 Jul 2023) +Emanuele Torre (1 Dec 2023) -- curl: return error when asked to use an unsupported HTTP version +- tool_writeout_json: fix JSON encoding of non-ascii bytes - When one of the following options are used but the libcurl in use does - not support it: + char variables if unspecified can be either signed or unsigned depending + on the platform according to the C standard; in most platforms, they are + signed. - --http2 - --http2-prior-knowledge - --proxy-http2 + This meant that the *i<32 waas always true for bytes with the top bit + set. So they were always getting encoded as \uXXXX, and then since they + were also signed negative, they were getting extended with 1s causing + '\xe2' to be expanded to \uffffffe2, for example: - Closes #11440 + $ curl --variable 'v=“' --expand-write-out '{{v:json}}\n' file:///dev/nul + l + \uffffffe2\uffffff80\uffffff9c -Chris Paulson-Ellis (14 Jul 2023) + I fixed this bug by making the code use explicitly unsigned char* + variables instead of char* variables. -- cf-socket: don't bypass fclosesocket callback if cancelled before connect + Test 268 verifies - After upgrading to 8.1.2 from 7.84.0, I found that sockets were being - closed without calling the fclosesocket callback if a request was - cancelled after the associated socket was created, but before the socket - was connected. This lead to an imbalance of fopensocket & fclosesocket - callbacks, causing problems with a custom event loop integration using - the multi-API. + Reported-by: iconoclasthero + Closes #12434 - This was caused by cf_socket_close() calling sclose() directly instead - of calling socket_close() if the socket was not active. For regular TCP - client connections, the socket is activated by cf_socket_active(), which - is only called when the socket completes the connect. +Stefan Eissing (1 Dec 2023) - As far as I can tell, this issue has existed since 7.88.0. That is, - since the code in question was introduced by: - commit 71b7e0161032927cdfb4e75ea40f65b8898b3956 - Author: Stefan Eissing - Date: Fri Dec 30 09:14:55 2022 +0100 +- cf-socket: TCP trace output local address used in connect - lib: connect/h2/h3 refactor + Closes #12427 - Closes #11439 +Jay Satiro (1 Dec 2023) -Daniel Stenberg (13 Jul 2023) +- CURLINFO_PRETRANSFER_TIME_T.3: fix time explanation -- tool_parsecfg: accept line lengths up to 10M + - Change CURLINFO_PRETRANSFER_TIME_T explanation to say that it + includes protocol-specific instructions that trigger a transfer. - Bumped from 100K set in 47dd957daff9 + Prior to this change it explicitly said that it did not include those + instructions in the time, but that is incorrect. - Reported-by: Antoine du Hamel - Fixes #11431 - Closes #11435 + The change is a copy of the fixed explanation already in + CURLINFO_PRETRANSFER_TIME, fixed by ec8dcd7b. -Stefan Eissing (13 Jul 2023) + Reported-by: eeverettrbx@users.noreply.github.com -- CI: brew fix for openssl in default path + Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/12431 + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12432 - If brew install/update links openssl into /usr/local, it will be found - before anything we add with `-isystem path` to CPP/LDLFAGS. Get rid of - that by unlinking the keg. +Daniel Stenberg (30 Nov 2023) - Fixes #11413 - Closes #11436 +- multi: during ratelimit multi_getsock should return no sockets -Daniel Stenberg (13 Jul 2023) + ... as there is nothing to wait for then, it just waits. Otherwise, this + causes much more CPU work and updates than necessary during ratelimit + periods. -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced + Ref: https://curl.se/mail/lib-2023-11/0056.html + Closes #12430 -Ondřej Koláček (13 Jul 2023) +Dmitry Karpov (30 Nov 2023) -- sectransp: fix EOF handling +- transfer: abort pause send when connection is marked for closing - Regression since the large refactor from 2022 + This handles cases of some bi-directional "upgrade" scenarios + (i.e. WebSockets) where sending is paused until some "upgrade" handshake + is completed, but server rejects the handshake and closes the + connection. - Closes #11427 + Closes #12428 -Daniel Stenberg (13 Jul 2023) +Daniel Stenberg (28 Nov 2023) -- checksrc: quote the file name to work with "funny" letters +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced - Closes #11437 +- openssl: when a session-ID is reused, skip OCSP stapling -Karthikdasari0423 (13 Jul 2023) + Fixes #12399 + Reported-by: Alexey Larikov + Closes #12418 -- HTTP3.md: ngtcp2 updated to v0.17.0 and nghttp3 to v0.13.0 +- test1545: test doing curl_formadd twice with missing file - Follow-up to e0093b4b732f6 + Reproduces #12410 + Verifies the fix + Closes #12421 - Closes #11433 +- Curl_http_body: cleanup properly when Curl_getformdata errors -Daniel Stenberg (13 Jul 2023) + Reported-by: yushicheng7788 on github + Based-on-work-by: yushicheng7788 on github + Fixes #12410 + Closes #12421 -- CURLOPT_MIMEPOST.3: clarify what setting to NULL means +- test1477: verify that libcurl-errors.3 and public headers are synced - Follow-up to e08382a208d4e480 + The script errorcodes.pl extracts all error codes from all headers and + checks that they are all documented, then checks that all documented + error codes are also specified in a header file. - Closes #11430 + Closes #12424 -Tatsuhiro Tsujikawa (12 Jul 2023) +- libcurl-errors.3: sync with current public headers -- ngtcp2: build with 0.17.0 and nghttp3 0.13.0 + Closes #12424 - - ngtcp2_crypto_openssl was renamed to ngtcp2_crypto_quictls. +Stefan Eissing (28 Nov 2023) - Closes #11428 +- test459: fix for parallel runs -- CI: Bump ngtcp2, nghttp3, and nghttp2 + - change warniing message to work better with varying filename + length. + - adapt test output check to new formatting - Closes #11428 + Follow-up to 97ccc4479f77ba3191c6 + Closes #12423 -James Fuller (11 Jul 2023) +Daniel Stenberg (27 Nov 2023) -- example/maxconnects: set maxconnect example +- tool_cb_prg: make the carriage return fit for wide progress bars - Closes #11343 + When the progress bar was made max width (256 columns), the fly() + function attempted to generate its output buffer too long so that the + trailing carriage return would not fit and then the output would show + wrongly. The fly function is called when the expected total transfer is + unknown, which could be one or more progress calls before the actual + progress meter get shown when the expected transfer size is provided. -Pontakorn Prasertsuk (11 Jul 2023) + This new take also replaces the msnprintf() call with a much simpler + memset() for speed. -- http2: send HEADER & DATA together if possible + Reported-by: Tim Hill + Fixes #12407 + Closes #12415 - Closes #11420 +- tool_parsecfg: make warning output propose double-quoting -Daniel Stenberg (11 Jul 2023) + When the config file parser detects a word that *probably* should be + quoted, mention double-quotes as a possible remedy. -- CI: use wolfSSL 5.6.3 in builds + Test 459 verifies. - No using master anymore + Proposed-by: Jiehong on github + Fixes #12409 + Closes #12412 - Closes #11424 +Jay Satiro (26 Nov 2023) -SaltyMilk (11 Jul 2023) +- curl.rc: switch out the copyright symbol for plain ASCII -- fopen: optimize + .. like we already do for libcurl.rc. - Closes #11419 + libcurl.rc copyright symbol used to cause a "non-ascii 8-bit codepoint" + warning so it was switched to ascii. -Daniel Stenberg (11 Jul 2023) + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/1ca62bb5#commitcomment-133474972 -- cmake: make use of snprintf + Suggested-by: Robert Southee - Follow-up to 935b1bd4544a23a91d68 + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12403 - Closes #11423 +Daniel Stenberg (26 Nov 2023) -Stefan Eissing (11 Jul 2023) +- conncache: use the closure handle when disconnecting surplus connections -- macOS: fix taget detection + Use the closure handle for disconnecting connection cache entries so + that anything that happens during the disconnect is not stored and + associated with the 'data' handle which already just finished a transfer + and it is important that details from the unrelated disconnect does not + taint meta-data in the data handle. - - TARGET_OS_OSX is not always defined on macOS - - this leads to missing symbol Curl_macos_init() - - TargetConditionals.h seems to define these only when - dynamic targets are enabled (somewhere?) - - this PR fixes that on my macOS 13.4.1 - - I have no clue why CI builds worked without it + Like storing the response code. - Follow-up to c7308592fb8ba213fc2c1 - Closes #11417 + This also adjust test 1506. Unfortunately it also removes a key part of + the test that verifies that a connection is closed since when this + output vanishes (because the closure handle is used), we don't know + exactly that the connection actually gets closed in this test... -Stan Hu (9 Jul 2023) + Reported-by: ohyeaah on github + Fixes #12367 + Closes #12405 -- hostip.c: Move macOS-specific calls into global init call +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced - https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/7121 introduced a macOS system call - to `SCDynamicStoreCopyProxies`, which is invoked every time an IP - address needs to be resolved. +Stefan Eissing (24 Nov 2023) - However, this system call is not thread-safe, and macOS will kill the - process if the system call is run first in a fork. To make it possible - for the parent process to call this once and prevent the crash, only - invoke this system call in the global initialization routine. +- quic: make eyeballers connect retries stop at weird replies - In addition, this change is beneficial because it: + - when a connect immediately goes into DRAINING state, do + not attempt retries in the QUIC connection filter. Instead, + return CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY + - When eyeballing, interpret CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY as an + inconclusive answer. When all addresses have been attempted, + rewind the address list once on an inconclusive answer. + - refs #11832 where connects were retried indefinitely until + the overall timeout fired - 1. Avoids extra macOS system calls for every IP lookup. - 2. Consolidates macOS-specific initialization in a separate file. + Closes #12400 - Fixes #11252 - Closes #11254 +Daniel Stenberg (24 Nov 2023) -Daniel Stenberg (9 Jul 2023) +- CI: verify libcurl function SYNPOSIS sections -- docs: use a space after RFC when spelling out RFC numbers + With the .github/scripits/verify-synopsis.pl script - Closes #11382 + Closes #12402 -Margu (9 Jul 2023) +- docs/libcurl: SYNSOPSIS cleanup -- imap-append.c: update to make it more likely to work + - use the correct include file + - make sure they are declared as in the header file + - fix minor nroff syntax mistakes (missing .fi) - Fixes #10300 - Closes #11397 + These are verified by verify-synopsis.pl, which extracts the SYNPOSIS + code and runs it through gcc. -Emanuele Torre (9 Jul 2023) + Closes #12402 -- tool_writeout_json: fix encoding of control characters +- sendf: fix comment typo - Control characters without a special escape sequence e.g. %00 or %06 - were being encoded as "u0006" instead of "\u0006". +- fopen: allocate the dir after fopen - Ref: https://github.com/curl/trurl/pull/214#discussion_r1257487858 - Closes #11414 + Move the allocation of the directory name down to after the fopen() call + to allow that shortcut code path to avoid a superfluous malloc+free + cycle. -Stefan Eissing (9 Jul 2023) + Follow-up to 73b65e94f35311 -- http3/ngtcp2: upload EAGAIN handling + Closes #12398 - - refs #11389 where IDLE timeouts on upload are reported - - reword ngtcp2 expiry handling to apply to both send+recv - calls into the filter - - EAGAIN uploads similar to the recent changes in HTTP/2, e.g. - report success only when send data was ACKed. - - HOLD sending of EAGAINed uploads to avoid cpu busy loops - - rename internal function for consistency with HTTP/2 - implementation +Stefan Eissing (24 Nov 2023) - Fixes #11389 - Closes #11390 +- transfer: cleanup done+excess handling -Brian Nixon (9 Jul 2023) + - add `SingleRequest->download_done` as indicator that + all download bytes have been received + - remove `stop_reading` bool from readwrite functions + - move excess body handling into client download writer -- tool_easysrc.h: correct `easysrc_perform` for `CURL_DISABLE_LIBCURL_OPTION` + Closes #12371 - Closes #11398 +Daniel Stenberg (23 Nov 2023) -Daniel Stenberg (9 Jul 2023) +- fopen: create new file using old file's mode -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced + Because the function renames the temp file to the target name as a last + step, if the file was previously owned by a different user, not ORing + the old mode could otherwise end up creating a file that was no longer + readable by the original owner after save. -- transfer: clear credentials when redirecting to absolute URL + Reported-by: Loïc Yhuel + Fixes #12299 + Closes #12395 - Make sure the user and password for the second request is taken from the - redirected-to URL. +- test1476: require proxy - Add test case 899 to verify. + Follow-up from 323df4261c3542 - Reported-by: James Lucas - Fixes #11410 - Closes #11412 + Closes #12394 -Stefan Eissing (8 Jul 2023) +- fopen: create short(er) temporary file name -- hyper: fix EOF handling on input + Only using random letters in the name plus a ".tmp" extension. Not by + appending characters to the final file name. - We ran out of disc space due to an infinite loop with debug logging + Reported-by: Maksymilian Arciemowicz - Fixes #11377 - Closes #11385 - Reported-by: Dan Fandrich + Closes #12388 -- http2: raise header limitations above and beyond +Stefan Eissing (23 Nov 2023) - - not quite to infinity - - rewrote the implementation of our internal HTTP/1.x request - parsing to work with very large lines using dynbufs. - - new default limit is `DYN_HTTP_REQUEST`, aka 1MB, which - is also the limit of curl's general HTTP request processing. +- tests: git ignore generated second-hsts.txt file - Fixes #11405 - Closes #11407 + File is generated in test lib1900 -Juan Cruz Viotti (8 Jul 2023) + Follow-up to 7cb03229d9e9c5 -- curl_easy_nextheader.3: add missing open parenthesis examples + Closes #12393 - Closes #11409 - Signed-off-by: Juan Cruz Viotti +Viktor Szakats (23 Nov 2023) -Dan Fandrich (7 Jul 2023) +- openssl: enable `infof_certstack` for 1.1 and LibreSSL 3.6 -- CI: enable verbose test output on pytest + Lower the barrier to enable `infof_certstack()` from OpenSSL 3 to + OpenSSL 1.1.x, and LibreSSL 3.6 or upper. - This shows individual pass/fail status on tests and makes this output - consistent with other jobs' pytest invocations. + With the caveat, that "group name" and "type name" are missing from + the log output with these TLS backends. -Stefan Eissing (28 Jun 2023) + Follow-up to b6e6d4ff8f253c8b8055bab9d4d6a10f9be109f3 #12030 -- http2: fix crash in handling stream weights + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Closes #12385 - - Delay the priority handling until the stream has been opened. +Daniel Stenberg (23 Nov 2023) - - Add test2404 to reproduce and verify. +- urldata: fix typo in comment - Weights may change "on the run", which is why there are checks in - general egress handling. These must not trigger when the stream has not - been opened yet. +- CI: codespell - Reported-by: jbgoog@users.noreply.github.com + The list of words to ignore is in the file + .github/scripts/codespell-ignore.txt - Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/11379 - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11384 + Closes #12390 -- tests/http: Add mod_h2 directive `H2ProxyRequests` +- lib: fix comment typos - master of mod_h2 now requires H2ProxyRequests directives for forward - proxying with HTTP/2 to work. + Five separate ones, found by codespell - Ref: https://github.com/icing/mod_h2/commit/3897a7086 + Closes #12390 - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11392 +- test1476: verify cookie PSL mixed case -Dan Fandrich (28 Jun 2023) +- cookie: lowercase the domain names before PSL checks -- CI: make Appveyor job names unique + Reported-by: Harry Sintonen - Two otherwise identical mingw-w64 jobs now have their differing compiler - versions mentioned in their names. + Closes #12387 -Sheshadri.V (25 Jun 2023) +Viktor Szakats (23 Nov 2023) -- curl.h: include for vxworks +- openssl: fix building with v3 `no-deprecated` + add CI test - Closes #11356 + - build quictls with `no-deprecated` in CI to have test coverage for + this OpenSSL 3 configuration. -Dan Fandrich (24 Jun 2023) + - don't call `OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms()`, `OpenSSL_add_all_digests()`. + The caller code is meant for OpenSSL 3, while these two functions were + only necessary before OpenSSL 1.1.0. They are missing from OpenSSL 3 + if built with option `no-deprecated`, causing build errors: + ``` + vtls/openssl.c:4097:3: error: call to undeclared function 'OpenSSL_add_all_ + algorithms'; ISO C99 and later do not support implicit function declaration + s [-Wimplicit-function-declaration] + vtls/openssl.c:4098:3: error: call to undeclared function 'OpenSSL_add_all_ + digests'; ISO C99 and later do not support implicit function declarations [ + -Wimplicit-function-declaration] + ``` + Ref: https://ci.appveyor.com/project/curlorg/curl-for-win/builds/48587418?f + ullLog=true#L7667 -- CI: enable parallel make in more builds + Regression from b6e6d4ff8f253c8b8055bab9d4d6a10f9be109f3 #12030 + Bug: https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/12380#issuecomment-1822944669 + Reviewed-by: Alex Bozarth - Most CI services provide at least two cores, so enable parallel make - jobs to take advantage of that for builds. Some dependencies aren't safe - to build in parallel so leave those as-is. Also, rename a few - workflows to eliminate duplicate names and provide a better idea what - they're about. + - vquic/curl_ngtcp2: fix using `SSL_get_peer_certificate` with + `no-deprecated` quictls 3 builds. + Do it by moving an existing solution for this from `vtls/openssl.c` + to `vtls/openssl.h` and adjusting caller code. + ``` + vquic/curl_ngtcp2.c:1950:19: error: implicit declaration of function 'SSL_g + et_peer_certificate'; did you mean 'SSL_get1_peer_certificate'? [-Wimplicit + -function-declaration] + ``` + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/actions/runs/6960723097/job/18940818625#s + tep:24:1178 -- CI: don't install impacket if tests are not run + - curl_ntlm_core: fix `-Wunused-parameter`, `-Wunused-variable` and + `-Wunused-function` when trying to build curl with NTLM enabled but + without the necessary TLS backend (with DES) support. - It just wastes time and bandwidth and isn't even used. + Closes #12384 -divinity76 (24 Jun 2023) +- curl.h: delete Symbian OS references -- configure: the --without forms of the options are also gone + curl deprecated Symbian OS in 3d64031fa7a80ac4ae3fd09a5939196268b92f81 + via #5989. Delete references to it from public headers, because there + is no fresh release to use those headers with. - --without-darwin-ssl and --without-metalink + Reviewed-by: Dan Fandrich + Reviewed-by: Jay Satiro + Closes #12378 - Closes #11378 +- windows: use built-in `_WIN32` macro to detect Windows -Daniel Stenberg (23 Jun 2023) + Windows compilers define `_WIN32` automatically. Windows SDK headers + or build env defines `WIN32`, or we have to take care of it. The + agreement seems to be that `_WIN32` is the preferred practice here. + Make the source code rely on that to detect we're building for Windows. -- configure: add check for ldap_init_fd + Public `curl.h` was using `WIN32`, `__WIN32__` and `CURL_WIN32` for + Windows detection, next to the official `_WIN32`. After this patch it + only uses `_WIN32` for this. Also, make it stop defining `CURL_WIN32`. - ... as otherwise the configure script will say it is OpenLDAP in the - summary, but not set the USE_OPENLDAP define, therefor not using the - intended OpenLDAP code paths. + There is a slight chance these break compatibility with Windows + compilers that fail to define `_WIN32`. I'm not aware of any obsolete + or modern compiler affected, but in case there is one, one possible + solution is to define this macro manually. - Regression since 4d7385446 (7.85.0) - Fixes #11372 - Closes #11374 - Reported-by: vlkl-sap on github + grepping for `WIN32` remains useful to discover Windows-specific code. -Michał Petryka (23 Jun 2023) + Also: -- cmake: stop CMake from quietly ignoring missing Brotli + - extend `checksrc` to ensure we're not using `WIN32` anymore. - The CMake project was set to `QUIET` for Brotli instead of - `REQUIRED`. This makes builds unexpectedly ignore missing Brotli even - when `CURL_BROTLI` is enabled. + - apply minor formatting here and there. - Closes #11376 + - delete unnecessary checks for `!MSDOS` when `_WIN32` is present. -Emanuele Torre (22 Jun 2023) + Co-authored-by: Jay Satiro + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg -- docs: add more .IP after .RE to fix indentation of generate paragraphs + Closes #12376 - follow-up from 099f41e097c030077b8ec078f2c2d4038d31353b +Stefan Eissing (22 Nov 2023) - I just thought of checking all the other files with .RE, and I found 6 - other files that were missing .IP at the end. +- url: ConnectionExists revisited - Closes #11375 + - have common pattern of `if not match, continue` + - revert pages long if()s to return early + - move dead connection check to later since it may + be relatively expensive + - check multiuse also when NOT building with NGHTTP2 + - for MULTIUSE bundles, verify that the inspected + connection indeed supports multiplexing when in use + (bundles may contain a mix of connection, afaict) -Stefan Eissing (22 Jun 2023) + Closes #12373 -- http2: h2 and h2-PROXY connection alive check fixes +Daniel Stenberg (22 Nov 2023) - - fix HTTP/2 check to not declare a connection dead when - the read attempt results in EAGAIN - - add H2-PROXY alive check as for HTTP/2 that was missing - and is needed - - add attach/detach around Curl_conn_is_alive() and remove - these in filter methods - - add checks for number of connections used in some test_10 - proxy tunneling tests +- CURLMOPT_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS: make sure the set value is within range - Closes #11368 + ... or use the default value. -- http2: error stream resets with code CURLE_HTTP2_STREAM + Also clarify the documentation language somewhat. - - refs #11357, where it was reported that HTTP/1.1 downgrades - no longer works - - fixed with suggested change - - added test_05_03 and a new handler in the curltest module - to reproduce that downgrades work + Closes #12382 - Fixes #11357 - Closes #11362 - Reported-by: Jay Satiro +- urldata: make maxconnects a 32 bit value -Daniel Stenberg (22 Jun 2023) + "2^32 idle connections ought to be enough for anybody" -- connect-timeout.d: mention that the DNS lookup is included + Closes #12375 - Closes #11370 +- FEATURES: update the URL phrasing -Emanuele Torre (22 Jun 2023) + The URL is length limited since a while back so "no limit" simply is not + true anymore. Mention the URL RFC standard used instead. -- quote.d: fix indentation of generated paragraphs + Closes #12383 - quote.d was missing a .IP at the end which caused the paragraphs - generated for See-also, Multi, and Example to not be indented correctly. +- wolfssh: remove redundant static prototypes - I also remove a redundant "This option can be used multiple times.", and - replaced .IP "item" with .TP .B "item" to make more clear which lines - are part of the list of commands and which aren't. + vssh/wolfssh.c:346:18: error: redundant redeclaration of ‘wscp_recv’ [-We + rror=redundant-decls] - Closes #11371 + Closes #12381 -Paul Wise (22 Jun 2023) +- setopt: remove superfluous use of ternary expressions -- checksrc: modernise perl file open + Closes #12374 - Use regular variables and separate file open modes from filenames. +- mime: store "form escape" as a single bit - Suggested by perlcritic + Closes #12374 - Copied from https://github.com/curl/trurl/commit/f2784a9240f47ee28a845 +- setopt: check CURLOPT_TFTP_BLKSIZE range on set - Closes #11358 + ... instead of later when the transfer is about to happen. -Dan Fandrich (21 Jun 2023) + Closes #12374 -- runtests: work around a perl without SIGUSR1 +Viktor Szakats (21 Nov 2023) - At least msys2 perl v5.32.1 doesn't seem to define this signal. Since - this signal is only used for debugging, just ignore if setting it fails. +- build: add more picky warnings and fix them - Reported-by: Marcel Raad - Fixes #11350 - Closes #11366 + Enable more picky compiler warnings. I've found these options in the + nghttp3 project when implementing the CMake quick picky warning + functionality for it [1]. -- runtests: include missing valgrind package + `-Wunused-macros` was too noisy to keep around, but fixed a few issues + it revealed while testing. - use valgrind was missing which caused torture tests with valgrind - enabled to fail. + - autotools: reflect the more precisely-versioned clang warnings. + Follow-up to 033f8e2a08eb1d3102f08c4d8c8e85470f8b460e #12324 + - autotools: sync between clang and gcc the way we set `no-multichar`. + - autotools: avoid setting `-Wstrict-aliasing=3` twice. + - autotools: disable `-Wmissing-noreturn` for MSYS gcc targets [2]. + It triggers in libtool-generated stub code. - Reported-by: Daniel Stenberg - Fixes #11364 - Closes #11365 + - lib/timeval: delete a redundant `!MSDOS` guard from a `WIN32` branch. -- runtests: use more consistent failure lines + - lib/curl_setup.h: delete duplicate declaration for `fileno`. + Added in initial commit ae1912cb0d494b48d514d937826c9fe83ec96c4d + (1999-12-29). This suggests this may not be needed anymore, but if + it does, we may restore this for those specific (non-Windows) systems. + - lib: delete unused macro `FTP_BUFFER_ALLOCSIZE` since + c1d6fe2aaa5a26e49a69a4f2495b3cc7a24d9394. + - lib: delete unused macro `isxdigit_ascii` since + f65f750742068f579f4ee6d8539ed9d5f0afcb85. + - lib/mqtt: delete unused macro `MQTT_HEADER_LEN`. + - lib/multi: delete unused macro `SH_READ`/`SH_WRITE`. + - lib/hostip: add `noreturn` function attribute via new `CURL_NORETURN` + macro. + - lib/mprintf: delete duplicate declaration for `Curl_dyn_vprintf`. + - lib/rand: fix `-Wunreachable-code` and related fallouts [3]. + - lib/setopt: fix `-Wunreachable-code-break`. + - lib/system_win32 and lib/timeval: fix double declarations for + `Curl_freq` and `Curl_isVistaOrGreater` in CMake UNITY mode [4]. + - lib/warnless: fix double declarations in CMake UNITY mode [5]. + This was due to force-disabling the header guard of `warnless.h` to + to reapply it to source code coming after `warnless.c` in UNITY + builds. This reapplied declarations too, causing the warnings. + Solved by adding a header guard for the lines that actually need + to be reapplied. + - lib/vauth/digest: fix `-Wunreachable-code-break` [6]. + - lib/vssh/libssh2: fix `-Wunreachable-code-break` and delete redundant + block. + - lib/vtls/sectransp: fix `-Wunreachable-code-break` [7]. + - lib/vtls/sectransp: suppress `-Wunreachable-code`. + Detected in `else` branches of dynamic feature checks, with results + known at compile-time, e.g. + ```c + if(SecCertificateCopySubjectSummary) /* -> true */ + ``` + Likely fixable as a separate micro-project, but given SecureTransport + is deprecated anyway, let's just silence these locally. + - src/tool_help: delete duplicate declaration for `helptext`. + - src/tool_xattr: fix `-Wunreachable-code`. + - tests: delete duplicate declaration for `unitfail` [8]. + - tests: delete duplicate declaration for `strncasecompare`. + - tests/libtest: delete duplicate declaration for `gethostname`. + Originally added in 687df5c8c39c370a59999b9afc0917d808d978b7 + (2010-08-02). + Got complicated later: c49e9683b85ba9d12cbb6eebc4ab2c8dba68fbdc + If there are still systems around with warnings, we may restore the + prototype, but limited for those systems. + - tests/lib2305: delete duplicate declaration for + `libtest_debug_config`. + - tests/h2-download: fix `-Wunreachable-code-break`. - After a test failure log a consistent log message to make it easier to - parse the log file. Also, log a consistent message with "ignored" for - failures that cause the test to be not considered at all. These should - perhaps be counted in the skipped category, but this commit does not - change that behaviour. + [1] https://github.com/ngtcp2/nghttp3/blob/a70edb08e954d690e8fb2c1df999b5a056 + f8bf9f/cmake/PickyWarningsC.cmake + [2] https://ci.appveyor.com/project/curlorg/curl/builds/48553586/job/3qkgjaui + qla5fj45?fullLog=true#L1675 + [3] https://github.com/curl/curl/actions/runs/6880886309/job/18716044703?pr=1 + 2331#step:7:72 + https://github.com/curl/curl/actions/runs/6883016087/job/18722707368?pr=1 + 2331#step:7:109 + [4] https://ci.appveyor.com/project/curlorg/curl/builds/48555101/job/9g15qkrr + iklpf1ut#L204 + [5] https://ci.appveyor.com/project/curlorg/curl/builds/48555101/job/9g15qkrr + iklpf1ut#L218 + [6] https://github.com/curl/curl/actions/runs/6880886309/job/18716042927?pr=1 + 2331#step:7:290 + [7] https://github.com/curl/curl/actions/runs/6891484996/job/18746659406?pr=1 + 2331#step:9:1193 + [8] https://github.com/curl/curl/actions/runs/6882803986/job/18722082562?pr=1 + 2331#step:33:1870 -- runtests: consistently write the test check summary block + Closes #12331 - The memory check character was erroneously omitted if the memory - checking file was not available for some reason, making the block of - characters an inconsistent length. +Daniel Stenberg (21 Nov 2023) -- test2600: fix the description +- transfer: avoid unreachable expression - It looks like it was cut-and-pasted. + If curl_off_t and size_t have the same size (which is common on modern + 64 bit systems), a condition cannot occur which Coverity pointed + out. Avoid the warning by having the code conditionally only used if + curl_off_t actually is larger. - Closes #11354 + Follow-up to 1cd2f0072fa482e25baa2 -Daniel Stenberg (21 Jun 2023) + Closes #12370 -- TODO: "Support HTTP/2 for HTTP(S) proxies" *done* +Stefan Eissing (21 Nov 2023) -humbleacolyte (21 Jun 2023) +- transfer: readwrite improvements -- cf-socket: move ctx declaration under HAVE_GETPEERNAME + - changed header/chunk/handler->readwrite prototypes to accept `buf`, + `blen` and a `pconsumed` pointer. They now get the buffer to work on + and report back how many bytes they consumed + - eliminated `k->str` in SingleRequest + - improved excess data handling to properly calculate with any body data + left in the headerb buffer + - eliminated `k->badheader` enum to only be a bool - Closes #11352 + Closes #12283 -Daniel Stenberg (20 Jun 2023) +Daniel Stenberg (21 Nov 2023) - RELEASE-NOTES: synced -- example/connect-to: show CURLOPT_CONNECT_TO - - Closes #11340 - -Stefan Eissing (20 Jun 2023) - -- hyper: unslow - - - refs #11203 where hyper was reported as being slow - - fixes hyper_executor_poll to loop until it is out of - tasks as advised by @seanmonstar in https://github.com/hyperium/hyper/issue - s/3237 - - added a fix in hyper io handling for detecting EAGAIN - - added some debug logs to see IO results - - pytest http/1.1 test cases pass - - pytest h2 test cases fail on connection reuse. HTTP/2 - connection reuse does not seem to work. Hyper submits - a request on a reused connection, curl's IO works and - thereafter hyper declares `Hyper: [1] operation was canceled: connection cl - osed` - on stderr without any error being logged before. - - Fixes #11203 - Reported-by: Gisle Vanem - Advised-by: Sean McArthur - Closes #11344 - -- HTTP/2: upload handling fixes - - - fixes #11242 where 100% CPU on uploads was reported - - fixes possible stalls on last part of a request body when - that information could not be fully send on the connection - due to an EAGAIN - - applies the same EGAIN handling to HTTP/2 proxying +Jiří Hruška (21 Nov 2023) - Reported-by: Sergey Alirzaev - Fixed #11242 - Closes #11342 +- transfer: avoid calling the read callback again after EOF -Daniel Stenberg (20 Jun 2023) + Regression since 7f43f3dc5994d01b12 (7.84.0) -- example/opensslthreadlock: remove + Bug: https://curl.se/mail/lib-2023-11/0017.html - This shows how to setup OpenSSL mutex callbacks, but this is not - necessary since OpenSSL 1.1.0 - meaning that no currently supported - OpenSSL version requires this anymore + Closes #12363 - Closes #11341 +Daniel Stenberg (21 Nov 2023) -Dan Fandrich (19 Jun 2023) +- doh: provide better return code for responses w/o addresses -- libtest: display the times after a test timeout error + Previously it was wrongly returning CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY when the + response did not contain any addresses. Now it more accurately returns + CURLE_COULDNT_RESOLVE_HOST. - This is to help with test failure debugging. + Reported-by: lRoccoon on github - Ref: #11328 - Closes #11329 + Fixes #12365 + Closes #12366 -- test2600: bump a test timeout +Stefan Eissing (21 Nov 2023) - Case 1 failed at least once on GHA by going 30 msec too long. +- HTTP/2, HTTP/3: handle detach of onoing transfers - Ref: #11328 + - refs #12356 where a UAF is reported when closing a connection + with a stream whose easy handle was cleaned up already + - handle DETACH events same as DONE events in h2/h3 filters -- runtests: better detect and handle pipe errors in the controller + Fixes #12356 + Reported-by: Paweł Wegner + Closes #12364 - Errors reading and writing to the pipes are now better detected and - propagated up to the main test loop so it can be cleanly shut down. Such - errors are usually due to a runner dying so it doesn't make much sense - to try to continue the test run. +Viktor Szakats (20 Nov 2023) -- runtests: cleanly abort the runner if the controller dies +- autotools: stop setting `-std=gnu89` with `--enable-warnings` - If the controller dies unexpectedly, have the runner stop its servers - and exit cleanly. Otherwise, the orphaned servers will stay running in - the background. + Do not alter the C standard when building with `--enable-warnings` when + building with gcc. -- runtests: improve error logging + On one hand this alters warning results compared to a default build. + On the other, it may produce different binaries, which is unexpected. - Give more information about test harness error conditions to help figure - out what might be wrong. Print some internal test state when SIGUSR1 is - sent to runtests.pl. + Also fix new warnings that appeared after removing `-std=gnu89`: - Ref: #11328 + - include: fix public curl headers to use the correct printf mask for + `CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T` and `CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_TU` with mingw-w64 + and Visual Studio 2013 and newer. This fixes the printf mask warnings + in examples and tests. E.g. [1] -- runtests: better handle ^C during slow tests + - conncache: fix printf format string [2]. - Since the SIGINT handler now just sets a flag that must be checked in the - main controller loop, make sure that runs periodically. Rather than - blocking on a response from a test runner near the end of the test run, - add a short timeout to allow it. + - http2: fix potential null pointer dereference [3]. + (seen on Slackware with gcc 11.) -- runtests: rename server command file + - libssh: fix printf format string in SFTP code [4]. + Also make MSVC builds compatible with old CRT versions. - The name ftpserver.cmd was historical and has been used for more than - ftp for many years now. Rename it to plain server.cmd to reduce - confusion. + - libssh2: fix printf format string in SFTP code for MSVC. + Applying the same fix as for libssh above. -- tests: improve reliability of TFTP tests + - unit1395: fix `argument is null` and related issues [5]: + - stop calling `strcmp()` with NULL to avoid undefined behaviour. + - fix checking results if some of them were NULL. + - do not pass NULL to printf `%s`. - Stop checking the timeout used by the client under test (for most - tests). The timeout will change if the TFTP test server is slow (such as - happens on an overprovisioned CI server) because the client will retry - and reduce its timeout, and the actual value is not important for most - tests. + - ci: keep a build job with `-std=gnu89` to continue testing for + C89-compliance. We can apply this to other gcc jobs as needed. + Ref: b23ce2cee7329bbf425f18b49973b7a5f23dfcb4 (2022-09-23) #9542 - test285 is changed a different way, by increasing the connect timeout. - This improves test coverage by allowing the changed timeout value to be - checked, but improves reliability with a carefully-chosen timeout that - not only allows twice the time to respond as before, but also allows - several retries before the client will change its timeout value. + [1] https://dev.azure.com/daniel0244/curl/_build/results?buildId=18581&view=l + ogs&jobId=ccf9cc6d-2ef1-5cf2-2c09-30f0c14f923b + [2] https://github.com/curl/curl/actions/runs/6896854263/job/18763831142?pr=1 + 2346#step:6:67 + [3] https://github.com/curl/curl/actions/runs/6896854253/job/18763839238?pr=1 + 2346#step:30:214 + [4] https://github.com/curl/curl/actions/runs/6896854253/job/18763838007?pr=1 + 2346#step:29:895 + [5] https://github.com/curl/curl/actions/runs/6896854253/job/18763836775?pr=1 + 2346#step:33:1689 - Ref: #11328 + Closes #12346 -Daniel Stenberg (19 Jun 2023) +- autotools: fix/improve gcc and Apple clang version detection -- cf-socket: skip getpeername()/getsockname for TFTP + - Before this patch we expected `n.n` `-dumpversion` output, but Ubuntu + may return `n-win32` (also with `-dumpfullversion`). Causing these + errors and failing to enable picky warnings: + ``` + ../configure: line 23845: test: : integer expression expected + ``` + Ref: https://github.com/libssh2/libssh2/actions/runs/6263453828/job/1700789 + 3718#step:5:143 - Since the socket is not connected then the call fails. When the call - fails, failf() is called to write an error message that is then - surviving and is returned when the *real* error occurs later. The - earlier, incorrect, error therefore hides the actual error message. + Fix that by stripping any dash-suffix and handling a dotless (major-only) + version number by assuming `.0` in that case. - This could be seen in stderr for test 1007 + `9.3-posix`, `9.3-win32`, `6`, `9.3.0`, `11`, `11.2`, `11.2.0` + Ref: https://github.com/mamedev/mame/pull/9767 - Test 1007 has now been extended to verify the stderr message. + - fix Apple clang version detection for releases between + 'Apple LLVM version 7.3.0' and 'Apple LLVM version 10.0.1' where the + version was under-detected as 3.7 llvm/clang equivalent. - Closes #11332 + - fix Apple clang version detection for 'Apple clang version 11.0.0' + and newer where the Apple clang version was detected, instead of its + llvm/clang equivalent. -- example/crawler: make it use a few more options + - display detected clang/gcc/icc compiler version. - For show, but reasonable + Via libssh2: + - https://github.com/libssh2/libssh2/commit/00a3b88c51cdb407fbbb347a2e38c5c7d + 89875ad + https://github.com/libssh2/libssh2/pull/1187 + - https://github.com/libssh2/libssh2/commit/89ccc83c7da73e7ca3a112e3500081319 + 42b592e + https://github.com/libssh2/libssh2/pull/1232 -- libcurl-ws.3: mention raw mode + Closes #12362 - Closes #11339 +- autotools: delete LCC compiler support bits -- example/default-scheme: set the default scheme for schemeless URLs + Follow-up to fd7ef00f4305a2919e6950def1cf83d0110a4acd #12222 - Closes #11338 + Closes #12357 -- example/hsts-preload: show one way to HSTS preload +- cmake: add test for `DISABLE` options, add `CURL_DISABLE_HEADERS_API` - Closes #11337 + - tests: verify CMake `DISABLE` options. -- examples/http-options: show how to send "OPTIONS *" + Make an exception for 2 CMake-only ones, and one more that's + using a different naming scheme, also in autotools and source. - With CURLOPT_REQUEST_TARGET. + - cmake: add support for `CURL_DISABLE_HEADERS_API`. - Also add use of CURLOPT_QUICK_EXIT to show. + Suggested-by: Daniel Stenberg + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12345#pullrequestreview-1736238641 - Closes #11333 + Closes #12353 -- examples: make use of CURLOPT_(REDIR_|)PROTOCOLS_STR +Jacob Hoffman-Andrews (20 Nov 2023) - To show how to use them +- hyper: temporarily remove HTTP/2 support - Closes #11334 + The current design of the Hyper integration requires rebuilding the + Hyper clientconn for each request. However, building the clientconn + requires resending the HTTP/2 connection preface, which is incorrect + from a protocol perspective. That in turn causes servers to send GOAWAY + frames, effectively degrading performance to "no connection reuse" in + the best case. It may also be triggering some bugs where requests get + dropped entirely and reconnects take too long. -- examples/smtp-mime: use CURLOPT_MAIL_RCPT_ALLOWFAILS + This doesn't rule out HTTP/2 support with Hyper, but it may take a + redesign of the Hyper integration in order to make things work. - For show + Closes #12191 - Closes #11335 +Jay Satiro (20 Nov 2023) -- http: rectify the outgoing Cookie: header field size check +- schannel: fix unused variable warning - Previously it would count the size of the entire outgoing request and - not just the size of only the Cookie: header field - which was the - intention. + Bug: https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12349#issuecomment-1818000846 + Reported-by: Viktor Szakats - This could make the check be off by several hundred bytes in some cases. + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12361 - Closes #11331 +Daniel Stenberg (19 Nov 2023) -Jay Satiro (17 Jun 2023) +- url: find scheme with a "perfect hash" -- lib: fix some format specifiers + Instead of a loop to scan over the potentially 30+ scheme names, this + uses a "perfect hash" table. This works fine because the set of schemes + is known and cannot change in a build. The hash algorithm and table size + is made to only make a single scheme index per table entry. - - Use CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T where %zd was erroneously used for some - curl_off_t variables. + The perfect hash is generated by a separate tool (scripts/schemetable.c) - - Use %zu where %zd was erroneously used for some size_t variables. + Closes #12347 - Prior to this change some of the Windows CI tests were failing because - in Windows 32-bit targets have a 32-bit size_t and a 64-bit curl_off_t. - When %zd was used for some curl_off_t variables then only the lower - 32-bits was read and the upper 32-bits would be read for part or all of - the next specifier. +- scripts: add schemetable.c - Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/11327 - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11321 + This tool generates a scheme-matching table. -Marcel Raad (16 Jun 2023) + It iterates over a number of different initial and shift values in order + to find the hash algorithm that needs the smallest possible table. -- test427: add `cookies` feature and keyword + The generated hash function, table and table size then needs to be used + by the url.c:Curl_getn_scheme_handler() function. - This test doesn't work with `--disable-cookies`. +Stefan Eissing (19 Nov 2023) - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11320 +- vtls/vquic, keep peer name information together -Chris Talbot (15 Jun 2023) + - add `struct ssl_peer` to keep hostname, dispname and sni + for a filter + - allocate `sni` for use in VTLS backend + - eliminate `Curl_ssl_snihost()` and its use of the download buffer + - use ssl_peer in SSL and QUIC filters -- imap: Provide method to disable SASL if it is advertised + Closes #12349 - - Implement AUTH=+LOGIN for CURLOPT_LOGIN_OPTIONS to prefer plaintext - LOGIN over SASL auth. +Viktor Szakats (18 Nov 2023) - Prior to this change there was no method to be able to fall back to - LOGIN if an IMAP server advertises SASL capabilities. However, this may - be desirable for e.g. a misconfigured server. +- build: always revert `#pragma GCC diagnostic` after use - Per: https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5092.html#section-3.2 + Before this patch some source files were overriding gcc warning options, + but without restoring them at the end of the file. In CMake UNITY builds + these options spilled over to the remainder of the source code, + effecitvely disabling them for a larger portion of the codebase than + intended. - ";AUTH=" looks to be the correct way to specify what - authenication method to use, regardless of SASL or not. + `#pragma clang diagnostic` didn't have such issue in the codebase. - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/10041 + Reviewed-by: Marcel Raad + Closes #12352 -Daniel Stenberg (15 Jun 2023) +- tidy-up: casing typos, delete unused Windows version aliases -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced + - cmake: fix casing of `UnixSockets` to match the rest of the codebase. -- examples/multi-debugcallback.c: avoid the bool typedef + - curl-compilers.m4: fix casing in a comment. - Apparently this cannot be done in c23 + - setup-win32: delete unused Windows version constant aliases. - Reported-by: Cristian Rodríguez - Fixes #11299 - Closes #11319 + Reviewed-by: Marcel Raad + Closes #12351 -- docs/libcurl/libcurl.3: cleanups and improvements +- keylog: disable if unused - Closes #11317 + Fully disable keylog code if there is no TLS or QUIC subsystem using it. -- libcurl-ws.3: fix typo + Closes #12350 -- curl_ws_*.3: enhance +- cmake: add `CURL_DISABLE_BINDLOCAL` option - - all: SEE ALSO the libcurl-ws man page - - send: add example and return value information - - meta: mention that the returned data is read-only + To match similar autotools option. - Closes #11318 + Default is `ON`. -- docs/libcurl/libcurl-ws.3: see also CURLOPT_WS_OPTIONS + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Closes #12345 -- docs/libcurl/libcurl-ws.3: minor polish +- url: fix `-Wzero-length-array` with no protocols -- libcurl-ws.3. WebSocket API overview + Fixes: + ``` + ./lib/url.c:178:56: warning: use of an empty initializer is a C2x extension [ + -Wc2x-extensions] + 178 | static const struct Curl_handler * const protocols[] = { + | ^ + ./lib/url.c:178:56: warning: zero size arrays are an extension [-Wzero-length + -array] + ``` - Closes #11314 + Closes #12344 -- libcurl-url.3: also mention CURLUPART_ZONEID +- url: fix builds with `CURL_DISABLE_HTTP` - ... and sort the two part-using lists alphabetically + Fixes: + ``` + ./lib/url.c:456:35: error: no member named 'formp' in 'struct UrlState' + 456 | Curl_mime_cleanpart(data->state.formp); + | ~~~~~~~~~~~ ^ + ``` -Marcel Raad (14 Jun 2023) + Regression from 74b87a8af13a155c659227f5acfa78243a8b2aa6 #11682 -- fopen: fix conversion warning on 32-bit Android + Closes #12343 - When building for 32-bit ARM or x86 Android, `st_mode` is defined as - `unsigned int` instead of `mode_t`, resulting in a - -Wimplicit-int-conversion clang warning because `mode_t` is - `unsigned short`. Add a cast to silence the warning. +- http: fix `-Wunused-parameter` with no auth and no proxy - Ref: https://android.googlesource.com/platform/bionic/+/refs/tags/ndk-r25c/li - bc/include/sys/stat.h#86 - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11313 + ``` + lib/http.c:734:26: warning: unused parameter 'proxy' [-Wunused-parameter] + bool proxy) + ^ + ``` -- http2: fix variable type + Reviewed-by: Marcel Raad + Closes #12338 - `max_recv_speed` is `curl_off_t`, so using `size_t` might result in - -Wconversion GCC warnings for 32-bit `size_t`. Visible in the NetBSD - ARM autobuilds. +Daniel Stenberg (16 Nov 2023) - Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/11312 +- TODO: Some TLS options are not offered for HTTPS proxies -Daniel Stenberg (13 Jun 2023) + Closes #12286 + Closes #12342 -- vtls: fix potentially uninitialized local variable warnings +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced - Follow-up from a4a5e438ae533c +- duphandle: make dupset() not return with pointers to old alloced data - Closes #11310 + As the blob pointers are to be duplicated, the function must not return + mid-function with lingering pointers to the old handle's allocated data, + as that would lead to double-free in OOM situations. -- timeval: use CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW if available + Make sure to clear all destination pointers first to avoid this risk. - Reported-by: Harry Sintonen - Ref: #11288 - Closes #11291 + Closes #12337 -Stefan Eissing (12 Jun 2023) +Viktor Szakats (16 Nov 2023) -- tool: add curl command line option `--trace-ids` +- http: fix `-Wunused-variable` compiler warning - - added and documented --trace-ids to prepend (after the timestamp) - the transfer and connection identifiers to each verbose log line - - format is [n-m] with `n` being the transfer id and `m` being the - connection id. In case there is not valid connection id, print 'x'. - - Log calls with a handle that has no transfer id yet, are written - without any ids. + Fix compiler warnings in builds with disabled auths, NTLM and SPNEGO. - Closes #11185 + E.g. with `CURL_DISABLE_BASIC_AUTH` + `CURL_DISABLE_BEARER_AUTH` + + `CURL_DISABLE_DIGEST_AUTH` + `CURL_DISABLE_NEGOTIATE_AUTH` + + `CURL_DISABLE_NTLM` on non-Windows. -- lib: add CURLINFO_CONN_ID and CURLINFO_XFER_ID + ``` + ./curl/lib/http.c:737:12: warning: unused variable 'result' [-Wunused-variabl + e] + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + ^ + ./curl/lib/http.c:995:18: warning: variable 'availp' set but not used [-Wunus + ed-but-set-variable] + unsigned long *availp; + ^ + ./curl/lib/http.c:996:16: warning: variable 'authp' set but not used [-Wunuse + d-but-set-variable] + struct auth *authp; + ^ + ``` - - add an `id` long to Curl_easy, -1 on init - - once added to a multi (or its own multi), it gets - a non-negative number assigned by the connection cache - - `id` is unique among all transfers using the same - cache until reaching LONG_MAX where it will wrap - around. So, not unique eternally. - - CURLINFO_CONN_ID returns the connection id attached to - data or, if none present, data->state.lastconnect_id - - variables and type declared in tool for write out + Regression from e92edfbef64448ef461117769881f3ed776dec4e #11490 - Closes #11185 + Fixes #12228 + Closes #12335 -Daniel Stenberg (12 Jun 2023) +Jay Satiro (16 Nov 2023) -- CURLOPT_INFILESIZE.3: mention -1 triggers chunked +- tool: support bold headers in Windows - Ref: #11300 - Closes #11304 + - If virtual terminal processing is enabled in Windows then use ANSI + escape codes Esc[1m and Esc[22m to turn bold on and off. -Philip Heiduck (12 Jun 2023) + Suggested-by: Gisle Vanem -- CI: openssl-3.0.9+quic + Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/discussions/11770 - Closes #11296 + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12321 -Karthikdasari0423 (12 Jun 2023) +Viktor Szakats (15 Nov 2023) -- HTTP3.md: update openssl version +- build: fix libssh2 + `CURL_DISABLE_DIGEST_AUTH` + `CURL_DISABLE_AWS` - Closes #11297 + Builds with libssh2 + `-DCURL_DISABLE_DIGEST_AUTH=ON` + + `-DCURL_DISABLE_AWS=ON` in combination with either Schannel on Windows, + or `-DCURL_DISABLE_NTLM=ON` on other operating systems failed while + compiling due to a missing HMAC declaration. -Daniel Stenberg (12 Jun 2023) + The reason is that HMAC is required by `lib/sha256.c` which publishes + `Curl_sha256it()` which is required by `lib/vssh/libssh2.c` when + building for libssh2 v1.8.2 (2019-05-25) or older. -- vtls: avoid memory leak if sha256 call fails + Make sure to compile the HMAC bits for a successful build. - ... in the pinned public key handling function. + Both HMAC and `Curl_sha256it()` rely on the same internals, so splitting + them into separate sources isn't practical. - Reported-by: lizhuang0630 on github - Fixes #11306 - Closes #11307 + Fixes: + ``` + [...] + In file included from ./curl/_x64-win-ucrt-cmake-llvm-bld/lib/CMakeFiles/libc + url_object.dir/Unity/unity_0_c.c:310: + ./curl/lib/sha256.c:527:42: error: array has incomplete element type 'const s + truct HMAC_params' + 527 | const struct HMAC_params Curl_HMAC_SHA256[] = { + | ^ + ./curl/lib/curl_sha256.h:34:21: note: forward declaration of 'struct HMAC_par + ams' + [...] + ``` -- examples/ipv6: disable on win32 + Regression from e92edfbef64448ef461117769881f3ed776dec4e #11490 - I can't make if_nametoindex() work there + Fixes #12273 + Closes #12332 - Follow-up to c23dc42f3997acf23 +Daniel Stenberg (15 Nov 2023) - Closes #11305 +- duphandle: also free 'outcurl->cookies' in error path -- tool_operate: allow cookie lines up to 8200 bytes + Fixes memory-leak when OOM mid-function - Since this option might set multiple cookies in the same line, it does - not make total sense to cap this at 4096 bytes, which is the limit for a - single cookie name or value. + Use plain free instead of safefree, since the entire struct is + freed below. - Closes #11303 + Remove some free calls that is already freed in Curl_freeset() -- test427: verify sending more cookies than fit in a 8190 bytes line + Closes #12329 - curl will then only populate the header with cookies that fit, dropping - ones that otherwise would have been sent +Viktor Szakats (15 Nov 2023) - Ref: https://curl.se/mail/lib-2023-06/0020.html +- config-win32: set `HAVE_SNPRINTF` for mingw-w64 - Closes #11303 + It's available in all mingw-w64 releases. We already pre-fill this + detection in CMake. -- testutil: allow multiple %-operators on the same line + Closes #12325 - Closes #11303 +- sasl: fix `-Wunused-function` compiler warning -Oleg Jukovec (12 Jun 2023) + In builds with disabled auths. -- docs: update CURLOPT_UPLOAD.3 + ``` + lib/curl_sasl.c:266:17: warning: unused function 'get_server_message' [-Wunus + ed-function] + static CURLcode get_server_message(struct SASL *sasl, struct Curl_easy *data, + ^ + 1 warning generated. + ``` + Ref: https://github.com/curl/trurl/actions/runs/6871732122/job/18689066151#st + ep:3:3822 - The behavior of CURLOPT_UPLOAD differs from what is described in the - documentation. The option automatically adds the 'Transfer-Encoding: - chunked' header if the upload size is unknown. + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Closes #12326 - Closes #11300 +- build: picky warning updates -Daniel Stenberg (12 Jun 2023) + - cmake: sync some picky gcc warnings with autotools. + - cmake, autotools: add `-Wold-style-definition` for clang too. + - cmake: more precise version info for old clang options. + - cmake: use `IN LISTS` syntax in `foreach()`. -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Reviewed-by: Marcel Raad + Closes #12324 -- CURLOPT_AWS_SIGV4.3: remove unused variable from example +Daniel Stenberg (15 Nov 2023) - Closes #11302 +- urldata: move cookielist from UserDefined to UrlState -- examples/https.c: use CURLOPT_CA_CACHE_TIMEOUT + 1. Because the value is not strictly set with a setopt option. - for demonstration purposes + 2. Because otherwise when duping a handle when all the set.* fields are + first copied and an error happens (think out of memory mid-function), + the function would easily free the list *before* it was deep-copied, + which could lead to a double-free. - Closes #11290 + Closes #12323 -- example/ipv6: feature CURLOPT_ADDRESS_SCOPE in use +Viktor Szakats (14 Nov 2023) - Closes #11282 +- autotools: avoid passing `LDFLAGS` twice to libcurl -Karthikdasari0423 (10 Jun 2023) + autotools passes `LDFLAGS` automatically linker commands. curl's + `lib/Makefile.am` customizes libcurl linker flags. In that + customization, it added `LDFLAGS` to the custom flags. This resulted in + passing `LDFLAGS` _twice_ to the `libtool` command. -- docs: Update HTTP3.md for newer ngtcp2 and nghttp3 + Most of the time this is benign, but some `LDFLAGS` options can break + the build when passed twice. One such example is passing `.o` files, + e.g. `crt*.o` files necessary when customizing the C runtime, e.g. for + MUSL builds. - Follow-up to fb9b9b58 + Passing them twice resulted in duplicate symbol errors: + ``` + libtool: link: clang-15 --target=aarch64-unknown-linux-musl [...] /usr/lib/a + arch64-linux-musl/crt1.o [...] /usr/lib/aarch64-linux-musl/crt1.o [...] + ld.lld-15: error: duplicate symbol: _start + >>> defined at crt1.c + >>> /usr/lib/aarch64-linux-musl/crt1.o:(.text+0x0) + >>> defined at crt1.c + >>> /usr/lib/aarch64-linux-musl/crt1.o:(.text+0x0) + [...] + clang: error: linker command failed with exit code 1 (use -v to see invocatio + n) + ``` - Ref: #11184 - Closes #11295 + This behaviour came with commit 1a593191c2769a47b8c3e4d9715ec9f6dddf5e36 + (2013-07-23) as a fix for bug https://curl.haxx.se/bug/view.cgi?id=1217. + The patch was a works-for-me hack that ended up merged in curl: + https://sourceforge.net/p/curl/bugs/1217/#06ef + With the root cause remaining unclear. -Dan Fandrich (10 Jun 2023) + Perhaps the SUNPro 12 linker was sensitive to `-L` `-l` order, requiring + `-L` first? This would be unusual and suggests a bug in either the + linker or in `libtool`. -- docs: update the supported ngtcp2 and nghttp3 versions + The curl build does pass the list of detected libs via its own + `LIBCURL_LIBS` variable, which ends up before `LDFLAGS` on the `libtool` + command line, but it's the job of `libtool` to ensure that even + a peculiar linker gets the options in the expected order. Also because + autotools passes `LDFLAGS` last, making it hardly possible to pass + anything after it. - Follow-up to cae9d10b + Perhaps in the 10 years since this issue, this already got a fix + upstream. - Ref: #11184 - Closes #11294 + This patch deletes `LDFLAGS` from our customized libcurl options, + leaving a single copy of them as passed by autotools automatically. -- tests: fix error messages & handling around sockets + Reverts 1a593191c2769a47b8c3e4d9715ec9f6dddf5e36 + Closes #12310 - The wrong error code was checked on Windows on UNIX socket failures, - which could have caused all UNIX sockets to be reported as having - errored and the tests therefore skipped. Also, a useless error message - was displayed on socket errors in many test servers on Windows because - strerror() doesn't work on WinSock error codes; perror() is overridden - there to work on all errors and is used instead. +- autotools: accept linker flags via `CURL_LDFLAGS_{LIB,BIN}` - Ref #11258 - Closes #11265 + To allow passing `LDFLAGS` specific to libcurl (`CURL_LDFLAGS_LIB`) and + curl tool (`CURL_LDFLAGS_BIN`). -Daniel Stenberg (9 Jun 2023) + This makes it possible to build libcurl and curl with a single + invocation with lib- and tool-specific custom linker flags. -- CURLOPT_SSH_PRIVATE_KEYFILE.3: expand on the file search + Such flag can be enabling `.map` files, a `.def` file for libcurl DLL, + controlling static/shared, incl. requesting a static curl tool (with + `-static-libtool-libs`) while building both shared and static libcurl. - Reported-by: atjg on github - Ref: #11287 - Closes #11289 + curl-for-win uses the above and some more. -Stefan Eissing (9 Jun 2023) + These options are already supported in `Makefile.mk`. CMake has built-in + variables for this. -- ngtcp2: use ever increasing timestamp in io + Closes #12312 - - ngtcp2 v0.16.0 asserts that timestamps passed to its function - will only ever increase. - - Use a context shared between ingress/egress operations that - uses a shared timestamp, regularly updated during calls. +Jay Satiro (14 Nov 2023) - Closes #11288 +- tool_cb_hdr: add an additional parsing check -Daniel Stenberg (9 Jun 2023) + - Don't dereference the past-the-end element when parsing the server's + Content-disposition header. -- GHA: use nghttp2 1.54.0 for the ngtcp2 jobs + As 'p' is advanced it can point to the past-the-end element and prior + to this change 'p' could be dereferenced in that case. -Philip Heiduck (9 Jun 2023) + Technically the past-the-end element is not out of bounds because dynbuf + (which manages the header line) automatically adds a null terminator to + every buffer and that is not included in the buffer length passed to + the header callback. -- GHA: ngtcp2: use 0.16.0 and nghttp3 0.12.0 + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12320 -Daniel Stenberg (9 Jun 2023) +Philip Heiduck (14 Nov 2023) -- ngtcp2: build with 0.16.0 and nghttp3 0.12.0 +- .cirrus.yml: freebsd 14 - - moved to qlog_write - - crypto => encryption - - CRYPTO => ENCRYPTION - - removed "_is_" - - ngtcp2_conn_shutdown_stream_read and - ngtcp2_conn_shutdown_stream_write got flag arguments - - the nghttp3_callbacks struct got a recv_settings callback + ensure curl works on latest freebsd version - Closes #11184 + Closes #12053 -- example/http2-download: set CURLOPT_BUFFERSIZE +Daniel Stenberg (13 Nov 2023) - Primarily because no other example sets it, and remove the disabling of - the certificate check because we should not recommend that. +- easy: in duphandle, init the cookies for the new handle - Closes #11284 + ... not the source handle. -- example/crawler: also set CURLOPT_AUTOREFERER + Closes #12318 - Could make sense, and it was not used in any example before. +- duphandle: use strdup to clone *COPYPOSTFIELDS if size is not set - Closes #11283 + Previously it would unconditionally use the size, which is set to -1 + when strlen is requested. -Wyatt OʼDay (9 Jun 2023) + Updated test 544 to verify. -- tls13-ciphers.d: include Schannel + Closes #12317 - Closes #11271 +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced -Daniel Stenberg (9 Jun 2023) +- curl_easy_duphandle.3: clarify how HSTS and alt-svc are duped -- curl_pushheader_byname/bynum.3: document in their own man pages + Closes #12315 - These two functions were added in 7.44.0 when CURLMOPT_PUSHFUNCTION was - introduced but always lived a life in the shadows, embedded in the - CURLMOPT_PUSHFUNCTION man page. Until now. +- urldata: move hstslist from 'set' to 'state' - It makes better sense and gives more visibility to document them in - their own stand-alone man pages. + To make it work properly with curl_easy_duphandle(). This, because + duphandle duplicates the entire 'UserDefined' struct by plain copy while + 'hstslist' is a linked curl_list of file names. This would lead to a + double-free when the second of the two involved easy handles were + closed. - Closes #11286 + Closes #12315 -- curl_mprintf.3: minor fix of the example +- test1900: verify duphandle with HSTS using multiple files -- curl_url_set: enforce the max string length check for all parts + Closes #12315 - Update the docs and test 1559 accordingly +Goro FUJI (13 Nov 2023) - Closes #11273 +- http: allow longer HTTP/2 request method names -- examples/ftpuploadresume.c: add use of CURLOPT_ACCEPTTIMEOUT_MS + - Increase the maximum request method name length from 11 to 23. - For show + For HTTP/1.1 and earlier there's not a specific limit in libcurl for + method length except that it is limited by the initial HTTP request + limit (DYN_HTTP_REQUEST). Prior to fc2f1e54 HTTP/2 was treated the same + and there was no specific limit. - Closes #11277 + According to Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) the longest + registered method is UPDATEREDIRECTREF which is 17 characters. -- examples/unixsocket.c: example using CURLOPT_UNIX_SOCKET_PATH + Also there are unregistered methods used by some companies that are + longer than 11 characters. - and alternatively CURLOPT_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET + The limit was originally added by 61f52a97 but not used until fc2f1e54. - Closes #11276 + Ref: https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-methods/http-methods.xhtml -Anssi Kolehmainen (8 Jun 2023) + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12311 -- docs: fix missing parameter names in examples +Jay Satiro (12 Nov 2023) - Closes #11278 +- CURLOPT_CAINFO_BLOB.3: explain what CURL_BLOB_COPY does -Daniel Stenberg (8 Jun 2023) + - Add an explanation of the CURL_BLOB_COPY flag to CURLOPT_CAINFO_BLOB + and CURLOPT_PROXY_CAINFO_BLOB docs. -- urlapi: have *set(PATH) prepend a slash if one is missing + All the other _BLOB option docs already have the same explanation. - Previously the code would just do that for the path when extracting the - full URL, which made a subsequent curl_url_get() of the path to - (unexpectedly) still return it without the leading path. + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12277 - Amend lib1560 to verify this. Clarify the curl_url_set() docs about it. +Viktor Szakats (11 Nov 2023) - Bug: https://curl.se/mail/lib-2023-06/0015.html - Closes #11272 - Reported-by: Pedro Henrique +- tidy-up: dedupe Windows system libs in cmake -Dan Fandrich (7 Jun 2023) + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Closes #12307 -- runtests; give each server a unique log lock file +Junho Choi (11 Nov 2023) - Logs are written by several servers and all of them must be finished - writing before the test results can be determined. This means each - server must have its own lock file rather than sharing a single one, - which is how it was done up to now. Previously, the first server to - complete a test would clear the lock before the other server was done, - which caused flaky tests. +- ci: test with latest quiche release (0.19.0) - Lock files are now all found in their own directory, so counting locks - equals counting the files in that directory. The result is that the - proxy logs are now reliably written which actually changes the expected - output for two tests. + Closes #12180 - Fixes #11231 - Closes #11259 +- quiche: use quiche_conn_peer_transport_params() -- runtests: make test file directories in log/N + In recent quiche, transport parameter API is separated + with quiche_conn_peer_transport_params(). + (https://github.com/cloudflare/quiche/pull/1575) + It breaks with bulding with latest(post 0.18.0) quiche. - Test files in subdirectories were not created after parallel test log - directories were moved down a level due to a now-bad comparison. + Closes #12180 - Follow-up to 92d7dd39 +Daniel Stenberg (11 Nov 2023) - Ref #11264 - Closes #11267 +- Makefile: generate the VC 14.20 project files at dist-time -Daniel Stenberg (7 Jun 2023) + Follow-up to 28287092cc5a6d6ef8 (#12282) -- ws: make the curl_ws_meta() return pointer a const + Closes #12290 - The returned info is read-only for the user. +Sam James (11 Nov 2023) - Closes #11261 +- misc: fix -Walloc-size warnings -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced + GCC 14 introduces a new -Walloc-size included in -Wextra which gives: -- runtests: move parallel log dirs from logN to log/N + ``` + src/tool_operate.c: In function ‘add_per_transfer’: + src/tool_operate.c:213:5: warning: allocation of insufficient size ‘1’ fo + r type ‘struct per_transfer’ with size ‘480’ [-Walloc-size] + 213 | p = calloc(sizeof(struct per_transfer), 1); + | ^ + src/var.c: In function ‘addvariable’: + src/var.c:361:5: warning: allocation of insufficient size ‘1’ for type + struct var’ with size ‘32’ [-Walloc-size] + 361 | p = calloc(sizeof(struct var), 1); + | ^ + ``` - Having several hundreds of them in there gets annoying. + The calloc prototype is: + ``` + void *calloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size); + ``` - Closes #11264 + So, just swap the number of members and size arguments to match the + prototype, as we're initialising 1 struct of size `sizeof(struct + ...)`. GCC then sees we're not doing anything wrong. -Dan Fandrich (7 Jun 2023) + Closes #12292 -- test447: move the test file into %LOGDIR +Mark Gaiser (11 Nov 2023) -Viktor Szakats (7 Jun 2023) +- IPFS: bugfixes -- cmake: add support for "unity" builds + - Fixed endianness bug in gateway file parsing + - Use IPFS_PATH in tests where IPFS_DATA was used + - Fixed typos from traling -> trailing + - Fixed broken link in IPFS.md - Aka "jumbo" or "amalgamation" builds. It means to compile all sources - per target as a single C source. This is experimental. + Follow-up to 859e88f6533f9e - You can enable it by passing `-DCMAKE_UNITY_BUILD=ON` to cmake. - It requires CMake 3.16 or newer. + Reported-by: Michael Kaufmann + Bug: https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12152#issuecomment-1798214137 + Closes #12305 - It makes builds (much) faster, allows for better optimizations and tends - to promote less ambiguous code. +Daniel Stenberg (11 Nov 2023) - Also add a new AppVeyor CI job and convert an existing one to use - "unity" mode (one MSVC, one MinGW), and enable it for one macOS CI job. +- VULN-DISCLOSURE-POLIC: remove broken link to hackerone - Fix related issues: - - add missing include guard to `easy_lock.h`. - - rename static variables and functions (and a macro) with names reused - across sources, or shadowed by local variables. - - add an `#undef` after use. - - add a missing `#undef` before use. - - move internal definitions from `ftp.h` to `ftp.c`. - - `curl_memory.h` fixes to make it work when included repeatedly. - - stop building/linking curlx bits twice for a static-mode curl tool. - These caused doubly defined symbols in unity builds. - - silence missing extern declarations compiler warning for ` _CRT_glob`. - - fix extern declarations for `tool_freq` and `tool_isVistaOrGreater`. - - fix colliding static symbols in debug mode: `debugtime()` and - `statename`. - - rename `ssl_backend_data` structure to unique names for each - TLS-backend, along with the `ssl_connect_data` struct member - referencing them. This required adding casts for each access. - - add workaround for missing `[P]UNICODE_STRING` types in certain Windows - builds when compiling `lib/ldap.c`. To support "unity" builds, we had - to enable `SCHANNEL_USE_BLACKLISTS` for Schannel (a Windows - `schannel.h` option) _globally_. This caused an indirect inclusion of - Windows `schannel.h` from `ldap.c` via `winldap.h` to have it enabled - as well. This requires `[P]UNICODE_STRING` types, which is apperantly - not defined automatically (as seen with both MSVS and mingw-w64). - This patch includes `` to fix it. - Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/runs/13987772013 - Ref: https://dev.azure.com/daniel0244/curl/_build/results?buildId=15827&vie - w=logs&jobId=2c9f582d-e278-56b6-4354-f38a4d851906&j=2c9f582d-e278-56b6-4354-f - 38a4d851906&t=90509b00-34fa-5a81-35d7-5ed9569d331c - - tweak unity builds to compile `lib/memdebug.c` separately in memory - trace builds to avoid PP confusion. - - force-disable unity for test programs. - - do not compile and link libcurl sources to libtests _twice_ when libcurl - is built in static mode. + It should ideally soon not be done from hackerone anyway - KNOWN ISSUES: - - running tests with unity builds may fail in cases. - - some build configurations/env may not compile in unity mode. E.g.: - https://ci.appveyor.com/project/curlorg/curl/builds/47230972/job/51wfesgnfu - auwl8q#L250 + Closes #12308 - Ref: https://github.com/libssh2/libssh2/issues/1034 - Ref: https://cmake.org/cmake/help/latest/prop_tgt/UNITY_BUILD.html - Ref: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unity_build +Andrew Kurushin (11 Nov 2023) - Closes #11095 +- schannel: add CA cache support for files and memory blobs -Daniel Stenberg (7 Jun 2023) + - Support CA bundle and blob caching. -- examples/websocket.c: websocket example using CONNECT_ONLY + Cache timeout is 24 hours or can be set via CURLOPT_CA_CACHE_TIMEOUT. - Closes #11262 + Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/12261 -- websocket-cb: example doing WebSocket download using callback +Daniel Stenberg (10 Nov 2023) - Very basic +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced - Closes #11260 +Charlie C (10 Nov 2023) -- test/.gitignore: ignore log* +- cmake: option to disable install & drop `curlu` target when unused -Dan Fandrich (5 Jun 2023) + This patch makes the following changes: + - adds the option `CURL_DISABLE_INSTALL` - to disable 'install' targets. + - Removes the target `curlu` when the option `BUILD_TESTING` is set to + `OFF` - to prevent it from being loaded in Visual Studio. -- runtests: document the -j parallel testing option + Closes #12287 - Reported-by: Daniel Stenberg - Ref: #10818 - Closes #11255 +Kai Pastor (10 Nov 2023) -- runtests: create multiple test runners when requested +- cmake: fix multiple include of CURL package - Parallel testing is enabled by using a nonzero value for the -j option - to runtests.pl. Performant values seem to be about 7*num CPU cores, or - 1.3*num CPU cores if Valgrind is in use. + Fixes errors on second `find_package(CURL)`. This is a frequent case + with transitive dependencies: + ``` + CMake Error at ...: + add_library cannot create ALIAS target "CURL::libcurl" because another + target with the same name already exists. + ``` - Flaky tests due to improper log locking (bug #11231) are exacerbated - while parallel testing, so it is not enabled by default yet. + Test to reproduce: + ```cmake + cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 3.27) # must be 3.18 or higher - Fixes #10818 - Closes #11246 + project(curl) -- runtests: handle repeating tests in multiprocess mode + set(CURL_DIR "example/lib/cmake/CURL/") + find_package(CURL CONFIG REQUIRED) + find_package(CURL CONFIG REQUIRED) # fails - Such as what happens with the --repeat option. Some functions are - changed to pass the runner ID instead of relying on the non-unique test - number. + add_executable(main main.c) + target_link_libraries(main CURL::libcurl) + ``` - Ref: #10818 + Ref: https://cmake.org/cmake/help/latest/release/3.18.html#other-changes + Ref: https://cmake.org/cmake/help/v3.18/policy/CMP0107.html + Ref: #12300 + Assisted-by: Harry Mallon + Closes #11913 -- runtests: buffer logmsg while running singletest() +Viktor Szakats (8 Nov 2023) - This allows all messages relating to a single test case to be displayed - together at the end of the test. +- tidy-up: use `OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER` - Ref: #10818 + Uniformly use `OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER` to check for OpenSSL version. + Before this patch some places used `OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR`. -- runtests: call initserverconfig() in the runner + Also fix `lib/md4.c`, which included `opensslconf.h`, but that doesn't + define any version number in these implementations: BoringSSL, AWS-LC, + LibreSSL, wolfSSL. (Only in mainline OpenSSL/quictls). Switch that to + `opensslv.h`. This wasn't causing a deeper problem because the code is + looking for v3, which is only provided by OpenSSL/quictls as of now. - This must be done so variables pick up the runner's unique $LOGDIR. + According to https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/17517, the macro + `OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER` is safe to use and not deprecated. - Ref: #10818 + Reviewed-by: Marcel Raad + Closes #12298 -- runtests: use a per-runner random seed +Daniel Stenberg (8 Nov 2023) - Each runner needs a unique random seed to reduce the chance of port - number collisions. The new scheme uses a consistent per-runner source of - randomness which results in deterministic behaviour, as it did before. +- resolve.d: drop a multi use-sentence - Ref: #10818 + Since the `multi:` keyword adds that message. -- runtests: complete main test loop refactor for multiple runners + Reported-by: 積丹尼 Dan Jacobson + Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/discussions/12294 + Closes #12295 - The main test loop is now able to handle multiple runners, or no - additional runner processes at all. At most one process is still - created, however. +- content_encoding: make Curl_all_content_encodings allocless - Ref: #10818 + - Fixes a memory leak pointed out by Coverity + - Also found by OSS-Fuzz: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail? + id=63947 + - Avoids unncessary allocations -- runtests: prepare main test loop for multiple runners + Follow-up ad051e1cbec68b2456a22661b - Some variables are expanded to arrays and hashes so that multiple - runners can be used for running tests. + Closes #12289 - Ref: #10818 +Michael Kaufmann (7 Nov 2023) -Stefan Eissing (5 Jun 2023) +- vtls: use ALPN "http/1.1" for HTTP/1.x, including HTTP/1.0 -- bufq: make write/pass methods more robust + Some servers don't support the ALPN protocol "http/1.0" (e.g. IIS 10), + avoid it and use "http/1.1" instead. - - related to #11242 where curl enters busy loop when - sending http2 data to the server + This reverts commit df856cb5c9 (#10183). - Closes #11247 + Fixes #12259 + Closes #12285 -Boris Verkhovskiy (5 Jun 2023) +Daniel Stenberg (7 Nov 2023) -- tool_getparam: fix comment +- Makefile.am: drop vc10, vc11 and vc12 projects from dist - Closes #11253 + They are end of life products. Support for generating them remain in the + repo for a while but this change drops them from distribution. -Raito Bezarius (5 Jun 2023) + Closes #12288 -- haproxy: add --haproxy-clientip flag to spoof client IPs +David Suter (7 Nov 2023) - CURLOPT_HAPROXY_CLIENT_IP in the library +- projects: add VC14.20 project files - Closes #10779 + Windows projects included VC14, VC14.10, VC14.30 but not VC14.20. + OpenSSL and Wolf SSL scripts mention VC14.20 so I don't see a reason why + this is missing. Updated the templates to produce a VC14.20 project. + Project opens in Visual Studio 2019 as expected. -Daniel Stenberg (5 Jun 2023) + Closes #12282 -- curl: add --ca-native and --proxy-ca-native +Daniel Stenberg (7 Nov 2023) - These are two boolean options to ask curl to use the native OS's CA - store when verifying TLS servers. For peers and for proxies - respectively. +- curl: move IPFS code into src/tool_ipfs.[ch] - They currently only have an effect for curl on Windows when built to use - OpenSSL for TLS. + - convert ensure_trailing into ensure_trailing_slash + - strdup the URL string to own it proper + - use shorter variable names + - combine some expressions + - simplify error handling in ipfs_gateway() + - add MAX_GATEWAY_URL_LEN + proper bailout if maximum is reached + - ipfs-gateway.d polish and simplification + - shorten ipfs error message + make them "synthetic" - Closes #11049 + Closes #12281 -Viktor Szakats (5 Jun 2023) +Viktor Szakats (6 Nov 2023) -- build: drop unused/redundant `HAVE_WINLDAP_H` +- build: delete support bits for obsolete Windows compilers - Sources did not use it. Autotools used it when checking for the - `winldap` library, which is redundant. + - Pelles C: Unclear status, failed to obtain a fresh copy a few months + ago. Possible website is HTTP-only. ~10 years ago I left this compiler + dealing with crashes and other issues with no response on the forum + for years. It has seen some activity in curl back in 2021. + - LCC: Last stable release in September 2002. + - Salford C: Misses winsock2 support, possibly abandoned? Last mentioned + in 2006. + - Borland C++: We dropped Borland C++ support in 2018. + - MS Visual C++ 6.0: Released in 1998. curl already requires VS 2010 + (or possibly 2008) as a minimum. - With CMake, detection was broken: - ``` - Run Build Command(s):/usr/local/Cellar/cmake/3.26.3/bin/cmake -E env VERBOSE= - 1 /usr/bin/make -f Makefile cmTC_2d8fe/fast && /Library/Developer/CommandLine - Tools/usr/bin/make -f CMakeFiles/cmTC_2d8fe.dir/build.make CMakeFiles/cmTC_2 - d8fe.dir/build - Building C object CMakeFiles/cmTC_2d8fe.dir/HAVE_WINLDAP_H.c.obj - /usr/local/opt/llvm/bin/clang --target=x86_64-w64-mingw32 --sysroot=/usr/loca - l/opt/mingw-w64/toolchain-x86_64 -D_WINSOCKAPI_="" -I/my/quictls/x64-ucrt/usr - /include -I/my/zlib/x64-ucrt/usr/include -I/my/brotli/x64-ucrt/usr/include -W - no-unused-command-line-argument -D_UCRT -DCURL_HIDDEN_SYMBOLS -DHAVE_SSL_SE - T0_WBIO -DHAS_ALPN -DNGHTTP2_STATICLIB -DNGHTTP3_STATICLIB -DNGTCP2_STATICLIB - -DUSE_MANUAL=1 -fuse-ld=lld -Wl,-s -static-libgcc -lucrt -Wextra -Wall -p - edantic -Wbad-function-cast -Wconversion -Winline -Wmissing-declarations -Wmi - ssing-prototypes -Wnested-externs -Wno-long-long -Wno-multichar -Wpointer-ari - th -Wshadow -Wsign-compare -Wundef -Wunused -Wwrite-strings -Wcast-align -Wde - claration-after-statement -Wempty-body -Wendif-labels -Wfloat-equal -Wignored - -qualifiers -Wno-format-nonliteral -Wno-sign-conversion -Wno-system-headers - - Wstrict-prototypes -Wtype-limits -Wvla -Wshift-sign-overflow -Wshorten-64-to- - 32 -Wdouble-promotion -Wenum-conversion -Wunused-const-variable -Wcomma -Wmis - sing-variable-declarations -Wassign-enum -Wextra-semi-stmt -MD -MT CMakeFile - s/cmTC_2d8fe.dir/HAVE_WINLDAP_H.c.obj -MF CMakeFiles/cmTC_2d8fe.dir/HAVE_WINL - DAP_H.c.obj.d -o CMakeFiles/cmTC_2d8fe.dir/HAVE_WINLDAP_H.c.obj -c /my/curl/b - ld-cmake-llvm-x64-shared/CMakeFiles/CMakeScratch/TryCompile-3JP6dR/HAVE_WINLD - AP_H.c - In file included from /my/curl/bld-cmake-llvm-x64-shared/CMakeFiles/CMakeScra - tch/TryCompile-3JP6dR/HAVE_WINLDAP_H.c:2: - In file included from /usr/local/opt/mingw-w64/toolchain-x86_64/x86_64-w64-mi - ngw32/include/winldap.h:17: - In file included from /usr/local/opt/mingw-w64/toolchain-x86_64/x86_64-w64-mi - ngw32/include/schnlsp.h:9: - In file included from /usr/local/opt/mingw-w64/toolchain-x86_64/x86_64-w64-mi - ngw32/include/schannel.h:10: - /usr/local/opt/mingw-w64/toolchain-x86_64/x86_64-w64-mingw32/include/wincrypt - .h:5041:254: error: unknown type name 'PSYSTEMTIME' - WINIMPM PCCERT_CONTEXT WINAPI CertCreateSelfSignCertificate (HCRYPTPROV_OR_ - NCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE hCryptProvOrNCryptKey, PCERT_NAME_BLOB pSubjectIssuerBlob, - DWORD dwFlags, PCRYPT_KEY_PROV_INFO pKeyProvInfo, PCRYPT_ALGORITHM_IDENTIFIER - pSignatureAlgorithm, PSYSTEMTIME pStartTime, PSYSTEMTIME pEndTime, PCERT_EXT - ENSIONS pExtensions); - - - - ^ - /usr/local/opt/mingw-w64/toolchain-x86_64/x86_64-w64-mingw32/include/wincrypt - .h:5041:278: error: unknown type name 'PSYSTEMTIME' - WINIMPM PCCERT_CONTEXT WINAPI CertCreateSelfSignCertificate (HCRYPTPROV_OR_ - NCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE hCryptProvOrNCryptKey, PCERT_NAME_BLOB pSubjectIssuerBlob, - DWORD dwFlags, PCRYPT_KEY_PROV_INFO pKeyProvInfo, PCRYPT_ALGORITHM_IDENTIFIER - pSignatureAlgorithm, PSYSTEMTIME pStartTime, PSYSTEMTIME pEndTime, PCERT_EXT - ENSIONS pExtensions); - - - - ^ - 2 errors generated. - make[1]: *** [CMakeFiles/cmTC_2d8fe.dir/HAVE_WINLDAP_H.c.obj] Error 1 - make: *** [cmTC_2d8fe/fast] Error 2 - exitCode: 2 - ``` + Closes #12222 - Cherry-picked from #11095 88e4a21ff70ccef391cf99c8165281ff81374503 - Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg - Closes #11245 +- build: delete `HAVE_STDINT_H` and `HAVE_INTTYPES_H` -Daniel Stenberg (5 Jun 2023) + We use `stdint.h` unconditionally in all places except one. These uses + are imposed by external dependencies / features. nghttp2, quic, wolfSSL + and `HAVE_MACH_ABSOLUTE_TIME` do require this C99 header. It means that + any of these features make curl require a C99 compiler. (In case of + MSVC, this means Visual Studio 2010 or newer.) -- urlapi: scheme starts with alpha + This patch changes the single use of `stdint.h` guarded by + `HAVE_STDINT_H` to use `stdint.h` unconditionally. Also stop using + `inttypes.h` as an alternative there. `HAVE_INTTYPES_H` wasn't used + anywhere else, allowing to delete this feature check as well. - Add multiple tests to lib1560 to verify + Closes #12275 - Fixes #11249 - Reported-by: ad0p on github - Closes #11250 +Daniel Stenberg (6 Nov 2023) -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced +- tool_operate: do not mix memory models -- CURLOPT_MAIL_RCPT_ALLOWFAILS: replace CURLOPT_MAIL_RCPT_ALLLOWFAILS + Make sure 'inputpath' only points to memory allocated by libcurl so that + curl_free works correctly. - Deprecate the name using three Ls and prefer the name with two. + Pointed out by Coverity - Replaces #10047 - Closes #11218 + Follow-up to 859e88f6533f9e1f890 -- tests/servers: generate temp names in /tmp for unix domain sockets + Closes #12280 - ... instead of putting them in the regular pid directories because - systems generally have strict length requirements for the path name to - be shorter than 107 bytes and we easily hit that boundary otherwise. +Stefan Eissing (6 Nov 2023) - The new concept generates two random names: one for the socks daemon and - one for http. +- lib: client writer, part 2, accounting + logging - Reported-by: Andy Fiddaman - Fixes #11152 - Closes #11166 + This PR has these changes: -Stefan Eissing (2 Jun 2023) + Renaming of unencode_* to cwriter, e.g. client writers + - documentation of sendf.h functions + - move max decode stack checks back to content_encoding.c + - define writer phase which was used as order before + - introduce phases for monitoring inbetween decode phases + - offering default implementations for init/write/close -- http2: better support for --limit-rate + Add type paramter to client writer's do_write() + - always pass all writes through the writer stack + - writers who only care about BODY data will pass other writes unchanged - - leave transfer loop when --limit-rate is in effect and has - been received - - adjust stream window size to --limit-rate plus some slack - to make the server observe the pacing we want - - add test case to confirm behaviour + add RAW and PROTOCOL client writers + - RAW used for Curl_debug() logging of CURLINFO_DATA_IN + - PROTOCOL used for updates to data->req.bytecount, max_filesize checks and + Curl_pgrsSetDownloadCounter() + - remove all updates of data->req.bytecount and calls to + Curl_pgrsSetDownloadCounter() and Curl_debug() from other code + - adjust test457 expected output to no longer see the excess write - Closes #11115 + Closes #12184 -- curl_log: evaluate log statement only when transfer is verbose +Daniel Stenberg (6 Nov 2023) - Closes #11238 +- VULN-DISCLOSURE-POLICY: escape sequences are not a security flaw -Daniel Stenberg (2 Jun 2023) + Closes #12278 -- libssh2: provide error message when setting host key type fails +Viktor Szakats (6 Nov 2023) - Ref: https://curl.se/mail/archive-2023-06/0001.html +- rand: fix build error with autotools + LibreSSL - Closes #11240 + autotools unexpectedly detects `arc4random` because it is also looking + into dependency libs. One dependency, LibreSSL, happens to publish an + `arc4random` function (via its shared lib before v3.7, also via static + lib as of v3.8.2). When trying to use this function in `lib/rand.c`, + its protoype is missing. To fix that, curl included a prototype, but + that used a C99 type without including `stdint.h`, causing: -Igor Todorovski (2 Jun 2023) + ``` + ../../lib/rand.c:37:1: error: unknown type name 'uint32_t' + 37 | uint32_t arc4random(void); + | ^ + 1 error generated. + ``` -- system.h: remove __IBMC__/__IBMCPP__ guards and apply to all z/OS compiles + This patch improves this by dropping the local prototype and instead + limiting `arc4random` use for non-OpenSSL builds. OpenSSL builds provide + their own random source anyway. - Closes #11241 + The better fix would be to teach autotools to not link dependency libs + while detecting `arc4random`. -Daniel Stenberg (2 Jun 2023) + LibreSSL publishing a non-namespaced `arc4random` tracked here: + https://github.com/libressl/portable/issues/928 -- docs/SECURITY-PROCESS.md: link to example of previous critical flaw + Regression from 755ddbe901cd0c921fbc3ac5b3775c0dc683bc73 #10672 -Mark Seuffert (2 Jun 2023) + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg + Fixes #12257 + Closes #12274 -- README.md: updated link to opencollective +Daniel Stenberg (5 Nov 2023) - Closes #11232 +- RELEASE-NOTES: synced -Daniel Stenberg (1 Jun 2023) +- strdup: do Curl_strndup without strncpy -- libssh2: use custom memory functions + To avoid (false positive) gcc-13 compiler warnings. - Because of how libssh2_userauth_keyboard_interactive_ex() works: the - libcurl callback allocates memory that is later free()d by libssh2, we - must set the custom memory functions. + Follow-up to 4855debd8a2c1cb - Reverts 8b5f100db388ee60118c08aa28 + Assisted-by: Jay Satiro + Reported-by: Viktor Szakats + Fixes #12258 - Ref: https://github.com/libssh2/libssh2/issues/1078 - Closes #11235 +Enno Boland (5 Nov 2023) -- test447: test PUTting a file that grows +- HTTP: fix empty-body warning - ... and have curl trim the end when it reaches the expected total amount - of bytes instead of over-sending. + This change fixes a compiler warning with gcc-12.2.0 when + `-DCURL_DISABLE_BEARER_AUTH=ON` is used. - Reported-by: JustAnotherArchivist on github - Closes #11223 + /home/tox/src/curl/lib/http.c: In function 'Curl_http_input_auth': + /home/tox/src/curl/lib/http.c:1147:12: warning: suggest braces around emp + ty body in an 'else' statement [-Wempty-body] + 1147 | ; + | ^ -- curl: count uploaded data to stop at the originally given size + Closes #12262 - Closes #11223 - Fixes #11222 - Reported-by: JustAnotherArchivist on github +Daniel Stenberg (5 Nov 2023) -- tool: remove exclamation marks from error/warning messages +- openssl: identify the "quictls" backend correctly -- tool: use errorf() for error output + Since vanilla OpenSSL does not support the QUIC API I think it helps + users to identify the correct OpenSSL fork in version output. The best + (crude) way to do that right now seems to be to check if ngtcp2 support + is enabled. - Convert a number of fprintf() calls. + Closes #12270 -- tool: remove newlines from all helpf/notef/warnf/errorf calls +Mark Gaiser (5 Nov 2023) - Make voutf() always add one. +- curl: improved IPFS and IPNS URL support - Closes #11226 + Previously just ipfs:// and ipns:// was supported, which is + too strict for some usecases. -- tests/servers.pm: pick unused port number with a server socket + This patch allows paths and query arguments to be used too. + Making this work according to normal http semantics: - This change replaces the previous method of picking a port number at - random to try to start servers on, then retrying up to ten times with - new random numbers each time, with a function that creates a server - socket on port zero, thereby getting a suitable random port set by the - kernel. That server socket is then closed and that port number is used - to setup the actual test server on. + ipfs:///foo/bar?key=val + ipns:///foo/bar?key=val - There is a risk that *another* server can be started on the machine in - the time gap, but the server verification feature will detect that. + The gateway url support is changed. + It now only supports gateways in the form of: - Closes #11220 + http:///foo/bar + http:// -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced + Query arguments here are explicitly not allowed and trigger an intended + malformed url error. - bump to 8.2.0 + There also was a crash when IPFS_PATH was set with a non trailing + forward slash. This has been fixed. -Alejandro R. Sedeño (31 May 2023) + Lastly, a load of test cases have been added to verify the above. -- configure: fix run-compiler for old /bin/sh + Reported-by: Steven Allen + Fixes #12148 + Closes #12152 - If you try to assign and export on the same line on some older /bin/sh - implementations, it complains: +Harry Mallon (5 Nov 2023) - ``` - $ export "NAME=value" - NAME=value: is not an identifier - ``` +- docs: KNOWN_BUGS cleanup - This commit rewrites run-compiler's assignments and exports to work with - old /bin/sh, splitting assignment and export into two separate - statements, and only quote the value. So now we have: + * Remove other mention of hyper memory-leaks from `KNOWN_BUGS`. + Should have been removed in 629723ecf22a8eae78d64cceec2f3bdae703ec95 - ``` - NAME="value" - export NAME - ``` + * Remove mention of aws-sigv4 sort query string from `KNOWN_BUGS`. + Fixed in #11806 - While we're here, make the same change to the two supporting - assign+export lines preceeding the script to be consistent with how - exports work throughout the rest of configure.ac. + * Remove mention of aws-sigv4 query empty value problems - Closes #11228 + * Remove mention of aws-sigv4 missing amz-content-sha256 + Fixed in #9995 -Philip Heiduck (31 May 2023) +- http_aws_sigv4: canonicalise valueless query params -- circleci: install impacket & wolfssl 5.6.0 + Fixes #8107 + Closes #12244 - Closes #11221 +Michael Kaufmann (4 Nov 2023) -Daniel Stenberg (31 May 2023) +- docs: preserve the modification date when copying the prebuilt man page -- tool_urlglob: use curl_off_t instead of longs + The previously built man page "curl.1" must be copied with the original + modification date, otherwise the man page is never updated. - To handle more globs better (especially on Windows) + This fixes a bug that has been introduced with commit 2568441cab. - Closes #11224 + Reviewed-by: Dan Fandrich + Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg -Dan Fandrich (30 May 2023) + Closes #12199 -- scripts: Fix GHA matrix job detection in cijobs.pl +Daniel Stenberg (4 Nov 2023) - The parsing is pretty brittle and it broke detecting some jobs at some - point. Also, detect if Windows is used in GHA. +- docs: remove bold from some man page SYNOPSIS sections -- runtests: abort test run after failure without -a + In the name of consistency - This was broken in a recent refactor and test runs would not stop. + Closes #12267 - Follow-up to d4a1b5b6 +- openssl: two multi pointer checks should probably rather be asserts - Reported-by: Daniel Stenberg - Fixes #11225 - Closes #11227 + ... so add the asserts now and consider removing the dynamic checks in a + future. -Version 8.1.2 (30 May 2023) + Ref: #12261 + Closes #12264 -Daniel Stenberg (30 May 2023) +boilingoden (4 Nov 2023) -- RELEASE-NOTES: synced +- docs: add supported version for the json write-out - 8.1.2 release + xref: https://curl.se/changes.html#7_70_0 -- THANKS: contributors from 8.1.2 + Closes #12266 diff --git a/vendor/curl/COPYING b/vendor/curl/COPYING index d1eab3eb93..d9e7e0bef3 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/COPYING +++ b/vendor/curl/COPYING @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ COPYRIGHT AND PERMISSION NOTICE -Copyright (c) 1996 - 2023, Daniel Stenberg, , and many +Copyright (c) 1996 - 2024, Daniel Stenberg, , and many contributors, see the THANKS file. All rights reserved. diff --git a/vendor/curl/RELEASE-NOTES b/vendor/curl/RELEASE-NOTES index 3f7dc99f68..a48c8efc9c 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/RELEASE-NOTES +++ b/vendor/curl/RELEASE-NOTES @@ -1,206 +1,244 @@ -curl and libcurl 8.5.0 +curl and libcurl 8.8.0 - Public curl releases: 253 - Command line options: 258 - curl_easy_setopt() options: 303 - Public functions in libcurl: 93 - Contributors: 3039 + Public curl releases: 257 + Command line options: 259 + curl_easy_setopt() options: 305 + Public functions in libcurl: 94 + Contributors: 3173 This release includes the following changes: - o gnutls: support CURLSSLOPT_NATIVE_CA [31] - o HTTP3: ngtcp2 builds are no longer experimental [77] + o curl_version_info: provide librtmp version [73] + o file: add support for directory listings [63] + o idn: add native AppleIDN (icucore) support for macOS/iOS [95] + o lib: add curl_multi_waitfds [34] + o mbedTLS: implement CURLOPT_SSL_CIPHER_LIST option [103] + o NTLM_WB: drop support [67] + o TLS: add support for ECH (Encrypted Client Hello) [109] + o urlapi: add CURLU_GET_EMPTY for empty queries and fragments [111] This release includes the following bugfixes: - o appveyor: make VS2008-built curl tool runnable [93] - o asyn-thread: use pipe instead of socketpair for IPC when available [4] - o autotools: accept linker flags via `CURL_LDFLAGS_{LIB,BIN}` [128] - o autotools: avoid passing `LDFLAGS` twice to libcurl [127] - o autotools: delete LCC compiler support bits [137] - o autotools: fix/improve gcc and Apple clang version detection [136] - o autotools: stop setting `-std=gnu89` with `--enable-warnings` [135] - o autotools: update references to deleted `crypt-auth` option [46] - o BINDINGS: add V binding [54] - o build: add `src/.checksrc` to source tarball [1] - o build: add more picky warnings and fix them [172] - o build: always revert `#pragma GCC diagnostic` after use [143] - o build: delete `HAVE_STDINT_H` and `HAVE_INTTYPES_H` [107] - o build: delete support bits for obsolete Windows compilers [106] - o build: fix 'threadsafe' feature detection for older gcc [19] - o build: fix builds that disable protocols but not digest auth [174] - o build: fix compiler warning with auths disabled [85] - o build: fix libssh2 + `CURL_DISABLE_DIGEST_AUTH` + `CURL_DISABLE_AWS` [120] - o build: picky warning updates [125] - o build: require Windows XP or newer [86] - o cfilter: provide call to tell connection to forget a socket [65] - o checksrc.pl: support #line instructions - o CI: add autotools, out-of-tree, debug build to distro check job [14] - o CI: ignore test 286 on Appveyor gcc 9 build [6] - o cmake: add `CURL_DISABLE_BINDLOCAL` option [146] - o cmake: add test for `DISABLE` options, add `CURL_DISABLE_HEADERS_API` [138] - o cmake: dedupe Windows system libs [114] - o cmake: fix `HAVE_H_ERRNO_ASSIGNABLE` detection [2] - o cmake: fix CURL_DISABLE_GETOPTIONS [12] - o cmake: fix multiple include of CURL package [96] - o cmake: fix OpenSSL quic detection in quiche builds [56] - o cmake: option to disable install & drop `curlu` target when unused [72] - o cmake: pre-fill rest of detection values for Windows [50] - o cmake: replace `check_library_exists_concat()` [23] - o cmake: speed up threads setup for Windows [68] - o cmake: speed up zstd detection [69] - o config-win32: set `HAVE_SNPRINTF` for mingw-w64 [123] - o configure: better --disable-http [80] - o configure: check for the fseeko declaration too [55] - o conncache: use the closure handle when disconnecting surplus connections [173] - o content_encoding: make Curl_all_content_encodings allocless [101] - o cookie: lowercase the domain names before PSL checks [160] - o curl.h: delete Symbian OS references [162] - o curl.h: on FreeBSD include sys/param.h instead of osreldate.h [21] - o curl.rc: switch out the copyright symbol for plain ASCII [167] - o curl: improved IPFS and IPNS URL support [87] - o curl_easy_duphandle.3: clarify how HSTS and alt-svc are duped [99] - o Curl_http_body: cleanup properly when Curl_getformdata errors [152] - o curl_setup: disallow Windows IPv6 builds missing getaddrinfo [57] - o curl_sspi: support more revocation error names in error messages [95] - o CURLINFO_PRETRANSFER_TIME_T.3: fix time explanation [181] - o CURLMOPT_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS: make sure the set value is within range [165] - o CURLOPT_CAINFO_BLOB.3: explain what CURL_BLOB_COPY does [113] - o CURLOPT_WRITEFUNCTION.3: clarify libcurl returns for CURL_WRITEFUNC_ERROR [45] - o CURPOST_POSTFIELDS.3: add CURLOPT_COPYPOSTFIELDS in SEE ALSO - o docs/example/keepalive.c: show TCP keep-alive options [73] - o docs/example/localport.c: show off CURLOPT_LOCALPORT [83] - o docs/examples/interface.c: show CURLOPT_INTERFACE use [84] - o docs/libcurl: fix three minor man page format mistakes [26] - o docs/libcurl: SYNSOPSIS cleanup [150] - o docs: add supported version for the json write-out [92] - o docs: clarify that curl passes on input unfiltered [47] - o docs: fix function typo in curl_easy_option_next.3 [36] - o docs: KNOWN_BUGS cleanup - o docs: make all examples in all libcurl man pages compile [175] - o docs: preserve the modification date when copying the prebuilt man page [89] - o docs: remove bold from some man page SYNOPSIS sections [90] - o docs: use SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH for generated manpages [16] - o doh: provide better return code for responses w/o addresses [133] - o doh: use PIPEWAIT when HTTP/2 is attempted [63] - o duphandle: also free 'outcurl->cookies' in error path [122] - o duphandle: make dupset() not return with pointers to old alloced data [109] - o duphandle: use strdup to clone *COPYPOSTFIELDS if size is not set [132] - o easy: in duphandle, init the cookies for the new handle [131] - o easy: remove duplicate wolfSSH init call [37] - o easy_lock: add a pthread_mutex_t fallback [13] - o examples/rtsp-options.c: add [157] - o fopen: create new file using old file's mode [153] - o fopen: create short(er) temporary file name [155] - o getenv: PlayStation doesn't have getenv() [41] - o GHA: move mod_h2 version in CI to v2.0.25 [43] - o hostip: show the list of IPs when resolving is done [35] - o hostip: silence compiler warning `-Wparentheses-equality` [62] - o hsts: skip single-dot hostname [67] - o HTTP/2, HTTP/3: handle detach of onoing transfers [134] - o http2: header conversion tightening [33] - o http2: provide an error callback and failf the message [53] - o http2: safer invocation of populate_binsettings [8] - o http: allow longer HTTP/2 request method names [112] - o http: avoid Expect: 100-continue if Upgrade: is used [15] - o http: consider resume with CURLOPT_FAILONERRROR and 416 to be fine [81] - o http: fix `-Wunused-parameter` with no auth and no proxy [149] - o http: fix `-Wunused-variable` compiler warning [115] - o http: fix empty-body warning [76] - o http_aws_sigv4: canonicalise valueless query params [88] - o hyper: temporarily remove HTTP/2 support [139] - o INSTALL: update list of ports and CPU archs - o IPFS: fix IPFS_PATH and file parsing [119] - o keylog: disable if unused [145] - o lib: add and use Curl_strndup() [97] - o lib: apache style infof and trace macros/functions [71] - o lib: fix gcc warning in printf call [7] - o libcurl-errors.3: sync with current public headers [156] - o libcurl-thread.3: simplify the TLS section [79] - o Makefile.am: drop vc10, vc11 and vc12 projects from dist [103] - o Makefile.mk: fix `-rtmp` option for non-Windows - o mime: store "form escape" as a single bit [170] - o misc: fix -Walloc-size warnings [118] - o msh3: error when built with CURL_DISABLE_SOCKETPAIR set [61] - o multi: during ratelimit multi_getsock should return no sockets [182] - o multi: use pipe instead of socketpair to *wakeup() [18] - o ngtcp2: fix races in stream handling [178] - o ngtcp2: ignore errors on unknown streams [158] - o ntlm_wb: use pipe instead of socketpair when possible [44] - o openldap: move the alloc of ldapconninfo to *connect() [29] - o openldap: set the callback argument in oldap_do [30] - o openssl: avoid BN_num_bits() NULL pointer derefs [9] - o openssl: fix building with v3 `no-deprecated` + add CI test [161] - o openssl: fix infof() to avoid compiler warning for %s with null [70] - o openssl: identify the "quictls" backend correctly [82] - o openssl: include SIG and KEM algorithms in verbose [52] - o openssl: make CURLSSLOPT_NATIVE_CA import Windows intermediate CAs [58] - o openssl: two multi pointer checks should probably rather be asserts [91] - o openssl: when a session-ID is reused, skip OCSP stapling [142] - o page-footer: clarify exit code 25 [51] - o projects: add VC14.20 project files [104] - o pytest: use lower count in repeat tests [98] - o quic: make eyeballers connect retries stop at weird replies [140] - o quic: manage connection idle timeouts [5] - o quiche: use quiche_conn_peer_transport_params() [116] - o rand: fix build error with autotools + LibreSSL [111] - o resolve.d: drop a multi use-sentence [100] - o RTSP: improved RTP parser [32] - o rustls: implement connect_blocking [154] - o sasl: fix `-Wunused-function` compiler warning [124] - o schannel: add CA cache support for files and memory blobs [121] - o setopt: check CURLOPT_TFTP_BLKSIZE range on set [171] - o setopt: remove outdated cookie comment [64] - o setopt: remove superfluous use of ternary expressions [169] - o socks: better buffer size checks for socks4a user and hostname [20] - o socks: make SOCKS5 use the CURLOPT_IPRESOLVE choice [38] - o symbols-in-versions: the CLOSEPOLICY options are deprecated - o test1683: remove commented-out check alternatives - o test3103: add missing quotes around a test tag attribute - o test613: stop showing an error on missing output file - o tests/README: SOCKS tests are not using OpenSSH, it has its own server [48] - o tests/server: add more SOCKS5 handshake error checking [27] - o tests: Fix Windows test helper tool search & use it for handle64 [17] - o tidy-up: casing typos, delete unused Windows version aliases [144] - o tool: fix --capath when proxy support is disabled [28] - o tool: support bold headers in Windows [117] - o tool_cb_hdr: add an additional parsing check [129] - o tool_cb_prg: make the carriage return fit for wide progress bars [159] - o tool_cb_wrt: fix write output for very old Windows versions [24] - o tool_getparam: limit --rate to be smaller than number of ms [3] - o tool_operate: do not mix memory models [108] - o tool_operate: fix links in ipfs errors [22] - o tool_parsecfg: make warning output propose double-quoting [164] - o tool_urlglob: fix build for old gcc versions [25] - o tool_urlglob: make multiply() bail out on negative values [11] - o tool_writeout_json: fix JSON encoding of non-ascii bytes [179] - o transfer: abort pause send when connection is marked for closing [183] - o transfer: avoid calling the read callback again after EOF [130] - o transfer: only reset the FTP wildcard engine in CLEAR state [42] - o url: don't touch the multi handle when closing internal handles [40] - o url: find scheme with a "perfect hash" [141] - o url: fix `-Wzero-length-array` with no protocols [147] - o url: fix builds with `CURL_DISABLE_HTTP` [148] - o url: protocol handler lookup tidy-up [66] - o url: proxy ssl connection reuse fix [94] - o urlapi: avoid null deref if setting blank host to url encode [75] - o urlapi: skip appending NULL pointer query [74] - o urlapi: when URL encoding the fragment, pass in the right length [59] - o urldata: make maxconnects a 32 bit value [166] - o urldata: move async resolver state from easy handle to connectdata [34] - o urldata: move cookielist from UserDefined to UrlState [126] - o urldata: move hstslist from 'set' to 'state' [105] - o urldata: move the 'internal' boolean to the state struct [39] - o vssh: remove the #ifdef for Curl_ssh_init, use empty macro - o vtls: cleanup SSL config management [78] - o vtls: consistently use typedef names for OpenSSL structs [176] - o vtls: late clone of connection ssl config [60] - o vtls: use ALPN "http/1.1" for HTTP/1.x, including HTTP/1.0 [102] - o VULN-DISCLOSURE-POLICY: escape sequences are not a security flaw [110] - o windows: use built-in `_WIN32` macro to detect Windows [163] - o wolfssh: remove redundant static prototypes [168] - o wolfssl: add default case for wolfssl_connect_step1 switch [49] - o wolfssl: require WOLFSSL_SYS_CA_CERTS for loading system CA [10] + o appveyor: drop unnecessary `--clean-first` cmake option [197] + o appveyor: guard against crash-build with VS2008 [193] + o appveyor: make gcc 6 mingw64 job build-only [152] + o asyn-thread: fix curl_global_cleanup crash in Windows [161] + o asyn-thread: fix Curl_thread_create result check [162] + o autotools: delete unused functions [177] + o autotools: fix `HAVE_IOCTLSOCKET_FIONBIO` test for gcc 14 [186] + o autotools: only probe for SGI MIPS compilers on IRIX [213] + o bearssl: fix compiler warnings [43] + o bearssl: use common code for cipher suite lookup [126] + o bufq: remove duplicate word in comment [154] + o BUG-BOUNTY.md: clarify the third party situation [210] + o build: prefer `USE_IPV6` macro internally (was: `ENABLE_IPV6`) [85] + o build: remove MacOSX-Framework script [60] + o cd2nroff/manage: use UTC when SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH is set [36] + o cf-https-connect: use timeouts as unsigned ints [143] + o cf-socket: don't try getting local IP without socket [188] + o cf-socket: remove references to l_ip, l_port [9] + o ci: add curl-for-win builds: Linux MUSL, macOS, Windows [68] + o cmake: add `BUILD_EXAMPLES` option to build examples [128] + o cmake: add librtmp/rtmpdump option and detection [108] + o cmake: check fseeko after detecting HAVE_FILE_OFFSET_BITS [64] + o cmake: do not pass linker flags to the static library tool [203] + o cmake: enable `-pedantic-errors` for clang when `CURL_WERROR=ON` [47] + o cmake: FindNGHTTP2 add static lib name to find_library call [141] + o cmake: fix `CURL_WERROR=ON` for old CMake and use it in GHA/linux-old [48] + o cmake: fix `HAVE_IOCTLSOCKET_FIONBIO` test with gcc 14 [179] + o cmake: fixup `DEPENDS` filename [51] + o cmake: forward `USE_LIBRTMP` option to C [59] + o cmake: generate misc manpages and install `mk-ca-bundle.pl` [24] + o cmake: initialize `BUILD_TESTING` before first use [227] + o cmake: speed up libcurl doc building again [15] + o cmake: tidy-up to use `WORKING_DIRECTORY` [23] + o cmake: use namespaced custom target names [80] + o cmdline-docs: fix make install with configure --disable-docs [1] + o configure: error on missing perl if docs or manual is enabled [135] + o configure: make --disable-docs imply --disable-manual [2] + o content_encoding: brotli and others, pass through 0-length writes [5] + o content_encoding: ignore duplicate chunked encoding [137] + o content_encoding: reject transfer-encoding after chunked [200] + o contrithanks: honor `CURLWWW` variable [69] + o curl-confopts.m4: define CARES_NO_DEPRECATED when c-ares is used [17] + o curl.h: change CURL_SSLVERSION_* from enum to defines [132] + o curl: make --help adapt to the terminal width [11] + o curl: use curl_getenv instead of the curlx_ version [20] + o Curl_creader_read: init two variables to avoid using them uninited [99] + o curl_easy_pause.md: use correct defines in example [187] + o curl_getdate.md: document two-digit year handling [127] + o curl_global_trace.md: shorten the description [29] + o curl_multibyte: remove access() function wrapper for Windows [163] + o curl_path: make Curl_get_pathname use dynbuf [158] + o curl_setup.h: add support for IAR compiler [191] + o curl_setup.h: detect 'inline' support [133] + o curl_sha512_256: do not use workaround for NetBSD when not needed [21] + o curl_sha512_256: fix detection of OpenSSL 1.1.1 or later [8] + o curl_url_get.md: clarify queries and fragments and CURLU_GET_EMPTY [105] + o CURLINFO_REQUEST_SIZE: fixed, add tests for transfer infos reported [52] + o CURLOPT_WRITEFUNCTION.md: fix the callback proto in the example [215] + o cw-out: improved error handling [104] + o DEPRECATE.md: TLS libraries without 1.3 support [199] + o digest: replace strcpy for empty string with simple assignment [185] + o dist: `set -eu`, fix shellcheck, make reproducible and smaller tarballs [38] + o dist: add files missing from release tarball [53] + o dist: add reproducible dir entries to tarballs [56] + o dist: do not require Perl in `maketgz` [71] + o dist: remove the curl-config.1 from the tarball [28] + o dist: verify tarball reproducibility in CI [40] + o DISTROS: add patch and issues link for curl-for-win [110] + o DISTROS: Cygwin updates [44] + o dllmain: Call OpenSSL thread cleanup for Windows and Cygwin [114] + o doc: pytest `--repeat` -> `--count` [58] + o docs/cmdline-opts: invoke managen using a relative path [30] + o docs/cmdline-opts: mention STARTTLS for --ssl and --ssl-reqd [175] + o docs: add CURLOPT_NOPROGRESS to CURLOPT_XFERINFOFUNCTION example [61] + o docs: clarify CURLOPT_MAXFILESIZE and CURLOPT_MAXFILESIZE_LARGE [74] + o docs: fix some CURLINFO examples [147] + o doh: fix typo in comment [173] + o doh: remove unused function prototype [169] + o dynbuf: fix returncode on memory error [174] + o examples: fix/silence `-Wsign-conversion` [178] + o EXPERIMENTAL: add graduation requirements for each feature [166] + o file: remove useless assignment [89] + o ftp: add tracing support [181] + o ftp: fix build for CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS + o ftp: fix socket leak on rare error [102] + o GHA: add NetBSD, OpenBSD, FreeBSD/arm64 and OmniOS jobs [201] + o GHA: add shellcheck job and fix warnings, shell tidy-ups [70] + o GHA: add valgrind to a wolfSSL build [37] + o GHA: on macOS remove $HOME/.curlrc [50] + o GHA: pin dependencies [194] + o gnutls: lazy init the trust settings [75] + o h3/ngtcp2: improve error handling [140] + o hash: change 'slots' to size_t from int [144] + o hash: delete unused debug function [198] + o hsts: explicitly skip blank lines [212] + o hsts: remove single-use single-line function [151] + o http tests: in CI skip test_02_23* for quiche [211] + o http2 + ngtcp2: pass CURLcode errors from callbacks [94] + o http2, http3: decouple stream state from easy handle [92] + o http2: emit RST when client write fails [65] + o http3: quiche+ngtcp2 improvements [129] + o http: acknowledge a returned error code [123] + o http: HEAD response body tolerance [170] + o http: reject HTTP major version switch mid connection [100] + o http: remove redundant check [182] + o http: with chunked POST forced, disable length check on read callback [31] + o http_aws_sigv4: remove useless assignment [88] + o idn: make Curl_idnconvert_hostname() use Curl_idn_decode() [16] + o if2ip: make the buf_size arg a size_t [142] + o INSTALL-CMAKE.md: explain `cmake -G ` [32] + o krb5: use dynbuf [149] + o ldap: fix unused variables (seen on OmniOS) [183] + o lib/cf-h1-proxy: silence compiler warnings (gcc 14) [155] + o lib: add trace support for client reads and writes [45] + o lib: bump hash sizes to `size_t` [153] + o lib: clear the easy handle's saved errno before transfer [180] + o lib: fix compiler warnings (gcc) [222] + o lib: make protocol handlers store scheme name lowercase [159] + o lib: merge `ENABLE_QUIC` C macro into `USE_HTTP3` [84] + o lib: remove two instances of "only only" messages [160] + o lib: silence `-Wsign-conversion` in base64, strcase, mprintf [139] + o lib: silence warnings on comma misuse [91] + o lib: use `#error` instead of invalid syntax in `curl_setup_once.h` [49] + o lib: use multi instead of multi_easy for the active multi [41] + o libcurl-opts: mention pipelining less [33] + o libssh2: delete redundant feature guard [171] + o libssh2: replace `access()` with `stat()` [145] + o libssh2: set length to 0 if strdup failed [6] + o m4: fix rustls pkg-config codepath [22] + o MAIL-ETIQUETTE: convert to markdown [12] + o makefile: remove the sorting from the vc-ide action [42] + o maketgz: put docs/RELEASE-TOOL.md into the tarball [35] + o managen: fix the option sort order [150] + o mbedtls: call mbedtls_ssl_setup() after RNG callback is set [66] + o mbedtls: cut off trailing newlines from debug logs [87] + o mbedtls: fix building with v3 in CMake Unity mode [107] + o mbedtls: support TLS 1.3 [156] + o mime: avoid using access() [125] + o misc: fix typos [62] + o misc: fix typos, quoting and spelling [167] + o mprintf: check fputc error rather than matching returned character [82] + o mqtt: when Curl_xfer_recv returns error, don't use nread [101] + o multi: avoid memory-leak risk [134] + o multi: introduce SETUP state for better timeouts [26] + o multi: multi_wait improvements [131] + o multi: remove the unused Curl_preconnect function [98] + o multi: remove useless assignment [146] + o multi: timeout handles even without connection [81] + o openldap: create ldap URLs correctly for IPv6 addresses [19] + o openssl: do not set SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS [10] + o openssl: revert keylog_callback support for LibreSSL [192] + o OS400: fix shellcheck warnings in scripts [72] + o projects: drop MSVC project files for recent versions [79] + o pytest: add DELETE tests, check server version [225] + o pytest: fixes for recent python, add FTP tests [206] + o quic: fixup duplicate static function name (for cmake unity) [77] + o quiche: expire all active transfers on connection close [116] + o quiche: trust its timeout handling [190] + o RELEASE-PROCEDURE: mention an initial working build [7] + o request: make Curl_req_init return void [96] + o request: paused upload on completed download, assess connection [54] + o reuse: add copyright + license info to individual docs/*.md files [13] + o ROADMAP: remove completed entries, mention websocket + o rustls: fix handshake done handling [207] + o rustls: fix partial send handling [224] + o rustls: remove incorrect SSLSUPP_TLS13_CIPHERSUITES flag [115] + o rustsls: fix error code on receive [230] + o sendf: fix two typos in comments [90] + o sendf: useless assignment in cr_lc_read() [120] + o setopt: acknowledge errors proper for CURLOPT_COOKIEJAR [216] + o setopt: make the setstropt_userpwd args compulsory [221] + o setopt: remove check for 'option' that is always true [219] + o setopt: warn on Curl_set*opt() uses not using the return value [176] + o smtp: result of Curl_bufq_cread was not used [78] + o socket: remove redundant call to getsockname [195] + o socketpair: fix compilation when USE_UNIX_SOCKETS is not defined [229] + o src: tidy up types, add necessary casts [217] + o telnet: check return code from fileno() [112] + o tests/http: fix compiler warning [39] + o tests: add -q as first option when invoking curl for tests [97] + o tests: check caddy server version to match test expectations [106] + o tests: enable test 1117 for hyper [119] + o tests: fix feature case in test1481 [117] + o tests: fix test 1167 to skip digit-only symbols [214] + o tests: make the unit test result type `CURLcode` [165] + o tests: Mark tftpd timer function as noreturn [168] + o tests: tidy up types in server code [220] + o tls: fix SecureTransport + BearSSL cmake unity builds [113] + o tls: remove EXAMPLEs from deprecated options [164] + o tls: use shared init code for TCP+QUIC [57] + o tool: move tool_ftruncate64 to tool_util.c [138] + o tool_cb_rea: limit rate unpause for -T . uploads [136] + o tool_cfgable: free {proxy_}cipher13_list on exit [172] + o tool_getparam: output warning for leading unicode quote character [14] + o tool_getparam: remove two redundant conditions [189] + o tool_operate: don't truncate the etag save file by default [118] + o tool_operate: init vars unconditionally in post_per_transfer [124] + o tool_paramhlp: remove duplicate assign [121] + o tool_xattr: "guess" URL scheme if none is provided [3] + o tool_xattr: in debug builds, act normally if CURL_FAKE_XATTR is not set [4] + o transfer: remove useless assignment [122] + o url: do not URL decode proxy crendentials [55] + o url: fix use of an uninitialized variable [86] + o url: make parse_login_details use memdup0 [184] + o url: remove duplicate call to Curl_conncache_remove_conn when pruning [196] + o urlapi: allow setting port number zero [76] + o urlapi: fix relative redirects to fragment-only [83] + o urldata: remove fields not used depending on used features [46] + o vauth: make two functions void that always just returned OK [218] + o version: use msnprintf instead of strncpy [157] + o vquic-tls: use correct cert name check API for wolfSSL [226] + o vquic: use CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T for 64 bit printf output [18] + o vtls: TLS session storage overhaul [130] + o wakeup_create: use FD_CLOEXEC/SOCK_CLOEXEC [223] + o warnless: delete orphan declarations [209] + o websocket: avoid memory leak in error path [148] + o winbuild: add ENABLE_WEBSOCKETS option [93] + o winbuild: use $(RC) correctly [27] + o wolfssl: plug memory leak in wolfssl_connect_step2() [25] + o x509asn1: return error on missing OID [208] This release includes the following known bugs: @@ -215,204 +253,253 @@ Planned upcoming removals include: This release would not have looked like this without help, code, reports and advice from friends like these: - 12932 on github, Alex Bozarth, Alexey Larikov, Alex Klyubin, Ammar Faizi, - Andrew Kurushin, Anubhav Rai, boilingoden, calvin2021y on github, - Carlos Henrique Lima Melara, Casey Bodley, Charlie C, Dan Fandrich, - Daniel Jeliński, Daniel Stenberg, David Benjamin, David Suter, Dmitry Karpov, - eeverettrbx on github, Emanuele Torre, Enno Boland, enWILLYado on github, - Faraz Fallahi, Gisle Vanem, Goro FUJI, Graham Campbell, Harry Mallon, - Harry Sintonen, iconoclasthero, icy17 on github, Jacob Hoffman-Andrews, - Jan Alexander Steffens, Jeroen Ooms, Jiehong on github, Jiri Hruska, - Junho Choi, Kai Pastor, Kareem, Kartatz on Github, kirbyn17 on hackerone, - Lau, lkordos on github, Loïc Yhuel, LoRd_MuldeR, lRoccoon on github, - Maksymilian Arciemowicz, Manfred Schwarb, Marcel Raad, Marcin Rataj, - Mark Gaiser, Martin Schmatz, Michael Kaufmann, Michał Antoniak, Nico Rieck, - Niracler Li, ohyeaah on github, Ophir Lojkine, Paweł Wegner, Philip Heiduck, - Ray Satiro, rilysh, Robert Southee, Romain Geissler, Sam James, - Samuel Henrique, sd0 on hackerone, Smackd0wn, Sohom Datta, Stefan Eissing, - Steven Allen, Tim Hill, Torben Dury, Turiiya, Viktor Szakats, - yushicheng7788 on github, z2_, zhengqwe on github, 積丹尼 Dan Jacobson - (78 contributors) + Abdullah Alyan, Andrew, Antoine Bollengier, blankie, Brian Inglis, + Carlos Henrique Lima Melara, Ch40zz on github, Christian Schmitz, Chris Webb, + Colin Leroy-Mira, Dagfinn Ilmari Mannsåker, Dan Fandrich, Daniel Gustafsson, + Daniel J. H., Daniel McCarney, Daniel Stenberg, Dmitry Karpov, + Emanuele Torre, Evgeny Grin (Karlson2k), Fabian Keil, farazrbx on github, + fuzzard, Gisle Vanem, Gonçalo Carvalho, Gusted, hammlee96 on github, + Harmen Stoppels, Harry Sintonen, Hongfei Li, Ivan, Jan Macku, Jan Venekamp, + Jeff King, Jeroen Ooms, Jérôme Leclercq, Jiwoo Park, + Johann Sebastian Schicho, Jonatan Vela, Joseph Chen, Juliusz Sosinowicz, + Kailun Qin, kalvdans on github, Keitagit-kun on github, Konstantin Kuzov, + kpcyrd on github, Laramie Leavitt, LigH, Lucas Nussbaum, + magisterquis on hackerone, Marcel Raad, Matt Jolly, Max Dymond, Mel Zuser, + Michael Kaufmann, Michael Litwak, Michał Antoniak, Nathan Moinvaziri, + Orgad Shaneh, Patrick Monnerat, Paul Gilmartin, Paul Howarth, + Pavel Kropachev, Pavel Pavlov, Philip Heiduck, Rahul Krishna M, RainRat, + Ray Satiro, renovate[bot], riastradh on github, Robert Moreton, + Sanjay Pujare, Sergey Bronnikov, Sergey Ogryzkov, Sergio Durigan Junior, + southernedge on github, Stefan Eissing, Stephen Farrell, Tal Regev, + Tatsuhiro Tsujikawa, Tobias Stoeckmann, Toon Claes, Trumeet on github, + Trzik on github, Viktor Szakats, zmcx16 on github + (85 contributors) References to bug reports and discussions on issues: - [1] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12084 - [2] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12093 - [3] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12116 - [4] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12146 - [5] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12064 - [6] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12040 - [7] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12082 - [8] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12101 - [9] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12099 - [10] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12108 - [11] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12102 - [12] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12091 - [13] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12090 - [14] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12088 - [15] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12022 - [16] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12092 - [17] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12115 - [18] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12142 - [19] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12125 - [20] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12139 - [21] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12107 - [22] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12133 - [23] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=11285 - [24] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12131 - [25] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12124 - [26] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12126 - [27] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12117 - [28] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12089 - [29] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12166 - [30] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12166 - [31] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12137 - [32] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12052 - [33] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12097 - [34] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12198 - [35] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12145 - [36] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12170 - [37] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12168 - [38] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=11949 - [39] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12165 - [40] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12165 - [41] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12140 - [42] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=11775 - [43] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12157 - [44] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12149 - [45] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12201 - [46] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12194 - [47] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12249 - [48] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12195 - [49] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12218 - [50] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12044 - [51] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12189 - [52] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12030 - [53] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12179 - [54] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12182 - [55] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12086 - [56] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12160 - [57] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12221 - [58] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12155 - [59] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12250 - [60] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12237 - [61] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12213 - [62] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12215 - [63] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12214 - [64] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12206 - [65] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12207 - [66] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12216 - [67] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12247 - [68] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12202 - [69] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12200 - [70] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12196 - [71] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12083 - [72] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12287 - [73] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12242 - [74] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12240 - [75] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12240 - [76] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12262 - [77] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12235 - [78] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12204 - [79] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12233 - [80] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12223 - [81] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=10521 - [82] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12270 - [83] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12230 - [84] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12229 - [85] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12227 - [86] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12225 - [87] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12148 - [88] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=8107 - [89] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12199 - [90] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12267 - [91] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12264 - [92] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12266 - [93] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12263 - [94] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12255 - [95] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12239 - [96] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=11913 - [97] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12251 - [98] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12248 - [99] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12315 - [100] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12294 - [101] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12289 - [102] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12259 - [103] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12288 - [104] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12282 - [105] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12315 - [106] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12222 - [107] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12275 - [108] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12280 - [109] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12337 - [110] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12278 - [111] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12257 - [112] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12311 - [113] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12277 - [114] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12307 - [115] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12228 - [116] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12180 - [117] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12321 - [118] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12292 - [119] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12152 - [120] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12273 - [121] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12261 - [122] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12329 - [123] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12325 - [124] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12326 - [125] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12324 - [126] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12323 - [127] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12310 - [128] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12312 - [129] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12320 - [130] = https://curl.se/mail/lib-2023-11/0017.html - [131] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12318 - [132] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12317 - [133] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12365 - [134] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12356 - [135] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12346 - [136] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12362 - [137] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12357 - [138] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12353 - [139] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12191 - [140] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12400 - [141] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12347 - [142] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12399 - [143] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12352 - [144] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12351 - [145] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12350 - [146] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12345 - [147] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12344 - [148] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12343 - [149] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12338 - [150] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12402 - [152] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12410 - [153] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12299 - [154] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=11647 - [155] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12388 - [156] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12424 - [157] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12452 - [158] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12449 - [159] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12407 - [160] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12387 - [161] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12384 - [162] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12378 - [163] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12376 - [164] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12409 - [165] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12382 - [166] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12375 - [167] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12403 - [168] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12381 - [169] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12374 - [170] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12374 - [171] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12374 - [172] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12331 - [173] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12367 - [174] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12440 - [175] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12448 - [176] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12439 - [178] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12435 - [179] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12434 - [181] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12431 - [182] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12430 - [183] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12428 + [1] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13198 + [2] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13191 + [3] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13205 + [4] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13220 + [5] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13209 + [6] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13213 + [7] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13216 + [8] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13208 + [9] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13210 + [10] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13203 + [11] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13171 + [12] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13247 + [13] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13245 + [14] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13214 + [15] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13207 + [16] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13236 + [17] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13240 + [18] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13224 + [19] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13228 + [20] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13230 + [21] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13225 + [22] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13200 + [23] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13206 + [24] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13197 + [25] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13272 + [26] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13371 + [27] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13267 + [28] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13268 + [29] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13263 + [30] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13281 + [31] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13229 + [32] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13244 + [33] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13254 + [34] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13135 + [35] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13239 + [36] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13242 + [37] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13274 + [38] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13299 + [39] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13301 + [40] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13327 + [41] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12665 + [42] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13294 + [43] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13290 + [44] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13258 + [45] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13223 + [46] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13188 + [47] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13286 + [48] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13282 + [49] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13287 + [50] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13284 + [51] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13283 + [52] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13269 + [53] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13346 + [54] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13260 + [55] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13265 + [56] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13322 + [57] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13172 + [58] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13218 + [59] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13364 + [60] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13313 + [61] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13348 + [62] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13344 + [63] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13137 + [64] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13264 + [65] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13292 + [66] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13314 + [67] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13249 + [68] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13335 + [69] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13315 + [70] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13307 + [71] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13310 + [72] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13309 + [73] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13368 + [74] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13372 + [75] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13339 + [76] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13427 + [77] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13332 + [78] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13398 + [79] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13311 + [80] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13324 + [81] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13276 + [82] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13367 + [83] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13394 + [84] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13352 + [85] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13349 + [86] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13399 + [87] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13321 + [88] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13426 + [89] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13425 + [90] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13393 + [91] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13392 + [92] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13204 + [93] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13232 + [94] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13411 + [95] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13246 + [96] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13423 + [97] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13387 + [98] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13422 + [99] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13419 + [100] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13421 + [101] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13418 + [102] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13417 + [103] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13442 + [104] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13337 + [105] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13407 + [106] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13405 + [107] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13377 + [108] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13373 + [109] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=11922 + [110] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13499 + [111] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13396 + [112] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13457 + [113] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13450 + [114] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=12327 + [115] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13452 + [116] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13439 + [117] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13445 + [118] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13432 + [119] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13436 + [120] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13437 + [121] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13433 + [122] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13435 + [123] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13434 + [124] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13430 + [125] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13497 + [126] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13464 + [127] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13494 + [128] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13491 + [129] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13475 + [130] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13386 + [131] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13150 + [132] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13510 + [133] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13355 + [134] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13471 + [135] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13508 + [136] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13174 + [137] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13451 + [138] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13458 + [139] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13467 + [140] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13562 + [141] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13495 + [142] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13505 + [143] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13503 + [144] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13502 + [145] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13498 + [146] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13500 + [147] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13557 + [148] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13602 + [149] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13568 + [150] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13567 + [151] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13604 + [152] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13566 + [153] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13601 + [154] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13554 + [155] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13237 + [156] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13539 + [157] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13549 + [158] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13550 + [159] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13553 + [160] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13551 + [161] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13509 + [162] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13542 + [163] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13529 + [164] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13540 + [165] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13600 + [166] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13541 + [167] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13538 + [168] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13534 + [169] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13536 + [170] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13725 + [171] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13537 + [172] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13531 + [173] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13504 + [174] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13533 + [175] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13590 + [176] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13591 + [177] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13605 + [178] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13501 + [179] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13578 + [180] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13574 + [181] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13580 + [182] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13582 + [183] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13588 + [184] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13584 + [185] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13586 + [186] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13579 + [187] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13664 + [188] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13577 + [189] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13576 + [190] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13581 + [191] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13728 + [192] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13672 + [193] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13654 + [194] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13628 + [195] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13655 + [196] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13710 + [197] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13707 + [198] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13729 + [199] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13544 + [200] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13733 + [201] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13583 + [203] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13697 + [206] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13661 + [207] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13686 + [208] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13684 + [209] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13639 + [210] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13560 + [211] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13638 + [212] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13603 + [213] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13611 + [214] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13634 + [215] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13681 + [216] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13624 + [217] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13614 + [218] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13621 + [219] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13619 + [220] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13610 + [221] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13608 + [222] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13643 + [223] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13618 + [224] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13676 + [225] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13679 + [226] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13487 + [227] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13668 + [229] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13666 + [230] = https://curl.se/bug/?i=13670 diff --git a/vendor/curl/include/curl/curl.h b/vendor/curl/include/curl/curl.h index cc24c05065..91e11f62d1 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/include/curl/curl.h +++ b/vendor/curl/include/curl/curl.h @@ -631,6 +631,8 @@ typedef enum { CURLE_PROXY, /* 97 - proxy handshake error */ CURLE_SSL_CLIENTCERT, /* 98 - client-side certificate required */ CURLE_UNRECOVERABLE_POLL, /* 99 - poll/select returned fatal error */ + CURLE_TOO_LARGE, /* 100 - a value/data met its maximum */ + CURLE_ECH_REQUIRED, /* 101 - ECH tried but failed */ CURL_LAST /* never use! */ } CURLcode; @@ -810,7 +812,10 @@ typedef enum { #define CURLAUTH_GSSAPI CURLAUTH_NEGOTIATE #define CURLAUTH_NTLM (((unsigned long)1)<<3) #define CURLAUTH_DIGEST_IE (((unsigned long)1)<<4) +#ifndef CURL_NO_OLDIES + /* functionality removed since 8.8.0 */ #define CURLAUTH_NTLM_WB (((unsigned long)1)<<5) +#endif #define CURLAUTH_BEARER (((unsigned long)1)<<6) #define CURLAUTH_AWS_SIGV4 (((unsigned long)1)<<7) #define CURLAUTH_ONLY (((unsigned long)1)<<31) @@ -1845,7 +1850,8 @@ typedef enum { /* allow GSSAPI credential delegation */ CURLOPT(CURLOPT_GSSAPI_DELEGATION, CURLOPTTYPE_VALUES, 210), - /* Set the name servers to use for DNS resolution */ + /* Set the name servers to use for DNS resolution. + * Only supported by the c-ares DNS backend */ CURLOPT(CURLOPT_DNS_SERVERS, CURLOPTTYPE_STRINGPOINT, 211), /* Time-out accept operations (currently for FTP only) after this amount @@ -2201,6 +2207,12 @@ typedef enum { /* set a specific client IP for HAProxy PROXY protocol header? */ CURLOPT(CURLOPT_HAPROXY_CLIENT_IP, CURLOPTTYPE_STRINGPOINT, 323), + /* millisecond version */ + CURLOPT(CURLOPT_SERVER_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_MS, CURLOPTTYPE_LONG, 324), + + /* set ECH configuration */ + CURLOPT(CURLOPT_ECH, CURLOPTTYPE_STRINGPOINT, 325), + CURLOPT_LASTENTRY /* the last unused */ } CURLoption; @@ -2306,30 +2318,26 @@ enum CURL_NETRC_OPTION { CURL_NETRC_LAST }; -enum { - CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT, - CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1, /* TLS 1.x */ - CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2, - CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3, - CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0, - CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1, - CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2, - CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_3, - - CURL_SSLVERSION_LAST /* never use, keep last */ -}; +#define CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT 0 +#define CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1 1 /* TLS 1.x */ +#define CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2 2 +#define CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3 3 +#define CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0 4 +#define CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1 5 +#define CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2 6 +#define CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_3 7 -enum { - CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_NONE = 0, - CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_DEFAULT = (CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1 << 16), - CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_0 = (CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0 << 16), - CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_1 = (CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1 << 16), - CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_2 = (CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2 << 16), - CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_3 = (CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_3 << 16), +#define CURL_SSLVERSION_LAST 8 /* never use, keep last */ + +#define CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_NONE 0 +#define CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_DEFAULT (CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1 << 16) +#define CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_0 (CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0 << 16) +#define CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_1 (CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1 << 16) +#define CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_2 (CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2 << 16) +#define CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_3 (CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_3 << 16) /* never use, keep last */ - CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_LAST = (CURL_SSLVERSION_LAST << 16) -}; +#define CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_LAST (CURL_SSLVERSION_LAST << 16) enum CURL_TLSAUTH { CURL_TLSAUTH_NONE, @@ -2932,7 +2940,9 @@ typedef enum { CURLINFO_CAPATH = CURLINFO_STRING + 62, CURLINFO_XFER_ID = CURLINFO_OFF_T + 63, CURLINFO_CONN_ID = CURLINFO_OFF_T + 64, - CURLINFO_LASTONE = 64 + CURLINFO_QUEUE_TIME_T = CURLINFO_OFF_T + 65, + CURLINFO_USED_PROXY = CURLINFO_LONG + 66, + CURLINFO_LASTONE = 66 } CURLINFO; /* CURLINFO_RESPONSE_CODE is the new name for the option previously known as @@ -3028,17 +3038,18 @@ CURL_EXTERN CURLSHcode curl_share_cleanup(CURLSH *share); */ typedef enum { - CURLVERSION_FIRST, - CURLVERSION_SECOND, - CURLVERSION_THIRD, - CURLVERSION_FOURTH, - CURLVERSION_FIFTH, - CURLVERSION_SIXTH, - CURLVERSION_SEVENTH, - CURLVERSION_EIGHTH, - CURLVERSION_NINTH, - CURLVERSION_TENTH, - CURLVERSION_ELEVENTH, + CURLVERSION_FIRST, /* 7.10 */ + CURLVERSION_SECOND, /* 7.11.1 */ + CURLVERSION_THIRD, /* 7.12.0 */ + CURLVERSION_FOURTH, /* 7.16.1 */ + CURLVERSION_FIFTH, /* 7.57.0 */ + CURLVERSION_SIXTH, /* 7.66.0 */ + CURLVERSION_SEVENTH, /* 7.70.0 */ + CURLVERSION_EIGHTH, /* 7.72.0 */ + CURLVERSION_NINTH, /* 7.75.0 */ + CURLVERSION_TENTH, /* 7.77.0 */ + CURLVERSION_ELEVENTH, /* 7.87.0 */ + CURLVERSION_TWELFTH, /* 8.8.0 */ CURLVERSION_LAST /* never actually use this */ } CURLversion; @@ -3047,7 +3058,7 @@ typedef enum { meant to be a built-in version number for what kind of struct the caller expects. If the struct ever changes, we redefine the NOW to another enum from above. */ -#define CURLVERSION_NOW CURLVERSION_ELEVENTH +#define CURLVERSION_NOW CURLVERSION_TWELFTH struct curl_version_info_data { CURLversion age; /* age of the returned struct */ @@ -3107,6 +3118,9 @@ struct curl_version_info_data { /* These fields were added in CURLVERSION_ELEVENTH */ /* feature_names is terminated by an entry with a NULL feature name */ const char * const *feature_names; + + /* These fields were added in CURLVERSION_TWELFTH */ + const char *rtmp_version; /* human readable string. */ }; typedef struct curl_version_info_data curl_version_info_data; @@ -3147,7 +3161,7 @@ typedef struct curl_version_info_data curl_version_info_data; #define CURL_VERSION_GSASL (1<<29) /* libgsasl is supported */ #define CURL_VERSION_THREADSAFE (1<<30) /* libcurl API is thread-safe */ - /* +/* * NAME curl_version_info() * * DESCRIPTION diff --git a/vendor/curl/include/curl/curlver.h b/vendor/curl/include/curl/curlver.h index 73b37e8ffd..b68e3ee64a 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/include/curl/curlver.h +++ b/vendor/curl/include/curl/curlver.h @@ -32,12 +32,12 @@ /* This is the version number of the libcurl package from which this header file origins: */ -#define LIBCURL_VERSION "8.5.0" +#define LIBCURL_VERSION "8.8.0" /* The numeric version number is also available "in parts" by using these defines: */ #define LIBCURL_VERSION_MAJOR 8 -#define LIBCURL_VERSION_MINOR 5 +#define LIBCURL_VERSION_MINOR 8 #define LIBCURL_VERSION_PATCH 0 /* This is the numeric version of the libcurl version number, meant for easier @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ CURL_VERSION_BITS() macro since curl's own configure script greps for it and needs it to contain the full number. */ -#define LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM 0x080500 +#define LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM 0x080800 /* * This is the date and time when the full source package was created. The @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ * * "2007-11-23" */ -#define LIBCURL_TIMESTAMP "2023-12-06" +#define LIBCURL_TIMESTAMP "2024-05-22" #define CURL_VERSION_BITS(x,y,z) ((x)<<16|(y)<<8|(z)) #define CURL_AT_LEAST_VERSION(x,y,z) \ diff --git a/vendor/curl/include/curl/mprintf.h b/vendor/curl/include/curl/mprintf.h index dc5664bc53..4f704548d1 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/include/curl/mprintf.h +++ b/vendor/curl/include/curl/mprintf.h @@ -34,19 +34,27 @@ extern "C" { #if (defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)) && \ defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && (__STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L) && \ - !defined(__MINGW32__) && !defined(CURL_NO_FMT_CHECKS) -#define CURL_TEMP_PRINTF(a,b) __attribute__ ((format(printf, a, b))) + !defined(CURL_NO_FMT_CHECKS) +#if defined(__MINGW32__) && !defined(__clang__) +#define CURL_TEMP_PRINTF(fmt, arg) \ + __attribute__((format(gnu_printf, fmt, arg))) #else -#define CURL_TEMP_PRINTF(a,b) +#define CURL_TEMP_PRINTF(fmt, arg) \ + __attribute__((format(printf, fmt, arg))) +#endif +#else +#define CURL_TEMP_PRINTF(fmt, arg) #endif -CURL_EXTERN int curl_mprintf(const char *format, ...) CURL_TEMP_PRINTF(1, 2); +CURL_EXTERN int curl_mprintf(const char *format, ...) + CURL_TEMP_PRINTF(1, 2); CURL_EXTERN int curl_mfprintf(FILE *fd, const char *format, ...) CURL_TEMP_PRINTF(2, 3); CURL_EXTERN int curl_msprintf(char *buffer, const char *format, ...) CURL_TEMP_PRINTF(2, 3); CURL_EXTERN int curl_msnprintf(char *buffer, size_t maxlength, - const char *format, ...) CURL_TEMP_PRINTF(3, 4); + const char *format, ...) + CURL_TEMP_PRINTF(3, 4); CURL_EXTERN int curl_mvprintf(const char *format, va_list args) CURL_TEMP_PRINTF(1, 0); CURL_EXTERN int curl_mvfprintf(FILE *fd, const char *format, va_list args) diff --git a/vendor/curl/include/curl/multi.h b/vendor/curl/include/curl/multi.h index e79b48ff32..561470ce70 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/include/curl/multi.h +++ b/vendor/curl/include/curl/multi.h @@ -464,6 +464,20 @@ typedef int (*curl_push_callback)(CURL *parent, struct curl_pushheaders *headers, void *userp); +/* + * Name: curl_multi_waitfds() + * + * Desc: Ask curl for fds for polling. The app can use these to poll on. + * We want curl_multi_perform() called as soon as one of them are + * ready. Passing zero size allows to get just a number of fds. + * + * Returns: CURLMcode type, general multi error code. + */ +CURL_EXTERN CURLMcode curl_multi_waitfds(CURLM *multi, + struct curl_waitfd *ufds, + unsigned int size, + unsigned int *fd_count); + #ifdef __cplusplus } /* end of extern "C" */ #endif diff --git a/vendor/curl/include/curl/system.h b/vendor/curl/include/curl/system.h index f2554b4a90..81a1b817df 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/include/curl/system.h +++ b/vendor/curl/include/curl/system.h @@ -184,9 +184,8 @@ # define CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_TU PRIu64 # define CURL_SUFFIX_CURL_OFF_T LL # define CURL_SUFFIX_CURL_OFF_TU ULL -# define CURL_TYPEOF_CURL_SOCKLEN_T socklen_t +# define CURL_TYPEOF_CURL_SOCKLEN_T int # define CURL_PULL_SYS_TYPES_H 1 -# define CURL_PULL_WS2TCPIP_H 1 #elif defined(__VMS) # if defined(__VAX) @@ -417,15 +416,6 @@ #define CURL_PULL_SYS_POLL_H #endif - -/* CURL_PULL_WS2TCPIP_H is defined above when inclusion of header file */ -/* ws2tcpip.h is required here to properly make type definitions below. */ -#ifdef CURL_PULL_WS2TCPIP_H -# include -# include -# include -#endif - /* CURL_PULL_SYS_TYPES_H is defined above when inclusion of header file */ /* sys/types.h is required here to properly make type definitions below. */ #ifdef CURL_PULL_SYS_TYPES_H diff --git a/vendor/curl/include/curl/typecheck-gcc.h b/vendor/curl/include/curl/typecheck-gcc.h index b880f3dc60..873a49e020 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/include/curl/typecheck-gcc.h +++ b/vendor/curl/include/curl/typecheck-gcc.h @@ -275,6 +275,7 @@ CURLWARNING(_curl_easy_getinfo_err_curl_off_t, (option) == CURLOPT_DNS_LOCAL_IP6 || \ (option) == CURLOPT_DNS_SERVERS || \ (option) == CURLOPT_DOH_URL || \ + (option) == CURLOPT_ECH || \ (option) == CURLOPT_EGDSOCKET || \ (option) == CURLOPT_FTP_ACCOUNT || \ (option) == CURLOPT_FTP_ALTERNATIVE_TO_USER || \ diff --git a/vendor/curl/include/curl/urlapi.h b/vendor/curl/include/curl/urlapi.h index 88cdeb3bca..19388c3c01 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/include/curl/urlapi.h +++ b/vendor/curl/include/curl/urlapi.h @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ typedef enum { CURLUE_BAD_SLASHES, /* 28 */ CURLUE_BAD_USER, /* 29 */ CURLUE_LACKS_IDN, /* 30 */ + CURLUE_TOO_LARGE, /* 31 */ CURLUE_LAST } CURLUcode; @@ -98,6 +99,9 @@ typedef enum { #define CURLU_ALLOW_SPACE (1<<11) /* Allow spaces in the URL */ #define CURLU_PUNYCODE (1<<12) /* get the host name in punycode */ #define CURLU_PUNY2IDN (1<<13) /* punycode => IDN conversion */ +#define CURLU_GET_EMPTY (1<<14) /* allow empty queries and fragments + when extracting the URL or the + components */ typedef struct Curl_URL CURLU; diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/altsvc.c b/vendor/curl/lib/altsvc.c index 35450d6b1c..b72a59612a 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/altsvc.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/altsvc.c @@ -106,9 +106,11 @@ static struct altsvc *altsvc_createid(const char *srchost, dlen = strlen(dsthost); DEBUGASSERT(hlen); DEBUGASSERT(dlen); - if(!hlen || !dlen) + if(!hlen || !dlen) { /* bad input */ + free(as); return NULL; + } if((hlen > 2) && srchost[0] == '[') { /* IPv6 address, strip off brackets */ srchost++; @@ -123,11 +125,11 @@ static struct altsvc *altsvc_createid(const char *srchost, dlen -= 2; } - as->src.host = Curl_strndup(srchost, hlen); + as->src.host = Curl_memdup0(srchost, hlen); if(!as->src.host) goto error; - as->dst.host = Curl_strndup(dsthost, dlen); + as->dst.host = Curl_memdup0(dsthost, dlen); if(!as->dst.host) goto error; @@ -189,7 +191,7 @@ static CURLcode altsvc_add(struct altsvcinfo *asi, char *line) as->expires = expires; as->prio = prio; as->persist = persist ? 1 : 0; - Curl_llist_insert_next(&asi->list, asi->list.tail, as, &as->node); + Curl_llist_append(&asi->list, as, &as->node); } } @@ -207,7 +209,6 @@ static CURLcode altsvc_add(struct altsvcinfo *asi, char *line) static CURLcode altsvc_load(struct altsvcinfo *asi, const char *file) { CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; - char *line = NULL; FILE *fp; /* we need a private copy of the file name so that the altsvc cache file @@ -219,11 +220,10 @@ static CURLcode altsvc_load(struct altsvcinfo *asi, const char *file) fp = fopen(file, FOPEN_READTEXT); if(fp) { - line = malloc(MAX_ALTSVC_LINE); - if(!line) - goto fail; - while(Curl_get_line(line, MAX_ALTSVC_LINE, fp)) { - char *lineptr = line; + struct dynbuf buf; + Curl_dyn_init(&buf, MAX_ALTSVC_LINE); + while(Curl_get_line(&buf, fp)) { + char *lineptr = Curl_dyn_ptr(&buf); while(*lineptr && ISBLANK(*lineptr)) lineptr++; if(*lineptr == '#') @@ -232,16 +232,10 @@ static CURLcode altsvc_load(struct altsvcinfo *asi, const char *file) altsvc_add(asi, lineptr); } - free(line); /* free the line buffer */ + Curl_dyn_free(&buf); /* free the line buffer */ fclose(fp); } return result; - -fail: - Curl_safefree(asi->filename); - free(line); - fclose(fp); - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; } /* @@ -258,7 +252,7 @@ static CURLcode altsvc_out(struct altsvc *as, FILE *fp) CURLcode result = Curl_gmtime(as->expires, &stamp); if(result) return result; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 else { char ipv6_unused[16]; if(1 == Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, as->dst.host, ipv6_unused)) { @@ -309,7 +303,7 @@ struct altsvcinfo *Curl_altsvc_init(void) #ifdef USE_HTTP2 | CURLALTSVC_H2 #endif -#ifdef ENABLE_QUIC +#ifdef USE_HTTP3 | CURLALTSVC_H3 #endif ; @@ -333,9 +327,6 @@ CURLcode Curl_altsvc_load(struct altsvcinfo *asi, const char *file) CURLcode Curl_altsvc_ctrl(struct altsvcinfo *asi, const long ctrl) { DEBUGASSERT(asi); - if(!ctrl) - /* unexpected */ - return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; asi->flags = ctrl; return CURLE_OK; } @@ -652,7 +643,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_altsvc_parse(struct Curl_easy *data, account. [See RFC 7838 section 3.1] */ as->expires = maxage + time(NULL); as->persist = persist; - Curl_llist_insert_next(&asi->list, asi->list.tail, as, &as->node); + Curl_llist_append(&asi->list, as, &as->node); infof(data, "Added alt-svc: %s:%d over %s", dsthost, dstport, Curl_alpnid2str(dstalpnid)); } diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/asyn-ares.c b/vendor/curl/lib/asyn-ares.c index 437c9337fc..8fed61760b 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/asyn-ares.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/asyn-ares.c @@ -122,6 +122,8 @@ struct thread_data { #define CARES_TIMEOUT_PER_ATTEMPT 2000 +static int ares_ver = 0; + /* * Curl_resolver_global_init() - the generic low-level asynchronous name * resolve API. Called from curl_global_init() to initialize global resolver @@ -134,6 +136,7 @@ int Curl_resolver_global_init(void) return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; } #endif + ares_version(&ares_ver); return CURLE_OK; } @@ -175,8 +178,21 @@ CURLcode Curl_resolver_init(struct Curl_easy *easy, void **resolver) int optmask = ARES_OPT_SOCK_STATE_CB; options.sock_state_cb = sock_state_cb; options.sock_state_cb_data = easy; - options.timeout = CARES_TIMEOUT_PER_ATTEMPT; - optmask |= ARES_OPT_TIMEOUTMS; + + /* + if c ares < 1.20.0: curl set timeout to CARES_TIMEOUT_PER_ATTEMPT (2s) + + if c-ares >= 1.20.0 it already has the timeout to 2s, curl does not need + to set the timeout value; + + if c-ares >= 1.24.0, user can set the timeout via /etc/resolv.conf to + overwrite c-ares' timeout. + */ + DEBUGASSERT(ares_ver); + if(ares_ver < 0x011400) { + options.timeout = CARES_TIMEOUT_PER_ATTEMPT; + optmask |= ARES_OPT_TIMEOUTMS; + } status = ares_init_options((ares_channel*)resolver, &options, optmask); if(status != ARES_SUCCESS) { @@ -228,9 +244,9 @@ static void destroy_async_data(struct Curl_async *async); void Curl_resolver_cancel(struct Curl_easy *data) { DEBUGASSERT(data); - if(data->conn->resolve_async.resolver) - ares_cancel((ares_channel)data->conn->resolve_async.resolver); - destroy_async_data(&data->conn->resolve_async); + if(data->state.async.resolver) + ares_cancel((ares_channel)data->state.async.resolver); + destroy_async_data(&data->state.async); } /* @@ -278,14 +294,14 @@ int Curl_resolver_getsock(struct Curl_easy *data, struct timeval timebuf; struct timeval *timeout; long milli; - int max = ares_getsock((ares_channel)data->conn->resolve_async.resolver, + int max = ares_getsock((ares_channel)data->state.async.resolver, (ares_socket_t *)socks, MAX_SOCKSPEREASYHANDLE); maxtime.tv_sec = CURL_TIMEOUT_RESOLVE; maxtime.tv_usec = 0; - timeout = ares_timeout((ares_channel)data->conn->resolve_async.resolver, - &maxtime, &timebuf); + timeout = ares_timeout((ares_channel)data->state.async.resolver, &maxtime, + &timebuf); milli = (long)curlx_tvtoms(timeout); if(milli == 0) milli += 10; @@ -313,8 +329,8 @@ static int waitperform(struct Curl_easy *data, timediff_t timeout_ms) int i; int num = 0; - bitmask = ares_getsock((ares_channel)data->conn->resolve_async.resolver, - socks, ARES_GETSOCK_MAXNUM); + bitmask = ares_getsock((ares_channel)data->state.async.resolver, socks, + ARES_GETSOCK_MAXNUM); for(i = 0; i < ARES_GETSOCK_MAXNUM; i++) { pfd[i].events = 0; @@ -344,12 +360,12 @@ static int waitperform(struct Curl_easy *data, timediff_t timeout_ms) if(!nfds) /* Call ares_process() unconditionally here, even if we simply timed out above, as otherwise the ares name resolve won't timeout! */ - ares_process_fd((ares_channel)data->conn->resolve_async.resolver, - ARES_SOCKET_BAD, ARES_SOCKET_BAD); + ares_process_fd((ares_channel)data->state.async.resolver, ARES_SOCKET_BAD, + ARES_SOCKET_BAD); else { /* move through the descriptors and ask for processing on them */ for(i = 0; i < num; i++) - ares_process_fd((ares_channel)data->conn->resolve_async.resolver, + ares_process_fd((ares_channel)data->state.async.resolver, (pfd[i].revents & (POLLRDNORM|POLLIN))? pfd[i].fd:ARES_SOCKET_BAD, (pfd[i].revents & (POLLWRNORM|POLLOUT))? @@ -368,7 +384,7 @@ static int waitperform(struct Curl_easy *data, timediff_t timeout_ms) CURLcode Curl_resolver_is_resolved(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_dns_entry **dns) { - struct thread_data *res = data->conn->resolve_async.tdata; + struct thread_data *res = data->state.async.tdata; CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; DEBUGASSERT(dns); @@ -397,7 +413,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_resolver_is_resolved(struct Curl_easy *data, ARES_ECANCELLED synchronously for all pending responses. This will leave us with res->num_pending == 0, which is perfect for the next block. */ - ares_cancel((ares_channel)data->conn->resolve_async.resolver); + ares_cancel((ares_channel)data->state.async.resolver); DEBUGASSERT(res->num_pending == 0); } #endif @@ -408,12 +424,12 @@ CURLcode Curl_resolver_is_resolved(struct Curl_easy *data, them */ res->temp_ai = NULL; - if(!data->conn->resolve_async.dns) + if(!data->state.async.dns) result = Curl_resolver_error(data); else - *dns = data->conn->resolve_async.dns; + *dns = data->state.async.dns; - destroy_async_data(&data->conn->resolve_async); + destroy_async_data(&data->state.async); } return result; @@ -464,8 +480,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_resolver_wait_resolv(struct Curl_easy *data, store.tv_sec = itimeout/1000; store.tv_usec = (itimeout%1000)*1000; - tvp = ares_timeout((ares_channel)data->conn->resolve_async.resolver, - &store, &tv); + tvp = ares_timeout((ares_channel)data->state.async.resolver, &store, &tv); /* use the timeout period ares returned to us above if less than one second is left, otherwise just use 1000ms to make sure the progress @@ -479,7 +494,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_resolver_wait_resolv(struct Curl_easy *data, return CURLE_UNRECOVERABLE_POLL; result = Curl_resolver_is_resolved(data, entry); - if(result || data->conn->resolve_async.done) + if(result || data->state.async.done) break; if(Curl_pgrsUpdate(data)) @@ -500,12 +515,12 @@ CURLcode Curl_resolver_wait_resolv(struct Curl_easy *data, } if(result) /* failure, so we cancel the ares operation */ - ares_cancel((ares_channel)data->conn->resolve_async.resolver); + ares_cancel((ares_channel)data->state.async.resolver); /* Operation complete, if the lookup was successful we now have the entry in the cache. */ if(entry) - *entry = data->conn->resolve_async.dns; + *entry = data->state.async.dns; if(result) /* close the connection, since we can't return failure here without @@ -524,7 +539,7 @@ static void compound_results(struct thread_data *res, if(!ai) return; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 /* CURLRES_IPV6 */ +#ifdef USE_IPV6 /* CURLRES_IPV6 */ if(res->temp_ai && res->temp_ai->ai_family == PF_INET6) { /* We have results already, put the new IPv6 entries at the head of the list. */ @@ -572,13 +587,12 @@ static void query_completed_cb(void *arg, /* (struct connectdata *) */ be valid so only defer it when we know the 'status' says its fine! */ return; - res = data->conn->resolve_async.tdata; + res = data->state.async.tdata; if(res) { res->num_pending--; if(CURL_ASYNC_SUCCESS == status) { - struct Curl_addrinfo *ai = Curl_he2ai(hostent, - data->conn->resolve_async.port); + struct Curl_addrinfo *ai = Curl_he2ai(hostent, data->state.async.port); if(ai) { compound_results(res, ai); } @@ -670,7 +684,7 @@ static struct Curl_addrinfo *ares2addr(struct ares_addrinfo_node *node) /* settle family-specific sockaddr structure size. */ if(ai->ai_family == AF_INET) ss_size = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 else if(ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) ss_size = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); #endif @@ -729,16 +743,14 @@ static void addrinfo_cb(void *arg, int status, int timeouts, struct ares_addrinfo *result) { struct Curl_easy *data = (struct Curl_easy *)arg; - if(data->conn) { - struct thread_data *res = data->conn->resolve_async.tdata; - (void)timeouts; - if(ARES_SUCCESS == status) { - res->temp_ai = ares2addr(result->nodes); - res->last_status = CURL_ASYNC_SUCCESS; - ares_freeaddrinfo(result); - } - res->num_pending--; + struct thread_data *res = data->state.async.tdata; + (void)timeouts; + if(ARES_SUCCESS == status) { + res->temp_ai = ares2addr(result->nodes); + res->last_status = CURL_ASYNC_SUCCESS; + ares_freeaddrinfo(result); } + res->num_pending--; } #endif @@ -762,12 +774,12 @@ struct Curl_addrinfo *Curl_resolver_getaddrinfo(struct Curl_easy *data, res = calloc(1, sizeof(struct thread_data) + namelen); if(res) { strcpy(res->hostname, hostname); - data->conn->resolve_async.hostname = res->hostname; - data->conn->resolve_async.port = port; - data->conn->resolve_async.done = FALSE; /* not done */ - data->conn->resolve_async.status = 0; /* clear */ - data->conn->resolve_async.dns = NULL; /* clear */ - data->conn->resolve_async.tdata = res; + data->state.async.hostname = res->hostname; + data->state.async.port = port; + data->state.async.done = FALSE; /* not done */ + data->state.async.status = 0; /* clear */ + data->state.async.dns = NULL; /* clear */ + data->state.async.tdata = res; /* initial status - failed */ res->last_status = ARES_ENOTFOUND; @@ -797,8 +809,8 @@ struct Curl_addrinfo *Curl_resolver_getaddrinfo(struct Curl_easy *data, hints.ai_flags = ARES_AI_NUMERICSERV; msnprintf(service, sizeof(service), "%d", port); res->num_pending = 1; - ares_getaddrinfo((ares_channel)data->conn->resolve_async.resolver, - hostname, service, &hints, addrinfo_cb, data); + ares_getaddrinfo((ares_channel)data->state.async.resolver, hostname, + service, &hints, addrinfo_cb, data); } #else @@ -808,10 +820,10 @@ struct Curl_addrinfo *Curl_resolver_getaddrinfo(struct Curl_easy *data, res->num_pending = 2; /* areschannel is already setup in the Curl_open() function */ - ares_gethostbyname((ares_channel)data->conn->resolve_async.resolver, - hostname, PF_INET, query_completed_cb, data); - ares_gethostbyname((ares_channel)data->conn->resolve_async.resolver, - hostname, PF_INET6, query_completed_cb, data); + ares_gethostbyname((ares_channel)data->state.async.resolver, hostname, + PF_INET, query_completed_cb, data); + ares_gethostbyname((ares_channel)data->state.async.resolver, hostname, + PF_INET6, query_completed_cb, data); } else #endif @@ -819,7 +831,7 @@ struct Curl_addrinfo *Curl_resolver_getaddrinfo(struct Curl_easy *data, res->num_pending = 1; /* areschannel is already setup in the Curl_open() function */ - ares_gethostbyname((ares_channel)data->conn->resolve_async.resolver, + ares_gethostbyname((ares_channel)data->state.async.resolver, hostname, PF_INET, query_completed_cb, data); } @@ -833,36 +845,23 @@ CURLcode Curl_set_dns_servers(struct Curl_easy *data, char *servers) { CURLcode result = CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN; - ares_channel channel, lchannel = NULL; int ares_result; /* If server is NULL or empty, this would purge all DNS servers * from ares library, which will cause any and all queries to fail. * So, just return OK if none are configured and don't actually make - * any changes to c-ares. This lets c-ares use it's defaults, which + * any changes to c-ares. This lets c-ares use its defaults, which * it gets from the OS (for instance from /etc/resolv.conf on Linux). */ if(!(servers && servers[0])) return CURLE_OK; #ifdef HAVE_CARES_SERVERS_CSV - if(data->conn) - channel = data->conn->resolve_async.resolver; - else { - /* we are called by setopt on a data without a connection (yet). In that - * case we set the value on a local instance for checking. - * The configured data options are set when the connection for this - * transfer is created. */ - result = Curl_resolver_init(data, (void **)&lchannel); - if(result) - goto out; - channel = lchannel; - } - #ifdef HAVE_CARES_PORTS_CSV - ares_result = ares_set_servers_ports_csv(channel, servers); + ares_result = ares_set_servers_ports_csv(data->state.async.resolver, + servers); #else - ares_result = ares_set_servers_csv(channel, servers); + ares_result = ares_set_servers_csv(data->state.async.resolver, servers); #endif switch(ares_result) { case ARES_SUCCESS: @@ -875,12 +874,10 @@ CURLcode Curl_set_dns_servers(struct Curl_easy *data, case ARES_ENODATA: case ARES_EBADSTR: default: + DEBUGF(infof(data, "bad servers set")); result = CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; break; } -out: - if(lchannel) - Curl_resolver_cleanup(lchannel); #else /* too old c-ares version! */ (void)data; (void)(ares_result); @@ -892,14 +889,11 @@ CURLcode Curl_set_dns_interface(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *interf) { #ifdef HAVE_CARES_LOCAL_DEV - if(data->conn) { - /* not a setopt test run, set the value */ - if(!interf) - interf = ""; + if(!interf) + interf = ""; + + ares_set_local_dev((ares_channel)data->state.async.resolver, interf); - ares_set_local_dev((ares_channel)data->conn->resolve_async.resolver, - interf); - } return CURLE_OK; #else /* c-ares version too old! */ (void)data; @@ -919,15 +913,13 @@ CURLcode Curl_set_dns_local_ip4(struct Curl_easy *data, } else { if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, local_ip4, &a4) != 1) { + DEBUGF(infof(data, "bad DNS IPv4 address")); return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; } } - if(data->conn) { - /* not a setopt test run, set the value */ - ares_set_local_ip4((ares_channel)data->conn->resolve_async.resolver, - ntohl(a4.s_addr)); - } + ares_set_local_ip4((ares_channel)data->state.async.resolver, + ntohl(a4.s_addr)); return CURLE_OK; #else /* c-ares version too old! */ @@ -940,7 +932,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_set_dns_local_ip4(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLcode Curl_set_dns_local_ip6(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *local_ip6) { -#if defined(HAVE_CARES_SET_LOCAL) && defined(ENABLE_IPV6) +#if defined(HAVE_CARES_SET_LOCAL) && defined(USE_IPV6) unsigned char a6[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN]; if((!local_ip6) || (local_ip6[0] == 0)) { @@ -949,14 +941,12 @@ CURLcode Curl_set_dns_local_ip6(struct Curl_easy *data, } else { if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, local_ip6, a6) != 1) { + DEBUGF(infof(data, "bad DNS IPv6 address")); return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; } } - if(data->conn) { - /* not a setopt test run, set the value */ - ares_set_local_ip6((ares_channel)data->conn->resolve_async.resolver, a6); - } + ares_set_local_ip6((ares_channel)data->state.async.resolver, a6); return CURLE_OK; #else /* c-ares version too old! */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/asyn-thread.c b/vendor/curl/lib/asyn-thread.c index 63414b6174..1760d6cb3f 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/asyn-thread.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/asyn-thread.c @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ # define RESOLVER_ENOMEM ENOMEM #endif +#include "system_win32.h" #include "urldata.h" #include "sendf.h" #include "hostip.h" @@ -136,7 +137,7 @@ static void destroy_async_data(struct Curl_async *); */ void Curl_resolver_cancel(struct Curl_easy *data) { - destroy_async_data(&data->conn->resolve_async); + destroy_async_data(&data->state.async); } /* This function is used to init a threaded resolve */ @@ -144,9 +145,22 @@ static bool init_resolve_thread(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *hostname, int port, const struct addrinfo *hints); +#ifdef _WIN32 +/* Thread sync data used by GetAddrInfoExW for win8+ */ +struct thread_sync_data_w8 +{ + OVERLAPPED overlapped; + ADDRINFOEXW_ *res; + HANDLE cancel_ev; + ADDRINFOEXW_ hints; +}; +#endif /* Data for synchronization between resolver thread and its parent */ struct thread_sync_data { +#ifdef _WIN32 + struct thread_sync_data_w8 w8; +#endif curl_mutex_t *mtx; int done; int port; @@ -165,6 +179,9 @@ struct thread_sync_data { }; struct thread_data { +#ifdef _WIN32 + HANDLE complete_ev; +#endif curl_thread_t thread_hnd; unsigned int poll_interval; timediff_t interval_end; @@ -173,7 +190,7 @@ struct thread_data { static struct thread_sync_data *conn_thread_sync_data(struct Curl_easy *data) { - return &(data->conn->resolve_async.tdata->tsd); + return &(data->state.async.tdata->tsd); } /* Destroy resolver thread synchronization data */ @@ -276,13 +293,158 @@ static CURLcode getaddrinfo_complete(struct Curl_easy *data) return result; } +#ifdef _WIN32 +static VOID WINAPI +query_complete(DWORD err, DWORD bytes, LPWSAOVERLAPPED overlapped) +{ + size_t ss_size; + const ADDRINFOEXW_ *ai; + struct Curl_addrinfo *ca; + struct Curl_addrinfo *cafirst = NULL; + struct Curl_addrinfo *calast = NULL; +#ifdef __clang__ +#pragma clang diagnostic push +#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wcast-align" +#endif + struct thread_sync_data *tsd = + CONTAINING_RECORD(overlapped, struct thread_sync_data, w8.overlapped); +#ifdef __clang__ +#pragma clang diagnostic pop +#endif + struct thread_data *td = tsd->td; + const ADDRINFOEXW_ *res = tsd->w8.res; + int error = (int)err; + (void)bytes; + + if(error == ERROR_SUCCESS) { + /* traverse the addrinfo list */ + + for(ai = res; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) { + size_t namelen = ai->ai_canonname ? wcslen(ai->ai_canonname) + 1 : 0; + /* ignore elements with unsupported address family, */ + /* settle family-specific sockaddr structure size. */ + if(ai->ai_family == AF_INET) + ss_size = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); +#ifdef USE_IPV6 + else if(ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) + ss_size = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); +#endif + else + continue; + + /* ignore elements without required address info */ + if(!ai->ai_addr || !(ai->ai_addrlen > 0)) + continue; + + /* ignore elements with bogus address size */ + if((size_t)ai->ai_addrlen < ss_size) + continue; + + ca = malloc(sizeof(struct Curl_addrinfo) + ss_size + namelen); + if(!ca) { + error = EAI_MEMORY; + break; + } + + /* copy each structure member individually, member ordering, */ + /* size, or padding might be different for each platform. */ + ca->ai_flags = ai->ai_flags; + ca->ai_family = ai->ai_family; + ca->ai_socktype = ai->ai_socktype; + ca->ai_protocol = ai->ai_protocol; + ca->ai_addrlen = (curl_socklen_t)ss_size; + ca->ai_addr = NULL; + ca->ai_canonname = NULL; + ca->ai_next = NULL; + + ca->ai_addr = (void *)((char *)ca + sizeof(struct Curl_addrinfo)); + memcpy(ca->ai_addr, ai->ai_addr, ss_size); + + if(namelen) { + size_t i; + ca->ai_canonname = (void *)((char *)ca->ai_addr + ss_size); + for(i = 0; i < namelen; ++i) /* convert wide string to ascii */ + ca->ai_canonname[i] = (char)ai->ai_canonname[i]; + ca->ai_canonname[namelen] = '\0'; + } + + /* if the return list is empty, this becomes the first element */ + if(!cafirst) + cafirst = ca; + + /* add this element last in the return list */ + if(calast) + calast->ai_next = ca; + calast = ca; + } + + /* if we failed, also destroy the Curl_addrinfo list */ + if(error) { + Curl_freeaddrinfo(cafirst); + cafirst = NULL; + } + else if(!cafirst) { +#ifdef EAI_NONAME + /* rfc3493 conformant */ + error = EAI_NONAME; +#else + /* rfc3493 obsoleted */ + error = EAI_NODATA; +#endif +#ifdef USE_WINSOCK + SET_SOCKERRNO(error); +#endif + } + tsd->res = cafirst; + } + + if(tsd->w8.res) { + Curl_FreeAddrInfoExW(tsd->w8.res); + tsd->w8.res = NULL; + } + + if(error) { + tsd->sock_error = SOCKERRNO?SOCKERRNO:error; + if(tsd->sock_error == 0) + tsd->sock_error = RESOLVER_ENOMEM; + } + else { + Curl_addrinfo_set_port(tsd->res, tsd->port); + } + + Curl_mutex_acquire(tsd->mtx); + if(tsd->done) { + /* too late, gotta clean up the mess */ + Curl_mutex_release(tsd->mtx); + destroy_thread_sync_data(tsd); + free(td); + } + else { +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_SOCKETPAIR + char buf[1]; + if(tsd->sock_pair[1] != CURL_SOCKET_BAD) { + /* DNS has been resolved, signal client task */ + buf[0] = 1; + if(swrite(tsd->sock_pair[1], buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) { + /* update sock_erro to errno */ + tsd->sock_error = SOCKERRNO; + } + } +#endif + tsd->done = 1; + Curl_mutex_release(tsd->mtx); + if(td->complete_ev) + SetEvent(td->complete_ev); /* Notify caller that the query completed */ + } +} +#endif #ifdef HAVE_GETADDRINFO /* * getaddrinfo_thread() resolves a name and then exits. * - * For builds without ARES, but with ENABLE_IPV6, create a resolver thread + * For builds without ARES, but with USE_IPV6, create a resolver thread * and wait on it. */ static unsigned int CURL_STDCALL getaddrinfo_thread(void *arg) @@ -391,9 +553,26 @@ static void destroy_async_data(struct Curl_async *async) Curl_mutex_release(td->tsd.mtx); if(!done) { - Curl_thread_destroy(td->thread_hnd); +#ifdef _WIN32 + if(td->complete_ev) { + CloseHandle(td->complete_ev); + td->complete_ev = NULL; + } +#endif + if(td->thread_hnd != curl_thread_t_null) { + Curl_thread_destroy(td->thread_hnd); + td->thread_hnd = curl_thread_t_null; + } } else { +#ifdef _WIN32 + if(td->complete_ev) { + Curl_GetAddrInfoExCancel(&td->tsd.w8.cancel_ev); + WaitForSingleObject(td->complete_ev, INFINITE); + CloseHandle(td->complete_ev); + td->complete_ev = NULL; + } +#endif if(td->thread_hnd != curl_thread_t_null) Curl_thread_join(&td->thread_hnd); @@ -407,7 +586,7 @@ static void destroy_async_data(struct Curl_async *async) * before the FD is invalidated to avoid EBADF on EPOLL_CTL_DEL */ Curl_multi_closed(data, sock_rd); - sclose(sock_rd); + wakeup_close(sock_rd); #endif } async->tdata = NULL; @@ -428,9 +607,9 @@ static bool init_resolve_thread(struct Curl_easy *data, { struct thread_data *td = calloc(1, sizeof(struct thread_data)); int err = ENOMEM; - struct Curl_async *asp = &data->conn->resolve_async; + struct Curl_async *asp = &data->state.async; - data->conn->resolve_async.tdata = td; + data->state.async.tdata = td; if(!td) goto errno_exit; @@ -439,6 +618,9 @@ static bool init_resolve_thread(struct Curl_easy *data, asp->status = 0; asp->dns = NULL; td->thread_hnd = curl_thread_t_null; +#ifdef _WIN32 + td->complete_ev = NULL; +#endif if(!init_thread_sync_data(td, hostname, port, hints)) { asp->tdata = NULL; @@ -454,13 +636,48 @@ static bool init_resolve_thread(struct Curl_easy *data, /* The thread will set this to 1 when complete. */ td->tsd.done = 0; +#ifdef _WIN32 + if(Curl_isWindows8OrGreater && Curl_FreeAddrInfoExW && + Curl_GetAddrInfoExCancel && Curl_GetAddrInfoExW) { +#define MAX_NAME_LEN 256 /* max domain name is 253 chars */ +#define MAX_PORT_LEN 8 + WCHAR namebuf[MAX_NAME_LEN]; + WCHAR portbuf[MAX_PORT_LEN]; + /* calculate required length */ + int w_len = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, MB_ERR_INVALID_CHARS, hostname, + -1, NULL, 0); + if((w_len > 0) && (w_len < MAX_NAME_LEN)) { + /* do utf8 conversion */ + w_len = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0, hostname, -1, namebuf, w_len); + if((w_len > 0) && (w_len < MAX_NAME_LEN)) { + swprintf(portbuf, MAX_PORT_LEN, L"%d", port); + td->tsd.w8.hints.ai_family = hints->ai_family; + td->tsd.w8.hints.ai_socktype = hints->ai_socktype; + td->complete_ev = CreateEvent(NULL, TRUE, FALSE, NULL); + if(!td->complete_ev) { + /* failed to start, mark it as done here for proper cleanup. */ + td->tsd.done = 1; + goto err_exit; + } + err = Curl_GetAddrInfoExW(namebuf, portbuf, NS_DNS, + NULL, &td->tsd.w8.hints, &td->tsd.w8.res, + NULL, &td->tsd.w8.overlapped, + &query_complete, &td->tsd.w8.cancel_ev); + if(err != WSA_IO_PENDING) + query_complete(err, 0, &td->tsd.w8.overlapped); + return TRUE; + } + } + } +#endif + #ifdef HAVE_GETADDRINFO td->thread_hnd = Curl_thread_create(getaddrinfo_thread, &td->tsd); #else td->thread_hnd = Curl_thread_create(gethostbyname_thread, &td->tsd); #endif - if(!td->thread_hnd) { + if(td->thread_hnd == curl_thread_t_null) { /* The thread never started, so mark it as done here for proper cleanup. */ td->tsd.done = 1; err = errno; @@ -488,11 +705,25 @@ static CURLcode thread_wait_resolv(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; DEBUGASSERT(data); - td = data->conn->resolve_async.tdata; + td = data->state.async.tdata; DEBUGASSERT(td); +#ifdef _WIN32 + DEBUGASSERT(td->complete_ev || td->thread_hnd != curl_thread_t_null); +#else DEBUGASSERT(td->thread_hnd != curl_thread_t_null); +#endif /* wait for the thread to resolve the name */ +#ifdef _WIN32 + if(td->complete_ev) { + WaitForSingleObject(td->complete_ev, INFINITE); + CloseHandle(td->complete_ev); + td->complete_ev = NULL; + if(entry) + result = getaddrinfo_complete(data); + } + else +#endif if(Curl_thread_join(&td->thread_hnd)) { if(entry) result = getaddrinfo_complete(data); @@ -500,18 +731,18 @@ static CURLcode thread_wait_resolv(struct Curl_easy *data, else DEBUGASSERT(0); - data->conn->resolve_async.done = TRUE; + data->state.async.done = TRUE; if(entry) - *entry = data->conn->resolve_async.dns; + *entry = data->state.async.dns; - if(!data->conn->resolve_async.dns && report) + if(!data->state.async.dns && report) /* a name was not resolved, report error */ result = Curl_resolver_error(data); - destroy_async_data(&data->conn->resolve_async); + destroy_async_data(&data->state.async); - if(!data->conn->resolve_async.dns && report) + if(!data->state.async.dns && report) connclose(data->conn, "asynch resolve failed"); return result; @@ -524,11 +755,18 @@ static CURLcode thread_wait_resolv(struct Curl_easy *data, */ void Curl_resolver_kill(struct Curl_easy *data) { - struct thread_data *td = data->conn->resolve_async.tdata; + struct thread_data *td = data->state.async.tdata; /* If we're still resolving, we must wait for the threads to fully clean up, unfortunately. Otherwise, we can simply cancel to clean up any resolver data. */ +#ifdef _WIN32 + if(td && td->complete_ev) { + Curl_GetAddrInfoExCancel(&td->tsd.w8.cancel_ev); + (void)thread_wait_resolv(data, NULL, FALSE); + } + else +#endif if(td && td->thread_hnd != curl_thread_t_null && (data->set.quick_exit != 1L)) (void)thread_wait_resolv(data, NULL, FALSE); @@ -563,7 +801,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_resolver_wait_resolv(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLcode Curl_resolver_is_resolved(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_dns_entry **entry) { - struct thread_data *td = data->conn->resolve_async.tdata; + struct thread_data *td = data->state.async.tdata; int done = 0; DEBUGASSERT(entry); @@ -581,13 +819,13 @@ CURLcode Curl_resolver_is_resolved(struct Curl_easy *data, if(done) { getaddrinfo_complete(data); - if(!data->conn->resolve_async.dns) { + if(!data->state.async.dns) { CURLcode result = Curl_resolver_error(data); - destroy_async_data(&data->conn->resolve_async); + destroy_async_data(&data->state.async); return result; } - destroy_async_data(&data->conn->resolve_async); - *entry = data->conn->resolve_async.dns; + destroy_async_data(&data->state.async); + *entry = data->state.async.dns; } else { /* poll for name lookup done with exponential backoff up to 250ms */ @@ -619,9 +857,9 @@ int Curl_resolver_getsock(struct Curl_easy *data, curl_socket_t *socks) int ret_val = 0; timediff_t milli; timediff_t ms; - struct resdata *reslv = (struct resdata *)data->conn->resolve_async.resolver; + struct resdata *reslv = (struct resdata *)data->state.async.resolver; #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_SOCKETPAIR - struct thread_data *td = data->conn->resolve_async.tdata; + struct thread_data *td = data->state.async.tdata; #else (void)socks; #endif @@ -662,7 +900,7 @@ struct Curl_addrinfo *Curl_resolver_getaddrinfo(struct Curl_easy *data, int port, int *waitp) { - struct resdata *reslv = (struct resdata *)data->conn->resolve_async.resolver; + struct resdata *reslv = (struct resdata *)data->state.async.resolver; *waitp = 0; /* default to synchronous response */ @@ -691,7 +929,7 @@ struct Curl_addrinfo *Curl_resolver_getaddrinfo(struct Curl_easy *data, { struct addrinfo hints; int pf = PF_INET; - struct resdata *reslv = (struct resdata *)data->conn->resolve_async.resolver; + struct resdata *reslv = (struct resdata *)data->state.async.resolver; *waitp = 0; /* default to synchronous response */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/base64.c b/vendor/curl/lib/base64.c index 919eb62359..8373115d20 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/base64.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/base64.c @@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ static CURLcode base64_encode(const char *table64, *outptr = base64data; /* Return the length of the new data */ - *outlen = output - base64data; + *outlen = (size_t)(output - base64data); return CURLE_OK; } diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/bufq.c b/vendor/curl/lib/bufq.c index d03906d166..c3245516c9 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/bufq.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/bufq.c @@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ ssize_t Curl_bufq_write(struct bufq *q, while(len) { tail = get_non_full_tail(q); if(!tail) { - if(q->chunk_count < q->max_chunks) { + if((q->chunk_count < q->max_chunks) || (q->opts & BUFQ_OPT_SOFT_LIMIT)) { *err = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; return -1; } @@ -417,6 +417,17 @@ ssize_t Curl_bufq_write(struct bufq *q, return nwritten; } +CURLcode Curl_bufq_cwrite(struct bufq *q, + const char *buf, size_t len, + size_t *pnwritten) +{ + ssize_t n; + CURLcode result; + n = Curl_bufq_write(q, (const unsigned char *)buf, len, &result); + *pnwritten = (n < 0)? 0 : (size_t)n; + return result; +} + ssize_t Curl_bufq_read(struct bufq *q, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, CURLcode *err) { @@ -440,6 +451,16 @@ ssize_t Curl_bufq_read(struct bufq *q, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, return nread; } +CURLcode Curl_bufq_cread(struct bufq *q, char *buf, size_t len, + size_t *pnread) +{ + ssize_t n; + CURLcode result; + n = Curl_bufq_read(q, (unsigned char *)buf, len, &result); + *pnread = (n < 0)? 0 : (size_t)n; + return result; +} + bool Curl_bufq_peek(struct bufq *q, const unsigned char **pbuf, size_t *plen) { diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/bufq.h b/vendor/curl/lib/bufq.h index 089d61bfe4..87ffa45da2 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/bufq.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/bufq.h @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ void Curl_bufcp_free(struct bufc_pool *pool); * preferably never fail (except for memory exhaustion). * * By default and without a pool, a bufq will keep chunks that read - * read empty in its `spare` list. Option `BUFQ_OPT_NO_SPARES` will + * empty in its `spare` list. Option `BUFQ_OPT_NO_SPARES` will * disable that and free chunks once they become empty. * * When providing a pool to a bufq, all chunk creation and spare handling @@ -178,6 +178,10 @@ ssize_t Curl_bufq_write(struct bufq *q, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, CURLcode *err); +CURLcode Curl_bufq_cwrite(struct bufq *q, + const char *buf, size_t len, + size_t *pnwritten); + /** * Read buf from the start of the buffer queue. The buf is copied * and the amount of copied bytes is returned. @@ -187,6 +191,9 @@ ssize_t Curl_bufq_write(struct bufq *q, ssize_t Curl_bufq_read(struct bufq *q, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, CURLcode *err); +CURLcode Curl_bufq_cread(struct bufq *q, char *buf, size_t len, + size_t *pnread); + /** * Peek at the head chunk in the buffer queue. Returns a pointer to * the chunk buf (at the current offset) and its length. Does not diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/bufref.c b/vendor/curl/lib/bufref.c index ce686b6f37..f0a0e2a7de 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/bufref.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/bufref.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include "curl_setup.h" #include "urldata.h" #include "bufref.h" +#include "strdup.h" #include "curl_memory.h" #include "memdebug.h" @@ -116,12 +117,9 @@ CURLcode Curl_bufref_memdup(struct bufref *br, const void *ptr, size_t len) DEBUGASSERT(len <= CURL_MAX_INPUT_LENGTH); if(ptr) { - cpy = malloc(len + 1); + cpy = Curl_memdup0(ptr, len); if(!cpy) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - if(len) - memcpy(cpy, ptr, len); - cpy[len] = '\0'; } Curl_bufref_set(br, cpy, len, curl_free); diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/c-hyper.c b/vendor/curl/lib/c-hyper.c index 787d6bbdbe..0593d97065 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/c-hyper.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/c-hyper.c @@ -53,7 +53,9 @@ #include #include "urldata.h" +#include "cfilters.h" #include "sendf.h" +#include "headers.h" #include "transfer.h" #include "multiif.h" #include "progress.h" @@ -65,6 +67,9 @@ #include "curl_memory.h" #include "memdebug.h" + +static CURLcode cr_hyper_add(struct Curl_easy *data); + typedef enum { USERDATA_NOT_SET = 0, /* for tasks with no userdata set; must be zero */ USERDATA_RESP_BODY @@ -73,7 +78,8 @@ typedef enum { size_t Curl_hyper_recv(void *userp, hyper_context *ctx, uint8_t *buf, size_t buflen) { - struct Curl_easy *data = userp; + struct hyp_io_ctx *io_ctx = userp; + struct Curl_easy *data = io_ctx->data; struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; CURLcode result; ssize_t nread; @@ -81,7 +87,8 @@ size_t Curl_hyper_recv(void *userp, hyper_context *ctx, (void)ctx; DEBUGF(infof(data, "Curl_hyper_recv(%zu)", buflen)); - result = Curl_read(data, conn->sockfd, (char *)buf, buflen, &nread); + result = Curl_conn_recv(data, io_ctx->sockindex, + (char *)buf, buflen, &nread); if(result == CURLE_AGAIN) { /* would block, register interest */ DEBUGF(infof(data, "Curl_hyper_recv(%zu) -> EAGAIN", buflen)); @@ -105,15 +112,14 @@ size_t Curl_hyper_recv(void *userp, hyper_context *ctx, size_t Curl_hyper_send(void *userp, hyper_context *ctx, const uint8_t *buf, size_t buflen) { - struct Curl_easy *data = userp; - struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; + struct hyp_io_ctx *io_ctx = userp; + struct Curl_easy *data = io_ctx->data; CURLcode result; - ssize_t nwrote; + size_t nwrote; DEBUGF(infof(data, "Curl_hyper_send(%zu)", buflen)); - result = Curl_write(data, conn->sockfd, (void *)buf, buflen, &nwrote); - if(!result && !nwrote) - result = CURLE_AGAIN; + result = Curl_conn_send(data, io_ctx->sockindex, + (void *)buf, buflen, &nwrote); if(result == CURLE_AGAIN) { DEBUGF(infof(data, "Curl_hyper_send(%zu) -> EAGAIN", buflen)); /* would block, register interest */ @@ -148,13 +154,10 @@ static int hyper_each_header(void *userdata, if(name_len + value_len + 2 > CURL_MAX_HTTP_HEADER) { failf(data, "Too long response header"); - data->state.hresult = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + data->state.hresult = CURLE_TOO_LARGE; return HYPER_ITER_BREAK; } - if(!data->req.bytecount) - Curl_pgrsTime(data, TIMER_STARTTRANSFER); - Curl_dyn_reset(&data->state.headerb); if(name_len) { if(Curl_dyn_addf(&data->state.headerb, "%.*s: %.*s\r\n", @@ -168,7 +171,7 @@ static int hyper_each_header(void *userdata, len = Curl_dyn_len(&data->state.headerb); headp = Curl_dyn_ptr(&data->state.headerb); - result = Curl_http_header(data, data->conn, headp); + result = Curl_http_header(data, headp, len); if(result) { data->state.hresult = result; return HYPER_ITER_BREAK; @@ -204,7 +207,6 @@ static int hyper_body_chunk(void *userdata, const hyper_buf *chunk) CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; if(0 == k->bodywrites) { - bool done = FALSE; #if defined(USE_NTLM) struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; if(conn->bits.close && @@ -217,27 +219,26 @@ static int hyper_body_chunk(void *userdata, const hyper_buf *chunk) Curl_safefree(data->req.newurl); } #endif - if(data->state.expect100header) { - Curl_expire_done(data, EXPIRE_100_TIMEOUT); + if(Curl_http_exp100_is_selected(data)) { if(data->req.httpcode < 400) { - k->exp100 = EXP100_SEND_DATA; - if(data->hyp.exp100_waker) { - hyper_waker_wake(data->hyp.exp100_waker); - data->hyp.exp100_waker = NULL; + Curl_http_exp100_got100(data); + if(data->hyp.send_body_waker) { + hyper_waker_wake(data->hyp.send_body_waker); + data->hyp.send_body_waker = NULL; } } else { /* >= 4xx */ - k->exp100 = EXP100_FAILED; + Curl_req_abort_sending(data); } } if(data->state.hconnect && (data->req.httpcode/100 != 2) && data->state.authproxy.done) { - done = TRUE; + data->req.done = TRUE; result = CURLE_OK; } else - result = Curl_http_firstwrite(data, data->conn, &done); - if(result || done) { + result = Curl_http_firstwrite(data); + if(result || data->req.done) { infof(data, "Return early from hyper_body_chunk"); data->state.hresult = result; return HYPER_ITER_BREAK; @@ -273,14 +274,13 @@ static CURLcode status_line(struct Curl_easy *data, /* We need to set 'httpcodeq' for functions that check the response code in a single place. */ data->req.httpcode = http_status; - + data->req.httpversion = http_version == HYPER_HTTP_VERSION_1_1? 11 : + (http_version == HYPER_HTTP_VERSION_2 ? 20 : 10); if(data->state.hconnect) /* CONNECT */ data->info.httpproxycode = http_status; else { - conn->httpversion = - http_version == HYPER_HTTP_VERSION_1_1 ? 11 : - (http_version == HYPER_HTTP_VERSION_2 ? 20 : 10); + conn->httpversion = (unsigned char)data->req.httpversion; if(http_version == HYPER_HTTP_VERSION_1_0) data->state.httpwant = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_0; @@ -325,6 +325,9 @@ static CURLcode empty_header(struct Curl_easy *data) CURLE_WRITE_ERROR : CURLE_OK; if(result) failf(data, "hyperstream: couldn't pass blank header"); + /* Hyper does chunked decoding itself. If it was added during + * response header processing, remove it again. */ + Curl_cwriter_remove_by_name(data, "chunked"); } return result; } @@ -332,7 +335,6 @@ static CURLcode empty_header(struct Curl_easy *data) CURLcode Curl_hyper_stream(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, int *didwhat, - bool *done, int select_res) { hyper_response *resp = NULL; @@ -349,20 +351,9 @@ CURLcode Curl_hyper_stream(struct Curl_easy *data, struct SingleRequest *k = &data->req; (void)conn; - if(k->exp100 > EXP100_SEND_DATA) { - struct curltime now = Curl_now(); - timediff_t ms = Curl_timediff(now, k->start100); - if(ms >= data->set.expect_100_timeout) { - /* we've waited long enough, continue anyway */ - k->exp100 = EXP100_SEND_DATA; - k->keepon |= KEEP_SEND; - Curl_expire_done(data, EXPIRE_100_TIMEOUT); - infof(data, "Done waiting for 100-continue"); - if(data->hyp.exp100_waker) { - hyper_waker_wake(data->hyp.exp100_waker); - data->hyp.exp100_waker = NULL; - } - } + if(data->hyp.send_body_waker) { + hyper_waker_wake(data->hyp.send_body_waker); + data->hyp.send_body_waker = NULL; } if(select_res & CURL_CSELECT_IN) { @@ -376,7 +367,6 @@ CURLcode Curl_hyper_stream(struct Curl_easy *data, h->write_waker = NULL; } - *done = FALSE; do { hyper_task_return_type t; task = hyper_executor_poll(h->exec); @@ -419,7 +409,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_hyper_stream(struct Curl_easy *data, break; } } - *done = TRUE; + data->req.done = TRUE; hyper_error_free(hypererr); break; } @@ -428,12 +418,11 @@ CURLcode Curl_hyper_stream(struct Curl_easy *data, hyper_task_free(task); if((userdata_t)userdata == USERDATA_RESP_BODY) { /* end of transfer */ - *done = TRUE; + data->req.done = TRUE; infof(data, "hyperstream is done"); if(!k->bodywrites) { /* hyper doesn't always call the body write callback */ - bool stilldone; - result = Curl_http_firstwrite(data, data->conn, &stilldone); + result = Curl_http_firstwrite(data); } break; } @@ -459,11 +448,11 @@ CURLcode Curl_hyper_stream(struct Curl_easy *data, reasonp = hyper_response_reason_phrase(resp); reason_len = hyper_response_reason_phrase_len(resp); - if(http_status == 417 && data->state.expect100header) { + if(http_status == 417 && Curl_http_exp100_is_selected(data)) { infof(data, "Got 417 while waiting for a 100"); data->state.disableexpect = TRUE; data->req.newurl = strdup(data->state.url); - Curl_done_sending(data, k); + Curl_req_abort_sending(data); } result = status_line(data, conn, @@ -651,115 +640,66 @@ static CURLcode request_target(struct Curl_easy *data, return result; } -static int uploadpostfields(void *userdata, hyper_context *ctx, - hyper_buf **chunk) -{ - struct Curl_easy *data = (struct Curl_easy *)userdata; - (void)ctx; - if(data->req.exp100 > EXP100_SEND_DATA) { - if(data->req.exp100 == EXP100_FAILED) - return HYPER_POLL_ERROR; - - /* still waiting confirmation */ - if(data->hyp.exp100_waker) - hyper_waker_free(data->hyp.exp100_waker); - data->hyp.exp100_waker = hyper_context_waker(ctx); - return HYPER_POLL_PENDING; - } - if(data->req.upload_done) - *chunk = NULL; /* nothing more to deliver */ - else { - /* send everything off in a single go */ - hyper_buf *copy = hyper_buf_copy(data->set.postfields, - (size_t)data->req.p.http->postsize); - if(copy) - *chunk = copy; - else { - data->state.hresult = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - return HYPER_POLL_ERROR; - } - /* increasing the writebytecount here is a little premature but we - don't know exactly when the body is sent */ - data->req.writebytecount += (size_t)data->req.p.http->postsize; - Curl_pgrsSetUploadCounter(data, data->req.writebytecount); - data->req.upload_done = TRUE; - } - return HYPER_POLL_READY; -} - static int uploadstreamed(void *userdata, hyper_context *ctx, hyper_buf **chunk) { size_t fillcount; struct Curl_easy *data = (struct Curl_easy *)userdata; - struct connectdata *conn = (struct connectdata *)data->conn; CURLcode result; + char *xfer_ulbuf; + size_t xfer_ulblen; + bool eos; + int rc = HYPER_POLL_ERROR; (void)ctx; - if(data->req.exp100 > EXP100_SEND_DATA) { - if(data->req.exp100 == EXP100_FAILED) - return HYPER_POLL_ERROR; + result = Curl_multi_xfer_ulbuf_borrow(data, &xfer_ulbuf, &xfer_ulblen); + if(result) + goto out; - /* still waiting confirmation */ - if(data->hyp.exp100_waker) - hyper_waker_free(data->hyp.exp100_waker); - data->hyp.exp100_waker = hyper_context_waker(ctx); - return HYPER_POLL_PENDING; - } + result = Curl_client_read(data, xfer_ulbuf, xfer_ulblen, &fillcount, &eos); + if(result) + goto out; - if(data->req.upload_chunky && conn->bits.authneg) { - fillcount = 0; - data->req.upload_chunky = FALSE; - result = CURLE_OK; - } - else { - result = Curl_fillreadbuffer(data, data->set.upload_buffer_size, - &fillcount); - } - if(result) { - data->state.hresult = result; - return HYPER_POLL_ERROR; - } - if(!fillcount) { - if((data->req.keepon & KEEP_SEND_PAUSE) != KEEP_SEND_PAUSE) - /* done! */ - *chunk = NULL; - else { - /* paused, save a waker */ - if(data->hyp.send_body_waker) - hyper_waker_free(data->hyp.send_body_waker); - data->hyp.send_body_waker = hyper_context_waker(ctx); - return HYPER_POLL_PENDING; - } - } - else { - hyper_buf *copy = hyper_buf_copy((uint8_t *)data->state.ulbuf, fillcount); + if(fillcount) { + hyper_buf *copy = hyper_buf_copy((uint8_t *)xfer_ulbuf, fillcount); if(copy) *chunk = copy; else { - data->state.hresult = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - return HYPER_POLL_ERROR; + result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + goto out; } /* increasing the writebytecount here is a little premature but we don't know exactly when the body is sent */ data->req.writebytecount += fillcount; Curl_pgrsSetUploadCounter(data, data->req.writebytecount); + rc = HYPER_POLL_READY; + } + else if(eos) { + *chunk = NULL; + rc = HYPER_POLL_READY; } - return HYPER_POLL_READY; + else { + /* paused, save a waker */ + if(data->hyp.send_body_waker) + hyper_waker_free(data->hyp.send_body_waker); + data->hyp.send_body_waker = hyper_context_waker(ctx); + rc = HYPER_POLL_PENDING; + } + +out: + Curl_multi_xfer_ulbuf_release(data, xfer_ulbuf); + data->state.hresult = result; + return rc; } /* - * bodysend() sets up headers in the outgoing request for an HTTP transfer that - * sends a body + * finalize_request() sets up last headers and optional body settings */ - -static CURLcode bodysend(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn, - hyper_headers *headers, - hyper_request *hyperreq, - Curl_HttpReq httpreq) +static CURLcode finalize_request(struct Curl_easy *data, + hyper_headers *headers, + hyper_request *hyperreq, + Curl_HttpReq httpreq) { - struct HTTP *http = data->req.p.http; CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; struct dynbuf req; if((httpreq == HTTPREQ_GET) || (httpreq == HTTPREQ_HEAD)) @@ -767,34 +707,31 @@ static CURLcode bodysend(struct Curl_easy *data, else { hyper_body *body; Curl_dyn_init(&req, DYN_HTTP_REQUEST); - result = Curl_http_bodysend(data, conn, &req, httpreq); + result = Curl_http_req_complete(data, &req, httpreq); + if(result) + return result; - if(!result) + /* if the "complete" above did produce more than the closing line, + parse the added headers */ + if(Curl_dyn_len(&req) != 2 || strcmp(Curl_dyn_ptr(&req), "\r\n")) { result = Curl_hyper_header(data, headers, Curl_dyn_ptr(&req)); + if(result) + return result; + } Curl_dyn_free(&req); body = hyper_body_new(); hyper_body_set_userdata(body, data); - if(data->set.postfields) - hyper_body_set_data_func(body, uploadpostfields); - else { - result = Curl_get_upload_buffer(data); - if(result) { - hyper_body_free(body); - return result; - } - /* init the "upload from here" pointer */ - data->req.upload_fromhere = data->state.ulbuf; - hyper_body_set_data_func(body, uploadstreamed); - } + hyper_body_set_data_func(body, uploadstreamed); + if(HYPERE_OK != hyper_request_set_body(hyperreq, body)) { /* fail */ result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; } } - http->sending = HTTPSEND_BODY; - return result; + + return cr_hyper_add(data); } static CURLcode cookies(struct Curl_easy *data, @@ -882,7 +819,16 @@ CURLcode Curl_http(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) may be parts of the request that is not yet sent, since we can deal with the rest of the request in the PERFORM phase. */ *done = TRUE; - Curl_client_cleanup(data); + result = Curl_client_start(data); + if(result) + return result; + + /* Add collecting of headers written to client. For a new connection, + * we might have done that already, but reuse + * or multiplex needs it here as well. */ + result = Curl_headers_init(data); + if(result) + return result; infof(data, "Time for the Hyper dance"); memset(h, 0, sizeof(struct hyptransfer)); @@ -910,9 +856,9 @@ CURLcode Curl_http(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) return result; } - result = Curl_http_resume(data, conn, httpreq); + result = Curl_http_req_set_reader(data, httpreq, &te); if(result) - return result; + goto error; result = Curl_http_range(data, httpreq); if(result) @@ -929,7 +875,9 @@ CURLcode Curl_http(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) goto error; } /* tell Hyper how to read/write network data */ - hyper_io_set_userdata(io, data); + h->io_ctx.data = data; + h->io_ctx.sockindex = FIRSTSOCKET; + hyper_io_set_userdata(io, &h->io_ctx); hyper_io_set_read(io, Curl_hyper_recv); hyper_io_set_write(io, Curl_hyper_send); @@ -1002,11 +950,6 @@ CURLcode Curl_http(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) goto error; } } - else { - if(!data->state.disableexpect) { - data->state.expect100header = TRUE; - } - } if(hyper_request_set_method(req, (uint8_t *)method, strlen(method))) { failf(data, "error setting method"); @@ -1031,21 +974,19 @@ CURLcode Curl_http(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) goto error; } - result = Curl_http_body(data, conn, httpreq, &te); - if(result) - goto error; - if(data->state.aptr.host) { result = Curl_hyper_header(data, headers, data->state.aptr.host); if(result) goto error; } +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY if(data->state.aptr.proxyuserpwd) { result = Curl_hyper_header(data, headers, data->state.aptr.proxyuserpwd); if(result) goto error; } +#endif if(data->state.aptr.userpwd) { result = Curl_hyper_header(data, headers, data->state.aptr.userpwd); @@ -1157,13 +1098,13 @@ CURLcode Curl_http(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) if(result) goto error; - result = bodysend(data, conn, headers, req, httpreq); + result = finalize_request(data, headers, req, httpreq); if(result) goto error; Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_HEADER_OUT, (char *)"\r\n", 2); - if(data->req.upload_chunky && conn->bits.authneg) { + if(data->req.upload_chunky && data->req.authneg) { data->req.upload_chunky = TRUE; } else { @@ -1190,18 +1131,17 @@ CURLcode Curl_http(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) if((httpreq == HTTPREQ_GET) || (httpreq == HTTPREQ_HEAD)) { /* HTTP GET/HEAD download */ Curl_pgrsSetUploadSize(data, 0); /* nothing */ - Curl_setup_transfer(data, FIRSTSOCKET, -1, TRUE, -1); } + + Curl_xfer_setup(data, FIRSTSOCKET, -1, TRUE, FIRSTSOCKET); conn->datastream = Curl_hyper_stream; - if(data->state.expect100header) - /* Timeout count starts now since with Hyper we don't know exactly when - the full request has been sent. */ - data->req.start100 = Curl_now(); /* clear userpwd and proxyuserpwd to avoid reusing old credentials * from reused connections */ Curl_safefree(data->state.aptr.userpwd); +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY Curl_safefree(data->state.aptr.proxyuserpwd); +#endif return CURLE_OK; error: DEBUGASSERT(result); @@ -1238,10 +1178,51 @@ void Curl_hyper_done(struct Curl_easy *data) hyper_waker_free(h->write_waker); h->write_waker = NULL; } - if(h->exp100_waker) { - hyper_waker_free(h->exp100_waker); - h->exp100_waker = NULL; + if(h->send_body_waker) { + hyper_waker_free(h->send_body_waker); + h->send_body_waker = NULL; } } +static CURLcode cr_hyper_unpause(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + (void)reader; + if(data->hyp.send_body_waker) { + hyper_waker_wake(data->hyp.send_body_waker); + data->hyp.send_body_waker = NULL; + } + return CURLE_OK; +} + +/* Hyper client reader, handling unpausing */ +static const struct Curl_crtype cr_hyper_protocol = { + "cr-hyper", + Curl_creader_def_init, + Curl_creader_def_read, + Curl_creader_def_close, + Curl_creader_def_needs_rewind, + Curl_creader_def_total_length, + Curl_creader_def_resume_from, + Curl_creader_def_rewind, + cr_hyper_unpause, + Curl_creader_def_done, + sizeof(struct Curl_creader) +}; + +static CURLcode cr_hyper_add(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct Curl_creader *reader = NULL; + CURLcode result; + + result = Curl_creader_create(&reader, data, &cr_hyper_protocol, + CURL_CR_PROTOCOL); + if(!result) + result = Curl_creader_add(data, reader); + + if(result && reader) + Curl_creader_free(data, reader); + return result; +} + #endif /* !defined(CURL_DISABLE_HTTP) && defined(USE_HYPER) */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/c-hyper.h b/vendor/curl/lib/c-hyper.h index 0c7de90b70..89dd53b8fd 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/c-hyper.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/c-hyper.h @@ -29,13 +29,18 @@ #include +struct hyp_io_ctx { + struct Curl_easy *data; + int sockindex; +}; + /* per-transfer data for the Hyper backend */ struct hyptransfer { hyper_waker *write_waker; hyper_waker *read_waker; const hyper_executor *exec; - hyper_waker *exp100_waker; hyper_waker *send_body_waker; + struct hyp_io_ctx io_ctx; }; size_t Curl_hyper_recv(void *userp, hyper_context *ctx, @@ -45,7 +50,6 @@ size_t Curl_hyper_send(void *userp, hyper_context *ctx, CURLcode Curl_hyper_stream(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, int *didwhat, - bool *done, int select_res); CURLcode Curl_hyper_header(struct Curl_easy *data, hyper_headers *headers, diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/cf-h1-proxy.c b/vendor/curl/lib/cf-h1-proxy.c index 2e23b0b9f5..093c33be5b 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/cf-h1-proxy.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/cf-h1-proxy.c @@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ struct h1_tunnel_state { struct dynbuf request_data; size_t nsent; size_t headerlines; + struct Curl_chunker ch; enum keeponval { KEEPON_DONE, KEEPON_CONNECT, @@ -113,18 +114,12 @@ static CURLcode tunnel_init(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct h1_tunnel_state **pts) { struct h1_tunnel_state *ts; - CURLcode result; if(cf->conn->handler->flags & PROTOPT_NOTCPPROXY) { failf(data, "%s cannot be done over CONNECT", cf->conn->handler->scheme); return CURLE_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; } - /* we might need the upload buffer for streaming a partial request */ - result = Curl_get_upload_buffer(data); - if(result) - return result; - ts = calloc(1, sizeof(*ts)); if(!ts) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; @@ -133,6 +128,7 @@ static CURLcode tunnel_init(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, Curl_dyn_init(&ts->rcvbuf, DYN_PROXY_CONNECT_HEADERS); Curl_dyn_init(&ts->request_data, DYN_HTTP_REQUEST); + Curl_httpchunk_init(data, &ts->ch, TRUE); *pts = ts; connkeep(cf->conn, "HTTP proxy CONNECT"); @@ -146,14 +142,6 @@ static void h1_tunnel_go_state(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, { if(ts->tunnel_state == new_state) return; - /* leaving this one */ - switch(ts->tunnel_state) { - case H1_TUNNEL_CONNECT: - data->req.ignorebody = FALSE; - break; - default: - break; - } /* entering this one */ switch(new_state) { case H1_TUNNEL_INIT: @@ -183,7 +171,7 @@ static void h1_tunnel_go_state(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, infof(data, "CONNECT phase completed"); data->state.authproxy.done = TRUE; data->state.authproxy.multipass = FALSE; - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case H1_TUNNEL_FAILED: if(new_state == H1_TUNNEL_FAILED) CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "new tunnel state 'failed'"); @@ -207,16 +195,24 @@ static void h1_tunnel_go_state(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, static void tunnel_free(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) { - struct h1_tunnel_state *ts = cf->ctx; - if(ts) { - h1_tunnel_go_state(cf, ts, H1_TUNNEL_FAILED, data); - Curl_dyn_free(&ts->rcvbuf); - Curl_dyn_free(&ts->request_data); - free(ts); - cf->ctx = NULL; + if(cf) { + struct h1_tunnel_state *ts = cf->ctx; + if(ts) { + h1_tunnel_go_state(cf, ts, H1_TUNNEL_FAILED, data); + Curl_dyn_free(&ts->rcvbuf); + Curl_dyn_free(&ts->request_data); + Curl_httpchunk_free(data, &ts->ch); + free(ts); + cf->ctx = NULL; + } } } +static bool tunnel_want_send(struct h1_tunnel_state *ts) +{ + return (ts->tunnel_state == H1_TUNNEL_CONNECT); +} + #ifndef USE_HYPER static CURLcode start_CONNECT(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, @@ -243,6 +239,8 @@ static CURLcode start_CONNECT(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, http_minor = (cf->conn->http_proxy.proxytype == CURLPROXY_HTTP_1_0) ? 0 : 1; result = Curl_h1_req_write_head(req, http_minor, &ts->request_data); + if(!result) + result = Curl_creader_set_null(data); out: if(result) @@ -344,8 +342,8 @@ static CURLcode on_resp_header(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, STRCONST("chunked"))) { infof(data, "CONNECT responded chunked"); ts->chunked_encoding = TRUE; - /* init our chunky engine */ - Curl_httpchunk_init(data); + /* reset our chunky engine */ + Curl_httpchunk_reset(data, &ts->ch, TRUE); } } else if(Curl_compareheader(header, @@ -371,9 +369,8 @@ static CURLcode recv_CONNECT_resp(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, { CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; struct SingleRequest *k = &data->req; - curl_socket_t tunnelsocket = Curl_conn_cf_get_socket(cf, data); char *linep; - size_t perline; + size_t line_len; int error, writetype; #define SELECT_OK 0 @@ -391,7 +388,7 @@ static CURLcode recv_CONNECT_resp(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, /* Read one byte at a time to avoid a race condition. Wait at most one second before looping to ensure continuous pgrsUpdates. */ - result = Curl_read(data, tunnelsocket, &byte, 1, &nread); + result = Curl_conn_recv(data, cf->sockindex, &byte, 1, &nread); if(result == CURLE_AGAIN) /* socket buffer drained, return */ return CURLE_OK; @@ -432,17 +429,17 @@ static CURLcode recv_CONNECT_resp(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, break; } } - else { + else if(ts->chunked_encoding) { /* chunked-encoded body, so we need to do the chunked dance properly to know when the end of the body is reached */ - CHUNKcode r; - CURLcode extra; size_t consumed = 0; /* now parse the chunked piece of data so that we can properly tell when the stream ends */ - r = Curl_httpchunk_read(data, &byte, 1, &consumed, &extra); - if(r == CHUNKE_STOP) { + result = Curl_httpchunk_read(data, &ts->ch, &byte, 1, &consumed); + if(result) + return result; + if(Curl_httpchunk_is_done(data, &ts->ch)) { /* we're done reading chunks! */ infof(data, "chunk reading DONE"); ts->keepon = KEEPON_DONE; @@ -462,19 +459,19 @@ static CURLcode recv_CONNECT_resp(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, ts->headerlines++; linep = Curl_dyn_ptr(&ts->rcvbuf); - perline = Curl_dyn_len(&ts->rcvbuf); /* amount of bytes in this line */ + line_len = Curl_dyn_len(&ts->rcvbuf); /* amount of bytes in this line */ /* output debug if that is requested */ - Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_HEADER_IN, linep, perline); + Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_HEADER_IN, linep, line_len); /* send the header to the callback */ writetype = CLIENTWRITE_HEADER | CLIENTWRITE_CONNECT | (ts->headerlines == 1 ? CLIENTWRITE_STATUS : 0); - result = Curl_client_write(data, writetype, linep, perline); + result = Curl_client_write(data, writetype, linep, line_len); if(result) return result; - result = Curl_bump_headersize(data, perline, TRUE); + result = Curl_bump_headersize(data, line_len, TRUE); if(result) return result; @@ -497,29 +494,7 @@ static CURLcode recv_CONNECT_resp(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, " bytes of response-body", ts->cl); } else if(ts->chunked_encoding) { - CHUNKcode r; - CURLcode extra; - size_t consumed = 0; - infof(data, "Ignore chunked response-body"); - - /* We set ignorebody true here since the chunked decoder - function will acknowledge that. Pay attention so that this is - cleared again when this function returns! */ - k->ignorebody = TRUE; - - if(linep[1] == '\n') - /* this can only be a LF if the letter at index 0 was a CR */ - linep++; - - /* now parse the chunked piece of data so that we can properly - tell when the stream ends */ - r = Curl_httpchunk_read(data, linep + 1, 1, &consumed, &extra); - if(r == CHUNKE_STOP) { - /* we're done reading chunks! */ - infof(data, "chunk reading DONE"); - ts->keepon = KEEPON_DONE; - } } else { /* without content-length or chunked encoding, we @@ -620,7 +595,9 @@ static CURLcode start_CONNECT(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, goto error; } /* tell Hyper how to read/write network data */ - hyper_io_set_userdata(io, data); + h->io_ctx.data = data; + h->io_ctx.sockindex = cf->sockindex; + hyper_io_set_userdata(io, &h->io_ctx); hyper_io_set_read(io, Curl_hyper_recv); hyper_io_set_write(io, Curl_hyper_send); conn->sockfd = tunnelsocket; @@ -752,7 +729,7 @@ static CURLcode start_CONNECT(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, } if(!Curl_checkProxyheaders(data, conn, STRCONST("User-Agent")) && - data->set.str[STRING_USERAGENT]) { + data->set.str[STRING_USERAGENT] && *data->set.str[STRING_USERAGENT]) { struct dynbuf ua; Curl_dyn_init(&ua, DYN_HTTP_REQUEST); result = Curl_dyn_addf(&ua, "User-Agent: %s\r\n", @@ -776,6 +753,10 @@ static CURLcode start_CONNECT(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(result) goto error; + result = Curl_creader_set_null(data); + if(result) + goto error; + sendtask = hyper_clientconn_send(client, req); if(!sendtask) { failf(data, "hyper_clientconn_send"); @@ -859,9 +840,9 @@ static CURLcode recv_CONNECT_resp(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, int didwhat; (void)ts; - *done = FALSE; - result = Curl_hyper_stream(data, cf->conn, &didwhat, done, + result = Curl_hyper_stream(data, cf->conn, &didwhat, CURL_CSELECT_IN | CURL_CSELECT_OUT); + *done = data->req.done; if(result || !*done) return result; if(h->exec) { @@ -912,7 +893,7 @@ static CURLcode H1_CONNECT(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(result) goto out; h1_tunnel_go_state(cf, ts, H1_TUNNEL_CONNECT, data); - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case H1_TUNNEL_CONNECT: /* see that the request is completely sent */ @@ -921,7 +902,7 @@ static CURLcode H1_CONNECT(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(result || !done) goto out; h1_tunnel_go_state(cf, ts, H1_TUNNEL_RECEIVE, data); - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case H1_TUNNEL_RECEIVE: /* read what is there */ @@ -936,7 +917,7 @@ static CURLcode H1_CONNECT(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, goto out; /* got it */ h1_tunnel_go_state(cf, ts, H1_TUNNEL_RESPONSE, data); - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case H1_TUNNEL_RESPONSE: CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "CONNECT response"); @@ -945,6 +926,7 @@ static CURLcode H1_CONNECT(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, * If the other side indicated a connection close, or if someone * else told us to close this connection, do so now. */ + Curl_req_soft_reset(&data->req, data); if(ts->close_connection || conn->bits.close) { /* Close this filter and the sub-chain, re-connect the * sub-chain and continue. Closing this filter will @@ -1030,6 +1012,12 @@ static CURLcode cf_h1_proxy_connect(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, *done = (result == CURLE_OK) && tunnel_is_established(cf->ctx); if(*done) { cf->connected = TRUE; + /* The real request will follow the CONNECT, reset request partially */ + Curl_req_soft_reset(&data->req, data); + Curl_client_reset(data); + Curl_pgrsSetUploadCounter(data, 0); + Curl_pgrsSetDownloadCounter(data, 0); + tunnel_free(cf, data); } return result; @@ -1050,7 +1038,7 @@ static void cf_h1_proxy_adjust_pollset(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, wait for the socket to become readable to be able to get the response headers or if we're still sending the request, wait for write. */ - if(ts->CONNECT.sending == HTTPSEND_REQUEST) + if(tunnel_want_send(ts)) Curl_pollset_set_out_only(data, ps, sock); else Curl_pollset_set_in_only(data, ps, sock); @@ -1071,18 +1059,20 @@ static void cf_h1_proxy_close(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) { CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "close"); - cf->connected = FALSE; - if(cf->ctx) { - h1_tunnel_go_state(cf, cf->ctx, H1_TUNNEL_INIT, data); + if(cf) { + cf->connected = FALSE; + if(cf->ctx) { + h1_tunnel_go_state(cf, cf->ctx, H1_TUNNEL_INIT, data); + } + if(cf->next) + cf->next->cft->do_close(cf->next, data); } - if(cf->next) - cf->next->cft->do_close(cf->next, data); } struct Curl_cftype Curl_cft_h1_proxy = { "H1-PROXY", - CF_TYPE_IP_CONNECT, + CF_TYPE_IP_CONNECT|CF_TYPE_PROXY, 0, cf_h1_proxy_destroy, cf_h1_proxy_connect, diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/cf-h2-proxy.c b/vendor/curl/lib/cf-h2-proxy.c index 147acdc86f..0bff15f38c 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/cf-h2-proxy.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/cf-h2-proxy.c @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ #include "http2.h" #include "http_proxy.h" #include "multiif.h" +#include "sendf.h" #include "cf-h2-proxy.h" /* The last 3 #include files should be in this order */ @@ -155,7 +156,7 @@ static void h2_tunnel_go_state(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, infof(data, "CONNECT phase completed"); data->state.authproxy.done = TRUE; data->state.authproxy.multipass = FALSE; - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case H2_TUNNEL_FAILED: if(new_state == H2_TUNNEL_FAILED) CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%d] new tunnel state 'failed'", ts->stream_id); @@ -221,10 +222,10 @@ static void drain_tunnel(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, bits = CURL_CSELECT_IN; if(!tunnel->closed && !tunnel->reset && tunnel->upload_blocked_len) bits |= CURL_CSELECT_OUT; - if(data->state.dselect_bits != bits) { - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%d] DRAIN dselect_bits=%x", + if(data->state.select_bits != bits) { + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%d] DRAIN select_bits=%x", tunnel->stream_id, bits); - data->state.dselect_bits = bits; + data->state.select_bits = bits; Curl_expire(data, 0, EXPIRE_RUN_NOW); } } @@ -954,6 +955,9 @@ static CURLcode submit_CONNECT(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct httpreq *req = NULL; result = Curl_http_proxy_create_CONNECT(&req, cf, data, 2); + if(result) + goto out; + result = Curl_creader_set_null(data); if(result) goto out; @@ -1033,7 +1037,7 @@ static CURLcode H2_CONNECT(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(result) goto out; h2_tunnel_go_state(cf, ts, H2_TUNNEL_CONNECT, data); - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case H2_TUNNEL_CONNECT: /* see that the request is completely sent */ @@ -1052,7 +1056,7 @@ static CURLcode H2_CONNECT(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, result = CURLE_OK; goto out; } - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case H2_TUNNEL_RESPONSE: DEBUGASSERT(ts->has_final_response); @@ -1125,7 +1129,12 @@ static CURLcode cf_h2_proxy_connect(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, out: *done = (result == CURLE_OK) && (ts->state == H2_TUNNEL_ESTABLISHED); - cf->connected = *done; + if(*done) { + cf->connected = TRUE; + /* The real request will follow the CONNECT, reset request partially */ + Curl_req_soft_reset(&data->req, data); + Curl_client_reset(data); + } CF_DATA_RESTORE(cf, save); return result; } @@ -1523,7 +1532,7 @@ static bool cf_h2_proxy_is_alive(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_cftype Curl_cft_h2_proxy = { "H2-PROXY", - CF_TYPE_IP_CONNECT, + CF_TYPE_IP_CONNECT|CF_TYPE_PROXY, CURL_LOG_LVL_NONE, cf_h2_proxy_destroy, cf_h2_proxy_connect, diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/cf-haproxy.c b/vendor/curl/lib/cf-haproxy.c index 1ca43937bf..2abc4d754e 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/cf-haproxy.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/cf-haproxy.c @@ -86,14 +86,14 @@ static CURLcode cf_haproxy_date_out_set(struct Curl_cfilter*cf, if(data->set.str[STRING_HAPROXY_CLIENT_IP]) client_ip = data->set.str[STRING_HAPROXY_CLIENT_IP]; else - client_ip = data->info.conn_local_ip; + client_ip = data->info.primary.local_ip; result = Curl_dyn_addf(&ctx->data_out, "PROXY %s %s %s %i %i\r\n", tcp_version, client_ip, - data->info.conn_primary_ip, - data->info.conn_local_port, - data->info.conn_primary_port); + data->info.primary.remote_ip, + data->info.primary.local_port, + data->info.primary.remote_port); #ifdef USE_UNIX_SOCKETS } @@ -125,23 +125,28 @@ static CURLcode cf_haproxy_connect(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(result) goto out; ctx->state = HAPROXY_SEND; - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case HAPROXY_SEND: len = Curl_dyn_len(&ctx->data_out); if(len > 0) { - ssize_t written = Curl_conn_send(data, cf->sockindex, - Curl_dyn_ptr(&ctx->data_out), - len, &result); - if(written < 0) + size_t written; + result = Curl_conn_send(data, cf->sockindex, + Curl_dyn_ptr(&ctx->data_out), + len, &written); + if(result == CURLE_AGAIN) { + result = CURLE_OK; + written = 0; + } + else if(result) goto out; - Curl_dyn_tail(&ctx->data_out, len - (size_t)written); + Curl_dyn_tail(&ctx->data_out, len - written); if(Curl_dyn_len(&ctx->data_out) > 0) { result = CURLE_OK; goto out; } } ctx->state = HAPROXY_DONE; - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); default: Curl_dyn_free(&ctx->data_out); break; @@ -184,7 +189,7 @@ static void cf_haproxy_adjust_pollset(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_cftype Curl_cft_haproxy = { "HAPROXY", - 0, + CF_TYPE_PROXY, 0, cf_haproxy_destroy, cf_haproxy_connect, diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/cf-https-connect.c b/vendor/curl/lib/cf-https-connect.c index b4f33c8e02..50ac8d4bc2 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/cf-https-connect.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/cf-https-connect.c @@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ struct cf_hc_ctx { CURLcode result; /* overall result */ struct cf_hc_baller h3_baller; struct cf_hc_baller h21_baller; - int soft_eyeballs_timeout_ms; - int hard_eyeballs_timeout_ms; + unsigned int soft_eyeballs_timeout_ms; + unsigned int hard_eyeballs_timeout_ms; }; static void cf_hc_baller_init(struct cf_hc_baller *b, @@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ static CURLcode cf_hc_connect(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, cf_hc_baller_init(&ctx->h21_baller, cf, data, "h21", cf->conn->transport); ctx->state = CF_HC_CONNECT; - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case CF_HC_CONNECT: if(cf_hc_baller_is_active(&ctx->h3_baller)) { diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/cf-socket.c b/vendor/curl/lib/cf-socket.c index e42b4a87b1..3e87889f9c 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/cf-socket.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/cf-socket.c @@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ #include "memdebug.h" -#if defined(ENABLE_IPV6) && defined(IPV6_V6ONLY) && defined(_WIN32) +#if defined(USE_IPV6) && defined(IPV6_V6ONLY) && defined(_WIN32) /* It makes support for IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses. * Linux kernel, NetBSD, FreeBSD and Darwin: default is off; * Windows Vista and later: default is on; @@ -137,14 +137,14 @@ static void nosigpipe(struct Curl_easy *data, #define nosigpipe(x,y) Curl_nop_stmt #endif -#if defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(HAVE_WINSOCK2_H) +#if defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(USE_WINSOCK) /* DragonFlyBSD and Windows use millisecond units */ #define KEEPALIVE_FACTOR(x) (x *= 1000) #else #define KEEPALIVE_FACTOR(x) #endif -#if defined(HAVE_WINSOCK2_H) && !defined(SIO_KEEPALIVE_VALS) +#if defined(USE_WINSOCK) && !defined(SIO_KEEPALIVE_VALS) #define SIO_KEEPALIVE_VALS _WSAIOW(IOC_VENDOR,4) struct tcp_keepalive { @@ -163,7 +163,9 @@ tcpkeepalive(struct Curl_easy *data, /* only set IDLE and INTVL if setting KEEPALIVE is successful */ if(setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&optval, sizeof(optval)) < 0) { - infof(data, "Failed to set SO_KEEPALIVE on fd %d", sockfd); + infof(data, "Failed to set SO_KEEPALIVE on fd " + "%" CURL_FORMAT_SOCKET_T ": errno %d", + sockfd, SOCKERRNO); } else { #if defined(SIO_KEEPALIVE_VALS) @@ -178,8 +180,9 @@ tcpkeepalive(struct Curl_easy *data, vals.keepaliveinterval = optval; if(WSAIoctl(sockfd, SIO_KEEPALIVE_VALS, (LPVOID) &vals, sizeof(vals), NULL, 0, &dummy, NULL, NULL) != 0) { - infof(data, "Failed to set SIO_KEEPALIVE_VALS on fd %d: %d", - (int)sockfd, WSAGetLastError()); + infof(data, "Failed to set SIO_KEEPALIVE_VALS on fd " + "%" CURL_FORMAT_SOCKET_T ": errno %d", + sockfd, SOCKERRNO); } #else #ifdef TCP_KEEPIDLE @@ -187,7 +190,9 @@ tcpkeepalive(struct Curl_easy *data, KEEPALIVE_FACTOR(optval); if(setsockopt(sockfd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_KEEPIDLE, (void *)&optval, sizeof(optval)) < 0) { - infof(data, "Failed to set TCP_KEEPIDLE on fd %d", sockfd); + infof(data, "Failed to set TCP_KEEPIDLE on fd " + "%" CURL_FORMAT_SOCKET_T ": errno %d", + sockfd, SOCKERRNO); } #elif defined(TCP_KEEPALIVE) /* Mac OS X style */ @@ -195,7 +200,9 @@ tcpkeepalive(struct Curl_easy *data, KEEPALIVE_FACTOR(optval); if(setsockopt(sockfd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&optval, sizeof(optval)) < 0) { - infof(data, "Failed to set TCP_KEEPALIVE on fd %d", sockfd); + infof(data, "Failed to set TCP_KEEPALIVE on fd " + "%" CURL_FORMAT_SOCKET_T ": errno %d", + sockfd, SOCKERRNO); } #endif #ifdef TCP_KEEPINTVL @@ -203,7 +210,9 @@ tcpkeepalive(struct Curl_easy *data, KEEPALIVE_FACTOR(optval); if(setsockopt(sockfd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_KEEPINTVL, (void *)&optval, sizeof(optval)) < 0) { - infof(data, "Failed to set TCP_KEEPINTVL on fd %d", sockfd); + infof(data, "Failed to set TCP_KEEPINTVL on fd " + "%" CURL_FORMAT_SOCKET_T ": errno %d", + sockfd, SOCKERRNO); } #endif #endif @@ -278,7 +287,7 @@ static CURLcode socket_open(struct Curl_easy *data, /* no socket, no connection */ return CURLE_COULDNT_CONNECT; -#if defined(ENABLE_IPV6) && defined(HAVE_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID) +#if defined(USE_IPV6) && defined(HAVE_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID) if(data->conn->scope_id && (addr->family == AF_INET6)) { struct sockaddr_in6 * const sa6 = (void *)&addr->sa_addr; sa6->sin6_scope_id = data->conn->scope_id; @@ -396,7 +405,7 @@ static CURLcode bindlocal(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, struct sockaddr *sock = (struct sockaddr *)&sa; /* bind to this address */ curl_socklen_t sizeof_sa = 0; /* size of the data sock points to */ struct sockaddr_in *si4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&sa; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 struct sockaddr_in6 *si6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&sa; #endif @@ -410,7 +419,7 @@ static CURLcode bindlocal(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, #ifdef IP_BIND_ADDRESS_NO_PORT int on = 1; #endif -#ifndef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifndef USE_IPV6 (void)scope; #endif @@ -466,7 +475,7 @@ static CURLcode bindlocal(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, #endif switch(Curl_if2ip(af, -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 scope, conn->scope_id, #endif dev, myhost, sizeof(myhost))) { @@ -505,7 +514,7 @@ static CURLcode bindlocal(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, if(af == AF_INET) conn->ip_version = CURL_IPRESOLVE_V4; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 else if(af == AF_INET6) conn->ip_version = CURL_IPRESOLVE_V6; #endif @@ -538,7 +547,7 @@ static CURLcode bindlocal(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, } if(done > 0) { -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 /* IPv6 address */ if(af == AF_INET6) { #ifdef HAVE_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID @@ -587,7 +596,7 @@ static CURLcode bindlocal(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, } else { /* no device was given, prepare sa to match af's needs */ -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 if(af == AF_INET6) { si6->sin6_family = AF_INET6; si6->sin6_port = htons(port); @@ -607,16 +616,6 @@ static CURLcode bindlocal(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, for(;;) { if(bind(sockfd, sock, sizeof_sa) >= 0) { /* we succeeded to bind */ - struct Curl_sockaddr_storage add; - curl_socklen_t size = sizeof(add); - memset(&add, 0, sizeof(struct Curl_sockaddr_storage)); - if(getsockname(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *) &add, &size) < 0) { - char buffer[STRERROR_LEN]; - data->state.os_errno = error = SOCKERRNO; - failf(data, "getsockname() failed with errno %d: %s", - error, Curl_strerror(error, buffer, sizeof(buffer))); - return CURLE_INTERFACE_FAILED; - } infof(data, "Local port: %hu", port); conn->bits.bound = TRUE; return CURLE_OK; @@ -630,7 +629,7 @@ static CURLcode bindlocal(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, /* We reuse/clobber the port variable here below */ if(sock->sa_family == AF_INET) si4->sin_port = ntohs(port); -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 else si6->sin6_port = ntohs(port); #endif @@ -767,10 +766,7 @@ struct cf_socket_ctx { struct Curl_sockaddr_ex addr; /* address to connect to */ curl_socket_t sock; /* current attempt socket */ struct bufq recvbuf; /* used when `buffer_recv` is set */ - char r_ip[MAX_IPADR_LEN]; /* remote IP as string */ - int r_port; /* remote port number */ - char l_ip[MAX_IPADR_LEN]; /* local IP as string */ - int l_port; /* local port number */ + struct ip_quadruple ip; /* The IP quadruple 2x(addr+port) */ struct curltime started_at; /* when socket was created */ struct curltime connected_at; /* when socket connected/got first byte */ struct curltime first_byte_at; /* when first byte was recvd */ @@ -783,6 +779,7 @@ struct cf_socket_ctx { #endif BIT(got_first_byte); /* if first byte was received */ BIT(accepted); /* socket was accepted, not connected */ + BIT(sock_connected); /* socket is "connected", e.g. in UDP */ BIT(active); BIT(buffer_recv); }; @@ -870,8 +867,9 @@ static ssize_t nw_in_read(void *reader_ctx, nread = -1; } } - CURL_TRC_CF(rctx->data, rctx->cf, "nw_in_read(len=%zu) -> %d, err=%d", - len, (int)nread, *err); + CURL_TRC_CF(rctx->data, rctx->cf, "nw_in_read(len=%zu, fd=%" + CURL_FORMAT_SOCKET_T ") -> %d, err=%d", + len, ctx->sock, (int)nread, *err); return nread; } @@ -915,7 +913,8 @@ static CURLcode set_local_ip(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct cf_socket_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; #ifdef HAVE_GETSOCKNAME - if(!(data->conn->handler->protocol & CURLPROTO_TFTP)) { + if((ctx->sock != CURL_SOCKET_BAD) && + !(data->conn->handler->protocol & CURLPROTO_TFTP)) { /* TFTP does not connect, so it cannot get the IP like this */ char buffer[STRERROR_LEN]; @@ -930,7 +929,7 @@ static CURLcode set_local_ip(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; } if(!Curl_addr2string((struct sockaddr*)&ssloc, slen, - ctx->l_ip, &ctx->l_port)) { + ctx->ip.local_ip, &ctx->ip.local_port)) { failf(data, "ssloc inet_ntop() failed with errno %d: %s", errno, Curl_strerror(errno, buffer, sizeof(buffer))); return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; @@ -938,8 +937,8 @@ static CURLcode set_local_ip(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, } #else (void)data; - ctx->l_ip[0] = 0; - ctx->l_port = -1; + ctx->ip.local_ip[0] = 0; + ctx->ip.local_port = -1; #endif return CURLE_OK; } @@ -951,7 +950,7 @@ static CURLcode set_remote_ip(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, /* store remote address and port used in this connection attempt */ if(!Curl_addr2string(&ctx->addr.sa_addr, ctx->addr.addrlen, - ctx->r_ip, &ctx->r_port)) { + ctx->ip.remote_ip, &ctx->ip.remote_port)) { char buffer[STRERROR_LEN]; ctx->error = errno; @@ -983,22 +982,16 @@ static CURLcode cf_socket_open(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(result) goto out; -#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS - { - const char *ipmsg; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 - if(ctx->addr.family == AF_INET6) { - set_ipv6_v6only(ctx->sock, 0); - ipmsg = " Trying [%s]:%d..."; - } - else -#endif - ipmsg = " Trying %s:%d..."; - infof(data, ipmsg, ctx->r_ip, ctx->r_port); +#ifdef USE_IPV6 + if(ctx->addr.family == AF_INET6) { + set_ipv6_v6only(ctx->sock, 0); + infof(data, " Trying [%s]:%d...", ctx->ip.remote_ip, ctx->ip.remote_port); } + else #endif + infof(data, " Trying %s:%d...", ctx->ip.remote_ip, ctx->ip.remote_port); -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 is_tcp = (ctx->addr.family == AF_INET || ctx->addr.family == AF_INET6) && ctx->addr.socktype == SOCK_STREAM; @@ -1035,7 +1028,7 @@ static CURLcode cf_socket_open(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_BINDLOCAL /* possibly bind the local end to an IP, interface or port */ if(ctx->addr.family == AF_INET -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 || ctx->addr.family == AF_INET6 #endif ) { @@ -1054,7 +1047,7 @@ static CURLcode cf_socket_open(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, /* set socket non-blocking */ (void)curlx_nonblock(ctx->sock, TRUE); - + ctx->sock_connected = (ctx->addr.socktype != SOCK_DGRAM); out: if(result) { if(ctx->sock != CURL_SOCKET_BAD) { @@ -1162,9 +1155,9 @@ static CURLcode cf_tcp_connect(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, error = SOCKERRNO; set_local_ip(cf, data); CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "local address %s port %d...", - ctx->l_ip, ctx->l_port); + ctx->ip.local_ip, ctx->ip.local_port); if(-1 == rc) { - result = socket_connect_result(data, ctx->r_ip, error); + result = socket_connect_result(data, ctx->ip.remote_ip, error); goto out; } } @@ -1209,7 +1202,8 @@ static CURLcode cf_tcp_connect(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, { char buffer[STRERROR_LEN]; infof(data, "connect to %s port %u from %s port %d failed: %s", - ctx->r_ip, ctx->r_port, ctx->l_ip, ctx->l_port, + ctx->ip.remote_ip, ctx->ip.remote_port, + ctx->ip.local_ip, ctx->ip.local_port, Curl_strerror(ctx->error, buffer, sizeof(buffer))); } #endif @@ -1229,10 +1223,11 @@ static void cf_socket_get_host(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, const char **pdisplay_host, int *pport) { + struct cf_socket_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; (void)data; *phost = cf->conn->host.name; *pdisplay_host = cf->conn->host.dispname; - *pport = cf->conn->port; + *pport = ctx->ip.remote_port; } static void cf_socket_adjust_pollset(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, @@ -1242,11 +1237,16 @@ static void cf_socket_adjust_pollset(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct cf_socket_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; if(ctx->sock != CURL_SOCKET_BAD) { - if(!cf->connected) + if(!cf->connected) { Curl_pollset_set_out_only(data, ps, ctx->sock); - else + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "adjust_pollset, !connected, POLLOUT fd=%" + CURL_FORMAT_SOCKET_T, ctx->sock); + } + else if(!ctx->active) { Curl_pollset_add_in(data, ps, ctx->sock); - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "adjust_pollset -> %d socks", ps->num); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "adjust_pollset, !active, POLLIN fd=%" + CURL_FORMAT_SOCKET_T, ctx->sock); + } } } @@ -1279,7 +1279,7 @@ static ssize_t cf_socket_send(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, #ifdef DEBUGBUILD /* simulate network blocking/partial writes */ if(ctx->wblock_percent > 0) { - unsigned char c; + unsigned char c = 0; Curl_rand(data, &c, 1); if(c >= ((100-ctx->wblock_percent)*256/100)) { CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "send(len=%zu) SIMULATE EWOULDBLOCK", orig_len); @@ -1357,7 +1357,7 @@ static ssize_t cf_socket_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, #ifdef DEBUGBUILD /* simulate network blocking/partial reads */ if(cf->cft != &Curl_cft_udp && ctx->rblock_percent > 0) { - unsigned char c; + unsigned char c = 0; Curl_rand(data, &c, 1); if(c >= ((100-ctx->rblock_percent)*256/100)) { CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "recv(len=%zu) SIMULATE EWOULDBLOCK", len); @@ -1426,56 +1426,24 @@ static ssize_t cf_socket_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, return nread; } -static void conn_set_primary_ip(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, - struct Curl_easy *data) -{ -#ifdef HAVE_GETPEERNAME - struct cf_socket_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - if(!(data->conn->handler->protocol & CURLPROTO_TFTP)) { - /* TFTP does not connect the endpoint: getpeername() failed with errno - 107: Transport endpoint is not connected */ - - char buffer[STRERROR_LEN]; - struct Curl_sockaddr_storage ssrem; - curl_socklen_t plen; - int port; - - plen = sizeof(ssrem); - memset(&ssrem, 0, plen); - if(getpeername(ctx->sock, (struct sockaddr*) &ssrem, &plen)) { - int error = SOCKERRNO; - failf(data, "getpeername() failed with errno %d: %s", - error, Curl_strerror(error, buffer, sizeof(buffer))); - return; - } - if(!Curl_addr2string((struct sockaddr*)&ssrem, plen, - cf->conn->primary_ip, &port)) { - failf(data, "ssrem inet_ntop() failed with errno %d: %s", - errno, Curl_strerror(errno, buffer, sizeof(buffer))); - return; - } - } -#else - cf->conn->primary_ip[0] = 0; - (void)data; -#endif -} - static void cf_socket_active(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) { struct cf_socket_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; /* use this socket from now on */ cf->conn->sock[cf->sockindex] = ctx->sock; - /* the first socket info gets set at conn and data */ + set_local_ip(cf, data); + if(cf->sockindex == SECONDARYSOCKET) + cf->conn->secondary = ctx->ip; + else + cf->conn->primary = ctx->ip; + /* the first socket info gets some specials */ if(cf->sockindex == FIRSTSOCKET) { cf->conn->remote_addr = &ctx->addr; - #ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 + #ifdef USE_IPV6 cf->conn->bits.ipv6 = (ctx->addr.family == AF_INET6)? TRUE : FALSE; #endif - conn_set_primary_ip(cf, data); - set_local_ip(cf, data); - Curl_persistconninfo(data, cf->conn, ctx->l_ip, ctx->l_port); + Curl_persistconninfo(data, cf->conn, &ctx->ip); /* buffering is currently disabled by default because we have stalls * in parallel transfers where not all buffered data is consumed and no * socket events happen. @@ -1498,7 +1466,7 @@ static CURLcode cf_socket_cntrl(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, cf_socket_active(cf, data); break; case CF_CTRL_DATA_SETUP: - Curl_persistconninfo(data, cf->conn, ctx->l_ip, ctx->l_port); + Curl_persistconninfo(data, cf->conn, &ctx->ip); break; case CF_CTRL_FORGET_SOCKET: ctx->sock = CURL_SOCKET_BAD; @@ -1574,7 +1542,7 @@ static CURLcode cf_socket_query(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, *when = ctx->first_byte_at; break; } - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); default: *when = ctx->connected_at; break; @@ -1648,15 +1616,23 @@ static CURLcode cf_udp_setup_quic(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, /* QUIC needs a connected socket, nonblocking */ DEBUGASSERT(ctx->sock != CURL_SOCKET_BAD); +#if defined(__APPLE__) && defined(USE_OPENSSL_QUIC) + (void)rc; + /* On macOS OpenSSL QUIC fails on connected sockets. + * see: */ +#else rc = connect(ctx->sock, &ctx->addr.sa_addr, ctx->addr.addrlen); if(-1 == rc) { - return socket_connect_result(data, ctx->r_ip, SOCKERRNO); + return socket_connect_result(data, ctx->ip.remote_ip, SOCKERRNO); } + ctx->sock_connected = TRUE; +#endif set_local_ip(cf, data); CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "%s socket %" CURL_FORMAT_SOCKET_T " connected: [%s:%d] -> [%s:%d]", (ctx->transport == TRNSPRT_QUIC)? "QUIC" : "UDP", - ctx->sock, ctx->l_ip, ctx->l_port, ctx->r_ip, ctx->r_port); + ctx->sock, ctx->ip.local_ip, ctx->ip.local_port, + ctx->ip.remote_ip, ctx->ip.remote_port); (void)curlx_nonblock(ctx->sock, TRUE); switch(ctx->addr.family) { @@ -1706,7 +1682,7 @@ static CURLcode cf_udp_connect(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, goto out; CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "cf_udp_connect(), opened socket=%" CURL_FORMAT_SOCKET_T " (%s:%d)", - ctx->sock, ctx->l_ip, ctx->l_port); + ctx->sock, ctx->ip.local_ip, ctx->ip.local_port); } else { CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "cf_udp_connect(), opened socket=%" @@ -1902,8 +1878,8 @@ static void set_accepted_remote_ip(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_sockaddr_storage ssrem; curl_socklen_t plen; - ctx->r_ip[0] = 0; - ctx->r_port = 0; + ctx->ip.remote_ip[0] = 0; + ctx->ip.remote_port = 0; plen = sizeof(ssrem); memset(&ssrem, 0, plen); if(getpeername(ctx->sock, (struct sockaddr*) &ssrem, &plen)) { @@ -1913,14 +1889,14 @@ static void set_accepted_remote_ip(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, return; } if(!Curl_addr2string((struct sockaddr*)&ssrem, plen, - ctx->r_ip, &ctx->r_port)) { + ctx->ip.remote_ip, &ctx->ip.remote_port)) { failf(data, "ssrem inet_ntop() failed with errno %d: %s", errno, Curl_strerror(errno, buffer, sizeof(buffer))); return; } #else - ctx->r_ip[0] = 0; - ctx->r_port = 0; + ctx->ip.remote_ip[0] = 0; + ctx->ip.remote_port = 0; (void)data; #endif } @@ -1949,7 +1925,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_conn_tcp_accepted_set(struct Curl_easy *data, cf->connected = TRUE; CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "accepted_set(sock=%" CURL_FORMAT_SOCKET_T ", remote=%s port=%d)", - ctx->sock, ctx->r_ip, ctx->r_port); + ctx->sock, ctx->ip.remote_ip, ctx->ip.remote_port); return CURLE_OK; } @@ -1969,9 +1945,9 @@ CURLcode Curl_cf_socket_peek(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, curl_socket_t *psock, const struct Curl_sockaddr_ex **paddr, - const char **pr_ip_str, int *pr_port, - const char **pl_ip_str, int *pl_port) + struct ip_quadruple *pip) { + (void)data; if(cf_is_socket(cf) && cf->ctx) { struct cf_socket_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; @@ -1979,17 +1955,8 @@ CURLcode Curl_cf_socket_peek(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, *psock = ctx->sock; if(paddr) *paddr = &ctx->addr; - if(pr_ip_str) - *pr_ip_str = ctx->r_ip; - if(pr_port) - *pr_port = ctx->r_port; - if(pl_port ||pl_ip_str) { - set_local_ip(cf, data); - if(pl_ip_str) - *pl_ip_str = ctx->l_ip; - if(pl_port) - *pl_port = ctx->l_port; - } + if(pip) + *pip = ctx->ip; return CURLE_OK; } return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/cf-socket.h b/vendor/curl/lib/cf-socket.h index 1d40df737f..058af50098 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/cf-socket.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/cf-socket.h @@ -33,23 +33,7 @@ struct Curl_cfilter; struct Curl_easy; struct connectdata; struct Curl_sockaddr_ex; - -#ifndef SIZEOF_CURL_SOCKET_T -/* configure and cmake check and set the define */ -# ifdef _WIN64 -# define SIZEOF_CURL_SOCKET_T 8 -# else -/* default guess */ -# define SIZEOF_CURL_SOCKET_T 4 -# endif -#endif - -#if SIZEOF_CURL_SOCKET_T < 8 -# define CURL_FORMAT_SOCKET_T "d" -#else -# define CURL_FORMAT_SOCKET_T "qd" -#endif - +struct ip_quadruple; /* * The Curl_sockaddr_ex structure is basically libcurl's external API @@ -170,18 +154,14 @@ CURLcode Curl_conn_tcp_accepted_set(struct Curl_easy *data, * The filter owns all returned values. * @param psock pointer to hold socket descriptor or NULL * @param paddr pointer to hold addr reference or NULL - * @param pr_ip_str pointer to hold remote addr as string or NULL - * @param pr_port pointer to hold remote port number or NULL - * @param pl_ip_str pointer to hold local addr as string or NULL - * @param pl_port pointer to hold local port number or NULL + * @param pip pointer to get IP quadruple or NULL * Returns error if the filter is of invalid type. */ CURLcode Curl_cf_socket_peek(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, curl_socket_t *psock, const struct Curl_sockaddr_ex **paddr, - const char **pr_ip_str, int *pr_port, - const char **pl_ip_str, int *pl_port); + struct ip_quadruple *pip); extern struct Curl_cftype Curl_cft_tcp; extern struct Curl_cftype Curl_cft_udp; diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/cfilters.c b/vendor/curl/lib/cfilters.c index e78ecd71de..a327fa1944 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/cfilters.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/cfilters.c @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ void Curl_cf_def_get_host(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, else { *phost = cf->conn->host.name; *pdisplay_host = cf->conn->host.dispname; - *pport = cf->conn->port; + *pport = cf->conn->primary.remote_port; } } @@ -168,38 +168,46 @@ void Curl_conn_close(struct Curl_easy *data, int index) } } -ssize_t Curl_conn_recv(struct Curl_easy *data, int num, char *buf, - size_t len, CURLcode *code) +ssize_t Curl_cf_recv(struct Curl_easy *data, int num, char *buf, + size_t len, CURLcode *code) { struct Curl_cfilter *cf; DEBUGASSERT(data); DEBUGASSERT(data->conn); + *code = CURLE_OK; cf = data->conn->cfilter[num]; while(cf && !cf->connected) { cf = cf->next; } if(cf) { - return cf->cft->do_recv(cf, data, buf, len, code); + ssize_t nread = cf->cft->do_recv(cf, data, buf, len, code); + DEBUGASSERT(nread >= 0 || *code); + DEBUGASSERT(nread < 0 || !*code); + return nread; } failf(data, "recv: no filter connected"); *code = CURLE_FAILED_INIT; return -1; } -ssize_t Curl_conn_send(struct Curl_easy *data, int num, - const void *mem, size_t len, CURLcode *code) +ssize_t Curl_cf_send(struct Curl_easy *data, int num, + const void *mem, size_t len, CURLcode *code) { struct Curl_cfilter *cf; DEBUGASSERT(data); DEBUGASSERT(data->conn); + *code = CURLE_OK; cf = data->conn->cfilter[num]; while(cf && !cf->connected) { cf = cf->next; } if(cf) { - return cf->cft->do_send(cf, data, mem, len, code); + ssize_t nwritten = cf->cft->do_send(cf, data, mem, len, code); + DEBUGASSERT(nwritten >= 0 || *code); + DEBUGASSERT(nwritten < 0 || !*code || !len); + return nwritten; } failf(data, "send: no filter connected"); DEBUGASSERT(0); @@ -582,7 +590,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_conn_ev_data_idle(struct Curl_easy *data) /** * Notify connection filters that the transfer represented by `data` - * is donw with sending data (e.g. has uploaded everything). + * is done with sending data (e.g. has uploaded everything). */ void Curl_conn_ev_data_done_send(struct Curl_easy *data) { @@ -662,6 +670,71 @@ size_t Curl_conn_get_max_concurrent(struct Curl_easy *data, return (result || n <= 0)? 1 : (size_t)n; } +int Curl_conn_get_stream_error(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct connectdata *conn, + int sockindex) +{ + CURLcode result; + int n = 0; + + struct Curl_cfilter *cf = conn->cfilter[sockindex]; + result = cf? cf->cft->query(cf, data, CF_QUERY_STREAM_ERROR, + &n, NULL) : CURLE_UNKNOWN_OPTION; + return (result || n < 0)? 0 : n; +} + +int Curl_conn_sockindex(struct Curl_easy *data, curl_socket_t sockfd) +{ + if(data && data->conn && + sockfd != CURL_SOCKET_BAD && sockfd == data->conn->sock[SECONDARYSOCKET]) + return SECONDARYSOCKET; + return FIRSTSOCKET; +} + +CURLcode Curl_conn_recv(struct Curl_easy *data, int sockindex, + char *buf, size_t blen, ssize_t *n) +{ + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + ssize_t nread; + + DEBUGASSERT(data->conn); + nread = data->conn->recv[sockindex](data, sockindex, buf, blen, &result); + DEBUGASSERT(nread >= 0 || result); + DEBUGASSERT(nread < 0 || !result); + *n = (nread >= 0)? (size_t)nread : 0; + return result; +} + +CURLcode Curl_conn_send(struct Curl_easy *data, int sockindex, + const void *buf, size_t blen, + size_t *pnwritten) +{ + ssize_t nwritten; + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + struct connectdata *conn; + + DEBUGASSERT(sockindex >= 0 && sockindex < 2); + DEBUGASSERT(pnwritten); + DEBUGASSERT(data); + DEBUGASSERT(data->conn); + conn = data->conn; +#ifdef CURLDEBUG + { + /* Allow debug builds to override this logic to force short sends + */ + char *p = getenv("CURL_SMALLSENDS"); + if(p) { + size_t altsize = (size_t)strtoul(p, NULL, 10); + if(altsize) + blen = CURLMIN(blen, altsize); + } + } +#endif + nwritten = conn->send[sockindex](data, sockindex, buf, blen, &result); + DEBUGASSERT((nwritten >= 0) || result); + *pnwritten = (nwritten < 0)? 0 : (size_t)nwritten; + return result; +} void Curl_pollset_reset(struct Curl_easy *data, struct easy_pollset *ps) @@ -760,25 +833,11 @@ static void ps_add(struct Curl_easy *data, struct easy_pollset *ps, void Curl_pollset_add_socks(struct Curl_easy *data, struct easy_pollset *ps, int (*get_socks_cb)(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn, curl_socket_t *socks)) { curl_socket_t socks[MAX_SOCKSPEREASYHANDLE]; int bitmap; - DEBUGASSERT(data->conn); - bitmap = get_socks_cb(data, data->conn, socks); - ps_add(data, ps, bitmap, socks); -} - -void Curl_pollset_add_socks2(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct easy_pollset *ps, - int (*get_socks_cb)(struct Curl_easy *data, - curl_socket_t *socks)) -{ - curl_socket_t socks[MAX_SOCKSPEREASYHANDLE]; - int bitmap; - bitmap = get_socks_cb(data, socks); ps_add(data, ps, bitmap, socks); } diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/cfilters.h b/vendor/curl/lib/cfilters.h index 09a3f162ac..dcfc1b71fa 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/cfilters.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/cfilters.h @@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ typedef CURLcode Curl_cft_cntrl(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, #define CF_QUERY_SOCKET 3 /* - curl_socket_t */ #define CF_QUERY_TIMER_CONNECT 4 /* - struct curltime */ #define CF_QUERY_TIMER_APPCONNECT 5 /* - struct curltime */ +#define CF_QUERY_STREAM_ERROR 6 /* error code - */ /** * Query the cfilter for properties. Filters ignorant of a query will @@ -178,10 +179,12 @@ typedef CURLcode Curl_cft_query(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, * connection, etc. * CF_TYPE_SSL: provide SSL/TLS * CF_TYPE_MULTIPLEX: provides multiplexing of easy handles + * CF_TYPE_PROXY provides proxying */ #define CF_TYPE_IP_CONNECT (1 << 0) #define CF_TYPE_SSL (1 << 1) #define CF_TYPE_MULTIPLEX (1 << 2) +#define CF_TYPE_PROXY (1 << 3) /* A connection filter type, e.g. specific implementation. */ struct Curl_cftype { @@ -402,11 +405,11 @@ void Curl_conn_adjust_pollset(struct Curl_easy *data, /** * Receive data through the filter chain at `sockindex` for connection * `data->conn`. Copy at most `len` bytes into `buf`. Return the - * actuel number of bytes copied or a negative value on error. + * actual number of bytes copied or a negative value on error. * The error code is placed into `*code`. */ -ssize_t Curl_conn_recv(struct Curl_easy *data, int sockindex, char *buf, - size_t len, CURLcode *code); +ssize_t Curl_cf_recv(struct Curl_easy *data, int sockindex, char *buf, + size_t len, CURLcode *code); /** * Send `len` bytes of data from `buf` through the filter chain `sockindex` @@ -414,8 +417,8 @@ ssize_t Curl_conn_recv(struct Curl_easy *data, int sockindex, char *buf, * or a negative value on error. * The error code is placed into `*code`. */ -ssize_t Curl_conn_send(struct Curl_easy *data, int sockindex, - const void *buf, size_t len, CURLcode *code); +ssize_t Curl_cf_send(struct Curl_easy *data, int sockindex, + const void *buf, size_t len, CURLcode *code); /** * The easy handle `data` is being attached to `conn`. This does @@ -449,7 +452,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_conn_ev_data_idle(struct Curl_easy *data); /** * Notify connection filters that the transfer represented by `data` - * is donw with sending data (e.g. has uploaded everything). + * is done with sending data (e.g. has uploaded everything). */ void Curl_conn_ev_data_done_send(struct Curl_easy *data); @@ -496,6 +499,36 @@ size_t Curl_conn_get_max_concurrent(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex); +/** + * Get the underlying error code for a transfer stream or 0 if not known. + */ +int Curl_conn_get_stream_error(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct connectdata *conn, + int sockindex); + +/** + * Get the index of the given socket in the connection's sockets. + * Useful in calling `Curl_conn_send()/Curl_conn_recv()` with the + * correct socket index. + */ +int Curl_conn_sockindex(struct Curl_easy *data, curl_socket_t sockfd); + +/* + * Receive data on the connection, using FIRSTSOCKET/SECONDARYSOCKET. + * Will return CURLE_AGAIN iff blocked on receiving. + */ +CURLcode Curl_conn_recv(struct Curl_easy *data, int sockindex, + char *buf, size_t buffersize, + ssize_t *pnread); + +/* + * Send data on the connection, using FIRSTSOCKET/SECONDARYSOCKET. + * Will return CURLE_AGAIN iff blocked on sending. + */ +CURLcode Curl_conn_send(struct Curl_easy *data, int sockindex, + const void *buf, size_t blen, + size_t *pnwritten); + void Curl_pollset_reset(struct Curl_easy *data, struct easy_pollset *ps); @@ -530,12 +563,7 @@ void Curl_pollset_set(struct Curl_easy *data, void Curl_pollset_add_socks(struct Curl_easy *data, struct easy_pollset *ps, int (*get_socks_cb)(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn, curl_socket_t *socks)); -void Curl_pollset_add_socks2(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct easy_pollset *ps, - int (*get_socks_cb)(struct Curl_easy *data, - curl_socket_t *socks)); /** * Check if the pollset, as is, wants to read and/or write regarding diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/config-os400.h b/vendor/curl/lib/config-os400.h index 357a36458b..018e90af7e 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/config-os400.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/config-os400.h @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ #undef NEED_REENTRANT /* Define if you want to enable IPv6 support */ -#define ENABLE_IPV6 +#define USE_IPV6 /* Define if struct sockaddr_in6 has the sin6_scope_id member */ #define HAVE_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID 1 @@ -116,12 +116,6 @@ /* Define if you have the GNU gssapi libraries */ #undef HAVE_GSSGNU -/* Define if you have the Heimdal gssapi libraries */ -#define HAVE_GSSHEIMDAL - -/* Define if you have the MIT gssapi libraries */ -#undef HAVE_GSSMIT - /* Define if you need the malloc.h header file even with stdlib.h */ /* #define NEED_MALLOC_H 1 */ @@ -243,7 +237,7 @@ /* Define to enable HTTP3 support (experimental, requires NGTCP2, QUICHE or MSH3) */ -#undef ENABLE_QUIC +#undef USE_HTTP3 /* Version number of package */ #undef VERSION diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/config-plan9.h b/vendor/curl/lib/config-plan9.h index aa9623f922..6f3a15a5ef 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/config-plan9.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/config-plan9.h @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ #define CURL_CA_BUNDLE "/sys/lib/tls/ca.pem" #define CURL_CA_PATH "/sys/lib/tls" #define CURL_STATICLIB 1 -#define ENABLE_IPV6 1 +#define USE_IPV6 1 #define CURL_DISABLE_LDAP 1 #define NEED_REENTRANT 1 diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/config-riscos.h b/vendor/curl/lib/config-riscos.h index f3a8e68321..eb1d26ec77 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/config-riscos.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/config-riscos.h @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ #undef NEED_REENTRANT /* Define if you want to enable IPv6 support */ -#undef ENABLE_IPV6 +#undef USE_IPV6 /* Define if struct sockaddr_in6 has the sin6_scope_id member */ #define HAVE_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID 1 @@ -66,9 +66,6 @@ /* Define this as a suitable file to read random data from */ #undef RANDOM_FILE -/* Define if you want to enable IPv6 support */ -#undef ENABLE_IPV6 - /* Define if you have the alarm function. */ #define HAVE_ALARM diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/config-win32.h b/vendor/curl/lib/config-win32.h index 7b8a289bcd..d1341933b3 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/config-win32.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/config-win32.h @@ -97,15 +97,6 @@ #define HAVE_UNISTD_H 1 #endif -/* Define if you have the header file. */ -#define HAVE_WINDOWS_H 1 - -/* Define if you have the header file. */ -#define HAVE_WINSOCK2_H 1 - -/* Define if you have the header file. */ -#define HAVE_WS2TCPIP_H 1 - /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #if defined(__MINGW32__) #define HAVE_LIBGEN_H 1 @@ -292,52 +283,6 @@ /* Define to the size of `curl_off_t', as computed by sizeof. */ #define SIZEOF_CURL_OFF_T 8 -/* ---------------------------------------------------------------- */ -/* BSD-style lwIP TCP/IP stack SPECIFIC */ -/* ---------------------------------------------------------------- */ - -/* Define to use BSD-style lwIP TCP/IP stack. */ -/* #define USE_LWIPSOCK 1 */ - -#ifdef USE_LWIPSOCK -# undef USE_WINSOCK -# undef HAVE_WINSOCK2_H -# undef HAVE_WS2TCPIP_H -# undef HAVE_GETHOSTNAME -# undef LWIP_POSIX_SOCKETS_IO_NAMES -# undef RECV_TYPE_ARG1 -# undef RECV_TYPE_ARG3 -# undef SEND_TYPE_ARG1 -# undef SEND_TYPE_ARG3 -# define HAVE_GETHOSTBYNAME_R -# define HAVE_GETHOSTBYNAME_R_6 -# define LWIP_POSIX_SOCKETS_IO_NAMES 0 -# define RECV_TYPE_ARG1 int -# define RECV_TYPE_ARG3 size_t -# define SEND_TYPE_ARG1 int -# define SEND_TYPE_ARG3 size_t -#endif - -/* ---------------------------------------------------------------- */ -/* Watt-32 tcp/ip SPECIFIC */ -/* ---------------------------------------------------------------- */ - -#ifdef USE_WATT32 - #include - #undef byte - #undef word - #undef USE_WINSOCK - #undef HAVE_WINSOCK2_H - #undef HAVE_WS2TCPIP_H - #define HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H - #define HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H - #define HAVE_NETINET_IN_H - #define HAVE_NETDB_H - #define HAVE_ARPA_INET_H - #define SOCKET int -#endif - - /* ---------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* COMPILER SPECIFIC */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------- */ @@ -564,8 +509,4 @@ Vista /* If you want to build curl with the built-in manual */ #define USE_MANUAL 1 -#if defined(USE_IPV6) -# define ENABLE_IPV6 1 -#endif - #endif /* HEADER_CURL_CONFIG_WIN32_H */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/config-win32ce.h b/vendor/curl/lib/config-win32ce.h index e0db57fd0f..ae3ca290c3 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/config-win32ce.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/config-win32ce.h @@ -85,15 +85,6 @@ #define HAVE_UNISTD_H 1 #endif -/* Define if you have the header file. */ -#define HAVE_WINDOWS_H 1 - -/* Define if you have the header file. */ -#define HAVE_WINSOCK2_H 1 - -/* Define if you have the header file. */ -#define HAVE_WS2TCPIP_H 1 - /* ---------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* OTHER HEADER INFO */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------- */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/conncache.c b/vendor/curl/lib/conncache.c index 66f18ecb85..2b5ee4f25f 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/conncache.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/conncache.c @@ -68,8 +68,7 @@ static void bundle_destroy(struct connectbundle *bundle) static void bundle_add_conn(struct connectbundle *bundle, struct connectdata *conn) { - Curl_llist_insert_next(&bundle->conn_list, bundle->conn_list.tail, conn, - &conn->bundle_node); + Curl_llist_append(&bundle->conn_list, conn, &conn->bundle_node); conn->bundle = bundle; bundle->num_connections++; } @@ -101,7 +100,7 @@ static void free_bundle_hash_entry(void *freethis) bundle_destroy(b); } -int Curl_conncache_init(struct conncache *connc, int size) +int Curl_conncache_init(struct conncache *connc, size_t size) { /* allocate a new easy handle to use when closing cached connections */ connc->closure_handle = curl_easy_init(); @@ -131,7 +130,7 @@ static void hashkey(struct connectdata *conn, char *buf, size_t len) #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY if(conn->bits.httpproxy && !conn->bits.tunnel_proxy) { hostname = conn->http_proxy.host.name; - port = conn->port; + port = conn->primary.remote_port; } else #endif @@ -141,7 +140,7 @@ static void hashkey(struct connectdata *conn, char *buf, size_t len) hostname = conn->host.name; /* put the numbers first so that the hostname gets cut off if too long */ -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 msnprintf(buf, len, "%u/%ld/%s", conn->scope_id, port, hostname); #else msnprintf(buf, len, "%ld/%s", port, hostname); @@ -395,8 +394,6 @@ bool Curl_conncache_return_conn(struct Curl_easy *data, important that details from this (unrelated) disconnect does not taint meta-data in the data handle. */ struct conncache *connc = data->state.conn_cache; - connc->closure_handle->state.buffer = data->state.buffer; - connc->closure_handle->set.buffer_size = data->set.buffer_size; Curl_disconnect(connc->closure_handle, conn_candidate, /* dead_connection */ FALSE); } @@ -522,12 +519,9 @@ Curl_conncache_extract_oldest(struct Curl_easy *data) void Curl_conncache_close_all_connections(struct conncache *connc) { struct connectdata *conn; - char buffer[READBUFFER_MIN + 1]; SIGPIPE_VARIABLE(pipe_st); if(!connc->closure_handle) return; - connc->closure_handle->state.buffer = buffer; - connc->closure_handle->set.buffer_size = READBUFFER_MIN; conn = conncache_find_first_connection(connc); while(conn) { @@ -541,7 +535,6 @@ void Curl_conncache_close_all_connections(struct conncache *connc) conn = conncache_find_first_connection(connc); } - connc->closure_handle->state.buffer = NULL; sigpipe_ignore(connc->closure_handle, &pipe_st); Curl_hostcache_clean(connc->closure_handle, diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/conncache.h b/vendor/curl/lib/conncache.h index c60f8449ee..e685123948 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/conncache.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/conncache.h @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ struct connectbundle { }; /* returns 1 on error, 0 is fine */ -int Curl_conncache_init(struct conncache *, int size); +int Curl_conncache_init(struct conncache *, size_t size); void Curl_conncache_destroy(struct conncache *connc); /* return the correct bundle, to a host or a proxy */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/connect.c b/vendor/curl/lib/connect.c index ec5ab71d49..bf85e640f8 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/connect.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/connect.c @@ -93,25 +93,17 @@ * transfer/connection. If the value is 0, there's no timeout (ie there's * infinite time left). If the value is negative, the timeout time has already * elapsed. - * - * If 'nowp' is non-NULL, it points to the current time. - * 'duringconnect' is FALSE if not during a connect, as then of course the - * connect timeout is not taken into account! - * + * @param data the transfer to check on + * @param nowp timestamp to use for calculation, NULL to use Curl_now() + * @param duringconnect TRUE iff connect timeout is also taken into account. * @unittest: 1303 */ - -#define TIMEOUT_CONNECT 1 -#define TIMEOUT_MAXTIME 2 - timediff_t Curl_timeleft(struct Curl_easy *data, struct curltime *nowp, bool duringconnect) { - unsigned int timeout_set = 0; - timediff_t connect_timeout_ms = 0; - timediff_t maxtime_timeout_ms = 0; - timediff_t timeout_ms = 0; + timediff_t timeleft_ms = 0; + timediff_t ctimeleft_ms = 0; struct curltime now; /* The duration of a connect and the total transfer are calculated from two @@ -119,61 +111,60 @@ timediff_t Curl_timeleft(struct Curl_easy *data, before the connect timeout expires and we must acknowledge whichever timeout that is reached first. The total timeout is set per entire operation, while the connect timeout is set per connect. */ - - if(data->set.timeout > 0) { - timeout_set = TIMEOUT_MAXTIME; - maxtime_timeout_ms = data->set.timeout; - } - if(duringconnect) { - timeout_set |= TIMEOUT_CONNECT; - connect_timeout_ms = (data->set.connecttimeout > 0) ? - data->set.connecttimeout : DEFAULT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT; - } - if(!timeout_set) - /* no timeout */ - return 0; + if(data->set.timeout <= 0 && !duringconnect) + return 0; /* no timeout in place or checked, return "no limit" */ if(!nowp) { now = Curl_now(); nowp = &now; } - if(timeout_set & TIMEOUT_MAXTIME) { - maxtime_timeout_ms -= Curl_timediff(*nowp, data->progress.t_startop); - timeout_ms = maxtime_timeout_ms; + if(data->set.timeout > 0) { + timeleft_ms = data->set.timeout - + Curl_timediff(*nowp, data->progress.t_startop); + if(!timeleft_ms) + timeleft_ms = -1; /* 0 is "no limit", fake 1 ms expiry */ + if(!duringconnect) + return timeleft_ms; /* no connect check, this is it */ } - if(timeout_set & TIMEOUT_CONNECT) { - connect_timeout_ms -= Curl_timediff(*nowp, data->progress.t_startsingle); - - if(!(timeout_set & TIMEOUT_MAXTIME) || - (connect_timeout_ms < maxtime_timeout_ms)) - timeout_ms = connect_timeout_ms; + if(duringconnect) { + timediff_t ctimeout_ms = (data->set.connecttimeout > 0) ? + data->set.connecttimeout : DEFAULT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT; + ctimeleft_ms = ctimeout_ms - + Curl_timediff(*nowp, data->progress.t_startsingle); + if(!ctimeleft_ms) + ctimeleft_ms = -1; /* 0 is "no limit", fake 1 ms expiry */ + if(!timeleft_ms) + return ctimeleft_ms; /* no general timeout, this is it */ } - - if(!timeout_ms) - /* avoid returning 0 as that means no timeout! */ - return -1; - - return timeout_ms; + /* return minimal time left or max amount already expired */ + return (ctimeleft_ms < timeleft_ms)? ctimeleft_ms : timeleft_ms; } /* Copies connection info into the transfer handle to make it available when the transfer handle is no longer associated with the connection. */ void Curl_persistconninfo(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, - char *local_ip, int local_port) + struct ip_quadruple *ip) { - memcpy(data->info.conn_primary_ip, conn->primary_ip, MAX_IPADR_LEN); - if(local_ip && local_ip[0]) - memcpy(data->info.conn_local_ip, local_ip, MAX_IPADR_LEN); - else - data->info.conn_local_ip[0] = 0; + if(ip) + data->info.primary = *ip; + else { + memset(&data->info.primary, 0, sizeof(data->info.primary)); + data->info.primary.remote_port = -1; + data->info.primary.local_port = -1; + } data->info.conn_scheme = conn->handler->scheme; /* conn_protocol can only provide "old" protocols */ data->info.conn_protocol = (conn->handler->protocol) & CURLPROTO_MASK; - data->info.conn_primary_port = conn->port; data->info.conn_remote_port = conn->remote_port; - data->info.conn_local_port = local_port; + data->info.used_proxy = +#ifdef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY + 0 +#else + conn->bits.proxy +#endif + ; } static const struct Curl_addrinfo * @@ -204,7 +195,7 @@ bool Curl_addr2string(struct sockaddr *sa, curl_socklen_t salen, char *addr, int *port) { struct sockaddr_in *si = NULL; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 struct sockaddr_in6 *si6 = NULL; #endif #if (defined(HAVE_SYS_UN_H) || defined(WIN32_SOCKADDR_UN)) && defined(AF_UNIX) @@ -223,7 +214,7 @@ bool Curl_addr2string(struct sockaddr *sa, curl_socklen_t salen, return TRUE; } break; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 case AF_INET6: si6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)(void *) sa; if(Curl_inet_ntop(sa->sa_family, &si6->sin6_addr, @@ -405,12 +396,12 @@ static CURLcode eyeballer_new(struct eyeballer **pballer, struct eyeballer *baller; *pballer = NULL; - baller = calloc(1, sizeof(*baller) + 1000); + baller = calloc(1, sizeof(*baller)); if(!baller) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; baller->name = ((ai_family == AF_INET)? "ipv4" : ( -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 (ai_family == AF_INET6)? "ipv6" : #endif "ip")); @@ -737,7 +728,7 @@ static CURLcode is_connected(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, failf(data, "Failed to connect to %s port %u after " "%" CURL_FORMAT_TIMEDIFF_T " ms: %s", - hostname, conn->port, + hostname, conn->primary.remote_port, Curl_timediff(now, data->progress.t_startsingle), curl_easy_strerror(result)); @@ -788,7 +779,7 @@ static CURLcode start_connect(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, /* any IP version is allowed */ ai_family0 = remotehost->addr? remotehost->addr->ai_family : 0; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 ai_family1 = ai_family0 == AF_INET6 ? AF_INET : AF_INET6; #else @@ -799,7 +790,7 @@ static CURLcode start_connect(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, /* only one IP version is allowed */ ai_family0 = (conn->ip_version == CURL_IPRESOLVE_V4) ? AF_INET : -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 AF_INET6; #else AF_UNSPEC; @@ -908,7 +899,7 @@ static CURLcode cf_he_connect(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(result) return result; ctx->state = SCFST_WAITING; - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case SCFST_WAITING: result = is_connected(cf, data, done); if(!result && *done) { @@ -927,7 +918,7 @@ static CURLcode cf_he_connect(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(cf->conn->handler->protocol & PROTO_FAMILY_SSH) Curl_pgrsTime(data, TIMER_APPCONNECT); /* we're connected already */ - Curl_verboseconnect(data, cf->conn); + Curl_verboseconnect(data, cf->conn, cf->sockindex); data->info.numconnects++; /* to track the # of connections made */ } break; @@ -1126,7 +1117,7 @@ const #endif struct transport_provider transport_providers[] = { { TRNSPRT_TCP, Curl_cf_tcp_create }, -#ifdef ENABLE_QUIC +#ifdef USE_HTTP3 { TRNSPRT_QUIC, Curl_cf_quic_create }, #endif #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_TFTP diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/connect.h b/vendor/curl/lib/connect.h index 58264bdba4..00efe6f34e 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/connect.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/connect.h @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include "timeval.h" struct Curl_dns_entry; +struct ip_quadruple; /* generic function that returns how much time there's left to run, according to the timeouts set */ @@ -52,7 +53,7 @@ bool Curl_addr2string(struct sockaddr *sa, curl_socklen_t salen, char *addr, int *port); void Curl_persistconninfo(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, - char *local_ip, int local_port); + struct ip_quadruple *ip); /* * Curl_conncontrol() marks the end of a connection/stream. The 'closeit' diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/content_encoding.c b/vendor/curl/lib/content_encoding.c index 4167d4d684..d34d3a1f5e 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/content_encoding.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/content_encoding.c @@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static CURLcode deflate_do_write(struct Curl_easy *data, struct zlib_writer *zp = (struct zlib_writer *) writer; z_stream *z = &zp->z; /* zlib state structure */ - if(!(type & CLIENTWRITE_BODY)) + if(!(type & CLIENTWRITE_BODY) || !nbytes) return Curl_cwriter_write(data, writer->next, type, buf, nbytes); /* Set the compressed input when this function is called */ @@ -365,11 +365,14 @@ static CURLcode gzip_do_init(struct Curl_easy *data, #ifdef OLD_ZLIB_SUPPORT /* Skip over the gzip header */ -static enum { +typedef enum { GZIP_OK, GZIP_BAD, GZIP_UNDERFLOW -} check_gzip_header(unsigned char const *data, ssize_t len, ssize_t *headerlen) +} gzip_status; + +static gzip_status check_gzip_header(unsigned char const *data, ssize_t len, + ssize_t *headerlen) { int method, flags; const ssize_t totallen = len; @@ -454,7 +457,7 @@ static CURLcode gzip_do_write(struct Curl_easy *data, struct zlib_writer *zp = (struct zlib_writer *) writer; z_stream *z = &zp->z; /* zlib state structure */ - if(!(type & CLIENTWRITE_BODY)) + if(!(type & CLIENTWRITE_BODY) || !nbytes) return Curl_cwriter_write(data, writer->next, type, buf, nbytes); if(zp->zlib_init == ZLIB_INIT_GZIP) { @@ -666,7 +669,7 @@ static CURLcode brotli_do_write(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; BrotliDecoderResult r = BROTLI_DECODER_RESULT_NEEDS_MORE_OUTPUT; - if(!(type & CLIENTWRITE_BODY)) + if(!(type & CLIENTWRITE_BODY) || !nbytes) return Curl_cwriter_write(data, writer->next, type, buf, nbytes); if(!bp->br) @@ -759,7 +762,7 @@ static CURLcode zstd_do_write(struct Curl_easy *data, ZSTD_outBuffer out; size_t errorCode; - if(!(type & CLIENTWRITE_BODY)) + if(!(type & CLIENTWRITE_BODY) || !nbytes) return Curl_cwriter_write(data, writer->next, type, buf, nbytes); if(!zp->decomp) { @@ -832,8 +835,8 @@ static const struct Curl_cwtype identity_encoding = { }; -/* supported content encodings table. */ -static const struct Curl_cwtype * const encodings[] = { +/* supported general content decoders. */ +static const struct Curl_cwtype * const general_unencoders[] = { &identity_encoding, #ifdef HAVE_LIBZ &deflate_encoding, @@ -848,6 +851,13 @@ static const struct Curl_cwtype * const encodings[] = { NULL }; +/* supported content decoders only for transfer encodings */ +static const struct Curl_cwtype * const transfer_unencoders[] = { +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_HTTP + &Curl_httpchunk_unencoder, +#endif + NULL +}; /* Provide a list of comma-separated names of supported encodings. */ @@ -861,7 +871,7 @@ void Curl_all_content_encodings(char *buf, size_t blen) DEBUGASSERT(blen); buf[0] = 0; - for(cep = encodings; *cep; cep++) { + for(cep = general_unencoders; *cep; cep++) { ce = *cep; if(!strcasecompare(ce->name, CONTENT_ENCODING_DEFAULT)) len += strlen(ce->name) + 2; @@ -873,7 +883,7 @@ void Curl_all_content_encodings(char *buf, size_t blen) } else if(blen > len) { char *p = buf; - for(cep = encodings; *cep; cep++) { + for(cep = general_unencoders; *cep; cep++) { ce = *cep; if(!strcasecompare(ce->name, CONTENT_ENCODING_DEFAULT)) { strcpy(p, ce->name); @@ -906,7 +916,7 @@ static CURLcode error_do_write(struct Curl_easy *data, (void) buf; (void) nbytes; - if(!(type & CLIENTWRITE_BODY)) + if(!(type & CLIENTWRITE_BODY) || !nbytes) return Curl_cwriter_write(data, writer->next, type, buf, nbytes); failf(data, "Unrecognized content encoding type. " @@ -931,12 +941,23 @@ static const struct Curl_cwtype error_writer = { }; /* Find the content encoding by name. */ -static const struct Curl_cwtype *find_encoding(const char *name, - size_t len) +static const struct Curl_cwtype *find_unencode_writer(const char *name, + size_t len, + Curl_cwriter_phase phase) { const struct Curl_cwtype * const *cep; - for(cep = encodings; *cep; cep++) { + if(phase == CURL_CW_TRANSFER_DECODE) { + for(cep = transfer_unencoders; *cep; cep++) { + const struct Curl_cwtype *ce = *cep; + if((strncasecompare(name, ce->name, len) && !ce->name[len]) || + (ce->alias && strncasecompare(name, ce->alias, len) + && !ce->alias[len])) + return ce; + } + } + /* look among the general decoders */ + for(cep = general_unencoders; *cep; cep++) { const struct Curl_cwtype *ce = *cep; if((strncasecompare(name, ce->name, len) && !ce->name[len]) || (ce->alias && strncasecompare(name, ce->alias, len) && !ce->alias[len])) @@ -950,7 +971,6 @@ static const struct Curl_cwtype *find_encoding(const char *name, CURLcode Curl_build_unencoding_stack(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *enclist, int is_transfer) { - struct SingleRequest *k = &data->req; Curl_cwriter_phase phase = is_transfer? CURL_CW_TRANSFER_DECODE:CURL_CW_CONTENT_DECODE; CURLcode result; @@ -958,6 +978,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_build_unencoding_stack(struct Curl_easy *data, do { const char *name; size_t namelen; + bool is_chunked = FALSE; /* Parse a single encoding name. */ while(ISBLANK(*enclist) || *enclist == ',') @@ -969,16 +990,15 @@ CURLcode Curl_build_unencoding_stack(struct Curl_easy *data, if(!ISSPACE(*enclist)) namelen = enclist - name + 1; - /* Special case: chunked encoding is handled at the reader level. */ - if(is_transfer && namelen == 7 && strncasecompare(name, "chunked", 7)) { - k->chunk = TRUE; /* chunks coming our way. */ - Curl_httpchunk_init(data); /* init our chunky engine. */ - } - else if(namelen) { + if(namelen) { const struct Curl_cwtype *cwt; struct Curl_cwriter *writer; - if((is_transfer && !data->set.http_transfer_encoding) || + is_chunked = (is_transfer && (namelen == 7) && + strncasecompare(name, "chunked", 7)); + /* if we skip the decoding in this phase, do not look further. + * Exception is "chunked" transfer-encoding which always must happen */ + if((is_transfer && !data->set.http_transfer_encoding && !is_chunked) || (!is_transfer && data->set.http_ce_skip)) { /* not requested, ignore */ return CURLE_OK; @@ -990,7 +1010,32 @@ CURLcode Curl_build_unencoding_stack(struct Curl_easy *data, return CURLE_BAD_CONTENT_ENCODING; } - cwt = find_encoding(name, namelen); + cwt = find_unencode_writer(name, namelen, phase); + if(cwt && is_chunked && Curl_cwriter_get_by_type(data, cwt)) { + /* A 'chunked' transfer encoding has already been added. + * Ignore duplicates. See #13451. + * Also RFC 9112, ch. 6.1: + * "A sender MUST NOT apply the chunked transfer coding more than + * once to a message body." + */ + return CURLE_OK; + } + + if(is_transfer && !is_chunked && + Curl_cwriter_get_by_name(data, "chunked")) { + /* RFC 9112, ch. 6.1: + * "If any transfer coding other than chunked is applied to a + * response's content, the sender MUST either apply chunked as the + * final transfer coding or terminate the message by closing the + * connection." + * "chunked" must be the last added to be the first in its phase, + * reject this. + */ + failf(data, "Reject response due to 'chunked' not being the last " + "Transfer-Encoding"); + return CURLE_BAD_CONTENT_ENCODING; + } + if(!cwt) cwt = &error_writer; /* Defer error at use. */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/cookie.c b/vendor/curl/lib/cookie.c index 9095cea3e9..837caaab38 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/cookie.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/cookie.c @@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ static void strstore(char **str, const char *newstr, size_t len) DEBUGASSERT(newstr); DEBUGASSERT(str); free(*str); - *str = Curl_strndup(newstr, len); + *str = Curl_memdup0(newstr, len); } /* @@ -426,6 +426,7 @@ static void remove_expired(struct CookieInfo *cookies) } } +#ifndef USE_LIBPSL /* Make sure domain contains a dot or is localhost. */ static bool bad_domain(const char *domain, size_t len) { @@ -443,6 +444,7 @@ static bool bad_domain(const char *domain, size_t len) } return TRUE; } +#endif /* RFC 6265 section 4.1.1 says a server should accept this range: @@ -821,10 +823,8 @@ Curl_cookie_add(struct Curl_easy *data, endslash = memrchr(path, '/', (queryp - path)); if(endslash) { size_t pathlen = (endslash-path + 1); /* include end slash */ - co->path = malloc(pathlen + 1); /* one extra for the zero byte */ + co->path = Curl_memdup0(path, pathlen); if(co->path) { - memcpy(co->path, path, pathlen); - co->path[pathlen] = 0; /* null-terminate */ co->spath = sanitize_cookie_path(co->path); if(!co->spath) badcookie = TRUE; /* out of memory bad */ @@ -886,7 +886,8 @@ Curl_cookie_add(struct Curl_easy *data, * Now loop through the fields and init the struct we already have * allocated */ - for(ptr = firstptr, fields = 0; ptr && !badcookie; + fields = 0; + for(ptr = firstptr; ptr && !badcookie; ptr = strtok_r(NULL, "\t", &tok_buf), fields++) { switch(fields) { case 0: @@ -927,7 +928,7 @@ Curl_cookie_add(struct Curl_easy *data, if(!co->spath) badcookie = TRUE; fields++; /* add a field and fall down to secure */ - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case 3: co->secure = FALSE; if(strcasecompare(ptr, "TRUE")) { @@ -1042,7 +1043,7 @@ Curl_cookie_add(struct Curl_easy *data, Curl_psl_release(data); } else - acceptable = !bad_domain(domain, strlen(domain)); + infof(data, "libpsl problem, rejecting cookie for satety"); } if(!acceptable) { @@ -1207,7 +1208,6 @@ struct CookieInfo *Curl_cookie_init(struct Curl_easy *data, bool newsession) { struct CookieInfo *c; - char *line = NULL; FILE *handle = NULL; if(!inc) { @@ -1229,7 +1229,7 @@ struct CookieInfo *Curl_cookie_init(struct Curl_easy *data, if(data) { FILE *fp = NULL; - if(file) { + if(file && *file) { if(!strcmp(file, "-")) fp = stdin; else { @@ -1243,16 +1243,14 @@ struct CookieInfo *Curl_cookie_init(struct Curl_easy *data, c->running = FALSE; /* this is not running, this is init */ if(fp) { - - line = malloc(MAX_COOKIE_LINE); - if(!line) - goto fail; - while(Curl_get_line(line, MAX_COOKIE_LINE, fp)) { - char *lineptr = line; + struct dynbuf buf; + Curl_dyn_init(&buf, MAX_COOKIE_LINE); + while(Curl_get_line(&buf, fp)) { + char *lineptr = Curl_dyn_ptr(&buf); bool headerline = FALSE; - if(checkprefix("Set-Cookie:", line)) { + if(checkprefix("Set-Cookie:", lineptr)) { /* This is a cookie line, get it! */ - lineptr = &line[11]; + lineptr += 11; headerline = TRUE; while(*lineptr && ISBLANK(*lineptr)) lineptr++; @@ -1260,7 +1258,7 @@ struct CookieInfo *Curl_cookie_init(struct Curl_easy *data, Curl_cookie_add(data, c, headerline, TRUE, lineptr, NULL, NULL, TRUE); } - free(line); /* free the line buffer */ + Curl_dyn_free(&buf); /* free the line buffer */ /* * Remove expired cookies from the hash. We must make sure to run this @@ -1276,18 +1274,6 @@ struct CookieInfo *Curl_cookie_init(struct Curl_easy *data, c->running = TRUE; /* now, we're running */ return c; - -fail: - free(line); - /* - * Only clean up if we allocated it here, as the original could still be in - * use by a share handle. - */ - if(!inc) - Curl_cookie_cleanup(c); - if(handle) - fclose(handle); - return NULL; /* out of memory */ } /* diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_addrinfo.c b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_addrinfo.c index f9211d3f57..c32f24d018 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_addrinfo.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_addrinfo.c @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ Curl_getaddrinfo_ex(const char *nodename, /* settle family-specific sockaddr structure size. */ if(ai->ai_family == AF_INET) ss_size = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 else if(ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) ss_size = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); #endif @@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ Curl_he2ai(const struct hostent *he, int port) struct Curl_addrinfo *prevai = NULL; struct Curl_addrinfo *firstai = NULL; struct sockaddr_in *addr; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6; #endif CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; @@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ Curl_he2ai(const struct hostent *he, int port) for(i = 0; (curr = he->h_addr_list[i]) != NULL; i++) { size_t ss_size; size_t namelen = strlen(he->h_name) + 1; /* include null-terminator */ -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 if(he->h_addrtype == AF_INET6) ss_size = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); else @@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ Curl_he2ai(const struct hostent *he, int port) addr->sin_port = htons((unsigned short)port); break; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 case AF_INET6: addr6 = (void *)ai->ai_addr; /* storage area for this info */ @@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ struct namebuff { struct hostent hostentry; union { struct in_addr ina4; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 struct in6_addr ina6; #endif } addrentry; @@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ Curl_ip2addr(int af, const void *inaddr, const char *hostname, int port) addrentry = (void *)&buf->addrentry.ina4; memcpy(addrentry, inaddr, sizeof(struct in_addr)); break; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 case AF_INET6: addrsize = sizeof(struct in6_addr); addrentry = (void *)&buf->addrentry.ina6; @@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ struct Curl_addrinfo *Curl_str2addr(char *address, int port) if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, address, &in) > 0) /* This is a dotted IP address 123.123.123.123-style */ return Curl_ip2addr(AF_INET, &in, address, port); -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 { struct in6_addr in6; if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, address, &in6) > 0) @@ -570,7 +570,7 @@ void Curl_addrinfo_set_port(struct Curl_addrinfo *addrinfo, int port) { struct Curl_addrinfo *ca; struct sockaddr_in *addr; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6; #endif for(ca = addrinfo; ca != NULL; ca = ca->ai_next) { @@ -580,7 +580,7 @@ void Curl_addrinfo_set_port(struct Curl_addrinfo *addrinfo, int port) addr->sin_port = htons((unsigned short)port); break; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 case AF_INET6: addr6 = (void *)ca->ai_addr; /* storage area for this info */ addr6->sin6_port = htons((unsigned short)port); diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_des.c b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_des.c index b77763f268..f8d2b2cc69 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_des.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_des.c @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ * Curl_des_set_odd_parity() * * This is used to apply odd parity to the given byte array. It is typically - * used by when a cryptography engines doesn't have it's own version. + * used by when a cryptography engine doesn't have its own version. * * The function is a port of the Java based oddParity() function over at: * diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_get_line.c b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_get_line.c index 686abe7511..100207331d 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_get_line.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_get_line.c @@ -33,14 +33,16 @@ #include "memdebug.h" /* - * Curl_get_line() makes sure to only return complete whole lines that fit in - * 'len' bytes and end with a newline. + * Curl_get_line() makes sure to only return complete whole lines that end + * newlines. */ -char *Curl_get_line(char *buf, int len, FILE *input) +int Curl_get_line(struct dynbuf *buf, FILE *input) { - bool partial = FALSE; + CURLcode result; + char buffer[128]; + Curl_dyn_reset(buf); while(1) { - char *b = fgets(buf, len, input); + char *b = fgets(buffer, sizeof(buffer), input); if(b) { size_t rlen = strlen(b); @@ -48,39 +50,28 @@ char *Curl_get_line(char *buf, int len, FILE *input) if(!rlen) break; - if(b[rlen-1] == '\n') { - /* b is \n terminated */ - if(partial) { - partial = FALSE; - continue; - } - return b; - } - else if(feof(input)) { - if(partial) - /* Line is already too large to return, ignore rest */ - break; + result = Curl_dyn_addn(buf, b, rlen); + if(result) + /* too long line or out of memory */ + return 0; /* error */ - if(rlen + 1 < (size_t) len) { - /* b is EOF terminated, insert missing \n */ - b[rlen] = '\n'; - b[rlen + 1] = '\0'; - return b; - } - else - /* Maximum buffersize reached + EOF - * This line is impossible to add a \n to so we'll ignore it - */ - break; + else if(b[rlen-1] == '\n') + /* end of the line */ + return 1; /* all good */ + + else if(feof(input)) { + /* append a newline */ + result = Curl_dyn_addn(buf, "\n", 1); + if(result) + /* too long line or out of memory */ + return 0; /* error */ + return 1; /* all good */ } - else - /* Maximum buffersize reached */ - partial = TRUE; } else break; } - return NULL; + return 0; } #endif /* if not disabled */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_get_line.h b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_get_line.h index 0ff32c5c2c..7907cde880 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_get_line.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_get_line.h @@ -24,8 +24,9 @@ * ***************************************************************************/ -/* get_line() makes sure to only return complete whole lines that fit in 'len' - * bytes and end with a newline. */ -char *Curl_get_line(char *buf, int len, FILE *input); +#include "dynbuf.h" + +/* Curl_get_line() returns complete lines that end with a newline. */ +int Curl_get_line(struct dynbuf *buf, FILE *input); #endif /* HEADER_CURL_GET_LINE_H */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_gethostname.c b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_gethostname.c index 706b2e6892..bd9b220d49 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_gethostname.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_gethostname.c @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ int Curl_gethostname(char * const name, GETHOSTNAME_TYPE_ARG2 namelen) /* Override host name when environment variable CURL_GETHOSTNAME is set */ const char *force_hostname = getenv("CURL_GETHOSTNAME"); if(force_hostname) { - strncpy(name, force_hostname, namelen); + strncpy(name, force_hostname, namelen - 1); err = 0; } else { diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_multibyte.c b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_multibyte.c index ff21098563..86ac74ff4b 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_multibyte.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_multibyte.c @@ -159,21 +159,4 @@ int curlx_win32_stat(const char *path, struct_stat *buffer) #endif } -int curlx_win32_access(const char *path, int mode) -{ -#if defined(_UNICODE) - int result = -1; - wchar_t *path_w = curlx_convert_UTF8_to_wchar(path); - if(path_w) { - result = _waccess(path_w, mode); - curlx_unicodefree(path_w); - } - else - errno = EINVAL; - return result; -#else - return _access(path, mode); -#endif -} - #endif /* USE_WIN32_LARGE_FILES || USE_WIN32_SMALL_FILES */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_ntlm_wb.c b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_ntlm_wb.c deleted file mode 100644 index b087a37a3d..0000000000 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_ntlm_wb.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,500 +0,0 @@ -/*************************************************************************** - * _ _ ____ _ - * Project ___| | | | _ \| | - * / __| | | | |_) | | - * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ - * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| - * - * Copyright (C) Daniel Stenberg, , et al. - * - * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which - * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms - * are also available at https://curl.se/docs/copyright.html. - * - * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell - * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is - * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file. - * - * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY - * KIND, either express or implied. - * - * SPDX-License-Identifier: curl - * - ***************************************************************************/ - -#include "curl_setup.h" - -#if !defined(CURL_DISABLE_HTTP) && defined(USE_NTLM) && \ - defined(NTLM_WB_ENABLED) - -/* - * NTLM details: - * - * https://davenport.sourceforge.net/ntlm.html - * https://www.innovation.ch/java/ntlm.html - */ - -#define DEBUG_ME 0 - -#ifdef HAVE_SYS_WAIT_H -#include -#endif -#include -#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H -#include -#endif - -#include "urldata.h" -#include "sendf.h" -#include "select.h" -#include "vauth/ntlm.h" -#include "curl_ntlm_core.h" -#include "curl_ntlm_wb.h" -#include "url.h" -#include "strerror.h" -#include "strdup.h" -#include "strcase.h" - -/* The last 3 #include files should be in this order */ -#include "curl_printf.h" -#include "curl_memory.h" -#include "memdebug.h" - -#if DEBUG_ME -# define DEBUG_OUT(x) x -#else -# define DEBUG_OUT(x) Curl_nop_stmt -#endif - -/* Portable 'sclose_nolog' used only in child process instead of 'sclose' - to avoid fooling the socket leak detector */ -#ifdef HAVE_PIPE -# define sclose_nolog(x) close((x)) -#elif defined(HAVE_CLOSESOCKET) -# define sclose_nolog(x) closesocket((x)) -#elif defined(HAVE_CLOSESOCKET_CAMEL) -# define sclose_nolog(x) CloseSocket((x)) -#else -# define sclose_nolog(x) close((x)) -#endif - -static void ntlm_wb_cleanup(struct ntlmdata *ntlm) -{ - if(ntlm->ntlm_auth_hlpr_socket != CURL_SOCKET_BAD) { - sclose(ntlm->ntlm_auth_hlpr_socket); - ntlm->ntlm_auth_hlpr_socket = CURL_SOCKET_BAD; - } - - if(ntlm->ntlm_auth_hlpr_pid) { - int i; - for(i = 0; i < 4; i++) { - pid_t ret = waitpid(ntlm->ntlm_auth_hlpr_pid, NULL, WNOHANG); - if(ret == ntlm->ntlm_auth_hlpr_pid || errno == ECHILD) - break; - switch(i) { - case 0: - kill(ntlm->ntlm_auth_hlpr_pid, SIGTERM); - break; - case 1: - /* Give the process another moment to shut down cleanly before - bringing down the axe */ - Curl_wait_ms(1); - break; - case 2: - kill(ntlm->ntlm_auth_hlpr_pid, SIGKILL); - break; - case 3: - break; - } - } - ntlm->ntlm_auth_hlpr_pid = 0; - } - - Curl_safefree(ntlm->challenge); - Curl_safefree(ntlm->response); -} - -static CURLcode ntlm_wb_init(struct Curl_easy *data, struct ntlmdata *ntlm, - const char *userp) -{ - curl_socket_t sockfds[2]; - pid_t child_pid; - const char *username; - char *slash, *domain = NULL; - const char *ntlm_auth = NULL; - char *ntlm_auth_alloc = NULL; -#if defined(HAVE_GETPWUID_R) && defined(HAVE_GETEUID) - struct passwd pw, *pw_res; - char pwbuf[1024]; -#endif - char buffer[STRERROR_LEN]; - -#if defined(CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS) - (void) data; -#endif - - /* Return if communication with ntlm_auth already set up */ - if(ntlm->ntlm_auth_hlpr_socket != CURL_SOCKET_BAD || - ntlm->ntlm_auth_hlpr_pid) - return CURLE_OK; - - username = userp; - /* The real ntlm_auth really doesn't like being invoked with an - empty username. It won't make inferences for itself, and expects - the client to do so (mostly because it's really designed for - servers like squid to use for auth, and client support is an - afterthought for it). So try hard to provide a suitable username - if we don't already have one. But if we can't, provide the - empty one anyway. Perhaps they have an implementation of the - ntlm_auth helper which *doesn't* need it so we might as well try */ - if(!username || !username[0]) { - username = getenv("NTLMUSER"); - if(!username || !username[0]) - username = getenv("LOGNAME"); - if(!username || !username[0]) - username = getenv("USER"); -#if defined(HAVE_GETPWUID_R) && defined(HAVE_GETEUID) - if((!username || !username[0]) && - !getpwuid_r(geteuid(), &pw, pwbuf, sizeof(pwbuf), &pw_res) && - pw_res) { - username = pw.pw_name; - } -#endif - if(!username || !username[0]) - username = userp; - } - slash = strpbrk(username, "\\/"); - if(slash) { - domain = strdup(username); - if(!domain) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - slash = domain + (slash - username); - *slash = '\0'; - username = username + (slash - domain) + 1; - } - - /* For testing purposes, when DEBUGBUILD is defined and environment - variable CURL_NTLM_WB_FILE is set a fake_ntlm is used to perform - NTLM challenge/response which only accepts commands and output - strings pre-written in test case definitions */ -#ifdef DEBUGBUILD - ntlm_auth_alloc = curl_getenv("CURL_NTLM_WB_FILE"); - if(ntlm_auth_alloc) - ntlm_auth = ntlm_auth_alloc; - else -#endif - ntlm_auth = NTLM_WB_FILE; - - if(access(ntlm_auth, X_OK) != 0) { - failf(data, "Could not access ntlm_auth: %s errno %d: %s", - ntlm_auth, errno, Curl_strerror(errno, buffer, sizeof(buffer))); - goto done; - } - - if(wakeup_create(sockfds)) { - failf(data, "Could not open socket pair. errno %d: %s", - errno, Curl_strerror(errno, buffer, sizeof(buffer))); - goto done; - } - - child_pid = fork(); - if(child_pid == -1) { - wakeup_close(sockfds[0]); - wakeup_close(sockfds[1]); - failf(data, "Could not fork. errno %d: %s", - errno, Curl_strerror(errno, buffer, sizeof(buffer))); - goto done; - } - else if(!child_pid) { - /* - * child process - */ - - /* Don't use sclose in the child since it fools the socket leak detector */ - sclose_nolog(sockfds[0]); - if(dup2(sockfds[1], STDIN_FILENO) == -1) { - failf(data, "Could not redirect child stdin. errno %d: %s", - errno, Curl_strerror(errno, buffer, sizeof(buffer))); - exit(1); - } - - if(dup2(sockfds[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) { - failf(data, "Could not redirect child stdout. errno %d: %s", - errno, Curl_strerror(errno, buffer, sizeof(buffer))); - exit(1); - } - - if(domain) - execl(ntlm_auth, ntlm_auth, - "--helper-protocol", "ntlmssp-client-1", - "--use-cached-creds", - "--username", username, - "--domain", domain, - NULL); - else - execl(ntlm_auth, ntlm_auth, - "--helper-protocol", "ntlmssp-client-1", - "--use-cached-creds", - "--username", username, - NULL); - - sclose_nolog(sockfds[1]); - failf(data, "Could not execl(). errno %d: %s", - errno, Curl_strerror(errno, buffer, sizeof(buffer))); - exit(1); - } - - sclose(sockfds[1]); - ntlm->ntlm_auth_hlpr_socket = sockfds[0]; - ntlm->ntlm_auth_hlpr_pid = child_pid; - free(domain); - free(ntlm_auth_alloc); - return CURLE_OK; - -done: - free(domain); - free(ntlm_auth_alloc); - return CURLE_REMOTE_ACCESS_DENIED; -} - -/* if larger than this, something is seriously wrong */ -#define MAX_NTLM_WB_RESPONSE 100000 - -static CURLcode ntlm_wb_response(struct Curl_easy *data, struct ntlmdata *ntlm, - const char *input, curlntlm state) -{ - size_t len_in = strlen(input), len_out = 0; - struct dynbuf b; - char *ptr = NULL; - unsigned char *buf = (unsigned char *)data->state.buffer; - Curl_dyn_init(&b, MAX_NTLM_WB_RESPONSE); - - while(len_in > 0) { - ssize_t written = wakeup_write(ntlm->ntlm_auth_hlpr_socket, input, len_in); - if(written == -1) { - /* Interrupted by a signal, retry it */ - if(errno == EINTR) - continue; - /* write failed if other errors happen */ - goto done; - } - input += written; - len_in -= written; - } - /* Read one line */ - while(1) { - ssize_t size = - wakeup_read(ntlm->ntlm_auth_hlpr_socket, buf, data->set.buffer_size); - if(size == -1) { - if(errno == EINTR) - continue; - goto done; - } - else if(size == 0) - goto done; - - if(Curl_dyn_addn(&b, buf, size)) - goto done; - - len_out = Curl_dyn_len(&b); - ptr = Curl_dyn_ptr(&b); - if(len_out && ptr[len_out - 1] == '\n') { - ptr[len_out - 1] = '\0'; - break; /* done! */ - } - /* loop */ - } - - /* Samba/winbind installed but not configured */ - if(state == NTLMSTATE_TYPE1 && - len_out == 3 && - ptr[0] == 'P' && ptr[1] == 'W') - goto done; - /* invalid response */ - if(len_out < 4) - goto done; - if(state == NTLMSTATE_TYPE1 && - (ptr[0]!='Y' || ptr[1]!='R' || ptr[2]!=' ')) - goto done; - if(state == NTLMSTATE_TYPE2 && - (ptr[0]!='K' || ptr[1]!='K' || ptr[2]!=' ') && - (ptr[0]!='A' || ptr[1]!='F' || ptr[2]!=' ')) - goto done; - - ntlm->response = strdup(ptr + 3); - Curl_dyn_free(&b); - if(!ntlm->response) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - return CURLE_OK; -done: - Curl_dyn_free(&b); - return CURLE_REMOTE_ACCESS_DENIED; -} - -CURLcode Curl_input_ntlm_wb(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn, - bool proxy, - const char *header) -{ - struct ntlmdata *ntlm = proxy ? &conn->proxyntlm : &conn->ntlm; - curlntlm *state = proxy ? &conn->proxy_ntlm_state : &conn->http_ntlm_state; - - (void) data; /* In case it gets unused by nop log macros. */ - - if(!checkprefix("NTLM", header)) - return CURLE_BAD_CONTENT_ENCODING; - - header += strlen("NTLM"); - while(*header && ISSPACE(*header)) - header++; - - if(*header) { - ntlm->challenge = strdup(header); - if(!ntlm->challenge) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - - *state = NTLMSTATE_TYPE2; /* We got a type-2 message */ - } - else { - if(*state == NTLMSTATE_LAST) { - infof(data, "NTLM auth restarted"); - Curl_http_auth_cleanup_ntlm_wb(conn); - } - else if(*state == NTLMSTATE_TYPE3) { - infof(data, "NTLM handshake rejected"); - Curl_http_auth_cleanup_ntlm_wb(conn); - *state = NTLMSTATE_NONE; - return CURLE_REMOTE_ACCESS_DENIED; - } - else if(*state >= NTLMSTATE_TYPE1) { - infof(data, "NTLM handshake failure (internal error)"); - return CURLE_REMOTE_ACCESS_DENIED; - } - - *state = NTLMSTATE_TYPE1; /* We should send away a type-1 */ - } - - return CURLE_OK; -} - -/* - * This is for creating ntlm header output by delegating challenge/response - * to Samba's winbind daemon helper ntlm_auth. - */ -CURLcode Curl_output_ntlm_wb(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, - bool proxy) -{ - /* point to the address of the pointer that holds the string to send to the - server, which is for a plain host or for an HTTP proxy */ - char **allocuserpwd; - /* point to the name and password for this */ - const char *userp; - struct ntlmdata *ntlm; - curlntlm *state; - struct auth *authp; - - CURLcode res = CURLE_OK; - - DEBUGASSERT(conn); - DEBUGASSERT(data); - - if(proxy) { -#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY - allocuserpwd = &data->state.aptr.proxyuserpwd; - userp = conn->http_proxy.user; - ntlm = &conn->proxyntlm; - state = &conn->proxy_ntlm_state; - authp = &data->state.authproxy; -#else - return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN; -#endif - } - else { - allocuserpwd = &data->state.aptr.userpwd; - userp = conn->user; - ntlm = &conn->ntlm; - state = &conn->http_ntlm_state; - authp = &data->state.authhost; - } - authp->done = FALSE; - - /* not set means empty */ - if(!userp) - userp = ""; - - switch(*state) { - case NTLMSTATE_TYPE1: - default: - /* Use Samba's 'winbind' daemon to support NTLM authentication, - * by delegating the NTLM challenge/response protocol to a helper - * in ntlm_auth. - * https://web.archive.org/web/20190925164737 - * /devel.squid-cache.org/ntlm/squid_helper_protocol.html - * https://www.samba.org/samba/docs/man/manpages-3/winbindd.8.html - * https://www.samba.org/samba/docs/man/manpages-3/ntlm_auth.1.html - * Preprocessor symbol 'NTLM_WB_ENABLED' is defined when this - * feature is enabled and 'NTLM_WB_FILE' symbol holds absolute - * filename of ntlm_auth helper. - * If NTLM authentication using winbind fails, go back to original - * request handling process. - */ - /* Create communication with ntlm_auth */ - res = ntlm_wb_init(data, ntlm, userp); - if(res) - return res; - res = ntlm_wb_response(data, ntlm, "YR\n", *state); - if(res) - return res; - - free(*allocuserpwd); - *allocuserpwd = aprintf("%sAuthorization: NTLM %s\r\n", - proxy ? "Proxy-" : "", - ntlm->response); - DEBUG_OUT(fprintf(stderr, "**** Header %s\n ", *allocuserpwd)); - Curl_safefree(ntlm->response); - if(!*allocuserpwd) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - break; - - case NTLMSTATE_TYPE2: { - char *input = aprintf("TT %s\n", ntlm->challenge); - if(!input) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - res = ntlm_wb_response(data, ntlm, input, *state); - free(input); - if(res) - return res; - - free(*allocuserpwd); - *allocuserpwd = aprintf("%sAuthorization: NTLM %s\r\n", - proxy ? "Proxy-" : "", - ntlm->response); - DEBUG_OUT(fprintf(stderr, "**** %s\n ", *allocuserpwd)); - *state = NTLMSTATE_TYPE3; /* we sent a type-3 */ - authp->done = TRUE; - Curl_http_auth_cleanup_ntlm_wb(conn); - if(!*allocuserpwd) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - break; - } - case NTLMSTATE_TYPE3: - /* connection is already authenticated, - * don't send a header in future requests */ - *state = NTLMSTATE_LAST; - /* FALLTHROUGH */ - case NTLMSTATE_LAST: - Curl_safefree(*allocuserpwd); - authp->done = TRUE; - break; - } - - return CURLE_OK; -} - -void Curl_http_auth_cleanup_ntlm_wb(struct connectdata *conn) -{ - ntlm_wb_cleanup(&conn->ntlm); - ntlm_wb_cleanup(&conn->proxyntlm); -} - -#endif /* !CURL_DISABLE_HTTP && USE_NTLM && NTLM_WB_ENABLED */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_path.c b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_path.c index 856423db99..144f8803d3 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_path.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_path.c @@ -98,8 +98,8 @@ CURLcode Curl_getworkingpath(struct Curl_easy *data, return CURLE_OK; } -/* The get_pathname() function is being borrowed from OpenSSH sftp.c - version 4.6p1. */ +/* The original get_pathname() function came from OpenSSH sftp.c version + 4.6p1. */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller * @@ -115,38 +115,37 @@ CURLcode Curl_getworkingpath(struct Curl_easy *data, * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ -CURLcode Curl_get_pathname(const char **cpp, char **path, char *homedir) + +#define MAX_PATHLENGTH 65535 /* arbitrary long */ + +CURLcode Curl_get_pathname(const char **cpp, char **path, const char *homedir) { const char *cp = *cpp, *end; char quot; - unsigned int i, j; - size_t fullPathLength, pathLength; - bool relativePath = false; + unsigned int i; static const char WHITESPACE[] = " \t\r\n"; + struct dynbuf out; + CURLcode result; DEBUGASSERT(homedir); - if(!*cp || !homedir) { - *cpp = NULL; - *path = NULL; + *path = NULL; + *cpp = NULL; + if(!*cp || !homedir) return CURLE_QUOTE_ERROR; - } + + Curl_dyn_init(&out, MAX_PATHLENGTH); + /* Ignore leading whitespace */ cp += strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); - /* Allocate enough space for home directory and filename + separator */ - fullPathLength = strlen(cp) + strlen(homedir) + 2; - *path = malloc(fullPathLength); - if(!*path) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; /* Check for quoted filenames */ if(*cp == '\"' || *cp == '\'') { quot = *cp++; /* Search for terminating quote, unescape some chars */ - for(i = j = 0; i <= strlen(cp); i++) { + for(i = 0; i <= strlen(cp); i++) { if(cp[i] == quot) { /* Found quote */ i++; - (*path)[j] = '\0'; break; } if(cp[i] == '\0') { /* End of string */ @@ -159,40 +158,45 @@ CURLcode Curl_get_pathname(const char **cpp, char **path, char *homedir) goto fail; } } - (*path)[j++] = cp[i]; + result = Curl_dyn_addn(&out, &cp[i], 1); + if(result) + return result; } - if(j == 0) { + if(!Curl_dyn_len(&out)) goto fail; - } - *cpp = cp + i + strspn(cp + i, WHITESPACE); + + /* return pointer to second parameter if it exists */ + *cpp = &cp[i] + strspn(&cp[i], WHITESPACE); } else { /* Read to end of filename - either to whitespace or terminator */ end = strpbrk(cp, WHITESPACE); if(!end) end = strchr(cp, '\0'); + /* return pointer to second parameter if it exists */ *cpp = end + strspn(end, WHITESPACE); - pathLength = 0; - relativePath = (cp[0] == '/' && cp[1] == '~' && cp[2] == '/'); + /* Handling for relative path - prepend home directory */ - if(relativePath) { - strcpy(*path, homedir); - pathLength = strlen(homedir); - (*path)[pathLength++] = '/'; - (*path)[pathLength] = '\0'; + if(cp[0] == '/' && cp[1] == '~' && cp[2] == '/') { + result = Curl_dyn_add(&out, homedir); + if(!result) + result = Curl_dyn_addn(&out, "/", 1); + if(result) + return result; cp += 3; } /* Copy path name up until first "whitespace" */ - memcpy(&(*path)[pathLength], cp, (int)(end - cp)); - pathLength += (int)(end - cp); - (*path)[pathLength] = '\0'; + result = Curl_dyn_addn(&out, cp, (end - cp)); + if(result) + return result; } + *path = Curl_dyn_ptr(&out); return CURLE_OK; fail: - Curl_safefree(*path); + Curl_dyn_free(&out); return CURLE_QUOTE_ERROR; } diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_path.h b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_path.h index cbe51c2217..6fdb2fddff 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_path.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_path.h @@ -45,5 +45,5 @@ CURLcode Curl_getworkingpath(struct Curl_easy *data, char *homedir, char **path); -CURLcode Curl_get_pathname(const char **cpp, char **path, char *homedir); +CURLcode Curl_get_pathname(const char **cpp, char **path, const char *homedir); #endif /* HEADER_CURL_PATH_H */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_printf.h b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_printf.h index 46ef344f76..c2457d2a64 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_printf.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_printf.h @@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ #include +#define MERR_OK 0 +#define MERR_MEM 1 +#define MERR_TOO_LARGE 2 + # undef printf # undef fprintf # undef msnprintf diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_rtmp.c b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_rtmp.c index f7cf54e882..76eff787b9 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_rtmp.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_rtmp.c @@ -35,8 +35,10 @@ #include "warnless.h" #include #include + +/* The last 3 #include files should be in this order */ +#include "curl_printf.h" #include "curl_memory.h" -/* The last #include file should be: */ #include "memdebug.h" #if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(USE_LWIPSOCK) @@ -66,7 +68,7 @@ static Curl_send rtmp_send; */ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_rtmp = { - "RTMP", /* scheme */ + "rtmp", /* scheme */ rtmp_setup_connection, /* setup_connection */ rtmp_do, /* do_it */ rtmp_done, /* done */ @@ -79,7 +81,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_rtmp = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ rtmp_disconnect, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_RTMP, /* defport */ @@ -89,7 +92,7 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_rtmp = { }; const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_rtmpt = { - "RTMPT", /* scheme */ + "rtmpt", /* scheme */ rtmp_setup_connection, /* setup_connection */ rtmp_do, /* do_it */ rtmp_done, /* done */ @@ -102,7 +105,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_rtmpt = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ rtmp_disconnect, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_RTMPT, /* defport */ @@ -112,7 +116,7 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_rtmpt = { }; const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_rtmpe = { - "RTMPE", /* scheme */ + "rtmpe", /* scheme */ rtmp_setup_connection, /* setup_connection */ rtmp_do, /* do_it */ rtmp_done, /* done */ @@ -125,7 +129,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_rtmpe = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ rtmp_disconnect, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_RTMP, /* defport */ @@ -135,7 +140,7 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_rtmpe = { }; const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_rtmpte = { - "RTMPTE", /* scheme */ + "rtmpte", /* scheme */ rtmp_setup_connection, /* setup_connection */ rtmp_do, /* do_it */ rtmp_done, /* done */ @@ -148,7 +153,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_rtmpte = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ rtmp_disconnect, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_RTMPT, /* defport */ @@ -158,7 +164,7 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_rtmpte = { }; const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_rtmps = { - "RTMPS", /* scheme */ + "rtmps", /* scheme */ rtmp_setup_connection, /* setup_connection */ rtmp_do, /* do_it */ rtmp_done, /* done */ @@ -171,7 +177,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_rtmps = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ rtmp_disconnect, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_RTMPS, /* defport */ @@ -181,7 +188,7 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_rtmps = { }; const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_rtmpts = { - "RTMPTS", /* scheme */ + "rtmpts", /* scheme */ rtmp_setup_connection, /* setup_connection */ rtmp_do, /* do_it */ rtmp_done, /* done */ @@ -194,7 +201,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_rtmpts = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ rtmp_disconnect, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_RTMPS, /* defport */ @@ -265,10 +273,10 @@ static CURLcode rtmp_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) if(data->state.upload) { Curl_pgrsSetUploadSize(data, data->state.infilesize); - Curl_setup_transfer(data, -1, -1, FALSE, FIRSTSOCKET); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, -1, -1, FALSE, FIRSTSOCKET); } else - Curl_setup_transfer(data, FIRSTSOCKET, -1, FALSE, -1); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, FIRSTSOCKET, -1, FALSE, -1); *done = TRUE; return CURLE_OK; } @@ -335,4 +343,20 @@ static ssize_t rtmp_send(struct Curl_easy *data, int sockindex, return num; } + +void Curl_rtmp_version(char *version, size_t len) +{ + char suff[2]; + if(RTMP_LIB_VERSION & 0xff) { + suff[0] = (RTMP_LIB_VERSION & 0xff) + 'a' - 1; + suff[1] = '\0'; + } + else + suff[0] = '\0'; + + msnprintf(version, len, "librtmp/%d.%d%s", + RTMP_LIB_VERSION >> 16, (RTMP_LIB_VERSION >> 8) & 0xff, + suff); +} + #endif /* USE_LIBRTMP */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_rtmp.h b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_rtmp.h index 9b93ee060b..339d3a4384 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_rtmp.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_rtmp.h @@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ extern const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_rtmpe; extern const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_rtmpte; extern const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_rtmps; extern const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_rtmpts; + +void Curl_rtmp_version(char *version, size_t len); #endif #endif /* HEADER_CURL_RTMP_H */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_sasl.c b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_sasl.c index 78ad298f20..ba8911b72b 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_sasl.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_sasl.c @@ -205,18 +205,23 @@ void Curl_sasl_init(struct SASL *sasl, struct Curl_easy *data, sasl->force_ir = FALSE; /* Respect external option */ if(auth != CURLAUTH_BASIC) { - sasl->resetprefs = FALSE; - sasl->prefmech = SASL_AUTH_NONE; + unsigned short mechs = SASL_AUTH_NONE; + + /* If some usable http authentication options have been set, determine + new defaults from them. */ if(auth & CURLAUTH_BASIC) - sasl->prefmech |= SASL_MECH_PLAIN | SASL_MECH_LOGIN; + mechs |= SASL_MECH_PLAIN | SASL_MECH_LOGIN; if(auth & CURLAUTH_DIGEST) - sasl->prefmech |= SASL_MECH_DIGEST_MD5; + mechs |= SASL_MECH_DIGEST_MD5; if(auth & CURLAUTH_NTLM) - sasl->prefmech |= SASL_MECH_NTLM; + mechs |= SASL_MECH_NTLM; if(auth & CURLAUTH_BEARER) - sasl->prefmech |= SASL_MECH_OAUTHBEARER | SASL_MECH_XOAUTH2; + mechs |= SASL_MECH_OAUTHBEARER | SASL_MECH_XOAUTH2; if(auth & CURLAUTH_GSSAPI) - sasl->prefmech |= SASL_MECH_GSSAPI; + mechs |= SASL_MECH_GSSAPI; + + if(mechs != SASL_AUTH_NONE) + sasl->prefmech = mechs; } } @@ -371,7 +376,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_sasl_start(struct SASL *sasl, struct Curl_easy *data, sasl->authused = SASL_MECH_EXTERNAL; if(force_ir || data->set.sasl_ir) - result = Curl_auth_create_external_message(conn->user, &resp); + Curl_auth_create_external_message(conn->user, &resp); } else if(data->state.aptr.user) { #if defined(USE_KERBEROS5) @@ -493,7 +498,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_sasl_start(struct SASL *sasl, struct Curl_easy *data, sasl->authused = SASL_MECH_LOGIN; if(force_ir || data->set.sasl_ir) - result = Curl_auth_create_login_message(conn->user, &resp); + Curl_auth_create_login_message(conn->user, &resp); } } @@ -571,14 +576,14 @@ CURLcode Curl_sasl_continue(struct SASL *sasl, struct Curl_easy *data, conn->user, conn->passwd, &resp); break; case SASL_LOGIN: - result = Curl_auth_create_login_message(conn->user, &resp); + Curl_auth_create_login_message(conn->user, &resp); newstate = SASL_LOGIN_PASSWD; break; case SASL_LOGIN_PASSWD: - result = Curl_auth_create_login_message(conn->passwd, &resp); + Curl_auth_create_login_message(conn->passwd, &resp); break; case SASL_EXTERNAL: - result = Curl_auth_create_external_message(conn->user, &resp); + Curl_auth_create_external_message(conn->user, &resp); break; #ifdef USE_GSASL case SASL_GSASL: diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_setup.h b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_setup.h index a08784140d..6c05b87525 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_setup.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_setup.h @@ -28,6 +28,13 @@ #define CURL_NO_OLDIES #endif +/* FIXME: Delete this once the warnings have been fixed. */ +#if !defined(CURL_WARN_SIGN_CONVERSION) +#ifdef __GNUC__ +#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wsign-conversion" +#endif +#endif + /* Set default _WIN32_WINNT */ #ifdef __MINGW32__ #include <_mingw.h> @@ -65,6 +72,11 @@ # endif #endif +/* Compatibility */ +#if defined(ENABLE_IPV6) +# define USE_IPV6 1 +#endif + /* * Include configuration script results or hand-crafted * configuration file for platforms which lack config tool. @@ -253,12 +265,47 @@ * Windows setup file includes some system headers. */ -#ifdef HAVE_WINDOWS_H +#ifdef _WIN32 # include "setup-win32.h" #endif #include +/* Helper macro to expand and concatenate two macros. + * Direct macros concatenation does not work because macros + * are not expanded before direct concatenation. + */ +#define CURL_CONC_MACROS_(A,B) A ## B +#define CURL_CONC_MACROS(A,B) CURL_CONC_MACROS_(A,B) + +/* curl uses its own printf() function internally. It understands the GNU + * format. Use this format, so that is matches the GNU format attribute we + * use with the mingw compiler, allowing it to verify them at compile-time. + */ +#ifdef __MINGW32__ +# undef CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T +# undef CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_TU +# define CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T "lld" +# define CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_TU "llu" +#endif + +/* based on logic in "curl/mprintf.h" */ + +#if (defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__) || \ + defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)) && \ + defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && (__STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L) && \ + !defined(CURL_NO_FMT_CHECKS) +#if defined(__MINGW32__) && !defined(__clang__) +#define CURL_PRINTF(fmt, arg) \ + __attribute__((format(gnu_printf, fmt, arg))) +#else +#define CURL_PRINTF(fmt, arg) \ + __attribute__((format(__printf__, fmt, arg))) +#endif +#else +#define CURL_PRINTF(fmt, arg) +#endif + /* * Use getaddrinfo to resolve the IPv4 address literal. If the current network * interface doesn't support IPv4, but supports IPv6, NAT64, and DNS64, @@ -268,7 +315,7 @@ #include #define USE_RESOLVE_ON_IPS 1 # if TARGET_OS_MAC && !(defined(TARGET_OS_IPHONE) && TARGET_OS_IPHONE) && \ - defined(ENABLE_IPV6) + defined(USE_IPV6) # define CURL_MACOS_CALL_COPYPROXIES 1 # endif #endif @@ -363,11 +410,9 @@ # define LSEEK_ERROR (__int64)-1 # define open curlx_win32_open # define fopen(fname,mode) curlx_win32_fopen(fname, mode) -# define access(fname,mode) curlx_win32_access(fname, mode) int curlx_win32_open(const char *filename, int oflag, ...); int curlx_win32_stat(const char *path, struct_stat *buffer); FILE *curlx_win32_fopen(const char *filename, const char *mode); - int curlx_win32_access(const char *path, int mode); #endif /* @@ -386,11 +431,9 @@ # define struct_stat struct _stat # define open curlx_win32_open # define fopen(fname,mode) curlx_win32_fopen(fname, mode) -# define access(fname,mode) curlx_win32_access(fname, mode) int curlx_win32_stat(const char *path, struct_stat *buffer); int curlx_win32_open(const char *filename, int oflag, ...); FILE *curlx_win32_fopen(const char *filename, const char *mode); - int curlx_win32_access(const char *path, int mode); # endif # define LSEEK_ERROR (long)-1 #endif @@ -408,6 +451,24 @@ #define SIZEOF_TIME_T 4 #endif +#ifndef SIZEOF_CURL_SOCKET_T +/* configure and cmake check and set the define */ +# ifdef _WIN64 +# define SIZEOF_CURL_SOCKET_T 8 +# else +/* default guess */ +# define SIZEOF_CURL_SOCKET_T 4 +# endif +#endif + +#if SIZEOF_CURL_SOCKET_T < 8 +# define CURL_FORMAT_SOCKET_T "d" +#elif defined(__MINGW32__) +# define CURL_FORMAT_SOCKET_T "zd" +#else +# define CURL_FORMAT_SOCKET_T "qd" +#endif + /* * Default sizeof(off_t) in case it hasn't been defined in config file. */ @@ -443,6 +504,20 @@ #endif #define CURL_OFF_T_MIN (-CURL_OFF_T_MAX - CURL_OFF_T_C(1)) +#if (SIZEOF_CURL_OFF_T != 8) +# error "curl_off_t must be exactly 64 bits" +#else + typedef unsigned CURL_TYPEOF_CURL_OFF_T curl_uint64_t; + typedef CURL_TYPEOF_CURL_OFF_T curl_int64_t; +# ifndef CURL_SUFFIX_CURL_OFF_TU +# error "CURL_SUFFIX_CURL_OFF_TU must be defined" +# endif +# define CURL_UINT64_SUFFIX CURL_SUFFIX_CURL_OFF_TU +# define CURL_UINT64_C(val) CURL_CONC_MACROS(val,CURL_UINT64_SUFFIX) +# define CURL_PRId64 CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T +# define CURL_PRIu64 CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_TU +#endif + #if (SIZEOF_TIME_T == 4) # ifdef HAVE_TIME_T_UNSIGNED # define TIME_T_MAX UINT_MAX @@ -547,9 +622,9 @@ * Mutually exclusive CURLRES_* definitions. */ -#if defined(ENABLE_IPV6) && defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO) +#if defined(USE_IPV6) && defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO) # define CURLRES_IPV6 -#elif defined(ENABLE_IPV6) && (defined(_WIN32) || defined(__CYGWIN__)) +#elif defined(USE_IPV6) && (defined(_WIN32) || defined(__CYGWIN__)) /* assume on Windows that IPv6 without getaddrinfo is a broken build */ # error "Unexpected build: IPv6 is enabled but getaddrinfo was not found." #else @@ -571,13 +646,14 @@ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------- */ -#if defined(HAVE_LIBIDN2) && defined(HAVE_IDN2_H) && !defined(USE_WIN32_IDN) +#if defined(HAVE_LIBIDN2) && defined(HAVE_IDN2_H) && \ + !defined(USE_WIN32_IDN) && !defined(USE_APPLE_IDN) /* The lib and header are present */ #define USE_LIBIDN2 #endif -#if defined(USE_LIBIDN2) && defined(USE_WIN32_IDN) -#error "Both libidn2 and WinIDN are enabled, choose one." +#if defined(USE_LIBIDN2) && (defined(USE_WIN32_IDN) || defined(USE_APPLE_IDN)) +#error "libidn2 cannot be enabled with WinIDN or AppleIDN, choose one." #endif #define LIBIDN_REQUIRED_VERSION "0.4.1" @@ -631,6 +707,13 @@ ((__GNUC__ == 2) && defined(__GNUC_MINOR__) && (__GNUC_MINOR__ >= 7))) # define UNUSED_PARAM __attribute__((__unused__)) # define WARN_UNUSED_RESULT __attribute__((warn_unused_result)) +#elif defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +# define UNUSED_PARAM __attribute__((__unused__)) +# if (__VER__ >= 9040001) +# define WARN_UNUSED_RESULT __attribute__((warn_unused_result)) +# else +# define WARN_UNUSED_RESULT +# endif #else # define UNUSED_PARAM /* NOTHING */ # define WARN_UNUSED_RESULT @@ -639,7 +722,8 @@ /* noreturn attribute */ #if !defined(CURL_NORETURN) -#if (defined(__GNUC__) && (__GNUC__ >= 3)) || defined(__clang__) +#if (defined(__GNUC__) && (__GNUC__ >= 3)) || defined(__clang__) || \ + defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) # define CURL_NORETURN __attribute__((__noreturn__)) #elif defined(_MSC_VER) && (_MSC_VER >= 1200) # define CURL_NORETURN __declspec(noreturn) @@ -648,6 +732,17 @@ #endif #endif +/* fallthrough attribute */ + +#if !defined(FALLTHROUGH) +#if (defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ >= 7) || \ + (defined(__clang__) && __clang_major__ >= 10) +# define FALLTHROUGH() __attribute__((fallthrough)) +#else +# define FALLTHROUGH() do {} while (0) +#endif +#endif + /* * Include macros and defines that should only be processed once. */ @@ -669,10 +764,7 @@ */ #if defined(__LWIP_OPT_H__) || defined(LWIP_HDR_OPT_H) -# if defined(SOCKET) || \ - defined(USE_WINSOCK) || \ - defined(HAVE_WINSOCK2_H) || \ - defined(HAVE_WS2TCPIP_H) +# if defined(SOCKET) || defined(USE_WINSOCK) # error "WinSock and lwIP TCP/IP stack definitions shall not coexist!" # endif #endif @@ -767,8 +859,13 @@ int getpwuid_r(uid_t uid, struct passwd *pwd, char *buf, #endif #if (defined(USE_NGTCP2) && defined(USE_NGHTTP3)) || \ + (defined(USE_OPENSSL_QUIC) && defined(USE_NGHTTP3)) || \ defined(USE_QUICHE) || defined(USE_MSH3) -#define ENABLE_QUIC + +#ifdef CURL_WITH_MULTI_SSL +#error "Multi-SSL combined with QUIC is not supported" +#endif + #define USE_HTTP3 #endif @@ -799,4 +896,26 @@ int getpwuid_r(uid_t uid, struct passwd *pwd, char *buf, #define OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED #endif +#if defined(inline) + /* 'inline' is defined as macro and assumed to be correct */ + /* No need for 'inline' replacement */ +#elif defined(__cplusplus) + /* The code is compiled with C++ compiler. + C++ always supports 'inline'. */ + /* No need for 'inline' replacement */ +#elif defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901 + /* C99 (and later) supports 'inline' keyword */ + /* No need for 'inline' replacement */ +#elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ >= 3 + /* GCC supports '__inline__' as an extension */ +# define inline __inline__ +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER >= 1400 + /* MSC supports '__inline' from VS 2005 (or even earlier) */ +# define inline __inline +#else + /* Probably 'inline' is not supported by compiler. + Define to the empty string to be on the safe side. */ +# define inline /* empty */ +#endif + #endif /* HEADER_CURL_SETUP_H */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_setup_once.h b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_setup_once.h index bf0ee663d3..40c7bcbff0 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_setup_once.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_setup_once.h @@ -164,9 +164,7 @@ struct timeval { (RECV_TYPE_ARG4)(0)) #else /* HAVE_RECV */ #ifndef sread - /* */ - Error Missing_definition_of_macro_sread - /* */ +#error "Missing definition of macro sread!" #endif #endif /* HAVE_RECV */ @@ -184,9 +182,7 @@ struct timeval { (SEND_TYPE_ARG4)(SEND_4TH_ARG)) #else /* HAVE_SEND */ #ifndef swrite - /* */ - Error Missing_definition_of_macro_swrite - /* */ +#error "Missing definition of macro swrite!" #endif #endif /* HAVE_SEND */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_sha512_256.c b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_sha512_256.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5f2e99517a --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_sha512_256.c @@ -0,0 +1,850 @@ +/*************************************************************************** + * _ _ ____ _ + * Project ___| | | | _ \| | + * / __| | | | |_) | | + * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ + * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| + * + * Copyright (C) Evgeny Grin (Karlson2k), . + * + * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which + * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms + * are also available at https://curl.se/docs/copyright.html. + * + * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell + * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is + * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file. + * + * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY + * KIND, either express or implied. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: curl + * + ***************************************************************************/ + +#include "curl_setup.h" + +#if !defined(CURL_DISABLE_DIGEST_AUTH) && !defined(CURL_DISABLE_SHA512_256) + +#include "curl_sha512_256.h" +#include "warnless.h" + +/* The recommended order of the TLS backends: + * * OpenSSL + * * GnuTLS + * * wolfSSL + * * Schannel SSPI + * * SecureTransport (Darwin) + * * mbedTLS + * * BearSSL + * * rustls + * Skip the backend if it does not support the required algorithm */ + +#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) +# include +# if (!defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \ + defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \ + (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L)) || \ + (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \ + (LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x3080000fL)) +# include +# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA512) +# include +# define USE_OPENSSL_SHA512_256 1 +# define HAS_SHA512_256_IMPLEMENTATION 1 +# ifdef __NetBSD__ +/* Some NetBSD versions has a bug in SHA-512/256. + * See https://gnats.netbsd.org/cgi-bin/query-pr-single.pl?number=58039 + * The problematic versions: + * - NetBSD before 9.4 + * - NetBSD 9 all development versions (9.99.x) + * - NetBSD 10 development versions (10.99.x) before 10.99.11 + * The bug was fixed in NetBSD 9.4 release, NetBSD 10.0 release, + * NetBSD 10.99.11 development. + * It is safe to apply the workaround even if the bug is not present, as + * the workaround just reduces performance slightly. */ +# include +# if __NetBSD_Version__ < 904000000 || \ + (__NetBSD_Version__ >= 999000000 && \ + __NetBSD_Version__ < 1000000000) || \ + (__NetBSD_Version__ >= 1099000000 && \ + __NetBSD_Version__ < 1099001100) +# define NEED_NETBSD_SHA512_256_WORKAROUND 1 +# include +# endif +# endif +# endif +# endif +#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */ + + +#if !defined(HAS_SHA512_256_IMPLEMENTATION) && defined(USE_GNUTLS) +# include +# if defined(SHA512_256_DIGEST_SIZE) +# define USE_GNUTLS_SHA512_256 1 +# define HAS_SHA512_256_IMPLEMENTATION 1 +# endif +#endif /* ! HAS_SHA512_256_IMPLEMENTATION && USE_GNUTLS */ + +#if defined(USE_OPENSSL_SHA512_256) + +/* OpenSSL does not provide macros for SHA-512/256 sizes */ + +/** + * Size of the SHA-512/256 single processing block in bytes. + */ +#define SHA512_256_BLOCK_SIZE 128 + +/** + * Size of the SHA-512/256 resulting digest in bytes. + * This is the final digest size, not intermediate hash. + */ +#define SHA512_256_DIGEST_SIZE SHA512_256_DIGEST_LENGTH + +/** + * Context type used for SHA-512/256 calculations + */ +typedef EVP_MD_CTX *Curl_sha512_256_ctx; + +/** + * Initialise structure for SHA-512/256 calculation. + * + * @param context the calculation context + * @return CURLE_OK if succeed, + * error code otherwise + */ +static CURLcode +Curl_sha512_256_init(void *context) +{ + Curl_sha512_256_ctx *const ctx = (Curl_sha512_256_ctx *)context; + + *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); + if(!*ctx) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + + if(EVP_DigestInit_ex(*ctx, EVP_sha512_256(), NULL)) { + /* Check whether the header and this file use the same numbers */ + DEBUGASSERT(EVP_MD_CTX_size(*ctx) == SHA512_256_DIGEST_SIZE); + /* Check whether the block size is correct */ + DEBUGASSERT(EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(*ctx) == SHA512_256_BLOCK_SIZE); + + return CURLE_OK; /* Success */ + } + + /* Cleanup */ + EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*ctx); + return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; +} + + +/** + * Process portion of bytes. + * + * @param context the calculation context + * @param data bytes to add to hash + * @return CURLE_OK if succeed, + * error code otherwise + */ +static CURLcode +Curl_sha512_256_update(void *context, + const unsigned char *data, + size_t length) +{ + Curl_sha512_256_ctx *const ctx = (Curl_sha512_256_ctx *)context; + + if(!EVP_DigestUpdate(*ctx, data, length)) + return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER; + + return CURLE_OK; +} + + +/** + * Finalise SHA-512/256 calculation, return digest. + * + * @param context the calculation context + * @param[out] digest set to the hash, must be #SHA512_256_DIGEST_SIZE bytes + * @return CURLE_OK if succeed, + * error code otherwise + */ +static CURLcode +Curl_sha512_256_finish(unsigned char *digest, + void *context) +{ + CURLcode ret; + Curl_sha512_256_ctx *const ctx = (Curl_sha512_256_ctx *)context; + +#ifdef NEED_NETBSD_SHA512_256_WORKAROUND + /* Use a larger buffer to work around a bug in NetBSD: + https://gnats.netbsd.org/cgi-bin/query-pr-single.pl?number=58039 */ + unsigned char tmp_digest[SHA512_256_DIGEST_SIZE * 2]; + ret = EVP_DigestFinal_ex(*ctx, + tmp_digest, NULL) ? CURLE_OK : CURLE_SSL_CIPHER; + if(ret == CURLE_OK) + memcpy(digest, tmp_digest, SHA512_256_DIGEST_SIZE); + explicit_memset(tmp_digest, 0, sizeof(tmp_digest)); +#else /* ! NEED_NETBSD_SHA512_256_WORKAROUND */ + ret = EVP_DigestFinal_ex(*ctx, digest, NULL) ? CURLE_OK : CURLE_SSL_CIPHER; +#endif /* ! NEED_NETBSD_SHA512_256_WORKAROUND */ + + EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*ctx); + *ctx = NULL; + + return ret; +} + +#elif defined(USE_GNUTLS_SHA512_256) + +/** + * Context type used for SHA-512/256 calculations + */ +typedef struct sha512_256_ctx Curl_sha512_256_ctx; + +/** + * Initialise structure for SHA-512/256 calculation. + * + * @param context the calculation context + * @return always CURLE_OK + */ +static CURLcode +Curl_sha512_256_init(void *context) +{ + Curl_sha512_256_ctx *const ctx = (Curl_sha512_256_ctx *)context; + + /* Check whether the header and this file use the same numbers */ + DEBUGASSERT(SHA512_256_DIGEST_LENGTH == SHA512_256_DIGEST_SIZE); + + sha512_256_init(ctx); + + return CURLE_OK; +} + + +/** + * Process portion of bytes. + * + * @param context the calculation context + * @param data bytes to add to hash + * @param length number of bytes in @a data + * @return always CURLE_OK + */ +static CURLcode +Curl_sha512_256_update(void *context, + const unsigned char *data, + size_t length) +{ + Curl_sha512_256_ctx *const ctx = (Curl_sha512_256_ctx *)context; + + DEBUGASSERT((data != NULL) || (length == 0)); + + sha512_256_update(ctx, length, (const uint8_t *)data); + + return CURLE_OK; +} + + +/** + * Finalise SHA-512/256 calculation, return digest. + * + * @param context the calculation context + * @param[out] digest set to the hash, must be #SHA512_256_DIGEST_SIZE bytes + * @return always CURLE_OK + */ +static CURLcode +Curl_sha512_256_finish(unsigned char *digest, + void *context) +{ + Curl_sha512_256_ctx *const ctx = (Curl_sha512_256_ctx *)context; + + sha512_256_digest(ctx, (size_t)SHA512_256_DIGEST_SIZE, (uint8_t *)digest); + + return CURLE_OK; +} + +#else /* No system or TLS backend SHA-512/256 implementation available */ + +/* Use local implementation */ +#define HAS_SHA512_256_IMPLEMENTATION 1 + +/* ** This implementation of SHA-512/256 hash calculation was originally ** * + * ** written by Evgeny Grin (Karlson2k) for GNU libmicrohttpd. ** * + * ** The author ported the code to libcurl. The ported code is provided ** * + * ** under curl license. ** * + * ** This is a minimal version with minimal optimisations. Performance ** * + * ** can be significantly improved. Big-endian store and load macros ** * + * ** are obvious targets for optimisation. ** */ + +#ifdef __GNUC__ +# if defined(__has_attribute) && defined(__STDC_VERSION__) +# if __has_attribute(always_inline) && __STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901 +# define MHDX_INLINE inline __attribute__((always_inline)) +# endif +# endif +#endif + +#if !defined(MHDX_INLINE) && \ + defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__clang__) +# if _MSC_VER >= 1400 +# define MHDX_INLINE __forceinline +# endif +#endif + +#if !defined(MHDX_INLINE) + /* Assume that 'inline' keyword works or the + * macro was already defined correctly. */ +# define MHDX_INLINE inline +#endif + +/* Bits manipulation macros and functions. + Can be moved to other headers to reuse. */ + +#define MHDX_GET_64BIT_BE(ptr) \ + ( ((curl_uint64_t)(((const unsigned char*)(ptr))[0]) << 56) | \ + ((curl_uint64_t)(((const unsigned char*)(ptr))[1]) << 48) | \ + ((curl_uint64_t)(((const unsigned char*)(ptr))[2]) << 40) | \ + ((curl_uint64_t)(((const unsigned char*)(ptr))[3]) << 32) | \ + ((curl_uint64_t)(((const unsigned char*)(ptr))[4]) << 24) | \ + ((curl_uint64_t)(((const unsigned char*)(ptr))[5]) << 16) | \ + ((curl_uint64_t)(((const unsigned char*)(ptr))[6]) << 8) | \ + (curl_uint64_t)(((const unsigned char*)(ptr))[7]) ) + +#define MHDX_PUT_64BIT_BE(ptr,val) do { \ + ((unsigned char*)(ptr))[7]=(unsigned char)((curl_uint64_t)(val)); \ + ((unsigned char*)(ptr))[6]=(unsigned char)(((curl_uint64_t)(val)) >> 8); \ + ((unsigned char*)(ptr))[5]=(unsigned char)(((curl_uint64_t)(val)) >> 16); \ + ((unsigned char*)(ptr))[4]=(unsigned char)(((curl_uint64_t)(val)) >> 24); \ + ((unsigned char*)(ptr))[3]=(unsigned char)(((curl_uint64_t)(val)) >> 32); \ + ((unsigned char*)(ptr))[2]=(unsigned char)(((curl_uint64_t)(val)) >> 40); \ + ((unsigned char*)(ptr))[1]=(unsigned char)(((curl_uint64_t)(val)) >> 48); \ + ((unsigned char*)(ptr))[0]=(unsigned char)(((curl_uint64_t)(val)) >> 56); \ + } while(0) + +/* Defined as a function. The macro version may duplicate the binary code + * size as each argument is used twice, so if any calculation is used + * as an argument, the calculation could be done twice. */ +static MHDX_INLINE curl_uint64_t +MHDx_rotr64(curl_uint64_t value, unsigned int bits) +{ + bits %= 64; + if(0 == bits) + return value; + /* Defined in a form which modern compiler could optimise. */ + return (value >> bits) | (value << (64 - bits)); +} + +/* SHA-512/256 specific data */ + +/** + * Number of bits in a single SHA-512/256 word. + */ +#define SHA512_256_WORD_SIZE_BITS 64 + +/** + * Number of bytes in a single SHA-512/256 word. + */ +#define SHA512_256_BYTES_IN_WORD (SHA512_256_WORD_SIZE_BITS / 8) + +/** + * Hash is kept internally as 8 64-bit words. + * This is the intermediate hash size, used during computing the final digest. + */ +#define SHA512_256_HASH_SIZE_WORDS 8 + +/** + * Size of the SHA-512/256 resulting digest in words. + * This is the final digest size, not intermediate hash. + */ +#define SHA512_256_DIGEST_SIZE_WORDS (SHA512_256_HASH_SIZE_WORDS / 2) + +/** + * Size of the SHA-512/256 resulting digest in bytes + * This is the final digest size, not intermediate hash. + */ +#define SHA512_256_DIGEST_SIZE \ + (SHA512_256_DIGEST_SIZE_WORDS * SHA512_256_BYTES_IN_WORD) + +/** + * Size of the SHA-512/256 single processing block in bits. + */ +#define SHA512_256_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS 1024 + +/** + * Size of the SHA-512/256 single processing block in bytes. + */ +#define SHA512_256_BLOCK_SIZE (SHA512_256_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS / 8) + +/** + * Size of the SHA-512/256 single processing block in words. + */ +#define SHA512_256_BLOCK_SIZE_WORDS \ + (SHA512_256_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS / SHA512_256_WORD_SIZE_BITS) + +/** + * SHA-512/256 calculation context + */ +struct mhdx_sha512_256ctx +{ + /** + * Intermediate hash value. The variable is properly aligned. Smart + * compilers may automatically use fast load/store instruction for big + * endian data on little endian machine. + */ + curl_uint64_t H[SHA512_256_HASH_SIZE_WORDS]; + /** + * SHA-512/256 input data buffer. The buffer is properly aligned. Smart + * compilers may automatically use fast load/store instruction for big + * endian data on little endian machine. + */ + curl_uint64_t buffer[SHA512_256_BLOCK_SIZE_WORDS]; + /** + * The number of bytes, lower part + */ + curl_uint64_t count; + /** + * The number of bits, high part. Unlike lower part, this counts the number + * of bits, not bytes. + */ + curl_uint64_t count_bits_hi; +}; + +/** + * Context type used for SHA-512/256 calculations + */ +typedef struct mhdx_sha512_256ctx Curl_sha512_256_ctx; + + +/** + * Initialise structure for SHA-512/256 calculation. + * + * @param context the calculation context + * @return always CURLE_OK + */ +static CURLcode +MHDx_sha512_256_init(void *context) +{ + struct mhdx_sha512_256ctx *const ctx = (struct mhdx_sha512_256ctx *) context; + + /* Check whether the header and this file use the same numbers */ + DEBUGASSERT(SHA512_256_DIGEST_LENGTH == SHA512_256_DIGEST_SIZE); + + DEBUGASSERT(sizeof(curl_uint64_t) == 8); + + /* Initial hash values, see FIPS PUB 180-4 section 5.3.6.2 */ + /* Values generated by "IV Generation Function" as described in + * section 5.3.6 */ + ctx->H[0] = CURL_UINT64_C(0x22312194FC2BF72C); + ctx->H[1] = CURL_UINT64_C(0x9F555FA3C84C64C2); + ctx->H[2] = CURL_UINT64_C(0x2393B86B6F53B151); + ctx->H[3] = CURL_UINT64_C(0x963877195940EABD); + ctx->H[4] = CURL_UINT64_C(0x96283EE2A88EFFE3); + ctx->H[5] = CURL_UINT64_C(0xBE5E1E2553863992); + ctx->H[6] = CURL_UINT64_C(0x2B0199FC2C85B8AA); + ctx->H[7] = CURL_UINT64_C(0x0EB72DDC81C52CA2); + + /* Initialise number of bytes and high part of number of bits. */ + ctx->count = CURL_UINT64_C(0); + ctx->count_bits_hi = CURL_UINT64_C(0); + + return CURLE_OK; +} + + +/** + * Base of the SHA-512/256 transformation. + * Gets a full 128 bytes block of data and updates hash values; + * @param H hash values + * @param data the data buffer with #SHA512_256_BLOCK_SIZE bytes block + */ +static void +MHDx_sha512_256_transform(curl_uint64_t H[SHA512_256_HASH_SIZE_WORDS], + const void *data) +{ + /* Working variables, + see FIPS PUB 180-4 section 6.7, 6.4. */ + curl_uint64_t a = H[0]; + curl_uint64_t b = H[1]; + curl_uint64_t c = H[2]; + curl_uint64_t d = H[3]; + curl_uint64_t e = H[4]; + curl_uint64_t f = H[5]; + curl_uint64_t g = H[6]; + curl_uint64_t h = H[7]; + + /* Data buffer, used as a cyclic buffer. + See FIPS PUB 180-4 section 5.2.2, 6.7, 6.4. */ + curl_uint64_t W[16]; + + /* 'Ch' and 'Maj' macro functions are defined with widely-used optimisation. + See FIPS PUB 180-4 formulae 4.8, 4.9. */ +#define Ch(x,y,z) ( (z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z))) ) +#define Maj(x,y,z) ( ((x) & (y)) ^ ((z) & ((x) ^ (y))) ) + + /* Four 'Sigma' macro functions. + See FIPS PUB 180-4 formulae 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.13. */ +#define SIG0(x) \ + ( MHDx_rotr64((x), 28) ^ MHDx_rotr64((x), 34) ^ MHDx_rotr64((x), 39) ) +#define SIG1(x) \ + ( MHDx_rotr64((x), 14) ^ MHDx_rotr64((x), 18) ^ MHDx_rotr64((x), 41) ) +#define sig0(x) \ + ( MHDx_rotr64((x), 1) ^ MHDx_rotr64((x), 8) ^ ((x) >> 7) ) +#define sig1(x) \ + ( MHDx_rotr64((x), 19) ^ MHDx_rotr64((x), 61) ^ ((x) >> 6) ) + + if(1) { + unsigned int t; + /* K constants array. + See FIPS PUB 180-4 section 4.2.3 for K values. */ + static const curl_uint64_t K[80] = { + CURL_UINT64_C(0x428a2f98d728ae22), CURL_UINT64_C(0x7137449123ef65cd), + CURL_UINT64_C(0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2f), CURL_UINT64_C(0xe9b5dba58189dbbc), + CURL_UINT64_C(0x3956c25bf348b538), CURL_UINT64_C(0x59f111f1b605d019), + CURL_UINT64_C(0x923f82a4af194f9b), CURL_UINT64_C(0xab1c5ed5da6d8118), + CURL_UINT64_C(0xd807aa98a3030242), CURL_UINT64_C(0x12835b0145706fbe), + CURL_UINT64_C(0x243185be4ee4b28c), CURL_UINT64_C(0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2), + CURL_UINT64_C(0x72be5d74f27b896f), CURL_UINT64_C(0x80deb1fe3b1696b1), + CURL_UINT64_C(0x9bdc06a725c71235), CURL_UINT64_C(0xc19bf174cf692694), + CURL_UINT64_C(0xe49b69c19ef14ad2), CURL_UINT64_C(0xefbe4786384f25e3), + CURL_UINT64_C(0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5), CURL_UINT64_C(0x240ca1cc77ac9c65), + CURL_UINT64_C(0x2de92c6f592b0275), CURL_UINT64_C(0x4a7484aa6ea6e483), + CURL_UINT64_C(0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4), CURL_UINT64_C(0x76f988da831153b5), + CURL_UINT64_C(0x983e5152ee66dfab), CURL_UINT64_C(0xa831c66d2db43210), + CURL_UINT64_C(0xb00327c898fb213f), CURL_UINT64_C(0xbf597fc7beef0ee4), + CURL_UINT64_C(0xc6e00bf33da88fc2), CURL_UINT64_C(0xd5a79147930aa725), + CURL_UINT64_C(0x06ca6351e003826f), CURL_UINT64_C(0x142929670a0e6e70), + CURL_UINT64_C(0x27b70a8546d22ffc), CURL_UINT64_C(0x2e1b21385c26c926), + CURL_UINT64_C(0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aed), CURL_UINT64_C(0x53380d139d95b3df), + CURL_UINT64_C(0x650a73548baf63de), CURL_UINT64_C(0x766a0abb3c77b2a8), + CURL_UINT64_C(0x81c2c92e47edaee6), CURL_UINT64_C(0x92722c851482353b), + CURL_UINT64_C(0xa2bfe8a14cf10364), CURL_UINT64_C(0xa81a664bbc423001), + CURL_UINT64_C(0xc24b8b70d0f89791), CURL_UINT64_C(0xc76c51a30654be30), + CURL_UINT64_C(0xd192e819d6ef5218), CURL_UINT64_C(0xd69906245565a910), + CURL_UINT64_C(0xf40e35855771202a), CURL_UINT64_C(0x106aa07032bbd1b8), + CURL_UINT64_C(0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8), CURL_UINT64_C(0x1e376c085141ab53), + CURL_UINT64_C(0x2748774cdf8eeb99), CURL_UINT64_C(0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8), + CURL_UINT64_C(0x391c0cb3c5c95a63), CURL_UINT64_C(0x4ed8aa4ae3418acb), + CURL_UINT64_C(0x5b9cca4f7763e373), CURL_UINT64_C(0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3), + CURL_UINT64_C(0x748f82ee5defb2fc), CURL_UINT64_C(0x78a5636f43172f60), + CURL_UINT64_C(0x84c87814a1f0ab72), CURL_UINT64_C(0x8cc702081a6439ec), + CURL_UINT64_C(0x90befffa23631e28), CURL_UINT64_C(0xa4506cebde82bde9), + CURL_UINT64_C(0xbef9a3f7b2c67915), CURL_UINT64_C(0xc67178f2e372532b), + CURL_UINT64_C(0xca273eceea26619c), CURL_UINT64_C(0xd186b8c721c0c207), + CURL_UINT64_C(0xeada7dd6cde0eb1e), CURL_UINT64_C(0xf57d4f7fee6ed178), + CURL_UINT64_C(0x06f067aa72176fba), CURL_UINT64_C(0x0a637dc5a2c898a6), + CURL_UINT64_C(0x113f9804bef90dae), CURL_UINT64_C(0x1b710b35131c471b), + CURL_UINT64_C(0x28db77f523047d84), CURL_UINT64_C(0x32caab7b40c72493), + CURL_UINT64_C(0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebc), CURL_UINT64_C(0x431d67c49c100d4c), + CURL_UINT64_C(0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6), CURL_UINT64_C(0x597f299cfc657e2a), + CURL_UINT64_C(0x5fcb6fab3ad6faec), CURL_UINT64_C(0x6c44198c4a475817) + }; + + /* One step of SHA-512/256 computation, + see FIPS PUB 180-4 section 6.4.2 step 3. + * Note: this macro updates working variables in-place, without rotation. + * Note: the first (vH += SIG1(vE) + Ch(vE,vF,vG) + kt + wt) equals T1 in + FIPS PUB 180-4 section 6.4.2 step 3. + the second (vH += SIG0(vA) + Maj(vE,vF,vC) equals T1 + T2 in + FIPS PUB 180-4 section 6.4.2 step 3. + * Note: 'wt' must be used exactly one time in this macro as macro for + 'wt' calculation may change other data as well every time when + used. */ +#define SHA2STEP64(vA,vB,vC,vD,vE,vF,vG,vH,kt,wt) do { \ + (vD) += ((vH) += SIG1 ((vE)) + Ch ((vE),(vF),(vG)) + (kt) + (wt)); \ + (vH) += SIG0 ((vA)) + Maj ((vA),(vB),(vC)); } while (0) + + /* One step of SHA-512/256 computation with working variables rotation, + see FIPS PUB 180-4 section 6.4.2 step 3. This macro version reassigns + all working variables on each step. */ +#define SHA2STEP64RV(vA,vB,vC,vD,vE,vF,vG,vH,kt,wt) do { \ + curl_uint64_t tmp_h_ = (vH); \ + SHA2STEP64((vA),(vB),(vC),(vD),(vE),(vF),(vG),tmp_h_,(kt),(wt)); \ + (vH) = (vG); \ + (vG) = (vF); \ + (vF) = (vE); \ + (vE) = (vD); \ + (vD) = (vC); \ + (vC) = (vB); \ + (vB) = (vA); \ + (vA) = tmp_h_; } while(0) + + /* Get value of W(t) from input data buffer for 0 <= t <= 15, + See FIPS PUB 180-4 section 6.2. + Input data must be read in big-endian bytes order, + see FIPS PUB 180-4 section 3.1.2. */ +#define SHA512_GET_W_FROM_DATA(buf,t) \ + MHDX_GET_64BIT_BE( \ + ((const unsigned char*) (buf)) + (t) * SHA512_256_BYTES_IN_WORD) + + /* During first 16 steps, before making any calculation on each step, the + W element is read from the input data buffer as a big-endian value and + stored in the array of W elements. */ + for(t = 0; t < 16; ++t) { + SHA2STEP64RV(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, K[t], \ + W[t] = SHA512_GET_W_FROM_DATA(data, t)); + } + + /* 'W' generation and assignment for 16 <= t <= 79. + See FIPS PUB 180-4 section 6.4.2. + As only the last 16 'W' are used in calculations, it is possible to + use 16 elements array of W as a cyclic buffer. + Note: ((t-16) & 15) have same value as (t & 15) */ +#define Wgen(w,t) \ + (curl_uint64_t)( (w)[(t - 16) & 15] + sig1((w)[((t) - 2) & 15]) \ + + (w)[((t) - 7) & 15] + sig0((w)[((t) - 15) & 15]) ) + + /* During the last 64 steps, before making any calculation on each step, + current W element is generated from other W elements of the cyclic + buffer and the generated value is stored back in the cyclic buffer. */ + for(t = 16; t < 80; ++t) { + SHA2STEP64RV(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, K[t], \ + W[t & 15] = Wgen(W, t)); + } + } + + /* Compute and store the intermediate hash. + See FIPS PUB 180-4 section 6.4.2 step 4. */ + H[0] += a; + H[1] += b; + H[2] += c; + H[3] += d; + H[4] += e; + H[5] += f; + H[6] += g; + H[7] += h; +} + + +/** + * Process portion of bytes. + * + * @param context the calculation context + * @param data bytes to add to hash + * @param length number of bytes in @a data + * @return always CURLE_OK + */ +static CURLcode +MHDx_sha512_256_update(void *context, + const unsigned char *data, + size_t length) +{ + unsigned int bytes_have; /**< Number of bytes in the context buffer */ + struct mhdx_sha512_256ctx *const ctx = (struct mhdx_sha512_256ctx *)context; + /* the void pointer here is required to mute Intel compiler warning */ + void *const ctx_buf = ctx->buffer; + + DEBUGASSERT((data != NULL) || (length == 0)); + + if(0 == length) + return CURLE_OK; /* Shortcut, do nothing */ + + /* Note: (count & (SHA512_256_BLOCK_SIZE-1)) + equals (count % SHA512_256_BLOCK_SIZE) for this block size. */ + bytes_have = (unsigned int) (ctx->count & (SHA512_256_BLOCK_SIZE - 1)); + ctx->count += length; + if(length > ctx->count) + ctx->count_bits_hi += 1U << 3; /* Value wrap */ + ctx->count_bits_hi += ctx->count >> 61; + ctx->count &= CURL_UINT64_C(0x1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF); + + if(0 != bytes_have) { + unsigned int bytes_left = SHA512_256_BLOCK_SIZE - bytes_have; + if(length >= bytes_left) { + /* Combine new data with data in the buffer and process the full + block. */ + memcpy(((unsigned char *) ctx_buf) + bytes_have, + data, + bytes_left); + data += bytes_left; + length -= bytes_left; + MHDx_sha512_256_transform(ctx->H, ctx->buffer); + bytes_have = 0; + } + } + + while(SHA512_256_BLOCK_SIZE <= length) { + /* Process any full blocks of new data directly, + without copying to the buffer. */ + MHDx_sha512_256_transform(ctx->H, data); + data += SHA512_256_BLOCK_SIZE; + length -= SHA512_256_BLOCK_SIZE; + } + + if(0 != length) { + /* Copy incomplete block of new data (if any) + to the buffer. */ + memcpy(((unsigned char *) ctx_buf) + bytes_have, data, length); + } + + return CURLE_OK; +} + + + +/** + * Size of "length" insertion in bits. + * See FIPS PUB 180-4 section 5.1.2. + */ +#define SHA512_256_SIZE_OF_LEN_ADD_BITS 128 + +/** + * Size of "length" insertion in bytes. + */ +#define SHA512_256_SIZE_OF_LEN_ADD (SHA512_256_SIZE_OF_LEN_ADD_BITS / 8) + +/** + * Finalise SHA-512/256 calculation, return digest. + * + * @param context the calculation context + * @param[out] digest set to the hash, must be #SHA512_256_DIGEST_SIZE bytes + * @return always CURLE_OK + */ +static CURLcode +MHDx_sha512_256_finish(unsigned char *digest, + void *context) +{ + struct mhdx_sha512_256ctx *const ctx = (struct mhdx_sha512_256ctx *)context; + curl_uint64_t num_bits; /**< Number of processed bits */ + unsigned int bytes_have; /**< Number of bytes in the context buffer */ + /* the void pointer here is required to mute Intel compiler warning */ + void *const ctx_buf = ctx->buffer; + + /* Memorise the number of processed bits. + The padding and other data added here during the postprocessing must + not change the amount of hashed data. */ + num_bits = ctx->count << 3; + + /* Note: (count & (SHA512_256_BLOCK_SIZE-1)) + equals (count % SHA512_256_BLOCK_SIZE) for this block size. */ + bytes_have = (unsigned int) (ctx->count & (SHA512_256_BLOCK_SIZE - 1)); + + /* Input data must be padded with a single bit "1", then with zeros and + the finally the length of data in bits must be added as the final bytes + of the last block. + See FIPS PUB 180-4 section 5.1.2. */ + + /* Data is always processed in form of bytes (not by individual bits), + therefore position of the first padding bit in byte is always + predefined (0x80). */ + /* Buffer always have space at least for one byte (as full buffers are + processed when formed). */ + ((unsigned char *) ctx_buf)[bytes_have++] = 0x80U; + + if(SHA512_256_BLOCK_SIZE - bytes_have < SHA512_256_SIZE_OF_LEN_ADD) { + /* No space in the current block to put the total length of message. + Pad the current block with zeros and process it. */ + if(bytes_have < SHA512_256_BLOCK_SIZE) + memset(((unsigned char *) ctx_buf) + bytes_have, 0, + SHA512_256_BLOCK_SIZE - bytes_have); + /* Process the full block. */ + MHDx_sha512_256_transform(ctx->H, ctx->buffer); + /* Start the new block. */ + bytes_have = 0; + } + + /* Pad the rest of the buffer with zeros. */ + memset(((unsigned char *) ctx_buf) + bytes_have, 0, + SHA512_256_BLOCK_SIZE - SHA512_256_SIZE_OF_LEN_ADD - bytes_have); + /* Put high part of number of bits in processed message and then lower + part of number of bits as big-endian values. + See FIPS PUB 180-4 section 5.1.2. */ + /* Note: the target location is predefined and buffer is always aligned */ + MHDX_PUT_64BIT_BE(((unsigned char *) ctx_buf) \ + + SHA512_256_BLOCK_SIZE \ + - SHA512_256_SIZE_OF_LEN_ADD, \ + ctx->count_bits_hi); + MHDX_PUT_64BIT_BE(((unsigned char *) ctx_buf) \ + + SHA512_256_BLOCK_SIZE \ + - SHA512_256_SIZE_OF_LEN_ADD \ + + SHA512_256_BYTES_IN_WORD, \ + num_bits); + /* Process the full final block. */ + MHDx_sha512_256_transform(ctx->H, ctx->buffer); + + /* Put in BE mode the leftmost part of the hash as the final digest. + See FIPS PUB 180-4 section 6.7. */ + + MHDX_PUT_64BIT_BE((digest + 0 * SHA512_256_BYTES_IN_WORD), ctx->H[0]); + MHDX_PUT_64BIT_BE((digest + 1 * SHA512_256_BYTES_IN_WORD), ctx->H[1]); + MHDX_PUT_64BIT_BE((digest + 2 * SHA512_256_BYTES_IN_WORD), ctx->H[2]); + MHDX_PUT_64BIT_BE((digest + 3 * SHA512_256_BYTES_IN_WORD), ctx->H[3]); + + /* Erase potentially sensitive data. */ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(struct mhdx_sha512_256ctx)); + + return CURLE_OK; +} + +/* Map to the local implementation */ +#define Curl_sha512_256_init MHDx_sha512_256_init +#define Curl_sha512_256_update MHDx_sha512_256_update +#define Curl_sha512_256_finish MHDx_sha512_256_finish + +#endif /* Local SHA-512/256 code */ + + +/** + * Compute SHA-512/256 hash for the given data in one function call + * @param[out] output the pointer to put the hash + * @param[in] input the pointer to the data to process + * @param input_size the size of the data pointed by @a input + * @return always #CURLE_OK + */ +CURLcode +Curl_sha512_256it(unsigned char *output, const unsigned char *input, + size_t input_size) +{ + Curl_sha512_256_ctx ctx; + CURLcode res; + + res = Curl_sha512_256_init(&ctx); + if(res != CURLE_OK) + return res; + + res = Curl_sha512_256_update(&ctx, (const void *) input, input_size); + + if(res != CURLE_OK) { + (void) Curl_sha512_256_finish(output, &ctx); + return res; + } + + return Curl_sha512_256_finish(output, &ctx); +} + +/* Wrapper function, takes 'unsigned int' as length type, returns void */ +static void +Curl_sha512_256_update_i(void *context, + const unsigned char *data, + unsigned int length) +{ + /* Hypothetically the function may fail, but assume it does not */ + (void) Curl_sha512_256_update(context, data, length); +} + +/* Wrapper function, returns void */ +static void +Curl_sha512_256_finish_v(unsigned char *result, + void *context) +{ + /* Hypothetically the function may fail, but assume it does not */ + (void) Curl_sha512_256_finish(result, context); +} + +/* Wrapper function, takes 'unsigned int' as length type, returns void */ + +const struct HMAC_params Curl_HMAC_SHA512_256[] = { + { + /* Initialize context procedure. */ + Curl_sha512_256_init, + /* Update context with data. */ + Curl_sha512_256_update_i, + /* Get final result procedure. */ + Curl_sha512_256_finish_v, + /* Context structure size. */ + sizeof(Curl_sha512_256_ctx), + /* Maximum key length (bytes). */ + SHA512_256_BLOCK_SIZE, + /* Result length (bytes). */ + SHA512_256_DIGEST_SIZE + } +}; + +#endif /* !CURL_DISABLE_DIGEST_AUTH && !CURL_DISABLE_SHA512_256 */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_sha512_256.h b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_sha512_256.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..30a9f140ea --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_sha512_256.h @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +#ifndef HEADER_CURL_SHA512_256_H +#define HEADER_CURL_SHA512_256_H +/*************************************************************************** + * _ _ ____ _ + * Project ___| | | | _ \| | + * / __| | | | |_) | | + * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ + * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| + * + * Copyright (C) Evgeny Grin (Karlson2k), . + * + * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which + * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms + * are also available at https://curl.se/docs/copyright.html. + * + * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell + * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is + * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file. + * + * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY + * KIND, either express or implied. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: curl + * + ***************************************************************************/ + +#if !defined(CURL_DISABLE_DIGEST_AUTH) && !defined(CURL_DISABLE_SHA512_256) + +#include +#include "curl_hmac.h" + +#define CURL_HAVE_SHA512_256 + +extern const struct HMAC_params Curl_HMAC_SHA512_256[1]; + +#define SHA512_256_DIGEST_LENGTH 32 + +CURLcode +Curl_sha512_256it(unsigned char *output, const unsigned char *input, + size_t input_size); + +#endif /* !CURL_DISABLE_DIGEST_AUTH && !CURL_DISABLE_SHA512_256 */ + +#endif /* HEADER_CURL_SHA256_H */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_threads.c b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_threads.c index 222d9364f0..93fa2dafb6 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_threads.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_threads.c @@ -131,7 +131,8 @@ curl_thread_t Curl_thread_create(unsigned int (CURL_STDCALL *func) (void *), void Curl_thread_destroy(curl_thread_t hnd) { - CloseHandle(hnd); + if(hnd != curl_thread_t_null) + CloseHandle(hnd); } int Curl_thread_join(curl_thread_t *hnd) diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_trc.c b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_trc.c index 0ebe40b8f7..f017e21a5a 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_trc.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_trc.c @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ #include "cf-socket.h" #include "connect.h" +#include "doh.h" #include "http2.h" #include "http_proxy.h" #include "cf-h1-proxy.h" @@ -110,19 +111,30 @@ void Curl_failf(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *fmt, ...) /* Curl_infof() is for info message along the way */ #define MAXINFO 2048 +static void trc_infof(struct Curl_easy *data, struct curl_trc_feat *feat, + const char * const fmt, va_list ap) CURL_PRINTF(3, 0); + +static void trc_infof(struct Curl_easy *data, struct curl_trc_feat *feat, + const char * const fmt, va_list ap) +{ + int len = 0; + char buffer[MAXINFO + 2]; + if(feat) + len = msnprintf(buffer, MAXINFO, "[%s] ", feat->name); + len += mvsnprintf(buffer + len, MAXINFO - len, fmt, ap); + buffer[len++] = '\n'; + buffer[len] = '\0'; + Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_TEXT, buffer, len); +} + void Curl_infof(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *fmt, ...) { DEBUGASSERT(!strchr(fmt, '\n')); - if(data && data->set.verbose) { + if(Curl_trc_is_verbose(data)) { va_list ap; - int len; - char buffer[MAXINFO + 2]; va_start(ap, fmt); - len = mvsnprintf(buffer, MAXINFO, fmt, ap); + trc_infof(data, data->state.feat, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); - buffer[len++] = '\n'; - buffer[len] = '\0'; - Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_TEXT, buffer, len); } } @@ -132,9 +144,16 @@ void Curl_trc_cf_infof(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_cfilter *cf, DEBUGASSERT(cf); if(Curl_trc_cf_is_verbose(cf, data)) { va_list ap; - int len; + int len = 0; char buffer[MAXINFO + 2]; - len = msnprintf(buffer, MAXINFO, "[%s] ", cf->cft->name); + if(data->state.feat) + len += msnprintf(buffer + len, MAXINFO - len, "[%s] ", + data->state.feat->name); + if(cf->sockindex) + len += msnprintf(buffer + len, MAXINFO - len, "[%s-%d] ", + cf->cft->name, cf->sockindex); + else + len += msnprintf(buffer + len, MAXINFO - len, "[%s] ", cf->cft->name); va_start(ap, fmt); len += mvsnprintf(buffer + len, MAXINFO - len, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); @@ -144,6 +163,66 @@ void Curl_trc_cf_infof(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_cfilter *cf, } } +struct curl_trc_feat Curl_trc_feat_read = { + "READ", + CURL_LOG_LVL_NONE, +}; +struct curl_trc_feat Curl_trc_feat_write = { + "WRITE", + CURL_LOG_LVL_NONE, +}; + +void Curl_trc_read(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + DEBUGASSERT(!strchr(fmt, '\n')); + if(Curl_trc_ft_is_verbose(data, &Curl_trc_feat_read)) { + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, fmt); + trc_infof(data, &Curl_trc_feat_read, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + } +} + +void Curl_trc_write(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + DEBUGASSERT(!strchr(fmt, '\n')); + if(Curl_trc_ft_is_verbose(data, &Curl_trc_feat_write)) { + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, fmt); + trc_infof(data, &Curl_trc_feat_write, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + } +} + +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_FTP +struct curl_trc_feat Curl_trc_feat_ftp = { + "FTP", + CURL_LOG_LVL_NONE, +}; + +void Curl_trc_ftp(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + DEBUGASSERT(!strchr(fmt, '\n')); + if(Curl_trc_ft_is_verbose(data, &Curl_trc_feat_ftp)) { + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, fmt); + trc_infof(data, &Curl_trc_feat_ftp, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + } +} +#endif /* !CURL_DISABLE_FTP */ + +static struct curl_trc_feat *trc_feats[] = { + &Curl_trc_feat_read, + &Curl_trc_feat_write, +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_FTP + &Curl_trc_feat_ftp, +#endif +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_DOH + &Curl_doh_trc, +#endif + NULL, +}; static struct Curl_cftype *cf_types[] = { &Curl_cft_tcp, @@ -157,8 +236,10 @@ static struct Curl_cftype *cf_types[] = { #endif #ifdef USE_SSL &Curl_cft_ssl, +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY &Curl_cft_ssl_proxy, #endif +#endif #if !defined(CURL_DISABLE_PROXY) #if !defined(CURL_DISABLE_HTTP) &Curl_cft_h1_proxy, @@ -170,7 +251,7 @@ static struct Curl_cftype *cf_types[] = { &Curl_cft_haproxy, &Curl_cft_socks_proxy, #endif /* !CURL_DISABLE_PROXY */ -#ifdef ENABLE_QUIC +#ifdef USE_HTTP3 &Curl_cft_http3, #endif #if !defined(CURL_DISABLE_HTTP) && !defined(USE_HYPER) @@ -213,6 +294,15 @@ CURLcode Curl_trc_opt(const char *config) break; } } + for(i = 0; trc_feats[i]; ++i) { + if(strcasecompare(token, "all")) { + trc_feats[i]->log_level = lvl; + } + else if(strcasecompare(token, trc_feats[i]->name)) { + trc_feats[i]->log_level = lvl; + break; + } + } token = strtok_r(NULL, ", ", &tok_buf); } free(tmp); diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_trc.h b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_trc.h index ade9108ac7..3d38018342 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_trc.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/curl_trc.h @@ -58,14 +58,7 @@ void Curl_debug(struct Curl_easy *data, curl_infotype type, * Output a failure message on registered callbacks for transfer. */ void Curl_failf(struct Curl_easy *data, -#if defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(printf) && \ - defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && (__STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L) && \ - !defined(__MINGW32__) - const char *fmt, ...) - __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); -#else - const char *fmt, ...); -#endif + const char *fmt, ...) CURL_PRINTF(2, 3); #define failf Curl_failf @@ -84,50 +77,85 @@ void Curl_failf(struct Curl_easy *data, #define CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, ...) \ do { if(Curl_trc_cf_is_verbose(cf, data)) \ Curl_trc_cf_infof(data, cf, __VA_ARGS__); } while(0) +#define CURL_TRC_WRITE(data, ...) \ + do { if(Curl_trc_ft_is_verbose(data, &Curl_trc_feat_write)) \ + Curl_trc_write(data, __VA_ARGS__); } while(0) +#define CURL_TRC_READ(data, ...) \ + do { if(Curl_trc_ft_is_verbose(data, &Curl_trc_feat_read)) \ + Curl_trc_read(data, __VA_ARGS__); } while(0) + +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_FTP +#define CURL_TRC_FTP(data, ...) \ + do { if(Curl_trc_ft_is_verbose(data, &Curl_trc_feat_ftp)) \ + Curl_trc_ftp(data, __VA_ARGS__); } while(0) +#endif /* !CURL_DISABLE_FTP */ + +#else /* CURL_HAVE_C99 */ -#else #define infof Curl_infof #define CURL_TRC_CF Curl_trc_cf_infof +#define CURL_TRC_WRITE Curl_trc_write +#define CURL_TRC_READ Curl_trc_read + +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_FTP +#define CURL_TRC_FTP Curl_trc_ftp #endif +#endif /* !CURL_HAVE_C99 */ + #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS /* informational messages enabled */ -#define Curl_trc_is_verbose(data) ((data) && (data)->set.verbose) +struct curl_trc_feat { + const char *name; + int log_level; +}; +extern struct curl_trc_feat Curl_trc_feat_read; +extern struct curl_trc_feat Curl_trc_feat_write; + +#define Curl_trc_is_verbose(data) \ + ((data) && (data)->set.verbose && \ + (!(data)->state.feat || \ + ((data)->state.feat->log_level >= CURL_LOG_LVL_INFO))) #define Curl_trc_cf_is_verbose(cf, data) \ - ((data) && (data)->set.verbose && \ - (cf) && (cf)->cft->log_level >= CURL_LOG_LVL_INFO) + (Curl_trc_is_verbose(data) && \ + (cf) && (cf)->cft->log_level >= CURL_LOG_LVL_INFO) +#define Curl_trc_ft_is_verbose(data, ft) \ + (Curl_trc_is_verbose(data) && \ + (ft)->log_level >= CURL_LOG_LVL_INFO) /** * Output an informational message when transfer's verbose logging is enabled. */ void Curl_infof(struct Curl_easy *data, -#if defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(printf) && defined(CURL_HAVE_C99) && \ - !defined(__MINGW32__) - const char *fmt, ...) - __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); -#else - const char *fmt, ...); -#endif + const char *fmt, ...) CURL_PRINTF(2, 3); /** * Output an informational message when both transfer's verbose logging * and connection filters verbose logging are enabled. */ void Curl_trc_cf_infof(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_cfilter *cf, -#if defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(printf) && defined(CURL_HAVE_C99) && \ - !defined(__MINGW32__) - const char *fmt, ...) - __attribute__((format(printf, 3, 4))); -#else - const char *fmt, ...); + const char *fmt, ...) CURL_PRINTF(3, 4); +void Curl_trc_ft_infof(struct Curl_easy *data, struct curl_trc_feat *ft, + const char *fmt, ...) CURL_PRINTF(3, 4); +void Curl_trc_write(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *fmt, ...) CURL_PRINTF(2, 3); +void Curl_trc_read(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *fmt, ...) CURL_PRINTF(2, 3); + +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_FTP +extern struct curl_trc_feat Curl_trc_feat_ftp; +void Curl_trc_ftp(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *fmt, ...) CURL_PRINTF(2, 3); #endif + #else /* defined(CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS) */ /* All informational messages are not compiled in for size savings */ -#define Curl_trc_is_verbose(d) ((void)(d), FALSE) -#define Curl_trc_cf_is_verbose(x,y) ((void)(x), (void)(y), FALSE) +#define Curl_trc_is_verbose(d) (FALSE) +#define Curl_trc_cf_is_verbose(x,y) (FALSE) +#define Curl_trc_ft_is_verbose(x,y) (FALSE) static void Curl_infof(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *fmt, ...) { @@ -141,6 +169,32 @@ static void Curl_trc_cf_infof(struct Curl_easy *data, (void)data; (void)cf; (void)fmt; } +struct curl_trc_feat; + +static void Curl_trc_ft_infof(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct curl_trc_feat *ft, + const char *fmt, ...) +{ + (void)data; (void)ft; (void)fmt; +} + +static void Curl_trc_write(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + (void)data; (void)fmt; +} + +static void Curl_trc_read(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + (void)data; (void)fmt; +} + +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_FTP +static void Curl_trc_ftp(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + (void)data; (void)fmt; +} +#endif + #endif /* !defined(CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS) */ #endif /* HEADER_CURL_TRC_H */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/curlx.h b/vendor/curl/lib/curlx.h index 7a753d6824..54e4279572 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/curlx.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/curlx.h @@ -77,7 +77,6 @@ */ -#define curlx_getenv curl_getenv #define curlx_mvsnprintf curl_mvsnprintf #define curlx_msnprintf curl_msnprintf #define curlx_maprintf curl_maprintf diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/cw-out.c b/vendor/curl/lib/cw-out.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4e56c6a1bb --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/cw-out.c @@ -0,0 +1,474 @@ +/*************************************************************************** + * _ _ ____ _ + * Project ___| | | | _ \| | + * / __| | | | |_) | | + * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ + * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| + * + * Copyright (C) Daniel Stenberg, , et al. + * + * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which + * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms + * are also available at https://curl.se/docs/copyright.html. + * + * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell + * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is + * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file. + * + * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY + * KIND, either express or implied. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: curl + * + ***************************************************************************/ + +#include "curl_setup.h" + +#include + +#include "urldata.h" +#include "cfilters.h" +#include "headers.h" +#include "multiif.h" +#include "sendf.h" +#include "cw-out.h" + +/* The last 3 #include files should be in this order */ +#include "curl_printf.h" +#include "curl_memory.h" +#include "memdebug.h" + + +/** + * OVERALL DESIGN of this client writer + * + * The 'cw-out' writer is supposed to be the last writer in a transfer's + * stack. It is always added when that stack is initialized. Its purpose + * is to pass BODY and HEADER bytes to the client-installed callback + * functions. + * + * These callback may return `CURL_WRITEFUNC_PAUSE` to indicate that the + * data had not been written and the whole transfer should stop receiving + * new data. Or at least, stop calling the functions. When the transfer + * is "unpaused" by the client, the previous data shall be passed as + * if nothing happened. + * + * The `cw-out` writer therefore manages buffers for bytes that could + * not be written. Data that was already in flight from the server also + * needs buffering on paused transfer when it arrives. + * + * In addition, the writer allows buffering of "small" body writes, + * so client functions are called less often. That is only enabled on a + * number of conditions. + * + * HEADER and BODY data may arrive in any order. For paused transfers, + * a list of `struct cw_out_buf` is kept for `cw_out_type` types. The + * list may be: [BODY]->[HEADER]->[BODY]->[HEADER].... + * When unpausing, this list is "played back" to the client callbacks. + * + * The amount of bytes being buffered is limited by `DYN_PAUSE_BUFFER` + * and when that is exceeded `CURLE_TOO_LARGE` is returned as error. + */ +typedef enum { + CW_OUT_NONE, + CW_OUT_BODY, + CW_OUT_HDS +} cw_out_type; + +struct cw_out_buf { + struct cw_out_buf *next; + struct dynbuf b; + cw_out_type type; +}; + +static struct cw_out_buf *cw_out_buf_create(cw_out_type otype) +{ + struct cw_out_buf *cwbuf = calloc(1, sizeof(*cwbuf)); + if(cwbuf) { + cwbuf->type = otype; + Curl_dyn_init(&cwbuf->b, DYN_PAUSE_BUFFER); + } + return cwbuf; +} + +static void cw_out_buf_free(struct cw_out_buf *cwbuf) +{ + if(cwbuf) { + Curl_dyn_free(&cwbuf->b); + free(cwbuf); + } +} + +struct cw_out_ctx { + struct Curl_cwriter super; + struct cw_out_buf *buf; + BIT(paused); + BIT(errored); +}; + +static CURLcode cw_out_write(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_cwriter *writer, int type, + const char *buf, size_t nbytes); +static void cw_out_close(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_cwriter *writer); +static CURLcode cw_out_init(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_cwriter *writer); + +struct Curl_cwtype Curl_cwt_out = { + "cw-out", + NULL, + cw_out_init, + cw_out_write, + cw_out_close, + sizeof(struct cw_out_ctx) +}; + +static CURLcode cw_out_init(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_cwriter *writer) +{ + struct cw_out_ctx *ctx = writer->ctx; + (void)data; + ctx->buf = NULL; + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static void cw_out_bufs_free(struct cw_out_ctx *ctx) +{ + while(ctx->buf) { + struct cw_out_buf *next = ctx->buf->next; + cw_out_buf_free(ctx->buf); + ctx->buf = next; + } +} + +static size_t cw_out_bufs_len(struct cw_out_ctx *ctx) +{ + struct cw_out_buf *cwbuf = ctx->buf; + size_t len = 0; + while(cwbuf) { + len += Curl_dyn_len(&cwbuf->b); + cwbuf = cwbuf->next; + } + return len; +} + +static void cw_out_close(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_cwriter *writer) +{ + struct cw_out_ctx *ctx = writer->ctx; + + (void)data; + cw_out_bufs_free(ctx); +} + +/** + * Return the current curl_write_callback and user_data for the buf type + */ +static void cw_get_writefunc(struct Curl_easy *data, cw_out_type otype, + curl_write_callback *pwcb, void **pwcb_data, + size_t *pmax_write, size_t *pmin_write) +{ + switch(otype) { + case CW_OUT_BODY: + *pwcb = data->set.fwrite_func; + *pwcb_data = data->set.out; + *pmax_write = CURL_MAX_WRITE_SIZE; + /* if we ever want buffering of BODY output, we can set `min_write` + * the preferred size. The default should always be to pass data + * to the client as it comes without delay */ + *pmin_write = 0; + break; + case CW_OUT_HDS: + *pwcb = data->set.fwrite_header? data->set.fwrite_header : + (data->set.writeheader? data->set.fwrite_func : NULL); + *pwcb_data = data->set.writeheader; + *pmax_write = 0; /* do not chunk-write headers, write them as they are */ + *pmin_write = 0; + break; + default: + *pwcb = NULL; + *pwcb_data = NULL; + *pmax_write = CURL_MAX_WRITE_SIZE; + *pmin_write = 0; + } +} + +static CURLcode cw_out_ptr_flush(struct cw_out_ctx *ctx, + struct Curl_easy *data, + cw_out_type otype, + bool flush_all, + const char *buf, size_t blen, + size_t *pconsumed) +{ + curl_write_callback wcb; + void *wcb_data; + size_t max_write, min_write; + size_t wlen, nwritten; + + /* If we errored once, we do not invoke the client callback again */ + if(ctx->errored) + return CURLE_WRITE_ERROR; + + /* write callbacks may get NULLed by the client between calls. */ + cw_get_writefunc(data, otype, &wcb, &wcb_data, &max_write, &min_write); + if(!wcb) { + *pconsumed = blen; + return CURLE_OK; + } + + *pconsumed = 0; + while(blen && !ctx->paused) { + if(!flush_all && blen < min_write) + break; + wlen = max_write? CURLMIN(blen, max_write) : blen; + Curl_set_in_callback(data, TRUE); + nwritten = wcb((char *)buf, 1, wlen, wcb_data); + Curl_set_in_callback(data, FALSE); + CURL_TRC_WRITE(data, "cw_out, wrote %zu %s bytes -> %zu", + wlen, (otype == CW_OUT_BODY)? "body" : "header", + nwritten); + if(CURL_WRITEFUNC_PAUSE == nwritten) { + if(data->conn && data->conn->handler->flags & PROTOPT_NONETWORK) { + /* Protocols that work without network cannot be paused. This is + actually only FILE:// just now, and it can't pause since the + transfer isn't done using the "normal" procedure. */ + failf(data, "Write callback asked for PAUSE when not supported"); + return CURLE_WRITE_ERROR; + } + /* mark the connection as RECV paused */ + data->req.keepon |= KEEP_RECV_PAUSE; + ctx->paused = TRUE; + CURL_TRC_WRITE(data, "cw_out, PAUSE requested by client"); + break; + } + else if(CURL_WRITEFUNC_ERROR == nwritten) { + failf(data, "client returned ERROR on write of %zu bytes", wlen); + return CURLE_WRITE_ERROR; + } + else if(nwritten != wlen) { + failf(data, "Failure writing output to destination, " + "passed %zu returned %zd", wlen, nwritten); + return CURLE_WRITE_ERROR; + } + *pconsumed += nwritten; + blen -= nwritten; + buf += nwritten; + } + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static CURLcode cw_out_buf_flush(struct cw_out_ctx *ctx, + struct Curl_easy *data, + struct cw_out_buf *cwbuf, + bool flush_all) +{ + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + + if(Curl_dyn_len(&cwbuf->b)) { + size_t consumed; + + result = cw_out_ptr_flush(ctx, data, cwbuf->type, flush_all, + Curl_dyn_ptr(&cwbuf->b), + Curl_dyn_len(&cwbuf->b), + &consumed); + if(result) + return result; + + if(consumed) { + if(consumed == Curl_dyn_len(&cwbuf->b)) { + Curl_dyn_free(&cwbuf->b); + } + else { + DEBUGASSERT(consumed < Curl_dyn_len(&cwbuf->b)); + result = Curl_dyn_tail(&cwbuf->b, Curl_dyn_len(&cwbuf->b) - consumed); + if(result) + return result; + } + } + } + return result; +} + +static CURLcode cw_out_flush_chain(struct cw_out_ctx *ctx, + struct Curl_easy *data, + struct cw_out_buf **pcwbuf, + bool flush_all) +{ + struct cw_out_buf *cwbuf = *pcwbuf; + CURLcode result; + + if(!cwbuf) + return CURLE_OK; + if(ctx->paused) + return CURLE_OK; + + /* write the end of the chain until it blocks or gets empty */ + while(cwbuf->next) { + struct cw_out_buf **plast = &cwbuf->next; + while((*plast)->next) + plast = &(*plast)->next; + result = cw_out_flush_chain(ctx, data, plast, flush_all); + if(result) + return result; + if(*plast) { + /* could not write last, paused again? */ + DEBUGASSERT(ctx->paused); + return CURLE_OK; + } + } + + result = cw_out_buf_flush(ctx, data, cwbuf, flush_all); + if(result) + return result; + if(!Curl_dyn_len(&cwbuf->b)) { + cw_out_buf_free(cwbuf); + *pcwbuf = NULL; + } + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static CURLcode cw_out_append(struct cw_out_ctx *ctx, + cw_out_type otype, + const char *buf, size_t blen) +{ + if(cw_out_bufs_len(ctx) + blen > DYN_PAUSE_BUFFER) + return CURLE_TOO_LARGE; + + /* if we do not have a buffer, or it is of another type, make a new one. + * And for CW_OUT_HDS always make a new one, so we "replay" headers + * exactly as they came in */ + if(!ctx->buf || (ctx->buf->type != otype) || (otype == CW_OUT_HDS)) { + struct cw_out_buf *cwbuf = cw_out_buf_create(otype); + if(!cwbuf) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + cwbuf->next = ctx->buf; + ctx->buf = cwbuf; + } + DEBUGASSERT(ctx->buf && (ctx->buf->type == otype)); + return Curl_dyn_addn(&ctx->buf->b, buf, blen); +} + +static CURLcode cw_out_do_write(struct cw_out_ctx *ctx, + struct Curl_easy *data, + cw_out_type otype, + bool flush_all, + const char *buf, size_t blen) +{ + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + + /* if we have buffered data and it is a different type than what + * we are writing now, try to flush all */ + if(ctx->buf && ctx->buf->type != otype) { + result = cw_out_flush_chain(ctx, data, &ctx->buf, TRUE); + if(result) + goto out; + } + + if(ctx->buf) { + /* still have buffered data, append and flush */ + result = cw_out_append(ctx, otype, buf, blen); + if(result) + return result; + result = cw_out_flush_chain(ctx, data, &ctx->buf, flush_all); + if(result) + goto out; + } + else { + /* nothing buffered, try direct write */ + size_t consumed; + result = cw_out_ptr_flush(ctx, data, otype, flush_all, + buf, blen, &consumed); + if(result) + return result; + if(consumed < blen) { + /* did not write all, append the rest */ + result = cw_out_append(ctx, otype, buf + consumed, blen - consumed); + if(result) + goto out; + } + } + +out: + if(result) { + /* We do not want to invoked client callbacks a second time after + * encountering an error. See issue #13337 */ + ctx->errored = TRUE; + cw_out_bufs_free(ctx); + } + return result; +} + +static CURLcode cw_out_write(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_cwriter *writer, int type, + const char *buf, size_t blen) +{ + struct cw_out_ctx *ctx = writer->ctx; + CURLcode result; + bool flush_all; + + flush_all = (type & CLIENTWRITE_EOS)? TRUE:FALSE; + if((type & CLIENTWRITE_BODY) || + ((type & CLIENTWRITE_HEADER) && data->set.include_header)) { + result = cw_out_do_write(ctx, data, CW_OUT_BODY, flush_all, buf, blen); + if(result) + return result; + } + + if(type & (CLIENTWRITE_HEADER|CLIENTWRITE_INFO)) { + result = cw_out_do_write(ctx, data, CW_OUT_HDS, flush_all, buf, blen); + if(result) + return result; + } + + return CURLE_OK; +} + +bool Curl_cw_out_is_paused(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct Curl_cwriter *cw_out; + struct cw_out_ctx *ctx; + + cw_out = Curl_cwriter_get_by_type(data, &Curl_cwt_out); + if(!cw_out) + return FALSE; + + ctx = (struct cw_out_ctx *)cw_out; + CURL_TRC_WRITE(data, "cw-out is%spaused", ctx->paused? "" : " not"); + return ctx->paused; +} + +static CURLcode cw_out_flush(struct Curl_easy *data, + bool unpause, bool flush_all) +{ + struct Curl_cwriter *cw_out; + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + + cw_out = Curl_cwriter_get_by_type(data, &Curl_cwt_out); + if(cw_out) { + struct cw_out_ctx *ctx = (struct cw_out_ctx *)cw_out; + if(ctx->errored) + return CURLE_WRITE_ERROR; + if(unpause && ctx->paused) + ctx->paused = FALSE; + if(ctx->paused) + return CURLE_OK; /* not doing it */ + + result = cw_out_flush_chain(ctx, data, &ctx->buf, flush_all); + if(result) { + ctx->errored = TRUE; + cw_out_bufs_free(ctx); + return result; + } + } + return result; +} + +CURLcode Curl_cw_out_unpause(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + CURL_TRC_WRITE(data, "cw-out unpause"); + return cw_out_flush(data, TRUE, FALSE); +} + +CURLcode Curl_cw_out_done(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + CURL_TRC_WRITE(data, "cw-out done"); + return cw_out_flush(data, FALSE, TRUE); +} diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_ntlm_wb.h b/vendor/curl/lib/cw-out.h similarity index 60% rename from vendor/curl/lib/curl_ntlm_wb.h rename to vendor/curl/lib/cw-out.h index 37704c0fe0..ca4c2e435d 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/curl_ntlm_wb.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/cw-out.h @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ -#ifndef HEADER_CURL_NTLM_WB_H -#define HEADER_CURL_NTLM_WB_H +#ifndef HEADER_CURL_CW_OUT_H +#define HEADER_CURL_CW_OUT_H /*************************************************************************** * _ _ ____ _ * Project ___| | | | _ \| | @@ -26,20 +26,28 @@ #include "curl_setup.h" -#if !defined(CURL_DISABLE_HTTP) && defined(USE_NTLM) && \ - defined(NTLM_WB_ENABLED) +#include "sendf.h" -/* this is for ntlm header input */ -CURLcode Curl_input_ntlm_wb(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn, bool proxy, - const char *header); +/** + * The client writer type "cw-out" that does the actual writing to + * the client callbacks. Intended to be the last installed in the + * client writer stack of a transfer. + */ +extern struct Curl_cwtype Curl_cwt_out; -/* this is for creating ntlm header output */ -CURLcode Curl_output_ntlm_wb(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, - bool proxy); +/** + * Return TRUE iff 'cw-out' client write has paused data. + */ +bool Curl_cw_out_is_paused(struct Curl_easy *data); -void Curl_http_auth_cleanup_ntlm_wb(struct connectdata *conn); +/** + * Flush any buffered date to the client, chunk collation still applies. + */ +CURLcode Curl_cw_out_unpause(struct Curl_easy *data); -#endif /* !CURL_DISABLE_HTTP && USE_NTLM && NTLM_WB_ENABLED */ +/** + * Mark EndOfStream reached and flush ALL data to the client. + */ +CURLcode Curl_cw_out_done(struct Curl_easy *data); -#endif /* HEADER_CURL_NTLM_WB_H */ +#endif /* HEADER_CURL_CW_OUT_H */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/dict.c b/vendor/curl/lib/dict.c index 3172b38290..a26a28b7b2 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/dict.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/dict.c @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ static CURLcode dict_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done); */ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_dict = { - "DICT", /* scheme */ + "dict", /* scheme */ ZERO_NULL, /* setup_connection */ dict_do, /* do_it */ ZERO_NULL, /* done */ @@ -89,7 +89,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_dict = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_DICT, /* defport */ @@ -122,10 +123,12 @@ static char *unescape_word(const char *input) } /* sendf() sends formatted data to the server */ -static CURLcode sendf(curl_socket_t sockfd, struct Curl_easy *data, - const char *fmt, ...) +static CURLcode sendf(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *fmt, ...) CURL_PRINTF(2, 3); + +static CURLcode sendf(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *fmt, ...) { - ssize_t bytes_written; + size_t bytes_written; size_t write_len; CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; char *s; @@ -143,7 +146,7 @@ static CURLcode sendf(curl_socket_t sockfd, struct Curl_easy *data, for(;;) { /* Write the buffer to the socket */ - result = Curl_write(data, sockfd, sptr, write_len, &bytes_written); + result = Curl_xfer_send(data, sptr, write_len, &bytes_written); if(result) break; @@ -175,8 +178,6 @@ static CURLcode dict_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) char *nthdef = NULL; /* This is not part of the protocol, but required by RFC 2229 */ CURLcode result; - struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; - curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[FIRSTSOCKET]; char *path; @@ -225,7 +226,7 @@ static CURLcode dict_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) goto error; } - result = sendf(sockfd, data, + result = sendf(data, "CLIENT " LIBCURL_NAME " " LIBCURL_VERSION "\r\n" "MATCH " "%s " /* database */ @@ -240,7 +241,7 @@ static CURLcode dict_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) failf(data, "Failed sending DICT request"); goto error; } - Curl_setup_transfer(data, FIRSTSOCKET, -1, FALSE, -1); /* no upload */ + Curl_xfer_setup(data, FIRSTSOCKET, -1, FALSE, -1); /* no upload */ } else if(strncasecompare(path, DICT_DEFINE, sizeof(DICT_DEFINE)-1) || strncasecompare(path, DICT_DEFINE2, sizeof(DICT_DEFINE2)-1) || @@ -273,7 +274,7 @@ static CURLcode dict_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) goto error; } - result = sendf(sockfd, data, + result = sendf(data, "CLIENT " LIBCURL_NAME " " LIBCURL_VERSION "\r\n" "DEFINE " "%s " /* database */ @@ -286,7 +287,7 @@ static CURLcode dict_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) failf(data, "Failed sending DICT request"); goto error; } - Curl_setup_transfer(data, FIRSTSOCKET, -1, FALSE, -1); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, FIRSTSOCKET, -1, FALSE, -1); } else { @@ -299,7 +300,7 @@ static CURLcode dict_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) if(ppath[i] == ':') ppath[i] = ' '; } - result = sendf(sockfd, data, + result = sendf(data, "CLIENT " LIBCURL_NAME " " LIBCURL_VERSION "\r\n" "%s\r\n" "QUIT\r\n", ppath); @@ -308,7 +309,7 @@ static CURLcode dict_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) goto error; } - Curl_setup_transfer(data, FIRSTSOCKET, -1, FALSE, -1); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, FIRSTSOCKET, -1, FALSE, -1); } } diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/dllmain.c b/vendor/curl/lib/dllmain.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..41e97b37eb --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/dllmain.c @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +/*************************************************************************** + * _ _ ____ _ + * Project ___| | | | _ \| | + * / __| | | | |_) | | + * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ + * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| + * + * Copyright (C) Daniel Stenberg, , et al. + * + * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which + * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms + * are also available at https://curl.se/docs/copyright.html. + * + * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell + * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is + * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file. + * + * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY + * KIND, either express or implied. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: curl + * + ***************************************************************************/ + +#include "curl_setup.h" + +#ifdef USE_OPENSSL +#include +#endif + +/* The fourth-to-last include */ +#ifdef __CYGWIN__ +#define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN +#include +#ifdef _WIN32 +#undef _WIN32 +#endif +#endif + +/* The last 3 #include files should be in this order */ +#include "curl_printf.h" +#include "curl_memory.h" +#include "memdebug.h" + +/* DllMain() must only be defined for Windows and Cygwin DLL builds. */ +#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(__CYGWIN__)) && !defined(CURL_STATICLIB) + +#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && \ + !defined(OPENSSL_IS_AWSLC) && \ + !defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) && \ + !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \ + (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) +#define PREVENT_OPENSSL_MEMLEAK +#endif + +#ifdef PREVENT_OPENSSL_MEMLEAK +BOOL WINAPI DllMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL, DWORD fdwReason, LPVOID lpvReserved); +BOOL WINAPI DllMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL, DWORD fdwReason, LPVOID lpvReserved) +{ + (void)hinstDLL; + (void)lpvReserved; + + switch(fdwReason) { + case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH: + break; + case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH: + break; + case DLL_THREAD_ATTACH: + break; + case DLL_THREAD_DETACH: + /* Call OPENSSL_thread_stop to prevent a memory leak in case OpenSSL is + linked statically. + https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/12327#issuecomment-1826405944 */ + OPENSSL_thread_stop(); + break; + } + return TRUE; +} +#endif /* OpenSSL */ + +#endif /* DLL build */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/doh.c b/vendor/curl/lib/doh.c index 1d928e92c7..03317ae27e 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/doh.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/doh.c @@ -42,9 +42,13 @@ #include "curl_printf.h" #include "curl_memory.h" #include "memdebug.h" +#include "escape.h" #define DNS_CLASS_IN 0x01 +/* local_print_buf truncates if the hex string will be more than this */ +#define LOCAL_PB_HEXMAX 400 + #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS static const char * const errors[]={ "", @@ -69,7 +73,12 @@ static const char *doh_strerror(DOHcode code) return errors[code]; return "bad error code"; } -#endif + +struct curl_trc_feat Curl_doh_trc = { + "DoH", + CURL_LOG_LVL_NONE, +}; +#endif /* !CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS */ /* @unittest 1655 */ @@ -182,6 +191,26 @@ doh_write_cb(const void *contents, size_t size, size_t nmemb, void *userp) return realsize; } +#if defined(USE_HTTPSRR) && defined(CURLDEBUG) +static void local_print_buf(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *prefix, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + unsigned char hexstr[LOCAL_PB_HEXMAX]; + size_t hlen = LOCAL_PB_HEXMAX; + bool truncated = false; + + if(len > (LOCAL_PB_HEXMAX / 2)) + truncated = true; + Curl_hexencode(buf, len, hexstr, hlen); + if(!truncated) + infof(data, "%s: len=%d, val=%s", prefix, (int)len, hexstr); + else + infof(data, "%s: len=%d (truncated)val=%s", prefix, (int)len, hexstr); + return; +} +#endif + /* called from multi.c when this DoH transfer is complete */ static int doh_done(struct Curl_easy *doh, CURLcode result) { @@ -189,9 +218,9 @@ static int doh_done(struct Curl_easy *doh, CURLcode result) struct dohdata *dohp = data->req.doh; /* so one of the DoH request done for the 'data' transfer is now complete! */ dohp->pending--; - infof(data, "a DoH request is completed, %u to go", dohp->pending); + infof(doh, "a DoH request is completed, %u to go", dohp->pending); if(result) - infof(data, "DoH request %s", curl_easy_strerror(result)); + infof(doh, "DoH request %s", curl_easy_strerror(result)); if(!dohp->pending) { /* DoH completed */ @@ -218,7 +247,6 @@ static CURLcode dohprobe(struct Curl_easy *data, struct curl_slist *headers) { struct Curl_easy *doh = NULL; - char *nurl = NULL; CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; timediff_t timeout_ms; DOHcode d = doh_encode(host, dnstype, p->dohbuffer, sizeof(p->dohbuffer), @@ -243,6 +271,9 @@ static CURLcode dohprobe(struct Curl_easy *data, the gcc typecheck helpers */ struct dynbuf *resp = &p->serverdoh; doh->state.internal = true; +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS + doh->state.feat = &Curl_doh_trc; +#endif ERROR_CHECK_SETOPT(CURLOPT_URL, url); ERROR_CHECK_SETOPT(CURLOPT_DEFAULT_PROTOCOL, "https"); ERROR_CHECK_SETOPT(CURLOPT_WRITEFUNCTION, doh_write_cb); @@ -265,7 +296,7 @@ static CURLcode dohprobe(struct Curl_easy *data, ERROR_CHECK_SETOPT(CURLOPT_SHARE, data->share); if(data->set.err && data->set.err != stderr) ERROR_CHECK_SETOPT(CURLOPT_STDERR, data->set.err); - if(data->set.verbose) + if(Curl_trc_ft_is_verbose(data, &Curl_doh_trc)) ERROR_CHECK_SETOPT(CURLOPT_VERBOSE, 1L); if(data->set.no_signal) ERROR_CHECK_SETOPT(CURLOPT_NOSIGNAL, 1L); @@ -351,11 +382,9 @@ static CURLcode dohprobe(struct Curl_easy *data, } else goto error; - free(nurl); return CURLE_OK; error: - free(nurl); Curl_close(&doh); return result; } @@ -374,6 +403,12 @@ struct Curl_addrinfo *Curl_doh(struct Curl_easy *data, int slot; struct dohdata *dohp; struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; +#ifdef USE_HTTPSRR + /* for now, this is only used when ECH is enabled */ +# ifdef USE_ECH + char *qname = NULL; +# endif +#endif *waitp = FALSE; (void)hostname; (void)port; @@ -403,7 +438,7 @@ struct Curl_addrinfo *Curl_doh(struct Curl_easy *data, goto error; dohp->pending++; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 if((conn->ip_version != CURL_IPRESOLVE_V4) && Curl_ipv6works(data)) { /* create IPv6 DoH request */ result = dohprobe(data, &dohp->probe[DOH_PROBE_SLOT_IPADDR_V6], @@ -413,6 +448,37 @@ struct Curl_addrinfo *Curl_doh(struct Curl_easy *data, goto error; dohp->pending++; } +#endif + +#ifdef USE_HTTPSRR + /* + * TODO: Figure out the conditions under which we want to make + * a request for an HTTPS RR when we are not doing ECH. For now, + * making this request breaks a bunch of DoH tests, e.g. test2100, + * where the additional request doesn't match the pre-cooked data + * files, so there's a bit of work attached to making the request + * in a non-ECH use-case. For the present, we'll only make the + * request when ECH is enabled in the build and is being used for + * the curl operation. + */ +# ifdef USE_ECH + if(data->set.tls_ech & CURLECH_ENABLE + || data->set.tls_ech & CURLECH_HARD) { + if(port == 443) + qname = strdup(hostname); + else + qname = aprintf("_%d._https.%s", port, hostname); + if(!qname) + goto error; + result = dohprobe(data, &dohp->probe[DOH_PROBE_SLOT_HTTPS], + DNS_TYPE_HTTPS, qname, data->set.str[STRING_DOH], + data->multi, dohp->headers); + free(qname); + if(result) + goto error; + dohp->pending++; + } +# endif #endif *waitp = TRUE; /* this never returns synchronously */ return NULL; @@ -447,7 +513,7 @@ static DOHcode skipqname(const unsigned char *doh, size_t dohlen, return DOH_DNS_BAD_LABEL; if(dohlen < (*indexp + 1 + length)) return DOH_DNS_OUT_OF_RANGE; - *indexp += 1 + length; + *indexp += (unsigned int)(1 + length); } while(length); return DOH_OK; } @@ -459,14 +525,15 @@ static unsigned short get16bit(const unsigned char *doh, int index) static unsigned int get32bit(const unsigned char *doh, int index) { - /* make clang and gcc optimize this to bswap by incrementing - the pointer first. */ - doh += index; - - /* avoid undefined behavior by casting to unsigned before shifting - 24 bits, possibly into the sign bit. codegen is same, but - ub sanitizer won't be upset */ - return ( (unsigned)doh[0] << 24) | (doh[1] << 16) |(doh[2] << 8) | doh[3]; + /* make clang and gcc optimize this to bswap by incrementing + the pointer first. */ + doh += index; + + /* avoid undefined behavior by casting to unsigned before shifting + 24 bits, possibly into the sign bit. codegen is same, but + ub sanitizer won't be upset */ + return ((unsigned)doh[0] << 24) | ((unsigned)doh[1] << 16) | + ((unsigned)doh[2] << 8) | doh[3]; } static DOHcode store_a(const unsigned char *doh, int index, struct dohentry *d) @@ -495,6 +562,25 @@ static DOHcode store_aaaa(const unsigned char *doh, return DOH_OK; } +#ifdef USE_HTTPSRR +static DOHcode store_https(const unsigned char *doh, + int index, + struct dohentry *d, + uint16_t len) +{ + /* silently ignore RRs over the limit */ + if(d->numhttps_rrs < DOH_MAX_HTTPS) { + struct dohhttps_rr *h = &d->https_rrs[d->numhttps_rrs]; + h->val = Curl_memdup(&doh[index], len); + if(!h->val) + return DOH_OUT_OF_MEM; + h->len = len; + d->numhttps_rrs++; + } + return DOH_OK; +} +#endif + static DOHcode store_cname(const unsigned char *doh, size_t dohlen, unsigned int index, @@ -557,7 +643,8 @@ static DOHcode rdata(const unsigned char *doh, /* RDATA - A (TYPE 1): 4 bytes - AAAA (TYPE 28): 16 bytes - - NS (TYPE 2): N bytes */ + - NS (TYPE 2): N bytes + - HTTPS (TYPE 65): N bytes */ DOHcode rc; switch(type) { @@ -575,6 +662,13 @@ static DOHcode rdata(const unsigned char *doh, if(rc) return rc; break; +#ifdef USE_HTTPSRR + case DNS_TYPE_HTTPS: + rc = store_https(doh, index, d, rdlength); + if(rc) + return rc; + break; +#endif case DNS_TYPE_CNAME: rc = store_cname(doh, dohlen, index, d); if(rc) @@ -731,7 +825,11 @@ UNITTEST DOHcode doh_decode(const unsigned char *doh, if(index != dohlen) return DOH_DNS_MALFORMAT; /* something is wrong */ +#ifdef USE_HTTTPS + if((type != DNS_TYPE_NS) && !d->numcname && !d->numaddr && !d->numhttps_rrs) +#else if((type != DNS_TYPE_NS) && !d->numcname && !d->numaddr) +#endif /* nothing stored! */ return DOH_NO_CONTENT; @@ -743,11 +841,11 @@ static void showdoh(struct Curl_easy *data, const struct dohentry *d) { int i; - infof(data, "TTL: %u seconds", d->ttl); + infof(data, "[DoH] TTL: %u seconds", d->ttl); for(i = 0; i < d->numaddr; i++) { const struct dohaddr *a = &d->addr[i]; if(a->type == DNS_TYPE_A) { - infof(data, "DoH A: %u.%u.%u.%u", + infof(data, "[DoH] A: %u.%u.%u.%u", a->ip.v4[0], a->ip.v4[1], a->ip.v4[2], a->ip.v4[3]); } @@ -756,9 +854,9 @@ static void showdoh(struct Curl_easy *data, char buffer[128]; char *ptr; size_t len; - msnprintf(buffer, 128, "DoH AAAA: "); - ptr = &buffer[10]; - len = 118; + len = msnprintf(buffer, 128, "[DoH] AAAA: "); + ptr = &buffer[len]; + len = sizeof(buffer) - len; for(j = 0; j < 16; j += 2) { size_t l; msnprintf(ptr, len, "%s%02x%02x", j?":":"", d->addr[i].ip.v6[j], @@ -770,6 +868,16 @@ static void showdoh(struct Curl_easy *data, infof(data, "%s", buffer); } } +#ifdef USE_HTTPSRR + for(i = 0; i < d->numhttps_rrs; i++) { +# ifdef CURLDEBUG + local_print_buf(data, "DoH HTTPS", + d->https_rrs[i].val, d->https_rrs[i].len); +# else + infof(data, "DoH HTTPS RR: length %d", d->https_rrs[i].len); +# endif + } +#endif for(i = 0; i < d->numcname; i++) { infof(data, "CNAME: %s", Curl_dyn_ptr(&d->cname[i])); } @@ -798,7 +906,7 @@ static CURLcode doh2ai(const struct dohentry *de, const char *hostname, struct Curl_addrinfo *prevai = NULL; struct Curl_addrinfo *firstai = NULL; struct sockaddr_in *addr; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6; #endif CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; @@ -814,7 +922,7 @@ static CURLcode doh2ai(const struct dohentry *de, const char *hostname, size_t ss_size; CURL_SA_FAMILY_T addrtype; if(de->addr[i].type == DNS_TYPE_AAAA) { -#ifndef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifndef USE_IPV6 /* we can't handle IPv6 addresses */ continue; #else @@ -863,7 +971,7 @@ static CURLcode doh2ai(const struct dohentry *de, const char *hostname, addr->sin_port = htons((unsigned short)port); break; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 case AF_INET6: addr6 = (void *)ai->ai_addr; /* storage area for this info */ DEBUGASSERT(sizeof(struct in6_addr) == sizeof(de->addr[i].ip.v6)); @@ -889,7 +997,18 @@ static CURLcode doh2ai(const struct dohentry *de, const char *hostname, #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS static const char *type2name(DNStype dnstype) { - return (dnstype == DNS_TYPE_A)?"A":"AAAA"; + switch(dnstype) { + case DNS_TYPE_A: + return "A"; + case DNS_TYPE_AAAA: + return "AAAA"; +#ifdef USE_HTTPSRR + case DNS_TYPE_HTTPS: + return "HTTPS"; +#endif + default: + return "unknown"; + } } #endif @@ -899,12 +1018,273 @@ UNITTEST void de_cleanup(struct dohentry *d) for(i = 0; i < d->numcname; i++) { Curl_dyn_free(&d->cname[i]); } +#ifdef USE_HTTPSRR + for(i = 0; i < d->numhttps_rrs; i++) + free(d->https_rrs[i].val); +#endif } +#ifdef USE_HTTPSRR + +/* + * @brief decode the DNS name in a binary RRData + * @param buf points to the buffer (in/out) + * @param remaining points to the remaining buffer length (in/out) + * @param dnsname returns the string form name on success + * @return is 1 for success, error otherwise + * + * The encoding here is defined in + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1035#section-3.1 + * + * The input buffer pointer will be modified so it points to + * just after the end of the DNS name encoding on output. (And + * that's why it's an "unsigned char **" :-) + */ +static CURLcode local_decode_rdata_name(unsigned char **buf, size_t *remaining, + char **dnsname) +{ + unsigned char *cp = NULL; + int rem = 0; + unsigned char clen = 0; /* chunk len */ + struct dynbuf thename; + + DEBUGASSERT(buf && remaining && dnsname); + if(!buf || !remaining || !dnsname) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + rem = (int)*remaining; + if(rem <= 0) { + Curl_dyn_free(&thename); + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + Curl_dyn_init(&thename, CURL_MAXLEN_host_name); + cp = *buf; + clen = *cp++; + if(clen == 0) { + /* special case - return "." as name */ + if(Curl_dyn_addn(&thename, ".", 1)) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + while(clen) { + if(clen >= rem) { + Curl_dyn_free(&thename); + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + if(Curl_dyn_addn(&thename, cp, clen) || + Curl_dyn_addn(&thename, ".", 1)) + return CURLE_TOO_LARGE; + + cp += clen; + rem -= (clen + 1); + if(rem <= 0) { + Curl_dyn_free(&thename); + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + clen = *cp++; + } + *buf = cp; + *remaining = rem - 1; + *dnsname = Curl_dyn_ptr(&thename); + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static CURLcode local_decode_rdata_alpn(unsigned char *rrval, size_t len, + char **alpns) +{ + /* + * spec here is as per draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-https, section-7.1.1 + * encoding is catenated list of strings each preceded by a one + * octet length + * output is comma-sep list of the strings + * implementations may or may not handle quoting of comma within + * string values, so we might see a comma within the wire format + * version of a string, in which case we'll precede that by a + * backslash - same goes for a backslash character, and of course + * we need to use two backslashes in strings when we mean one;-) + */ + int remaining = (int) len; + char *oval; + size_t i; + unsigned char *cp = rrval; + struct dynbuf dval; + + if(!alpns) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + Curl_dyn_init(&dval, DYN_DOH_RESPONSE); + remaining = (int)len; + cp = rrval; + while(remaining > 0) { + size_t tlen = (size_t) *cp++; + + /* if not 1st time, add comma */ + if(remaining != (int)len && Curl_dyn_addn(&dval, ",", 1)) + goto err; + remaining--; + if(tlen > (size_t)remaining) + goto err; + /* add escape char if needed, clunky but easier to read */ + for(i = 0; i != tlen; i++) { + if('\\' == *cp || ',' == *cp) { + if(Curl_dyn_addn(&dval, "\\", 1)) + goto err; + } + if(Curl_dyn_addn(&dval, cp++, 1)) + goto err; + } + remaining -= (int)tlen; + } + /* this string is always null terminated */ + oval = Curl_dyn_ptr(&dval); + if(!oval) + goto err; + *alpns = oval; + return CURLE_OK; +err: + Curl_dyn_free(&dval); + return CURLE_BAD_CONTENT_ENCODING; +} + +#ifdef CURLDEBUG +static CURLcode test_alpn_escapes(void) +{ + /* we'll use an example from draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb, figure 10 */ + static unsigned char example[] = { + 0x08, /* length 8 */ + 0x66, 0x5c, 0x6f, 0x6f, 0x2c, 0x62, 0x61, 0x72, /* value "f\\oo,bar" */ + 0x02, /* length 2 */ + 0x68, 0x32 /* value "h2" */ + }; + size_t example_len = sizeof(example); + char *aval = NULL; + static const char *expected = "f\\\\oo\\,bar,h2"; + + if(local_decode_rdata_alpn(example, example_len, &aval) != CURLE_OK) + return CURLE_BAD_CONTENT_ENCODING; + if(strlen(aval) != strlen(expected)) + return CURLE_BAD_CONTENT_ENCODING; + if(memcmp(aval, expected, strlen(aval))) + return CURLE_BAD_CONTENT_ENCODING; + return CURLE_OK; +} +#endif + +static CURLcode Curl_doh_decode_httpsrr(unsigned char *rrval, size_t len, + struct Curl_https_rrinfo **hrr) +{ + size_t remaining = len; + unsigned char *cp = rrval; + uint16_t pcode = 0, plen = 0; + struct Curl_https_rrinfo *lhrr = NULL; + char *dnsname = NULL; + +#ifdef CURLDEBUG + /* a few tests of escaping, shouldn't be here but ok for now */ + if(test_alpn_escapes() != CURLE_OK) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; +#endif + lhrr = calloc(1, sizeof(struct Curl_https_rrinfo)); + if(!lhrr) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + lhrr->val = Curl_memdup(rrval, len); + if(!lhrr->val) + goto err; + lhrr->len = len; + if(remaining <= 2) + goto err; + lhrr->priority = (uint16_t)((cp[0] << 8) + cp[1]); + cp += 2; + remaining -= (uint16_t)2; + if(local_decode_rdata_name(&cp, &remaining, &dnsname) != CURLE_OK) + goto err; + lhrr->target = dnsname; + while(remaining >= 4) { + pcode = (uint16_t)((*cp << 8) + (*(cp + 1))); + cp += 2; + plen = (uint16_t)((*cp << 8) + (*(cp + 1))); + cp += 2; + remaining -= 4; + if(pcode == HTTPS_RR_CODE_ALPN) { + if(local_decode_rdata_alpn(cp, plen, &lhrr->alpns) != CURLE_OK) + goto err; + } + if(pcode == HTTPS_RR_CODE_NO_DEF_ALPN) + lhrr->no_def_alpn = TRUE; + else if(pcode == HTTPS_RR_CODE_IPV4) { + lhrr->ipv4hints = Curl_memdup(cp, plen); + if(!lhrr->ipv4hints) + goto err; + lhrr->ipv4hints_len = (size_t)plen; + } + else if(pcode == HTTPS_RR_CODE_ECH) { + lhrr->echconfiglist = Curl_memdup(cp, plen); + if(!lhrr->echconfiglist) + goto err; + lhrr->echconfiglist_len = (size_t)plen; + } + else if(pcode == HTTPS_RR_CODE_IPV6) { + lhrr->ipv6hints = Curl_memdup(cp, plen); + if(!lhrr->ipv6hints) + goto err; + lhrr->ipv6hints_len = (size_t)plen; + } + if(plen > 0 && plen <= remaining) { + cp += plen; + remaining -= plen; + } + } + DEBUGASSERT(!remaining); + *hrr = lhrr; + return CURLE_OK; +err: + if(lhrr) { + free(lhrr->target); + free(lhrr->echconfiglist); + free(lhrr->val); + free(lhrr); + } + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; +} + +# ifdef CURLDEBUG +static void local_print_httpsrr(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_https_rrinfo *hrr) +{ + DEBUGASSERT(hrr); + infof(data, "HTTPS RR: priority %d, target: %s", + hrr->priority, hrr->target); + if(hrr->alpns) + infof(data, "HTTPS RR: alpns %s", hrr->alpns); + else + infof(data, "HTTPS RR: no alpns"); + if(hrr->no_def_alpn) + infof(data, "HTTPS RR: no_def_alpn set"); + else + infof(data, "HTTPS RR: no_def_alpn not set"); + if(hrr->ipv4hints) { + local_print_buf(data, "HTTPS RR: ipv4hints", + hrr->ipv4hints, hrr->ipv4hints_len); + } + else + infof(data, "HTTPS RR: no ipv4hints"); + if(hrr->echconfiglist) { + local_print_buf(data, "HTTPS RR: ECHConfigList", + hrr->echconfiglist, hrr->echconfiglist_len); + } + else + infof(data, "HTTPS RR: no ECHConfigList"); + if(hrr->ipv6hints) { + local_print_buf(data, "HTTPS RR: ipv6hint", + hrr->ipv6hints, hrr->ipv6hints_len); + } + else + infof(data, "HTTPS RR: no ipv6hints"); + return; +} +# endif +#endif + CURLcode Curl_doh_is_resolved(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_dns_entry **dnsp) { - struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; CURLcode result; struct dohdata *dohp = data->req.doh; *dnsp = NULL; /* defaults to no response */ @@ -913,14 +1293,20 @@ CURLcode Curl_doh_is_resolved(struct Curl_easy *data, if(!dohp->probe[DOH_PROBE_SLOT_IPADDR_V4].easy && !dohp->probe[DOH_PROBE_SLOT_IPADDR_V6].easy) { - failf(data, "Could not DoH-resolve: %s", conn->resolve_async.hostname); + failf(data, "Could not DoH-resolve: %s", data->state.async.hostname); return CONN_IS_PROXIED(data->conn)?CURLE_COULDNT_RESOLVE_PROXY: CURLE_COULDNT_RESOLVE_HOST; } else if(!dohp->pending) { +#ifndef USE_HTTPSRR DOHcode rc[DOH_PROBE_SLOTS] = { DOH_OK, DOH_OK }; +#else + DOHcode rc[DOH_PROBE_SLOTS] = { + DOH_OK, DOH_OK, DOH_OK + }; +#endif struct dohentry de; int slot; /* remove DoH handles from multi handle and close them */ @@ -953,8 +1339,11 @@ CURLcode Curl_doh_is_resolved(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_dns_entry *dns; struct Curl_addrinfo *ai; - infof(data, "DoH Host name: %s", dohp->host); - showdoh(data, &de); + + if(Curl_trc_ft_is_verbose(data, &Curl_doh_trc)) { + infof(data, "[DoH] Host name: %s", dohp->host); + showdoh(data, &de); + } result = doh2ai(&de, dohp->host, dohp->port, &ai); if(result) { @@ -976,13 +1365,29 @@ CURLcode Curl_doh_is_resolved(struct Curl_easy *data, Curl_freeaddrinfo(ai); } else { - conn->resolve_async.dns = dns; + data->state.async.dns = dns; *dnsp = dns; result = CURLE_OK; /* address resolution OK */ } } /* address processing done */ /* Now process any build-specific attributes retrieved from DNS */ +#ifdef USE_HTTPSRR + if(de.numhttps_rrs > 0 && result == CURLE_OK && *dnsp) { + struct Curl_https_rrinfo *hrr = NULL; + result = Curl_doh_decode_httpsrr(de.https_rrs->val, de.https_rrs->len, + &hrr); + if(result) { + infof(data, "Failed to decode HTTPS RR"); + return result; + } + infof(data, "Some HTTPS RR to process"); +# ifdef CURLDEBUG + local_print_httpsrr(data, hrr); +# endif + (*dnsp)->hinfo = hrr; + } +#endif /* All done */ de_cleanup(&de); diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/doh.h b/vendor/curl/lib/doh.h index 7d7b694f33..bb881ecc50 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/doh.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/doh.h @@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ #include "urldata.h" #include "curl_addrinfo.h" +#ifdef USE_HTTPSRR +# include +#endif #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_DOH @@ -51,7 +54,8 @@ typedef enum { DNS_TYPE_NS = 2, DNS_TYPE_CNAME = 5, DNS_TYPE_AAAA = 28, - DNS_TYPE_DNAME = 39 /* RFC6672 */ + DNS_TYPE_DNAME = 39, /* RFC6672 */ + DNS_TYPE_HTTPS = 65 } DNStype; /* one of these for each DoH request */ @@ -84,10 +88,9 @@ struct Curl_addrinfo *Curl_doh(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLcode Curl_doh_is_resolved(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_dns_entry **dns); -int Curl_doh_getsock(struct connectdata *conn, curl_socket_t *socks); - #define DOH_MAX_ADDR 24 #define DOH_MAX_CNAME 4 +#define DOH_MAX_HTTPS 4 struct dohaddr { int type; @@ -97,12 +100,44 @@ struct dohaddr { } ip; }; +#ifdef USE_HTTPSRR + +/* + * These are the code points for DNS wire format SvcParams as + * per draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-https + * Not all are supported now, and even those that are may need + * more work in future to fully support the spec. + */ +#define HTTPS_RR_CODE_ALPN 0x01 +#define HTTPS_RR_CODE_NO_DEF_ALPN 0x02 +#define HTTPS_RR_CODE_PORT 0x03 +#define HTTPS_RR_CODE_IPV4 0x04 +#define HTTPS_RR_CODE_ECH 0x05 +#define HTTPS_RR_CODE_IPV6 0x06 + +/* + * These may need escaping when found within an alpn string + * value. + */ +#define COMMA_CHAR ',' +#define BACKSLASH_CHAR '\\' + +struct dohhttps_rr { + uint16_t len; /* raw encoded length */ + unsigned char *val; /* raw encoded octets */ +}; +#endif + struct dohentry { struct dynbuf cname[DOH_MAX_CNAME]; struct dohaddr addr[DOH_MAX_ADDR]; int numaddr; unsigned int ttl; int numcname; +#ifdef USE_HTTPSRR + struct dohhttps_rr https_rrs[DOH_MAX_HTTPS]; + int numhttps_rrs; +#endif }; @@ -120,6 +155,8 @@ void de_init(struct dohentry *d); void de_cleanup(struct dohentry *d); #endif +extern struct curl_trc_feat Curl_doh_trc; + #else /* if DoH is disabled */ #define Curl_doh(a,b,c,d) NULL #define Curl_doh_is_resolved(x,y) CURLE_COULDNT_RESOLVE_HOST diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/dynbuf.c b/vendor/curl/lib/dynbuf.c index 2973d8da29..3b62eaf8a4 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/dynbuf.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/dynbuf.c @@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ static CURLcode dyn_nappend(struct dynbuf *s, if(fit > s->toobig) { Curl_dyn_free(s); - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + return CURLE_TOO_LARGE; } else if(!a) { DEBUGASSERT(!indx); @@ -199,6 +199,9 @@ CURLcode Curl_dyn_vaddf(struct dynbuf *s, const char *fmt, va_list ap) if(!rc) return CURLE_OK; + else if(rc == MERR_TOO_LARGE) + return CURLE_TOO_LARGE; + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; #else char *str; str = vaprintf(fmt, ap); /* this allocs a new string to append */ @@ -210,8 +213,8 @@ CURLcode Curl_dyn_vaddf(struct dynbuf *s, const char *fmt, va_list ap) } /* If we failed, we cleanup the whole buffer and return error */ Curl_dyn_free(s); -#endif return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; +#endif } /* diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/dynbuf.h b/vendor/curl/lib/dynbuf.h index 31a9130197..7dbaab886e 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/dynbuf.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/dynbuf.h @@ -61,9 +61,9 @@ CURLcode Curl_dyn_addn(struct dynbuf *s, const void *mem, size_t len) CURLcode Curl_dyn_add(struct dynbuf *s, const char *str) WARN_UNUSED_RESULT; CURLcode Curl_dyn_addf(struct dynbuf *s, const char *fmt, ...) - WARN_UNUSED_RESULT; + WARN_UNUSED_RESULT CURL_PRINTF(2, 3); CURLcode Curl_dyn_vaddf(struct dynbuf *s, const char *fmt, va_list ap) - WARN_UNUSED_RESULT; + WARN_UNUSED_RESULT CURL_PRINTF(2, 0); void Curl_dyn_reset(struct dynbuf *s); CURLcode Curl_dyn_tail(struct dynbuf *s, size_t trail); CURLcode Curl_dyn_setlen(struct dynbuf *s, size_t set); diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/easy.c b/vendor/curl/lib/easy.c index 322d1a41b8..a04dbedd87 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/easy.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/easy.c @@ -480,13 +480,15 @@ static int events_socket(struct Curl_easy *easy, /* easy handle */ ev->list = nxt; free(m); m = nxt; - infof(easy, "socket cb: socket %d REMOVED", s); + infof(easy, "socket cb: socket %" CURL_FORMAT_SOCKET_T + " REMOVED", s); } else { /* The socket 's' is already being monitored, update the activity mask. Convert from libcurl bitmask to the poll one. */ m->socket.events = socketcb2poll(what); - infof(easy, "socket cb: socket %d UPDATED as %s%s", s, + infof(easy, "socket cb: socket %" CURL_FORMAT_SOCKET_T + " UPDATED as %s%s", s, (what&CURL_POLL_IN)?"IN":"", (what&CURL_POLL_OUT)?"OUT":""); } @@ -510,7 +512,8 @@ static int events_socket(struct Curl_easy *easy, /* easy handle */ m->socket.events = socketcb2poll(what); m->socket.revents = 0; ev->list = m; - infof(easy, "socket cb: socket %d ADDED as %s%s", s, + infof(easy, "socket cb: socket %" CURL_FORMAT_SOCKET_T + " ADDED as %s%s", s, (what&CURL_POLL_IN)?"IN":"", (what&CURL_POLL_OUT)?"OUT":""); } @@ -599,8 +602,9 @@ static CURLcode wait_or_timeout(struct Curl_multi *multi, struct events *ev) if(fds[i].revents) { /* socket activity, tell libcurl */ int act = poll2cselect(fds[i].revents); /* convert */ - infof(multi->easyp, "call curl_multi_socket_action(socket %d)", - fds[i].fd); + infof(multi->easyp, + "call curl_multi_socket_action(socket " + "%" CURL_FORMAT_SOCKET_T ")", fds[i].fd); mcode = curl_multi_socket_action(multi, fds[i].fd, act, &ev->running_handles); } @@ -684,9 +688,9 @@ static CURLcode easy_transfer(struct Curl_multi *multi) /* Make sure to return some kind of error if there was a multi problem */ if(mcode) { result = (mcode == CURLM_OUT_OF_MEMORY) ? CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY : - /* The other multi errors should never happen, so return - something suitably generic */ - CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + /* The other multi errors should never happen, so return + something suitably generic */ + CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; } return result; @@ -724,6 +728,8 @@ static CURLcode easy_perform(struct Curl_easy *data, bool events) /* clear this as early as possible */ data->set.errorbuffer[0] = 0; + data->state.os_errno = 0; + if(data->multi) { failf(data, "easy handle already used in multi handle"); return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; @@ -737,7 +743,6 @@ static CURLcode easy_perform(struct Curl_easy *data, bool events) multi = Curl_multi_handle(1, 3, 7); if(!multi) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - data->multi_easy = multi; } if(multi->in_callback) @@ -746,15 +751,18 @@ static CURLcode easy_perform(struct Curl_easy *data, bool events) /* Copy the MAXCONNECTS option to the multi handle */ curl_multi_setopt(multi, CURLMOPT_MAXCONNECTS, (long)data->set.maxconnects); + data->multi_easy = NULL; /* pretend it does not exist */ mcode = curl_multi_add_handle(multi, data); if(mcode) { curl_multi_cleanup(multi); - data->multi_easy = NULL; if(mcode == CURLM_OUT_OF_MEMORY) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; } + /* assign this after curl_multi_add_handle() */ + data->multi_easy = multi; + sigpipe_ignore(data, &pipe_st); /* run the transfer */ @@ -973,6 +981,36 @@ struct Curl_easy *curl_easy_duphandle(struct Curl_easy *data) } #endif +#ifdef CURLRES_ASYNCH + /* Clone the resolver handle, if present, for the new handle */ + if(Curl_resolver_duphandle(outcurl, + &outcurl->state.async.resolver, + data->state.async.resolver)) + goto fail; +#endif + +#ifdef USE_ARES + { + CURLcode rc; + + rc = Curl_set_dns_servers(outcurl, data->set.str[STRING_DNS_SERVERS]); + if(rc && rc != CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN) + goto fail; + + rc = Curl_set_dns_interface(outcurl, data->set.str[STRING_DNS_INTERFACE]); + if(rc && rc != CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN) + goto fail; + + rc = Curl_set_dns_local_ip4(outcurl, data->set.str[STRING_DNS_LOCAL_IP4]); + if(rc && rc != CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN) + goto fail; + + rc = Curl_set_dns_local_ip6(outcurl, data->set.str[STRING_DNS_LOCAL_IP6]); + if(rc && rc != CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN) + goto fail; + } +#endif /* USE_ARES */ + Curl_initinfo(outcurl); outcurl->magic = CURLEASY_MAGIC_NUMBER; @@ -987,7 +1025,6 @@ struct Curl_easy *curl_easy_duphandle(struct Curl_easy *data) #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_COOKIES free(outcurl->cookies); #endif - free(outcurl->state.buffer); Curl_dyn_free(&outcurl->state.headerb); Curl_altsvc_cleanup(&outcurl->asi); Curl_hsts_cleanup(&outcurl->hsts); @@ -1004,7 +1041,7 @@ struct Curl_easy *curl_easy_duphandle(struct Curl_easy *data) */ void curl_easy_reset(struct Curl_easy *data) { - Curl_free_request_state(data); + Curl_req_hard_reset(&data->req, data); /* zero out UserDefined data: */ Curl_freeset(data); @@ -1050,6 +1087,7 @@ CURLcode curl_easy_pause(struct Curl_easy *data, int action) int oldstate; int newstate; bool recursive = FALSE; + bool keep_changed, unpause_read, not_all_paused; if(!GOOD_EASY_HANDLE(data) || !data->conn) /* crazy input, don't continue */ @@ -1065,60 +1103,47 @@ CURLcode curl_easy_pause(struct Curl_easy *data, int action) ((action & CURLPAUSE_RECV)?KEEP_RECV_PAUSE:0) | ((action & CURLPAUSE_SEND)?KEEP_SEND_PAUSE:0); - if((newstate & (KEEP_RECV_PAUSE| KEEP_SEND_PAUSE)) == oldstate) { - /* Not changing any pause state, return */ - DEBUGF(infof(data, "pause: no change, early return")); - return CURLE_OK; - } - - /* Unpause parts in active mime tree. */ - if((k->keepon & ~newstate & KEEP_SEND_PAUSE) && - (data->mstate == MSTATE_PERFORMING || - data->mstate == MSTATE_RATELIMITING) && - data->state.fread_func == (curl_read_callback) Curl_mime_read) { - Curl_mime_unpause(data->state.in); - } - - /* put it back in the keepon */ + keep_changed = ((newstate & (KEEP_RECV_PAUSE| KEEP_SEND_PAUSE)) != oldstate); + not_all_paused = (newstate & (KEEP_RECV_PAUSE|KEEP_SEND_PAUSE)) != + (KEEP_RECV_PAUSE|KEEP_SEND_PAUSE); + unpause_read = ((k->keepon & ~newstate & KEEP_SEND_PAUSE) && + (data->mstate == MSTATE_PERFORMING || + data->mstate == MSTATE_RATELIMITING)); + /* Unpausing writes is detected on the next run in + * transfer.c:Curl_readwrite(). This is because this may result + * in a transfer error if the application's callbacks fail */ + + /* Set the new keepon state, so it takes effect no matter what error + * may happen afterwards. */ k->keepon = newstate; - if(!(newstate & KEEP_RECV_PAUSE)) { - Curl_conn_ev_data_pause(data, FALSE); - result = Curl_client_unpause(data); - if(result) - return result; - } - -#ifdef USE_HYPER - if(!(newstate & KEEP_SEND_PAUSE)) { - /* need to wake the send body waker */ - if(data->hyp.send_body_waker) { - hyper_waker_wake(data->hyp.send_body_waker); - data->hyp.send_body_waker = NULL; - } - } -#endif - - /* if there's no error and we're not pausing both directions, we want - to have this handle checked soon */ - if((newstate & (KEEP_RECV_PAUSE|KEEP_SEND_PAUSE)) != - (KEEP_RECV_PAUSE|KEEP_SEND_PAUSE)) { - Curl_expire(data, 0, EXPIRE_RUN_NOW); /* get this handle going again */ - + /* If not completely pausing both directions now, run again in any case. */ + if(not_all_paused) { + Curl_expire(data, 0, EXPIRE_RUN_NOW); /* reset the too-slow time keeper */ data->state.keeps_speed.tv_sec = 0; - - if(!data->state.tempcount) - /* if not pausing again, force a recv/send check of this connection as - the data might've been read off the socket already */ - data->conn->cselect_bits = CURL_CSELECT_IN | CURL_CSELECT_OUT; - if(data->multi) { - if(Curl_update_timer(data->multi)) - return CURLE_ABORTED_BY_CALLBACK; + /* Simulate socket events on next run for unpaused directions */ + if(!(newstate & KEEP_SEND_PAUSE)) + data->state.select_bits |= CURL_CSELECT_OUT; + if(!(newstate & KEEP_RECV_PAUSE)) + data->state.select_bits |= CURL_CSELECT_IN; + /* On changes, tell application to update its timers. */ + if(keep_changed && data->multi) { + if(Curl_update_timer(data->multi)) { + result = CURLE_ABORTED_BY_CALLBACK; + goto out; + } } } - if(!data->state.done) + if(unpause_read) { + result = Curl_creader_unpause(data); + if(result) + goto out; + } + +out: + if(!result && !data->state.done && keep_changed) /* This transfer may have been moved in or out of the bundle, update the corresponding socket callback, if used */ result = Curl_updatesocket(data); @@ -1132,9 +1157,11 @@ CURLcode curl_easy_pause(struct Curl_easy *data, int action) } -static CURLcode easy_connection(struct Curl_easy *data, curl_socket_t *sfd, +static CURLcode easy_connection(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata **connp) { + curl_socket_t sfd; + if(!data) return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; @@ -1144,9 +1171,9 @@ static CURLcode easy_connection(struct Curl_easy *data, curl_socket_t *sfd, return CURLE_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; } - *sfd = Curl_getconnectinfo(data, connp); + sfd = Curl_getconnectinfo(data, connp); - if(*sfd == CURL_SOCKET_BAD) { + if(sfd == CURL_SOCKET_BAD) { failf(data, "Failed to get recent socket"); return CURLE_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; } @@ -1162,7 +1189,6 @@ static CURLcode easy_connection(struct Curl_easy *data, curl_socket_t *sfd, CURLcode curl_easy_recv(struct Curl_easy *data, void *buffer, size_t buflen, size_t *n) { - curl_socket_t sfd; CURLcode result; ssize_t n1; struct connectdata *c; @@ -1170,7 +1196,7 @@ CURLcode curl_easy_recv(struct Curl_easy *data, void *buffer, size_t buflen, if(Curl_is_in_callback(data)) return CURLE_RECURSIVE_API_CALL; - result = easy_connection(data, &sfd, &c); + result = easy_connection(data, &c); if(result) return result; @@ -1180,7 +1206,7 @@ CURLcode curl_easy_recv(struct Curl_easy *data, void *buffer, size_t buflen, Curl_attach_connection(data, c); *n = 0; - result = Curl_read(data, sfd, buffer, buflen, &n1); + result = Curl_conn_recv(data, FIRSTSOCKET, buffer, buflen, &n1); if(result) return result; @@ -1192,11 +1218,10 @@ CURLcode curl_easy_recv(struct Curl_easy *data, void *buffer, size_t buflen, #ifdef USE_WEBSOCKETS CURLcode Curl_connect_only_attach(struct Curl_easy *data) { - curl_socket_t sfd; CURLcode result; struct connectdata *c = NULL; - result = easy_connection(data, &sfd, &c); + result = easy_connection(data, &c); if(result) return result; @@ -1215,15 +1240,14 @@ CURLcode Curl_connect_only_attach(struct Curl_easy *data) * This is the private internal version of curl_easy_send() */ CURLcode Curl_senddata(struct Curl_easy *data, const void *buffer, - size_t buflen, ssize_t *n) + size_t buflen, size_t *n) { - curl_socket_t sfd; CURLcode result; - ssize_t n1; struct connectdata *c = NULL; SIGPIPE_VARIABLE(pipe_st); - result = easy_connection(data, &sfd, &c); + *n = 0; + result = easy_connection(data, &c); if(result) return result; @@ -1232,20 +1256,12 @@ CURLcode Curl_senddata(struct Curl_easy *data, const void *buffer, needs to be reattached */ Curl_attach_connection(data, c); - *n = 0; sigpipe_ignore(data, &pipe_st); - result = Curl_write(data, sfd, buffer, buflen, &n1); + result = Curl_conn_send(data, FIRSTSOCKET, buffer, buflen, n); sigpipe_restore(&pipe_st); - if(n1 == -1) + if(result && result != CURLE_AGAIN) return CURLE_SEND_ERROR; - - /* detect EAGAIN */ - if(!result && !n1) - return CURLE_AGAIN; - - *n = n1; - return result; } @@ -1256,13 +1272,13 @@ CURLcode Curl_senddata(struct Curl_easy *data, const void *buffer, CURLcode curl_easy_send(struct Curl_easy *data, const void *buffer, size_t buflen, size_t *n) { - ssize_t written = 0; + size_t written = 0; CURLcode result; if(Curl_is_in_callback(data)) return CURLE_RECURSIVE_API_CALL; result = Curl_senddata(data, buffer, buflen, &written); - *n = (size_t)written; + *n = written; return result; } @@ -1287,7 +1303,7 @@ static int conn_upkeep(struct Curl_easy *data, conn->handler->connection_check(data, conn, CONNCHECK_KEEPALIVE); } else { - /* Do the generic action on the FIRSTSOCKE filter chain */ + /* Do the generic action on the FIRSTSOCKET filter chain */ Curl_conn_keep_alive(data, conn, FIRSTSOCKET); } Curl_detach_connection(data); diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/easygetopt.c b/vendor/curl/lib/easygetopt.c index 2b8a521cd2..a0239a89fb 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/easygetopt.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/easygetopt.c @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ * ___|___/|_| ______| * - * Copyright (C) Daniel Stenberg, , et al. + * Copyright (C) Daniel Stenberg, , et al. * * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/easyif.h b/vendor/curl/lib/easyif.h index 6448952966..6ce3483c64 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/easyif.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/easyif.h @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ * Prototypes for library-wide functions provided by easy.c */ CURLcode Curl_senddata(struct Curl_easy *data, const void *buffer, - size_t buflen, ssize_t *n); + size_t buflen, size_t *n); #ifdef USE_WEBSOCKETS CURLcode Curl_connect_only_attach(struct Curl_easy *data); diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/easyoptions.c b/vendor/curl/lib/easyoptions.c index e69c658b0c..c79d136707 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/easyoptions.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/easyoptions.c @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| * - * Copyright (C) Daniel Stenberg, , et al. + * Copyright (C) Daniel Stenberg, , et al. * * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms @@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ struct curl_easyoption Curl_easyopts[] = { {"DOH_SSL_VERIFYPEER", CURLOPT_DOH_SSL_VERIFYPEER, CURLOT_LONG, 0}, {"DOH_SSL_VERIFYSTATUS", CURLOPT_DOH_SSL_VERIFYSTATUS, CURLOT_LONG, 0}, {"DOH_URL", CURLOPT_DOH_URL, CURLOT_STRING, 0}, + {"ECH", CURLOPT_ECH, CURLOT_STRING, 0}, {"EGDSOCKET", CURLOPT_EGDSOCKET, CURLOT_STRING, 0}, {"ENCODING", CURLOPT_ACCEPT_ENCODING, CURLOT_STRING, CURLOT_FLAG_ALIAS}, {"ERRORBUFFER", CURLOPT_ERRORBUFFER, CURLOT_OBJECT, 0}, @@ -274,6 +275,8 @@ struct curl_easyoption Curl_easyopts[] = { {"SEEKFUNCTION", CURLOPT_SEEKFUNCTION, CURLOT_FUNCTION, 0}, {"SERVER_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT", CURLOPT_SERVER_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT, CURLOT_LONG, 0}, + {"SERVER_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_MS", CURLOPT_SERVER_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_MS, + CURLOT_LONG, 0}, {"SERVICE_NAME", CURLOPT_SERVICE_NAME, CURLOT_STRING, 0}, {"SHARE", CURLOPT_SHARE, CURLOT_OBJECT, 0}, {"SOCKOPTDATA", CURLOPT_SOCKOPTDATA, CURLOT_CBPTR, 0}, @@ -373,6 +376,6 @@ struct curl_easyoption Curl_easyopts[] = { */ int Curl_easyopts_check(void) { - return ((CURLOPT_LASTENTRY%10000) != (323 + 1)); + return ((CURLOPT_LASTENTRY%10000) != (325 + 1)); } #endif diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/file.c b/vendor/curl/lib/file.c index c985071376..db860225b0 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/file.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/file.c @@ -50,6 +50,14 @@ #include #endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H +#include +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_DIRENT_H +#include +#endif + #include "strtoofft.h" #include "urldata.h" #include @@ -59,6 +67,7 @@ #include "file.h" #include "speedcheck.h" #include "getinfo.h" +#include "multiif.h" #include "transfer.h" #include "url.h" #include "parsedate.h" /* for the week day and month names */ @@ -100,7 +109,7 @@ static CURLcode file_setup_connection(struct Curl_easy *data, */ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_file = { - "FILE", /* scheme */ + "file", /* scheme */ file_setup_connection, /* setup_connection */ file_do, /* do_it */ file_done, /* done */ @@ -113,7 +122,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_file = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ file_disconnect, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ 0, /* defport */ @@ -290,16 +300,17 @@ static CURLcode file_upload(struct Curl_easy *data) int fd; int mode; CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; - char *buf = data->state.buffer; + char *xfer_ulbuf; + size_t xfer_ulblen; curl_off_t bytecount = 0; struct_stat file_stat; - const char *buf2; + const char *sendbuf; + bool eos = FALSE; /* * Since FILE: doesn't do the full init, we need to provide some extra * assignments here. */ - data->req.upload_fromhere = buf; if(!dir) return CURLE_FILE_COULDNT_READ_FILE; /* fix: better error code */ @@ -338,11 +349,16 @@ static CURLcode file_upload(struct Curl_easy *data) data->state.resume_from = (curl_off_t)file_stat.st_size; } - while(!result) { + result = Curl_multi_xfer_ulbuf_borrow(data, &xfer_ulbuf, &xfer_ulblen); + if(result) + goto out; + + while(!result && !eos) { size_t nread; ssize_t nwrite; size_t readcount; - result = Curl_fillreadbuffer(data, data->set.buffer_size, &readcount); + + result = Curl_client_read(data, xfer_ulbuf, xfer_ulblen, &readcount, &eos); if(result) break; @@ -356,19 +372,19 @@ static CURLcode file_upload(struct Curl_easy *data) if((curl_off_t)nread <= data->state.resume_from) { data->state.resume_from -= nread; nread = 0; - buf2 = buf; + sendbuf = xfer_ulbuf; } else { - buf2 = buf + data->state.resume_from; + sendbuf = xfer_ulbuf + data->state.resume_from; nread -= (size_t)data->state.resume_from; data->state.resume_from = 0; } } else - buf2 = buf; + sendbuf = xfer_ulbuf; /* write the data to the target */ - nwrite = write(fd, buf2, nread); + nwrite = write(fd, sendbuf, nread); if((size_t)nwrite != nread) { result = CURLE_SEND_ERROR; break; @@ -386,7 +402,9 @@ static CURLcode file_upload(struct Curl_easy *data) if(!result && Curl_pgrsUpdate(data)) result = CURLE_ABORTED_BY_CALLBACK; +out: close(fd); + Curl_multi_xfer_ulbuf_release(data, xfer_ulbuf); return result; } @@ -413,14 +431,13 @@ static CURLcode file_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) curl_off_t expected_size = -1; bool size_known; bool fstated = FALSE; - char *buf = data->state.buffer; int fd; struct FILEPROTO *file; + char *xfer_buf; + size_t xfer_blen; *done = TRUE; /* unconditionally */ - Curl_pgrsStartNow(data); - if(data->state.upload) return file_upload(data); @@ -438,12 +455,9 @@ static CURLcode file_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) fstated = TRUE; } - if(fstated && !data->state.range && data->set.timecondition) { - if(!Curl_meets_timecondition(data, data->info.filetime)) { - *done = TRUE; - return CURLE_OK; - } - } + if(fstated && !data->state.range && data->set.timecondition && + !Curl_meets_timecondition(data, data->info.filetime)) + return CURLE_OK; if(fstated) { time_t filetime; @@ -535,48 +549,90 @@ static CURLcode file_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) Curl_pgrsSetDownloadSize(data, expected_size); if(data->state.resume_from) { - if(data->state.resume_from != - lseek(fd, data->state.resume_from, SEEK_SET)) + if(!S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode)) { + if(data->state.resume_from != + lseek(fd, data->state.resume_from, SEEK_SET)) + return CURLE_BAD_DOWNLOAD_RESUME; + } + else { return CURLE_BAD_DOWNLOAD_RESUME; + } } - Curl_pgrsTime(data, TIMER_STARTTRANSFER); + result = Curl_multi_xfer_buf_borrow(data, &xfer_buf, &xfer_blen); + if(result) + goto out; - while(!result) { - ssize_t nread; - /* Don't fill a whole buffer if we want less than all data */ - size_t bytestoread; + if(!S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode)) { + while(!result) { + ssize_t nread; + /* Don't fill a whole buffer if we want less than all data */ + size_t bytestoread; - if(size_known) { - bytestoread = (expected_size < data->set.buffer_size) ? - curlx_sotouz(expected_size) : (size_t)data->set.buffer_size; - } - else - bytestoread = data->set.buffer_size-1; + if(size_known) { + bytestoread = (expected_size < (curl_off_t)(xfer_blen-1)) ? + curlx_sotouz(expected_size) : (xfer_blen-1); + } + else + bytestoread = xfer_blen-1; - nread = read(fd, buf, bytestoread); + nread = read(fd, xfer_buf, bytestoread); - if(nread > 0) - buf[nread] = 0; + if(nread > 0) + xfer_buf[nread] = 0; - if(nread <= 0 || (size_known && (expected_size == 0))) - break; + if(nread <= 0 || (size_known && (expected_size == 0))) + break; - if(size_known) - expected_size -= nread; + if(size_known) + expected_size -= nread; - result = Curl_client_write(data, CLIENTWRITE_BODY, buf, nread); - if(result) - return result; + result = Curl_client_write(data, CLIENTWRITE_BODY, xfer_buf, nread); + if(result) + goto out; - if(Curl_pgrsUpdate(data)) - result = CURLE_ABORTED_BY_CALLBACK; - else - result = Curl_speedcheck(data, Curl_now()); + if(Curl_pgrsUpdate(data)) + result = CURLE_ABORTED_BY_CALLBACK; + else + result = Curl_speedcheck(data, Curl_now()); + if(result) + goto out; + } } + else { +#ifdef HAVE_OPENDIR + DIR *dir = opendir(file->path); + struct dirent *entry; + + if(!dir) { + result = CURLE_READ_ERROR; + goto out; + } + else { + while((entry = readdir(dir))) { + if(entry->d_name[0] != '.') { + result = Curl_client_write(data, CLIENTWRITE_BODY, + entry->d_name, strlen(entry->d_name)); + if(result) + break; + result = Curl_client_write(data, CLIENTWRITE_BODY, "\n", 1); + if(result) + break; + } + } + closedir(dir); + } +#else + failf(data, "Directory listing not yet implemented on this platform."); + result = CURLE_READ_ERROR; +#endif + } + if(Curl_pgrsUpdate(data)) result = CURLE_ABORTED_BY_CALLBACK; +out: + Curl_multi_xfer_buf_release(data, xfer_buf); return result; } diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/fopen.c b/vendor/curl/lib/fopen.c index 851279fe12..0bdf2e11b6 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/fopen.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/fopen.c @@ -129,7 +129,12 @@ CURLcode Curl_fopen(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *filename, } result = CURLE_WRITE_ERROR; +#if (defined(ANDROID) || defined(__ANDROID__)) && \ + (defined(__i386__) || defined(__arm__)) + fd = open(tempstore, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, (mode_t)(0600|sb.st_mode)); +#else fd = open(tempstore, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0600|sb.st_mode); +#endif if(fd == -1) goto fail; diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/formdata.c b/vendor/curl/lib/formdata.c index 05dc9b53d6..d6a1697aa7 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/formdata.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/formdata.c @@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ CURLFORMcode FormAdd(struct curl_httppost **httppost, case CURLFORM_PTRNAME: current_form->flags |= HTTPPOST_PTRNAME; /* fall through */ - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case CURLFORM_COPYNAME: if(current_form->name) return_value = CURL_FORMADD_OPTION_TWICE; @@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ CURLFORMcode FormAdd(struct curl_httppost **httppost, */ case CURLFORM_PTRCONTENTS: current_form->flags |= HTTPPOST_PTRCONTENTS; - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case CURLFORM_COPYCONTENTS: if(current_form->value) return_value = CURL_FORMADD_OPTION_TWICE; @@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ CURLFORMcode FormAdd(struct curl_httppost **httppost, app passed in a bad combo, so we better check for that first. */ if(form->name) { /* copy name (without strdup; possibly not null-terminated) */ - form->name = Curl_strndup(form->name, form->namelength? + form->name = Curl_memdup0(form->name, form->namelength? form->namelength: strlen(form->name)); } @@ -779,11 +779,9 @@ static CURLcode setname(curl_mimepart *part, const char *name, size_t len) if(!name || !len) return curl_mime_name(part, name); - zname = malloc(len + 1); + zname = Curl_memdup0(name, len); if(!zname) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - memcpy(zname, name, len); - zname[len] = '\0'; res = curl_mime_name(part, zname); free(zname); return res; diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/ftp.c b/vendor/curl/lib/ftp.c index a8dcedf531..b88d4d7b0f 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/ftp.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/ftp.c @@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ #include "warnless.h" #include "http_proxy.h" #include "socks.h" +#include "strdup.h" /* The last 3 #include files should be in this order */ #include "curl_printf.h" #include "curl_memory.h" @@ -84,21 +85,99 @@ #define INET_ADDRSTRLEN 16 #endif +/* macro to check for a three-digit ftp status code at the start of the + given string */ +#define STATUSCODE(line) (ISDIGIT(line[0]) && ISDIGIT(line[1]) && \ + ISDIGIT(line[2])) + +/* macro to check for the last line in an FTP server response */ +#define LASTLINE(line) (STATUSCODE(line) && (' ' == line[3])) + #ifdef CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS #define ftp_pasv_verbose(a,b,c,d) Curl_nop_stmt +#define FTP_CSTATE(c) "" +#define FTP_DSTATE(d) "" +#else /* CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS */ + /* for tracing purposes */ +static const char * const ftp_state_names[]={ + "STOP", + "WAIT220", + "AUTH", + "USER", + "PASS", + "ACCT", + "PBSZ", + "PROT", + "CCC", + "PWD", + "SYST", + "NAMEFMT", + "QUOTE", + "RETR_PREQUOTE", + "STOR_PREQUOTE", + "POSTQUOTE", + "CWD", + "MKD", + "MDTM", + "TYPE", + "LIST_TYPE", + "RETR_TYPE", + "STOR_TYPE", + "SIZE", + "RETR_SIZE", + "STOR_SIZE", + "REST", + "RETR_REST", + "PORT", + "PRET", + "PASV", + "LIST", + "RETR", + "STOR", + "QUIT" +}; +#define FTP_CSTATE(c) ((c)? ftp_state_names[(c)->proto.ftpc.state] : "???") +#define FTP_DSTATE(d) (((d) && (d)->conn)? \ + ftp_state_names[(d)->conn->proto.ftpc.state] : "???") + +#endif /* !CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS */ + +/* This is the ONLY way to change FTP state! */ +static void _ftp_state(struct Curl_easy *data, + ftpstate newstate +#ifdef DEBUGBUILD + , int lineno +#endif + ) +{ + struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; + struct ftp_conn *ftpc = &conn->proto.ftpc; + +#if defined(CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS) +#ifdef DEBUGBUILD + (void)lineno; +#endif +#else /* CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS */ + if(ftpc->state != newstate) +#ifdef DEBUGBUILD + CURL_TRC_FTP(data, "[%s] -> [%s] (line %d)", FTP_DSTATE(data), + ftp_state_names[newstate], lineno); +#else + CURL_TRC_FTP(data, "[%s] -> [%s]", FTP_DSTATE(data), + ftp_state_names[newstate]); #endif +#endif /* !CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS */ + + ftpc->state = newstate; +} + /* Local API functions */ #ifndef DEBUGBUILD -static void _ftp_state(struct Curl_easy *data, - ftpstate newstate); #define ftp_state(x,y) _ftp_state(x,y) -#else -static void _ftp_state(struct Curl_easy *data, - ftpstate newstate, - int lineno); +#else /* !DEBUGBUILD */ #define ftp_state(x,y) _ftp_state(x,y,__LINE__) -#endif +#endif /* DEBUGBUILD */ static CURLcode ftp_sendquote(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, @@ -142,7 +221,7 @@ static CURLcode wc_statemach(struct Curl_easy *data); static void wc_data_dtor(void *ptr); static CURLcode ftp_state_retr(struct Curl_easy *data, curl_off_t filesize); static CURLcode ftp_readresp(struct Curl_easy *data, - curl_socket_t sockfd, + int sockindex, struct pingpong *pp, int *ftpcode, size_t *size); @@ -154,7 +233,7 @@ static CURLcode ftp_dophase_done(struct Curl_easy *data, */ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_ftp = { - "FTP", /* scheme */ + "ftp", /* scheme */ ftp_setup_connection, /* setup_connection */ ftp_do, /* do_it */ ftp_done, /* done */ @@ -167,7 +246,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_ftp = { ftp_domore_getsock, /* domore_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ ftp_disconnect, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_FTP, /* defport */ @@ -185,7 +265,7 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_ftp = { */ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_ftps = { - "FTPS", /* scheme */ + "ftps", /* scheme */ ftp_setup_connection, /* setup_connection */ ftp_do, /* do_it */ ftp_done, /* done */ @@ -198,7 +278,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_ftps = { ftp_domore_getsock, /* domore_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ ftp_disconnect, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_FTPS, /* defport */ @@ -212,6 +293,7 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_ftps = { static void close_secondarysocket(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn) { + CURL_TRC_FTP(data, "[%s] closing DATA connection", FTP_DSTATE(data)); Curl_conn_close(data, SECONDARYSOCKET); Curl_conn_cf_discard_all(data, conn, SECONDARYSOCKET); } @@ -246,6 +328,98 @@ static void freedirs(struct ftp_conn *ftpc) Curl_safefree(ftpc->newhost); } +#ifdef CURL_DO_LINEEND_CONV +/*********************************************************************** + * + * Lineend Conversions + * On ASCII transfers, e.g. directory listings, we might get lines + * ending in '\r\n' and we prefer just '\n'. + * We might also get a lonely '\r' which we convert into a '\n'. + */ +struct ftp_cw_lc_ctx { + struct Curl_cwriter super; + bool newline_pending; +}; + +static CURLcode ftp_cw_lc_write(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_cwriter *writer, int type, + const char *buf, size_t blen) +{ + static const char nl = '\n'; + struct ftp_cw_lc_ctx *ctx = writer->ctx; + + if(!(type & CLIENTWRITE_BODY) || + data->conn->proto.ftpc.transfertype != 'A') + return Curl_cwriter_write(data, writer->next, type, buf, blen); + + /* ASCII mode BODY data, convert lineends */ + while(blen) { + /* do not pass EOS when writing parts */ + int chunk_type = (type & ~CLIENTWRITE_EOS); + const char *cp; + size_t chunk_len; + CURLcode result; + + if(ctx->newline_pending) { + if(buf[0] != '\n') { + /* previous chunk ended in '\r' and we do not see a '\n' in this one, + * need to write a newline. */ + result = Curl_cwriter_write(data, writer->next, chunk_type, &nl, 1); + if(result) + return result; + } + /* either we just wrote the newline or it is part of the next + * chunk of bytes we write. */ + data->state.crlf_conversions++; + ctx->newline_pending = FALSE; + } + + cp = memchr(buf, '\r', blen); + if(!cp) + break; + + /* write the bytes before the '\r', excluding the '\r' */ + chunk_len = cp - buf; + if(chunk_len) { + result = Curl_cwriter_write(data, writer->next, chunk_type, + buf, chunk_len); + if(result) + return result; + } + /* skip the '\r', we now have a newline pending */ + buf = cp + 1; + blen = blen - chunk_len - 1; + ctx->newline_pending = TRUE; + } + + /* Any remaining data does not contain a '\r' */ + if(blen) { + DEBUGASSERT(!ctx->newline_pending); + return Curl_cwriter_write(data, writer->next, type, buf, blen); + } + else if(type & CLIENTWRITE_EOS) { + /* EndOfStream, if we have a trailing cr, now is the time to write it */ + if(ctx->newline_pending) { + ctx->newline_pending = FALSE; + data->state.crlf_conversions++; + return Curl_cwriter_write(data, writer->next, type, &nl, 1); + } + /* Always pass on the EOS type indicator */ + return Curl_cwriter_write(data, writer->next, type, buf, 0); + } + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static const struct Curl_cwtype ftp_cw_lc = { + "ftp-lineconv", + NULL, + Curl_cwriter_def_init, + ftp_cw_lc_write, + Curl_cwriter_def_close, + sizeof(struct ftp_cw_lc_ctx) +}; + +#endif /* CURL_DO_LINEEND_CONV */ /*********************************************************************** * * AcceptServerConnect() @@ -259,7 +433,7 @@ static CURLcode AcceptServerConnect(struct Curl_easy *data) struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; curl_socket_t sock = conn->sock[SECONDARYSOCKET]; curl_socket_t s = CURL_SOCKET_BAD; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 struct Curl_sockaddr_storage add; #else struct sockaddr_in add; @@ -285,8 +459,10 @@ static CURLcode AcceptServerConnect(struct Curl_easy *data) (void)curlx_nonblock(s, TRUE); /* enable non-blocking */ /* Replace any filter on SECONDARY with one listening on this socket */ result = Curl_conn_tcp_accepted_set(data, conn, SECONDARYSOCKET, &s); - if(result) + if(result) { + sclose(s); return result; + } if(data->set.fsockopt) { int error = 0; @@ -362,10 +538,11 @@ static CURLcode ReceivedServerConnect(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *received) curl_socket_t data_sock = conn->sock[SECONDARYSOCKET]; struct ftp_conn *ftpc = &conn->proto.ftpc; struct pingpong *pp = &ftpc->pp; - int result; + int socketstate = 0; timediff_t timeout_ms; ssize_t nread; int ftpcode; + bool response = FALSE; *received = FALSE; @@ -378,17 +555,21 @@ static CURLcode ReceivedServerConnect(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *received) } /* First check whether there is a cached response from server */ - if(pp->cache_size && pp->cache && pp->cache[0] > '3') { + if(Curl_dyn_len(&pp->recvbuf) && (*Curl_dyn_ptr(&pp->recvbuf) > '3')) { /* Data connection could not be established, let's return */ infof(data, "There is negative response in cache while serv connect"); (void)Curl_GetFTPResponse(data, &nread, &ftpcode); return CURLE_FTP_ACCEPT_FAILED; } - result = Curl_socket_check(ctrl_sock, data_sock, CURL_SOCKET_BAD, 0); + if(pp->overflow) + /* there is pending control data still in the buffer to read */ + response = TRUE; + else + socketstate = Curl_socket_check(ctrl_sock, data_sock, CURL_SOCKET_BAD, 0); /* see if the connection request is already here */ - switch(result) { + switch(socketstate) { case -1: /* error */ /* let's die here */ failf(data, "Error while waiting for server connect"); @@ -396,23 +577,47 @@ static CURLcode ReceivedServerConnect(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *received) case 0: /* Server connect is not received yet */ break; /* loop */ default: - - if(result & CURL_CSELECT_IN2) { + if(socketstate & CURL_CSELECT_IN2) { infof(data, "Ready to accept data connection from server"); *received = TRUE; } - else if(result & CURL_CSELECT_IN) { - infof(data, "Ctrl conn has data while waiting for data conn"); - (void)Curl_GetFTPResponse(data, &nread, &ftpcode); + else if(socketstate & CURL_CSELECT_IN) + response = TRUE; + break; + } + if(response) { + infof(data, "Ctrl conn has data while waiting for data conn"); + if(pp->overflow > 3) { + char *r = Curl_dyn_ptr(&pp->recvbuf); + + DEBUGASSERT((pp->overflow + pp->nfinal) <= + Curl_dyn_len(&pp->recvbuf)); + /* move over the most recently handled response line */ + r += pp->nfinal; + + if(LASTLINE(r)) { + int status = curlx_sltosi(strtol(r, NULL, 10)); + if(status == 226) { + /* funny timing situation where we get the final message on the + control connection before traffic on the data connection has been + noticed. Leave the 226 in there and use this as a trigger to read + the data socket. */ + infof(data, "Got 226 before data activity"); + *received = TRUE; + return CURLE_OK; + } + } + } - if(ftpcode/100 > 3) - return CURLE_FTP_ACCEPT_FAILED; + (void)Curl_GetFTPResponse(data, &nread, &ftpcode); - return CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY; - } + infof(data, "FTP code: %03d", ftpcode); - break; - } /* switch() */ + if(ftpcode/100 > 3) + return CURLE_FTP_ACCEPT_FAILED; + + return CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY; + } return CURLE_OK; } @@ -432,7 +637,7 @@ static CURLcode InitiateTransfer(struct Curl_easy *data) struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; bool connected; - DEBUGF(infof(data, "ftp InitiateTransfer()")); + CURL_TRC_FTP(data, "InitiateTransfer()"); if(conn->bits.ftp_use_data_ssl && data->set.ftp_use_port && !Curl_conn_is_ssl(conn, SECONDARYSOCKET)) { result = Curl_ssl_cfilter_add(data, conn, SECONDARYSOCKET); @@ -451,12 +656,12 @@ static CURLcode InitiateTransfer(struct Curl_easy *data) /* set the SO_SNDBUF for the secondary socket for those who need it */ Curl_sndbufset(conn->sock[SECONDARYSOCKET]); - Curl_setup_transfer(data, -1, -1, FALSE, SECONDARYSOCKET); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, -1, -1, FALSE, SECONDARYSOCKET); } else { /* FTP download: */ - Curl_setup_transfer(data, SECONDARYSOCKET, - conn->proto.ftpc.retr_size_saved, FALSE, -1); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, SECONDARYSOCKET, + conn->proto.ftpc.retr_size_saved, FALSE, -1); } conn->proto.ftpc.pp.pending_resp = TRUE; /* expect server response */ @@ -515,18 +720,10 @@ static CURLcode AllowServerConnect(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *connected) } out: - DEBUGF(infof(data, "ftp AllowServerConnect() -> %d", result)); + CURL_TRC_FTP(data, "AllowServerConnect() -> %d", result); return result; } -/* macro to check for a three-digit ftp status code at the start of the - given string */ -#define STATUSCODE(line) (ISDIGIT(line[0]) && ISDIGIT(line[1]) && \ - ISDIGIT(line[2])) - -/* macro to check for the last line in an FTP server response */ -#define LASTLINE(line) (STATUSCODE(line) && (' ' == line[3])) - static bool ftp_endofresp(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, char *line, size_t len, int *code) { @@ -542,18 +739,18 @@ static bool ftp_endofresp(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, } static CURLcode ftp_readresp(struct Curl_easy *data, - curl_socket_t sockfd, + int sockindex, struct pingpong *pp, int *ftpcode, /* return the ftp-code if done */ size_t *size) /* size of the response */ { int code; - CURLcode result = Curl_pp_readresp(data, sockfd, pp, &code, size); + CURLcode result = Curl_pp_readresp(data, sockindex, pp, &code, size); #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI { struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; - char * const buf = data->state.buffer; + char * const buf = Curl_dyn_ptr(&data->conn->proto.ftpc.pp.recvbuf); /* handle the security-oriented responses 6xx ***/ switch(code) { @@ -659,7 +856,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_GetFTPResponse(struct Curl_easy *data, * */ - if(pp->cache && (cache_skip < 2)) { + if(Curl_dyn_len(&pp->recvbuf) && (cache_skip < 2)) { /* * There's a cache left since before. We then skipping the wait for * socket action, unless this is the same cache like the previous round @@ -683,11 +880,11 @@ CURLcode Curl_GetFTPResponse(struct Curl_easy *data, break; } } - result = ftp_readresp(data, sockfd, pp, ftpcode, &nread); + result = ftp_readresp(data, FIRSTSOCKET, pp, ftpcode, &nread); if(result) break; - if(!nread && pp->cache) + if(!nread && Curl_dyn_len(&pp->recvbuf)) /* bump cache skip counter as on repeated skips we must wait for more data */ cache_skip++; @@ -705,73 +902,6 @@ CURLcode Curl_GetFTPResponse(struct Curl_easy *data, return result; } -#if defined(DEBUGBUILD) && !defined(CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS) - /* for debug purposes */ -static const char * const ftp_state_names[]={ - "STOP", - "WAIT220", - "AUTH", - "USER", - "PASS", - "ACCT", - "PBSZ", - "PROT", - "CCC", - "PWD", - "SYST", - "NAMEFMT", - "QUOTE", - "RETR_PREQUOTE", - "STOR_PREQUOTE", - "POSTQUOTE", - "CWD", - "MKD", - "MDTM", - "TYPE", - "LIST_TYPE", - "RETR_TYPE", - "STOR_TYPE", - "SIZE", - "RETR_SIZE", - "STOR_SIZE", - "REST", - "RETR_REST", - "PORT", - "PRET", - "PASV", - "LIST", - "RETR", - "STOR", - "QUIT" -}; -#endif - -/* This is the ONLY way to change FTP state! */ -static void _ftp_state(struct Curl_easy *data, - ftpstate newstate -#ifdef DEBUGBUILD - , int lineno -#endif - ) -{ - struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; - struct ftp_conn *ftpc = &conn->proto.ftpc; - -#if defined(DEBUGBUILD) - -#if defined(CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS) - (void) lineno; -#else - if(ftpc->state != newstate) - infof(data, "FTP %p (line %d) state change from %s to %s", - (void *)ftpc, lineno, ftp_state_names[ftpc->state], - ftp_state_names[newstate]); -#endif -#endif - - ftpc->state = newstate; -} - static CURLcode ftp_state_user(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn) { @@ -815,24 +945,18 @@ static int ftp_domore_getsock(struct Curl_easy *data, * remote site, or we could wait for that site to connect to us. Or just * handle ordinary commands. */ - - DEBUGF(infof(data, "ftp_domore_getsock()")); - if(conn->cfilter[SECONDARYSOCKET] - && !Curl_conn_is_connected(conn, SECONDARYSOCKET)) - return 0; + CURL_TRC_FTP(data, "[%s] ftp_domore_getsock()", FTP_DSTATE(data)); if(FTP_STOP == ftpc->state) { - int bits = GETSOCK_READSOCK(0); - /* if stopped and still in this state, then we're also waiting for a connect on the secondary connection */ + DEBUGASSERT(conn->sock[SECONDARYSOCKET] != CURL_SOCKET_BAD || + (conn->cfilter[SECONDARYSOCKET] && + !Curl_conn_is_connected(conn, SECONDARYSOCKET))); socks[0] = conn->sock[FIRSTSOCKET]; - if(conn->sock[SECONDARYSOCKET] != CURL_SOCKET_BAD) { - socks[1] = conn->sock[SECONDARYSOCKET]; - bits |= GETSOCK_WRITESOCK(1) | GETSOCK_READSOCK(1); - } - - return bits; + /* An unconnected SECONDARY will add its socket by itself + * via its adjust_pollset() */ + return GETSOCK_READSOCK(0); } return Curl_pp_getsock(data, &conn->proto.ftpc.pp, socks); } @@ -911,7 +1035,7 @@ static CURLcode ftp_state_use_port(struct Curl_easy *data, char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST]; struct sockaddr *sa = (struct sockaddr *)&ss; struct sockaddr_in * const sa4 = (void *)sa; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 struct sockaddr_in6 * const sa6 = (void *)sa; #endif static const char mode[][5] = { "EPRT", "PORT" }; @@ -926,6 +1050,8 @@ static CURLcode ftp_state_use_port(struct Curl_easy *data, bool possibly_non_local = TRUE; char buffer[STRERROR_LEN]; char *addr = NULL; + size_t addrlen = 0; + char ipstr[50]; /* Step 1, figure out what is requested, * accepted format : @@ -934,32 +1060,17 @@ static CURLcode ftp_state_use_port(struct Curl_easy *data, if(data->set.str[STRING_FTPPORT] && (strlen(data->set.str[STRING_FTPPORT]) > 1)) { - -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 - size_t addrlen = INET6_ADDRSTRLEN > strlen(string_ftpport) ? - INET6_ADDRSTRLEN : strlen(string_ftpport); -#else - size_t addrlen = INET_ADDRSTRLEN > strlen(string_ftpport) ? - INET_ADDRSTRLEN : strlen(string_ftpport); -#endif - char *ip_start = string_ftpport; char *ip_end = NULL; - char *port_start = NULL; - char *port_sep = NULL; - addr = calloc(1, addrlen + 1); - if(!addr) { - result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - goto out; - } - -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 if(*string_ftpport == '[') { /* [ipv6]:port(-range) */ - ip_start = string_ftpport + 1; - ip_end = strchr(string_ftpport, ']'); - if(ip_end) - strncpy(addr, ip_start, ip_end - ip_start); + char *ip_start = string_ftpport + 1; + ip_end = strchr(ip_start, ']'); + if(ip_end) { + addrlen = ip_end - ip_start; + addr = ip_start; + } } else #endif @@ -969,28 +1080,27 @@ static CURLcode ftp_state_use_port(struct Curl_easy *data, } else { ip_end = strchr(string_ftpport, ':'); + addr = string_ftpport; if(ip_end) { /* either ipv6 or (ipv4|domain|interface):port(-range) */ -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 + addrlen = ip_end - string_ftpport; +#ifdef USE_IPV6 if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, string_ftpport, &sa6->sin6_addr) == 1) { /* ipv6 */ port_min = port_max = 0; - strcpy(addr, string_ftpport); ip_end = NULL; /* this got no port ! */ } - else #endif - /* (ipv4|domain|interface):port(-range) */ - strncpy(addr, string_ftpport, ip_end - ip_start); } else /* ipv4|interface */ - strcpy(addr, string_ftpport); + addrlen = strlen(string_ftpport); } /* parse the port */ if(ip_end) { - port_start = strchr(ip_end, ':'); + char *port_sep = NULL; + char *port_start = strchr(ip_end, ':'); if(port_start) { port_min = curlx_ultous(strtoul(port_start + 1, NULL, 10)); port_sep = strchr(port_start, '-'); @@ -1011,22 +1121,29 @@ static CURLcode ftp_state_use_port(struct Curl_easy *data, if(port_min > port_max) port_min = port_max = 0; - if(*addr != '\0') { + if(addrlen) { + DEBUGASSERT(addr); + if(addrlen >= sizeof(ipstr)) + goto out; + memcpy(ipstr, addr, addrlen); + ipstr[addrlen] = 0; + /* attempt to get the address of the given interface name */ switch(Curl_if2ip(conn->remote_addr->family, -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 Curl_ipv6_scope(&conn->remote_addr->sa_addr), conn->scope_id, #endif - addr, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf))) { + ipstr, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf))) { case IF2IP_NOT_FOUND: /* not an interface, use the given string as host name instead */ - host = addr; + host = ipstr; break; case IF2IP_AF_NOT_SUPPORTED: goto out; case IF2IP_FOUND: host = hbuf; /* use the hbuf for host name */ + break; } } else @@ -1045,7 +1162,7 @@ static CURLcode ftp_state_use_port(struct Curl_easy *data, goto out; } switch(sa->sa_family) { -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 case AF_INET6: r = Curl_inet_ntop(sa->sa_family, &sa6->sin6_addr, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf)); break; @@ -1095,7 +1212,8 @@ static CURLcode ftp_state_use_port(struct Curl_easy *data, Curl_strerror(error, buffer, sizeof(buffer))); goto out; } - DEBUGF(infof(data, "ftp_state_use_port(), opened socket")); + CURL_TRC_FTP(data, "[%s] ftp_state_use_port(), opened socket", + FTP_DSTATE(data)); /* step 3, bind to a suitable local address */ @@ -1105,7 +1223,7 @@ static CURLcode ftp_state_use_port(struct Curl_easy *data, for(port = port_min; port <= port_max;) { if(sa->sa_family == AF_INET) sa4->sin_port = htons(port); -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 else sa6->sin6_port = htons(port); #endif @@ -1156,7 +1274,8 @@ static CURLcode ftp_state_use_port(struct Curl_easy *data, Curl_strerror(SOCKERRNO, buffer, sizeof(buffer))); goto out; } - DEBUGF(infof(data, "ftp_state_use_port(), socket bound to port %d", port)); + CURL_TRC_FTP(data, "[%s] ftp_state_use_port(), socket bound to port %d", + FTP_DSTATE(data), port); /* step 4, listen on the socket */ @@ -1165,7 +1284,8 @@ static CURLcode ftp_state_use_port(struct Curl_easy *data, Curl_strerror(SOCKERRNO, buffer, sizeof(buffer))); goto out; } - DEBUGF(infof(data, "ftp_state_use_port(), listening on %d", port)); + CURL_TRC_FTP(data, "[%s] ftp_state_use_port(), listening on %d", + FTP_DSTATE(data), port); /* step 5, send the proper FTP command */ @@ -1173,13 +1293,19 @@ static CURLcode ftp_state_use_port(struct Curl_easy *data, below */ Curl_printable_address(ai, myhost, sizeof(myhost)); -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 if(!conn->bits.ftp_use_eprt && conn->bits.ipv6) /* EPRT is disabled but we are connected to a IPv6 host, so we ignore the request and enable EPRT again! */ conn->bits.ftp_use_eprt = TRUE; #endif + /* Replace any filter on SECONDARY with one listening on this socket */ + result = Curl_conn_tcp_listen_set(data, conn, SECONDARYSOCKET, &portsock); + if(result) + goto out; + portsock = CURL_SOCKET_BAD; /* now held in filter */ + for(; fcmd != DONE; fcmd++) { if(!conn->bits.ftp_use_eprt && (EPRT == fcmd)) @@ -1194,7 +1320,7 @@ static CURLcode ftp_state_use_port(struct Curl_easy *data, case AF_INET: port = ntohs(sa4->sin_port); break; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 case AF_INET6: port = ntohs(sa6->sin6_port); break; @@ -1253,11 +1379,6 @@ static CURLcode ftp_state_use_port(struct Curl_easy *data, /* store which command was sent */ ftpc->count1 = fcmd; - /* Replace any filter on SECONDARY with one listening on this socket */ - result = Curl_conn_tcp_listen_set(data, conn, SECONDARYSOCKET, &portsock); - if(result) - goto out; - portsock = CURL_SOCKET_BAD; /* now held in filter */ ftp_state(data, FTP_PORT); out: @@ -1266,7 +1387,6 @@ static CURLcode ftp_state_use_port(struct Curl_easy *data, } if(portsock != CURL_SOCKET_BAD) Curl_socket_close(data, conn, portsock); - free(addr); return result; } @@ -1574,10 +1694,10 @@ static CURLcode ftp_state_ul_setup(struct Curl_easy *data, append = TRUE; /* Let's read off the proper amount of bytes from the input. */ - if(conn->seek_func) { + if(data->set.seek_func) { Curl_set_in_callback(data, true); - seekerr = conn->seek_func(conn->seek_client, data->state.resume_from, - SEEK_SET); + seekerr = data->set.seek_func(data->set.seek_client, + data->state.resume_from, SEEK_SET); Curl_set_in_callback(data, false); } @@ -1589,13 +1709,14 @@ static CURLcode ftp_state_ul_setup(struct Curl_easy *data, } /* seekerr == CURL_SEEKFUNC_CANTSEEK (can't seek to offset) */ do { + char scratch[4*1024]; size_t readthisamountnow = - (data->state.resume_from - passed > data->set.buffer_size) ? - (size_t)data->set.buffer_size : + (data->state.resume_from - passed > (curl_off_t)sizeof(scratch)) ? + sizeof(scratch) : curlx_sotouz(data->state.resume_from - passed); size_t actuallyread = - data->state.fread_func(data->state.buffer, 1, readthisamountnow, + data->state.fread_func(scratch, 1, readthisamountnow, data->state.in); passed += actuallyread; @@ -1615,7 +1736,7 @@ static CURLcode ftp_state_ul_setup(struct Curl_easy *data, infof(data, "File already completely uploaded"); /* no data to transfer */ - Curl_setup_transfer(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); /* Set ->transfer so that we won't get any error in * ftp_done() because we didn't transfer anything! */ @@ -1793,7 +1914,7 @@ static char *control_address(struct connectdata *conn) if(conn->bits.tunnel_proxy || conn->bits.socksproxy) return conn->host.name; #endif - return conn->primary_ip; + return conn->primary.remote_ip; } static bool match_pasv_6nums(const char *p, @@ -1828,7 +1949,9 @@ static CURLcode ftp_state_pasv_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_dns_entry *addr = NULL; enum resolve_t rc; unsigned short connectport; /* the local port connect() should use! */ - char *str = &data->state.buffer[4]; /* start on the first letter */ + struct pingpong *pp = &ftpc->pp; + char *str = + Curl_dyn_ptr(&pp->recvbuf) + 4; /* start on the first letter */ /* if we come here again, make sure the former name is cleared */ Curl_safefree(ftpc->newhost); @@ -1928,14 +2051,14 @@ static CURLcode ftp_state_pasv_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, */ const char * const host_name = conn->bits.socksproxy ? conn->socks_proxy.host.name : conn->http_proxy.host.name; - rc = Curl_resolv(data, host_name, conn->port, FALSE, &addr); + rc = Curl_resolv(data, host_name, conn->primary.remote_port, FALSE, &addr); if(rc == CURLRESOLV_PENDING) /* BLOCKING, ignores the return code but 'addr' will be NULL in case of failure */ (void)Curl_resolver_wait_resolv(data, &addr); - connectport = - (unsigned short)conn->port; /* we connect to the proxy's port */ + /* we connect to the proxy's port */ + connectport = (unsigned short)conn->primary.remote_port; if(!addr) { failf(data, "Can't resolve proxy host %s:%hu", host_name, connectport); @@ -2106,8 +2229,9 @@ static CURLcode ftp_state_mdtm_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, /* we got a time. Format should be: "YYYYMMDDHHMMSS[.sss]" where the last .sss part is optional and means fractions of a second */ int year, month, day, hour, minute, second; - if(ftp_213_date(&data->state.buffer[4], - &year, &month, &day, &hour, &minute, &second)) { + struct pingpong *pp = &ftpc->pp; + char *resp = Curl_dyn_ptr(&pp->recvbuf) + 4; + if(ftp_213_date(resp, &year, &month, &day, &hour, &minute, &second)) { /* we have a time, reformat it */ char timebuf[24]; msnprintf(timebuf, sizeof(timebuf), @@ -2236,7 +2360,7 @@ static CURLcode ftp_state_retr(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; struct ftp_conn *ftpc = &conn->proto.ftpc; - DEBUGF(infof(data, "ftp_state_retr()")); + CURL_TRC_FTP(data, "[%s] ftp_state_retr()", FTP_DSTATE(data)); if(data->set.max_filesize && (filesize > data->set.max_filesize)) { failf(data, "Maximum file size exceeded"); return CURLE_FILESIZE_EXCEEDED; @@ -2283,7 +2407,7 @@ static CURLcode ftp_state_retr(struct Curl_easy *data, if(ftp->downloadsize == 0) { /* no data to transfer */ - Curl_setup_transfer(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); infof(data, "File already completely downloaded"); /* Set ->transfer so that we won't get any error in ftp_done() @@ -2318,7 +2442,8 @@ static CURLcode ftp_state_size_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, { CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; curl_off_t filesize = -1; - char *buf = data->state.buffer; + char *buf = Curl_dyn_ptr(&data->conn->proto.ftpc.pp.recvbuf); + size_t len = data->conn->proto.ftpc.pp.nfinal; /* get the size from the ascii string: */ if(ftpcode == 213) { @@ -2326,13 +2451,13 @@ static CURLcode ftp_state_size_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, for all the digits at the end of the response and parse only those as a number. */ char *start = &buf[4]; - char *fdigit = strchr(start, '\r'); + char *fdigit = memchr(start, '\r', len); if(fdigit) { - do + fdigit--; + if(*fdigit == '\n') + fdigit--; + while(ISDIGIT(fdigit[-1]) && (fdigit > start)) fdigit--; - while(ISDIGIT(*fdigit) && (fdigit > start)); - if(!ISDIGIT(*fdigit)) - fdigit++; } else fdigit = start; @@ -2501,7 +2626,7 @@ static CURLcode ftp_state_get_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, * * Example D above makes this parsing a little tricky */ char *bytes; - char *buf = data->state.buffer; + char *buf = Curl_dyn_ptr(&conn->proto.ftpc.pp.recvbuf); bytes = strstr(buf, " bytes"); if(bytes) { long in = (long)(--bytes-buf); @@ -2689,7 +2814,6 @@ static CURLcode ftp_statemachine(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn) { CURLcode result; - curl_socket_t sock = conn->sock[FIRSTSOCKET]; int ftpcode; struct ftp_conn *ftpc = &conn->proto.ftpc; struct pingpong *pp = &ftpc->pp; @@ -2699,7 +2823,7 @@ static CURLcode ftp_statemachine(struct Curl_easy *data, if(pp->sendleft) return Curl_pp_flushsend(data, pp); - result = ftp_readresp(data, sock, pp, &ftpcode, &nread); + result = ftp_readresp(data, FIRSTSOCKET, pp, &ftpcode, &nread); if(result) return result; @@ -2770,7 +2894,7 @@ static CURLcode ftp_statemachine(struct Curl_easy *data, case FTP_AUTH: /* we have gotten the response to a previous AUTH command */ - if(pp->cache_size) + if(pp->overflow) return CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY; /* Forbid pipelining in response. */ /* RFC2228 (page 5) says: @@ -2868,14 +2992,11 @@ static CURLcode ftp_statemachine(struct Curl_easy *data, case FTP_PWD: if(ftpcode == 257) { - char *ptr = &data->state.buffer[4]; /* start on the first letter */ - const size_t buf_size = data->set.buffer_size; - char *dir; + char *ptr = Curl_dyn_ptr(&pp->recvbuf) + 4; /* start on the first + letter */ bool entry_extracted = FALSE; - - dir = malloc(nread + 1); - if(!dir) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + struct dynbuf out; + Curl_dyn_init(&out, 1000); /* Reply format is like 257[rubbish]"" and the @@ -2887,33 +3008,30 @@ static CURLcode ftp_statemachine(struct Curl_easy *data, */ /* scan for the first double-quote for non-standard responses */ - while(ptr < &data->state.buffer[buf_size] - && *ptr != '\n' && *ptr != '\0' && *ptr != '"') + while(*ptr != '\n' && *ptr != '\0' && *ptr != '"') ptr++; if('\"' == *ptr) { /* it started good */ - char *store; - ptr++; - for(store = dir; *ptr;) { + for(ptr++; *ptr; ptr++) { if('\"' == *ptr) { if('\"' == ptr[1]) { /* "quote-doubling" */ - *store = ptr[1]; + result = Curl_dyn_addn(&out, &ptr[1], 1); ptr++; } else { /* end of path */ - entry_extracted = TRUE; + if(Curl_dyn_len(&out)) + entry_extracted = TRUE; break; /* get out of this loop */ } } else - *store = *ptr; - store++; - ptr++; + result = Curl_dyn_addn(&out, ptr, 1); + if(result) + return result; } - *store = '\0'; /* null-terminate */ } if(entry_extracted) { /* If the path name does not look like an absolute path (i.e.: it @@ -2927,6 +3045,7 @@ static CURLcode ftp_statemachine(struct Curl_easy *data, The method used here is to check the server OS: we do it only if the path name looks strange to minimize overhead on other systems. */ + char *dir = Curl_dyn_ptr(&out); if(!ftpc->server_os && dir[0] != '/') { result = Curl_pp_sendf(data, &ftpc->pp, "%s", "SYST"); @@ -2951,35 +3070,33 @@ static CURLcode ftp_statemachine(struct Curl_easy *data, } else { /* couldn't get the path */ - free(dir); + Curl_dyn_free(&out); infof(data, "Failed to figure out path"); } } ftp_state(data, FTP_STOP); /* we are done with the CONNECT phase! */ - DEBUGF(infof(data, "protocol connect phase DONE")); + CURL_TRC_FTP(data, "[%s] protocol connect phase DONE", FTP_DSTATE(data)); break; case FTP_SYST: if(ftpcode == 215) { - char *ptr = &data->state.buffer[4]; /* start on the first letter */ + char *ptr = Curl_dyn_ptr(&pp->recvbuf) + 4; /* start on the first + letter */ char *os; - char *store; - - os = malloc(nread + 1); - if(!os) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + char *start; /* Reply format is like 215 */ while(*ptr == ' ') ptr++; - for(store = os; *ptr && *ptr != ' ';) - *store++ = *ptr++; - *store = '\0'; /* null-terminate */ + for(start = ptr; *ptr && *ptr != ' '; ptr++) + ; + os = Curl_memdup0(start, ptr - start); + if(!os) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; /* Check for special servers here. */ - if(strcasecompare(os, "OS/400")) { /* Force OS400 name format 1. */ result = Curl_pp_sendf(data, &ftpc->pp, "%s", "SITE NAMEFMT 1"); @@ -3003,7 +3120,7 @@ static CURLcode ftp_statemachine(struct Curl_easy *data, } ftp_state(data, FTP_STOP); /* we are done with the CONNECT phase! */ - DEBUGF(infof(data, "protocol connect phase DONE")); + CURL_TRC_FTP(data, "[%s] protocol connect phase DONE", FTP_DSTATE(data)); break; case FTP_NAMEFMT: @@ -3014,7 +3131,7 @@ static CURLcode ftp_statemachine(struct Curl_easy *data, } ftp_state(data, FTP_STOP); /* we are done with the CONNECT phase! */ - DEBUGF(infof(data, "protocol connect phase DONE")); + CURL_TRC_FTP(data, "[%s] protocol connect phase DONE", FTP_DSTATE(data)); break; case FTP_QUOTE: @@ -3131,7 +3248,6 @@ static CURLcode ftp_statemachine(struct Curl_easy *data, break; case FTP_QUIT: - /* fallthrough, just stop! */ default: /* internal error */ ftp_state(data, FTP_STOP); @@ -3206,8 +3322,7 @@ static CURLcode ftp_connect(struct Curl_easy *data, conn->bits.ftp_use_control_ssl = TRUE; } - Curl_pp_setup(pp); /* once per transfer */ - Curl_pp_init(data, pp); /* init the generic pingpong data */ + Curl_pp_init(pp); /* once per transfer */ /* When we connect, we start in the state where we await the 220 response */ @@ -3258,14 +3373,13 @@ static CURLcode ftp_done(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLcode status, case CURLE_REMOTE_FILE_NOT_FOUND: case CURLE_WRITE_ERROR: /* the connection stays alive fine even though this happened */ - /* fall-through */ case CURLE_OK: /* doesn't affect the control connection's status */ if(!premature) break; /* until we cope better with prematurely ended requests, let them * fallback as if in complete failure */ - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); default: /* by default, an error means the control connection is wedged and should not be used anymore */ ftpc->ctl_valid = FALSE; @@ -3446,6 +3560,7 @@ static CURLcode ftp_done(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLcode status, /* Send any post-transfer QUOTE strings? */ if(!status && !result && !premature && data->set.postquote) result = ftp_sendquote(data, conn, data->set.postquote); + CURL_TRC_FTP(data, "[%s] done, result=%d", FTP_DSTATE(data), result); Curl_safefree(ftp->pathalloc); return result; } @@ -3709,12 +3824,13 @@ static CURLcode ftp_do_more(struct Curl_easy *data, int *completep) } /* no data to transfer */ - Curl_setup_transfer(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); if(!ftpc->wait_data_conn) { /* no waiting for the data connection so this is now complete */ *completep = 1; - DEBUGF(infof(data, "DO-MORE phase ends with %d", (int)result)); + CURL_TRC_FTP(data, "[%s] DO-MORE phase ends with %d", FTP_DSTATE(data), + (int)result); } return result; @@ -3738,7 +3854,7 @@ CURLcode ftp_perform(struct Curl_easy *data, /* this is FTP and no proxy */ CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; - DEBUGF(infof(data, "DO phase starts")); + CURL_TRC_FTP(data, "[%s] DO phase starts", FTP_DSTATE(data)); if(data->req.no_body) { /* requested no body means no transfer... */ @@ -3758,10 +3874,15 @@ CURLcode ftp_perform(struct Curl_easy *data, *connected = Curl_conn_is_connected(data->conn, SECONDARYSOCKET); - infof(data, "ftp_perform ends with SECONDARY: %d", *connected); + if(*connected) + infof(data, "[FTP] [%s] perform, DATA connection established", + FTP_DSTATE(data)); + else + CURL_TRC_FTP(data, "[%s] perform, awaiting DATA connect", + FTP_DSTATE(data)); if(*dophase_done) - DEBUGF(infof(data, "DO phase is complete1")); + CURL_TRC_FTP(data, "[%s] DO phase is complete1", FTP_DSTATE(data)); return result; } @@ -4017,6 +4138,24 @@ static CURLcode ftp_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) *done = FALSE; /* default to false */ ftpc->wait_data_conn = FALSE; /* default to no such wait */ +#ifdef CURL_DO_LINEEND_CONV + { + /* FTP data may need conversion. */ + struct Curl_cwriter *ftp_lc_writer; + + result = Curl_cwriter_create(&ftp_lc_writer, data, &ftp_cw_lc, + CURL_CW_CONTENT_DECODE); + if(result) + return result; + + result = Curl_cwriter_add(data, ftp_lc_writer); + if(result) { + Curl_cwriter_free(data, ftp_lc_writer); + return result; + } + } +#endif /* CURL_DO_LINEEND_CONV */ + if(data->state.wildcardmatch) { result = wc_statemach(data); if(data->wildcard->state == CURLWC_SKIP || @@ -4177,13 +4316,12 @@ CURLcode ftp_parse_url_path(struct Curl_easy *data) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; } - ftpc->dirs[0] = calloc(1, dirlen + 1); + ftpc->dirs[0] = Curl_memdup0(rawPath, dirlen); if(!ftpc->dirs[0]) { free(rawPath); return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; } - strncpy(ftpc->dirs[0], rawPath, dirlen); ftpc->dirdepth = 1; /* we consider it to be a single dir */ fileName = slashPos + 1; /* rest is file name */ } @@ -4222,12 +4360,11 @@ CURLcode ftp_parse_url_path(struct Curl_easy *data) CWD requires a parameter and a non-existent parameter a) doesn't work on many servers and b) has no effect on the others. */ if(compLen > 0) { - char *comp = calloc(1, compLen + 1); + char *comp = Curl_memdup0(curPos, compLen); if(!comp) { free(rawPath); return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; } - strncpy(comp, curPos, compLen); ftpc->dirs[ftpc->dirdepth++] = comp; } curPos = slashPos + 1; @@ -4295,7 +4432,7 @@ static CURLcode ftp_dophase_done(struct Curl_easy *data, bool connected) if(ftp->transfer != PPTRANSFER_BODY) /* no data to transfer */ - Curl_setup_transfer(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); else if(!connected) /* since we didn't connect now, we want do_more to get called */ conn->bits.do_more = TRUE; @@ -4312,11 +4449,11 @@ static CURLcode ftp_doing(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLcode result = ftp_multi_statemach(data, dophase_done); if(result) - DEBUGF(infof(data, "DO phase failed")); + CURL_TRC_FTP(data, "[%s] DO phase failed", FTP_DSTATE(data)); else if(*dophase_done) { result = ftp_dophase_done(data, FALSE /* not connected */); - DEBUGF(infof(data, "DO phase is complete2")); + CURL_TRC_FTP(data, "[%s] DO phase is complete2", FTP_DSTATE(data)); } return result; } @@ -4440,6 +4577,7 @@ static CURLcode ftp_setup_connection(struct Curl_easy *data, ftpc->use_ssl = data->set.use_ssl; ftpc->ccc = data->set.ftp_ccc; + CURL_TRC_FTP(data, "[%s] setup connection -> %d", FTP_CSTATE(conn), result); return result; } diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/ftplistparser.c b/vendor/curl/lib/ftplistparser.c index 82f1ea00d3..448f3a43ab 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/ftplistparser.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/ftplistparser.c @@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ static CURLcode ftp_pl_insert_finfo(struct Curl_easy *data, Curl_set_in_callback(data, false); if(add) { - Curl_llist_insert_next(llist, llist->tail, finfo, &infop->list); + Curl_llist_append(llist, finfo, &infop->list); } else { Curl_fileinfo_cleanup(infop); diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/getinfo.c b/vendor/curl/lib/getinfo.c index f1574e097b..e423f0b29a 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/getinfo.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/getinfo.c @@ -76,10 +76,10 @@ CURLcode Curl_initinfo(struct Curl_easy *data) free(info->wouldredirect); info->wouldredirect = NULL; - info->conn_primary_ip[0] = '\0'; - info->conn_local_ip[0] = '\0'; - info->conn_primary_port = 0; - info->conn_local_port = 0; + info->primary.remote_ip[0] = '\0'; + info->primary.local_ip[0] = '\0'; + info->primary.remote_port = 0; + info->primary.local_port = 0; info->retry_after = 0; info->conn_scheme = 0; @@ -153,15 +153,19 @@ static CURLcode getinfo_char(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLINFO info, break; case CURLINFO_PRIMARY_IP: /* Return the ip address of the most recent (primary) connection */ - *param_charp = data->info.conn_primary_ip; + *param_charp = data->info.primary.remote_ip; break; case CURLINFO_LOCAL_IP: /* Return the source/local ip address of the most recent (primary) connection */ - *param_charp = data->info.conn_local_ip; + *param_charp = data->info.primary.local_ip; break; case CURLINFO_RTSP_SESSION_ID: +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_RTSP *param_charp = data->set.str[STRING_RTSP_SESSION_ID]; +#else + *param_charp = NULL; +#endif break; case CURLINFO_SCHEME: *param_charp = data->info.conn_scheme; @@ -180,7 +184,6 @@ static CURLcode getinfo_char(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLINFO info, *param_charp = NULL; #endif break; - default: return CURLE_UNKNOWN_OPTION; } @@ -285,11 +288,11 @@ static CURLcode getinfo_long(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLINFO info, break; case CURLINFO_PRIMARY_PORT: /* Return the (remote) port of the most recent (primary) connection */ - *param_longp = data->info.conn_primary_port; + *param_longp = data->info.primary.remote_port; break; case CURLINFO_LOCAL_PORT: /* Return the local port of the most recent (primary) connection */ - *param_longp = data->info.conn_local_port; + *param_longp = data->info.primary.local_port; break; case CURLINFO_PROXY_ERROR: *param_longp = (long)data->info.pxcode; @@ -334,6 +337,15 @@ static CURLcode getinfo_long(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLINFO info, case CURLINFO_PROTOCOL: *param_longp = data->info.conn_protocol; break; + case CURLINFO_USED_PROXY: + *param_longp = +#ifdef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY + 0 +#else + data->info.used_proxy +#endif + ; + break; default: return CURLE_UNKNOWN_OPTION; } @@ -409,6 +421,9 @@ static CURLcode getinfo_offt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLINFO info, case CURLINFO_STARTTRANSFER_TIME_T: *param_offt = data->progress.t_starttransfer; break; + case CURLINFO_QUEUE_TIME_T: + *param_offt = data->progress.t_postqueue; + break; case CURLINFO_REDIRECT_TIME_T: *param_offt = data->progress.t_redirect; break; @@ -420,7 +435,7 @@ static CURLcode getinfo_offt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLINFO info, break; case CURLINFO_CONN_ID: *param_offt = data->conn? - data->conn->connection_id : data->state.recent_conn_id; + data->conn->connection_id : data->state.recent_conn_id; break; default: return CURLE_UNKNOWN_OPTION; diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/gopher.c b/vendor/curl/lib/gopher.c index 61e41b7e47..311bd3798e 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/gopher.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/gopher.c @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static CURLcode gopher_connecting(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done); */ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_gopher = { - "GOPHER", /* scheme */ + "gopher", /* scheme */ ZERO_NULL, /* setup_connection */ gopher_do, /* do_it */ ZERO_NULL, /* done */ @@ -75,7 +75,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_gopher = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_GOPHER, /* defport */ @@ -86,7 +87,7 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_gopher = { #ifdef USE_SSL const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_gophers = { - "GOPHERS", /* scheme */ + "gophers", /* scheme */ ZERO_NULL, /* setup_connection */ gopher_do, /* do_it */ ZERO_NULL, /* done */ @@ -99,7 +100,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_gophers = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_GOPHER, /* defport */ @@ -139,8 +141,8 @@ static CURLcode gopher_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) char *sel = NULL; char *sel_org = NULL; timediff_t timeout_ms; - ssize_t amount, k; - size_t len; + ssize_t k; + size_t amount, len; int what; *done = TRUE; /* unconditionally */ @@ -185,7 +187,7 @@ static CURLcode gopher_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) if(strlen(sel) < 1) break; - result = Curl_nwrite(data, FIRSTSOCKET, sel, k, &amount); + result = Curl_xfer_send(data, sel, k, &amount); if(!result) { /* Which may not have written it all! */ result = Curl_client_write(data, CLIENTWRITE_HEADER, sel, amount); if(result) @@ -227,7 +229,7 @@ static CURLcode gopher_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) free(sel_org); if(!result) - result = Curl_nwrite(data, FIRSTSOCKET, "\r\n", 2, &amount); + result = Curl_xfer_send(data, "\r\n", 2, &amount); if(result) { failf(data, "Failed sending Gopher request"); return result; @@ -236,7 +238,7 @@ static CURLcode gopher_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) if(result) return result; - Curl_setup_transfer(data, FIRSTSOCKET, -1, FALSE, -1); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, FIRSTSOCKET, -1, FALSE, -1); return CURLE_OK; } #endif /* CURL_DISABLE_GOPHER */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/hash.c b/vendor/curl/lib/hash.c index 30f28e2352..ddbae4d3e1 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/hash.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/hash.c @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ hash_element_dtor(void *user, void *element) */ void Curl_hash_init(struct Curl_hash *h, - int slots, + size_t slots, hash_function hfunc, comp_function comparator, Curl_hash_dtor dtor) @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Curl_hash_add(struct Curl_hash *h, void *key, size_t key_len, void *p) DEBUGASSERT(h); DEBUGASSERT(h->slots); if(!h->table) { - int i; + size_t i; h->table = malloc(h->slots * sizeof(struct Curl_llist)); if(!h->table) return NULL; /* OOM */ @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ Curl_hash_add(struct Curl_hash *h, void *key, size_t key_len, void *p) he = mk_hash_element(key, key_len, p); if(he) { - Curl_llist_insert_next(l, l->tail, he, &he->list); + Curl_llist_append(l, he, &he->list); ++h->size; return p; /* return the new entry */ } @@ -192,25 +192,6 @@ Curl_hash_pick(struct Curl_hash *h, void *key, size_t key_len) return NULL; } -#if defined(DEBUGBUILD) && defined(AGGRESSIVE_TEST) -void -Curl_hash_apply(Curl_hash *h, void *user, - void (*cb)(void *user, void *ptr)) -{ - struct Curl_llist_element *le; - int i; - - for(i = 0; i < h->slots; ++i) { - for(le = (h->table[i])->head; - le; - le = le->next) { - Curl_hash_element *el = le->ptr; - cb(user, el->ptr); - } - } -} -#endif - /* Destroys all the entries in the given hash and resets its attributes, * prepping the given hash for [static|dynamic] deallocation. * @@ -222,7 +203,7 @@ void Curl_hash_destroy(struct Curl_hash *h) { if(h->table) { - int i; + size_t i; for(i = 0; i < h->slots; ++i) { Curl_llist_destroy(&h->table[i], (void *) h); } @@ -250,7 +231,7 @@ Curl_hash_clean_with_criterium(struct Curl_hash *h, void *user, struct Curl_llist_element *le; struct Curl_llist_element *lnext; struct Curl_llist *list; - int i; + size_t i; if(!h || !h->table) return; @@ -316,7 +297,7 @@ Curl_hash_next_element(struct Curl_hash_iterator *iter) /* If we have reached the end of the list, find the next one */ if(!iter->current_element) { - int i; + size_t i; for(i = iter->slot_index; i < h->slots; i++) { if(h->table[i].head) { iter->current_element = h->table[i].head; @@ -339,7 +320,7 @@ void Curl_hash_print(struct Curl_hash *h, { struct Curl_hash_iterator iter; struct Curl_hash_element *he; - int last_index = -1; + size_t last_index = ~0; if(!h) return; @@ -352,7 +333,7 @@ void Curl_hash_print(struct Curl_hash *h, while(he) { if(iter.slot_index != last_index) { fprintf(stderr, "index %d:", iter.slot_index); - if(last_index >= 0) { + if(last_index != ~0) { fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } last_index = iter.slot_index; @@ -368,3 +349,25 @@ void Curl_hash_print(struct Curl_hash *h, fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } #endif + +void Curl_hash_offt_init(struct Curl_hash *h, + size_t slots, + Curl_hash_dtor dtor) +{ + Curl_hash_init(h, slots, Curl_hash_str, Curl_str_key_compare, dtor); +} + +void *Curl_hash_offt_set(struct Curl_hash *h, curl_off_t id, void *elem) +{ + return Curl_hash_add(h, &id, sizeof(id), elem); +} + +int Curl_hash_offt_remove(struct Curl_hash *h, curl_off_t id) +{ + return Curl_hash_delete(h, &id, sizeof(id)); +} + +void *Curl_hash_offt_get(struct Curl_hash *h, curl_off_t id) +{ + return Curl_hash_pick(h, &id, sizeof(id)); +} diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/hash.h b/vendor/curl/lib/hash.h index 9cfffc25b0..2bdc247172 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/hash.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/hash.h @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ struct Curl_hash { /* Comparator function to compare keys */ comp_function comp_func; Curl_hash_dtor dtor; - int slots; + size_t slots; size_t size; }; @@ -67,12 +67,12 @@ struct Curl_hash_element { struct Curl_hash_iterator { struct Curl_hash *hash; - int slot_index; + size_t slot_index; struct Curl_llist_element *current_element; }; void Curl_hash_init(struct Curl_hash *h, - int slots, + size_t slots, hash_function hfunc, comp_function comparator, Curl_hash_dtor dtor); @@ -80,8 +80,6 @@ void Curl_hash_init(struct Curl_hash *h, void *Curl_hash_add(struct Curl_hash *h, void *key, size_t key_len, void *p); int Curl_hash_delete(struct Curl_hash *h, void *key, size_t key_len); void *Curl_hash_pick(struct Curl_hash *, void *key, size_t key_len); -void Curl_hash_apply(struct Curl_hash *h, void *user, - void (*cb)(void *user, void *ptr)); #define Curl_hash_count(h) ((h)->size) void Curl_hash_destroy(struct Curl_hash *h); void Curl_hash_clean(struct Curl_hash *h); @@ -98,5 +96,13 @@ Curl_hash_next_element(struct Curl_hash_iterator *iter); void Curl_hash_print(struct Curl_hash *h, void (*func)(void *)); +/* Hash for `curl_off_t` as key */ +void Curl_hash_offt_init(struct Curl_hash *h, size_t slots, + Curl_hash_dtor dtor); + +void *Curl_hash_offt_set(struct Curl_hash *h, curl_off_t id, void *elem); +int Curl_hash_offt_remove(struct Curl_hash *h, curl_off_t id); +void *Curl_hash_offt_get(struct Curl_hash *h, curl_off_t id); + #endif /* HEADER_CURL_HASH_H */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/headers.c b/vendor/curl/lib/headers.c index 3ff4d5eb07..9a5692e54e 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/headers.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/headers.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #include "urldata.h" #include "strdup.h" #include "strcase.h" +#include "sendf.h" #include "headers.h" /* The last 3 #include files should be in this order */ @@ -185,7 +186,7 @@ struct curl_header *curl_easy_nextheader(CURL *easy, } static CURLcode namevalue(char *header, size_t hlen, unsigned int type, - char **name, char **value) + char **name, char **value) { char *end = header + hlen - 1; /* point to the last byte */ DEBUGASSERT(hlen); @@ -252,7 +253,7 @@ static CURLcode unfold_value(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *value, newhs = Curl_saferealloc(hs, sizeof(*hs) + vlen + oalloc + 1); if(!newhs) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - /* ->name' and ->value point into ->buffer (to keep the header allocation + /* ->name and ->value point into ->buffer (to keep the header allocation in a single memory block), which now potentially have moved. Adjust them. */ newhs->name = newhs->buffer; @@ -263,8 +264,7 @@ static CURLcode unfold_value(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *value, newhs->value[olen + vlen] = 0; /* null-terminate at newline */ /* insert this node into the list of headers */ - Curl_llist_insert_next(&data->state.httphdrs, data->state.httphdrs.tail, - newhs, &newhs->node); + Curl_llist_append(&data->state.httphdrs, newhs, &newhs->node); data->state.prevhead = newhs; return CURLE_OK; } @@ -292,9 +292,10 @@ CURLcode Curl_headers_push(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *header, if(!end) { end = strchr(header, '\n'); if(!end) - return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + /* neither CR nor LF as terminator is not a valid header */ + return CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY; } - hlen = end - header + 1; + hlen = end - header; if((header[0] == ' ') || (header[0] == '\t')) { if(data->state.prevhead) @@ -319,33 +320,86 @@ CURLcode Curl_headers_push(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *header, hs->buffer[hlen] = 0; /* nul terminate */ result = namevalue(hs->buffer, hlen, type, &name, &value); - if(result) - goto fail; - - hs->name = name; - hs->value = value; - hs->type = type; - hs->request = data->state.requests; - - /* insert this node into the list of headers */ - Curl_llist_insert_next(&data->state.httphdrs, data->state.httphdrs.tail, - hs, &hs->node); - data->state.prevhead = hs; - return CURLE_OK; -fail: - free(hs); + if(!result) { + hs->name = name; + hs->value = value; + hs->type = type; + hs->request = data->state.requests; + + /* insert this node into the list of headers */ + Curl_llist_append(&data->state.httphdrs, hs, &hs->node); + data->state.prevhead = hs; + } + else + free(hs); return result; } /* - * Curl_headers_init(). Init the headers subsystem. + * Curl_headers_reset(). Reset the headers subsystem. */ -static void headers_init(struct Curl_easy *data) +static void headers_reset(struct Curl_easy *data) { Curl_llist_init(&data->state.httphdrs, NULL); data->state.prevhead = NULL; } +struct hds_cw_collect_ctx { + struct Curl_cwriter super; +}; + +static CURLcode hds_cw_collect_write(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_cwriter *writer, int type, + const char *buf, size_t blen) +{ + if((type & CLIENTWRITE_HEADER) && !(type & CLIENTWRITE_STATUS)) { + unsigned char htype = (unsigned char) + (type & CLIENTWRITE_CONNECT ? CURLH_CONNECT : + (type & CLIENTWRITE_1XX ? CURLH_1XX : + (type & CLIENTWRITE_TRAILER ? CURLH_TRAILER : + CURLH_HEADER))); + CURLcode result = Curl_headers_push(data, buf, htype); + CURL_TRC_WRITE(data, "header_collect pushed(type=%x, len=%zu) -> %d", + htype, blen, result); + if(result) + return result; + } + return Curl_cwriter_write(data, writer->next, type, buf, blen); +} + +static const struct Curl_cwtype hds_cw_collect = { + "hds-collect", + NULL, + Curl_cwriter_def_init, + hds_cw_collect_write, + Curl_cwriter_def_close, + sizeof(struct hds_cw_collect_ctx) +}; + +CURLcode Curl_headers_init(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct Curl_cwriter *writer; + CURLcode result; + + if(data->conn && (data->conn->handler->protocol & PROTO_FAMILY_HTTP)) { + /* avoid installing it twice */ + if(Curl_cwriter_get_by_name(data, hds_cw_collect.name)) + return CURLE_OK; + + result = Curl_cwriter_create(&writer, data, &hds_cw_collect, + CURL_CW_PROTOCOL); + if(result) + return result; + + result = Curl_cwriter_add(data, writer); + if(result) { + Curl_cwriter_free(data, writer); + return result; + } + } + return CURLE_OK; +} + /* * Curl_headers_cleanup(). Free all stored headers and associated memory. */ @@ -359,7 +413,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_headers_cleanup(struct Curl_easy *data) n = e->next; free(hs); } - headers_init(data); + headers_reset(data); return CURLE_OK; } diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/headers.h b/vendor/curl/lib/headers.h index a5229ea22f..d9813388c5 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/headers.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/headers.h @@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ struct Curl_header_store { char buffer[1]; /* this is the raw header blob */ }; +/* + * Initialize header collecting for a transfer. + * Will add a client writer that catches CLIENTWRITE_HEADER writes. + */ +CURLcode Curl_headers_init(struct Curl_easy *data); + /* * Curl_headers_push() gets passed a full header to store. */ @@ -48,6 +54,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_headers_push(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *header, CURLcode Curl_headers_cleanup(struct Curl_easy *data); #else +#define Curl_headers_init(x) CURLE_OK #define Curl_headers_push(x,y,z) CURLE_OK #define Curl_headers_cleanup(x) Curl_nop_stmt #endif diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/hostasyn.c b/vendor/curl/lib/hostasyn.c index faf01c5f4c..2f6762ca4e 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/hostasyn.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/hostasyn.c @@ -67,11 +67,10 @@ CURLcode Curl_addrinfo_callback(struct Curl_easy *data, int status, struct Curl_addrinfo *ai) { - struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; struct Curl_dns_entry *dns = NULL; CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; - conn->resolve_async.status = status; + data->state.async.status = status; if(CURL_ASYNC_SUCCESS == status) { if(ai) { @@ -79,8 +78,8 @@ CURLcode Curl_addrinfo_callback(struct Curl_easy *data, Curl_share_lock(data, CURL_LOCK_DATA_DNS, CURL_LOCK_ACCESS_SINGLE); dns = Curl_cache_addr(data, ai, - conn->resolve_async.hostname, 0, - conn->resolve_async.port); + data->state.async.hostname, 0, + data->state.async.port); if(data->share) Curl_share_unlock(data, CURL_LOCK_DATA_DNS); @@ -95,12 +94,12 @@ CURLcode Curl_addrinfo_callback(struct Curl_easy *data, } } - conn->resolve_async.dns = dns; + data->state.async.dns = dns; /* Set async.done TRUE last in this function since it may be used multi- threaded and once this is TRUE the other thread may read fields from the async struct */ - conn->resolve_async.done = TRUE; + data->state.async.done = TRUE; /* IPv4: The input hostent struct will be freed by ares when we return from this function */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/hostip.c b/vendor/curl/lib/hostip.c index e7c318af77..93c36e031b 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/hostip.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/hostip.c @@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ void Curl_printable_address(const struct Curl_addrinfo *ai, char *buf, (void)Curl_inet_ntop(ai->ai_family, (const void *)ipaddr4, buf, bufsize); break; } -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 case AF_INET6: { const struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6 = (const void *)ai->ai_addr; const struct in6_addr *ipaddr6 = &sa6->sin6_addr; @@ -167,17 +167,12 @@ create_hostcache_id(const char *name, int port, char *ptr, size_t buflen) { size_t len = nlen ? nlen : strlen(name); - size_t olen = 0; DEBUGASSERT(buflen >= MAX_HOSTCACHE_LEN); if(len > (buflen - 7)) len = buflen - 7; /* store and lower case the name */ - while(len--) { - *ptr++ = Curl_raw_tolower(*name++); - olen++; - } - olen += msnprintf(ptr, 7, ":%u", port); - return olen; + Curl_strntolower(ptr, name, len); + return msnprintf(&ptr[len], 7, ":%u", port) + len; } struct hostcache_prune_data { @@ -249,7 +244,7 @@ void Curl_hostcache_prune(struct Curl_easy *data) if(data->share) Curl_share_lock(data, CURL_LOCK_DATA_DNS, CURL_LOCK_ACCESS_SINGLE); - time(&now); + now = time(NULL); do { /* Remove outdated and unused entries from the hostcache */ @@ -288,7 +283,7 @@ static struct Curl_dns_entry *fetch_addr(struct Curl_easy *data, size_t entry_len = create_hostcache_id(hostname, 0, port, entry_id, sizeof(entry_id)); - /* See if its already in our dns cache */ + /* See if it's already in our dns cache */ dns = Curl_hash_pick(data->dns.hostcache, entry_id, entry_len + 1); /* No entry found in cache, check if we might have a wildcard entry */ @@ -303,7 +298,7 @@ static struct Curl_dns_entry *fetch_addr(struct Curl_easy *data, /* See whether the returned entry is stale. Done before we release lock */ struct hostcache_prune_data user; - time(&user.now); + user.now = time(NULL); user.cache_timeout = data->set.dns_cache_timeout; user.oldest = 0; @@ -523,7 +518,7 @@ Curl_cache_addr(struct Curl_easy *data, return dns; } -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 /* return a static IPv6 ::1 for the name */ static struct Curl_addrinfo *get_localhost6(int port, const char *name) { @@ -600,7 +595,7 @@ static struct Curl_addrinfo *get_localhost(int port, const char *name) return ca6; } -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 /* * Curl_ipv6works() returns TRUE if IPv6 seems to work. */ @@ -632,7 +627,7 @@ bool Curl_ipv6works(struct Curl_easy *data) return (ipv6_works>0)?TRUE:FALSE; } } -#endif /* ENABLE_IPV6 */ +#endif /* USE_IPV6 */ /* * Curl_host_is_ipnum() returns TRUE if the given string is a numerical IPv4 @@ -641,11 +636,11 @@ bool Curl_ipv6works(struct Curl_easy *data) bool Curl_host_is_ipnum(const char *hostname) { struct in_addr in; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 struct in6_addr in6; #endif if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, hostname, &in) > 0 -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 || Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, hostname, &in6) > 0 #endif ) @@ -741,7 +736,7 @@ enum resolve_t Curl_resolv(struct Curl_easy *data, Curl_set_in_callback(data, true); st = data->set.resolver_start( #ifdef USE_CURL_ASYNC - conn->resolve_async.resolver, + data->state.async.resolver, #else NULL, #endif @@ -754,18 +749,24 @@ enum resolve_t Curl_resolv(struct Curl_easy *data, #ifndef USE_RESOLVE_ON_IPS /* First check if this is an IPv4 address string */ - if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, hostname, &in) > 0) + if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, hostname, &in) > 0) { /* This is a dotted IP address 123.123.123.123-style */ addr = Curl_ip2addr(AF_INET, &in, hostname, port); -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 - if(!addr) { + if(!addr) + return CURLRESOLV_ERROR; + } +#ifdef USE_IPV6 + else { struct in6_addr in6; /* check if this is an IPv6 address string */ - if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, hostname, &in6) > 0) + if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, hostname, &in6) > 0) { /* This is an IPv6 address literal */ addr = Curl_ip2addr(AF_INET6, &in6, hostname, port); + if(!addr) + return CURLRESOLV_ERROR; + } } -#endif /* ENABLE_IPV6 */ +#endif /* USE_IPV6 */ #else /* if USE_RESOLVE_ON_IPS */ #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_DOH @@ -773,7 +774,7 @@ enum resolve_t Curl_resolv(struct Curl_easy *data, if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, hostname, &in) > 0) /* This is a dotted IP address 123.123.123.123-style */ ipnum = TRUE; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 else { struct in6_addr in6; /* check if this is an IPv6 address string */ @@ -781,7 +782,7 @@ enum resolve_t Curl_resolv(struct Curl_easy *data, /* This is an IPv6 address literal */ ipnum = TRUE; } -#endif /* ENABLE_IPV6 */ +#endif /* USE_IPV6 */ #endif /* CURL_DISABLE_DOH */ #endif /* !USE_RESOLVE_ON_IPS */ @@ -1064,6 +1065,23 @@ static void freednsentry(void *freethis) dns->inuse--; if(dns->inuse == 0) { Curl_freeaddrinfo(dns->addr); +#ifdef USE_HTTPSRR + if(dns->hinfo) { + if(dns->hinfo->target) + free(dns->hinfo->target); + if(dns->hinfo->alpns) + free(dns->hinfo->alpns); + if(dns->hinfo->ipv4hints) + free(dns->hinfo->ipv4hints); + if(dns->hinfo->echconfiglist) + free(dns->hinfo->echconfiglist); + if(dns->hinfo->ipv6hints) + free(dns->hinfo->ipv6hints); + if(dns->hinfo->val) + free(dns->hinfo->val); + free(dns->hinfo); + } +#endif free(dns); } } @@ -1071,7 +1089,7 @@ static void freednsentry(void *freethis) /* * Curl_init_dnscache() inits a new DNS cache. */ -void Curl_init_dnscache(struct Curl_hash *hash, int size) +void Curl_init_dnscache(struct Curl_hash *hash, size_t size) { Curl_hash_init(hash, size, Curl_hash_str, Curl_str_key_compare, freednsentry); @@ -1204,7 +1222,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_loadhostpairs(struct Curl_easy *data) memcpy(address, addr_begin, alen); address[alen] = '\0'; -#ifndef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifndef USE_IPV6 if(strchr(address, ':')) { infof(data, "Ignoring resolve address '%s', missing IPv6 support.", address); @@ -1415,9 +1433,9 @@ CURLcode Curl_once_resolved(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *protocol_done) struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; #ifdef USE_CURL_ASYNC - if(conn->resolve_async.dns) { - conn->dns_entry = conn->resolve_async.dns; - conn->resolve_async.dns = NULL; + if(data->state.async.dns) { + conn->dns_entry = data->state.async.dns; + data->state.async.dns = NULL; } #endif @@ -1439,11 +1457,11 @@ CURLcode Curl_once_resolved(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *protocol_done) #ifdef USE_CURL_ASYNC CURLcode Curl_resolver_error(struct Curl_easy *data) { - struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; const char *host_or_proxy; CURLcode result; #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY + struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; if(conn->bits.httpproxy) { host_or_proxy = "proxy"; result = CURLE_COULDNT_RESOLVE_PROXY; @@ -1456,7 +1474,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_resolver_error(struct Curl_easy *data) } failf(data, "Could not resolve %s: %s", host_or_proxy, - conn->resolve_async.hostname); + data->state.async.hostname); return result; } diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/hostip.h b/vendor/curl/lib/hostip.h index fb53a5776b..bf4e94d2fa 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/hostip.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/hostip.h @@ -32,6 +32,10 @@ #include +#ifdef USE_HTTPSRR +# include +#endif + /* Allocate enough memory to hold the full name information structs and * everything. OSF1 is known to require at least 8872 bytes. The buffer * required for storing all possible aliases and IP numbers is according to @@ -58,8 +62,41 @@ struct connectdata; */ struct Curl_hash *Curl_global_host_cache_init(void); +#ifdef USE_HTTPSRR + +#define CURL_MAXLEN_host_name 253 + +struct Curl_https_rrinfo { + size_t len; /* raw encoded length */ + unsigned char *val; /* raw encoded octets */ + /* + * fields from HTTPS RR, with the mandatory fields + * first (priority, target), then the others in the + * order of the keytag numbers defined at + * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9460#section-14.3.2 + */ + uint16_t priority; + char *target; + char *alpns; /* keytag = 1 */ + bool no_def_alpn; /* keytag = 2 */ + /* + * we don't support ports (keytag = 3) as we don't support + * port-switching yet + */ + unsigned char *ipv4hints; /* keytag = 4 */ + size_t ipv4hints_len; + unsigned char *echconfiglist; /* keytag = 5 */ + size_t echconfiglist_len; + unsigned char *ipv6hints; /* keytag = 6 */ + size_t ipv6hints_len; +}; +#endif + struct Curl_dns_entry { struct Curl_addrinfo *addr; +#ifdef USE_HTTPSRR + struct Curl_https_rrinfo *hinfo; +#endif /* timestamp == 0 -- permanent CURLOPT_RESOLVE entry (doesn't time out) */ time_t timestamp; /* use-counter, use Curl_resolv_unlock to release reference */ @@ -96,7 +133,7 @@ enum resolve_t Curl_resolv_timeout(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_dns_entry **dnsentry, timediff_t timeoutms); -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 /* * Curl_ipv6works() returns TRUE if IPv6 seems to work. */ @@ -129,7 +166,7 @@ void Curl_resolv_unlock(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_dns_entry *dns); /* init a new dns cache */ -void Curl_init_dnscache(struct Curl_hash *hash, int hashsize); +void Curl_init_dnscache(struct Curl_hash *hash, size_t hashsize); /* prune old entries from the DNS cache */ void Curl_hostcache_prune(struct Curl_easy *data); diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/hsts.c b/vendor/curl/lib/hsts.c index 9314be294b..a5e7676138 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/hsts.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/hsts.c @@ -107,18 +107,11 @@ void Curl_hsts_cleanup(struct hsts **hp) } } -static struct stsentry *hsts_entry(void) -{ - return calloc(1, sizeof(struct stsentry)); -} - static CURLcode hsts_create(struct hsts *h, const char *hostname, bool subdomains, curl_off_t expires) { - struct stsentry *sts; - char *duphost; size_t hlen; DEBUGASSERT(h); DEBUGASSERT(hostname); @@ -127,24 +120,23 @@ static CURLcode hsts_create(struct hsts *h, if(hlen && (hostname[hlen - 1] == '.')) /* strip off any trailing dot */ --hlen; - if(!hlen) - /* no host name left */ - return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; - - sts = hsts_entry(); - if(!sts) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + if(hlen) { + char *duphost; + struct stsentry *sts = calloc(1, sizeof(struct stsentry)); + if(!sts) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + + duphost = Curl_memdup0(hostname, hlen); + if(!duphost) { + free(sts); + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } - duphost = Curl_strndup(hostname, hlen); - if(!duphost) { - free(sts); - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + sts->host = duphost; + sts->expires = expires; + sts->includeSubDomains = subdomains; + Curl_llist_append(&h->list, sts, &sts->node); } - - sts->host = duphost; - sts->expires = expires; - sts->includeSubDomains = subdomains; - Curl_llist_insert_next(&h->list, h->list.tail, sts, &sts->node); return CURLE_OK; } @@ -481,6 +473,7 @@ static CURLcode hsts_pull(struct Curl_easy *data, struct hsts *h) if(sc == CURLSTS_OK) { time_t expires; CURLcode result; + DEBUGASSERT(e.name[0]); if(!e.name[0]) /* bail out if no name was stored */ return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; @@ -513,7 +506,6 @@ static CURLcode hsts_pull(struct Curl_easy *data, struct hsts *h) static CURLcode hsts_load(struct hsts *h, const char *file) { CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; - char *line = NULL; FILE *fp; /* we need a private copy of the file name so that the hsts cache file @@ -525,28 +517,25 @@ static CURLcode hsts_load(struct hsts *h, const char *file) fp = fopen(file, FOPEN_READTEXT); if(fp) { - line = malloc(MAX_HSTS_LINE); - if(!line) - goto fail; - while(Curl_get_line(line, MAX_HSTS_LINE, fp)) { - char *lineptr = line; + struct dynbuf buf; + Curl_dyn_init(&buf, MAX_HSTS_LINE); + while(Curl_get_line(&buf, fp)) { + char *lineptr = Curl_dyn_ptr(&buf); while(*lineptr && ISBLANK(*lineptr)) lineptr++; - if(*lineptr == '#') - /* skip commented lines */ + /* + * Skip empty or commented lines, since we know the line will have a + * trailing newline from Curl_get_line we can treat length 1 as empty. + */ + if((*lineptr == '#') || strlen(lineptr) <= 1) continue; hsts_add(h, lineptr); } - free(line); /* free the line buffer */ + Curl_dyn_free(&buf); /* free the line buffer */ fclose(fp); } return result; - -fail: - Curl_safefree(h->filename); - fclose(fp); - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; } /* diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/http.c b/vendor/curl/lib/http.c index be6d442e8b..2a41f80786 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/http.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/http.c @@ -65,7 +65,6 @@ #include "vquic/vquic.h" #include "http_digest.h" #include "http_ntlm.h" -#include "curl_ntlm_wb.h" #include "http_negotiate.h" #include "http_aws_sigv4.h" #include "url.h" @@ -73,6 +72,7 @@ #include "hostip.h" #include "dynhds.h" #include "http.h" +#include "headers.h" #include "select.h" #include "parsedate.h" /* for the week day and month names */ #include "strtoofft.h" @@ -100,24 +100,17 @@ * Forward declarations. */ -static int http_getsock_do(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn, - curl_socket_t *socks); -static bool http_should_fail(struct Curl_easy *data); - -static CURLcode http_setup_conn(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn); -#ifdef USE_WEBSOCKETS -static CURLcode ws_setup_conn(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn); -#endif +static bool http_should_fail(struct Curl_easy *data, int httpcode); +static bool http_exp100_is_waiting(struct Curl_easy *data); +static CURLcode http_exp100_add_reader(struct Curl_easy *data); +static void http_exp100_send_anyway(struct Curl_easy *data); /* * HTTP handler interface. */ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_http = { - "HTTP", /* scheme */ - http_setup_conn, /* setup_connection */ + "http", /* scheme */ + Curl_http_setup_conn, /* setup_connection */ Curl_http, /* do_it */ Curl_http_done, /* done */ ZERO_NULL, /* do_more */ @@ -125,11 +118,12 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_http = { ZERO_NULL, /* connecting */ ZERO_NULL, /* doing */ ZERO_NULL, /* proto_getsock */ - http_getsock_do, /* doing_getsock */ + Curl_http_getsock_do, /* doing_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + Curl_http_write_resp, /* write_resp */ + Curl_http_write_resp_hd, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_HTTP, /* defport */ @@ -139,39 +133,13 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_http = { PROTOPT_USERPWDCTRL }; -#ifdef USE_WEBSOCKETS -const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_ws = { - "WS", /* scheme */ - ws_setup_conn, /* setup_connection */ - Curl_http, /* do_it */ - Curl_http_done, /* done */ - ZERO_NULL, /* do_more */ - Curl_http_connect, /* connect_it */ - ZERO_NULL, /* connecting */ - ZERO_NULL, /* doing */ - ZERO_NULL, /* proto_getsock */ - http_getsock_do, /* doing_getsock */ - ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ - ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ - Curl_ws_disconnect, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ - ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ - ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ - PORT_HTTP, /* defport */ - CURLPROTO_WS, /* protocol */ - CURLPROTO_HTTP, /* family */ - PROTOPT_CREDSPERREQUEST | /* flags */ - PROTOPT_USERPWDCTRL -}; -#endif - #ifdef USE_SSL /* * HTTPS handler interface. */ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_https = { - "HTTPS", /* scheme */ - http_setup_conn, /* setup_connection */ + "https", /* scheme */ + Curl_http_setup_conn, /* setup_connection */ Curl_http, /* do_it */ Curl_http_done, /* done */ ZERO_NULL, /* do_more */ @@ -179,11 +147,12 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_https = { NULL, /* connecting */ ZERO_NULL, /* doing */ NULL, /* proto_getsock */ - http_getsock_do, /* doing_getsock */ + Curl_http_getsock_do, /* doing_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + Curl_http_write_resp, /* write_resp */ + Curl_http_write_resp_hd, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_HTTPS, /* defport */ @@ -193,36 +162,10 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_https = { PROTOPT_USERPWDCTRL }; -#ifdef USE_WEBSOCKETS -const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_wss = { - "WSS", /* scheme */ - ws_setup_conn, /* setup_connection */ - Curl_http, /* do_it */ - Curl_http_done, /* done */ - ZERO_NULL, /* do_more */ - Curl_http_connect, /* connect_it */ - NULL, /* connecting */ - ZERO_NULL, /* doing */ - NULL, /* proto_getsock */ - http_getsock_do, /* doing_getsock */ - ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ - ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ - Curl_ws_disconnect, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ - ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ - ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ - PORT_HTTPS, /* defport */ - CURLPROTO_WSS, /* protocol */ - CURLPROTO_HTTP, /* family */ - PROTOPT_SSL | PROTOPT_CREDSPERREQUEST | /* flags */ - PROTOPT_USERPWDCTRL -}; -#endif - #endif -static CURLcode http_setup_conn(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn) +CURLcode Curl_http_setup_conn(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct connectdata *conn) { /* allocate the HTTP-specific struct for the Curl_easy, only to survive during this request */ @@ -245,16 +188,6 @@ static CURLcode http_setup_conn(struct Curl_easy *data, return CURLE_OK; } -#ifdef USE_WEBSOCKETS -static CURLcode ws_setup_conn(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn) -{ - /* websockets is 1.1 only (for now) */ - data->state.httpwant = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1; - return http_setup_conn(data, conn); -} -#endif - #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY /* * checkProxyHeaders() checks the linked list of custom proxy headers @@ -297,7 +230,6 @@ char *Curl_copy_header_value(const char *header) { const char *start; const char *end; - char *value; size_t len; /* Find the end of the header name */ @@ -313,8 +245,6 @@ char *Curl_copy_header_value(const char *header) while(*start && ISSPACE(*start)) start++; - /* data is in the host encoding so - use '\r' and '\n' instead of 0x0d and 0x0a */ end = strchr(start, '\r'); if(!end) end = strchr(start, '\n'); @@ -330,14 +260,7 @@ char *Curl_copy_header_value(const char *header) /* get length of the type */ len = end - start + 1; - value = malloc(len + 1); - if(!value) - return NULL; - - memcpy(value, start, len); - value[len] = 0; /* null-terminate */ - - return value; + return Curl_memdup0(start, len); } #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_HTTP_AUTH @@ -462,8 +385,6 @@ static bool pickoneauth(struct auth *pick, unsigned long mask) #endif else if(avail & CURLAUTH_NTLM) pick->picked = CURLAUTH_NTLM; - else if(avail & CURLAUTH_NTLM_WB) - pick->picked = CURLAUTH_NTLM_WB; #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_BASIC_AUTH else if(avail & CURLAUTH_BASIC) pick->picked = CURLAUTH_BASIC; @@ -484,150 +405,86 @@ static bool pickoneauth(struct auth *pick, unsigned long mask) /* * http_perhapsrewind() * - * If we are doing POST or PUT { - * If we have more data to send { - * If we are doing NTLM { - * Keep sending since we must not disconnect - * } - * else { - * If there is more than just a little data left to send, close - * the current connection by force. - * } - * } - * If we have sent any data { - * If we don't have track of all the data { - * call app to tell it to rewind - * } - * else { - * rewind internally so that the operation can restart fine - * } - * } - * } + * The current request needs to be done again - maybe due to a follow + * or authentication negotiation. Check if: + * 1) a rewind of the data sent to the server is necessary + * 2) the current transfer should continue or be stopped early */ static CURLcode http_perhapsrewind(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn) { - struct HTTP *http = data->req.p.http; - curl_off_t bytessent; - curl_off_t expectsend = -1; /* default is unknown */ - - if(!http) - /* If this is still NULL, we have not reach very far and we can safely - skip this rewinding stuff */ - return CURLE_OK; - - switch(data->state.httpreq) { - case HTTPREQ_GET: - case HTTPREQ_HEAD: + curl_off_t bytessent = data->req.writebytecount; + curl_off_t expectsend = Curl_creader_total_length(data); + curl_off_t upload_remain = (expectsend >= 0)? (expectsend - bytessent) : -1; + bool little_upload_remains = (upload_remain >= 0 && upload_remain < 2000); + bool needs_rewind = Curl_creader_needs_rewind(data); + /* By default, we'd like to abort the transfer when little or + * unknown amount remains. But this may be overridden by authentications + * further below! */ + bool abort_upload = (!data->req.upload_done && !little_upload_remains); + const char *ongoing_auth = NULL; + + /* We need a rewind before uploading client read data again. The + * checks below just influence of the upload is to be continued + * or aborted early. + * This depends on how much remains to be sent and in what state + * the authentication is. Some auth schemes such as NTLM do not work + * for a new connection. */ + if(needs_rewind) { + infof(data, "Need to rewind upload for next request"); + Curl_creader_set_rewind(data, TRUE); + } + + if(conn->bits.close) + /* If we already decided to close this connection, we cannot veto. */ return CURLE_OK; - default: - break; - } - - bytessent = data->req.writebytecount; - - if(conn->bits.authneg) { - /* This is a state where we are known to be negotiating and we don't send - any data then. */ - expectsend = 0; - } - else if(!conn->bits.protoconnstart) { - /* HTTP CONNECT in progress: there is no body */ - expectsend = 0; - } - else { - /* figure out how much data we are expected to send */ - switch(data->state.httpreq) { - case HTTPREQ_POST: - case HTTPREQ_PUT: - if(data->state.infilesize != -1) - expectsend = data->state.infilesize; - break; - case HTTPREQ_POST_FORM: - case HTTPREQ_POST_MIME: - expectsend = http->postsize; - break; - default: - break; - } - } - data->state.rewindbeforesend = FALSE; /* default */ - - if((expectsend == -1) || (expectsend > bytessent)) { + if(abort_upload) { + /* We'd like to abort the upload - but should we? */ #if defined(USE_NTLM) - /* There is still data left to send */ if((data->state.authproxy.picked == CURLAUTH_NTLM) || - (data->state.authhost.picked == CURLAUTH_NTLM) || - (data->state.authproxy.picked == CURLAUTH_NTLM_WB) || - (data->state.authhost.picked == CURLAUTH_NTLM_WB)) { - if(((expectsend - bytessent) < 2000) || - (conn->http_ntlm_state != NTLMSTATE_NONE) || + (data->state.authhost.picked == CURLAUTH_NTLM)) { + ongoing_auth = "NTML"; + if((conn->http_ntlm_state != NTLMSTATE_NONE) || (conn->proxy_ntlm_state != NTLMSTATE_NONE)) { - /* The NTLM-negotiation has started *OR* there is just a little (<2K) - data left to send, keep on sending. */ - - /* rewind data when completely done sending! */ - if(!conn->bits.authneg && (conn->writesockfd != CURL_SOCKET_BAD)) { - data->state.rewindbeforesend = TRUE; - infof(data, "Rewind stream before next send"); - } - - return CURLE_OK; + /* The NTLM-negotiation has started, keep on sending. + * Need to do further work on same connection */ + abort_upload = FALSE; } - - if(conn->bits.close) - /* this is already marked to get closed */ - return CURLE_OK; - - infof(data, "NTLM send, close instead of sending %" - CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T " bytes", - (curl_off_t)(expectsend - bytessent)); } #endif #if defined(USE_SPNEGO) /* There is still data left to send */ if((data->state.authproxy.picked == CURLAUTH_NEGOTIATE) || (data->state.authhost.picked == CURLAUTH_NEGOTIATE)) { - if(((expectsend - bytessent) < 2000) || - (conn->http_negotiate_state != GSS_AUTHNONE) || + ongoing_auth = "NEGOTIATE"; + if((conn->http_negotiate_state != GSS_AUTHNONE) || (conn->proxy_negotiate_state != GSS_AUTHNONE)) { - /* The NEGOTIATE-negotiation has started *OR* - there is just a little (<2K) data left to send, keep on sending. */ - - /* rewind data when completely done sending! */ - if(!conn->bits.authneg && (conn->writesockfd != CURL_SOCKET_BAD)) { - data->state.rewindbeforesend = TRUE; - infof(data, "Rewind stream before next send"); - } - - return CURLE_OK; + /* The NEGOTIATE-negotiation has started, keep on sending. + * Need to do further work on same connection */ + abort_upload = FALSE; } - - if(conn->bits.close) - /* this is already marked to get closed */ - return CURLE_OK; - - infof(data, "NEGOTIATE send, close instead of sending %" - CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T " bytes", - (curl_off_t)(expectsend - bytessent)); } #endif + } - /* This is not NEGOTIATE/NTLM or many bytes left to send: close */ + if(abort_upload) { + if(upload_remain >= 0) + infof(data, "%s%sclose instead of sending %" + CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T " more bytes", + ongoing_auth? ongoing_auth : "", + ongoing_auth? " send, " : "", + upload_remain); + else + infof(data, "%s%sclose instead of sending unknown amount " + "of more bytes", + ongoing_auth? ongoing_auth : "", + ongoing_auth? " send, " : ""); + /* We decided to abort the ongoing transfer */ streamclose(conn, "Mid-auth HTTP and much data left to send"); + /* FIXME: questionable manipulation here, can we do this differently? */ data->req.size = 0; /* don't download any more than 0 bytes */ - - /* There still is data left to send, but this connection is marked for - closure so we can safely do the rewind right now */ - } - - if(bytessent) { - /* mark for rewind since if we already sent something */ - data->state.rewindbeforesend = TRUE; - infof(data, "Please rewind output before next send"); } - return CURLE_OK; } @@ -658,7 +515,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_auth_act(struct Curl_easy *data) if((data->state.aptr.user || data->set.str[STRING_BEARER]) && ((data->req.httpcode == 401) || - (conn->bits.authneg && data->req.httpcode < 300))) { + (data->req.authneg && data->req.httpcode < 300))) { pickhost = pickoneauth(&data->state.authhost, authmask); if(!pickhost) data->state.authproblem = TRUE; @@ -672,7 +529,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_auth_act(struct Curl_easy *data) #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY if(conn->bits.proxy_user_passwd && ((data->req.httpcode == 407) || - (conn->bits.authneg && data->req.httpcode < 300))) { + (data->req.authneg && data->req.httpcode < 300))) { pickproxy = pickoneauth(&data->state.authproxy, authmask & ~CURLAUTH_BEARER); if(!pickproxy) @@ -681,13 +538,10 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_auth_act(struct Curl_easy *data) #endif if(pickhost || pickproxy) { - if((data->state.httpreq != HTTPREQ_GET) && - (data->state.httpreq != HTTPREQ_HEAD) && - !data->state.rewindbeforesend) { - result = http_perhapsrewind(data, conn); - if(result) - return result; - } + result = http_perhapsrewind(data, conn); + if(result) + return result; + /* In case this is GSS auth, the newurl field is already allocated so we must make sure to free it before allocating a new one. As figured out in bug #2284386 */ @@ -698,7 +552,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_auth_act(struct Curl_easy *data) } else if((data->req.httpcode < 300) && (!data->state.authhost.done) && - conn->bits.authneg) { + data->req.authneg) { /* no (known) authentication available, authentication is not "done" yet and no authentication seems to be required and @@ -711,7 +565,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_auth_act(struct Curl_easy *data) data->state.authhost.done = TRUE; } } - if(http_should_fail(data)) { + if(http_should_fail(data, data->req.httpcode)) { failf(data, "The requested URL returned error: %d", data->req.httpcode); result = CURLE_HTTP_RETURNED_ERROR; @@ -768,15 +622,6 @@ output_auth_headers(struct Curl_easy *data, } else #endif -#if defined(USE_NTLM) && defined(NTLM_WB_ENABLED) - if(authstatus->picked == CURLAUTH_NTLM_WB) { - auth = "NTLM_WB"; - result = Curl_output_ntlm_wb(data, conn, proxy); - if(result) - return result; - } - else -#endif #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_DIGEST_AUTH if(authstatus->picked == CURLAUTH_DIGEST) { auth = "Digest"; @@ -943,10 +788,10 @@ Curl_http_output_auth(struct Curl_easy *data, (httpreq != HTTPREQ_HEAD)) { /* Auth is required and we are not authenticated yet. Make a PUT or POST with content-length zero as a "probe". */ - conn->bits.authneg = TRUE; + data->req.authneg = TRUE; } else - conn->bits.authneg = FALSE; + data->req.authneg = FALSE; return result; } @@ -1066,31 +911,15 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_input_auth(struct Curl_easy *data, bool proxy, /* NTLM support requires the SSL crypto libs */ if(checkprefix("NTLM", auth) && is_valid_auth_separator(auth[4])) { if((authp->avail & CURLAUTH_NTLM) || - (authp->avail & CURLAUTH_NTLM_WB) || Curl_auth_is_ntlm_supported()) { *availp |= CURLAUTH_NTLM; authp->avail |= CURLAUTH_NTLM; - if(authp->picked == CURLAUTH_NTLM || - authp->picked == CURLAUTH_NTLM_WB) { + if(authp->picked == CURLAUTH_NTLM) { /* NTLM authentication is picked and activated */ CURLcode result = Curl_input_ntlm(data, proxy, auth); if(!result) { data->state.authproblem = FALSE; -#ifdef NTLM_WB_ENABLED - if(authp->picked == CURLAUTH_NTLM_WB) { - *availp &= ~CURLAUTH_NTLM; - authp->avail &= ~CURLAUTH_NTLM; - *availp |= CURLAUTH_NTLM_WB; - authp->avail |= CURLAUTH_NTLM_WB; - - result = Curl_input_ntlm_wb(data, conn, proxy, auth); - if(result) { - infof(data, "Authentication problem. Ignoring this."); - data->state.authproblem = TRUE; - } - } -#endif } else { infof(data, "Authentication problem. Ignoring this."); @@ -1177,21 +1006,18 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_input_auth(struct Curl_easy *data, bool proxy, } /** - * http_should_fail() determines whether an HTTP response has gotten us + * http_should_fail() determines whether an HTTP response code has gotten us * into an error state or not. * * @retval FALSE communications should continue * * @retval TRUE communications should not continue */ -static bool http_should_fail(struct Curl_easy *data) +static bool http_should_fail(struct Curl_easy *data, int httpcode) { - int httpcode; DEBUGASSERT(data); DEBUGASSERT(data->conn); - httpcode = data->req.httpcode; - /* ** If we haven't been asked to fail on error, ** don't fail. @@ -1253,274 +1079,6 @@ static bool http_should_fail(struct Curl_easy *data) return data->state.authproblem; } -/* - * readmoredata() is a "fread() emulation" to provide POST and/or request - * data. It is used when a huge POST is to be made and the entire chunk wasn't - * sent in the first send(). This function will then be called from the - * transfer.c loop when more data is to be sent to the peer. - * - * Returns the amount of bytes it filled the buffer with. - */ -static size_t readmoredata(char *buffer, - size_t size, - size_t nitems, - void *userp) -{ - struct HTTP *http = (struct HTTP *)userp; - struct Curl_easy *data = http->backup.data; - size_t fullsize = size * nitems; - - if(!http->postsize) - /* nothing to return */ - return 0; - - /* make sure that an HTTP request is never sent away chunked! */ - data->req.forbidchunk = (http->sending == HTTPSEND_REQUEST)?TRUE:FALSE; - - if(data->set.max_send_speed && - (data->set.max_send_speed < (curl_off_t)fullsize) && - (data->set.max_send_speed < http->postsize)) - /* speed limit */ - fullsize = (size_t)data->set.max_send_speed; - - else if(http->postsize <= (curl_off_t)fullsize) { - memcpy(buffer, http->postdata, (size_t)http->postsize); - fullsize = (size_t)http->postsize; - - if(http->backup.postsize) { - /* move backup data into focus and continue on that */ - http->postdata = http->backup.postdata; - http->postsize = http->backup.postsize; - data->state.fread_func = http->backup.fread_func; - data->state.in = http->backup.fread_in; - - http->sending++; /* move one step up */ - - http->backup.postsize = 0; - } - else - http->postsize = 0; - - return fullsize; - } - - memcpy(buffer, http->postdata, fullsize); - http->postdata += fullsize; - http->postsize -= fullsize; - - return fullsize; -} - -/* - * Curl_buffer_send() sends a header buffer and frees all associated - * memory. Body data may be appended to the header data if desired. - * - * Returns CURLcode - */ -CURLcode Curl_buffer_send(struct dynbuf *in, - struct Curl_easy *data, - struct HTTP *http, - /* add the number of sent bytes to this - counter */ - curl_off_t *bytes_written, - /* how much of the buffer contains body data */ - curl_off_t included_body_bytes, - int sockindex) -{ - ssize_t amount; - CURLcode result; - char *ptr; - size_t size; - struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; - size_t sendsize; - size_t headersize; - - DEBUGASSERT(sockindex <= SECONDARYSOCKET && sockindex >= 0); - - /* The looping below is required since we use non-blocking sockets, but due - to the circumstances we will just loop and try again and again etc */ - - ptr = Curl_dyn_ptr(in); - size = Curl_dyn_len(in); - - headersize = size - (size_t)included_body_bytes; /* the initial part that - isn't body is header */ - - DEBUGASSERT(size > (size_t)included_body_bytes); - - if((conn->handler->flags & PROTOPT_SSL -#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY - || IS_HTTPS_PROXY(conn->http_proxy.proxytype) -#endif - ) - && conn->httpversion < 20) { - /* Make sure this doesn't send more body bytes than what the max send - speed says. The request bytes do not count to the max speed. - */ - if(data->set.max_send_speed && - (included_body_bytes > data->set.max_send_speed)) { - curl_off_t overflow = included_body_bytes - data->set.max_send_speed; - DEBUGASSERT((size_t)overflow < size); - sendsize = size - (size_t)overflow; - } - else - sendsize = size; - - /* OpenSSL is very picky and we must send the SAME buffer pointer to the - library when we attempt to re-send this buffer. Sending the same data - is not enough, we must use the exact same address. For this reason, we - must copy the data to the uploadbuffer first, since that is the buffer - we will be using if this send is retried later. - */ - result = Curl_get_upload_buffer(data); - if(result) { - /* malloc failed, free memory and return to the caller */ - Curl_dyn_free(in); - return result; - } - /* We never send more than upload_buffer_size bytes in one single chunk - when we speak HTTPS, as if only a fraction of it is sent now, this data - needs to fit into the normal read-callback buffer later on and that - buffer is using this size. - */ - if(sendsize > (size_t)data->set.upload_buffer_size) - sendsize = (size_t)data->set.upload_buffer_size; - - memcpy(data->state.ulbuf, ptr, sendsize); - ptr = data->state.ulbuf; - } - else { -#ifdef CURLDEBUG - /* Allow debug builds to override this logic to force short initial - sends - */ - char *p = getenv("CURL_SMALLREQSEND"); - if(p) { - size_t altsize = (size_t)strtoul(p, NULL, 10); - if(altsize) - sendsize = CURLMIN(size, altsize); - else - sendsize = size; - } - else -#endif - { - /* Make sure this doesn't send more body bytes than what the max send - speed says. The request bytes do not count to the max speed. - */ - if(data->set.max_send_speed && - (included_body_bytes > data->set.max_send_speed)) { - curl_off_t overflow = included_body_bytes - data->set.max_send_speed; - DEBUGASSERT((size_t)overflow < size); - sendsize = size - (size_t)overflow; - } - else - sendsize = size; - } - - /* We currently cannot send more that this for http here: - * - if sending blocks, it return 0 as amount - * - we then whisk aside the `in` into the `http` struct - * and install our own `data->state.fread_func` that - * on subsequent calls reads `in` empty. - * - when the whisked away `in` is empty, the `fread_func` - * is restored to its original state. - * The problem is that `fread_func` can only return - * `upload_buffer_size` lengths. If the send we do here - * is larger and blocks, we do re-sending with smaller - * amounts of data and connection filters do not like - * that. - */ - if(http && (sendsize > (size_t)data->set.upload_buffer_size)) - sendsize = (size_t)data->set.upload_buffer_size; - } - - result = Curl_nwrite(data, sockindex, ptr, sendsize, &amount); - - if(!result) { - /* - * Note that we may not send the entire chunk at once, and we have a set - * number of data bytes at the end of the big buffer (out of which we may - * only send away a part). - */ - /* how much of the header that was sent */ - size_t headlen = (size_t)amount>headersize ? headersize : (size_t)amount; - size_t bodylen = amount - headlen; - - /* this data _may_ contain binary stuff */ - Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_HEADER_OUT, ptr, headlen); - if(bodylen) - /* there was body data sent beyond the initial header part, pass that on - to the debug callback too */ - Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_DATA_OUT, ptr + headlen, bodylen); - - /* 'amount' can never be a very large value here so typecasting it so a - signed 31 bit value should not cause problems even if ssize_t is - 64bit */ - *bytes_written += (long)amount; - - if(http) { - /* if we sent a piece of the body here, up the byte counter for it - accordingly */ - data->req.writebytecount += bodylen; - Curl_pgrsSetUploadCounter(data, data->req.writebytecount); - - if((size_t)amount != size) { - /* The whole request could not be sent in one system call. We must - queue it up and send it later when we get the chance. We must not - loop here and wait until it might work again. */ - - size -= amount; - - ptr = Curl_dyn_ptr(in) + amount; - - /* backup the currently set pointers */ - http->backup.fread_func = data->state.fread_func; - http->backup.fread_in = data->state.in; - http->backup.postdata = http->postdata; - http->backup.postsize = http->postsize; - http->backup.data = data; - - /* set the new pointers for the request-sending */ - data->state.fread_func = (curl_read_callback)readmoredata; - data->state.in = (void *)http; - http->postdata = ptr; - http->postsize = (curl_off_t)size; - - /* this much data is remaining header: */ - data->req.pendingheader = headersize - headlen; - - http->send_buffer = *in; /* copy the whole struct */ - http->sending = HTTPSEND_REQUEST; - return CURLE_OK; - } - http->sending = HTTPSEND_BODY; - /* the full buffer was sent, clean up and return */ - } - else { - if((size_t)amount != size) - /* We have no continue-send mechanism now, fail. This can only happen - when this function is used from the CONNECT sending function. We - currently (stupidly) assume that the whole request is always sent - away in the first single chunk. - - This needs FIXing. - */ - return CURLE_SEND_ERROR; - } - } - Curl_dyn_free(in); - - /* no remaining header data */ - data->req.pendingheader = 0; - return result; -} - -/* end of the add_buffer functions */ -/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------- */ - - - /* * Curl_compareheader() * @@ -1597,9 +1155,9 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_connect(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) /* this returns the socket to wait for in the DO and DOING state for the multi interface and then we're always _sending_ a request and thus we wait for the single socket to become writable only */ -static int http_getsock_do(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn, - curl_socket_t *socks) +int Curl_http_getsock_do(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct connectdata *conn, + curl_socket_t *socks) { /* write mode */ (void)conn; @@ -1623,17 +1181,11 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_done(struct Curl_easy *data, data->state.authhost.multipass = FALSE; data->state.authproxy.multipass = FALSE; - /* set the proper values (possibly modified on POST) */ - conn->seek_func = data->set.seek_func; /* restore */ - conn->seek_client = data->set.seek_client; /* restore */ - if(!http) return CURLE_OK; - Curl_dyn_free(&http->send_buffer); Curl_dyn_reset(&data->state.headerb); Curl_hyper_done(data); - Curl_ws_done(data); if(status) return status; @@ -1693,83 +1245,12 @@ static const char *get_http_string(const struct Curl_easy *data, } #endif -/* check and possibly add an Expect: header */ -static CURLcode expect100(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn, - struct dynbuf *req) -{ - CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; - if(!data->state.disableexpect && Curl_use_http_1_1plus(data, conn) && - (conn->httpversion < 20)) { - /* if not doing HTTP 1.0 or version 2, or disabled explicitly, we add an - Expect: 100-continue to the headers which actually speeds up post - operations (as there is one packet coming back from the web server) */ - const char *ptr = Curl_checkheaders(data, STRCONST("Expect")); - if(ptr) { - data->state.expect100header = - Curl_compareheader(ptr, STRCONST("Expect:"), STRCONST("100-continue")); - } - else { - result = Curl_dyn_addn(req, STRCONST("Expect: 100-continue\r\n")); - if(!result) - data->state.expect100header = TRUE; - } - } - - return result; -} - enum proxy_use { HEADER_SERVER, /* direct to server */ HEADER_PROXY, /* regular request to proxy */ HEADER_CONNECT /* sending CONNECT to a proxy */ }; -/* used to compile the provided trailers into one buffer - will return an error code if one of the headers is - not formatted correctly */ -CURLcode Curl_http_compile_trailers(struct curl_slist *trailers, - struct dynbuf *b, - struct Curl_easy *handle) -{ - char *ptr = NULL; - CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; - const char *endofline_native = NULL; - const char *endofline_network = NULL; - - if( -#ifdef CURL_DO_LINEEND_CONV - (handle->state.prefer_ascii) || -#endif - (handle->set.crlf)) { - /* \n will become \r\n later on */ - endofline_native = "\n"; - endofline_network = "\x0a"; - } - else { - endofline_native = "\r\n"; - endofline_network = "\x0d\x0a"; - } - - while(trailers) { - /* only add correctly formatted trailers */ - ptr = strchr(trailers->data, ':'); - if(ptr && *(ptr + 1) == ' ') { - result = Curl_dyn_add(b, trailers->data); - if(result) - return result; - result = Curl_dyn_add(b, endofline_native); - if(result) - return result; - } - else - infof(handle, "Malformatted trailing header, skipping trailer"); - trailers = trailers->next; - } - result = Curl_dyn_add(b, endofline_network); - return result; -} - static bool hd_name_eq(const char *n1, size_t n1len, const char *n2, size_t n2len) { @@ -1888,7 +1369,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_dynhds_add_custom(struct Curl_easy *data, /* this header is sent later */ hd_name_eq(name, namelen, STRCONST("Content-Type:"))) ; - else if(conn->bits.authneg && + else if(data->req.authneg && /* while doing auth neg, don't allow the custom length since we will force length zero then */ hd_name_eq(name, namelen, STRCONST("Content-Length:"))) @@ -2034,7 +1515,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_add_custom_headers(struct Curl_easy *data, /* this header is sent later */ checkprefix("Content-Type:", compare)) ; - else if(conn->bits.authneg && + else if(data->req.authneg && /* while doing auth neg, don't allow the custom length since we will force length zero then */ checkprefix("Content-Length:", compare)) @@ -2103,6 +1584,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_add_timecondition(struct Curl_easy *data, switch(data->set.timecondition) { default: + DEBUGF(infof(data, "invalid time condition")); return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; case CURL_TIMECOND_IFMODSINCE: @@ -2271,7 +1753,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_host(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn) } #endif - if(strcmp("Host:", ptr)) { + if(!strcasecompare("Host:", ptr)) { aptr->host = aprintf("Host:%s\r\n", &ptr[5]); if(!aptr->host) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; @@ -2359,9 +1841,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_target(struct Curl_easy *data, return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; } } - /* Extract the URL to use in the request. Store in STRING_TEMP_URL for - clean-up reasons if the function returns before the free() further - down. */ + /* Extract the URL to use in the request. */ uc = curl_url_get(h, CURLUPART_URL, &url, CURLU_NO_DEFAULT_PORT); if(uc) { curl_url_cleanup(h); @@ -2416,18 +1896,17 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_target(struct Curl_easy *data, return result; } -CURLcode Curl_http_body(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, - Curl_HttpReq httpreq, const char **tep) +#if !defined(CURL_DISABLE_MIME) || !defined(CURL_DISABLE_FORM_API) +static CURLcode set_post_reader(struct Curl_easy *data, Curl_HttpReq httpreq) { - CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; - const char *ptr; - struct HTTP *http = data->req.p.http; - http->postsize = 0; + CURLcode result; switch(httpreq) { +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_MIME case HTTPREQ_POST_MIME: data->state.mimepost = &data->set.mimepost; break; +#endif #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_FORM_API case HTTPREQ_POST_FORM: /* Convert the form structure into a mime structure, then keep @@ -2449,56 +1928,189 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_body(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, #endif default: data->state.mimepost = NULL; + break; } + switch(httpreq) { + case HTTPREQ_POST_FORM: + case HTTPREQ_POST_MIME: + /* This is form posting using mime data. */ #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_MIME - if(data->state.mimepost) { - const char *cthdr = Curl_checkheaders(data, STRCONST("Content-Type")); + if(data->state.mimepost) { + const char *cthdr = Curl_checkheaders(data, STRCONST("Content-Type")); - /* Read and seek body only. */ - data->state.mimepost->flags |= MIME_BODY_ONLY; + /* Read and seek body only. */ + data->state.mimepost->flags |= MIME_BODY_ONLY; - /* Prepare the mime structure headers & set content type. */ + /* Prepare the mime structure headers & set content type. */ - if(cthdr) - for(cthdr += 13; *cthdr == ' '; cthdr++) - ; - else if(data->state.mimepost->kind == MIMEKIND_MULTIPART) - cthdr = "multipart/form-data"; + if(cthdr) + for(cthdr += 13; *cthdr == ' '; cthdr++) + ; + else if(data->state.mimepost->kind == MIMEKIND_MULTIPART) + cthdr = "multipart/form-data"; - curl_mime_headers(data->state.mimepost, data->set.headers, 0); - result = Curl_mime_prepare_headers(data, data->state.mimepost, cthdr, - NULL, MIMESTRATEGY_FORM); - curl_mime_headers(data->state.mimepost, NULL, 0); - if(!result) - result = Curl_mime_rewind(data->state.mimepost); - if(result) - return result; - http->postsize = Curl_mime_size(data->state.mimepost); + curl_mime_headers(data->state.mimepost, data->set.headers, 0); + result = Curl_mime_prepare_headers(data, data->state.mimepost, cthdr, + NULL, MIMESTRATEGY_FORM); + if(result) + return result; + curl_mime_headers(data->state.mimepost, NULL, 0); + result = Curl_creader_set_mime(data, data->state.mimepost); + if(result) + return result; + } + else +#endif + { + result = Curl_creader_set_null(data); + } + data->state.infilesize = Curl_creader_total_length(data); + return result; + + default: + return Curl_creader_set_null(data); } + /* never reached */ +} #endif - ptr = Curl_checkheaders(data, STRCONST("Transfer-Encoding")); - if(ptr) { - /* Some kind of TE is requested, check if 'chunked' is chosen */ - data->req.upload_chunky = - Curl_compareheader(ptr, - STRCONST("Transfer-Encoding:"), STRCONST("chunked")); +static CURLcode set_reader(struct Curl_easy *data, Curl_HttpReq httpreq) +{ + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + curl_off_t postsize = data->state.infilesize; + + DEBUGASSERT(data->conn); + + if(data->req.authneg) { + return Curl_creader_set_null(data); } - else { - if((conn->handler->protocol & PROTO_FAMILY_HTTP) && - (((httpreq == HTTPREQ_POST_MIME || httpreq == HTTPREQ_POST_FORM) && - http->postsize < 0) || - ((data->state.upload || httpreq == HTTPREQ_POST) && - data->state.infilesize == -1))) { - if(conn->bits.authneg) - /* don't enable chunked during auth neg */ - ; - else if(Curl_use_http_1_1plus(data, conn)) { - if(conn->httpversion < 20) - /* HTTP, upload, unknown file size and not HTTP 1.0 */ - data->req.upload_chunky = TRUE; - } + + switch(httpreq) { + case HTTPREQ_PUT: /* Let's PUT the data to the server! */ + if(!postsize) + result = Curl_creader_set_null(data); + else + result = Curl_creader_set_fread(data, postsize); + return result; + +#if !defined(CURL_DISABLE_MIME) || !defined(CURL_DISABLE_FORM_API) + case HTTPREQ_POST_FORM: + case HTTPREQ_POST_MIME: + return set_post_reader(data, httpreq); +#endif + + case HTTPREQ_POST: + /* this is the simple POST, using x-www-form-urlencoded style */ + /* the size of the post body */ + if(!postsize) { + result = Curl_creader_set_null(data); + } + else if(data->set.postfields) { + if(postsize > 0) + result = Curl_creader_set_buf(data, data->set.postfields, + (size_t)postsize); + else + result = Curl_creader_set_null(data); + } + else { + /* we read the bytes from the callback. In case "chunked" encoding + * is forced by the application, we disregard `postsize`. This is + * a backward compatibility decision to earlier versions where + * chunking disregarded this. See issue #13229. */ + bool chunked = FALSE; + char *ptr = Curl_checkheaders(data, STRCONST("Transfer-Encoding")); + if(ptr) { + /* Some kind of TE is requested, check if 'chunked' is chosen */ + chunked = Curl_compareheader(ptr, STRCONST("Transfer-Encoding:"), + STRCONST("chunked")); + } + result = Curl_creader_set_fread(data, chunked? -1 : postsize); + } + return result; + + default: + /* HTTP GET/HEAD download, has no body, needs no Content-Length */ + data->state.infilesize = 0; + return Curl_creader_set_null(data); + } + /* not reached */ +} + +static CURLcode http_resume(struct Curl_easy *data, Curl_HttpReq httpreq) +{ + if((HTTPREQ_POST == httpreq || HTTPREQ_PUT == httpreq) && + data->state.resume_from) { + /********************************************************************** + * Resuming upload in HTTP means that we PUT or POST and that we have + * got a resume_from value set. The resume value has already created + * a Range: header that will be passed along. We need to "fast forward" + * the file the given number of bytes and decrease the assume upload + * file size before we continue this venture in the dark lands of HTTP. + * Resuming mime/form posting at an offset > 0 has no sense and is ignored. + *********************************************************************/ + + if(data->state.resume_from < 0) { + /* + * This is meant to get the size of the present remote-file by itself. + * We don't support this now. Bail out! + */ + data->state.resume_from = 0; + } + + if(data->state.resume_from && !data->req.authneg) { + /* only act on the first request */ + CURLcode result; + result = Curl_creader_resume_from(data, data->state.resume_from); + if(result) { + failf(data, "Unable to resume from offset %" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T, + data->state.resume_from); + return result; + } + } + } + return CURLE_OK; +} + +CURLcode Curl_http_req_set_reader(struct Curl_easy *data, + Curl_HttpReq httpreq, + const char **tep) +{ + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + const char *ptr; + + result = set_reader(data, httpreq); + if(result) + return result; + + result = http_resume(data, httpreq); + if(result) + return result; + + ptr = Curl_checkheaders(data, STRCONST("Transfer-Encoding")); + if(ptr) { + /* Some kind of TE is requested, check if 'chunked' is chosen */ + data->req.upload_chunky = + Curl_compareheader(ptr, + STRCONST("Transfer-Encoding:"), STRCONST("chunked")); + if(data->req.upload_chunky && + Curl_use_http_1_1plus(data, data->conn) && + (data->conn->httpversion >= 20)) { + infof(data, "suppressing chunked transfer encoding on connection " + "using HTTP version 2 or higher"); + data->req.upload_chunky = FALSE; + } + } + else { + curl_off_t req_clen = Curl_creader_total_length(data); + + if(req_clen < 0) { + /* indeterminate request content length */ + if(Curl_use_http_1_1plus(data, data->conn)) { + /* On HTTP/1.1, enable chunked, on HTTP/2 and later we do not + * need it */ + data->req.upload_chunky = (data->conn->httpversion < 20); + } else { failf(data, "Chunky upload is not supported by HTTP 1.0"); return CURLE_UPLOAD_FAILED; @@ -2515,330 +2127,128 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_body(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, return result; } -static CURLcode addexpect(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, - struct dynbuf *r) +static CURLcode addexpect(struct Curl_easy *data, struct dynbuf *r, + bool *announced_exp100) { - data->state.expect100header = FALSE; + CURLcode result; + char *ptr; + + *announced_exp100 = FALSE; /* Avoid Expect: 100-continue if Upgrade: is used */ - if(data->req.upgr101 == UPGR101_INIT) { - struct HTTP *http = data->req.p.http; - /* For really small puts we don't use Expect: headers at all, and for - the somewhat bigger ones we allow the app to disable it. Just make - sure that the expect100header is always set to the preferred value - here. */ - char *ptr = Curl_checkheaders(data, STRCONST("Expect")); - if(ptr) { - data->state.expect100header = - Curl_compareheader(ptr, STRCONST("Expect:"), - STRCONST("100-continue")); + if(data->req.upgr101 != UPGR101_INIT) + return CURLE_OK; + + /* For really small puts we don't use Expect: headers at all, and for + the somewhat bigger ones we allow the app to disable it. Just make + sure that the expect100header is always set to the preferred value + here. */ + ptr = Curl_checkheaders(data, STRCONST("Expect")); + if(ptr) { + *announced_exp100 = + Curl_compareheader(ptr, STRCONST("Expect:"), STRCONST("100-continue")); + } + else if(!data->state.disableexpect && + Curl_use_http_1_1plus(data, data->conn) && + (data->conn->httpversion < 20)) { + /* if not doing HTTP 1.0 or version 2, or disabled explicitly, we add an + Expect: 100-continue to the headers which actually speeds up post + operations (as there is one packet coming back from the web server) */ + curl_off_t client_len = Curl_creader_client_length(data); + if(client_len > EXPECT_100_THRESHOLD || client_len < 0) { + result = Curl_dyn_addn(r, STRCONST("Expect: 100-continue\r\n")); + if(result) + return result; + *announced_exp100 = TRUE; } - else if(http->postsize > EXPECT_100_THRESHOLD || http->postsize < 0) - return expect100(data, conn, r); } return CURLE_OK; } -CURLcode Curl_http_bodysend(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, - struct dynbuf *r, Curl_HttpReq httpreq) +CURLcode Curl_http_req_complete(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct dynbuf *r, Curl_HttpReq httpreq) { -#ifndef USE_HYPER - /* Hyper always handles the body separately */ - curl_off_t included_body = 0; -#else - /* from this point down, this function should not be used */ -#define Curl_buffer_send(a,b,c,d,e,f) CURLE_OK -#endif CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; - struct HTTP *http = data->req.p.http; - - switch(httpreq) { - case HTTPREQ_PUT: /* Let's PUT the data to the server! */ - - if(conn->bits.authneg) - http->postsize = 0; - else - http->postsize = data->state.infilesize; - - if((http->postsize != -1) && !data->req.upload_chunky && - (conn->bits.authneg || - !Curl_checkheaders(data, STRCONST("Content-Length")))) { - /* only add Content-Length if not uploading chunked */ - result = Curl_dyn_addf(r, "Content-Length: %" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T - "\r\n", http->postsize); - if(result) - return result; - } - - result = addexpect(data, conn, r); - if(result) - return result; - - /* end of headers */ - result = Curl_dyn_addn(r, STRCONST("\r\n")); - if(result) - return result; + curl_off_t req_clen; + bool announced_exp100 = FALSE; - /* set the upload size to the progress meter */ - Curl_pgrsSetUploadSize(data, http->postsize); - - /* this sends the buffer and frees all the buffer resources */ - result = Curl_buffer_send(r, data, data->req.p.http, - &data->info.request_size, 0, - FIRSTSOCKET); - if(result) - failf(data, "Failed sending PUT request"); - else - /* prepare for transfer */ - Curl_setup_transfer(data, FIRSTSOCKET, -1, TRUE, - http->postsize?FIRSTSOCKET:-1); + DEBUGASSERT(data->conn); +#ifndef USE_HYPER + if(data->req.upload_chunky) { + result = Curl_httpchunk_add_reader(data); if(result) return result; - break; + } +#endif + /* Get the request body length that has been set up */ + req_clen = Curl_creader_total_length(data); + switch(httpreq) { + case HTTPREQ_PUT: + case HTTPREQ_POST: +#if !defined(CURL_DISABLE_MIME) || !defined(CURL_DISABLE_FORM_API) case HTTPREQ_POST_FORM: case HTTPREQ_POST_MIME: - /* This is form posting using mime data. */ - if(conn->bits.authneg) { - /* nothing to post! */ - result = Curl_dyn_addn(r, STRCONST("Content-Length: 0\r\n\r\n")); - if(result) - return result; - - result = Curl_buffer_send(r, data, data->req.p.http, - &data->info.request_size, 0, - FIRSTSOCKET); - if(result) - failf(data, "Failed sending POST request"); - else - /* setup variables for the upcoming transfer */ - Curl_setup_transfer(data, FIRSTSOCKET, -1, TRUE, -1); - break; - } - - data->state.infilesize = http->postsize; - +#endif /* We only set Content-Length and allow a custom Content-Length if we don't upload data chunked, as RFC2616 forbids us to set both - kinds of headers (Transfer-Encoding: chunked and Content-Length) */ - if(http->postsize != -1 && !data->req.upload_chunky && - (!Curl_checkheaders(data, STRCONST("Content-Length")))) { + kinds of headers (Transfer-Encoding: chunked and Content-Length). + We do not override a custom "Content-Length" header, but during + authentication negotiation that header is suppressed. + */ + if(req_clen >= 0 && !data->req.upload_chunky && + (data->req.authneg || + !Curl_checkheaders(data, STRCONST("Content-Length")))) { /* we allow replacing this header if not during auth negotiation, although it isn't very wise to actually set your own */ result = Curl_dyn_addf(r, "Content-Length: %" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T - "\r\n", http->postsize); - if(result) - return result; + "\r\n", req_clen); } + if(result) + goto out; #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_MIME /* Output mime-generated headers. */ - { + if(data->state.mimepost && + ((httpreq == HTTPREQ_POST_FORM) || (httpreq == HTTPREQ_POST_MIME))) { struct curl_slist *hdr; for(hdr = data->state.mimepost->curlheaders; hdr; hdr = hdr->next) { result = Curl_dyn_addf(r, "%s\r\n", hdr->data); if(result) - return result; - } - } -#endif - - result = addexpect(data, conn, r); - if(result) - return result; - - /* make the request end in a true CRLF */ - result = Curl_dyn_addn(r, STRCONST("\r\n")); - if(result) - return result; - - /* set the upload size to the progress meter */ - Curl_pgrsSetUploadSize(data, http->postsize); - - /* Read from mime structure. */ - data->state.fread_func = (curl_read_callback) Curl_mime_read; - data->state.in = (void *) data->state.mimepost; - http->sending = HTTPSEND_BODY; - - /* this sends the buffer and frees all the buffer resources */ - result = Curl_buffer_send(r, data, data->req.p.http, - &data->info.request_size, 0, - FIRSTSOCKET); - if(result) - failf(data, "Failed sending POST request"); - else - /* prepare for transfer */ - Curl_setup_transfer(data, FIRSTSOCKET, -1, TRUE, - http->postsize?FIRSTSOCKET:-1); - if(result) - return result; - - break; - - case HTTPREQ_POST: - /* this is the simple POST, using x-www-form-urlencoded style */ - - if(conn->bits.authneg) - http->postsize = 0; - else - /* the size of the post body */ - http->postsize = data->state.infilesize; - - /* We only set Content-Length and allow a custom Content-Length if - we don't upload data chunked, as RFC2616 forbids us to set both - kinds of headers (Transfer-Encoding: chunked and Content-Length) */ - if((http->postsize != -1) && !data->req.upload_chunky && - (conn->bits.authneg || - !Curl_checkheaders(data, STRCONST("Content-Length")))) { - /* we allow replacing this header if not during auth negotiation, - although it isn't very wise to actually set your own */ - result = Curl_dyn_addf(r, "Content-Length: %" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T - "\r\n", http->postsize); - if(result) - return result; - } - - if(!Curl_checkheaders(data, STRCONST("Content-Type"))) { - result = Curl_dyn_addn(r, STRCONST("Content-Type: application/" - "x-www-form-urlencoded\r\n")); - if(result) - return result; - } - - result = addexpect(data, conn, r); - if(result) - return result; - -#ifndef USE_HYPER - /* With Hyper the body is always passed on separately */ - if(data->set.postfields) { - if(!data->state.expect100header && - (http->postsize < MAX_INITIAL_POST_SIZE)) { - /* if we don't use expect: 100 AND - postsize is less than MAX_INITIAL_POST_SIZE - - then append the post data to the HTTP request header. This limit - is no magic limit but only set to prevent really huge POSTs to - get the data duplicated with malloc() and family. */ - - /* end of headers! */ - result = Curl_dyn_addn(r, STRCONST("\r\n")); - if(result) - return result; - - if(!data->req.upload_chunky) { - /* We're not sending it 'chunked', append it to the request - already now to reduce the number of send() calls */ - result = Curl_dyn_addn(r, data->set.postfields, - (size_t)http->postsize); - included_body = http->postsize; - } - else { - if(http->postsize) { - char chunk[16]; - /* Append the POST data chunky-style */ - msnprintf(chunk, sizeof(chunk), "%x\r\n", (int)http->postsize); - result = Curl_dyn_add(r, chunk); - if(!result) { - included_body = http->postsize + strlen(chunk); - result = Curl_dyn_addn(r, data->set.postfields, - (size_t)http->postsize); - if(!result) - result = Curl_dyn_addn(r, STRCONST("\r\n")); - included_body += 2; - } - } - if(!result) { - result = Curl_dyn_addn(r, STRCONST("\x30\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0a")); - /* 0 CR LF CR LF */ - included_body += 5; - } - } - if(result) - return result; - /* Make sure the progress information is accurate */ - Curl_pgrsSetUploadSize(data, http->postsize); - } - else { - /* A huge POST coming up, do data separate from the request */ - http->postdata = data->set.postfields; - http->sending = HTTPSEND_BODY; - http->backup.data = data; - data->state.fread_func = (curl_read_callback)readmoredata; - data->state.in = (void *)http; - - /* set the upload size to the progress meter */ - Curl_pgrsSetUploadSize(data, http->postsize); - - /* end of headers! */ - result = Curl_dyn_addn(r, STRCONST("\r\n")); - if(result) - return result; + goto out; } } - else #endif - { - /* end of headers! */ - result = Curl_dyn_addn(r, STRCONST("\r\n")); - if(result) - return result; - - if(data->req.upload_chunky && conn->bits.authneg) { - /* Chunky upload is selected and we're negotiating auth still, send - end-of-data only */ - result = Curl_dyn_addn(r, (char *)STRCONST("\x30\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0a")); - /* 0 CR LF CR LF */ + if(httpreq == HTTPREQ_POST) { + if(!Curl_checkheaders(data, STRCONST("Content-Type"))) { + result = Curl_dyn_addn(r, STRCONST("Content-Type: application/" + "x-www-form-urlencoded\r\n")); if(result) - return result; - } - - else if(data->state.infilesize) { - /* set the upload size to the progress meter */ - Curl_pgrsSetUploadSize(data, http->postsize?http->postsize:-1); - - /* set the pointer to mark that we will send the post body using the - read callback, but only if we're not in authenticate negotiation */ - if(!conn->bits.authneg) - http->postdata = (char *)&http->postdata; + goto out; } } - /* issue the request */ - result = Curl_buffer_send(r, data, data->req.p.http, - &data->info.request_size, included_body, - FIRSTSOCKET); - + result = addexpect(data, r, &announced_exp100); if(result) - failf(data, "Failed sending HTTP POST request"); - else - Curl_setup_transfer(data, FIRSTSOCKET, -1, TRUE, - http->postdata?FIRSTSOCKET:-1); + goto out; break; - default: - result = Curl_dyn_addn(r, STRCONST("\r\n")); - if(result) - return result; + break; + } - /* issue the request */ - result = Curl_buffer_send(r, data, data->req.p.http, - &data->info.request_size, 0, - FIRSTSOCKET); - if(result) - failf(data, "Failed sending HTTP request"); -#ifdef USE_WEBSOCKETS - else if((conn->handler->protocol & (CURLPROTO_WS|CURLPROTO_WSS)) && - !(data->set.connect_only)) - /* Set up the transfer for two-way since without CONNECT_ONLY set, this - request probably wants to send data too post upgrade */ - Curl_setup_transfer(data, FIRSTSOCKET, -1, TRUE, FIRSTSOCKET); -#endif - else - /* HTTP GET/HEAD download: */ - Curl_setup_transfer(data, FIRSTSOCKET, -1, TRUE, -1); + /* end of headers */ + result = Curl_dyn_addn(r, STRCONST("\r\n")); + if(!result) { + Curl_pgrsSetUploadSize(data, req_clen); + if(announced_exp100) + result = http_exp100_add_reader(data); } +out: + if(!result) { + /* setup variables for the upcoming transfer */ + Curl_xfer_setup(data, FIRSTSOCKET, -1, TRUE, FIRSTSOCKET); + } return result; } @@ -2938,7 +2348,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_range(struct Curl_easy *data, } else if((httpreq == HTTPREQ_POST || httpreq == HTTPREQ_PUT) && !Curl_checkheaders(data, STRCONST("Content-Range"))) { - + curl_off_t req_clen = Curl_creader_total_length(data); /* if a line like this was already allocated, free the previous one */ free(data->state.aptr.rangeline); @@ -2949,25 +2359,28 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_range(struct Curl_easy *data, data->state.aptr.rangeline = aprintf("Content-Range: bytes 0-%" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T "/%" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T "\r\n", - data->state.infilesize - 1, data->state.infilesize); + req_clen - 1, req_clen); } else if(data->state.resume_from) { /* This is because "resume" was selected */ - curl_off_t total_expected_size = - data->state.resume_from + data->state.infilesize; + /* TODO: not sure if we want to send this header during authentication + * negotiation, but test1084 checks for it. In which case we have a + * "null" client reader installed that gives an unexpected length. */ + curl_off_t total_len = data->req.authneg? + data->state.infilesize : + (data->state.resume_from + req_clen); data->state.aptr.rangeline = aprintf("Content-Range: bytes %s%" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T "/%" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T "\r\n", - data->state.range, total_expected_size-1, - total_expected_size); + data->state.range, total_len-1, total_len); } else { /* Range was selected and then we just pass the incoming range and append total size */ data->state.aptr.rangeline = aprintf("Content-Range: bytes %s/%" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T "\r\n", - data->state.range, data->state.infilesize); + data->state.range, req_clen); } if(!data->state.aptr.rangeline) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; @@ -2976,99 +2389,18 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_range(struct Curl_easy *data, return CURLE_OK; } -CURLcode Curl_http_resume(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn, - Curl_HttpReq httpreq) +CURLcode Curl_http_firstwrite(struct Curl_easy *data) { - if((HTTPREQ_POST == httpreq || HTTPREQ_PUT == httpreq) && - data->state.resume_from) { - /********************************************************************** - * Resuming upload in HTTP means that we PUT or POST and that we have - * got a resume_from value set. The resume value has already created - * a Range: header that will be passed along. We need to "fast forward" - * the file the given number of bytes and decrease the assume upload - * file size before we continue this venture in the dark lands of HTTP. - * Resuming mime/form posting at an offset > 0 has no sense and is ignored. - *********************************************************************/ + struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; + struct SingleRequest *k = &data->req; - if(data->state.resume_from < 0) { - /* - * This is meant to get the size of the present remote-file by itself. - * We don't support this now. Bail out! - */ - data->state.resume_from = 0; - } - - if(data->state.resume_from && !data->state.followlocation) { - /* only act on the first request */ - - /* Now, let's read off the proper amount of bytes from the - input. */ - int seekerr = CURL_SEEKFUNC_CANTSEEK; - if(conn->seek_func) { - Curl_set_in_callback(data, true); - seekerr = conn->seek_func(conn->seek_client, data->state.resume_from, - SEEK_SET); - Curl_set_in_callback(data, false); - } - - if(seekerr != CURL_SEEKFUNC_OK) { - curl_off_t passed = 0; - - if(seekerr != CURL_SEEKFUNC_CANTSEEK) { - failf(data, "Could not seek stream"); - return CURLE_READ_ERROR; - } - /* when seekerr == CURL_SEEKFUNC_CANTSEEK (can't seek to offset) */ - do { - size_t readthisamountnow = - (data->state.resume_from - passed > data->set.buffer_size) ? - (size_t)data->set.buffer_size : - curlx_sotouz(data->state.resume_from - passed); - - size_t actuallyread = - data->state.fread_func(data->state.buffer, 1, readthisamountnow, - data->state.in); - - passed += actuallyread; - if((actuallyread == 0) || (actuallyread > readthisamountnow)) { - /* this checks for greater-than only to make sure that the - CURL_READFUNC_ABORT return code still aborts */ - failf(data, "Could only read %" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T - " bytes from the input", passed); - return CURLE_READ_ERROR; - } - } while(passed < data->state.resume_from); - } - - /* now, decrease the size of the read */ - if(data->state.infilesize>0) { - data->state.infilesize -= data->state.resume_from; - - if(data->state.infilesize <= 0) { - failf(data, "File already completely uploaded"); - return CURLE_PARTIAL_FILE; - } - } - /* we've passed, proceed as normal */ - } - } - return CURLE_OK; -} - -CURLcode Curl_http_firstwrite(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn, - bool *done) -{ - struct SingleRequest *k = &data->req; - - if(data->req.newurl) { - if(conn->bits.close) { - /* Abort after the headers if "follow Location" is set - and we're set to close anyway. */ - k->keepon &= ~KEEP_RECV; - *done = TRUE; - return CURLE_OK; + if(data->req.newurl) { + if(conn->bits.close) { + /* Abort after the headers if "follow Location" is set + and we're set to close anyway. */ + k->keepon &= ~KEEP_RECV; + k->done = TRUE; + return CURLE_OK; } /* We have a new url to load, but since we want to be able to reuse this connection properly, we read the full response in "ignore more" */ @@ -3086,7 +2418,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_firstwrite(struct Curl_easy *data, streamclose(conn, "already downloaded"); /* Abort download */ k->keepon &= ~KEEP_RECV; - *done = TRUE; + k->done = TRUE; return CURLE_OK; } @@ -3104,7 +2436,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_firstwrite(struct Curl_easy *data, action for an HTTP/1.1 client */ if(!Curl_meets_timecondition(data, k->timeofdoc)) { - *done = TRUE; + k->done = TRUE; /* We're simulating an HTTP 304 from server so we return what should have been returned from the server */ data->info.httpcode = 304; @@ -3162,7 +2494,6 @@ CURLcode Curl_http(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) { struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; - struct HTTP *http; Curl_HttpReq httpreq; const char *te = ""; /* transfer-encoding */ const char *request; @@ -3187,7 +2518,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_http(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) ) { result = Curl_http2_switch(data, conn, FIRSTSOCKET); if(result) - return result; + goto fail; } else #endif @@ -3202,21 +2533,25 @@ CURLcode Curl_http(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) DEBUGF(infof(data, "HTTP/2 over clean TCP")); result = Curl_http2_switch(data, conn, FIRSTSOCKET); if(result) - return result; + goto fail; } break; } - http = data->req.p.http; - DEBUGASSERT(http); + /* Add collecting of headers written to client. For a new connection, + * we might have done that already, but reuse + * or multiplex needs it here as well. */ + result = Curl_headers_init(data); + if(result) + goto fail; result = Curl_http_host(data, conn); if(result) - return result; + goto fail; result = Curl_http_useragent(data); if(result) - return result; + goto fail; Curl_http_method(data, conn, &request, &httpreq); @@ -3232,7 +2567,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_http(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) (pq ? pq : data->state.up.path), FALSE); free(pq); if(result) - return result; + goto fail; } Curl_safefree(data->state.aptr.ref); @@ -3257,23 +2592,19 @@ CURLcode Curl_http(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) /* we only consider transfer-encoding magic if libz support is built-in */ result = Curl_transferencode(data); if(result) - return result; + goto fail; #endif - result = Curl_http_body(data, conn, httpreq, &te); + result = Curl_http_req_set_reader(data, httpreq, &te); if(result) - return result; + goto fail; p_accept = Curl_checkheaders(data, STRCONST("Accept"))?NULL:"Accept: */*\r\n"; - result = Curl_http_resume(data, conn, httpreq); - if(result) - return result; - result = Curl_http_range(data, httpreq); if(result) - return result; + goto fail; httpstring = get_http_string(data, conn); @@ -3291,7 +2622,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_http(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) result = Curl_http_target(data, conn, &req); if(result) { Curl_dyn_free(&req); - return result; + goto fail; } #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_ALTSVC @@ -3322,8 +2653,12 @@ CURLcode Curl_http(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) httpstring, (data->state.aptr.host?data->state.aptr.host:""), +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY data->state.aptr.proxyuserpwd? data->state.aptr.proxyuserpwd:"", +#else + "", +#endif data->state.aptr.userpwd?data->state.aptr.userpwd:"", (data->state.use_range && data->state.aptr.rangeline)? data->state.aptr.rangeline:"", @@ -3357,12 +2692,14 @@ CURLcode Curl_http(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) /* clear userpwd and proxyuserpwd to avoid reusing old credentials * from reused connections */ Curl_safefree(data->state.aptr.userpwd); +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY Curl_safefree(data->state.aptr.proxyuserpwd); +#endif free(altused); if(result) { Curl_dyn_free(&req); - return result; + goto fail; } if(!(conn->handler->flags&PROTOPT_SSL) && @@ -3388,52 +2725,23 @@ CURLcode Curl_http(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) result = Curl_add_custom_headers(data, FALSE, &req); if(!result) { - http->postdata = NULL; /* nothing to post at this point */ - if((httpreq == HTTPREQ_GET) || - (httpreq == HTTPREQ_HEAD)) - Curl_pgrsSetUploadSize(data, 0); /* nothing */ - - /* bodysend takes ownership of the 'req' memory on success */ - result = Curl_http_bodysend(data, conn, &req, httpreq); - } - if(result) { - Curl_dyn_free(&req); - return result; - } - - if((http->postsize > -1) && - (http->postsize <= data->req.writebytecount) && - (http->sending != HTTPSEND_REQUEST)) - data->req.upload_done = TRUE; - - if(data->req.writebytecount) { - /* if a request-body has been sent off, we make sure this progress is noted - properly */ - Curl_pgrsSetUploadCounter(data, data->req.writebytecount); - if(Curl_pgrsUpdate(data)) - result = CURLE_ABORTED_BY_CALLBACK; - - if(!http->postsize) { - /* already sent the entire request body, mark the "upload" as - complete */ - infof(data, "upload completely sent off: %" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T - " out of %" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T " bytes", - data->req.writebytecount, http->postsize); - data->req.upload_done = TRUE; - data->req.keepon &= ~KEEP_SEND; /* we're done writing */ - data->req.exp100 = EXP100_SEND_DATA; /* already sent */ - Curl_expire_done(data, EXPIRE_100_TIMEOUT); - } + /* req_send takes ownership of the 'req' memory on success */ + result = Curl_http_req_complete(data, &req, httpreq); + if(!result) + result = Curl_req_send(data, &req); } - - if(data->req.upload_done) - Curl_conn_ev_data_done_send(data); + Curl_dyn_free(&req); + if(result) + goto fail; if((conn->httpversion >= 20) && data->req.upload_chunky) /* upload_chunky was set above to set up the request in a chunky fashion, but is disabled here again to avoid that the chunked encoded version is actually used when sending the request body over h2 */ data->req.upload_chunky = FALSE; +fail: + if(CURLE_TOO_LARGE == result) + failf(data, "HTTP request too large"); return result; } @@ -3509,325 +2817,373 @@ checkprotoprefix(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, return checkhttpprefix(data, s, len); } +/* HTTP header has field name `n` (a string constant) */ +#define HD_IS(hd, hdlen, n) \ + (((hdlen) >= (sizeof(n)-1)) && curl_strnequal((n), (hd), (sizeof(n)-1))) + +#define HD_VAL(hd, hdlen, n) \ + ((((hdlen) >= (sizeof(n)-1)) && \ + curl_strnequal((n), (hd), (sizeof(n)-1)))? (hd + (sizeof(n)-1)) : NULL) + +/* HTTP header has field name `n` (a string constant) and contains `v` + * (a string constant) in its value(s) */ +#define HD_IS_AND_SAYS(hd, hdlen, n, v) \ + (HD_IS(hd, hdlen, n) && \ + ((hdlen) > ((sizeof(n)-1) + (sizeof(v)-1))) && \ + Curl_compareheader(hd, STRCONST(n), STRCONST(v))) + /* * Curl_http_header() parses a single response header. */ -CURLcode Curl_http_header(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, - char *headp) +CURLcode Curl_http_header(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *hd, size_t hdlen) { + struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; CURLcode result; struct SingleRequest *k = &data->req; - /* Check for Content-Length: header lines to get size */ - if(!k->http_bodyless && - !data->set.ignorecl && checkprefix("Content-Length:", headp)) { - curl_off_t contentlength; - CURLofft offt = curlx_strtoofft(headp + strlen("Content-Length:"), - NULL, 10, &contentlength); - - if(offt == CURL_OFFT_OK) { - k->size = contentlength; - k->maxdownload = k->size; + const char *v; + + switch(hd[0]) { + case 'a': + case 'A': +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_ALTSVC + v = (data->asi && + ((data->conn->handler->flags & PROTOPT_SSL) || +#ifdef CURLDEBUG + /* allow debug builds to circumvent the HTTPS restriction */ + getenv("CURL_ALTSVC_HTTP") +#else + 0 +#endif + ))? HD_VAL(hd, hdlen, "Alt-Svc:") : NULL; + if(v) { + /* the ALPN of the current request */ + enum alpnid id = (conn->httpversion == 30)? ALPN_h3 : + (conn->httpversion == 20) ? ALPN_h2 : ALPN_h1; + return Curl_altsvc_parse(data, data->asi, v, id, conn->host.name, + curlx_uitous((unsigned int)conn->remote_port)); } - else if(offt == CURL_OFFT_FLOW) { - /* out of range */ - if(data->set.max_filesize) { - failf(data, "Maximum file size exceeded"); - return CURLE_FILESIZE_EXCEEDED; +#endif + break; + case 'c': + case 'C': + /* Check for Content-Length: header lines to get size */ + v = (!k->http_bodyless && !data->set.ignorecl)? + HD_VAL(hd, hdlen, "Content-Length:") : NULL; + if(v) { + curl_off_t contentlength; + CURLofft offt = curlx_strtoofft(v, NULL, 10, &contentlength); + + if(offt == CURL_OFFT_OK) { + k->size = contentlength; + k->maxdownload = k->size; + } + else if(offt == CURL_OFFT_FLOW) { + /* out of range */ + if(data->set.max_filesize) { + failf(data, "Maximum file size exceeded"); + return CURLE_FILESIZE_EXCEEDED; + } + streamclose(conn, "overflow content-length"); + infof(data, "Overflow Content-Length: value"); + } + else { + /* negative or just rubbish - bad HTTP */ + failf(data, "Invalid Content-Length: value"); + return CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY; } - streamclose(conn, "overflow content-length"); - infof(data, "Overflow Content-Length: value"); + return CURLE_OK; } - else { - /* negative or just rubbish - bad HTTP */ - failf(data, "Invalid Content-Length: value"); - return CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY; + v = (!k->http_bodyless && data->set.str[STRING_ENCODING])? + HD_VAL(hd, hdlen, "Content-Encoding:") : NULL; + if(v) { + /* + * Process Content-Encoding. Look for the values: identity, + * gzip, deflate, compress, x-gzip and x-compress. x-gzip and + * x-compress are the same as gzip and compress. (Sec 3.5 RFC + * 2616). zlib cannot handle compress. However, errors are + * handled further down when the response body is processed + */ + return Curl_build_unencoding_stack(data, v, FALSE); } - } - /* check for Content-Type: header lines to get the MIME-type */ - else if(checkprefix("Content-Type:", headp)) { - char *contenttype = Curl_copy_header_value(headp); - if(!contenttype) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - if(!*contenttype) - /* ignore empty data */ - free(contenttype); - else { - Curl_safefree(data->info.contenttype); - data->info.contenttype = contenttype; + /* check for Content-Type: header lines to get the MIME-type */ + v = HD_VAL(hd, hdlen, "Content-Type:"); + if(v) { + char *contenttype = Curl_copy_header_value(hd); + if(!contenttype) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + if(!*contenttype) + /* ignore empty data */ + free(contenttype); + else { + Curl_safefree(data->info.contenttype); + data->info.contenttype = contenttype; + } + return CURLE_OK; } - } -#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY - else if((conn->httpversion == 10) && - conn->bits.httpproxy && - Curl_compareheader(headp, - STRCONST("Proxy-Connection:"), - STRCONST("keep-alive"))) { - /* - * When an HTTP/1.0 reply comes when using a proxy, the - * 'Proxy-Connection: keep-alive' line tells us the - * connection will be kept alive for our pleasure. - * Default action for 1.0 is to close. - */ - connkeep(conn, "Proxy-Connection keep-alive"); /* don't close */ - infof(data, "HTTP/1.0 proxy connection set to keep alive"); - } - else if((conn->httpversion == 11) && - conn->bits.httpproxy && - Curl_compareheader(headp, - STRCONST("Proxy-Connection:"), - STRCONST("close"))) { - /* - * We get an HTTP/1.1 response from a proxy and it says it'll - * close down after this transfer. - */ - connclose(conn, "Proxy-Connection: asked to close after done"); - infof(data, "HTTP/1.1 proxy connection set close"); - } -#endif - else if((conn->httpversion == 10) && - Curl_compareheader(headp, - STRCONST("Connection:"), - STRCONST("keep-alive"))) { - /* - * An HTTP/1.0 reply with the 'Connection: keep-alive' line - * tells us the connection will be kept alive for our - * pleasure. Default action for 1.0 is to close. - * - * [RFC2068, section 19.7.1] */ - connkeep(conn, "Connection keep-alive"); - infof(data, "HTTP/1.0 connection set to keep alive"); - } - else if(Curl_compareheader(headp, - STRCONST("Connection:"), STRCONST("close"))) { - /* - * [RFC 2616, section 8.1.2.1] - * "Connection: close" is HTTP/1.1 language and means that - * the connection will close when this request has been - * served. - */ - streamclose(conn, "Connection: close used"); - } - else if(!k->http_bodyless && checkprefix("Transfer-Encoding:", headp)) { - /* One or more encodings. We check for chunked and/or a compression - algorithm. */ - /* - * [RFC 2616, section 3.6.1] A 'chunked' transfer encoding - * means that the server will send a series of "chunks". Each - * chunk starts with line with info (including size of the - * coming block) (terminated with CRLF), then a block of data - * with the previously mentioned size. There can be any amount - * of chunks, and a chunk-data set to zero signals the - * end-of-chunks. */ - - result = Curl_build_unencoding_stack(data, - headp + strlen("Transfer-Encoding:"), - TRUE); - if(result) - return result; - if(!k->chunk && data->set.http_transfer_encoding) { - /* if this isn't chunked, only close can signal the end of this transfer - as Content-Length is said not to be trusted for transfer-encoding! */ - connclose(conn, "HTTP/1.1 transfer-encoding without chunks"); - k->ignore_cl = TRUE; + if(HD_IS_AND_SAYS(hd, hdlen, "Connection:", "close")) { + /* + * [RFC 2616, section 8.1.2.1] + * "Connection: close" is HTTP/1.1 language and means that + * the connection will close when this request has been + * served. + */ + streamclose(conn, "Connection: close used"); + return CURLE_OK; } - } - else if(!k->http_bodyless && checkprefix("Content-Encoding:", headp) && - data->set.str[STRING_ENCODING]) { - /* - * Process Content-Encoding. Look for the values: identity, - * gzip, deflate, compress, x-gzip and x-compress. x-gzip and - * x-compress are the same as gzip and compress. (Sec 3.5 RFC - * 2616). zlib cannot handle compress. However, errors are - * handled further down when the response body is processed - */ - result = Curl_build_unencoding_stack(data, - headp + strlen("Content-Encoding:"), - FALSE); - if(result) - return result; - } - else if(checkprefix("Retry-After:", headp)) { - /* Retry-After = HTTP-date / delay-seconds */ - curl_off_t retry_after = 0; /* zero for unknown or "now" */ - /* Try it as a decimal number, if it works it is not a date */ - (void)curlx_strtoofft(headp + strlen("Retry-After:"), - NULL, 10, &retry_after); - if(!retry_after) { - time_t date = Curl_getdate_capped(headp + strlen("Retry-After:")); - if(-1 != date) - /* convert date to number of seconds into the future */ - retry_after = date - time(NULL); + if((conn->httpversion == 10) && + HD_IS_AND_SAYS(hd, hdlen, "Connection:", "keep-alive")) { + /* + * An HTTP/1.0 reply with the 'Connection: keep-alive' line + * tells us the connection will be kept alive for our + * pleasure. Default action for 1.0 is to close. + * + * [RFC2068, section 19.7.1] */ + connkeep(conn, "Connection keep-alive"); + infof(data, "HTTP/1.0 connection set to keep alive"); + return CURLE_OK; } - data->info.retry_after = retry_after; /* store it */ - } - else if(!k->http_bodyless && checkprefix("Content-Range:", headp)) { - /* Content-Range: bytes [num]- - Content-Range: bytes: [num]- - Content-Range: [num]- - Content-Range: [asterisk]/[total] - - The second format was added since Sun's webserver - JavaWebServer/1.1.1 obviously sends the header this way! - The third added since some servers use that! - The fourth means the requested range was unsatisfied. - */ - - char *ptr = headp + strlen("Content-Range:"); - - /* Move forward until first digit or asterisk */ - while(*ptr && !ISDIGIT(*ptr) && *ptr != '*') - ptr++; - - /* if it truly stopped on a digit */ - if(ISDIGIT(*ptr)) { - if(!curlx_strtoofft(ptr, NULL, 10, &k->offset)) { - if(data->state.resume_from == k->offset) - /* we asked for a resume and we got it */ - k->content_range = TRUE; + v = !k->http_bodyless? HD_VAL(hd, hdlen, "Content-Range:") : NULL; + if(v) { + /* Content-Range: bytes [num]- + Content-Range: bytes: [num]- + Content-Range: [num]- + Content-Range: [asterisk]/[total] + + The second format was added since Sun's webserver + JavaWebServer/1.1.1 obviously sends the header this way! + The third added since some servers use that! + The fourth means the requested range was unsatisfied. + */ + + const char *ptr = v; + + /* Move forward until first digit or asterisk */ + while(*ptr && !ISDIGIT(*ptr) && *ptr != '*') + ptr++; + + /* if it truly stopped on a digit */ + if(ISDIGIT(*ptr)) { + if(!curlx_strtoofft(ptr, NULL, 10, &k->offset)) { + if(data->state.resume_from == k->offset) + /* we asked for a resume and we got it */ + k->content_range = TRUE; + } } + else if(k->httpcode < 300) + data->state.resume_from = 0; /* get everything */ } - else if(k->httpcode < 300) - data->state.resume_from = 0; /* get everything */ - } -#if !defined(CURL_DISABLE_COOKIES) - else if(data->cookies && data->state.cookie_engine && - checkprefix("Set-Cookie:", headp)) { - /* If there is a custom-set Host: name, use it here, or else use real peer - host name. */ - const char *host = data->state.aptr.cookiehost? - data->state.aptr.cookiehost:conn->host.name; - const bool secure_context = - conn->handler->protocol&(CURLPROTO_HTTPS|CURLPROTO_WSS) || - strcasecompare("localhost", host) || - !strcmp(host, "127.0.0.1") || - !strcmp(host, "::1") ? TRUE : FALSE; - - Curl_share_lock(data, CURL_LOCK_DATA_COOKIE, - CURL_LOCK_ACCESS_SINGLE); - Curl_cookie_add(data, data->cookies, TRUE, FALSE, - headp + strlen("Set-Cookie:"), host, - data->state.up.path, secure_context); - Curl_share_unlock(data, CURL_LOCK_DATA_COOKIE); - } -#endif - else if(!k->http_bodyless && checkprefix("Last-Modified:", headp) && - (data->set.timecondition || data->set.get_filetime) ) { - k->timeofdoc = Curl_getdate_capped(headp + strlen("Last-Modified:")); - if(data->set.get_filetime) - data->info.filetime = k->timeofdoc; - } - else if((checkprefix("WWW-Authenticate:", headp) && - (401 == k->httpcode)) || - (checkprefix("Proxy-authenticate:", headp) && - (407 == k->httpcode))) { - - bool proxy = (k->httpcode == 407) ? TRUE : FALSE; - char *auth = Curl_copy_header_value(headp); - if(!auth) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + break; + case 'l': + case 'L': + v = (!k->http_bodyless && + (data->set.timecondition || data->set.get_filetime))? + HD_VAL(hd, hdlen, "Last-Modified:") : NULL; + if(v) { + k->timeofdoc = Curl_getdate_capped(v); + if(data->set.get_filetime) + data->info.filetime = k->timeofdoc; + return CURLE_OK; + } + if((k->httpcode >= 300 && k->httpcode < 400) && + HD_IS(hd, hdlen, "Location:") && + !data->req.location) { + /* this is the URL that the server advises us to use instead */ + char *location = Curl_copy_header_value(hd); + if(!location) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + if(!*location) + /* ignore empty data */ + free(location); + else { + data->req.location = location; - result = Curl_http_input_auth(data, proxy, auth); + if(data->set.http_follow_location) { + DEBUGASSERT(!data->req.newurl); + data->req.newurl = strdup(data->req.location); /* clone */ + if(!data->req.newurl) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - free(auth); + /* some cases of POST and PUT etc needs to rewind the data + stream at this point */ + result = http_perhapsrewind(data, conn); + if(result) + return result; - if(result) + /* mark the next request as a followed location: */ + data->state.this_is_a_follow = TRUE; + } + } + } + break; + case 'p': + case 'P': +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY + v = HD_VAL(hd, hdlen, "Proxy-Connection:"); + if(v) { + if((conn->httpversion == 10) && conn->bits.httpproxy && + HD_IS_AND_SAYS(hd, hdlen, "Proxy-Connection:", "keep-alive")) { + /* + * When an HTTP/1.0 reply comes when using a proxy, the + * 'Proxy-Connection: keep-alive' line tells us the + * connection will be kept alive for our pleasure. + * Default action for 1.0 is to close. + */ + connkeep(conn, "Proxy-Connection keep-alive"); /* don't close */ + infof(data, "HTTP/1.0 proxy connection set to keep alive"); + } + else if((conn->httpversion == 11) && conn->bits.httpproxy && + HD_IS_AND_SAYS(hd, hdlen, "Proxy-Connection:", "close")) { + /* + * We get an HTTP/1.1 response from a proxy and it says it'll + * close down after this transfer. + */ + connclose(conn, "Proxy-Connection: asked to close after done"); + infof(data, "HTTP/1.1 proxy connection set close"); + } + return CURLE_OK; + } +#endif + if((407 == k->httpcode) && HD_IS(hd, hdlen, "Proxy-authenticate:")) { + char *auth = Curl_copy_header_value(hd); + if(!auth) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + result = Curl_http_input_auth(data, TRUE, auth); + free(auth); return result; - } + } #ifdef USE_SPNEGO - else if(checkprefix("Persistent-Auth:", headp)) { - struct negotiatedata *negdata = &conn->negotiate; - struct auth *authp = &data->state.authhost; - if(authp->picked == CURLAUTH_NEGOTIATE) { - char *persistentauth = Curl_copy_header_value(headp); - if(!persistentauth) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - negdata->noauthpersist = checkprefix("false", persistentauth)? - TRUE:FALSE; - negdata->havenoauthpersist = TRUE; - infof(data, "Negotiate: noauthpersist -> %d, header part: %s", - negdata->noauthpersist, persistentauth); - free(persistentauth); + if(HD_IS(hd, hdlen, "Persistent-Auth:")) { + struct negotiatedata *negdata = &conn->negotiate; + struct auth *authp = &data->state.authhost; + if(authp->picked == CURLAUTH_NEGOTIATE) { + char *persistentauth = Curl_copy_header_value(hd); + if(!persistentauth) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + negdata->noauthpersist = checkprefix("false", persistentauth)? + TRUE:FALSE; + negdata->havenoauthpersist = TRUE; + infof(data, "Negotiate: noauthpersist -> %d, header part: %s", + negdata->noauthpersist, persistentauth); + free(persistentauth); + } } - } #endif - else if((k->httpcode >= 300 && k->httpcode < 400) && - checkprefix("Location:", headp) && - !data->req.location) { - /* this is the URL that the server advises us to use instead */ - char *location = Curl_copy_header_value(headp); - if(!location) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - if(!*location) - /* ignore empty data */ - free(location); - else { - data->req.location = location; - - if(data->set.http_follow_location) { - DEBUGASSERT(!data->req.newurl); - data->req.newurl = strdup(data->req.location); /* clone */ - if(!data->req.newurl) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - - /* some cases of POST and PUT etc needs to rewind the data - stream at this point */ - result = http_perhapsrewind(data, conn); - if(result) - return result; - - /* mark the next request as a followed location: */ - data->state.this_is_a_follow = TRUE; + break; + case 'r': + case 'R': + v = HD_VAL(hd, hdlen, "Retry-After:"); + if(v) { + /* Retry-After = HTTP-date / delay-seconds */ + curl_off_t retry_after = 0; /* zero for unknown or "now" */ + /* Try it as a decimal number, if it works it is not a date */ + (void)curlx_strtoofft(v, NULL, 10, &retry_after); + if(!retry_after) { + time_t date = Curl_getdate_capped(v); + if(-1 != date) + /* convert date to number of seconds into the future */ + retry_after = date - time(NULL); } + data->info.retry_after = retry_after; /* store it */ + return CURLE_OK; } - } + break; + case 's': + case 'S': +#if !defined(CURL_DISABLE_COOKIES) + v = (data->cookies && data->state.cookie_engine)? + HD_VAL(hd, hdlen, "Set-Cookie:") : NULL; + if(v) { + /* If there is a custom-set Host: name, use it here, or else use + * real peer host name. */ + const char *host = data->state.aptr.cookiehost? + data->state.aptr.cookiehost:conn->host.name; + const bool secure_context = + conn->handler->protocol&(CURLPROTO_HTTPS|CURLPROTO_WSS) || + strcasecompare("localhost", host) || + !strcmp(host, "127.0.0.1") || + !strcmp(host, "::1") ? TRUE : FALSE; + Curl_share_lock(data, CURL_LOCK_DATA_COOKIE, + CURL_LOCK_ACCESS_SINGLE); + Curl_cookie_add(data, data->cookies, TRUE, FALSE, v, host, + data->state.up.path, secure_context); + Curl_share_unlock(data, CURL_LOCK_DATA_COOKIE); + return CURLE_OK; + } +#endif #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_HSTS - /* If enabled, the header is incoming and this is over HTTPS */ - else if(data->hsts && checkprefix("Strict-Transport-Security:", headp) && - ((conn->handler->flags & PROTOPT_SSL) || + /* If enabled, the header is incoming and this is over HTTPS */ + v = (data->hsts && + ((conn->handler->flags & PROTOPT_SSL) || #ifdef CURLDEBUG /* allow debug builds to circumvent the HTTPS restriction */ getenv("CURL_HSTS_HTTP") #else 0 #endif - )) { - CURLcode check = - Curl_hsts_parse(data->hsts, conn->host.name, - headp + strlen("Strict-Transport-Security:")); - if(check) - infof(data, "Illegal STS header skipped"); + ) + )? HD_VAL(hd, hdlen, "Strict-Transport-Security:") : NULL; + if(v) { + CURLcode check = + Curl_hsts_parse(data->hsts, conn->host.name, v); + if(check) + infof(data, "Illegal STS header skipped"); #ifdef DEBUGBUILD - else - infof(data, "Parsed STS header fine (%zu entries)", - data->hsts->list.size); -#endif - } + else + infof(data, "Parsed STS header fine (%zu entries)", + data->hsts->list.size); #endif -#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_ALTSVC - /* If enabled, the header is incoming and this is over HTTPS */ - else if(data->asi && checkprefix("Alt-Svc:", headp) && - ((conn->handler->flags & PROTOPT_SSL) || -#ifdef CURLDEBUG - /* allow debug builds to circumvent the HTTPS restriction */ - getenv("CURL_ALTSVC_HTTP") -#else - 0 + } #endif - )) { - /* the ALPN of the current request */ - enum alpnid id = (conn->httpversion == 30)? ALPN_h3 : - (conn->httpversion == 20) ? ALPN_h2 : ALPN_h1; - result = Curl_altsvc_parse(data, data->asi, - headp + strlen("Alt-Svc:"), - id, conn->host.name, - curlx_uitous((unsigned int)conn->remote_port)); - if(result) + break; + case 't': + case 'T': + /* RFC 9112, ch. 6.1 + * "Transfer-Encoding MAY be sent in a response to a HEAD request or + * in a 304 (Not Modified) response (Section 15.4.5 of [HTTP]) to a + * GET request, neither of which includes a message body, to indicate + * that the origin server would have applied a transfer coding to the + * message body if the request had been an unconditional GET." + * + * Read: in these cases the 'Transfer-Encoding' does not apply + * to any data following the response headers. Do not add any decoders. + */ + v = (!k->http_bodyless && + (data->state.httpreq != HTTPREQ_HEAD) && + (k->httpcode != 304))? + HD_VAL(hd, hdlen, "Transfer-Encoding:") : NULL; + if(v) { + /* One or more encodings. We check for chunked and/or a compression + algorithm. */ + result = Curl_build_unencoding_stack(data, v, TRUE); + if(result) + return result; + if(!k->chunk && data->set.http_transfer_encoding) { + /* if this isn't chunked, only close can signal the end of this + * transfer as Content-Length is said not to be trusted for + * transfer-encoding! */ + connclose(conn, "HTTP/1.1 transfer-encoding without chunks"); + k->ignore_cl = TRUE; + } + return CURLE_OK; + } + break; + case 'w': + case 'W': + if((401 == k->httpcode) && HD_IS(hd, hdlen, "WWW-Authenticate:")) { + char *auth = Curl_copy_header_value(hd); + if(!auth) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + result = Curl_http_input_auth(data, FALSE, auth); + free(auth); return result; + } + break; } -#endif - else if(conn->handler->protocol & CURLPROTO_RTSP) { - result = Curl_rtsp_parseheader(data, headp); + + if(conn->handler->protocol & CURLPROTO_RTSP) { + result = Curl_rtsp_parseheader(data, hd); if(result) return result; } @@ -3838,18 +3194,41 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_header(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, * Called after the first HTTP response line (the status line) has been * received and parsed. */ - CURLcode Curl_http_statusline(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn) { struct SingleRequest *k = &data->req; + + switch(k->httpversion) { + case 10: + case 11: +#ifdef USE_HTTP2 + case 20: +#endif +#ifdef USE_HTTP3 + case 30: +#endif + /* no major version switch mid-connection */ + if(conn->httpversion && + (k->httpversion/10 != conn->httpversion/10)) { + failf(data, "Version mismatch (from HTTP/%u to HTTP/%u)", + conn->httpversion/10, k->httpversion/10); + return CURLE_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; + } + break; + default: + failf(data, "Unsupported HTTP version (%u.%d) in response", + k->httpversion/10, k->httpversion%10); + return CURLE_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; + } + data->info.httpcode = k->httpcode; + data->info.httpversion = k->httpversion; + conn->httpversion = (unsigned char)k->httpversion; - data->info.httpversion = conn->httpversion; - if(!data->state.httpversion || - data->state.httpversion > conn->httpversion) + if(!data->state.httpversion || data->state.httpversion > k->httpversion) /* store the lowest server version we encounter */ - data->state.httpversion = conn->httpversion; + data->state.httpversion = (unsigned char)k->httpversion; /* * This code executes as part of processing the header. As a @@ -3866,26 +3245,20 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_statusline(struct Curl_easy *data, k->ignorebody = TRUE; /* Avoid appending error msg to good data. */ } - if(conn->httpversion == 10) { + if(k->httpversion == 10) { /* Default action for HTTP/1.0 must be to close, unless we get one of those fancy headers that tell us the server keeps it open for us! */ infof(data, "HTTP 1.0, assume close after body"); connclose(conn, "HTTP/1.0 close after body"); } - else if(conn->httpversion == 20 || + else if(k->httpversion == 20 || (k->upgr101 == UPGR101_H2 && k->httpcode == 101)) { DEBUGF(infof(data, "HTTP/2 found, allow multiplexing")); /* HTTP/2 cannot avoid multiplexing since it is a core functionality of the protocol */ conn->bundle->multiuse = BUNDLE_MULTIPLEX; } - else if(conn->httpversion >= 11 && - !conn->bits.close) { - /* If HTTP version is >= 1.1 and connection is persistent */ - DEBUGF(infof(data, - "HTTP 1.1 or later with persistent connection")); - } k->http_bodyless = k->httpcode >= 100 && k->httpcode < 200; switch(k->httpcode) { @@ -3896,7 +3269,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_statusline(struct Curl_easy *data, * fields. */ if(data->set.timecondition) data->info.timecond = TRUE; - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case 204: /* (quote from RFC2616, section 10.2.5): The server has * fulfilled the request but does not need to return an @@ -3936,12 +3309,11 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_size(struct Curl_easy *data) return CURLE_OK; } -static CURLcode verify_header(struct Curl_easy *data) +static CURLcode verify_header(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *hd, size_t hdlen) { struct SingleRequest *k = &data->req; - const char *header = Curl_dyn_ptr(&data->state.headerb); - size_t hlen = Curl_dyn_len(&data->state.headerb); - char *ptr = memchr(header, 0x00, hlen); + char *ptr = memchr(hd, 0x00, hdlen); if(ptr) { /* this is bad, bail out */ failf(data, "Nul byte in header"); @@ -3950,11 +3322,11 @@ static CURLcode verify_header(struct Curl_easy *data) if(k->headerline < 2) /* the first "header" is the status-line and it has no colon */ return CURLE_OK; - if(((header[0] == ' ') || (header[0] == '\t')) && k->headerline > 2) + if(((hd[0] == ' ') || (hd[0] == '\t')) && k->headerline > 2) /* line folding, can't happen on line 2 */ ; else { - ptr = memchr(header, ':', hlen); + ptr = memchr(hd, ':', hdlen); if(!ptr) { /* this is bad, bail out */ failf(data, "Header without colon"); @@ -3991,29 +3363,478 @@ CURLcode Curl_bump_headersize(struct Curl_easy *data, return CURLE_OK; } - + +static CURLcode http_on_response(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *buf, size_t blen, + size_t *pconsumed) +{ + struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + struct SingleRequest *k = &data->req; + + (void)buf; /* not used without HTTP2 enabled */ + *pconsumed = 0; + + if(k->upgr101 == UPGR101_RECEIVED) { + /* supposedly upgraded to http2 now */ + if(conn->httpversion != 20) + infof(data, "Lying server, not serving HTTP/2"); + } + if(conn->httpversion < 20) { + conn->bundle->multiuse = BUNDLE_NO_MULTIUSE; + } + + if(k->httpcode < 100) { + failf(data, "Unsupported response code in HTTP response"); + return CURLE_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; + } + else if(k->httpcode < 200) { + /* "A user agent MAY ignore unexpected 1xx status responses." + * By default, we expect to get more responses after this one. */ + k->header = TRUE; + k->headerline = 0; /* restart the header line counter */ + + switch(k->httpcode) { + case 100: + /* + * We have made an HTTP PUT or POST and this is 1.1-lingo + * that tells us that the server is OK with this and ready + * to receive the data. + */ + Curl_http_exp100_got100(data); + break; + case 101: + /* Switching Protocols only allowed from HTTP/1.1 */ + if(conn->httpversion != 11) { + /* invalid for other HTTP versions */ + failf(data, "unexpected 101 response code"); + return CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY; + } + if(k->upgr101 == UPGR101_H2) { + /* Switching to HTTP/2, where we will get more responses */ + infof(data, "Received 101, Switching to HTTP/2"); + k->upgr101 = UPGR101_RECEIVED; + /* We expect more response from HTTP/2 later */ + k->header = TRUE; + k->headerline = 0; /* restart the header line counter */ + /* Any remaining `buf` bytes are already HTTP/2 and passed to + * be processed. */ + result = Curl_http2_upgrade(data, conn, FIRSTSOCKET, buf, blen); + if(result) + return result; + *pconsumed += blen; + } +#ifdef USE_WEBSOCKETS + else if(k->upgr101 == UPGR101_WS) { + /* verify the response. Any passed `buf` bytes are already in + * WebSockets format and taken in by the protocol handler. */ + result = Curl_ws_accept(data, buf, blen); + if(result) + return result; + *pconsumed += blen; /* ws accept handled the data */ + k->header = FALSE; /* we will not get more responses */ + if(data->set.connect_only) + k->keepon &= ~KEEP_RECV; /* read no more content */ + } +#endif + else { + /* We silently accept this as the final response. + * TODO: this looks, uhm, wrong. What are we switching to if we + * did not ask for an Upgrade? Maybe the application provided an + * `Upgrade: xxx` header? */ + k->header = FALSE; + } + break; + default: + /* The server may send us other 1xx responses, like informative + * 103. This have no influence on request processing and we expect + * to receive a final response eventually. */ + break; + } + return result; + } + + /* k->httpcode >= 200, final response */ + k->header = FALSE; + + if(k->upgr101 == UPGR101_H2) { + /* A requested upgrade was denied, poke the multi handle to possibly + allow a pending pipewait to continue */ + Curl_multi_connchanged(data->multi); + } + + if((k->size == -1) && !k->chunk && !conn->bits.close && + (conn->httpversion == 11) && + !(conn->handler->protocol & CURLPROTO_RTSP) && + data->state.httpreq != HTTPREQ_HEAD) { + /* On HTTP 1.1, when connection is not to get closed, but no + Content-Length nor Transfer-Encoding chunked have been + received, according to RFC2616 section 4.4 point 5, we + assume that the server will close the connection to + signal the end of the document. */ + infof(data, "no chunk, no close, no size. Assume close to " + "signal end"); + streamclose(conn, "HTTP: No end-of-message indicator"); + } + + /* At this point we have some idea about the fate of the connection. + If we are closing the connection it may result auth failure. */ +#if defined(USE_NTLM) + if(conn->bits.close && + (((data->req.httpcode == 401) && + (conn->http_ntlm_state == NTLMSTATE_TYPE2)) || + ((data->req.httpcode == 407) && + (conn->proxy_ntlm_state == NTLMSTATE_TYPE2)))) { + infof(data, "Connection closure while negotiating auth (HTTP 1.0?)"); + data->state.authproblem = TRUE; + } +#endif +#if defined(USE_SPNEGO) + if(conn->bits.close && + (((data->req.httpcode == 401) && + (conn->http_negotiate_state == GSS_AUTHRECV)) || + ((data->req.httpcode == 407) && + (conn->proxy_negotiate_state == GSS_AUTHRECV)))) { + infof(data, "Connection closure while negotiating auth (HTTP 1.0?)"); + data->state.authproblem = TRUE; + } + if((conn->http_negotiate_state == GSS_AUTHDONE) && + (data->req.httpcode != 401)) { + conn->http_negotiate_state = GSS_AUTHSUCC; + } + if((conn->proxy_negotiate_state == GSS_AUTHDONE) && + (data->req.httpcode != 407)) { + conn->proxy_negotiate_state = GSS_AUTHSUCC; + } +#endif + +#ifdef USE_WEBSOCKETS + /* All >=200 HTTP status codes are errors when wanting websockets */ + if(data->req.upgr101 == UPGR101_WS) { + failf(data, "Refused WebSockets upgrade: %d", k->httpcode); + return CURLE_HTTP_RETURNED_ERROR; + } +#endif + + /* Check if this response means the transfer errored. */ + if(http_should_fail(data, data->req.httpcode)) { + failf(data, "The requested URL returned error: %d", + k->httpcode); + return CURLE_HTTP_RETURNED_ERROR; + } + + /* Curl_http_auth_act() checks what authentication methods + * that are available and decides which one (if any) to + * use. It will set 'newurl' if an auth method was picked. */ + result = Curl_http_auth_act(data); + if(result) + return result; + + if(k->httpcode >= 300) { + if((!data->req.authneg) && !conn->bits.close && + !Curl_creader_will_rewind(data)) { + /* + * General treatment of errors when about to send data. Including : + * "417 Expectation Failed", while waiting for 100-continue. + * + * The check for close above is done simply because of something + * else has already deemed the connection to get closed then + * something else should've considered the big picture and we + * avoid this check. + * + */ + + switch(data->state.httpreq) { + case HTTPREQ_PUT: + case HTTPREQ_POST: + case HTTPREQ_POST_FORM: + case HTTPREQ_POST_MIME: + /* We got an error response. If this happened before the whole + * request body has been sent we stop sending and mark the + * connection for closure after we've read the entire response. + */ + if(!Curl_req_done_sending(data)) { + if((k->httpcode == 417) && Curl_http_exp100_is_selected(data)) { + /* 417 Expectation Failed - try again without the Expect + header */ + if(!k->writebytecount && http_exp100_is_waiting(data)) { + infof(data, "Got HTTP failure 417 while waiting for a 100"); + } + else { + infof(data, "Got HTTP failure 417 while sending data"); + streamclose(conn, + "Stop sending data before everything sent"); + result = http_perhapsrewind(data, conn); + if(result) + return result; + } + data->state.disableexpect = TRUE; + DEBUGASSERT(!data->req.newurl); + data->req.newurl = strdup(data->state.url); + Curl_req_abort_sending(data); + } + else if(data->set.http_keep_sending_on_error) { + infof(data, "HTTP error before end of send, keep sending"); + http_exp100_send_anyway(data); + } + else { + infof(data, "HTTP error before end of send, stop sending"); + streamclose(conn, "Stop sending data before everything sent"); + result = Curl_req_abort_sending(data); + if(result) + return result; + } + } + break; + + default: /* default label present to avoid compiler warnings */ + break; + } + } + + if(Curl_creader_will_rewind(data) && !Curl_req_done_sending(data)) { + /* We rewind before next send, continue sending now */ + infof(data, "Keep sending data to get tossed away"); + k->keepon |= KEEP_SEND; + } + + } + + /* This is the last response that we will got for the current request. + * Check on the body size and determine if the response is complete. + */ + result = Curl_http_size(data); + if(result) + return result; + + /* If we requested a "no body", this is a good time to get + * out and return home. + */ + if(data->req.no_body) + k->download_done = TRUE; + + /* If max download size is *zero* (nothing) we already have + nothing and can safely return ok now! But for HTTP/2, we'd + like to call http2_handle_stream_close to properly close a + stream. In order to do this, we keep reading until we + close the stream. */ + if(0 == k->maxdownload + && !Curl_conn_is_http2(data, conn, FIRSTSOCKET) + && !Curl_conn_is_http3(data, conn, FIRSTSOCKET)) + k->download_done = TRUE; + + /* final response without error, prepare to receive the body */ + return Curl_http_firstwrite(data); +} + +static CURLcode http_rw_hd(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *hd, size_t hdlen, + const char *buf_remain, size_t blen, + size_t *pconsumed) +{ + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + struct SingleRequest *k = &data->req; + int writetype; + + *pconsumed = 0; + if((0x0a == *hd) || (0x0d == *hd)) { + /* Empty header line means end of headers! */ + size_t consumed; + + /* now, only output this if the header AND body are requested: + */ + Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_HEADER_IN, (char *)hd, hdlen); + + writetype = CLIENTWRITE_HEADER | + ((k->httpcode/100 == 1) ? CLIENTWRITE_1XX : 0); + + result = Curl_client_write(data, writetype, hd, hdlen); + if(result) + return result; + + result = Curl_bump_headersize(data, hdlen, FALSE); + if(result) + return result; + + data->req.deductheadercount = + (100 <= k->httpcode && 199 >= k->httpcode)?data->req.headerbytecount:0; + + /* analyze the response to find out what to do. */ + /* Caveat: we clear anything in the header brigade, because a + * response might switch HTTP version which may call use recursively. + * Not nice, but that is currently the way of things. */ + Curl_dyn_reset(&data->state.headerb); + result = http_on_response(data, buf_remain, blen, &consumed); + if(result) + return result; + *pconsumed += consumed; + return CURLE_OK; + } + + /* + * Checks for special headers coming up. + */ + + writetype = CLIENTWRITE_HEADER; + if(!k->headerline++) { + /* This is the first header, it MUST be the error code line + or else we consider this to be the body right away! */ + bool fine_statusline = FALSE; + + k->httpversion = 0; /* Don't know yet */ + if(data->conn->handler->protocol & PROTO_FAMILY_HTTP) { + /* + * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7230#section-3.1.2 + * + * The response code is always a three-digit number in HTTP as the spec + * says. We allow any three-digit number here, but we cannot make + * guarantees on future behaviors since it isn't within the protocol. + */ + const char *p = hd; + + while(*p && ISBLANK(*p)) + p++; + if(!strncmp(p, "HTTP/", 5)) { + p += 5; + switch(*p) { + case '1': + p++; + if((p[0] == '.') && (p[1] == '0' || p[1] == '1')) { + if(ISBLANK(p[2])) { + k->httpversion = 10 + (p[1] - '0'); + p += 3; + if(ISDIGIT(p[0]) && ISDIGIT(p[1]) && ISDIGIT(p[2])) { + k->httpcode = (p[0] - '0') * 100 + (p[1] - '0') * 10 + + (p[2] - '0'); + p += 3; + if(ISSPACE(*p)) + fine_statusline = TRUE; + } + } + } + if(!fine_statusline) { + failf(data, "Unsupported HTTP/1 subversion in response"); + return CURLE_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; + } + break; + case '2': + case '3': + if(!ISBLANK(p[1])) + break; + k->httpversion = (*p - '0') * 10; + p += 2; + if(ISDIGIT(p[0]) && ISDIGIT(p[1]) && ISDIGIT(p[2])) { + k->httpcode = (p[0] - '0') * 100 + (p[1] - '0') * 10 + + (p[2] - '0'); + p += 3; + if(!ISSPACE(*p)) + break; + fine_statusline = TRUE; + } + break; + default: /* unsupported */ + failf(data, "Unsupported HTTP version in response"); + return CURLE_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; + } + } + + if(!fine_statusline) { + /* If user has set option HTTP200ALIASES, + compare header line against list of aliases + */ + statusline check = checkhttpprefix(data, hd, hdlen); + if(check == STATUS_DONE) { + fine_statusline = TRUE; + k->httpcode = 200; + k->httpversion = 10; + } + } + } + else if(data->conn->handler->protocol & CURLPROTO_RTSP) { + const char *p = hd; + while(*p && ISBLANK(*p)) + p++; + if(!strncmp(p, "RTSP/", 5)) { + p += 5; + if(ISDIGIT(*p)) { + p++; + if((p[0] == '.') && ISDIGIT(p[1])) { + if(ISBLANK(p[2])) { + p += 3; + if(ISDIGIT(p[0]) && ISDIGIT(p[1]) && ISDIGIT(p[2])) { + k->httpcode = (p[0] - '0') * 100 + (p[1] - '0') * 10 + + (p[2] - '0'); + p += 3; + if(ISSPACE(*p)) { + fine_statusline = TRUE; + k->httpversion = 11; /* RTSP acts like HTTP 1.1 */ + } + } + } + } + } + if(!fine_statusline) + return CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY; + } + } + + if(fine_statusline) { + result = Curl_http_statusline(data, data->conn); + if(result) + return result; + writetype |= CLIENTWRITE_STATUS; + } + else { + k->header = FALSE; /* this is not a header line */ + return CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY; + } + } + + result = verify_header(data, hd, hdlen); + if(result) + return result; + + result = Curl_http_header(data, hd, hdlen); + if(result) + return result; + + /* + * Taken in one (more) header. Write it to the client. + */ + Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_HEADER_IN, (char *)hd, hdlen); + + if(k->httpcode/100 == 1) + writetype |= CLIENTWRITE_1XX; + result = Curl_client_write(data, writetype, hd, hdlen); + if(result) + return result; + + result = Curl_bump_headersize(data, hdlen, FALSE); + if(result) + return result; + + return CURLE_OK; +} + /* * Read any HTTP header lines from the server and pass them to the client app. */ -CURLcode Curl_http_readwrite_headers(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn, - const char *buf, size_t blen, - size_t *pconsumed) +static CURLcode http_parse_headers(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *buf, size_t blen, + size_t *pconsumed) { - CURLcode result; + struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; struct SingleRequest *k = &data->req; - char *headp; char *end_ptr; + bool leftover_body = FALSE; /* header line within buffer loop */ *pconsumed = 0; - do { - size_t line_length; - int writetype; - - /* data is in network encoding so use 0x0a instead of '\n' */ - end_ptr = memchr(buf, 0x0a, blen); + while(blen && k->header) { + size_t consumed; + end_ptr = memchr(buf, '\n', blen); if(!end_ptr) { /* Not a complete header line within buffer, append the data to the end of the headerbuff. */ @@ -4032,12 +3853,16 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_readwrite_headers(struct Curl_easy *data, if(st == STATUS_BAD) { /* this is not the beginning of a protocol first header line */ k->header = FALSE; - k->badheader = TRUE; streamclose(conn, "bad HTTP: No end-of-message indicator"); + if(conn->httpversion >= 10) { + failf(data, "Invalid status line"); + return CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY; + } if(!data->set.http09_allowed) { failf(data, "Received HTTP/0.9 when not allowed"); return CURLE_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; } + leftover_body = TRUE; goto out; } } @@ -4045,14 +3870,13 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_readwrite_headers(struct Curl_easy *data, } /* decrease the size of the remaining (supposed) header line */ - line_length = (end_ptr - buf) + 1; - result = Curl_dyn_addn(&data->state.headerb, buf, line_length); + consumed = (end_ptr - buf) + 1; + result = Curl_dyn_addn(&data->state.headerb, buf, consumed); if(result) return result; - - blen -= line_length; - buf += line_length; - *pconsumed += line_length; + blen -= consumed; + buf += consumed; + *pconsumed += consumed; /**** * We now have a FULL header line in 'headerb'. @@ -4066,522 +3890,122 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_readwrite_headers(struct Curl_easy *data, if(st == STATUS_BAD) { streamclose(conn, "bad HTTP: No end-of-message indicator"); /* this is not the beginning of a protocol first header line */ + if(conn->httpversion >= 10) { + failf(data, "Invalid status line"); + return CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY; + } if(!data->set.http09_allowed) { failf(data, "Received HTTP/0.9 when not allowed"); return CURLE_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; } k->header = FALSE; - if(blen) - /* since there's more, this is a partial bad header */ - k->badheader = TRUE; - else { - /* this was all we read so it's all a bad header */ - k->badheader = TRUE; - return CURLE_OK; - } - break; + leftover_body = TRUE; + goto out; } } - /* headers are in network encoding so use 0x0a and 0x0d instead of '\n' - and '\r' */ - headp = Curl_dyn_ptr(&data->state.headerb); - if((0x0a == *headp) || (0x0d == *headp)) { - size_t headerlen; - /* Zero-length header line means end of headers! */ - - if('\r' == *headp) - headp++; /* pass the \r byte */ - if('\n' == *headp) - headp++; /* pass the \n byte */ - - if(100 <= k->httpcode && 199 >= k->httpcode) { - /* "A user agent MAY ignore unexpected 1xx status responses." */ - switch(k->httpcode) { - case 100: - /* - * We have made an HTTP PUT or POST and this is 1.1-lingo - * that tells us that the server is OK with this and ready - * to receive the data. - * However, we'll get more headers now so we must get - * back into the header-parsing state! - */ - k->header = TRUE; - k->headerline = 0; /* restart the header line counter */ - - /* if we did wait for this do enable write now! */ - if(k->exp100 > EXP100_SEND_DATA) { - k->exp100 = EXP100_SEND_DATA; - k->keepon |= KEEP_SEND; - Curl_expire_done(data, EXPIRE_100_TIMEOUT); - } - break; - case 101: - /* Switching Protocols */ - if(k->upgr101 == UPGR101_H2) { - /* Switching to HTTP/2 */ - DEBUGASSERT(conn->httpversion < 20); - infof(data, "Received 101, Switching to HTTP/2"); - k->upgr101 = UPGR101_RECEIVED; - - /* we'll get more headers (HTTP/2 response) */ - k->header = TRUE; - k->headerline = 0; /* restart the header line counter */ - - /* switch to http2 now. The bytes after response headers - are also processed here, otherwise they are lost. */ - result = Curl_http2_upgrade(data, conn, FIRSTSOCKET, buf, blen); - if(result) - return result; - *pconsumed += blen; - blen = 0; - } -#ifdef USE_WEBSOCKETS - else if(k->upgr101 == UPGR101_WS) { - /* verify the response */ - result = Curl_ws_accept(data, buf, blen); - if(result) - return result; - k->header = FALSE; /* no more header to parse! */ - if(data->set.connect_only) { - k->keepon &= ~KEEP_RECV; /* read no more content */ - *pconsumed += blen; - blen = 0; - } - } -#endif - else { - /* Not switching to another protocol */ - k->header = FALSE; /* no more header to parse! */ - } - break; - default: - /* the status code 1xx indicates a provisional response, so - we'll get another set of headers */ - k->header = TRUE; - k->headerline = 0; /* restart the header line counter */ - break; - } - } - else { - if(k->upgr101 == UPGR101_H2) { - /* A requested upgrade was denied, poke the multi handle to possibly - allow a pending pipewait to continue */ - Curl_multi_connchanged(data->multi); - } - k->header = FALSE; /* no more header to parse! */ - - if((k->size == -1) && !k->chunk && !conn->bits.close && - (conn->httpversion == 11) && - !(conn->handler->protocol & CURLPROTO_RTSP) && - data->state.httpreq != HTTPREQ_HEAD) { - /* On HTTP 1.1, when connection is not to get closed, but no - Content-Length nor Transfer-Encoding chunked have been - received, according to RFC2616 section 4.4 point 5, we - assume that the server will close the connection to - signal the end of the document. */ - infof(data, "no chunk, no close, no size. Assume close to " - "signal end"); - streamclose(conn, "HTTP: No end-of-message indicator"); - } - } - - if(!k->header) { - result = Curl_http_size(data); - if(result) - return result; - } - - /* At this point we have some idea about the fate of the connection. - If we are closing the connection it may result auth failure. */ -#if defined(USE_NTLM) - if(conn->bits.close && - (((data->req.httpcode == 401) && - (conn->http_ntlm_state == NTLMSTATE_TYPE2)) || - ((data->req.httpcode == 407) && - (conn->proxy_ntlm_state == NTLMSTATE_TYPE2)))) { - infof(data, "Connection closure while negotiating auth (HTTP 1.0?)"); - data->state.authproblem = TRUE; - } -#endif -#if defined(USE_SPNEGO) - if(conn->bits.close && - (((data->req.httpcode == 401) && - (conn->http_negotiate_state == GSS_AUTHRECV)) || - ((data->req.httpcode == 407) && - (conn->proxy_negotiate_state == GSS_AUTHRECV)))) { - infof(data, "Connection closure while negotiating auth (HTTP 1.0?)"); - data->state.authproblem = TRUE; - } - if((conn->http_negotiate_state == GSS_AUTHDONE) && - (data->req.httpcode != 401)) { - conn->http_negotiate_state = GSS_AUTHSUCC; - } - if((conn->proxy_negotiate_state == GSS_AUTHDONE) && - (data->req.httpcode != 407)) { - conn->proxy_negotiate_state = GSS_AUTHSUCC; - } -#endif - - /* now, only output this if the header AND body are requested: - */ - writetype = CLIENTWRITE_HEADER | - ((k->httpcode/100 == 1) ? CLIENTWRITE_1XX : 0); - - headerlen = Curl_dyn_len(&data->state.headerb); - result = Curl_client_write(data, writetype, - Curl_dyn_ptr(&data->state.headerb), - headerlen); - if(result) - return result; - - result = Curl_bump_headersize(data, headerlen, FALSE); - if(result) - return result; - - /* - * When all the headers have been parsed, see if we should give - * up and return an error. - */ - if(http_should_fail(data)) { - failf(data, "The requested URL returned error: %d", - k->httpcode); - return CURLE_HTTP_RETURNED_ERROR; - } - -#ifdef USE_WEBSOCKETS - /* All non-101 HTTP status codes are bad when wanting to upgrade to - websockets */ - if(data->req.upgr101 == UPGR101_WS) { - failf(data, "Refused WebSockets upgrade: %d", k->httpcode); - return CURLE_HTTP_RETURNED_ERROR; - } -#endif - - - data->req.deductheadercount = - (100 <= k->httpcode && 199 >= k->httpcode)?data->req.headerbytecount:0; - - /* Curl_http_auth_act() checks what authentication methods - * that are available and decides which one (if any) to - * use. It will set 'newurl' if an auth method was picked. */ - result = Curl_http_auth_act(data); - - if(result) - return result; - - if(k->httpcode >= 300) { - if((!conn->bits.authneg) && !conn->bits.close && - !data->state.rewindbeforesend) { - /* - * General treatment of errors when about to send data. Including : - * "417 Expectation Failed", while waiting for 100-continue. - * - * The check for close above is done simply because of something - * else has already deemed the connection to get closed then - * something else should've considered the big picture and we - * avoid this check. - * - * rewindbeforesend indicates that something has told libcurl to - * continue sending even if it gets discarded - */ - - switch(data->state.httpreq) { - case HTTPREQ_PUT: - case HTTPREQ_POST: - case HTTPREQ_POST_FORM: - case HTTPREQ_POST_MIME: - /* We got an error response. If this happened before the whole - * request body has been sent we stop sending and mark the - * connection for closure after we've read the entire response. - */ - Curl_expire_done(data, EXPIRE_100_TIMEOUT); - if(!k->upload_done) { - if((k->httpcode == 417) && data->state.expect100header) { - /* 417 Expectation Failed - try again without the Expect - header */ - if(!k->writebytecount && - k->exp100 == EXP100_AWAITING_CONTINUE) { - infof(data, "Got HTTP failure 417 while waiting for a 100"); - } - else { - infof(data, "Got HTTP failure 417 while sending data"); - streamclose(conn, - "Stop sending data before everything sent"); - result = http_perhapsrewind(data, conn); - if(result) - return result; - } - data->state.disableexpect = TRUE; - DEBUGASSERT(!data->req.newurl); - data->req.newurl = strdup(data->state.url); - Curl_done_sending(data, k); - } - else if(data->set.http_keep_sending_on_error) { - infof(data, "HTTP error before end of send, keep sending"); - if(k->exp100 > EXP100_SEND_DATA) { - k->exp100 = EXP100_SEND_DATA; - k->keepon |= KEEP_SEND; - } - } - else { - infof(data, "HTTP error before end of send, stop sending"); - streamclose(conn, "Stop sending data before everything sent"); - result = Curl_done_sending(data, k); - if(result) - return result; - k->upload_done = TRUE; - if(data->state.expect100header) - k->exp100 = EXP100_FAILED; - } - } - break; - - default: /* default label present to avoid compiler warnings */ - break; - } - } - - if(data->state.rewindbeforesend && - (conn->writesockfd != CURL_SOCKET_BAD)) { - /* We rewind before next send, continue sending now */ - infof(data, "Keep sending data to get tossed away"); - k->keepon |= KEEP_SEND; - } - } - - if(!k->header) { - /* - * really end-of-headers. - * - * If we requested a "no body", this is a good time to get - * out and return home. - */ - if(data->req.no_body) - k->download_done = TRUE; -#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_RTSP - else if((conn->handler->protocol & CURLPROTO_RTSP) && - (data->set.rtspreq == RTSPREQ_DESCRIBE) && - (k->size <= -1)) - /* Respect section 4.4 of rfc2326: If the Content-Length header is - absent, a length 0 must be assumed. It will prevent libcurl from - hanging on DESCRIBE request that got refused for whatever - reason */ - k->download_done = TRUE; -#endif - - /* If max download size is *zero* (nothing) we already have - nothing and can safely return ok now! But for HTTP/2, we'd - like to call http2_handle_stream_close to properly close a - stream. In order to do this, we keep reading until we - close the stream. */ - if(0 == k->maxdownload - && !Curl_conn_is_http2(data, conn, FIRSTSOCKET) - && !Curl_conn_is_http3(data, conn, FIRSTSOCKET)) - k->download_done = TRUE; - - Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_HEADER_IN, - Curl_dyn_ptr(&data->state.headerb), - Curl_dyn_len(&data->state.headerb)); - goto out; /* exit header line loop */ - } - - /* We continue reading headers, reset the line-based header */ - Curl_dyn_reset(&data->state.headerb); - continue; + result = http_rw_hd(data, Curl_dyn_ptr(&data->state.headerb), + Curl_dyn_len(&data->state.headerb), + buf, blen, &consumed); + /* We are done with this line. We reset because response + * processing might switch to HTTP/2 and that might call us + * directly again. */ + Curl_dyn_reset(&data->state.headerb); + if(consumed) { + blen -= consumed; + buf += consumed; + *pconsumed += consumed; } + if(result) + return result; + } - /* - * Checks for special headers coming up. - */ - - writetype = CLIENTWRITE_HEADER; - if(!k->headerline++) { - /* This is the first header, it MUST be the error code line - or else we consider this to be the body right away! */ - bool fine_statusline = FALSE; - if(conn->handler->protocol & PROTO_FAMILY_HTTP) { - /* - * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7230#section-3.1.2 - * - * The response code is always a three-digit number in HTTP as the spec - * says. We allow any three-digit number here, but we cannot make - * guarantees on future behaviors since it isn't within the protocol. - */ - int httpversion = 0; - char *p = headp; - - while(*p && ISBLANK(*p)) - p++; - if(!strncmp(p, "HTTP/", 5)) { - p += 5; - switch(*p) { - case '1': - p++; - if((p[0] == '.') && (p[1] == '0' || p[1] == '1')) { - if(ISBLANK(p[2])) { - httpversion = 10 + (p[1] - '0'); - p += 3; - if(ISDIGIT(p[0]) && ISDIGIT(p[1]) && ISDIGIT(p[2])) { - k->httpcode = (p[0] - '0') * 100 + (p[1] - '0') * 10 + - (p[2] - '0'); - p += 3; - if(ISSPACE(*p)) - fine_statusline = TRUE; - } - } - } - if(!fine_statusline) { - failf(data, "Unsupported HTTP/1 subversion in response"); - return CURLE_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; - } - break; - case '2': - case '3': - if(!ISBLANK(p[1])) - break; - httpversion = (*p - '0') * 10; - p += 2; - if(ISDIGIT(p[0]) && ISDIGIT(p[1]) && ISDIGIT(p[2])) { - k->httpcode = (p[0] - '0') * 100 + (p[1] - '0') * 10 + - (p[2] - '0'); - p += 3; - if(!ISSPACE(*p)) - break; - fine_statusline = TRUE; - } - break; - default: /* unsupported */ - failf(data, "Unsupported HTTP version in response"); - return CURLE_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; - } - } + /* We might have reached the end of the header part here, but + there might be a non-header part left in the end of the read + buffer. */ +out: + if(!k->header && !leftover_body) { + Curl_dyn_free(&data->state.headerb); + } + return CURLE_OK; +} - if(fine_statusline) { - if(k->httpcode < 100) { - failf(data, "Unsupported response code in HTTP response"); - return CURLE_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; - } - switch(httpversion) { - case 10: - case 11: -#ifdef USE_HTTP2 - case 20: -#endif -#ifdef ENABLE_QUIC - case 30: -#endif - conn->httpversion = (unsigned char)httpversion; - break; - default: - failf(data, "Unsupported HTTP version (%u.%d) in response", - httpversion/10, httpversion%10); - return CURLE_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; - } +CURLcode Curl_http_write_resp_hd(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *hd, size_t hdlen, + bool is_eos) +{ + CURLcode result; + size_t consumed; + char tmp = 0; - if(k->upgr101 == UPGR101_RECEIVED) { - /* supposedly upgraded to http2 now */ - if(conn->httpversion != 20) - infof(data, "Lying server, not serving HTTP/2"); - } - if(conn->httpversion < 20) { - conn->bundle->multiuse = BUNDLE_NO_MULTIUSE; - } - } - else { - /* If user has set option HTTP200ALIASES, - compare header line against list of aliases - */ - statusline check = - checkhttpprefix(data, - Curl_dyn_ptr(&data->state.headerb), - Curl_dyn_len(&data->state.headerb)); - if(check == STATUS_DONE) { - fine_statusline = TRUE; - k->httpcode = 200; - conn->httpversion = 10; - } - } - } - else if(conn->handler->protocol & CURLPROTO_RTSP) { - char *p = headp; - while(*p && ISBLANK(*p)) - p++; - if(!strncmp(p, "RTSP/", 5)) { - p += 5; - if(ISDIGIT(*p)) { - p++; - if((p[0] == '.') && ISDIGIT(p[1])) { - if(ISBLANK(p[2])) { - p += 3; - if(ISDIGIT(p[0]) && ISDIGIT(p[1]) && ISDIGIT(p[2])) { - k->httpcode = (p[0] - '0') * 100 + (p[1] - '0') * 10 + - (p[2] - '0'); - p += 3; - if(ISSPACE(*p)) { - fine_statusline = TRUE; - conn->httpversion = 11; /* RTSP acts like HTTP 1.1 */ - } - } - } - } - } - if(!fine_statusline) - return CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY; - } - } + result = http_rw_hd(data, hd, hdlen, &tmp, 0, &consumed); + if(!result && is_eos) { + result = Curl_client_write(data, (CLIENTWRITE_BODY|CLIENTWRITE_EOS), + &tmp, 0); + } + return result; +} - if(fine_statusline) { - result = Curl_http_statusline(data, conn); - if(result) - return result; - writetype |= CLIENTWRITE_STATUS; - } - else { - k->header = FALSE; /* this is not a header line */ - break; +/* + * HTTP protocol `write_resp` implementation. Will parse headers + * when not done yet and otherwise return without consuming data. + */ +CURLcode Curl_http_write_resp_hds(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *buf, size_t blen, + size_t *pconsumed) +{ + if(!data->req.header) { + *pconsumed = 0; + return CURLE_OK; + } + else { + CURLcode result; + + result = http_parse_headers(data, buf, blen, pconsumed); + if(!result && !data->req.header) { + if(!data->req.no_body && Curl_dyn_len(&data->state.headerb)) { + /* leftover from parsing something that turned out not + * to be a header, only happens if we allow for + * HTTP/0.9 like responses */ + result = Curl_client_write(data, CLIENTWRITE_BODY, + Curl_dyn_ptr(&data->state.headerb), + Curl_dyn_len(&data->state.headerb)); } + Curl_dyn_free(&data->state.headerb); } + return result; + } +} - result = verify_header(data); - if(result) - return result; - - result = Curl_http_header(data, conn, headp); - if(result) - return result; - - /* - * End of header-checks. Write them to the client. - */ - if(k->httpcode/100 == 1) - writetype |= CLIENTWRITE_1XX; - - Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_HEADER_IN, headp, - Curl_dyn_len(&data->state.headerb)); - - result = Curl_client_write(data, writetype, headp, - Curl_dyn_len(&data->state.headerb)); - if(result) - return result; +CURLcode Curl_http_write_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *buf, size_t blen, + bool is_eos) +{ + CURLcode result; + size_t consumed; + int flags; - result = Curl_bump_headersize(data, Curl_dyn_len(&data->state.headerb), - FALSE); - if(result) - return result; + result = Curl_http_write_resp_hds(data, buf, blen, &consumed); + if(result || data->req.done) + goto out; - Curl_dyn_reset(&data->state.headerb); + DEBUGASSERT(consumed <= blen); + blen -= consumed; + buf += consumed; + /* either all was consumed in header parsing, or we have data left + * and are done with headers, e.g. it is BODY data */ + DEBUGASSERT(!blen || !data->req.header); + if(!data->req.header && (blen || is_eos)) { + /* BODY data after header been parsed, write and consume */ + flags = CLIENTWRITE_BODY; + if(is_eos) + flags |= CLIENTWRITE_EOS; + result = Curl_client_write(data, flags, (char *)buf, blen); } - while(blen); - - /* We might have reached the end of the header part here, but - there might be a non-header part left in the end of the read - buffer. */ out: - return CURLE_OK; + return result; } - /* Decode HTTP status code string. */ CURLcode Curl_http_decode_status(int *pstatus, const char *s, size_t len) { @@ -4617,7 +4041,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_req_make(struct httpreq **preq, CURLcode result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; DEBUGASSERT(method); - if(m_len + 1 >= sizeof(req->method)) + if(m_len + 1 > sizeof(req->method)) return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; req = calloc(1, sizeof(*req)); @@ -4625,17 +4049,17 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_req_make(struct httpreq **preq, goto out; memcpy(req->method, method, m_len); if(scheme) { - req->scheme = Curl_strndup(scheme, s_len); + req->scheme = Curl_memdup0(scheme, s_len); if(!req->scheme) goto out; } if(authority) { - req->authority = Curl_strndup(authority, a_len); + req->authority = Curl_memdup0(authority, a_len); if(!req->authority) goto out; } if(path) { - req->path = Curl_strndup(path, p_len); + req->path = Curl_memdup0(path, p_len); if(!req->path) goto out; } @@ -4773,7 +4197,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_req_make2(struct httpreq **preq, CURLUcode uc; DEBUGASSERT(method); - if(m_len + 1 >= sizeof(req->method)) + if(m_len + 1 > sizeof(req->method)) return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; req = calloc(1, sizeof(*req)); @@ -4951,4 +4375,142 @@ void Curl_http_resp_free(struct http_resp *resp) } } +struct cr_exp100_ctx { + struct Curl_creader super; + struct curltime start; /* time started waiting */ + enum expect100 state; +}; + +/* Expect: 100-continue client reader, blocking uploads */ + +static void http_exp100_continue(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + struct cr_exp100_ctx *ctx = reader->ctx; + if(ctx->state > EXP100_SEND_DATA) { + ctx->state = EXP100_SEND_DATA; + data->req.keepon |= KEEP_SEND; + data->req.keepon &= ~KEEP_SEND_TIMED; + Curl_expire_done(data, EXPIRE_100_TIMEOUT); + } +} + +static CURLcode cr_exp100_read(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader, + char *buf, size_t blen, + size_t *nread, bool *eos) +{ + struct cr_exp100_ctx *ctx = reader->ctx; + timediff_t ms; + + switch(ctx->state) { + case EXP100_SENDING_REQUEST: + /* We are now waiting for a reply from the server or + * a timeout on our side */ + DEBUGF(infof(data, "cr_exp100_read, start AWAITING_CONTINUE")); + ctx->state = EXP100_AWAITING_CONTINUE; + ctx->start = Curl_now(); + Curl_expire(data, data->set.expect_100_timeout, EXPIRE_100_TIMEOUT); + data->req.keepon &= ~KEEP_SEND; + data->req.keepon |= KEEP_SEND_TIMED; + *nread = 0; + *eos = FALSE; + return CURLE_OK; + case EXP100_FAILED: + DEBUGF(infof(data, "cr_exp100_read, expectation failed, error")); + *nread = 0; + *eos = FALSE; + return CURLE_READ_ERROR; + case EXP100_AWAITING_CONTINUE: + ms = Curl_timediff(Curl_now(), ctx->start); + if(ms < data->set.expect_100_timeout) { + DEBUGF(infof(data, "cr_exp100_read, AWAITING_CONTINUE, not expired")); + data->req.keepon &= ~KEEP_SEND; + data->req.keepon |= KEEP_SEND_TIMED; + *nread = 0; + *eos = FALSE; + return CURLE_OK; + } + /* we've waited long enough, continue anyway */ + http_exp100_continue(data, reader); + infof(data, "Done waiting for 100-continue"); + FALLTHROUGH(); + default: + DEBUGF(infof(data, "cr_exp100_read, pass through")); + return Curl_creader_read(data, reader->next, buf, blen, nread, eos); + } +} + +static void cr_exp100_done(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader, int premature) +{ + struct cr_exp100_ctx *ctx = reader->ctx; + ctx->state = premature? EXP100_FAILED : EXP100_SEND_DATA; + data->req.keepon &= ~KEEP_SEND_TIMED; + Curl_expire_done(data, EXPIRE_100_TIMEOUT); +} + +static const struct Curl_crtype cr_exp100 = { + "cr-exp100", + Curl_creader_def_init, + cr_exp100_read, + Curl_creader_def_close, + Curl_creader_def_needs_rewind, + Curl_creader_def_total_length, + Curl_creader_def_resume_from, + Curl_creader_def_rewind, + Curl_creader_def_unpause, + cr_exp100_done, + sizeof(struct cr_exp100_ctx) +}; + +static CURLcode http_exp100_add_reader(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct Curl_creader *reader = NULL; + CURLcode result; + + result = Curl_creader_create(&reader, data, &cr_exp100, + CURL_CR_PROTOCOL); + if(!result) + result = Curl_creader_add(data, reader); + if(!result) { + struct cr_exp100_ctx *ctx = reader->ctx; + ctx->state = EXP100_SENDING_REQUEST; + } + + if(result && reader) + Curl_creader_free(data, reader); + return result; +} + +void Curl_http_exp100_got100(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct Curl_creader *r = Curl_creader_get_by_type(data, &cr_exp100); + if(r) + http_exp100_continue(data, r); +} + +static bool http_exp100_is_waiting(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct Curl_creader *r = Curl_creader_get_by_type(data, &cr_exp100); + if(r) { + struct cr_exp100_ctx *ctx = r->ctx; + return (ctx->state == EXP100_AWAITING_CONTINUE); + } + return FALSE; +} + +static void http_exp100_send_anyway(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct Curl_creader *r = Curl_creader_get_by_type(data, &cr_exp100); + if(r) + http_exp100_continue(data, r); +} + +bool Curl_http_exp100_is_selected(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct Curl_creader *r = Curl_creader_get_by_type(data, &cr_exp100); + return r? TRUE : FALSE; +} + #endif /* CURL_DISABLE_HTTP */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/http.h b/vendor/curl/lib/http.h index 56b091301f..b0c4f5fd23 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/http.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/http.h @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ typedef enum { #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_HTTP -#if defined(ENABLE_QUIC) +#if defined(USE_HTTP3) #include #endif @@ -54,14 +54,6 @@ extern const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_http; extern const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_https; #endif -#ifdef USE_WEBSOCKETS -extern const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_ws; - -#ifdef USE_SSL -extern const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_wss; -#endif -#endif /* websockets */ - struct dynhds; CURLcode Curl_bump_headersize(struct Curl_easy *data, @@ -82,12 +74,6 @@ char *Curl_checkProxyheaders(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *thisheader, const size_t thislen); struct HTTP; /* see below */ -CURLcode Curl_buffer_send(struct dynbuf *in, - struct Curl_easy *data, - struct HTTP *http, - curl_off_t *bytes_written, - curl_off_t included_body_bytes, - int socketindex); CURLcode Curl_add_timecondition(struct Curl_easy *data, #ifndef USE_HYPER @@ -108,10 +94,6 @@ CURLcode Curl_dynhds_add_custom(struct Curl_easy *data, bool is_connect, struct dynhds *hds); -CURLcode Curl_http_compile_trailers(struct curl_slist *trailers, - struct dynbuf *buf, - struct Curl_easy *handle); - void Curl_http_method(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, const char **method, Curl_HttpReq *); CURLcode Curl_http_useragent(struct Curl_easy *data); @@ -120,14 +102,14 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_target(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, struct dynbuf *req); CURLcode Curl_http_statusline(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn); -CURLcode Curl_http_header(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, - char *headp); +CURLcode Curl_http_header(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *hd, size_t hdlen); CURLcode Curl_transferencode(struct Curl_easy *data); -CURLcode Curl_http_body(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, - Curl_HttpReq httpreq, - const char **teep); -CURLcode Curl_http_bodysend(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, - struct dynbuf *r, Curl_HttpReq httpreq); +CURLcode Curl_http_req_set_reader(struct Curl_easy *data, + Curl_HttpReq httpreq, + const char **tep); +CURLcode Curl_http_req_complete(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct dynbuf *r, Curl_HttpReq httpreq); bool Curl_use_http_1_1plus(const struct Curl_easy *data, const struct connectdata *conn); #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_COOKIES @@ -137,19 +119,24 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_cookies(struct Curl_easy *data, #else #define Curl_http_cookies(a,b,c) CURLE_OK #endif -CURLcode Curl_http_resume(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn, - Curl_HttpReq httpreq); CURLcode Curl_http_range(struct Curl_easy *data, Curl_HttpReq httpreq); -CURLcode Curl_http_firstwrite(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn, - bool *done); +CURLcode Curl_http_firstwrite(struct Curl_easy *data); /* protocol-specific functions set up to be called by the main engine */ +CURLcode Curl_http_setup_conn(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct connectdata *conn); CURLcode Curl_http(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done); CURLcode Curl_http_done(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLcode, bool premature); CURLcode Curl_http_connect(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done); +int Curl_http_getsock_do(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, + curl_socket_t *socks); +CURLcode Curl_http_write_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *buf, size_t blen, + bool is_eos); +CURLcode Curl_http_write_resp_hd(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *hd, size_t hdlen, + bool is_eos); /* These functions are in http.c */ CURLcode Curl_http_input_auth(struct Curl_easy *data, bool proxy, @@ -192,43 +179,24 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_auth_act(struct Curl_easy *data); version. This count includes CONNECT response headers. */ #define MAX_HTTP_RESP_HEADER_SIZE (300*1024) +bool Curl_http_exp100_is_selected(struct Curl_easy *data); +void Curl_http_exp100_got100(struct Curl_easy *data); + #endif /* CURL_DISABLE_HTTP */ /**************************************************************************** * HTTP unique setup ***************************************************************************/ struct HTTP { - curl_off_t postsize; /* off_t to handle large file sizes */ - const char *postdata; - struct back { - curl_read_callback fread_func; /* backup storage for fread pointer */ - void *fread_in; /* backup storage for fread_in pointer */ - const char *postdata; - curl_off_t postsize; - struct Curl_easy *data; - } backup; - - enum { - HTTPSEND_NADA, /* init */ - HTTPSEND_REQUEST, /* sending a request */ - HTTPSEND_BODY /* sending body */ - } sending; - -#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_HTTP - void *h2_ctx; /* HTTP/2 implementation context */ - void *h3_ctx; /* HTTP/3 implementation context */ - struct dynbuf send_buffer; /* used if the request couldn't be sent in one - chunk, points to an allocated send_buffer - struct */ -#endif + /* TODO: no longer used, we should remove it from SingleRequest */ + char unused; }; CURLcode Curl_http_size(struct Curl_easy *data); -CURLcode Curl_http_readwrite_headers(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn, - const char *buf, size_t blen, - size_t *pconsumed); +CURLcode Curl_http_write_resp_hds(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *buf, size_t blen, + size_t *pconsumed); /** * Curl_http_output_auth() setups the authentication headers for the diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/http2.c b/vendor/curl/lib/http2.c index 973848484a..f0f7b566e2 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/http2.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/http2.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #include #include "urldata.h" #include "bufq.h" +#include "hash.h" #include "http1.h" #include "http2.h" #include "http.h" @@ -121,15 +122,17 @@ static ssize_t populate_binsettings(uint8_t *binsettings, struct cf_h2_ctx { nghttp2_session *h2; - uint32_t max_concurrent_streams; /* The easy handle used in the current filter call, cleared at return */ struct cf_call_data call_data; struct bufq inbufq; /* network input */ struct bufq outbufq; /* network output */ struct bufc_pool stream_bufcp; /* spares for stream buffers */ + struct dynbuf scratch; /* scratch buffer for temp use */ + struct Curl_hash streams; /* hash of `data->id` to `h2_stream_ctx` */ size_t drain_total; /* sum of all stream's UrlState drain */ + uint32_t max_concurrent_streams; int32_t goaway_error; int32_t last_stream_id; BIT(conn_closed); @@ -153,6 +156,9 @@ static void cf_h2_ctx_clear(struct cf_h2_ctx *ctx) Curl_bufq_free(&ctx->inbufq); Curl_bufq_free(&ctx->outbufq); Curl_bufcp_free(&ctx->stream_bufcp); + Curl_dyn_free(&ctx->scratch); + Curl_hash_clean(&ctx->streams); + Curl_hash_destroy(&ctx->streams); memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); ctx->call_data = save; } @@ -169,11 +175,9 @@ static CURLcode h2_progress_egress(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data); /** - * All about the H3 internals of a stream + * All about the H2 internals of a stream */ -struct stream_ctx { - /*********** for HTTP/2 we store stream-local data here *************/ - int32_t id; /* HTTP/2 protocol identifier for stream */ +struct h2_stream_ctx { struct bufq recvbuf; /* response buffer */ struct bufq sendbuf; /* request buffer */ struct h1_req_parser h1; /* parsing the request */ @@ -181,6 +185,7 @@ struct stream_ctx { size_t resp_hds_len; /* amount of response header bytes in recvbuf */ size_t upload_blocked_len; curl_off_t upload_left; /* number of request bytes left to upload */ + curl_off_t nrcvd_data; /* number of DATA bytes received */ char **push_headers; /* allocated array */ size_t push_headers_used; /* number of entries filled in */ @@ -188,29 +193,77 @@ struct stream_ctx { int status_code; /* HTTP response status code */ uint32_t error; /* stream error code */ + CURLcode xfer_result; /* Result of writing out response */ uint32_t local_window_size; /* the local recv window size */ - bool resp_hds_complete; /* we have a complete, final response */ - bool closed; /* TRUE on stream close */ - bool reset; /* TRUE on stream reset */ - bool close_handled; /* TRUE if stream closure is handled by libcurl */ - bool bodystarted; - bool send_closed; /* transfer is done sending, we might have still - buffered data in stream->sendbuf to upload. */ + int32_t id; /* HTTP/2 protocol identifier for stream */ + BIT(resp_hds_complete); /* we have a complete, final response */ + BIT(closed); /* TRUE on stream close */ + BIT(reset); /* TRUE on stream reset */ + BIT(close_handled); /* TRUE if stream closure is handled by libcurl */ + BIT(bodystarted); + BIT(send_closed); /* transfer is done sending, we might have still + buffered data in stream->sendbuf to upload. */ }; -#define H2_STREAM_CTX(d) ((struct stream_ctx *)(((d) && (d)->req.p.http)? \ - ((struct HTTP *)(d)->req.p.http)->h2_ctx \ - : NULL)) -#define H2_STREAM_LCTX(d) ((struct HTTP *)(d)->req.p.http)->h2_ctx -#define H2_STREAM_ID(d) (H2_STREAM_CTX(d)? \ - H2_STREAM_CTX(d)->id : -2) +#define H2_STREAM_CTX(ctx,data) ((struct h2_stream_ctx *)(\ + data? Curl_hash_offt_get(&(ctx)->streams, (data)->id) : NULL)) + +static struct h2_stream_ctx *h2_stream_ctx_create(struct cf_h2_ctx *ctx) +{ + struct h2_stream_ctx *stream; + + (void)ctx; + stream = calloc(1, sizeof(*stream)); + if(!stream) + return NULL; + + stream->id = -1; + Curl_bufq_initp(&stream->sendbuf, &ctx->stream_bufcp, + H2_STREAM_SEND_CHUNKS, BUFQ_OPT_NONE); + Curl_h1_req_parse_init(&stream->h1, H1_PARSE_DEFAULT_MAX_LINE_LEN); + Curl_dynhds_init(&stream->resp_trailers, 0, DYN_HTTP_REQUEST); + stream->resp_hds_len = 0; + stream->bodystarted = FALSE; + stream->status_code = -1; + stream->closed = FALSE; + stream->close_handled = FALSE; + stream->error = NGHTTP2_NO_ERROR; + stream->local_window_size = H2_STREAM_WINDOW_SIZE; + stream->upload_left = 0; + stream->nrcvd_data = 0; + return stream; +} + +static void free_push_headers(struct h2_stream_ctx *stream) +{ + size_t i; + for(i = 0; ipush_headers_used; i++) + free(stream->push_headers[i]); + Curl_safefree(stream->push_headers); + stream->push_headers_used = 0; +} + +static void h2_stream_ctx_free(struct h2_stream_ctx *stream) +{ + Curl_bufq_free(&stream->sendbuf); + Curl_h1_req_parse_free(&stream->h1); + Curl_dynhds_free(&stream->resp_trailers); + free_push_headers(stream); + free(stream); +} + +static void h2_stream_hash_free(void *stream) +{ + DEBUGASSERT(stream); + h2_stream_ctx_free((struct h2_stream_ctx *)stream); +} /* * Mark this transfer to get "drained". */ static void drain_stream(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, - struct stream_ctx *stream) + struct h2_stream_ctx *stream) { unsigned char bits; @@ -219,20 +272,20 @@ static void drain_stream(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(!stream->send_closed && (stream->upload_left || stream->upload_blocked_len)) bits |= CURL_CSELECT_OUT; - if(data->state.dselect_bits != bits) { - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%d] DRAIN dselect_bits=%x", + if(data->state.select_bits != bits) { + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%d] DRAIN select_bits=%x", stream->id, bits); - data->state.dselect_bits = bits; + data->state.select_bits = bits; Curl_expire(data, 0, EXPIRE_RUN_NOW); } } static CURLcode http2_data_setup(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, - struct stream_ctx **pstream) + struct h2_stream_ctx **pstream) { struct cf_h2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct stream_ctx *stream; + struct h2_stream_ctx *stream; (void)cf; DEBUGASSERT(data); @@ -240,95 +293,56 @@ static CURLcode http2_data_setup(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, failf(data, "initialization failure, transfer not http initialized"); return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; } - stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(data); + stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); if(stream) { *pstream = stream; return CURLE_OK; } - stream = calloc(1, sizeof(*stream)); + stream = h2_stream_ctx_create(ctx); if(!stream) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - stream->id = -1; - Curl_bufq_initp(&stream->sendbuf, &ctx->stream_bufcp, - H2_STREAM_SEND_CHUNKS, BUFQ_OPT_NONE); - Curl_bufq_initp(&stream->recvbuf, &ctx->stream_bufcp, - H2_STREAM_RECV_CHUNKS, BUFQ_OPT_SOFT_LIMIT); - Curl_h1_req_parse_init(&stream->h1, H1_PARSE_DEFAULT_MAX_LINE_LEN); - Curl_dynhds_init(&stream->resp_trailers, 0, DYN_HTTP_REQUEST); - stream->resp_hds_len = 0; - stream->bodystarted = FALSE; - stream->status_code = -1; - stream->closed = FALSE; - stream->close_handled = FALSE; - stream->error = NGHTTP2_NO_ERROR; - stream->local_window_size = H2_STREAM_WINDOW_SIZE; - stream->upload_left = 0; + if(!Curl_hash_offt_set(&ctx->streams, data->id, stream)) { + h2_stream_ctx_free(stream); + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } - H2_STREAM_LCTX(data) = stream; *pstream = stream; return CURLE_OK; } -static void http2_data_done(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, - struct Curl_easy *data, bool premature) +static void http2_data_done(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) { struct cf_h2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct stream_ctx *stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct h2_stream_ctx *stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); DEBUGASSERT(ctx); - (void)premature; if(!stream) return; if(ctx->h2) { + bool flush_egress = FALSE; + /* returns error if stream not known, which is fine here */ + (void)nghttp2_session_set_stream_user_data(ctx->h2, stream->id, NULL); + if(!stream->closed && stream->id > 0) { /* RST_STREAM */ CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%d] premature DATA_DONE, RST stream", stream->id); - if(!nghttp2_submit_rst_stream(ctx->h2, NGHTTP2_FLAG_NONE, - stream->id, NGHTTP2_STREAM_CLOSED)) - (void)nghttp2_session_send(ctx->h2); - } - if(!Curl_bufq_is_empty(&stream->recvbuf)) { - /* Anything in the recvbuf is still being counted - * in stream and connection window flow control. Need - * to free that space or the connection window might get - * exhausted eventually. */ - nghttp2_session_consume(ctx->h2, stream->id, - Curl_bufq_len(&stream->recvbuf)); - /* give WINDOW_UPATE a chance to be sent, but ignore any error */ - (void)h2_progress_egress(cf, data); - } - - /* -1 means unassigned and 0 means cleared */ - if(nghttp2_session_get_stream_user_data(ctx->h2, stream->id)) { - int rv = nghttp2_session_set_stream_user_data(ctx->h2, - stream->id, 0); - if(rv) { - infof(data, "http/2: failed to clear user_data for stream %u", - stream->id); - DEBUGASSERT(0); - } + stream->closed = TRUE; + stream->reset = TRUE; + stream->send_closed = TRUE; + nghttp2_submit_rst_stream(ctx->h2, NGHTTP2_FLAG_NONE, + stream->id, NGHTTP2_STREAM_CLOSED); + flush_egress = TRUE; } - } - Curl_bufq_free(&stream->sendbuf); - Curl_bufq_free(&stream->recvbuf); - Curl_h1_req_parse_free(&stream->h1); - Curl_dynhds_free(&stream->resp_trailers); - if(stream->push_headers) { - /* if they weren't used and then freed before */ - for(; stream->push_headers_used > 0; --stream->push_headers_used) { - free(stream->push_headers[stream->push_headers_used - 1]); - } - free(stream->push_headers); - stream->push_headers = NULL; + if(flush_egress) + nghttp2_session_send(ctx->h2); } - free(stream); - H2_STREAM_LCTX(data) = NULL; + Curl_hash_offt_remove(&ctx->streams, data->id); } static int h2_client_new(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, @@ -412,7 +426,7 @@ static CURLcode cf_h2_ctx_init(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, bool via_h1_upgrade) { struct cf_h2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct stream_ctx *stream; + struct h2_stream_ctx *stream; CURLcode result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; int rc; nghttp2_session_callbacks *cbs = NULL; @@ -421,6 +435,8 @@ static CURLcode cf_h2_ctx_init(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, Curl_bufcp_init(&ctx->stream_bufcp, H2_CHUNK_SIZE, H2_STREAM_POOL_SPARES); Curl_bufq_initp(&ctx->inbufq, &ctx->stream_bufcp, H2_NW_RECV_CHUNKS, 0); Curl_bufq_initp(&ctx->outbufq, &ctx->stream_bufcp, H2_NW_SEND_CHUNKS, 0); + Curl_dyn_init(&ctx->scratch, CURL_MAX_HTTP_HEADER); + Curl_hash_offt_init(&ctx->streams, 63, h2_stream_hash_free); ctx->last_stream_id = 2147483647; rc = nghttp2_session_callbacks_new(&cbs); @@ -719,6 +735,7 @@ static ssize_t send_callback(nghttp2_session *h2, the struct are hidden from the user. */ struct curl_pushheaders { struct Curl_easy *data; + struct h2_stream_ctx *stream; const nghttp2_push_promise *frame; }; @@ -732,9 +749,8 @@ char *curl_pushheader_bynum(struct curl_pushheaders *h, size_t num) if(!h || !GOOD_EASY_HANDLE(h->data)) return NULL; else { - struct stream_ctx *stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(h->data); - if(stream && num < stream->push_headers_used) - return stream->push_headers[num]; + if(h->stream && num < h->stream->push_headers_used) + return h->stream->push_headers[num]; } return NULL; } @@ -744,7 +760,7 @@ char *curl_pushheader_bynum(struct curl_pushheaders *h, size_t num) */ char *curl_pushheader_byname(struct curl_pushheaders *h, const char *header) { - struct stream_ctx *stream; + struct h2_stream_ctx *stream; size_t len; size_t i; /* Verify that we got a good easy handle in the push header struct, @@ -757,7 +773,7 @@ char *curl_pushheader_byname(struct curl_pushheaders *h, const char *header) !strcmp(header, ":") || strchr(header + 1, ':')) return NULL; - stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(h->data); + stream = h->stream; if(!stream) return NULL; @@ -784,7 +800,7 @@ static struct Curl_easy *h2_duphandle(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, (void)Curl_close(&second); } else { - struct stream_ctx *second_stream; + struct h2_stream_ctx *second_stream; second->req.p.http = http; http2_data_setup(cf, second, &second_stream); @@ -817,7 +833,7 @@ static int set_transfer_url(struct Curl_easy *data, v = curl_pushheader_byname(hp, HTTP_PSEUDO_AUTHORITY); if(v) { - uc = Curl_url_set_authority(u, v, CURLU_DISALLOW_USER); + uc = Curl_url_set_authority(u, v); if(uc) { rc = 2; goto fail; @@ -851,9 +867,8 @@ static int set_transfer_url(struct Curl_easy *data, static void discard_newhandle(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *newhandle) { - if(!newhandle->req.p.http) { - http2_data_done(cf, newhandle, TRUE); - newhandle->req.p.http = NULL; + if(newhandle->req.p.http) { + http2_data_done(cf, newhandle); } (void)Curl_close(&newhandle); } @@ -868,12 +883,11 @@ static int push_promise(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%d] PUSH_PROMISE received", frame->promised_stream_id); if(data->multi->push_cb) { - struct stream_ctx *stream; - struct stream_ctx *newstream; + struct h2_stream_ctx *stream; + struct h2_stream_ctx *newstream; struct curl_pushheaders heads; CURLMcode rc; CURLcode result; - size_t i; /* clone the parent */ struct Curl_easy *newhandle = h2_duphandle(cf, data); if(!newhandle) { @@ -882,12 +896,10 @@ static int push_promise(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, goto fail; } - heads.data = data; - heads.frame = frame; /* ask the application */ CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "Got PUSH_PROMISE, ask application"); - stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(data); + stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); if(!stream) { failf(data, "Internal NULL stream"); discard_newhandle(cf, newhandle); @@ -895,6 +907,10 @@ static int push_promise(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, goto fail; } + heads.data = data; + heads.stream = stream; + heads.frame = frame; + rv = set_transfer_url(newhandle, &heads); if(rv) { discard_newhandle(cf, newhandle); @@ -918,11 +934,7 @@ static int push_promise(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, Curl_set_in_callback(data, false); /* free the headers again */ - for(i = 0; ipush_headers_used; i++) - free(stream->push_headers[i]); - free(stream->push_headers); - stream->push_headers = NULL; - stream->push_headers_used = 0; + free_push_headers(stream); if(rv) { DEBUGASSERT((rv > CURL_PUSH_OK) && (rv <= CURL_PUSH_ERROROUT)); @@ -964,22 +976,39 @@ static int push_promise(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, return rv; } -static CURLcode recvbuf_write_hds(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, +static void h2_xfer_write_resp_hd(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, - const char *buf, size_t blen) + struct h2_stream_ctx *stream, + const char *buf, size_t blen, bool eos) { - struct stream_ctx *stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(data); - ssize_t nwritten; - CURLcode result; - (void)cf; - nwritten = Curl_bufq_write(&stream->recvbuf, - (const unsigned char *)buf, blen, &result); - if(nwritten < 0) - return result; - stream->resp_hds_len += (size_t)nwritten; - DEBUGASSERT((size_t)nwritten == blen); - return CURLE_OK; + /* If we already encountered an error, skip further writes */ + if(!stream->xfer_result) { + stream->xfer_result = Curl_xfer_write_resp_hd(data, buf, blen, eos); + if(stream->xfer_result) + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%d] error %d writing %zu bytes of headers", + stream->id, stream->xfer_result, blen); + } +} + +static void h2_xfer_write_resp(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + struct h2_stream_ctx *stream, + const char *buf, size_t blen, bool eos) +{ + + /* If we already encountered an error, skip further writes */ + if(!stream->xfer_result) + stream->xfer_result = Curl_xfer_write_resp(data, buf, blen, eos); + /* If the transfer write is errored, we do not want any more data */ + if(stream->xfer_result) { + struct cf_h2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%d] error %d writing %zu bytes of data, " + "RST-ing stream", + stream->id, stream->xfer_result, blen); + nghttp2_submit_rst_stream(ctx->h2, 0, stream->id, + NGHTTP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE); + } } static CURLcode on_stream_frame(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, @@ -987,10 +1016,8 @@ static CURLcode on_stream_frame(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, const nghttp2_frame *frame) { struct cf_h2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct stream_ctx *stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct h2_stream_ctx *stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); int32_t stream_id = frame->hd.stream_id; - CURLcode result; - size_t rbuflen; int rv; if(!stream) { @@ -1000,9 +1027,8 @@ static CURLcode on_stream_frame(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, switch(frame->hd.type) { case NGHTTP2_DATA: - rbuflen = Curl_bufq_len(&stream->recvbuf); - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%d] DATA, buffered=%zu, window=%d/%d", - stream_id, rbuflen, + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%d] DATA, window=%d/%d", + stream_id, nghttp2_session_get_stream_effective_recv_data_length( ctx->h2, stream->id), nghttp2_session_get_stream_effective_local_window_size( @@ -1019,20 +1045,6 @@ static CURLcode on_stream_frame(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(frame->hd.flags & NGHTTP2_FLAG_END_STREAM) { drain_stream(cf, data, stream); } - else if(rbuflen > stream->local_window_size) { - int32_t wsize = nghttp2_session_get_stream_local_window_size( - ctx->h2, stream->id); - if(wsize > 0 && (uint32_t)wsize != stream->local_window_size) { - /* H2 flow control is not absolute, as the server might not have the - * same view, yet. When we receive more than we want, we enforce - * the local window size again to make nghttp2 send WINDOW_UPATEs - * accordingly. */ - nghttp2_session_set_local_window_size(ctx->h2, - NGHTTP2_FLAG_NONE, - stream->id, - stream->local_window_size); - } - } break; case NGHTTP2_HEADERS: if(stream->bodystarted) { @@ -1053,9 +1065,7 @@ static CURLcode on_stream_frame(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, stream->status_code = -1; } - result = recvbuf_write_hds(cf, data, STRCONST("\r\n")); - if(result) - return result; + h2_xfer_write_resp_hd(cf, data, stream, STRCONST("\r\n"), stream->closed); if(stream->status_code / 100 != 1) { stream->resp_hds_complete = TRUE; @@ -1234,7 +1244,7 @@ static int on_frame_recv(nghttp2_session *session, const nghttp2_frame *frame, * servers send an explicit WINDOW_UPDATE, but not all seem to do that. * To be safe, we UNHOLD a stream in order not to stall. */ if(CURL_WANT_SEND(data)) { - struct stream_ctx *stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct h2_stream_ctx *stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); if(stream) drain_stream(cf, data, stream); } @@ -1271,10 +1281,9 @@ static int on_data_chunk_recv(nghttp2_session *session, uint8_t flags, const uint8_t *mem, size_t len, void *userp) { struct Curl_cfilter *cf = userp; - struct stream_ctx *stream; + struct cf_h2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct h2_stream_ctx *stream; struct Curl_easy *data_s; - ssize_t nwritten; - CURLcode result; (void)flags; DEBUGASSERT(stream_id); /* should never be a zero stream ID here */ @@ -1293,22 +1302,17 @@ static int on_data_chunk_recv(nghttp2_session *session, uint8_t flags, return 0; } - stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(data_s); + stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data_s); if(!stream) return NGHTTP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; - nwritten = Curl_bufq_write(&stream->recvbuf, mem, len, &result); - if(nwritten < 0) { - if(result != CURLE_AGAIN) - return NGHTTP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; + h2_xfer_write_resp(cf, data_s, stream, (char *)mem, len, FALSE); - nwritten = 0; - } + nghttp2_session_consume(ctx->h2, stream_id, len); + stream->nrcvd_data += (curl_off_t)len; /* if we receive data for another handle, wake that up */ drain_stream(cf, data_s, stream); - - DEBUGASSERT((size_t)nwritten == len); return 0; } @@ -1316,26 +1320,44 @@ static int on_stream_close(nghttp2_session *session, int32_t stream_id, uint32_t error_code, void *userp) { struct Curl_cfilter *cf = userp; - struct Curl_easy *data_s; - struct stream_ctx *stream; + struct cf_h2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct Curl_easy *data_s, *call_data = CF_DATA_CURRENT(cf); + struct h2_stream_ctx *stream; int rv; (void)session; + DEBUGASSERT(call_data); /* get the stream from the hash based on Stream ID, stream ID zero is for connection-oriented stuff */ data_s = stream_id? nghttp2_session_get_stream_user_data(session, stream_id) : NULL; if(!data_s) { + CURL_TRC_CF(call_data, cf, + "[%d] on_stream_close, no easy set on stream", stream_id); return 0; } - stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(data_s); - if(!stream) + if(!GOOD_EASY_HANDLE(data_s)) { + /* nghttp2 still has an easy registered for the stream which has + * been freed be libcurl. This points to a code path that does not + * trigger DONE or DETACH events as it must. */ + CURL_TRC_CF(call_data, cf, + "[%d] on_stream_close, not a GOOD easy on stream", stream_id); + (void)nghttp2_session_set_stream_user_data(session, stream_id, 0); + return NGHTTP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; + } + stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data_s); + if(!stream) { + CURL_TRC_CF(data_s, cf, + "[%d] on_stream_close, GOOD easy but no stream", stream_id); return NGHTTP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; + } stream->closed = TRUE; stream->error = error_code; - if(stream->error) + if(stream->error) { stream->reset = TRUE; + stream->send_closed = TRUE; + } if(stream->error) CURL_TRC_CF(data_s, cf, "[%d] RESET: %s (err %d)", @@ -1358,7 +1380,8 @@ static int on_begin_headers(nghttp2_session *session, const nghttp2_frame *frame, void *userp) { struct Curl_cfilter *cf = userp; - struct stream_ctx *stream; + struct cf_h2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct h2_stream_ctx *stream; struct Curl_easy *data_s = NULL; (void)cf; @@ -1371,7 +1394,7 @@ static int on_begin_headers(nghttp2_session *session, return 0; } - stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(data_s); + stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data_s); if(!stream || !stream->bodystarted) { return 0; } @@ -1387,7 +1410,8 @@ static int on_header(nghttp2_session *session, const nghttp2_frame *frame, void *userp) { struct Curl_cfilter *cf = userp; - struct stream_ctx *stream; + struct cf_h2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct h2_stream_ctx *stream; struct Curl_easy *data_s; int32_t stream_id = frame->hd.stream_id; CURLcode result; @@ -1402,7 +1426,7 @@ static int on_header(nghttp2_session *session, const nghttp2_frame *frame, internal error more than anything else! */ return NGHTTP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; - stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(data_s); + stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data_s); if(!stream) { failf(data_s, "Internal NULL stream"); return NGHTTP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; @@ -1443,7 +1467,7 @@ static int on_header(nghttp2_session *session, const nghttp2_frame *frame, stream->push_headers = malloc(stream->push_headers_alloc * sizeof(char *)); if(!stream->push_headers) - return NGHTTP2_ERR_TEMPORAL_CALLBACK_FAILURE; + return NGHTTP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; stream->push_headers_used = 0; } else if(stream->push_headers_used == @@ -1452,15 +1476,15 @@ static int on_header(nghttp2_session *session, const nghttp2_frame *frame, if(stream->push_headers_alloc > 1000) { /* this is beyond crazy many headers, bail out */ failf(data_s, "Too many PUSH_PROMISE headers"); - Curl_safefree(stream->push_headers); - return NGHTTP2_ERR_TEMPORAL_CALLBACK_FAILURE; + free_push_headers(stream); + return NGHTTP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; } stream->push_headers_alloc *= 2; - headp = Curl_saferealloc(stream->push_headers, - stream->push_headers_alloc * sizeof(char *)); + headp = realloc(stream->push_headers, + stream->push_headers_alloc * sizeof(char *)); if(!headp) { - stream->push_headers = NULL; - return NGHTTP2_ERR_TEMPORAL_CALLBACK_FAILURE; + free_push_headers(stream); + return NGHTTP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; } stream->push_headers = headp; } @@ -1496,14 +1520,15 @@ static int on_header(nghttp2_session *session, const nghttp2_frame *frame, result = Curl_headers_push(data_s, buffer, CURLH_PSEUDO); if(result) return NGHTTP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; - result = recvbuf_write_hds(cf, data_s, STRCONST("HTTP/2 ")); - if(result) - return NGHTTP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; - result = recvbuf_write_hds(cf, data_s, (const char *)value, valuelen); - if(result) - return NGHTTP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; - /* the space character after the status code is mandatory */ - result = recvbuf_write_hds(cf, data_s, STRCONST(" \r\n")); + Curl_dyn_reset(&ctx->scratch); + result = Curl_dyn_addn(&ctx->scratch, STRCONST("HTTP/2 ")); + if(!result) + result = Curl_dyn_addn(&ctx->scratch, value, valuelen); + if(!result) + result = Curl_dyn_addn(&ctx->scratch, STRCONST(" \r\n")); + if(!result) + h2_xfer_write_resp_hd(cf, data_s, stream, Curl_dyn_ptr(&ctx->scratch), + Curl_dyn_len(&ctx->scratch), FALSE); if(result) return NGHTTP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; /* if we receive data for another handle, wake that up */ @@ -1518,16 +1543,17 @@ static int on_header(nghttp2_session *session, const nghttp2_frame *frame, /* nghttp2 guarantees that namelen > 0, and :status was already received, and this is not pseudo-header field . */ /* convert to an HTTP1-style header */ - result = recvbuf_write_hds(cf, data_s, (const char *)name, namelen); - if(result) - return NGHTTP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; - result = recvbuf_write_hds(cf, data_s, STRCONST(": ")); - if(result) - return NGHTTP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; - result = recvbuf_write_hds(cf, data_s, (const char *)value, valuelen); - if(result) - return NGHTTP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; - result = recvbuf_write_hds(cf, data_s, STRCONST("\r\n")); + Curl_dyn_reset(&ctx->scratch); + result = Curl_dyn_addn(&ctx->scratch, (const char *)name, namelen); + if(!result) + result = Curl_dyn_addn(&ctx->scratch, STRCONST(": ")); + if(!result) + result = Curl_dyn_addn(&ctx->scratch, (const char *)value, valuelen); + if(!result) + result = Curl_dyn_addn(&ctx->scratch, STRCONST("\r\n")); + if(!result) + h2_xfer_write_resp_hd(cf, data_s, stream, Curl_dyn_ptr(&ctx->scratch), + Curl_dyn_len(&ctx->scratch), FALSE); if(result) return NGHTTP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; /* if we receive data for another handle, wake that up */ @@ -1548,8 +1574,9 @@ static ssize_t req_body_read_callback(nghttp2_session *session, void *userp) { struct Curl_cfilter *cf = userp; + struct cf_h2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; struct Curl_easy *data_s; - struct stream_ctx *stream = NULL; + struct h2_stream_ctx *stream = NULL; CURLcode result; ssize_t nread; (void)source; @@ -1564,7 +1591,7 @@ static ssize_t req_body_read_callback(nghttp2_session *session, internal error more than anything else! */ return NGHTTP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; - stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(data_s); + stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data_s); if(!stream) return NGHTTP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; } @@ -1651,7 +1678,7 @@ static CURLcode http2_data_done_send(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, { struct cf_h2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; - struct stream_ctx *stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct h2_stream_ctx *stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); if(!ctx || !ctx->h2 || !stream) goto out; @@ -1675,7 +1702,7 @@ static CURLcode http2_data_done_send(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, static ssize_t http2_handle_stream_close(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, - struct stream_ctx *stream, + struct h2_stream_ctx *stream, CURLcode *err) { ssize_t rv = 0; @@ -1689,6 +1716,15 @@ static ssize_t http2_handle_stream_close(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, return -1; } else if(stream->error != NGHTTP2_NO_ERROR) { + if(stream->resp_hds_complete && data->req.no_body) { + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%d] error after response headers, but we did " + "not want a body anyway, ignore: %s (err %u)", + stream->id, nghttp2_http2_strerror(stream->error), + stream->error); + stream->close_handled = TRUE; + *err = CURLE_OK; + goto out; + } failf(data, "HTTP/2 stream %u was not closed cleanly: %s (err %u)", stream->id, nghttp2_http2_strerror(stream->error), stream->error); @@ -1697,7 +1733,7 @@ static ssize_t http2_handle_stream_close(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, } else if(stream->reset) { failf(data, "HTTP/2 stream %u was reset", stream->id); - *err = stream->bodystarted? CURLE_PARTIAL_FILE : CURLE_RECV_ERROR; + *err = data->req.bytecount? CURLE_PARTIAL_FILE : CURLE_HTTP2; return -1; } @@ -1767,11 +1803,12 @@ static int sweight_in_effect(const struct Curl_easy *data) * struct. */ -static void h2_pri_spec(struct Curl_easy *data, +static void h2_pri_spec(struct cf_h2_ctx *ctx, + struct Curl_easy *data, nghttp2_priority_spec *pri_spec) { struct Curl_data_priority *prio = &data->set.priority; - struct stream_ctx *depstream = H2_STREAM_CTX(prio->parent); + struct h2_stream_ctx *depstream = H2_STREAM_CTX(ctx, prio->parent); int32_t depstream_id = depstream? depstream->id:0; nghttp2_priority_spec_init(pri_spec, depstream_id, sweight_wanted(data), @@ -1789,7 +1826,7 @@ static CURLcode h2_progress_egress(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) { struct cf_h2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct stream_ctx *stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct h2_stream_ctx *stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); int rv = 0; if(stream && stream->id > 0 && @@ -1799,7 +1836,7 @@ static CURLcode h2_progress_egress(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, /* send new weight and/or dependency */ nghttp2_priority_spec pri_spec; - h2_pri_spec(data, &pri_spec); + h2_pri_spec(ctx, data, &pri_spec); CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%d] Queuing PRIORITY", stream->id); DEBUGASSERT(stream->id != -1); rv = nghttp2_submit_priority(ctx->h2, NGHTTP2_FLAG_NONE, @@ -1822,40 +1859,31 @@ static CURLcode h2_progress_egress(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, } static ssize_t stream_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, - struct stream_ctx *stream, + struct h2_stream_ctx *stream, char *buf, size_t len, CURLcode *err) { struct cf_h2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; ssize_t nread = -1; + (void)buf; *err = CURLE_AGAIN; - if(!Curl_bufq_is_empty(&stream->recvbuf)) { - nread = Curl_bufq_read(&stream->recvbuf, - (unsigned char *)buf, len, err); - if(nread < 0) - goto out; - DEBUGASSERT(nread > 0); + if(stream->xfer_result) { + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%d] xfer write failed", stream->id); + *err = stream->xfer_result; + nread = -1; } - - if(nread < 0) { - if(stream->closed) { - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%d] returning CLOSE", stream->id); - nread = http2_handle_stream_close(cf, data, stream, err); - } - else if(stream->reset || - (ctx->conn_closed && Curl_bufq_is_empty(&ctx->inbufq)) || - (ctx->goaway && ctx->last_stream_id < stream->id)) { - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%d] returning ERR", stream->id); - *err = stream->bodystarted? CURLE_PARTIAL_FILE : CURLE_RECV_ERROR; - nread = -1; - } + else if(stream->closed) { + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%d] returning CLOSE", stream->id); + nread = http2_handle_stream_close(cf, data, stream, err); } - else if(nread == 0) { - *err = CURLE_AGAIN; + else if(stream->reset || + (ctx->conn_closed && Curl_bufq_is_empty(&ctx->inbufq)) || + (ctx->goaway && ctx->last_stream_id < stream->id)) { + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%d] returning ERR", stream->id); + *err = data->req.bytecount? CURLE_PARTIAL_FILE : CURLE_HTTP2; nread = -1; } -out: if(nread < 0 && *err != CURLE_AGAIN) CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%d] stream_recv(len=%zu) -> %zd, %d", stream->id, len, nread, *err); @@ -1863,10 +1891,11 @@ static ssize_t stream_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, } static CURLcode h2_progress_ingress(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, - struct Curl_easy *data) + struct Curl_easy *data, + size_t data_max_bytes) { struct cf_h2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct stream_ctx *stream; + struct h2_stream_ctx *stream; CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; ssize_t nread; @@ -1882,17 +1911,18 @@ static CURLcode h2_progress_ingress(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, * it is time to stop due to connection close or us not processing * all network input */ while(!ctx->conn_closed && Curl_bufq_is_empty(&ctx->inbufq)) { - stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(data); - if(stream && (stream->closed || Curl_bufq_is_full(&stream->recvbuf))) { + stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); + if(stream && (stream->closed || !data_max_bytes)) { /* We would like to abort here and stop processing, so that * the transfer loop can handle the data/close here. However, * this may leave data in underlying buffers that will not * be consumed. */ if(!cf->next || !cf->next->cft->has_data_pending(cf->next, data)) - break; + drain_stream(cf, data, stream); + break; } - nread = Curl_bufq_slurp(&ctx->inbufq, nw_in_reader, cf, &result); + nread = Curl_bufq_sipn(&ctx->inbufq, 0, nw_in_reader, cf, &result); if(nread < 0) { if(result != CURLE_AGAIN) { failf(data, "Failed receiving HTTP2 data: %d(%s)", result, @@ -1907,8 +1937,9 @@ static CURLcode h2_progress_ingress(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, break; } else { - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[0] ingress: read %zd bytes", - nread); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[0] ingress: read %zd bytes", nread); + data_max_bytes = (data_max_bytes > (size_t)nread)? + (data_max_bytes - (size_t)nread) : 0; } if(h2_process_pending_input(cf, data, &result)) @@ -1926,7 +1957,7 @@ static ssize_t cf_h2_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, char *buf, size_t len, CURLcode *err) { struct cf_h2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct stream_ctx *stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct h2_stream_ctx *stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); ssize_t nread = -1; CURLcode result; struct cf_call_data save; @@ -1950,7 +1981,7 @@ static ssize_t cf_h2_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, goto out; if(nread < 0) { - *err = h2_progress_ingress(cf, data); + *err = h2_progress_ingress(cf, data, len); if(*err) goto out; @@ -1995,9 +2026,8 @@ static ssize_t cf_h2_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, nread = -1; } CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%d] cf_recv(len=%zu) -> %zd %d, " - "buffered=%zu, window=%d/%d, connection %d/%d", + "window=%d/%d, connection %d/%d", stream->id, len, nread, *err, - Curl_bufq_len(&stream->recvbuf), nghttp2_session_get_stream_effective_recv_data_length( ctx->h2, stream->id), nghttp2_session_get_stream_effective_local_window_size( @@ -2009,12 +2039,13 @@ static ssize_t cf_h2_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, return nread; } -static ssize_t h2_submit(struct stream_ctx **pstream, +static ssize_t h2_submit(struct h2_stream_ctx **pstream, struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, - const void *buf, size_t len, CURLcode *err) + const void *buf, size_t len, + size_t *phdslen, CURLcode *err) { struct cf_h2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct stream_ctx *stream = NULL; + struct h2_stream_ctx *stream = NULL; struct dynhds h2_headers; nghttp2_nv *nva = NULL; const void *body = NULL; @@ -2024,6 +2055,7 @@ static ssize_t h2_submit(struct stream_ctx **pstream, nghttp2_priority_spec pri_spec; ssize_t nwritten; + *phdslen = 0; Curl_dynhds_init(&h2_headers, 0, DYN_HTTP_REQUEST); *err = http2_data_setup(cf, data, &stream); @@ -2035,6 +2067,7 @@ static ssize_t h2_submit(struct stream_ctx **pstream, nwritten = Curl_h1_req_parse_read(&stream->h1, buf, len, NULL, 0, err); if(nwritten < 0) goto out; + *phdslen = (size_t)nwritten; if(!stream->h1.done) { /* need more data */ goto out; @@ -2056,7 +2089,7 @@ static ssize_t h2_submit(struct stream_ctx **pstream, goto out; } - h2_pri_spec(data, &pri_spec); + h2_pri_spec(ctx, data, &pri_spec); if(!nghttp2_session_check_request_allowed(ctx->h2)) CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "send request NOT allowed (via nghttp2)"); @@ -2153,10 +2186,11 @@ static ssize_t cf_h2_send(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, const void *buf, size_t len, CURLcode *err) { struct cf_h2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct stream_ctx *stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct h2_stream_ctx *stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); struct cf_call_data save; int rv; ssize_t nwritten; + size_t hdslen = 0; CURLcode result; int blocked = 0, was_blocked = 0; @@ -2220,11 +2254,12 @@ static ssize_t cf_h2_send(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, } } else { - nwritten = h2_submit(&stream, cf, data, buf, len, err); + nwritten = h2_submit(&stream, cf, data, buf, len, &hdslen, err); if(nwritten < 0) { goto out; } DEBUGASSERT(stream); + DEBUGASSERT(hdslen <= (size_t)nwritten); } /* Call the nghttp2 send loop and flush to write ALL buffered data, @@ -2259,18 +2294,26 @@ static ssize_t cf_h2_send(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, * frame buffer or our network out buffer. */ size_t rwin = nghttp2_session_get_stream_remote_window_size(ctx->h2, stream->id); - /* Whatever the cause, we need to return CURL_EAGAIN for this call. - * We have unwritten state that needs us being invoked again and EAGAIN - * is the only way to ensure that. */ - stream->upload_blocked_len = nwritten; + /* At the start of a stream, we are called with request headers + * and, possibly, parts of the body. Later, only body data. + * If we cannot send pure body data, we EAGAIN. If there had been + * header, we return that *they* have been written and remember the + * block on the data length only. */ + stream->upload_blocked_len = ((size_t)nwritten) - hdslen; CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%d] cf_send(len=%zu) BLOCK: win %u/%zu " - "blocked_len=%zu", + "hds_len=%zu blocked_len=%zu", stream->id, len, nghttp2_session_get_remote_window_size(ctx->h2), rwin, - nwritten); - *err = CURLE_AGAIN; - nwritten = -1; - goto out; + hdslen, stream->upload_blocked_len); + if(hdslen) { + *err = CURLE_OK; + nwritten = hdslen; + } + else { + *err = CURLE_AGAIN; + nwritten = -1; + goto out; + } } else if(should_close_session(ctx)) { /* nghttp2 thinks this session is done. If the stream has not been @@ -2315,18 +2358,22 @@ static void cf_h2_adjust_pollset(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct easy_pollset *ps) { struct cf_h2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - bool want_recv = CURL_WANT_RECV(data); - bool want_send = CURL_WANT_SEND(data); + curl_socket_t sock; + bool want_recv, want_send; + + if(!ctx->h2) + return; - if(ctx->h2 && (want_recv || want_send)) { - struct stream_ctx *stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(data); - curl_socket_t sock = Curl_conn_cf_get_socket(cf, data); + sock = Curl_conn_cf_get_socket(cf, data); + Curl_pollset_check(data, ps, sock, &want_recv, &want_send); + if(want_recv || want_send) { + struct h2_stream_ctx *stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); struct cf_call_data save; bool c_exhaust, s_exhaust; CF_DATA_SAVE(save, cf, data); - c_exhaust = !nghttp2_session_get_remote_window_size(ctx->h2); - s_exhaust = stream && stream->id >= 0 && + c_exhaust = want_send && !nghttp2_session_get_remote_window_size(ctx->h2); + s_exhaust = want_send && stream && stream->id >= 0 && !nghttp2_session_get_stream_remote_window_size(ctx->h2, stream->id); want_recv = (want_recv || c_exhaust || s_exhaust); @@ -2367,7 +2414,7 @@ static CURLcode cf_h2_connect(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, goto out; } - result = h2_progress_ingress(cf, data); + result = h2_progress_ingress(cf, data, H2_CHUNK_SIZE); if(result) goto out; @@ -2421,7 +2468,7 @@ static CURLcode http2_data_pause(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, { #ifdef NGHTTP2_HAS_SET_LOCAL_WINDOW_SIZE struct cf_h2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct stream_ctx *stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct h2_stream_ctx *stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); DEBUGASSERT(data); if(ctx && ctx->h2 && stream) { @@ -2490,10 +2537,10 @@ static CURLcode cf_h2_cntrl(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, result = http2_data_done_send(cf, data); break; case CF_CTRL_DATA_DETACH: - http2_data_done(cf, data, TRUE); + http2_data_done(cf, data); break; case CF_CTRL_DATA_DONE: - http2_data_done(cf, data, arg1 != 0); + http2_data_done(cf, data); break; default: break; @@ -2506,11 +2553,10 @@ static bool cf_h2_data_pending(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, const struct Curl_easy *data) { struct cf_h2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct stream_ctx *stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct h2_stream_ctx *stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); if(ctx && (!Curl_bufq_is_empty(&ctx->inbufq) - || (stream && !Curl_bufq_is_empty(&stream->sendbuf)) - || (stream && !Curl_bufq_is_empty(&stream->recvbuf)))) + || (stream && !Curl_bufq_is_empty(&stream->sendbuf)))) return TRUE; return cf->next? cf->next->cft->has_data_pending(cf->next, data) : FALSE; } @@ -2566,6 +2612,11 @@ static CURLcode cf_h2_query(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, *pres1 = (effective_max > INT_MAX)? INT_MAX : (int)effective_max; CF_DATA_RESTORE(cf, save); return CURLE_OK; + case CF_QUERY_STREAM_ERROR: { + struct h2_stream_ctx *stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); + *pres1 = stream? (int)stream->error : 0; + return CURLE_OK; + } default: break; } @@ -2595,7 +2646,8 @@ struct Curl_cftype Curl_cft_nghttp2 = { static CURLcode http2_cfilter_add(struct Curl_cfilter **pcf, struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, - int sockindex) + int sockindex, + bool via_h1_upgrade) { struct Curl_cfilter *cf = NULL; struct cf_h2_ctx *ctx; @@ -2610,8 +2662,9 @@ static CURLcode http2_cfilter_add(struct Curl_cfilter **pcf, if(result) goto out; + ctx = NULL; Curl_conn_cf_add(data, conn, sockindex, cf); - result = CURLE_OK; + result = cf_h2_ctx_init(cf, data, via_h1_upgrade); out: if(result) @@ -2621,7 +2674,8 @@ static CURLcode http2_cfilter_add(struct Curl_cfilter **pcf, } static CURLcode http2_cfilter_insert_after(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, - struct Curl_easy *data) + struct Curl_easy *data, + bool via_h1_upgrade) { struct Curl_cfilter *cf_h2 = NULL; struct cf_h2_ctx *ctx; @@ -2636,8 +2690,9 @@ static CURLcode http2_cfilter_insert_after(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(result) goto out; + ctx = NULL; Curl_conn_cf_insert_after(cf, cf_h2); - result = CURLE_OK; + result = cf_h2_ctx_init(cf_h2, data, via_h1_upgrade); out: if(result) @@ -2694,11 +2749,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_http2_switch(struct Curl_easy *data, DEBUGASSERT(!Curl_conn_is_http2(data, conn, sockindex)); DEBUGF(infof(data, "switching to HTTP/2")); - result = http2_cfilter_add(&cf, data, conn, sockindex); - if(result) - return result; - - result = cf_h2_ctx_init(cf, data, FALSE); + result = http2_cfilter_add(&cf, data, conn, sockindex, FALSE); if(result) return result; @@ -2721,15 +2772,11 @@ CURLcode Curl_http2_switch_at(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) DEBUGASSERT(!Curl_cf_is_http2(cf, data)); - result = http2_cfilter_insert_after(cf, data); + result = http2_cfilter_insert_after(cf, data, FALSE); if(result) return result; cf_h2 = cf->next; - result = cf_h2_ctx_init(cf_h2, data, FALSE); - if(result) - return result; - cf->conn->httpversion = 20; /* we know we're on HTTP/2 now */ cf->conn->bits.multiplex = TRUE; /* at least potentially multiplexed */ cf->conn->bundle->multiuse = BUNDLE_MULTIPLEX; @@ -2754,17 +2801,13 @@ CURLcode Curl_http2_upgrade(struct Curl_easy *data, DEBUGF(infof(data, "upgrading to HTTP/2")); DEBUGASSERT(data->req.upgr101 == UPGR101_RECEIVED); - result = http2_cfilter_add(&cf, data, conn, sockindex); + result = http2_cfilter_add(&cf, data, conn, sockindex, TRUE); if(result) return result; DEBUGASSERT(cf->cft == &Curl_cft_nghttp2); ctx = cf->ctx; - result = cf_h2_ctx_init(cf, data, TRUE); - if(result) - return result; - if(nread > 0) { /* Remaining data from the protocol switch reply is already using * the switched protocol, ie. HTTP/2. We add that to the network @@ -2803,8 +2846,11 @@ CURLcode Curl_http2_upgrade(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLE_HTTP2_STREAM error! */ bool Curl_h2_http_1_1_error(struct Curl_easy *data) { - struct stream_ctx *stream = H2_STREAM_CTX(data); - return (stream && stream->error == NGHTTP2_HTTP_1_1_REQUIRED); + if(Curl_conn_is_http2(data, data->conn, FIRSTSOCKET)) { + int err = Curl_conn_get_stream_error(data, data->conn, FIRSTSOCKET); + return (err == NGHTTP2_HTTP_1_1_REQUIRED); + } + return FALSE; } #else /* !USE_NGHTTP2 */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/http_aws_sigv4.c b/vendor/curl/lib/http_aws_sigv4.c index b673055f30..98cc033a08 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/http_aws_sigv4.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/http_aws_sigv4.c @@ -158,10 +158,7 @@ static CURLcode make_headers(struct Curl_easy *data, msnprintf(date_full_hdr, DATE_FULL_HDR_LEN, "x-%s-date:%s", provider1, timestamp); - if(Curl_checkheaders(data, STRCONST("Host"))) { - head = NULL; - } - else { + if(!Curl_checkheaders(data, STRCONST("Host"))) { char full_host[FULL_HOST_LEN + 1]; if(data->state.aptr.host) { @@ -247,7 +244,7 @@ static CURLcode make_headers(struct Curl_easy *data, } else { char *value; - + char *endp; value = strchr(*date_header, ':'); if(!value) { *date_header = NULL; @@ -256,8 +253,17 @@ static CURLcode make_headers(struct Curl_easy *data, ++value; while(ISBLANK(*value)) ++value; - strncpy(timestamp, value, TIMESTAMP_SIZE - 1); - timestamp[TIMESTAMP_SIZE - 1] = 0; + endp = value; + while(*endp && ISALNUM(*endp)) + ++endp; + /* 16 bytes => "19700101T000000Z" */ + if((endp - value) == TIMESTAMP_SIZE - 1) { + memcpy(timestamp, value, TIMESTAMP_SIZE - 1); + timestamp[TIMESTAMP_SIZE - 1] = 0; + } + else + /* bad timestamp length */ + timestamp[0] = 0; *date_header = NULL; } @@ -605,7 +611,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_output_aws_sigv4(struct Curl_easy *data, bool proxy) result = CURLE_URL_MALFORMAT; goto fail; } - strncpy(service, hostname, len); + memcpy(service, hostname, len); service[len] = '\0'; infof(data, "aws_sigv4: picked service %s from host", service); @@ -624,7 +630,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_output_aws_sigv4(struct Curl_easy *data, bool proxy) result = CURLE_URL_MALFORMAT; goto fail; } - strncpy(region, reg, len); + memcpy(region, reg, len); region[len] = '\0'; infof(data, "aws_sigv4: picked region %s from host", region); } diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/http_chunks.c b/vendor/curl/lib/http_chunks.c index acdb108634..48e7e462ba 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/http_chunks.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/http_chunks.c @@ -27,10 +27,13 @@ #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_HTTP #include "urldata.h" /* it includes http_chunks.h */ +#include "curl_printf.h" +#include "curl_trc.h" #include "sendf.h" /* for the client write stuff */ #include "dynbuf.h" #include "content_encoding.h" #include "http.h" +#include "multiif.h" #include "strtoofft.h" #include "warnless.h" @@ -75,47 +78,67 @@ */ -void Curl_httpchunk_init(struct Curl_easy *data) +void Curl_httpchunk_init(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_chunker *ch, + bool ignore_body) { - struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; - struct Curl_chunker *chunk = &conn->chunk; - chunk->hexindex = 0; /* start at 0 */ - chunk->state = CHUNK_HEX; /* we get hex first! */ - Curl_dyn_init(&conn->trailer, DYN_H1_TRAILER); + (void)data; + ch->hexindex = 0; /* start at 0 */ + ch->state = CHUNK_HEX; /* we get hex first! */ + ch->last_code = CHUNKE_OK; + Curl_dyn_init(&ch->trailer, DYN_H1_TRAILER); + ch->ignore_body = ignore_body; } -/* - * chunk_read() returns a OK for normal operations, or a positive return code - * for errors. STOP means this sequence of chunks is complete. The 'wrote' - * argument is set to tell the caller how many bytes we actually passed to the - * client (for byte-counting and whatever). - * - * The states and the state-machine is further explained in the header file. - * - * This function always uses ASCII hex values to accommodate non-ASCII hosts. - * For example, 0x0d and 0x0a are used instead of '\r' and '\n'. - */ -CHUNKcode Curl_httpchunk_read(struct Curl_easy *data, - char *buf, - size_t blen, - size_t *pconsumed, - CURLcode *extrap) +void Curl_httpchunk_reset(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_chunker *ch, + bool ignore_body) +{ + (void)data; + ch->hexindex = 0; /* start at 0 */ + ch->state = CHUNK_HEX; /* we get hex first! */ + ch->last_code = CHUNKE_OK; + Curl_dyn_reset(&ch->trailer); + ch->ignore_body = ignore_body; +} + +void Curl_httpchunk_free(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_chunker *ch) +{ + (void)data; + Curl_dyn_free(&ch->trailer); +} + +bool Curl_httpchunk_is_done(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_chunker *ch) +{ + (void)data; + return ch->state == CHUNK_DONE; +} + +static CURLcode httpchunk_readwrite(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_chunker *ch, + struct Curl_cwriter *cw_next, + const char *buf, size_t blen, + size_t *pconsumed) { CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; - struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; - struct Curl_chunker *ch = &conn->chunk; - struct SingleRequest *k = &data->req; size_t piece; *pconsumed = 0; /* nothing's written yet */ + /* first check terminal states that will not progress anywhere */ + if(ch->state == CHUNK_DONE) + return CURLE_OK; + if(ch->state == CHUNK_FAILED) + return CURLE_RECV_ERROR; /* the original data is written to the client, but we go on with the chunk read process, to properly calculate the content length */ - if(data->set.http_te_skip && !k->ignorebody) { - result = Curl_client_write(data, CLIENTWRITE_BODY, buf, blen); + if(data->set.http_te_skip && !ch->ignore_body) { + if(cw_next) + result = Curl_cwriter_write(data, cw_next, CLIENTWRITE_BODY, buf, blen); + else + result = Curl_client_write(data, CLIENTWRITE_BODY, (char *)buf, blen); if(result) { - *extrap = result; - return CHUNKE_PASSTHRU_ERROR; + ch->state = CHUNK_FAILED; + ch->last_code = CHUNKE_PASSTHRU_ERROR; + return result; } } @@ -123,28 +146,35 @@ CHUNKcode Curl_httpchunk_read(struct Curl_easy *data, switch(ch->state) { case CHUNK_HEX: if(ISXDIGIT(*buf)) { - if(ch->hexindex < CHUNK_MAXNUM_LEN) { - ch->hexbuffer[ch->hexindex] = *buf; - buf++; - blen--; - ch->hexindex++; - } - else { - return CHUNKE_TOO_LONG_HEX; /* longer hex than we support */ + if(ch->hexindex >= CHUNK_MAXNUM_LEN) { + failf(data, "chunk hex-length longer than %d", CHUNK_MAXNUM_LEN); + ch->state = CHUNK_FAILED; + ch->last_code = CHUNKE_TOO_LONG_HEX; /* longer than we support */ + return CURLE_RECV_ERROR; } + ch->hexbuffer[ch->hexindex++] = *buf; + buf++; + blen--; + (*pconsumed)++; } else { - char *endptr; - if(0 == ch->hexindex) + if(0 == ch->hexindex) { /* This is illegal data, we received junk where we expected a hexadecimal digit. */ - return CHUNKE_ILLEGAL_HEX; + failf(data, "chunk hex-length char not a hex digit: 0x%x", *buf); + ch->state = CHUNK_FAILED; + ch->last_code = CHUNKE_ILLEGAL_HEX; + return CURLE_RECV_ERROR; + } /* blen and buf are unmodified */ ch->hexbuffer[ch->hexindex] = 0; - - if(curlx_strtoofft(ch->hexbuffer, &endptr, 16, &ch->datasize)) - return CHUNKE_ILLEGAL_HEX; + if(curlx_strtoofft(ch->hexbuffer, NULL, 16, &ch->datasize)) { + failf(data, "chunk hex-length not valid: '%s'", ch->hexbuffer); + ch->state = CHUNK_FAILED; + ch->last_code = CHUNKE_ILLEGAL_HEX; + return CURLE_RECV_ERROR; + } ch->state = CHUNK_LF; /* now wait for the CRLF */ } break; @@ -156,12 +186,16 @@ CHUNKcode Curl_httpchunk_read(struct Curl_easy *data, if(0 == ch->datasize) { ch->state = CHUNK_TRAILER; /* now check for trailers */ } - else + else { ch->state = CHUNK_DATA; + CURL_TRC_WRITE(data, "http_chunked, chunk start of %" + CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T " bytes", ch->datasize); + } } buf++; blen--; + (*pconsumed)++; break; case CHUNK_DATA: @@ -173,12 +207,17 @@ CHUNKcode Curl_httpchunk_read(struct Curl_easy *data, piece = curlx_sotouz(ch->datasize); /* Write the data portion available */ - if(!data->set.http_te_skip && !k->ignorebody) { - result = Curl_client_write(data, CLIENTWRITE_BODY, buf, piece); - + if(!data->set.http_te_skip && !ch->ignore_body) { + if(cw_next) + result = Curl_cwriter_write(data, cw_next, CLIENTWRITE_BODY, + buf, piece); + else + result = Curl_client_write(data, CLIENTWRITE_BODY, + (char *)buf, piece); if(result) { - *extrap = result; - return CHUNKE_PASSTHRU_ERROR; + ch->state = CHUNK_FAILED; + ch->last_code = CHUNKE_PASSTHRU_ERROR; + return result; } } @@ -186,6 +225,9 @@ CHUNKcode Curl_httpchunk_read(struct Curl_easy *data, ch->datasize -= piece; /* decrease amount left to expect */ buf += piece; /* move read pointer forward */ blen -= piece; /* decrease space left in this round */ + CURL_TRC_WRITE(data, "http_chunked, write %zu body bytes, %" + CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T " bytes in chunk remain", + piece, ch->datasize); if(0 == ch->datasize) /* end of data this round, we now expect a trailing CRLF */ @@ -195,38 +237,52 @@ CHUNKcode Curl_httpchunk_read(struct Curl_easy *data, case CHUNK_POSTLF: if(*buf == 0x0a) { /* The last one before we go back to hex state and start all over. */ - Curl_httpchunk_init(data); /* sets state back to CHUNK_HEX */ + Curl_httpchunk_reset(data, ch, ch->ignore_body); + } + else if(*buf != 0x0d) { + ch->state = CHUNK_FAILED; + ch->last_code = CHUNKE_BAD_CHUNK; + return CURLE_RECV_ERROR; } - else if(*buf != 0x0d) - return CHUNKE_BAD_CHUNK; buf++; blen--; + (*pconsumed)++; break; case CHUNK_TRAILER: if((*buf == 0x0d) || (*buf == 0x0a)) { - char *tr = Curl_dyn_ptr(&conn->trailer); + char *tr = Curl_dyn_ptr(&ch->trailer); /* this is the end of a trailer, but if the trailer was zero bytes there was no trailer and we move on */ if(tr) { size_t trlen; - result = Curl_dyn_addn(&conn->trailer, (char *)STRCONST("\x0d\x0a")); - if(result) - return CHUNKE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - - tr = Curl_dyn_ptr(&conn->trailer); - trlen = Curl_dyn_len(&conn->trailer); + result = Curl_dyn_addn(&ch->trailer, (char *)STRCONST("\x0d\x0a")); + if(result) { + ch->state = CHUNK_FAILED; + ch->last_code = CHUNKE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + return result; + } + tr = Curl_dyn_ptr(&ch->trailer); + trlen = Curl_dyn_len(&ch->trailer); if(!data->set.http_te_skip) { - result = Curl_client_write(data, - CLIENTWRITE_HEADER|CLIENTWRITE_TRAILER, - tr, trlen); + if(cw_next) + result = Curl_cwriter_write(data, cw_next, + CLIENTWRITE_HEADER| + CLIENTWRITE_TRAILER, + tr, trlen); + else + result = Curl_client_write(data, + CLIENTWRITE_HEADER| + CLIENTWRITE_TRAILER, + tr, trlen); if(result) { - *extrap = result; - return CHUNKE_PASSTHRU_ERROR; + ch->state = CHUNK_FAILED; + ch->last_code = CHUNKE_PASSTHRU_ERROR; + return result; } } - Curl_dyn_reset(&conn->trailer); + Curl_dyn_reset(&ch->trailer); ch->state = CHUNK_TRAILER_CR; if(*buf == 0x0a) /* already on the LF */ @@ -239,12 +295,16 @@ CHUNKcode Curl_httpchunk_read(struct Curl_easy *data, } } else { - result = Curl_dyn_addn(&conn->trailer, buf, 1); - if(result) - return CHUNKE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + result = Curl_dyn_addn(&ch->trailer, buf, 1); + if(result) { + ch->state = CHUNK_FAILED; + ch->last_code = CHUNKE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + return result; + } } buf++; blen--; + (*pconsumed)++; break; case CHUNK_TRAILER_CR: @@ -252,9 +312,13 @@ CHUNKcode Curl_httpchunk_read(struct Curl_easy *data, ch->state = CHUNK_TRAILER_POSTCR; buf++; blen--; + (*pconsumed)++; + } + else { + ch->state = CHUNK_FAILED; + ch->last_code = CHUNKE_BAD_CHUNK; + return CURLE_RECV_ERROR; } - else - return CHUNKE_BAD_CHUNK; break; case CHUNK_TRAILER_POSTCR: @@ -269,6 +333,7 @@ CHUNKcode Curl_httpchunk_read(struct Curl_easy *data, /* skip if CR */ buf++; blen--; + (*pconsumed)++; } /* now wait for the final LF */ ch->state = CHUNK_STOP; @@ -277,21 +342,33 @@ CHUNKcode Curl_httpchunk_read(struct Curl_easy *data, case CHUNK_STOP: if(*buf == 0x0a) { blen--; - + (*pconsumed)++; /* Record the length of any data left in the end of the buffer even if there's no more chunks to read */ ch->datasize = blen; - - return CHUNKE_STOP; /* return stop */ + ch->state = CHUNK_DONE; + CURL_TRC_WRITE(data, "http_chunk, response complete"); + return CURLE_OK; } - else - return CHUNKE_BAD_CHUNK; + else { + ch->state = CHUNK_FAILED; + ch->last_code = CHUNKE_BAD_CHUNK; + CURL_TRC_WRITE(data, "http_chunk error, expected 0x0a, seeing 0x%ux", + (unsigned int)*buf); + return CURLE_RECV_ERROR; + } + case CHUNK_DONE: + return CURLE_OK; + + case CHUNK_FAILED: + return CURLE_RECV_ERROR; } + } - return CHUNKE_OK; + return CURLE_OK; } -const char *Curl_chunked_strerror(CHUNKcode code) +static const char *Curl_chunked_strerror(CHUNKcode code) { switch(code) { default: @@ -303,8 +380,7 @@ const char *Curl_chunked_strerror(CHUNKcode code) case CHUNKE_BAD_CHUNK: return "Malformed encoding found"; case CHUNKE_PASSTHRU_ERROR: - DEBUGASSERT(0); /* never used */ - return ""; + return "Error writing data to client"; case CHUNKE_BAD_ENCODING: return "Bad content-encoding found"; case CHUNKE_OUT_OF_MEMORY: @@ -312,4 +388,294 @@ const char *Curl_chunked_strerror(CHUNKcode code) } } +CURLcode Curl_httpchunk_read(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_chunker *ch, + char *buf, size_t blen, + size_t *pconsumed) +{ + return httpchunk_readwrite(data, ch, NULL, buf, blen, pconsumed); +} + +struct chunked_writer { + struct Curl_cwriter super; + struct Curl_chunker ch; +}; + +static CURLcode cw_chunked_init(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_cwriter *writer) +{ + struct chunked_writer *ctx = writer->ctx; + + data->req.chunk = TRUE; /* chunks coming our way. */ + Curl_httpchunk_init(data, &ctx->ch, FALSE); + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static void cw_chunked_close(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_cwriter *writer) +{ + struct chunked_writer *ctx = writer->ctx; + Curl_httpchunk_free(data, &ctx->ch); +} + +static CURLcode cw_chunked_write(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_cwriter *writer, int type, + const char *buf, size_t blen) +{ + struct chunked_writer *ctx = writer->ctx; + CURLcode result; + size_t consumed; + + if(!(type & CLIENTWRITE_BODY)) + return Curl_cwriter_write(data, writer->next, type, buf, blen); + + consumed = 0; + result = httpchunk_readwrite(data, &ctx->ch, writer->next, buf, blen, + &consumed); + + if(result) { + if(CHUNKE_PASSTHRU_ERROR == ctx->ch.last_code) { + failf(data, "Failed reading the chunked-encoded stream"); + } + else { + failf(data, "%s in chunked-encoding", + Curl_chunked_strerror(ctx->ch.last_code)); + } + return result; + } + + blen -= consumed; + if(CHUNK_DONE == ctx->ch.state) { + /* chunks read successfully, download is complete */ + data->req.download_done = TRUE; + if(blen) { + infof(data, "Leftovers after chunking: %zu bytes", blen); + } + } + else if((type & CLIENTWRITE_EOS) && !data->req.no_body) { + failf(data, "transfer closed with outstanding read data remaining"); + return CURLE_PARTIAL_FILE; + } + + return CURLE_OK; +} + +/* HTTP chunked Transfer-Encoding decoder */ +const struct Curl_cwtype Curl_httpchunk_unencoder = { + "chunked", + NULL, + cw_chunked_init, + cw_chunked_write, + cw_chunked_close, + sizeof(struct chunked_writer) +}; + +/* max length of a HTTP chunk that we want to generate */ +#define CURL_CHUNKED_MINLEN (1024) +#define CURL_CHUNKED_MAXLEN (64 * 1024) + +struct chunked_reader { + struct Curl_creader super; + struct bufq chunkbuf; + BIT(read_eos); /* we read an EOS from the next reader */ + BIT(eos); /* we have returned an EOS */ +}; + +static CURLcode cr_chunked_init(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + struct chunked_reader *ctx = reader->ctx; + (void)data; + Curl_bufq_init2(&ctx->chunkbuf, CURL_CHUNKED_MAXLEN, 2, BUFQ_OPT_SOFT_LIMIT); + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static void cr_chunked_close(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + struct chunked_reader *ctx = reader->ctx; + (void)data; + Curl_bufq_free(&ctx->chunkbuf); +} + +static CURLcode add_last_chunk(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + struct chunked_reader *ctx = reader->ctx; + struct curl_slist *trailers = NULL, *tr; + CURLcode result; + size_t n; + int rc; + + if(!data->set.trailer_callback) { + CURL_TRC_READ(data, "http_chunk, added last, empty chunk"); + return Curl_bufq_cwrite(&ctx->chunkbuf, STRCONST("0\r\n\r\n"), &n); + } + + result = Curl_bufq_cwrite(&ctx->chunkbuf, STRCONST("0\r\n"), &n); + if(result) + goto out; + + Curl_set_in_callback(data, true); + rc = data->set.trailer_callback(&trailers, data->set.trailer_data); + Curl_set_in_callback(data, false); + + if(rc != CURL_TRAILERFUNC_OK) { + failf(data, "operation aborted by trailing headers callback"); + result = CURLE_ABORTED_BY_CALLBACK; + goto out; + } + + for(tr = trailers; tr; tr = tr->next) { + /* only add correctly formatted trailers */ + char *ptr = strchr(tr->data, ':'); + if(!ptr || *(ptr + 1) != ' ') { + infof(data, "Malformatted trailing header, skipping trailer"); + continue; + } + + result = Curl_bufq_cwrite(&ctx->chunkbuf, tr->data, + strlen(tr->data), &n); + if(!result) + result = Curl_bufq_cwrite(&ctx->chunkbuf, STRCONST("\r\n"), &n); + if(result) + goto out; + } + + result = Curl_bufq_cwrite(&ctx->chunkbuf, STRCONST("\r\n"), &n); + +out: + curl_slist_free_all(trailers); + CURL_TRC_READ(data, "http_chunk, added last chunk with trailers " + "from client -> %d", result); + return result; +} + +static CURLcode add_chunk(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader, + char *buf, size_t blen) +{ + struct chunked_reader *ctx = reader->ctx; + CURLcode result; + char tmp[CURL_CHUNKED_MINLEN]; + size_t nread; + bool eos; + + DEBUGASSERT(!ctx->read_eos); + blen = CURLMIN(blen, CURL_CHUNKED_MAXLEN); /* respect our buffer pref */ + if(blen < sizeof(tmp)) { + /* small read, make a chunk of decent size */ + buf = tmp; + blen = sizeof(tmp); + } + else { + /* larger read, make a chunk that will fit when read back */ + blen -= (8 + 2 + 2); /* deduct max overhead, 8 hex + 2*crlf */ + } + + result = Curl_creader_read(data, reader->next, buf, blen, &nread, &eos); + if(result) + return result; + if(eos) + ctx->read_eos = TRUE; + + if(nread) { + /* actually got bytes, wrap them into the chunkbuf */ + char hd[11] = ""; + int hdlen; + size_t n; + + hdlen = msnprintf(hd, sizeof(hd), "%zx\r\n", nread); + if(hdlen <= 0) + return CURLE_READ_ERROR; + /* On a soft-limited bufq, we do not need to check that all was written */ + result = Curl_bufq_cwrite(&ctx->chunkbuf, hd, hdlen, &n); + if(!result) + result = Curl_bufq_cwrite(&ctx->chunkbuf, buf, nread, &n); + if(!result) + result = Curl_bufq_cwrite(&ctx->chunkbuf, "\r\n", 2, &n); + CURL_TRC_READ(data, "http_chunk, made chunk of %zu bytes -> %d", + nread, result); + if(result) + return result; + } + + if(ctx->read_eos) + return add_last_chunk(data, reader); + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static CURLcode cr_chunked_read(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader, + char *buf, size_t blen, + size_t *pnread, bool *peos) +{ + struct chunked_reader *ctx = reader->ctx; + CURLcode result = CURLE_READ_ERROR; + + *pnread = 0; + *peos = ctx->eos; + + if(!ctx->eos) { + if(!ctx->read_eos && Curl_bufq_is_empty(&ctx->chunkbuf)) { + /* Still getting data form the next reader, buffer is empty */ + result = add_chunk(data, reader, buf, blen); + if(result) + return result; + } + + if(!Curl_bufq_is_empty(&ctx->chunkbuf)) { + result = Curl_bufq_cread(&ctx->chunkbuf, buf, blen, pnread); + if(!result && ctx->read_eos && Curl_bufq_is_empty(&ctx->chunkbuf)) { + /* no more data, read all, done. */ + ctx->eos = TRUE; + *peos = TRUE; + } + return result; + } + } + /* We may get here, because we are done or because callbacks paused */ + DEBUGASSERT(ctx->eos || !ctx->read_eos); + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static curl_off_t cr_chunked_total_length(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + /* this reader changes length depending on input */ + (void)data; + (void)reader; + return -1; +} + +/* HTTP chunked Transfer-Encoding encoder */ +const struct Curl_crtype Curl_httpchunk_encoder = { + "chunked", + cr_chunked_init, + cr_chunked_read, + cr_chunked_close, + Curl_creader_def_needs_rewind, + cr_chunked_total_length, + Curl_creader_def_resume_from, + Curl_creader_def_rewind, + Curl_creader_def_unpause, + Curl_creader_def_done, + sizeof(struct chunked_reader) +}; + +CURLcode Curl_httpchunk_add_reader(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct Curl_creader *reader = NULL; + CURLcode result; + + result = Curl_creader_create(&reader, data, &Curl_httpchunk_encoder, + CURL_CR_TRANSFER_ENCODE); + if(!result) + result = Curl_creader_add(data, reader); + + if(result && reader) + Curl_creader_free(data, reader); + return result; +} + #endif /* CURL_DISABLE_HTTP */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/http_chunks.h b/vendor/curl/lib/http_chunks.h index 0a36f379b1..d3ecc36c77 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/http_chunks.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/http_chunks.h @@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ * ***************************************************************************/ +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_HTTP + +#include "dynbuf.h" + struct connectdata; /* @@ -67,34 +71,75 @@ typedef enum { signalled If this is an empty trailer CHUNKE_STOP will be signalled. Otherwise the trailer will be broadcasted via Curl_client_write() and the next state will be CHUNK_TRAILER */ - CHUNK_TRAILER_POSTCR + CHUNK_TRAILER_POSTCR, + + /* Successfully de-chunked everything */ + CHUNK_DONE, + + /* Failed on seeing a bad or not correctly terminated chunk */ + CHUNK_FAILED } ChunkyState; typedef enum { - CHUNKE_STOP = -1, CHUNKE_OK = 0, CHUNKE_TOO_LONG_HEX = 1, CHUNKE_ILLEGAL_HEX, CHUNKE_BAD_CHUNK, CHUNKE_BAD_ENCODING, CHUNKE_OUT_OF_MEMORY, - CHUNKE_PASSTHRU_ERROR, /* Curl_httpchunk_read() returns a CURLcode to use */ - CHUNKE_LAST + CHUNKE_PASSTHRU_ERROR /* Curl_httpchunk_read() returns a CURLcode to use */ } CHUNKcode; -const char *Curl_chunked_strerror(CHUNKcode code); - struct Curl_chunker { curl_off_t datasize; ChunkyState state; + CHUNKcode last_code; + struct dynbuf trailer; /* for chunked-encoded trailer */ unsigned char hexindex; - char hexbuffer[ CHUNK_MAXNUM_LEN + 1]; /* +1 for null-terminator */ + char hexbuffer[CHUNK_MAXNUM_LEN + 1]; /* +1 for null-terminator */ + BIT(ignore_body); /* never write response body data */ }; /* The following functions are defined in http_chunks.c */ -void Curl_httpchunk_init(struct Curl_easy *data); -CHUNKcode Curl_httpchunk_read(struct Curl_easy *data, char *buf, - size_t blen, size_t *pconsumed, - CURLcode *passthru); +void Curl_httpchunk_init(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_chunker *ch, + bool ignore_body); +void Curl_httpchunk_free(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_chunker *ch); +void Curl_httpchunk_reset(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_chunker *ch, + bool ignore_body); + +/* + * Read BODY bytes in HTTP/1.1 chunked encoding from `buf` and return + * the amount of bytes consumed. The actual response bytes and trailer + * headers are written out to the client. + * On success, this will consume all bytes up to the end of the response, + * e.g. the last chunk, has been processed. + * @param data the transfer involved + * @param ch the chunker instance keeping state across calls + * @param buf the response data + * @param blen amount of bytes in `buf` + * @param pconsumed on successful return, the number of bytes in `buf` + * consumed + * + * This function always uses ASCII hex values to accommodate non-ASCII hosts. + * For example, 0x0d and 0x0a are used instead of '\r' and '\n'. + */ +CURLcode Curl_httpchunk_read(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_chunker *ch, + char *buf, size_t blen, size_t *pconsumed); + +/** + * @return TRUE iff chunked decoded has finished successfully. + */ +bool Curl_httpchunk_is_done(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_chunker *ch); + +extern const struct Curl_cwtype Curl_httpchunk_unencoder; + +extern const struct Curl_crtype Curl_httpchunk_encoder; + +/** + * Add a transfer-encoding "chunked" reader to the transfers reader stack + */ +CURLcode Curl_httpchunk_add_reader(struct Curl_easy *data); + +#endif /* !CURL_DISABLE_HTTP */ #endif /* HEADER_CURL_HTTP_CHUNKS_H */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/http_negotiate.c b/vendor/curl/lib/http_negotiate.c index 153e3d4ab8..4cbe2df42a 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/http_negotiate.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/http_negotiate.c @@ -120,16 +120,29 @@ CURLcode Curl_input_negotiate(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, CURLcode Curl_output_negotiate(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, bool proxy) { - struct negotiatedata *neg_ctx = proxy ? &conn->proxyneg : - &conn->negotiate; - struct auth *authp = proxy ? &data->state.authproxy : &data->state.authhost; - curlnegotiate *state = proxy ? &conn->proxy_negotiate_state : - &conn->http_negotiate_state; + struct negotiatedata *neg_ctx; + struct auth *authp; + curlnegotiate *state; char *base64 = NULL; size_t len = 0; char *userp; CURLcode result; + if(proxy) { +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY + neg_ctx = &conn->proxyneg; + authp = &data->state.authproxy; + state = &conn->proxy_negotiate_state; +#else + return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN; +#endif + } + else { + neg_ctx = &conn->negotiate; + authp = &data->state.authhost; + state = &conn->http_negotiate_state; + } + authp->done = FALSE; if(*state == GSS_AUTHRECV) { @@ -171,8 +184,10 @@ CURLcode Curl_output_negotiate(struct Curl_easy *data, base64); if(proxy) { +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY Curl_safefree(data->state.aptr.proxyuserpwd); data->state.aptr.proxyuserpwd = userp; +#endif } else { Curl_safefree(data->state.aptr.userpwd); diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/http_ntlm.c b/vendor/curl/lib/http_ntlm.c index b845ddf37f..3dccb5cb78 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/http_ntlm.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/http_ntlm.c @@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ #include "strcase.h" #include "http_ntlm.h" #include "curl_ntlm_core.h" -#include "curl_ntlm_wb.h" #include "curl_base64.h" #include "vauth/vauth.h" #include "url.h" @@ -266,10 +265,6 @@ void Curl_http_auth_cleanup_ntlm(struct connectdata *conn) { Curl_auth_cleanup_ntlm(&conn->ntlm); Curl_auth_cleanup_ntlm(&conn->proxyntlm); - -#if defined(NTLM_WB_ENABLED) - Curl_http_auth_cleanup_ntlm_wb(conn); -#endif } #endif /* !CURL_DISABLE_HTTP && USE_NTLM */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/http_proxy.c b/vendor/curl/lib/http_proxy.c index 8e1832581d..7c035d4b60 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/http_proxy.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/http_proxy.c @@ -131,8 +131,8 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_proxy_create_CONNECT(struct httpreq **preq, goto out; } - if(!Curl_checkProxyheaders(data, cf->conn, STRCONST("User-Agent")) - && data->set.str[STRING_USERAGENT]) { + if(!Curl_checkProxyheaders(data, cf->conn, STRCONST("User-Agent")) && + data->set.str[STRING_USERAGENT] && *data->set.str[STRING_USERAGENT]) { result = Curl_dynhds_cadd(&req->headers, "User-Agent", data->set.str[STRING_USERAGENT]); if(result) @@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static void http_proxy_cf_close(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_cftype Curl_cft_http_proxy = { "HTTP-PROXY", - CF_TYPE_IP_CONNECT, + CF_TYPE_IP_CONNECT|CF_TYPE_PROXY, 0, http_proxy_cf_destroy, http_proxy_cf_connect, diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/idn.c b/vendor/curl/lib/idn.c index 81a177f8cf..c795672544 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/idn.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/idn.c @@ -50,6 +50,63 @@ #include "curl_memory.h" #include "memdebug.h" +/* for macOS and iOS targets */ +#if defined(USE_APPLE_IDN) +#include + +static CURLcode mac_idn_to_ascii(const char *in, char **out) +{ + UErrorCode err = U_ZERO_ERROR; + UIDNA* idna = uidna_openUTS46(UIDNA_CHECK_BIDI, &err); + if(U_FAILURE(err)) { + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + else { + UIDNAInfo info = UIDNA_INFO_INITIALIZER; + char buffer[256] = {0}; + (void)uidna_nameToASCII_UTF8(idna, in, -1, buffer, + sizeof(buffer), &info, &err); + uidna_close(idna); + if(U_FAILURE(err)) { + return CURLE_URL_MALFORMAT; + } + else { + *out = strdup(buffer); + if(*out) + return CURLE_OK; + else + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + } +} + +static CURLcode mac_ascii_to_idn(const char *in, char **out) +{ + UErrorCode err = U_ZERO_ERROR; + UIDNA* idna = uidna_openUTS46(UIDNA_CHECK_BIDI, &err); + if(U_FAILURE(err)) { + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + else { + UIDNAInfo info = UIDNA_INFO_INITIALIZER; + char buffer[256] = {0}; + (void)uidna_nameToUnicodeUTF8(idna, in, -1, buffer, + sizeof(buffer), &info, &err); + uidna_close(idna); + if(U_FAILURE(err)) { + return CURLE_URL_MALFORMAT; + } + else { + *out = strdup(buffer); + if(*out) + return CURLE_OK; + else + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + } +} +#endif + #ifdef USE_WIN32_IDN /* using Windows kernel32 and normaliz libraries. */ @@ -181,6 +238,8 @@ static CURLcode idn_decode(const char *input, char **output) result = CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN; #elif defined(USE_WIN32_IDN) result = win32_idn_to_ascii(input, &decoded); +#elif defined(USE_APPLE_IDN) + result = mac_idn_to_ascii(input, &decoded); #endif if(!result) *output = decoded; @@ -198,6 +257,10 @@ static CURLcode idn_encode(const char *puny, char **output) CURLcode result = win32_ascii_to_idn(puny, &enc); if(result) return result; +#elif defined(USE_APPLE_IDN) + CURLcode result = mac_ascii_to_idn(puny, &enc); + if(result) + return result; #endif *output = enc; return CURLE_OK; @@ -246,11 +309,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_idn_encode(const char *puny, char **output) */ void Curl_free_idnconverted_hostname(struct hostname *host) { - if(host->encalloc) { - /* must be freed with idn2_free() if allocated by libidn */ - Curl_idn_free(host->encalloc); - host->encalloc = NULL; - } + Curl_safefree(host->encalloc); } #endif /* USE_IDN */ @@ -267,20 +326,11 @@ CURLcode Curl_idnconvert_hostname(struct hostname *host) /* Check name for non-ASCII and convert hostname if we can */ if(!Curl_is_ASCII_name(host->name)) { char *decoded; - CURLcode result = idn_decode(host->name, &decoded); - if(!result) { - if(!*decoded) { - /* zero length is a bad host name */ - Curl_idn_free(decoded); - return CURLE_URL_MALFORMAT; - } - /* successful */ - host->encalloc = decoded; - /* change the name pointer to point to the encoded hostname */ - host->name = host->encalloc; - } - else + CURLcode result = Curl_idn_decode(host->name, &decoded); + if(result) return result; + /* successful */ + host->name = host->encalloc = decoded; } #endif return CURLE_OK; diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/idn.h b/vendor/curl/lib/idn.h index 74bbcaf498..2bdce8927f 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/idn.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/idn.h @@ -26,16 +26,11 @@ bool Curl_is_ASCII_name(const char *hostname); CURLcode Curl_idnconvert_hostname(struct hostname *host); -#if defined(USE_LIBIDN2) || defined(USE_WIN32_IDN) +#if defined(USE_LIBIDN2) || defined(USE_WIN32_IDN) || defined(USE_APPLE_IDN) #define USE_IDN void Curl_free_idnconverted_hostname(struct hostname *host); CURLcode Curl_idn_decode(const char *input, char **output); CURLcode Curl_idn_encode(const char *input, char **output); -#ifdef USE_LIBIDN2 -#define Curl_idn_free(x) idn2_free(x) -#else -#define Curl_idn_free(x) free(x) -#endif #else #define Curl_free_idnconverted_hostname(x) diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/if2ip.c b/vendor/curl/lib/if2ip.c index 5249f6cc7e..42e14500bc 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/if2ip.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/if2ip.c @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ /* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */ -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 /* Return the scope of the given address. */ unsigned int Curl_ipv6_scope(const struct sockaddr *sa) { @@ -97,17 +97,17 @@ unsigned int Curl_ipv6_scope(const struct sockaddr *sa) #if defined(HAVE_GETIFADDRS) if2ip_result_t Curl_if2ip(int af, -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 unsigned int remote_scope, unsigned int local_scope_id, #endif const char *interf, - char *buf, int buf_size) + char *buf, size_t buf_size) { struct ifaddrs *iface, *head; if2ip_result_t res = IF2IP_NOT_FOUND; -#if defined(ENABLE_IPV6) && \ +#if defined(USE_IPV6) && \ !defined(HAVE_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID) (void) local_scope_id; #endif @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ if2ip_result_t Curl_if2ip(int af, const char *ip; char scope[12] = ""; char ipstr[64]; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 if(af == AF_INET6) { #ifdef HAVE_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID unsigned int scopeid = 0; @@ -182,12 +182,12 @@ if2ip_result_t Curl_if2ip(int af, #elif defined(HAVE_IOCTL_SIOCGIFADDR) if2ip_result_t Curl_if2ip(int af, -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 unsigned int remote_scope, unsigned int local_scope_id, #endif const char *interf, - char *buf, int buf_size) + char *buf, size_t buf_size) { struct ifreq req; struct in_addr in; @@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ if2ip_result_t Curl_if2ip(int af, size_t len; const char *r; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 (void)remote_scope; (void)local_scope_id; #endif @@ -237,15 +237,15 @@ if2ip_result_t Curl_if2ip(int af, #else if2ip_result_t Curl_if2ip(int af, -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 unsigned int remote_scope, unsigned int local_scope_id, #endif const char *interf, - char *buf, int buf_size) + char *buf, size_t buf_size) { (void) af; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 (void) remote_scope; (void) local_scope_id; #endif diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/if2ip.h b/vendor/curl/lib/if2ip.h index 1f973505c0..f4b2f4c15d 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/if2ip.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/if2ip.h @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ #define IPV6_SCOPE_UNIQUELOCAL 3 /* Unique local */ #define IPV6_SCOPE_NODELOCAL 4 /* Loopback. */ -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 unsigned int Curl_ipv6_scope(const struct sockaddr *sa); #else #define Curl_ipv6_scope(x) 0 @@ -45,12 +45,12 @@ typedef enum { } if2ip_result_t; if2ip_result_t Curl_if2ip(int af, -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 unsigned int remote_scope, unsigned int local_scope_id, #endif const char *interf, - char *buf, int buf_size); + char *buf, size_t buf_size); #ifdef __INTERIX diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/imap.c b/vendor/curl/lib/imap.c index 47cff4897c..f6e98bd81d 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/imap.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/imap.c @@ -97,7 +97,8 @@ static CURLcode imap_doing(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *dophase_done); static CURLcode imap_setup_connection(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn); static char *imap_atom(const char *str, bool escape_only); -static CURLcode imap_sendf(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *fmt, ...); +static CURLcode imap_sendf(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *fmt, ...) + CURL_PRINTF(2, 3); static CURLcode imap_parse_url_options(struct connectdata *conn); static CURLcode imap_parse_url_path(struct Curl_easy *data); static CURLcode imap_parse_custom_request(struct Curl_easy *data); @@ -116,7 +117,7 @@ static CURLcode imap_get_message(struct Curl_easy *data, struct bufref *out); */ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_imap = { - "IMAP", /* scheme */ + "imap", /* scheme */ imap_setup_connection, /* setup_connection */ imap_do, /* do_it */ imap_done, /* done */ @@ -129,7 +130,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_imap = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ imap_disconnect, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_IMAP, /* defport */ @@ -145,7 +147,7 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_imap = { */ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_imaps = { - "IMAPS", /* scheme */ + "imaps", /* scheme */ imap_setup_connection, /* setup_connection */ imap_do, /* do_it */ imap_done, /* done */ @@ -158,7 +160,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_imaps = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ imap_disconnect, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_IMAPS, /* defport */ @@ -354,8 +357,8 @@ static bool imap_endofresp(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, */ static CURLcode imap_get_message(struct Curl_easy *data, struct bufref *out) { - char *message = data->state.buffer; - size_t len = strlen(message); + char *message = Curl_dyn_ptr(&data->conn->proto.imapc.pp.recvbuf); + size_t len = data->conn->proto.imapc.pp.nfinal; if(len > 2) { /* Find the start of the message */ @@ -769,6 +772,7 @@ static CURLcode imap_perform_append(struct Curl_easy *data) return CURLE_URL_MALFORMAT; } +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_MIME /* Prepare the mime data if some. */ if(data->set.mimepost.kind != MIMEKIND_NONE) { /* Use the whole structure as data. */ @@ -784,18 +788,18 @@ static CURLcode imap_perform_append(struct Curl_easy *data) result = Curl_mime_add_header(&data->set.mimepost.curlheaders, "Mime-Version: 1.0"); - /* Make sure we will read the entire mime structure. */ if(!result) - result = Curl_mime_rewind(&data->set.mimepost); - + result = Curl_creader_set_mime(data, &data->set.mimepost); + if(result) + return result; + data->state.infilesize = Curl_creader_client_length(data); + } + else +#endif + { + result = Curl_creader_set_fread(data, data->state.infilesize); if(result) return result; - - data->state.infilesize = Curl_mime_size(&data->set.mimepost); - - /* Read from mime structure. */ - data->state.fread_func = (curl_read_callback) Curl_mime_read; - data->state.in = (void *) &data->set.mimepost; } /* Check we know the size of the upload */ @@ -895,7 +899,7 @@ static CURLcode imap_state_capability_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; struct imap_conn *imapc = &conn->proto.imapc; - const char *line = data->state.buffer; + const char *line = Curl_dyn_ptr(&imapc->pp.recvbuf); (void)instate; /* no use for this yet */ @@ -981,7 +985,7 @@ static CURLcode imap_state_starttls_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, (void)instate; /* no use for this yet */ /* Pipelining in response is forbidden. */ - if(data->conn->proto.imapc.pp.cache_size) + if(data->conn->proto.imapc.pp.overflow) return CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY; if(imapcode != IMAP_RESP_OK) { @@ -1057,17 +1061,13 @@ static CURLcode imap_state_listsearch_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, imapstate instate) { CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; - char *line = data->state.buffer; - size_t len = strlen(line); + char *line = Curl_dyn_ptr(&data->conn->proto.imapc.pp.recvbuf); + size_t len = data->conn->proto.imapc.pp.nfinal; (void)instate; /* No use for this yet */ - if(imapcode == '*') { - /* Temporarily add the LF character back and send as body to the client */ - line[len] = '\n'; - result = Curl_client_write(data, CLIENTWRITE_BODY, line, len + 1); - line[len] = '\0'; - } + if(imapcode == '*') + result = Curl_client_write(data, CLIENTWRITE_BODY, line, len); else if(imapcode != IMAP_RESP_OK) result = CURLE_QUOTE_ERROR; else @@ -1085,7 +1085,7 @@ static CURLcode imap_state_select_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, int imapcode, struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; struct IMAP *imap = data->req.p.imap; struct imap_conn *imapc = &conn->proto.imapc; - const char *line = data->state.buffer; + const char *line = Curl_dyn_ptr(&data->conn->proto.imapc.pp.recvbuf); (void)instate; /* no use for this yet */ @@ -1144,7 +1144,8 @@ static CURLcode imap_state_fetch_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; struct imap_conn *imapc = &conn->proto.imapc; struct pingpong *pp = &imapc->pp; - const char *ptr = data->state.buffer; + const char *ptr = Curl_dyn_ptr(&data->conn->proto.imapc.pp.recvbuf); + size_t len = data->conn->proto.imapc.pp.nfinal; bool parsed = FALSE; curl_off_t size = 0; @@ -1158,16 +1159,12 @@ static CURLcode imap_state_fetch_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, /* Something like this is received "* 1 FETCH (BODY[TEXT] {2021}\r" so parse the continuation data contained within the curly brackets */ - while(*ptr && (*ptr != '{')) - ptr++; - - if(*ptr == '{') { + ptr = memchr(ptr, '{', len); + if(ptr) { char *endptr; - if(!curlx_strtoofft(ptr + 1, &endptr, 10, &size)) { - if(endptr - ptr > 1 && endptr[0] == '}' && - endptr[1] == '\r' && endptr[2] == '\0') - parsed = TRUE; - } + if(!curlx_strtoofft(ptr + 1, &endptr, 10, &size) && + (endptr - ptr > 1 && *endptr == '}')) + parsed = TRUE; } if(parsed) { @@ -1175,11 +1172,15 @@ static CURLcode imap_state_fetch_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, size); Curl_pgrsSetDownloadSize(data, size); - if(pp->cache) { - /* At this point there is a bunch of data in the header "cache" that is - actually body content, send it as body and then skip it. Do note - that there may even be additional "headers" after the body. */ - size_t chunk = pp->cache_size; + if(pp->overflow) { + /* At this point there is a data in the receive buffer that is body + content, send it as body and then skip it. Do note that there may + even be additional "headers" after the body. */ + size_t chunk = pp->overflow; + + /* keep only the overflow */ + Curl_dyn_tail(&pp->recvbuf, chunk); + pp->nfinal = 0; /* done */ if(chunk > (size_t)size) /* The conversion from curl_off_t to size_t is always fine here */ @@ -1190,38 +1191,37 @@ static CURLcode imap_state_fetch_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, imap_state(data, IMAP_STOP); return CURLE_OK; } - result = Curl_client_write(data, CLIENTWRITE_BODY, pp->cache, chunk); + result = Curl_client_write(data, CLIENTWRITE_BODY, + Curl_dyn_ptr(&pp->recvbuf), chunk); if(result) return result; infof(data, "Written %zu bytes, %" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_TU " bytes are left for transfer", chunk, size - chunk); - /* Have we used the entire cache or just part of it?*/ - if(pp->cache_size > chunk) { - /* Only part of it so shrink the cache to fit the trailing data */ - memmove(pp->cache, pp->cache + chunk, pp->cache_size - chunk); - pp->cache_size -= chunk; + /* Have we used the entire overflow or just part of it?*/ + if(pp->overflow > chunk) { + /* remember the remaining trailing overflow data */ + pp->overflow -= chunk; + Curl_dyn_tail(&pp->recvbuf, pp->overflow); } else { + pp->overflow = 0; /* handled */ /* Free the cache */ - Curl_safefree(pp->cache); - - /* Reset the cache size */ - pp->cache_size = 0; + Curl_dyn_reset(&pp->recvbuf); } } if(data->req.bytecount == size) /* The entire data is already transferred! */ - Curl_setup_transfer(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); else { /* IMAP download */ data->req.maxdownload = size; /* force a recv/send check of this connection, as the data might've been read off the socket already */ - data->conn->cselect_bits = CURL_CSELECT_IN; - Curl_setup_transfer(data, FIRSTSOCKET, size, FALSE, -1); + data->state.select_bits = CURL_CSELECT_IN; + Curl_xfer_setup(data, FIRSTSOCKET, size, FALSE, -1); } } else { @@ -1269,7 +1269,7 @@ static CURLcode imap_state_append_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, int imapcode, Curl_pgrsSetUploadSize(data, data->state.infilesize); /* IMAP upload */ - Curl_setup_transfer(data, -1, -1, FALSE, FIRSTSOCKET); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, -1, -1, FALSE, FIRSTSOCKET); /* End of DO phase */ imap_state(data, IMAP_STOP); @@ -1300,7 +1300,6 @@ static CURLcode imap_statemachine(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn) { CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; - curl_socket_t sock = conn->sock[FIRSTSOCKET]; int imapcode; struct imap_conn *imapc = &conn->proto.imapc; struct pingpong *pp = &imapc->pp; @@ -1317,7 +1316,7 @@ static CURLcode imap_statemachine(struct Curl_easy *data, do { /* Read the response from the server */ - result = Curl_pp_readresp(data, sock, pp, &imapcode, &nread); + result = Curl_pp_readresp(data, FIRSTSOCKET, pp, &imapcode, &nread); if(result) return result; @@ -1376,7 +1375,6 @@ static CURLcode imap_statemachine(struct Curl_easy *data, break; case IMAP_LOGOUT: - /* fallthrough, just stop! */ default: /* internal error */ imap_state(data, IMAP_STOP); @@ -1472,9 +1470,7 @@ static CURLcode imap_connect(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) Curl_sasl_init(&imapc->sasl, data, &saslimap); Curl_dyn_init(&imapc->dyn, DYN_IMAP_CMD); - /* Initialise the pingpong layer */ - Curl_pp_setup(pp); - Curl_pp_init(data, pp); + Curl_pp_init(pp); /* Parse the URL options */ result = imap_parse_url_options(conn); @@ -1519,10 +1515,10 @@ static CURLcode imap_done(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLcode status, } else if(!data->set.connect_only && !imap->custom && (imap->uid || imap->mindex || data->state.upload || - data->set.mimepost.kind != MIMEKIND_NONE)) { + IS_MIME_POST(data))) { /* Handle responses after FETCH or APPEND transfer has finished */ - if(!data->state.upload && data->set.mimepost.kind == MIMEKIND_NONE) + if(!data->state.upload && !IS_MIME_POST(data)) imap_state(data, IMAP_FETCH_FINAL); else { /* End the APPEND command first by sending an empty line */ @@ -1588,7 +1584,7 @@ static CURLcode imap_perform(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *connected, selected = TRUE; /* Start the first command in the DO phase */ - if(data->state.upload || data->set.mimepost.kind != MIMEKIND_NONE) + if(data->state.upload || IS_MIME_POST(data)) /* APPEND can be executed directly */ result = imap_perform_append(data); else if(imap->custom && (selected || !imap->mailbox)) @@ -1698,7 +1694,7 @@ static CURLcode imap_dophase_done(struct Curl_easy *data, bool connected) if(imap->transfer != PPTRANSFER_BODY) /* no data to transfer */ - Curl_setup_transfer(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); return CURLE_OK; } @@ -1795,7 +1791,14 @@ static CURLcode imap_sendf(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *fmt, ...) if(!result) { va_list ap; va_start(ap, fmt); +#ifdef __clang__ +#pragma clang diagnostic push +#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wformat-nonliteral" +#endif result = Curl_pp_vsendf(data, &imapc->pp, Curl_dyn_ptr(&imapc->dyn), ap); +#ifdef __clang__ +#pragma clang diagnostic pop +#endif va_end(ap); } return result; diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/inet_ntop.c b/vendor/curl/lib/inet_ntop.c index c9cee0c578..4520b87150 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/inet_ntop.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/inet_ntop.c @@ -42,11 +42,11 @@ #define INT16SZ 2 /* - * If ENABLE_IPV6 is disabled, we still want to parse IPv6 addresses, so make + * If USE_IPV6 is disabled, we still want to parse IPv6 addresses, so make * sure we have _some_ value for AF_INET6 without polluting our fake value * everywhere. */ -#if !defined(ENABLE_IPV6) && !defined(AF_INET6) +#if !defined(USE_IPV6) && !defined(AF_INET6) #define AF_INET6 (AF_INET + 1) #endif diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/inet_pton.c b/vendor/curl/lib/inet_pton.c index 7d3c698795..9cfcec1c9a 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/inet_pton.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/inet_pton.c @@ -39,11 +39,11 @@ #define INT16SZ 2 /* - * If ENABLE_IPV6 is disabled, we still want to parse IPv6 addresses, so make + * If USE_IPV6 is disabled, we still want to parse IPv6 addresses, so make * sure we have _some_ value for AF_INET6 without polluting our fake value * everywhere. */ -#if !defined(ENABLE_IPV6) && !defined(AF_INET6) +#if !defined(USE_IPV6) && !defined(AF_INET6) #define AF_INET6 (AF_INET + 1) #endif @@ -112,7 +112,8 @@ inet_pton4(const char *src, unsigned char *dst) pch = strchr(digits, ch); if(pch) { - unsigned int val = *tp * 10 + (unsigned int)(pch - digits); + unsigned int val = (unsigned int)(*tp * 10) + + (unsigned int)(pch - digits); if(saw_digit && *tp == 0) return (0); diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/inet_pton.h b/vendor/curl/lib/inet_pton.h index 82fde7e2eb..f8562fa8a7 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/inet_pton.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/inet_pton.h @@ -31,9 +31,6 @@ int Curl_inet_pton(int, const char *, void *); #ifdef HAVE_INET_PTON #ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H #include -#elif defined(HAVE_WS2TCPIP_H) -/* inet_pton() exists in Vista or later */ -#include #endif #define Curl_inet_pton(x,y,z) inet_pton(x,y,z) #endif diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/krb5.c b/vendor/curl/lib/krb5.c index 18e73debbf..d355665b8e 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/krb5.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/krb5.c @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ #include "ftp.h" #include "curl_gssapi.h" #include "sendf.h" +#include "transfer.h" #include "curl_krb5.h" #include "warnless.h" #include "strcase.h" @@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ static CURLcode ftpsend(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, const char *cmd) { - ssize_t bytes_written; + size_t bytes_written; #define SBUF_SIZE 1024 char s[SBUF_SIZE]; size_t write_len; @@ -75,8 +76,7 @@ static CURLcode ftpsend(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, unsigned char data_sec = conn->data_prot; #endif - if(!cmd) - return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + DEBUGASSERT(cmd); write_len = strlen(cmd); if(!write_len || write_len > (sizeof(s) -3)) @@ -91,8 +91,7 @@ static CURLcode ftpsend(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI conn->data_prot = PROT_CMD; #endif - result = Curl_nwrite(data, FIRSTSOCKET, sptr, write_len, - &bytes_written); + result = Curl_xfer_send(data, sptr, write_len, &bytes_written); #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI DEBUGASSERT(data_sec > PROT_NONE && data_sec < PROT_LAST); conn->data_prot = data_sec; @@ -101,9 +100,9 @@ static CURLcode ftpsend(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, if(result) break; - Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_HEADER_OUT, sptr, (size_t)bytes_written); + Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_HEADER_OUT, sptr, bytes_written); - if(bytes_written != (ssize_t)write_len) { + if(bytes_written != write_len) { write_len -= bytes_written; sptr += bytes_written; } @@ -236,9 +235,12 @@ krb5_auth(void *app_data, struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn) if(Curl_GetFTPResponse(data, &nread, NULL)) return -1; - - if(data->state.buffer[0] != '3') - return -1; + else { + struct pingpong *pp = &conn->proto.ftpc.pp; + char *line = Curl_dyn_ptr(&pp->recvbuf); + if(line[0] != '3') + return -1; + } } stringp = aprintf("%s@%s", service, host); @@ -322,15 +324,19 @@ krb5_auth(void *app_data, struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn) ret = -1; break; } - - if(data->state.buffer[0] != '2' && data->state.buffer[0] != '3') { - infof(data, "Server didn't accept auth data"); - ret = AUTH_ERROR; - break; + else { + struct pingpong *pp = &conn->proto.ftpc.pp; + size_t len = Curl_dyn_len(&pp->recvbuf); + p = Curl_dyn_ptr(&pp->recvbuf); + if((len < 4) || (p[0] != '2' && p[0] != '3')) { + infof(data, "Server didn't accept auth data"); + ret = AUTH_ERROR; + break; + } } _gssresp.value = NULL; /* make sure it is initialized */ - p = data->state.buffer + 4; + p += 4; /* over '789 ' */ p = strstr(p, "ADAT="); if(p) { result = Curl_base64_decode(p + 5, @@ -417,7 +423,6 @@ static char level_to_char(int level) case PROT_PRIVATE: return 'P'; case PROT_CMD: - /* Fall through */ default: /* Those 2 cases should not be reached! */ break; @@ -429,6 +434,9 @@ static char level_to_char(int level) /* Send an FTP command defined by |message| and the optional arguments. The function returns the ftp_code. If an error occurs, -1 is returned. */ +static int ftp_send_command(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *message, ...) + CURL_PRINTF(2, 3); + static int ftp_send_command(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *message, ...) { int ftp_code; @@ -462,7 +470,7 @@ socket_read(struct Curl_easy *data, int sockindex, void *to, size_t len) ssize_t nread = 0; while(len > 0) { - nread = Curl_conn_recv(data, sockindex, to_p, len, &result); + result = Curl_conn_recv(data, sockindex, to_p, len, &nread); if(nread > 0) { len -= nread; to_p += nread; @@ -486,11 +494,11 @@ socket_write(struct Curl_easy *data, int sockindex, const void *to, { const char *to_p = to; CURLcode result; - ssize_t written; + size_t written; while(len > 0) { - written = Curl_conn_send(data, sockindex, to_p, len, &result); - if(written > 0) { + result = Curl_conn_send(data, sockindex, to_p, len, &written); + if(!result && written > 0) { len -= written; to_p += written; } @@ -516,24 +524,33 @@ static CURLcode read_data(struct Curl_easy *data, int sockindex, return result; if(len) { - /* only realloc if there was a length */ len = ntohl(len); if(len > CURL_MAX_INPUT_LENGTH) - len = 0; - else - buf->data = Curl_saferealloc(buf->data, len); + return CURLE_TOO_LARGE; + + Curl_dyn_reset(&buf->buf); } - if(!len || !buf->data) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + else + return CURLE_RECV_ERROR; - result = socket_read(data, sockindex, buf->data, len); - if(result) - return result; - nread = conn->mech->decode(conn->app_data, buf->data, len, - conn->data_prot, conn); + do { + char buffer[1024]; + nread = CURLMIN(len, (int)sizeof(buffer)); + result = socket_read(data, sockindex, buffer, nread); + if(result) + return result; + result = Curl_dyn_addn(&buf->buf, buffer, nread); + if(result) + return result; + len -= nread; + } while(len); + /* this decodes the dynbuf *in place* */ + nread = conn->mech->decode(conn->app_data, + Curl_dyn_ptr(&buf->buf), + len, conn->data_prot, conn); if(nread < 0) return CURLE_RECV_ERROR; - buf->size = (size_t)nread; + Curl_dyn_setlen(&buf->buf, nread); buf->index = 0; return CURLE_OK; } @@ -541,9 +558,10 @@ static CURLcode read_data(struct Curl_easy *data, int sockindex, static size_t buffer_read(struct krb5buffer *buf, void *data, size_t len) { - if(buf->size - buf->index < len) - len = buf->size - buf->index; - memcpy(data, (char *)buf->data + buf->index, len); + size_t size = Curl_dyn_len(&buf->buf); + if(size - buf->index < len) + len = size - buf->index; + memcpy(data, Curl_dyn_ptr(&buf->buf) + buf->index, len); buf->index += len; return len; } @@ -559,8 +577,11 @@ static ssize_t sec_recv(struct Curl_easy *data, int sockindex, *err = CURLE_OK; /* Handle clear text response. */ - if(conn->sec_complete == 0 || conn->data_prot == PROT_CLEAR) - return Curl_conn_recv(data, sockindex, buffer, len, err); + if(conn->sec_complete == 0 || conn->data_prot == PROT_CLEAR) { + ssize_t nread; + *err = Curl_conn_recv(data, sockindex, buffer, len, &nread); + return nread; + } if(conn->in_buffer.eof_flag) { conn->in_buffer.eof_flag = 0; @@ -575,7 +596,7 @@ static ssize_t sec_recv(struct Curl_easy *data, int sockindex, while(len > 0) { if(read_data(data, sockindex, &conn->in_buffer)) return -1; - if(conn->in_buffer.size == 0) { + if(Curl_dyn_len(&conn->in_buffer.buf) == 0) { if(bytes_read > 0) conn->in_buffer.eof_flag = 1; return bytes_read; @@ -750,6 +771,8 @@ static int sec_set_protection_level(struct Curl_easy *data) if(level) { char *pbsz; unsigned int buffer_size = 1 << 20; /* 1048576 */ + struct pingpong *pp = &conn->proto.ftpc.pp; + char *line; code = ftp_send_command(data, "PBSZ %u", buffer_size); if(code < 0) @@ -761,10 +784,11 @@ static int sec_set_protection_level(struct Curl_easy *data) } conn->buffer_size = buffer_size; - pbsz = strstr(data->state.buffer, "PBSZ="); + line = Curl_dyn_ptr(&pp->recvbuf); + pbsz = strstr(line, "PBSZ="); if(pbsz) { /* stick to default value if the check fails */ - if(!strncmp(pbsz, "PBSZ=", 5) && ISDIGIT(pbsz[5])) + if(ISDIGIT(pbsz[5])) buffer_size = atoi(&pbsz[5]); if(buffer_size < conn->buffer_size) conn->buffer_size = buffer_size; @@ -821,6 +845,7 @@ static CURLcode choose_mech(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn) mech->name); return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; } + Curl_dyn_init(&conn->in_buffer.buf, CURL_MAX_INPUT_LENGTH); } infof(data, "Trying mechanism %s...", mech->name); @@ -885,15 +910,10 @@ Curl_sec_end(struct connectdata *conn) { if(conn->mech && conn->mech->end) conn->mech->end(conn->app_data); - free(conn->app_data); - conn->app_data = NULL; - if(conn->in_buffer.data) { - free(conn->in_buffer.data); - conn->in_buffer.data = NULL; - conn->in_buffer.size = 0; - conn->in_buffer.index = 0; - conn->in_buffer.eof_flag = 0; - } + Curl_safefree(conn->app_data); + Curl_dyn_free(&conn->in_buffer.buf); + conn->in_buffer.index = 0; + conn->in_buffer.eof_flag = 0; conn->sec_complete = 0; conn->data_prot = PROT_CLEAR; conn->mech = NULL; diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/ldap.c b/vendor/curl/lib/ldap.c index eb5fe795e8..678b4d5af6 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/ldap.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/ldap.c @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static void _ldap_free_urldesc(LDAPURLDesc *ludp); _ldap_trace x; \ } while(0) - static void _ldap_trace(const char *fmt, ...); + static void _ldap_trace(const char *fmt, ...) CURL_PRINTF(1, 2); #else #define LDAP_TRACE(x) Curl_nop_stmt #endif @@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static CURLcode ldap_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done); */ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_ldap = { - "LDAP", /* scheme */ + "ldap", /* scheme */ ZERO_NULL, /* setup_connection */ ldap_do, /* do_it */ ZERO_NULL, /* done */ @@ -177,7 +177,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_ldap = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_LDAP, /* defport */ @@ -192,7 +193,7 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_ldap = { */ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_ldaps = { - "LDAPS", /* scheme */ + "ldaps", /* scheme */ ZERO_NULL, /* setup_connection */ ldap_do, /* do_it */ ZERO_NULL, /* done */ @@ -205,7 +206,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_ldaps = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_LDAPS, /* defport */ @@ -371,7 +373,7 @@ static CURLcode ldap_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) #ifdef HAVE_LDAP_SSL #ifdef USE_WIN32_LDAP /* Win32 LDAP SDK doesn't support insecure mode without CA! */ - server = ldap_sslinit(host, conn->port, 1); + server = ldap_sslinit(host, conn->primary.remote_port, 1); ldap_set_option(server, LDAP_OPT_SSL, LDAP_OPT_ON); #else int ldap_option; @@ -417,10 +419,10 @@ static CURLcode ldap_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) result = CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM; goto quit; } - server = ldapssl_init(host, conn->port, 1); + server = ldapssl_init(host, conn->primary.remote_port, 1); if(!server) { failf(data, "LDAP local: Cannot connect to %s:%u", - conn->host.dispname, conn->port); + conn->host.dispname, conn->primary.remote_port); result = CURLE_COULDNT_CONNECT; goto quit; } @@ -458,10 +460,10 @@ static CURLcode ldap_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) result = CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM; goto quit; } - server = ldap_init(host, conn->port); + server = ldap_init(host, conn->primary.remote_port); if(!server) { failf(data, "LDAP local: Cannot connect to %s:%u", - conn->host.dispname, conn->port); + conn->host.dispname, conn->primary.remote_port); result = CURLE_COULDNT_CONNECT; goto quit; } @@ -483,6 +485,8 @@ static CURLcode ldap_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) } */ #else + (void)ldap_option; + (void)ldap_ca; /* we should probably never come up to here since configure should check in first place if we can support LDAP SSL/TLS */ failf(data, "LDAP local: SSL/TLS not supported with this version " @@ -499,10 +503,10 @@ static CURLcode ldap_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) goto quit; } else { - server = ldap_init(host, conn->port); + server = ldap_init(host, conn->primary.remote_port); if(!server) { failf(data, "LDAP local: Cannot connect to %s:%u", - conn->host.dispname, conn->port); + conn->host.dispname, conn->primary.remote_port); result = CURLE_COULDNT_CONNECT; goto quit; } @@ -544,7 +548,8 @@ static CURLcode ldap_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) goto quit; } - for(num = 0, entryIterator = ldap_first_entry(server, ldapmsg); + num = 0; + for(entryIterator = ldap_first_entry(server, ldapmsg); entryIterator; entryIterator = ldap_next_entry(server, entryIterator), num++) { BerElement *ber = NULL; @@ -749,7 +754,7 @@ static CURLcode ldap_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) FREE_ON_WINLDAP(host); /* no data to transfer */ - Curl_setup_transfer(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); connclose(conn, "LDAP connection always disable reuse"); return result; diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/llist.c b/vendor/curl/lib/llist.c index 5b6b0336da..716f0cd576 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/llist.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/llist.c @@ -88,6 +88,22 @@ Curl_llist_insert_next(struct Curl_llist *list, struct Curl_llist_element *e, ++list->size; } +/* + * Curl_llist_append() + * + * Adds a new list element to the end of the list. + * + * The 'ne' argument should be a pointer into the object to store. + * + * @unittest: 1300 + */ +void +Curl_llist_append(struct Curl_llist *list, const void *p, + struct Curl_llist_element *ne) +{ + Curl_llist_insert_next(list, list->tail, p, ne); +} + /* * @unittest: 1300 */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/llist.h b/vendor/curl/lib/llist.h index 320580e33c..d75582fa97 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/llist.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/llist.h @@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ struct Curl_llist { void Curl_llist_init(struct Curl_llist *, Curl_llist_dtor); void Curl_llist_insert_next(struct Curl_llist *, struct Curl_llist_element *, const void *, struct Curl_llist_element *node); +void Curl_llist_append(struct Curl_llist *, + const void *, struct Curl_llist_element *node); void Curl_llist_remove(struct Curl_llist *, struct Curl_llist_element *, void *); size_t Curl_llist_count(struct Curl_llist *); diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/md4.c b/vendor/curl/lib/md4.c index 486e5fa6a0..db0028135f 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/md4.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/md4.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include +#include "strdup.h" #include "curl_md4.h" #include "warnless.h" @@ -54,7 +55,8 @@ #else #include #endif -#if(MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x02070000) +#if(MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x02070000) && \ + (MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x03000000) #define HAS_MBEDTLS_RESULT_CODE_BASED_FUNCTIONS #endif #endif /* USE_MBEDTLS */ @@ -194,11 +196,9 @@ static int MD4_Init(MD4_CTX *ctx) static void MD4_Update(MD4_CTX *ctx, const void *data, unsigned long size) { if(!ctx->data) { - ctx->data = malloc(size); - if(ctx->data) { - memcpy(ctx->data, data, size); + ctx->data = Curl_memdup(data, size); + if(ctx->data) ctx->size = size; - } } } diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/memdebug.c b/vendor/curl/lib/memdebug.c index f6ced85cd9..fce933a322 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/memdebug.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/memdebug.c @@ -304,12 +304,6 @@ void curl_dbg_free(void *ptr, int line, const char *source) curl_socket_t curl_dbg_socket(int domain, int type, int protocol, int line, const char *source) { - const char *fmt = (sizeof(curl_socket_t) == sizeof(int)) ? - "FD %s:%d socket() = %d\n" : - (sizeof(curl_socket_t) == sizeof(long)) ? - "FD %s:%d socket() = %ld\n" : - "FD %s:%d socket() = %zd\n"; - curl_socket_t sockfd; if(countcheck("socket", line, source)) @@ -318,7 +312,8 @@ curl_socket_t curl_dbg_socket(int domain, int type, int protocol, sockfd = socket(domain, type, protocol); if(source && (sockfd != CURL_SOCKET_BAD)) - curl_dbg_log(fmt, source, line, sockfd); + curl_dbg_log("FD %s:%d socket() = %" CURL_FORMAT_SOCKET_T "\n", + source, line, sockfd); return sockfd; } @@ -357,16 +352,12 @@ int curl_dbg_socketpair(int domain, int type, int protocol, curl_socket_t socket_vector[2], int line, const char *source) { - const char *fmt = (sizeof(curl_socket_t) == sizeof(int)) ? - "FD %s:%d socketpair() = %d %d\n" : - (sizeof(curl_socket_t) == sizeof(long)) ? - "FD %s:%d socketpair() = %ld %ld\n" : - "FD %s:%d socketpair() = %zd %zd\n"; - int res = socketpair(domain, type, protocol, socket_vector); if(source && (0 == res)) - curl_dbg_log(fmt, source, line, socket_vector[0], socket_vector[1]); + curl_dbg_log("FD %s:%d socketpair() = " + "%" CURL_FORMAT_SOCKET_T " %" CURL_FORMAT_SOCKET_T "\n", + source, line, socket_vector[0], socket_vector[1]); return res; } @@ -375,19 +366,14 @@ int curl_dbg_socketpair(int domain, int type, int protocol, curl_socket_t curl_dbg_accept(curl_socket_t s, void *saddr, void *saddrlen, int line, const char *source) { - const char *fmt = (sizeof(curl_socket_t) == sizeof(int)) ? - "FD %s:%d accept() = %d\n" : - (sizeof(curl_socket_t) == sizeof(long)) ? - "FD %s:%d accept() = %ld\n" : - "FD %s:%d accept() = %zd\n"; - struct sockaddr *addr = (struct sockaddr *)saddr; curl_socklen_t *addrlen = (curl_socklen_t *)saddrlen; curl_socket_t sockfd = accept(s, addr, addrlen); if(source && (sockfd != CURL_SOCKET_BAD)) - curl_dbg_log(fmt, source, line, sockfd); + curl_dbg_log("FD %s:%d accept() = %" CURL_FORMAT_SOCKET_T "\n", + source, line, sockfd); return sockfd; } @@ -395,14 +381,9 @@ curl_socket_t curl_dbg_accept(curl_socket_t s, void *saddr, void *saddrlen, /* separate function to allow libcurl to mark a "faked" close */ void curl_dbg_mark_sclose(curl_socket_t sockfd, int line, const char *source) { - const char *fmt = (sizeof(curl_socket_t) == sizeof(int)) ? - "FD %s:%d sclose(%d)\n": - (sizeof(curl_socket_t) == sizeof(long)) ? - "FD %s:%d sclose(%ld)\n": - "FD %s:%d sclose(%zd)\n"; - if(source) - curl_dbg_log(fmt, source, line, sockfd); + curl_dbg_log("FD %s:%d sclose(%" CURL_FORMAT_SOCKET_T ")\n", + source, line, sockfd); } /* this is our own defined way to close sockets on *ALL* platforms */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/memdebug.h b/vendor/curl/lib/memdebug.h index 78a012580c..51147cdcba 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/memdebug.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/memdebug.h @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ CURL_EXTERN ALLOC_FUNC wchar_t *curl_dbg_wcsdup(const wchar_t *str, CURL_EXTERN void curl_dbg_memdebug(const char *logname); CURL_EXTERN void curl_dbg_memlimit(long limit); -CURL_EXTERN void curl_dbg_log(const char *format, ...); +CURL_EXTERN void curl_dbg_log(const char *format, ...) CURL_PRINTF(1, 2); /* file descriptor manipulators */ CURL_EXTERN curl_socket_t curl_dbg_socket(int domain, int type, int protocol, diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/mime.c b/vendor/curl/lib/mime.c index bb66130ad7..a2356c4738 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/mime.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/mime.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include "warnless.h" #include "urldata.h" #include "sendf.h" +#include "strdup.h" #if !defined(CURL_DISABLE_MIME) && (!defined(CURL_DISABLE_HTTP) || \ !defined(CURL_DISABLE_SMTP) || \ @@ -73,6 +74,7 @@ static curl_off_t encoder_base64_size(curl_mimepart *part); static size_t encoder_qp_read(char *buffer, size_t size, bool ateof, curl_mimepart *part); static curl_off_t encoder_qp_size(curl_mimepart *part); +static curl_off_t mime_size(curl_mimepart *part); static const struct mime_encoder encoders[] = { {"binary", encoder_nop_read, encoder_nop_size}, @@ -817,7 +819,7 @@ static size_t read_part_content(curl_mimepart *part, case MIMEKIND_FILE: if(part->fp && feof(part->fp)) break; /* At EOF. */ - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); default: if(part->readfunc) { if(!(part->flags & MIME_FAST_READ)) { @@ -936,7 +938,7 @@ static size_t readback_part(curl_mimepart *part, mimesetstate(&part->state, MIMESTATE_USERHEADERS, hdr->next); break; } - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case MIMESTATE_CURLHEADERS: if(!hdr) mimesetstate(&part->state, MIMESTATE_USERHEADERS, part->userheaders); @@ -970,7 +972,7 @@ static size_t readback_part(curl_mimepart *part, fclose(part->fp); part->fp = NULL; } - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case CURL_READFUNC_ABORT: case CURL_READFUNC_PAUSE: case READ_ERROR: @@ -1235,6 +1237,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_mime_duppart(struct Curl_easy *data, } break; default: /* Invalid kind: should not occur. */ + DEBUGF(infof(data, "invalid MIMEKIND* attempt")); res = CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; /* Internal error? */ break; } @@ -1370,27 +1373,22 @@ CURLcode curl_mime_filename(curl_mimepart *part, const char *filename) /* Set mime part content from memory data. */ CURLcode curl_mime_data(curl_mimepart *part, - const char *data, size_t datasize) + const char *ptr, size_t datasize) { if(!part) return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; cleanup_part_content(part); - if(data) { + if(ptr) { if(datasize == CURL_ZERO_TERMINATED) - datasize = strlen(data); + datasize = strlen(ptr); - part->data = malloc(datasize + 1); + part->data = Curl_memdup0(ptr, datasize); if(!part->data) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; part->datasize = datasize; - - if(datasize) - memcpy(part->data, data, datasize); - part->data[datasize] = '\0'; /* Set a null terminator as sentinel. */ - part->readfunc = mime_mem_read; part->seekfunc = mime_mem_seek; part->freefunc = mime_mem_free; @@ -1415,36 +1413,35 @@ CURLcode curl_mime_filedata(curl_mimepart *part, const char *filename) char *base; struct_stat sbuf; - if(stat(filename, &sbuf) || access(filename, R_OK)) + if(stat(filename, &sbuf)) result = CURLE_READ_ERROR; - - part->data = strdup(filename); - if(!part->data) - result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - - part->datasize = -1; - if(!result && S_ISREG(sbuf.st_mode)) { - part->datasize = filesize(filename, sbuf); - part->seekfunc = mime_file_seek; - } - - part->readfunc = mime_file_read; - part->freefunc = mime_file_free; - part->kind = MIMEKIND_FILE; - - /* As a side effect, set the filename to the current file's base name. - It is possible to withdraw this by explicitly calling - curl_mime_filename() with a NULL filename argument after the current - call. */ - base = strippath(filename); - if(!base) - result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; else { - CURLcode res = curl_mime_filename(part, base); + part->data = strdup(filename); + if(!part->data) + result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + else { + part->datasize = -1; + if(S_ISREG(sbuf.st_mode)) { + part->datasize = filesize(filename, sbuf); + part->seekfunc = mime_file_seek; + } - if(res) - result = res; - free(base); + part->readfunc = mime_file_read; + part->freefunc = mime_file_free; + part->kind = MIMEKIND_FILE; + + /* As a side effect, set the filename to the current file's base name. + It is possible to withdraw this by explicitly calling + curl_mime_filename() with a NULL filename argument after the current + call. */ + base = strippath(filename); + if(!base) + result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + else { + result = curl_mime_filename(part, base); + free(base); + } + } } } return result; @@ -1605,7 +1602,7 @@ size_t Curl_mime_read(char *buffer, size_t size, size_t nitems, void *instream) } /* Rewind mime stream. */ -CURLcode Curl_mime_rewind(curl_mimepart *part) +static CURLcode mime_rewind(curl_mimepart *part) { return mime_part_rewind(part) == CURL_SEEKFUNC_OK? CURLE_OK: CURLE_SEND_FAIL_REWIND; @@ -1637,7 +1634,7 @@ static curl_off_t multipart_size(curl_mime *mime) size = boundarysize; /* Final boundary - CRLF after headers. */ for(part = mime->firstpart; part; part = part->nextpart) { - curl_off_t sz = Curl_mime_size(part); + curl_off_t sz = mime_size(part); if(sz < 0) size = sz; @@ -1650,7 +1647,7 @@ static curl_off_t multipart_size(curl_mime *mime) } /* Get/compute mime size. */ -curl_off_t Curl_mime_size(curl_mimepart *part) +static curl_off_t mime_size(curl_mimepart *part) { curl_off_t size; @@ -1899,7 +1896,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_mime_prepare_headers(struct Curl_easy *data, } /* Recursively reset paused status in the given part. */ -void Curl_mime_unpause(curl_mimepart *part) +static void mime_unpause(curl_mimepart *part) { if(part) { if(part->lastreadstatus == CURL_READFUNC_PAUSE) @@ -1911,12 +1908,228 @@ void Curl_mime_unpause(curl_mimepart *part) curl_mimepart *subpart; for(subpart = mime->firstpart; subpart; subpart = subpart->nextpart) - Curl_mime_unpause(subpart); + mime_unpause(subpart); } } } } +struct cr_mime_ctx { + struct Curl_creader super; + curl_mimepart *part; + curl_off_t total_len; + curl_off_t read_len; + CURLcode error_result; + BIT(seen_eos); + BIT(errored); +}; + +static CURLcode cr_mime_init(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + struct cr_mime_ctx *ctx = reader->ctx; + (void)data; + ctx->total_len = -1; + ctx->read_len = 0; + return CURLE_OK; +} + +/* Real client reader to installed client callbacks. */ +static CURLcode cr_mime_read(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader, + char *buf, size_t blen, + size_t *pnread, bool *peos) +{ + struct cr_mime_ctx *ctx = reader->ctx; + size_t nread; + + /* Once we have errored, we will return the same error forever */ + if(ctx->errored) { + *pnread = 0; + *peos = FALSE; + return ctx->error_result; + } + if(ctx->seen_eos) { + *pnread = 0; + *peos = TRUE; + return CURLE_OK; + } + /* respect length limitations */ + if(ctx->total_len >= 0) { + curl_off_t remain = ctx->total_len - ctx->read_len; + if(remain <= 0) + blen = 0; + else if(remain < (curl_off_t)blen) + blen = (size_t)remain; + } + nread = 0; + if(blen) { + nread = Curl_mime_read(buf, 1, blen, ctx->part); + } + + switch(nread) { + case 0: + if((ctx->total_len >= 0) && (ctx->read_len < ctx->total_len)) { + failf(data, "client mime read EOF fail, " + "only %"CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T"/%"CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T + " of needed bytes read", ctx->read_len, ctx->total_len); + return CURLE_READ_ERROR; + } + *pnread = 0; + *peos = TRUE; + ctx->seen_eos = TRUE; + break; + + case CURL_READFUNC_ABORT: + failf(data, "operation aborted by callback"); + *pnread = 0; + *peos = FALSE; + ctx->errored = TRUE; + ctx->error_result = CURLE_ABORTED_BY_CALLBACK; + return CURLE_ABORTED_BY_CALLBACK; + + case CURL_READFUNC_PAUSE: + /* CURL_READFUNC_PAUSE pauses read callbacks that feed socket writes */ + data->req.keepon |= KEEP_SEND_PAUSE; /* mark socket send as paused */ + *pnread = 0; + *peos = FALSE; + break; /* nothing was read */ + + default: + if(nread > blen) { + /* the read function returned a too large value */ + failf(data, "read function returned funny value"); + *pnread = 0; + *peos = FALSE; + ctx->errored = TRUE; + ctx->error_result = CURLE_READ_ERROR; + return CURLE_READ_ERROR; + } + ctx->read_len += nread; + if(ctx->total_len >= 0) + ctx->seen_eos = (ctx->read_len >= ctx->total_len); + *pnread = nread; + *peos = ctx->seen_eos; + break; + } + DEBUGF(infof(data, "cr_mime_read(len=%zu, total=%"CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T + ", read=%"CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T") -> %d, %zu, %d", + blen, ctx->total_len, ctx->read_len, CURLE_OK, *pnread, *peos)); + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static bool cr_mime_needs_rewind(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + struct cr_mime_ctx *ctx = reader->ctx; + (void)data; + return ctx->read_len > 0; +} + +static curl_off_t cr_mime_total_length(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + struct cr_mime_ctx *ctx = reader->ctx; + (void)data; + return ctx->total_len; +} + +static CURLcode cr_mime_resume_from(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader, + curl_off_t offset) +{ + struct cr_mime_ctx *ctx = reader->ctx; + + if(offset > 0) { + curl_off_t passed = 0; + + do { + char scratch[4*1024]; + size_t readthisamountnow = + (offset - passed > (curl_off_t)sizeof(scratch)) ? + sizeof(scratch) : + curlx_sotouz(offset - passed); + size_t nread; + + nread = Curl_mime_read(scratch, 1, readthisamountnow, ctx->part); + passed += (curl_off_t)nread; + if((nread == 0) || (nread > readthisamountnow)) { + /* this checks for greater-than only to make sure that the + CURL_READFUNC_ABORT return code still aborts */ + failf(data, "Could only read %" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T + " bytes from the mime post", passed); + return CURLE_READ_ERROR; + } + } while(passed < offset); + + /* now, decrease the size of the read */ + if(ctx->total_len > 0) { + ctx->total_len -= offset; + + if(ctx->total_len <= 0) { + failf(data, "Mime post already completely uploaded"); + return CURLE_PARTIAL_FILE; + } + } + /* we've passed, proceed as normal */ + } + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static CURLcode cr_mime_rewind(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + struct cr_mime_ctx *ctx = reader->ctx; + CURLcode result = mime_rewind(ctx->part); + if(result) + failf(data, "Cannot rewind mime/post data"); + return result; +} + +static CURLcode cr_mime_unpause(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + struct cr_mime_ctx *ctx = reader->ctx; + (void)data; + mime_unpause(ctx->part); + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static const struct Curl_crtype cr_mime = { + "cr-mime", + cr_mime_init, + cr_mime_read, + Curl_creader_def_close, + cr_mime_needs_rewind, + cr_mime_total_length, + cr_mime_resume_from, + cr_mime_rewind, + cr_mime_unpause, + Curl_creader_def_done, + sizeof(struct cr_mime_ctx) +}; + +CURLcode Curl_creader_set_mime(struct Curl_easy *data, curl_mimepart *part) +{ + struct Curl_creader *r; + struct cr_mime_ctx *ctx; + CURLcode result; + + result = Curl_creader_create(&r, data, &cr_mime, CURL_CR_CLIENT); + if(result) + return result; + ctx = r->ctx; + ctx->part = part; + /* Make sure we will read the entire mime structure. */ + result = mime_rewind(ctx->part); + if(result) { + Curl_creader_free(data, r); + return result; + } + ctx->total_len = mime_size(ctx->part); + + return Curl_creader_set(data, r); +} #else /* !CURL_DISABLE_MIME && (!CURL_DISABLE_HTTP || !CURL_DISABLE_SMTP || !CURL_DISABLE_IMAP) */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/mime.h b/vendor/curl/lib/mime.h index 0a05c2a5aa..954b3ccf39 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/mime.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/mime.h @@ -130,7 +130,8 @@ struct curl_mimepart { size_t lastreadstatus; /* Last read callback returned status. */ }; -CURLcode Curl_mime_add_header(struct curl_slist **slp, const char *fmt, ...); +CURLcode Curl_mime_add_header(struct curl_slist **slp, const char *fmt, ...) + CURL_PRINTF(2, 3); #if !defined(CURL_DISABLE_MIME) && (!defined(CURL_DISABLE_HTTP) || \ !defined(CURL_DISABLE_SMTP) || \ @@ -150,12 +151,15 @@ CURLcode Curl_mime_prepare_headers(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *contenttype, const char *disposition, enum mimestrategy strategy); -curl_off_t Curl_mime_size(struct curl_mimepart *part); size_t Curl_mime_read(char *buffer, size_t size, size_t nitems, void *instream); -CURLcode Curl_mime_rewind(struct curl_mimepart *part); const char *Curl_mime_contenttype(const char *filename); -void Curl_mime_unpause(struct curl_mimepart *part); + +/** + * Install a client reader as upload source that reads the given + * mime part. + */ +CURLcode Curl_creader_set_mime(struct Curl_easy *data, curl_mimepart *part); #else /* if disabled */ @@ -164,10 +168,8 @@ void Curl_mime_unpause(struct curl_mimepart *part); #define Curl_mime_duppart(x,y,z) CURLE_OK /* Nothing to duplicate. Succeed */ #define Curl_mime_set_subparts(a,b,c) CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN #define Curl_mime_prepare_headers(a,b,c,d,e) CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN -#define Curl_mime_size(x) (curl_off_t) -1 #define Curl_mime_read NULL -#define Curl_mime_rewind(x) ((void)x, CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN) -#define Curl_mime_unpause(x) +#define Curl_creader_set_mime(x,y) ((void)x, CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN) #endif diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/mprintf.c b/vendor/curl/lib/mprintf.c index 6b5df5bdde..1829abc73e 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/mprintf.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/mprintf.c @@ -20,25 +20,11 @@ * * SPDX-License-Identifier: curl * - * - * Purpose: - * A merge of Bjorn Reese's format() function and Daniel's dsprintf() - * 1.0. A full blooded printf() clone with full support for $ - * everywhere (parameters, widths and precisions) including variabled - * sized parameters (like doubles, long longs, long doubles and even - * void * in 64-bit architectures). - * - * Current restrictions: - * - Max 128 parameters - * - No 'long double' support. - * - * If you ever want truly portable and good *printf() clones, the project that - * took on from here is named 'Trio' and you find more details on the trio web - * page at https://daniel.haxx.se/projects/trio/ */ #include "curl_setup.h" #include "dynbuf.h" +#include "curl_printf.h" #include #include "curl_memory.h" @@ -62,16 +48,6 @@ # endif #endif -/* - * Non-ANSI integer extensions - */ - -#if (defined(_WIN32_WCE)) || \ - (defined(__MINGW32__)) || \ - (defined(_MSC_VER) && (_MSC_VER >= 900) && (_INTEGRAL_MAX_BITS >= 64)) -# define MP_HAVE_INT_EXTENSIONS -#endif - /* * Max integer data types that mprintf.c is capable */ @@ -86,7 +62,8 @@ #define BUFFSIZE 326 /* buffer for long-to-str and float-to-str calcs, should fit negative DBL_MAX (317 letters) */ -#define MAX_PARAMETERS 128 /* lame static limit */ +#define MAX_PARAMETERS 128 /* number of input arguments */ +#define MAX_SEGMENTS 128 /* number of output segments */ #ifdef __AMIGA__ # undef FORMAT_INT @@ -98,31 +75,33 @@ static const char lower_digits[] = "0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"; /* Upper-case digits. */ static const char upper_digits[] = "0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"; -#define OUTCHAR(x) \ - do { \ - if(stream((unsigned char)(x), (FILE *)data) != -1) \ - done++; \ - else \ - return done; /* return immediately on failure */ \ +#define OUTCHAR(x) \ + do { \ + if(!stream((unsigned char)x, userp)) \ + done++; \ + else \ + return done; /* return on failure */ \ } while(0) /* Data type to read from the arglist */ typedef enum { - FORMAT_UNKNOWN = 0, FORMAT_STRING, FORMAT_PTR, - FORMAT_INT, FORMAT_INTPTR, + FORMAT_INT, FORMAT_LONG, FORMAT_LONGLONG, + FORMAT_INTU, + FORMAT_LONGU, + FORMAT_LONGLONGU, FORMAT_DOUBLE, FORMAT_LONGDOUBLE, - FORMAT_WIDTH /* For internal use */ + FORMAT_WIDTH, + FORMAT_PRECISION } FormatType; /* conversion and display flags */ enum { - FLAGS_NEW = 0, FLAGS_SPACE = 1<<0, FLAGS_SHOWSIGN = 1<<1, FLAGS_LEFT = 1<<2, @@ -142,23 +121,40 @@ enum { FLAGS_PRECPARAM = 1<<16, /* precision PARAMETER was specified */ FLAGS_CHAR = 1<<17, /* %c story */ FLAGS_FLOATE = 1<<18, /* %e or %E */ - FLAGS_FLOATG = 1<<19 /* %g or %G */ + FLAGS_FLOATG = 1<<19, /* %g or %G */ + FLAGS_SUBSTR = 1<<20 /* no input, only substring */ }; -struct va_stack { - FormatType type; - int flags; - long width; /* width OR width parameter number */ - long precision; /* precision OR precision parameter number */ +enum { + DOLLAR_UNKNOWN, + DOLLAR_NOPE, + DOLLAR_USE +}; + +/* + * Describes an input va_arg type and hold its value. + */ +struct va_input { + FormatType type; /* FormatType */ union { char *str; void *ptr; - union { - mp_intmax_t as_signed; - mp_uintmax_t as_unsigned; - } num; + mp_intmax_t nums; /* signed */ + mp_uintmax_t numu; /* unsigned */ double dnum; - } data; + } val; +}; + +/* + * Describes an output segment. + */ +struct outsegment { + int width; /* width OR width parameter number */ + int precision; /* precision OR precision parameter number */ + unsigned int flags; + unsigned int input; /* input argument array index */ + char *start; /* format string start to output */ + size_t outlen; /* number of bytes from the format string to output */ }; struct nsprintf { @@ -169,118 +165,124 @@ struct nsprintf { struct asprintf { struct dynbuf *b; - bool fail; /* if an alloc has failed and thus the output is not the complete - data */ + char merr; }; -static long dprintf_DollarString(char *input, char **end) -{ - int number = 0; - while(ISDIGIT(*input)) { - if(number < MAX_PARAMETERS) { - number *= 10; - number += *input - '0'; - } - input++; - } - if(number <= MAX_PARAMETERS && ('$' == *input)) { - *end = ++input; - return number; - } - return 0; -} +/* the provided input number is 1-based but this returns the number 0-based. -static bool dprintf_IsQualifierNoDollar(const char *fmt) + returns -1 if no valid number was provided. +*/ +static int dollarstring(char *input, char **end) { -#if defined(MP_HAVE_INT_EXTENSIONS) - if(!strncmp(fmt, "I32", 3) || !strncmp(fmt, "I64", 3)) { - return TRUE; - } -#endif - - switch(*fmt) { - case '-': case '+': case ' ': case '#': case '.': - case '0': case '1': case '2': case '3': case '4': - case '5': case '6': case '7': case '8': case '9': - case 'h': case 'l': case 'L': case 'z': case 'q': - case '*': case 'O': -#if defined(MP_HAVE_INT_EXTENSIONS) - case 'I': -#endif - return TRUE; + if(ISDIGIT(*input)) { + int number = 0; + do { + if(number < MAX_PARAMETERS) { + number *= 10; + number += *input - '0'; + } + input++; + } while(ISDIGIT(*input)); - default: - return FALSE; + if(number && (number <= MAX_PARAMETERS) && ('$' == *input)) { + *end = ++input; + return number - 1; + } } + return -1; } -/****************************************************************** +/* + * Parse the format string. * - * Pass 1: - * Create an index with the type of each parameter entry and its - * value (may vary in size) + * Create two arrays. One describes the inputs, one describes the outputs. * * Returns zero on success. - * - ******************************************************************/ + */ -static int dprintf_Pass1(const char *format, struct va_stack *vto, - char **endpos, va_list arglist) +#define PFMT_OK 0 +#define PFMT_DOLLAR 1 /* bad dollar for main param */ +#define PFMT_DOLLARWIDTH 2 /* bad dollar use for width */ +#define PFMT_DOLLARPREC 3 /* bad dollar use for precision */ +#define PFMT_MANYARGS 4 /* too many input arguments used */ +#define PFMT_PREC 5 /* precision overflow */ +#define PFMT_PRECMIX 6 /* bad mix of precision specifiers */ +#define PFMT_WIDTH 7 /* width overflow */ +#define PFMT_INPUTGAP 8 /* gap in arguments */ +#define PFMT_WIDTHARG 9 /* attempted to use same arg twice, for width */ +#define PFMT_PRECARG 10 /* attempted to use same arg twice, for prec */ +#define PFMT_MANYSEGS 11 /* maxed out output segments */ + +static int parsefmt(const char *format, + struct outsegment *out, + struct va_input *in, + int *opieces, + int *ipieces, va_list arglist) { char *fmt = (char *)format; int param_num = 0; - long this_param; - long width; - long precision; - int flags; - long max_param = 0; - long i; + int param; + int width; + int precision; + unsigned int flags; + FormatType type; + int max_param = -1; + int i; + int ocount = 0; + unsigned char usedinput[MAX_PARAMETERS/8]; + size_t outlen = 0; + struct outsegment *optr; + int use_dollar = DOLLAR_UNKNOWN; + char *start = fmt; + + /* clear, set a bit for each used input */ + memset(usedinput, 0, sizeof(usedinput)); while(*fmt) { - if(*fmt++ == '%') { + if(*fmt == '%') { + struct va_input *iptr; + bool loopit = TRUE; + fmt++; + outlen = (size_t)(fmt - start - 1); if(*fmt == '%') { + /* this means a %% that should be output only as %. Create an output + segment. */ + if(outlen) { + optr = &out[ocount++]; + if(ocount > MAX_SEGMENTS) + return PFMT_MANYSEGS; + optr->input = 0; + optr->flags = FLAGS_SUBSTR; + optr->start = start; + optr->outlen = outlen; + } + start = fmt; fmt++; continue; /* while */ } - flags = FLAGS_NEW; - - /* Handle the positional case (N$) */ + flags = 0; + width = precision = 0; - param_num++; + if(use_dollar != DOLLAR_NOPE) { + param = dollarstring(fmt, &fmt); + if(param < 0) { + if(use_dollar == DOLLAR_USE) + /* illegal combo */ + return PFMT_DOLLAR; - this_param = dprintf_DollarString(fmt, &fmt); - if(0 == this_param) - /* we got no positional, get the next counter */ - this_param = param_num; - - if(this_param > max_param) - max_param = this_param; - - /* - * The parameter with number 'i' should be used. Next, we need - * to get SIZE and TYPE of the parameter. Add the information - * to our array. - */ - - width = 0; - precision = 0; - - /* Handle the flags */ - - while(dprintf_IsQualifierNoDollar(fmt)) { -#if defined(MP_HAVE_INT_EXTENSIONS) - if(!strncmp(fmt, "I32", 3)) { - flags |= FLAGS_LONG; - fmt += 3; - } - else if(!strncmp(fmt, "I64", 3)) { - flags |= FLAGS_LONGLONG; - fmt += 3; + /* we got no positional, just get the next arg */ + param = -1; + use_dollar = DOLLAR_NOPE; } else -#endif + use_dollar = DOLLAR_USE; + } + else + param = -1; + /* Handle the flags */ + while(loopit) { switch(*fmt++) { case ' ': flags |= FLAGS_SPACE; @@ -290,7 +292,7 @@ static int dprintf_Pass1(const char *format, struct va_stack *vto, break; case '-': flags |= FLAGS_LEFT; - flags &= ~FLAGS_PAD_NIL; + flags &= ~(unsigned int)FLAGS_PAD_NIL; break; case '#': flags |= FLAGS_ALT; @@ -298,42 +300,66 @@ static int dprintf_Pass1(const char *format, struct va_stack *vto, case '.': if('*' == *fmt) { /* The precision is picked from a specified parameter */ - flags |= FLAGS_PRECPARAM; fmt++; - param_num++; - i = dprintf_DollarString(fmt, &fmt); - if(i) - precision = i; + if(use_dollar == DOLLAR_USE) { + precision = dollarstring(fmt, &fmt); + if(precision < 0) + /* illegal combo */ + return PFMT_DOLLARPREC; + } else - precision = param_num; - - if(precision > max_param) - max_param = precision; + /* get it from the next argument */ + precision = -1; } else { + bool is_neg = FALSE; flags |= FLAGS_PREC; - precision = strtol(fmt, &fmt, 10); + precision = 0; + if('-' == *fmt) { + is_neg = TRUE; + fmt++; + } + while(ISDIGIT(*fmt)) { + if(precision > INT_MAX/10) + return PFMT_PREC; + precision *= 10; + precision += *fmt - '0'; + fmt++; + } + if(is_neg) + precision = -precision; } if((flags & (FLAGS_PREC | FLAGS_PRECPARAM)) == (FLAGS_PREC | FLAGS_PRECPARAM)) /* it is not permitted to use both kinds of precision for the same argument */ - return 1; + return PFMT_PRECMIX; break; case 'h': flags |= FLAGS_SHORT; break; -#if defined(MP_HAVE_INT_EXTENSIONS) +#if defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE) case 'I': + /* Non-ANSI integer extensions I32 I64 */ + if((fmt[0] == '3') && (fmt[1] == '2')) { + flags |= FLAGS_LONG; + fmt += 2; + } + else if((fmt[0] == '6') && (fmt[1] == '4')) { + flags |= FLAGS_LONGLONG; + fmt += 2; + } + else { #if (SIZEOF_CURL_OFF_T > SIZEOF_LONG) - flags |= FLAGS_LONGLONG; + flags |= FLAGS_LONGLONG; #else - flags |= FLAGS_LONG; + flags |= FLAGS_LONG; #endif + } break; -#endif +#endif /* _WIN32 || _WIN32_WCE */ case 'l': if(flags & FLAGS_LONG) flags |= FLAGS_LONGLONG; @@ -365,401 +391,421 @@ static int dprintf_Pass1(const char *format, struct va_stack *vto, case '0': if(!(flags & FLAGS_LEFT)) flags |= FLAGS_PAD_NIL; - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case '1': case '2': case '3': case '4': case '5': case '6': case '7': case '8': case '9': flags |= FLAGS_WIDTH; - width = strtol(fmt-1, &fmt, 10); + width = 0; + fmt--; + do { + if(width > INT_MAX/10) + return PFMT_WIDTH; + width *= 10; + width += *fmt - '0'; + fmt++; + } while(ISDIGIT(*fmt)); break; - case '*': /* Special case */ + case '*': /* read width from argument list */ flags |= FLAGS_WIDTHPARAM; - param_num++; - - i = dprintf_DollarString(fmt, &fmt); - if(i) - width = i; + if(use_dollar == DOLLAR_USE) { + width = dollarstring(fmt, &fmt); + if(width < 0) + /* illegal combo */ + return PFMT_DOLLARWIDTH; + } else - width = param_num; - if(width > max_param) - max_param = width; + /* pick from the next argument */ + width = -1; break; - case '\0': - fmt--; default: + loopit = FALSE; + fmt--; break; - } - } /* switch */ - - /* Handle the specifier */ - - i = this_param - 1; - - if((i < 0) || (i >= MAX_PARAMETERS)) - /* out of allowed range */ - return 1; + } /* switch */ + } /* while */ switch(*fmt) { case 'S': flags |= FLAGS_ALT; - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case 's': - vto[i].type = FORMAT_STRING; + type = FORMAT_STRING; break; case 'n': - vto[i].type = FORMAT_INTPTR; + type = FORMAT_INTPTR; break; case 'p': - vto[i].type = FORMAT_PTR; + type = FORMAT_PTR; break; - case 'd': case 'i': - vto[i].type = FORMAT_INT; + case 'd': + case 'i': + if(flags & FLAGS_LONGLONG) + type = FORMAT_LONGLONG; + else if(flags & FLAGS_LONG) + type = FORMAT_LONG; + else + type = FORMAT_INT; break; case 'u': - vto[i].type = FORMAT_INT; + if(flags & FLAGS_LONGLONG) + type = FORMAT_LONGLONGU; + else if(flags & FLAGS_LONG) + type = FORMAT_LONGU; + else + type = FORMAT_INTU; flags |= FLAGS_UNSIGNED; break; case 'o': - vto[i].type = FORMAT_INT; + type = FORMAT_INT; flags |= FLAGS_OCTAL; break; case 'x': - vto[i].type = FORMAT_INT; + type = FORMAT_INTU; flags |= FLAGS_HEX|FLAGS_UNSIGNED; break; case 'X': - vto[i].type = FORMAT_INT; + type = FORMAT_INTU; flags |= FLAGS_HEX|FLAGS_UPPER|FLAGS_UNSIGNED; break; case 'c': - vto[i].type = FORMAT_INT; + type = FORMAT_INT; flags |= FLAGS_CHAR; break; case 'f': - vto[i].type = FORMAT_DOUBLE; + type = FORMAT_DOUBLE; break; case 'e': - vto[i].type = FORMAT_DOUBLE; + type = FORMAT_DOUBLE; flags |= FLAGS_FLOATE; break; case 'E': - vto[i].type = FORMAT_DOUBLE; + type = FORMAT_DOUBLE; flags |= FLAGS_FLOATE|FLAGS_UPPER; break; case 'g': - vto[i].type = FORMAT_DOUBLE; + type = FORMAT_DOUBLE; flags |= FLAGS_FLOATG; break; case 'G': - vto[i].type = FORMAT_DOUBLE; + type = FORMAT_DOUBLE; flags |= FLAGS_FLOATG|FLAGS_UPPER; break; default: - vto[i].type = FORMAT_UNKNOWN; - break; + /* invalid instruction, disregard and continue */ + continue; } /* switch */ - vto[i].flags = flags; - vto[i].width = width; - vto[i].precision = precision; - if(flags & FLAGS_WIDTHPARAM) { - /* we have the width specified from a parameter, so we make that - parameter's info setup properly */ - long k = width - 1; - if((k < 0) || (k >= MAX_PARAMETERS)) - /* out of allowed range */ - return 1; - vto[i].width = k; - vto[k].type = FORMAT_WIDTH; - vto[k].flags = FLAGS_NEW; - /* can't use width or precision of width! */ - vto[k].width = 0; - vto[k].precision = 0; + if(width < 0) + width = param_num++; + else { + /* if this identifies a parameter already used, this + is illegal */ + if(usedinput[width/8] & (1 << (width&7))) + return PFMT_WIDTHARG; + } + if(width >= MAX_PARAMETERS) + return PFMT_MANYARGS; + if(width >= max_param) + max_param = width; + + in[width].type = FORMAT_WIDTH; + /* mark as used */ + usedinput[width/8] |= (unsigned char)(1 << (width&7)); } + if(flags & FLAGS_PRECPARAM) { - /* we have the precision specified from a parameter, so we make that - parameter's info setup properly */ - long k = precision - 1; - if((k < 0) || (k >= MAX_PARAMETERS)) - /* out of allowed range */ - return 1; - vto[i].precision = k; - vto[k].type = FORMAT_WIDTH; - vto[k].flags = FLAGS_NEW; - /* can't use width or precision of width! */ - vto[k].width = 0; - vto[k].precision = 0; + if(precision < 0) + precision = param_num++; + else { + /* if this identifies a parameter already used, this + is illegal */ + if(usedinput[precision/8] & (1 << (precision&7))) + return PFMT_PRECARG; + } + if(precision >= MAX_PARAMETERS) + return PFMT_MANYARGS; + if(precision >= max_param) + max_param = precision; + + in[precision].type = FORMAT_PRECISION; + usedinput[precision/8] |= (unsigned char)(1 << (precision&7)); } - *endpos++ = fmt + ((*fmt == '\0') ? 0 : 1); /* end of this sequence */ + + /* Handle the specifier */ + if(param < 0) + param = param_num++; + if(param >= MAX_PARAMETERS) + return PFMT_MANYARGS; + if(param >= max_param) + max_param = param; + + iptr = &in[param]; + iptr->type = type; + + /* mark this input as used */ + usedinput[param/8] |= (unsigned char)(1 << (param&7)); + + fmt++; + optr = &out[ocount++]; + if(ocount > MAX_SEGMENTS) + return PFMT_MANYSEGS; + optr->input = (unsigned int)param; + optr->flags = flags; + optr->width = width; + optr->precision = precision; + optr->start = start; + optr->outlen = outlen; + start = fmt; } + else + fmt++; } - /* Read the arg list parameters into our data list */ - for(i = 0; i MAX_SEGMENTS) + return PFMT_MANYSEGS; + optr->input = 0; + optr->flags = FLAGS_SUBSTR; + optr->start = start; + optr->outlen = outlen; + } - switch(vto[i].type) { + /* Read the arg list parameters into our data list */ + for(i = 0; i < max_param + 1; i++) { + struct va_input *iptr = &in[i]; + if(!(usedinput[i/8] & (1 << (i&7)))) + /* bad input */ + return PFMT_INPUTGAP; + + /* based on the type, read the correct argument */ + switch(iptr->type) { case FORMAT_STRING: - vto[i].data.str = va_arg(arglist, char *); + iptr->val.str = va_arg(arglist, char *); break; case FORMAT_INTPTR: - case FORMAT_UNKNOWN: case FORMAT_PTR: - vto[i].data.ptr = va_arg(arglist, void *); + iptr->val.ptr = va_arg(arglist, void *); break; - case FORMAT_INT: -#ifdef HAVE_LONG_LONG_TYPE - if((vto[i].flags & FLAGS_LONGLONG) && (vto[i].flags & FLAGS_UNSIGNED)) - vto[i].data.num.as_unsigned = - (mp_uintmax_t)va_arg(arglist, mp_uintmax_t); - else if(vto[i].flags & FLAGS_LONGLONG) - vto[i].data.num.as_signed = - (mp_intmax_t)va_arg(arglist, mp_intmax_t); - else -#endif - { - if((vto[i].flags & FLAGS_LONG) && (vto[i].flags & FLAGS_UNSIGNED)) - vto[i].data.num.as_unsigned = - (mp_uintmax_t)va_arg(arglist, unsigned long); - else if(vto[i].flags & FLAGS_LONG) - vto[i].data.num.as_signed = - (mp_intmax_t)va_arg(arglist, long); - else if(vto[i].flags & FLAGS_UNSIGNED) - vto[i].data.num.as_unsigned = - (mp_uintmax_t)va_arg(arglist, unsigned int); - else - vto[i].data.num.as_signed = - (mp_intmax_t)va_arg(arglist, int); - } + case FORMAT_LONGLONGU: + iptr->val.numu = (mp_uintmax_t)va_arg(arglist, mp_uintmax_t); break; - case FORMAT_DOUBLE: - vto[i].data.dnum = va_arg(arglist, double); + case FORMAT_LONGLONG: + iptr->val.nums = (mp_intmax_t)va_arg(arglist, mp_intmax_t); + break; + + case FORMAT_LONGU: + iptr->val.numu = (mp_uintmax_t)va_arg(arglist, unsigned long); + break; + + case FORMAT_LONG: + iptr->val.nums = (mp_intmax_t)va_arg(arglist, long); break; + case FORMAT_INTU: + iptr->val.numu = (mp_uintmax_t)va_arg(arglist, unsigned int); + break; + + case FORMAT_INT: case FORMAT_WIDTH: - /* Argument has been read. Silently convert it into an integer - * for later use - */ - vto[i].type = FORMAT_INT; + case FORMAT_PRECISION: + iptr->val.nums = (mp_intmax_t)va_arg(arglist, int); + break; + + case FORMAT_DOUBLE: + iptr->val.dnum = va_arg(arglist, double); break; default: + DEBUGASSERT(NULL); /* unexpected */ break; } } + *ipieces = max_param + 1; + *opieces = ocount; - return 0; - + return PFMT_OK; } -static int dprintf_formatf( - void *data, /* untouched by format(), just sent to the stream() function in - the second argument */ +/* + * formatf() - the general printf function. + * + * It calls parsefmt() to parse the format string. It populates two arrays; + * one that describes the input arguments and one that describes a number of + * output segments. + * + * On success, the input array describes the type of all arguments and their + * values. + * + * The function then iterates over the output segments and outputs them one + * by one until done. Using the appropriate input arguments (if any). + * + * All output is sent to the 'stream()' callback, one byte at a time. + */ + +static int formatf( + void *userp, /* untouched by format(), just sent to the stream() function in + the second argument */ /* function pointer called for each output character */ - int (*stream)(int, FILE *), + int (*stream)(unsigned char, void *), const char *format, /* %-formatted string */ va_list ap_save) /* list of parameters */ { - /* Base-36 digits for numbers. */ - const char *digits = lower_digits; - - /* Pointer into the format string. */ - char *f; - - /* Number of characters written. */ - int done = 0; - - long param; /* current parameter to read */ - long param_num = 0; /* parameter counter */ - - struct va_stack vto[MAX_PARAMETERS]; - char *endpos[MAX_PARAMETERS]; - char **end; + static const char nilstr[] = "(nil)"; + const char *digits = lower_digits; /* Base-36 digits for numbers. */ + int done = 0; /* number of characters written */ + int i; + int ocount = 0; /* number of output segments */ + int icount = 0; /* number of input arguments */ + + struct outsegment output[MAX_SEGMENTS]; + struct va_input input[MAX_PARAMETERS]; char work[BUFFSIZE]; - struct va_stack *p; /* 'workend' points to the final buffer byte position, but with an extra byte as margin to avoid the (false?) warning Coverity gives us otherwise */ char *workend = &work[sizeof(work) - 2]; - /* Do the actual %-code parsing */ - if(dprintf_Pass1(format, vto, endpos, ap_save)) + /* Parse the format string */ + if(parsefmt(format, output, input, &ocount, &icount, ap_save)) return 0; - end = &endpos[0]; /* the initial end-position from the list dprintf_Pass1() - created for us */ - - f = (char *)format; - while(*f != '\0') { - /* Format spec modifiers. */ - int is_alt; - - /* Width of a field. */ - long width; - - /* Precision of a field. */ - long prec; - - /* Decimal integer is negative. */ - int is_neg; - - /* Base of a number to be written. */ - unsigned long base; - - /* Integral values to be written. */ - mp_uintmax_t num; - - /* Used to convert negative in positive. */ - mp_intmax_t signed_num; - + for(i = 0; i < ocount; i++) { + struct outsegment *optr = &output[i]; + struct va_input *iptr; + bool is_alt; /* Format spec modifiers. */ + int width; /* Width of a field. */ + int prec; /* Precision of a field. */ + bool is_neg; /* Decimal integer is negative. */ + unsigned long base; /* Base of a number to be written. */ + mp_uintmax_t num; /* Integral values to be written. */ + mp_intmax_t signed_num; /* Used to convert negative in positive. */ char *w; - - if(*f != '%') { - /* This isn't a format spec, so write everything out until the next one - OR end of string is reached. */ - do { - OUTCHAR(*f); - } while(*++f && ('%' != *f)); - continue; + size_t outlen = optr->outlen; + unsigned int flags = optr->flags; + + if(outlen) { + char *str = optr->start; + for(; outlen && *str; outlen--) + OUTCHAR(*str++); + if(optr->flags & FLAGS_SUBSTR) + /* this is just a substring */ + continue; } - ++f; - - /* Check for "%%". Note that although the ANSI standard lists - '%' as a conversion specifier, it says "The complete format - specification shall be `%%'," so we can avoid all the width - and precision processing. */ - if(*f == '%') { - ++f; - OUTCHAR('%'); - continue; - } - - /* If this is a positional parameter, the position must follow immediately - after the %, thus create a %$ sequence */ - param = dprintf_DollarString(f, &f); - - if(!param) - param = param_num; - else - --param; - - param_num++; /* increase this always to allow "%2$s %1$s %s" and then the - third %s will pick the 3rd argument */ - - p = &vto[param]; - /* pick up the specified width */ - if(p->flags & FLAGS_WIDTHPARAM) { - width = (long)vto[p->width].data.num.as_signed; - param_num++; /* since the width is extracted from a parameter, we - must skip that to get to the next one properly */ + if(flags & FLAGS_WIDTHPARAM) { + width = (int)input[optr->width].val.nums; if(width < 0) { /* "A negative field width is taken as a '-' flag followed by a positive field width." */ - width = -width; - p->flags |= FLAGS_LEFT; - p->flags &= ~FLAGS_PAD_NIL; + if(width == INT_MIN) + width = INT_MAX; + else + width = -width; + flags |= FLAGS_LEFT; + flags &= ~(unsigned int)FLAGS_PAD_NIL; } } else - width = p->width; + width = optr->width; /* pick up the specified precision */ - if(p->flags & FLAGS_PRECPARAM) { - prec = (long)vto[p->precision].data.num.as_signed; - param_num++; /* since the precision is extracted from a parameter, we - must skip that to get to the next one properly */ + if(flags & FLAGS_PRECPARAM) { + prec = (int)input[optr->precision].val.nums; if(prec < 0) /* "A negative precision is taken as if the precision were omitted." */ prec = -1; } - else if(p->flags & FLAGS_PREC) - prec = p->precision; + else if(flags & FLAGS_PREC) + prec = optr->precision; else prec = -1; - is_alt = (p->flags & FLAGS_ALT) ? 1 : 0; + is_alt = (flags & FLAGS_ALT) ? 1 : 0; + iptr = &input[optr->input]; - switch(p->type) { + switch(iptr->type) { + case FORMAT_INTU: + case FORMAT_LONGU: + case FORMAT_LONGLONGU: + flags |= FLAGS_UNSIGNED; + FALLTHROUGH(); case FORMAT_INT: - num = p->data.num.as_unsigned; - if(p->flags & FLAGS_CHAR) { + case FORMAT_LONG: + case FORMAT_LONGLONG: + num = iptr->val.numu; + if(flags & FLAGS_CHAR) { /* Character. */ - if(!(p->flags & FLAGS_LEFT)) + if(!(flags & FLAGS_LEFT)) while(--width > 0) OUTCHAR(' '); OUTCHAR((char) num); - if(p->flags & FLAGS_LEFT) + if(flags & FLAGS_LEFT) while(--width > 0) OUTCHAR(' '); break; } - if(p->flags & FLAGS_OCTAL) { - /* Octal unsigned integer. */ + if(flags & FLAGS_OCTAL) { + /* Octal unsigned integer */ base = 8; - goto unsigned_number; + is_neg = FALSE; } - else if(p->flags & FLAGS_HEX) { - /* Hexadecimal unsigned integer. */ - - digits = (p->flags & FLAGS_UPPER)? upper_digits : lower_digits; + else if(flags & FLAGS_HEX) { + /* Hexadecimal unsigned integer */ + digits = (flags & FLAGS_UPPER)? upper_digits : lower_digits; base = 16; - goto unsigned_number; + is_neg = FALSE; } - else if(p->flags & FLAGS_UNSIGNED) { - /* Decimal unsigned integer. */ + else if(flags & FLAGS_UNSIGNED) { + /* Decimal unsigned integer */ base = 10; - goto unsigned_number; + is_neg = FALSE; } + else { + /* Decimal integer. */ + base = 10; - /* Decimal integer. */ - base = 10; - - is_neg = (p->data.num.as_signed < (mp_intmax_t)0) ? 1 : 0; - if(is_neg) { - /* signed_num might fail to hold absolute negative minimum by 1 */ - signed_num = p->data.num.as_signed + (mp_intmax_t)1; - signed_num = -signed_num; - num = (mp_uintmax_t)signed_num; - num += (mp_uintmax_t)1; + is_neg = (iptr->val.nums < (mp_intmax_t)0); + if(is_neg) { + /* signed_num might fail to hold absolute negative minimum by 1 */ + signed_num = iptr->val.nums + (mp_intmax_t)1; + signed_num = -signed_num; + num = (mp_uintmax_t)signed_num; + num += (mp_uintmax_t)1; + } } - - goto number; - -unsigned_number: - /* Unsigned number of base BASE. */ - is_neg = 0; - number: - /* Number of base BASE. */ - /* Supply a default precision if none was given. */ if(prec == -1) prec = 1; /* Put the number in WORK. */ w = workend; - while(num > 0) { - *w-- = digits[num % base]; - num /= base; + switch(base) { + case 10: + while(num > 0) { + *w-- = (char)('0' + (num % 10)); + num /= 10; + } + break; + default: + while(num > 0) { + *w-- = digits[num % base]; + num /= base; + } + break; } - width -= (long)(workend - w); - prec -= (long)(workend - w); + width -= (int)(workend - w); + prec -= (int)(workend - w); if(is_alt && base == 8 && prec <= 0) { *w-- = '0'; @@ -775,29 +821,29 @@ static int dprintf_formatf( if(is_alt && base == 16) width -= 2; - if(is_neg || (p->flags & FLAGS_SHOWSIGN) || (p->flags & FLAGS_SPACE)) + if(is_neg || (flags & FLAGS_SHOWSIGN) || (flags & FLAGS_SPACE)) --width; - if(!(p->flags & FLAGS_LEFT) && !(p->flags & FLAGS_PAD_NIL)) + if(!(flags & FLAGS_LEFT) && !(flags & FLAGS_PAD_NIL)) while(width-- > 0) OUTCHAR(' '); if(is_neg) OUTCHAR('-'); - else if(p->flags & FLAGS_SHOWSIGN) + else if(flags & FLAGS_SHOWSIGN) OUTCHAR('+'); - else if(p->flags & FLAGS_SPACE) + else if(flags & FLAGS_SPACE) OUTCHAR(' '); if(is_alt && base == 16) { OUTCHAR('0'); - if(p->flags & FLAGS_UPPER) + if(flags & FLAGS_UPPER) OUTCHAR('X'); else OUTCHAR('x'); } - if(!(p->flags & FLAGS_LEFT) && (p->flags & FLAGS_PAD_NIL)) + if(!(flags & FLAGS_LEFT) && (flags & FLAGS_PAD_NIL)) while(width-- > 0) OUTCHAR('0'); @@ -806,219 +852,200 @@ static int dprintf_formatf( OUTCHAR(*w); } - if(p->flags & FLAGS_LEFT) + if(flags & FLAGS_LEFT) while(width-- > 0) OUTCHAR(' '); break; - case FORMAT_STRING: - /* String. */ - { - static const char null[] = "(nil)"; - const char *str; - size_t len; - - str = (char *) p->data.str; - if(!str) { - /* Write null[] if there's space. */ - if(prec == -1 || prec >= (long) sizeof(null) - 1) { - str = null; - len = sizeof(null) - 1; - /* Disable quotes around (nil) */ - p->flags &= (~FLAGS_ALT); - } - else { - str = ""; - len = 0; - } + case FORMAT_STRING: { + const char *str; + size_t len; + + str = (char *)iptr->val.str; + if(!str) { + /* Write null string if there's space. */ + if(prec == -1 || prec >= (int) sizeof(nilstr) - 1) { + str = nilstr; + len = sizeof(nilstr) - 1; + /* Disable quotes around (nil) */ + flags &= ~(unsigned int)FLAGS_ALT; } - else if(prec != -1) - len = (size_t)prec; - else if(*str == '\0') + else { + str = ""; len = 0; - else - len = strlen(str); + } + } + else if(prec != -1) + len = (size_t)prec; + else if(*str == '\0') + len = 0; + else + len = strlen(str); - width -= (len > LONG_MAX) ? LONG_MAX : (long)len; + width -= (len > INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : (int)len; - if(p->flags & FLAGS_ALT) - OUTCHAR('"'); + if(flags & FLAGS_ALT) + OUTCHAR('"'); - if(!(p->flags&FLAGS_LEFT)) - while(width-- > 0) - OUTCHAR(' '); + if(!(flags & FLAGS_LEFT)) + while(width-- > 0) + OUTCHAR(' '); - for(; len && *str; len--) - OUTCHAR(*str++); - if(p->flags&FLAGS_LEFT) - while(width-- > 0) - OUTCHAR(' '); + for(; len && *str; len--) + OUTCHAR(*str++); + if(flags & FLAGS_LEFT) + while(width-- > 0) + OUTCHAR(' '); - if(p->flags & FLAGS_ALT) - OUTCHAR('"'); - } + if(flags & FLAGS_ALT) + OUTCHAR('"'); break; + } case FORMAT_PTR: /* Generic pointer. */ - { - void *ptr; - ptr = (void *) p->data.ptr; - if(ptr) { - /* If the pointer is not NULL, write it as a %#x spec. */ - base = 16; - digits = (p->flags & FLAGS_UPPER)? upper_digits : lower_digits; - is_alt = 1; - num = (size_t) ptr; - is_neg = 0; - goto number; - } - else { - /* Write "(nil)" for a nil pointer. */ - static const char strnil[] = "(nil)"; - const char *point; - - width -= (long)(sizeof(strnil) - 1); - if(p->flags & FLAGS_LEFT) - while(width-- > 0) - OUTCHAR(' '); - for(point = strnil; *point != '\0'; ++point) - OUTCHAR(*point); - if(!(p->flags & FLAGS_LEFT)) - while(width-- > 0) - OUTCHAR(' '); - } + if(iptr->val.ptr) { + /* If the pointer is not NULL, write it as a %#x spec. */ + base = 16; + digits = (flags & FLAGS_UPPER)? upper_digits : lower_digits; + is_alt = TRUE; + num = (size_t) iptr->val.ptr; + is_neg = FALSE; + goto number; } - break; + else { + /* Write "(nil)" for a nil pointer. */ + const char *point; - case FORMAT_DOUBLE: - { - char formatbuf[32]="%"; - char *fptr = &formatbuf[1]; - size_t left = sizeof(formatbuf)-strlen(formatbuf); - int len; - - width = -1; - if(p->flags & FLAGS_WIDTH) - width = p->width; - else if(p->flags & FLAGS_WIDTHPARAM) - width = (long)vto[p->width].data.num.as_signed; + width -= (int)(sizeof(nilstr) - 1); + if(flags & FLAGS_LEFT) + while(width-- > 0) + OUTCHAR(' '); + for(point = nilstr; *point != '\0'; ++point) + OUTCHAR(*point); + if(!(flags & FLAGS_LEFT)) + while(width-- > 0) + OUTCHAR(' '); + } + break; - prec = -1; - if(p->flags & FLAGS_PREC) - prec = p->precision; - else if(p->flags & FLAGS_PRECPARAM) - prec = (long)vto[p->precision].data.num.as_signed; - - if(p->flags & FLAGS_LEFT) - *fptr++ = '-'; - if(p->flags & FLAGS_SHOWSIGN) - *fptr++ = '+'; - if(p->flags & FLAGS_SPACE) - *fptr++ = ' '; - if(p->flags & FLAGS_ALT) - *fptr++ = '#'; - - *fptr = 0; - - if(width >= 0) { - if(width >= (long)sizeof(work)) - width = sizeof(work)-1; - /* RECURSIVE USAGE */ - len = curl_msnprintf(fptr, left, "%ld", width); - fptr += len; - left -= len; + case FORMAT_DOUBLE: { + char formatbuf[32]="%"; + char *fptr = &formatbuf[1]; + size_t left = sizeof(formatbuf)-strlen(formatbuf); + int len; + + if(flags & FLAGS_WIDTH) + width = optr->width; + + if(flags & FLAGS_PREC) + prec = optr->precision; + + if(flags & FLAGS_LEFT) + *fptr++ = '-'; + if(flags & FLAGS_SHOWSIGN) + *fptr++ = '+'; + if(flags & FLAGS_SPACE) + *fptr++ = ' '; + if(flags & FLAGS_ALT) + *fptr++ = '#'; + + *fptr = 0; + + if(width >= 0) { + size_t dlen; + if(width >= (int)sizeof(work)) + width = sizeof(work)-1; + /* RECURSIVE USAGE */ + dlen = (size_t)curl_msnprintf(fptr, left, "%d", width); + fptr += dlen; + left -= dlen; + } + if(prec >= 0) { + /* for each digit in the integer part, we can have one less + precision */ + size_t maxprec = sizeof(work) - 2; + double val = iptr->val.dnum; + if(width > 0 && prec <= width) + maxprec -= (size_t)width; + while(val >= 10.0) { + val /= 10; + maxprec--; } - if(prec >= 0) { - /* for each digit in the integer part, we can have one less - precision */ - size_t maxprec = sizeof(work) - 2; - double val = p->data.dnum; - if(width > 0 && prec <= width) - maxprec -= width; - while(val >= 10.0) { - val /= 10; - maxprec--; - } - if(prec > (long)maxprec) - prec = (long)maxprec-1; - if(prec < 0) - prec = 0; - /* RECURSIVE USAGE */ - len = curl_msnprintf(fptr, left, ".%ld", prec); - fptr += len; - } - if(p->flags & FLAGS_LONG) - *fptr++ = 'l'; + if(prec > (int)maxprec) + prec = (int)maxprec-1; + if(prec < 0) + prec = 0; + /* RECURSIVE USAGE */ + len = curl_msnprintf(fptr, left, ".%d", prec); + fptr += len; + } + if(flags & FLAGS_LONG) + *fptr++ = 'l'; - if(p->flags & FLAGS_FLOATE) - *fptr++ = (char)((p->flags & FLAGS_UPPER) ? 'E':'e'); - else if(p->flags & FLAGS_FLOATG) - *fptr++ = (char)((p->flags & FLAGS_UPPER) ? 'G' : 'g'); - else - *fptr++ = 'f'; + if(flags & FLAGS_FLOATE) + *fptr++ = (char)((flags & FLAGS_UPPER) ? 'E':'e'); + else if(flags & FLAGS_FLOATG) + *fptr++ = (char)((flags & FLAGS_UPPER) ? 'G' : 'g'); + else + *fptr++ = 'f'; - *fptr = 0; /* and a final null-termination */ + *fptr = 0; /* and a final null-termination */ #ifdef __clang__ #pragma clang diagnostic push #pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wformat-nonliteral" #endif - /* NOTE NOTE NOTE!! Not all sprintf implementations return number of - output characters */ + /* NOTE NOTE NOTE!! Not all sprintf implementations return number of + output characters */ #ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF - (snprintf)(work, sizeof(work), formatbuf, p->data.dnum); + (snprintf)(work, sizeof(work), formatbuf, iptr->val.dnum); #else - (sprintf)(work, formatbuf, p->data.dnum); + (sprintf)(work, formatbuf, iptr->val.dnum); #endif #ifdef __clang__ #pragma clang diagnostic pop #endif - DEBUGASSERT(strlen(work) <= sizeof(work)); - for(fptr = work; *fptr; fptr++) - OUTCHAR(*fptr); - } + DEBUGASSERT(strlen(work) <= sizeof(work)); + for(fptr = work; *fptr; fptr++) + OUTCHAR(*fptr); break; + } case FORMAT_INTPTR: /* Answer the count of characters written. */ #ifdef HAVE_LONG_LONG_TYPE - if(p->flags & FLAGS_LONGLONG) - *(LONG_LONG_TYPE *) p->data.ptr = (LONG_LONG_TYPE)done; + if(flags & FLAGS_LONGLONG) + *(LONG_LONG_TYPE *) iptr->val.ptr = (LONG_LONG_TYPE)done; else #endif - if(p->flags & FLAGS_LONG) - *(long *) p->data.ptr = (long)done; - else if(!(p->flags & FLAGS_SHORT)) - *(int *) p->data.ptr = (int)done; + if(flags & FLAGS_LONG) + *(long *) iptr->val.ptr = (long)done; + else if(!(flags & FLAGS_SHORT)) + *(int *) iptr->val.ptr = (int)done; else - *(short *) p->data.ptr = (short)done; + *(short *) iptr->val.ptr = (short)done; break; default: break; } - f = *end++; /* goto end of %-code */ - } return done; } /* fputc() look-alike */ -static int addbyter(int output, FILE *data) +static int addbyter(unsigned char outc, void *f) { - struct nsprintf *infop = (struct nsprintf *)data; - unsigned char outc = (unsigned char)output; - + struct nsprintf *infop = f; if(infop->length < infop->max) { /* only do this if we haven't reached max length yet */ - infop->buffer[0] = outc; /* store */ - infop->buffer++; /* increase pointer */ + *infop->buffer++ = (char)outc; /* store */ infop->length++; /* we are now one byte larger */ - return outc; /* fputc() returns like this on success */ + return 0; /* fputc() returns like this on success */ } - return -1; + return 1; } int curl_mvsnprintf(char *buffer, size_t maxlength, const char *format, @@ -1031,7 +1058,7 @@ int curl_mvsnprintf(char *buffer, size_t maxlength, const char *format, info.length = 0; info.max = maxlength; - retcode = dprintf_formatf(&info, addbyter, format, ap_save); + retcode = formatf(&info, addbyter, format, ap_save); if(info.max) { /* we terminate this with a zero byte */ if(info.max == info.length) { @@ -1057,29 +1084,28 @@ int curl_msnprintf(char *buffer, size_t maxlength, const char *format, ...) } /* fputc() look-alike */ -static int alloc_addbyter(int output, FILE *data) +static int alloc_addbyter(unsigned char outc, void *f) { - struct asprintf *infop = (struct asprintf *)data; - unsigned char outc = (unsigned char)output; - - if(Curl_dyn_addn(infop->b, &outc, 1)) { - infop->fail = 1; - return -1; /* fail */ + struct asprintf *infop = f; + CURLcode result = Curl_dyn_addn(infop->b, &outc, 1); + if(result) { + infop->merr = result == CURLE_TOO_LARGE ? MERR_TOO_LARGE : MERR_MEM; + return 1 ; /* fail */ } - return outc; /* fputc() returns like this on success */ + return 0; } -/* appends the formatted string, returns 0 on success, 1 on error */ +/* appends the formatted string, returns MERR error code */ int Curl_dyn_vprintf(struct dynbuf *dyn, const char *format, va_list ap_save) { struct asprintf info; info.b = dyn; - info.fail = 0; + info.merr = MERR_OK; - (void)dprintf_formatf(&info, alloc_addbyter, format, ap_save); - if(info.fail) { + (void)formatf(&info, alloc_addbyter, format, ap_save); + if(info.merr) { Curl_dyn_free(info.b); - return 1; + return info.merr; } return 0; } @@ -1090,10 +1116,10 @@ char *curl_mvaprintf(const char *format, va_list ap_save) struct dynbuf dyn; info.b = &dyn; Curl_dyn_init(info.b, DYN_APRINTF); - info.fail = 0; + info.merr = MERR_OK; - (void)dprintf_formatf(&info, alloc_addbyter, format, ap_save); - if(info.fail) { + (void)formatf(&info, alloc_addbyter, format, ap_save); + if(info.merr) { Curl_dyn_free(info.b); return NULL; } @@ -1112,13 +1138,12 @@ char *curl_maprintf(const char *format, ...) return s; } -static int storebuffer(int output, FILE *data) +static int storebuffer(unsigned char outc, void *f) { - char **buffer = (char **)data; - unsigned char outc = (unsigned char)output; - **buffer = outc; + char **buffer = f; + **buffer = (char)outc; (*buffer)++; - return outc; /* act like fputc() ! */ + return 0; } int curl_msprintf(char *buffer, const char *format, ...) @@ -1126,19 +1151,27 @@ int curl_msprintf(char *buffer, const char *format, ...) va_list ap_save; /* argument pointer */ int retcode; va_start(ap_save, format); - retcode = dprintf_formatf(&buffer, storebuffer, format, ap_save); + retcode = formatf(&buffer, storebuffer, format, ap_save); va_end(ap_save); *buffer = 0; /* we terminate this with a zero byte */ return retcode; } +static int fputc_wrapper(unsigned char outc, void *f) +{ + int out = outc; + FILE *s = f; + int rc = fputc(out, s); + return rc == EOF; +} + int curl_mprintf(const char *format, ...) { int retcode; va_list ap_save; /* argument pointer */ va_start(ap_save, format); - retcode = dprintf_formatf(stdout, fputc, format, ap_save); + retcode = formatf(stdout, fputc_wrapper, format, ap_save); va_end(ap_save); return retcode; } @@ -1148,25 +1181,24 @@ int curl_mfprintf(FILE *whereto, const char *format, ...) int retcode; va_list ap_save; /* argument pointer */ va_start(ap_save, format); - retcode = dprintf_formatf(whereto, fputc, format, ap_save); + retcode = formatf(whereto, fputc_wrapper, format, ap_save); va_end(ap_save); return retcode; } int curl_mvsprintf(char *buffer, const char *format, va_list ap_save) { - int retcode; - retcode = dprintf_formatf(&buffer, storebuffer, format, ap_save); + int retcode = formatf(&buffer, storebuffer, format, ap_save); *buffer = 0; /* we terminate this with a zero byte */ return retcode; } int curl_mvprintf(const char *format, va_list ap_save) { - return dprintf_formatf(stdout, fputc, format, ap_save); + return formatf(stdout, fputc_wrapper, format, ap_save); } int curl_mvfprintf(FILE *whereto, const char *format, va_list ap_save) { - return dprintf_formatf(whereto, fputc, format, ap_save); + return formatf(whereto, fputc_wrapper, format, ap_save); } diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/mqtt.c b/vendor/curl/lib/mqtt.c index 366235c559..4ca24eb41c 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/mqtt.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/mqtt.c @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static CURLcode mqtt_setup_conn(struct Curl_easy *data, */ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_mqtt = { - "MQTT", /* scheme */ + "mqtt", /* scheme */ mqtt_setup_conn, /* setup_connection */ mqtt_do, /* do_it */ mqtt_done, /* done */ @@ -88,7 +88,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_mqtt = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_MQTT, /* defport */ @@ -119,12 +120,12 @@ static CURLcode mqtt_send(struct Curl_easy *data, { CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; struct MQTT *mq = data->req.p.mqtt; - ssize_t n; - result = Curl_nwrite(data, FIRSTSOCKET, buf, len, &n); + size_t n; + result = Curl_xfer_send(data, buf, len, &n); if(result) return result; Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_HEADER_OUT, buf, (size_t)n); - if(len != (size_t)n) { + if(len != n) { size_t nsend = len - n; char *sendleftovers = Curl_memdup(&buf[n], nsend); if(!sendleftovers) @@ -366,8 +367,7 @@ static CURLcode mqtt_recv_atleast(struct Curl_easy *data, size_t nbytes) ssize_t nread; DEBUGASSERT(nbytes - rlen < sizeof(readbuf)); - result = Curl_read(data, data->conn->sock[FIRSTSOCKET], - (char *)readbuf, nbytes - rlen, &nread); + result = Curl_xfer_recv(data, (char *)readbuf, nbytes - rlen, &nread); if(result) return result; DEBUGASSERT(nread >= 0); @@ -524,8 +524,10 @@ static CURLcode mqtt_publish(struct Curl_easy *data) char encodedbytes[4]; curl_off_t postfieldsize = data->set.postfieldsize; - if(!payload) + if(!payload) { + DEBUGF(infof(data, "mqtt_publish without payload, return bad arg")); return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + } if(postfieldsize < 0) payloadlen = strlen(payload); else @@ -620,9 +622,7 @@ static CURLcode mqtt_read_publish(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) { CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; - curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[FIRSTSOCKET]; ssize_t nread; - unsigned char *pkt = (unsigned char *)data->state.buffer; size_t remlen; struct mqtt_conn *mqtt = &conn->proto.mqtt; struct MQTT *mq = data->req.p.mqtt; @@ -671,13 +671,14 @@ static CURLcode mqtt_read_publish(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) data->req.bytecount = 0; data->req.size = remlen; mq->npacket = remlen; /* get this many bytes */ - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case MQTT_PUB_REMAIN: { /* read rest of packet, but no more. Cap to buffer size */ + char buffer[4*1024]; size_t rest = mq->npacket; - if(rest > (size_t)data->set.buffer_size) - rest = (size_t)data->set.buffer_size; - result = Curl_read(data, sockfd, (char *)pkt, rest, &nread); + if(rest > sizeof(buffer)) + rest = sizeof(buffer); + result = Curl_xfer_recv(data, buffer, rest, &nread); if(result) { if(CURLE_AGAIN == result) { infof(data, "EEEE AAAAGAIN"); @@ -690,14 +691,12 @@ static CURLcode mqtt_read_publish(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) goto end; } - mq->npacket -= nread; - /* if QoS is set, message contains packet id */ - - result = Curl_client_write(data, CLIENTWRITE_BODY, (char *)pkt, nread); + result = Curl_client_write(data, CLIENTWRITE_BODY, buffer, nread); if(result) goto end; + mq->npacket -= nread; if(!mq->npacket) /* no more PUBLISH payload, back to subscribe wait state */ mqstate(data, MQTT_FIRST, MQTT_PUBWAIT); @@ -744,8 +743,6 @@ static CURLcode mqtt_doing(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) struct mqtt_conn *mqtt = &conn->proto.mqtt; struct MQTT *mq = data->req.p.mqtt; ssize_t nread; - curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[FIRSTSOCKET]; - unsigned char *pkt = (unsigned char *)data->state.buffer; unsigned char byte; *done = FALSE; @@ -763,7 +760,7 @@ static CURLcode mqtt_doing(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) switch(mqtt->state) { case MQTT_FIRST: /* Read the initial byte only */ - result = Curl_read(data, sockfd, (char *)&mq->firstbyte, 1, &nread); + result = Curl_xfer_recv(data, (char *)&mq->firstbyte, 1, &nread); if(result) break; else if(!nread) { @@ -776,22 +773,22 @@ static CURLcode mqtt_doing(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) /* remember the first byte */ mq->npacket = 0; mqstate(data, MQTT_REMAINING_LENGTH, MQTT_NOSTATE); - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case MQTT_REMAINING_LENGTH: do { - result = Curl_read(data, sockfd, (char *)&byte, 1, &nread); - if(!nread) + result = Curl_xfer_recv(data, (char *)&byte, 1, &nread); + if(result || !nread) break; Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_HEADER_IN, (char *)&byte, 1); - pkt[mq->npacket++] = byte; + mq->pkt_hd[mq->npacket++] = byte; } while((byte & 0x80) && (mq->npacket < 4)); - if(nread && (byte & 0x80)) + if(!result && nread && (byte & 0x80)) /* MQTT supports up to 127 * 128^0 + 127 * 128^1 + 127 * 128^2 + 127 * 128^3 bytes. server tried to send more */ result = CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY; if(result) break; - mq->remaining_length = mqtt_decode_len(&pkt[0], mq->npacket, NULL); + mq->remaining_length = mqtt_decode_len(mq->pkt_hd, mq->npacket, NULL); mq->npacket = 0; if(mq->remaining_length) { mqstate(data, mqtt->nextstate, MQTT_NOSTATE); diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/mqtt.h b/vendor/curl/lib/mqtt.h index 84f177022e..99ab12a98a 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/mqtt.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/mqtt.h @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ struct MQTT { unsigned char firstbyte; size_t remaining_length; struct dynbuf recvbuf; + unsigned char pkt_hd[4]; /* for decoding the arriving packet length */ }; #endif /* HEADER_CURL_MQTT_H */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/multi.c b/vendor/curl/lib/multi.c index 5456113be7..6bbdfe2672 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/multi.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/multi.c @@ -86,6 +86,8 @@ ((x) && (x)->magic == CURL_MULTI_HANDLE) #endif +static void move_pending_to_connect(struct Curl_multi *multi, + struct Curl_easy *data); static CURLMcode singlesocket(struct Curl_multi *multi, struct Curl_easy *data); static CURLMcode add_next_timeout(struct curltime now, @@ -94,11 +96,13 @@ static CURLMcode add_next_timeout(struct curltime now, static CURLMcode multi_timeout(struct Curl_multi *multi, long *timeout_ms); static void process_pending_handles(struct Curl_multi *multi); +static void multi_xfer_bufs_free(struct Curl_multi *multi); #ifdef DEBUGBUILD static const char * const multi_statename[]={ "INIT", "PENDING", + "SETUP", "CONNECT", "RESOLVING", "CONNECTING", @@ -148,6 +152,7 @@ static void mstate(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLMstate state static const init_multistate_func finit[MSTATE_LAST] = { NULL, /* INIT */ NULL, /* PENDING */ + NULL, /* SETUP */ Curl_init_CONNECT, /* CONNECT */ NULL, /* RESOLVING */ NULL, /* CONNECTING */ @@ -189,6 +194,10 @@ static void mstate(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLMstate state /* changing to COMPLETED means there's one less easy handle 'alive' */ DEBUGASSERT(data->multi->num_alive > 0); data->multi->num_alive--; + if(!data->multi->num_alive) { + /* free the transfer buffer when we have no more active transfers */ + multi_xfer_bufs_free(data->multi); + } } /* if this state has an init-function, run it */ @@ -355,7 +364,7 @@ static size_t hash_fd(void *key, size_t key_length, size_t slots_num) * per call." * */ -static void sh_init(struct Curl_hash *hash, int hashsize) +static void sh_init(struct Curl_hash *hash, size_t hashsize) { Curl_hash_init(hash, hashsize, hash_fd, fd_key_compare, sh_freeentry); @@ -369,13 +378,12 @@ static void sh_init(struct Curl_hash *hash, int hashsize) */ static void multi_addmsg(struct Curl_multi *multi, struct Curl_message *msg) { - Curl_llist_insert_next(&multi->msglist, multi->msglist.tail, msg, - &msg->list); + Curl_llist_append(&multi->msglist, msg, &msg->list); } -struct Curl_multi *Curl_multi_handle(int hashsize, /* socket hash */ - int chashsize, /* connection hash */ - int dnssize) /* dns hash */ +struct Curl_multi *Curl_multi_handle(size_t hashsize, /* socket hash */ + size_t chashsize, /* connection hash */ + size_t dnssize) /* dns hash */ { struct Curl_multi *multi = calloc(1, sizeof(struct Curl_multi)); @@ -525,6 +533,13 @@ CURLMcode curl_multi_add_handle(struct Curl_multi *multi, multi->dead = FALSE; } + if(data->multi_easy) { + /* if this easy handle was previously used for curl_easy_perform(), there + is a private multi handle here that we can kill */ + curl_multi_cleanup(data->multi_easy); + data->multi_easy = NULL; + } + /* Initialize timeout list for this handle */ Curl_llist_init(&data->state.timeoutlist, NULL); @@ -537,6 +552,8 @@ CURLMcode curl_multi_add_handle(struct Curl_multi *multi, if(data->set.errorbuffer) data->set.errorbuffer[0] = 0; + data->state.os_errno = 0; + /* make the Curl_easy refer back to this multi handle - before Curl_expire() is called. */ data->multi = multi; @@ -640,7 +657,7 @@ static CURLcode multi_done(struct Curl_easy *data, after an error was detected */ bool premature) { - CURLcode result; + CURLcode result, r2; struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; #if defined(DEBUGBUILD) && !defined(CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS) @@ -672,6 +689,7 @@ static CURLcode multi_done(struct Curl_easy *data, many callbacks and protocols work differently, we could potentially do this more fine-grained in the future. */ premature = TRUE; + FALLTHROUGH(); default: break; } @@ -690,14 +708,18 @@ static CURLcode multi_done(struct Curl_easy *data, result = CURLE_ABORTED_BY_CALLBACK; } + /* Make sure that transfer client writes are really done now. */ + r2 = Curl_xfer_write_done(data, premature); + if(r2 && !result) + result = r2; + /* Inform connection filters that this transfer is done */ Curl_conn_ev_data_done(data, premature); process_pending_handles(data->multi); /* connection / multiplex */ - Curl_safefree(data->state.ulbuf); - - Curl_client_cleanup(data); + if(!result) + result = Curl_req_done(&data->req, data, premature); CONNCACHE_LOCK(data); Curl_detach_connection(data); @@ -783,7 +805,6 @@ static CURLcode multi_done(struct Curl_easy *data, data->state.lastconnect_id = -1; } - Curl_safefree(data->state.buffer); return result; } @@ -986,38 +1007,98 @@ void Curl_attach_connection(struct Curl_easy *data, DEBUGASSERT(!data->conn); DEBUGASSERT(conn); data->conn = conn; - Curl_llist_insert_next(&conn->easyq, conn->easyq.tail, data, - &data->conn_queue); + Curl_llist_append(&conn->easyq, data, &data->conn_queue); if(conn->handler && conn->handler->attach) conn->handler->attach(data, conn); Curl_conn_ev_data_attach(conn, data); } -static int domore_getsock(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn, - curl_socket_t *socks) +static int connecting_getsock(struct Curl_easy *data, curl_socket_t *socks) +{ + struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; + (void)socks; + /* Not using `conn->sockfd` as `Curl_xfer_setup()` initializes + * that *after* the connect. */ + if(conn && conn->sock[FIRSTSOCKET] != CURL_SOCKET_BAD) { + /* Default is to wait to something from the server */ + socks[0] = conn->sock[FIRSTSOCKET]; + return GETSOCK_READSOCK(0); + } + return GETSOCK_BLANK; +} + +static int protocol_getsock(struct Curl_easy *data, curl_socket_t *socks) { + struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; + if(conn && conn->handler->proto_getsock) + return conn->handler->proto_getsock(data, conn, socks); + else if(conn && conn->sockfd != CURL_SOCKET_BAD) { + /* Default is to wait to something from the server */ + socks[0] = conn->sockfd; + return GETSOCK_READSOCK(0); + } + return GETSOCK_BLANK; +} + +static int domore_getsock(struct Curl_easy *data, curl_socket_t *socks) +{ + struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; if(conn && conn->handler->domore_getsock) return conn->handler->domore_getsock(data, conn, socks); + else if(conn && conn->sockfd != CURL_SOCKET_BAD) { + /* Default is that we want to send something to the server */ + socks[0] = conn->sockfd; + return GETSOCK_WRITESOCK(0); + } return GETSOCK_BLANK; } -static int doing_getsock(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn, - curl_socket_t *socks) +static int doing_getsock(struct Curl_easy *data, curl_socket_t *socks) { + struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; if(conn && conn->handler->doing_getsock) return conn->handler->doing_getsock(data, conn, socks); + else if(conn && conn->sockfd != CURL_SOCKET_BAD) { + /* Default is that we want to send something to the server */ + socks[0] = conn->sockfd; + return GETSOCK_WRITESOCK(0); + } return GETSOCK_BLANK; } -static int protocol_getsock(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn, - curl_socket_t *socks) +static int perform_getsock(struct Curl_easy *data, curl_socket_t *sock) { - if(conn->handler->proto_getsock) - return conn->handler->proto_getsock(data, conn, socks); - return GETSOCK_BLANK; + struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; + + if(!conn) + return GETSOCK_BLANK; + else if(conn->handler->perform_getsock) + return conn->handler->perform_getsock(data, conn, sock); + else { + /* Default is to obey the data->req.keepon flags for send/recv */ + int bitmap = GETSOCK_BLANK; + unsigned sockindex = 0; + if(CURL_WANT_RECV(data)) { + DEBUGASSERT(conn->sockfd != CURL_SOCKET_BAD); + bitmap |= GETSOCK_READSOCK(sockindex); + sock[sockindex] = conn->sockfd; + } + + if(CURL_WANT_SEND(data)) { + if((conn->sockfd != conn->writesockfd) || + bitmap == GETSOCK_BLANK) { + /* only if they are not the same socket and we have a readable + one, we increase index */ + if(bitmap != GETSOCK_BLANK) + sockindex++; /* increase index if we need two entries */ + + DEBUGASSERT(conn->writesockfd != CURL_SOCKET_BAD); + sock[sockindex] = conn->writesockfd; + } + bitmap |= GETSOCK_WRITESOCK(sockindex); + } + return bitmap; + } } /* Initializes `poll_set` with the current socket poll actions needed @@ -1033,45 +1114,62 @@ static void multi_getsock(struct Curl_easy *data, return; switch(data->mstate) { - default: + case MSTATE_INIT: + case MSTATE_PENDING: + case MSTATE_SETUP: + case MSTATE_CONNECT: + /* nothing to poll for yet */ break; case MSTATE_RESOLVING: - Curl_pollset_add_socks2(data, ps, Curl_resolv_getsock); + Curl_pollset_add_socks(data, ps, Curl_resolv_getsock); /* connection filters are not involved in this phase */ - return; + break; + + case MSTATE_CONNECTING: + case MSTATE_TUNNELING: + Curl_pollset_add_socks(data, ps, connecting_getsock); + Curl_conn_adjust_pollset(data, ps); + break; - case MSTATE_PROTOCONNECTING: case MSTATE_PROTOCONNECT: + case MSTATE_PROTOCONNECTING: Curl_pollset_add_socks(data, ps, protocol_getsock); + Curl_conn_adjust_pollset(data, ps); break; case MSTATE_DO: case MSTATE_DOING: Curl_pollset_add_socks(data, ps, doing_getsock); - break; - - case MSTATE_TUNNELING: - case MSTATE_CONNECTING: + Curl_conn_adjust_pollset(data, ps); break; case MSTATE_DOING_MORE: Curl_pollset_add_socks(data, ps, domore_getsock); + Curl_conn_adjust_pollset(data, ps); break; - case MSTATE_DID: /* since is set after DO is completed, we switch to - waiting for the same as the PERFORMING state */ + case MSTATE_DID: /* same as PERFORMING in regard to polling */ case MSTATE_PERFORMING: - Curl_pollset_add_socks(data, ps, Curl_single_getsock); + Curl_pollset_add_socks(data, ps, perform_getsock); + Curl_conn_adjust_pollset(data, ps); break; case MSTATE_RATELIMITING: - /* nothing to wait for */ - return; - } + /* we need to let time pass, ignore socket(s) */ + break; + + case MSTATE_DONE: + case MSTATE_COMPLETED: + case MSTATE_MSGSENT: + /* nothing more to poll for */ + break; - /* Let connection filters add/remove as needed */ - Curl_conn_adjust_pollset(data, ps); + default: + failf(data, "multi_getsock: unexpected multi state %d", data->mstate); + DEBUGASSERT(0); + break; + } } CURLMcode curl_multi_fdset(struct Curl_multi *multi, @@ -1115,6 +1213,68 @@ CURLMcode curl_multi_fdset(struct Curl_multi *multi, return CURLM_OK; } +CURLMcode curl_multi_waitfds(struct Curl_multi *multi, + struct curl_waitfd *ufds, + unsigned int size, + unsigned int *fd_count) +{ + struct Curl_easy *data; + unsigned int nfds = 0; + struct easy_pollset ps; + unsigned int i; + CURLMcode result = CURLM_OK; + struct curl_waitfd *ufd; + unsigned int j; + + if(!ufds) + return CURLM_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + + if(!GOOD_MULTI_HANDLE(multi)) + return CURLM_BAD_HANDLE; + + if(multi->in_callback) + return CURLM_RECURSIVE_API_CALL; + + memset(&ps, 0, sizeof(ps)); + for(data = multi->easyp; data; data = data->next) { + multi_getsock(data, &ps); + + for(i = 0; i < ps.num; i++) { + if(nfds < size) { + curl_socket_t fd = ps.sockets[i]; + int fd_idx = -1; + + /* Simple linear search to skip an already added descriptor */ + for(j = 0; j < nfds; j++) { + if(ufds[j].fd == fd) { + fd_idx = (int)j; + break; + } + } + + if(fd_idx < 0) { + ufd = &ufds[nfds++]; + ufd->fd = ps.sockets[i]; + ufd->events = 0; + } + else + ufd = &ufds[fd_idx]; + + if(ps.actions[i] & CURL_POLL_IN) + ufd->events |= CURL_WAIT_POLLIN; + if(ps.actions[i] & CURL_POLL_OUT) + ufd->events |= CURL_WAIT_POLLOUT; + } + else + return CURLM_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + } + + if(fd_count) + *fd_count = nfds; + return result; +} + #ifdef USE_WINSOCK /* Reset FD_WRITE for TCP sockets. Nothing is actually sent. UDP sockets can't * be reset this way because an empty datagram would be sent. #9203 @@ -1131,6 +1291,29 @@ static void reset_socket_fdwrite(curl_socket_t s) } #endif +static CURLMcode ufds_increase(struct pollfd **pfds, unsigned int *pfds_len, + unsigned int inc, bool *is_malloced) +{ + struct pollfd *new_fds, *old_fds = *pfds; + unsigned int new_len = *pfds_len + inc; + + new_fds = calloc(new_len, sizeof(struct pollfd)); + if(!new_fds) { + if(*is_malloced) + free(old_fds); + *pfds = NULL; + *pfds_len = 0; + return CURLM_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + memcpy(new_fds, old_fds, (*pfds_len) * sizeof(struct pollfd)); + if(*is_malloced) + free(old_fds); + *pfds = new_fds; + *pfds_len = new_len; + *is_malloced = TRUE; + return CURLM_OK; +} + #define NUM_POLLS_ON_STACK 10 static CURLMcode multi_wait(struct Curl_multi *multi, @@ -1144,12 +1327,12 @@ static CURLMcode multi_wait(struct Curl_multi *multi, struct Curl_easy *data; struct easy_pollset ps; size_t i; - unsigned int nfds = 0; - unsigned int curlfds; long timeout_internal; int retcode = 0; struct pollfd a_few_on_stack[NUM_POLLS_ON_STACK]; struct pollfd *ufds = &a_few_on_stack[0]; + unsigned int ufds_len = NUM_POLLS_ON_STACK; + unsigned int nfds = 0, curl_nfds = 0; /* how many ufds are in use */ bool ufds_malloc = FALSE; #ifdef USE_WINSOCK WSANETWORKEVENTS wsa_events; @@ -1168,13 +1351,6 @@ static CURLMcode multi_wait(struct Curl_multi *multi, if(timeout_ms < 0) return CURLM_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; - /* Count up how many fds we have from the multi handle */ - memset(&ps, 0, sizeof(ps)); - for(data = multi->easyp; data; data = data->next) { - multi_getsock(data, &ps); - nfds += ps.num; - } - /* If the internally desired timeout is actually shorter than requested from the outside, then use the shorter time! But only if the internal timer is actually larger than -1! */ @@ -1182,70 +1358,60 @@ static CURLMcode multi_wait(struct Curl_multi *multi, if((timeout_internal >= 0) && (timeout_internal < (long)timeout_ms)) timeout_ms = (int)timeout_internal; - curlfds = nfds; /* number of internal file descriptors */ - nfds += extra_nfds; /* add the externally provided ones */ - -#ifdef ENABLE_WAKEUP -#ifdef USE_WINSOCK - if(use_wakeup) { -#else - if(use_wakeup && multi->wakeup_pair[0] != CURL_SOCKET_BAD) { -#endif - ++nfds; - } -#endif - - if(nfds > NUM_POLLS_ON_STACK) { - /* 'nfds' is a 32 bit value and 'struct pollfd' is typically 8 bytes - big, so at 2^29 sockets this value might wrap. When a process gets - the capability to actually handle over 500 million sockets this - calculation needs a integer overflow check. */ - ufds = malloc(nfds * sizeof(struct pollfd)); - if(!ufds) - return CURLM_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - ufds_malloc = TRUE; - } - nfds = 0; - - /* only do the second loop if we found descriptors in the first stage run - above */ + memset(ufds, 0, ufds_len * sizeof(struct pollfd)); + memset(&ps, 0, sizeof(ps)); - if(curlfds) { - /* Add the curl handles to our pollfds first */ - for(data = multi->easyp; data; data = data->next) { - multi_getsock(data, &ps); + /* Add the curl handles to our pollfds first */ + for(data = multi->easyp; data; data = data->next) { + multi_getsock(data, &ps); - for(i = 0; i < ps.num; i++) { - struct pollfd *ufd = &ufds[nfds++]; + for(i = 0; i < ps.num; i++) { + short events = 0; #ifdef USE_WINSOCK - long mask = 0; + long mask = 0; #endif - ufd->fd = ps.sockets[i]; - ufd->events = 0; - if(ps.actions[i] & CURL_POLL_IN) { + if(ps.actions[i] & CURL_POLL_IN) { #ifdef USE_WINSOCK - mask |= FD_READ|FD_ACCEPT|FD_CLOSE; + mask |= FD_READ|FD_ACCEPT|FD_CLOSE; #endif - ufd->events |= POLLIN; - } - if(ps.actions[i] & CURL_POLL_OUT) { + events |= POLLIN; + } + if(ps.actions[i] & CURL_POLL_OUT) { #ifdef USE_WINSOCK - mask |= FD_WRITE|FD_CONNECT|FD_CLOSE; - reset_socket_fdwrite(ps.sockets[i]); + mask |= FD_WRITE|FD_CONNECT|FD_CLOSE; + reset_socket_fdwrite(ps.sockets[i]); #endif - ufd->events |= POLLOUT; + events |= POLLOUT; + } + if(events) { + if(nfds && ps.sockets[i] == ufds[nfds-1].fd) { + ufds[nfds-1].events |= events; } + else { + if(nfds >= ufds_len) { + if(ufds_increase(&ufds, &ufds_len, 100, &ufds_malloc)) + return CURLM_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + DEBUGASSERT(nfds < ufds_len); + ufds[nfds].fd = ps.sockets[i]; + ufds[nfds].events = events; + ++nfds; + } + } #ifdef USE_WINSOCK + if(mask) { if(WSAEventSelect(ps.sockets[i], multi->wsa_event, mask) != 0) { if(ufds_malloc) free(ufds); return CURLM_INTERNAL_ERROR; } -#endif } +#endif } } + curl_nfds = nfds; /* what curl internally used in ufds */ + /* Add external file descriptions from poll-like struct curl_waitfd */ for(i = 0; i < extra_nfds; i++) { #ifdef USE_WINSOCK @@ -1264,6 +1430,11 @@ static CURLMcode multi_wait(struct Curl_multi *multi, return CURLM_INTERNAL_ERROR; } #endif + if(nfds >= ufds_len) { + if(ufds_increase(&ufds, &ufds_len, 100, &ufds_malloc)) + return CURLM_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + DEBUGASSERT(nfds < ufds_len); ufds[nfds].fd = extra_fds[i].fd; ufds[nfds].events = 0; if(extra_fds[i].events & CURL_WAIT_POLLIN) @@ -1278,6 +1449,11 @@ static CURLMcode multi_wait(struct Curl_multi *multi, #ifdef ENABLE_WAKEUP #ifndef USE_WINSOCK if(use_wakeup && multi->wakeup_pair[0] != CURL_SOCKET_BAD) { + if(nfds >= ufds_len) { + if(ufds_increase(&ufds, &ufds_len, 100, &ufds_malloc)) + return CURLM_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + DEBUGASSERT(nfds < ufds_len); ufds[nfds].fd = multi->wakeup_pair[0]; ufds[nfds].events = POLLIN; ++nfds; @@ -1317,7 +1493,7 @@ static CURLMcode multi_wait(struct Curl_multi *multi, struct, the bit values of the actual underlying poll() implementation may not be the same as the ones in the public libcurl API! */ for(i = 0; i < extra_nfds; i++) { - unsigned r = ufds[curlfds + i].revents; + unsigned r = ufds[curl_nfds + i].revents; unsigned short mask = 0; #ifdef USE_WINSOCK curl_socket_t s = extra_fds[i].fd; @@ -1350,7 +1526,7 @@ static CURLMcode multi_wait(struct Curl_multi *multi, #ifdef USE_WINSOCK /* Count up all our own sockets that had activity, and remove them from the event. */ - if(curlfds) { + if(curl_nfds) { for(data = multi->easyp; data; data = data->next) { multi_getsock(data, &ps); @@ -1371,7 +1547,7 @@ static CURLMcode multi_wait(struct Curl_multi *multi, #else #ifdef ENABLE_WAKEUP if(use_wakeup && multi->wakeup_pair[0] != CURL_SOCKET_BAD) { - if(ufds[curlfds + extra_nfds].revents & POLLIN) { + if(ufds[curl_nfds + extra_nfds].revents & POLLIN) { char buf[64]; ssize_t nread; while(1) { @@ -1591,47 +1767,47 @@ static bool multi_handle_timeout(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLcode *result, bool connect_timeout) { - timediff_t timeout_ms; - timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, now, connect_timeout); - + timediff_t timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, now, connect_timeout); if(timeout_ms < 0) { /* Handle timed out */ + struct curltime since; + if(connect_timeout) + since = data->progress.t_startsingle; + else + since = data->progress.t_startop; if(data->mstate == MSTATE_RESOLVING) failf(data, "Resolving timed out after %" CURL_FORMAT_TIMEDIFF_T - " milliseconds", - Curl_timediff(*now, data->progress.t_startsingle)); + " milliseconds", Curl_timediff(*now, since)); else if(data->mstate == MSTATE_CONNECTING) failf(data, "Connection timed out after %" CURL_FORMAT_TIMEDIFF_T - " milliseconds", - Curl_timediff(*now, data->progress.t_startsingle)); + " milliseconds", Curl_timediff(*now, since)); else { struct SingleRequest *k = &data->req; if(k->size != -1) { failf(data, "Operation timed out after %" CURL_FORMAT_TIMEDIFF_T " milliseconds with %" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T " out of %" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T " bytes received", - Curl_timediff(*now, data->progress.t_startsingle), - k->bytecount, k->size); + Curl_timediff(*now, since), k->bytecount, k->size); } else { failf(data, "Operation timed out after %" CURL_FORMAT_TIMEDIFF_T " milliseconds with %" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T - " bytes received", - Curl_timediff(*now, data->progress.t_startsingle), - k->bytecount); + " bytes received", Curl_timediff(*now, since), k->bytecount); } } - - /* Force connection closed if the connection has indeed been used */ - if(data->mstate > MSTATE_DO) { - streamclose(data->conn, "Disconnected with pending data"); - *stream_error = TRUE; - } *result = CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT; - (void)multi_done(data, *result, TRUE); + if(data->conn) { + /* Force connection closed if the connection has indeed been used */ + if(data->mstate > MSTATE_DO) { + streamclose(data->conn, "Disconnect due to timeout"); + *stream_error = TRUE; + } + (void)multi_done(data, *result, TRUE); + } + return TRUE; } - return (timeout_ms < 0); + return FALSE; } /* @@ -1723,105 +1899,6 @@ static CURLcode protocol_connect(struct Curl_easy *data, return result; /* pass back status */ } -/* - * readrewind() rewinds the read stream. This is typically used for HTTP - * POST/PUT with multi-pass authentication when a sending was denied and a - * resend is necessary. - */ -static CURLcode readrewind(struct Curl_easy *data) -{ - curl_mimepart *mimepart = &data->set.mimepost; - DEBUGASSERT(data->conn); - - data->state.rewindbeforesend = FALSE; /* we rewind now */ - - /* explicitly switch off sending data on this connection now since we are - about to restart a new transfer and thus we want to avoid inadvertently - sending more data on the existing connection until the next transfer - starts */ - data->req.keepon &= ~KEEP_SEND; - - /* We have sent away data. If not using CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS or - CURLOPT_HTTPPOST, call app to rewind - */ -#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_HTTP - if(data->conn->handler->protocol & PROTO_FAMILY_HTTP) { - if(data->state.mimepost) - mimepart = data->state.mimepost; - } -#endif - if(data->set.postfields || - (data->state.httpreq == HTTPREQ_GET) || - (data->state.httpreq == HTTPREQ_HEAD)) - ; /* no need to rewind */ - else if(data->state.httpreq == HTTPREQ_POST_MIME || - data->state.httpreq == HTTPREQ_POST_FORM) { - CURLcode result = Curl_mime_rewind(mimepart); - if(result) { - failf(data, "Cannot rewind mime/post data"); - return result; - } - } - else { - if(data->set.seek_func) { - int err; - - Curl_set_in_callback(data, true); - err = (data->set.seek_func)(data->set.seek_client, 0, SEEK_SET); - Curl_set_in_callback(data, false); - if(err) { - failf(data, "seek callback returned error %d", (int)err); - return CURLE_SEND_FAIL_REWIND; - } - } - else if(data->set.ioctl_func) { - curlioerr err; - - Curl_set_in_callback(data, true); - err = (data->set.ioctl_func)(data, CURLIOCMD_RESTARTREAD, - data->set.ioctl_client); - Curl_set_in_callback(data, false); - infof(data, "the ioctl callback returned %d", (int)err); - - if(err) { - failf(data, "ioctl callback returned error %d", (int)err); - return CURLE_SEND_FAIL_REWIND; - } - } - else { - /* If no CURLOPT_READFUNCTION is used, we know that we operate on a - given FILE * stream and we can actually attempt to rewind that - ourselves with fseek() */ - if(data->state.fread_func == (curl_read_callback)fread) { - if(-1 != fseek(data->state.in, 0, SEEK_SET)) - /* successful rewind */ - return CURLE_OK; - } - - /* no callback set or failure above, makes us fail at once */ - failf(data, "necessary data rewind wasn't possible"); - return CURLE_SEND_FAIL_REWIND; - } - } - return CURLE_OK; -} - -/* - * Curl_preconnect() is called immediately before a connect starts. When a - * redirect is followed, this is then called multiple times during a single - * transfer. - */ -CURLcode Curl_preconnect(struct Curl_easy *data) -{ - if(!data->state.buffer) { - data->state.buffer = malloc(data->set.buffer_size + 1); - if(!data->state.buffer) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - } - - return CURLE_OK; -} - static void set_in_callback(struct Curl_multi *multi, bool value) { multi->in_callback = value; @@ -1836,7 +1913,6 @@ static CURLMcode multi_runsingle(struct Curl_multi *multi, bool async; bool protocol_connected = FALSE; bool dophase_done = FALSE; - bool done = FALSE; CURLMcode rc; CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; timediff_t recv_timeout_ms; @@ -1876,51 +1952,44 @@ static CURLMcode multi_runsingle(struct Curl_multi *multi, return CURLM_INTERNAL_ERROR; } - if(data->conn && - (data->mstate >= MSTATE_CONNECT) && - (data->mstate < MSTATE_COMPLETED)) { - /* Check for overall operation timeout here but defer handling the - * connection timeout to later, to allow for a connection to be set up - * in the window since we last checked timeout. This prevents us - * tearing down a completed connection in the case where we were slow - * to check the timeout (e.g. process descheduled during this loop). - * We set connect_timeout=FALSE to do this. */ - - /* we need to wait for the connect state as only then is the start time - stored, but we must not check already completed handles */ - if(multi_handle_timeout(data, nowp, &stream_error, &result, FALSE)) { - /* Skip the statemachine and go directly to error handling section. */ - goto statemachine_end; - } - } + /* Wait for the connect state as only then is the start time stored, but + we must not check already completed handles */ + if((data->mstate >= MSTATE_CONNECT) && (data->mstate < MSTATE_COMPLETED) && + multi_handle_timeout(data, nowp, &stream_error, &result, FALSE)) + /* Skip the statemachine and go directly to error handling section. */ + goto statemachine_end; switch(data->mstate) { case MSTATE_INIT: - /* init this transfer. */ + /* Transitional state. init this transfer. A handle never comes + back to this state. */ result = Curl_pretransfer(data); - - if(!result) { - /* after init, go CONNECT */ - multistate(data, MSTATE_CONNECT); - *nowp = Curl_pgrsTime(data, TIMER_STARTOP); - rc = CURLM_CALL_MULTI_PERFORM; - } - break; - - case MSTATE_CONNECT: - /* Connect. We want to get a connection identifier filled in. */ - /* init this transfer. */ - result = Curl_preconnect(data); if(result) break; + /* after init, go SETUP */ + multistate(data, MSTATE_SETUP); + (void)Curl_pgrsTime(data, TIMER_STARTOP); + FALLTHROUGH(); + + case MSTATE_SETUP: + /* Transitional state. Setup things for a new transfer. The handle + can come back to this state on a redirect. */ *nowp = Curl_pgrsTime(data, TIMER_STARTSINGLE); if(data->set.timeout) Curl_expire(data, data->set.timeout, EXPIRE_TIMEOUT); - if(data->set.connecttimeout) + /* Since a connection might go to pending and back to CONNECT several + times before it actually takes off, we need to set the timeout once + in SETUP before we enter CONNECT the first time. */ Curl_expire(data, data->set.connecttimeout, EXPIRE_CONNECTTIMEOUT); + multistate(data, MSTATE_CONNECT); + FALLTHROUGH(); + + case MSTATE_CONNECT: + /* Connect. We want to get a connection identifier filled in. This state + can be entered from SETUP and from PENDING. */ result = Curl_connect(data, &async, &connected); if(CURLE_NO_CONNECTION_AVAILABLE == result) { /* There was no connection available. We will go to the pending @@ -1928,20 +1997,17 @@ static CURLMcode multi_runsingle(struct Curl_multi *multi, multistate(data, MSTATE_PENDING); /* add this handle to the list of connect-pending handles */ - Curl_llist_insert_next(&multi->pending, multi->pending.tail, data, - &data->connect_queue); + Curl_llist_append(&multi->pending, data, &data->connect_queue); /* unlink from the main list */ unlink_easy(multi, data); result = CURLE_OK; break; } - else if(data->state.previouslypending) { - /* this transfer comes from the pending queue so try move another */ - infof(data, "Transfer was pending, now try another"); + else process_pending_handles(data->multi); - } if(!result) { + *nowp = Curl_pgrsTime(data, TIMER_POSTQUEUE); if(async) /* We're now waiting for an asynchronous name lookup */ multistate(data, MSTATE_RESOLVING); @@ -1979,12 +2045,12 @@ static CURLMcode multi_runsingle(struct Curl_multi *multi, hostname = conn->host.name; /* check if we have the name resolved by now */ - dns = Curl_fetch_addr(data, hostname, (int)conn->port); + dns = Curl_fetch_addr(data, hostname, conn->primary.remote_port); if(dns) { #ifdef CURLRES_ASYNCH - conn->resolve_async.dns = dns; - conn->resolve_async.done = TRUE; + data->state.async.dns = dns; + data->state.async.done = TRUE; #endif result = CURLE_OK; infof(data, "Hostname '%s' was found in DNS cache", hostname); @@ -2074,9 +2140,6 @@ static CURLMcode multi_runsingle(struct Curl_multi *multi, break; case MSTATE_PROTOCONNECT: - if(data->state.rewindbeforesend) - result = readrewind(data); - if(!result && data->conn->bits.reuse) { /* ftp seems to hang when protoconnect on reused connection * since we handle PROTOCONNECT in general inside the filers, it @@ -2128,10 +2191,10 @@ static CURLMcode multi_runsingle(struct Curl_multi *multi, /* call the prerequest callback function */ Curl_set_in_callback(data, true); prereq_rc = data->set.fprereq(data->set.prereq_userp, - data->info.conn_primary_ip, - data->info.conn_local_ip, - data->info.conn_primary_port, - data->info.conn_local_port); + data->info.primary.remote_ip, + data->info.primary.local_ip, + data->info.primary.remote_port, + data->info.primary.local_port); Curl_set_in_callback(data, false); if(prereq_rc != CURL_PREREQFUNC_OK) { failf(data, "operation aborted by pre-request callback"); @@ -2222,7 +2285,7 @@ static CURLMcode multi_runsingle(struct Curl_multi *multi, follow = FOLLOW_RETRY; drc = Curl_follow(data, newurl, follow); if(!drc) { - multistate(data, MSTATE_CONNECT); + multistate(data, MSTATE_SETUP); rc = CURLM_CALL_MULTI_PERFORM; result = CURLE_OK; } @@ -2371,8 +2434,6 @@ static CURLMcode multi_runsingle(struct Curl_multi *multi, { char *newurl = NULL; bool retry = FALSE; - bool comeback = FALSE; - DEBUGASSERT(data->state.buffer); /* check if over send speed */ send_timeout_ms = 0; if(data->set.max_send_speed) @@ -2402,9 +2463,9 @@ static CURLMcode multi_runsingle(struct Curl_multi *multi, } /* read/write data if it is ready to do so */ - result = Curl_readwrite(data->conn, data, &done, &comeback); + result = Curl_readwrite(data); - if(done || (result == CURLE_RECV_ERROR)) { + if(data->req.done || (result == CURLE_RECV_ERROR)) { /* If CURLE_RECV_ERROR happens early enough, we assume it was a race * condition and the server closed the reused connection exactly when * we wanted to use it, so figure out if that is indeed the case. @@ -2419,7 +2480,7 @@ static CURLMcode multi_runsingle(struct Curl_multi *multi, /* if we are to retry, set the result to OK and consider the request as done */ result = CURLE_OK; - done = TRUE; + data->req.done = TRUE; } } else if((CURLE_HTTP2_STREAM == result) && @@ -2439,7 +2500,7 @@ static CURLMcode multi_runsingle(struct Curl_multi *multi, as done */ retry = TRUE; result = CURLE_OK; - done = TRUE; + data->req.done = TRUE; } else result = ret; @@ -2461,7 +2522,7 @@ static CURLMcode multi_runsingle(struct Curl_multi *multi, Curl_posttransfer(data); multi_done(data, result, TRUE); } - else if(done) { + else if(data->req.done && !Curl_cwriter_is_paused(data)) { /* call this even if the readwrite function returned error */ Curl_posttransfer(data); @@ -2484,10 +2545,9 @@ static CURLMcode multi_runsingle(struct Curl_multi *multi, /* multi_done() might return CURLE_GOT_NOTHING */ result = Curl_follow(data, newurl, follow); if(!result) { - multistate(data, MSTATE_CONNECT); + multistate(data, MSTATE_SETUP); rc = CURLM_CALL_MULTI_PERFORM; } - free(newurl); } else { /* after the transfer is done, go DONE */ @@ -2499,7 +2559,6 @@ static CURLMcode multi_runsingle(struct Curl_multi *multi, newurl = data->req.location; data->req.location = NULL; result = Curl_follow(data, newurl, FOLLOW_FAKE); - free(newurl); if(result) { stream_error = TRUE; result = multi_done(data, result, TRUE); @@ -2512,12 +2571,13 @@ static CURLMcode multi_runsingle(struct Curl_multi *multi, } } } - else if(comeback) { + else if(data->state.select_bits) { /* This avoids CURLM_CALL_MULTI_PERFORM so that a very fast transfer won't get stuck on this transfer at the expense of other concurrent transfers */ Curl_expire(data, 0, EXPIRE_RUN_NOW); } + free(newurl); break; } @@ -2568,8 +2628,7 @@ static CURLMcode multi_runsingle(struct Curl_multi *multi, return CURLM_INTERNAL_ERROR; } - if(data->conn && - data->mstate >= MSTATE_CONNECT && + if(data->mstate >= MSTATE_CONNECT && data->mstate < MSTATE_DO && rc != CURLM_CALL_MULTI_PERFORM && !multi_ischanged(multi, false)) { @@ -2579,7 +2638,7 @@ static CURLMcode multi_runsingle(struct Curl_multi *multi, * (i.e. CURLM_CALL_MULTI_PERFORM == TRUE) then we should do that before * declaring the connection timed out as we may almost have a completed * connection. */ - multi_handle_timeout(data, nowp, &stream_error, &result, TRUE); + multi_handle_timeout(data, nowp, &stream_error, &result, FALSE); } statemachine_end: @@ -2656,8 +2715,7 @@ static CURLMcode multi_runsingle(struct Curl_multi *multi, multistate(data, MSTATE_MSGSENT); /* add this handle to the list of msgsent handles */ - Curl_llist_insert_next(&multi->msgsent, multi->msgsent.tail, data, - &data->connect_queue); + Curl_llist_append(&multi->msgsent, data, &data->connect_queue); /* unlink from the main list */ unlink_easy(multi, data); return CURLM_OK; @@ -2719,10 +2777,20 @@ CURLMcode curl_multi_perform(struct Curl_multi *multi, int *running_handles) */ do { multi->timetree = Curl_splaygetbest(now, multi->timetree, &t); - if(t) + if(t) { /* the removed may have another timeout in queue */ + data = t->payload; + if(data->mstate == MSTATE_PENDING) { + bool stream_unused; + CURLcode result_unused; + if(multi_handle_timeout(data, &now, &stream_unused, &result_unused, + FALSE)) { + infof(data, "PENDING handle timeout"); + move_pending_to_connect(multi, data); + } + } (void)add_next_timeout(now, multi, t->payload); - + } } while(t); *running_handles = multi->num_alive; @@ -2805,6 +2873,7 @@ CURLMcode curl_multi_cleanup(struct Curl_multi *multi) Curl_free_multi_ssl_backend_data(multi->ssl_backend_data); #endif + multi_xfer_bufs_free(multi); free(multi); return CURLM_OK; @@ -3164,7 +3233,7 @@ static CURLMcode multi_socket(struct Curl_multi *multi, if(data->conn && !(data->conn->handler->flags & PROTOPT_DIRLOCK)) /* set socket event bitmask if they're not locked */ - data->conn->cselect_bits = (unsigned char)ev_bitmask; + data->state.select_bits |= (unsigned char)ev_bitmask; Curl_expire(data, 0, EXPIRE_RUN_NOW); } @@ -3675,47 +3744,55 @@ void Curl_multiuse_state(struct Curl_easy *data, process_pending_handles(data->multi); } -/* process_pending_handles() moves all handles from PENDING - back into the main list and change state to CONNECT */ -static void process_pending_handles(struct Curl_multi *multi) +static void move_pending_to_connect(struct Curl_multi *multi, + struct Curl_easy *data) { - struct Curl_llist_element *e = multi->pending.head; - if(e) { - struct Curl_easy *data = e->ptr; + DEBUGASSERT(data->mstate == MSTATE_PENDING); - DEBUGASSERT(data->mstate == MSTATE_PENDING); + /* put it back into the main list */ + link_easy(multi, data); - /* put it back into the main list */ - link_easy(multi, data); + multistate(data, MSTATE_CONNECT); - multistate(data, MSTATE_CONNECT); + /* Remove this node from the pending list */ + Curl_llist_remove(&multi->pending, &data->connect_queue, NULL); - /* Remove this node from the list */ - Curl_llist_remove(&multi->pending, e, NULL); + /* Make sure that the handle will be processed soonish. */ + Curl_expire(data, 0, EXPIRE_RUN_NOW); +} + +/* process_pending_handles() moves a handle from PENDING back into the main + list and change state to CONNECT. - /* Make sure that the handle will be processed soonish. */ - Curl_expire(data, 0, EXPIRE_RUN_NOW); + We do not move all transfers because that can be a significant amount. + Since this is tried every now and then doing too many too often becomes a + performance problem. - /* mark this as having been in the pending queue */ - data->state.previouslypending = TRUE; + When there is a change for connection limits like max host connections etc, + this likely only allows one new transfer. When there is a pipewait change, + it can potentially allow hundreds of new transfers. + + We could consider an improvement where we store the queue reason and allow + more pipewait rechecks than others. +*/ +static void process_pending_handles(struct Curl_multi *multi) +{ + struct Curl_llist_element *e = multi->pending.head; + if(e) { + struct Curl_easy *data = e->ptr; + move_pending_to_connect(multi, data); } } void Curl_set_in_callback(struct Curl_easy *data, bool value) { - /* might get called when there is no data pointer! */ - if(data) { - if(data->multi_easy) - data->multi_easy->in_callback = value; - else if(data->multi) - data->multi->in_callback = value; - } + if(data && data->multi) + data->multi->in_callback = value; } -bool Curl_is_in_callback(struct Curl_easy *easy) +bool Curl_is_in_callback(struct Curl_easy *data) { - return ((easy->multi && easy->multi->in_callback) || - (easy->multi_easy && easy->multi_easy->in_callback)); + return (data && data->multi && data->multi->in_callback); } unsigned int Curl_multi_max_concurrent_streams(struct Curl_multi *multi) @@ -3741,3 +3818,120 @@ struct Curl_easy **curl_multi_get_handles(struct Curl_multi *multi) } return a; } + +CURLcode Curl_multi_xfer_buf_borrow(struct Curl_easy *data, + char **pbuf, size_t *pbuflen) +{ + DEBUGASSERT(data); + DEBUGASSERT(data->multi); + *pbuf = NULL; + *pbuflen = 0; + if(!data->multi) { + failf(data, "transfer has no multi handle"); + return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + } + if(!data->set.buffer_size) { + failf(data, "transfer buffer size is 0"); + return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + } + if(data->multi->xfer_buf_borrowed) { + failf(data, "attempt to borrow xfer_buf when already borrowed"); + return CURLE_AGAIN; + } + + if(data->multi->xfer_buf && + data->set.buffer_size > data->multi->xfer_buf_len) { + /* not large enough, get a new one */ + free(data->multi->xfer_buf); + data->multi->xfer_buf = NULL; + data->multi->xfer_buf_len = 0; + } + + if(!data->multi->xfer_buf) { + data->multi->xfer_buf = malloc((size_t)data->set.buffer_size); + if(!data->multi->xfer_buf) { + failf(data, "could not allocate xfer_buf of %zu bytes", + (size_t)data->set.buffer_size); + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + data->multi->xfer_buf_len = data->set.buffer_size; + } + + data->multi->xfer_buf_borrowed = TRUE; + *pbuf = data->multi->xfer_buf; + *pbuflen = data->multi->xfer_buf_len; + return CURLE_OK; +} + +void Curl_multi_xfer_buf_release(struct Curl_easy *data, char *buf) +{ + (void)buf; + DEBUGASSERT(data); + DEBUGASSERT(data->multi); + DEBUGASSERT(!buf || data->multi->xfer_buf == buf); + data->multi->xfer_buf_borrowed = FALSE; +} + +CURLcode Curl_multi_xfer_ulbuf_borrow(struct Curl_easy *data, + char **pbuf, size_t *pbuflen) +{ + DEBUGASSERT(data); + DEBUGASSERT(data->multi); + *pbuf = NULL; + *pbuflen = 0; + if(!data->multi) { + failf(data, "transfer has no multi handle"); + return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + } + if(!data->set.upload_buffer_size) { + failf(data, "transfer upload buffer size is 0"); + return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + } + if(data->multi->xfer_ulbuf_borrowed) { + failf(data, "attempt to borrow xfer_ulbuf when already borrowed"); + return CURLE_AGAIN; + } + + if(data->multi->xfer_ulbuf && + data->set.upload_buffer_size > data->multi->xfer_ulbuf_len) { + /* not large enough, get a new one */ + free(data->multi->xfer_ulbuf); + data->multi->xfer_ulbuf = NULL; + data->multi->xfer_ulbuf_len = 0; + } + + if(!data->multi->xfer_ulbuf) { + data->multi->xfer_ulbuf = malloc((size_t)data->set.upload_buffer_size); + if(!data->multi->xfer_ulbuf) { + failf(data, "could not allocate xfer_ulbuf of %zu bytes", + (size_t)data->set.upload_buffer_size); + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + data->multi->xfer_ulbuf_len = data->set.upload_buffer_size; + } + + data->multi->xfer_ulbuf_borrowed = TRUE; + *pbuf = data->multi->xfer_ulbuf; + *pbuflen = data->multi->xfer_ulbuf_len; + return CURLE_OK; +} + +void Curl_multi_xfer_ulbuf_release(struct Curl_easy *data, char *buf) +{ + (void)buf; + DEBUGASSERT(data); + DEBUGASSERT(data->multi); + DEBUGASSERT(!buf || data->multi->xfer_ulbuf == buf); + data->multi->xfer_ulbuf_borrowed = FALSE; +} + +static void multi_xfer_bufs_free(struct Curl_multi *multi) +{ + DEBUGASSERT(multi); + Curl_safefree(multi->xfer_buf); + multi->xfer_buf_len = 0; + multi->xfer_buf_borrowed = FALSE; + Curl_safefree(multi->xfer_ulbuf); + multi->xfer_ulbuf_len = 0; + multi->xfer_ulbuf_borrowed = FALSE; +} diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/multihandle.h b/vendor/curl/lib/multihandle.h index e03e382e28..add9a05184 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/multihandle.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/multihandle.h @@ -44,24 +44,25 @@ struct Curl_message { typedef enum { MSTATE_INIT, /* 0 - start in this state */ MSTATE_PENDING, /* 1 - no connections, waiting for one */ - MSTATE_CONNECT, /* 2 - resolve/connect has been sent off */ - MSTATE_RESOLVING, /* 3 - awaiting the resolve to finalize */ - MSTATE_CONNECTING, /* 4 - awaiting the TCP connect to finalize */ - MSTATE_TUNNELING, /* 5 - awaiting HTTPS proxy SSL initialization to + MSTATE_SETUP, /* 2 - start a new transfer */ + MSTATE_CONNECT, /* 3 - resolve/connect has been sent off */ + MSTATE_RESOLVING, /* 4 - awaiting the resolve to finalize */ + MSTATE_CONNECTING, /* 5 - awaiting the TCP connect to finalize */ + MSTATE_TUNNELING, /* 6 - awaiting HTTPS proxy SSL initialization to complete and/or proxy CONNECT to finalize */ - MSTATE_PROTOCONNECT, /* 6 - initiate protocol connect procedure */ - MSTATE_PROTOCONNECTING, /* 7 - completing the protocol-specific connect + MSTATE_PROTOCONNECT, /* 7 - initiate protocol connect procedure */ + MSTATE_PROTOCONNECTING, /* 8 - completing the protocol-specific connect phase */ - MSTATE_DO, /* 8 - start send off the request (part 1) */ - MSTATE_DOING, /* 9 - sending off the request (part 1) */ - MSTATE_DOING_MORE, /* 10 - send off the request (part 2) */ - MSTATE_DID, /* 11 - done sending off request */ - MSTATE_PERFORMING, /* 12 - transfer data */ - MSTATE_RATELIMITING, /* 13 - wait because limit-rate exceeded */ - MSTATE_DONE, /* 14 - post data transfer operation */ - MSTATE_COMPLETED, /* 15 - operation complete */ - MSTATE_MSGSENT, /* 16 - the operation complete message is sent */ - MSTATE_LAST /* 17 - not a true state, never use this */ + MSTATE_DO, /* 9 - start send off the request (part 1) */ + MSTATE_DOING, /* 10 - sending off the request (part 1) */ + MSTATE_DOING_MORE, /* 11 - send off the request (part 2) */ + MSTATE_DID, /* 12 - done sending off request */ + MSTATE_PERFORMING, /* 13 - transfer data */ + MSTATE_RATELIMITING, /* 14 - wait because limit-rate exceeded */ + MSTATE_DONE, /* 15 - post data transfer operation */ + MSTATE_COMPLETED, /* 16 - operation complete */ + MSTATE_MSGSENT, /* 17 - the operation complete message is sent */ + MSTATE_LAST /* 18 - not a true state, never use this */ } CURLMstate; /* we support N sockets per easy handle. Set the corresponding bit to what @@ -124,6 +125,13 @@ struct Curl_multi { times of all currently set timers */ struct Curl_tree *timetree; + /* buffer used for transfer data, lazy initialized */ + char *xfer_buf; /* the actual buffer */ + size_t xfer_buf_len; /* the allocated length */ + /* buffer used for upload data, lazy initialized */ + char *xfer_ulbuf; /* the actual buffer */ + size_t xfer_ulbuf_len; /* the allocated length */ + #if defined(USE_SSL) struct multi_ssl_backend_data *ssl_backend_data; #endif @@ -151,7 +159,7 @@ struct Curl_multi { WSAEVENT wsa_event; /* winsock event used for waits */ #else #ifdef ENABLE_WAKEUP - curl_socket_t wakeup_pair[2]; /* socketpair() used for wakeup + curl_socket_t wakeup_pair[2]; /* pipe()/socketpair() used for wakeup 0 is used for read, 1 is used for write */ #endif #endif @@ -171,6 +179,8 @@ struct Curl_multi { #endif BIT(dead); /* a callback returned error, everything needs to crash and burn */ + BIT(xfer_buf_borrowed); /* xfer_buf is currently being borrowed */ + BIT(xfer_ulbuf_borrowed); /* xfer_ulbuf is currently being borrowed */ #ifdef DEBUGBUILD BIT(warned); /* true after user warned of DEBUGBUILD */ #endif diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/multiif.h b/vendor/curl/lib/multiif.h index 7a344fa9fd..59a30646c1 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/multiif.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/multiif.h @@ -38,15 +38,16 @@ void Curl_attach_connection(struct Curl_easy *data, void Curl_detach_connection(struct Curl_easy *data); bool Curl_multiplex_wanted(const struct Curl_multi *multi); void Curl_set_in_callback(struct Curl_easy *data, bool value); -bool Curl_is_in_callback(struct Curl_easy *easy); +bool Curl_is_in_callback(struct Curl_easy *data); CURLcode Curl_preconnect(struct Curl_easy *data); void Curl_multi_connchanged(struct Curl_multi *multi); /* Internal version of curl_multi_init() accepts size parameters for the socket, connection and dns hashes */ -struct Curl_multi *Curl_multi_handle(int hashsize, int chashsize, - int dnssize); +struct Curl_multi *Curl_multi_handle(size_t hashsize, + size_t chashsize, + size_t dnssize); /* the write bits start at bit 16 for the *getsock() bitmap */ #define GETSOCK_WRITEBITSTART 16 @@ -94,4 +95,53 @@ CURLMcode Curl_multi_add_perform(struct Curl_multi *multi, /* Return the value of the CURLMOPT_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS option */ unsigned int Curl_multi_max_concurrent_streams(struct Curl_multi *multi); +/** + * Borrow the transfer buffer from the multi, suitable + * for the given transfer `data`. The buffer may only be used in one + * multi processing of the easy handle. It MUST be returned to the + * multi before it can be borrowed again. + * Pointers into the buffer remain only valid as long as it is borrowed. + * + * @param data the easy handle + * @param pbuf on return, the buffer to use or NULL on error + * @param pbuflen on return, the size of *pbuf or 0 on error + * @return CURLE_OK when buffer is available and is returned. + * CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORy on failure to allocate the buffer, + * CURLE_FAILED_INIT if the easy handle is without multi. + * CURLE_AGAIN if the buffer is borrowed already. + */ +CURLcode Curl_multi_xfer_buf_borrow(struct Curl_easy *data, + char **pbuf, size_t *pbuflen); +/** + * Release the borrowed buffer. All references into the buffer become + * invalid after this. + * @param buf the buffer pointer borrowed for coding error checks. + */ +void Curl_multi_xfer_buf_release(struct Curl_easy *data, char *buf); + +/** + * Borrow the upload buffer from the multi, suitable + * for the given transfer `data`. The buffer may only be used in one + * multi processing of the easy handle. It MUST be returned to the + * multi before it can be borrowed again. + * Pointers into the buffer remain only valid as long as it is borrowed. + * + * @param data the easy handle + * @param pbuf on return, the buffer to use or NULL on error + * @param pbuflen on return, the size of *pbuf or 0 on error + * @return CURLE_OK when buffer is available and is returned. + * CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORy on failure to allocate the buffer, + * CURLE_FAILED_INIT if the easy handle is without multi. + * CURLE_AGAIN if the buffer is borrowed already. + */ +CURLcode Curl_multi_xfer_ulbuf_borrow(struct Curl_easy *data, + char **pbuf, size_t *pbuflen); + +/** + * Release the borrowed upload buffer. All references into the buffer become + * invalid after this. + * @param buf the upload buffer pointer borrowed for coding error checks. + */ +void Curl_multi_xfer_ulbuf_release(struct Curl_easy *data, char *buf); + #endif /* HEADER_CURL_MULTIIF_H */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/netrc.c b/vendor/curl/lib/netrc.c index 038c6dca6a..cd2a2844e2 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/netrc.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/netrc.c @@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ enum host_lookup_state { #define NETRC_FAILED -1 #define NETRC_SUCCESS 0 +#define MAX_NETRC_LINE 4096 + /* * Returns zero on success. */ @@ -80,13 +82,14 @@ static int parsenetrc(const char *host, file = fopen(netrcfile, FOPEN_READTEXT); if(file) { bool done = FALSE; - char netrcbuffer[4096]; - int netrcbuffsize = (int)sizeof(netrcbuffer); + struct dynbuf buf; + Curl_dyn_init(&buf, MAX_NETRC_LINE); - while(!done && Curl_get_line(netrcbuffer, netrcbuffsize, file)) { + while(!done && Curl_get_line(&buf, file)) { char *tok; char *tok_end; bool quoted; + char *netrcbuffer = Curl_dyn_ptr(&buf); if(state == MACDEF) { if((netrcbuffer[0] == '\n') || (netrcbuffer[0] == '\r')) state = NOTHING; @@ -245,6 +248,7 @@ static int parsenetrc(const char *host, } /* while Curl_get_line() */ out: + Curl_dyn_free(&buf); if(!retcode) { /* success */ if(login_alloc) { diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/noproxy.c b/vendor/curl/lib/noproxy.c index 2b9908d894..62299e28f3 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/noproxy.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/noproxy.c @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ UNITTEST bool Curl_cidr6_match(const char *ipv6, const char *network, unsigned int bits) { -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 int bytes; int rest; unsigned char address[16]; @@ -216,7 +216,6 @@ bool Curl_check_noproxy(const char *name, const char *no_proxy, /* case C passes through, not a match */ break; case TYPE_IPV4: - /* FALLTHROUGH */ case TYPE_IPV6: { const char *check = token; char *slash; diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/openldap.c b/vendor/curl/lib/openldap.c index 131f474142..0348ef5bab 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/openldap.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/openldap.c @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ static Curl_recv oldap_recv; */ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_ldap = { - "LDAP", /* scheme */ + "ldap", /* scheme */ oldap_setup_connection, /* setup_connection */ oldap_do, /* do_it */ oldap_done, /* done */ @@ -130,7 +130,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_ldap = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ oldap_disconnect, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_LDAP, /* defport */ @@ -145,7 +146,7 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_ldap = { */ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_ldaps = { - "LDAPS", /* scheme */ + "ldaps", /* scheme */ oldap_setup_connection, /* setup_connection */ oldap_do, /* do_it */ oldap_done, /* done */ @@ -158,7 +159,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_ldaps = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ oldap_disconnect, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_LDAPS, /* defport */ @@ -548,9 +550,12 @@ static CURLcode oldap_connect(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) return result; } - hosturl = aprintf("ldap%s://%s:%d", - conn->handler->flags & PROTOPT_SSL? "s": "", - conn->host.name, conn->remote_port); + hosturl = aprintf("%s://%s%s%s:%d", + conn->handler->scheme, + conn->bits.ipv6_ip? "[": "", + conn->host.name, + conn->bits.ipv6_ip? "]": "", + conn->remote_port); if(!hosturl) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; @@ -645,7 +650,7 @@ static CURLcode oldap_state_mechs_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, switch(code) { case LDAP_SIZELIMIT_EXCEEDED: infof(data, "Too many authentication mechanisms\n"); - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case LDAP_SUCCESS: case LDAP_NO_RESULTS_RETURNED: if(Curl_sasl_can_authenticate(&li->sasl, data)) @@ -793,10 +798,13 @@ static CURLcode oldap_connecting(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) result = oldap_perform_bind(data, OLDAP_BIND); break; } - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + result = Curl_ssl_cfilter_add(data, conn, FIRSTSOCKET); + if(result) + break; + FALLTHROUGH(); case OLDAP_TLS: result = oldap_ssl_connect(data, OLDAP_TLS); - if(result && data->set.use_ssl != CURLUSESSL_TRY) + if(result) result = oldap_map_error(code, CURLE_USE_SSL_FAILED); else if(ssl_installed(conn)) { conn->bits.tls_upgraded = TRUE; @@ -887,10 +895,14 @@ static CURLcode oldap_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) result = oldap_url_parse(data, &lud); if(!result) { - Sockbuf *sb; - /* re-install the libcurl SSL handlers into the sockbuf. */ - ldap_get_option(li->ld, LDAP_OPT_SOCKBUF, &sb); - ber_sockbuf_add_io(sb, &ldapsb_tls, LBER_SBIOD_LEVEL_TRANSPORT, data); +#ifdef USE_SSL + if(ssl_installed(conn)) { + Sockbuf *sb; + /* re-install the libcurl SSL handlers into the sockbuf. */ + ldap_get_option(li->ld, LDAP_OPT_SOCKBUF, &sb); + ber_sockbuf_add_io(sb, &ldapsb_tls, LBER_SBIOD_LEVEL_TRANSPORT, data); + } +#endif rc = ldap_search_ext(li->ld, lud->lud_dn, lud->lud_scope, lud->lud_filter, lud->lud_attrs, 0, @@ -909,7 +921,7 @@ static CURLcode oldap_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) else { lr->msgid = msgid; data->req.p.ldap = lr; - Curl_setup_transfer(data, FIRSTSOCKET, -1, FALSE, -1); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, FIRSTSOCKET, -1, FALSE, -1); *done = TRUE; } } @@ -1014,7 +1026,7 @@ static ssize_t oldap_recv(struct Curl_easy *data, int sockindex, char *buf, switch(code) { case LDAP_SIZELIMIT_EXCEEDED: infof(data, "There are more than %d entries", lr->nument); - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case LDAP_SUCCESS: data->req.size = data->req.bytecount; break; diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/pingpong.c b/vendor/curl/lib/pingpong.c index 0081c9ca62..81576c08c9 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/pingpong.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/pingpong.c @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ #include "pingpong.h" #include "multiif.h" #include "vtls/vtls.h" +#include "strdup.h" /* The last 3 #include files should be in this order */ #include "curl_printf.h" @@ -105,7 +106,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_pp_statemach(struct Curl_easy *data, if(Curl_conn_data_pending(data, FIRSTSOCKET)) rc = 1; - else if(Curl_pp_moredata(pp)) + else if(pp->overflow) /* We are receiving and there is data in the cache so just read it */ rc = 1; else if(!pp->sendleft && Curl_conn_data_pending(data, FIRSTSOCKET)) @@ -139,19 +140,13 @@ CURLcode Curl_pp_statemach(struct Curl_easy *data, } /* initialize stuff to prepare for reading a fresh new response */ -void Curl_pp_init(struct Curl_easy *data, struct pingpong *pp) +void Curl_pp_init(struct pingpong *pp) { - DEBUGASSERT(data); pp->nread_resp = 0; - pp->linestart_resp = data->state.buffer; - pp->pending_resp = TRUE; pp->response = Curl_now(); /* start response time-out now! */ -} - -/* setup for the coming transfer */ -void Curl_pp_setup(struct pingpong *pp) -{ + pp->pending_resp = TRUE; Curl_dyn_init(&pp->sendbuf, DYN_PINGPPONG_CMD); + Curl_dyn_init(&pp->recvbuf, DYN_PINGPPONG_CMD); } /*********************************************************************** @@ -169,7 +164,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_pp_vsendf(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *fmt, va_list args) { - ssize_t bytes_written = 0; + size_t bytes_written = 0; size_t write_len; char *s; CURLcode result; @@ -197,15 +192,18 @@ CURLcode Curl_pp_vsendf(struct Curl_easy *data, if(result) return result; + pp->pending_resp = TRUE; write_len = Curl_dyn_len(&pp->sendbuf); s = Curl_dyn_ptr(&pp->sendbuf); - Curl_pp_init(data, pp); #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI conn->data_prot = PROT_CMD; #endif - result = Curl_nwrite(data, FIRSTSOCKET, s, write_len, &bytes_written); - if(result) + result = Curl_conn_send(data, FIRSTSOCKET, s, write_len, &bytes_written); + if(result == CURLE_AGAIN) { + bytes_written = 0; + } + else if(result) return result; #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI data_sec = conn->data_prot; @@ -213,9 +211,9 @@ CURLcode Curl_pp_vsendf(struct Curl_easy *data, conn->data_prot = (unsigned char)data_sec; #endif - Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_HEADER_OUT, s, (size_t)bytes_written); + Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_HEADER_OUT, s, bytes_written); - if(bytes_written != (ssize_t)write_len) { + if(bytes_written != write_len) { /* the whole chunk was not sent, keep it around and adjust sizes */ pp->sendthis = s; pp->sendsize = write_len; @@ -255,192 +253,126 @@ CURLcode Curl_pp_sendf(struct Curl_easy *data, struct pingpong *pp, return result; } +static CURLcode pingpong_read(struct Curl_easy *data, + int sockindex, + char *buffer, + size_t buflen, + ssize_t *nread) +{ + CURLcode result; +#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI + enum protection_level prot = data->conn->data_prot; + data->conn->data_prot = PROT_CLEAR; +#endif + result = Curl_conn_recv(data, sockindex, buffer, buflen, nread); +#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI + DEBUGASSERT(prot > PROT_NONE && prot < PROT_LAST); + data->conn->data_prot = (unsigned char)prot; +#endif + return result; +} + /* * Curl_pp_readresp() * * Reads a piece of a server response. */ CURLcode Curl_pp_readresp(struct Curl_easy *data, - curl_socket_t sockfd, + int sockindex, struct pingpong *pp, int *code, /* return the server code if done */ size_t *size) /* size of the response */ { - ssize_t perline; /* count bytes per line */ - bool keepon = TRUE; - ssize_t gotbytes; - char *ptr; struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; - char * const buf = data->state.buffer; CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; *code = 0; /* 0 for errors or not done */ *size = 0; - ptr = buf + pp->nread_resp; + if(pp->nfinal) { + /* a previous call left this many bytes in the beginning of the buffer as + that was the final line; now ditch that */ + size_t full = Curl_dyn_len(&pp->recvbuf); - /* number of bytes in the current line, so far */ - perline = (ssize_t)(ptr-pp->linestart_resp); + /* trim off the "final" leading part */ + Curl_dyn_tail(&pp->recvbuf, full - pp->nfinal); - while((pp->nread_resp < (size_t)data->set.buffer_size) && - (keepon && !result)) { + pp->nfinal = 0; /* now gone */ + } + if(!pp->overflow) { + ssize_t gotbytes = 0; + char buffer[900]; - if(pp->cache) { - /* we had data in the "cache", copy that instead of doing an actual - * read - * - * pp->cache_size is cast to ssize_t here. This should be safe, because - * it would have been populated with something of size int to begin - * with, even though its datatype may be larger than an int. - */ - if((ptr + pp->cache_size) > (buf + data->set.buffer_size + 1)) { - failf(data, "cached response data too big to handle"); - return CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY; - } - memcpy(ptr, pp->cache, pp->cache_size); - gotbytes = (ssize_t)pp->cache_size; - free(pp->cache); /* free the cache */ - pp->cache = NULL; /* clear the pointer */ - pp->cache_size = 0; /* zero the size just in case */ - } - else { -#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI - enum protection_level prot = conn->data_prot; - conn->data_prot = PROT_CLEAR; -#endif - DEBUGASSERT((ptr + data->set.buffer_size - pp->nread_resp) <= - (buf + data->set.buffer_size + 1)); - result = Curl_read(data, sockfd, ptr, - data->set.buffer_size - pp->nread_resp, - &gotbytes); -#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI - DEBUGASSERT(prot > PROT_NONE && prot < PROT_LAST); - conn->data_prot = (unsigned char)prot; -#endif - if(result == CURLE_AGAIN) - return CURLE_OK; /* return */ + result = pingpong_read(data, sockindex, buffer, sizeof(buffer), &gotbytes); + if(result == CURLE_AGAIN) + return CURLE_OK; - if(result) - /* Set outer result variable to this error. */ - keepon = FALSE; - } + if(result) + return result; - if(!keepon) - ; - else if(gotbytes <= 0) { - keepon = FALSE; - result = CURLE_RECV_ERROR; + if(gotbytes <= 0) { failf(data, "response reading failed (errno: %d)", SOCKERRNO); + return CURLE_RECV_ERROR; } - else { - /* we got a whole chunk of data, which can be anything from one - * byte to a set of lines and possible just a piece of the last - * line */ - ssize_t i; - ssize_t clipamount = 0; - bool restart = FALSE; - - data->req.headerbytecount += (unsigned int)gotbytes; - - pp->nread_resp += gotbytes; - for(i = 0; i < gotbytes; ptr++, i++) { - perline++; - if(*ptr == '\n') { - /* a newline is CRLF in pp-talk, so the CR is ignored as - the line isn't really terminated until the LF comes */ - - /* output debug output if that is requested */ + + result = Curl_dyn_addn(&pp->recvbuf, buffer, gotbytes); + if(result) + return result; + + data->req.headerbytecount += (unsigned int)gotbytes; + + pp->nread_resp += gotbytes; + } + + do { + char *line = Curl_dyn_ptr(&pp->recvbuf); + char *nl = memchr(line, '\n', Curl_dyn_len(&pp->recvbuf)); + if(nl) { + /* a newline is CRLF in pp-talk, so the CR is ignored as + the line isn't really terminated until the LF comes */ + size_t length = nl - line + 1; + + /* output debug output if that is requested */ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI - if(!conn->sec_complete) + if(!conn->sec_complete) #endif - Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_HEADER_IN, - pp->linestart_resp, (size_t)perline); - - /* - * We pass all response-lines to the callback function registered - * for "headers". The response lines can be seen as a kind of - * headers. - */ - result = Curl_client_write(data, CLIENTWRITE_INFO, - pp->linestart_resp, perline); - if(result) - return result; - - if(pp->endofresp(data, conn, pp->linestart_resp, perline, code)) { - /* This is the end of the last line, copy the last line to the - start of the buffer and null-terminate, for old times sake */ - size_t n = ptr - pp->linestart_resp; - memmove(buf, pp->linestart_resp, n); - buf[n] = 0; /* null-terminate */ - keepon = FALSE; - pp->linestart_resp = ptr + 1; /* advance pointer */ - i++; /* skip this before getting out */ - - *size = pp->nread_resp; /* size of the response */ - pp->nread_resp = 0; /* restart */ - break; - } - perline = 0; /* line starts over here */ - pp->linestart_resp = ptr + 1; - } - } + Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_HEADER_IN, line, length); - if(!keepon && (i != gotbytes)) { - /* We found the end of the response lines, but we didn't parse the - full chunk of data we have read from the server. We therefore need - to store the rest of the data to be checked on the next invoke as - it may actually contain another end of response already! */ - clipamount = gotbytes - i; - restart = TRUE; - DEBUGF(infof(data, "Curl_pp_readresp_ %d bytes of trailing " - "server response left", - (int)clipamount)); - } - else if(keepon) { - - if((perline == gotbytes) && - (gotbytes > (ssize_t)data->set.buffer_size/2)) { - /* We got an excessive line without newlines and we need to deal - with it. We keep the first bytes of the line then we throw - away the rest. */ - infof(data, "Excessive server response line length received, " - "%zd bytes. Stripping", gotbytes); - restart = TRUE; - - /* we keep 40 bytes since all our pingpong protocols are only - interested in the first piece */ - clipamount = 40; - } - else if(pp->nread_resp > (size_t)data->set.buffer_size/2) { - /* We got a large chunk of data and there's potentially still - trailing data to take care of, so we put any such part in the - "cache", clear the buffer to make space and restart. */ - clipamount = perline; - restart = TRUE; - } - } - else if(i == gotbytes) - restart = TRUE; - - if(clipamount) { - pp->cache_size = clipamount; - pp->cache = malloc(pp->cache_size); - if(pp->cache) - memcpy(pp->cache, pp->linestart_resp, pp->cache_size); + /* + * Pass all response-lines to the callback function registered for + * "headers". The response lines can be seen as a kind of headers. + */ + result = Curl_client_write(data, CLIENTWRITE_INFO, line, length); + if(result) + return result; + + if(pp->endofresp(data, conn, line, length, code)) { + /* When at "end of response", keep the endofresp line first in the + buffer since it will be accessed outside (by pingpong + parsers). Store the overflow counter to inform about additional + data in this buffer after the endofresp line. */ + pp->nfinal = length; + if(Curl_dyn_len(&pp->recvbuf) > length) + pp->overflow = Curl_dyn_len(&pp->recvbuf) - length; else - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - } - if(restart) { - /* now reset a few variables to start over nicely from the start of - the big buffer */ - pp->nread_resp = 0; /* start over from scratch in the buffer */ - ptr = pp->linestart_resp = buf; - perline = 0; + pp->overflow = 0; + *size = pp->nread_resp; /* size of the response */ + pp->nread_resp = 0; /* restart */ + break; } + if(Curl_dyn_len(&pp->recvbuf) > length) + /* keep the remaining piece */ + Curl_dyn_tail((&pp->recvbuf), Curl_dyn_len(&pp->recvbuf) - length); + else + Curl_dyn_reset(&pp->recvbuf); + } + else { + /* without a newline, there is no overflow */ + pp->overflow = 0; + break; + } - } /* there was data */ - - } /* while there's buffer left and loop is requested */ + } while(1); /* while there's buffer left to scan */ pp->pending_resp = FALSE; @@ -466,14 +398,20 @@ CURLcode Curl_pp_flushsend(struct Curl_easy *data, struct pingpong *pp) { /* we have a piece of a command still left to send */ - ssize_t written; - CURLcode result = Curl_nwrite(data, FIRSTSOCKET, - pp->sendthis + pp->sendsize - pp->sendleft, - pp->sendleft, &written); + size_t written; + CURLcode result; + + result = Curl_conn_send(data, FIRSTSOCKET, + pp->sendthis + pp->sendsize - pp->sendleft, + pp->sendleft, &written); + if(result == CURLE_AGAIN) { + result = CURLE_OK; + written = 0; + } if(result) return result; - if(written != (ssize_t)pp->sendleft) { + if(written != pp->sendleft) { /* only a fraction was sent */ pp->sendleft -= written; } @@ -488,14 +426,13 @@ CURLcode Curl_pp_flushsend(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLcode Curl_pp_disconnect(struct pingpong *pp) { Curl_dyn_free(&pp->sendbuf); - Curl_safefree(pp->cache); + Curl_dyn_free(&pp->recvbuf); return CURLE_OK; } bool Curl_pp_moredata(struct pingpong *pp) { - return (!pp->sendleft && pp->cache && pp->nread_resp < pp->cache_size) ? - TRUE : FALSE; + return (!pp->sendleft && Curl_dyn_len(&pp->recvbuf) > pp->nfinal); } #endif diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/pingpong.h b/vendor/curl/lib/pingpong.h index 80d3f7718c..28172c7284 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/pingpong.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/pingpong.h @@ -47,16 +47,11 @@ typedef enum { * It holds response cache and non-blocking sending data. */ struct pingpong { - char *cache; /* data cache between getresponse()-calls */ - size_t cache_size; /* size of cache in bytes */ size_t nread_resp; /* number of bytes currently read of a server response */ - char *linestart_resp; /* line start pointer for the server response - reader function */ bool pending_resp; /* set TRUE when a server response is pending or in progress, and is cleared once the last response is read */ - char *sendthis; /* allocated pointer to a buffer that is to be sent to the - server */ + char *sendthis; /* pointer to a buffer that is to be sent to the server */ size_t sendleft; /* number of bytes left to send from the sendthis buffer */ size_t sendsize; /* total size of the sendthis buffer */ struct curltime response; /* set to Curl_now() when a command has been sent @@ -64,6 +59,10 @@ struct pingpong { timediff_t response_time; /* When no timeout is given, this is the amount of milliseconds we await for a server response. */ struct dynbuf sendbuf; + struct dynbuf recvbuf; + size_t overflow; /* number of bytes left after a final response line */ + size_t nfinal; /* number of bytes in the final response line, which + after a match is first in the receice buffer */ /* Function pointers the protocols MUST implement and provide for the pingpong layer to function */ @@ -90,10 +89,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_pp_statemach(struct Curl_easy *data, struct pingpong *pp, bool block, bool disconnecting); /* initialize stuff to prepare for reading a fresh new response */ -void Curl_pp_init(struct Curl_easy *data, struct pingpong *pp); - -/* setup for the transfer */ -void Curl_pp_setup(struct pingpong *pp); +void Curl_pp_init(struct pingpong *pp); /* Returns timeout in ms. 0 or negative number means the timeout has already triggered */ @@ -113,7 +109,7 @@ timediff_t Curl_pp_state_timeout(struct Curl_easy *data, */ CURLcode Curl_pp_sendf(struct Curl_easy *data, struct pingpong *pp, - const char *fmt, ...); + const char *fmt, ...) CURL_PRINTF(3, 4); /*********************************************************************** * @@ -128,7 +124,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_pp_sendf(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLcode Curl_pp_vsendf(struct Curl_easy *data, struct pingpong *pp, const char *fmt, - va_list args); + va_list args) CURL_PRINTF(3, 0); /* * Curl_pp_readresp() @@ -136,7 +132,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_pp_vsendf(struct Curl_easy *data, * Reads a piece of a server response. */ CURLcode Curl_pp_readresp(struct Curl_easy *data, - curl_socket_t sockfd, + int sockindex, struct pingpong *pp, int *code, /* return the server code if done */ size_t *size); /* size of the response */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/pop3.c b/vendor/curl/lib/pop3.c index 3e0f20a690..9a30331529 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/pop3.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/pop3.c @@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ #include "curl_sasl.h" #include "curl_md5.h" #include "warnless.h" +#include "strdup.h" /* The last 3 #include files should be in this order */ #include "curl_printf.h" #include "curl_memory.h" @@ -111,7 +112,7 @@ static CURLcode pop3_get_message(struct Curl_easy *data, struct bufref *out); */ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_pop3 = { - "POP3", /* scheme */ + "pop3", /* scheme */ pop3_setup_connection, /* setup_connection */ pop3_do, /* do_it */ pop3_done, /* done */ @@ -124,7 +125,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_pop3 = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ pop3_disconnect, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_POP3, /* defport */ @@ -140,7 +142,7 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_pop3 = { */ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_pop3s = { - "POP3S", /* scheme */ + "pop3s", /* scheme */ pop3_setup_connection, /* setup_connection */ pop3_do, /* do_it */ pop3_done, /* done */ @@ -153,7 +155,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_pop3s = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ pop3_disconnect, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_POP3S, /* defport */ @@ -251,8 +254,8 @@ static bool pop3_endofresp(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, */ static CURLcode pop3_get_message(struct Curl_easy *data, struct bufref *out) { - char *message = data->state.buffer; - size_t len = strlen(message); + char *message = Curl_dyn_ptr(&data->conn->proto.pop3c.pp.recvbuf); + size_t len = data->conn->proto.pop3c.pp.nfinal; if(len > 2) { /* Find the start of the message */ @@ -648,8 +651,8 @@ static CURLcode pop3_state_servergreet_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; struct pop3_conn *pop3c = &conn->proto.pop3c; - const char *line = data->state.buffer; - size_t len = strlen(line); + const char *line = Curl_dyn_ptr(&data->conn->proto.pop3c.pp.recvbuf); + size_t len = data->conn->proto.pop3c.pp.nfinal; (void)instate; /* no use for this yet */ @@ -657,44 +660,35 @@ static CURLcode pop3_state_servergreet_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, failf(data, "Got unexpected pop3-server response"); result = CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY; } - else { + else if(len > 3) { /* Does the server support APOP authentication? */ - if(len >= 4 && line[len - 2] == '>') { - /* Look for the APOP timestamp */ - size_t i; - for(i = 3; i < len - 2; ++i) { - if(line[i] == '<') { - /* Calculate the length of the timestamp */ - size_t timestamplen = len - 1 - i; - char *at; - if(!timestamplen) - break; - - /* Allocate some memory for the timestamp */ - pop3c->apoptimestamp = (char *)calloc(1, timestamplen + 1); - - if(!pop3c->apoptimestamp) - break; - - /* Copy the timestamp */ - memcpy(pop3c->apoptimestamp, line + i, timestamplen); - pop3c->apoptimestamp[timestamplen] = '\0'; - - /* If the timestamp does not contain '@' it is not (as required by - RFC-1939) conformant to the RFC-822 message id syntax, and we - therefore do not use APOP authentication. */ - at = strchr(pop3c->apoptimestamp, '@'); - if(!at) - Curl_safefree(pop3c->apoptimestamp); - else - /* Store the APOP capability */ - pop3c->authtypes |= POP3_TYPE_APOP; - break; - } + char *lt; + char *gt = NULL; + + /* Look for the APOP timestamp */ + lt = memchr(line, '<', len); + if(lt) + /* search the remainder for '>' */ + gt = memchr(lt, '>', len - (lt - line)); + if(gt) { + /* the length of the timestamp, including the brackets */ + size_t timestamplen = gt - lt + 1; + char *at = memchr(lt, '@', timestamplen); + /* If the timestamp does not contain '@' it is not (as required by + RFC-1939) conformant to the RFC-822 message id syntax, and we + therefore do not use APOP authentication. */ + if(at) { + /* dupe the timestamp */ + pop3c->apoptimestamp = Curl_memdup0(lt, timestamplen); + if(!pop3c->apoptimestamp) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + /* Store the APOP capability */ + pop3c->authtypes |= POP3_TYPE_APOP; } } - result = pop3_perform_capa(data, conn); + if(!result) + result = pop3_perform_capa(data, conn); } return result; @@ -707,8 +701,8 @@ static CURLcode pop3_state_capa_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, int pop3code, CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; struct pop3_conn *pop3c = &conn->proto.pop3c; - const char *line = data->state.buffer; - size_t len = strlen(line); + const char *line = Curl_dyn_ptr(&data->conn->proto.pop3c.pp.recvbuf); + size_t len = data->conn->proto.pop3c.pp.nfinal; (void)instate; /* no use for this yet */ @@ -795,7 +789,7 @@ static CURLcode pop3_state_starttls_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, (void)instate; /* no use for this yet */ /* Pipelining in response is forbidden. */ - if(data->conn->proto.pop3c.pp.cache_size) + if(data->conn->proto.pop3c.pp.overflow) return CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY; if(pop3code != '+') { @@ -942,26 +936,31 @@ static CURLcode pop3_state_command_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, if(pop3->transfer == PPTRANSFER_BODY) { /* POP3 download */ - Curl_setup_transfer(data, FIRSTSOCKET, -1, FALSE, -1); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, FIRSTSOCKET, -1, FALSE, -1); + + if(pp->overflow) { + /* The recv buffer contains data that is actually body content so send + it as such. Note that there may even be additional "headers" after + the body */ - if(pp->cache) { - /* The header "cache" contains a bunch of data that is actually body - content so send it as such. Note that there may even be additional - "headers" after the body */ + /* keep only the overflow */ + Curl_dyn_tail(&pp->recvbuf, pp->overflow); + pp->nfinal = 0; /* done */ if(!data->req.no_body) { - result = Curl_pop3_write(data, pp->cache, pp->cache_size); + result = Curl_pop3_write(data, Curl_dyn_ptr(&pp->recvbuf), + Curl_dyn_len(&pp->recvbuf)); if(result) return result; } - /* Free the cache */ - Curl_safefree(pp->cache); - - /* Reset the cache size */ - pp->cache_size = 0; + /* reset the buffer */ + Curl_dyn_reset(&pp->recvbuf); + pp->overflow = 0; } } + else + pp->overflow = 0; /* End of DO phase */ pop3_state(data, POP3_STOP); @@ -973,7 +972,6 @@ static CURLcode pop3_statemachine(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn) { CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; - curl_socket_t sock = conn->sock[FIRSTSOCKET]; int pop3code; struct pop3_conn *pop3c = &conn->proto.pop3c; struct pingpong *pp = &pop3c->pp; @@ -990,7 +988,7 @@ static CURLcode pop3_statemachine(struct Curl_easy *data, do { /* Read the response from the server */ - result = Curl_pp_readresp(data, sock, pp, &pop3code, &nread); + result = Curl_pp_readresp(data, FIRSTSOCKET, pp, &pop3code, &nread); if(result) return result; @@ -1131,8 +1129,7 @@ static CURLcode pop3_connect(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) Curl_sasl_init(&pop3c->sasl, data, &saslpop3); /* Initialise the pingpong layer */ - Curl_pp_setup(pp); - Curl_pp_init(data, pp); + Curl_pp_init(pp); /* Parse the URL options */ result = pop3_parse_url_options(conn); @@ -1455,7 +1452,7 @@ static CURLcode pop3_parse_custom_request(struct Curl_easy *data) * This function scans the body after the end-of-body and writes everything * until the end is found. */ -CURLcode Curl_pop3_write(struct Curl_easy *data, char *str, size_t nread) +CURLcode Curl_pop3_write(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *str, size_t nread) { /* This code could be made into a special function in the handler struct */ CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/pop3.h b/vendor/curl/lib/pop3.h index 83f0f831e6..e8e98db04b 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/pop3.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/pop3.h @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ extern const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_pop3s; /* This function scans the body after the end-of-body and writes everything * until the end is found */ -CURLcode Curl_pop3_write(struct Curl_easy *data, char *str, size_t nread); +CURLcode Curl_pop3_write(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *str, size_t nread); #endif /* HEADER_CURL_POP3_H */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/progress.c b/vendor/curl/lib/progress.c index e96cbf7af4..d05fcc3ebd 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/progress.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/progress.c @@ -174,10 +174,18 @@ void Curl_pgrsTimeWas(struct Curl_easy *data, timerid timer, data->progress.t_startop = timestamp; break; case TIMER_STARTSINGLE: - /* This is set at the start of each single fetch */ + /* This is set at the start of each single transfer */ data->progress.t_startsingle = timestamp; data->progress.is_t_startransfer_set = false; break; + case TIMER_POSTQUEUE: + /* Set when the transfer starts (after potentially having been brought + back from the waiting queue). It needs to count from t_startop and not + t_startsingle since the latter is reset when a connection is brought + back from the pending queue. */ + data->progress.t_postqueue = + Curl_timediff_us(timestamp, data->progress.t_startop); + break; case TIMER_STARTACCEPT: data->progress.t_acceptdata = timestamp; break; diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/progress.h b/vendor/curl/lib/progress.h index fc39e34d20..73749419ad 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/progress.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/progress.h @@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ typedef enum { TIMER_NONE, TIMER_STARTOP, - TIMER_STARTSINGLE, + TIMER_STARTSINGLE, /* start of transfer, might get queued */ + TIMER_POSTQUEUE, /* start, immediately after dequeue */ TIMER_NAMELOOKUP, TIMER_CONNECT, TIMER_APPCONNECT, diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/rand.c b/vendor/curl/lib/rand.c index 3383c490b6..c62b1a4032 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/rand.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/rand.c @@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_rand(struct Curl_easy *data, unsigned char *rnd, size_t num) { CURLcode result = CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; - DEBUGASSERT(num > 0); + DEBUGASSERT(num); while(num) { unsigned int r; @@ -241,9 +241,11 @@ CURLcode Curl_rand_hex(struct Curl_easy *data, unsigned char *rnd, memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer)); #endif - if((num/2 >= sizeof(buffer)) || !(num&1)) + if((num/2 >= sizeof(buffer)) || !(num&1)) { /* make sure it fits in the local buffer and that it is an odd number! */ + DEBUGF(infof(data, "invalid buffer size with Curl_rand_hex")); return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + } num--; /* save one for null-termination */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/request.c b/vendor/curl/lib/request.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..26741fa6cb --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/request.c @@ -0,0 +1,409 @@ +/*************************************************************************** + * _ _ ____ _ + * Project ___| | | | _ \| | + * / __| | | | |_) | | + * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ + * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| + * + * Copyright (C) Daniel Stenberg, , et al. + * + * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which + * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms + * are also available at https://curl.se/docs/copyright.html. + * + * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell + * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is + * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file. + * + * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY + * KIND, either express or implied. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: curl + * + ***************************************************************************/ + +#include "curl_setup.h" + +#include "urldata.h" +#include "cfilters.h" +#include "dynbuf.h" +#include "doh.h" +#include "multiif.h" +#include "progress.h" +#include "request.h" +#include "sendf.h" +#include "transfer.h" +#include "url.h" + +/* The last 3 #include files should be in this order */ +#include "curl_printf.h" +#include "curl_memory.h" +#include "memdebug.h" + +void Curl_req_init(struct SingleRequest *req) +{ + memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req)); +} + +CURLcode Curl_req_soft_reset(struct SingleRequest *req, + struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + CURLcode result; + + req->done = FALSE; + req->upload_done = FALSE; + req->download_done = FALSE; + req->ignorebody = FALSE; + req->bytecount = 0; + req->writebytecount = 0; + req->header = TRUE; /* assume header */ + req->headerline = 0; + req->headerbytecount = 0; + req->allheadercount = 0; + req->deductheadercount = 0; + + result = Curl_client_start(data); + if(result) + return result; + + if(!req->sendbuf_init) { + Curl_bufq_init2(&req->sendbuf, data->set.upload_buffer_size, 1, + BUFQ_OPT_SOFT_LIMIT); + req->sendbuf_init = TRUE; + } + else { + Curl_bufq_reset(&req->sendbuf); + if(data->set.upload_buffer_size != req->sendbuf.chunk_size) { + Curl_bufq_free(&req->sendbuf); + Curl_bufq_init2(&req->sendbuf, data->set.upload_buffer_size, 1, + BUFQ_OPT_SOFT_LIMIT); + } + } + + return CURLE_OK; +} + +CURLcode Curl_req_start(struct SingleRequest *req, + struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + req->start = Curl_now(); + return Curl_req_soft_reset(req, data); +} + +static CURLcode req_flush(struct Curl_easy *data); + +CURLcode Curl_req_done(struct SingleRequest *req, + struct Curl_easy *data, bool aborted) +{ + (void)req; + if(!aborted) + (void)req_flush(data); + Curl_client_reset(data); + return CURLE_OK; +} + +void Curl_req_hard_reset(struct SingleRequest *req, struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct curltime t0 = {0, 0}; + + /* This is a bit ugly. `req->p` is a union and we assume we can + * free this safely without leaks. */ + Curl_safefree(req->p.http); + Curl_safefree(req->newurl); + Curl_client_reset(data); + if(req->sendbuf_init) + Curl_bufq_reset(&req->sendbuf); + +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_DOH + if(req->doh) { + Curl_close(&req->doh->probe[0].easy); + Curl_close(&req->doh->probe[1].easy); + } +#endif + /* Can no longer memset() this struct as we need to keep some state */ + req->size = -1; + req->maxdownload = -1; + req->bytecount = 0; + req->writebytecount = 0; + req->start = t0; + req->headerbytecount = 0; + req->allheadercount = 0; + req->deductheadercount = 0; + req->headerline = 0; + req->offset = 0; + req->httpcode = 0; + req->keepon = 0; + req->upgr101 = UPGR101_INIT; + req->timeofdoc = 0; + req->bodywrites = 0; + req->location = NULL; + req->newurl = NULL; +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_COOKIES + req->setcookies = 0; +#endif + req->header = FALSE; + req->content_range = FALSE; + req->download_done = FALSE; + req->eos_written = FALSE; + req->eos_read = FALSE; + req->upload_done = FALSE; + req->upload_aborted = FALSE; + req->ignorebody = FALSE; + req->http_bodyless = FALSE; + req->chunk = FALSE; + req->ignore_cl = FALSE; + req->upload_chunky = FALSE; + req->getheader = FALSE; + req->no_body = data->set.opt_no_body; + req->authneg = FALSE; +} + +void Curl_req_free(struct SingleRequest *req, struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + /* This is a bit ugly. `req->p` is a union and we assume we can + * free this safely without leaks. */ + Curl_safefree(req->p.http); + Curl_safefree(req->newurl); + if(req->sendbuf_init) + Curl_bufq_free(&req->sendbuf); + Curl_client_cleanup(data); + +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_DOH + if(req->doh) { + Curl_close(&req->doh->probe[0].easy); + Curl_close(&req->doh->probe[1].easy); + Curl_dyn_free(&req->doh->probe[0].serverdoh); + Curl_dyn_free(&req->doh->probe[1].serverdoh); + curl_slist_free_all(req->doh->headers); + Curl_safefree(req->doh); + } +#endif +} + +static CURLcode xfer_send(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *buf, size_t blen, + size_t hds_len, size_t *pnwritten) +{ + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + + *pnwritten = 0; +#ifdef CURLDEBUG + { + /* Allow debug builds to override this logic to force short initial + sends + */ + char *p = getenv("CURL_SMALLREQSEND"); + if(p) { + size_t altsize = (size_t)strtoul(p, NULL, 10); + if(altsize && altsize < blen) + blen = altsize; + } + } +#endif + /* Make sure this doesn't send more body bytes than what the max send + speed says. The headers do not count to the max speed. */ + if(data->set.max_send_speed) { + size_t body_bytes = blen - hds_len; + if((curl_off_t)body_bytes > data->set.max_send_speed) + blen = hds_len + (size_t)data->set.max_send_speed; + } + + result = Curl_xfer_send(data, buf, blen, pnwritten); + if(!result && *pnwritten) { + if(hds_len) + Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_HEADER_OUT, (char *)buf, + CURLMIN(hds_len, *pnwritten)); + if(*pnwritten > hds_len) { + size_t body_len = *pnwritten - hds_len; + Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_DATA_OUT, (char *)buf + hds_len, body_len); + data->req.writebytecount += body_len; + Curl_pgrsSetUploadCounter(data, data->req.writebytecount); + } + } + return result; +} + +static CURLcode req_send_buffer_flush(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + const unsigned char *buf; + size_t blen; + + while(Curl_bufq_peek(&data->req.sendbuf, &buf, &blen)) { + size_t nwritten, hds_len = CURLMIN(data->req.sendbuf_hds_len, blen); + result = xfer_send(data, (const char *)buf, blen, hds_len, &nwritten); + if(result) + break; + + Curl_bufq_skip(&data->req.sendbuf, nwritten); + if(hds_len) { + data->req.sendbuf_hds_len -= CURLMIN(hds_len, nwritten); + } + /* leave if we could not send all. Maybe network blocking or + * speed limits on transfer */ + if(nwritten < blen) + break; + } + return result; +} + +static CURLcode req_set_upload_done(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + DEBUGASSERT(!data->req.upload_done); + data->req.upload_done = TRUE; + data->req.keepon &= ~(KEEP_SEND|KEEP_SEND_TIMED); /* we're done sending */ + + Curl_creader_done(data, data->req.upload_aborted); + + if(data->req.upload_aborted) { + if(data->req.writebytecount) + infof(data, "abort upload after having sent %" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T + " bytes", data->req.writebytecount); + else + infof(data, "abort upload"); + } + else if(data->req.writebytecount) + infof(data, "upload completely sent off: %" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T + " bytes", data->req.writebytecount); + else if(!data->req.download_done) + infof(data, Curl_creader_total_length(data)? + "We are completely uploaded and fine" : + "Request completely sent off"); + + return Curl_xfer_send_close(data); +} + +static CURLcode req_flush(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + CURLcode result; + + if(!data || !data->conn) + return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + + if(!Curl_bufq_is_empty(&data->req.sendbuf)) { + result = req_send_buffer_flush(data); + if(result) + return result; + if(!Curl_bufq_is_empty(&data->req.sendbuf)) { + return CURLE_AGAIN; + } + } + + if(!data->req.upload_done && data->req.eos_read && + Curl_bufq_is_empty(&data->req.sendbuf)) { + return req_set_upload_done(data); + } + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static ssize_t add_from_client(void *reader_ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, + CURLcode *err) +{ + struct Curl_easy *data = reader_ctx; + size_t nread; + bool eos; + + *err = Curl_client_read(data, (char *)buf, buflen, &nread, &eos); + if(*err) + return -1; + if(eos) + data->req.eos_read = TRUE; + return (ssize_t)nread; +} + +#ifndef USE_HYPER + +static CURLcode req_send_buffer_add(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *buf, size_t blen, + size_t hds_len) +{ + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + ssize_t n; + n = Curl_bufq_write(&data->req.sendbuf, + (const unsigned char *)buf, blen, &result); + if(n < 0) + return result; + /* We rely on a SOFTLIMIT on sendbuf, so it can take all data in */ + DEBUGASSERT((size_t)n == blen); + data->req.sendbuf_hds_len += hds_len; + return CURLE_OK; +} + +CURLcode Curl_req_send(struct Curl_easy *data, struct dynbuf *req) +{ + CURLcode result; + const char *buf; + size_t blen, nwritten; + + if(!data || !data->conn) + return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + + buf = Curl_dyn_ptr(req); + blen = Curl_dyn_len(req); + if(!Curl_creader_total_length(data)) { + /* Request without body. Try to send directly from the buf given. */ + data->req.eos_read = TRUE; + result = xfer_send(data, buf, blen, blen, &nwritten); + if(result) + return result; + buf += nwritten; + blen -= nwritten; + } + + if(blen) { + /* Either we have a request body, or we could not send the complete + * request in one go. Buffer the remainder and try to add as much + * body bytes as room is left in the buffer. Then flush. */ + result = req_send_buffer_add(data, buf, blen, blen); + if(result) + return result; + + return Curl_req_send_more(data); + } + return CURLE_OK; +} +#endif /* !USE_HYPER */ + +bool Curl_req_want_send(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + return data->req.sendbuf_init && !Curl_bufq_is_empty(&data->req.sendbuf); +} + +bool Curl_req_done_sending(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + if(data->req.upload_done) { + DEBUGASSERT(Curl_bufq_is_empty(&data->req.sendbuf)); + return TRUE; + } + return FALSE; +} + +CURLcode Curl_req_send_more(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + CURLcode result; + + /* Fill our send buffer if more from client can be read. */ + if(!data->req.eos_read && !Curl_bufq_is_full(&data->req.sendbuf)) { + ssize_t nread = Curl_bufq_sipn(&data->req.sendbuf, 0, + add_from_client, data, &result); + if(nread < 0 && result != CURLE_AGAIN) + return result; + } + + result = req_flush(data); + if(result == CURLE_AGAIN) + result = CURLE_OK; + + return result; +} + +CURLcode Curl_req_abort_sending(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + if(!data->req.upload_done) { + Curl_bufq_reset(&data->req.sendbuf); + data->req.upload_aborted = TRUE; + return req_set_upload_done(data); + } + return CURLE_OK; +} diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/request.h b/vendor/curl/lib/request.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f9be6f2993 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/request.h @@ -0,0 +1,227 @@ +#ifndef HEADER_CURL_REQUEST_H +#define HEADER_CURL_REQUEST_H +/*************************************************************************** + * _ _ ____ _ + * Project ___| | | | _ \| | + * / __| | | | |_) | | + * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ + * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| + * + * Copyright (C) Daniel Stenberg, , et al. + * + * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which + * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms + * are also available at https://curl.se/docs/copyright.html. + * + * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell + * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is + * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file. + * + * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY + * KIND, either express or implied. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: curl + * + ***************************************************************************/ + +/* This file is for lib internal stuff */ + +#include "curl_setup.h" + +#include "bufq.h" + +/* forward declarations */ +struct UserDefined; + +enum expect100 { + EXP100_SEND_DATA, /* enough waiting, just send the body now */ + EXP100_AWAITING_CONTINUE, /* waiting for the 100 Continue header */ + EXP100_SENDING_REQUEST, /* still sending the request but will wait for + the 100 header once done with the request */ + EXP100_FAILED /* used on 417 Expectation Failed */ +}; + +enum upgrade101 { + UPGR101_INIT, /* default state */ + UPGR101_WS, /* upgrade to WebSockets requested */ + UPGR101_H2, /* upgrade to HTTP/2 requested */ + UPGR101_RECEIVED, /* 101 response received */ + UPGR101_WORKING /* talking upgraded protocol */ +}; + + +/* + * Request specific data in the easy handle (Curl_easy). Previously, + * these members were on the connectdata struct but since a conn struct may + * now be shared between different Curl_easys, we store connection-specific + * data here. This struct only keeps stuff that's interesting for *this* + * request, as it will be cleared between multiple ones + */ +struct SingleRequest { + curl_off_t size; /* -1 if unknown at this point */ + curl_off_t maxdownload; /* in bytes, the maximum amount of data to fetch, + -1 means unlimited */ + curl_off_t bytecount; /* total number of bytes read */ + curl_off_t writebytecount; /* number of bytes written */ + + struct curltime start; /* transfer started at this time */ + unsigned int headerbytecount; /* received server headers (not CONNECT + headers) */ + unsigned int allheadercount; /* all received headers (server + CONNECT) */ + unsigned int deductheadercount; /* this amount of bytes doesn't count when + we check if anything has been transferred + at the end of a connection. We use this + counter to make only a 100 reply (without + a following second response code) result + in a CURLE_GOT_NOTHING error code */ + int headerline; /* counts header lines to better track the + first one */ + curl_off_t offset; /* possible resume offset read from the + Content-Range: header */ + int httpversion; /* Version in response (09, 10, 11, etc.) */ + int httpcode; /* error code from the 'HTTP/1.? XXX' or + 'RTSP/1.? XXX' line */ + int keepon; + enum upgrade101 upgr101; /* 101 upgrade state */ + + /* Client Writer stack, handles transfer- and content-encodings, protocol + * checks, pausing by client callbacks. */ + struct Curl_cwriter *writer_stack; + /* Client Reader stack, handles transfer- and content-encodings, protocol + * checks, pausing by client callbacks. */ + struct Curl_creader *reader_stack; + struct bufq sendbuf; /* data which needs to be send to the server */ + size_t sendbuf_hds_len; /* amount of header bytes in sendbuf */ + time_t timeofdoc; + long bodywrites; + char *location; /* This points to an allocated version of the Location: + header data */ + char *newurl; /* Set to the new URL to use when a redirect or a retry is + wanted */ + + /* Allocated protocol-specific data. Each protocol handler makes sure this + points to data it needs. */ + union { + struct FILEPROTO *file; + struct FTP *ftp; + struct HTTP *http; + struct IMAP *imap; + struct ldapreqinfo *ldap; + struct MQTT *mqtt; + struct POP3 *pop3; + struct RTSP *rtsp; + struct smb_request *smb; + struct SMTP *smtp; + struct SSHPROTO *ssh; + struct TELNET *telnet; + } p; +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_DOH + struct dohdata *doh; /* DoH specific data for this request */ +#endif +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_COOKIES + unsigned char setcookies; +#endif + BIT(header); /* incoming data has HTTP header */ + BIT(done); /* request is done, e.g. no more send/recv should + * happen. This can be TRUE before `upload_done` or + * `download_done` is TRUE. */ + BIT(content_range); /* set TRUE if Content-Range: was found */ + BIT(download_done); /* set to TRUE when download is complete */ + BIT(eos_written); /* iff EOS has been written to client */ + BIT(eos_read); /* iff EOS has been read from the client */ + BIT(rewind_read); /* iff reader needs rewind at next start */ + BIT(upload_done); /* set to TRUE when all request data has been sent */ + BIT(upload_aborted); /* set to TRUE when upload was aborted. Will also + * show `upload_done` as TRUE. */ + BIT(ignorebody); /* we read a response-body but we ignore it! */ + BIT(http_bodyless); /* HTTP response status code is between 100 and 199, + 204 or 304 */ + BIT(chunk); /* if set, this is a chunked transfer-encoding */ + BIT(ignore_cl); /* ignore content-length */ + BIT(upload_chunky); /* set TRUE if we are doing chunked transfer-encoding + on upload */ + BIT(getheader); /* TRUE if header parsing is wanted */ + BIT(no_body); /* the response has no body */ + BIT(authneg); /* TRUE when the auth phase has started, which means + that we are creating a request with an auth header, + but it is not the final request in the auth + negotiation. */ + BIT(sendbuf_init); /* sendbuf is initialized */ +}; + +/** + * Initialize the state of the request for first use. + */ +void Curl_req_init(struct SingleRequest *req); + +/** + * The request is about to start. Record time and do a soft reset. + */ +CURLcode Curl_req_start(struct SingleRequest *req, + struct Curl_easy *data); + +/** + * The request may continue with a follow up. Reset + * members, but keep start time for overall duration calc. + */ +CURLcode Curl_req_soft_reset(struct SingleRequest *req, + struct Curl_easy *data); + +/** + * The request is done. If not aborted, make sure that buffers are + * flushed to the client. + * @param req the request + * @param data the transfer + * @param aborted TRUE iff the request was aborted/errored + */ +CURLcode Curl_req_done(struct SingleRequest *req, + struct Curl_easy *data, bool aborted); + +/** + * Free the state of the request, not usable afterwards. + */ +void Curl_req_free(struct SingleRequest *req, struct Curl_easy *data); + +/** + * Hard reset the state of the request to virgin state base on + * transfer settings. + */ +void Curl_req_hard_reset(struct SingleRequest *req, struct Curl_easy *data); + +#ifndef USE_HYPER +/** + * Send request headers. If not all could be sent + * they will be buffered. Use `Curl_req_flush()` to make sure + * bytes are really send. + * @param data the transfer making the request + * @param buf the complete header bytes, no body + * @return CURLE_OK (on blocking with *pnwritten == 0) or error. + */ +CURLcode Curl_req_send(struct Curl_easy *data, struct dynbuf *buf); + +#endif /* !USE_HYPER */ + +/** + * TRUE iff the request has sent all request headers and data. + */ +bool Curl_req_done_sending(struct Curl_easy *data); + +/* + * Read more from client and flush all buffered request bytes. + * @return CURLE_OK on success or the error on the sending. + * Never returns CURLE_AGAIN. + */ +CURLcode Curl_req_send_more(struct Curl_easy *data); + +/** + * TRUE iff the request wants to send, e.g. has buffered bytes. + */ +bool Curl_req_want_send(struct Curl_easy *data); + +/** + * Stop sending any more request data to the server. + * Will clear the send buffer and mark request sending as done. + */ +CURLcode Curl_req_abort_sending(struct Curl_easy *data); + +#endif /* HEADER_CURL_REQUEST_H */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/rtsp.c b/vendor/curl/lib/rtsp.c index e673bb8dc0..1f162daa06 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/rtsp.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/rtsp.c @@ -58,21 +58,19 @@ static int rtsp_getsock_do(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, curl_socket_t *socks); /* - * Parse and write out any available RTP data. + * Parse and write out an RTSP response. * @param data the transfer * @param conn the connection * @param buf data read from connection * @param blen amount of data in buf - * @param consumed out, number of blen consumed + * @param is_eos TRUE iff this is the last write * @param readmore out, TRUE iff complete buf was consumed and more data * is needed */ -static CURLcode rtsp_rtp_readwrite(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn, - const char *buf, - size_t blen, - size_t *pconsumed, - bool *readmore); +static CURLcode rtsp_rtp_write_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *buf, + size_t blen, + bool is_eos); static CURLcode rtsp_setup_connection(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn); @@ -95,14 +93,14 @@ static int rtsp_getsock_do(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, static CURLcode rtp_client_write(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *ptr, size_t len); static -CURLcode rtsp_parse_transport(struct Curl_easy *data, char *transport); +CURLcode rtsp_parse_transport(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *transport); /* * RTSP handler interface. */ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_rtsp = { - "RTSP", /* scheme */ + "rtsp", /* scheme */ rtsp_setup_connection, /* setup_connection */ rtsp_do, /* do_it */ rtsp_done, /* done */ @@ -115,7 +113,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_rtsp = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ rtsp_disconnect, /* disconnect */ - rtsp_rtp_readwrite, /* readwrite */ + rtsp_rtp_write_resp, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ rtsp_conncheck, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_RTSP, /* defport */ @@ -226,8 +225,6 @@ static CURLcode rtsp_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) Curl_RtspReq rtspreq = data->set.rtspreq; struct RTSP *rtsp = data->req.p.rtsp; struct dynbuf req_buffer; - curl_off_t postsize = 0; /* for ANNOUNCE and SET_PARAMETER */ - curl_off_t putsize = 0; /* for ANNOUNCE and SET_PARAMETER */ const char *p_request = NULL; const char *p_session_id = NULL; @@ -242,6 +239,8 @@ static CURLcode rtsp_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) const char *p_userpwd = NULL; *done = TRUE; + /* Initialize a dynamic send buffer */ + Curl_dyn_init(&req_buffer, DYN_RTSP_REQ_HEADER); rtsp->CSeq_sent = data->state.rtsp_next_client_CSeq; rtsp->CSeq_recv = 0; @@ -311,9 +310,8 @@ static CURLcode rtsp_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) } if(rtspreq == RTSPREQ_RECEIVE) { - Curl_setup_transfer(data, FIRSTSOCKET, -1, TRUE, -1); - - return result; + Curl_xfer_setup(data, FIRSTSOCKET, -1, TRUE, -1); + goto out; } p_session_id = data->set.str[STRING_RTSP_SESSION_ID]; @@ -321,7 +319,8 @@ static CURLcode rtsp_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) (rtspreq & ~(RTSPREQ_OPTIONS | RTSPREQ_DESCRIBE | RTSPREQ_SETUP))) { failf(data, "Refusing to issue an RTSP request [%s] without a session ID.", p_request); - return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + result = CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + goto out; } /* Stream URI. Default to server '*' if not specified */ @@ -348,7 +347,8 @@ static CURLcode rtsp_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) else { failf(data, "Refusing to issue an RTSP SETUP without a Transport: header."); - return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + result = CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + goto out; } p_transport = data->state.aptr.rtsp_transport; @@ -367,9 +367,10 @@ static CURLcode rtsp_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) data->state.aptr.accept_encoding = aprintf("Accept-Encoding: %s\r\n", data->set.str[STRING_ENCODING]); - if(!data->state.aptr.accept_encoding) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - + if(!data->state.aptr.accept_encoding) { + result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + goto out; + } p_accept_encoding = data->state.aptr.accept_encoding; } } @@ -391,9 +392,11 @@ static CURLcode rtsp_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) result = Curl_http_output_auth(data, conn, p_request, HTTPREQ_GET, p_stream_uri, FALSE); if(result) - return result; + goto out; +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY p_proxyuserpwd = data->state.aptr.proxyuserpwd; +#endif p_userpwd = data->state.aptr.userpwd; /* Referrer */ @@ -425,23 +428,22 @@ static CURLcode rtsp_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) */ if(Curl_checkheaders(data, STRCONST("CSeq"))) { failf(data, "CSeq cannot be set as a custom header."); - return CURLE_RTSP_CSEQ_ERROR; + result = CURLE_RTSP_CSEQ_ERROR; + goto out; } if(Curl_checkheaders(data, STRCONST("Session"))) { failf(data, "Session ID cannot be set as a custom header."); - return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + result = CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + goto out; } - /* Initialize a dynamic send buffer */ - Curl_dyn_init(&req_buffer, DYN_RTSP_REQ_HEADER); - result = Curl_dyn_addf(&req_buffer, "%s %s RTSP/1.0\r\n" /* Request Stream-URI RTSP/1.0 */ "CSeq: %ld\r\n", /* CSeq */ p_request, p_stream_uri, rtsp->CSeq_sent); if(result) - return result; + goto out; /* * Rather than do a normal alloc line, keep the session_id unformatted @@ -450,7 +452,7 @@ static CURLcode rtsp_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) if(p_session_id) { result = Curl_dyn_addf(&req_buffer, "Session: %s\r\n", p_session_id); if(result) - return result; + goto out; } /* @@ -482,44 +484,58 @@ static CURLcode rtsp_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) Curl_safefree(data->state.aptr.userpwd); if(result) - return result; + goto out; if((rtspreq == RTSPREQ_SETUP) || (rtspreq == RTSPREQ_DESCRIBE)) { result = Curl_add_timecondition(data, &req_buffer); if(result) - return result; + goto out; } result = Curl_add_custom_headers(data, FALSE, &req_buffer); if(result) - return result; + goto out; if(rtspreq == RTSPREQ_ANNOUNCE || rtspreq == RTSPREQ_SET_PARAMETER || rtspreq == RTSPREQ_GET_PARAMETER) { + curl_off_t req_clen; /* request content length */ if(data->state.upload) { - putsize = data->state.infilesize; + req_clen = data->state.infilesize; data->state.httpreq = HTTPREQ_PUT; - + result = Curl_creader_set_fread(data, req_clen); + if(result) + goto out; } else { - postsize = (data->state.infilesize != -1)? - data->state.infilesize: - (data->set.postfields? (curl_off_t)strlen(data->set.postfields):0); - data->state.httpreq = HTTPREQ_POST; + if(data->set.postfields) { + size_t plen = strlen(data->set.postfields); + req_clen = (curl_off_t)plen; + result = Curl_creader_set_buf(data, data->set.postfields, plen); + } + else if(data->state.infilesize >= 0) { + req_clen = data->state.infilesize; + result = Curl_creader_set_fread(data, req_clen); + } + else { + req_clen = 0; + result = Curl_creader_set_null(data); + } + if(result) + goto out; } - if(putsize > 0 || postsize > 0) { + if(req_clen > 0) { /* As stated in the http comments, it is probably not wise to * actually set a custom Content-Length in the headers */ if(!Curl_checkheaders(data, STRCONST("Content-Length"))) { result = Curl_dyn_addf(&req_buffer, "Content-Length: %" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T"\r\n", - (data->state.upload ? putsize : postsize)); + req_clen); if(result) - return result; + goto out; } if(rtspreq == RTSPREQ_SET_PARAMETER || @@ -529,7 +545,7 @@ static CURLcode rtsp_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) STRCONST("Content-Type: " "text/parameters\r\n")); if(result) - return result; + goto out; } } @@ -539,11 +555,9 @@ static CURLcode rtsp_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) STRCONST("Content-Type: " "application/sdp\r\n")); if(result) - return result; + goto out; } } - - data->state.expect100header = FALSE; /* RTSP posts are simple/small */ } else if(rtspreq == RTSPREQ_GET_PARAMETER) { /* Check for an empty GET_PARAMETER (heartbeat) request */ @@ -551,31 +565,26 @@ static CURLcode rtsp_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) data->req.no_body = TRUE; } } + else { + result = Curl_creader_set_null(data); + if(result) + goto out; + } - /* RTSP never allows chunked transfer */ - data->req.forbidchunk = TRUE; /* Finish the request buffer */ result = Curl_dyn_addn(&req_buffer, STRCONST("\r\n")); if(result) - return result; + goto out; - if(postsize > 0) { - result = Curl_dyn_addn(&req_buffer, data->set.postfields, - (size_t)postsize); - if(result) - return result; - } + Curl_xfer_setup(data, FIRSTSOCKET, -1, TRUE, FIRSTSOCKET); /* issue the request */ - result = Curl_buffer_send(&req_buffer, data, data->req.p.http, - &data->info.request_size, 0, FIRSTSOCKET); + result = Curl_req_send(data, &req_buffer); if(result) { failf(data, "Failed sending RTSP request"); - return result; + goto out; } - Curl_setup_transfer(data, FIRSTSOCKET, -1, TRUE, putsize?FIRSTSOCKET:-1); - /* Increment the CSeq on success */ data->state.rtsp_next_client_CSeq++; @@ -586,30 +595,53 @@ static CURLcode rtsp_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) if(Curl_pgrsUpdate(data)) result = CURLE_ABORTED_BY_CALLBACK; } - +out: + Curl_dyn_free(&req_buffer); return result; } +/** + * write any BODY bytes missing to the client, ignore the rest. + */ +static CURLcode rtp_write_body_junk(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *buf, + size_t blen) +{ + struct rtsp_conn *rtspc = &(data->conn->proto.rtspc); + curl_off_t body_remain; + bool in_body; + + in_body = (data->req.headerline && !rtspc->in_header) && + (data->req.size >= 0) && + (data->req.bytecount < data->req.size); + body_remain = in_body? (data->req.size - data->req.bytecount) : 0; + DEBUGASSERT(body_remain >= 0); + if(body_remain) { + if((curl_off_t)blen > body_remain) + blen = (size_t)body_remain; + return Curl_client_write(data, CLIENTWRITE_BODY, (char *)buf, blen); + } + return CURLE_OK; +} + static CURLcode rtsp_filter_rtp(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn, const char *buf, size_t blen, - bool in_body, size_t *pconsumed) { - struct rtsp_conn *rtspc = &(conn->proto.rtspc); + struct rtsp_conn *rtspc = &(data->conn->proto.rtspc); CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + size_t skip_len = 0; *pconsumed = 0; while(blen) { + bool in_body = (data->req.headerline && !rtspc->in_header) && + (data->req.size >= 0) && + (data->req.bytecount < data->req.size); switch(rtspc->state) { case RTP_PARSE_SKIP: { DEBUGASSERT(Curl_dyn_len(&rtspc->buf) == 0); - if(in_body && buf[0] != '$') { - /* in BODY and no valid start, do not consume and return */ - goto out; - } while(blen && buf[0] != '$') { if(!in_body && buf[0] == 'R' && data->set.rtspreq != RTSPREQ_RECEIVE) { @@ -624,13 +656,22 @@ static CURLcode rtsp_filter_rtp(struct Curl_easy *data, goto out; } } - /* junk, consume without buffering */ + /* junk/BODY, consume without buffering */ *pconsumed += 1; ++buf; --blen; + ++skip_len; } if(blen && buf[0] == '$') { /* possible start of an RTP message, buffer */ + if(skip_len) { + /* end of junk/BODY bytes, flush */ + result = rtp_write_body_junk(data, + (char *)(buf - skip_len), skip_len); + skip_len = 0; + if(result) + goto out; + } if(Curl_dyn_addn(&rtspc->buf, buf, 1)) { result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; goto out; @@ -650,35 +691,22 @@ static CURLcode rtsp_filter_rtp(struct Curl_easy *data, if(!(data->state.rtp_channel_mask[idx] & (1 << off))) { /* invalid channel number, junk or BODY data */ rtspc->state = RTP_PARSE_SKIP; - if(in_body) { - /* we do not consume this byte, it is BODY data */ - DEBUGF(infof(data, "RTSP: invalid RTP channel %d in BODY, " - "treating as BODY data", idx)); - if(*pconsumed == 0) { - /* We did not consume the initial '$' in our buffer, but had - * it from an earlier call. We cannot un-consume it and have - * to write it directly as BODY data */ - result = Curl_client_write(data, CLIENTWRITE_BODY, - Curl_dyn_ptr(&rtspc->buf), 1); - Curl_dyn_free(&rtspc->buf); - if(result) - goto out; - } - else { - /* un-consume the '$' and leave */ - Curl_dyn_free(&rtspc->buf); - *pconsumed -= 1; - --buf; - ++blen; + DEBUGASSERT(skip_len == 0); + /* we do not consume this byte, it is BODY data */ + DEBUGF(infof(data, "RTSP: invalid RTP channel %d, skipping", idx)); + if(*pconsumed == 0) { + /* We did not consume the initial '$' in our buffer, but had + * it from an earlier call. We cannot un-consume it and have + * to write it directly as BODY data */ + result = rtp_write_body_junk(data, Curl_dyn_ptr(&rtspc->buf), 1); + if(result) goto out; - } } else { - /* not BODY, forget the junk '$'. Do not consume this byte, - * it might be a start */ - infof(data, "RTSP: invalid RTP channel %d, skipping", idx); - Curl_dyn_free(&rtspc->buf); + /* count the '$' as skip and continue */ + skip_len = 1; } + Curl_dyn_free(&rtspc->buf); break; } /* a valid channel, so we expect this to be a real RTP message */ @@ -754,52 +782,49 @@ static CURLcode rtsp_filter_rtp(struct Curl_easy *data, } } out: + if(!result && skip_len) + result = rtp_write_body_junk(data, (char *)(buf - skip_len), skip_len); return result; } -static CURLcode rtsp_rtp_readwrite(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn, - const char *buf, - size_t blen, - size_t *pconsumed, - bool *readmore) +static CURLcode rtsp_rtp_write_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *buf, + size_t blen, + bool is_eos) { - struct rtsp_conn *rtspc = &(conn->proto.rtspc); + struct rtsp_conn *rtspc = &(data->conn->proto.rtspc); CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; size_t consumed = 0; - bool in_body; if(!data->req.header) rtspc->in_header = FALSE; - in_body = (data->req.headerline && !rtspc->in_header) && - (data->req.size >= 0) && - (data->req.bytecount < data->req.size); - - *readmore = FALSE; - *pconsumed = 0; if(!blen) { goto out; } - /* If header parsing is not onging, extract RTP messages */ + DEBUGF(infof(data, "rtsp_rtp_write_resp(len=%zu, in_header=%d, eos=%d)", + blen, rtspc->in_header, is_eos)); + + /* If header parsing is not ongoing, extract RTP messages */ if(!rtspc->in_header) { - result = rtsp_filter_rtp(data, conn, buf, blen, in_body, &consumed); + result = rtsp_filter_rtp(data, buf, blen, &consumed); if(result) goto out; - *pconsumed += consumed; buf += consumed; blen -= consumed; + /* either we consumed all or are at the start of header parsing */ + if(blen && !data->req.header) + DEBUGF(infof(data, "RTSP: %zu bytes, possibly excess in response body", + blen)); } /* we want to parse headers, do so */ if(data->req.header && blen) { rtspc->in_header = TRUE; - result = Curl_http_readwrite_headers(data, conn, buf, blen, - &consumed); + result = Curl_http_write_resp_hds(data, buf, blen, &consumed); if(result) goto out; - *pconsumed += consumed; buf += consumed; blen -= consumed; @@ -807,26 +832,42 @@ static CURLcode rtsp_rtp_readwrite(struct Curl_easy *data, rtspc->in_header = FALSE; if(!rtspc->in_header) { - /* If header parsing is done and data left, extract RTP messages */ - in_body = (data->req.headerline && !rtspc->in_header) && - (data->req.size >= 0) && - (data->req.bytecount < data->req.size); - result = rtsp_filter_rtp(data, conn, buf, blen, in_body, &consumed); + /* If header parsing is done, extract interleaved RTP messages */ + if(data->req.size <= -1) { + /* Respect section 4.4 of rfc2326: If the Content-Length header is + absent, a length 0 must be assumed. */ + data->req.size = 0; + data->req.download_done = TRUE; + } + result = rtsp_filter_rtp(data, buf, blen, &consumed); if(result) goto out; - *pconsumed += consumed; + blen -= consumed; } } if(rtspc->state != RTP_PARSE_SKIP) - *readmore = TRUE; + data->req.done = FALSE; + /* we SHOULD have consumed all bytes, unless the response is borked. + * In which case we write out the left over bytes, letting the client + * writer deal with it (it will report EXCESS and fail the transfer). */ + DEBUGF(infof(data, "rtsp_rtp_write_resp(len=%zu, in_header=%d, done=%d " + " rtspc->state=%d, req.size=%" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T ")", + blen, rtspc->in_header, data->req.done, rtspc->state, + data->req.size)); + if(!result && (is_eos || blen)) { + result = Curl_client_write(data, CLIENTWRITE_BODY| + (is_eos? CLIENTWRITE_EOS:0), + (char *)buf, blen); + } out: - if(!*readmore && data->set.rtspreq == RTSPREQ_RECEIVE) { + if((data->set.rtspreq == RTSPREQ_RECEIVE) && + (rtspc->state == RTP_PARSE_SKIP)) { /* In special mode RECEIVE, we just process one chunk of network * data, so we stop the transfer here, if we have no incomplete * RTP message pending. */ - data->req.keepon &= ~KEEP_RECV; + data->req.download_done = TRUE; } return result; } @@ -873,12 +914,12 @@ CURLcode rtp_client_write(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *ptr, size_t len) return CURLE_OK; } -CURLcode Curl_rtsp_parseheader(struct Curl_easy *data, char *header) +CURLcode Curl_rtsp_parseheader(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *header) { if(checkprefix("CSeq:", header)) { long CSeq = 0; char *endp; - char *p = &header[5]; + const char *p = &header[5]; while(ISBLANK(*p)) p++; CSeq = strtol(p, &endp, 10); @@ -893,8 +934,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_rtsp_parseheader(struct Curl_easy *data, char *header) } } else if(checkprefix("Session:", header)) { - char *start; - char *end; + const char *start, *end; size_t idlen; /* Find the first non-space letter */ @@ -922,7 +962,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_rtsp_parseheader(struct Curl_easy *data, char *header) /* If the Session ID is set, then compare */ if(strlen(data->set.str[STRING_RTSP_SESSION_ID]) != idlen || - strncmp(start, data->set.str[STRING_RTSP_SESSION_ID], idlen) != 0) { + strncmp(start, data->set.str[STRING_RTSP_SESSION_ID], idlen)) { failf(data, "Got RTSP Session ID Line [%s], but wanted ID [%s]", start, data->set.str[STRING_RTSP_SESSION_ID]); return CURLE_RTSP_SESSION_ERROR; @@ -934,11 +974,9 @@ CURLcode Curl_rtsp_parseheader(struct Curl_easy *data, char *header) */ /* Copy the id substring into a new buffer */ - data->set.str[STRING_RTSP_SESSION_ID] = malloc(idlen + 1); + data->set.str[STRING_RTSP_SESSION_ID] = Curl_memdup0(start, idlen); if(!data->set.str[STRING_RTSP_SESSION_ID]) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - memcpy(data->set.str[STRING_RTSP_SESSION_ID], start, idlen); - (data->set.str[STRING_RTSP_SESSION_ID])[idlen] = '\0'; } } else if(checkprefix("Transport:", header)) { @@ -951,14 +989,13 @@ CURLcode Curl_rtsp_parseheader(struct Curl_easy *data, char *header) } static -CURLcode rtsp_parse_transport(struct Curl_easy *data, char *transport) +CURLcode rtsp_parse_transport(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *transport) { /* If we receive multiple Transport response-headers, the linterleaved channels of each response header is recorded and used together for subsequent data validity checks.*/ /* e.g.: ' RTP/AVP/TCP;unicast;interleaved=5-6' */ - char *start; - char *end; + const char *start, *end; start = transport; while(start && *start) { while(*start && ISBLANK(*start) ) @@ -967,7 +1004,7 @@ CURLcode rtsp_parse_transport(struct Curl_easy *data, char *transport) if(checkprefix("interleaved=", start)) { long chan1, chan2, chan; char *endp; - char *p = start + 12; + const char *p = start + 12; chan1 = strtol(p, &endp, 10); if(p != endp && chan1 >= 0 && chan1 <= 255) { unsigned char *rtp_channel_mask = data->state.rtp_channel_mask; diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/rtsp.h b/vendor/curl/lib/rtsp.h index 237b80f809..b1ffa5c7ea 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/rtsp.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/rtsp.h @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ extern const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_rtsp; -CURLcode Curl_rtsp_parseheader(struct Curl_easy *data, char *header); +CURLcode Curl_rtsp_parseheader(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *header); #else /* disabled */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/sendf.c b/vendor/curl/lib/sendf.c index a2fac0c4e9..68a8bf3b6a 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/sendf.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/sendf.c @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ #include "cfilters.h" #include "connect.h" #include "content_encoding.h" +#include "cw-out.h" #include "vtls/vtls.h" #include "vssh/ssh.h" #include "easyif.h" @@ -49,8 +50,8 @@ #include "select.h" #include "strdup.h" #include "http2.h" -#include "headers.h" #include "progress.h" +#include "warnless.h" #include "ws.h" /* The last 3 #include files should be in this order */ @@ -59,426 +60,124 @@ #include "memdebug.h" -static CURLcode do_init_stack(struct Curl_easy *data); - -#if defined(CURL_DO_LINEEND_CONV) && !defined(CURL_DISABLE_FTP) -/* - * convert_lineends() changes CRLF (\r\n) end-of-line markers to a single LF - * (\n), with special processing for CRLF sequences that are split between two - * blocks of data. Remaining, bare CRs are changed to LFs. The possibly new - * size of the data is returned. - */ -static size_t convert_lineends(struct Curl_easy *data, - char *startPtr, size_t size) -{ - char *inPtr, *outPtr; - - /* sanity check */ - if(!startPtr || (size < 1)) { - return size; - } - - if(data->state.prev_block_had_trailing_cr) { - /* The previous block of incoming data - had a trailing CR, which was turned into a LF. */ - if(*startPtr == '\n') { - /* This block of incoming data starts with the - previous block's LF so get rid of it */ - memmove(startPtr, startPtr + 1, size-1); - size--; - /* and it wasn't a bare CR but a CRLF conversion instead */ - data->state.crlf_conversions++; - } - data->state.prev_block_had_trailing_cr = FALSE; /* reset the flag */ - } - - /* find 1st CR, if any */ - inPtr = outPtr = memchr(startPtr, '\r', size); - if(inPtr) { - /* at least one CR, now look for CRLF */ - while(inPtr < (startPtr + size-1)) { - /* note that it's size-1, so we'll never look past the last byte */ - if(memcmp(inPtr, "\r\n", 2) == 0) { - /* CRLF found, bump past the CR and copy the NL */ - inPtr++; - *outPtr = *inPtr; - /* keep track of how many CRLFs we converted */ - data->state.crlf_conversions++; - } - else { - if(*inPtr == '\r') { - /* lone CR, move LF instead */ - *outPtr = '\n'; - } - else { - /* not a CRLF nor a CR, just copy whatever it is */ - *outPtr = *inPtr; - } - } - outPtr++; - inPtr++; - } /* end of while loop */ - - if(inPtr < startPtr + size) { - /* handle last byte */ - if(*inPtr == '\r') { - /* deal with a CR at the end of the buffer */ - *outPtr = '\n'; /* copy a NL instead */ - /* note that a CRLF might be split across two blocks */ - data->state.prev_block_had_trailing_cr = TRUE; - } - else { - /* copy last byte */ - *outPtr = *inPtr; - } - outPtr++; - } - if(outPtr < startPtr + size) - /* tidy up by null terminating the now shorter data */ - *outPtr = '\0'; - - return (outPtr - startPtr); - } - return size; -} -#endif /* CURL_DO_LINEEND_CONV && !CURL_DISABLE_FTP */ - -/* - * Curl_nwrite() is an internal write function that sends data to the - * server. Works with a socket index for the connection. - * - * If the write would block (CURLE_AGAIN), it returns CURLE_OK and - * (*nwritten == 0). Otherwise we return regular CURLcode value. - */ -CURLcode Curl_nwrite(struct Curl_easy *data, - int sockindex, - const void *buf, - size_t blen, - ssize_t *pnwritten) -{ - ssize_t nwritten; - CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; - struct connectdata *conn; - - DEBUGASSERT(sockindex >= 0 && sockindex < 2); - DEBUGASSERT(pnwritten); - DEBUGASSERT(data); - DEBUGASSERT(data->conn); - conn = data->conn; -#ifdef CURLDEBUG - { - /* Allow debug builds to override this logic to force short sends - */ - char *p = getenv("CURL_SMALLSENDS"); - if(p) { - size_t altsize = (size_t)strtoul(p, NULL, 10); - if(altsize) - blen = CURLMIN(blen, altsize); - } - } -#endif - nwritten = conn->send[sockindex](data, sockindex, buf, blen, &result); - if(result == CURLE_AGAIN) { - nwritten = 0; - result = CURLE_OK; - } - else if(result) { - nwritten = -1; /* make sure */ - } - else { - DEBUGASSERT(nwritten >= 0); - } - - *pnwritten = nwritten; - return result; -} - -/* - * Curl_write() is an internal write function that sends data to the - * server. Works with plain sockets, SCP, SSL or kerberos. - * - * If the write would block (CURLE_AGAIN), we return CURLE_OK and - * (*written == 0). Otherwise we return regular CURLcode value. - */ -CURLcode Curl_write(struct Curl_easy *data, - curl_socket_t sockfd, - const void *mem, - size_t len, - ssize_t *written) -{ - struct connectdata *conn; - int num; - - DEBUGASSERT(data); - DEBUGASSERT(data->conn); - conn = data->conn; - num = (sockfd != CURL_SOCKET_BAD && sockfd == conn->sock[SECONDARYSOCKET]); - return Curl_nwrite(data, num, mem, len, written); -} - -static CURLcode pausewrite(struct Curl_easy *data, - int type, /* what type of data */ - bool paused_body, - const char *ptr, - size_t len) -{ - /* signalled to pause sending on this connection, but since we have data - we want to send we need to dup it to save a copy for when the sending - is again enabled */ - struct SingleRequest *k = &data->req; - struct UrlState *s = &data->state; - unsigned int i; - bool newtype = TRUE; - - Curl_conn_ev_data_pause(data, TRUE); - - if(s->tempcount) { - for(i = 0; i< s->tempcount; i++) { - if(s->tempwrite[i].type == type && - !!s->tempwrite[i].paused_body == !!paused_body) { - /* data for this type exists */ - newtype = FALSE; - break; - } - } - DEBUGASSERT(i < 3); - if(i >= 3) - /* There are more types to store than what fits: very bad */ - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - } - else - i = 0; - - if(newtype) { - /* store this information in the state struct for later use */ - Curl_dyn_init(&s->tempwrite[i].b, DYN_PAUSE_BUFFER); - s->tempwrite[i].type = type; - s->tempwrite[i].paused_body = paused_body; - s->tempcount++; - } - - if(Curl_dyn_addn(&s->tempwrite[i].b, (unsigned char *)ptr, len)) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - - /* mark the connection as RECV paused */ - k->keepon |= KEEP_RECV_PAUSE; - - return CURLE_OK; -} - - -/* chop_write() writes chunks of data not larger than CURL_MAX_WRITE_SIZE via - * client write callback(s) and takes care of pause requests from the - * callbacks. - */ -static CURLcode chop_write(struct Curl_easy *data, - int type, - bool skip_body_write, - char *optr, - size_t olen) -{ - struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; - curl_write_callback writeheader = NULL; - curl_write_callback writebody = NULL; - char *ptr = optr; - size_t len = olen; - void *writebody_ptr = data->set.out; - - if(!len) - return CURLE_OK; - - /* If reading is paused, append this data to the already held data for this - type. */ - if(data->req.keepon & KEEP_RECV_PAUSE) - return pausewrite(data, type, !skip_body_write, ptr, len); - - /* Determine the callback(s) to use. */ - if(!skip_body_write && - ((type & CLIENTWRITE_BODY) || - ((type & CLIENTWRITE_HEADER) && data->set.include_header))) { -#ifdef USE_WEBSOCKETS - if(conn->handler->protocol & (CURLPROTO_WS|CURLPROTO_WSS)) { - writebody = Curl_ws_writecb; - writebody_ptr = data; - } - else -#endif - writebody = data->set.fwrite_func; - } - if((type & (CLIENTWRITE_HEADER|CLIENTWRITE_INFO)) && - (data->set.fwrite_header || data->set.writeheader)) { - /* - * Write headers to the same callback or to the especially setup - * header callback function (added after version 7.7.1). - */ - writeheader = - data->set.fwrite_header? data->set.fwrite_header: data->set.fwrite_func; - } - - /* Chop data, write chunks. */ - while(len) { - size_t chunklen = len <= CURL_MAX_WRITE_SIZE? len: CURL_MAX_WRITE_SIZE; - - if(writebody) { - size_t wrote; - Curl_set_in_callback(data, true); - wrote = writebody(ptr, 1, chunklen, writebody_ptr); - Curl_set_in_callback(data, false); - - if(CURL_WRITEFUNC_PAUSE == wrote) { - if(conn->handler->flags & PROTOPT_NONETWORK) { - /* Protocols that work without network cannot be paused. This is - actually only FILE:// just now, and it can't pause since the - transfer isn't done using the "normal" procedure. */ - failf(data, "Write callback asked for PAUSE when not supported"); - return CURLE_WRITE_ERROR; - } - return pausewrite(data, type, TRUE, ptr, len); - } - if(wrote != chunklen) { - failf(data, "Failure writing output to destination"); - return CURLE_WRITE_ERROR; - } - } - - ptr += chunklen; - len -= chunklen; - } - -#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_HTTP - /* HTTP header, but not status-line */ - if((conn->handler->protocol & PROTO_FAMILY_HTTP) && - (type & CLIENTWRITE_HEADER) && !(type & CLIENTWRITE_STATUS) ) { - unsigned char htype = (unsigned char) - (type & CLIENTWRITE_CONNECT ? CURLH_CONNECT : - (type & CLIENTWRITE_1XX ? CURLH_1XX : - (type & CLIENTWRITE_TRAILER ? CURLH_TRAILER : - CURLH_HEADER))); - CURLcode result = Curl_headers_push(data, optr, htype); - if(result) - return result; - } -#endif - - if(writeheader) { - size_t wrote; - - Curl_set_in_callback(data, true); - wrote = writeheader(optr, 1, olen, data->set.writeheader); - Curl_set_in_callback(data, false); - - if(CURL_WRITEFUNC_PAUSE == wrote) - return pausewrite(data, type, FALSE, optr, olen); - if(wrote != olen) { - failf(data, "Failed writing header"); - return CURLE_WRITE_ERROR; - } - } - - return CURLE_OK; -} - +static CURLcode do_init_writer_stack(struct Curl_easy *data); /* Curl_client_write() sends data to the write callback(s) The bit pattern defines to what "streams" to write to. Body and/or header. The defines are in sendf.h of course. - - If CURL_DO_LINEEND_CONV is enabled, data is converted IN PLACE to the - local character encoding. This is a problem and should be changed in - the future to leave the original data alone. */ CURLcode Curl_client_write(struct Curl_easy *data, - int type, char *buf, size_t blen) + int type, const char *buf, size_t blen) { CURLcode result; -#if !defined(CURL_DISABLE_FTP) && defined(CURL_DO_LINEEND_CONV) - /* FTP data may need conversion. */ - if((type & CLIENTWRITE_BODY) && - (data->conn->handler->protocol & PROTO_FAMILY_FTP) && - data->conn->proto.ftpc.transfertype == 'A') { - /* convert end-of-line markers */ - blen = convert_lineends(data, buf, blen); - } -#endif /* it is one of those, at least */ DEBUGASSERT(type & (CLIENTWRITE_BODY|CLIENTWRITE_HEADER|CLIENTWRITE_INFO)); - /* BODY is only BODY */ - DEBUGASSERT(!(type & CLIENTWRITE_BODY) || (type == CLIENTWRITE_BODY)); - /* INFO is only INFO */ - DEBUGASSERT(!(type & CLIENTWRITE_INFO) || (type == CLIENTWRITE_INFO)); + /* BODY is only BODY (with optional EOS) */ + DEBUGASSERT(!(type & CLIENTWRITE_BODY) || + ((type & ~(CLIENTWRITE_BODY|CLIENTWRITE_EOS)) == 0)); + /* INFO is only INFO (with optional EOS) */ + DEBUGASSERT(!(type & CLIENTWRITE_INFO) || + ((type & ~(CLIENTWRITE_INFO|CLIENTWRITE_EOS)) == 0)); if(!data->req.writer_stack) { - result = do_init_stack(data); + result = do_init_writer_stack(data); if(result) return result; DEBUGASSERT(data->req.writer_stack); } - return Curl_cwriter_write(data, data->req.writer_stack, type, buf, blen); -} - -CURLcode Curl_client_unpause(struct Curl_easy *data) -{ - CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; - - if(data->state.tempcount) { - /* there are buffers for sending that can be delivered as the receive - pausing is lifted! */ - unsigned int i; - unsigned int count = data->state.tempcount; - struct tempbuf writebuf[3]; /* there can only be three */ - - /* copy the structs to allow for immediate re-pausing */ - for(i = 0; i < data->state.tempcount; i++) { - writebuf[i] = data->state.tempwrite[i]; - Curl_dyn_init(&data->state.tempwrite[i].b, DYN_PAUSE_BUFFER); - } - data->state.tempcount = 0; - - for(i = 0; i < count; i++) { - /* even if one function returns error, this loops through and frees - all buffers */ - if(!result) - result = chop_write(data, writebuf[i].type, - !writebuf[i].paused_body, - Curl_dyn_ptr(&writebuf[i].b), - Curl_dyn_len(&writebuf[i].b)); - Curl_dyn_free(&writebuf[i].b); - } - } + result = Curl_cwriter_write(data, data->req.writer_stack, type, buf, blen); + CURL_TRC_WRITE(data, "client_write(type=%x, len=%zu) -> %d", + type, blen, result); return result; } -void Curl_client_cleanup(struct Curl_easy *data) +static void cl_reset_writer(struct Curl_easy *data) { struct Curl_cwriter *writer = data->req.writer_stack; - size_t i; - while(writer) { data->req.writer_stack = writer->next; writer->cwt->do_close(data, writer); free(writer); writer = data->req.writer_stack; } +} - for(i = 0; i < data->state.tempcount; i++) { - Curl_dyn_free(&data->state.tempwrite[i].b); +static void cl_reset_reader(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct Curl_creader *reader = data->req.reader_stack; + while(reader) { + data->req.reader_stack = reader->next; + reader->crt->do_close(data, reader); + free(reader); + reader = data->req.reader_stack; + } +} + +void Curl_client_cleanup(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + cl_reset_reader(data); + cl_reset_writer(data); + + data->req.bytecount = 0; + data->req.headerline = 0; +} + +void Curl_client_reset(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + if(data->req.rewind_read) { + /* already requested */ + CURL_TRC_READ(data, "client_reset, will rewind reader"); } - data->state.tempcount = 0; + else { + CURL_TRC_READ(data, "client_reset, clear readers"); + cl_reset_reader(data); + } + cl_reset_writer(data); + data->req.bytecount = 0; data->req.headerline = 0; } -/* Write data using an unencoding writer stack. "nbytes" is not - allowed to be 0. */ +CURLcode Curl_client_start(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + if(data->req.rewind_read) { + struct Curl_creader *r = data->req.reader_stack; + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + + CURL_TRC_READ(data, "client start, rewind readers"); + while(r) { + result = r->crt->rewind(data, r); + if(result) { + failf(data, "rewind of client reader '%s' failed: %d", + r->crt->name, result); + return result; + } + r = r->next; + } + data->req.rewind_read = FALSE; + cl_reset_reader(data); + } + return CURLE_OK; +} + +bool Curl_creader_will_rewind(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + return data->req.rewind_read; +} + +void Curl_creader_set_rewind(struct Curl_easy *data, bool enable) +{ + data->req.rewind_read = !!enable; +} + +/* Write data using an unencoding writer stack. */ CURLcode Curl_cwriter_write(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_cwriter *writer, int type, const char *buf, size_t nbytes) { - if(!nbytes) - return CURLE_OK; if(!writer) return CURLE_WRITE_ERROR; return writer->cwt->do_write(data, writer, type, buf, nbytes); @@ -506,26 +205,6 @@ void Curl_cwriter_def_close(struct Curl_easy *data, (void) writer; } -/* Real client writer to installed callbacks. */ -static CURLcode cw_client_write(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct Curl_cwriter *writer, int type, - const char *buf, size_t nbytes) -{ - (void)writer; - if(!nbytes) - return CURLE_OK; - return chop_write(data, type, FALSE, (char *)buf, nbytes); -} - -static const struct Curl_cwtype cw_client = { - "client", - NULL, - Curl_cwriter_def_init, - cw_client_write, - Curl_cwriter_def_close, - sizeof(struct Curl_cwriter) -}; - static size_t get_max_body_write_len(struct Curl_easy *data, curl_off_t limit) { if(limit != -1) { @@ -548,29 +227,63 @@ static size_t get_max_body_write_len(struct Curl_easy *data, curl_off_t limit) return SIZE_T_MAX; } +struct cw_download_ctx { + struct Curl_cwriter super; + BIT(started_response); +}; /* Download client writer in phase CURL_CW_PROTOCOL that * sees the "real" download body data. */ static CURLcode cw_download_write(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_cwriter *writer, int type, const char *buf, size_t nbytes) { + struct cw_download_ctx *ctx = writer->ctx; CURLcode result; size_t nwrite, excess_len = 0; - const char *excess_data = NULL; + bool is_connect = !!(type & CLIENTWRITE_CONNECT); + + if(!is_connect && !ctx->started_response) { + Curl_pgrsTime(data, TIMER_STARTTRANSFER); + ctx->started_response = TRUE; + } if(!(type & CLIENTWRITE_BODY)) { - if((type & CLIENTWRITE_CONNECT) && data->set.suppress_connect_headers) + if(is_connect && data->set.suppress_connect_headers) + return CURLE_OK; + result = Curl_cwriter_write(data, writer->next, type, buf, nbytes); + CURL_TRC_WRITE(data, "download_write header(type=%x, blen=%zu) -> %d", + type, nbytes, result); + return result; + } + + /* Here, we deal with REAL BODY bytes. All filtering and transfer + * encodings have been applied and only the true content, e.g. BODY, + * bytes are passed here. + * This allows us to check sizes, update stats, etc. independent + * from the protocol in play. */ + + if(data->req.no_body && nbytes > 0) { + /* BODY arrives although we want none, bail out */ + streamclose(data->conn, "ignoring body"); + CURL_TRC_WRITE(data, "download_write body(type=%x, blen=%zu), " + "did not want a BODY", type, nbytes); + data->req.download_done = TRUE; + if(data->info.header_size) + /* if headers have been received, this is fine */ return CURLE_OK; - return Curl_cwriter_write(data, writer->next, type, buf, nbytes); + return CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY; } + /* Determine if we see any bytes in excess to what is allowed. + * We write the allowed bytes and handle excess further below. + * This gives deterministic BODY writes on varying buffer receive + * lengths. */ nwrite = nbytes; if(-1 != data->req.maxdownload) { size_t wmax = get_max_body_write_len(data, data->req.maxdownload); if(nwrite > wmax) { excess_len = nbytes - wmax; nwrite = wmax; - excess_data = buf + nwrite; } if(nwrite == wmax) { @@ -578,6 +291,8 @@ static CURLcode cw_download_write(struct Curl_easy *data, } } + /* Error on too large filesize is handled below, after writing + * the permitted bytes */ if(data->set.max_filesize) { size_t wmax = get_max_body_write_len(data, data->set.max_filesize); if(nwrite > wmax) { @@ -585,35 +300,22 @@ static CURLcode cw_download_write(struct Curl_easy *data, } } - data->req.bytecount += nwrite; - ++data->req.bodywrites; - if(!data->req.ignorebody && nwrite) { + if(!data->req.ignorebody && (nwrite || (type & CLIENTWRITE_EOS))) { result = Curl_cwriter_write(data, writer->next, type, buf, nwrite); + CURL_TRC_WRITE(data, "download_write body(type=%x, blen=%zu) -> %d", + type, nbytes, result); if(result) return result; } + /* Update stats, write and report progress */ + data->req.bytecount += nwrite; + ++data->req.bodywrites; result = Curl_pgrsSetDownloadCounter(data, data->req.bytecount); if(result) return result; if(excess_len) { - if(data->conn->handler->readwrite) { - /* RTSP hack moved from transfer loop to here */ - bool readmore = FALSE; /* indicates data is incomplete, need more */ - size_t consumed = 0; - result = data->conn->handler->readwrite(data, data->conn, - excess_data, excess_len, - &consumed, &readmore); - if(result) - return result; - DEBUGASSERT(consumed <= excess_len); - excess_len -= consumed; - if(readmore) { - data->req.download_done = FALSE; - data->req.keepon |= KEEP_RECV; /* we're not done reading */ - } - } - if(excess_len && !data->req.ignorebody) { + if(!data->req.ignorebody) { infof(data, "Excess found writing body:" " excess = %zu" @@ -637,12 +339,12 @@ static CURLcode cw_download_write(struct Curl_easy *data, } static const struct Curl_cwtype cw_download = { - "download", + "protocol", NULL, Curl_cwriter_def_init, cw_download_write, Curl_cwriter_def_close, - sizeof(struct Curl_cwriter) + sizeof(struct cw_download_ctx) }; /* RAW client writer in phase CURL_CW_RAW that @@ -672,15 +374,18 @@ CURLcode Curl_cwriter_create(struct Curl_cwriter **pwriter, const struct Curl_cwtype *cwt, Curl_cwriter_phase phase) { - struct Curl_cwriter *writer; + struct Curl_cwriter *writer = NULL; CURLcode result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + void *p; DEBUGASSERT(cwt->cwriter_size >= sizeof(struct Curl_cwriter)); - writer = (struct Curl_cwriter *) calloc(1, cwt->cwriter_size); - if(!writer) + p = calloc(1, cwt->cwriter_size); + if(!p) goto out; + writer = (struct Curl_cwriter *)p; writer->cwt = cwt; + writer->ctx = p; writer->phase = phase; result = cwt->do_init(data, writer); @@ -712,14 +417,14 @@ size_t Curl_cwriter_count(struct Curl_easy *data, Curl_cwriter_phase phase) return n; } -static CURLcode do_init_stack(struct Curl_easy *data) +static CURLcode do_init_writer_stack(struct Curl_easy *data) { struct Curl_cwriter *writer; CURLcode result; DEBUGASSERT(!data->req.writer_stack); result = Curl_cwriter_create(&data->req.writer_stack, - data, &cw_client, CURL_CW_CLIENT); + data, &Curl_cwt_out, CURL_CW_CLIENT); if(result) return result; @@ -748,7 +453,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_cwriter_add(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_cwriter **anchor = &data->req.writer_stack; if(!*anchor) { - result = do_init_stack(data); + result = do_init_writer_stack(data); if(result) return result; } @@ -762,41 +467,912 @@ CURLcode Curl_cwriter_add(struct Curl_easy *data, return CURLE_OK; } +struct Curl_cwriter *Curl_cwriter_get_by_name(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *name) +{ + struct Curl_cwriter *writer; + for(writer = data->req.writer_stack; writer; writer = writer->next) { + if(!strcmp(name, writer->cwt->name)) + return writer; + } + return NULL; +} -/* - * Internal read-from-socket function. This is meant to deal with plain - * sockets, SSL sockets and kerberos sockets. - * - * Returns a regular CURLcode value. - */ -CURLcode Curl_read(struct Curl_easy *data, /* transfer */ - curl_socket_t sockfd, /* read from this socket */ - char *buf, /* store read data here */ - size_t sizerequested, /* max amount to read */ - ssize_t *n) /* amount bytes read */ -{ - CURLcode result = CURLE_RECV_ERROR; - ssize_t nread = 0; - size_t bytesfromsocket = 0; - char *buffertofill = NULL; - struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; - - /* Set 'num' to 0 or 1, depending on which socket that has been sent here. - If it is the second socket, we set num to 1. Otherwise to 0. This lets - us use the correct ssl handle. */ - int num = (sockfd == conn->sock[SECONDARYSOCKET]); - - *n = 0; /* reset amount to zero */ - - bytesfromsocket = CURLMIN(sizerequested, (size_t)data->set.buffer_size); - buffertofill = buf; - - nread = conn->recv[num](data, num, buffertofill, bytesfromsocket, &result); - if(nread < 0) +struct Curl_cwriter *Curl_cwriter_get_by_type(struct Curl_easy *data, + const struct Curl_cwtype *cwt) +{ + struct Curl_cwriter *writer; + for(writer = data->req.writer_stack; writer; writer = writer->next) { + if(writer->cwt == cwt) + return writer; + } + return NULL; +} + +void Curl_cwriter_remove_by_name(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *name) +{ + struct Curl_cwriter **anchor = &data->req.writer_stack; + + while(*anchor) { + if(!strcmp(name, (*anchor)->cwt->name)) { + struct Curl_cwriter *w = (*anchor); + *anchor = w->next; + Curl_cwriter_free(data, w); + continue; + } + anchor = &((*anchor)->next); + } +} + +bool Curl_cwriter_is_paused(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + return Curl_cw_out_is_paused(data); +} + +CURLcode Curl_cwriter_unpause(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + return Curl_cw_out_unpause(data); +} + +CURLcode Curl_creader_read(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader, + char *buf, size_t blen, size_t *nread, bool *eos) +{ + *nread = 0; + *eos = FALSE; + if(!reader) + return CURLE_READ_ERROR; + return reader->crt->do_read(data, reader, buf, blen, nread, eos); +} + +CURLcode Curl_creader_def_init(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + (void)data; + (void)reader; + return CURLE_OK; +} + +void Curl_creader_def_close(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + (void)data; + (void)reader; +} + +CURLcode Curl_creader_def_read(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader, + char *buf, size_t blen, + size_t *nread, bool *eos) +{ + if(reader->next) + return reader->next->crt->do_read(data, reader->next, buf, blen, + nread, eos); + else { + *nread = 0; + *eos = FALSE; + return CURLE_READ_ERROR; + } +} + +bool Curl_creader_def_needs_rewind(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + (void)data; + (void)reader; + return FALSE; +} + +curl_off_t Curl_creader_def_total_length(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + return reader->next? + reader->next->crt->total_length(data, reader->next) : -1; +} + +CURLcode Curl_creader_def_resume_from(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader, + curl_off_t offset) +{ + (void)data; + (void)reader; + (void)offset; + return CURLE_READ_ERROR; +} + +CURLcode Curl_creader_def_rewind(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + (void)data; + (void)reader; + return CURLE_OK; +} + +CURLcode Curl_creader_def_unpause(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + (void)data; + (void)reader; + return CURLE_OK; +} + +void Curl_creader_def_done(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader, int premature) +{ + (void)data; + (void)reader; + (void)premature; +} + +struct cr_in_ctx { + struct Curl_creader super; + curl_read_callback read_cb; + void *cb_user_data; + curl_off_t total_len; + curl_off_t read_len; + CURLcode error_result; + BIT(seen_eos); + BIT(errored); + BIT(has_used_cb); +}; + +static CURLcode cr_in_init(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + struct cr_in_ctx *ctx = reader->ctx; + (void)data; + ctx->read_cb = data->state.fread_func; + ctx->cb_user_data = data->state.in; + ctx->total_len = -1; + ctx->read_len = 0; + return CURLE_OK; +} + +/* Real client reader to installed client callbacks. */ +static CURLcode cr_in_read(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader, + char *buf, size_t blen, + size_t *pnread, bool *peos) +{ + struct cr_in_ctx *ctx = reader->ctx; + size_t nread; + + /* Once we have errored, we will return the same error forever */ + if(ctx->errored) { + *pnread = 0; + *peos = FALSE; + return ctx->error_result; + } + if(ctx->seen_eos) { + *pnread = 0; + *peos = TRUE; + return CURLE_OK; + } + /* respect length limitations */ + if(ctx->total_len >= 0) { + curl_off_t remain = ctx->total_len - ctx->read_len; + if(remain <= 0) + blen = 0; + else if(remain < (curl_off_t)blen) + blen = (size_t)remain; + } + nread = 0; + if(ctx->read_cb && blen) { + Curl_set_in_callback(data, true); + nread = ctx->read_cb(buf, 1, blen, ctx->cb_user_data); + Curl_set_in_callback(data, false); + ctx->has_used_cb = TRUE; + } + + switch(nread) { + case 0: + if((ctx->total_len >= 0) && (ctx->read_len < ctx->total_len)) { + failf(data, "client read function EOF fail, " + "only %"CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T"/%"CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T + " of needed bytes read", ctx->read_len, ctx->total_len); + return CURLE_READ_ERROR; + } + *pnread = 0; + *peos = TRUE; + ctx->seen_eos = TRUE; + break; + + case CURL_READFUNC_ABORT: + failf(data, "operation aborted by callback"); + *pnread = 0; + *peos = FALSE; + ctx->errored = TRUE; + ctx->error_result = CURLE_ABORTED_BY_CALLBACK; + return CURLE_ABORTED_BY_CALLBACK; + + case CURL_READFUNC_PAUSE: + if(data->conn->handler->flags & PROTOPT_NONETWORK) { + /* protocols that work without network cannot be paused. This is + actually only FILE:// just now, and it can't pause since the transfer + isn't done using the "normal" procedure. */ + failf(data, "Read callback asked for PAUSE when not supported"); + return CURLE_READ_ERROR; + } + /* CURL_READFUNC_PAUSE pauses read callbacks that feed socket writes */ + data->req.keepon |= KEEP_SEND_PAUSE; /* mark socket send as paused */ + *pnread = 0; + *peos = FALSE; + break; /* nothing was read */ + + default: + if(nread > blen) { + /* the read function returned a too large value */ + failf(data, "read function returned funny value"); + *pnread = 0; + *peos = FALSE; + ctx->errored = TRUE; + ctx->error_result = CURLE_READ_ERROR; + return CURLE_READ_ERROR; + } + ctx->read_len += nread; + if(ctx->total_len >= 0) + ctx->seen_eos = (ctx->read_len >= ctx->total_len); + *pnread = nread; + *peos = ctx->seen_eos; + break; + } + CURL_TRC_READ(data, "cr_in_read(len=%zu, total=%"CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T + ", read=%"CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T") -> %d, nread=%zu, eos=%d", + blen, ctx->total_len, ctx->read_len, CURLE_OK, + *pnread, *peos); + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static bool cr_in_needs_rewind(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + struct cr_in_ctx *ctx = reader->ctx; + (void)data; + return ctx->has_used_cb; +} + +static curl_off_t cr_in_total_length(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + struct cr_in_ctx *ctx = reader->ctx; + (void)data; + return ctx->total_len; +} + +static CURLcode cr_in_resume_from(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader, + curl_off_t offset) +{ + struct cr_in_ctx *ctx = reader->ctx; + int seekerr = CURL_SEEKFUNC_CANTSEEK; + + DEBUGASSERT(data->conn); + /* already started reading? */ + if(ctx->read_len) + return CURLE_READ_ERROR; + + if(data->set.seek_func) { + Curl_set_in_callback(data, true); + seekerr = data->set.seek_func(data->set.seek_client, offset, SEEK_SET); + Curl_set_in_callback(data, false); + } + + if(seekerr != CURL_SEEKFUNC_OK) { + curl_off_t passed = 0; + + if(seekerr != CURL_SEEKFUNC_CANTSEEK) { + failf(data, "Could not seek stream"); + return CURLE_READ_ERROR; + } + /* when seekerr == CURL_SEEKFUNC_CANTSEEK (can't seek to offset) */ + do { + char scratch[4*1024]; + size_t readthisamountnow = + (offset - passed > (curl_off_t)sizeof(scratch)) ? + sizeof(scratch) : + curlx_sotouz(offset - passed); + size_t actuallyread; + + Curl_set_in_callback(data, true); + actuallyread = ctx->read_cb(scratch, 1, readthisamountnow, + ctx->cb_user_data); + Curl_set_in_callback(data, false); + + passed += actuallyread; + if((actuallyread == 0) || (actuallyread > readthisamountnow)) { + /* this checks for greater-than only to make sure that the + CURL_READFUNC_ABORT return code still aborts */ + failf(data, "Could only read %" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T + " bytes from the input", passed); + return CURLE_READ_ERROR; + } + } while(passed < offset); + } + + /* now, decrease the size of the read */ + if(ctx->total_len > 0) { + ctx->total_len -= offset; + + if(ctx->total_len <= 0) { + failf(data, "File already completely uploaded"); + return CURLE_PARTIAL_FILE; + } + } + /* we've passed, proceed as normal */ + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static CURLcode cr_in_rewind(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + struct cr_in_ctx *ctx = reader->ctx; + + /* If we never invoked the callback, there is noting to rewind */ + if(!ctx->has_used_cb) + return CURLE_OK; + + if(data->set.seek_func) { + int err; + + Curl_set_in_callback(data, true); + err = (data->set.seek_func)(data->set.seek_client, 0, SEEK_SET); + Curl_set_in_callback(data, false); + CURL_TRC_READ(data, "cr_in, rewind via set.seek_func -> %d", err); + if(err) { + failf(data, "seek callback returned error %d", (int)err); + return CURLE_SEND_FAIL_REWIND; + } + } + else if(data->set.ioctl_func) { + curlioerr err; + + Curl_set_in_callback(data, true); + err = (data->set.ioctl_func)(data, CURLIOCMD_RESTARTREAD, + data->set.ioctl_client); + Curl_set_in_callback(data, false); + CURL_TRC_READ(data, "cr_in, rewind via set.ioctl_func -> %d", (int)err); + if(err) { + failf(data, "ioctl callback returned error %d", (int)err); + return CURLE_SEND_FAIL_REWIND; + } + } + else { + /* If no CURLOPT_READFUNCTION is used, we know that we operate on a + given FILE * stream and we can actually attempt to rewind that + ourselves with fseek() */ + if(data->state.fread_func == (curl_read_callback)fread) { + int err = fseek(data->state.in, 0, SEEK_SET); + CURL_TRC_READ(data, "cr_in, rewind via fseek -> %d(%d)", + (int)err, (int)errno); + if(-1 != err) + /* successful rewind */ + return CURLE_OK; + } + + /* no callback set or failure above, makes us fail at once */ + failf(data, "necessary data rewind wasn't possible"); + return CURLE_SEND_FAIL_REWIND; + } + return CURLE_OK; +} + + +static const struct Curl_crtype cr_in = { + "cr-in", + cr_in_init, + cr_in_read, + Curl_creader_def_close, + cr_in_needs_rewind, + cr_in_total_length, + cr_in_resume_from, + cr_in_rewind, + Curl_creader_def_unpause, + Curl_creader_def_done, + sizeof(struct cr_in_ctx) +}; + +CURLcode Curl_creader_create(struct Curl_creader **preader, + struct Curl_easy *data, + const struct Curl_crtype *crt, + Curl_creader_phase phase) +{ + struct Curl_creader *reader = NULL; + CURLcode result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + void *p; + + DEBUGASSERT(crt->creader_size >= sizeof(struct Curl_creader)); + p = calloc(1, crt->creader_size); + if(!p) + goto out; + + reader = (struct Curl_creader *)p; + reader->crt = crt; + reader->ctx = p; + reader->phase = phase; + result = crt->do_init(data, reader); + +out: + *preader = result? NULL : reader; + if(result) + free(reader); + return result; +} + +void Curl_creader_free(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + if(reader) { + reader->crt->do_close(data, reader); + free(reader); + } +} + +struct cr_lc_ctx { + struct Curl_creader super; + struct bufq buf; + BIT(read_eos); /* we read an EOS from the next reader */ + BIT(eos); /* we have returned an EOS */ +}; + +static CURLcode cr_lc_init(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + struct cr_lc_ctx *ctx = reader->ctx; + (void)data; + Curl_bufq_init2(&ctx->buf, (16 * 1024), 1, BUFQ_OPT_SOFT_LIMIT); + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static void cr_lc_close(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + struct cr_lc_ctx *ctx = reader->ctx; + (void)data; + Curl_bufq_free(&ctx->buf); +} + +/* client reader doing line end conversions. */ +static CURLcode cr_lc_read(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader, + char *buf, size_t blen, + size_t *pnread, bool *peos) +{ + struct cr_lc_ctx *ctx = reader->ctx; + CURLcode result; + size_t nread, i, start, n; + bool eos; + + if(ctx->eos) { + *pnread = 0; + *peos = TRUE; + return CURLE_OK; + } + + if(Curl_bufq_is_empty(&ctx->buf)) { + if(ctx->read_eos) { + ctx->eos = TRUE; + *pnread = 0; + *peos = TRUE; + return CURLE_OK; + } + /* Still getting data form the next reader, ctx->buf is empty */ + result = Curl_creader_read(data, reader->next, buf, blen, &nread, &eos); + if(result) + return result; + ctx->read_eos = eos; + + if(!nread || !memchr(buf, '\n', nread)) { + /* nothing to convert, return this right away */ + if(ctx->read_eos) + ctx->eos = TRUE; + *pnread = nread; + *peos = ctx->eos; + goto out; + } + + /* at least one \n needs conversion to '\r\n', place into ctx->buf */ + for(i = start = 0; i < nread; ++i) { + if(buf[i] != '\n') + continue; + /* on a soft limit bufq, we do not need to check length */ + result = Curl_bufq_cwrite(&ctx->buf, buf + start, i - start, &n); + if(!result) + result = Curl_bufq_cwrite(&ctx->buf, STRCONST("\r\n"), &n); + if(result) + return result; + start = i + 1; + if(!data->set.crlf && (data->state.infilesize != -1)) { + /* we're here only because FTP is in ASCII mode... + bump infilesize for the LF we just added */ + data->state.infilesize++; + /* comment: this might work for FTP, but in HTTP we could not change + * the content length after having started the request... */ + } + } + } + + DEBUGASSERT(!Curl_bufq_is_empty(&ctx->buf)); + *peos = FALSE; + result = Curl_bufq_cread(&ctx->buf, buf, blen, pnread); + if(!result && ctx->read_eos && Curl_bufq_is_empty(&ctx->buf)) { + /* no more data, read all, done. */ + ctx->eos = TRUE; + *peos = TRUE; + } + +out: + CURL_TRC_READ(data, "cr_lc_read(len=%zu) -> %d, nread=%zu, eos=%d", + blen, result, *pnread, *peos); + return result; +} + +static curl_off_t cr_lc_total_length(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + /* this reader changes length depending on input */ + (void)data; + (void)reader; + return -1; +} + +static const struct Curl_crtype cr_lc = { + "cr-lineconv", + cr_lc_init, + cr_lc_read, + cr_lc_close, + Curl_creader_def_needs_rewind, + cr_lc_total_length, + Curl_creader_def_resume_from, + Curl_creader_def_rewind, + Curl_creader_def_unpause, + Curl_creader_def_done, + sizeof(struct cr_lc_ctx) +}; + +static CURLcode cr_lc_add(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct Curl_creader *reader = NULL; + CURLcode result; + + result = Curl_creader_create(&reader, data, &cr_lc, + CURL_CR_CONTENT_ENCODE); + if(!result) + result = Curl_creader_add(data, reader); + + if(result && reader) + Curl_creader_free(data, reader); + return result; +} + +static CURLcode do_init_reader_stack(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *r) +{ + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + curl_off_t clen; + + DEBUGASSERT(r); + DEBUGASSERT(r->crt); + DEBUGASSERT(r->phase == CURL_CR_CLIENT); + DEBUGASSERT(!data->req.reader_stack); + + data->req.reader_stack = r; + clen = r->crt->total_length(data, r); + /* if we do not have 0 length init, and crlf conversion is wanted, + * add the reader for it */ + if(clen && (data->set.crlf +#ifdef CURL_DO_LINEEND_CONV + || data->state.prefer_ascii +#endif + )) { + result = cr_lc_add(data); + if(result) + return result; + } + + return result; +} + +CURLcode Curl_creader_set_fread(struct Curl_easy *data, curl_off_t len) +{ + CURLcode result; + struct Curl_creader *r; + struct cr_in_ctx *ctx; + + result = Curl_creader_create(&r, data, &cr_in, CURL_CR_CLIENT); + if(result) goto out; + ctx = r->ctx; + ctx->total_len = len; - *n += nread; - result = CURLE_OK; + cl_reset_reader(data); + result = do_init_reader_stack(data, r); out: + CURL_TRC_READ(data, "add fread reader, len=%"CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T + " -> %d", len, result); + return result; +} + +CURLcode Curl_creader_add(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + CURLcode result; + struct Curl_creader **anchor = &data->req.reader_stack; + + if(!*anchor) { + result = Curl_creader_set_fread(data, data->state.infilesize); + if(result) + return result; + } + + /* Insert the writer as first in its phase. + * Skip existing readers of lower phases. */ + while(*anchor && (*anchor)->phase < reader->phase) + anchor = &((*anchor)->next); + reader->next = *anchor; + *anchor = reader; + return CURLE_OK; +} + +CURLcode Curl_creader_set(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_creader *r) +{ + CURLcode result; + + DEBUGASSERT(r); + DEBUGASSERT(r->crt); + DEBUGASSERT(r->phase == CURL_CR_CLIENT); + + cl_reset_reader(data); + result = do_init_reader_stack(data, r); + if(result) + Curl_creader_free(data, r); return result; } + +CURLcode Curl_client_read(struct Curl_easy *data, char *buf, size_t blen, + size_t *nread, bool *eos) +{ + CURLcode result; + + DEBUGASSERT(buf); + DEBUGASSERT(blen); + DEBUGASSERT(nread); + DEBUGASSERT(eos); + + if(!data->req.reader_stack) { + result = Curl_creader_set_fread(data, data->state.infilesize); + if(result) + return result; + DEBUGASSERT(data->req.reader_stack); + } + + result = Curl_creader_read(data, data->req.reader_stack, buf, blen, + nread, eos); + CURL_TRC_READ(data, "client_read(len=%zu) -> %d, nread=%zu, eos=%d", + blen, result, *nread, *eos); + return result; +} + +bool Curl_creader_needs_rewind(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct Curl_creader *reader = data->req.reader_stack; + while(reader) { + if(reader->crt->needs_rewind(data, reader)) { + CURL_TRC_READ(data, "client reader needs rewind before next request"); + return TRUE; + } + reader = reader->next; + } + return FALSE; +} + +static CURLcode cr_null_read(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader, + char *buf, size_t blen, + size_t *pnread, bool *peos) +{ + (void)data; + (void)reader; + (void)buf; + (void)blen; + *pnread = 0; + *peos = TRUE; + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static curl_off_t cr_null_total_length(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + /* this reader changes length depending on input */ + (void)data; + (void)reader; + return 0; +} + +static const struct Curl_crtype cr_null = { + "cr-null", + Curl_creader_def_init, + cr_null_read, + Curl_creader_def_close, + Curl_creader_def_needs_rewind, + cr_null_total_length, + Curl_creader_def_resume_from, + Curl_creader_def_rewind, + Curl_creader_def_unpause, + Curl_creader_def_done, + sizeof(struct Curl_creader) +}; + +CURLcode Curl_creader_set_null(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct Curl_creader *r; + CURLcode result; + + result = Curl_creader_create(&r, data, &cr_null, CURL_CR_CLIENT); + if(result) + return result; + + cl_reset_reader(data); + return do_init_reader_stack(data, r); +} + +struct cr_buf_ctx { + struct Curl_creader super; + const char *buf; + size_t blen; + size_t index; +}; + +static CURLcode cr_buf_read(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader, + char *buf, size_t blen, + size_t *pnread, bool *peos) +{ + struct cr_buf_ctx *ctx = reader->ctx; + size_t nread = ctx->blen - ctx->index; + + (void)data; + if(!nread || !ctx->buf) { + *pnread = 0; + *peos = TRUE; + } + else { + if(nread > blen) + nread = blen; + memcpy(buf, ctx->buf + ctx->index, nread); + *pnread = nread; + ctx->index += nread; + *peos = (ctx->index == ctx->blen); + } + CURL_TRC_READ(data, "cr_buf_read(len=%zu) -> 0, nread=%zu, eos=%d", + blen, *pnread, *peos); + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static bool cr_buf_needs_rewind(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + struct cr_buf_ctx *ctx = reader->ctx; + (void)data; + return ctx->index > 0; +} + +static curl_off_t cr_buf_total_length(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + struct cr_buf_ctx *ctx = reader->ctx; + (void)data; + return (curl_off_t)ctx->blen; +} + +static CURLcode cr_buf_resume_from(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader, + curl_off_t offset) +{ + struct cr_buf_ctx *ctx = reader->ctx; + size_t boffset; + + (void)data; + DEBUGASSERT(data->conn); + /* already started reading? */ + if(ctx->index) + return CURLE_READ_ERROR; + if(offset <= 0) + return CURLE_OK; + boffset = (size_t)offset; + if(boffset > ctx->blen) + return CURLE_READ_ERROR; + + ctx->buf += boffset; + ctx->blen -= boffset; + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static const struct Curl_crtype cr_buf = { + "cr-buf", + Curl_creader_def_init, + cr_buf_read, + Curl_creader_def_close, + cr_buf_needs_rewind, + cr_buf_total_length, + cr_buf_resume_from, + Curl_creader_def_rewind, + Curl_creader_def_unpause, + Curl_creader_def_done, + sizeof(struct cr_buf_ctx) +}; + +CURLcode Curl_creader_set_buf(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *buf, size_t blen) +{ + CURLcode result; + struct Curl_creader *r; + struct cr_buf_ctx *ctx; + + result = Curl_creader_create(&r, data, &cr_buf, CURL_CR_CLIENT); + if(result) + goto out; + ctx = r->ctx; + ctx->buf = buf; + ctx->blen = blen; + ctx->index = 0; + + cl_reset_reader(data); + result = do_init_reader_stack(data, r); +out: + CURL_TRC_READ(data, "add buf reader, len=%zu -> %d", blen, result); + return result; +} + +curl_off_t Curl_creader_total_length(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct Curl_creader *r = data->req.reader_stack; + return r? r->crt->total_length(data, r) : -1; +} + +curl_off_t Curl_creader_client_length(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct Curl_creader *r = data->req.reader_stack; + while(r && r->phase != CURL_CR_CLIENT) + r = r->next; + return r? r->crt->total_length(data, r) : -1; +} + +CURLcode Curl_creader_resume_from(struct Curl_easy *data, curl_off_t offset) +{ + struct Curl_creader *r = data->req.reader_stack; + while(r && r->phase != CURL_CR_CLIENT) + r = r->next; + return r? r->crt->resume_from(data, r, offset) : CURLE_READ_ERROR; +} + +CURLcode Curl_creader_unpause(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct Curl_creader *reader = data->req.reader_stack; + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + + while(reader) { + result = reader->crt->unpause(data, reader); + if(result) + break; + reader = reader->next; + } + return result; +} + +void Curl_creader_done(struct Curl_easy *data, int premature) +{ + struct Curl_creader *reader = data->req.reader_stack; + while(reader) { + reader->crt->done(data, reader, premature); + reader = reader->next; + } +} + +struct Curl_creader *Curl_creader_get_by_type(struct Curl_easy *data, + const struct Curl_crtype *crt) +{ + struct Curl_creader *r; + for(r = data->req.reader_stack; r; r = r->next) { + if(r->crt == crt) + return r; + } + return NULL; + +} diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/sendf.h b/vendor/curl/lib/sendf.h index a70189f2f5..82a290257a 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/sendf.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/sendf.h @@ -49,25 +49,31 @@ #define CLIENTWRITE_CONNECT (1<<4) /* a CONNECT related HEADER */ #define CLIENTWRITE_1XX (1<<5) /* a 1xx response related HEADER */ #define CLIENTWRITE_TRAILER (1<<6) /* a trailer HEADER */ +#define CLIENTWRITE_EOS (1<<7) /* End Of transfer download Stream */ /** * Write `len` bytes at `prt` to the client. `type` indicates what * kind of data is being written. */ -CURLcode Curl_client_write(struct Curl_easy *data, int type, char *ptr, +CURLcode Curl_client_write(struct Curl_easy *data, int type, const char *ptr, size_t len) WARN_UNUSED_RESULT; /** - * For a paused transfer, there might be buffered data held back. - * Attempt to flush this data to the client. This *may* trigger - * another pause of the transfer. + * Free all resources related to client writing. */ -CURLcode Curl_client_unpause(struct Curl_easy *data); +void Curl_client_cleanup(struct Curl_easy *data); /** - * Free all resources related to client writing. + * Reset readers and writer chains, keep rewind information + * when necessary. */ -void Curl_client_cleanup(struct Curl_easy *data); +void Curl_client_reset(struct Curl_easy *data); + +/** + * A new request is starting, perform any ops like rewinding + * previous readers when needed. + */ +CURLcode Curl_client_start(struct Curl_easy *data); /** * Client Writers - a chain passing transfer BODY data to the client. @@ -111,10 +117,16 @@ struct Curl_cwtype { size_t cwriter_size; /* sizeof() allocated struct Curl_cwriter */ }; -/* Client writer instance */ +/* Client writer instance, allocated on creation. + * `void *ctx` is the pointer from the allocation of + * the `struct Curl_cwriter` itself. This is suitable for "downcasting" + * by the writers implementation. See https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/13054 + * for the alignment problems that arise otherwise. + */ struct Curl_cwriter { const struct Curl_cwtype *cwt; /* type implementation */ struct Curl_cwriter *next; /* Downstream writer. */ + void *ctx; /* allocated instance pointer */ Curl_cwriter_phase phase; /* phase at which it operates */ }; @@ -147,6 +159,19 @@ size_t Curl_cwriter_count(struct Curl_easy *data, Curl_cwriter_phase phase); CURLcode Curl_cwriter_add(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_cwriter *writer); +/** + * Look up an installed client writer on `data` by its type. + * @return first writer with that type or NULL + */ +struct Curl_cwriter *Curl_cwriter_get_by_type(struct Curl_easy *data, + const struct Curl_cwtype *cwt); + +void Curl_cwriter_remove_by_name(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *name); + +struct Curl_cwriter *Curl_cwriter_get_by_name(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *name); + /** * Convenience method for calling `writer->do_write()` that * checks for NULL writer. @@ -155,6 +180,16 @@ CURLcode Curl_cwriter_write(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_cwriter *writer, int type, const char *buf, size_t nbytes); +/** + * Return TRUE iff client writer is paused. + */ +bool Curl_cwriter_is_paused(struct Curl_easy *data); + +/** + * Unpause client writer and flush any buffered date to the client. + */ +CURLcode Curl_cwriter_unpause(struct Curl_easy *data); + /** * Default implementations for do_init, do_write, do_close that * do nothing and pass the data through. @@ -168,22 +203,205 @@ void Curl_cwriter_def_close(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_cwriter *writer); -/* internal read-function, does plain socket, SSL and krb4 */ -CURLcode Curl_read(struct Curl_easy *data, curl_socket_t sockfd, - char *buf, size_t buffersize, - ssize_t *n); -/* internal write-function, does plain socket, SSL, SCP, SFTP and krb4 */ -CURLcode Curl_write(struct Curl_easy *data, - curl_socket_t sockfd, - const void *mem, size_t len, - ssize_t *written); +/* Client Reader Type, provides the implementation */ +struct Curl_crtype { + const char *name; /* writer name. */ + CURLcode (*do_init)(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_creader *reader); + CURLcode (*do_read)(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_creader *reader, + char *buf, size_t blen, size_t *nread, bool *eos); + void (*do_close)(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_creader *reader); + bool (*needs_rewind)(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_creader *reader); + curl_off_t (*total_length)(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader); + CURLcode (*resume_from)(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader, curl_off_t offset); + CURLcode (*rewind)(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_creader *reader); + CURLcode (*unpause)(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_creader *reader); + void (*done)(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader, int premature); + size_t creader_size; /* sizeof() allocated struct Curl_creader */ +}; + +/* Phase a reader operates at. */ +typedef enum { + CURL_CR_NET, /* data send to the network (connection filters) */ + CURL_CR_TRANSFER_ENCODE, /* add transfer-encodings */ + CURL_CR_PROTOCOL, /* before transfer, but after content decoding */ + CURL_CR_CONTENT_ENCODE, /* add content-encodings */ + CURL_CR_CLIENT /* data read from client */ +} Curl_creader_phase; + +/* Client reader instance, allocated on creation. + * `void *ctx` is the pointer from the allocation of + * the `struct Curl_cwriter` itself. This is suitable for "downcasting" + * by the writers implementation. See https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/13054 + * for the alignment problems that arise otherwise. + */ +struct Curl_creader { + const struct Curl_crtype *crt; /* type implementation */ + struct Curl_creader *next; /* Downstream reader. */ + void *ctx; + Curl_creader_phase phase; /* phase at which it operates */ +}; + +/** + * Default implementations for do_init, do_write, do_close that + * do nothing and pass the data through. + */ +CURLcode Curl_creader_def_init(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader); +void Curl_creader_def_close(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader); +CURLcode Curl_creader_def_read(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader, + char *buf, size_t blen, + size_t *nread, bool *eos); +bool Curl_creader_def_needs_rewind(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader); +curl_off_t Curl_creader_def_total_length(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader); +CURLcode Curl_creader_def_resume_from(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader, + curl_off_t offset); +CURLcode Curl_creader_def_rewind(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader); +CURLcode Curl_creader_def_unpause(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader); +void Curl_creader_def_done(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader, int premature); + +/** + * Convenience method for calling `reader->do_read()` that + * checks for NULL reader. + */ +CURLcode Curl_creader_read(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader, + char *buf, size_t blen, size_t *nread, bool *eos); + +/** + * Create a new creader instance with given type and phase. Is not + * inserted into the writer chain by this call. + * Invokes `reader->do_init()`. + */ +CURLcode Curl_creader_create(struct Curl_creader **preader, + struct Curl_easy *data, + const struct Curl_crtype *cr_handler, + Curl_creader_phase phase); + +/** + * Free a creader instance. + * Invokes `reader->do_close()`. + */ +void Curl_creader_free(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_creader *reader); -/* internal write-function, using sockindex for connection destination */ -CURLcode Curl_nwrite(struct Curl_easy *data, - int sockindex, - const void *buf, - size_t blen, - ssize_t *pnwritten); +/** + * Adds a reader to the transfer's reader chain. + * The readers `phase` determines where in the chain it is inserted. + */ +CURLcode Curl_creader_add(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader); + +/** + * Set the given reader, which needs to be of type CURL_CR_CLIENT, + * as the new first reader. Discard any installed readers and init + * the reader chain anew. + * The function takes ownership of `r`. + */ +CURLcode Curl_creader_set(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_creader *r); + +/** + * Read at most `blen` bytes at `buf` from the client. + * @param data the transfer to read client bytes for + * @param buf the memory location to read to + * @param blen the amount of memory at `buf` + * @param nread on return the number of bytes read into `buf` + * @param eos TRUE iff bytes are the end of data from client + * @return CURLE_OK on successful read (even 0 length) or error + */ +CURLcode Curl_client_read(struct Curl_easy *data, char *buf, size_t blen, + size_t *nread, bool *eos) WARN_UNUSED_RESULT; + +/** + * TRUE iff client reader needs rewing before it can be used for + * a retry request. + */ +bool Curl_creader_needs_rewind(struct Curl_easy *data); + +/** + * TRUE iff client reader will rewind at next start + */ +bool Curl_creader_will_rewind(struct Curl_easy *data); + +/** + * En-/disable rewind of client reader at next start. + */ +void Curl_creader_set_rewind(struct Curl_easy *data, bool enable); + +/** + * Get the total length of bytes provided by the installed readers. + * This is independent of the amount already delivered and is calculated + * by all readers in the stack. If a reader like "chunked" or + * "crlf conversion" is installed, the returned length will be -1. + * @return -1 if length is indeterminate + */ +curl_off_t Curl_creader_total_length(struct Curl_easy *data); + +/** + * Get the total length of bytes provided by the reader at phase + * CURL_CR_CLIENT. This may not match the amount of bytes read + * for a request, depending if other, encoding readers are also installed. + * However it allows for rough estimation of the overall length. + * @return -1 if length is indeterminate + */ +curl_off_t Curl_creader_client_length(struct Curl_easy *data); + +/** + * Ask the installed reader at phase CURL_CR_CLIENT to start + * reading from the given offset. On success, this will reduce + * the `total_length()` by the amount. + * @param data the transfer to read client bytes for + * @param offset the offset where to start reads from, negative + * values will be ignored. + * @return CURLE_OK if offset could be set + * CURLE_READ_ERROR if not supported by reader or seek/read failed + * of offset larger then total length + * CURLE_PARTIAL_FILE if offset led to 0 total length + */ +CURLcode Curl_creader_resume_from(struct Curl_easy *data, curl_off_t offset); + +/** + * Unpause all installed readers. + */ +CURLcode Curl_creader_unpause(struct Curl_easy *data); + +/** + * Tell all client readers that they are done. + */ +void Curl_creader_done(struct Curl_easy *data, int premature); + +/** + * Look up an installed client reader on `data` by its type. + * @return first reader with that type or NULL + */ +struct Curl_creader *Curl_creader_get_by_type(struct Curl_easy *data, + const struct Curl_crtype *crt); + + +/** + * Set the client reader to provide 0 bytes, immediate EOS. + */ +CURLcode Curl_creader_set_null(struct Curl_easy *data); + +/** + * Set the client reader the reads from fread callback. + */ +CURLcode Curl_creader_set_fread(struct Curl_easy *data, curl_off_t len); + +/** + * Set the client reader the reads from the supplied buf (NOT COPIED). + */ +CURLcode Curl_creader_set_buf(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *buf, size_t blen); #endif /* HEADER_CURL_SENDF_H */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/setopt.c b/vendor/curl/lib/setopt.c index a08140cce8..e8b25454b2 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/setopt.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/setopt.c @@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ #include "altsvc.h" #include "hsts.h" #include "tftp.h" +#include "strdup.h" +#include "escape.h" /* The last 3 #include files should be in this order */ #include "curl_printf.h" @@ -109,45 +111,32 @@ CURLcode Curl_setblobopt(struct curl_blob **blobp, static CURLcode setstropt_userpwd(char *option, char **userp, char **passwdp) { - CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; char *user = NULL; char *passwd = NULL; + DEBUGASSERT(userp); + DEBUGASSERT(passwdp); + /* Parse the login details if specified. It not then we treat NULL as a hint to clear the existing data */ if(option) { size_t len = strlen(option); + CURLcode result; if(len > CURL_MAX_INPUT_LENGTH) return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; - result = Curl_parse_login_details(option, len, - (userp ? &user : NULL), - (passwdp ? &passwd : NULL), - NULL); + result = Curl_parse_login_details(option, len, &user, &passwd, NULL); + if(result) + return result; } - if(!result) { - /* Store the username part of option if required */ - if(userp) { - if(!user && option && option[0] == ':') { - /* Allocate an empty string instead of returning NULL as user name */ - user = strdup(""); - if(!user) - result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - } + free(*userp); + *userp = user; - Curl_safefree(*userp); - *userp = user; - } + free(*passwdp); + *passwdp = passwd; - /* Store the password part of option if required */ - if(passwdp) { - Curl_safefree(*passwdp); - *passwdp = passwd; - } - } - - return result; + return CURLE_OK; } #define C_SSLVERSION_VALUE(x) (x & 0xffff) @@ -155,6 +144,12 @@ static CURLcode setstropt_userpwd(char *option, char **userp, char **passwdp) static CURLcode protocol2num(const char *str, curl_prot_t *val) { + /* + * We are asked to cherry-pick protocols, so play it safe and disallow all + * protocols to start with, and re-add the wanted ones back in. + */ + *val = 0; + if(!str) return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; @@ -163,8 +158,6 @@ static CURLcode protocol2num(const char *str, curl_prot_t *val) return CURLE_OK; } - *val = 0; - do { const char *token = str; size_t tlen; @@ -366,6 +359,17 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param) else return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; break; + case CURLOPT_SERVER_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_MS: + /* + * Option that specifies how quickly a server response must be obtained + * before it is considered failure. For pingpong protocols. + */ + arg = va_arg(param, long); + if((arg >= 0) && (arg <= INT_MAX)) + data->set.server_response_timeout = (unsigned int)arg; + else + return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + break; #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_TFTP case CURLOPT_TFTP_NO_OPTIONS: /* @@ -497,24 +501,16 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param) (data->set.postfieldsize > (curl_off_t)((size_t)-1)))) result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; else { - char *p; - - (void) Curl_setstropt(&data->set.str[STRING_COPYPOSTFIELDS], NULL); - /* Allocate even when size == 0. This satisfies the need of possible - later address compare to detect the COPYPOSTFIELDS mode, and - to mark that postfields is used rather than read function or - form data. + later address compare to detect the COPYPOSTFIELDS mode, and to + mark that postfields is used rather than read function or form + data. */ - p = malloc((size_t)(data->set.postfieldsize? - data->set.postfieldsize:1)); - + char *p = Curl_memdup0(argptr, (size_t)data->set.postfieldsize); if(!p) result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; else { - if(data->set.postfieldsize) - memcpy(p, argptr, (size_t)data->set.postfieldsize); - + free(data->set.str[STRING_COPYPOSTFIELDS]); data->set.str[STRING_COPYPOSTFIELDS] = p; } } @@ -530,7 +526,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param) */ data->set.postfields = va_arg(param, void *); /* Release old copied data. */ - (void) Curl_setstropt(&data->set.str[STRING_COPYPOSTFIELDS], NULL); + Curl_safefree(data->set.str[STRING_COPYPOSTFIELDS]); data->set.method = HTTPREQ_POST; break; @@ -546,7 +542,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param) if(data->set.postfieldsize < bigsize && data->set.postfields == data->set.str[STRING_COPYPOSTFIELDS]) { /* Previous CURLOPT_COPYPOSTFIELDS is no longer valid. */ - (void) Curl_setstropt(&data->set.str[STRING_COPYPOSTFIELDS], NULL); + Curl_safefree(data->set.str[STRING_COPYPOSTFIELDS]); data->set.postfields = NULL; } @@ -565,7 +561,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param) if(data->set.postfieldsize < bigsize && data->set.postfields == data->set.str[STRING_COPYPOSTFIELDS]) { /* Previous CURLOPT_COPYPOSTFIELDS is no longer valid. */ - (void) Curl_setstropt(&data->set.str[STRING_COPYPOSTFIELDS], NULL); + Curl_safefree(data->set.str[STRING_COPYPOSTFIELDS]); data->set.postfields = NULL; } @@ -670,6 +666,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param) data->set.opt_no_body = FALSE; /* this is implied */ Curl_mime_cleanpart(data->state.formp); Curl_safefree(data->state.formp); + data->state.mimepost = NULL; break; #endif @@ -782,22 +779,20 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param) /* * Set cookie file name to dump all cookies to when we're done. */ - { - struct CookieInfo *newcookies; result = Curl_setstropt(&data->set.str[STRING_COOKIEJAR], va_arg(param, char *)); - - /* - * Activate the cookie parser. This may or may not already - * have been made. - */ - newcookies = Curl_cookie_init(data, NULL, data->cookies, - data->set.cookiesession); - if(!newcookies) - result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - data->cookies = newcookies; - } - break; + if(!result) { + /* + * Activate the cookie parser. This may or may not already + * have been made. + */ + struct CookieInfo *newcookies = + Curl_cookie_init(data, NULL, data->cookies, data->set.cookiesession); + if(!newcookies) + result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + data->cookies = newcookies; + } + break; case CURLOPT_COOKIESESSION: /* @@ -906,7 +901,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param) /* accepted */ break; #endif -#ifdef ENABLE_QUIC +#ifdef USE_HTTP3 case CURL_HTTP_VERSION_3: case CURL_HTTP_VERSION_3ONLY: /* accepted */ @@ -977,6 +972,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param) #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_FORM_API Curl_mime_cleanpart(data->state.formp); Curl_safefree(data->state.formp); + data->state.mimepost = NULL; #endif } break; @@ -1014,9 +1010,6 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param) /* switch off bits we can't support */ #ifndef USE_NTLM auth &= ~CURLAUTH_NTLM; /* no NTLM support */ - auth &= ~CURLAUTH_NTLM_WB; /* no NTLM_WB support */ -#elif !defined(NTLM_WB_ENABLED) - auth &= ~CURLAUTH_NTLM_WB; /* no NTLM_WB support */ #endif #ifndef USE_SPNEGO auth &= ~CURLAUTH_NEGOTIATE; /* no Negotiate (SPNEGO) auth without @@ -1095,9 +1088,6 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param) /* switch off bits we can't support */ #ifndef USE_NTLM auth &= ~CURLAUTH_NTLM; /* no NTLM support */ - auth &= ~CURLAUTH_NTLM_WB; /* no NTLM_WB support */ -#elif !defined(NTLM_WB_ENABLED) - auth &= ~CURLAUTH_NTLM_WB; /* no NTLM_WB support */ #endif #ifndef USE_SPNEGO auth &= ~CURLAUTH_NEGOTIATE; /* no Negotiate (SPNEGO) auth without @@ -1310,6 +1300,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param) return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; data->set.ftpsslauth = (unsigned char)(curl_ftpauth)arg; break; +#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI case CURLOPT_KRBLEVEL: /* * A string that defines the kerberos security level. @@ -1319,6 +1310,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param) data->set.krb = !!(data->set.str[STRING_KRB_LEVEL]); break; #endif +#endif #if !defined(CURL_DISABLE_FTP) || defined(USE_SSH) case CURLOPT_FTP_CREATE_MISSING_DIRS: /* @@ -1585,13 +1577,24 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param) break; #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY - case CURLOPT_PROXYUSERPWD: + case CURLOPT_PROXYUSERPWD: { /* * user:password needed to use the proxy */ - result = setstropt_userpwd(va_arg(param, char *), - &data->set.str[STRING_PROXYUSERNAME], - &data->set.str[STRING_PROXYPASSWORD]); + char *u = NULL; + char *p = NULL; + result = setstropt_userpwd(va_arg(param, char *), &u, &p); + + /* URL decode the components */ + if(!result && u) + result = Curl_urldecode(u, 0, &data->set.str[STRING_PROXYUSERNAME], NULL, + REJECT_ZERO); + if(!result && p) + result = Curl_urldecode(p, 0, &data->set.str[STRING_PROXYPASSWORD], NULL, + REJECT_ZERO); + free(u); + free(p); + } break; case CURLOPT_PROXYUSERNAME: /* @@ -1843,7 +1846,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param) /* * flag to set engine as default. */ - Curl_setstropt(&data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ENGINE], NULL); + Curl_safefree(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ENGINE]); result = Curl_ssl_set_engine_default(data); break; case CURLOPT_CRLF: @@ -2206,9 +2209,6 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param) * The application kindly asks for a differently sized receive buffer. * If it seems reasonable, we'll use it. */ - if(data->state.buffer) - return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; - arg = va_arg(param, long); if(arg > READBUFFER_MAX) @@ -2234,7 +2234,6 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param) arg = UPLOADBUFFER_MIN; data->set.upload_buffer_size = (unsigned int)arg; - Curl_safefree(data->state.ulbuf); /* force a realloc next opportunity */ break; case CURLOPT_NOSIGNAL: @@ -2311,7 +2310,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param) Curl_hsts_cleanup(&data->hsts); data->hsts = data->share->hsts; } -#endif /* CURL_DISABLE_HTTP */ +#endif #ifdef USE_SSL if(data->share->sslsession) { data->set.general_ssl.max_ssl_sessions = data->share->max_ssl_sessions; @@ -2621,7 +2620,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param) break; #endif -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 case CURLOPT_ADDRESS_SCOPE: /* * Use this scope id when using IPv6 @@ -2653,22 +2652,18 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param) break; case CURLOPT_PROTOCOLS_STR: { - curl_prot_t prot; argptr = va_arg(param, char *); - result = protocol2num(argptr, &prot); + result = protocol2num(argptr, &data->set.allowed_protocols); if(result) return result; - data->set.allowed_protocols = prot; break; } case CURLOPT_REDIR_PROTOCOLS_STR: { - curl_prot_t prot; argptr = va_arg(param, char *); - result = protocol2num(argptr, &prot); + result = protocol2num(argptr, &data->set.redir_protocols); if(result) return result; - data->set.redir_protocols = prot; break; } @@ -2863,13 +2858,13 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param) #endif case CURLOPT_TLSAUTH_TYPE: argptr = va_arg(param, char *); - if(argptr && !strncasecompare(argptr, "SRP", strlen("SRP"))) + if(argptr && !strcasecompare(argptr, "SRP")) return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; break; #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY case CURLOPT_PROXY_TLSAUTH_TYPE: argptr = va_arg(param, char *); - if(argptr || !strncasecompare(argptr, "SRP", strlen("SRP"))) + if(argptr && !strcasecompare(argptr, "SRP")) return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; break; #endif @@ -3109,6 +3104,10 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; } arg = va_arg(param, long); + if(!arg) { + DEBUGF(infof(data, "bad CURLOPT_ALTSVC_CTRL input")); + return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + } result = Curl_altsvc_ctrl(data->asi, arg); if(result) return result; @@ -3128,6 +3127,49 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param) data->set.ws_raw_mode = raw; break; } +#endif +#ifdef USE_ECH + case CURLOPT_ECH: { + size_t plen = 0; + + argptr = va_arg(param, char *); + if(!argptr) { + data->set.tls_ech = CURLECH_DISABLE; + result = CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + return result; + } + plen = strlen(argptr); + if(plen > CURL_MAX_INPUT_LENGTH) { + data->set.tls_ech = CURLECH_DISABLE; + result = CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + return result; + } + /* set tls_ech flag value, preserving CLA_CFG bit */ + if(plen == 5 && !strcmp(argptr, "false")) + data->set.tls_ech = CURLECH_DISABLE + | (data->set.tls_ech & CURLECH_CLA_CFG); + else if(plen == 6 && !strcmp(argptr, "grease")) + data->set.tls_ech = CURLECH_GREASE + | (data->set.tls_ech & CURLECH_CLA_CFG); + else if(plen == 4 && !strcmp(argptr, "true")) + data->set.tls_ech = CURLECH_ENABLE + | (data->set.tls_ech & CURLECH_CLA_CFG); + else if(plen == 4 && !strcmp(argptr, "hard")) + data->set.tls_ech = CURLECH_HARD + | (data->set.tls_ech & CURLECH_CLA_CFG); + else if(plen > 5 && !strncmp(argptr, "ecl:", 4)) { + result = Curl_setstropt(&data->set.str[STRING_ECH_CONFIG], argptr + 4); + if(result) + return result; + data->set.tls_ech |= CURLECH_CLA_CFG; + } + else if(plen > 4 && !strncmp(argptr, "pn:", 3)) { + result = Curl_setstropt(&data->set.str[STRING_ECH_PUBLIC], argptr + 3); + if(result) + return result; + } + break; + } #endif case CURLOPT_QUICK_EXIT: data->set.quick_exit = (0 != va_arg(param, long)) ? 1L:0L; @@ -3163,5 +3205,9 @@ CURLcode curl_easy_setopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption tag, ...) result = Curl_vsetopt(data, tag, arg); va_end(arg); +#ifdef DEBUGBUILD + if(result == CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT) + infof(data, "setopt arg 0x%x returned CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT", tag); +#endif return result; } diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/setopt.h b/vendor/curl/lib/setopt.h index 3c14a05e37..b0237467bd 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/setopt.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/setopt.h @@ -24,9 +24,10 @@ * ***************************************************************************/ -CURLcode Curl_setstropt(char **charp, const char *s); +CURLcode Curl_setstropt(char **charp, const char *s) WARN_UNUSED_RESULT; CURLcode Curl_setblobopt(struct curl_blob **blobp, - const struct curl_blob *blob); -CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list arg); + const struct curl_blob *blob) WARN_UNUSED_RESULT; +CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list arg) + WARN_UNUSED_RESULT; #endif /* HEADER_CURL_SETOPT_H */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/setup-vms.h b/vendor/curl/lib/setup-vms.h index 645cc1a9cd..ea3936c708 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/setup-vms.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/setup-vms.h @@ -374,8 +374,8 @@ static struct passwd *vms_getpwuid(uid_t uid) #ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H #include #ifndef AI_NUMERICHOST -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 -#undef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 +#undef USE_IPV6 #endif #endif #endif diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/setup-win32.h b/vendor/curl/lib/setup-win32.h index 4e034d4bb2..d7e2e6be11 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/setup-win32.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/setup-win32.h @@ -24,18 +24,53 @@ * ***************************************************************************/ +#undef USE_WINSOCK +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* Watt-32 TCP/IP SPECIFIC */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------- */ +#ifdef USE_WATT32 +# include +# undef byte +# undef word +# define HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H +# define HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H +# define HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +# define HAVE_NETDB_H +# define HAVE_ARPA_INET_H +# define SOCKET int +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------- */ +/* BSD-style lwIP TCP/IP stack SPECIFIC */ +/* ---------------------------------------------------------------- */ +#elif defined(USE_LWIPSOCK) + /* Define to use BSD-style lwIP TCP/IP stack. */ + /* #define USE_LWIPSOCK 1 */ +# undef HAVE_GETHOSTNAME +# undef LWIP_POSIX_SOCKETS_IO_NAMES +# undef RECV_TYPE_ARG1 +# undef RECV_TYPE_ARG3 +# undef SEND_TYPE_ARG1 +# undef SEND_TYPE_ARG3 +# define HAVE_GETHOSTBYNAME_R +# define HAVE_GETHOSTBYNAME_R_6 +# define LWIP_POSIX_SOCKETS_IO_NAMES 0 +# define RECV_TYPE_ARG1 int +# define RECV_TYPE_ARG3 size_t +# define SEND_TYPE_ARG1 int +# define SEND_TYPE_ARG3 size_t +#elif defined(_WIN32) +# define USE_WINSOCK 2 +#endif + /* * Include header files for windows builds before redefining anything. * Use this preprocessor block only to include or exclude windows.h, * winsock2.h or ws2tcpip.h. Any other windows thing belongs * to any other further and independent block. Under Cygwin things work * just as under linux (e.g. ) and the winsock headers should - * never be included when __CYGWIN__ is defined. configure script takes - * care of this, not defining HAVE_WINDOWS_H, HAVE_WINSOCK2_H, - * neither HAVE_WS2TCPIP_H when __CYGWIN__ is defined. + * never be included when __CYGWIN__ is defined. */ -#ifdef HAVE_WINDOWS_H +#ifdef _WIN32 # if defined(UNICODE) && !defined(_UNICODE) # error "UNICODE is defined but _UNICODE is not defined" # endif @@ -53,12 +88,8 @@ # ifndef NOGDI # define NOGDI # endif -# ifdef HAVE_WINSOCK2_H -# include -# ifdef HAVE_WS2TCPIP_H -# include -# endif -# endif +# include +# include # include # include # include @@ -67,17 +98,6 @@ # endif #endif -/* - * Define USE_WINSOCK to 2 if we have and use WINSOCK2 API, else - * undefine USE_WINSOCK. - */ - -#undef USE_WINSOCK - -#ifdef HAVE_WINSOCK2_H -# define USE_WINSOCK 2 -#endif - /* * Define _WIN32_WINNT_[OS] symbols because not all Windows build systems have * those symbols to compare against, and even those that do may be missing diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/share.c b/vendor/curl/lib/share.c index c0a8d806f3..8fa5cda00f 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/share.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/share.c @@ -133,13 +133,13 @@ curl_share_setopt(struct Curl_share *share, CURLSHoption option, ...) res = CURLSHE_BAD_OPTION; } if(!res) - share->specifier |= (1<specifier |= (unsigned int)(1<specifier &= ~(1<specifier &= ~(unsigned int)(1<specifier & (1<specifier & (unsigned int)(1<lockfunc) /* only call this if set! */ share->lockfunc(data, type, accesstype, share->clientdata); } @@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ Curl_share_unlock(struct Curl_easy *data, curl_lock_data type) if(!share) return CURLSHE_INVALID; - if(share->specifier & (1<specifier & (unsigned int)(1<unlockfunc) /* only call this if set! */ share->unlockfunc (data, type, share->clientdata); } diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/smb.c b/vendor/curl/lib/smb.c index 6c8a47c7fd..cab1e757f3 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/smb.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/smb.c @@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ static CURLcode smb_parse_url_path(struct Curl_easy *data, * SMB handler interface */ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_smb = { - "SMB", /* scheme */ + "smb", /* scheme */ smb_setup_connection, /* setup_connection */ smb_do, /* do_it */ ZERO_NULL, /* done */ @@ -272,7 +272,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_smb = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ smb_disconnect, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_SMB, /* defport */ @@ -286,7 +287,7 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_smb = { * SMBS handler interface */ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_smbs = { - "SMBS", /* scheme */ + "smbs", /* scheme */ smb_setup_connection, /* setup_connection */ smb_do, /* do_it */ ZERO_NULL, /* done */ @@ -299,7 +300,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_smbs = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ smb_disconnect, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_SMBS, /* defport */ @@ -456,6 +458,9 @@ static CURLcode smb_connect(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) smbc->recv_buf = malloc(MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE); if(!smbc->recv_buf) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + smbc->send_buf = malloc(MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE); + if(!smbc->send_buf) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; /* Multiple requests are allowed with this connection */ connkeep(conn, "SMB default"); @@ -485,7 +490,6 @@ static CURLcode smb_connect(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) static CURLcode smb_recv_message(struct Curl_easy *data, void **msg) { struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; - curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[FIRSTSOCKET]; struct smb_conn *smbc = &conn->proto.smbc; char *buf = smbc->recv_buf; ssize_t bytes_read; @@ -494,7 +498,7 @@ static CURLcode smb_recv_message(struct Curl_easy *data, void **msg) size_t len = MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE - smbc->got; CURLcode result; - result = Curl_read(data, sockfd, buf + smbc->got, len, &bytes_read); + result = Curl_xfer_recv(data, buf + smbc->got, len, &bytes_read); if(result) return result; @@ -560,16 +564,15 @@ static void smb_format_message(struct Curl_easy *data, struct smb_header *h, h->pid = smb_swap16((unsigned short) pid); } -static CURLcode smb_send(struct Curl_easy *data, ssize_t len, +static CURLcode smb_send(struct Curl_easy *data, size_t len, size_t upload_size) { struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; struct smb_conn *smbc = &conn->proto.smbc; - ssize_t bytes_written; + size_t bytes_written; CURLcode result; - result = Curl_nwrite(data, FIRSTSOCKET, data->state.ulbuf, - len, &bytes_written); + result = Curl_xfer_send(data, smbc->send_buf, len, &bytes_written); if(result) return result; @@ -587,16 +590,15 @@ static CURLcode smb_flush(struct Curl_easy *data) { struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; struct smb_conn *smbc = &conn->proto.smbc; - ssize_t bytes_written; - ssize_t len = smbc->send_size - smbc->sent; + size_t bytes_written; + size_t len = smbc->send_size - smbc->sent; CURLcode result; if(!smbc->send_size) return CURLE_OK; - result = Curl_nwrite(data, FIRSTSOCKET, - data->state.ulbuf + smbc->sent, - len, &bytes_written); + result = Curl_xfer_send(data, smbc->send_buf + smbc->sent, len, + &bytes_written); if(result) return result; @@ -611,13 +613,13 @@ static CURLcode smb_flush(struct Curl_easy *data) static CURLcode smb_send_message(struct Curl_easy *data, unsigned char cmd, const void *msg, size_t msg_len) { - CURLcode result = Curl_get_upload_buffer(data); - if(result) - return result; - smb_format_message(data, (struct smb_header *)data->state.ulbuf, + struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; + struct smb_conn *smbc = &conn->proto.smbc; + + smb_format_message(data, (struct smb_header *)smbc->send_buf, cmd, msg_len); - memcpy(data->state.ulbuf + sizeof(struct smb_header), - msg, msg_len); + DEBUGASSERT((sizeof(struct smb_header) + msg_len) <= MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE); + memcpy(smbc->send_buf + sizeof(struct smb_header), msg, msg_len); return smb_send(data, sizeof(struct smb_header) + msg_len, 0); } @@ -775,15 +777,14 @@ static CURLcode smb_send_read(struct Curl_easy *data) static CURLcode smb_send_write(struct Curl_easy *data) { + struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; + struct smb_conn *smbc = &conn->proto.smbc; struct smb_write *msg; struct smb_request *req = data->req.p.smb; curl_off_t offset = data->req.offset; curl_off_t upload_size = data->req.size - data->req.bytecount; - CURLcode result = Curl_get_upload_buffer(data); - if(result) - return result; - msg = (struct smb_write *)data->state.ulbuf; + msg = (struct smb_write *)smbc->send_buf; if(upload_size >= MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE - 1) /* There is one byte of padding */ upload_size = MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE - 1; @@ -812,10 +813,11 @@ static CURLcode smb_send_and_recv(struct Curl_easy *data, void **msg) /* Check if there is data in the transfer buffer */ if(!smbc->send_size && smbc->upload_size) { - size_t nread = smbc->upload_size > (size_t)data->set.upload_buffer_size ? - (size_t)data->set.upload_buffer_size : smbc->upload_size; - data->req.upload_fromhere = data->state.ulbuf; - result = Curl_fillreadbuffer(data, nread, &nread); + size_t nread = smbc->upload_size > (size_t)MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE ? + (size_t)MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE : smbc->upload_size; + bool eos; + + result = Curl_client_read(data, smbc->send_buf, nread, &nread, &eos); if(result && result != CURLE_AGAIN) return result; if(!nread) @@ -1133,6 +1135,7 @@ static CURLcode smb_disconnect(struct Curl_easy *data, Curl_safefree(smbc->share); Curl_safefree(smbc->domain); Curl_safefree(smbc->recv_buf); + Curl_safefree(smbc->send_buf); return CURLE_OK; } diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/smb.h b/vendor/curl/lib/smb.h index 437f4a58a8..9ea2a8cc31 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/smb.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/smb.h @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ struct smb_conn { unsigned int session_key; unsigned short uid; char *recv_buf; + char *send_buf; size_t upload_size; size_t send_size; size_t sent; diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/smtp.c b/vendor/curl/lib/smtp.c index 65fbc5b6c5..dd231a521e 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/smtp.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/smtp.c @@ -111,13 +111,14 @@ static CURLcode smtp_continue_auth(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *mech, const struct bufref *resp); static CURLcode smtp_cancel_auth(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *mech); static CURLcode smtp_get_message(struct Curl_easy *data, struct bufref *out); +static CURLcode cr_eob_add(struct Curl_easy *data); /* * SMTP protocol handler. */ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_smtp = { - "SMTP", /* scheme */ + "smtp", /* scheme */ smtp_setup_connection, /* setup_connection */ smtp_do, /* do_it */ smtp_done, /* done */ @@ -130,7 +131,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_smtp = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ smtp_disconnect, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_SMTP, /* defport */ @@ -146,7 +148,7 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_smtp = { */ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_smtps = { - "SMTPS", /* scheme */ + "smtps", /* scheme */ smtp_setup_connection, /* setup_connection */ smtp_do, /* do_it */ smtp_done, /* done */ @@ -159,7 +161,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_smtps = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ smtp_disconnect, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_SMTPS, /* defport */ @@ -250,8 +253,8 @@ static bool smtp_endofresp(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, */ static CURLcode smtp_get_message(struct Curl_easy *data, struct bufref *out) { - char *message = data->state.buffer; - size_t len = strlen(message); + char *message = Curl_dyn_ptr(&data->conn->proto.smtpc.pp.recvbuf); + size_t len = data->conn->proto.smtpc.pp.nfinal; if(len > 4) { /* Find the start of the message */ @@ -618,7 +621,7 @@ static CURLcode smtp_perform_mail(struct Curl_easy *data) result = smtp_parse_address(data->set.str[STRING_MAIL_FROM], &address, &host); if(result) - return result; + goto out; /* Establish whether we should report SMTPUTF8 to the server for this mailbox as per RFC-6531 sect. 3.1 point 4 and sect. 3.4 */ @@ -642,8 +645,10 @@ static CURLcode smtp_perform_mail(struct Curl_easy *data) /* Null reverse-path, RFC-5321, sect. 3.6.3 */ from = strdup("<>"); - if(!from) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + if(!from) { + result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + goto out; + } /* Calculate the optional AUTH parameter */ if(data->set.str[STRING_MAIL_AUTH] && conn->proto.smtpc.sasl.authused) { @@ -655,10 +660,8 @@ static CURLcode smtp_perform_mail(struct Curl_easy *data) converting the host name to an IDN A-label if necessary */ result = smtp_parse_address(data->set.str[STRING_MAIL_AUTH], &address, &host); - if(result) { - free(from); - return result; - } + if(result) + goto out; /* Establish whether we should report SMTPUTF8 to the server for this mailbox as per RFC-6531 sect. 3.1 point 4 and sect. 3.4 */ @@ -676,7 +679,6 @@ static CURLcode smtp_perform_mail(struct Curl_easy *data) /* An invalid mailbox was provided but we'll simply let the server worry about it */ auth = aprintf("<%s>", address); - free(address); } else @@ -684,12 +686,12 @@ static CURLcode smtp_perform_mail(struct Curl_easy *data) auth = strdup("<>"); if(!auth) { - free(from); - - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + goto out; } } +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_MIME /* Prepare the mime data if some. */ if(data->set.mimepost.kind != MIMEKIND_NONE) { /* Use the whole structure as data. */ @@ -705,22 +707,18 @@ static CURLcode smtp_perform_mail(struct Curl_easy *data) result = Curl_mime_add_header(&data->set.mimepost.curlheaders, "Mime-Version: 1.0"); - /* Make sure we will read the entire mime structure. */ if(!result) - result = Curl_mime_rewind(&data->set.mimepost); - - if(result) { - free(from); - free(auth); - - return result; - } - - data->state.infilesize = Curl_mime_size(&data->set.mimepost); - - /* Read from mime structure. */ - data->state.fread_func = (curl_read_callback) Curl_mime_read; - data->state.in = (void *) &data->set.mimepost; + result = Curl_creader_set_mime(data, &data->set.mimepost); + if(result) + goto out; + data->state.infilesize = Curl_creader_total_length(data); + } + else +#endif + { + result = Curl_creader_set_fread(data, data->state.infilesize); + if(result) + goto out; } /* Calculate the optional SIZE parameter */ @@ -728,10 +726,8 @@ static CURLcode smtp_perform_mail(struct Curl_easy *data) size = aprintf("%" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T, data->state.infilesize); if(!size) { - free(from); - free(auth); - - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + goto out; } } @@ -752,6 +748,11 @@ static CURLcode smtp_perform_mail(struct Curl_easy *data) } } + /* Add the client reader doing STMP EOB escaping */ + result = cr_eob_add(data); + if(result) + goto out; + /* Send the MAIL command */ result = Curl_pp_sendf(data, &conn->proto.smtpc.pp, "MAIL FROM:%s%s%s%s%s%s", @@ -763,6 +764,7 @@ static CURLcode smtp_perform_mail(struct Curl_easy *data) utf8 ? " SMTPUTF8" /* Internationalised mailbox */ : ""); /* included in our envelope */ +out: free(from); free(auth); free(size); @@ -859,7 +861,7 @@ static CURLcode smtp_state_starttls_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, (void)instate; /* no use for this yet */ /* Pipelining in response is forbidden. */ - if(data->conn->proto.smtpc.pp.cache_size) + if(data->conn->proto.smtpc.pp.overflow) return CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY; if(smtpcode != 220) { @@ -883,8 +885,8 @@ static CURLcode smtp_state_ehlo_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, { CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; struct smtp_conn *smtpc = &conn->proto.smtpc; - const char *line = data->state.buffer; - size_t len = strlen(line); + const char *line = Curl_dyn_ptr(&smtpc->pp.recvbuf); + size_t len = smtpc->pp.nfinal; (void)instate; /* no use for this yet */ @@ -1033,8 +1035,8 @@ static CURLcode smtp_state_command_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, int smtpcode, { CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; struct SMTP *smtp = data->req.p.smtp; - char *line = data->state.buffer; - size_t len = strlen(line); + char *line = Curl_dyn_ptr(&data->conn->proto.smtpc.pp.recvbuf); + size_t len = data->conn->proto.smtpc.pp.nfinal; (void)instate; /* no use for this yet */ @@ -1044,12 +1046,8 @@ static CURLcode smtp_state_command_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, int smtpcode, result = CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY; } else { - /* Temporarily add the LF character back and send as body to the client */ - if(!data->req.no_body) { - line[len] = '\n'; - result = Curl_client_write(data, CLIENTWRITE_BODY, line, len + 1); - line[len] = '\0'; - } + if(!data->req.no_body) + result = Curl_client_write(data, CLIENTWRITE_BODY, line, len); if(smtpcode != 1) { if(smtp->rcpt) { @@ -1166,7 +1164,7 @@ static CURLcode smtp_state_data_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, int smtpcode, Curl_pgrsSetUploadSize(data, data->state.infilesize); /* SMTP upload */ - Curl_setup_transfer(data, -1, -1, FALSE, FIRSTSOCKET); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, -1, -1, FALSE, FIRSTSOCKET); /* End of DO phase */ smtp_state(data, SMTP_STOP); @@ -1198,7 +1196,6 @@ static CURLcode smtp_statemachine(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn) { CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; - curl_socket_t sock = conn->sock[FIRSTSOCKET]; int smtpcode; struct smtp_conn *smtpc = &conn->proto.smtpc; struct pingpong *pp = &smtpc->pp; @@ -1214,7 +1211,7 @@ static CURLcode smtp_statemachine(struct Curl_easy *data, do { /* Read the response from the server */ - result = Curl_pp_readresp(data, sock, pp, &smtpcode, &nread); + result = Curl_pp_readresp(data, FIRSTSOCKET, pp, &smtpcode, &nread); if(result) return result; @@ -1268,7 +1265,6 @@ static CURLcode smtp_statemachine(struct Curl_easy *data, break; case SMTP_QUIT: - /* fallthrough, just stop! */ default: /* internal error */ smtp_state(data, SMTP_STOP); @@ -1362,8 +1358,7 @@ static CURLcode smtp_connect(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) Curl_sasl_init(&smtpc->sasl, data, &saslsmtp); /* Initialise the pingpong layer */ - Curl_pp_setup(pp); - Curl_pp_init(data, pp); + Curl_pp_init(pp); /* Parse the URL options */ result = smtp_parse_url_options(conn); @@ -1398,10 +1393,6 @@ static CURLcode smtp_done(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLcode status, CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; struct SMTP *smtp = data->req.p.smtp; - struct pingpong *pp = &conn->proto.smtpc.pp; - char *eob; - ssize_t len; - ssize_t bytes_written; (void)premature; @@ -1416,47 +1407,7 @@ static CURLcode smtp_done(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLcode status, result = status; /* use the already set error code */ } else if(!data->set.connect_only && data->set.mail_rcpt && - (data->state.upload || data->set.mimepost.kind)) { - /* Calculate the EOB taking into account any terminating CRLF from the - previous line of the email or the CRLF of the DATA command when there - is "no mail data". RFC-5321, sect. 4.1.1.4. - - Note: As some SSL backends, such as OpenSSL, will cause Curl_write() to - fail when using a different pointer following a previous write, that - returned CURLE_AGAIN, we duplicate the EOB now rather than when the - bytes written doesn't equal len. */ - if(smtp->trailing_crlf || !data->state.infilesize) { - eob = strdup(&SMTP_EOB[2]); - len = SMTP_EOB_LEN - 2; - } - else { - eob = strdup(SMTP_EOB); - len = SMTP_EOB_LEN; - } - - if(!eob) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - - /* Send the end of block data */ - result = Curl_write(data, conn->writesockfd, eob, len, &bytes_written); - if(result) { - free(eob); - return result; - } - - if(bytes_written != len) { - /* The whole chunk was not sent so keep it around and adjust the - pingpong structure accordingly */ - pp->sendthis = eob; - pp->sendsize = len; - pp->sendleft = len - bytes_written; - } - else { - /* Successfully sent so adjust the response timeout relative to now */ - pp->response = Curl_now(); - - free(eob); - } + (data->state.upload || IS_MIME_POST(data))) { smtp_state(data, SMTP_POSTDATA); @@ -1508,7 +1459,7 @@ static CURLcode smtp_perform(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *connected, smtp->eob = 2; /* Start the first command in the DO phase */ - if((data->state.upload || data->set.mimepost.kind) && data->set.mail_rcpt) + if((data->state.upload || IS_MIME_POST(data)) && data->set.mail_rcpt) /* MAIL transfer */ result = smtp_perform_mail(data); else @@ -1541,6 +1492,8 @@ static CURLcode smtp_perform(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *connected, static CURLcode smtp_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) { CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + DEBUGASSERT(data); + DEBUGASSERT(data->conn); *done = FALSE; /* default to false */ /* Parse the custom request */ @@ -1597,7 +1550,7 @@ static CURLcode smtp_dophase_done(struct Curl_easy *data, bool connected) if(smtp->transfer != PPTRANSFER_BODY) /* no data to transfer */ - Curl_setup_transfer(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); return CURLE_OK; } @@ -1822,108 +1775,173 @@ static CURLcode smtp_parse_address(const char *fqma, char **address, return result; } -CURLcode Curl_smtp_escape_eob(struct Curl_easy *data, - const ssize_t nread, - const ssize_t offset) +struct cr_eob_ctx { + struct Curl_creader super; + struct bufq buf; + size_t n_eob; /* how many EOB bytes we matched so far */ + size_t eob; /* Number of bytes of the EOB (End Of Body) that + have been received so far */ + BIT(read_eos); /* we read an EOS from the next reader */ + BIT(eos); /* we have returned an EOS */ +}; + +static CURLcode cr_eob_init(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader) { - /* When sending a SMTP payload we must detect CRLF. sequences making sure - they are sent as CRLF.. instead, as a . on the beginning of a line will - be deleted by the server when not part of an EOB terminator and a - genuine CRLF.CRLF which isn't escaped will wrongly be detected as end of - data by the server - */ - ssize_t i; - ssize_t si; - struct SMTP *smtp = data->req.p.smtp; - char *scratch = data->state.scratch; - char *newscratch = NULL; - char *oldscratch = NULL; - size_t eob_sent; + struct cr_eob_ctx *ctx = reader->ctx; + (void)data; + /* The first char we read is the first on a line, as if we had + * read CRLF just before */ + ctx->n_eob = 2; + Curl_bufq_init2(&ctx->buf, (16 * 1024), 1, BUFQ_OPT_SOFT_LIMIT); + return CURLE_OK; +} - /* Do we need to allocate a scratch buffer? */ - if(!scratch || data->set.crlf) { - oldscratch = scratch; +static void cr_eob_close(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + struct cr_eob_ctx *ctx = reader->ctx; + (void)data; + Curl_bufq_free(&ctx->buf); +} - scratch = newscratch = malloc(2 * data->set.upload_buffer_size); - if(!newscratch) { - failf(data, "Failed to alloc scratch buffer"); +/* this is the 5-bytes End-Of-Body marker for SMTP */ +#define SMTP_EOB "\r\n.\r\n" +#define SMTP_EOB_FIND_LEN 3 - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - } - } - DEBUGASSERT((size_t)data->set.upload_buffer_size >= (size_t)nread); - - /* Have we already sent part of the EOB? */ - eob_sent = smtp->eob; - - /* This loop can be improved by some kind of Boyer-Moore style of - approach but that is saved for later... */ - if(offset) - memcpy(scratch, data->req.upload_fromhere, offset); - for(i = offset, si = offset; i < nread; i++) { - if(SMTP_EOB[smtp->eob] == data->req.upload_fromhere[i]) { - smtp->eob++; - - /* Is the EOB potentially the terminating CRLF? */ - if(2 == smtp->eob || SMTP_EOB_LEN == smtp->eob) - smtp->trailing_crlf = TRUE; - else - smtp->trailing_crlf = FALSE; - } - else if(smtp->eob) { - /* A previous substring matched so output that first */ - memcpy(&scratch[si], &SMTP_EOB[eob_sent], smtp->eob - eob_sent); - si += smtp->eob - eob_sent; - - /* Then compare the first byte */ - if(SMTP_EOB[0] == data->req.upload_fromhere[i]) - smtp->eob = 1; - else - smtp->eob = 0; +/* client reader doing SMTP End-Of-Body escaping. */ +static CURLcode cr_eob_read(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader, + char *buf, size_t blen, + size_t *pnread, bool *peos) +{ + struct cr_eob_ctx *ctx = reader->ctx; + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + size_t nread, i, start, n; + bool eos; + + if(!ctx->read_eos && Curl_bufq_is_empty(&ctx->buf)) { + /* Get more and convert it when needed */ + result = Curl_creader_read(data, reader->next, buf, blen, &nread, &eos); + if(result) + return result; - eob_sent = 0; + ctx->read_eos = eos; + if(nread) { + if(!ctx->n_eob && !memchr(buf, SMTP_EOB[0], nread)) { + /* not in the middle of a match, no EOB start found, just pass */ + *pnread = nread; + *peos = FALSE; + return CURLE_OK; + } + /* scan for EOB (continuation) and convert */ + for(i = start = 0; i < nread; ++i) { + if(ctx->n_eob >= SMTP_EOB_FIND_LEN) { + /* matched the EOB prefix and seeing additional char, add '.' */ + result = Curl_bufq_cwrite(&ctx->buf, buf + start, i - start, &n); + if(result) + return result; + result = Curl_bufq_cwrite(&ctx->buf, ".", 1, &n); + if(result) + return result; + ctx->n_eob = 0; + start = i; + if(data->state.infilesize > 0) + data->state.infilesize++; + } - /* Reset the trailing CRLF flag as there was more data */ - smtp->trailing_crlf = FALSE; + if(buf[i] != SMTP_EOB[ctx->n_eob]) + ctx->n_eob = 0; + + if(buf[i] == SMTP_EOB[ctx->n_eob]) { + /* matching another char of the EOB */ + ++ctx->n_eob; + } + } + + /* add any remainder to buf */ + if(start < nread) { + result = Curl_bufq_cwrite(&ctx->buf, buf + start, nread - start, &n); + if(result) + return result; + } } - /* Do we have a match for CRLF. as per RFC-5321, sect. 4.5.2 */ - if(SMTP_EOB_FIND_LEN == smtp->eob) { - /* Copy the replacement data to the target buffer */ - memcpy(&scratch[si], &SMTP_EOB_REPL[eob_sent], - SMTP_EOB_REPL_LEN - eob_sent); - si += SMTP_EOB_REPL_LEN - eob_sent; - smtp->eob = 0; - eob_sent = 0; + if(ctx->read_eos) { + /* if we last matched a CRLF or if the data was empty, add ".\r\n" + * to end the body. If we sent something and it did not end with "\r\n", + * add "\r\n.\r\n" to end the body */ + const char *eob = SMTP_EOB; + switch(ctx->n_eob) { + case 2: + /* seen a CRLF at the end, just add the remainder */ + eob = &SMTP_EOB[2]; + break; + case 3: + /* ended with '\r\n.', we should escpe the last '.' */ + eob = "." SMTP_EOB; + break; + default: + break; + } + result = Curl_bufq_cwrite(&ctx->buf, eob, strlen(eob), &n); + if(result) + return result; } - else if(!smtp->eob) - scratch[si++] = data->req.upload_fromhere[i]; } - if(smtp->eob - eob_sent) { - /* A substring matched before processing ended so output that now */ - memcpy(&scratch[si], &SMTP_EOB[eob_sent], smtp->eob - eob_sent); - si += smtp->eob - eob_sent; + *peos = FALSE; + if(!Curl_bufq_is_empty(&ctx->buf)) { + result = Curl_bufq_cread(&ctx->buf, buf, blen, pnread); } + else + *pnread = 0; + + if(ctx->read_eos && Curl_bufq_is_empty(&ctx->buf)) { + /* no more data, read all, done. */ + ctx->eos = TRUE; + } + *peos = ctx->eos; + DEBUGF(infof(data, "cr_eob_read(%zu) -> %d, %zd, %d", + blen, result, *pnread, *peos)); + return result; +} - /* Only use the new buffer if we replaced something */ - if(si != nread) { - /* Upload from the new (replaced) buffer instead */ - data->req.upload_fromhere = scratch; +static curl_off_t cr_eob_total_length(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_creader *reader) +{ + /* this reader changes length depending on input */ + (void)data; + (void)reader; + return -1; +} - /* Save the buffer so it can be freed later */ - data->state.scratch = scratch; +static const struct Curl_crtype cr_eob = { + "cr-smtp-eob", + cr_eob_init, + cr_eob_read, + cr_eob_close, + Curl_creader_def_needs_rewind, + cr_eob_total_length, + Curl_creader_def_resume_from, + Curl_creader_def_rewind, + Curl_creader_def_unpause, + Curl_creader_def_done, + sizeof(struct cr_eob_ctx) +}; - /* Free the old scratch buffer */ - free(oldscratch); +static CURLcode cr_eob_add(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct Curl_creader *reader = NULL; + CURLcode result; - /* Set the new amount too */ - data->req.upload_present = si; - } - else - free(newscratch); + result = Curl_creader_create(&reader, data, &cr_eob, + CURL_CR_CONTENT_ENCODE); + if(!result) + result = Curl_creader_add(data, reader); - return CURLE_OK; + if(result && reader) + Curl_creader_free(data, reader); + return result; } #endif /* CURL_DISABLE_SMTP */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/smtp.h b/vendor/curl/lib/smtp.h index 7a04c21549..7c2af68073 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/smtp.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/smtp.h @@ -84,17 +84,4 @@ struct smtp_conn { extern const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_smtp; extern const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_smtps; -/* this is the 5-bytes End-Of-Body marker for SMTP */ -#define SMTP_EOB "\x0d\x0a\x2e\x0d\x0a" -#define SMTP_EOB_LEN 5 -#define SMTP_EOB_FIND_LEN 3 - -/* if found in data, replace it with this string instead */ -#define SMTP_EOB_REPL "\x0d\x0a\x2e\x2e" -#define SMTP_EOB_REPL_LEN 4 - -CURLcode Curl_smtp_escape_eob(struct Curl_easy *data, - const ssize_t nread, - const ssize_t offset); - #endif /* HEADER_CURL_SMTP_H */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/sockaddr.h b/vendor/curl/lib/sockaddr.h index 5a6bb207dc..2e2d375e06 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/sockaddr.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/sockaddr.h @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ struct Curl_sockaddr_storage { union { struct sockaddr sa; struct sockaddr_in sa_in; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 struct sockaddr_in6 sa_in6; #endif #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/socketpair.c b/vendor/curl/lib/socketpair.c index e3d40ff94e..d7e3afd889 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/socketpair.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/socketpair.c @@ -27,15 +27,33 @@ #include "urldata.h" #include "rand.h" +#if defined(HAVE_PIPE) && defined(HAVE_FCNTL) +#include + +int Curl_pipe(curl_socket_t socks[2]) +{ + if(pipe(socks)) + return -1; + + if(fcntl(socks[0], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) || + fcntl(socks[1], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) ) { + close(socks[0]); + close(socks[1]); + socks[0] = socks[1] = CURL_SOCKET_BAD; + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif + + #if !defined(HAVE_SOCKETPAIR) && !defined(CURL_DISABLE_SOCKETPAIR) #ifdef _WIN32 /* * This is a socketpair() implementation for Windows. */ #include -#include -#include -#include #include #else #ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/socketpair.h b/vendor/curl/lib/socketpair.h index bd499abbef..ddd44374a7 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/socketpair.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/socketpair.h @@ -31,17 +31,41 @@ #define wakeup_write write #define wakeup_read read #define wakeup_close close -#define wakeup_create pipe +#define wakeup_create(p) Curl_pipe(p) + +#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL +#include +int Curl_pipe(curl_socket_t socks[2]); +#else +#define Curl_pipe(p) pipe(p) +#endif #else /* HAVE_PIPE */ #define wakeup_write swrite #define wakeup_read sread #define wakeup_close sclose -#define wakeup_create(p) Curl_socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, p) + +#if defined(USE_UNIX_SOCKETS) && defined(HAVE_SOCKETPAIR) +#define SOCKETPAIR_FAMILY AF_UNIX +#elif !defined(HAVE_SOCKETPAIR) +#define SOCKETPAIR_FAMILY 0 /* not used */ +#else +#error "unsupported unix domain and socketpair build combo" +#endif + +#ifdef SOCK_CLOEXEC +#define SOCKETPAIR_TYPE (SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC) +#else +#define SOCKETPAIR_TYPE SOCK_STREAM +#endif + +#define wakeup_create(p)\ +Curl_socketpair(SOCKETPAIR_FAMILY, SOCKETPAIR_TYPE, 0, p) #endif /* HAVE_PIPE */ + #ifndef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR #include diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/socks.c b/vendor/curl/lib/socks.c index 3a396de620..4ade4eb020 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/socks.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/socks.c @@ -71,9 +71,18 @@ enum connect_t { CONNECT_DONE /* 17 connected fine to the remote or the SOCKS proxy */ }; +#define CURL_SOCKS_BUF_SIZE 600 + +/* make sure we configure it not too low */ +#if CURL_SOCKS_BUF_SIZE < 600 +#error CURL_SOCKS_BUF_SIZE must be at least 600 +#endif + + struct socks_state { enum connect_t state; ssize_t outstanding; /* send this many bytes more */ + unsigned char buffer[CURL_SOCKS_BUF_SIZE]; unsigned char *outp; /* send from this pointer */ const char *hostname; @@ -249,7 +258,7 @@ static CURLproxycode socks_state_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, failf(data, "connection to proxy closed"); return CURLPX_CLOSED; } - failf(data, "SOCKS4: Failed receiving %s: %s", description, + failf(data, "SOCKS: Failed receiving %s: %s", description, curl_easy_strerror(result)); return failcode; } @@ -278,14 +287,11 @@ static CURLproxycode do_SOCKS4(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct connectdata *conn = cf->conn; const bool protocol4a = (conn->socks_proxy.proxytype == CURLPROXY_SOCKS4A) ? TRUE : FALSE; - unsigned char *socksreq = (unsigned char *)data->state.buffer; + unsigned char *socksreq = sx->buffer; CURLcode result; CURLproxycode presult; struct Curl_dns_entry *dns = NULL; - /* make sure that the buffer is at least 600 bytes */ - DEBUGASSERT(READBUFFER_MIN >= 600); - switch(sx->state) { case CONNECT_SOCKS_INIT: /* SOCKS4 can only do IPv4, insist! */ @@ -335,12 +341,12 @@ static CURLproxycode do_SOCKS4(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, case CONNECT_RESOLVING: /* check if we have the name resolved by now */ - dns = Curl_fetch_addr(data, sx->hostname, (int)conn->port); + dns = Curl_fetch_addr(data, sx->hostname, conn->primary.remote_port); if(dns) { #ifdef CURLRES_ASYNCH - conn->resolve_async.dns = dns; - conn->resolve_async.done = TRUE; + data->state.async.dns = dns; + data->state.async.done = TRUE; #endif infof(data, "Hostname '%s' was found", sx->hostname); sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_RESOLVED); @@ -353,9 +359,10 @@ static CURLproxycode do_SOCKS4(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, return CURLPX_OK; } } - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); + case CONNECT_RESOLVED: CONNECT_RESOLVED: - case CONNECT_RESOLVED: { + { struct Curl_addrinfo *hp = NULL; /* * We cannot use 'hostent' as a struct that Curl_resolv() returns. It @@ -393,9 +400,9 @@ static CURLproxycode do_SOCKS4(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(!hp) return CURLPX_RESOLVE_HOST; } - /* FALLTHROUGH */ -CONNECT_REQ_INIT: + FALLTHROUGH(); case CONNECT_REQ_INIT: +CONNECT_REQ_INIT: /* * This is currently not supporting "Identification Protocol (RFC1413)". */ @@ -430,7 +437,7 @@ static CURLproxycode do_SOCKS4(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, /* append hostname */ hostnamelen = strlen(sx->hostname) + 1; /* length including NUL */ if((hostnamelen <= 255) && - (packetsize + hostnamelen < data->set.buffer_size)) + (packetsize + hostnamelen < sizeof(sx->buffer))) strcpy((char *)socksreq + packetsize, sx->hostname); else { failf(data, "SOCKS4: too long host name"); @@ -439,10 +446,11 @@ static CURLproxycode do_SOCKS4(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, packetsize += hostnamelen; } sx->outp = socksreq; + DEBUGASSERT(packetsize <= sizeof(sx->buffer)); sx->outstanding = packetsize; sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_REQ_SENDING); } - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case CONNECT_REQ_SENDING: /* Send request */ presult = socks_state_send(cf, sx, data, CURLPX_SEND_CONNECT, @@ -458,7 +466,7 @@ static CURLproxycode do_SOCKS4(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, sx->outp = socksreq; sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_SOCKS_READ); - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case CONNECT_SOCKS_READ: /* Receive response */ presult = socks_state_recv(cf, sx, data, CURLPX_RECV_CONNECT, @@ -570,14 +578,14 @@ static CURLproxycode do_SOCKS5(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, o X'00' succeeded */ struct connectdata *conn = cf->conn; - unsigned char *socksreq = (unsigned char *)data->state.buffer; - int idx; + unsigned char *socksreq = sx->buffer; + size_t idx; CURLcode result; CURLproxycode presult; bool socks5_resolve_local = (conn->socks_proxy.proxytype == CURLPROXY_SOCKS5) ? TRUE : FALSE; const size_t hostname_len = strlen(sx->hostname); - ssize_t len = 0; + size_t len = 0; const unsigned char auth = data->set.socks5auth; bool allow_gssapi = FALSE; struct Curl_dns_entry *dns = NULL; @@ -620,6 +628,7 @@ static CURLproxycode do_SOCKS5(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, socksreq[1] = (unsigned char) (idx - 2); sx->outp = socksreq; + DEBUGASSERT(idx <= sizeof(sx->buffer)); sx->outstanding = idx; presult = socks_state_send(cf, sx, data, CURLPX_SEND_CONNECT, "initial SOCKS5 request"); @@ -640,12 +649,12 @@ static CURLproxycode do_SOCKS5(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, /* remain in sending state */ return CURLPX_OK; } - /* FALLTHROUGH */ -CONNECT_SOCKS_READ_INIT: + FALLTHROUGH(); case CONNECT_SOCKS_READ_INIT: +CONNECT_SOCKS_READ_INIT: sx->outstanding = 2; /* expect two bytes */ sx->outp = socksreq; /* store it here */ - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case CONNECT_SOCKS_READ: presult = socks_state_recv(cf, sx, data, CURLPX_RECV_CONNECT, "initial SOCKS5 response"); @@ -746,10 +755,11 @@ static CURLproxycode do_SOCKS5(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, } len += proxy_password_len; sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_AUTH_SEND); + DEBUGASSERT(len <= sizeof(sx->buffer)); sx->outstanding = len; sx->outp = socksreq; } - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case CONNECT_AUTH_SEND: presult = socks_state_send(cf, sx, data, CURLPX_SEND_AUTH, "SOCKS5 sub-negotiation request"); @@ -762,7 +772,7 @@ static CURLproxycode do_SOCKS5(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, sx->outp = socksreq; sx->outstanding = 2; sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_AUTH_READ); - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case CONNECT_AUTH_READ: presult = socks_state_recv(cf, sx, data, CURLPX_RECV_AUTH, "SOCKS5 sub-negotiation response"); @@ -781,9 +791,9 @@ static CURLproxycode do_SOCKS5(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, /* Everything is good so far, user was authenticated! */ sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_REQ_INIT); - /* FALLTHROUGH */ -CONNECT_REQ_INIT: + FALLTHROUGH(); case CONNECT_REQ_INIT: +CONNECT_REQ_INIT: if(socks5_resolve_local) { enum resolve_t rc = Curl_resolv(data, sx->hostname, sx->remote_port, TRUE, &dns); @@ -806,8 +816,8 @@ static CURLproxycode do_SOCKS5(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(dns) { #ifdef CURLRES_ASYNCH - conn->resolve_async.dns = dns; - conn->resolve_async.done = TRUE; + data->state.async.dns = dns; + data->state.async.done = TRUE; #endif infof(data, "SOCKS5: hostname '%s' found", sx->hostname); } @@ -820,14 +830,15 @@ static CURLproxycode do_SOCKS5(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, return CURLPX_OK; } } - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); + case CONNECT_RESOLVED: CONNECT_RESOLVED: - case CONNECT_RESOLVED: { + { char dest[MAX_IPADR_LEN]; /* printable address */ struct Curl_addrinfo *hp = NULL; if(dns) hp = dns->addr; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 if(data->set.ipver != CURL_IPRESOLVE_WHATEVER) { int wanted_family = data->set.ipver == CURL_IPRESOLVE_V4 ? AF_INET : AF_INET6; @@ -861,7 +872,7 @@ static CURLproxycode do_SOCKS5(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, infof(data, "SOCKS5 connect to %s:%d (locally resolved)", dest, sx->remote_port); } -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 else if(hp->ai_family == AF_INET6) { int i; struct sockaddr_in6 *saddr_in6; @@ -898,7 +909,7 @@ static CURLproxycode do_SOCKS5(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, IPv6 == 4, IPv4 == 1 */ unsigned char ip4[4]; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 if(conn->bits.ipv6_ip) { char ip6[16]; if(1 != Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, sx->hostname, ip6)) @@ -923,10 +934,10 @@ static CURLproxycode do_SOCKS5(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, infof(data, "SOCKS5 connect to %s:%d (remotely resolved)", sx->hostname, sx->remote_port); } - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); -CONNECT_REQ_SEND: case CONNECT_REQ_SEND: +CONNECT_REQ_SEND: /* PORT MSB */ socksreq[len++] = (unsigned char)((sx->remote_port >> 8) & 0xff); /* PORT LSB */ @@ -939,9 +950,10 @@ static CURLproxycode do_SOCKS5(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, } #endif sx->outp = socksreq; + DEBUGASSERT(len <= sizeof(sx->buffer)); sx->outstanding = len; sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_REQ_SENDING); - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case CONNECT_REQ_SENDING: presult = socks_state_send(cf, sx, data, CURLPX_SEND_REQUEST, "SOCKS5 connect request"); @@ -960,7 +972,7 @@ static CURLproxycode do_SOCKS5(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, sx->outstanding = 10; /* minimum packet size is 10 */ sx->outp = socksreq; sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_REQ_READ); - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case CONNECT_REQ_READ: presult = socks_state_recv(cf, sx, data, CURLPX_RECV_REQACK, "SOCKS5 connect request ack"); @@ -1038,6 +1050,7 @@ static CURLproxycode do_SOCKS5(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, /* decrypt_gssapi_blockread already read the whole packet */ #endif if(len > 10) { + DEBUGASSERT(len <= sizeof(sx->buffer)); sx->outstanding = len - 10; /* get the rest */ sx->outp = &socksreq[10]; sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_REQ_READ_MORE); @@ -1049,7 +1062,7 @@ static CURLproxycode do_SOCKS5(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, #if defined(HAVE_GSSAPI) || defined(USE_WINDOWS_SSPI) } #endif - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case CONNECT_REQ_READ_MORE: presult = socks_state_recv(cf, sx, data, CURLPX_RECV_ADDRESS, "SOCKS5 connect request address"); @@ -1162,7 +1175,7 @@ static CURLcode socks_proxy_cf_connect(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, result = connect_SOCKS(cf, sx, data); if(!result && sx->state == CONNECT_DONE) { cf->connected = TRUE; - Curl_verboseconnect(data, conn); + Curl_verboseconnect(data, conn, cf->sockindex); socks_proxy_cf_free(cf); } @@ -1231,7 +1244,7 @@ static void socks_cf_get_host(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_cftype Curl_cft_socks_proxy = { "SOCKS-PROXYY", - CF_TYPE_IP_CONNECT, + CF_TYPE_IP_CONNECT|CF_TYPE_PROXY, 0, socks_proxy_cf_destroy, socks_proxy_cf_connect, diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/socks_gssapi.c b/vendor/curl/lib/socks_gssapi.c index 2ede8c7c29..c0b42b871a 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/socks_gssapi.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/socks_gssapi.c @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ #include "timeval.h" #include "socks.h" #include "warnless.h" +#include "strdup.h" /* The last 3 #include files should be in this order */ #include "curl_printf.h" @@ -139,10 +140,9 @@ CURLcode Curl_SOCKS5_gssapi_negotiate(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, /* prepare service name */ if(strchr(serviceptr, '/')) { service.length = serviceptr_length; - service.value = malloc(service.length); + service.value = Curl_memdup(serviceptr, service.length); if(!service.value) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - memcpy(service.value, serviceptr, service.length); gss_major_status = gss_import_name(&gss_minor_status, &service, (gss_OID) GSS_C_NULL_OID, &server); @@ -387,12 +387,11 @@ CURLcode Curl_SOCKS5_gssapi_negotiate(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, } else { gss_send_token.length = 1; - gss_send_token.value = malloc(1); + gss_send_token.value = Curl_memdup(&gss_enc, 1); if(!gss_send_token.value) { gss_delete_sec_context(&gss_status, &gss_context, NULL); return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; } - memcpy(gss_send_token.value, &gss_enc, 1); gss_major_status = gss_wrap(&gss_minor_status, gss_context, 0, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, &gss_send_token, @@ -476,7 +475,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_SOCKS5_gssapi_negotiate(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, gss_recv_token.length, &actualread); if(result || (actualread != us_length)) { - failf(data, "Failed to receive GSS-API encryptrion type."); + failf(data, "Failed to receive GSS-API encryption type."); gss_release_buffer(&gss_status, &gss_recv_token); gss_delete_sec_context(&gss_status, &gss_context, NULL); return CURLE_COULDNT_CONNECT; diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/socks_sspi.c b/vendor/curl/lib/socks_sspi.c index d1200ea037..2baae2c2b2 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/socks_sspi.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/socks_sspi.c @@ -331,9 +331,15 @@ CURLcode Curl_SOCKS5_gssapi_negotiate(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, failf(data, "Failed to determine user name."); return CURLE_COULDNT_CONNECT; } - infof(data, "SOCKS5 server authenticated user %s with GSS-API.", - names.sUserName); - s_pSecFn->FreeContextBuffer(names.sUserName); + else { +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS + char *user_utf8 = curlx_convert_tchar_to_UTF8(names.sUserName); + infof(data, "SOCKS5 server authenticated user %s with GSS-API.", + (user_utf8 ? user_utf8 : "(unknown)")); + curlx_unicodefree(user_utf8); +#endif + s_pSecFn->FreeContextBuffer(names.sUserName); + } /* Do encryption */ socksreq[0] = 1; /* GSS-API subnegotiation version */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/strcase.c b/vendor/curl/lib/strcase.c index 7c0b4ef909..14d76f785d 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/strcase.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/strcase.c @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ static const unsigned char tolowermap[256] = { altered by the current locale. */ char Curl_raw_toupper(char in) { - return touppermap[(unsigned char) in]; + return (char)touppermap[(unsigned char) in]; } @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ char Curl_raw_toupper(char in) altered by the current locale. */ char Curl_raw_tolower(char in) { - return tolowermap[(unsigned char) in]; + return (char)tolowermap[(unsigned char) in]; } /* diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/strdup.c b/vendor/curl/lib/strdup.c index 2578441c31..299c9cc36b 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/strdup.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/strdup.c @@ -101,21 +101,17 @@ void *Curl_memdup(const void *src, size_t length) /*************************************************************************** * - * Curl_strndup(source, length) + * Curl_memdup0(source, length) * * Copies the 'source' string to a newly allocated buffer (that is returned). - * Copies not more than 'length' bytes (up to a null terminator) then adds a - * null terminator. + * Copies 'length' bytes then adds a null terminator. * * Returns the new pointer or NULL on failure. * ***************************************************************************/ -void *Curl_strndup(const char *src, size_t length) +void *Curl_memdup0(const char *src, size_t length) { - char *buf = memchr(src, '\0', length); - if(buf) - length = buf - src; - buf = malloc(length + 1); + char *buf = malloc(length + 1); if(!buf) return NULL; memcpy(buf, src, length); diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/strdup.h b/vendor/curl/lib/strdup.h index 9f12b25482..238a2611f6 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/strdup.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/strdup.h @@ -33,6 +33,6 @@ wchar_t* Curl_wcsdup(const wchar_t* src); #endif void *Curl_memdup(const void *src, size_t buffer_length); void *Curl_saferealloc(void *ptr, size_t size); -void *Curl_strndup(const char *src, size_t length); +void *Curl_memdup0(const char *src, size_t length); #endif /* HEADER_CURL_STRDUP_H */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/strerror.c b/vendor/curl/lib/strerror.c index 0d5f9276f0..f142cf181d 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/strerror.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/strerror.c @@ -319,6 +319,12 @@ curl_easy_strerror(CURLcode error) case CURLE_UNRECOVERABLE_POLL: return "Unrecoverable error in select/poll"; + case CURLE_TOO_LARGE: + return "A value or data field grew larger than allowed"; + + case CURLE_ECH_REQUIRED: + return "ECH attempted but failed"; + /* error codes not used by current libcurl */ case CURLE_OBSOLETE20: case CURLE_OBSOLETE24: @@ -553,6 +559,9 @@ curl_url_strerror(CURLUcode error) case CURLUE_LACKS_IDN: return "libcurl lacks IDN support"; + case CURLUE_TOO_LARGE: + return "A value or data field is larger than allowed"; + case CURLUE_LAST: break; } @@ -572,10 +581,11 @@ curl_url_strerror(CURLUcode error) * Returns NULL if no error message was found for error code. */ static const char * -get_winsock_error (int err, char *buf, size_t len) +get_winsock_error(int err, char *buf, size_t len) { #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS const char *p; + size_t alen; #endif if(!len) @@ -755,8 +765,9 @@ get_winsock_error (int err, char *buf, size_t len) default: return NULL; } - strncpy(buf, p, len); - buf [len-1] = '\0'; + alen = strlen(p); + if(alen < len) + strcpy(buf, p); return buf; #endif } @@ -832,7 +843,6 @@ const char *Curl_strerror(int err, char *buf, size_t buflen) #endif int old_errno = errno; char *p; - size_t max; if(!buflen) return NULL; @@ -841,23 +851,22 @@ const char *Curl_strerror(int err, char *buf, size_t buflen) DEBUGASSERT(err >= 0); #endif - max = buflen - 1; *buf = '\0'; #if defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE) #if defined(_WIN32) /* 'sys_nerr' is the maximum errno number, it is not widely portable */ if(err >= 0 && err < sys_nerr) - strncpy(buf, sys_errlist[err], max); + msnprintf(buf, buflen, "%s", sys_errlist[err]); else #endif { if( #ifdef USE_WINSOCK - !get_winsock_error(err, buf, max) && + !get_winsock_error(err, buf, buflen) && #endif - !get_winapi_error((DWORD)err, buf, max)) - msnprintf(buf, max, "Unknown error %d (%#x)", err, err); + !get_winapi_error((DWORD)err, buf, buflen)) + msnprintf(buf, buflen, "Unknown error %d (%#x)", err, err); } #else /* not Windows coming up */ @@ -867,9 +876,9 @@ const char *Curl_strerror(int err, char *buf, size_t buflen) * storage is supplied via 'strerrbuf' and 'buflen' to hold the generated * message string, or EINVAL if 'errnum' is not a valid error number. */ - if(0 != strerror_r(err, buf, max)) { + if(0 != strerror_r(err, buf, buflen)) { if('\0' == buf[0]) - msnprintf(buf, max, "Unknown error %d", err); + msnprintf(buf, buflen, "Unknown error %d", err); } #elif defined(HAVE_STRERROR_R) && defined(HAVE_GLIBC_STRERROR_R) /* @@ -881,25 +890,23 @@ const char *Curl_strerror(int err, char *buf, size_t buflen) char buffer[256]; char *msg = strerror_r(err, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); if(msg) - strncpy(buf, msg, max); + msnprintf(buf, buflen, "%s", msg); else - msnprintf(buf, max, "Unknown error %d", err); + msnprintf(buf, buflen, "Unknown error %d", err); } #else { /* !checksrc! disable STRERROR 1 */ const char *msg = strerror(err); if(msg) - strncpy(buf, msg, max); + msnprintf(buf, buflen, "%s", msg); else - msnprintf(buf, max, "Unknown error %d", err); + msnprintf(buf, buflen, "Unknown error %d", err); } #endif #endif /* end of not Windows */ - buf[max] = '\0'; /* make sure the string is null-terminated */ - /* strip trailing '\r\n' or '\n'. */ p = strrchr(buf, '\n'); if(p && (p - buf) >= 2) @@ -943,8 +950,8 @@ const char *Curl_winapi_strerror(DWORD err, char *buf, size_t buflen) #else { const char *txt = (err == ERROR_SUCCESS) ? "No error" : "Error"; - strncpy(buf, txt, buflen); - buf[buflen - 1] = '\0'; + if(strlen(txt) < buflen) + strcpy(buf, txt); } #endif @@ -1081,17 +1088,11 @@ const char *Curl_sspi_strerror(int err, char *buf, size_t buflen) err); } else { - char txtbuf[80]; char msgbuf[256]; - - msnprintf(txtbuf, sizeof(txtbuf), "%s (0x%08X)", txt, err); - if(get_winapi_error(err, msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf))) - msnprintf(buf, buflen, "%s - %s", txtbuf, msgbuf); - else { - strncpy(buf, txtbuf, buflen); - buf[buflen - 1] = '\0'; - } + msnprintf(buf, buflen, "%s (0x%08X) - %s", txt, err, msgbuf); + else + msnprintf(buf, buflen, "%s (0x%08X)", txt, err); } #else @@ -1099,8 +1100,8 @@ const char *Curl_sspi_strerror(int err, char *buf, size_t buflen) txt = "No error"; else txt = "Error"; - strncpy(buf, txt, buflen); - buf[buflen - 1] = '\0'; + if(buflen > strlen(txt)) + strcpy(buf, txt); #endif if(errno != old_errno) diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/strtoofft.c b/vendor/curl/lib/strtoofft.c index 077b25792e..580fd23bf1 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/strtoofft.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/strtoofft.c @@ -79,11 +79,10 @@ static int get_char(char c, int base); static curl_off_t strtooff(const char *nptr, char **endptr, int base) { char *end; - int is_negative = 0; - int overflow; + bool is_negative = FALSE; + bool overflow = FALSE; int i; curl_off_t value = 0; - curl_off_t newval; /* Skip leading whitespace. */ end = (char *)nptr; @@ -93,7 +92,7 @@ static curl_off_t strtooff(const char *nptr, char **endptr, int base) /* Handle the sign, if any. */ if(end[0] == '-') { - is_negative = 1; + is_negative = TRUE; end++; } else if(end[0] == '+') { @@ -129,19 +128,15 @@ static curl_off_t strtooff(const char *nptr, char **endptr, int base) } /* Loop handling digits. */ - value = 0; - overflow = 0; for(i = get_char(end[0], base); i != -1; end++, i = get_char(end[0], base)) { - newval = base * value + i; - if(newval < value) { - /* We've overflowed. */ - overflow = 1; + + if(value > (CURL_OFF_T_MAX - i) / base) { + overflow = TRUE; break; } - else - value = newval; + value = base * value + i; } if(!overflow) { @@ -217,7 +212,7 @@ static int get_char(char c, int base) CURLofft curlx_strtoofft(const char *str, char **endp, int base, curl_off_t *num) { - char *end; + char *end = NULL; curl_off_t number; errno = 0; *num = 0; /* clear by default */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/system_win32.c b/vendor/curl/lib/system_win32.c index 9408d026b1..d2862de923 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/system_win32.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/system_win32.c @@ -38,16 +38,23 @@ LARGE_INTEGER Curl_freq; bool Curl_isVistaOrGreater; +bool Curl_isWindows8OrGreater; /* Handle of iphlpapp.dll */ static HMODULE s_hIpHlpApiDll = NULL; -/* Pointer to the if_nametoindex function */ +/* Function pointers */ IF_NAMETOINDEX_FN Curl_if_nametoindex = NULL; +FREEADDRINFOEXW_FN Curl_FreeAddrInfoExW = NULL; +GETADDRINFOEXCANCEL_FN Curl_GetAddrInfoExCancel = NULL; +GETADDRINFOEXW_FN Curl_GetAddrInfoExW = NULL; /* Curl_win32_init() performs win32 global initialization */ CURLcode Curl_win32_init(long flags) { +#ifdef USE_WINSOCK + HMODULE ws2_32Dll; +#endif /* CURL_GLOBAL_WIN32 controls the *optional* part of the initialization which is just for Winsock at the moment. Any required win32 initialization should take place after this block. */ @@ -104,6 +111,18 @@ CURLcode Curl_win32_init(long flags) Curl_if_nametoindex = pIfNameToIndex; } +#ifdef USE_WINSOCK + ws2_32Dll = GetModuleHandleA("ws2_32"); + if(ws2_32Dll) { + Curl_FreeAddrInfoExW = CURLX_FUNCTION_CAST(FREEADDRINFOEXW_FN, + GetProcAddress(ws2_32Dll, "FreeAddrInfoExW")); + Curl_GetAddrInfoExCancel = CURLX_FUNCTION_CAST(GETADDRINFOEXCANCEL_FN, + GetProcAddress(ws2_32Dll, "GetAddrInfoExCancel")); + Curl_GetAddrInfoExW = CURLX_FUNCTION_CAST(GETADDRINFOEXW_FN, + GetProcAddress(ws2_32Dll, "GetAddrInfoExW")); + } +#endif + /* curlx_verify_windows_version must be called during init at least once because it has its own initialization routine. */ if(curlx_verify_windows_version(6, 0, 0, PLATFORM_WINNT, @@ -113,6 +132,13 @@ CURLcode Curl_win32_init(long flags) else Curl_isVistaOrGreater = FALSE; + if(curlx_verify_windows_version(6, 2, 0, PLATFORM_WINNT, + VERSION_GREATER_THAN_EQUAL)) { + Curl_isWindows8OrGreater = TRUE; + } + else + Curl_isWindows8OrGreater = FALSE; + QueryPerformanceFrequency(&Curl_freq); return CURLE_OK; } @@ -120,6 +146,9 @@ CURLcode Curl_win32_init(long flags) /* Curl_win32_cleanup() is the opposite of Curl_win32_init() */ void Curl_win32_cleanup(long init_flags) { + Curl_FreeAddrInfoExW = NULL; + Curl_GetAddrInfoExCancel = NULL; + Curl_GetAddrInfoExW = NULL; if(s_hIpHlpApiDll) { FreeLibrary(s_hIpHlpApiDll); s_hIpHlpApiDll = NULL; diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/system_win32.h b/vendor/curl/lib/system_win32.h index 2566766681..bd490cabcc 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/system_win32.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/system_win32.h @@ -26,10 +26,11 @@ #include "curl_setup.h" -#if defined(_WIN32) +#ifdef _WIN32 extern LARGE_INTEGER Curl_freq; extern bool Curl_isVistaOrGreater; +extern bool Curl_isWindows8OrGreater; CURLcode Curl_win32_init(long flags); void Curl_win32_cleanup(long init_flags); @@ -40,6 +41,33 @@ typedef unsigned int(WINAPI *IF_NAMETOINDEX_FN)(const char *); /* This is used instead of if_nametoindex if available on Windows */ extern IF_NAMETOINDEX_FN Curl_if_nametoindex; +/* Identical copy of addrinfoexW/ADDRINFOEXW */ +typedef struct addrinfoexW_ +{ + int ai_flags; + int ai_family; + int ai_socktype; + int ai_protocol; + size_t ai_addrlen; + PWSTR ai_canonname; + struct sockaddr *ai_addr; + void *ai_blob; + size_t ai_bloblen; + LPGUID ai_provider; + struct addrinfoexW_ *ai_next; +} ADDRINFOEXW_; + +typedef void (CALLBACK *LOOKUP_COMPLETION_FN)(DWORD, DWORD, LPWSAOVERLAPPED); +typedef void (WSAAPI *FREEADDRINFOEXW_FN)(ADDRINFOEXW_*); +typedef int (WSAAPI *GETADDRINFOEXCANCEL_FN)(LPHANDLE); +typedef int (WSAAPI *GETADDRINFOEXW_FN)(PCWSTR, PCWSTR, DWORD, LPGUID, + const ADDRINFOEXW_*, ADDRINFOEXW_**, struct timeval*, LPOVERLAPPED, + LOOKUP_COMPLETION_FN, LPHANDLE); + +extern FREEADDRINFOEXW_FN Curl_FreeAddrInfoExW; +extern GETADDRINFOEXCANCEL_FN Curl_GetAddrInfoExCancel; +extern GETADDRINFOEXW_FN Curl_GetAddrInfoExW; + /* This is used to dynamically load DLLs */ HMODULE Curl_load_library(LPCTSTR filename); #else /* _WIN32 */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/telnet.c b/vendor/curl/lib/telnet.c index 836e255c9d..227a166f2f 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/telnet.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/telnet.c @@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ struct TELNET { unsigned short subopt_wsy; /* Set with suboption NAWS */ TelnetReceive telrcv_state; struct curl_slist *telnet_vars; /* Environment variables */ + struct dynbuf out; /* output buffer */ /* suboptions */ unsigned char subbuffer[SUBBUFSIZE]; @@ -172,7 +173,7 @@ struct TELNET { */ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_telnet = { - "TELNET", /* scheme */ + "telnet", /* scheme */ ZERO_NULL, /* setup_connection */ telnet_do, /* do_it */ telnet_done, /* done */ @@ -185,7 +186,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_telnet = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_TELNET, /* defport */ @@ -204,6 +206,7 @@ CURLcode init_telnet(struct Curl_easy *data) if(!tn) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + Curl_dyn_init(&tn->out, 0xffff); data->req.p.telnet = tn; /* make us known */ tn->telrcv_state = CURL_TS_DATA; @@ -799,8 +802,10 @@ static CURLcode check_telnet_options(struct Curl_easy *data) was given on the command line */ if(data->state.aptr.user) { char buffer[256]; - if(str_is_nonascii(data->conn->user)) + if(str_is_nonascii(data->conn->user)) { + DEBUGF(infof(data, "set a non ASCII user name in telnet")); return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + } msnprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "USER,%s", data->conn->user); beg = curl_slist_append(tn->telnet_vars, buffer); if(!beg) { @@ -826,23 +831,27 @@ static CURLcode check_telnet_options(struct Curl_easy *data) case 5: /* Terminal type */ if(strncasecompare(option, "TTYPE", 5)) { - strncpy(tn->subopt_ttype, arg, 31); - tn->subopt_ttype[31] = 0; /* String termination */ - tn->us_preferred[CURL_TELOPT_TTYPE] = CURL_YES; + size_t l = strlen(arg); + if(l < sizeof(tn->subopt_ttype)) { + strcpy(tn->subopt_ttype, arg); + tn->us_preferred[CURL_TELOPT_TTYPE] = CURL_YES; + break; + } } - else - result = CURLE_UNKNOWN_OPTION; + result = CURLE_UNKNOWN_OPTION; break; case 8: /* Display variable */ if(strncasecompare(option, "XDISPLOC", 8)) { - strncpy(tn->subopt_xdisploc, arg, 127); - tn->subopt_xdisploc[127] = 0; /* String termination */ - tn->us_preferred[CURL_TELOPT_XDISPLOC] = CURL_YES; + size_t l = strlen(arg); + if(l < sizeof(tn->subopt_xdisploc)) { + strcpy(tn->subopt_xdisploc, arg); + tn->us_preferred[CURL_TELOPT_XDISPLOC] = CURL_YES; + break; + } } - else - result = CURLE_UNKNOWN_OPTION; + result = CURLE_UNKNOWN_OPTION; break; case 7: @@ -1223,37 +1232,37 @@ CURLcode telrcv(struct Curl_easy *data, static CURLcode send_telnet_data(struct Curl_easy *data, char *buffer, ssize_t nread) { - ssize_t escapes, i, outlen; - unsigned char *outbuf = NULL; + size_t i, outlen; + unsigned char *outbuf; CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; - ssize_t bytes_written, total_written; + size_t bytes_written; + size_t total_written = 0; struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; + struct TELNET *tn = data->req.p.telnet; - /* Determine size of new buffer after escaping */ - escapes = 0; - for(i = 0; i < nread; i++) - if((unsigned char)buffer[i] == CURL_IAC) - escapes++; - outlen = nread + escapes; + DEBUGASSERT(tn); + DEBUGASSERT(nread > 0); + if(nread < 0) + return CURLE_TOO_LARGE; - if(outlen == nread) - outbuf = (unsigned char *)buffer; - else { - ssize_t j; - outbuf = malloc(nread + escapes + 1); - if(!outbuf) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + if(memchr(buffer, CURL_IAC, nread)) { + /* only use the escape buffer when necessary */ + Curl_dyn_reset(&tn->out); - j = 0; - for(i = 0; i < nread; i++) { - outbuf[j++] = (unsigned char)buffer[i]; - if((unsigned char)buffer[i] == CURL_IAC) - outbuf[j++] = CURL_IAC; + for(i = 0; i < (size_t)nread && !result; i++) { + result = Curl_dyn_addn(&tn->out, &buffer[i], 1); + if(!result && ((unsigned char)buffer[i] == CURL_IAC)) + /* IAC is FF in hex */ + result = Curl_dyn_addn(&tn->out, "\xff", 1); } - outbuf[j] = '\0'; - } - total_written = 0; + outlen = Curl_dyn_len(&tn->out); + outbuf = Curl_dyn_uptr(&tn->out); + } + else { + outlen = (size_t)nread; + outbuf = (unsigned char *)buffer; + } while(!result && total_written < outlen) { /* Make sure socket is writable to avoid EWOULDBLOCK condition */ struct pollfd pfd[1]; @@ -1266,19 +1275,13 @@ static CURLcode send_telnet_data(struct Curl_easy *data, break; default: /* write! */ bytes_written = 0; - result = Curl_nwrite(data, FIRSTSOCKET, - outbuf + total_written, - outlen - total_written, - &bytes_written); + result = Curl_xfer_send(data, outbuf + total_written, + outlen - total_written, &bytes_written); total_written += bytes_written; break; } } - /* Free malloc copy if escaped */ - if(outbuf != (unsigned char *)buffer) - free(outbuf); - return result; } @@ -1294,6 +1297,7 @@ static CURLcode telnet_done(struct Curl_easy *data, curl_slist_free_all(tn->telnet_vars); tn->telnet_vars = NULL; + Curl_dyn_free(&tn->out); return CURLE_OK; } @@ -1321,7 +1325,7 @@ static CURLcode telnet_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) ssize_t nread; struct curltime now; bool keepon = TRUE; - char *buf = data->state.buffer; + char buffer[4*1024]; struct TELNET *tn; *done = TRUE; /* unconditionally */ @@ -1378,7 +1382,7 @@ static CURLcode telnet_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) /* Keep on listening and act on events */ while(keepon) { - const DWORD buf_size = (DWORD)data->set.buffer_size; + const DWORD buf_size = (DWORD)sizeof(buffer); DWORD waitret = WaitForMultipleObjects(obj_count, objs, FALSE, wait_timeout); switch(waitret) { @@ -1389,7 +1393,7 @@ static CURLcode telnet_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) if(data->set.is_fread_set) { size_t n; /* read from user-supplied method */ - n = data->state.fread_func(buf, 1, buf_size, data->state.in); + n = data->state.fread_func(buffer, 1, buf_size, data->state.in); if(n == CURL_READFUNC_ABORT) { keepon = FALSE; result = CURLE_READ_ERROR; @@ -1417,7 +1421,7 @@ static CURLcode telnet_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) if(!readfile_read) break; - if(!ReadFile(stdin_handle, buf, buf_size, + if(!ReadFile(stdin_handle, buffer, buf_size, &readfile_read, NULL)) { keepon = FALSE; result = CURLE_READ_ERROR; @@ -1425,7 +1429,7 @@ static CURLcode telnet_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) } } - result = send_telnet_data(data, buf, readfile_read); + result = send_telnet_data(data, buffer, readfile_read); if(result) { keepon = FALSE; break; @@ -1436,14 +1440,14 @@ static CURLcode telnet_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) case WAIT_OBJECT_0 + 1: { - if(!ReadFile(stdin_handle, buf, buf_size, + if(!ReadFile(stdin_handle, buffer, buf_size, &readfile_read, NULL)) { keepon = FALSE; result = CURLE_READ_ERROR; break; } - result = send_telnet_data(data, buf, readfile_read); + result = send_telnet_data(data, buffer, readfile_read); if(result) { keepon = FALSE; break; @@ -1465,7 +1469,7 @@ static CURLcode telnet_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) } if(events.lNetworkEvents & FD_READ) { /* read data from network */ - result = Curl_read(data, sockfd, buf, data->set.buffer_size, &nread); + result = Curl_xfer_recv(data, buffer, sizeof(buffer), &nread); /* read would've blocked. Loop again */ if(result == CURLE_AGAIN) break; @@ -1481,7 +1485,7 @@ static CURLcode telnet_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) break; } - result = telrcv(data, (unsigned char *) buf, nread); + result = telrcv(data, (unsigned char *) buffer, nread); if(result) { keepon = FALSE; break; @@ -1531,6 +1535,11 @@ static CURLcode telnet_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) pfd[1].events = POLLIN; poll_cnt = 2; interval_ms = 1 * 1000; + if(pfd[1].fd < 0) { + failf(data, "cannot read input"); + result = CURLE_RECV_ERROR; + keepon = FALSE; + } } while(keepon) { @@ -1542,11 +1551,11 @@ static CURLcode telnet_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) case 0: /* timeout */ pfd[0].revents = 0; pfd[1].revents = 0; - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); default: /* read! */ if(pfd[0].revents & POLLIN) { /* read data from network */ - result = Curl_read(data, sockfd, buf, data->set.buffer_size, &nread); + result = Curl_xfer_recv(data, buffer, sizeof(buffer), &nread); /* read would've blocked. Loop again */ if(result == CURLE_AGAIN) break; @@ -1572,7 +1581,7 @@ static CURLcode telnet_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) total_dl += nread; result = Curl_pgrsSetDownloadCounter(data, total_dl); if(!result) - result = telrcv(data, (unsigned char *)buf, nread); + result = telrcv(data, (unsigned char *)buffer, nread); if(result) { keepon = FALSE; break; @@ -1590,12 +1599,12 @@ static CURLcode telnet_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) nread = 0; if(poll_cnt == 2) { if(pfd[1].revents & POLLIN) { /* read from in file */ - nread = read(pfd[1].fd, buf, data->set.buffer_size); + nread = read(pfd[1].fd, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); } } else { /* read from user-supplied method */ - nread = (int)data->state.fread_func(buf, 1, data->set.buffer_size, + nread = (int)data->state.fread_func(buffer, 1, sizeof(buffer), data->state.in); if(nread == CURL_READFUNC_ABORT) { keepon = FALSE; @@ -1606,7 +1615,7 @@ static CURLcode telnet_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) } if(nread > 0) { - result = send_telnet_data(data, buf, nread); + result = send_telnet_data(data, buffer, nread); if(result) { keepon = FALSE; break; @@ -1636,7 +1645,7 @@ static CURLcode telnet_do(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) } #endif /* mark this as "no further transfer wanted" */ - Curl_setup_transfer(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); return result; } diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/tftp.c b/vendor/curl/lib/tftp.c index 663015502d..310a0faba7 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/tftp.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/tftp.c @@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static CURLcode tftp_translate_code(tftp_error_t error); */ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_tftp = { - "TFTP", /* scheme */ + "tftp", /* scheme */ tftp_setup_connection, /* setup_connection */ tftp_do, /* do_it */ tftp_done, /* done */ @@ -181,7 +181,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_tftp = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ tftp_disconnect, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_TFTP, /* defport */ @@ -452,8 +453,6 @@ static CURLcode tftp_send_first(struct tftp_state_data *state, if(data->state.upload) { /* If we are uploading, send an WRQ */ setpacketevent(&state->spacket, TFTP_EVENT_WRQ); - state->data->req.upload_fromhere = - (char *)state->spacket.data + 4; if(data->state.infilesize != -1) Curl_pgrsSetUploadSize(data, data->state.infilesize); } @@ -708,6 +707,8 @@ static CURLcode tftp_tx(struct tftp_state_data *state, tftp_event_t event) struct SingleRequest *k = &data->req; size_t cb; /* Bytes currently read */ char buffer[STRERROR_LEN]; + char *bufptr; + bool eos; switch(event) { @@ -771,13 +772,14 @@ static CURLcode tftp_tx(struct tftp_state_data *state, tftp_event_t event) * data block. * */ state->sbytes = 0; - state->data->req.upload_fromhere = (char *)state->spacket.data + 4; + bufptr = (char *)state->spacket.data + 4; do { - result = Curl_fillreadbuffer(data, state->blksize - state->sbytes, &cb); + result = Curl_client_read(data, bufptr, state->blksize - state->sbytes, + &cb, &eos); if(result) return result; state->sbytes += (int)cb; - state->data->req.upload_fromhere += cb; + bufptr += cb; } while(state->sbytes < state->blksize && cb); sbytes = sendto(state->sockfd, (void *) state->spacket.data, @@ -1202,7 +1204,7 @@ static timediff_t tftp_state_timeout(struct Curl_easy *data, state->state = TFTP_STATE_FIN; return 0; } - time(¤t); + current = time(NULL); if(current > state->rx_time + state->retry_time) { if(event) *event = TFTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT; @@ -1240,7 +1242,7 @@ static CURLcode tftp_multi_statemach(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) *done = (state->state == TFTP_STATE_FIN) ? TRUE : FALSE; if(*done) /* Tell curl we're done */ - Curl_setup_transfer(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); } else { /* no timeouts to handle, check our socket */ @@ -1263,7 +1265,7 @@ static CURLcode tftp_multi_statemach(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) *done = (state->state == TFTP_STATE_FIN) ? TRUE : FALSE; if(*done) /* Tell curl we're done */ - Curl_setup_transfer(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); } /* if rc == 0, then select() timed out */ } diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/transfer.c b/vendor/curl/lib/transfer.c index 96f1fde755..744227eb36 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/transfer.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/transfer.c @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ #include "content_encoding.h" #include "hostip.h" #include "cfilters.h" +#include "cw-out.h" #include "transfer.h" #include "sendf.h" #include "speedcheck.h" @@ -114,260 +115,6 @@ char *Curl_checkheaders(const struct Curl_easy *data, } #endif -CURLcode Curl_get_upload_buffer(struct Curl_easy *data) -{ - if(!data->state.ulbuf) { - data->state.ulbuf = malloc(data->set.upload_buffer_size); - if(!data->state.ulbuf) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - } - return CURLE_OK; -} - -#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_HTTP -/* - * This function will be called to loop through the trailers buffer - * until no more data is available for sending. - */ -static size_t trailers_read(char *buffer, size_t size, size_t nitems, - void *raw) -{ - struct Curl_easy *data = (struct Curl_easy *)raw; - struct dynbuf *trailers_buf = &data->state.trailers_buf; - size_t bytes_left = Curl_dyn_len(trailers_buf) - - data->state.trailers_bytes_sent; - size_t to_copy = (size*nitems < bytes_left) ? size*nitems : bytes_left; - if(to_copy) { - memcpy(buffer, - Curl_dyn_ptr(trailers_buf) + data->state.trailers_bytes_sent, - to_copy); - data->state.trailers_bytes_sent += to_copy; - } - return to_copy; -} - -static size_t trailers_left(void *raw) -{ - struct Curl_easy *data = (struct Curl_easy *)raw; - struct dynbuf *trailers_buf = &data->state.trailers_buf; - return Curl_dyn_len(trailers_buf) - data->state.trailers_bytes_sent; -} -#endif - -/* - * This function will call the read callback to fill our buffer with data - * to upload. - */ -CURLcode Curl_fillreadbuffer(struct Curl_easy *data, size_t bytes, - size_t *nreadp) -{ - size_t buffersize = bytes; - size_t nread; - curl_read_callback readfunc = NULL; - void *extra_data = NULL; - int eof_index = 0; - -#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_HTTP - if(data->state.trailers_state == TRAILERS_INITIALIZED) { - struct curl_slist *trailers = NULL; - CURLcode result; - int trailers_ret_code; - - /* at this point we already verified that the callback exists - so we compile and store the trailers buffer, then proceed */ - infof(data, - "Moving trailers state machine from initialized to sending."); - data->state.trailers_state = TRAILERS_SENDING; - Curl_dyn_init(&data->state.trailers_buf, DYN_TRAILERS); - - data->state.trailers_bytes_sent = 0; - Curl_set_in_callback(data, true); - trailers_ret_code = data->set.trailer_callback(&trailers, - data->set.trailer_data); - Curl_set_in_callback(data, false); - if(trailers_ret_code == CURL_TRAILERFUNC_OK) { - result = Curl_http_compile_trailers(trailers, &data->state.trailers_buf, - data); - } - else { - failf(data, "operation aborted by trailing headers callback"); - *nreadp = 0; - result = CURLE_ABORTED_BY_CALLBACK; - } - if(result) { - Curl_dyn_free(&data->state.trailers_buf); - curl_slist_free_all(trailers); - return result; - } - infof(data, "Successfully compiled trailers."); - curl_slist_free_all(trailers); - } -#endif - -#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_HTTP - /* if we are transmitting trailing data, we don't need to write - a chunk size so we skip this */ - if(data->req.upload_chunky && - data->state.trailers_state == TRAILERS_NONE) { - /* if chunked Transfer-Encoding */ - buffersize -= (8 + 2 + 2); /* 32bit hex + CRLF + CRLF */ - data->req.upload_fromhere += (8 + 2); /* 32bit hex + CRLF */ - } - - if(data->state.trailers_state == TRAILERS_SENDING) { - /* if we're here then that means that we already sent the last empty chunk - but we didn't send a final CR LF, so we sent 0 CR LF. We then start - pulling trailing data until we have no more at which point we - simply return to the previous point in the state machine as if - nothing happened. - */ - readfunc = trailers_read; - extra_data = (void *)data; - eof_index = 1; - } - else -#endif - { - readfunc = data->state.fread_func; - extra_data = data->state.in; - } - - if(!data->req.fread_eof[eof_index]) { - Curl_set_in_callback(data, true); - nread = readfunc(data->req.upload_fromhere, 1, buffersize, extra_data); - Curl_set_in_callback(data, false); - /* make sure the callback is not called again after EOF */ - data->req.fread_eof[eof_index] = !nread; - } - else - nread = 0; - - if(nread == CURL_READFUNC_ABORT) { - failf(data, "operation aborted by callback"); - *nreadp = 0; - return CURLE_ABORTED_BY_CALLBACK; - } - if(nread == CURL_READFUNC_PAUSE) { - struct SingleRequest *k = &data->req; - - if(data->conn->handler->flags & PROTOPT_NONETWORK) { - /* protocols that work without network cannot be paused. This is - actually only FILE:// just now, and it can't pause since the transfer - isn't done using the "normal" procedure. */ - failf(data, "Read callback asked for PAUSE when not supported"); - return CURLE_READ_ERROR; - } - - /* CURL_READFUNC_PAUSE pauses read callbacks that feed socket writes */ - k->keepon |= KEEP_SEND_PAUSE; /* mark socket send as paused */ - if(data->req.upload_chunky) { - /* Back out the preallocation done above */ - data->req.upload_fromhere -= (8 + 2); - } - *nreadp = 0; - - return CURLE_OK; /* nothing was read */ - } - else if(nread > buffersize) { - /* the read function returned a too large value */ - *nreadp = 0; - failf(data, "read function returned funny value"); - return CURLE_READ_ERROR; - } - -#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_HTTP - if(!data->req.forbidchunk && data->req.upload_chunky) { - /* if chunked Transfer-Encoding - * build chunk: - * - * CRLF - * CRLF - */ - /* On non-ASCII platforms the may or may not be - translated based on state.prefer_ascii while the protocol - portion must always be translated to the network encoding. - To further complicate matters, line end conversion might be - done later on, so we need to prevent CRLFs from becoming - CRCRLFs if that's the case. To do this we use bare LFs - here, knowing they'll become CRLFs later on. - */ - - bool added_crlf = FALSE; - int hexlen = 0; - const char *endofline_native; - const char *endofline_network; - - if( -#ifdef CURL_DO_LINEEND_CONV - (data->state.prefer_ascii) || -#endif - (data->set.crlf)) { - /* \n will become \r\n later on */ - endofline_native = "\n"; - endofline_network = "\x0a"; - } - else { - endofline_native = "\r\n"; - endofline_network = "\x0d\x0a"; - } - - /* if we're not handling trailing data, proceed as usual */ - if(data->state.trailers_state != TRAILERS_SENDING) { - char hexbuffer[11] = ""; - hexlen = msnprintf(hexbuffer, sizeof(hexbuffer), - "%zx%s", nread, endofline_native); - - /* move buffer pointer */ - data->req.upload_fromhere -= hexlen; - nread += hexlen; - - /* copy the prefix to the buffer, leaving out the NUL */ - memcpy(data->req.upload_fromhere, hexbuffer, hexlen); - - /* always append ASCII CRLF to the data unless - we have a valid trailer callback */ - if((nread-hexlen) == 0 && - data->set.trailer_callback != NULL && - data->state.trailers_state == TRAILERS_NONE) { - data->state.trailers_state = TRAILERS_INITIALIZED; - } - else { - memcpy(data->req.upload_fromhere + nread, - endofline_network, - strlen(endofline_network)); - added_crlf = TRUE; - } - } - - if(data->state.trailers_state == TRAILERS_SENDING && - !trailers_left(data)) { - Curl_dyn_free(&data->state.trailers_buf); - data->state.trailers_state = TRAILERS_DONE; - data->set.trailer_data = NULL; - data->set.trailer_callback = NULL; - /* mark the transfer as done */ - data->req.upload_done = TRUE; - infof(data, "Signaling end of chunked upload after trailers."); - } - else - if((nread - hexlen) == 0 && - data->state.trailers_state != TRAILERS_INITIALIZED) { - /* mark this as done once this chunk is transferred */ - data->req.upload_done = TRUE; - infof(data, - "Signaling end of chunked upload via terminating chunk."); - } - - if(added_crlf) - nread += strlen(endofline_network); /* for the added end of line */ - } -#endif - - *nreadp = nread; - - return CURLE_OK; -} - static int data_pending(struct Curl_easy *data) { struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; @@ -413,321 +160,148 @@ bool Curl_meets_timecondition(struct Curl_easy *data, time_t timeofdoc) return TRUE; } +/** + * Receive raw response data for the transfer. + * @param data the transfer + * @param buf buffer to keep response data received + * @param blen length of `buf` + * @param eos_reliable if EOS detection in underlying connection is reliable + * @param err error code in case of -1 return + * @return number of bytes read or -1 for error + */ +static ssize_t Curl_xfer_recv_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, + char *buf, size_t blen, + bool eos_reliable, + CURLcode *err) +{ + ssize_t nread; + + DEBUGASSERT(blen > 0); + /* If we are reading BODY data and the connection does NOT handle EOF + * and we know the size of the BODY data, limit the read amount */ + if(!eos_reliable && !data->req.header && data->req.size != -1) { + curl_off_t totalleft = data->req.size - data->req.bytecount; + if(totalleft <= 0) + blen = 0; + else if(totalleft < (curl_off_t)blen) + blen = (size_t)totalleft; + } + + if(!blen) { + /* want nothing - continue as if read nothing. */ + DEBUGF(infof(data, "readwrite_data: we're done")); + *err = CURLE_OK; + return 0; + } + + *err = Curl_xfer_recv(data, buf, blen, &nread); + if(*err) + return -1; + DEBUGASSERT(nread >= 0); + return nread; +} + /* * Go ahead and do a read if we have a readable socket or if * the stream was rewound (in which case we have data in a * buffer) - * - * return '*comeback' TRUE if we didn't properly drain the socket so this - * function should get called again without select() or similar in between! */ static CURLcode readwrite_data(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn, struct SingleRequest *k, - int *didwhat, bool *done, - bool *comeback) + int *didwhat) { + struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; - char *buf; - size_t blen; - size_t consumed; - int maxloops = 100; - curl_off_t max_recv = data->set.max_recv_speed? - data->set.max_recv_speed : CURL_OFF_T_MAX; - bool data_eof_handled = FALSE; - - DEBUGASSERT(data->state.buffer); - *done = FALSE; - *comeback = FALSE; + char *buf, *xfer_buf; + size_t blen, xfer_blen; + int maxloops = 10; + curl_off_t total_received = 0; + bool is_multiplex = FALSE; + + result = Curl_multi_xfer_buf_borrow(data, &xfer_buf, &xfer_blen); + if(result) + goto out; /* This is where we loop until we have read everything there is to read or we get a CURLE_AGAIN */ do { - bool is_empty_data = FALSE; - size_t bytestoread = data->set.buffer_size; - /* For HTTP/2 and HTTP/3, read data without caring about the content - length. This is safe because body in HTTP/2 is always segmented - thanks to its framing layer. Meanwhile, we have to call Curl_read - to ensure that http2_handle_stream_close is called when we read all - incoming bytes for a particular stream. */ - bool is_http3 = Curl_conn_is_http3(data, conn, FIRSTSOCKET); - data_eof_handled = is_http3 || Curl_conn_is_http2(data, conn, FIRSTSOCKET); - - /* Each loop iteration starts with a fresh buffer and handles - * all data read into it. */ - buf = data->state.buffer; - blen = 0; - - /* If we are reading BODY data and the connection does NOT handle EOF - * and we know the size of the BODY data, limit the read amount */ - if(!k->header && !data_eof_handled && k->size != -1) { - curl_off_t totalleft = k->size - k->bytecount; - if(totalleft <= 0) - bytestoread = 0; - else if(totalleft < (curl_off_t)bytestoread) - bytestoread = (size_t)totalleft; + bool is_eos = FALSE; + size_t bytestoread; + ssize_t nread; + + if(!is_multiplex) { + /* Multiplexed connection have inherent handling of EOF and we do not + * have to carefully restrict the amount we try to read. + * Multiplexed changes only in one direction. */ + is_multiplex = Curl_conn_is_multiplex(conn, FIRSTSOCKET); } - if(bytestoread) { - /* receive data from the network! */ - ssize_t nread; /* number of bytes read */ - result = Curl_read(data, conn->sockfd, buf, bytestoread, &nread); + buf = xfer_buf; + bytestoread = xfer_blen; + + if(bytestoread && data->set.max_recv_speed) { + /* In case of speed limit on receiving: if this loop already got + * data, break out. If not, limit the amount of bytes to receive. + * The overall, timed, speed limiting is done in multi.c */ + if(total_received) + break; + if((size_t)data->set.max_recv_speed < bytestoread) + bytestoread = (size_t)data->set.max_recv_speed; + } + + nread = Curl_xfer_recv_resp(data, buf, bytestoread, + is_multiplex, &result); + if(nread < 0) { if(CURLE_AGAIN == result) { result = CURLE_OK; break; /* get out of loop */ } - else if(result) - goto out; - DEBUGASSERT(nread >= 0); - blen = (size_t)nread; - } - else { - /* read nothing but since we wanted nothing we consider this an OK - situation to proceed from */ - DEBUGF(infof(data, "readwrite_data: we're done")); - } - - if(!k->bytecount) { - Curl_pgrsTime(data, TIMER_STARTTRANSFER); - if(k->exp100 > EXP100_SEND_DATA) - /* set time stamp to compare with when waiting for the 100 */ - k->start100 = Curl_now(); + goto out; /* real error */ } + /* We only get a 0-length read on EndOfStream */ + blen = (size_t)nread; + is_eos = (blen == 0); *didwhat |= KEEP_RECV; - /* indicates data of zero size, i.e. empty file */ - is_empty_data = ((blen == 0) && (k->bodywrites == 0)) ? TRUE : FALSE; - - if(0 < blen || is_empty_data) { - /* data->state.buffer is allocated 1 byte larger than - * data->set.buffer_size admits. *wink* */ - /* TODO: we should really not rely on this being 0-terminated, since - * the actual data read might contain 0s. */ - buf[blen] = 0; - } if(!blen) { /* if we receive 0 or less here, either the data transfer is done or the server closed the connection and we bail out from this! */ - if(data_eof_handled) + if(is_multiplex) DEBUGF(infof(data, "nread == 0, stream closed, bailing")); else DEBUGF(infof(data, "nread <= 0, server closed connection, bailing")); - k->keepon = 0; /* stop sending as well */ - if(!is_empty_data) - break; - } - - if(conn->handler->readwrite) { - bool readmore = FALSE; /* indicates data is incomplete, need more */ - consumed = 0; - result = conn->handler->readwrite(data, conn, buf, blen, - &consumed, &readmore); - if(result) - goto out; - if(readmore) - break; - buf += consumed; - blen -= consumed; - if(k->download_done) { - /* We've stopped dealing with input, get out of the do-while loop */ - if(blen > 0) { - infof(data, - "Excess found:" - " excess = %zu" - " url = %s (zero-length body)", - blen, data->state.up.path); - } - - /* we make sure that this socket isn't read more now */ - k->keepon &= ~KEEP_RECV; + k->keepon &= ~(KEEP_RECV|KEEP_SEND); /* stop sending as well */ + if(k->eos_written) /* already did write this to client, leave */ break; - } } + total_received += blen; -#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_HTTP - /* Since this is a two-state thing, we check if we are parsing - headers at the moment or not. */ - if(k->header) { - consumed = 0; - result = Curl_http_readwrite_headers(data, conn, buf, blen, &consumed); - if(result) - goto out; - buf += consumed; - blen -= consumed; - - if(conn->handler->readwrite && - (k->maxdownload <= 0 && blen > 0)) { - bool readmore = FALSE; /* indicates data is incomplete, need more */ - consumed = 0; - result = conn->handler->readwrite(data, conn, buf, blen, - &consumed, &readmore); - if(result) - goto out; - if(readmore) - break; - buf += consumed; - blen -= consumed; - } - - if(k->download_done) { - /* We've stopped dealing with input, get out of the do-while loop */ - if(blen > 0) { - infof(data, - "Excess found:" - " excess = %zu" - " url = %s (zero-length body)", - blen, data->state.up.path); - } - - /* we make sure that this socket isn't read more now */ - k->keepon &= ~KEEP_RECV; - break; - } - } -#endif /* CURL_DISABLE_HTTP */ - - - /* This is not an 'else if' since it may be a rest from the header - parsing, where the beginning of the buffer is headers and the end - is non-headers. */ - if(!k->header && (blen > 0 || is_empty_data)) { - - if(data->req.no_body && blen > 0) { - /* data arrives although we want none, bail out */ - streamclose(conn, "ignoring body"); - DEBUGF(infof(data, "did not want a BODY, but seeing %zu bytes", - blen)); - *done = TRUE; - result = CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY; - goto out; - } - -#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_HTTP - if(0 == k->bodywrites && !is_empty_data) { - /* These checks are only made the first time we are about to - write a piece of the body */ - if(conn->handler->protocol&(PROTO_FAMILY_HTTP|CURLPROTO_RTSP)) { - /* HTTP-only checks */ - result = Curl_http_firstwrite(data, conn, done); - if(result || *done) - goto out; - } - } /* this is the first time we write a body part */ -#endif /* CURL_DISABLE_HTTP */ - -#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_HTTP - if(k->chunk) { - /* - * Here comes a chunked transfer flying and we need to decode this - * properly. While the name says read, this function both reads - * and writes away the data. - */ - CURLcode extra; - CHUNKcode res; - - consumed = 0; - res = Curl_httpchunk_read(data, buf, blen, &consumed, &extra); - - if(CHUNKE_OK < res) { - if(CHUNKE_PASSTHRU_ERROR == res) { - failf(data, "Failed reading the chunked-encoded stream"); - result = extra; - goto out; - } - failf(data, "%s in chunked-encoding", Curl_chunked_strerror(res)); - result = CURLE_RECV_ERROR; - goto out; - } - - buf += consumed; - blen -= consumed; - if(CHUNKE_STOP == res) { - /* we're done reading chunks! */ - k->keepon &= ~KEEP_RECV; /* read no more */ - /* chunks read successfully, download is complete */ - k->download_done = TRUE; - - /* N number of bytes at the end of the str buffer that weren't - written to the client. */ - if(conn->chunk.datasize) { - infof(data, "Leftovers after chunking: % " - CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T "u bytes", - conn->chunk.datasize); - } - } - /* If it returned OK, we just keep going */ - } -#endif /* CURL_DISABLE_HTTP */ - - max_recv -= blen; - - if(!k->chunk && (blen || k->badheader || is_empty_data)) { - /* If this is chunky transfer, it was already written */ - - if(k->badheader) { - /* we parsed a piece of data wrongly assuming it was a header - and now we output it as body instead */ - size_t headlen = Curl_dyn_len(&data->state.headerb); - - /* Don't let excess data pollute body writes */ - if(k->maxdownload != -1 && (curl_off_t)headlen > k->maxdownload) - headlen = (size_t)k->maxdownload; - - result = Curl_client_write(data, CLIENTWRITE_BODY, - Curl_dyn_ptr(&data->state.headerb), - headlen); - if(result) - goto out; - } - - if(blen) { -#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_POP3 - if(conn->handler->protocol & PROTO_FAMILY_POP3) { - result = k->ignorebody? CURLE_OK : - Curl_pop3_write(data, buf, blen); - } - else -#endif /* CURL_DISABLE_POP3 */ - result = Curl_client_write(data, CLIENTWRITE_BODY, buf, blen); - } - k->badheader = FALSE; /* taken care of now */ - - if(result) - goto out; - } - - if(k->download_done && !is_http3) { - /* HTTP/3 over QUIC should keep reading until QUIC connection - is closed. In contrast to HTTP/2 which can stop reading - from TCP connection, HTTP/3 over QUIC needs ACK from server - to ensure stream closure. It should keep reading. */ - k->keepon &= ~KEEP_RECV; /* we're done reading */ - } - } /* if(!header and data to read) */ + result = Curl_xfer_write_resp(data, buf, blen, is_eos); + if(result || data->req.done) + goto out; - if(is_empty_data) { - /* if we received nothing, the server closed the connection and we - are done */ - k->keepon &= ~KEEP_RECV; - k->download_done = TRUE; + /* if we are done, we stop receiving. On multiplexed connections, + * we should read the EOS. Which may arrive as meta data after + * the bytes. Not taking it in might lead to RST of streams. */ + if((!is_multiplex && data->req.download_done) || is_eos) { + data->req.keepon &= ~KEEP_RECV; } - - if((k->keepon & KEEP_RECV_PAUSE) || !(k->keepon & KEEP_RECV)) { - /* this is a paused or stopped transfer */ + /* if we are PAUSEd or stopped receiving, leave the loop */ + if((k->keepon & KEEP_RECV_PAUSE) || !(k->keepon & KEEP_RECV)) break; - } - } while((max_recv > 0) && data_pending(data) && maxloops--); + } while(maxloops-- && data_pending(data)); - if(maxloops <= 0 || max_recv <= 0) { - /* we mark it as read-again-please */ - data->state.dselect_bits = CURL_CSELECT_IN; - *comeback = TRUE; + if(maxloops <= 0) { + /* did not read until EAGAIN, mark read-again-please */ + data->state.select_bits = CURL_CSELECT_IN; + if((k->keepon & KEEP_SENDBITS) == KEEP_SEND) + data->state.select_bits |= CURL_CSELECT_OUT; } if(((k->keepon & (KEEP_RECV|KEEP_SEND)) == KEEP_SEND) && - (conn->bits.close || data_eof_handled)) { + (conn->bits.close || is_multiplex)) { /* When we've read the entire thing and the close bit is set, the server may now close the connection. If there's now any kind of sending going on from our side, we need to stop that immediately. */ @@ -737,22 +311,12 @@ static CURLcode readwrite_data(struct Curl_easy *data, } out: + Curl_multi_xfer_buf_release(data, xfer_buf); if(result) DEBUGF(infof(data, "readwrite_data() -> %d", result)); return result; } -CURLcode Curl_done_sending(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct SingleRequest *k) -{ - k->keepon &= ~KEEP_SEND; /* we're done writing */ - - /* These functions should be moved into the handler struct! */ - Curl_conn_ev_data_done_send(data); - - return CURLE_OK; -} - #if defined(_WIN32) && defined(USE_WINSOCK) #ifndef SIO_IDEAL_SEND_BACKLOG_QUERY #define SIO_IDEAL_SEND_BACKLOG_QUERY 0x4004747B @@ -775,245 +339,42 @@ static void win_update_buffer_size(curl_socket_t sockfd) #endif #define curl_upload_refill_watermark(data) \ - ((ssize_t)((data)->set.upload_buffer_size >> 5)) + ((size_t)((data)->set.upload_buffer_size >> 5)) /* * Send data to upload to the server, when the socket is writable. */ -static CURLcode readwrite_upload(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn, - int *didwhat) +static CURLcode readwrite_upload(struct Curl_easy *data, int *didwhat) { - ssize_t i, si; - ssize_t bytes_written; - CURLcode result; - ssize_t nread; /* number of bytes read */ - bool sending_http_headers = FALSE; - struct SingleRequest *k = &data->req; - - *didwhat |= KEEP_SEND; - - do { - curl_off_t nbody; - ssize_t offset = 0; - - if(0 != k->upload_present && - k->upload_present < curl_upload_refill_watermark(data) && - !k->upload_chunky &&/*(variable sized chunked header; append not safe)*/ - !k->upload_done && /*!(k->upload_done once k->upload_present sent)*/ - !(k->writebytecount + k->upload_present - k->pendingheader == - data->state.infilesize)) { - offset = k->upload_present; - } - - /* only read more data if there's no upload data already - present in the upload buffer, or if appending to upload buffer */ - if(0 == k->upload_present || offset) { - result = Curl_get_upload_buffer(data); - if(result) - return result; - if(offset && k->upload_fromhere != data->state.ulbuf) - memmove(data->state.ulbuf, k->upload_fromhere, offset); - /* init the "upload from here" pointer */ - k->upload_fromhere = data->state.ulbuf; - - if(!k->upload_done) { - /* HTTP pollution, this should be written nicer to become more - protocol agnostic. */ - size_t fillcount; - struct HTTP *http = k->p.http; - - if((k->exp100 == EXP100_SENDING_REQUEST) && - (http->sending == HTTPSEND_BODY)) { - /* If this call is to send body data, we must take some action: - We have sent off the full HTTP 1.1 request, and we shall now - go into the Expect: 100 state and await such a header */ - k->exp100 = EXP100_AWAITING_CONTINUE; /* wait for the header */ - k->keepon &= ~KEEP_SEND; /* disable writing */ - k->start100 = Curl_now(); /* timeout count starts now */ - *didwhat &= ~KEEP_SEND; /* we didn't write anything actually */ - /* set a timeout for the multi interface */ - Curl_expire(data, data->set.expect_100_timeout, EXPIRE_100_TIMEOUT); - break; - } - - if(conn->handler->protocol&(PROTO_FAMILY_HTTP|CURLPROTO_RTSP)) { - if(http->sending == HTTPSEND_REQUEST) - /* We're sending the HTTP request headers, not the data. - Remember that so we don't change the line endings. */ - sending_http_headers = TRUE; - else - sending_http_headers = FALSE; - } - - k->upload_fromhere += offset; - result = Curl_fillreadbuffer(data, data->set.upload_buffer_size-offset, - &fillcount); - k->upload_fromhere -= offset; - if(result) - return result; - - nread = offset + fillcount; - } - else - nread = 0; /* we're done uploading/reading */ - - if(!nread && (k->keepon & KEEP_SEND_PAUSE)) { - /* this is a paused transfer */ - break; - } - if(nread <= 0) { - result = Curl_done_sending(data, k); - if(result) - return result; - break; - } - - /* store number of bytes available for upload */ - k->upload_present = nread; - - /* convert LF to CRLF if so asked */ - if((!sending_http_headers) && ( -#ifdef CURL_DO_LINEEND_CONV - /* always convert if we're FTPing in ASCII mode */ - (data->state.prefer_ascii) || -#endif - (data->set.crlf))) { - /* Do we need to allocate a scratch buffer? */ - if(!data->state.scratch) { - data->state.scratch = malloc(2 * data->set.upload_buffer_size); - if(!data->state.scratch) { - failf(data, "Failed to alloc scratch buffer"); - - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - } - } - - /* - * ASCII/EBCDIC Note: This is presumably a text (not binary) - * transfer so the data should already be in ASCII. - * That means the hex values for ASCII CR (0x0d) & LF (0x0a) - * must be used instead of the escape sequences \r & \n. - */ - if(offset) - memcpy(data->state.scratch, k->upload_fromhere, offset); - for(i = offset, si = offset; i < nread; i++, si++) { - if(k->upload_fromhere[i] == 0x0a) { - data->state.scratch[si++] = 0x0d; - data->state.scratch[si] = 0x0a; - if(!data->set.crlf) { - /* we're here only because FTP is in ASCII mode... - bump infilesize for the LF we just added */ - if(data->state.infilesize != -1) - data->state.infilesize++; - } - } - else - data->state.scratch[si] = k->upload_fromhere[i]; - } - - if(si != nread) { - /* only perform the special operation if we really did replace - anything */ - nread = si; - - /* upload from the new (replaced) buffer instead */ - k->upload_fromhere = data->state.scratch; + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; - /* set the new amount too */ - k->upload_present = nread; - } - } + if((data->req.keepon & KEEP_SEND_PAUSE)) + return CURLE_OK; -#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_SMTP - if(conn->handler->protocol & PROTO_FAMILY_SMTP) { - result = Curl_smtp_escape_eob(data, nread, offset); - if(result) - return result; - } -#endif /* CURL_DISABLE_SMTP */ - } /* if 0 == k->upload_present or appended to upload buffer */ - else { - /* We have a partial buffer left from a previous "round". Use - that instead of reading more data */ - } + /* We should not get here when the sending is already done. It + * probably means that someone set `data-req.keepon |= KEEP_SEND` + * when it should not. */ + DEBUGASSERT(!Curl_req_done_sending(data)); - /* write to socket (send away data) */ - result = Curl_write(data, - conn->writesockfd, /* socket to send to */ - k->upload_fromhere, /* buffer pointer */ - k->upload_present, /* buffer size */ - &bytes_written); /* actually sent */ + if(!Curl_req_done_sending(data)) { + *didwhat |= KEEP_SEND; + result = Curl_req_send_more(data); if(result) return result; #if defined(_WIN32) && defined(USE_WINSOCK) + /* FIXME: this looks like it would fit better into cf-socket.c + * but then I do not know enough Windows to say... */ { struct curltime n = Curl_now(); - if(Curl_timediff(n, k->last_sndbuf_update) > 1000) { - win_update_buffer_size(conn->writesockfd); - k->last_sndbuf_update = n; + if(Curl_timediff(n, data->conn->last_sndbuf_update) > 1000) { + win_update_buffer_size(data->conn->writesockfd); + data->conn->last_sndbuf_update = n; } } #endif - - if(k->pendingheader) { - /* parts of what was sent was header */ - curl_off_t n = CURLMIN(k->pendingheader, bytes_written); - /* show the data before we change the pointer upload_fromhere */ - Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_HEADER_OUT, k->upload_fromhere, (size_t)n); - k->pendingheader -= n; - nbody = bytes_written - n; /* size of the written body part */ - } - else - nbody = bytes_written; - - if(nbody) { - /* show the data before we change the pointer upload_fromhere */ - Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_DATA_OUT, - &k->upload_fromhere[bytes_written - nbody], - (size_t)nbody); - - k->writebytecount += nbody; - Curl_pgrsSetUploadCounter(data, k->writebytecount); - } - - if((!k->upload_chunky || k->forbidchunk) && - (k->writebytecount == data->state.infilesize)) { - /* we have sent all data we were supposed to */ - k->upload_done = TRUE; - infof(data, "We are completely uploaded and fine"); - } - - if(k->upload_present != bytes_written) { - /* we only wrote a part of the buffer (if anything), deal with it! */ - - /* store the amount of bytes left in the buffer to write */ - k->upload_present -= bytes_written; - - /* advance the pointer where to find the buffer when the next send - is to happen */ - k->upload_fromhere += bytes_written; - } - else { - /* we've uploaded that buffer now */ - result = Curl_get_upload_buffer(data); - if(result) - return result; - k->upload_fromhere = data->state.ulbuf; - k->upload_present = 0; /* no more bytes left */ - - if(k->upload_done) { - result = Curl_done_sending(data, k); - if(result) - return result; - } - } - - - } while(0); /* just to break out from! */ - - return CURLE_OK; + } + return result; } static int select_bits_paused(struct Curl_easy *data, int select_bits) @@ -1023,46 +384,48 @@ static int select_bits_paused(struct Curl_easy *data, int select_bits) * of our state machine are handling PAUSED transfers correctly. So, we * do not want to go there. * NOTE: we are only interested in PAUSE, not HOLD. */ - return (((select_bits & CURL_CSELECT_IN) && - (data->req.keepon & KEEP_RECV_PAUSE)) || - ((select_bits & CURL_CSELECT_OUT) && - (data->req.keepon & KEEP_SEND_PAUSE))); + + /* if there is data in a direction not paused, return false */ + if(((select_bits & CURL_CSELECT_IN) && + !(data->req.keepon & KEEP_RECV_PAUSE)) || + ((select_bits & CURL_CSELECT_OUT) && + !(data->req.keepon & KEEP_SEND_PAUSE))) + return FALSE; + + return (data->req.keepon & (KEEP_RECV_PAUSE|KEEP_SEND_PAUSE)); } /* * Curl_readwrite() is the low-level function to be called when data is to * be read and written to/from the connection. - * - * return '*comeback' TRUE if we didn't properly drain the socket so this - * function should get called again without select() or similar in between! */ -CURLcode Curl_readwrite(struct connectdata *conn, - struct Curl_easy *data, - bool *done, - bool *comeback) +CURLcode Curl_readwrite(struct Curl_easy *data) { + struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; struct SingleRequest *k = &data->req; CURLcode result; struct curltime now; int didwhat = 0; int select_bits; - if(data->state.dselect_bits) { - if(select_bits_paused(data, data->state.dselect_bits)) { + /* Check if client writes had been paused and can resume now. */ + if(!(k->keepon & KEEP_RECV_PAUSE) && Curl_cwriter_is_paused(data)) { + Curl_conn_ev_data_pause(data, FALSE); + result = Curl_cwriter_unpause(data); + if(result) + goto out; + } + + if(data->state.select_bits) { + if(select_bits_paused(data, data->state.select_bits)) { /* leave the bits unchanged, so they'll tell us what to do when * this transfer gets unpaused. */ - DEBUGF(infof(data, "readwrite, dselect_bits, early return on PAUSED")); + DEBUGF(infof(data, "readwrite, select_bits, early return on PAUSED")); result = CURLE_OK; goto out; } - select_bits = data->state.dselect_bits; - data->state.dselect_bits = 0; - } - else if(conn->cselect_bits) { - /* CAVEAT: adding `select_bits_paused()` check here makes test640 hang - * (among others). Which hints at strange state handling in FTP land... */ - select_bits = conn->cselect_bits; - conn->cselect_bits = 0; + select_bits = data->state.select_bits; + data->state.select_bits = 0; } else { curl_socket_t fd_read; @@ -1090,8 +453,8 @@ CURLcode Curl_readwrite(struct connectdata *conn, #ifdef USE_HYPER if(conn->datastream) { - result = conn->datastream(data, conn, &didwhat, done, select_bits); - if(result || *done) + result = conn->datastream(data, conn, &didwhat, select_bits); + if(result || data->req.done) goto out; } else { @@ -1100,16 +463,17 @@ CURLcode Curl_readwrite(struct connectdata *conn, the stream was rewound (in which case we have data in a buffer) */ if((k->keepon & KEEP_RECV) && (select_bits & CURL_CSELECT_IN)) { - result = readwrite_data(data, conn, k, &didwhat, done, comeback); - if(result || *done) + result = readwrite_data(data, k, &didwhat); + if(result || data->req.done) goto out; } /* If we still have writing to do, we check if we have a writable socket. */ - if((k->keepon & KEEP_SEND) && (select_bits & CURL_CSELECT_OUT)) { + if(((k->keepon & KEEP_SEND) && (select_bits & CURL_CSELECT_OUT)) || + (k->keepon & KEEP_SEND_TIMED)) { /* write */ - result = readwrite_upload(data, conn, &didwhat); + result = readwrite_upload(data, &didwhat); if(result) goto out; } @@ -1119,31 +483,6 @@ CURLcode Curl_readwrite(struct connectdata *conn, now = Curl_now(); if(!didwhat) { - /* no read no write, this is a timeout? */ - if(k->exp100 == EXP100_AWAITING_CONTINUE) { - /* This should allow some time for the header to arrive, but only a - very short time as otherwise it'll be too much wasted time too - often. */ - - /* Quoting RFC2616, section "8.2.3 Use of the 100 (Continue) Status": - - Therefore, when a client sends this header field to an origin server - (possibly via a proxy) from which it has never seen a 100 (Continue) - status, the client SHOULD NOT wait for an indefinite period before - sending the request body. - - */ - - timediff_t ms = Curl_timediff(now, k->start100); - if(ms >= data->set.expect_100_timeout) { - /* we've waited long enough, continue anyway */ - k->exp100 = EXP100_SEND_DATA; - k->keepon |= KEEP_SEND; - Curl_expire_done(data, EXPIRE_100_TIMEOUT); - infof(data, "Done waiting for 100-continue"); - } - } - result = Curl_conn_ev_data_idle(data); if(result) goto out; @@ -1180,7 +519,6 @@ CURLcode Curl_readwrite(struct connectdata *conn, * The transfer has been performed. Just make some general checks before * returning. */ - if(!(data->req.no_body) && (k->size != -1) && (k->bytecount != k->size) && #ifdef CURL_DO_LINEEND_CONV @@ -1196,81 +534,22 @@ CURLcode Curl_readwrite(struct connectdata *conn, result = CURLE_PARTIAL_FILE; goto out; } - if(!(data->req.no_body) && k->chunk && - (conn->chunk.state != CHUNK_STOP)) { - /* - * In chunked mode, return an error if the connection is closed prior to - * the empty (terminating) chunk is read. - * - * The condition above used to check for - * conn->proto.http->chunk.datasize != 0 which is true after reading - * *any* chunk, not just the empty chunk. - * - */ - failf(data, "transfer closed with outstanding read data remaining"); - result = CURLE_PARTIAL_FILE; - goto out; - } if(Curl_pgrsUpdate(data)) { result = CURLE_ABORTED_BY_CALLBACK; goto out; } } - /* Now update the "done" boolean we return */ - *done = (0 == (k->keepon&(KEEP_RECVBITS|KEEP_SENDBITS))) ? TRUE : FALSE; + /* If there is nothing more to send/recv, the request is done */ + if(0 == (k->keepon&(KEEP_RECVBITS|KEEP_SENDBITS))) + data->req.done = TRUE; + out: if(result) DEBUGF(infof(data, "Curl_readwrite() -> %d", result)); return result; } -/* - * Curl_single_getsock() gets called by the multi interface code when the app - * has requested to get the sockets for the current connection. This function - * will then be called once for every connection that the multi interface - * keeps track of. This function will only be called for connections that are - * in the proper state to have this information available. - */ -int Curl_single_getsock(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn, - curl_socket_t *sock) -{ - int bitmap = GETSOCK_BLANK; - unsigned sockindex = 0; - - if(conn->handler->perform_getsock) - return conn->handler->perform_getsock(data, conn, sock); - - /* don't include HOLD and PAUSE connections */ - if((data->req.keepon & KEEP_RECVBITS) == KEEP_RECV) { - - DEBUGASSERT(conn->sockfd != CURL_SOCKET_BAD); - - bitmap |= GETSOCK_READSOCK(sockindex); - sock[sockindex] = conn->sockfd; - } - - /* don't include HOLD and PAUSE connections */ - if((data->req.keepon & KEEP_SENDBITS) == KEEP_SEND) { - if((conn->sockfd != conn->writesockfd) || - bitmap == GETSOCK_BLANK) { - /* only if they are not the same socket and we have a readable - one, we increase index */ - if(bitmap != GETSOCK_BLANK) - sockindex++; /* increase index if we need two entries */ - - DEBUGASSERT(conn->writesockfd != CURL_SOCKET_BAD); - - sock[sockindex] = conn->writesockfd; - } - - bitmap |= GETSOCK_WRITESOCK(sockindex); - } - - return bitmap; -} - /* Curl_init_CONNECT() gets called each time the handle switches to CONNECT which means this gets called once for each subsequent redirect etc */ void Curl_init_CONNECT(struct Curl_easy *data) @@ -1433,12 +712,14 @@ CURLcode Curl_pretransfer(struct Curl_easy *data) if(!result) result = Curl_setstropt(&data->state.aptr.passwd, data->set.str[STRING_PASSWORD]); +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY if(!result) result = Curl_setstropt(&data->state.aptr.proxyuser, data->set.str[STRING_PROXYUSERNAME]); if(!result) result = Curl_setstropt(&data->state.aptr.proxypasswd, data->set.str[STRING_PROXYPASSWORD]); +#endif data->req.headerbytecount = 0; Curl_headers_cleanup(data); @@ -1639,7 +920,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_follow(struct Curl_easy *data, data->state.url = newurl; data->state.url_alloc = TRUE; - + Curl_req_soft_reset(&data->req, data); infof(data, "Issue another request to this URL: '%s'", data->state.url); /* @@ -1685,6 +966,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_follow(struct Curl_easy *data, && !(data->set.keep_post & CURL_REDIR_POST_301)) { infof(data, "Switch from POST to GET"); data->state.httpreq = HTTPREQ_GET; + Curl_creader_set_rewind(data, FALSE); } break; case 302: /* Found */ @@ -1710,6 +992,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_follow(struct Curl_easy *data, && !(data->set.keep_post & CURL_REDIR_POST_302)) { infof(data, "Switch from POST to GET"); data->state.httpreq = HTTPREQ_GET; + Curl_creader_set_rewind(data, FALSE); } break; @@ -1812,23 +1095,16 @@ CURLcode Curl_retry_request(struct Curl_easy *data, char **url) prevent i.e HTTP transfers to return error just because nothing has been transferred! */ - - - if((conn->handler->protocol&PROTO_FAMILY_HTTP) && - data->req.writebytecount) { - data->state.rewindbeforesend = TRUE; - infof(data, "state.rewindbeforesend = TRUE"); - } + Curl_creader_set_rewind(data, TRUE); } return CURLE_OK; } /* - * Curl_setup_transfer() is called to setup some basic properties for the + * Curl_xfer_setup() is called to setup some basic properties for the * upcoming transfer. */ -void -Curl_setup_transfer( +void Curl_xfer_setup( struct Curl_easy *data, /* transfer */ int sockindex, /* socket index to read from or -1 */ curl_off_t size, /* -1 if unknown at this point */ @@ -1839,22 +1115,19 @@ Curl_setup_transfer( { struct SingleRequest *k = &data->req; struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; - struct HTTP *http = data->req.p.http; - bool httpsending; + bool want_send = Curl_req_want_send(data); DEBUGASSERT(conn != NULL); DEBUGASSERT((sockindex <= 1) && (sockindex >= -1)); + DEBUGASSERT((writesockindex <= 1) && (writesockindex >= -1)); - httpsending = ((conn->handler->protocol&PROTO_FAMILY_HTTP) && - (http->sending == HTTPSEND_REQUEST)); - - if(conn->bits.multiplex || conn->httpversion >= 20 || httpsending) { + if(conn->bits.multiplex || conn->httpversion >= 20 || want_send) { /* when multiplexing, the read/write sockets need to be the same! */ conn->sockfd = sockindex == -1 ? ((writesockindex == -1 ? CURL_SOCKET_BAD : conn->sock[writesockindex])) : conn->sock[sockindex]; conn->writesockfd = conn->sockfd; - if(httpsending) + if(want_send) /* special and very HTTP-specific */ writesockindex = FIRSTSOCKET; } @@ -1883,37 +1156,123 @@ Curl_setup_transfer( if(sockindex != -1) k->keepon |= KEEP_RECV; - if(writesockindex != -1) { - /* HTTP 1.1 magic: - - Even if we require a 100-return code before uploading data, we might - need to write data before that since the REQUEST may not have been - finished sent off just yet. - - Thus, we must check if the request has been sent before we set the - state info where we wait for the 100-return code - */ - if((data->state.expect100header) && - (conn->handler->protocol&PROTO_FAMILY_HTTP) && - (http->sending == HTTPSEND_BODY)) { - /* wait with write until we either got 100-continue or a timeout */ - k->exp100 = EXP100_AWAITING_CONTINUE; - k->start100 = Curl_now(); - - /* Set a timeout for the multi interface. Add the inaccuracy margin so - that we don't fire slightly too early and get denied to run. */ - Curl_expire(data, data->set.expect_100_timeout, EXPIRE_100_TIMEOUT); - } - else { - if(data->state.expect100header) - /* when we've sent off the rest of the headers, we must await a - 100-continue but first finish sending the request */ - k->exp100 = EXP100_SENDING_REQUEST; + if(writesockindex != -1) + k->keepon |= KEEP_SEND; + } /* if(k->getheader || !data->req.no_body) */ + +} - /* enable the write bit when we're not waiting for continue */ - k->keepon |= KEEP_SEND; +CURLcode Curl_xfer_write_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *buf, size_t blen, + bool is_eos) +{ + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + + if(data->conn->handler->write_resp) { + /* protocol handlers offering this function take full responsibility + * for writing all received download data to the client. */ + result = data->conn->handler->write_resp(data, buf, blen, is_eos); + } + else { + /* No special handling by protocol handler, write all received data + * as BODY to the client. */ + if(blen || is_eos) { + int cwtype = CLIENTWRITE_BODY; + if(is_eos) + cwtype |= CLIENTWRITE_EOS; + +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_POP3 + if(blen && data->conn->handler->protocol & PROTO_FAMILY_POP3) { + result = data->req.ignorebody? CURLE_OK : + Curl_pop3_write(data, buf, blen); } - } /* if(writesockindex != -1) */ - } /* if(k->getheader || !data->req.no_body) */ + else +#endif /* CURL_DISABLE_POP3 */ + result = Curl_client_write(data, cwtype, buf, blen); + } + } + + if(!result && is_eos) { + /* If we wrote the EOS, we are definitely done */ + data->req.eos_written = TRUE; + data->req.download_done = TRUE; + } + CURL_TRC_WRITE(data, "xfer_write_resp(len=%zu, eos=%d) -> %d", + blen, is_eos, result); + return result; +} + +CURLcode Curl_xfer_write_resp_hd(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *hd0, size_t hdlen, bool is_eos) +{ + if(data->conn->handler->write_resp_hd) { + /* protocol handlers offering this function take full responsibility + * for writing all received download data to the client. */ + return data->conn->handler->write_resp_hd(data, hd0, hdlen, is_eos); + } + /* No special handling by protocol handler, write as response bytes */ + return Curl_xfer_write_resp(data, hd0, hdlen, is_eos); +} + +CURLcode Curl_xfer_write_done(struct Curl_easy *data, bool premature) +{ + (void)premature; + return Curl_cw_out_done(data); +} + +CURLcode Curl_xfer_send(struct Curl_easy *data, + const void *buf, size_t blen, + size_t *pnwritten) +{ + CURLcode result; + int sockindex; + + if(!data || !data->conn) + return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + /* FIXME: would like to enable this, but some protocols (MQTT) do not + * setup the transfer correctly, it seems + if(data->conn->writesockfd == CURL_SOCKET_BAD) { + failf(data, "transfer not setup for sending"); + DEBUGASSERT(0); + return CURLE_SEND_ERROR; + } */ + sockindex = ((data->conn->writesockfd != CURL_SOCKET_BAD) && + (data->conn->writesockfd == data->conn->sock[SECONDARYSOCKET])); + result = Curl_conn_send(data, sockindex, buf, blen, pnwritten); + if(result == CURLE_AGAIN) { + result = CURLE_OK; + *pnwritten = 0; + } + else if(!result && *pnwritten) + data->info.request_size += *pnwritten; + return result; +} + +CURLcode Curl_xfer_recv(struct Curl_easy *data, + char *buf, size_t blen, + ssize_t *pnrcvd) +{ + int sockindex; + + if(!data || !data->conn) + return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + /* FIXME: would like to enable this, but some protocols (MQTT) do not + * setup the transfer correctly, it seems + if(data->conn->sockfd == CURL_SOCKET_BAD) { + failf(data, "transfer not setup for receiving"); + DEBUGASSERT(0); + return CURLE_RECV_ERROR; + } */ + sockindex = ((data->conn->sockfd != CURL_SOCKET_BAD) && + (data->conn->sockfd == data->conn->sock[SECONDARYSOCKET])); + if(data->set.buffer_size > 0 && (size_t)data->set.buffer_size < blen) + blen = (size_t)data->set.buffer_size; + return Curl_conn_recv(data, sockindex, buf, blen, pnrcvd); +} + +CURLcode Curl_xfer_send_close(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + Curl_conn_ev_data_done_send(data); + return CURLE_OK; } diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/transfer.h b/vendor/curl/lib/transfer.h index 536ac249b7..ad0f3a20cc 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/transfer.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/transfer.h @@ -45,23 +45,39 @@ typedef enum { CURLcode Curl_follow(struct Curl_easy *data, char *newurl, followtype type); -CURLcode Curl_readwrite(struct connectdata *conn, - struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done, - bool *comeback); +CURLcode Curl_readwrite(struct Curl_easy *data); int Curl_single_getsock(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, curl_socket_t *socks); -CURLcode Curl_fillreadbuffer(struct Curl_easy *data, size_t bytes, - size_t *nreadp); CURLcode Curl_retry_request(struct Curl_easy *data, char **url); bool Curl_meets_timecondition(struct Curl_easy *data, time_t timeofdoc); -CURLcode Curl_get_upload_buffer(struct Curl_easy *data); -CURLcode Curl_done_sending(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct SingleRequest *k); +/** + * Write the transfer raw response bytes, as received from the connection. + * Will handle all passed bytes or return an error. By default, this will + * write the bytes as BODY to the client. Protocols may provide a + * "write_resp" callback in their handler to add specific treatment. E.g. + * HTTP parses response headers and passes them differently to the client. + * @param data the transfer + * @param buf the raw response bytes + * @param blen the amount of bytes in `buf` + * @param is_eos TRUE iff the connection indicates this to be the last + * bytes of the response + */ +CURLcode Curl_xfer_write_resp(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *buf, size_t blen, + bool is_eos); + +/** + * Write a single "header" line from a server response. + * @param hd0 the 0-terminated, single header line + * @param hdlen the length of the header line + * @param is_eos TRUE iff this is the end of the response + */ +CURLcode Curl_xfer_write_resp_hd(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *hd0, size_t hdlen, bool is_eos); /* This sets up a forthcoming transfer */ -void -Curl_setup_transfer (struct Curl_easy *data, +void Curl_xfer_setup(struct Curl_easy *data, int sockindex, /* socket index to read from or -1 */ curl_off_t size, /* -1 if unknown at this point */ bool getheader, /* TRUE if header parsing is wanted */ @@ -70,4 +86,30 @@ Curl_setup_transfer (struct Curl_easy *data, disables */ ); +/** + * Multi has set transfer to DONE. Last chance to trigger + * missing response things like writing an EOS to the client. + */ +CURLcode Curl_xfer_write_done(struct Curl_easy *data, bool premature); + +/** + * Send data on the socket/connection filter designated + * for transfer's outgoing data. + * Will return CURLE_OK on blocking with (*pnwritten == 0). + */ +CURLcode Curl_xfer_send(struct Curl_easy *data, + const void *buf, size_t blen, + size_t *pnwritten); + +/** + * Receive data on the socket/connection filter designated + * for transfer's incoming data. + * Will return CURLE_AGAIN on blocking with (*pnrcvd == 0). + */ +CURLcode Curl_xfer_recv(struct Curl_easy *data, + char *buf, size_t blen, + ssize_t *pnrcvd); + +CURLcode Curl_xfer_send_close(struct Curl_easy *data); + #endif /* HEADER_CURL_TRANSFER_H */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/url.c b/vendor/curl/lib/url.c index b81785fe2e..2814d31ad9 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/url.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/url.c @@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_close(struct Curl_easy **datap) free(data->state.range); /* freed here just in case DONE wasn't called */ - Curl_free_request_state(data); + Curl_req_free(&data->req, data); /* Close down all open SSL info and sessions */ Curl_ssl_close_all(data); @@ -269,10 +269,6 @@ CURLcode Curl_close(struct Curl_easy **datap) Curl_safefree(data->state.scratch); Curl_ssl_free_certinfo(data); - /* Cleanup possible redirect junk */ - free(data->req.newurl); - data->req.newurl = NULL; - if(data->state.referer_alloc) { Curl_safefree(data->state.referer); data->state.referer_alloc = FALSE; @@ -280,14 +276,14 @@ CURLcode Curl_close(struct Curl_easy **datap) data->state.referer = NULL; up_free(data); - Curl_safefree(data->state.buffer); Curl_dyn_free(&data->state.headerb); - Curl_safefree(data->state.ulbuf); Curl_flush_cookies(data, TRUE); +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_ALTSVC Curl_altsvc_save(data, data->asi, data->set.str[STRING_ALTSVC]); Curl_altsvc_cleanup(&data->asi); - Curl_hsts_save(data, data->hsts, data->set.str[STRING_HSTS]); +#endif #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_HSTS + Curl_hsts_save(data, data->hsts, data->set.str[STRING_HSTS]); if(!data->share || !data->share->hsts) Curl_hsts_cleanup(&data->hsts); curl_slist_free_all(data->state.hstslist); /* clean up list */ @@ -298,6 +294,10 @@ CURLcode Curl_close(struct Curl_easy **datap) Curl_safefree(data->info.contenttype); Curl_safefree(data->info.wouldredirect); + /* this destroys the channel and we cannot use it anymore after this */ + Curl_resolver_cancel(data); + Curl_resolver_cleanup(data->state.async.resolver); + data_priority_cleanup(data); /* No longer a dirty share, if it exists */ @@ -307,7 +307,9 @@ CURLcode Curl_close(struct Curl_easy **datap) Curl_share_unlock(data, CURL_LOCK_DATA_SHARE); } +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY Curl_safefree(data->state.aptr.proxyuserpwd); +#endif Curl_safefree(data->state.aptr.uagent); Curl_safefree(data->state.aptr.userpwd); Curl_safefree(data->state.aptr.accept_encoding); @@ -315,23 +317,20 @@ CURLcode Curl_close(struct Curl_easy **datap) Curl_safefree(data->state.aptr.rangeline); Curl_safefree(data->state.aptr.ref); Curl_safefree(data->state.aptr.host); +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_COOKIES Curl_safefree(data->state.aptr.cookiehost); +#endif +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_RTSP Curl_safefree(data->state.aptr.rtsp_transport); +#endif Curl_safefree(data->state.aptr.user); Curl_safefree(data->state.aptr.passwd); +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY Curl_safefree(data->state.aptr.proxyuser); Curl_safefree(data->state.aptr.proxypasswd); - -#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_DOH - if(data->req.doh) { - Curl_dyn_free(&data->req.doh->probe[0].serverdoh); - Curl_dyn_free(&data->req.doh->probe[1].serverdoh); - curl_slist_free_all(data->req.doh->headers); - Curl_safefree(data->req.doh); - } #endif -#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_HTTP +#if !defined(CURL_DISABLE_HTTP) && !defined(CURL_DISABLE_FORM_API) Curl_mime_cleanpart(data->state.formp); Curl_safefree(data->state.formp); #endif @@ -364,7 +363,6 @@ CURLcode Curl_init_userdefined(struct Curl_easy *data) set->fread_func_set = (curl_read_callback)fread; set->is_fread_set = 0; - set->seek_func = ZERO_NULL; set->seek_client = ZERO_NULL; set->filesize = -1; /* we don't know the size */ @@ -430,29 +428,33 @@ CURLcode Curl_init_userdefined(struct Curl_easy *data) /* Set the default CA cert bundle/path detected/specified at build time. * - * If Schannel is the selected SSL backend then these locations are - * ignored. We allow setting CA location for schannel only when explicitly - * specified by the user via CURLOPT_CAINFO / --cacert. + * If Schannel or SecureTransport is the selected SSL backend then these + * locations are ignored. We allow setting CA location for schannel and + * securetransport when explicitly specified by the user via + * CURLOPT_CAINFO / --cacert. */ - if(Curl_ssl_backend() != CURLSSLBACKEND_SCHANNEL) { + if(Curl_ssl_backend() != CURLSSLBACKEND_SCHANNEL && + Curl_ssl_backend() != CURLSSLBACKEND_SECURETRANSPORT) { #if defined(CURL_CA_BUNDLE) result = Curl_setstropt(&set->str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE], CURL_CA_BUNDLE); if(result) return result; - +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY result = Curl_setstropt(&set->str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE_PROXY], CURL_CA_BUNDLE); if(result) return result; #endif +#endif #if defined(CURL_CA_PATH) result = Curl_setstropt(&set->str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH], CURL_CA_PATH); if(result) return result; - +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY result = Curl_setstropt(&set->str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH_PROXY], CURL_CA_PATH); if(result) return result; +#endif #endif } @@ -514,6 +516,16 @@ CURLcode Curl_open(struct Curl_easy **curl) data->magic = CURLEASY_MAGIC_NUMBER; + Curl_req_init(&data->req); + + result = Curl_resolver_init(data, &data->state.async.resolver); + if(result) { + DEBUGF(fprintf(stderr, "Error: resolver_init failed\n")); + Curl_req_free(&data->req, data); + free(data); + return result; + } + result = Curl_init_userdefined(data); if(!result) { Curl_dyn_init(&data->state.headerb, CURL_MAX_HTTP_HEADER); @@ -530,8 +542,10 @@ CURLcode Curl_open(struct Curl_easy **curl) } if(result) { + Curl_resolver_cleanup(data->state.async.resolver); Curl_dyn_free(&data->state.headerb); Curl_freeset(data); + Curl_req_free(&data->req, data); free(data); data = NULL; } @@ -563,7 +577,6 @@ static void conn_free(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn) Curl_conn_cf_discard_all(data, conn, (int)i); } - Curl_resolver_cleanup(conn->resolve_async.resolver); Curl_free_idnconverted_hostname(&conn->host); Curl_free_idnconverted_hostname(&conn->conn_to_host); #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY @@ -581,9 +594,6 @@ static void conn_free(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn) Curl_safefree(conn->sasl_authzid); Curl_safefree(conn->options); Curl_safefree(conn->oauth_bearer); -#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_HTTP - Curl_dyn_free(&conn->trailer); -#endif Curl_safefree(conn->host.rawalloc); /* host name buffer */ Curl_safefree(conn->conn_to_host.rawalloc); /* host name buffer */ Curl_safefree(conn->hostname_resolve); @@ -663,7 +673,6 @@ void Curl_disconnect(struct Curl_easy *data, conn->handler->disconnect(data, conn, dead_connection); conn_shutdown(data); - Curl_resolver_cancel(data); /* detach it again */ Curl_detach_connection(data); @@ -765,16 +774,16 @@ static bool conn_maxage(struct Curl_easy *data, } /* - * This function checks if the given connection is dead and extracts it from + * This function checks if the given connection is dead and prunes it from * the connection cache if so. * * When this is called as a Curl_conncache_foreach() callback, the connection * cache lock is held! * - * Returns TRUE if the connection was dead and extracted. + * Returns TRUE if the connection was dead and pruned. */ -static bool extract_if_dead(struct connectdata *conn, - struct Curl_easy *data) +static bool prune_if_dead(struct connectdata *conn, + struct Curl_easy *data) { if(!CONN_INUSE(conn)) { /* The check for a dead socket makes sense only if the connection isn't in @@ -801,7 +810,7 @@ static bool extract_if_dead(struct connectdata *conn, } else { - bool input_pending; + bool input_pending = FALSE; Curl_attach_connection(data, conn); dead = !Curl_conn_is_alive(data, conn, &input_pending); @@ -820,6 +829,7 @@ static bool extract_if_dead(struct connectdata *conn, } if(dead) { + /* remove connection from cache */ infof(data, "Connection %" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T " seems to be dead", conn->connection_id); Curl_conncache_remove_conn(data, conn, FALSE); @@ -829,22 +839,17 @@ static bool extract_if_dead(struct connectdata *conn, return FALSE; } -struct prunedead { - struct Curl_easy *data; - struct connectdata *extracted; -}; - /* - * Wrapper to use extract_if_dead() function in Curl_conncache_foreach() + * Wrapper to use prune_if_dead() function in Curl_conncache_foreach() * */ -static int call_extract_if_dead(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn, void *param) +static int call_prune_if_dead(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct connectdata *conn, void *param) { - struct prunedead *p = (struct prunedead *)param; - if(extract_if_dead(conn, data)) { - /* stop the iteration here, pass back the connection that was extracted */ - p->extracted = conn; + struct connectdata **pruned = (struct connectdata **)param; + if(prune_if_dead(conn, data)) { + /* stop the iteration here, pass back the connection that was pruned */ + *pruned = conn; return 1; } return 0; /* continue iteration */ @@ -868,18 +873,15 @@ static void prune_dead_connections(struct Curl_easy *data) CONNCACHE_UNLOCK(data); if(elapsed >= 1000L) { - struct prunedead prune; - prune.data = data; - prune.extracted = NULL; - while(Curl_conncache_foreach(data, data->state.conn_cache, &prune, - call_extract_if_dead)) { + struct connectdata *pruned = NULL; + while(Curl_conncache_foreach(data, data->state.conn_cache, &pruned, + call_prune_if_dead)) { /* unlocked */ - /* remove connection from cache */ - Curl_conncache_remove_conn(data, prune.extracted, TRUE); + /* connection previously removed from cache in prune_if_dead() */ /* disconnect it */ - Curl_disconnect(data, prune.extracted, TRUE); + Curl_disconnect(data, pruned, TRUE); } CONNCACHE_LOCK(data); data->state.conn_cache->last_cleanup = now; @@ -923,13 +925,12 @@ ConnectionExists(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_llist_element *curr; #ifdef USE_NTLM - bool wantNTLMhttp = ((data->state.authhost.want & - (CURLAUTH_NTLM | CURLAUTH_NTLM_WB)) && + bool wantNTLMhttp = ((data->state.authhost.want & CURLAUTH_NTLM) && (needle->handler->protocol & PROTO_FAMILY_HTTP)); #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY bool wantProxyNTLMhttp = (needle->bits.proxy_user_passwd && ((data->state.authproxy.want & - (CURLAUTH_NTLM | CURLAUTH_NTLM_WB)) && + CURLAUTH_NTLM) && (needle->handler->protocol & PROTO_FAMILY_HTTP))); #else bool wantProxyNTLMhttp = FALSE; @@ -1000,9 +1001,9 @@ ConnectionExists(struct Curl_easy *data, if(!canmultiplex) { if(Curl_resolver_asynch() && - /* primary_ip[0] is NUL only if the resolving of the name hasn't + /* remote_ip[0] is NUL only if the resolving of the name hasn't completed yet and until then we don't reuse this connection */ - !check->primary_ip[0]) + !check->primary.remote_ip[0]) continue; } @@ -1291,7 +1292,7 @@ ConnectionExists(struct Curl_easy *data, /* When not multiplexed, we have a match here! */ infof(data, "Multiplexed connection found"); } - else if(extract_if_dead(check, data)) { + else if(prune_if_dead(check, data)) { /* disconnect it */ Curl_disconnect(data, check, TRUE); continue; @@ -1325,11 +1326,15 @@ ConnectionExists(struct Curl_easy *data, */ #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS void Curl_verboseconnect(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn) + struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) { - if(data->set.verbose) + if(data->set.verbose && sockindex == SECONDARYSOCKET) + infof(data, "Connected 2nd connection to %s port %u", + conn->secondary.remote_ip, conn->secondary.remote_port); + else infof(data, "Connected to %s (%s) port %u", - CURL_CONN_HOST_DISPNAME(conn), conn->primary_ip, conn->port); + CURL_CONN_HOST_DISPNAME(conn), conn->primary.remote_ip, + conn->primary.remote_port); } #endif @@ -1346,8 +1351,10 @@ static struct connectdata *allocate_conn(struct Curl_easy *data) conn->sock[FIRSTSOCKET] = CURL_SOCKET_BAD; /* no file descriptor */ conn->sock[SECONDARYSOCKET] = CURL_SOCKET_BAD; /* no file descriptor */ + conn->sockfd = CURL_SOCKET_BAD; + conn->writesockfd = CURL_SOCKET_BAD; conn->connection_id = -1; /* no ID */ - conn->port = -1; /* unknown at this point */ + conn->primary.remote_port = -1; /* unknown at this point */ conn->remote_port = -1; /* unknown at this point */ /* Default protocol-independent behavior doesn't support persistent @@ -1395,12 +1402,6 @@ static struct connectdata *allocate_conn(struct Curl_easy *data) conn->connect_only = data->set.connect_only; conn->transport = TRNSPRT_TCP; /* most of them are TCP streams */ -#if !defined(CURL_DISABLE_HTTP) && defined(USE_NTLM) && \ - defined(NTLM_WB_ENABLED) - conn->ntlm.ntlm_auth_hlpr_socket = CURL_SOCKET_BAD; - conn->proxyntlm.ntlm_auth_hlpr_socket = CURL_SOCKET_BAD; -#endif - /* Initialize the easy handle list */ Curl_llist_init(&conn->easyq, NULL); @@ -1680,8 +1681,9 @@ static CURLcode findprotocol(struct Curl_easy *data, /* The protocol was not found in the table, but we don't have to assign it to anything since it is already assigned to a dummy-struct in the create_conn() function when the connectdata struct is allocated. */ - failf(data, "Protocol \"%s\" not supported or disabled in " LIBCURL_NAME, - protostr); + failf(data, "Protocol \"%s\" %s%s", protostr, + p ? "disabled" : "not supported", + data->state.this_is_a_follow ? " (in redirect)":""); return CURLE_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; } @@ -1701,7 +1703,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_uc_to_curlcode(CURLUcode uc) } } -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 /* * If the URL was set with an IPv6 numerical address with a zone id part, set * the scope_id based on that! @@ -1959,14 +1961,14 @@ static CURLcode parseurlandfillconn(struct Curl_easy *data, } else { unsigned long port = strtoul(data->state.up.port, NULL, 10); - conn->port = conn->remote_port = + conn->primary.remote_port = conn->remote_port = (data->set.use_port && data->state.allow_port) ? data->set.use_port : curlx_ultous(port); } (void)curl_url_get(uh, CURLUPART_QUERY, &data->state.up.query, 0); -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 if(data->set.scope_id) /* Override any scope that was set above. */ conn->scope_id = data->set.scope_id; @@ -2035,32 +2037,14 @@ static CURLcode setup_connection_internals(struct Curl_easy *data, p = conn->handler; /* May have changed. */ } - if(conn->port < 0) + if(conn->primary.remote_port < 0) /* we check for -1 here since if proxy was detected already, this was very likely already set to the proxy port */ - conn->port = p->defport; + conn->primary.remote_port = p->defport; return CURLE_OK; } -/* - * Curl_free_request_state() should free temp data that was allocated in the - * Curl_easy for this single request. - */ - -void Curl_free_request_state(struct Curl_easy *data) -{ - Curl_safefree(data->req.p.http); - Curl_safefree(data->req.newurl); -#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_DOH - if(data->req.doh) { - Curl_close(&data->req.doh->probe[0].easy); - Curl_close(&data->req.doh->probe[1].easy); - } -#endif - Curl_client_cleanup(data); -} - #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY @@ -2092,19 +2076,13 @@ static char *detect_proxy(struct Curl_easy *data, * For compatibility, the all-uppercase versions of these variables are * checked if the lowercase versions don't exist. */ - char proxy_env[128]; - const char *protop = conn->handler->scheme; + char proxy_env[20]; char *envp = proxy_env; #ifdef CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS (void)data; #endif - /* Now, build _proxy and check for such a one to use */ - while(*protop) - *envp++ = Curl_raw_tolower(*protop++); - - /* append _proxy */ - strcpy(envp, "_proxy"); + msnprintf(proxy_env, sizeof(proxy_env), "%s_proxy", conn->handler->scheme); /* read the protocol proxy: */ proxy = curl_getenv(proxy_env); @@ -2127,7 +2105,6 @@ static char *detect_proxy(struct Curl_easy *data, proxy = curl_getenv(proxy_env); } - envp = proxy_env; if(!proxy) { #ifdef USE_WEBSOCKETS /* websocket proxy fallbacks */ @@ -2302,8 +2279,9 @@ static CURLcode parse_proxy(struct Curl_easy *data, } if(port >= 0) { proxyinfo->port = port; - if(conn->port < 0 || sockstype || !conn->socks_proxy.host.rawalloc) - conn->port = port; + if(conn->primary.remote_port < 0 || sockstype || + !conn->socks_proxy.host.rawalloc) + conn->primary.remote_port = port; } /* now, clone the proxy host name */ @@ -2374,17 +2352,16 @@ static CURLcode parse_proxy_auth(struct Curl_easy *data, data->state.aptr.proxyuser : ""; const char *proxypasswd = data->state.aptr.proxypasswd ? data->state.aptr.proxypasswd : ""; - CURLcode result = Curl_urldecode(proxyuser, 0, &conn->http_proxy.user, NULL, - REJECT_ZERO); - if(!result) - result = Curl_setstropt(&data->state.aptr.proxyuser, - conn->http_proxy.user); - if(!result) - result = Curl_urldecode(proxypasswd, 0, &conn->http_proxy.passwd, - NULL, REJECT_ZERO); - if(!result) - result = Curl_setstropt(&data->state.aptr.proxypasswd, - conn->http_proxy.passwd); + CURLcode result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + + conn->http_proxy.user = strdup(proxyuser); + if(conn->http_proxy.user) { + conn->http_proxy.passwd = strdup(proxypasswd); + if(conn->http_proxy.passwd) + result = CURLE_OK; + else + Curl_safefree(conn->http_proxy.user); + } return result; } @@ -2584,14 +2561,15 @@ static CURLcode create_conn_helper_init_proxy(struct Curl_easy *data, * * Parameters: * - * login [in] - The login string. - * len [in] - The length of the login string. - * userp [in/out] - The address where a pointer to newly allocated memory + * login [in] - login string. + * len [in] - length of the login string. + * userp [in/out] - address where a pointer to newly allocated memory * holding the user will be stored upon completion. - * passwdp [in/out] - The address where a pointer to newly allocated memory + * passwdp [in/out] - address where a pointer to newly allocated memory * holding the password will be stored upon completion. - * optionsp [in/out] - The address where a pointer to newly allocated memory - * holding the options will be stored upon completion. + * optionsp [in/out] - OPTIONAL address where a pointer to newly allocated + * memory holding the options will be stored upon + * completion. * * Returns CURLE_OK on success. */ @@ -2599,19 +2577,19 @@ CURLcode Curl_parse_login_details(const char *login, const size_t len, char **userp, char **passwdp, char **optionsp) { - CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; char *ubuf = NULL; char *pbuf = NULL; - char *obuf = NULL; const char *psep = NULL; const char *osep = NULL; size_t ulen; size_t plen; size_t olen; + DEBUGASSERT(userp); + DEBUGASSERT(passwdp); + /* Attempt to find the password separator */ - if(passwdp) - psep = memchr(login, ':', len); + psep = memchr(login, ':', len); /* Attempt to find the options separator */ if(optionsp) @@ -2623,64 +2601,40 @@ CURLcode Curl_parse_login_details(const char *login, const size_t len, (osep ? (size_t)(osep - login) : len)); plen = (psep ? (osep && osep > psep ? (size_t)(osep - psep) : - (size_t)(login + len - psep)) - 1 : 0); + (size_t)(login + len - psep)) - 1 : 0); olen = (osep ? (psep && psep > osep ? (size_t)(psep - osep) : - (size_t)(login + len - osep)) - 1 : 0); + (size_t)(login + len - osep)) - 1 : 0); - /* Allocate the user portion buffer, which can be zero length */ - if(userp) { - ubuf = malloc(ulen + 1); - if(!ubuf) - result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - } + /* Clone the user portion buffer, which can be zero length */ + ubuf = Curl_memdup0(login, ulen); + if(!ubuf) + goto error; - /* Allocate the password portion buffer */ - if(!result && passwdp && psep) { - pbuf = malloc(plen + 1); - if(!pbuf) { - free(ubuf); - result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - } + /* Clone the password portion buffer */ + if(psep) { + pbuf = Curl_memdup0(&psep[1], plen); + if(!pbuf) + goto error; } /* Allocate the options portion buffer */ - if(!result && optionsp && olen) { - obuf = malloc(olen + 1); - if(!obuf) { - free(pbuf); - free(ubuf); - result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - } - } - - if(!result) { - /* Store the user portion if necessary */ - if(ubuf) { - memcpy(ubuf, login, ulen); - ubuf[ulen] = '\0'; - Curl_safefree(*userp); - *userp = ubuf; - } - - /* Store the password portion if necessary */ - if(pbuf) { - memcpy(pbuf, psep + 1, plen); - pbuf[plen] = '\0'; - Curl_safefree(*passwdp); - *passwdp = pbuf; - } - - /* Store the options portion if necessary */ - if(obuf) { - memcpy(obuf, osep + 1, olen); - obuf[olen] = '\0'; - Curl_safefree(*optionsp); - *optionsp = obuf; + if(optionsp) { + char *obuf = NULL; + if(olen) { + obuf = Curl_memdup0(&osep[1], olen); + if(!obuf) + goto error; } + *optionsp = obuf; } - - return result; + *userp = ubuf; + *passwdp = pbuf; + return CURLE_OK; +error: + free(ubuf); + free(pbuf); + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; } /************************************************************* @@ -2891,7 +2845,7 @@ static CURLcode parse_connect_to_host_port(struct Curl_easy *data, /* detect and extract RFC6874-style IPv6-addresses */ if(*hostptr == '[') { -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 char *ptr = ++hostptr; /* advance beyond the initial bracket */ while(*ptr && (ISXDIGIT(*ptr) || (*ptr == ':') || (*ptr == '.'))) ptr++; @@ -3089,7 +3043,7 @@ static CURLcode parse_connect_to_slist(struct Curl_easy *data, #ifdef USE_HTTP2 | ALPN_h2 #endif -#ifdef ENABLE_QUIC +#ifdef USE_HTTP3 | ALPN_h3 #endif ) & data->asi->flags; @@ -3201,8 +3155,8 @@ static CURLcode resolve_proxy(struct Curl_easy *data, if(!conn->hostname_resolve) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - rc = Curl_resolv_timeout(data, conn->hostname_resolve, (int)conn->port, - &hostaddr, timeout_ms); + rc = Curl_resolv_timeout(data, conn->hostname_resolve, + conn->primary.remote_port, &hostaddr, timeout_ms); conn->dns_entry = hostaddr; if(rc == CURLRESOLV_PENDING) *async = TRUE; @@ -3232,7 +3186,7 @@ static CURLcode resolve_host(struct Curl_easy *data, /* If not connecting via a proxy, extract the port from the URL, if it is * there, thus overriding any defaults that might have been set above. */ - conn->port = conn->bits.conn_to_port ? conn->conn_to_port : + conn->primary.remote_port = conn->bits.conn_to_port ? conn->conn_to_port : conn->remote_port; /* Resolve target host right on */ @@ -3240,8 +3194,8 @@ static CURLcode resolve_host(struct Curl_easy *data, if(!conn->hostname_resolve) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - rc = Curl_resolv_timeout(data, conn->hostname_resolve, (int)conn->port, - &hostaddr, timeout_ms); + rc = Curl_resolv_timeout(data, conn->hostname_resolve, + conn->primary.remote_port, &hostaddr, timeout_ms); conn->dns_entry = hostaddr; if(rc == CURLRESOLV_PENDING) *async = TRUE; @@ -3578,7 +3532,7 @@ static CURLcode create_conn(struct Curl_easy *data, /* this is supposed to be the connect function so we better at least check that the file is present here! */ DEBUGASSERT(conn->handler->connect_it); - Curl_persistconninfo(data, conn, NULL, -1); + Curl_persistconninfo(data, conn, NULL); result = conn->handler->connect_it(data, &done); /* Setup a "faked" transfer that'll do nothing */ @@ -3598,7 +3552,7 @@ static CURLcode create_conn(struct Curl_easy *data, (void)conn->handler->done(data, result, FALSE); goto out; } - Curl_setup_transfer(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); } /* since we skip do_init() */ @@ -3609,10 +3563,10 @@ static CURLcode create_conn(struct Curl_easy *data, #endif /* Setup filter for network connections */ - conn->recv[FIRSTSOCKET] = Curl_conn_recv; - conn->send[FIRSTSOCKET] = Curl_conn_send; - conn->recv[SECONDARYSOCKET] = Curl_conn_recv; - conn->send[SECONDARYSOCKET] = Curl_conn_send; + conn->recv[FIRSTSOCKET] = Curl_cf_recv; + conn->send[FIRSTSOCKET] = Curl_cf_send; + conn->recv[SECONDARYSOCKET] = Curl_cf_recv; + conn->send[SECONDARYSOCKET] = Curl_cf_send; conn->bits.tcp_fastopen = data->set.tcp_fastopen; /* Complete the easy's SSL configuration for connection cache matching */ @@ -3739,35 +3693,7 @@ static CURLcode create_conn(struct Curl_easy *data, goto out; } - result = Curl_resolver_init(data, &conn->resolve_async.resolver); - if(result) { - DEBUGF(fprintf(stderr, "Error: resolver_init failed\n")); - goto out; - } - Curl_attach_connection(data, conn); - -#ifdef USE_ARES - result = Curl_set_dns_servers(data, data->set.str[STRING_DNS_SERVERS]); - if(result && result != CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN) - goto out; - - result = Curl_set_dns_interface(data, - data->set.str[STRING_DNS_INTERFACE]); - if(result && result != CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN) - goto out; - - result = Curl_set_dns_local_ip4(data, - data->set.str[STRING_DNS_LOCAL_IP4]); - if(result && result != CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN) - goto out; - - result = Curl_set_dns_local_ip6(data, - data->set.str[STRING_DNS_LOCAL_IP6]); - if(result && result != CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN) - goto out; -#endif /* USE_ARES */ - result = Curl_conncache_add_conn(data); if(result) goto out; @@ -3777,14 +3703,14 @@ static CURLcode create_conn(struct Curl_easy *data, /* If NTLM is requested in a part of this connection, make sure we don't assume the state is fine as this is a fresh connection and NTLM is connection based. */ - if((data->state.authhost.picked & (CURLAUTH_NTLM | CURLAUTH_NTLM_WB)) && + if((data->state.authhost.picked & CURLAUTH_NTLM) && data->state.authhost.done) { infof(data, "NTLM picked AND auth done set, clear picked"); data->state.authhost.picked = CURLAUTH_NONE; data->state.authhost.done = FALSE; } - if((data->state.authproxy.picked & (CURLAUTH_NTLM | CURLAUTH_NTLM_WB)) && + if((data->state.authproxy.picked & CURLAUTH_NTLM) && data->state.authproxy.done) { infof(data, "NTLM-proxy picked AND auth done set, clear picked"); data->state.authproxy.picked = CURLAUTH_NONE; @@ -3805,13 +3731,6 @@ static CURLcode create_conn(struct Curl_easy *data, /* Continue connectdata initialization here. */ - /* - * Inherit the proper values from the urldata struct AFTER we have arranged - * the persistent connection stuff - */ - conn->seek_func = data->set.seek_func; - conn->seek_client = data->set.seek_client; - /************************************************************* * Resolve the address of the server or proxy *************************************************************/ @@ -3865,6 +3784,9 @@ CURLcode Curl_setup_conn(struct Curl_easy *data, if(!conn->bits.reuse) result = Curl_conn_setup(data, conn, FIRSTSOCKET, conn->dns_entry, CURL_CF_SSL_DEFAULT); + if(!result) + result = Curl_headers_init(data); + /* not sure we need this flag to be passed around any more */ *protocol_done = FALSE; return result; @@ -3879,11 +3801,8 @@ CURLcode Curl_connect(struct Curl_easy *data, *asyncp = FALSE; /* assume synchronous resolves by default */ - /* init the single-transfer specific data */ - Curl_free_request_state(data); - memset(&data->req, 0, sizeof(struct SingleRequest)); - data->req.size = data->req.maxdownload = -1; - data->req.no_body = data->set.opt_no_body; + /* Set the request to virgin state based on transfer settings */ + Curl_req_hard_reset(&data->req, data); /* call the stuff that needs to be called */ result = create_conn(data, &conn, asyncp); @@ -3926,12 +3845,8 @@ CURLcode Curl_connect(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLcode Curl_init_do(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn) { - struct SingleRequest *k = &data->req; - /* if this is a pushed stream, we need this: */ - CURLcode result = Curl_preconnect(data); - if(result) - return result; + CURLcode result; if(conn) { conn->bits.do_more = FALSE; /* by default there's no curl_do_more() to @@ -3943,23 +3858,18 @@ CURLcode Curl_init_do(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn) } data->state.done = FALSE; /* *_done() is not called yet */ - data->state.expect100header = FALSE; if(data->req.no_body) /* in HTTP lingo, no body means using the HEAD request... */ data->state.httpreq = HTTPREQ_HEAD; - k->start = Curl_now(); /* start time */ - k->header = TRUE; /* assume header */ - k->bytecount = 0; - k->ignorebody = FALSE; - - Curl_client_cleanup(data); - Curl_speedinit(data); - Curl_pgrsSetUploadCounter(data, 0); - Curl_pgrsSetDownloadCounter(data, 0); - - return CURLE_OK; + result = Curl_req_start(&data->req, data); + if(!result) { + Curl_speedinit(data); + Curl_pgrsSetUploadCounter(data, 0); + Curl_pgrsSetDownloadCounter(data, 0); + } + return result; } #if defined(USE_HTTP2) || defined(USE_HTTP3) diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/url.h b/vendor/curl/lib/url.h index 7c1a29bc3c..198a00ad17 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/url.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/url.h @@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ void Curl_disconnect(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *, bool dead_connection); CURLcode Curl_setup_conn(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *protocol_done); -void Curl_free_request_state(struct Curl_easy *data); CURLcode Curl_parse_login_details(const char *login, const size_t len, char **userptr, char **passwdptr, char **optionsptr); @@ -59,9 +58,10 @@ const struct Curl_handler *Curl_getn_scheme_handler(const char *scheme, specified */ #ifdef CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS -#define Curl_verboseconnect(x,y) Curl_nop_stmt +#define Curl_verboseconnect(x,y,z) Curl_nop_stmt #else -void Curl_verboseconnect(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn); +void Curl_verboseconnect(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, + int sockindex); #endif #if defined(USE_HTTP2) || defined(USE_HTTP3) diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/urlapi-int.h b/vendor/curl/lib/urlapi-int.h index d6e240aa36..c40281a898 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/urlapi-int.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/urlapi-int.h @@ -28,8 +28,7 @@ size_t Curl_is_absolute_url(const char *url, char *buf, size_t buflen, bool guess_scheme); -CURLUcode Curl_url_set_authority(CURLU *u, const char *authority, - unsigned int flags); +CURLUcode Curl_url_set_authority(CURLU *u, const char *authority); #ifdef DEBUGBUILD CURLUcode Curl_parse_port(struct Curl_URL *u, struct dynbuf *host, diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/urlapi.c b/vendor/curl/lib/urlapi.c index 0d11e48c92..eb03966876 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/urlapi.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/urlapi.c @@ -59,11 +59,11 @@ #define MAX_SCHEME_LEN 40 /* - * If ENABLE_IPV6 is disabled, we still want to parse IPv6 addresses, so make + * If USE_IPV6 is disabled, we still want to parse IPv6 addresses, so make * sure we have _some_ value for AF_INET6 without polluting our fake value * everywhere. */ -#if !defined(ENABLE_IPV6) && !defined(AF_INET6) +#if !defined(USE_IPV6) && !defined(AF_INET6) #define AF_INET6 (AF_INET + 1) #endif @@ -79,7 +79,9 @@ struct Curl_URL { char *path; char *query; char *fragment; - long portnum; /* the numerical version */ + unsigned short portnum; /* the numerical version (if 'port' is set) */ + BIT(query_present); /* to support blank */ + BIT(fragment_present); /* to support blank */ }; #define DEFAULT_SCHEME "https" @@ -126,6 +128,9 @@ static const char *find_host_sep(const char *url) return sep < query ? sep : query; } +/* convert CURLcode to CURLUcode */ +#define cc2cu(x) ((x) == CURLE_TOO_LARGE ? CURLUE_TOO_LARGE : \ + CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY) /* * Decide whether a character in a URL must be escaped. */ @@ -146,6 +151,7 @@ static CURLUcode urlencode_str(struct dynbuf *o, const char *url, bool left = !query; const unsigned char *iptr; const unsigned char *host_sep = (const unsigned char *) url; + CURLcode result; if(!relative) host_sep = (const unsigned char *) find_host_sep(url); @@ -154,20 +160,19 @@ static CURLUcode urlencode_str(struct dynbuf *o, const char *url, len; iptr++, len--) { if(iptr < host_sep) { - if(Curl_dyn_addn(o, iptr, 1)) - return CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + result = Curl_dyn_addn(o, iptr, 1); + if(result) + return cc2cu(result); continue; } if(*iptr == ' ') { - if(left) { - if(Curl_dyn_addn(o, "%20", 3)) - return CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - } - else { - if(Curl_dyn_addn(o, "+", 1)) - return CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - } + if(left) + result = Curl_dyn_addn(o, "%20", 3); + else + result = Curl_dyn_addn(o, "+", 1); + if(result) + return cc2cu(result); continue; } @@ -178,13 +183,12 @@ static CURLUcode urlencode_str(struct dynbuf *o, const char *url, char out[3]={'%'}; out[1] = hexdigits[*iptr>>4]; out[2] = hexdigits[*iptr & 0xf]; - if(Curl_dyn_addn(o, out, 3)) - return CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - } - else { - if(Curl_dyn_addn(o, iptr, 1)) - return CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + result = Curl_dyn_addn(o, out, 3); } + else + result = Curl_dyn_addn(o, iptr, 1); + if(result) + return cc2cu(result); } return CURLUE_OK; @@ -230,10 +234,8 @@ size_t Curl_is_absolute_url(const char *url, char *buf, size_t buflen, /* the length of the scheme is the name part only */ size_t len = i; if(buf) { + Curl_strntolower(buf, url, i); buf[i] = 0; - while(i--) { - buf[i] = Curl_raw_tolower(url[i]); - } } return len; } @@ -248,7 +250,7 @@ size_t Curl_is_absolute_url(const char *url, char *buf, size_t buflen, * * Note that this function destroys the 'base' string. */ -static char *concat_url(char *base, const char *relurl) +static CURLcode concat_url(char *base, const char *relurl, char **newurl) { /*** TRY to append this new path to the old URL @@ -260,6 +262,10 @@ static char *concat_url(char *base, const char *relurl) char *pathsep; bool host_changed = FALSE; const char *useurl = relurl; + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + CURLUcode uc; + bool skip_slash = FALSE; + *newurl = NULL; /* protsep points to the start of the host name */ protsep = strstr(base, "//"); @@ -278,48 +284,50 @@ static char *concat_url(char *base, const char *relurl) *pathsep = 0; /* we have a relative path to append to the last slash if there's one - available, or if the new URL is just a query string (starts with a - '?') we append the new one at the end of the entire currently worked - out URL */ - if(useurl[0] != '?') { + available, or the new URL is just a query string (starts with a '?') or + a fragment (starts with '#') we append the new one at the end of the + current URL */ + if((useurl[0] != '?') && (useurl[0] != '#')) { pathsep = strrchr(protsep, '/'); if(pathsep) *pathsep = 0; - } - /* Check if there's any slash after the host name, and if so, remember - that position instead */ - pathsep = strchr(protsep, '/'); - if(pathsep) - protsep = pathsep + 1; - else - protsep = NULL; + /* Check if there's any slash after the host name, and if so, remember + that position instead */ + pathsep = strchr(protsep, '/'); + if(pathsep) + protsep = pathsep + 1; + else + protsep = NULL; - /* now deal with one "./" or any amount of "../" in the newurl - and act accordingly */ + /* now deal with one "./" or any amount of "../" in the newurl + and act accordingly */ - if((useurl[0] == '.') && (useurl[1] == '/')) - useurl += 2; /* just skip the "./" */ + if((useurl[0] == '.') && (useurl[1] == '/')) + useurl += 2; /* just skip the "./" */ - while((useurl[0] == '.') && - (useurl[1] == '.') && - (useurl[2] == '/')) { - level++; - useurl += 3; /* pass the "../" */ - } + while((useurl[0] == '.') && + (useurl[1] == '.') && + (useurl[2] == '/')) { + level++; + useurl += 3; /* pass the "../" */ + } - if(protsep) { - while(level--) { - /* cut off one more level from the right of the original URL */ - pathsep = strrchr(protsep, '/'); - if(pathsep) - *pathsep = 0; - else { - *protsep = 0; - break; + if(protsep) { + while(level--) { + /* cut off one more level from the right of the original URL */ + pathsep = strrchr(protsep, '/'); + if(pathsep) + *pathsep = 0; + else { + *protsep = 0; + break; + } } } } + else + skip_slash = TRUE; } else { /* We got a new absolute path for this server */ @@ -360,21 +368,27 @@ static char *concat_url(char *base, const char *relurl) Curl_dyn_init(&newest, CURL_MAX_INPUT_LENGTH); /* copy over the root url part */ - if(Curl_dyn_add(&newest, base)) - return NULL; + result = Curl_dyn_add(&newest, base); + if(result) + return result; /* check if we need to append a slash */ - if(('/' == useurl[0]) || (protsep && !*protsep) || ('?' == useurl[0])) + if(('/' == useurl[0]) || (protsep && !*protsep) || skip_slash) ; else { - if(Curl_dyn_addn(&newest, "/", 1)) - return NULL; + result = Curl_dyn_addn(&newest, "/", 1); + if(result) + return result; } /* then append the new piece on the right side */ - urlencode_str(&newest, useurl, strlen(useurl), !host_changed, FALSE); + uc = urlencode_str(&newest, useurl, strlen(useurl), !host_changed, + FALSE); + if(uc) + return (uc == CURLUE_TOO_LARGE) ? CURLE_TOO_LARGE : CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - return Curl_dyn_ptr(&newest); + *newurl = Curl_dyn_ptr(&newest); + return CURLE_OK; } /* scan for byte values <= 31, 127 and sometimes space */ @@ -520,8 +534,8 @@ UNITTEST CURLUcode Curl_parse_port(struct Curl_URL *u, struct dynbuf *host, portptr = strchr(hostname, ':'); if(portptr) { - char *rest; - long port; + char *rest = NULL; + unsigned long port; size_t keep = portptr - hostname; /* Browser behavior adaptation. If there's a colon with no digits after, @@ -539,15 +553,13 @@ UNITTEST CURLUcode Curl_parse_port(struct Curl_URL *u, struct dynbuf *host, if(!ISDIGIT(*portptr)) return CURLUE_BAD_PORT_NUMBER; - port = strtol(portptr, &rest, 10); /* Port number must be decimal */ - - if(port > 0xffff) - return CURLUE_BAD_PORT_NUMBER; + errno = 0; + port = strtoul(portptr, &rest, 10); /* Port number must be decimal */ - if(rest[0]) + if(errno || (port > 0xffff) || *rest) return CURLUE_BAD_PORT_NUMBER; - u->portnum = port; + u->portnum = (unsigned short) port; /* generate a new port number string to get rid of leading zeroes etc */ free(u->port); u->port = aprintf("%ld", port); @@ -669,13 +681,21 @@ static int ipv4_normalize(struct dynbuf *host) if(*c == '[') return HOST_IPV6; + errno = 0; /* for strtoul */ while(!done) { - char *endp; + char *endp = NULL; unsigned long l; if(!ISDIGIT(*c)) /* most importantly this doesn't allow a leading plus or minus */ return HOST_NAME; l = strtoul(c, &endp, 0); + if(errno) + return HOST_NAME; +#if SIZEOF_LONG > 4 + /* a value larger than 32 bits */ + if(l > UINT_MAX) + return HOST_NAME; +#endif parts[n] = l; c = endp; @@ -695,16 +715,6 @@ static int ipv4_normalize(struct dynbuf *host) default: return HOST_NAME; } - - /* overflow */ - if((l == ULONG_MAX) && (errno == ERANGE)) - return HOST_NAME; - -#if SIZEOF_LONG > 4 - /* a value larger than 32 bits */ - if(l > UINT_MAX) - return HOST_NAME; -#endif } switch(n) { @@ -712,24 +722,30 @@ static int ipv4_normalize(struct dynbuf *host) Curl_dyn_reset(host); result = Curl_dyn_addf(host, "%u.%u.%u.%u", - parts[0] >> 24, (parts[0] >> 16) & 0xff, - (parts[0] >> 8) & 0xff, parts[0] & 0xff); + (unsigned int)(parts[0] >> 24), + (unsigned int)((parts[0] >> 16) & 0xff), + (unsigned int)((parts[0] >> 8) & 0xff), + (unsigned int)(parts[0] & 0xff)); break; case 1: /* a.b -- 8.24 bits */ if((parts[0] > 0xff) || (parts[1] > 0xffffff)) return HOST_NAME; Curl_dyn_reset(host); result = Curl_dyn_addf(host, "%u.%u.%u.%u", - parts[0], (parts[1] >> 16) & 0xff, - (parts[1] >> 8) & 0xff, parts[1] & 0xff); + (unsigned int)(parts[0]), + (unsigned int)((parts[1] >> 16) & 0xff), + (unsigned int)((parts[1] >> 8) & 0xff), + (unsigned int)(parts[1] & 0xff)); break; case 2: /* a.b.c -- 8.8.16 bits */ if((parts[0] > 0xff) || (parts[1] > 0xff) || (parts[2] > 0xffff)) return HOST_NAME; Curl_dyn_reset(host); result = Curl_dyn_addf(host, "%u.%u.%u.%u", - parts[0], parts[1], (parts[2] >> 8) & 0xff, - parts[2] & 0xff); + (unsigned int)(parts[0]), + (unsigned int)(parts[1]), + (unsigned int)((parts[2] >> 8) & 0xff), + (unsigned int)(parts[2] & 0xff)); break; case 3: /* a.b.c.d -- 8.8.8.8 bits */ if((parts[0] > 0xff) || (parts[1] > 0xff) || (parts[2] > 0xff) || @@ -737,7 +753,10 @@ static int ipv4_normalize(struct dynbuf *host) return HOST_NAME; Curl_dyn_reset(host); result = Curl_dyn_addf(host, "%u.%u.%u.%u", - parts[0], parts[1], parts[2], parts[3]); + (unsigned int)(parts[0]), + (unsigned int)(parts[1]), + (unsigned int)(parts[2]), + (unsigned int)(parts[3])); break; } if(result) @@ -766,7 +785,7 @@ static CURLUcode urldecode_host(struct dynbuf *host) result = Curl_dyn_addn(host, decoded, dlen); free(decoded); if(result) - return CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + return cc2cu(result); } return CURLUE_OK; @@ -779,22 +798,24 @@ static CURLUcode parse_authority(struct Curl_URL *u, bool has_scheme) { size_t offset; - CURLUcode result; + CURLUcode uc; + CURLcode result; /* * Parse the login details and strip them out of the host name. */ - result = parse_hostname_login(u, auth, authlen, flags, &offset); - if(result) + uc = parse_hostname_login(u, auth, authlen, flags, &offset); + if(uc) goto out; - if(Curl_dyn_addn(host, auth + offset, authlen - offset)) { - result = CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + result = Curl_dyn_addn(host, auth + offset, authlen - offset); + if(result) { + uc = cc2cu(result); goto out; } - result = Curl_parse_port(u, host, has_scheme); - if(result) + uc = Curl_parse_port(u, host, has_scheme); + if(uc) goto out; if(!Curl_dyn_len(host)) @@ -804,28 +825,28 @@ static CURLUcode parse_authority(struct Curl_URL *u, case HOST_IPV4: break; case HOST_IPV6: - result = ipv6_parse(u, Curl_dyn_ptr(host), Curl_dyn_len(host)); + uc = ipv6_parse(u, Curl_dyn_ptr(host), Curl_dyn_len(host)); break; case HOST_NAME: - result = urldecode_host(host); - if(!result) - result = hostname_check(u, Curl_dyn_ptr(host), Curl_dyn_len(host)); + uc = urldecode_host(host); + if(!uc) + uc = hostname_check(u, Curl_dyn_ptr(host), Curl_dyn_len(host)); break; case HOST_ERROR: - result = CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + uc = CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; break; case HOST_BAD: default: - result = CURLUE_BAD_HOSTNAME; /* Bad IPv4 address even */ + uc = CURLUE_BAD_HOSTNAME; /* Bad IPv4 address even */ break; } out: - return result; + return uc; } -CURLUcode Curl_url_set_authority(CURLU *u, const char *authority, - unsigned int flags) +/* used for HTTP/2 server push */ +CURLUcode Curl_url_set_authority(CURLU *u, const char *authority) { CURLUcode result; struct dynbuf host; @@ -833,8 +854,8 @@ CURLUcode Curl_url_set_authority(CURLU *u, const char *authority, DEBUGASSERT(authority); Curl_dyn_init(&host, CURL_MAX_INPUT_LENGTH); - result = parse_authority(u, authority, strlen(authority), flags, - &host, !!u->scheme); + result = parse_authority(u, authority, strlen(authority), + CURLU_DISALLOW_USER, &host, !!u->scheme); if(result) Curl_dyn_free(&host); else { @@ -1070,8 +1091,9 @@ static CURLUcode parseurl(const char *url, CURLU *u, unsigned int flags) len = path - ptr; if(len) { - if(Curl_dyn_addn(&host, ptr, len)) { - result = CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + CURLcode code = Curl_dyn_addn(&host, ptr, len); + if(code) { + result = cc2cu(code); goto fail; } uncpath = TRUE; @@ -1219,19 +1241,19 @@ static CURLUcode parseurl(const char *url, CURLU *u, unsigned int flags) fragment = strchr(path, '#'); if(fragment) { fraglen = pathlen - (fragment - path); + u->fragment_present = TRUE; if(fraglen > 1) { /* skip the leading '#' in the copy but include the terminating null */ if(flags & CURLU_URLENCODE) { struct dynbuf enc; Curl_dyn_init(&enc, CURL_MAX_INPUT_LENGTH); - if(urlencode_str(&enc, fragment + 1, fraglen - 1, TRUE, FALSE)) { - result = CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + result = urlencode_str(&enc, fragment + 1, fraglen - 1, TRUE, FALSE); + if(result) goto fail; - } u->fragment = Curl_dyn_ptr(&enc); } else { - u->fragment = Curl_strndup(fragment + 1, fraglen - 1); + u->fragment = Curl_memdup0(fragment + 1, fraglen - 1); if(!u->fragment) { result = CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; goto fail; @@ -1242,25 +1264,24 @@ static CURLUcode parseurl(const char *url, CURLU *u, unsigned int flags) pathlen -= fraglen; } - DEBUGASSERT(pathlen < urllen); query = memchr(path, '?', pathlen); if(query) { size_t qlen = fragment ? (size_t)(fragment - query) : pathlen - (query - path); pathlen -= qlen; + u->query_present = TRUE; if(qlen > 1) { if(flags & CURLU_URLENCODE) { struct dynbuf enc; Curl_dyn_init(&enc, CURL_MAX_INPUT_LENGTH); /* skip the leading question mark */ - if(urlencode_str(&enc, query + 1, qlen - 1, TRUE, TRUE)) { - result = CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + result = urlencode_str(&enc, query + 1, qlen - 1, TRUE, TRUE); + if(result) goto fail; - } u->query = Curl_dyn_ptr(&enc); } else { - u->query = Curl_strndup(query + 1, qlen - 1); + u->query = Curl_memdup0(query + 1, qlen - 1); if(!u->query) { result = CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; goto fail; @@ -1280,10 +1301,9 @@ static CURLUcode parseurl(const char *url, CURLU *u, unsigned int flags) if(pathlen && (flags & CURLU_URLENCODE)) { struct dynbuf enc; Curl_dyn_init(&enc, CURL_MAX_INPUT_LENGTH); - if(urlencode_str(&enc, path, pathlen, TRUE, FALSE)) { - result = CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + result = urlencode_str(&enc, path, pathlen, TRUE, FALSE); + if(result) goto fail; - } pathlen = Curl_dyn_len(&enc); path = u->path = Curl_dyn_ptr(&enc); } @@ -1294,7 +1314,7 @@ static CURLUcode parseurl(const char *url, CURLU *u, unsigned int flags) } else { if(!u->path) { - u->path = Curl_strndup(path, pathlen); + u->path = Curl_memdup0(path, pathlen); if(!u->path) { result = CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; goto fail; @@ -1385,6 +1405,8 @@ CURLU *curl_url_dup(const CURLU *in) DUP(u, in, fragment); DUP(u, in, zoneid); u->portnum = in->portnum; + u->fragment_present = in->fragment_present; + u->query_present = in->query_present; } return u; fail: @@ -1469,10 +1491,16 @@ CURLUcode curl_url_get(const CURLU *u, CURLUPart what, ptr = u->query; ifmissing = CURLUE_NO_QUERY; plusdecode = urldecode; + if(ptr && !ptr[0] && !(flags & CURLU_GET_EMPTY)) + /* there was a blank query and the user do not ask for it */ + ptr = NULL; break; case CURLUPART_FRAGMENT: ptr = u->fragment; ifmissing = CURLUE_NO_FRAGMENT; + if(!ptr && u->fragment_present && flags & CURLU_GET_EMPTY) + /* there was a blank fragment and the user asks for it */ + ptr = ""; break; case CURLUPART_URL: { char *url; @@ -1480,13 +1508,18 @@ CURLUcode curl_url_get(const CURLU *u, CURLUPart what, char *options = u->options; char *port = u->port; char *allochost = NULL; + bool show_fragment = + u->fragment || (u->fragment_present && flags & CURLU_GET_EMPTY); + bool show_query = + (u->query && u->query[0]) || + (u->query_present && flags & CURLU_GET_EMPTY); punycode = (flags & CURLU_PUNYCODE)?1:0; depunyfy = (flags & CURLU_PUNY2IDN)?1:0; if(u->scheme && strcasecompare("file", u->scheme)) { url = aprintf("file://%s%s%s", u->path, - u->fragment? "#": "", - u->fragment? u->fragment : ""); + show_fragment ? "#": "", + u->fragment ? u->fragment : ""); } else if(!u->host) return CURLUE_NO_HOST; @@ -1574,9 +1607,9 @@ CURLUcode curl_url_get(const CURLU *u, CURLUPart what, port ? ":": "", port ? port : "", u->path ? u->path : "/", - (u->query && u->query[0]) ? "?": "", - (u->query && u->query[0]) ? u->query : "", - u->fragment? "#": "", + show_query ? "?": "", + u->query ? u->query : "", + show_fragment ? "#": "", u->fragment? u->fragment : ""); free(allochost); } @@ -1592,7 +1625,7 @@ CURLUcode curl_url_get(const CURLU *u, CURLUPart what, if(ptr) { size_t partlen = strlen(ptr); size_t i = 0; - *part = Curl_strndup(ptr, partlen); + *part = Curl_memdup0(ptr, partlen); if(!*part) return CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; if(plusdecode) { @@ -1619,10 +1652,11 @@ CURLUcode curl_url_get(const CURLU *u, CURLUPart what, } if(urlencode) { struct dynbuf enc; + CURLUcode uc; Curl_dyn_init(&enc, CURL_MAX_INPUT_LENGTH); - if(urlencode_str(&enc, *part, partlen, TRUE, - what == CURLUPART_QUERY)) - return CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + uc = urlencode_str(&enc, *part, partlen, TRUE, what == CURLUPART_QUERY); + if(uc) + return uc; free(*part); *part = Curl_dyn_ptr(&enc); } @@ -1667,7 +1701,6 @@ CURLUcode curl_url_set(CURLU *u, CURLUPart what, const char *part, unsigned int flags) { char **storep = NULL; - long port = 0; bool urlencode = (flags & CURLU_URLENCODE)? 1 : 0; bool plusencode = FALSE; bool urlskipslash = FALSE; @@ -1710,9 +1743,11 @@ CURLUcode curl_url_set(CURLU *u, CURLUPart what, break; case CURLUPART_QUERY: storep = &u->query; + u->query_present = FALSE; break; case CURLUPART_FRAGMENT: storep = &u->fragment; + u->fragment_present = FALSE; break; default: return CURLUE_UNKNOWN_PART; @@ -1774,18 +1809,26 @@ CURLUcode curl_url_set(CURLU *u, CURLUPart what, storep = &u->zoneid; break; case CURLUPART_PORT: - { - char *endp; - urlencode = FALSE; /* never */ - port = strtol(part, &endp, 10); /* Port number must be decimal */ - if((port <= 0) || (port > 0xffff)) - return CURLUE_BAD_PORT_NUMBER; - if(*endp) - /* weirdly provided number, not good! */ + if(!ISDIGIT(part[0])) + /* not a number */ return CURLUE_BAD_PORT_NUMBER; - storep = &u->port; - } - break; + else { + char *tmp; + char *endp; + unsigned long port; + errno = 0; + port = strtoul(part, &endp, 10); /* must be decimal */ + if(errno || (port > 0xffff) || *endp) + /* weirdly provided number, not good! */ + return CURLUE_BAD_PORT_NUMBER; + tmp = strdup(part); + if(!tmp) + return CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + free(u->port); + u->port = tmp; + u->portnum = (unsigned short)port; + return CURLUE_OK; + } case CURLUPART_PATH: urlskipslash = TRUE; leadingslash = TRUE; /* enforce */ @@ -1796,9 +1839,11 @@ CURLUcode curl_url_set(CURLU *u, CURLUPart what, appendquery = (flags & CURLU_APPENDQUERY)?1:0; equalsencode = appendquery; storep = &u->query; + u->query_present = TRUE; break; case CURLUPART_FRAGMENT: storep = &u->fragment; + u->fragment_present = TRUE; break; case CURLUPART_URL: { /* @@ -1807,7 +1852,8 @@ CURLUcode curl_url_set(CURLU *u, CURLUPart what, * If the existing contents is enough for a URL, allow a relative URL to * replace it. */ - CURLUcode result; + CURLcode result; + CURLUcode uc; char *oldurl; char *redired_url; @@ -1827,14 +1873,14 @@ CURLUcode curl_url_set(CURLU *u, CURLUPart what, /* apply the relative part to create a new URL * and replace the existing one with it. */ - redired_url = concat_url(oldurl, part); + result = concat_url(oldurl, part, &redired_url); free(oldurl); - if(!redired_url) - return CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + if(result) + return cc2cu(result); - result = parseurl_and_replace(redired_url, u, flags); + uc = parseurl_and_replace(redired_url, u, flags); free(redired_url); - return result; + return uc; } default: return CURLUE_UNKNOWN_PART; @@ -1848,7 +1894,7 @@ CURLUcode curl_url_set(CURLU *u, CURLUPart what, if(leadingslash && (part[0] != '/')) { CURLcode result = Curl_dyn_addn(&enc, "/", 1); if(result) - return CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + return cc2cu(result); } if(urlencode) { const unsigned char *i; @@ -1868,7 +1914,7 @@ CURLUcode curl_url_set(CURLU *u, CURLUPart what, equalsencode = FALSE; result = Curl_dyn_addn(&enc, i, 1); if(result) - return CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + return cc2cu(result); } else { char out[3]={'%'}; @@ -1876,7 +1922,7 @@ CURLUcode curl_url_set(CURLU *u, CURLUPart what, out[2] = hexdigits[*i & 0xf]; result = Curl_dyn_addn(&enc, out, 3); if(result) - return CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + return cc2cu(result); } } } @@ -1884,7 +1930,7 @@ CURLUcode curl_url_set(CURLU *u, CURLUPart what, char *p; CURLcode result = Curl_dyn_add(&enc, part); if(result) - return CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + return cc2cu(result); p = Curl_dyn_ptr(&enc); while(*p) { /* make sure percent encoded are lower case */ @@ -1945,9 +1991,5 @@ CURLUcode curl_url_set(CURLU *u, CURLUPart what, free(*storep); *storep = (char *)newp; } - /* set after the string, to make it not assigned if the allocation above - fails */ - if(port) - u->portnum = port; return CURLUE_OK; } diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/urldata.h b/vendor/curl/lib/urldata.h index ff661482ea..8b1bd65d61 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/urldata.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/urldata.h @@ -53,6 +53,17 @@ #define PORT_GOPHER 70 #define PORT_MQTT 1883 +struct curl_trc_featt; + +#ifdef USE_ECH +/* CURLECH_ bits for the tls_ech option */ +# define CURLECH_DISABLE (1<<0) +# define CURLECH_GREASE (1<<1) +# define CURLECH_ENABLE (1<<2) +# define CURLECH_HARD (1<<3) +# define CURLECH_CLA_CFG (1<<4) +#endif + #ifdef USE_WEBSOCKETS /* CURLPROTO_GOPHERS (29) is the highest publicly used protocol bit number, * the rest are internal information. If we use higher bits we only do this on @@ -102,7 +113,7 @@ typedef unsigned int curl_prot_t; #define PROTO_FAMILY_SSH (CURLPROTO_SCP|CURLPROTO_SFTP) #if !defined(CURL_DISABLE_FTP) || defined(USE_SSH) || \ - !defined(CURL_DISABLE_POP3) + !defined(CURL_DISABLE_POP3) || !defined(CURL_DISABLE_FILE) /* these protocols support CURLOPT_DIRLISTONLY */ #define CURL_LIST_ONLY_PROTOCOL 1 #endif @@ -141,6 +152,7 @@ typedef unsigned int curl_prot_t; #include "splay.h" #include "dynbuf.h" #include "dynhds.h" +#include "request.h" /* return the count of bytes sent, or -1 on error */ typedef ssize_t (Curl_send)(struct Curl_easy *data, /* transfer */ @@ -160,7 +172,6 @@ typedef ssize_t (Curl_recv)(struct Curl_easy *data, /* transfer */ typedef CURLcode (*Curl_datastream)(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, int *didwhat, - bool *done, int select_res); #endif @@ -230,8 +241,7 @@ typedef CURLcode (*Curl_datastream)(struct Curl_easy *data, #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI /* Types needed for krb5-ftp connections */ struct krb5buffer { - void *data; - size_t size; + struct dynbuf buf; size_t index; BIT(eof_flag); }; @@ -266,11 +276,19 @@ typedef enum { /* SSL backend-specific data; declared differently by each SSL backend */ struct ssl_backend_data; +typedef enum { + CURL_SSL_PEER_DNS, + CURL_SSL_PEER_IPV4, + CURL_SSL_PEER_IPV6 +} ssl_peer_type; + struct ssl_peer { char *hostname; /* hostname for verification */ char *dispname; /* display version of hostname */ char *sni; /* SNI version of hostname or NULL if not usable */ - BIT(is_ip_address); /* if hostname is an IPv4|6 address */ + ssl_peer_type type; /* type of the peer information */ + int port; /* port we are talking to */ + int transport; /* TCP or QUIC */ }; struct ssl_primary_config { @@ -326,6 +344,8 @@ struct ssl_general_config { int ca_cache_timeout; /* Certificate store cache timeout (seconds) */ }; +typedef void Curl_ssl_sessionid_dtor(void *sessionid, size_t idsize); + /* information stored about one single SSL session */ struct Curl_ssl_session { char *name; /* host name for which this ID was used */ @@ -333,9 +353,11 @@ struct Curl_ssl_session { const char *scheme; /* protocol scheme used */ void *sessionid; /* as returned from the SSL layer */ size_t idsize; /* if known, otherwise 0 */ + Curl_ssl_sessionid_dtor *sessionid_free; /* free `sessionid` callback */ long age; /* just a number, the higher the more recent */ int remote_port; /* remote port */ int conn_to_port; /* remote port for the connection (may be -1) */ + int transport; /* TCP or QUIC */ struct ssl_primary_config ssl_config; /* setup for this session */ }; @@ -436,14 +458,6 @@ struct ntlmdata { unsigned char nonce[8]; unsigned int target_info_len; void *target_info; /* TargetInfo received in the ntlm type-2 message */ - -#if defined(NTLM_WB_ENABLED) - /* used for communication with Samba's winbind daemon helper ntlm_auth */ - curl_socket_t ntlm_auth_hlpr_socket; - pid_t ntlm_auth_hlpr_pid; - char *challenge; /* The received base64 encoded ntlm type-2 message */ - char *response; /* The generated base64 ntlm type-1/type-3 message */ -#endif #endif }; #endif @@ -519,10 +533,6 @@ struct ConnectBits { the TCP layer connect */ BIT(retry); /* this connection is about to get closed and then re-attempted at another connection. */ - BIT(authneg); /* TRUE when the auth phase has started, which means - that we are creating a request with an auth header, - but it is not the final request in the auth - negotiation. */ #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_FTP BIT(ftp_use_epsv); /* As set with CURLOPT_FTP_USE_EPSV, but if we find out EPSV doesn't work we disable it for the forthcoming @@ -575,6 +585,14 @@ struct hostname { #define KEEP_RECV_PAUSE (1<<4) /* reading is paused */ #define KEEP_SEND_PAUSE (1<<5) /* writing is paused */ +/* KEEP_SEND_TIMED is set when the transfer should attempt sending + * at timer (or other) events. A transfer waiting on a timer will + * remove KEEP_SEND to suppress POLLOUTs of the connection. + * Adding KEEP_SEND_TIMED will then attempt to send whenever the transfer + * enters the "readwrite" loop, e.g. when a timer fires. + * This is used in HTTP for 'Expect: 100-continue' waiting. */ +#define KEEP_SEND_TIMED (1<<6) + #define KEEP_RECVBITS (KEEP_RECV | KEEP_RECV_HOLD | KEEP_RECV_PAUSE) #define KEEP_SENDBITS (KEEP_SEND | KEEP_SEND_HOLD | KEEP_SEND_PAUSE) @@ -583,7 +601,7 @@ struct hostname { (((data)->req.keepon & KEEP_SENDBITS) == KEEP_SEND) /* transfer receive is not on PAUSE or HOLD */ #define CURL_WANT_RECV(data) \ - (!((data)->req.keepon & (KEEP_RECV_PAUSE|KEEP_RECV_HOLD))) + (((data)->req.keepon & KEEP_RECVBITS) == KEEP_RECV) #if defined(CURLRES_ASYNCH) || !defined(CURL_DISABLE_DOH) #define USE_CURL_ASYNC @@ -612,22 +630,6 @@ struct easy_pollset { unsigned char actions[MAX_SOCKSPEREASYHANDLE]; }; -enum expect100 { - EXP100_SEND_DATA, /* enough waiting, just send the body now */ - EXP100_AWAITING_CONTINUE, /* waiting for the 100 Continue header */ - EXP100_SENDING_REQUEST, /* still sending the request but will wait for - the 100 header once done with the request */ - EXP100_FAILED /* used on 417 Expectation Failed */ -}; - -enum upgrade101 { - UPGR101_INIT, /* default state */ - UPGR101_WS, /* upgrade to WebSockets requested */ - UPGR101_H2, /* upgrade to HTTP/2 requested */ - UPGR101_RECEIVED, /* 101 response received */ - UPGR101_WORKING /* talking upgraded protocol */ -}; - enum doh_slots { /* Explicit values for first two symbols so as to match hard-coded * constants in existing code @@ -636,6 +638,9 @@ enum doh_slots { DOH_PROBE_SLOT_IPADDR_V6 = 1, /* 'V6' likewise */ /* Space here for (possibly build-specific) additional slot definitions */ +#ifdef USE_HTTPSRR + DOH_PROBE_SLOT_HTTPS = 2, /* for HTTPS RR */ +#endif /* for example */ /* #ifdef WANT_DOH_FOOBAR_TXT */ @@ -646,117 +651,12 @@ enum doh_slots { DOH_PROBE_SLOTS }; -/* - * Request specific data in the easy handle (Curl_easy). Previously, - * these members were on the connectdata struct but since a conn struct may - * now be shared between different Curl_easys, we store connection-specific - * data here. This struct only keeps stuff that's interesting for *this* - * request, as it will be cleared between multiple ones - */ -struct SingleRequest { - curl_off_t size; /* -1 if unknown at this point */ - curl_off_t maxdownload; /* in bytes, the maximum amount of data to fetch, - -1 means unlimited */ - curl_off_t bytecount; /* total number of bytes read */ - curl_off_t writebytecount; /* number of bytes written */ - - curl_off_t pendingheader; /* this many bytes left to send is actually - header and not body */ - struct curltime start; /* transfer started at this time */ - unsigned int headerbytecount; /* received server headers (not CONNECT - headers) */ - unsigned int allheadercount; /* all received headers (server + CONNECT) */ - unsigned int deductheadercount; /* this amount of bytes doesn't count when - we check if anything has been transferred - at the end of a connection. We use this - counter to make only a 100 reply (without - a following second response code) result - in a CURLE_GOT_NOTHING error code */ - int headerline; /* counts header lines to better track the - first one */ - curl_off_t offset; /* possible resume offset read from the - Content-Range: header */ - int httpcode; /* error code from the 'HTTP/1.? XXX' or - 'RTSP/1.? XXX' line */ - int keepon; - struct curltime start100; /* time stamp to wait for the 100 code from */ - enum expect100 exp100; /* expect 100 continue state */ - enum upgrade101 upgr101; /* 101 upgrade state */ - - /* Content unencoding stack. See sec 3.5, RFC2616. */ - struct Curl_cwriter *writer_stack; - time_t timeofdoc; - long bodywrites; - char *location; /* This points to an allocated version of the Location: - header data */ - char *newurl; /* Set to the new URL to use when a redirect or a retry is - wanted */ - - /* 'upload_present' is used to keep a byte counter of how much data there is - still left in the buffer, aimed for upload. */ - ssize_t upload_present; - - /* 'upload_fromhere' is used as a read-pointer when we uploaded parts of a - buffer, so the next read should read from where this pointer points to, - and the 'upload_present' contains the number of bytes available at this - position */ - char *upload_fromhere; - - /* Allocated protocol-specific data. Each protocol handler makes sure this - points to data it needs. */ - union { - struct FILEPROTO *file; - struct FTP *ftp; - struct HTTP *http; - struct IMAP *imap; - struct ldapreqinfo *ldap; - struct MQTT *mqtt; - struct POP3 *pop3; - struct RTSP *rtsp; - struct smb_request *smb; - struct SMTP *smtp; - struct SSHPROTO *ssh; - struct TELNET *telnet; - } p; -#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_DOH - struct dohdata *doh; /* DoH specific data for this request */ -#endif -#if defined(_WIN32) && defined(USE_WINSOCK) - struct curltime last_sndbuf_update; /* last time readwrite_upload called - win_update_buffer_size */ -#endif - char fread_eof[2]; /* the body read callback (index 0) returned EOF or - the trailer read callback (index 1) returned EOF */ -#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_COOKIES - unsigned char setcookies; -#endif - unsigned char writer_stack_depth; /* Unencoding stack depth. */ - BIT(header); /* incoming data has HTTP header */ - BIT(badheader); /* header parsing found sth not a header */ - BIT(content_range); /* set TRUE if Content-Range: was found */ - BIT(download_done); /* set to TRUE when download is complete */ - BIT(upload_done); /* set to TRUE when doing chunked transfer-encoding - upload and we're uploading the last chunk */ - BIT(ignorebody); /* we read a response-body but we ignore it! */ - BIT(http_bodyless); /* HTTP response status code is between 100 and 199, - 204 or 304 */ - BIT(chunk); /* if set, this is a chunked transfer-encoding */ - BIT(ignore_cl); /* ignore content-length */ - BIT(upload_chunky); /* set TRUE if we are doing chunked transfer-encoding - on upload */ - BIT(getheader); /* TRUE if header parsing is wanted */ - BIT(forbidchunk); /* used only to explicitly forbid chunk-upload for - specific upload buffers. See readmoredata() in http.c - for details. */ - BIT(no_body); /* the response has no body */ -}; - /* * Specific protocol handler. */ struct Curl_handler { - const char *scheme; /* URL scheme name. */ + const char *scheme; /* URL scheme name in lowercase */ /* Complement to setup_connection_internals(). This is done before the transfer "owns" the connection. */ @@ -815,11 +715,17 @@ struct Curl_handler { CURLcode (*disconnect)(struct Curl_easy *, struct connectdata *, bool dead_connection); - /* If used, this function gets called from transfer.c:readwrite_data() to - allow the protocol to do extra reads/writes */ - CURLcode (*readwrite)(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, - const char *buf, size_t blen, - size_t *pconsumed, bool *readmore); + /* If used, this function gets called from transfer.c to + allow the protocol to do extra handling in writing response to + the client. */ + CURLcode (*write_resp)(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *buf, size_t blen, + bool is_eos); + + /* If used, this function gets called from transfer.c to + allow the protocol to do extra handling in writing a single response + header line to the client. */ + CURLcode (*write_resp_hd)(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *hd, size_t hdlen, bool is_eos); /* This function can perform various checks on the connection. See CONNCHECK_* for more information about the checks that can be performed, @@ -875,6 +781,13 @@ struct Curl_handler { #define CONNRESULT_NONE 0 /* No extra information. */ #define CONNRESULT_DEAD (1<<0) /* The connection is dead. */ +struct ip_quadruple { + char remote_ip[MAX_IPADR_LEN]; + char local_ip[MAX_IPADR_LEN]; + int remote_port; + int local_port; +}; + struct proxy_info { struct hostname host; int port; @@ -898,11 +811,6 @@ struct ldapconninfo; struct connectdata { struct Curl_llist_element bundle_node; /* conncache */ - /* chunk is for HTTP chunked encoding, but is in the general connectdata - struct only because we can do just about any protocol through an HTTP - proxy and an HTTP proxy may in fact respond using chunked encoding */ - struct Curl_chunker chunk; - curl_closesocket_callback fclosesocket; /* function closing the socket(s) */ void *closesocket_client; @@ -921,9 +829,6 @@ struct connectdata { multi_done(). This entry will be NULL if the connection is reused as then there is no name resolve done. */ struct Curl_dns_entry *dns_entry; -#ifdef USE_CURL_ASYNC - struct Curl_async resolve_async; /* asynchronous name resolver data */ -#endif /* 'remote_addr' is the particular IP we connected to. it is owned, set * and NULLed by the connected socket filter (if there is one). */ @@ -938,14 +843,13 @@ struct connectdata { struct proxy_info socks_proxy; struct proxy_info http_proxy; #endif - /* 'primary_ip' and 'primary_port' get filled with peer's numerical - ip address and port number whenever an outgoing connection is - *attempted* from the primary socket to a remote address. When more - than one address is tried for a connection these will hold data + /* 'primary' and 'secondary' get filled with IP quadruple + (local/remote numerical ip address and port) whenever a is *attempted*. + When more than one address is tried for a connection these will hold data for the last attempt. When the connection is actually established these are updated with data which comes directly from the socket. */ - - char primary_ip[MAX_IPADR_LEN]; + struct ip_quadruple primary; + struct ip_quadruple secondary; char *user; /* user name string, allocated */ char *passwd; /* password string, allocated */ char *options; /* options string, allocated */ @@ -998,14 +902,17 @@ struct connectdata { #endif /* however, some of them are ftp specific. */ struct Curl_llist easyq; /* List of easy handles using this connection */ - curl_seek_callback seek_func; /* function that seeks the input */ - void *seek_client; /* pointer to pass to the seek() above */ /*************** Request - specific items ************/ #if defined(USE_WINDOWS_SSPI) && defined(SECPKG_ATTR_ENDPOINT_BINDINGS) CtxtHandle *sslContext; #endif +#if defined(_WIN32) && defined(USE_WINSOCK) + struct curltime last_sndbuf_update; /* last time readwrite_upload called + win_update_buffer_size */ +#endif + #ifdef USE_GSASL struct gsasldata gsasl; #endif @@ -1028,11 +935,6 @@ struct connectdata { struct negotiatedata proxyneg; /* state data for proxy Negotiate auth */ #endif -#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_HTTP - /* for chunked-encoded trailer */ - struct dynbuf trailer; -#endif - union { #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_FTP struct ftp_conn ftpc; @@ -1093,17 +995,15 @@ struct connectdata { int socks5_gssapi_enctype; #endif /* The field below gets set in connect.c:connecthost() */ - int port; /* which port to use locally - to connect to */ int remote_port; /* the remote port, not the proxy port! */ int conn_to_port; /* the remote port to connect to. valid only if bits.conn_to_port is set */ -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 unsigned int scope_id; /* Scope id for IPv6 */ #endif unsigned short localport; unsigned short secondary_port; /* secondary socket remote port to connect to (ftp) */ - unsigned char cselect_bits; /* bitmask of socket events */ unsigned char alpn; /* APLN TLS negotiated protocol, a CURL_HTTP_VERSION* value */ #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY @@ -1149,22 +1049,16 @@ struct PureInfo { curl_off_t retry_after; /* info from Retry-After: header */ unsigned int header_size; /* size of read header(s) in bytes */ - /* PureInfo members 'conn_primary_ip', 'conn_primary_port', 'conn_local_ip' - and, 'conn_local_port' are copied over from the connectdata struct in - order to allow curl_easy_getinfo() to return this information even when - the session handle is no longer associated with a connection, and also - allow curl_easy_reset() to clear this information from the session handle - without disturbing information which is still alive, and that might be - reused, in the connection cache. */ - - char conn_primary_ip[MAX_IPADR_LEN]; - int conn_primary_port; /* this is the destination port to the connection, - which might have been a proxy */ + /* PureInfo primary ip_quadruple is copied over from the connectdata + struct in order to allow curl_easy_getinfo() to return this information + even when the session handle is no longer associated with a connection, + and also allow curl_easy_reset() to clear this information from the + session handle without disturbing information which is still alive, and + that might be reused, in the connection cache. */ + struct ip_quadruple primary; int conn_remote_port; /* this is the "remote port", which is the port number of the used URL, independent of proxy or not */ - char conn_local_ip[MAX_IPADR_LEN]; - int conn_local_port; const char *conn_scheme; unsigned int conn_protocol; struct curl_certinfo certs; /* info about the certs. Asked for with @@ -1172,6 +1066,7 @@ struct PureInfo { CURLproxycode pxcode; BIT(timecond); /* set to TRUE if the time condition didn't match, which thus made the document NOT get fetched */ + BIT(used_proxy); /* the transfer used a proxy */ }; @@ -1193,6 +1088,7 @@ struct Progress { curl_off_t dlspeed; curl_off_t ulspeed; + timediff_t t_postqueue; timediff_t t_nslookup; timediff_t t_connect; timediff_t t_appconnect; @@ -1276,18 +1172,6 @@ struct Curl_data_priority { #endif }; -/* - * This struct is for holding data that was attempted to get sent to the user's - * callback but is held due to pausing. One instance per type (BOTH, HEADER, - * BODY). - */ -struct tempbuf { - struct dynbuf b; - int type; /* type of the 'tempwrite' buffer as a bitmask that is used with - Curl_client_write() */ - BIT(paused_body); /* if PAUSE happened before/during BODY write */ -}; - /* Timers */ typedef enum { EXPIRE_100_TIMEOUT, @@ -1350,8 +1234,6 @@ struct UrlState { struct dynbuf headerb; /* buffer to store headers in */ struct curl_slist *hstslist; /* list of HSTS files set by curl_easy_setopt(HSTS) calls */ - char *buffer; /* download buffer */ - char *ulbuf; /* allocated upload buffer or NULL */ curl_off_t current_speed; /* the ProgressShow() function sets this, bytes / second */ @@ -1366,8 +1248,6 @@ struct UrlState { int retrycount; /* number of retries on a new connection */ struct Curl_ssl_session *session; /* array of 'max_ssl_sessions' size */ long sessionage; /* number of the most recent session */ - struct tempbuf tempwrite[3]; /* BOTH, HEADER, BODY */ - unsigned int tempcount; /* number of entries in use in tempwrite, 0 - 3 */ int os_errno; /* filled in with errno whenever an error occurs */ char *scratch; /* huge buffer[set.buffer_size*2] for upload CRLF replacing */ long followlocation; /* redirect counter */ @@ -1382,6 +1262,9 @@ struct UrlState { #endif struct auth authhost; /* auth details for host */ struct auth authproxy; /* auth details for proxy */ +#ifdef USE_CURL_ASYNC + struct Curl_async async; /* asynchronous name resolver data */ +#endif #if defined(USE_OPENSSL) /* void instead of ENGINE to avoid bleeding OpenSSL into this header */ @@ -1397,8 +1280,6 @@ struct UrlState { #if !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(MSDOS) && !defined(__EMX__) /* do FTP line-end conversions on most platforms */ #define CURL_DO_LINEEND_CONV - /* for FTP downloads: track CRLF sequences that span blocks */ - BIT(prev_block_had_trailing_cr); /* for FTP downloads: how many CRLFs did we converted to LFs? */ curl_off_t crlf_conversions; #endif @@ -1432,8 +1313,10 @@ struct UrlState { this should be dealt with in pretransfer */ #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_HTTP curl_mimepart *mimepost; +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_FORM_API curl_mimepart *formp; /* storage for old API form-posting, allocated on demand */ +#endif size_t trailers_bytes_sent; struct dynbuf trailers_buf; /* a buffer containing the compiled trailing headers */ @@ -1452,25 +1335,35 @@ struct UrlState { CURLcode hresult; /* used to pass return codes back from hyper callbacks */ #endif +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS + struct curl_trc_feat *feat; /* opt. trace feature transfer is part of */ +#endif + /* Dynamically allocated strings, MUST be freed before this struct is killed. */ struct dynamically_allocated_data { - char *proxyuserpwd; char *uagent; char *accept_encoding; char *userpwd; char *rangeline; char *ref; char *host; +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_COOKIES char *cookiehost; +#endif +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_RTSP char *rtsp_transport; +#endif char *te; /* TE: request header */ /* transfer credentials */ char *user; char *passwd; +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY + char *proxyuserpwd; char *proxyuser; char *proxypasswd; +#endif } aptr; unsigned char httpwant; /* when non-zero, a specific HTTP version requested @@ -1479,7 +1372,7 @@ struct UrlState { server involved in this request */ unsigned char httpreq; /* Curl_HttpReq; what kind of HTTP request (if any) is this */ - unsigned char dselect_bits; /* != 0 -> bitmask of socket events for this + unsigned char select_bits; /* != 0 -> bitmask of socket events for this transfer overriding anything the socket may report */ #ifdef CURLDEBUG @@ -1500,7 +1393,6 @@ struct UrlState { BIT(authproblem); /* TRUE if there's some problem authenticating */ /* set after initial USER failure, to prevent an authentication loop */ BIT(wildcardmatch); /* enable wildcard matching */ - BIT(expect100header); /* TRUE if we added Expect: 100-continue */ BIT(disableexpect); /* TRUE if Expect: is disabled due to a previous 417 response */ BIT(use_range); @@ -1508,7 +1400,6 @@ struct UrlState { BIT(done); /* set to FALSE when Curl_init_do() is called and set to TRUE when multi_done() is called, to prevent multi_done() to get invoked twice when the multi interface is used. */ - BIT(previouslypending); /* this transfer WAS in the multi->pending queue */ #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_COOKIES BIT(cookie_engine); #endif @@ -1519,9 +1410,6 @@ struct UrlState { BIT(url_alloc); /* URL string is malloc()'ed */ BIT(referer_alloc); /* referer string is malloc()ed */ BIT(wildcard_resolve); /* Set to true if any resolve change is a wildcard */ - BIT(rewindbeforesend);/* TRUE when the sending couldn't be stopped even - though it will be discarded. We must call the data - rewind callback before trying to send again. */ BIT(upload); /* upload request */ BIT(internal); /* internal: true if this easy handle was created for internal use and the user does not have ownership of the @@ -1539,95 +1427,127 @@ struct UrlState { struct Curl_multi; /* declared in multihandle.c */ -/* - * This enumeration MUST not use conditional directives (#ifdefs), new - * null terminated strings MUST be added to the enumeration immediately - * before STRING_LASTZEROTERMINATED, binary fields immediately before - * STRING_LAST. When doing so, ensure that the packages/OS400/chkstring.c - * test is updated and applicable changes for EBCDIC to ASCII conversion - * are catered for in curl_easy_setopt_ccsid() - */ enum dupstring { STRING_CERT, /* client certificate file name */ - STRING_CERT_PROXY, /* client certificate file name */ STRING_CERT_TYPE, /* format for certificate (default: PEM)*/ + STRING_KEY, /* private key file name */ + STRING_KEY_PASSWD, /* plain text private key password */ + STRING_KEY_TYPE, /* format for private key (default: PEM) */ + STRING_SSL_CAPATH, /* CA directory name (doesn't work on windows) */ + STRING_SSL_CAFILE, /* certificate file to verify peer against */ + STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY, /* public key file to verify peer against */ + STRING_SSL_CIPHER_LIST, /* list of ciphers to use */ + STRING_SSL_CIPHER13_LIST, /* list of TLS 1.3 ciphers to use */ + STRING_SSL_CRLFILE, /* crl file to check certificate */ + STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT, /* issuer cert file to check certificate */ + STRING_SERVICE_NAME, /* Service name */ +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY + STRING_CERT_PROXY, /* client certificate file name */ STRING_CERT_TYPE_PROXY, /* format for certificate (default: PEM)*/ + STRING_KEY_PROXY, /* private key file name */ + STRING_KEY_PASSWD_PROXY, /* plain text private key password */ + STRING_KEY_TYPE_PROXY, /* format for private key (default: PEM) */ + STRING_SSL_CAPATH_PROXY, /* CA directory name (doesn't work on windows) */ + STRING_SSL_CAFILE_PROXY, /* certificate file to verify peer against */ + STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY_PROXY, /* public key file to verify proxy */ + STRING_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_PROXY, /* list of ciphers to use */ + STRING_SSL_CIPHER13_LIST_PROXY, /* list of TLS 1.3 ciphers to use */ + STRING_SSL_CRLFILE_PROXY, /* crl file to check certificate */ + STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT_PROXY, /* issuer cert file to check certificate */ + STRING_PROXY_SERVICE_NAME, /* Proxy service name */ +#endif +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_COOKIES STRING_COOKIE, /* HTTP cookie string to send */ STRING_COOKIEJAR, /* dump all cookies to this file */ +#endif STRING_CUSTOMREQUEST, /* HTTP/FTP/RTSP request/method to use */ STRING_DEFAULT_PROTOCOL, /* Protocol to use when the URL doesn't specify */ STRING_DEVICE, /* local network interface/address to use */ STRING_ENCODING, /* Accept-Encoding string */ +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_FTP STRING_FTP_ACCOUNT, /* ftp account data */ STRING_FTP_ALTERNATIVE_TO_USER, /* command to send if USER/PASS fails */ STRING_FTPPORT, /* port to send with the FTP PORT command */ - STRING_KEY, /* private key file name */ - STRING_KEY_PROXY, /* private key file name */ - STRING_KEY_PASSWD, /* plain text private key password */ - STRING_KEY_PASSWD_PROXY, /* plain text private key password */ - STRING_KEY_TYPE, /* format for private key (default: PEM) */ - STRING_KEY_TYPE_PROXY, /* format for private key (default: PEM) */ +#endif +#if defined(HAVE_GSSAPI) STRING_KRB_LEVEL, /* krb security level */ +#endif +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_NETRC STRING_NETRC_FILE, /* if not NULL, use this instead of trying to find $HOME/.netrc */ +#endif +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY STRING_PROXY, /* proxy to use */ STRING_PRE_PROXY, /* pre socks proxy to use */ +#endif STRING_SET_RANGE, /* range, if used */ STRING_SET_REFERER, /* custom string for the HTTP referer field */ STRING_SET_URL, /* what original URL to work on */ - STRING_SSL_CAPATH, /* CA directory name (doesn't work on windows) */ - STRING_SSL_CAPATH_PROXY, /* CA directory name (doesn't work on windows) */ - STRING_SSL_CAFILE, /* certificate file to verify peer against */ - STRING_SSL_CAFILE_PROXY, /* certificate file to verify peer against */ - STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY, /* public key file to verify peer against */ - STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY_PROXY, /* public key file to verify proxy */ - STRING_SSL_CIPHER_LIST, /* list of ciphers to use */ - STRING_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_PROXY, /* list of ciphers to use */ - STRING_SSL_CIPHER13_LIST, /* list of TLS 1.3 ciphers to use */ - STRING_SSL_CIPHER13_LIST_PROXY, /* list of TLS 1.3 ciphers to use */ STRING_USERAGENT, /* User-Agent string */ - STRING_SSL_CRLFILE, /* crl file to check certificate */ - STRING_SSL_CRLFILE_PROXY, /* crl file to check certificate */ - STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT, /* issuer cert file to check certificate */ - STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT_PROXY, /* issuer cert file to check certificate */ STRING_SSL_ENGINE, /* name of ssl engine */ STRING_USERNAME, /* , if used */ STRING_PASSWORD, /* , if used */ STRING_OPTIONS, /* , if used */ +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY STRING_PROXYUSERNAME, /* Proxy , if used */ STRING_PROXYPASSWORD, /* Proxy , if used */ STRING_NOPROXY, /* List of hosts which should not use the proxy, if used */ +#endif +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_RTSP STRING_RTSP_SESSION_ID, /* Session ID to use */ STRING_RTSP_STREAM_URI, /* Stream URI for this request */ STRING_RTSP_TRANSPORT, /* Transport for this session */ +#endif +#ifdef USE_SSH STRING_SSH_PRIVATE_KEY, /* path to the private key file for auth */ STRING_SSH_PUBLIC_KEY, /* path to the public key file for auth */ STRING_SSH_HOST_PUBLIC_KEY_MD5, /* md5 of host public key in ascii hex */ STRING_SSH_HOST_PUBLIC_KEY_SHA256, /* sha256 of host public key in base64 */ STRING_SSH_KNOWNHOSTS, /* file name of knownhosts file */ - STRING_PROXY_SERVICE_NAME, /* Proxy service name */ - STRING_SERVICE_NAME, /* Service name */ +#endif +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_SMTP STRING_MAIL_FROM, STRING_MAIL_AUTH, +#endif +#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME, /* TLS auth */ - STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME_PROXY, /* TLS auth */ STRING_TLSAUTH_PASSWORD, /* TLS auth */ +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY + STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME_PROXY, /* TLS auth */ STRING_TLSAUTH_PASSWORD_PROXY, /* TLS auth */ +#endif +#endif STRING_BEARER, /* , if used */ +#ifdef USE_UNIX_SOCKETS STRING_UNIX_SOCKET_PATH, /* path to Unix socket, if used */ +#endif STRING_TARGET, /* CURLOPT_REQUEST_TARGET */ +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_DOH STRING_DOH, /* CURLOPT_DOH_URL */ +#endif +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_ALTSVC STRING_ALTSVC, /* CURLOPT_ALTSVC */ +#endif +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_HSTS STRING_HSTS, /* CURLOPT_HSTS */ +#endif STRING_SASL_AUTHZID, /* CURLOPT_SASL_AUTHZID */ +#ifdef USE_ARES STRING_DNS_SERVERS, STRING_DNS_INTERFACE, STRING_DNS_LOCAL_IP4, STRING_DNS_LOCAL_IP6, +#endif STRING_SSL_EC_CURVES, +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_AWS STRING_AWS_SIGV4, /* Parameters for V4 signature */ +#endif +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY STRING_HAPROXY_CLIENT_IP, /* CURLOPT_HAPROXY_CLIENT_IP */ +#endif + STRING_ECH_CONFIG, /* CURLOPT_ECH_CONFIG */ + STRING_ECH_PUBLIC, /* CURLOPT_ECH_PUBLIC */ /* -- end of null-terminated strings -- */ @@ -1642,13 +1562,15 @@ enum dupstring { enum dupblob { BLOB_CERT, - BLOB_CERT_PROXY, BLOB_KEY, - BLOB_KEY_PROXY, BLOB_SSL_ISSUERCERT, - BLOB_SSL_ISSUERCERT_PROXY, BLOB_CAINFO, +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY + BLOB_CERT_PROXY, + BLOB_KEY_PROXY, + BLOB_SSL_ISSUERCERT_PROXY, BLOB_CAINFO_PROXY, +#endif BLOB_LAST }; @@ -1730,7 +1652,9 @@ struct UserDefined { curl_off_t set_resume_from; /* continue [ftp] transfer from here */ struct curl_slist *headers; /* linked list of extra headers */ struct curl_httppost *httppost; /* linked list of old POST data */ +#if !defined(CURL_DISABLE_MIME) || !defined(CURL_DISABLE_FORM_API) curl_mimepart mimepost; /* MIME/POST data. */ +#endif #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_TELNET struct curl_slist *telnet_options; /* linked list of telnet options */ #endif @@ -1797,7 +1721,7 @@ struct UserDefined { unsigned int new_file_perms; /* when creating remote files */ char *str[STRING_LAST]; /* array of strings, pointing to allocated memory */ struct curl_blob *blobs[BLOB_LAST]; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 unsigned int scope_id; /* Scope id for IPv6 */ #endif curl_prot_t allowed_protocols; @@ -1865,7 +1789,9 @@ struct UserDefined { BIT(cookiesession); /* new cookie session? */ #endif BIT(crlf); /* convert crlf on ftp upload(?) */ +#ifdef USE_SSH BIT(ssh_compression); /* enable SSH compression */ +#endif /* Here follows boolean settings that define how to behave during this session. They are STATIC, set by libcurl users or at least initially @@ -1875,7 +1801,9 @@ struct UserDefined { don't want lengthy cleanups to delay termination, e.g. after a DNS timeout */ BIT(get_filetime); /* get the time and get of the remote file */ +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY BIT(tunnel_thru_httpproxy); /* use CONNECT through an HTTP proxy */ +#endif BIT(prefer_ascii); /* ASCII rather than binary */ BIT(remote_append); /* append, not overwrite, on upload */ #ifdef CURL_LIST_ONLY_PROTOCOL @@ -1902,7 +1830,9 @@ struct UserDefined { location: */ BIT(opt_no_body); /* as set with CURLOPT_NOBODY */ BIT(verbose); /* output verbosity */ +#if defined(HAVE_GSSAPI) BIT(krb); /* Kerberos connection requested */ +#endif BIT(reuse_forbid); /* forbidden to be reused, close after use */ BIT(reuse_fresh); /* do not reuse an existing connection */ BIT(no_signal); /* do not use any signal/alarm handler */ @@ -1927,9 +1857,13 @@ struct UserDefined { BIT(suppress_connect_headers); /* suppress proxy CONNECT response headers from user callbacks */ BIT(dns_shuffle_addresses); /* whether to shuffle addresses before use */ +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY BIT(haproxyprotocol); /* whether to send HAProxy PROXY protocol v1 header */ +#endif +#ifdef USE_UNIX_SOCKETS BIT(abstract_unix_socket); +#endif BIT(disallow_username_in_url); /* disallow username in url */ #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_DOH BIT(doh); /* DNS-over-HTTPS enabled */ @@ -1941,8 +1875,17 @@ struct UserDefined { #ifdef USE_WEBSOCKETS BIT(ws_raw_mode); #endif +#ifdef USE_ECH + int tls_ech; /* TLS ECH configuration */ +#endif }; +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_MIME +#define IS_MIME_POST(a) ((a)->set.mimepost.kind != MIMEKIND_NONE) +#else +#define IS_MIME_POST(a) FALSE +#endif + struct Names { struct Curl_hash *hostcache; enum { diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/cleartext.c b/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/cleartext.c index 972a874480..29389c2c75 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/cleartext.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/cleartext.c @@ -107,12 +107,11 @@ CURLcode Curl_auth_create_plain_message(const char *authzid, * valuep [in] - The user name or user's password. * out [out] - The result storage. * - * Returns CURLE_OK on success. + * Returns void. */ -CURLcode Curl_auth_create_login_message(const char *valuep, struct bufref *out) +void Curl_auth_create_login_message(const char *valuep, struct bufref *out) { Curl_bufref_set(out, valuep, strlen(valuep), NULL); - return CURLE_OK; } /* @@ -126,13 +125,13 @@ CURLcode Curl_auth_create_login_message(const char *valuep, struct bufref *out) * user [in] - The user name. * out [out] - The result storage. * - * Returns CURLE_OK on success. + * Returns void. */ -CURLcode Curl_auth_create_external_message(const char *user, +void Curl_auth_create_external_message(const char *user, struct bufref *out) { /* This is the same formatting as the login message */ - return Curl_auth_create_login_message(user, out); + Curl_auth_create_login_message(user, out); } #endif /* if no users */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/digest.c b/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/digest.c index 416da0fcc7..a742cce26e 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/digest.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/digest.c @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ #include "curl_hmac.h" #include "curl_md5.h" #include "curl_sha256.h" +#include "curl_sha512_256.h" #include "vtls/vtls.h" #include "warnless.h" #include "strtok.h" @@ -150,7 +151,7 @@ static void auth_digest_md5_to_ascii(unsigned char *source, /* 16 bytes */ msnprintf((char *) &dest[i * 2], 3, "%02x", source[i]); } -/* Convert sha256 chunk to RFC7616 -suitable ascii string */ +/* Convert sha256 or SHA-512/256 chunk to RFC7616 -suitable ascii string */ static void auth_digest_sha256_to_ascii(unsigned char *source, /* 32 bytes */ unsigned char *dest) /* 65 bytes */ { @@ -287,7 +288,7 @@ static CURLcode auth_decode_digest_md5_message(const struct bufref *chlgref, /* Retrieve realm string from the challenge */ if(!auth_digest_get_key_value(chlg, "realm=\"", realm, rlen, '\"')) { /* Challenge does not have a realm, set empty string [RFC2831] page 6 */ - strcpy(realm, ""); + *realm = '\0'; } /* Retrieve algorithm string from the challenge */ @@ -601,10 +602,20 @@ CURLcode Curl_auth_decode_digest_http_message(const char *chlg, digest->algo = ALGO_SHA256; else if(strcasecompare(content, "SHA-256-SESS")) digest->algo = ALGO_SHA256SESS; - else if(strcasecompare(content, "SHA-512-256")) + else if(strcasecompare(content, "SHA-512-256")) { +#ifdef CURL_HAVE_SHA512_256 digest->algo = ALGO_SHA512_256; - else if(strcasecompare(content, "SHA-512-256-SESS")) +#else /* ! CURL_HAVE_SHA512_256 */ + return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN; +#endif /* ! CURL_HAVE_SHA512_256 */ + } + else if(strcasecompare(content, "SHA-512-256-SESS")) { +#ifdef CURL_HAVE_SHA512_256 digest->algo = ALGO_SHA512_256SESS; +#else /* ! CURL_HAVE_SHA512_256 */ + return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN; +#endif /* ! CURL_HAVE_SHA512_256 */ + } else return CURLE_BAD_CONTENT_ENCODING; } @@ -717,8 +728,10 @@ static CURLcode auth_create_digest_http_message( if(!hashthis) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - hash(hashbuf, (unsigned char *) hashthis, strlen(hashthis)); + result = hash(hashbuf, (unsigned char *) hashthis, strlen(hashthis)); free(hashthis); + if(result) + return result; convert_to_ascii(hashbuf, (unsigned char *)userh); } @@ -738,8 +751,10 @@ static CURLcode auth_create_digest_http_message( if(!hashthis) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - hash(hashbuf, (unsigned char *) hashthis, strlen(hashthis)); + result = hash(hashbuf, (unsigned char *) hashthis, strlen(hashthis)); free(hashthis); + if(result) + return result; convert_to_ascii(hashbuf, ha1); if(digest->algo & SESSION_ALGO) { @@ -748,8 +763,10 @@ static CURLcode auth_create_digest_http_message( if(!tmp) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - hash(hashbuf, (unsigned char *) tmp, strlen(tmp)); + result = hash(hashbuf, (unsigned char *) tmp, strlen(tmp)); free(tmp); + if(result) + return result; convert_to_ascii(hashbuf, ha1); } @@ -775,7 +792,11 @@ static CURLcode auth_create_digest_http_message( char hashed[65]; char *hashthis2; - hash(hashbuf, (const unsigned char *)"", 0); + result = hash(hashbuf, (const unsigned char *)"", 0); + if(result) { + free(hashthis); + return result; + } convert_to_ascii(hashbuf, (unsigned char *)hashed); hashthis2 = aprintf("%s:%s", hashthis, hashed); @@ -786,8 +807,10 @@ static CURLcode auth_create_digest_http_message( if(!hashthis) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - hash(hashbuf, (unsigned char *) hashthis, strlen(hashthis)); + result = hash(hashbuf, (unsigned char *) hashthis, strlen(hashthis)); free(hashthis); + if(result) + return result; convert_to_ascii(hashbuf, ha2); if(digest->qop) { @@ -801,8 +824,10 @@ static CURLcode auth_create_digest_http_message( if(!hashthis) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - hash(hashbuf, (unsigned char *) hashthis, strlen(hashthis)); + result = hash(hashbuf, (unsigned char *) hashthis, strlen(hashthis)); free(hashthis); + if(result) + return result; convert_to_ascii(hashbuf, request_digest); /* For test case 64 (snooped from a Mozilla 1.3a request) @@ -957,12 +982,24 @@ CURLcode Curl_auth_create_digest_http_message(struct Curl_easy *data, outptr, outlen, auth_digest_md5_to_ascii, Curl_md5it); - DEBUGASSERT(digest->algo <= ALGO_SHA512_256SESS); - return auth_create_digest_http_message(data, userp, passwdp, - request, uripath, digest, - outptr, outlen, - auth_digest_sha256_to_ascii, - Curl_sha256it); + + if(digest->algo <= ALGO_SHA256SESS) + return auth_create_digest_http_message(data, userp, passwdp, + request, uripath, digest, + outptr, outlen, + auth_digest_sha256_to_ascii, + Curl_sha256it); +#ifdef CURL_HAVE_SHA512_256 + if(digest->algo <= ALGO_SHA512_256SESS) + return auth_create_digest_http_message(data, userp, passwdp, + request, uripath, digest, + outptr, outlen, + auth_digest_sha256_to_ascii, + Curl_sha512_256it); +#endif /* CURL_HAVE_SHA512_256 */ + + /* Should be unreachable */ + return CURLE_BAD_CONTENT_ENCODING; } /* diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/digest_sspi.c b/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/digest_sspi.c index 02e36ea5ed..4696f29add 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/digest_sspi.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/digest_sspi.c @@ -211,8 +211,10 @@ CURLcode Curl_auth_create_digest_md5_message(struct Curl_easy *data, if(status == SEC_E_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; +#if !defined(CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS) infof(data, "schannel: InitializeSecurityContext failed: %s", Curl_sspi_strerror(status, buffer, sizeof(buffer))); +#endif return CURLE_AUTH_ERROR; } @@ -603,8 +605,10 @@ CURLcode Curl_auth_create_digest_http_message(struct Curl_easy *data, if(status == SEC_E_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; +#if !defined(CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS) infof(data, "schannel: InitializeSecurityContext failed: %s", Curl_sspi_strerror(status, buffer, sizeof(buffer))); +#endif return CURLE_AUTH_ERROR; } diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/krb5_gssapi.c b/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/krb5_gssapi.c index 65eb3e1b50..16b6e4037f 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/krb5_gssapi.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/krb5_gssapi.c @@ -226,7 +226,8 @@ CURLcode Curl_auth_create_gssapi_security_message(struct Curl_easy *data, /* Extract the security layer and the maximum message size */ indata = output_token.value; sec_layer = indata[0]; - max_size = (indata[1] << 16) | (indata[2] << 8) | indata[3]; + max_size = ((unsigned int)indata[1] << 16) | + ((unsigned int)indata[2] << 8) | indata[3]; /* Free the challenge as it is not required anymore */ gss_release_buffer(&unused_status, &output_token); diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/krb5_sspi.c b/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/krb5_sspi.c index c487149b9d..17a517a975 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/krb5_sspi.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/krb5_sspi.c @@ -319,7 +319,8 @@ CURLcode Curl_auth_create_gssapi_security_message(struct Curl_easy *data, /* Extract the security layer and the maximum message size */ indata = input_buf[1].pvBuffer; sec_layer = indata[0]; - max_size = (indata[1] << 16) | (indata[2] << 8) | indata[3]; + max_size = ((unsigned long)indata[1] << 16) | + ((unsigned long)indata[2] << 8) | indata[3]; /* Free the challenge as it is not required anymore */ s_pSecFn->FreeContextBuffer(input_buf[1].pvBuffer); diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/ntlm.c b/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/ntlm.c index ed7cee8def..018e6a67ef 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/ntlm.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/ntlm.c @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ #include "warnless.h" #include "rand.h" #include "vtls/vtls.h" +#include "strdup.h" #define BUILDING_CURL_NTLM_MSGS_C #include "vauth/vauth.h" @@ -184,11 +185,10 @@ static CURLcode ntlm_decode_type2_target(struct Curl_easy *data, } free(ntlm->target_info); /* replace any previous data */ - ntlm->target_info = malloc(target_info_len); + ntlm->target_info = Curl_memdup(&type2[target_info_offset], + target_info_len); if(!ntlm->target_info) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - - memcpy(ntlm->target_info, &type2[target_info_offset], target_info_len); } } diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/ntlm_sspi.c b/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/ntlm_sspi.c index 5118963f4d..92054316dc 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/ntlm_sspi.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/ntlm_sspi.c @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ #include "warnless.h" #include "curl_multibyte.h" #include "sendf.h" +#include "strdup.h" /* The last #include files should be: */ #include "curl_memory.h" @@ -213,11 +214,10 @@ CURLcode Curl_auth_decode_ntlm_type2_message(struct Curl_easy *data, } /* Store the challenge for later use */ - ntlm->input_token = malloc(Curl_bufref_len(type2) + 1); + ntlm->input_token = Curl_memdup0((const char *)Curl_bufref_ptr(type2), + Curl_bufref_len(type2)); if(!ntlm->input_token) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - memcpy(ntlm->input_token, Curl_bufref_ptr(type2), Curl_bufref_len(type2)); - ntlm->input_token[Curl_bufref_len(type2)] = '\0'; ntlm->input_token_len = Curl_bufref_len(type2); return CURLE_OK; @@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_auth_create_ntlm_type3_message(struct Curl_easy *data, &type_3_desc, &attrs, &expiry); if(status != SEC_E_OK) { - infof(data, "NTLM handshake failure (type-3 message): Status=%x", + infof(data, "NTLM handshake failure (type-3 message): Status=%lx", status); if(status == SEC_E_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY) diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/vauth.h b/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/vauth.h index 9da0540892..7e823484f6 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/vauth.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vauth/vauth.h @@ -79,12 +79,10 @@ CURLcode Curl_auth_create_plain_message(const char *authzid, struct bufref *out); /* This is used to generate a LOGIN cleartext message */ -CURLcode Curl_auth_create_login_message(const char *value, - struct bufref *out); +void Curl_auth_create_login_message(const char *value, struct bufref *out); /* This is used to generate an EXTERNAL cleartext message */ -CURLcode Curl_auth_create_external_message(const char *user, - struct bufref *out); +void Curl_auth_create_external_message(const char *user, struct bufref *out); #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_DIGEST_AUTH /* This is used to generate a CRAM-MD5 response message */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/version.c b/vendor/curl/lib/version.c index f957f085d8..a5c8c4e613 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/version.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/version.c @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ #ifdef USE_LIBRTMP #include +#include "curl_rtmp.h" #endif #ifdef HAVE_LIBZ @@ -152,7 +153,7 @@ char *curl_version(void) #ifdef USE_NGHTTP2 char h2_version[40]; #endif -#ifdef ENABLE_QUIC +#ifdef USE_HTTP3 char h3_version[40]; #endif #ifdef USE_LIBRTMP @@ -174,8 +175,7 @@ char *curl_version(void) /* Override version string when environment variable CURL_VERSION is set */ const char *debugversion = getenv("CURL_VERSION"); if(debugversion) { - strncpy(out, debugversion, sizeof(out)-1); - out[sizeof(out)-1] = '\0'; + msnprintf(out, sizeof(out), "%s", debugversion); return out; } #endif @@ -208,11 +208,23 @@ char *curl_version(void) src[i++] = idn_version; #elif defined(USE_WIN32_IDN) src[i++] = (char *)"WinIDN"; +#elif defined(USE_APPLE_IDN) + src[i++] = (char *)"AppleIDN"; #endif #ifdef USE_LIBPSL - msnprintf(psl_version, sizeof(psl_version), "libpsl/%s", psl_get_version()); - src[i++] = psl_version; + { +#if defined(PSL_VERSION_MAJOR) && (PSL_VERSION_MAJOR > 0 || \ + PSL_VERSION_MINOR >= 11) + int num = psl_check_version_number(0); + msnprintf(psl_version, sizeof(psl_version), "libpsl/%d.%d.%d", + num >> 16, (num >> 8) & 0xff, num & 0xff); +#else + msnprintf(psl_version, sizeof(psl_version), "libpsl/%s", + psl_get_version()); +#endif + src[i++] = psl_version; + } #endif #ifdef USE_SSH @@ -223,25 +235,13 @@ char *curl_version(void) Curl_http2_ver(h2_version, sizeof(h2_version)); src[i++] = h2_version; #endif -#ifdef ENABLE_QUIC +#ifdef USE_HTTP3 Curl_quic_ver(h3_version, sizeof(h3_version)); src[i++] = h3_version; #endif #ifdef USE_LIBRTMP - { - char suff[2]; - if(RTMP_LIB_VERSION & 0xff) { - suff[0] = (RTMP_LIB_VERSION & 0xff) + 'a' - 1; - suff[1] = '\0'; - } - else - suff[0] = '\0'; - - msnprintf(rtmp_version, sizeof(rtmp_version), "librtmp/%d.%d%s", - RTMP_LIB_VERSION >> 16, (RTMP_LIB_VERSION >> 8) & 0xff, - suff); - src[i++] = rtmp_version; - } + Curl_rtmp_version(rtmp_version, sizeof(rtmp_version)); + src[i++] = rtmp_version; #endif #ifdef USE_HYPER msnprintf(hyper_buf, sizeof(hyper_buf), "Hyper/%s", hyper_version()); @@ -418,6 +418,14 @@ static int https_proxy_present(curl_version_info_data *info) } #endif +#if defined(USE_SSL) && defined(USE_ECH) +static int ech_present(curl_version_info_data *info) +{ + (void) info; + return Curl_ssl_supports(NULL, SSLSUPP_ECH); +} +#endif + /* * Features table. * @@ -446,6 +454,9 @@ static const struct feat features_table[] = { #ifdef DEBUGBUILD FEATURE("Debug", NULL, CURL_VERSION_DEBUG), #endif +#if defined(USE_SSL) && defined(USE_ECH) + FEATURE("ECH", ech_present, 0), +#endif #ifdef USE_GSASL FEATURE("gsasl", NULL, CURL_VERSION_GSASL), #endif @@ -458,17 +469,17 @@ static const struct feat features_table[] = { #if defined(USE_NGHTTP2) FEATURE("HTTP2", NULL, CURL_VERSION_HTTP2), #endif -#if defined(ENABLE_QUIC) +#if defined(USE_HTTP3) FEATURE("HTTP3", NULL, CURL_VERSION_HTTP3), #endif #if defined(USE_SSL) && !defined(CURL_DISABLE_PROXY) && \ !defined(CURL_DISABLE_HTTP) FEATURE("HTTPS-proxy", https_proxy_present, CURL_VERSION_HTTPS_PROXY), #endif -#if defined(USE_LIBIDN2) || defined(USE_WIN32_IDN) +#if defined(USE_LIBIDN2) || defined(USE_WIN32_IDN) || defined(USE_APPLE_IDN) FEATURE("IDN", idn_present, CURL_VERSION_IDN), #endif -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 FEATURE("IPv6", NULL, CURL_VERSION_IPV6), #endif #ifdef USE_KERBEROS5 @@ -487,10 +498,6 @@ static const struct feat features_table[] = { #ifdef USE_NTLM FEATURE("NTLM", NULL, CURL_VERSION_NTLM), #endif -#if !defined(CURL_DISABLE_HTTP) && defined(USE_NTLM) && \ - defined(NTLM_WB_ENABLED) - FEATURE("NTLM_WB", NULL, CURL_VERSION_NTLM_WB), -#endif #if defined(USE_LIBPSL) FEATURE("PSL", NULL, CURL_VERSION_PSL), #endif @@ -562,7 +569,8 @@ static curl_version_info_data version_info = { NULL, /* zstd version */ NULL, /* Hyper version */ NULL, /* gsasl version */ - feature_names + feature_names, + NULL /* rtmp version */ }; curl_version_info_data *curl_version_info(CURLversion stamp) @@ -637,7 +645,7 @@ curl_version_info_data *curl_version_info(CURLversion stamp) } #endif -#ifdef ENABLE_QUIC +#ifdef USE_HTTP3 { static char quicbuffer[80]; Curl_quic_ver(quicbuffer, sizeof(quicbuffer)); @@ -670,5 +678,13 @@ curl_version_info_data *curl_version_info(CURLversion stamp) feature_names[n] = NULL; /* Terminate array. */ version_info.features = features; +#ifdef USE_LIBRTMP + { + static char rtmp_version[30]; + Curl_rtmp_version(rtmp_version, sizeof(rtmp_version)); + version_info.rtmp_version = rtmp_version; + } +#endif + return &version_info; } diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/curl_msh3.c b/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/curl_msh3.c index 8ae3672400..d49af6ea4c 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/curl_msh3.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/curl_msh3.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #ifdef USE_MSH3 #include "urldata.h" +#include "hash.h" #include "timeval.h" #include "multiif.h" #include "sendf.h" @@ -118,6 +119,7 @@ struct cf_msh3_ctx { struct cf_call_data call_data; struct curltime connect_started; /* time the current attempt started */ struct curltime handshake_at; /* time connect handshake finished */ + struct Curl_hash streams; /* hash `data->id` to `stream_ctx` */ /* Flags written by msh3/msquic thread */ bool handshake_complete; bool handshake_succeeded; @@ -127,6 +129,8 @@ struct cf_msh3_ctx { BIT(active); }; +static struct cf_msh3_ctx *h3_get_msh3_ctx(struct Curl_easy *data); + /* How to access `call_data` from a cf_msh3 filter */ #undef CF_CTX_CALL_DATA #define CF_CTX_CALL_DATA(cf) \ @@ -153,18 +157,26 @@ struct stream_ctx { bool recv_header_complete; }; -#define H3_STREAM_CTX(d) ((struct stream_ctx *)(((d) && (d)->req.p.http)? \ - ((struct HTTP *)(d)->req.p.http)->h3_ctx \ - : NULL)) -#define H3_STREAM_LCTX(d) ((struct HTTP *)(d)->req.p.http)->h3_ctx -#define H3_STREAM_ID(d) (H3_STREAM_CTX(d)? \ - H3_STREAM_CTX(d)->id : -2) +#define H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx,data) ((struct stream_ctx *)((data && ctx)? \ + Curl_hash_offt_get(&(ctx)->streams, (data)->id) : NULL)) + +static void h3_stream_ctx_free(struct stream_ctx *stream) +{ + Curl_bufq_free(&stream->recvbuf); + free(stream); +} +static void h3_stream_hash_free(void *stream) +{ + DEBUGASSERT(stream); + h3_stream_ctx_free((struct stream_ctx *)stream); +} static CURLcode h3_data_setup(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) { - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct cf_msh3_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); if(stream) return CURLE_OK; @@ -173,25 +185,29 @@ static CURLcode h3_data_setup(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(!stream) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - H3_STREAM_LCTX(data) = stream; stream->req = ZERO_NULL; msh3_lock_initialize(&stream->recv_lock); Curl_bufq_init2(&stream->recvbuf, H3_STREAM_CHUNK_SIZE, H3_STREAM_RECV_CHUNKS, BUFQ_OPT_SOFT_LIMIT); CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "data setup"); + + if(!Curl_hash_offt_set(&ctx->streams, data->id, stream)) { + h3_stream_ctx_free(stream); + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + return CURLE_OK; } static void h3_data_done(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) { - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct cf_msh3_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); (void)cf; if(stream) { CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "easy handle is done"); - Curl_bufq_free(&stream->recvbuf); - free(stream); - H3_STREAM_LCTX(data) = NULL; + Curl_hash_offt_remove(&ctx->streams, data->id); } } @@ -204,8 +220,8 @@ static void drain_stream_from_other_thread(struct Curl_easy *data, bits = CURL_CSELECT_IN; if(stream && !stream->upload_done) bits |= CURL_CSELECT_OUT; - if(data->state.dselect_bits != bits) { - data->state.dselect_bits = bits; + if(data->state.select_bits != bits) { + data->state.select_bits = bits; /* cannot expire from other thread */ } } @@ -213,15 +229,16 @@ static void drain_stream_from_other_thread(struct Curl_easy *data, static void drain_stream(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) { - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct cf_msh3_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); unsigned char bits; (void)cf; bits = CURL_CSELECT_IN; if(stream && !stream->upload_done) bits |= CURL_CSELECT_OUT; - if(data->state.dselect_bits != bits) { - data->state.dselect_bits = bits; + if(data->state.select_bits != bits) { + data->state.select_bits = bits; Curl_expire(data, 0, EXPIRE_RUN_NOW); } } @@ -311,7 +328,8 @@ static int decode_status_code(const char *value, size_t len) static CURLcode write_resp_raw(struct Curl_easy *data, const void *mem, size_t memlen) { - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct cf_msh3_ctx *ctx = h3_get_msh3_ctx(data); + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; ssize_t nwritten; @@ -337,10 +355,12 @@ static void MSH3_CALL msh3_header_received(MSH3_REQUEST *Request, const MSH3_HEADER *hd) { struct Curl_easy *data = userp; - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct cf_msh3_ctx *ctx = h3_get_msh3_ctx(data); + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); CURLcode result; (void)Request; + DEBUGF(infof(data, "[MSH3] header received, stream=%d", !!stream)); if(!stream || stream->recv_header_complete) { return; } @@ -386,7 +406,8 @@ static bool MSH3_CALL msh3_data_received(MSH3_REQUEST *Request, const uint8_t *buf) { struct Curl_easy *data = IfContext; - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct cf_msh3_ctx *ctx = h3_get_msh3_ctx(data); + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); CURLcode result; bool rv = FALSE; @@ -425,7 +446,8 @@ static void MSH3_CALL msh3_complete(MSH3_REQUEST *Request, void *IfContext, bool aborted, uint64_t error) { struct Curl_easy *data = IfContext; - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct cf_msh3_ctx *ctx = h3_get_msh3_ctx(data); + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); (void)Request; if(!stream) @@ -444,7 +466,8 @@ static void MSH3_CALL msh3_shutdown_complete(MSH3_REQUEST *Request, void *IfContext) { struct Curl_easy *data = IfContext; - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct cf_msh3_ctx *ctx = h3_get_msh3_ctx(data); + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); if(!stream) return; @@ -456,7 +479,8 @@ static void MSH3_CALL msh3_data_sent(MSH3_REQUEST *Request, void *IfContext, void *SendContext) { struct Curl_easy *data = IfContext; - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct cf_msh3_ctx *ctx = h3_get_msh3_ctx(data); + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); if(!stream) return; (void)Request; @@ -468,7 +492,8 @@ static ssize_t recv_closed_stream(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, CURLcode *err) { - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct cf_msh3_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); ssize_t nread = -1; if(!stream) { @@ -501,7 +526,8 @@ static ssize_t recv_closed_stream(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, static void set_quic_expire(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) { - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct cf_msh3_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); /* we have no indication from msh3 when it would be a good time * to juggle the connection again. So, we compromise by calling @@ -518,17 +544,17 @@ static void set_quic_expire(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) static ssize_t cf_msh3_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, char *buf, size_t len, CURLcode *err) { - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct cf_msh3_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); ssize_t nread = -1; struct cf_call_data save; - (void)cf; + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "cf_recv(len=%zu), stream=%d", len, !!stream); if(!stream) { *err = CURLE_RECV_ERROR; return -1; } CF_DATA_SAVE(save, cf, data); - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "req: recv with %zu byte buffer", len); msh3_lock_acquire(&stream->recv_lock); @@ -570,7 +596,7 @@ static ssize_t cf_msh3_send(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, const void *buf, size_t len, CURLcode *err) { struct cf_msh3_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); struct h1_req_parser h1; struct dynhds h2_headers; MSH3_HEADER *nva = NULL; @@ -682,7 +708,7 @@ static void cf_msh3_adjust_pollset(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct easy_pollset *ps) { struct cf_msh3_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); struct cf_call_data save; CF_DATA_SAVE(save, cf, data); @@ -701,7 +727,8 @@ static void cf_msh3_adjust_pollset(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, static bool cf_msh3_data_pending(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, const struct Curl_easy *data) { - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct cf_msh3_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); struct cf_call_data save; bool pending = FALSE; @@ -722,23 +749,6 @@ static bool cf_msh3_data_pending(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, return pending; } -static void cf_msh3_active(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) -{ - struct cf_msh3_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - - /* use this socket from now on */ - cf->conn->sock[cf->sockindex] = ctx->sock[SP_LOCAL]; - /* the first socket info gets set at conn and data */ - if(cf->sockindex == FIRSTSOCKET) { - cf->conn->remote_addr = &ctx->addr; - #ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 - cf->conn->bits.ipv6 = (ctx->addr.family == AF_INET6)? TRUE : FALSE; - #endif - Curl_persistconninfo(data, cf->conn, ctx->l_ip, ctx->l_port); - } - ctx->active = TRUE; -} - static CURLcode h3_data_pause(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, bool pause) @@ -754,7 +764,8 @@ static CURLcode cf_msh3_data_event(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, int event, int arg1, void *arg2) { - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct cf_msh3_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); struct cf_call_data save; CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; @@ -785,10 +796,6 @@ static CURLcode cf_msh3_data_event(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, } } break; - case CF_CTRL_CONN_INFO_UPDATE: - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "req: update info"); - cf_msh3_active(cf, data); - break; default: break; } @@ -806,6 +813,7 @@ static CURLcode cf_connect_start(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, CURLcode result; bool verify; + Curl_hash_offt_init(&ctx->streams, 63, h3_stream_hash_free); conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf); if(!conn_config) return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; @@ -932,6 +940,7 @@ static void cf_msh3_close(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) MsH3ApiClose(ctx->api); ctx->api = NULL; } + Curl_hash_destroy(&ctx->streams); if(ctx->active) { /* We share our socket at cf->conn->sock[cf->sockindex] when active. @@ -1040,6 +1049,20 @@ struct Curl_cftype Curl_cft_http3 = { cf_msh3_query, }; +static struct cf_msh3_ctx *h3_get_msh3_ctx(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + if(data && data->conn) { + struct Curl_cfilter *cf = data->conn->cfilter[FIRSTSOCKET]; + while(cf) { + if(cf->cft == &Curl_cft_http3) + return cf->ctx; + cf = cf->next; + } + } + DEBUGF(infof(data, "no filter context found")); + return NULL; +} + CURLcode Curl_cf_msh3_create(struct Curl_cfilter **pcf, struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/curl_ngtcp2.c b/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/curl_ngtcp2.c index f09b10bef7..0d9d87f34a 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/curl_ngtcp2.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/curl_ngtcp2.c @@ -41,10 +41,10 @@ #include "vtls/gtls.h" #elif defined(USE_WOLFSSL) #include -#include "vtls/wolfssl.h" #endif #include "urldata.h" +#include "hash.h" #include "sendf.h" #include "strdup.h" #include "rand.h" @@ -59,8 +59,10 @@ #include "http1.h" #include "select.h" #include "inet_pton.h" +#include "transfer.h" #include "vquic.h" #include "vquic_int.h" +#include "vquic-tls.h" #include "vtls/keylog.h" #include "vtls/vtls.h" #include "curl_ngtcp2.h" @@ -73,9 +75,6 @@ #include "memdebug.h" -#define H3_ALPN_H3_29 "\x5h3-29" -#define H3_ALPN_H3 "\x2h3" - #define QUIC_MAX_STREAMS (256*1024) #define QUIC_MAX_DATA (1*1024*1024) #define QUIC_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT (10*NGTCP2_SECONDS) @@ -101,25 +100,6 @@ (H3_STREAM_WINDOW_SIZE / H3_STREAM_CHUNK_SIZE) -#ifdef USE_OPENSSL -#define QUIC_CIPHERS \ - "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:TLS_CHACHA20_" \ - "POLY1305_SHA256:TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256" -#define QUIC_GROUPS "P-256:X25519:P-384:P-521" -#elif defined(USE_GNUTLS) -#define QUIC_PRIORITY \ - "NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:-CIPHER-ALL:+AES-128-GCM:+AES-256-GCM:" \ - "+CHACHA20-POLY1305:+AES-128-CCM:-GROUP-ALL:+GROUP-SECP256R1:" \ - "+GROUP-X25519:+GROUP-SECP384R1:+GROUP-SECP521R1:" \ - "%DISABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE" -#elif defined(USE_WOLFSSL) -#define QUIC_CIPHERS \ - "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:TLS_CHACHA20_" \ - "POLY1305_SHA256:TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256" -#define QUIC_GROUPS "P-256:P-384:P-521" -#endif - - /* * Store ngtcp2 version info in this buffer. */ @@ -134,6 +114,7 @@ void Curl_ngtcp2_ver(char *p, size_t len) struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx { struct cf_quic_ctx q; struct ssl_peer peer; + struct curl_tls_ctx tls; ngtcp2_path connected_path; ngtcp2_conn *qconn; ngtcp2_cid dcid; @@ -143,30 +124,21 @@ struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx { ngtcp2_transport_params transport_params; ngtcp2_ccerr last_error; ngtcp2_crypto_conn_ref conn_ref; -#ifdef USE_OPENSSL - SSL_CTX *sslctx; - SSL *ssl; -#elif defined(USE_GNUTLS) - struct gtls_instance *gtls; -#elif defined(USE_WOLFSSL) - WOLFSSL_CTX *sslctx; - WOLFSSL *ssl; -#endif struct cf_call_data call_data; nghttp3_conn *h3conn; nghttp3_settings h3settings; struct curltime started_at; /* time the current attempt started */ struct curltime handshake_at; /* time connect handshake finished */ - struct curltime first_byte_at; /* when first byte was recvd */ struct curltime reconnect_at; /* time the next attempt should start */ struct bufc_pool stream_bufcp; /* chunk pool for streams */ + struct dynbuf scratch; /* temp buffer for header construction */ + struct Curl_hash streams; /* hash `data->id` to `h3_stream_ctx` */ size_t max_stream_window; /* max flow window for one stream */ uint64_t max_idle_ms; /* max idle time for QUIC connection */ + uint64_t used_bidi_streams; /* bidi streams we have opened */ + uint64_t max_bidi_streams; /* max bidi streams we can open */ int qlogfd; - BIT(got_first_byte); /* if first byte was received */ -#ifdef USE_OPENSSL - BIT(x509_store_setup); /* if x509 store has been set up */ -#endif + BIT(conn_closed); /* connection is closed */ }; /* How to access `call_data` from a cf_ngtcp2 filter */ @@ -174,20 +146,27 @@ struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx { #define CF_CTX_CALL_DATA(cf) \ ((struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *)(cf)->ctx)->call_data +struct pkt_io_ctx; +static CURLcode cf_progress_ingress(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + struct pkt_io_ctx *pktx); +static CURLcode cf_progress_egress(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + struct pkt_io_ctx *pktx); + /** * All about the H3 internals of a stream */ struct h3_stream_ctx { - int64_t id; /* HTTP/3 protocol identifier */ + curl_int64_t id; /* HTTP/3 protocol identifier */ struct bufq sendbuf; /* h3 request body */ - struct bufq recvbuf; /* h3 response body */ struct h1_req_parser h1; /* h1 request parsing */ size_t sendbuf_len_in_flight; /* sendbuf amount "in flight" */ size_t upload_blocked_len; /* the amount written last and EGAINed */ - size_t recv_buf_nonflow; /* buffered bytes, not counting for flow control */ - uint64_t error3; /* HTTP/3 stream error code */ + curl_uint64_t error3; /* HTTP/3 stream error code */ curl_off_t upload_left; /* number of request bytes left to upload */ int status_code; /* HTTP status code */ + CURLcode xfer_result; /* result from xfer_resp_write(_hd) */ bool resp_hds_complete; /* we have a complete, final response */ bool closed; /* TRUE on stream close */ bool reset; /* TRUE on stream reset */ @@ -195,18 +174,29 @@ struct h3_stream_ctx { BIT(quic_flow_blocked); /* stream is blocked by QUIC flow control */ }; -#define H3_STREAM_CTX(d) ((struct h3_stream_ctx *)(((d) && (d)->req.p.http)? \ - ((struct HTTP *)(d)->req.p.http)->h3_ctx \ - : NULL)) -#define H3_STREAM_LCTX(d) ((struct HTTP *)(d)->req.p.http)->h3_ctx -#define H3_STREAM_ID(d) (H3_STREAM_CTX(d)? \ - H3_STREAM_CTX(d)->id : -2) +#define H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx,data) ((struct h3_stream_ctx *)(\ + data? Curl_hash_offt_get(&(ctx)->streams, (data)->id) : NULL)) +#define H3_STREAM_CTX_ID(ctx,id) ((struct h3_stream_ctx *)(\ + Curl_hash_offt_get(&(ctx)->streams, (id)))) + +static void h3_stream_ctx_free(struct h3_stream_ctx *stream) +{ + Curl_bufq_free(&stream->sendbuf); + Curl_h1_req_parse_free(&stream->h1); + free(stream); +} + +static void h3_stream_hash_free(void *stream) +{ + DEBUGASSERT(stream); + h3_stream_ctx_free((struct h3_stream_ctx *)stream); +} static CURLcode h3_data_setup(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) { struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); if(!data || !data->req.p.http) { failf(data, "initialization failure, transfer not http initialized"); @@ -225,75 +215,95 @@ static CURLcode h3_data_setup(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, Curl_bufq_initp(&stream->sendbuf, &ctx->stream_bufcp, H3_STREAM_SEND_CHUNKS, BUFQ_OPT_NONE); stream->sendbuf_len_in_flight = 0; - /* on recv, we need a flexible buffer limit since we also write - * headers to it that are not counted against the nghttp3 flow limits. */ - Curl_bufq_initp(&stream->recvbuf, &ctx->stream_bufcp, - H3_STREAM_RECV_CHUNKS, BUFQ_OPT_SOFT_LIMIT); - stream->recv_buf_nonflow = 0; Curl_h1_req_parse_init(&stream->h1, H1_PARSE_DEFAULT_MAX_LINE_LEN); - H3_STREAM_LCTX(data) = stream; + if(!Curl_hash_offt_set(&ctx->streams, data->id, stream)) { + h3_stream_ctx_free(stream); + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + return CURLE_OK; } -static void h3_data_done(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) +static void cf_ngtcp2_stream_close(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream) { struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + DEBUGASSERT(data); + DEBUGASSERT(stream); + if(!stream->closed && ctx->qconn && ctx->h3conn) { + CURLcode result; + + nghttp3_conn_set_stream_user_data(ctx->h3conn, stream->id, NULL); + ngtcp2_conn_set_stream_user_data(ctx->qconn, stream->id, NULL); + stream->closed = TRUE; + (void)ngtcp2_conn_shutdown_stream(ctx->qconn, 0, stream->id, + NGHTTP3_H3_REQUEST_CANCELLED); + result = cf_progress_egress(cf, data, NULL); + if(result) + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] cancel stream -> %d", + stream->id, result); + } +} +static void h3_data_done(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); (void)cf; if(stream) { - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%"PRId64"] easy handle is done", stream->id); - if(ctx->h3conn && !stream->closed) { - nghttp3_conn_shutdown_stream_read(ctx->h3conn, stream->id); - nghttp3_conn_close_stream(ctx->h3conn, stream->id, - NGHTTP3_H3_REQUEST_CANCELLED); - nghttp3_conn_set_stream_user_data(ctx->h3conn, stream->id, NULL); - ngtcp2_conn_set_stream_user_data(ctx->qconn, stream->id, NULL); - stream->closed = TRUE; - } - - Curl_bufq_free(&stream->sendbuf); - Curl_bufq_free(&stream->recvbuf); - Curl_h1_req_parse_free(&stream->h1); - free(stream); - H3_STREAM_LCTX(data) = NULL; + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] easy handle is done", + stream->id); + cf_ngtcp2_stream_close(cf, data, stream); + Curl_hash_offt_remove(&ctx->streams, data->id); } } static struct Curl_easy *get_stream_easy(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, - int64_t stream_id) + int64_t stream_id, + struct h3_stream_ctx **pstream) { + struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; struct Curl_easy *sdata; + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream; (void)cf; - if(H3_STREAM_ID(data) == stream_id) { + stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); + if(stream && stream->id == stream_id) { + *pstream = stream; return data; } else { DEBUGASSERT(data->multi); for(sdata = data->multi->easyp; sdata; sdata = sdata->next) { - if((sdata->conn == data->conn) && H3_STREAM_ID(sdata) == stream_id) { + if(sdata->conn != data->conn) + continue; + stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, sdata); + if(stream && stream->id == stream_id) { + *pstream = stream; return sdata; } } } + *pstream = NULL; return NULL; } static void h3_drain_stream(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) { - struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); unsigned char bits; (void)cf; bits = CURL_CSELECT_IN; if(stream && stream->upload_left && !stream->send_closed) bits |= CURL_CSELECT_OUT; - if(data->state.dselect_bits != bits) { - data->state.dselect_bits = bits; + if(data->state.select_bits != bits) { + data->state.select_bits = bits; Curl_expire(data, 0, EXPIRE_RUN_NOW); } } @@ -331,12 +341,6 @@ static void pktx_init(struct pkt_io_ctx *pktx, pktx_update_time(pktx, cf); } -static CURLcode cf_progress_ingress(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, - struct Curl_easy *data, - struct pkt_io_ctx *pktx); -static CURLcode cf_progress_egress(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, - struct Curl_easy *data, - struct pkt_io_ctx *pktx); static int cb_h3_acked_req_body(nghttp3_conn *conn, int64_t stream_id, uint64_t datalen, void *user_data, void *stream_user_data); @@ -413,432 +417,69 @@ static void quic_settings(struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx, } } -#ifdef USE_OPENSSL -static void keylog_callback(const SSL *ssl, const char *line) -{ - (void)ssl; - Curl_tls_keylog_write_line(line); -} -#elif defined(USE_GNUTLS) -static int keylog_callback(gnutls_session_t session, const char *label, - const gnutls_datum_t *secret) -{ - gnutls_datum_t crandom; - gnutls_datum_t srandom; - - gnutls_session_get_random(session, &crandom, &srandom); - if(crandom.size != 32) { - return -1; - } - - Curl_tls_keylog_write(label, crandom.data, secret->data, secret->size); - return 0; -} -#elif defined(USE_WOLFSSL) -#if defined(HAVE_SECRET_CALLBACK) -static void keylog_callback(const WOLFSSL *ssl, const char *line) -{ - (void)ssl; - Curl_tls_keylog_write_line(line); -} -#endif -#endif - static int init_ngh3_conn(struct Curl_cfilter *cf); -#ifdef USE_OPENSSL -static CURLcode quic_ssl_ctx(SSL_CTX **pssl_ctx, - struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) -{ - struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config; - CURLcode result = CURLE_FAILED_INIT; - - SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method()); - if(!ssl_ctx) { - result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - goto out; - } - conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf); - if(!conn_config) { - result = CURLE_FAILED_INIT; - goto out; - } - -#if defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) || defined(OPENSSL_IS_AWSLC) - if(ngtcp2_crypto_boringssl_configure_client_context(ssl_ctx) != 0) { - failf(data, "ngtcp2_crypto_boringssl_configure_client_context failed"); - goto out; - } -#else - if(ngtcp2_crypto_quictls_configure_client_context(ssl_ctx) != 0) { - failf(data, "ngtcp2_crypto_quictls_configure_client_context failed"); - goto out; - } -#endif - - SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ssl_ctx); - - { - const char *curves = conn_config->curves ? - conn_config->curves : QUIC_GROUPS; - if(!SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list(ssl_ctx, curves)) { - failf(data, "failed setting curves list for QUIC: '%s'", curves); - return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER; - } - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL - { - const char *ciphers13 = conn_config->cipher_list13 ? - conn_config->cipher_list13 : QUIC_CIPHERS; - if(SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(ssl_ctx, ciphers13) != 1) { - failf(data, "failed setting QUIC cipher suite: %s", ciphers13); - return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER; - } - infof(data, "QUIC cipher selection: %s", ciphers13); - } -#endif - - /* Open the file if a TLS or QUIC backend has not done this before. */ - Curl_tls_keylog_open(); - if(Curl_tls_keylog_enabled()) { - SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(ssl_ctx, keylog_callback); - } - - /* OpenSSL always tries to verify the peer, this only says whether it should - * fail to connect if the verification fails, or if it should continue - * anyway. In the latter case the result of the verification is checked with - * SSL_get_verify_result() below. */ - SSL_CTX_set_verify(ssl_ctx, conn_config->verifypeer ? - SSL_VERIFY_PEER : SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL); - - /* give application a chance to interfere with SSL set up. */ - if(data->set.ssl.fsslctx) { - /* When a user callback is installed to modify the SSL_CTX, - * we need to do the full initialization before calling it. - * See: #11800 */ - if(!ctx->x509_store_setup) { - result = Curl_ssl_setup_x509_store(cf, data, ssl_ctx); - if(result) - goto out; - ctx->x509_store_setup = TRUE; - } - Curl_set_in_callback(data, true); - result = (*data->set.ssl.fsslctx)(data, ssl_ctx, - data->set.ssl.fsslctxp); - Curl_set_in_callback(data, false); - if(result) { - failf(data, "error signaled by ssl ctx callback"); - goto out; - } - } - result = CURLE_OK; - -out: - *pssl_ctx = result? NULL : ssl_ctx; - if(result && ssl_ctx) - SSL_CTX_free(ssl_ctx); - return result; -} - -static CURLcode quic_set_client_cert(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, - struct Curl_easy *data) +static int cb_handshake_completed(ngtcp2_conn *tconn, void *user_data) { - struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = ctx->sslctx; - const struct ssl_config_data *ssl_config; - - ssl_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_config(cf, data); - DEBUGASSERT(ssl_config); - - if(ssl_config->primary.clientcert || ssl_config->primary.cert_blob - || ssl_config->cert_type) { - return Curl_ossl_set_client_cert( - data, ssl_ctx, ssl_config->primary.clientcert, - ssl_config->primary.cert_blob, ssl_config->cert_type, - ssl_config->key, ssl_config->key_blob, - ssl_config->key_type, ssl_config->key_passwd); - } - - return CURLE_OK; + (void)user_data; + (void)tconn; + return 0; } -/** SSL callbacks ***/ +static void cf_ngtcp2_conn_close(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data); -static CURLcode quic_init_ssl(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, - struct Curl_easy *data) -{ - struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - const uint8_t *alpn = NULL; - size_t alpnlen = 0; - - DEBUGASSERT(!ctx->ssl); - ctx->ssl = SSL_new(ctx->sslctx); - - SSL_set_app_data(ctx->ssl, &ctx->conn_ref); - SSL_set_connect_state(ctx->ssl); - SSL_set_quic_use_legacy_codepoint(ctx->ssl, 0); - - alpn = (const uint8_t *)H3_ALPN_H3_29 H3_ALPN_H3; - alpnlen = sizeof(H3_ALPN_H3_29) - 1 + sizeof(H3_ALPN_H3) - 1; - if(alpn) - SSL_set_alpn_protos(ctx->ssl, alpn, (int)alpnlen); - - /* set SNI */ - if(ctx->peer.sni) { - if(!SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(ctx->ssl, ctx->peer.sni)) { - failf(data, "Failed set SNI"); - SSL_free(ctx->ssl); - ctx->ssl = NULL; - return CURLE_QUIC_CONNECT_ERROR; - } - } - return CURLE_OK; -} -#elif defined(USE_GNUTLS) -static CURLcode quic_init_ssl(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, - struct Curl_easy *data) +static bool cf_ngtcp2_err_is_fatal(int code) { - struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config; - CURLcode result; - gnutls_datum_t alpn[2]; - /* this will need some attention when HTTPS proxy over QUIC get fixed */ - long * const pverifyresult = &data->set.ssl.certverifyresult; - int rc; - - conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf); - if(!conn_config) - return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; - - DEBUGASSERT(ctx->gtls == NULL); - ctx->gtls = calloc(1, sizeof(*(ctx->gtls))); - if(!ctx->gtls) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - - result = gtls_client_init(data, conn_config, &data->set.ssl, - &ctx->peer, ctx->gtls, pverifyresult); - if(result) - return result; - - gnutls_session_set_ptr(ctx->gtls->session, &ctx->conn_ref); - - if(ngtcp2_crypto_gnutls_configure_client_session(ctx->gtls->session) != 0) { - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, - "ngtcp2_crypto_gnutls_configure_client_session failed\n"); - return CURLE_QUIC_CONNECT_ERROR; - } - - rc = gnutls_priority_set_direct(ctx->gtls->session, QUIC_PRIORITY, NULL); - if(rc < 0) { - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "gnutls_priority_set_direct failed: %s\n", - gnutls_strerror(rc)); - return CURLE_QUIC_CONNECT_ERROR; - } - - /* Open the file if a TLS or QUIC backend has not done this before. */ - Curl_tls_keylog_open(); - if(Curl_tls_keylog_enabled()) { - gnutls_session_set_keylog_function(ctx->gtls->session, keylog_callback); - } - - /* strip the first byte (the length) from NGHTTP3_ALPN_H3 */ - alpn[0].data = (unsigned char *)H3_ALPN_H3_29 + 1; - alpn[0].size = sizeof(H3_ALPN_H3_29) - 2; - alpn[1].data = (unsigned char *)H3_ALPN_H3 + 1; - alpn[1].size = sizeof(H3_ALPN_H3) - 2; - - gnutls_alpn_set_protocols(ctx->gtls->session, - alpn, 2, GNUTLS_ALPN_MANDATORY); - return CURLE_OK; + return (NGTCP2_ERR_FATAL >= code) || + (NGTCP2_ERR_DROP_CONN == code) || + (NGTCP2_ERR_IDLE_CLOSE == code); } -#elif defined(USE_WOLFSSL) -static CURLcode quic_ssl_ctx(WOLFSSL_CTX **pssl_ctx, - struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) +static void cf_ngtcp2_err_set(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, int code) { - CURLcode result = CURLE_FAILED_INIT; - struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config; - WOLFSSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = NULL; - - conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf); - if(!conn_config) { - result = CURLE_FAILED_INIT; - goto out; - } - - ssl_ctx = wolfSSL_CTX_new(wolfTLSv1_3_client_method()); - if(!ssl_ctx) { - result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - goto out; - } - - if(ngtcp2_crypto_wolfssl_configure_client_context(ssl_ctx) != 0) { - failf(data, "ngtcp2_crypto_wolfssl_configure_client_context failed"); - result = CURLE_FAILED_INIT; - goto out; - } - - wolfSSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ssl_ctx); - - if(wolfSSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ssl_ctx, conn_config->cipher_list13 ? - conn_config->cipher_list13 : - QUIC_CIPHERS) != 1) { - char error_buffer[256]; - ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)); - failf(data, "wolfSSL failed to set ciphers: %s", error_buffer); - goto out; - } - - if(wolfSSL_CTX_set1_groups_list(ssl_ctx, conn_config->curves ? - conn_config->curves : - (char *)QUIC_GROUPS) != 1) { - failf(data, "wolfSSL failed to set curves"); - goto out; - } - - /* Open the file if a TLS or QUIC backend has not done this before. */ - Curl_tls_keylog_open(); - if(Curl_tls_keylog_enabled()) { -#if defined(HAVE_SECRET_CALLBACK) - wolfSSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(ssl_ctx, keylog_callback); -#else - failf(data, "wolfSSL was built without keylog callback"); - goto out; -#endif - } - - if(conn_config->verifypeer) { - const char * const ssl_cafile = conn_config->CAfile; - const char * const ssl_capath = conn_config->CApath; - - wolfSSL_CTX_set_verify(ssl_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, NULL); - if(ssl_cafile || ssl_capath) { - /* tell wolfSSL where to find CA certificates that are used to verify - the server's certificate. */ - int rc = - wolfSSL_CTX_load_verify_locations_ex(ssl_ctx, ssl_cafile, ssl_capath, - WOLFSSL_LOAD_FLAG_IGNORE_ERR); - if(SSL_SUCCESS != rc) { - /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */ - failf(data, "error setting certificate verify locations:" - " CAfile: %s CApath: %s", - ssl_cafile ? ssl_cafile : "none", - ssl_capath ? ssl_capath : "none"); - goto out; - } - infof(data, " CAfile: %s", ssl_cafile ? ssl_cafile : "none"); - infof(data, " CApath: %s", ssl_capath ? ssl_capath : "none"); + struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + if(!ctx->last_error.error_code) { + if(NGTCP2_ERR_CRYPTO == code) { + ngtcp2_ccerr_set_tls_alert(&ctx->last_error, + ngtcp2_conn_get_tls_alert(ctx->qconn), + NULL, 0); } -#ifdef CURL_CA_FALLBACK else { - /* verifying the peer without any CA certificates won't work so - use wolfssl's built-in default as fallback */ - wolfSSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ssl_ctx); + ngtcp2_ccerr_set_liberr(&ctx->last_error, code, NULL, 0); } -#endif } - else { - wolfSSL_CTX_set_verify(ssl_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL); - } - - /* give application a chance to interfere with SSL set up. */ - if(data->set.ssl.fsslctx) { - Curl_set_in_callback(data, true); - result = (*data->set.ssl.fsslctx)(data, ssl_ctx, - data->set.ssl.fsslctxp); - Curl_set_in_callback(data, false); - if(result) { - failf(data, "error signaled by ssl ctx callback"); - goto out; - } - } - result = CURLE_OK; - -out: - *pssl_ctx = result? NULL : ssl_ctx; - if(result && ssl_ctx) - SSL_CTX_free(ssl_ctx); - return result; + if(cf_ngtcp2_err_is_fatal(code)) + cf_ngtcp2_conn_close(cf, data); } -/** SSL callbacks ***/ - -static CURLcode quic_init_ssl(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, - struct Curl_easy *data) +static bool cf_ngtcp2_h3_err_is_fatal(int code) { - struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - const uint8_t *alpn = NULL; - size_t alpnlen = 0; - /* this will need some attention when HTTPS proxy over QUIC get fixed */ - const char * const hostname = cf->conn->host.name; - - (void)data; - DEBUGASSERT(!ctx->ssl); - ctx->ssl = wolfSSL_new(ctx->sslctx); - - wolfSSL_set_app_data(ctx->ssl, &ctx->conn_ref); - wolfSSL_set_connect_state(ctx->ssl); - wolfSSL_set_quic_use_legacy_codepoint(ctx->ssl, 0); - - alpn = (const uint8_t *)H3_ALPN_H3_29 H3_ALPN_H3; - alpnlen = sizeof(H3_ALPN_H3_29) - 1 + sizeof(H3_ALPN_H3) - 1; - if(alpn) - wolfSSL_set_alpn_protos(ctx->ssl, alpn, (int)alpnlen); - - /* set SNI */ - wolfSSL_UseSNI(ctx->ssl, WOLFSSL_SNI_HOST_NAME, - hostname, (unsigned short)strlen(hostname)); - - return CURLE_OK; + return (NGHTTP3_ERR_FATAL >= code) || + (NGHTTP3_ERR_H3_CLOSED_CRITICAL_STREAM == code); } -#endif /* defined(USE_WOLFSSL) */ -static int cb_handshake_completed(ngtcp2_conn *tconn, void *user_data) +static void cf_ngtcp2_h3_err_set(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, int code) { - (void)user_data; - (void)tconn; - return 0; -} - -static void report_consumed_data(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, - struct Curl_easy *data, - size_t consumed) -{ - struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - - if(!stream) - return; - /* the HTTP/1.1 response headers are written to the buffer, but - * consuming those does not count against flow control. */ - if(stream->recv_buf_nonflow) { - if(consumed >= stream->recv_buf_nonflow) { - consumed -= stream->recv_buf_nonflow; - stream->recv_buf_nonflow = 0; - } - else { - stream->recv_buf_nonflow -= consumed; - consumed = 0; - } - } - if(consumed > 0) { - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] ACK %zu bytes of DATA", - stream->id, consumed); - ngtcp2_conn_extend_max_stream_offset(ctx->qconn, stream->id, - consumed); - ngtcp2_conn_extend_max_offset(ctx->qconn, consumed); + if(!ctx->last_error.error_code) { + ngtcp2_ccerr_set_application_error(&ctx->last_error, + nghttp3_err_infer_quic_app_error_code(code), NULL, 0); } + if(cf_ngtcp2_h3_err_is_fatal(code)) + cf_ngtcp2_conn_close(cf, data); } static int cb_recv_stream_data(ngtcp2_conn *tconn, uint32_t flags, - int64_t stream_id, uint64_t offset, + int64_t sid, uint64_t offset, const uint8_t *buf, size_t buflen, void *user_data, void *stream_user_data) { struct Curl_cfilter *cf = user_data; struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + curl_int64_t stream_id = (curl_int64_t)sid; nghttp3_ssize nconsumed; int fin = (flags & NGTCP2_STREAM_DATA_FLAG_FIN) ? 1 : 0; struct Curl_easy *data = stream_user_data; @@ -847,18 +488,18 @@ static int cb_recv_stream_data(ngtcp2_conn *tconn, uint32_t flags, nconsumed = nghttp3_conn_read_stream(ctx->h3conn, stream_id, buf, buflen, fin); - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] read_stream(len=%zu) -> %zd", - stream_id, buflen, nconsumed); + if(!data) + data = CF_DATA_CURRENT(cf); + if(data) + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] read_stream(len=%zu) -> %zd", + stream_id, buflen, nconsumed); if(nconsumed < 0) { - if(!data) { - struct Curl_easy *cdata = CF_DATA_CURRENT(cf); - CURL_TRC_CF(cdata, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] nghttp3 error on stream not " - "used by us, ignored", stream_id); - return 0; + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX_ID(ctx, stream_id); + if(data && stream) { + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] error on known stream, " + "reset=%d, closed=%d", + stream_id, stream->reset, stream->closed); } - ngtcp2_ccerr_set_application_error( - &ctx->last_error, - nghttp3_err_infer_quic_app_error_code((int)nconsumed), NULL, 0); return NGTCP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; } @@ -894,41 +535,45 @@ cb_acked_stream_data_offset(ngtcp2_conn *tconn, int64_t stream_id, } static int cb_stream_close(ngtcp2_conn *tconn, uint32_t flags, - int64_t stream3_id, uint64_t app_error_code, + int64_t sid, uint64_t app_error_code, void *user_data, void *stream_user_data) { struct Curl_cfilter *cf = user_data; - struct Curl_easy *data = stream_user_data; struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct Curl_easy *data = stream_user_data; + curl_int64_t stream_id = (curl_int64_t)sid; int rv; (void)tconn; - (void)data; /* stream is closed... */ + if(!data) + data = CF_DATA_CURRENT(cf); + if(!data) + return NGTCP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; if(!(flags & NGTCP2_STREAM_CLOSE_FLAG_APP_ERROR_CODE_SET)) { app_error_code = NGHTTP3_H3_NO_ERROR; } - rv = nghttp3_conn_close_stream(ctx->h3conn, stream3_id, - app_error_code); - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] quic close(err=%" - PRIu64 ") -> %d", stream3_id, app_error_code, rv); + rv = nghttp3_conn_close_stream(ctx->h3conn, stream_id, app_error_code); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] quic close(app_error=%" + CURL_PRIu64 ") -> %d", stream_id, (curl_uint64_t)app_error_code, + rv); if(rv && rv != NGHTTP3_ERR_STREAM_NOT_FOUND) { - ngtcp2_ccerr_set_application_error( - &ctx->last_error, nghttp3_err_infer_quic_app_error_code(rv), NULL, 0); + cf_ngtcp2_h3_err_set(cf, data, rv); return NGTCP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; } return 0; } -static int cb_stream_reset(ngtcp2_conn *tconn, int64_t stream_id, +static int cb_stream_reset(ngtcp2_conn *tconn, int64_t sid, uint64_t final_size, uint64_t app_error_code, void *user_data, void *stream_user_data) { struct Curl_cfilter *cf = user_data; struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + curl_int64_t stream_id = (curl_int64_t)sid; struct Curl_easy *data = stream_user_data; int rv; (void)tconn; @@ -937,7 +582,7 @@ static int cb_stream_reset(ngtcp2_conn *tconn, int64_t stream_id, (void)data; rv = nghttp3_conn_shutdown_stream_read(ctx->h3conn, stream_id); - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] reset -> %d", stream_id, rv); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] reset -> %d", stream_id, rv); if(rv && rv != NGHTTP3_ERR_STREAM_NOT_FOUND) { return NGTCP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; } @@ -968,19 +613,26 @@ static int cb_extend_max_local_streams_bidi(ngtcp2_conn *tconn, uint64_t max_streams, void *user_data) { - (void)tconn; - (void)max_streams; - (void)user_data; + struct Curl_cfilter *cf = user_data; + struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct Curl_easy *data = CF_DATA_CURRENT(cf); + (void)tconn; + ctx->max_bidi_streams = max_streams; + if(data) + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "max bidi streams now %" CURL_PRIu64 + ", used %" CURL_PRIu64, (curl_uint64_t)ctx->max_bidi_streams, + (curl_uint64_t)ctx->used_bidi_streams); return 0; } -static int cb_extend_max_stream_data(ngtcp2_conn *tconn, int64_t stream_id, +static int cb_extend_max_stream_data(ngtcp2_conn *tconn, int64_t sid, uint64_t max_data, void *user_data, void *stream_user_data) { struct Curl_cfilter *cf = user_data; struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + curl_int64_t stream_id = (curl_int64_t)sid; struct Curl_easy *data = CF_DATA_CURRENT(cf); struct Curl_easy *s_data; struct h3_stream_ctx *stream; @@ -993,12 +645,12 @@ static int cb_extend_max_stream_data(ngtcp2_conn *tconn, int64_t stream_id, if(rv && rv != NGHTTP3_ERR_STREAM_NOT_FOUND) { return NGTCP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; } - s_data = get_stream_easy(cf, data, stream_id); - stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(s_data); - if(stream && stream->quic_flow_blocked) { - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] unblock quic flow", stream_id); + s_data = get_stream_easy(cf, data, stream_id, &stream); + if(s_data && stream && stream->quic_flow_blocked) { + CURL_TRC_CF(s_data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] unblock quic flow", + stream_id); stream->quic_flow_blocked = FALSE; - h3_drain_stream(cf, data); + h3_drain_stream(cf, s_data); } return 0; } @@ -1128,7 +780,7 @@ static CURLcode check_and_set_expiry(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(rv) { failf(data, "ngtcp2_conn_handle_expiry returned error: %s", ngtcp2_strerror(rv)); - ngtcp2_ccerr_set_liberr(&ctx->last_error, rv, NULL, 0); + cf_ngtcp2_err_set(cf, data, rv); return CURLE_SEND_ERROR; } result = cf_progress_ingress(cf, data, pktx); @@ -1157,18 +809,22 @@ static void cf_ngtcp2_adjust_pollset(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct easy_pollset *ps) { struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - bool want_recv = CURL_WANT_RECV(data); - bool want_send = CURL_WANT_SEND(data); + bool want_recv, want_send; - if(ctx->qconn && (want_recv || want_send)) { - struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + if(!ctx->qconn) + return; + + Curl_pollset_check(data, ps, ctx->q.sockfd, &want_recv, &want_send); + if(want_recv || want_send) { + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); struct cf_call_data save; bool c_exhaust, s_exhaust; CF_DATA_SAVE(save, cf, data); - c_exhaust = !ngtcp2_conn_get_cwnd_left(ctx->qconn) || - !ngtcp2_conn_get_max_data_left(ctx->qconn); - s_exhaust = stream && stream->id >= 0 && stream->quic_flow_blocked; + c_exhaust = want_send && (!ngtcp2_conn_get_cwnd_left(ctx->qconn) || + !ngtcp2_conn_get_max_data_left(ctx->qconn)); + s_exhaust = want_send && stream && stream->id >= 0 && + stream->quic_flow_blocked; want_recv = (want_recv || c_exhaust || s_exhaust); want_send = (!s_exhaust && want_send) || !Curl_bufq_is_empty(&ctx->q.sendbuf); @@ -1178,13 +834,15 @@ static void cf_ngtcp2_adjust_pollset(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, } } -static int cb_h3_stream_close(nghttp3_conn *conn, int64_t stream_id, +static int cb_h3_stream_close(nghttp3_conn *conn, int64_t sid, uint64_t app_error_code, void *user_data, void *stream_user_data) { struct Curl_cfilter *cf = user_data; + struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; struct Curl_easy *data = stream_user_data; - struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + curl_int64_t stream_id = (curl_int64_t)sid; + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); (void)conn; (void)stream_id; @@ -1193,63 +851,60 @@ static int cb_h3_stream_close(nghttp3_conn *conn, int64_t stream_id, return 0; stream->closed = TRUE; - stream->error3 = app_error_code; + stream->error3 = (curl_uint64_t)app_error_code; if(stream->error3 != NGHTTP3_H3_NO_ERROR) { stream->reset = TRUE; stream->send_closed = TRUE; - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] RESET: error %" PRId64, + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] RESET: error %" CURL_PRIu64, stream->id, stream->error3); } else { - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] CLOSED", stream->id); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] CLOSED", stream->id); } h3_drain_stream(cf, data); return 0; } -/* - * write_resp_raw() copies response data in raw format to the `data`'s - * receive buffer. If not enough space is available, it appends to the - * `data`'s overflow buffer. - */ -static CURLcode write_resp_raw(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, - struct Curl_easy *data, - const void *mem, size_t memlen, - bool flow) +static void h3_xfer_write_resp_hd(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream, + const char *buf, size_t blen, bool eos) { - struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); - CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; - ssize_t nwritten; - (void)cf; - if(!stream) { - return CURLE_RECV_ERROR; - } - nwritten = Curl_bufq_write(&stream->recvbuf, mem, memlen, &result); - if(nwritten < 0) { - return result; + /* If we already encountered an error, skip further writes */ + if(!stream->xfer_result) { + stream->xfer_result = Curl_xfer_write_resp_hd(data, buf, blen, eos); + if(stream->xfer_result) + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%"CURL_PRId64"] error %d writing %zu " + "bytes of headers", stream->id, stream->xfer_result, blen); } +} - if(!flow) - stream->recv_buf_nonflow += (size_t)nwritten; +static void h3_xfer_write_resp(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream, + const char *buf, size_t blen, bool eos) +{ - if((size_t)nwritten < memlen) { - /* This MUST not happen. Our recbuf is dimensioned to hold the - * full max_stream_window and then some for this very reason. */ - DEBUGASSERT(0); - return CURLE_RECV_ERROR; + /* If we already encountered an error, skip further writes */ + if(!stream->xfer_result) { + stream->xfer_result = Curl_xfer_write_resp(data, buf, blen, eos); + /* If the transfer write is errored, we do not want any more data */ + if(stream->xfer_result) { + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%"CURL_PRId64"] error %d writing %zu bytes " + "of data", stream->id, stream->xfer_result, blen); + } } - return result; } static int cb_h3_recv_data(nghttp3_conn *conn, int64_t stream3_id, - const uint8_t *buf, size_t buflen, + const uint8_t *buf, size_t blen, void *user_data, void *stream_user_data) { struct Curl_cfilter *cf = user_data; + struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; struct Curl_easy *data = stream_user_data; - struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); - CURLcode result; + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); (void)conn; (void)stream3_id; @@ -1257,14 +912,14 @@ static int cb_h3_recv_data(nghttp3_conn *conn, int64_t stream3_id, if(!stream) return NGHTTP3_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; - result = write_resp_raw(cf, data, buf, buflen, TRUE); - if(result) { - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] DATA len=%zu, ERROR receiving %d", - stream->id, buflen, result); - return NGHTTP3_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; + h3_xfer_write_resp(cf, data, stream, (char *)buf, blen, FALSE); + if(blen) { + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] ACK %zu bytes of DATA", + stream->id, blen); + ngtcp2_conn_extend_max_stream_offset(ctx->qconn, stream->id, blen); + ngtcp2_conn_extend_max_offset(ctx->qconn, blen); } - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] DATA len=%zu", stream->id, buflen); - h3_drain_stream(cf, data); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] DATA len=%zu", stream->id, blen); return 0; } @@ -1284,13 +939,14 @@ static int cb_h3_deferred_consume(nghttp3_conn *conn, int64_t stream3_id, return 0; } -static int cb_h3_end_headers(nghttp3_conn *conn, int64_t stream_id, +static int cb_h3_end_headers(nghttp3_conn *conn, int64_t sid, int fin, void *user_data, void *stream_user_data) { struct Curl_cfilter *cf = user_data; + struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; struct Curl_easy *data = stream_user_data; - struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); - CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + curl_int64_t stream_id = (curl_int64_t)sid; + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); (void)conn; (void)stream_id; (void)fin; @@ -1299,12 +955,9 @@ static int cb_h3_end_headers(nghttp3_conn *conn, int64_t stream_id, if(!stream) return 0; /* add a CRLF only if we've received some headers */ - result = write_resp_raw(cf, data, "\r\n", 2, FALSE); - if(result) { - return -1; - } + h3_xfer_write_resp_hd(cf, data, stream, STRCONST("\r\n"), stream->closed); - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] end_headers, status=%d", + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] end_headers, status=%d", stream_id, stream->status_code); if(stream->status_code / 100 != 1) { stream->resp_hds_complete = TRUE; @@ -1313,16 +966,18 @@ static int cb_h3_end_headers(nghttp3_conn *conn, int64_t stream_id, return 0; } -static int cb_h3_recv_header(nghttp3_conn *conn, int64_t stream_id, +static int cb_h3_recv_header(nghttp3_conn *conn, int64_t sid, int32_t token, nghttp3_rcbuf *name, nghttp3_rcbuf *value, uint8_t flags, void *user_data, void *stream_user_data) { struct Curl_cfilter *cf = user_data; + struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + curl_int64_t stream_id = (curl_int64_t)sid; nghttp3_vec h3name = nghttp3_rcbuf_get_buf(name); nghttp3_vec h3val = nghttp3_rcbuf_get_buf(value); struct Curl_easy *data = stream_user_data; - struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; (void)conn; (void)stream_id; @@ -1335,42 +990,45 @@ static int cb_h3_recv_header(nghttp3_conn *conn, int64_t stream_id, return 0; if(token == NGHTTP3_QPACK_TOKEN__STATUS) { - char line[14]; /* status line is always 13 characters long */ - size_t ncopy; result = Curl_http_decode_status(&stream->status_code, (const char *)h3val.base, h3val.len); if(result) return -1; - ncopy = msnprintf(line, sizeof(line), "HTTP/3 %03d \r\n", - stream->status_code); - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] status: %s", stream_id, line); - result = write_resp_raw(cf, data, line, ncopy, FALSE); + Curl_dyn_reset(&ctx->scratch); + result = Curl_dyn_addn(&ctx->scratch, STRCONST("HTTP/3 ")); + if(!result) + result = Curl_dyn_addn(&ctx->scratch, + (const char *)h3val.base, h3val.len); + if(!result) + result = Curl_dyn_addn(&ctx->scratch, STRCONST(" \r\n")); + if(!result) + h3_xfer_write_resp_hd(cf, data, stream, Curl_dyn_ptr(&ctx->scratch), + Curl_dyn_len(&ctx->scratch), FALSE); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] status: %s", + stream_id, Curl_dyn_ptr(&ctx->scratch)); if(result) { return -1; } } else { /* store as an HTTP1-style header */ - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] header: %.*s: %.*s", + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] header: %.*s: %.*s", stream_id, (int)h3name.len, h3name.base, (int)h3val.len, h3val.base); - result = write_resp_raw(cf, data, h3name.base, h3name.len, FALSE); - if(result) { - return -1; - } - result = write_resp_raw(cf, data, ": ", 2, FALSE); - if(result) { - return -1; - } - result = write_resp_raw(cf, data, h3val.base, h3val.len, FALSE); - if(result) { - return -1; - } - result = write_resp_raw(cf, data, "\r\n", 2, FALSE); - if(result) { - return -1; - } + Curl_dyn_reset(&ctx->scratch); + result = Curl_dyn_addn(&ctx->scratch, + (const char *)h3name.base, h3name.len); + if(!result) + result = Curl_dyn_addn(&ctx->scratch, STRCONST(": ")); + if(!result) + result = Curl_dyn_addn(&ctx->scratch, + (const char *)h3val.base, h3val.len); + if(!result) + result = Curl_dyn_addn(&ctx->scratch, STRCONST("\r\n")); + if(!result) + h3_xfer_write_resp_hd(cf, data, stream, Curl_dyn_ptr(&ctx->scratch), + Curl_dyn_len(&ctx->scratch), FALSE); } return 0; } @@ -1394,11 +1052,12 @@ static int cb_h3_stop_sending(nghttp3_conn *conn, int64_t stream_id, return 0; } -static int cb_h3_reset_stream(nghttp3_conn *conn, int64_t stream_id, +static int cb_h3_reset_stream(nghttp3_conn *conn, int64_t sid, uint64_t app_error_code, void *user_data, void *stream_user_data) { struct Curl_cfilter *cf = user_data; struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + curl_int64_t stream_id = (curl_int64_t)sid; struct Curl_easy *data = stream_user_data; int rv; (void)conn; @@ -1406,7 +1065,7 @@ static int cb_h3_reset_stream(nghttp3_conn *conn, int64_t stream_id, rv = ngtcp2_conn_shutdown_stream_write(ctx->qconn, 0, stream_id, app_error_code); - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] reset -> %d", stream_id, rv); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] reset -> %d", stream_id, rv); if(rv && rv != NGTCP2_ERR_STREAM_NOT_FOUND) { return NGTCP2_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; } @@ -1502,14 +1161,14 @@ static ssize_t recv_closed_stream(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, (void)cf; if(stream->reset) { failf(data, - "HTTP/3 stream %" PRId64 " reset by server", stream->id); - *err = stream->resp_hds_complete? CURLE_PARTIAL_FILE : CURLE_HTTP3; + "HTTP/3 stream %" CURL_PRId64 " reset by server", stream->id); + *err = data->req.bytecount? CURLE_PARTIAL_FILE : CURLE_HTTP3; goto out; } else if(!stream->resp_hds_complete) { failf(data, - "HTTP/3 stream %" PRId64 " was closed cleanly, but before getting" - " all response header fields, treated as error", + "HTTP/3 stream %" CURL_PRId64 " was closed cleanly, but before " + "getting all response header fields, treated as error", stream->id); *err = CURLE_HTTP3; goto out; @@ -1523,15 +1182,16 @@ static ssize_t recv_closed_stream(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, /* incoming data frames on the h3 stream */ static ssize_t cf_ngtcp2_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, - char *buf, size_t len, CURLcode *err) + char *buf, size_t blen, CURLcode *err) { struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); ssize_t nread = -1; struct cf_call_data save; struct pkt_io_ctx pktx; (void)ctx; + (void)buf; CF_DATA_SAVE(save, cf, data); DEBUGASSERT(cf->connected); @@ -1542,51 +1202,30 @@ static ssize_t cf_ngtcp2_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, pktx_init(&pktx, cf, data); - if(!stream) { + if(!stream || ctx->conn_closed) { *err = CURLE_RECV_ERROR; goto out; } - if(!Curl_bufq_is_empty(&stream->recvbuf)) { - nread = Curl_bufq_read(&stream->recvbuf, - (unsigned char *)buf, len, err); - if(nread < 0) { - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] read recvbuf(len=%zu) " - "-> %zd, %d", stream->id, len, nread, *err); - goto out; - } - report_consumed_data(cf, data, nread); - } - if(cf_progress_ingress(cf, data, &pktx)) { *err = CURLE_RECV_ERROR; nread = -1; goto out; } - /* recvbuf had nothing before, maybe after progressing ingress? */ - if(nread < 0 && !Curl_bufq_is_empty(&stream->recvbuf)) { - nread = Curl_bufq_read(&stream->recvbuf, - (unsigned char *)buf, len, err); - if(nread < 0) { - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] read recvbuf(len=%zu) " - "-> %zd, %d", stream->id, len, nread, *err); - goto out; - } - report_consumed_data(cf, data, nread); - } - - if(nread > 0) { - h3_drain_stream(cf, data); - } - else { - if(stream->closed) { - nread = recv_closed_stream(cf, data, stream, err); - goto out; - } - *err = CURLE_AGAIN; + if(stream->xfer_result) { + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] xfer write failed", stream->id); + cf_ngtcp2_stream_close(cf, data, stream); + *err = stream->xfer_result; nread = -1; + goto out; } + else if(stream->closed) { + nread = recv_closed_stream(cf, data, stream, err); + goto out; + } + *err = CURLE_AGAIN; + nread = -1; out: if(cf_progress_egress(cf, data, &pktx)) { @@ -1600,8 +1239,8 @@ static ssize_t cf_ngtcp2_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, nread = -1; } } - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] cf_recv(len=%zu) -> %zd, %d", - stream? stream->id : -1, len, nread, *err); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] cf_recv(blen=%zu) -> %zd, %d", + stream? stream->id : -1, blen, nread, *err); CF_DATA_RESTORE(cf, save); return nread; } @@ -1611,8 +1250,9 @@ static int cb_h3_acked_req_body(nghttp3_conn *conn, int64_t stream_id, void *stream_user_data) { struct Curl_cfilter *cf = user_data; + struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; struct Curl_easy *data = stream_user_data; - struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); size_t skiplen; (void)cf; @@ -1645,8 +1285,9 @@ cb_h3_read_req_body(nghttp3_conn *conn, int64_t stream_id, void *stream_user_data) { struct Curl_cfilter *cf = user_data; + struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; struct Curl_easy *data = stream_user_data; - struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); ssize_t nwritten = 0; size_t nvecs = 0; (void)cf; @@ -1689,12 +1330,12 @@ cb_h3_read_req_body(nghttp3_conn *conn, int64_t stream_id, } else if(!nwritten) { /* Not EOF, and nothing to give, we signal WOULDBLOCK. */ - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] read req body -> AGAIN", + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] read req body -> AGAIN", stream->id); return NGHTTP3_ERR_WOULDBLOCK; } - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] read req body -> " + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] read req body -> " "%d vecs%s with %zu (buffered=%zu, left=%" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T ")", stream->id, (int)nvecs, @@ -1715,6 +1356,7 @@ static ssize_t h3_stream_open(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, { struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = NULL; + int64_t sid; struct dynhds h2_headers; size_t nheader; nghttp3_nv *nva = NULL; @@ -1729,7 +1371,7 @@ static ssize_t h3_stream_open(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, *err = h3_data_setup(cf, data); if(*err) goto out; - stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); DEBUGASSERT(stream); if(!stream) { *err = CURLE_FAILED_INIT; @@ -1770,12 +1412,15 @@ static ssize_t h3_stream_open(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, nva[i].flags = NGHTTP3_NV_FLAG_NONE; } - rc = ngtcp2_conn_open_bidi_stream(ctx->qconn, &stream->id, data); + rc = ngtcp2_conn_open_bidi_stream(ctx->qconn, &sid, data); if(rc) { failf(data, "can get bidi streams"); *err = CURLE_SEND_ERROR; + nwritten = -1; goto out; } + stream->id = (curl_int64_t)sid; + ++ctx->used_bidi_streams; switch(data->state.httpreq) { case HTTPREQ_POST: @@ -1806,12 +1451,12 @@ static ssize_t h3_stream_open(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(rc) { switch(rc) { case NGHTTP3_ERR_CONN_CLOSING: - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "h3sid[%"PRId64"] failed to send, " + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "h3sid[%" CURL_PRId64 "] failed to send, " "connection is closing", stream->id); break; default: - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "h3sid[%"PRId64"] failed to send -> %d (%s)", - stream->id, rc, ngtcp2_strerror(rc)); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "h3sid[%" CURL_PRId64 "] failed to send -> " + "%d (%s)", stream->id, rc, ngtcp2_strerror(rc)); break; } *err = CURLE_SEND_ERROR; @@ -1820,10 +1465,10 @@ static ssize_t h3_stream_open(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, } if(Curl_trc_is_verbose(data)) { - infof(data, "[HTTP/3] [%" PRId64 "] OPENED stream for %s", + infof(data, "[HTTP/3] [%" CURL_PRId64 "] OPENED stream for %s", stream->id, data->state.url); for(i = 0; i < nheader; ++i) { - infof(data, "[HTTP/3] [%" PRId64 "] [%.*s: %.*s]", stream->id, + infof(data, "[HTTP/3] [%" CURL_PRId64 "] [%.*s: %.*s]", stream->id, (int)nva[i].namelen, nva[i].name, (int)nva[i].valuelen, nva[i].value); } @@ -1839,7 +1484,7 @@ static ssize_t cf_ngtcp2_send(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, const void *buf, size_t len, CURLcode *err) { struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); ssize_t sent = 0; struct cf_call_data save; struct pkt_io_ctx pktx; @@ -1859,12 +1504,25 @@ static ssize_t cf_ngtcp2_send(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, } if(!stream || stream->id < 0) { + if(ctx->conn_closed) { + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "cannot open stream on closed connection"); + *err = CURLE_SEND_ERROR; + sent = -1; + goto out; + } sent = h3_stream_open(cf, data, buf, len, err); if(sent < 0) { CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "failed to open stream -> %d", *err); goto out; } - stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); + } + else if(stream->xfer_result) { + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] xfer write failed", stream->id); + cf_ngtcp2_stream_close(cf, data, stream); + *err = stream->xfer_result; + sent = -1; + goto out; } else if(stream->upload_blocked_len) { /* the data in `buf` has already been submitted or added to the @@ -1888,19 +1546,27 @@ static ssize_t cf_ngtcp2_send(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, * body. This happens on 30x or 40x responses. * We silently discard the data sent, since this is not a transport * error situation. */ - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] discarding data" + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] discarding data" "on closed stream with response", stream->id); *err = CURLE_OK; sent = (ssize_t)len; goto out; } + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] send_body(len=%zu) " + "-> stream closed", stream->id, len); *err = CURLE_HTTP3; sent = -1; goto out; } + else if(ctx->conn_closed) { + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "cannot send on closed connection"); + *err = CURLE_SEND_ERROR; + sent = -1; + goto out; + } else { sent = Curl_bufq_write(&stream->sendbuf, buf, len, err); - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] cf_send, add to " + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] cf_send, add to " "sendbuf(len=%zu) -> %zd, %d", stream->id, len, sent, *err); if(sent < 0) { @@ -1921,7 +1587,7 @@ static ssize_t cf_ngtcp2_send(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, * caller. Instead we EAGAIN and remember how much we have already * "written" into our various internal connection buffers. */ stream->upload_blocked_len = sent; - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] cf_send(len=%zu), " + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] cf_send(len=%zu), " "%zu bytes in flight -> EGAIN", stream->id, len, stream->sendbuf_len_in_flight); *err = CURLE_AGAIN; @@ -1934,7 +1600,7 @@ static ssize_t cf_ngtcp2_send(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, *err = result; sent = -1; } - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] cf_send(len=%zu) -> %zd, %d", + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] cf_send(len=%zu) -> %zd, %d", stream? stream->id : -1, len, sent, *err); CF_DATA_RESTORE(cf, save); return sent; @@ -1944,49 +1610,12 @@ static CURLcode qng_verify_peer(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) { struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config; - CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; - - conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf); - if(!conn_config) - return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; cf->conn->bits.multiplex = TRUE; /* at least potentially multiplexed */ cf->conn->httpversion = 30; cf->conn->bundle->multiuse = BUNDLE_MULTIPLEX; - if(conn_config->verifyhost) { -#ifdef USE_OPENSSL - X509 *server_cert; - server_cert = SSL_get1_peer_certificate(ctx->ssl); - if(!server_cert) { - return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; - } - result = Curl_ossl_verifyhost(data, cf->conn, &ctx->peer, server_cert); - X509_free(server_cert); - if(result) - return result; -#elif defined(USE_GNUTLS) - result = Curl_gtls_verifyserver(data, ctx->gtls->session, - conn_config, &data->set.ssl, &ctx->peer, - data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY]); - if(result) - return result; -#elif defined(USE_WOLFSSL) - if(!ctx->peer.sni || - wolfSSL_check_domain_name(ctx->ssl, ctx->peer.sni) == SSL_FAILURE) - return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; -#endif - infof(data, "Verified certificate just fine"); - } - else - infof(data, "Skipped certificate verification"); -#ifdef USE_OPENSSL - if(data->set.ssl.certinfo) - /* asked to gather certificate info */ - (void)Curl_ossl_certchain(data, ctx->ssl); -#endif - return result; + return Curl_vquic_tls_verify_peer(&ctx->tls, cf, data, &ctx->peer); } static CURLcode recv_pkt(const unsigned char *pkt, size_t pktlen, @@ -2011,16 +1640,7 @@ static CURLcode recv_pkt(const unsigned char *pkt, size_t pktlen, if(rv) { CURL_TRC_CF(pktx->data, pktx->cf, "ingress, read_pkt -> %s (%d)", ngtcp2_strerror(rv), rv); - if(!ctx->last_error.error_code) { - if(rv == NGTCP2_ERR_CRYPTO) { - ngtcp2_ccerr_set_tls_alert(&ctx->last_error, - ngtcp2_conn_get_tls_alert(ctx->qconn), - NULL, 0); - } - else { - ngtcp2_ccerr_set_liberr(&ctx->last_error, rv, NULL, 0); - } - } + cf_ngtcp2_err_set(pktx->cf, pktx->data, rv); if(rv == NGTCP2_ERR_CRYPTO) /* this is a "TLS problem", but a failed certificate verification @@ -2039,7 +1659,6 @@ static CURLcode cf_progress_ingress(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; struct pkt_io_ctx local_pktx; size_t pkts_chunk = 128, i; - size_t pkts_max = 10 * pkts_chunk; CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; if(!pktx) { @@ -2050,26 +1669,17 @@ static CURLcode cf_progress_ingress(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, pktx_update_time(pktx, cf); } -#ifdef USE_OPENSSL - if(!ctx->x509_store_setup) { - result = Curl_ssl_setup_x509_store(cf, data, ctx->sslctx); - if(result) - return result; - ctx->x509_store_setup = TRUE; - } -#endif + result = Curl_vquic_tls_before_recv(&ctx->tls, cf, data); + if(result) + return result; - for(i = 0; i < pkts_max; i += pkts_chunk) { + for(i = 0; i < 4; ++i) { + if(i) + pktx_update_time(pktx, cf); pktx->pkt_count = 0; result = vquic_recv_packets(cf, data, &ctx->q, pkts_chunk, recv_pkt, pktx); - if(result) /* error */ - break; - if(pktx->pkt_count < pkts_chunk) /* got less than we could */ - break; - /* give egress a chance before we receive more */ - result = cf_progress_egress(cf, data, pktx); - if(result) /* error */ + if(result || !pktx->pkt_count) /* error or got nothing */ break; } return result; @@ -2113,9 +1723,7 @@ static ssize_t read_pkt_to_send(void *userp, if(veccnt < 0) { failf(x->data, "nghttp3_conn_writev_stream returned error: %s", nghttp3_strerror((int)veccnt)); - ngtcp2_ccerr_set_application_error( - &ctx->last_error, - nghttp3_err_infer_quic_app_error_code((int)veccnt), NULL, 0); + cf_ngtcp2_h3_err_set(x->cf, x->data, (int)veccnt); *err = CURLE_SEND_ERROR; return -1; } @@ -2136,11 +1744,11 @@ static ssize_t read_pkt_to_send(void *userp, else if(n < 0) { switch(n) { case NGTCP2_ERR_STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED: { - struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(x->data); + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, x->data); DEBUGASSERT(ndatalen == -1); nghttp3_conn_block_stream(ctx->h3conn, stream_id); - CURL_TRC_CF(x->data, x->cf, "[%" PRId64 "] block quic flow", - stream_id); + CURL_TRC_CF(x->data, x->cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] block quic flow", + (curl_int64_t)stream_id); DEBUGASSERT(stream); if(stream) stream->quic_flow_blocked = TRUE; @@ -2162,7 +1770,7 @@ static ssize_t read_pkt_to_send(void *userp, DEBUGASSERT(ndatalen == -1); failf(x->data, "ngtcp2_conn_writev_stream returned error: %s", ngtcp2_strerror((int)n)); - ngtcp2_ccerr_set_liberr(&ctx->last_error, (int)n, NULL, 0); + cf_ngtcp2_err_set(x->cf, x->data, (int)n); *err = CURLE_SEND_ERROR; nwritten = -1; goto out; @@ -2220,7 +1828,7 @@ static CURLcode cf_progress_egress(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, } /* In UDP, there is a maximum theoretical packet paload length and - * a minimum payload length that is "guarantueed" to work. + * a minimum payload length that is "guaranteed" to work. * To detect if this minimum payload can be increased, ngtcp2 sends * now and then a packet payload larger than the minimum. It that * is ACKed by the peer, both parties know that it works and @@ -2308,9 +1916,9 @@ static CURLcode cf_progress_egress(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, static bool cf_ngtcp2_data_pending(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, const struct Curl_easy *data) { - const struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); (void)cf; - return stream && !Curl_bufq_is_empty(&stream->recvbuf); + (void)data; + return FALSE; } static CURLcode h3_data_pause(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, @@ -2350,7 +1958,7 @@ static CURLcode cf_ngtcp2_data_event(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, h3_data_done(cf, data); break; case CF_CTRL_DATA_DONE_SEND: { - struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); if(stream && !stream->send_closed) { stream->send_closed = TRUE; stream->upload_left = Curl_bufq_len(&stream->sendbuf); @@ -2359,7 +1967,7 @@ static CURLcode cf_ngtcp2_data_event(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, break; } case CF_CTRL_DATA_IDLE: { - struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "data idle"); if(stream && !stream->closed) { result = check_and_set_expiry(cf, data, NULL); @@ -2382,31 +1990,16 @@ static void cf_ngtcp2_ctx_clear(struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx) if(ctx->qlogfd != -1) { close(ctx->qlogfd); } -#ifdef USE_OPENSSL - if(ctx->ssl) - SSL_free(ctx->ssl); - if(ctx->sslctx) - SSL_CTX_free(ctx->sslctx); -#elif defined(USE_GNUTLS) - if(ctx->gtls) { - if(ctx->gtls->cred) - gnutls_certificate_free_credentials(ctx->gtls->cred); - if(ctx->gtls->session) - gnutls_deinit(ctx->gtls->session); - free(ctx->gtls); - } -#elif defined(USE_WOLFSSL) - if(ctx->ssl) - wolfSSL_free(ctx->ssl); - if(ctx->sslctx) - wolfSSL_CTX_free(ctx->sslctx); -#endif + Curl_vquic_tls_cleanup(&ctx->tls); vquic_ctx_free(&ctx->q); if(ctx->h3conn) nghttp3_conn_del(ctx->h3conn); if(ctx->qconn) ngtcp2_conn_del(ctx->qconn); Curl_bufcp_free(&ctx->stream_bufcp); + Curl_dyn_free(&ctx->scratch); + Curl_hash_clean(&ctx->streams); + Curl_hash_destroy(&ctx->streams); Curl_ssl_peer_cleanup(&ctx->peer); memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); @@ -2414,31 +2007,42 @@ static void cf_ngtcp2_ctx_clear(struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx) ctx->call_data = save; } -static void cf_ngtcp2_close(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) +static void cf_ngtcp2_conn_close(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data) { struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct cf_call_data save; - - CF_DATA_SAVE(save, cf, data); - if(ctx && ctx->qconn) { + if(ctx && ctx->qconn && !ctx->conn_closed) { char buffer[NGTCP2_MAX_UDP_PAYLOAD_SIZE]; struct pkt_io_ctx pktx; ngtcp2_ssize rc; - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "close"); + ctx->conn_closed = TRUE; pktx_init(&pktx, cf, data); rc = ngtcp2_conn_write_connection_close(ctx->qconn, NULL, /* path */ NULL, /* pkt_info */ (uint8_t *)buffer, sizeof(buffer), &ctx->last_error, pktx.ts); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "closing connection(err_type=%d, err_code=%" + CURL_PRIu64 ") -> %d", ctx->last_error.type, + (curl_uint64_t)ctx->last_error.error_code, (int)rc); if(rc > 0) { while((send(ctx->q.sockfd, buffer, (SEND_TYPE_ARG3)rc, 0) == -1) && SOCKERRNO == EINTR); } + } +} + +static void cf_ngtcp2_close(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct cf_call_data save; + CF_DATA_SAVE(save, cf, data); + if(ctx && ctx->qconn) { + cf_ngtcp2_conn_close(cf, data); cf_ngtcp2_ctx_clear(ctx); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "close"); } - cf->connected = FALSE; CF_DATA_RESTORE(cf, save); } @@ -2459,6 +2063,71 @@ static void cf_ngtcp2_destroy(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) (void)save; } +#ifdef USE_OPENSSL +/* The "new session" callback must return zero if the session can be removed + * or non-zero if the session has been put into the session cache. + */ +static int quic_ossl_new_session_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *ssl_sessionid) +{ + struct Curl_cfilter *cf; + struct cf_ngtcp2_ctx *ctx; + struct Curl_easy *data; + ngtcp2_crypto_conn_ref *cref; + + cref = (ngtcp2_crypto_conn_ref *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl); + cf = cref? cref->user_data : NULL; + ctx = cf? cf->ctx : NULL; + data = cf? CF_DATA_CURRENT(cf) : NULL; + if(cf && data && ctx) { + Curl_ossl_add_session(cf, data, &ctx->peer, ssl_sessionid); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} +#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */ + +static CURLcode tls_ctx_setup(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + void *user_data) +{ + struct curl_tls_ctx *ctx = user_data; + (void)cf; +#ifdef USE_OPENSSL +#if defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) || defined(OPENSSL_IS_AWSLC) + if(ngtcp2_crypto_boringssl_configure_client_context(ctx->ossl.ssl_ctx) + != 0) { + failf(data, "ngtcp2_crypto_boringssl_configure_client_context failed"); + return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + } +#else + if(ngtcp2_crypto_quictls_configure_client_context(ctx->ossl.ssl_ctx) != 0) { + failf(data, "ngtcp2_crypto_quictls_configure_client_context failed"); + return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + } +#endif /* !OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL && !OPENSSL_IS_AWSLC */ + /* Enable the session cache because it's a prerequisite for the + * "new session" callback. Use the "external storage" mode to prevent + * OpenSSL from creating an internal session cache. + */ + SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx->ossl.ssl_ctx, + SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT | + SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL); + SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(ctx->ossl.ssl_ctx, quic_ossl_new_session_cb); + +#elif defined(USE_GNUTLS) + if(ngtcp2_crypto_gnutls_configure_client_session(ctx->gtls.session) != 0) { + failf(data, "ngtcp2_crypto_gnutls_configure_client_session failed"); + return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + } +#elif defined(USE_WOLFSSL) + if(ngtcp2_crypto_wolfssl_configure_client_context(ctx->ssl_ctx) != 0) { + failf(data, "ngtcp2_crypto_wolfssl_configure_client_context failed"); + return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + } +#endif + return CURLE_OK; +} + /* * Might be called twice for happy eyeballs. */ @@ -2478,29 +2147,24 @@ static CURLcode cf_connect_start(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, ctx->max_idle_ms = CURL_QUIC_MAX_IDLE_MS; Curl_bufcp_init(&ctx->stream_bufcp, H3_STREAM_CHUNK_SIZE, H3_STREAM_POOL_SPARES); + Curl_dyn_init(&ctx->scratch, CURL_MAX_HTTP_HEADER); + Curl_hash_offt_init(&ctx->streams, 63, h3_stream_hash_free); - result = Curl_ssl_peer_init(&ctx->peer, cf); + result = Curl_ssl_peer_init(&ctx->peer, cf, TRNSPRT_QUIC); if(result) return result; -#ifdef USE_OPENSSL - result = quic_ssl_ctx(&ctx->sslctx, cf, data); +#define H3_ALPN "\x2h3\x5h3-29" + result = Curl_vquic_tls_init(&ctx->tls, cf, data, &ctx->peer, + H3_ALPN, sizeof(H3_ALPN) - 1, + tls_ctx_setup, &ctx->tls, &ctx->conn_ref); if(result) return result; - result = quic_set_client_cert(cf, data); - if(result) - return result; -#elif defined(USE_WOLFSSL) - result = quic_ssl_ctx(&ctx->sslctx, cf, data); - if(result) - return result; +#ifdef USE_OPENSSL + SSL_set_quic_use_legacy_codepoint(ctx->tls.ossl.ssl, 0); #endif - result = quic_init_ssl(cf, data); - if(result) - return result; - ctx->dcid.datalen = NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN; result = Curl_rand(data, ctx->dcid.data, NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN); if(result) @@ -2519,8 +2183,7 @@ static CURLcode cf_connect_start(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(result) return result; - Curl_cf_socket_peek(cf->next, data, &ctx->q.sockfd, - &sockaddr, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + Curl_cf_socket_peek(cf->next, data, &ctx->q.sockfd, &sockaddr, NULL); if(!sockaddr) return CURLE_QUIC_CONNECT_ERROR; ctx->q.local_addrlen = sizeof(ctx->q.local_addr); @@ -2543,10 +2206,12 @@ static CURLcode cf_connect_start(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(rc) return CURLE_QUIC_CONNECT_ERROR; -#ifdef USE_GNUTLS - ngtcp2_conn_set_tls_native_handle(ctx->qconn, ctx->gtls->session); +#ifdef USE_OPENSSL + ngtcp2_conn_set_tls_native_handle(ctx->qconn, ctx->tls.ossl.ssl); +#elif defined(USE_GNUTLS) + ngtcp2_conn_set_tls_native_handle(ctx->qconn, ctx->tls.gtls.session); #else - ngtcp2_conn_set_tls_native_handle(ctx->qconn, ctx->ssl); + ngtcp2_conn_set_tls_native_handle(ctx->qconn, ctx->tls.ssl); #endif ngtcp2_ccerr_default(&ctx->last_error); @@ -2635,13 +2300,11 @@ static CURLcode cf_ngtcp2_connect(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS if(result) { - const char *r_ip = NULL; - int r_port = 0; + struct ip_quadruple ip; - Curl_cf_socket_peek(cf->next, data, NULL, NULL, - &r_ip, &r_port, NULL, NULL); + Curl_cf_socket_peek(cf->next, data, NULL, NULL, &ip); infof(data, "QUIC connect to %s port %u failed: %s", - r_ip, r_port, curl_easy_strerror(result)); + ip.remote_ip, ip.remote_port, curl_easy_strerror(result)); } #endif if(!result && ctx->qconn) { @@ -2662,23 +2325,34 @@ static CURLcode cf_ngtcp2_query(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, switch(query) { case CF_QUERY_MAX_CONCURRENT: { - const ngtcp2_transport_params *rp; DEBUGASSERT(pres1); - CF_DATA_SAVE(save, cf, data); - rp = ngtcp2_conn_get_remote_transport_params(ctx->qconn); - if(rp) - *pres1 = (rp->initial_max_streams_bidi > INT_MAX)? - INT_MAX : (int)rp->initial_max_streams_bidi; - else /* not arrived yet? */ + /* Set after transport params arrived and continually updated + * by callback. QUIC counts the number over the lifetime of the + * connection, ever increasing. + * We count the *open* transfers plus the budget for new ones. */ + if(!ctx->qconn || ctx->conn_closed) { + *pres1 = 0; + } + else if(ctx->max_bidi_streams) { + uint64_t avail_bidi_streams = 0; + uint64_t max_streams = CONN_INUSE(cf->conn); + if(ctx->max_bidi_streams > ctx->used_bidi_streams) + avail_bidi_streams = ctx->max_bidi_streams - ctx->used_bidi_streams; + max_streams += avail_bidi_streams; + *pres1 = (max_streams > INT_MAX)? INT_MAX : (int)max_streams; + } + else /* transport params not arrived yet? take our default. */ *pres1 = Curl_multi_max_concurrent_streams(data->multi); - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "query max_conncurrent -> %d", *pres1); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "query conn[%" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T "]: " + "MAX_CONCURRENT -> %d (%zu in use)", + cf->conn->connection_id, *pres1, CONN_INUSE(cf->conn)); CF_DATA_RESTORE(cf, save); return CURLE_OK; } case CF_QUERY_CONNECT_REPLY_MS: - if(ctx->got_first_byte) { - timediff_t ms = Curl_timediff(ctx->first_byte_at, ctx->started_at); + if(ctx->q.got_first_byte) { + timediff_t ms = Curl_timediff(ctx->q.first_byte_at, ctx->started_at); *pres1 = (ms < INT_MAX)? (int)ms : INT_MAX; } else @@ -2686,8 +2360,8 @@ static CURLcode cf_ngtcp2_query(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, return CURLE_OK; case CF_QUERY_TIMER_CONNECT: { struct curltime *when = pres2; - if(ctx->got_first_byte) - *when = ctx->first_byte_at; + if(ctx->q.got_first_byte) + *when = ctx->q.first_byte_at; return CURLE_OK; } case CF_QUERY_TIMER_APPCONNECT: { @@ -2713,9 +2387,9 @@ static bool cf_ngtcp2_conn_is_alive(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, const ngtcp2_transport_params *rp; struct cf_call_data save; - CF_DATA_SAVE(save, cf, data); + CF_DATA_SAVE(save, cf, data); *input_pending = FALSE; - if(!ctx->qconn) + if(!ctx->qconn || ctx->conn_closed) goto out; /* Both sides of the QUIC connection announce they max idle times in diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/curl_osslq.c b/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/curl_osslq.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8b9e889d75 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/curl_osslq.c @@ -0,0 +1,2332 @@ +/*************************************************************************** + * _ _ ____ _ + * Project ___| | | | _ \| | + * / __| | | | |_) | | + * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ + * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| + * + * Copyright (C) Daniel Stenberg, , et al. + * + * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which + * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms + * are also available at https://curl.se/docs/copyright.html. + * + * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell + * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is + * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file. + * + * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY + * KIND, either express or implied. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: curl + * + ***************************************************************************/ + +#include "curl_setup.h" + +#if defined(USE_OPENSSL_QUIC) && defined(USE_NGHTTP3) + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "urldata.h" +#include "hash.h" +#include "sendf.h" +#include "strdup.h" +#include "rand.h" +#include "multiif.h" +#include "strcase.h" +#include "cfilters.h" +#include "cf-socket.h" +#include "connect.h" +#include "progress.h" +#include "strerror.h" +#include "dynbuf.h" +#include "http1.h" +#include "select.h" +#include "inet_pton.h" +#include "vquic.h" +#include "vquic_int.h" +#include "vquic-tls.h" +#include "vtls/keylog.h" +#include "vtls/vtls.h" +#include "vtls/openssl.h" +#include "curl_osslq.h" + +#include "warnless.h" + +/* The last 3 #include files should be in this order */ +#include "curl_printf.h" +#include "curl_memory.h" +#include "memdebug.h" + +/* A stream window is the maximum amount we need to buffer for + * each active transfer. We use HTTP/3 flow control and only ACK + * when we take things out of the buffer. + * Chunk size is large enough to take a full DATA frame */ +#define H3_STREAM_WINDOW_SIZE (128 * 1024) +#define H3_STREAM_CHUNK_SIZE (16 * 1024) +/* The pool keeps spares around and half of a full stream window + * seems good. More does not seem to improve performance. + * The benefit of the pool is that stream buffer to not keep + * spares. So memory consumption goes down when streams run empty, + * have a large upload done, etc. */ +#define H3_STREAM_POOL_SPARES \ + (H3_STREAM_WINDOW_SIZE / H3_STREAM_CHUNK_SIZE ) / 2 +/* Receive and Send max number of chunks just follows from the + * chunk size and window size */ +#define H3_STREAM_RECV_CHUNKS \ + (H3_STREAM_WINDOW_SIZE / H3_STREAM_CHUNK_SIZE) +#define H3_STREAM_SEND_CHUNKS \ + (H3_STREAM_WINDOW_SIZE / H3_STREAM_CHUNK_SIZE) + +#ifndef ARRAYSIZE +#define ARRAYSIZE(A) (sizeof(A)/sizeof((A)[0])) +#endif + +#if defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) || defined(OPENSSL_IS_AWSLC) +typedef uint32_t sslerr_t; +#else +typedef unsigned long sslerr_t; +#endif + + +/* How to access `call_data` from a cf_osslq filter */ +#undef CF_CTX_CALL_DATA +#define CF_CTX_CALL_DATA(cf) \ + ((struct cf_osslq_ctx *)(cf)->ctx)->call_data + +static CURLcode cf_progress_ingress(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data); + +static const char *osslq_SSL_ERROR_to_str(int err) +{ + switch(err) { + case SSL_ERROR_NONE: + return "SSL_ERROR_NONE"; + case SSL_ERROR_SSL: + return "SSL_ERROR_SSL"; + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: + return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ"; + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: + return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE"; + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP: + return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP"; + case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: + return "SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL"; + case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: + return "SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN"; + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT: + return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT"; + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT: + return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT"; +#if defined(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC) + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC: + return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC"; +#endif +#if defined(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB) + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB: + return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB"; +#endif +#if defined(SSL_ERROR_WANT_EARLY) + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_EARLY: + return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_EARLY"; +#endif + default: + return "SSL_ERROR unknown"; + } +} + +/* Return error string for last OpenSSL error */ +static char *osslq_strerror(unsigned long error, char *buf, size_t size) +{ + DEBUGASSERT(size); + *buf = '\0'; + +#if defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) || defined(OPENSSL_IS_AWSLC) + ERR_error_string_n((uint32_t)error, buf, size); +#else + ERR_error_string_n(error, buf, size); +#endif + + if(!*buf) { + const char *msg = error ? "Unknown error" : "No error"; + if(strlen(msg) < size) + strcpy(buf, msg); + } + + return buf; +} + +static CURLcode make_bio_addr(BIO_ADDR **pbio_addr, + const struct Curl_sockaddr_ex *addr) +{ + BIO_ADDR *ba; + CURLcode result = CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + + ba = BIO_ADDR_new(); + if(!ba) { + result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + goto out; + } + + switch(addr->family) { + case AF_INET: { + struct sockaddr_in * const sin = + (struct sockaddr_in * const)(void *)&addr->sa_addr; + if(!BIO_ADDR_rawmake(ba, AF_INET, &sin->sin_addr, + sizeof(sin->sin_addr), sin->sin_port)) { + goto out; + } + result = CURLE_OK; + break; + } +#ifdef USE_IPV6 + case AF_INET6: { + struct sockaddr_in6 * const sin = + (struct sockaddr_in6 * const)(void *)&addr->sa_addr; + if(!BIO_ADDR_rawmake(ba, AF_INET6, &sin->sin6_addr, + sizeof(sin->sin6_addr), sin->sin6_port)) { + } + result = CURLE_OK; + break; + } +#endif /* USE_IPV6 */ + default: + /* sunsupported */ + DEBUGASSERT(0); + break; + } + +out: + if(result && ba) { + BIO_ADDR_free(ba); + ba = NULL; + } + *pbio_addr = ba; + return result; +} + +/* QUIC stream (not necessarily H3) */ +struct cf_osslq_stream { + curl_int64_t id; + SSL *ssl; + struct bufq recvbuf; /* QUIC war data recv buffer */ + BIT(recvd_eos); + BIT(closed); + BIT(reset); + BIT(send_blocked); +}; + +static CURLcode cf_osslq_stream_open(struct cf_osslq_stream *s, + SSL *conn, + uint64_t flags, + struct bufc_pool *bufcp, + void *user_data) +{ + DEBUGASSERT(!s->ssl); + Curl_bufq_initp(&s->recvbuf, bufcp, 1, BUFQ_OPT_NONE); + s->ssl = SSL_new_stream(conn, flags); + if(!s->ssl) { + return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + } + s->id = SSL_get_stream_id(s->ssl); + SSL_set_app_data(s->ssl, user_data); + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static void cf_osslq_stream_cleanup(struct cf_osslq_stream *s) +{ + if(s->ssl) { + SSL_set_app_data(s->ssl, NULL); + SSL_free(s->ssl); + } + Curl_bufq_free(&s->recvbuf); + memset(s, 0, sizeof(*s)); +} + +static void cf_osslq_stream_close(struct cf_osslq_stream *s) +{ + if(s->ssl) { + SSL_free(s->ssl); + s->ssl = NULL; + } +} + +struct cf_osslq_h3conn { + nghttp3_conn *conn; + nghttp3_settings settings; + struct cf_osslq_stream s_ctrl; + struct cf_osslq_stream s_qpack_enc; + struct cf_osslq_stream s_qpack_dec; + struct cf_osslq_stream remote_ctrl[3]; /* uni streams opened by the peer */ + size_t remote_ctrl_n; /* number of peer streams opened */ +}; + +static void cf_osslq_h3conn_cleanup(struct cf_osslq_h3conn *h3) +{ + size_t i; + + if(h3->conn) + nghttp3_conn_del(h3->conn); + cf_osslq_stream_cleanup(&h3->s_ctrl); + cf_osslq_stream_cleanup(&h3->s_qpack_enc); + cf_osslq_stream_cleanup(&h3->s_qpack_dec); + for(i = 0; i < h3->remote_ctrl_n; ++i) { + cf_osslq_stream_cleanup(&h3->remote_ctrl[i]); + } +} + +struct cf_osslq_ctx { + struct cf_quic_ctx q; + struct ssl_peer peer; + struct curl_tls_ctx tls; + struct cf_call_data call_data; + struct cf_osslq_h3conn h3; + struct curltime started_at; /* time the current attempt started */ + struct curltime handshake_at; /* time connect handshake finished */ + struct curltime first_byte_at; /* when first byte was recvd */ + struct curltime reconnect_at; /* time the next attempt should start */ + struct bufc_pool stream_bufcp; /* chunk pool for streams */ + struct Curl_hash streams; /* hash `data->id` to `h3_stream_ctx` */ + size_t max_stream_window; /* max flow window for one stream */ + uint64_t max_idle_ms; /* max idle time for QUIC connection */ + BIT(got_first_byte); /* if first byte was received */ +#ifdef USE_OPENSSL + BIT(x509_store_setup); /* if x509 store has been set up */ + BIT(protocol_shutdown); /* QUIC connection is shut down */ +#endif +}; + +static void cf_osslq_ctx_clear(struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx) +{ + struct cf_call_data save = ctx->call_data; + + cf_osslq_h3conn_cleanup(&ctx->h3); + Curl_vquic_tls_cleanup(&ctx->tls); + vquic_ctx_free(&ctx->q); + Curl_bufcp_free(&ctx->stream_bufcp); + Curl_hash_clean(&ctx->streams); + Curl_hash_destroy(&ctx->streams); + Curl_ssl_peer_cleanup(&ctx->peer); + + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); + ctx->call_data = save; +} + +static void cf_osslq_close(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct cf_call_data save; + + CF_DATA_SAVE(save, cf, data); + if(ctx && ctx->tls.ossl.ssl) { + /* TODO: send connection close */ + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "cf_osslq_close()"); + cf_osslq_ctx_clear(ctx); + } + + cf->connected = FALSE; + CF_DATA_RESTORE(cf, save); +} + +static void cf_osslq_destroy(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct cf_call_data save; + + CF_DATA_SAVE(save, cf, data); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "destroy"); + if(ctx) { + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "cf_osslq_destroy()"); + cf_osslq_ctx_clear(ctx); + free(ctx); + } + cf->ctx = NULL; + /* No CF_DATA_RESTORE(cf, save) possible */ + (void)save; +} + +static CURLcode cf_osslq_h3conn_add_stream(struct cf_osslq_h3conn *h3, + SSL *stream_ssl, + struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + int64_t stream_id = SSL_get_stream_id(stream_ssl); + + if(h3->remote_ctrl_n >= ARRAYSIZE(h3->remote_ctrl)) { + /* rejected, we are full */ + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] rejecting remote stream", + (curl_int64_t)stream_id); + SSL_free(stream_ssl); + return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + } + switch(SSL_get_stream_type(stream_ssl)) { + case SSL_STREAM_TYPE_READ: { + struct cf_osslq_stream *nstream = &h3->remote_ctrl[h3->remote_ctrl_n++]; + nstream->id = stream_id; + nstream->ssl = stream_ssl; + Curl_bufq_initp(&nstream->recvbuf, &ctx->stream_bufcp, 1, BUFQ_OPT_NONE); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] accepted remote uni stream", + (curl_int64_t)stream_id); + break; + } + default: + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] reject remote non-uni-read" + " stream", (curl_int64_t)stream_id); + SSL_free(stream_ssl); + return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + } + return CURLE_OK; + +} + +static CURLcode cf_osslq_ssl_err(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + int detail, CURLcode def_result) +{ + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + CURLcode result = def_result; + sslerr_t errdetail; + char ebuf[256] = "unknown"; + const char *err_descr = ebuf; + long lerr; + int lib; + int reason; + struct ssl_config_data *ssl_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_config(cf, data); + + errdetail = ERR_get_error(); + lib = ERR_GET_LIB(errdetail); + reason = ERR_GET_REASON(errdetail); + + if((lib == ERR_LIB_SSL) && + ((reason == SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED) || + (reason == SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED))) { + result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; + + lerr = SSL_get_verify_result(ctx->tls.ossl.ssl); + if(lerr != X509_V_OK) { + ssl_config->certverifyresult = lerr; + msnprintf(ebuf, sizeof(ebuf), + "SSL certificate problem: %s", + X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr)); + } + else + err_descr = "SSL certificate verification failed"; + } +#if defined(SSL_R_TLSV13_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED) + /* SSL_R_TLSV13_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED is only available on + OpenSSL version above v1.1.1, not LibreSSL, BoringSSL, or AWS-LC */ + else if((lib == ERR_LIB_SSL) && + (reason == SSL_R_TLSV13_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED)) { + /* If client certificate is required, communicate the + error to client */ + result = CURLE_SSL_CLIENTCERT; + osslq_strerror(errdetail, ebuf, sizeof(ebuf)); + } +#endif + else if((lib == ERR_LIB_SSL) && (reason == SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN)) { + ctx->protocol_shutdown = TRUE; + err_descr = "QUIC connection has been shut down"; + result = def_result; + } + else { + result = def_result; + osslq_strerror(errdetail, ebuf, sizeof(ebuf)); + } + + /* detail is already set to the SSL error above */ + + /* If we e.g. use SSLv2 request-method and the server doesn't like us + * (RST connection, etc.), OpenSSL gives no explanation whatsoever and + * the SO_ERROR is also lost. + */ + if(CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR == result && errdetail == 0) { + char extramsg[80]=""; + int sockerr = SOCKERRNO; + struct ip_quadruple ip; + + Curl_cf_socket_peek(cf->next, data, NULL, NULL, &ip); + if(sockerr && detail == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL) + Curl_strerror(sockerr, extramsg, sizeof(extramsg)); + failf(data, "QUIC connect: %s in connection to %s:%d (%s)", + extramsg[0] ? extramsg : osslq_SSL_ERROR_to_str(detail), + ctx->peer.dispname, ip.remote_port, ip.remote_ip); + } + else { + /* Could be a CERT problem */ + failf(data, "%s", err_descr); + } + return result; +} + +static CURLcode cf_osslq_verify_peer(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + + cf->conn->bits.multiplex = TRUE; /* at least potentially multiplexed */ + cf->conn->httpversion = 30; + cf->conn->bundle->multiuse = BUNDLE_MULTIPLEX; + + return Curl_vquic_tls_verify_peer(&ctx->tls, cf, data, &ctx->peer); +} + +/** + * All about the H3 internals of a stream + */ +struct h3_stream_ctx { + struct cf_osslq_stream s; + struct bufq sendbuf; /* h3 request body */ + struct bufq recvbuf; /* h3 response body */ + struct h1_req_parser h1; /* h1 request parsing */ + size_t sendbuf_len_in_flight; /* sendbuf amount "in flight" */ + size_t upload_blocked_len; /* the amount written last and EGAINed */ + size_t recv_buf_nonflow; /* buffered bytes, not counting for flow control */ + curl_uint64_t error3; /* HTTP/3 stream error code */ + curl_off_t upload_left; /* number of request bytes left to upload */ + curl_off_t download_recvd; /* number of response DATA bytes received */ + int status_code; /* HTTP status code */ + bool resp_hds_complete; /* we have a complete, final response */ + bool closed; /* TRUE on stream close */ + bool reset; /* TRUE on stream reset */ + bool send_closed; /* stream is local closed */ + BIT(quic_flow_blocked); /* stream is blocked by QUIC flow control */ +}; + +#define H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx,data) ((struct h3_stream_ctx *)(\ + data? Curl_hash_offt_get(&(ctx)->streams, (data)->id) : NULL)) + +static void h3_stream_ctx_free(struct h3_stream_ctx *stream) +{ + cf_osslq_stream_cleanup(&stream->s); + Curl_bufq_free(&stream->sendbuf); + Curl_bufq_free(&stream->recvbuf); + Curl_h1_req_parse_free(&stream->h1); + free(stream); +} + +static void h3_stream_hash_free(void *stream) +{ + DEBUGASSERT(stream); + h3_stream_ctx_free((struct h3_stream_ctx *)stream); +} + +static CURLcode h3_data_setup(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); + + if(!data || !data->req.p.http) { + failf(data, "initialization failure, transfer not http initialized"); + return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + } + + if(stream) + return CURLE_OK; + + stream = calloc(1, sizeof(*stream)); + if(!stream) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + + stream->s.id = -1; + /* on send, we control how much we put into the buffer */ + Curl_bufq_initp(&stream->sendbuf, &ctx->stream_bufcp, + H3_STREAM_SEND_CHUNKS, BUFQ_OPT_NONE); + stream->sendbuf_len_in_flight = 0; + /* on recv, we need a flexible buffer limit since we also write + * headers to it that are not counted against the nghttp3 flow limits. */ + Curl_bufq_initp(&stream->recvbuf, &ctx->stream_bufcp, + H3_STREAM_RECV_CHUNKS, BUFQ_OPT_SOFT_LIMIT); + stream->recv_buf_nonflow = 0; + Curl_h1_req_parse_init(&stream->h1, H1_PARSE_DEFAULT_MAX_LINE_LEN); + + if(!Curl_hash_offt_set(&ctx->streams, data->id, stream)) { + h3_stream_ctx_free(stream); + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static void h3_data_done(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); + + (void)cf; + if(stream) { + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%"CURL_PRId64"] easy handle is done", + stream->s.id); + if(ctx->h3.conn && !stream->closed) { + nghttp3_conn_shutdown_stream_read(ctx->h3.conn, stream->s.id); + nghttp3_conn_close_stream(ctx->h3.conn, stream->s.id, + NGHTTP3_H3_REQUEST_CANCELLED); + nghttp3_conn_set_stream_user_data(ctx->h3.conn, stream->s.id, NULL); + stream->closed = TRUE; + } + + Curl_hash_offt_remove(&ctx->streams, data->id); + } +} + +static struct cf_osslq_stream *cf_osslq_get_qstream(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + int64_t stream_id) +{ + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); + struct Curl_easy *sdata; + + if(stream && stream->s.id == stream_id) { + return &stream->s; + } + else if(ctx->h3.s_ctrl.id == stream_id) { + return &ctx->h3.s_ctrl; + } + else if(ctx->h3.s_qpack_enc.id == stream_id) { + return &ctx->h3.s_qpack_enc; + } + else if(ctx->h3.s_qpack_dec.id == stream_id) { + return &ctx->h3.s_qpack_dec; + } + else { + DEBUGASSERT(data->multi); + for(sdata = data->multi->easyp; sdata; sdata = sdata->next) { + if(sdata->conn != data->conn) + continue; + stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, sdata); + if(stream && stream->s.id == stream_id) { + return &stream->s; + } + } + } + return NULL; +} + +static void h3_drain_stream(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); + unsigned char bits; + + (void)cf; + bits = CURL_CSELECT_IN; + if(stream && stream->upload_left && !stream->send_closed) + bits |= CURL_CSELECT_OUT; + if(data->state.select_bits != bits) { + data->state.select_bits = bits; + Curl_expire(data, 0, EXPIRE_RUN_NOW); + } +} + +static CURLcode h3_data_pause(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + bool pause) +{ + if(!pause) { + /* unpaused. make it run again right away */ + h3_drain_stream(cf, data); + Curl_expire(data, 0, EXPIRE_RUN_NOW); + } + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static int cb_h3_stream_close(nghttp3_conn *conn, int64_t stream_id, + uint64_t app_error_code, void *user_data, + void *stream_user_data) +{ + struct Curl_cfilter *cf = user_data; + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct Curl_easy *data = stream_user_data; + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); + (void)conn; + (void)stream_id; + + /* we might be called by nghttp3 after we already cleaned up */ + if(!stream) + return 0; + + stream->closed = TRUE; + stream->error3 = app_error_code; + if(stream->error3 != NGHTTP3_H3_NO_ERROR) { + stream->reset = TRUE; + stream->send_closed = TRUE; + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] RESET: error %" CURL_PRIu64, + stream->s.id, stream->error3); + } + else { + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] CLOSED", stream->s.id); + } + h3_drain_stream(cf, data); + return 0; +} + +/* + * write_resp_raw() copies response data in raw format to the `data`'s + * receive buffer. If not enough space is available, it appends to the + * `data`'s overflow buffer. + */ +static CURLcode write_resp_raw(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + const void *mem, size_t memlen, + bool flow) +{ + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + ssize_t nwritten; + + (void)cf; + if(!stream) { + return CURLE_RECV_ERROR; + } + nwritten = Curl_bufq_write(&stream->recvbuf, mem, memlen, &result); + if(nwritten < 0) { + return result; + } + + if(!flow) + stream->recv_buf_nonflow += (size_t)nwritten; + + if((size_t)nwritten < memlen) { + /* This MUST not happen. Our recbuf is dimensioned to hold the + * full max_stream_window and then some for this very reason. */ + DEBUGASSERT(0); + return CURLE_RECV_ERROR; + } + return result; +} + +static int cb_h3_recv_data(nghttp3_conn *conn, int64_t stream3_id, + const uint8_t *buf, size_t buflen, + void *user_data, void *stream_user_data) +{ + struct Curl_cfilter *cf = user_data; + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct Curl_easy *data = stream_user_data; + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); + CURLcode result; + + (void)conn; + (void)stream3_id; + + if(!stream) + return NGHTTP3_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; + + result = write_resp_raw(cf, data, buf, buflen, TRUE); + if(result) { + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] DATA len=%zu, ERROR %d", + stream->s.id, buflen, result); + return NGHTTP3_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; + } + stream->download_recvd += (curl_off_t)buflen; + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] DATA len=%zu, total=%zd", + stream->s.id, buflen, stream->download_recvd); + h3_drain_stream(cf, data); + return 0; +} + +static int cb_h3_deferred_consume(nghttp3_conn *conn, int64_t stream_id, + size_t consumed, void *user_data, + void *stream_user_data) +{ + struct Curl_cfilter *cf = user_data; + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct Curl_easy *data = stream_user_data; + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); + + (void)conn; + (void)stream_id; + if(stream) + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] deferred consume %zu bytes", + stream->s.id, consumed); + return 0; +} + +static int cb_h3_recv_header(nghttp3_conn *conn, int64_t sid, + int32_t token, nghttp3_rcbuf *name, + nghttp3_rcbuf *value, uint8_t flags, + void *user_data, void *stream_user_data) +{ + struct Curl_cfilter *cf = user_data; + curl_int64_t stream_id = sid; + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + nghttp3_vec h3name = nghttp3_rcbuf_get_buf(name); + nghttp3_vec h3val = nghttp3_rcbuf_get_buf(value); + struct Curl_easy *data = stream_user_data; + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + (void)conn; + (void)stream_id; + (void)token; + (void)flags; + (void)cf; + + /* we might have cleaned up this transfer already */ + if(!stream) + return 0; + + if(token == NGHTTP3_QPACK_TOKEN__STATUS) { + char line[14]; /* status line is always 13 characters long */ + size_t ncopy; + + result = Curl_http_decode_status(&stream->status_code, + (const char *)h3val.base, h3val.len); + if(result) + return -1; + ncopy = msnprintf(line, sizeof(line), "HTTP/3 %03d \r\n", + stream->status_code); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] status: %s", stream_id, line); + result = write_resp_raw(cf, data, line, ncopy, FALSE); + if(result) { + return -1; + } + } + else { + /* store as an HTTP1-style header */ + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] header: %.*s: %.*s", + stream_id, (int)h3name.len, h3name.base, + (int)h3val.len, h3val.base); + result = write_resp_raw(cf, data, h3name.base, h3name.len, FALSE); + if(result) { + return -1; + } + result = write_resp_raw(cf, data, ": ", 2, FALSE); + if(result) { + return -1; + } + result = write_resp_raw(cf, data, h3val.base, h3val.len, FALSE); + if(result) { + return -1; + } + result = write_resp_raw(cf, data, "\r\n", 2, FALSE); + if(result) { + return -1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +static int cb_h3_end_headers(nghttp3_conn *conn, int64_t sid, + int fin, void *user_data, void *stream_user_data) +{ + struct Curl_cfilter *cf = user_data; + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct Curl_easy *data = stream_user_data; + curl_int64_t stream_id = sid; + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + (void)conn; + (void)stream_id; + (void)fin; + (void)cf; + + if(!stream) + return 0; + /* add a CRLF only if we've received some headers */ + result = write_resp_raw(cf, data, "\r\n", 2, FALSE); + if(result) { + return -1; + } + + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] end_headers, status=%d", + stream_id, stream->status_code); + if(stream->status_code / 100 != 1) { + stream->resp_hds_complete = TRUE; + } + h3_drain_stream(cf, data); + return 0; +} + +static int cb_h3_stop_sending(nghttp3_conn *conn, int64_t sid, + uint64_t app_error_code, void *user_data, + void *stream_user_data) +{ + struct Curl_cfilter *cf = user_data; + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct Curl_easy *data = stream_user_data; + curl_int64_t stream_id = sid; + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); + (void)conn; + (void)app_error_code; + + if(!stream || !stream->s.ssl) + return 0; + + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] stop_sending", stream_id); + cf_osslq_stream_close(&stream->s); + return 0; +} + +static int cb_h3_reset_stream(nghttp3_conn *conn, int64_t sid, + uint64_t app_error_code, void *user_data, + void *stream_user_data) { + struct Curl_cfilter *cf = user_data; + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct Curl_easy *data = stream_user_data; + curl_int64_t stream_id = sid; + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); + int rv; + (void)conn; + + if(stream && stream->s.ssl) { + SSL_STREAM_RESET_ARGS args = {0}; + args.quic_error_code = app_error_code; + rv = !SSL_stream_reset(stream->s.ssl, &args, sizeof(args)); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] reset -> %d", stream_id, rv); + if(!rv) { + return NGHTTP3_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; + } + } + return 0; +} + +static nghttp3_ssize +cb_h3_read_req_body(nghttp3_conn *conn, int64_t stream_id, + nghttp3_vec *vec, size_t veccnt, + uint32_t *pflags, void *user_data, + void *stream_user_data) +{ + struct Curl_cfilter *cf = user_data; + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct Curl_easy *data = stream_user_data; + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); + ssize_t nwritten = 0; + size_t nvecs = 0; + (void)cf; + (void)conn; + (void)stream_id; + (void)user_data; + (void)veccnt; + + if(!stream) + return NGHTTP3_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; + /* nghttp3 keeps references to the sendbuf data until it is ACKed + * by the server (see `cb_h3_acked_req_body()` for updates). + * `sendbuf_len_in_flight` is the amount of bytes in `sendbuf` + * that we have already passed to nghttp3, but which have not been + * ACKed yet. + * Any amount beyond `sendbuf_len_in_flight` we need still to pass + * to nghttp3. Do that now, if we can. */ + if(stream->sendbuf_len_in_flight < Curl_bufq_len(&stream->sendbuf)) { + nvecs = 0; + while(nvecs < veccnt && + Curl_bufq_peek_at(&stream->sendbuf, + stream->sendbuf_len_in_flight, + (const unsigned char **)&vec[nvecs].base, + &vec[nvecs].len)) { + stream->sendbuf_len_in_flight += vec[nvecs].len; + nwritten += vec[nvecs].len; + ++nvecs; + } + DEBUGASSERT(nvecs > 0); /* we SHOULD have been be able to peek */ + } + + if(nwritten > 0 && stream->upload_left != -1) + stream->upload_left -= nwritten; + + /* When we stopped sending and everything in `sendbuf` is "in flight", + * we are at the end of the request body. */ + if(stream->upload_left == 0) { + *pflags = NGHTTP3_DATA_FLAG_EOF; + stream->send_closed = TRUE; + } + else if(!nwritten) { + /* Not EOF, and nothing to give, we signal WOULDBLOCK. */ + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] read req body -> AGAIN", + stream->s.id); + return NGHTTP3_ERR_WOULDBLOCK; + } + + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] read req body -> " + "%d vecs%s with %zu (buffered=%zu, left=%" + CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T ")", + stream->s.id, (int)nvecs, + *pflags == NGHTTP3_DATA_FLAG_EOF?" EOF":"", + nwritten, Curl_bufq_len(&stream->sendbuf), + stream->upload_left); + return (nghttp3_ssize)nvecs; +} + +static int cb_h3_acked_stream_data(nghttp3_conn *conn, int64_t stream_id, + uint64_t datalen, void *user_data, + void *stream_user_data) +{ + struct Curl_cfilter *cf = user_data; + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct Curl_easy *data = stream_user_data; + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); + size_t skiplen; + + (void)cf; + if(!stream) + return 0; + /* The server acknowledged `datalen` of bytes from our request body. + * This is a delta. We have kept this data in `sendbuf` for + * re-transmissions and can free it now. */ + if(datalen >= (uint64_t)stream->sendbuf_len_in_flight) + skiplen = stream->sendbuf_len_in_flight; + else + skiplen = (size_t)datalen; + Curl_bufq_skip(&stream->sendbuf, skiplen); + stream->sendbuf_len_in_flight -= skiplen; + + /* Everything ACKed, we resume upload processing */ + if(!stream->sendbuf_len_in_flight) { + int rv = nghttp3_conn_resume_stream(conn, stream_id); + if(rv && rv != NGHTTP3_ERR_STREAM_NOT_FOUND) { + return NGHTTP3_ERR_CALLBACK_FAILURE; + } + } + return 0; +} + +static nghttp3_callbacks ngh3_callbacks = { + cb_h3_acked_stream_data, + cb_h3_stream_close, + cb_h3_recv_data, + cb_h3_deferred_consume, + NULL, /* begin_headers */ + cb_h3_recv_header, + cb_h3_end_headers, + NULL, /* begin_trailers */ + cb_h3_recv_header, + NULL, /* end_trailers */ + cb_h3_stop_sending, + NULL, /* end_stream */ + cb_h3_reset_stream, + NULL, /* shutdown */ + NULL /* recv_settings */ +}; + +static CURLcode cf_osslq_h3conn_init(struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx, SSL *conn, + void *user_data) +{ + struct cf_osslq_h3conn *h3 = &ctx->h3; + CURLcode result; + int rc; + + nghttp3_settings_default(&h3->settings); + rc = nghttp3_conn_client_new(&h3->conn, + &ngh3_callbacks, + &h3->settings, + nghttp3_mem_default(), + user_data); + if(rc) { + result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + goto out; + } + + result = cf_osslq_stream_open(&h3->s_ctrl, conn, + SSL_STREAM_FLAG_ADVANCE|SSL_STREAM_FLAG_UNI, + &ctx->stream_bufcp, NULL); + if(result) { + result = CURLE_QUIC_CONNECT_ERROR; + goto out; + } + result = cf_osslq_stream_open(&h3->s_qpack_enc, conn, + SSL_STREAM_FLAG_ADVANCE|SSL_STREAM_FLAG_UNI, + &ctx->stream_bufcp, NULL); + if(result) { + result = CURLE_QUIC_CONNECT_ERROR; + goto out; + } + result = cf_osslq_stream_open(&h3->s_qpack_dec, conn, + SSL_STREAM_FLAG_ADVANCE|SSL_STREAM_FLAG_UNI, + &ctx->stream_bufcp, NULL); + if(result) { + result = CURLE_QUIC_CONNECT_ERROR; + goto out; + } + + rc = nghttp3_conn_bind_control_stream(h3->conn, h3->s_ctrl.id); + if(rc) { + result = CURLE_QUIC_CONNECT_ERROR; + goto out; + } + rc = nghttp3_conn_bind_qpack_streams(h3->conn, h3->s_qpack_enc.id, + h3->s_qpack_dec.id); + if(rc) { + result = CURLE_QUIC_CONNECT_ERROR; + goto out; + } + + result = CURLE_OK; +out: + return result; +} + +static CURLcode cf_osslq_ctx_start(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + CURLcode result; + int rv; + const struct Curl_sockaddr_ex *peer_addr = NULL; + BIO *bio = NULL; + BIO_ADDR *baddr = NULL; + + Curl_bufcp_init(&ctx->stream_bufcp, H3_STREAM_CHUNK_SIZE, + H3_STREAM_POOL_SPARES); + Curl_hash_offt_init(&ctx->streams, 63, h3_stream_hash_free); + result = Curl_ssl_peer_init(&ctx->peer, cf, TRNSPRT_QUIC); + if(result) + goto out; + +#define H3_ALPN "\x2h3" + result = Curl_vquic_tls_init(&ctx->tls, cf, data, &ctx->peer, + H3_ALPN, sizeof(H3_ALPN) - 1, + NULL, NULL, NULL); + if(result) + goto out; + + result = vquic_ctx_init(&ctx->q); + if(result) + goto out; + + result = CURLE_QUIC_CONNECT_ERROR; + Curl_cf_socket_peek(cf->next, data, &ctx->q.sockfd, &peer_addr, NULL); + if(!peer_addr) + goto out; + + ctx->q.local_addrlen = sizeof(ctx->q.local_addr); + rv = getsockname(ctx->q.sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&ctx->q.local_addr, + &ctx->q.local_addrlen); + if(rv == -1) + goto out; + + result = make_bio_addr(&baddr, peer_addr); + if(result) { + failf(data, "error creating BIO_ADDR from sockaddr"); + goto out; + } + + /* Type conversions, see #12861: OpenSSL wants an `int`, but on 64-bit + * Win32 systems, Microsoft defines SOCKET as `unsigned long long`. + */ +#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__LWIP_OPT_H__) && !defined(LWIP_HDR_OPT_H) + if(ctx->q.sockfd > INT_MAX) { + failf(data, "Windows socket identifier larger than MAX_INT, " + "unable to set in OpenSSL dgram API."); + result = CURLE_QUIC_CONNECT_ERROR; + goto out; + } + bio = BIO_new_dgram((int)ctx->q.sockfd, BIO_NOCLOSE); +#else + bio = BIO_new_dgram(ctx->q.sockfd, BIO_NOCLOSE); +#endif + if(!bio) { + result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + goto out; + } + + if(!SSL_set1_initial_peer_addr(ctx->tls.ossl.ssl, baddr)) { + failf(data, "failed to set the initial peer address"); + result = CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + goto out; + } + if(!SSL_set_blocking_mode(ctx->tls.ossl.ssl, 0)) { + failf(data, "failed to turn off blocking mode"); + result = CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + goto out; + } + +#ifdef SSL_VALUE_QUIC_IDLE_TIMEOUT + /* Added in OpenSSL v3.3.x */ + if(!SSL_set_feature_request_uint(ctx->tls.ossl.ssl, + SSL_VALUE_QUIC_IDLE_TIMEOUT, + CURL_QUIC_MAX_IDLE_MS)) { + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "error setting idle timeout, "); + result = CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + goto out; + } +#endif + + SSL_set_bio(ctx->tls.ossl.ssl, bio, bio); + bio = NULL; + SSL_set_connect_state(ctx->tls.ossl.ssl); + SSL_set_incoming_stream_policy(ctx->tls.ossl.ssl, + SSL_INCOMING_STREAM_POLICY_ACCEPT, 0); + /* setup the H3 things on top of the QUIC connection */ + result = cf_osslq_h3conn_init(ctx, ctx->tls.ossl.ssl, cf); + +out: + if(bio) + BIO_free(bio); + if(baddr) + BIO_ADDR_free(baddr); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "QUIC tls init -> %d", result); + return result; +} + +struct h3_quic_recv_ctx { + struct Curl_cfilter *cf; + struct Curl_easy *data; + struct cf_osslq_stream *s; +}; + +static ssize_t h3_quic_recv(void *reader_ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len, + CURLcode *err) +{ + struct h3_quic_recv_ctx *x = reader_ctx; + size_t nread; + int rv; + + *err = CURLE_OK; + rv = SSL_read_ex(x->s->ssl, buf, len, &nread); + if(rv <= 0) { + int detail = SSL_get_error(x->s->ssl, rv); + if(detail == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ || detail == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE) { + *err = CURLE_AGAIN; + return -1; + } + else if(detail == SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN) { + CURL_TRC_CF(x->data, x->cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] h3_quic_recv -> EOS", + x->s->id); + x->s->recvd_eos = TRUE; + return 0; + } + else if(SSL_get_stream_read_state(x->s->ssl) == + SSL_STREAM_STATE_RESET_REMOTE) { + uint64_t app_error_code = NGHTTP3_H3_NO_ERROR; + SSL_get_stream_read_error_code(x->s->ssl, &app_error_code); + CURL_TRC_CF(x->data, x->cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] h3_quic_recv -> RESET, " + "rv=%d, app_err=%" CURL_PRIu64, + x->s->id, rv, (curl_uint64_t)app_error_code); + if(app_error_code != NGHTTP3_H3_NO_ERROR) { + x->s->reset = TRUE; + } + x->s->recvd_eos = TRUE; + return 0; + } + else { + *err = cf_osslq_ssl_err(x->cf, x->data, detail, CURLE_RECV_ERROR); + return -1; + } + } + return (ssize_t)nread; +} + +static CURLcode cf_osslq_stream_recv(struct cf_osslq_stream *s, + struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + ssize_t nread; + struct h3_quic_recv_ctx x; + int rv, eagain = FALSE; + size_t total_recv_len = 0; + + DEBUGASSERT(s); + if(s->closed) + return CURLE_OK; + + x.cf = cf; + x.data = data; + x.s = s; + while(s->ssl && !s->closed && !eagain && + (total_recv_len < H3_STREAM_CHUNK_SIZE)) { + if(Curl_bufq_is_empty(&s->recvbuf) && !s->recvd_eos) { + while(!eagain && !s->recvd_eos && !Curl_bufq_is_full(&s->recvbuf)) { + nread = Curl_bufq_sipn(&s->recvbuf, 0, h3_quic_recv, &x, &result); + if(nread < 0) { + if(result != CURLE_AGAIN) + goto out; + result = CURLE_OK; + eagain = TRUE; + } + } + } + + /* Forward what we have to nghttp3 */ + if(!Curl_bufq_is_empty(&s->recvbuf)) { + const unsigned char *buf; + size_t blen; + + while(Curl_bufq_peek(&s->recvbuf, &buf, &blen)) { + nread = nghttp3_conn_read_stream(ctx->h3.conn, s->id, + buf, blen, 0); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] forward %zu bytes " + "to nghttp3 -> %zd", s->id, blen, nread); + if(nread < 0) { + failf(data, "nghttp3_conn_read_stream(len=%zu) error: %s", + blen, nghttp3_strerror((int)nread)); + result = CURLE_RECV_ERROR; + goto out; + } + /* success, `nread` is the flow for QUIC to count as "consumed", + * not sure how that will work with OpenSSL. Anyways, without error, + * all data that we passed is not owned by nghttp3. */ + Curl_bufq_skip(&s->recvbuf, blen); + total_recv_len += blen; + } + } + + /* When we forwarded everything, handle RESET/EOS */ + if(Curl_bufq_is_empty(&s->recvbuf) && !s->closed) { + result = CURLE_OK; + if(s->reset) { + uint64_t app_error; + if(!SSL_get_stream_read_error_code(s->ssl, &app_error)) { + failf(data, "SSL_get_stream_read_error_code returned error"); + result = CURLE_RECV_ERROR; + goto out; + } + rv = nghttp3_conn_close_stream(ctx->h3.conn, s->id, app_error); + s->closed = TRUE; + if(rv < 0 && rv != NGHTTP3_ERR_STREAM_NOT_FOUND) { + failf(data, "nghttp3_conn_close_stream returned error: %s", + nghttp3_strerror(rv)); + result = CURLE_RECV_ERROR; + goto out; + } + } + else if(s->recvd_eos) { + rv = nghttp3_conn_close_stream(ctx->h3.conn, s->id, + NGHTTP3_H3_NO_ERROR); + s->closed = TRUE; + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] close nghttp3 stream -> %d", + s->id, rv); + if(rv < 0 && rv != NGHTTP3_ERR_STREAM_NOT_FOUND) { + failf(data, "nghttp3_conn_close_stream returned error: %s", + nghttp3_strerror(rv)); + result = CURLE_RECV_ERROR; + goto out; + } + } + } + } +out: + if(result) + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] cf_osslq_stream_recv -> %d", + s->id, result); + return result; +} + +static CURLcode cf_progress_ingress(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + + if(!ctx->tls.ossl.ssl) + goto out; + + ERR_clear_error(); + + /* 1. Check for new incoming streams */ + while(1) { + SSL *snew = SSL_accept_stream(ctx->tls.ossl.ssl, + SSL_ACCEPT_STREAM_NO_BLOCK); + if(!snew) + break; + + (void)cf_osslq_h3conn_add_stream(&ctx->h3, snew, cf, data); + } + + if(!SSL_handle_events(ctx->tls.ossl.ssl)) { + int detail = SSL_get_error(ctx->tls.ossl.ssl, 0); + result = cf_osslq_ssl_err(cf, data, detail, CURLE_RECV_ERROR); + } + + if(ctx->h3.conn) { + size_t i; + for(i = 0; i < ctx->h3.remote_ctrl_n; ++i) { + result = cf_osslq_stream_recv(&ctx->h3.remote_ctrl[i], cf, data); + if(result) + goto out; + } + } + + if(ctx->h3.conn) { + struct Curl_easy *sdata; + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream; + /* PULL all open streams */ + DEBUGASSERT(data->multi); + for(sdata = data->multi->easyp; sdata; sdata = sdata->next) { + if(sdata->conn == data->conn && CURL_WANT_RECV(sdata)) { + stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, sdata); + if(stream && !stream->closed && + !Curl_bufq_is_full(&stream->recvbuf)) { + result = cf_osslq_stream_recv(&stream->s, cf, sdata); + if(result) + goto out; + } + } + } + } + +out: + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "progress_ingress -> %d", result); + return result; +} + +/* Iterate over all streams and check if blocked can be unblocked */ +static CURLcode cf_osslq_check_and_unblock(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct Curl_easy *sdata; + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream; + + if(ctx->h3.conn) { + for(sdata = data->multi->easyp; sdata; sdata = sdata->next) { + if(sdata->conn == data->conn) { + stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, sdata); + if(stream && stream->s.ssl && stream->s.send_blocked && + !SSL_want_write(stream->s.ssl)) { + nghttp3_conn_unblock_stream(ctx->h3.conn, stream->s.id); + stream->s.send_blocked = FALSE; + h3_drain_stream(cf, sdata); + CURL_TRC_CF(sdata, cf, "unblocked"); + } + } + } + } + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static CURLcode h3_send_streams(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + + if(!ctx->tls.ossl.ssl || !ctx->h3.conn) + goto out; + + for(;;) { + struct cf_osslq_stream *s = NULL; + nghttp3_vec vec[16]; + nghttp3_ssize n, i; + int64_t stream_id; + size_t written; + int eos, ok, rv; + size_t total_len, acked_len = 0; + bool blocked = FALSE, eos_written = FALSE; + + n = nghttp3_conn_writev_stream(ctx->h3.conn, &stream_id, &eos, + vec, ARRAYSIZE(vec)); + if(n < 0) { + failf(data, "nghttp3_conn_writev_stream returned error: %s", + nghttp3_strerror((int)n)); + result = CURLE_SEND_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if(stream_id < 0) { + result = CURLE_OK; + goto out; + } + + /* Get the stream for this data */ + s = cf_osslq_get_qstream(cf, data, stream_id); + if(!s) { + failf(data, "nghttp3_conn_writev_stream gave unknown stream %" + CURL_PRId64, (curl_int64_t)stream_id); + result = CURLE_SEND_ERROR; + goto out; + } + /* Now write the data to the stream's SSL*, it may not all fit! */ + DEBUGASSERT(s->id == stream_id); + for(i = 0, total_len = 0; i < n; ++i) { + total_len += vec[i].len; + } + for(i = 0; (i < n) && !blocked; ++i) { + /* Without stream->s.ssl, we closed that already, so + * pretend the write did succeed. */ +#ifdef SSL_WRITE_FLAG_CONCLUDE + /* Since OpenSSL v3.3.x, on last chunk set EOS if needed */ + uint64_t flags = (eos && ((i + 1) == n))? SSL_WRITE_FLAG_CONCLUDE : 0; + written = vec[i].len; + ok = !s->ssl || SSL_write_ex2(s->ssl, vec[i].base, vec[i].len, flags, + &written); + if(ok && flags & SSL_WRITE_FLAG_CONCLUDE) + eos_written = TRUE; +#else + written = vec[i].len; + ok = !s->ssl || SSL_write_ex(s->ssl, vec[i].base, vec[i].len, + &written); +#endif + if(ok) { + /* As OpenSSL buffers the data, we count this as acknowledged + * from nghttp3's point of view */ + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] send %zu bytes to QUIC ok", + s->id, vec[i].len); + acked_len += vec[i].len; + } + else { + int detail = SSL_get_error(s->ssl, 0); + switch(detail) { + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: + /* QUIC blocked us from writing more */ + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%"CURL_PRId64 "] send %zu bytes to " + "QUIC blocked", s->id, vec[i].len); + written = 0; + nghttp3_conn_block_stream(ctx->h3.conn, s->id); + s->send_blocked = blocked = TRUE; + break; + default: + failf(data, "[%"CURL_PRId64 "] send %zu bytes to QUIC, SSL error %d", + s->id, vec[i].len, detail); + result = cf_osslq_ssl_err(cf, data, detail, CURLE_HTTP3); + goto out; + } + } + } + + if(acked_len > 0 || (eos && !s->send_blocked)) { + /* Since QUIC buffers the data written internally, we can tell + * nghttp3 that it can move forward on it */ + ctx->q.last_io = Curl_now(); + rv = nghttp3_conn_add_write_offset(ctx->h3.conn, s->id, acked_len); + if(rv && rv != NGHTTP3_ERR_STREAM_NOT_FOUND) { + failf(data, "nghttp3_conn_add_write_offset returned error: %s\n", + nghttp3_strerror(rv)); + result = CURLE_SEND_ERROR; + goto out; + } + rv = nghttp3_conn_add_ack_offset(ctx->h3.conn, s->id, acked_len); + if(rv && rv != NGHTTP3_ERR_STREAM_NOT_FOUND) { + failf(data, "nghttp3_conn_add_ack_offset returned error: %s\n", + nghttp3_strerror(rv)); + result = CURLE_SEND_ERROR; + goto out; + } + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] forwarded %zu/%zu h3 bytes " + "to QUIC, eos=%d", s->id, acked_len, total_len, eos); + } + + if(eos && !s->send_blocked && !eos_written) { + /* wrote everything and H3 indicates end of stream */ + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] closing QUIC stream", s->id); + SSL_stream_conclude(s->ssl, 0); + } + } + +out: + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "h3_send_streams -> %d", result); + return result; +} + +static CURLcode cf_progress_egress(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + + if(!ctx->tls.ossl.ssl) + goto out; + + ERR_clear_error(); + result = h3_send_streams(cf, data); + if(result) + goto out; + + if(!SSL_handle_events(ctx->tls.ossl.ssl)) { + int detail = SSL_get_error(ctx->tls.ossl.ssl, 0); + result = cf_osslq_ssl_err(cf, data, detail, CURLE_SEND_ERROR); + } + + result = cf_osslq_check_and_unblock(cf, data); + +out: + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "progress_egress -> %d", result); + return result; +} + +static CURLcode check_and_set_expiry(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + struct timeval tv; + timediff_t timeoutms; + int is_infinite = TRUE; + + if(ctx->tls.ossl.ssl && + SSL_get_event_timeout(ctx->tls.ossl.ssl, &tv, &is_infinite) && + !is_infinite) { + timeoutms = curlx_tvtoms(&tv); + /* QUIC want to be called again latest at the returned timeout */ + if(timeoutms <= 0) { + result = cf_progress_ingress(cf, data); + if(result) + goto out; + result = cf_progress_egress(cf, data); + if(result) + goto out; + if(SSL_get_event_timeout(ctx->tls.ossl.ssl, &tv, &is_infinite)) { + timeoutms = curlx_tvtoms(&tv); + } + } + if(!is_infinite) { + Curl_expire(data, timeoutms, EXPIRE_QUIC); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "QUIC expiry in %ldms", (long)timeoutms); + } + } +out: + return result; +} + +static CURLcode cf_osslq_connect(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + bool blocking, bool *done) +{ + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + struct cf_call_data save; + struct curltime now; + int err; + + if(cf->connected) { + *done = TRUE; + return CURLE_OK; + } + + /* Connect the UDP filter first */ + if(!cf->next->connected) { + result = Curl_conn_cf_connect(cf->next, data, blocking, done); + if(result || !*done) + return result; + } + + *done = FALSE; + now = Curl_now(); + CF_DATA_SAVE(save, cf, data); + + if(ctx->reconnect_at.tv_sec && Curl_timediff(now, ctx->reconnect_at) < 0) { + /* Not time yet to attempt the next connect */ + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "waiting for reconnect time"); + goto out; + } + + if(!ctx->tls.ossl.ssl) { + ctx->started_at = now; + result = cf_osslq_ctx_start(cf, data); + if(result) + goto out; + } + + if(!ctx->got_first_byte) { + int readable = SOCKET_READABLE(ctx->q.sockfd, 0); + if(readable > 0 && (readable & CURL_CSELECT_IN)) { + ctx->got_first_byte = TRUE; + ctx->first_byte_at = Curl_now(); + } + } + + ERR_clear_error(); + err = SSL_do_handshake(ctx->tls.ossl.ssl); + + if(err == 1) { + /* connected */ + ctx->handshake_at = now; + ctx->q.last_io = now; + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "handshake complete after %dms", + (int)Curl_timediff(now, ctx->started_at)); + result = cf_osslq_verify_peer(cf, data); + if(!result) { + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "peer verified"); + cf->connected = TRUE; + cf->conn->alpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_3; + *done = TRUE; + connkeep(cf->conn, "HTTP/3 default"); + } + } + else { + int detail = SSL_get_error(ctx->tls.ossl.ssl, err); + switch(detail) { + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: + ctx->q.last_io = now; + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "QUIC SSL_connect() -> WANT_RECV"); + result = Curl_vquic_tls_before_recv(&ctx->tls, cf, data); + goto out; + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: + ctx->q.last_io = now; + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "QUIC SSL_connect() -> WANT_SEND"); + result = CURLE_OK; + goto out; +#ifdef SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC: + ctx->q.last_io = now; + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "QUIC SSL_connect() -> WANT_ASYNC"); + result = CURLE_OK; + goto out; +#endif +#ifdef SSL_ERROR_WANT_RETRY_VERIFY + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_RETRY_VERIFY: + result = CURLE_OK; + goto out; +#endif + default: + result = cf_osslq_ssl_err(cf, data, detail, CURLE_COULDNT_CONNECT); + goto out; + } + } + +out: + if(result == CURLE_RECV_ERROR && ctx->tls.ossl.ssl && + ctx->protocol_shutdown) { + /* When a QUIC server instance is shutting down, it may send us a + * CONNECTION_CLOSE right away. Our connection then enters the DRAINING + * state. The CONNECT may work in the near future again. Indicate + * that as a "weird" reply. */ + result = CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY; + } + +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS + if(result) { + struct ip_quadruple ip; + + Curl_cf_socket_peek(cf->next, data, NULL, NULL, &ip); + infof(data, "QUIC connect to %s port %u failed: %s", + ip.remote_ip, ip.remote_port, curl_easy_strerror(result)); + } +#endif + if(!result) + result = check_and_set_expiry(cf, data); + if(result || *done) + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "connect -> %d, done=%d", result, *done); + CF_DATA_RESTORE(cf, save); + return result; +} + +static ssize_t h3_stream_open(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + const void *buf, size_t len, + CURLcode *err) +{ + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = NULL; + struct dynhds h2_headers; + size_t nheader; + nghttp3_nv *nva = NULL; + int rc = 0; + unsigned int i; + ssize_t nwritten = -1; + nghttp3_data_reader reader; + nghttp3_data_reader *preader = NULL; + + Curl_dynhds_init(&h2_headers, 0, DYN_HTTP_REQUEST); + + *err = h3_data_setup(cf, data); + if(*err) + goto out; + stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); + DEBUGASSERT(stream); + if(!stream) { + *err = CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + goto out; + } + + nwritten = Curl_h1_req_parse_read(&stream->h1, buf, len, NULL, 0, err); + if(nwritten < 0) + goto out; + if(!stream->h1.done) { + /* need more data */ + goto out; + } + DEBUGASSERT(stream->h1.req); + + *err = Curl_http_req_to_h2(&h2_headers, stream->h1.req, data); + if(*err) { + nwritten = -1; + goto out; + } + /* no longer needed */ + Curl_h1_req_parse_free(&stream->h1); + + nheader = Curl_dynhds_count(&h2_headers); + nva = malloc(sizeof(nghttp3_nv) * nheader); + if(!nva) { + *err = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + nwritten = -1; + goto out; + } + + for(i = 0; i < nheader; ++i) { + struct dynhds_entry *e = Curl_dynhds_getn(&h2_headers, i); + nva[i].name = (unsigned char *)e->name; + nva[i].namelen = e->namelen; + nva[i].value = (unsigned char *)e->value; + nva[i].valuelen = e->valuelen; + nva[i].flags = NGHTTP3_NV_FLAG_NONE; + } + + DEBUGASSERT(stream->s.id == -1); + *err = cf_osslq_stream_open(&stream->s, ctx->tls.ossl.ssl, 0, + &ctx->stream_bufcp, data); + if(*err) { + failf(data, "can't get bidi streams"); + *err = CURLE_SEND_ERROR; + goto out; + } + + switch(data->state.httpreq) { + case HTTPREQ_POST: + case HTTPREQ_POST_FORM: + case HTTPREQ_POST_MIME: + case HTTPREQ_PUT: + /* known request body size or -1 */ + if(data->state.infilesize != -1) + stream->upload_left = data->state.infilesize; + else + /* data sending without specifying the data amount up front */ + stream->upload_left = -1; /* unknown */ + break; + default: + /* there is not request body */ + stream->upload_left = 0; /* no request body */ + break; + } + + stream->send_closed = (stream->upload_left == 0); + if(!stream->send_closed) { + reader.read_data = cb_h3_read_req_body; + preader = &reader; + } + + rc = nghttp3_conn_submit_request(ctx->h3.conn, stream->s.id, + nva, nheader, preader, data); + if(rc) { + switch(rc) { + case NGHTTP3_ERR_CONN_CLOSING: + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "h3sid[%"CURL_PRId64"] failed to send, " + "connection is closing", stream->s.id); + break; + default: + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "h3sid[%"CURL_PRId64 "] failed to send -> %d (%s)", + stream->s.id, rc, nghttp3_strerror(rc)); + break; + } + *err = CURLE_SEND_ERROR; + nwritten = -1; + goto out; + } + + if(Curl_trc_is_verbose(data)) { + infof(data, "[HTTP/3] [%" CURL_PRId64 "] OPENED stream for %s", + stream->s.id, data->state.url); + for(i = 0; i < nheader; ++i) { + infof(data, "[HTTP/3] [%" CURL_PRId64 "] [%.*s: %.*s]", + stream->s.id, + (int)nva[i].namelen, nva[i].name, + (int)nva[i].valuelen, nva[i].value); + } + } + +out: + free(nva); + Curl_dynhds_free(&h2_headers); + return nwritten; +} + +static ssize_t cf_osslq_send(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, + const void *buf, size_t len, CURLcode *err) +{ + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); + struct cf_call_data save; + ssize_t nwritten; + CURLcode result; + + CF_DATA_SAVE(save, cf, data); + DEBUGASSERT(cf->connected); + DEBUGASSERT(ctx->tls.ossl.ssl); + DEBUGASSERT(ctx->h3.conn); + *err = CURLE_OK; + + result = cf_progress_ingress(cf, data); + if(result) { + *err = result; + nwritten = -1; + goto out; + } + + result = cf_progress_egress(cf, data); + if(result) { + *err = result; + nwritten = -1; + goto out; + } + + if(!stream || stream->s.id < 0) { + nwritten = h3_stream_open(cf, data, buf, len, err); + if(nwritten < 0) { + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "failed to open stream -> %d", *err); + goto out; + } + stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); + } + else if(stream->upload_blocked_len) { + /* the data in `buf` has already been submitted or added to the + * buffers, but have been EAGAINed on the last invocation. */ + DEBUGASSERT(len >= stream->upload_blocked_len); + if(len < stream->upload_blocked_len) { + /* Did we get called again with a smaller `len`? This should not + * happen. We are not prepared to handle that. */ + failf(data, "HTTP/3 send again with decreased length"); + *err = CURLE_HTTP3; + nwritten = -1; + goto out; + } + nwritten = (ssize_t)stream->upload_blocked_len; + stream->upload_blocked_len = 0; + } + else if(stream->closed) { + if(stream->resp_hds_complete) { + /* Server decided to close the stream after having sent us a final + * response. This is valid if it is not interested in the request + * body. This happens on 30x or 40x responses. + * We silently discard the data sent, since this is not a transport + * error situation. */ + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] discarding data" + "on closed stream with response", stream->s.id); + *err = CURLE_OK; + nwritten = (ssize_t)len; + goto out; + } + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] send_body(len=%zu) " + "-> stream closed", stream->s.id, len); + *err = CURLE_HTTP3; + nwritten = -1; + goto out; + } + else { + nwritten = Curl_bufq_write(&stream->sendbuf, buf, len, err); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] cf_send, add to " + "sendbuf(len=%zu) -> %zd, %d", + stream->s.id, len, nwritten, *err); + if(nwritten < 0) { + goto out; + } + + (void)nghttp3_conn_resume_stream(ctx->h3.conn, stream->s.id); + } + + result = cf_progress_egress(cf, data); + if(result) { + *err = result; + nwritten = -1; + } + + if(stream && nwritten > 0 && stream->sendbuf_len_in_flight) { + /* We have unacknowledged DATA and cannot report success to our + * caller. Instead we EAGAIN and remember how much we have already + * "written" into our various internal connection buffers. */ + stream->upload_blocked_len = nwritten; + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] cf_send(len=%zu), " + "%zu bytes in flight -> EGAIN", stream->s.id, len, + stream->sendbuf_len_in_flight); + *err = CURLE_AGAIN; + nwritten = -1; + } + +out: + result = check_and_set_expiry(cf, data); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] cf_send(len=%zu) -> %zd, %d", + stream? stream->s.id : -1, len, nwritten, *err); + CF_DATA_RESTORE(cf, save); + return nwritten; +} + +static ssize_t recv_closed_stream(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream, + CURLcode *err) +{ + ssize_t nread = -1; + + (void)cf; + if(stream->reset) { + failf(data, + "HTTP/3 stream %" CURL_PRId64 " reset by server", + stream->s.id); + *err = data->req.bytecount? CURLE_PARTIAL_FILE : CURLE_HTTP3; + goto out; + } + else if(!stream->resp_hds_complete) { + failf(data, + "HTTP/3 stream %" CURL_PRId64 + " was closed cleanly, but before getting" + " all response header fields, treated as error", + stream->s.id); + *err = CURLE_HTTP3; + goto out; + } + *err = CURLE_OK; + nread = 0; + +out: + return nread; +} + +static ssize_t cf_osslq_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, + char *buf, size_t len, CURLcode *err) +{ + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); + ssize_t nread = -1; + struct cf_call_data save; + CURLcode result; + + (void)ctx; + CF_DATA_SAVE(save, cf, data); + DEBUGASSERT(cf->connected); + DEBUGASSERT(ctx); + DEBUGASSERT(ctx->tls.ossl.ssl); + DEBUGASSERT(ctx->h3.conn); + *err = CURLE_OK; + + if(!stream) { + *err = CURLE_RECV_ERROR; + goto out; + } + + if(!Curl_bufq_is_empty(&stream->recvbuf)) { + nread = Curl_bufq_read(&stream->recvbuf, + (unsigned char *)buf, len, err); + if(nread < 0) { + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] read recvbuf(len=%zu) " + "-> %zd, %d", stream->s.id, len, nread, *err); + goto out; + } + } + + result = cf_progress_ingress(cf, data); + if(result) { + *err = result; + nread = -1; + goto out; + } + + /* recvbuf had nothing before, maybe after progressing ingress? */ + if(nread < 0 && !Curl_bufq_is_empty(&stream->recvbuf)) { + nread = Curl_bufq_read(&stream->recvbuf, + (unsigned char *)buf, len, err); + if(nread < 0) { + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] read recvbuf(len=%zu) " + "-> %zd, %d", stream->s.id, len, nread, *err); + goto out; + } + } + + if(nread > 0) { + h3_drain_stream(cf, data); + } + else { + if(stream->closed) { + nread = recv_closed_stream(cf, data, stream, err); + goto out; + } + *err = CURLE_AGAIN; + nread = -1; + } + +out: + if(cf_progress_egress(cf, data)) { + *err = CURLE_SEND_ERROR; + nread = -1; + } + else { + CURLcode result2 = check_and_set_expiry(cf, data); + if(result2) { + *err = result2; + nread = -1; + } + } + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRId64 "] cf_recv(len=%zu) -> %zd, %d", + stream? stream->s.id : -1, len, nread, *err); + CF_DATA_RESTORE(cf, save); + return nread; +} + +/* + * Called from transfer.c:data_pending to know if we should keep looping + * to receive more data from the connection. + */ +static bool cf_osslq_data_pending(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + const struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + const struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); + (void)cf; + return stream && !Curl_bufq_is_empty(&stream->recvbuf); +} + +static CURLcode cf_osslq_data_event(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + int event, int arg1, void *arg2) +{ + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + struct cf_call_data save; + + CF_DATA_SAVE(save, cf, data); + (void)arg1; + (void)arg2; + switch(event) { + case CF_CTRL_DATA_SETUP: + break; + case CF_CTRL_DATA_PAUSE: + result = h3_data_pause(cf, data, (arg1 != 0)); + break; + case CF_CTRL_DATA_DETACH: + h3_data_done(cf, data); + break; + case CF_CTRL_DATA_DONE: + h3_data_done(cf, data); + break; + case CF_CTRL_DATA_DONE_SEND: { + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); + if(stream && !stream->send_closed) { + stream->send_closed = TRUE; + stream->upload_left = Curl_bufq_len(&stream->sendbuf); + (void)nghttp3_conn_resume_stream(ctx->h3.conn, stream->s.id); + } + break; + } + case CF_CTRL_DATA_IDLE: { + struct h3_stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "data idle"); + if(stream && !stream->closed) { + result = check_and_set_expiry(cf, data); + } + break; + } + default: + break; + } + CF_DATA_RESTORE(cf, save); + return result; +} + +static bool cf_osslq_conn_is_alive(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + bool *input_pending) +{ + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + bool alive = FALSE; + struct cf_call_data save; + + CF_DATA_SAVE(save, cf, data); + *input_pending = FALSE; + if(!ctx->tls.ossl.ssl) + goto out; + +#ifdef SSL_VALUE_QUIC_IDLE_TIMEOUT + /* Added in OpenSSL v3.3.x */ + { + timediff_t idletime; + uint64_t idle_ms = ctx->max_idle_ms; + if(!SSL_get_value_uint(ctx->tls.ossl.ssl, + SSL_VALUE_CLASS_FEATURE_NEGOTIATED, + SSL_VALUE_QUIC_IDLE_TIMEOUT, &idle_ms)) { + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "error getting negotiated idle timeout, " + "assume connection is dead."); + goto out; + } + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "negotiated idle timeout: %zums", (size_t)idle_ms); + idletime = Curl_timediff(Curl_now(), ctx->q.last_io); + if(idletime > 0 && (uint64_t)idletime > idle_ms) + goto out; + } + +#endif + + if(!cf->next || !cf->next->cft->is_alive(cf->next, data, input_pending)) + goto out; + + alive = TRUE; + if(*input_pending) { + CURLcode result; + /* This happens before we've sent off a request and the connection is + not in use by any other transfer, there shouldn't be any data here, + only "protocol frames" */ + *input_pending = FALSE; + result = cf_progress_ingress(cf, data); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "is_alive, progress ingress -> %d", result); + alive = result? FALSE : TRUE; + } + +out: + CF_DATA_RESTORE(cf, save); + return alive; +} + +static void cf_osslq_adjust_pollset(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + struct easy_pollset *ps) +{ + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + + if(!ctx->tls.ossl.ssl) { + /* NOP */ + } + else if(!cf->connected) { + /* during handshake, transfer has not started yet. we always + * add our socket for polling if SSL wants to send/recv */ + Curl_pollset_set(data, ps, ctx->q.sockfd, + SSL_net_read_desired(ctx->tls.ossl.ssl), + SSL_net_write_desired(ctx->tls.ossl.ssl)); + } + else { + /* once connected, we only modify the socket if it is present. + * this avoids adding it for paused transfers. */ + bool want_recv, want_send; + Curl_pollset_check(data, ps, ctx->q.sockfd, &want_recv, &want_send); + if(want_recv || want_send) { + Curl_pollset_set(data, ps, ctx->q.sockfd, + SSL_net_read_desired(ctx->tls.ossl.ssl), + SSL_net_write_desired(ctx->tls.ossl.ssl)); + } + } +} + +static CURLcode cf_osslq_query(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + int query, int *pres1, void *pres2) +{ + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + + switch(query) { + case CF_QUERY_MAX_CONCURRENT: { +#ifdef SSL_VALUE_QUIC_STREAM_BIDI_LOCAL_AVAIL + /* Added in OpenSSL v3.3.x */ + uint64_t v; + if(!SSL_get_value_uint(ctx->tls.ossl.ssl, SSL_VALUE_CLASS_GENERIC, + SSL_VALUE_QUIC_STREAM_BIDI_LOCAL_AVAIL, &v)) { + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "error getting available local bidi streams"); + return CURLE_HTTP3; + } + /* we report avail + in_use */ + v += CONN_INUSE(cf->conn); + *pres1 = (v > INT_MAX)? INT_MAX : (int)v; +#else + *pres1 = 100; +#endif + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "query max_conncurrent -> %d", *pres1); + return CURLE_OK; + } + case CF_QUERY_CONNECT_REPLY_MS: + if(ctx->got_first_byte) { + timediff_t ms = Curl_timediff(ctx->first_byte_at, ctx->started_at); + *pres1 = (ms < INT_MAX)? (int)ms : INT_MAX; + } + else + *pres1 = -1; + return CURLE_OK; + case CF_QUERY_TIMER_CONNECT: { + struct curltime *when = pres2; + if(ctx->got_first_byte) + *when = ctx->first_byte_at; + return CURLE_OK; + } + case CF_QUERY_TIMER_APPCONNECT: { + struct curltime *when = pres2; + if(cf->connected) + *when = ctx->handshake_at; + return CURLE_OK; + } + default: + break; + } + return cf->next? + cf->next->cft->query(cf->next, data, query, pres1, pres2) : + CURLE_UNKNOWN_OPTION; +} + +struct Curl_cftype Curl_cft_http3 = { + "HTTP/3", + CF_TYPE_IP_CONNECT | CF_TYPE_SSL | CF_TYPE_MULTIPLEX, + 0, + cf_osslq_destroy, + cf_osslq_connect, + cf_osslq_close, + Curl_cf_def_get_host, + cf_osslq_adjust_pollset, + cf_osslq_data_pending, + cf_osslq_send, + cf_osslq_recv, + cf_osslq_data_event, + cf_osslq_conn_is_alive, + Curl_cf_def_conn_keep_alive, + cf_osslq_query, +}; + +CURLcode Curl_cf_osslq_create(struct Curl_cfilter **pcf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + struct connectdata *conn, + const struct Curl_addrinfo *ai) +{ + struct cf_osslq_ctx *ctx = NULL; + struct Curl_cfilter *cf = NULL, *udp_cf = NULL; + CURLcode result; + + (void)data; + ctx = calloc(1, sizeof(*ctx)); + if(!ctx) { + result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + goto out; + } + cf_osslq_ctx_clear(ctx); + + result = Curl_cf_create(&cf, &Curl_cft_http3, ctx); + if(result) + goto out; + + result = Curl_cf_udp_create(&udp_cf, data, conn, ai, TRNSPRT_QUIC); + if(result) + goto out; + + cf->conn = conn; + udp_cf->conn = cf->conn; + udp_cf->sockindex = cf->sockindex; + cf->next = udp_cf; + +out: + *pcf = (!result)? cf : NULL; + if(result) { + if(udp_cf) + Curl_conn_cf_discard_sub(cf, udp_cf, data, TRUE); + Curl_safefree(cf); + Curl_safefree(ctx); + } + return result; +} + +bool Curl_conn_is_osslq(const struct Curl_easy *data, + const struct connectdata *conn, + int sockindex) +{ + struct Curl_cfilter *cf = conn? conn->cfilter[sockindex] : NULL; + + (void)data; + for(; cf; cf = cf->next) { + if(cf->cft == &Curl_cft_http3) + return TRUE; + if(cf->cft->flags & CF_TYPE_IP_CONNECT) + return FALSE; + } + return FALSE; +} + +/* + * Store ngtcp2 version info in this buffer. + */ +void Curl_osslq_ver(char *p, size_t len) +{ + const nghttp3_info *ht3 = nghttp3_version(0); + (void)msnprintf(p, len, "nghttp3/%s", ht3->version_str); +} + +#endif /* USE_OPENSSL_QUIC && USE_NGHTTP3 */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/curl_osslq.h b/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/curl_osslq.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0e12d7023e --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/curl_osslq.h @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +#ifndef HEADER_CURL_VQUIC_CURL_OSSLQ_H +#define HEADER_CURL_VQUIC_CURL_OSSLQ_H +/*************************************************************************** + * _ _ ____ _ + * Project ___| | | | _ \| | + * / __| | | | |_) | | + * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ + * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| + * + * Copyright (C) Daniel Stenberg, , et al. + * + * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which + * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms + * are also available at https://curl.se/docs/copyright.html. + * + * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell + * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is + * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file. + * + * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY + * KIND, either express or implied. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: curl + * + ***************************************************************************/ + +#include "curl_setup.h" + +#if defined(USE_OPENSSL_QUIC) && defined(USE_NGHTTP3) + +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_UDP_H +#include +#endif + +struct Curl_cfilter; + +#include "urldata.h" + +void Curl_osslq_ver(char *p, size_t len); + +CURLcode Curl_cf_osslq_create(struct Curl_cfilter **pcf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + struct connectdata *conn, + const struct Curl_addrinfo *ai); + +bool Curl_conn_is_osslq(const struct Curl_easy *data, + const struct connectdata *conn, + int sockindex); +#endif + +#endif /* HEADER_CURL_VQUIC_CURL_OSSLQ_H */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/curl_quiche.c b/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/curl_quiche.c index 7123d63ca4..a68fc6430c 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/curl_quiche.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/curl_quiche.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #include #include #include "bufq.h" +#include "hash.h" #include "urldata.h" #include "cfilters.h" #include "cf-socket.h" @@ -43,6 +44,7 @@ #include "http1.h" #include "vquic.h" #include "vquic_int.h" +#include "vquic-tls.h" #include "curl_quiche.h" #include "transfer.h" #include "inet_pton.h" @@ -84,31 +86,22 @@ void Curl_quiche_ver(char *p, size_t len) (void)msnprintf(p, len, "quiche/%s", quiche_version()); } -static void keylog_callback(const SSL *ssl, const char *line) -{ - (void)ssl; - Curl_tls_keylog_write_line(line); -} - struct cf_quiche_ctx { struct cf_quic_ctx q; struct ssl_peer peer; + struct curl_tls_ctx tls; quiche_conn *qconn; quiche_config *cfg; quiche_h3_conn *h3c; quiche_h3_config *h3config; uint8_t scid[QUICHE_MAX_CONN_ID_LEN]; - SSL_CTX *sslctx; - SSL *ssl; struct curltime started_at; /* time the current attempt started */ struct curltime handshake_at; /* time connect handshake finished */ - struct curltime first_byte_at; /* when first byte was recvd */ struct curltime reconnect_at; /* time the next attempt should start */ struct bufc_pool stream_bufcp; /* chunk pool for streams */ + struct Curl_hash streams; /* hash `data->id` to `stream_ctx` */ curl_off_t data_recvd; - uint64_t max_idle_ms; /* max idle time for QUIC conn */ BIT(goaway); /* got GOAWAY from server */ - BIT(got_first_byte); /* if first byte was received */ BIT(x509_store_setup); /* if x509 store has been set up */ }; @@ -123,159 +116,79 @@ static void quiche_debug_log(const char *line, void *argp) static void cf_quiche_ctx_clear(struct cf_quiche_ctx *ctx) { if(ctx) { - vquic_ctx_free(&ctx->q); - if(ctx->qconn) - quiche_conn_free(ctx->qconn); - if(ctx->h3config) - quiche_h3_config_free(ctx->h3config); if(ctx->h3c) quiche_h3_conn_free(ctx->h3c); + if(ctx->h3config) + quiche_h3_config_free(ctx->h3config); + if(ctx->qconn) + quiche_conn_free(ctx->qconn); if(ctx->cfg) quiche_config_free(ctx->cfg); - Curl_bufcp_free(&ctx->stream_bufcp); + /* quiche just freed it */ + ctx->tls.ossl.ssl = NULL; + Curl_vquic_tls_cleanup(&ctx->tls); Curl_ssl_peer_cleanup(&ctx->peer); + vquic_ctx_free(&ctx->q); + Curl_bufcp_free(&ctx->stream_bufcp); + Curl_hash_clean(&ctx->streams); + Curl_hash_destroy(&ctx->streams); memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); } } -static CURLcode quic_x509_store_setup(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, - struct Curl_easy *data) -{ - struct cf_quiche_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config; - - conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf); - if(!conn_config) - return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; - - if(!ctx->x509_store_setup) { - if(conn_config->verifypeer) { - const char * const ssl_cafile = conn_config->CAfile; - const char * const ssl_capath = conn_config->CApath; - if(ssl_cafile || ssl_capath) { - SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx->sslctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, NULL); - /* tell OpenSSL where to find CA certificates that are used to verify - the server's certificate. */ - if(!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx->sslctx, ssl_cafile, - ssl_capath)) { - /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */ - failf(data, "error setting certificate verify locations:" - " CAfile: %s CApath: %s", - ssl_cafile ? ssl_cafile : "none", - ssl_capath ? ssl_capath : "none"); - return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE; - } - infof(data, " CAfile: %s", ssl_cafile ? ssl_cafile : "none"); - infof(data, " CApath: %s", ssl_capath ? ssl_capath : "none"); - } -#ifdef CURL_CA_FALLBACK - else { - /* verifying the peer without any CA certificates won't work so - use openssl's built-in default as fallback */ - SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx->sslctx); - } -#endif - } - ctx->x509_store_setup = TRUE; - } - return CURLE_OK; -} - -static CURLcode quic_ssl_setup(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) -{ - struct cf_quiche_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config; - CURLcode result; - - conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf); - if(!conn_config) - return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; - - result = Curl_ssl_peer_init(&ctx->peer, cf); - if(result) - return result; - - DEBUGASSERT(!ctx->sslctx); - ctx->sslctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method()); - if(!ctx->sslctx) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - - SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(ctx->sslctx, - (const uint8_t *)QUICHE_H3_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, - sizeof(QUICHE_H3_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL) - 1); - - SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx->sslctx); - - /* Open the file if a TLS or QUIC backend has not done this before. */ - Curl_tls_keylog_open(); - if(Curl_tls_keylog_enabled()) { - SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(ctx->sslctx, keylog_callback); - } - - if(conn_config->curves && - !SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list(ctx->sslctx, conn_config->curves)) { - failf(data, "failed setting curves list for QUIC: '%s'", - conn_config->curves); - return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER; - } - - ctx->ssl = SSL_new(ctx->sslctx); - if(!ctx->ssl) - return CURLE_QUIC_CONNECT_ERROR; - - SSL_set_app_data(ctx->ssl, cf); - - if(ctx->peer.sni) { - if(!SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(ctx->ssl, ctx->peer.sni)) { - failf(data, "Failed set SNI"); - SSL_free(ctx->ssl); - ctx->ssl = NULL; - return CURLE_QUIC_CONNECT_ERROR; - } - } - - return CURLE_OK; -} +static CURLcode cf_flush_egress(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data); /** * All about the H3 internals of a stream */ struct stream_ctx { - int64_t id; /* HTTP/3 protocol stream identifier */ + curl_uint64_t id; /* HTTP/3 protocol stream identifier */ struct bufq recvbuf; /* h3 response */ struct h1_req_parser h1; /* h1 request parsing */ - uint64_t error3; /* HTTP/3 stream error code */ + curl_uint64_t error3; /* HTTP/3 stream error code */ curl_off_t upload_left; /* number of request bytes left to upload */ - bool closed; /* TRUE on stream close */ - bool reset; /* TRUE on stream reset */ - bool send_closed; /* stream is locally closed */ - bool resp_hds_complete; /* complete, final response has been received */ - bool resp_got_header; /* TRUE when h3 stream has recvd some HEADER */ + BIT(opened); /* TRUE after stream has been opened */ + BIT(closed); /* TRUE on stream close */ + BIT(reset); /* TRUE on stream reset */ + BIT(send_closed); /* stream is locally closed */ + BIT(resp_hds_complete); /* final response has been received */ + BIT(resp_got_header); /* TRUE when h3 stream has recvd some HEADER */ BIT(quic_flow_blocked); /* stream is blocked by QUIC flow control */ }; -#define H3_STREAM_CTX(d) ((struct stream_ctx *)(((d) && (d)->req.p.http)? \ - ((struct HTTP *)(d)->req.p.http)->h3_ctx \ - : NULL)) -#define H3_STREAM_LCTX(d) ((struct HTTP *)(d)->req.p.http)->h3_ctx -#define H3_STREAM_ID(d) (H3_STREAM_CTX(d)? \ - H3_STREAM_CTX(d)->id : -2) +#define H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx,data) ((struct stream_ctx *)(\ + data? Curl_hash_offt_get(&(ctx)->streams, (data)->id) : NULL)) + +static void h3_stream_ctx_free(struct stream_ctx *stream) +{ + Curl_bufq_free(&stream->recvbuf); + Curl_h1_req_parse_free(&stream->h1); + free(stream); +} + +static void h3_stream_hash_free(void *stream) +{ + DEBUGASSERT(stream); + h3_stream_ctx_free((struct stream_ctx *)stream); +} static void check_resumes(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) { + struct cf_quiche_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; struct Curl_easy *sdata; struct stream_ctx *stream; DEBUGASSERT(data->multi); for(sdata = data->multi->easyp; sdata; sdata = sdata->next) { if(sdata->conn == data->conn) { - stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(sdata); + stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, sdata); if(stream && stream->quic_flow_blocked) { stream->quic_flow_blocked = FALSE; Curl_expire(data, 0, EXPIRE_RUN_NOW); - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%"PRId64"] unblock", stream->id); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%"CURL_PRIu64"] unblock", stream->id); } } } @@ -285,7 +198,7 @@ static CURLcode h3_data_setup(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) { struct cf_quiche_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); if(stream) return CURLE_OK; @@ -294,22 +207,28 @@ static CURLcode h3_data_setup(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(!stream) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - H3_STREAM_LCTX(data) = stream; stream->id = -1; Curl_bufq_initp(&stream->recvbuf, &ctx->stream_bufcp, H3_STREAM_RECV_CHUNKS, BUFQ_OPT_SOFT_LIMIT); Curl_h1_req_parse_init(&stream->h1, H1_PARSE_DEFAULT_MAX_LINE_LEN); + + if(!Curl_hash_offt_set(&ctx->streams, data->id, stream)) { + h3_stream_ctx_free(stream); + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + return CURLE_OK; } static void h3_data_done(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) { struct cf_quiche_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); + CURLcode result; (void)cf; if(stream) { - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%"PRId64"] easy handle is done", stream->id); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%"CURL_PRIu64"] easy handle is done", stream->id); if(ctx->qconn && !stream->closed) { quiche_conn_stream_shutdown(ctx->qconn, stream->id, QUICHE_SHUTDOWN_READ, CURL_H3_NO_ERROR); @@ -319,51 +238,77 @@ static void h3_data_done(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) stream->send_closed = TRUE; } stream->closed = TRUE; + result = cf_flush_egress(cf, data); + if(result) + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "data_done, flush egress -> %d", result); } - Curl_bufq_free(&stream->recvbuf); - Curl_h1_req_parse_free(&stream->h1); - free(stream); - H3_STREAM_LCTX(data) = NULL; + Curl_hash_offt_remove(&ctx->streams, data->id); } } static void drain_stream(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) { - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct cf_quiche_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); unsigned char bits; (void)cf; bits = CURL_CSELECT_IN; if(stream && !stream->send_closed && stream->upload_left) bits |= CURL_CSELECT_OUT; - if(data->state.dselect_bits != bits) { - data->state.dselect_bits = bits; + if(data->state.select_bits != bits) { + data->state.select_bits = bits; Curl_expire(data, 0, EXPIRE_RUN_NOW); } } static struct Curl_easy *get_stream_easy(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, - int64_t stream3_id) + curl_uint64_t stream_id, + struct stream_ctx **pstream) { + struct cf_quiche_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; struct Curl_easy *sdata; + struct stream_ctx *stream; (void)cf; - if(H3_STREAM_ID(data) == stream3_id) { + stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); + if(stream && stream->id == stream_id) { + *pstream = stream; return data; } else { DEBUGASSERT(data->multi); for(sdata = data->multi->easyp; sdata; sdata = sdata->next) { - if((sdata->conn == data->conn) && H3_STREAM_ID(sdata) == stream3_id) { + if(sdata->conn != data->conn) + continue; + stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, sdata); + if(stream && stream->id == stream_id) { + *pstream = stream; return sdata; } } } + *pstream = NULL; return NULL; } +static void cf_quiche_expire_conn_closed(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct Curl_easy *sdata; + + DEBUGASSERT(data->multi); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "conn closed, expire all transfers"); + for(sdata = data->multi->easyp; sdata; sdata = sdata->next) { + if(sdata == data || sdata->conn != data->conn) + continue; + CURL_TRC_CF(sdata, cf, "conn closed, expire transfer"); + Curl_expire(sdata, 0, EXPIRE_RUN_NOW); + } +} + /* * write_resp_raw() copies response data in raw format to the `data`'s * receive buffer. If not enough space is available, it appends to the @@ -373,7 +318,8 @@ static CURLcode write_resp_raw(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, const void *mem, size_t memlen) { - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct cf_quiche_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; ssize_t nwritten; @@ -403,14 +349,15 @@ static int cb_each_header(uint8_t *name, size_t name_len, void *argp) { struct cb_ctx *x = argp; - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(x->data); + struct cf_quiche_ctx *ctx = x->cf->ctx; + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, x->data); CURLcode result; if(!stream) return CURLE_OK; if((name_len == 7) && !strncmp(HTTP_PSEUDO_STATUS, (char *)name, 7)) { - CURL_TRC_CF(x->data, x->cf, "[%" PRId64 "] status: %.*s", + CURL_TRC_CF(x->data, x->cf, "[%" CURL_PRIu64 "] status: %.*s", stream->id, (int)value_len, value); result = write_resp_raw(x->cf, x->data, "HTTP/3 ", sizeof("HTTP/3 ") - 1); if(!result) @@ -419,7 +366,7 @@ static int cb_each_header(uint8_t *name, size_t name_len, result = write_resp_raw(x->cf, x->data, " \r\n", 3); } else { - CURL_TRC_CF(x->data, x->cf, "[%" PRId64 "] header: %.*s: %.*s", + CURL_TRC_CF(x->data, x->cf, "[%" CURL_PRIu64 "] header: %.*s: %.*s", stream->id, (int)name_len, name, (int)value_len, value); result = write_resp_raw(x->cf, x->data, name, name_len); @@ -431,7 +378,7 @@ static int cb_each_header(uint8_t *name, size_t name_len, result = write_resp_raw(x->cf, x->data, "\r\n", 2); } if(result) { - CURL_TRC_CF(x->data, x->cf, "[%"PRId64"] on header error %d", + CURL_TRC_CF(x->data, x->cf, "[%"CURL_PRIu64"] on header error %d", stream->id, result); } return result; @@ -443,7 +390,7 @@ static ssize_t stream_resp_read(void *reader_ctx, { struct cb_ctx *x = reader_ctx; struct cf_quiche_ctx *ctx = x->cf->ctx; - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(x->data); + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, x->data); ssize_t nread; if(!stream) { @@ -466,7 +413,8 @@ static ssize_t stream_resp_read(void *reader_ctx, static CURLcode cf_recv_body(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) { - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct cf_quiche_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); ssize_t nwritten; struct cb_ctx cb_ctx; CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; @@ -487,9 +435,9 @@ static CURLcode cf_recv_body(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, stream_resp_read, &cb_ctx, &result); if(nwritten < 0 && result != CURLE_AGAIN) { - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%"PRId64"] recv_body error %zd", + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%"CURL_PRIu64"] recv_body error %zd", stream->id, nwritten); - failf(data, "Error %d in HTTP/3 response body for stream[%"PRId64"]", + failf(data, "Error %d in HTTP/3 response body for stream[%"CURL_PRIu64"]", result, stream->id); stream->closed = TRUE; stream->reset = TRUE; @@ -524,17 +472,15 @@ static const char *cf_ev_name(quiche_h3_event *ev) static CURLcode h3_process_event(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, - int64_t stream3_id, + struct stream_ctx *stream, quiche_h3_event *ev) { - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); struct cb_ctx cb_ctx; CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; int rc; if(!stream) return CURLE_OK; - DEBUGASSERT(stream3_id == stream->id); switch(quiche_h3_event_type(ev)) { case QUICHE_H3_EVENT_HEADERS: stream->resp_got_header = TRUE; @@ -542,11 +488,11 @@ static CURLcode h3_process_event(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, cb_ctx.data = data; rc = quiche_h3_event_for_each_header(ev, cb_each_header, &cb_ctx); if(rc) { - failf(data, "Error %d in HTTP/3 response header for stream[%"PRId64"]", - rc, stream3_id); + failf(data, "Error %d in HTTP/3 response header for stream[%" + CURL_PRIu64"]", rc, stream->id); return CURLE_RECV_ERROR; } - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%"PRId64"] <- [HEADERS]", stream3_id); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%"CURL_PRIu64"] <- [HEADERS]", stream->id); break; case QUICHE_H3_EVENT_DATA: @@ -556,7 +502,7 @@ static CURLcode h3_process_event(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, break; case QUICHE_H3_EVENT_RESET: - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%"PRId64"] RESET", stream3_id); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%"CURL_PRIu64"] RESET", stream->id); stream->closed = TRUE; stream->reset = TRUE; stream->send_closed = TRUE; @@ -564,7 +510,7 @@ static CURLcode h3_process_event(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, break; case QUICHE_H3_EVENT_FINISHED: - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%"PRId64"] CLOSED", stream3_id); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%"CURL_PRIu64"] CLOSED", stream->id); if(!stream->resp_hds_complete) { result = write_resp_raw(cf, data, "\r\n", 2); if(result) @@ -576,12 +522,12 @@ static CURLcode h3_process_event(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, break; case QUICHE_H3_EVENT_GOAWAY: - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%"PRId64"] <- [GOAWAY]", stream3_id); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%"CURL_PRIu64"] <- [GOAWAY]", stream->id); break; default: - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%"PRId64"] recv, unhandled event %d", - stream3_id, quiche_h3_event_type(ev)); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%"CURL_PRIu64"] recv, unhandled event %d", + stream->id, quiche_h3_event_type(ev)); break; } return result; @@ -591,36 +537,33 @@ static CURLcode cf_poll_events(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) { struct cf_quiche_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct stream_ctx *stream = NULL; struct Curl_easy *sdata; quiche_h3_event *ev; CURLcode result; /* Take in the events and distribute them to the transfers. */ while(ctx->h3c) { - int64_t stream3_id = quiche_h3_conn_poll(ctx->h3c, ctx->qconn, &ev); + curl_int64_t stream3_id = quiche_h3_conn_poll(ctx->h3c, ctx->qconn, &ev); if(stream3_id == QUICHE_H3_ERR_DONE) { break; } else if(stream3_id < 0) { - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%"PRId64"] error poll: %"PRId64, - stream? stream->id : -1, stream3_id); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "error poll: %"CURL_PRId64, stream3_id); return CURLE_HTTP3; } - sdata = get_stream_easy(cf, data, stream3_id); - if(!sdata) { - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%"PRId64"] discard event %s for " - "unknown [%"PRId64"]", - stream? stream->id : -1, cf_ev_name(ev), stream3_id); + sdata = get_stream_easy(cf, data, stream3_id, &stream); + if(!sdata || !stream) { + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "discard event %s for unknown [%"CURL_PRId64"]", + cf_ev_name(ev), stream3_id); } else { - result = h3_process_event(cf, sdata, stream3_id, ev); + result = h3_process_event(cf, sdata, stream, ev); drain_stream(cf, sdata); if(result) { - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%"PRId64"] error processing event %s " - "for [%"PRId64"] -> %d", - stream? stream->id : -1, cf_ev_name(ev), + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "error processing event %s " + "for [%"CURL_PRIu64"] -> %d", cf_ev_name(ev), stream3_id, result); if(data == sdata) { /* Only report this error to the caller if it is about the @@ -664,11 +607,19 @@ static CURLcode recv_pkt(const unsigned char *pkt, size_t pktlen, &recv_info); if(nread < 0) { if(QUICHE_ERR_DONE == nread) { + if(quiche_conn_is_draining(ctx->qconn)) { + CURL_TRC_CF(r->data, r->cf, "ingress, connection is draining"); + return CURLE_RECV_ERROR; + } + if(quiche_conn_is_closed(ctx->qconn)) { + CURL_TRC_CF(r->data, r->cf, "ingress, connection is closed"); + return CURLE_RECV_ERROR; + } CURL_TRC_CF(r->data, r->cf, "ingress, quiche is DONE"); return CURLE_OK; } else if(QUICHE_ERR_TLS_FAIL == nread) { - long verify_ok = SSL_get_verify_result(ctx->ssl); + long verify_ok = SSL_get_verify_result(ctx->tls.ossl.ssl); if(verify_ok != X509_V_OK) { failf(r->data, "SSL certificate problem: %s", X509_verify_cert_error_string(verify_ok)); @@ -696,7 +647,7 @@ static CURLcode cf_process_ingress(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, CURLcode result; DEBUGASSERT(ctx->qconn); - result = quic_x509_store_setup(cf, data); + result = Curl_vquic_tls_before_recv(&ctx->tls, cf, data); if(result) return result; @@ -755,8 +706,8 @@ static CURLcode cf_flush_egress(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct cf_quiche_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; ssize_t nread; CURLcode result; - int64_t expiry_ns; - int64_t timeout_ns; + curl_int64_t expiry_ns; + curl_int64_t timeout_ns; struct read_ctx readx; size_t pkt_count, gsolen; @@ -764,7 +715,13 @@ static CURLcode cf_flush_egress(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(!expiry_ns) { quiche_conn_on_timeout(ctx->qconn); if(quiche_conn_is_closed(ctx->qconn)) { - failf(data, "quiche_conn_on_timeout closed the connection"); + if(quiche_conn_is_timed_out(ctx->qconn)) + failf(data, "connection closed by idle timeout"); + else + failf(data, "connection closed by server"); + /* Connection timed out, expire all transfers belonging to it + * as will not get any more POLL events here. */ + cf_quiche_expire_conn_closed(cf, data); return CURLE_SEND_ERROR; } } @@ -829,25 +786,26 @@ static ssize_t recv_closed_stream(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, CURLcode *err) { - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct cf_quiche_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); ssize_t nread = -1; DEBUGASSERT(stream); if(stream->reset) { failf(data, - "HTTP/3 stream %" PRId64 " reset by server", stream->id); - *err = stream->resp_got_header? CURLE_PARTIAL_FILE : CURLE_RECV_ERROR; - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] cf_recv, was reset -> %d", + "HTTP/3 stream %" CURL_PRIu64 " reset by server", stream->id); + *err = data->req.bytecount? CURLE_PARTIAL_FILE : CURLE_HTTP3; + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRIu64 "] cf_recv, was reset -> %d", stream->id, *err); } else if(!stream->resp_got_header) { failf(data, - "HTTP/3 stream %" PRId64 " was closed cleanly, but before getting" - " all response header fields, treated as error", + "HTTP/3 stream %" CURL_PRIu64 " was closed cleanly, but before " + "getting all response header fields, treated as error", stream->id); /* *err = CURLE_PARTIAL_FILE; */ - *err = CURLE_RECV_ERROR; - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] cf_recv, closed incomplete" + *err = CURLE_HTTP3; + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRIu64 "] cf_recv, closed incomplete" " -> %d", stream->id, *err); } else { @@ -861,7 +819,7 @@ static ssize_t cf_quiche_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, char *buf, size_t len, CURLcode *err) { struct cf_quiche_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); ssize_t nread = -1; CURLcode result; @@ -875,7 +833,7 @@ static ssize_t cf_quiche_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, if(!Curl_bufq_is_empty(&stream->recvbuf)) { nread = Curl_bufq_read(&stream->recvbuf, (unsigned char *)buf, len, err); - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] read recvbuf(len=%zu) " + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRIu64 "] read recvbuf(len=%zu) " "-> %zd, %d", stream->id, len, nread, *err); if(nread < 0) goto out; @@ -892,7 +850,7 @@ static ssize_t cf_quiche_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, if(nread < 0 && !Curl_bufq_is_empty(&stream->recvbuf)) { nread = Curl_bufq_read(&stream->recvbuf, (unsigned char *)buf, len, err); - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] read recvbuf(len=%zu) " + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRIu64 "] read recvbuf(len=%zu) " "-> %zd, %d", stream->id, len, nread, *err); if(nread < 0) goto out; @@ -926,7 +884,7 @@ static ssize_t cf_quiche_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, } if(nread > 0) ctx->data_recvd += nread; - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%"PRId64"] cf_recv(total=%" + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%"CURL_PRIu64"] cf_recv(total=%" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T ") -> %zd, %d", stream->id, ctx->data_recvd, nread, *err); return nread; @@ -942,9 +900,9 @@ static ssize_t h3_open_stream(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, CURLcode *err) { struct cf_quiche_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); size_t nheader, i; - int64_t stream3_id; + curl_int64_t stream3_id; struct dynhds h2_headers; quiche_h3_header *nva = NULL; ssize_t nwritten; @@ -954,7 +912,7 @@ static ssize_t h3_open_stream(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(*err) { return -1; } - stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); DEBUGASSERT(stream); } @@ -1019,14 +977,14 @@ static ssize_t h3_open_stream(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(QUICHE_H3_ERR_STREAM_BLOCKED == stream3_id) { /* quiche seems to report this error if the connection window is * exhausted. Which happens frequently and intermittent. */ - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%"PRId64"] blocked", stream->id); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%"CURL_PRIu64"] blocked", stream->id); stream->quic_flow_blocked = TRUE; *err = CURLE_AGAIN; nwritten = -1; goto out; } else { - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "send_request(%s) -> %" PRId64, + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "send_request(%s) -> %" CURL_PRIu64, data->state.url, stream3_id); } *err = CURLE_SEND_ERROR; @@ -1034,17 +992,18 @@ static ssize_t h3_open_stream(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, goto out; } - DEBUGASSERT(stream->id == -1); + DEBUGASSERT(!stream->opened); *err = CURLE_OK; stream->id = stream3_id; + stream->opened = TRUE; stream->closed = FALSE; stream->reset = FALSE; if(Curl_trc_is_verbose(data)) { - infof(data, "[HTTP/3] [%" PRId64 "] OPENED stream for %s", + infof(data, "[HTTP/3] [%" CURL_PRIu64 "] OPENED stream for %s", stream->id, data->state.url); for(i = 0; i < nheader; ++i) { - infof(data, "[HTTP/3] [%" PRId64 "] [%.*s: %.*s]", stream->id, + infof(data, "[HTTP/3] [%" CURL_PRIu64 "] [%.*s: %.*s]", stream->id, (int)nva[i].name_len, nva[i].name, (int)nva[i].value_len, nva[i].value); } @@ -1060,7 +1019,7 @@ static ssize_t cf_quiche_send(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, const void *buf, size_t len, CURLcode *err) { struct cf_quiche_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); CURLcode result; ssize_t nwritten; @@ -1072,11 +1031,33 @@ static ssize_t cf_quiche_send(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, goto out; } - if(!stream || stream->id < 0) { + if(!stream || !stream->opened) { nwritten = h3_open_stream(cf, data, buf, len, err); if(nwritten < 0) goto out; - stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); + } + else if(stream->closed) { + if(stream->resp_hds_complete) { + /* sending request body on a stream that has been closed by the + * server. If the server has send us a final response, we should + * silently discard the send data. + * This happens for example on redirects where the server, instead + * of reading the full request body just closed the stream after + * sending the 30x response. + * This is sort of a race: had the transfer loop called recv first, + * it would see the response and stop/discard sending on its own- */ + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRIu64 "] discarding data" + "on closed stream with response", stream->id); + *err = CURLE_OK; + nwritten = (ssize_t)len; + goto out; + } + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRIu64 "] send_body(len=%zu) " + "-> stream closed", stream->id, len); + *err = CURLE_HTTP3; + nwritten = -1; + goto out; } else { bool eof = (stream->upload_left >= 0 && @@ -1087,7 +1068,7 @@ static ssize_t cf_quiche_send(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, /* TODO: we seem to be blocked on flow control and should HOLD * sending. But when do we open again? */ if(!quiche_conn_stream_writable(ctx->qconn, stream->id, len)) { - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] send_body(len=%zu) " + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRIu64 "] send_body(len=%zu) " "-> window exhausted", stream->id, len); stream->quic_flow_blocked = TRUE; } @@ -1095,31 +1076,22 @@ static ssize_t cf_quiche_send(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, nwritten = -1; goto out; } - else if(nwritten == QUICHE_H3_TRANSPORT_ERR_INVALID_STREAM_STATE && - stream->closed && stream->resp_hds_complete) { - /* sending request body on a stream that has been closed by the - * server. If the server has send us a final response, we should - * silently discard the send data. - * This happens for example on redirects where the server, instead - * of reading the full request body just closed the stream after - * sending the 30x response. - * This is sort of a race: had the transfer loop called recv first, - * it would see the response and stop/discard sending on its own- */ - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] discarding data" - "on closed stream with response", stream->id); - *err = CURLE_OK; - nwritten = (ssize_t)len; + else if(nwritten == QUICHE_H3_TRANSPORT_ERR_INVALID_STREAM_STATE) { + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRIu64 "] send_body(len=%zu) " + "-> invalid stream state", stream->id, len); + *err = CURLE_HTTP3; + nwritten = -1; goto out; } else if(nwritten == QUICHE_H3_TRANSPORT_ERR_FINAL_SIZE) { - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] send_body(len=%zu) " + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRIu64 "] send_body(len=%zu) " "-> exceeds size", stream->id, len); *err = CURLE_SEND_ERROR; nwritten = -1; goto out; } else if(nwritten < 0) { - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] send_body(len=%zu) " + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRIu64 "] send_body(len=%zu) " "-> quiche err %zd", stream->id, len, nwritten); *err = CURLE_SEND_ERROR; nwritten = -1; @@ -1134,7 +1106,7 @@ static ssize_t cf_quiche_send(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, if(stream->upload_left == 0) stream->send_closed = TRUE; - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] send body(len=%zu, " + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRIu64 "] send body(len=%zu, " "left=%" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T ") -> %zd", stream->id, len, stream->upload_left, nwritten); *err = CURLE_OK; @@ -1147,7 +1119,7 @@ static ssize_t cf_quiche_send(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, *err = result; nwritten = -1; } - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" PRId64 "] cf_send(len=%zu) -> %zd, %d", + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%" CURL_PRIu64 "] cf_send(len=%zu) -> %zd, %d", stream? stream->id : -1, len, nwritten, *err); return nwritten; } @@ -1156,10 +1128,10 @@ static bool stream_is_writeable(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) { struct cf_quiche_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); - return stream && (quiche_conn_stream_writable(ctx->qconn, - (uint64_t)stream->id, 1) > 0); + return stream && (quiche_conn_stream_writable( + ctx->qconn, (curl_uint64_t)stream->id, 1) > 0); } static void cf_quiche_adjust_pollset(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, @@ -1167,16 +1139,19 @@ static void cf_quiche_adjust_pollset(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct easy_pollset *ps) { struct cf_quiche_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - bool want_recv = CURL_WANT_RECV(data); - bool want_send = CURL_WANT_SEND(data); + bool want_recv, want_send; - if(ctx->qconn && (want_recv || want_send)) { - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + if(!ctx->qconn) + return; + + Curl_pollset_check(data, ps, ctx->q.sockfd, &want_recv, &want_send); + if(want_recv || want_send) { + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); bool c_exhaust, s_exhaust; c_exhaust = FALSE; /* Have not found any call in quiche that tells us if the connection itself is blocked */ - s_exhaust = stream && stream->id >= 0 && + s_exhaust = want_send && stream && stream->opened && (stream->quic_flow_blocked || !stream_is_writeable(cf, data)); want_recv = (want_recv || c_exhaust || s_exhaust); want_send = (!s_exhaust && want_send) || @@ -1193,7 +1168,8 @@ static void cf_quiche_adjust_pollset(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, static bool cf_quiche_data_pending(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, const struct Curl_easy *data) { - const struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct cf_quiche_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + const struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); (void)cf; return stream && !Curl_bufq_is_empty(&stream->recvbuf); } @@ -1215,6 +1191,7 @@ static CURLcode cf_quiche_data_event(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, int event, int arg1, void *arg2) { + struct cf_quiche_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; (void)arg1; @@ -1232,7 +1209,7 @@ static CURLcode cf_quiche_data_event(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, h3_data_done(cf, data); break; case CF_CTRL_DATA_DONE_SEND: { - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); if(stream && !stream->send_closed) { unsigned char body[1]; ssize_t sent; @@ -1241,13 +1218,13 @@ static CURLcode cf_quiche_data_event(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, stream->upload_left = 0; body[0] = 'X'; sent = cf_quiche_send(cf, data, body, 0, &result); - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%"PRId64"] DONE_SEND -> %zd, %d", + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "[%"CURL_PRIu64"] DONE_SEND -> %zd, %d", stream->id, sent, result); } break; } case CF_CTRL_DATA_IDLE: { - struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(data); + struct stream_ctx *stream = H3_STREAM_CTX(ctx, data); if(stream && !stream->closed) { result = cf_flush_egress(cf, data); if(result) @@ -1261,66 +1238,6 @@ static CURLcode cf_quiche_data_event(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, return result; } -static CURLcode cf_verify_peer(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, - struct Curl_easy *data) -{ - struct cf_quiche_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; - struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config; - CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; - - conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf); - if(!conn_config) - return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; - - cf->conn->bits.multiplex = TRUE; /* at least potentially multiplexed */ - cf->conn->httpversion = 30; - cf->conn->bundle->multiuse = BUNDLE_MULTIPLEX; - - if(conn_config->verifyhost) { - X509 *server_cert; - server_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ctx->ssl); - if(!server_cert) { - result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; - goto out; - } - result = Curl_ossl_verifyhost(data, cf->conn, &ctx->peer, server_cert); - X509_free(server_cert); - if(result) - goto out; - } - else - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "Skipped certificate verification"); - - ctx->h3config = quiche_h3_config_new(); - if(!ctx->h3config) { - result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - goto out; - } - - /* Create a new HTTP/3 connection on the QUIC connection. */ - ctx->h3c = quiche_h3_conn_new_with_transport(ctx->qconn, ctx->h3config); - if(!ctx->h3c) { - result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - goto out; - } - if(data->set.ssl.certinfo) - /* asked to gather certificate info */ - (void)Curl_ossl_certchain(data, ctx->ssl); - -out: - if(result) { - if(ctx->h3config) { - quiche_h3_config_free(ctx->h3config); - ctx->h3config = NULL; - } - if(ctx->h3c) { - quiche_h3_conn_free(ctx->h3c); - ctx->h3c = NULL; - } - } - return result; -} - static CURLcode cf_connect_start(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) { @@ -1339,22 +1256,26 @@ static CURLcode cf_connect_start(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, debug_log_init = 1; } #endif - ctx->max_idle_ms = CURL_QUIC_MAX_IDLE_MS; Curl_bufcp_init(&ctx->stream_bufcp, H3_STREAM_CHUNK_SIZE, H3_STREAM_POOL_SPARES); + Curl_hash_offt_init(&ctx->streams, 63, h3_stream_hash_free); ctx->data_recvd = 0; result = vquic_ctx_init(&ctx->q); if(result) return result; + result = Curl_ssl_peer_init(&ctx->peer, cf, TRNSPRT_QUIC); + if(result) + return result; + ctx->cfg = quiche_config_new(QUICHE_PROTOCOL_VERSION); if(!ctx->cfg) { failf(data, "can't create quiche config"); return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; } quiche_config_enable_pacing(ctx->cfg, false); - quiche_config_set_max_idle_timeout(ctx->cfg, ctx->max_idle_ms * 1000); + quiche_config_set_max_idle_timeout(ctx->cfg, CURL_QUIC_MAX_IDLE_MS); quiche_config_set_initial_max_data(ctx->cfg, (1 * 1024 * 1024) /* (QUIC_MAX_STREAMS/2) * H3_STREAM_WINDOW_SIZE */); quiche_config_set_initial_max_streams_bidi(ctx->cfg, QUIC_MAX_STREAMS); @@ -1376,9 +1297,10 @@ static CURLcode cf_connect_start(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, sizeof(QUICHE_H3_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL) - 1); - DEBUGASSERT(!ctx->ssl); - DEBUGASSERT(!ctx->sslctx); - result = quic_ssl_setup(cf, data); + result = Curl_vquic_tls_init(&ctx->tls, cf, data, &ctx->peer, + QUICHE_H3_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, + sizeof(QUICHE_H3_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL) - 1, + NULL, NULL, cf); if(result) return result; @@ -1386,8 +1308,7 @@ static CURLcode cf_connect_start(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(result) return result; - Curl_cf_socket_peek(cf->next, data, &ctx->q.sockfd, - &sockaddr, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + Curl_cf_socket_peek(cf->next, data, &ctx->q.sockfd, &sockaddr, NULL); ctx->q.local_addrlen = sizeof(ctx->q.local_addr); rv = getsockname(ctx->q.sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&ctx->q.local_addr, &ctx->q.local_addrlen); @@ -1399,7 +1320,7 @@ static CURLcode cf_connect_start(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, (struct sockaddr *)&ctx->q.local_addr, ctx->q.local_addrlen, &sockaddr->sa_addr, sockaddr->addrlen, - ctx->cfg, ctx->ssl, false); + ctx->cfg, ctx->tls.ossl.ssl, false); if(!ctx->qconn) { failf(data, "can't create quiche connection"); return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; @@ -1438,6 +1359,18 @@ static CURLcode cf_connect_start(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, return CURLE_OK; } +static CURLcode cf_quiche_verify_peer(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct cf_quiche_ctx *ctx = cf->ctx; + + cf->conn->bits.multiplex = TRUE; /* at least potentially multiplexed */ + cf->conn->httpversion = 30; + cf->conn->bundle->multiuse = BUNDLE_MULTIPLEX; + + return Curl_vquic_tls_verify_peer(&ctx->tls, cf, data, &ctx->peer); +} + static CURLcode cf_quiche_connect(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, bool blocking, bool *done) @@ -1489,9 +1422,21 @@ static CURLcode cf_quiche_connect(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, ctx->handshake_at = ctx->q.last_op; CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "handshake complete after %dms", (int)Curl_timediff(ctx->handshake_at, ctx->started_at)); - result = cf_verify_peer(cf, data); + result = cf_quiche_verify_peer(cf, data); if(!result) { CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "peer verified"); + ctx->h3config = quiche_h3_config_new(); + if(!ctx->h3config) { + result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + goto out; + } + + /* Create a new HTTP/3 connection on the QUIC connection. */ + ctx->h3c = quiche_h3_conn_new_with_transport(ctx->qconn, ctx->h3config); + if(!ctx->h3c) { + result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + goto out; + } cf->connected = TRUE; cf->conn->alpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_3; *done = TRUE; @@ -1509,13 +1454,11 @@ static CURLcode cf_quiche_connect(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, out: #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS if(result && result != CURLE_AGAIN) { - const char *r_ip; - int r_port; + struct ip_quadruple ip; - Curl_cf_socket_peek(cf->next, data, NULL, NULL, - &r_ip, &r_port, NULL, NULL); + Curl_cf_socket_peek(cf->next, data, NULL, NULL, &ip); infof(data, "connect to %s port %u failed: %s", - r_ip, r_port, curl_easy_strerror(result)); + ip.remote_ip, ip.remote_port, curl_easy_strerror(result)); } #endif return result; @@ -1555,17 +1498,19 @@ static CURLcode cf_quiche_query(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, switch(query) { case CF_QUERY_MAX_CONCURRENT: { - uint64_t max_streams = CONN_INUSE(cf->conn); + curl_uint64_t max_streams = CONN_INUSE(cf->conn); if(!ctx->goaway) { max_streams += quiche_conn_peer_streams_left_bidi(ctx->qconn); } *pres1 = (max_streams > INT_MAX)? INT_MAX : (int)max_streams; - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "query: MAX_CONCURRENT -> %d", *pres1); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "query conn[%" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T "]: " + "MAX_CONCURRENT -> %d (%zu in use)", + cf->conn->connection_id, *pres1, CONN_INUSE(cf->conn)); return CURLE_OK; } case CF_QUERY_CONNECT_REPLY_MS: - if(ctx->got_first_byte) { - timediff_t ms = Curl_timediff(ctx->first_byte_at, ctx->started_at); + if(ctx->q.got_first_byte) { + timediff_t ms = Curl_timediff(ctx->q.first_byte_at, ctx->started_at); *pres1 = (ms < INT_MAX)? (int)ms : INT_MAX; } else @@ -1573,8 +1518,8 @@ static CURLcode cf_quiche_query(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, return CURLE_OK; case CF_QUERY_TIMER_CONNECT: { struct curltime *when = pres2; - if(ctx->got_first_byte) - *when = ctx->first_byte_at; + if(ctx->q.got_first_byte) + *when = ctx->q.first_byte_at; return CURLE_OK; } case CF_QUERY_TIMER_APPCONNECT: { @@ -1602,23 +1547,12 @@ static bool cf_quiche_conn_is_alive(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(!ctx->qconn) return FALSE; - /* Both sides of the QUIC connection announce they max idle times in - * the transport parameters. Look at the minimum of both and if - * we exceed this, regard the connection as dead. The other side - * may have completely purged it and will no longer respond - * to any packets from us. */ - { - quiche_transport_params qpeerparams; - timediff_t idletime; - uint64_t idle_ms = ctx->max_idle_ms; - - if(quiche_conn_peer_transport_params(ctx->qconn, &qpeerparams) && - qpeerparams.peer_max_idle_timeout && - qpeerparams.peer_max_idle_timeout < idle_ms) - idle_ms = qpeerparams.peer_max_idle_timeout; - idletime = Curl_timediff(Curl_now(), cf->conn->lastused); - if(idletime > 0 && (uint64_t)idletime > idle_ms) - return FALSE; + if(quiche_conn_is_closed(ctx->qconn)) { + if(quiche_conn_is_timed_out(ctx->qconn)) + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "connection was closed due to idle timeout"); + else + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "connection is closed"); + return FALSE; } if(!cf->next || !cf->next->cft->is_alive(cf->next, data, input_pending)) diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/vquic-tls.c b/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/vquic-tls.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..aca18b4570 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/vquic-tls.c @@ -0,0 +1,342 @@ +/*************************************************************************** + * _ _ ____ _ + * Project ___| | | | _ \| | + * / __| | | | |_) | | + * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ + * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| + * + * Copyright (C) Daniel Stenberg, , et al. + * + * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which + * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms + * are also available at https://curl.se/docs/copyright.html. + * + * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell + * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is + * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file. + * + * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY + * KIND, either express or implied. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: curl + * + ***************************************************************************/ + +#include "curl_setup.h" + +#if defined(USE_HTTP3) && \ + (defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_GNUTLS) || defined(USE_WOLFSSL)) + +#ifdef USE_OPENSSL +#include +#include "vtls/openssl.h" +#elif defined(USE_GNUTLS) +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "vtls/gtls.h" +#elif defined(USE_WOLFSSL) +#include +#include +#include +#include "vtls/wolfssl.h" +#endif + +#include "urldata.h" +#include "curl_trc.h" +#include "cfilters.h" +#include "multiif.h" +#include "vtls/keylog.h" +#include "vtls/vtls.h" +#include "vquic-tls.h" + +/* The last 3 #include files should be in this order */ +#include "curl_printf.h" +#include "curl_memory.h" +#include "memdebug.h" + +#ifndef ARRAYSIZE +#define ARRAYSIZE(A) (sizeof(A)/sizeof((A)[0])) +#endif + +#if defined(USE_WOLFSSL) + +#define QUIC_CIPHERS \ + "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:TLS_CHACHA20_" \ + "POLY1305_SHA256:TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256" +#define QUIC_GROUPS "P-256:P-384:P-521" + +#if defined(HAVE_SECRET_CALLBACK) +static void keylog_callback(const WOLFSSL *ssl, const char *line) +{ + (void)ssl; + Curl_tls_keylog_write_line(line); +} +#endif + +static CURLcode curl_wssl_init_ctx(struct curl_tls_ctx *ctx, + struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + Curl_vquic_tls_ctx_setup *cb_setup, + void *cb_user_data) +{ + struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config; + CURLcode result = CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + + conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf); + if(!conn_config) { + result = CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + goto out; + } + + ctx->ssl_ctx = wolfSSL_CTX_new(wolfTLSv1_3_client_method()); + if(!ctx->ssl_ctx) { + result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + goto out; + } + + if(cb_setup) { + result = cb_setup(cf, data, cb_user_data); + if(result) + goto out; + } + + wolfSSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx->ssl_ctx); + + if(wolfSSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx->ssl_ctx, conn_config->cipher_list13 ? + conn_config->cipher_list13 : + QUIC_CIPHERS) != 1) { + char error_buffer[256]; + ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)); + failf(data, "wolfSSL failed to set ciphers: %s", error_buffer); + result = CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + + if(wolfSSL_CTX_set1_groups_list(ctx->ssl_ctx, conn_config->curves ? + conn_config->curves : + (char *)QUIC_GROUPS) != 1) { + failf(data, "wolfSSL failed to set curves"); + result = CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + + /* Open the file if a TLS or QUIC backend has not done this before. */ + Curl_tls_keylog_open(); + if(Curl_tls_keylog_enabled()) { +#if defined(HAVE_SECRET_CALLBACK) + wolfSSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(ctx->ssl_ctx, keylog_callback); +#else + failf(data, "wolfSSL was built without keylog callback"); + result = CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN; + goto out; +#endif + } + + if(conn_config->verifypeer) { + const char * const ssl_cafile = conn_config->CAfile; + const char * const ssl_capath = conn_config->CApath; + + wolfSSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx->ssl_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, NULL); + if(ssl_cafile || ssl_capath) { + /* tell wolfSSL where to find CA certificates that are used to verify + the server's certificate. */ + int rc = + wolfSSL_CTX_load_verify_locations_ex(ctx->ssl_ctx, ssl_cafile, + ssl_capath, + WOLFSSL_LOAD_FLAG_IGNORE_ERR); + if(SSL_SUCCESS != rc) { + /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */ + failf(data, "error setting certificate verify locations:" + " CAfile: %s CApath: %s", + ssl_cafile ? ssl_cafile : "none", + ssl_capath ? ssl_capath : "none"); + result = CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE; + goto out; + } + infof(data, " CAfile: %s", ssl_cafile ? ssl_cafile : "none"); + infof(data, " CApath: %s", ssl_capath ? ssl_capath : "none"); + } +#ifdef CURL_CA_FALLBACK + else { + /* verifying the peer without any CA certificates won't work so + use wolfssl's built-in default as fallback */ + wolfSSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx->ssl_ctx); + } +#endif + } + else { + wolfSSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx->ssl_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL); + } + + /* give application a chance to interfere with SSL set up. */ + if(data->set.ssl.fsslctx) { + Curl_set_in_callback(data, true); + result = (*data->set.ssl.fsslctx)(data, ctx->ssl_ctx, + data->set.ssl.fsslctxp); + Curl_set_in_callback(data, false); + if(result) { + failf(data, "error signaled by ssl ctx callback"); + goto out; + } + } + result = CURLE_OK; + +out: + if(result && ctx->ssl_ctx) { + SSL_CTX_free(ctx->ssl_ctx); + ctx->ssl_ctx = NULL; + } + return result; +} + +/** SSL callbacks ***/ + +static CURLcode curl_wssl_init_ssl(struct curl_tls_ctx *ctx, + struct Curl_easy *data, + struct ssl_peer *peer, + const char *alpn, size_t alpn_len, + void *user_data) +{ + (void)data; + DEBUGASSERT(!ctx->ssl); + DEBUGASSERT(ctx->ssl_ctx); + ctx->ssl = wolfSSL_new(ctx->ssl_ctx); + + wolfSSL_set_app_data(ctx->ssl, user_data); + wolfSSL_set_connect_state(ctx->ssl); + wolfSSL_set_quic_use_legacy_codepoint(ctx->ssl, 0); + + if(alpn) + wolfSSL_set_alpn_protos(ctx->ssl, (const unsigned char *)alpn, + (int)alpn_len); + + if(peer->sni) { + wolfSSL_UseSNI(ctx->ssl, WOLFSSL_SNI_HOST_NAME, + peer->sni, (unsigned short)strlen(peer->sni)); + } + + return CURLE_OK; +} +#endif /* defined(USE_WOLFSSL) */ + +CURLcode Curl_vquic_tls_init(struct curl_tls_ctx *ctx, + struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + struct ssl_peer *peer, + const char *alpn, size_t alpn_len, + Curl_vquic_tls_ctx_setup *cb_setup, + void *cb_user_data, void *ssl_user_data) +{ + CURLcode result; + +#ifdef USE_OPENSSL + (void)result; + return Curl_ossl_ctx_init(&ctx->ossl, cf, data, peer, TRNSPRT_QUIC, + (const unsigned char *)alpn, alpn_len, + cb_setup, cb_user_data, NULL, ssl_user_data); +#elif defined(USE_GNUTLS) + (void)result; + return Curl_gtls_ctx_init(&ctx->gtls, cf, data, peer, + (const unsigned char *)alpn, alpn_len, + cb_setup, cb_user_data, ssl_user_data); +#elif defined(USE_WOLFSSL) + result = curl_wssl_init_ctx(ctx, cf, data, cb_setup, cb_user_data); + if(result) + return result; + + return curl_wssl_init_ssl(ctx, data, peer, alpn, alpn_len, ssl_user_data); +#else +#error "no TLS lib in used, should not happen" + return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; +#endif +} + +void Curl_vquic_tls_cleanup(struct curl_tls_ctx *ctx) +{ +#ifdef USE_OPENSSL + if(ctx->ossl.ssl) + SSL_free(ctx->ossl.ssl); + if(ctx->ossl.ssl_ctx) + SSL_CTX_free(ctx->ossl.ssl_ctx); +#elif defined(USE_GNUTLS) + if(ctx->gtls.cred) + gnutls_certificate_free_credentials(ctx->gtls.cred); + if(ctx->gtls.session) + gnutls_deinit(ctx->gtls.session); +#elif defined(USE_WOLFSSL) + if(ctx->ssl) + wolfSSL_free(ctx->ssl); + if(ctx->ssl_ctx) + wolfSSL_CTX_free(ctx->ssl_ctx); +#endif + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); +} + +CURLcode Curl_vquic_tls_before_recv(struct curl_tls_ctx *ctx, + struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data) +{ +#ifdef USE_OPENSSL + if(!ctx->ossl.x509_store_setup) { + CURLcode result = Curl_ssl_setup_x509_store(cf, data, ctx->ossl.ssl_ctx); + if(result) + return result; + ctx->ossl.x509_store_setup = TRUE; + } +#elif defined(USE_GNUTLS) + if(!ctx->gtls.trust_setup) { + CURLcode result = Curl_gtls_client_trust_setup(cf, data, &ctx->gtls); + if(result) + return result; + } +#else + (void)ctx; (void)cf; (void)data; +#endif + return CURLE_OK; +} + +CURLcode Curl_vquic_tls_verify_peer(struct curl_tls_ctx *ctx, + struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + struct ssl_peer *peer) +{ + struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config; + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + + conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf); + if(!conn_config) + return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + +#ifdef USE_OPENSSL + (void)conn_config; + result = Curl_oss_check_peer_cert(cf, data, &ctx->ossl, peer); +#elif defined(USE_GNUTLS) + if(conn_config->verifyhost) { + result = Curl_gtls_verifyserver(data, ctx->gtls.session, + conn_config, &data->set.ssl, peer, + data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY]); + if(result) + return result; + } +#elif defined(USE_WOLFSSL) + (void)data; + if(conn_config->verifyhost) { + if(peer->sni) { + WOLFSSL_X509* cert = wolfSSL_get_peer_certificate(ctx->ssl); + if(wolfSSL_X509_check_host(cert, peer->sni, strlen(peer->sni), 0, NULL) + == WOLFSSL_FAILURE) { + result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; + } + wolfSSL_X509_free(cert); + } + + } +#endif + return result; +} + + +#endif /* !USE_HTTP3 && (USE_OPENSSL || USE_GNUTLS || USE_WOLFSSL) */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/vquic-tls.h b/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/vquic-tls.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1d35fd0e62 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/vquic-tls.h @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +#ifndef HEADER_CURL_VQUIC_TLS_H +#define HEADER_CURL_VQUIC_TLS_H +/*************************************************************************** + * _ _ ____ _ + * Project ___| | | | _ \| | + * / __| | | | |_) | | + * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ + * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| + * + * Copyright (C) Daniel Stenberg, , et al. + * + * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which + * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms + * are also available at https://curl.se/docs/copyright.html. + * + * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell + * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is + * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file. + * + * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY + * KIND, either express or implied. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: curl + * + ***************************************************************************/ + +#include "curl_setup.h" +#include "bufq.h" +#include "vtls/openssl.h" + +#if defined(USE_HTTP3) && \ + (defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_GNUTLS) || defined(USE_WOLFSSL)) + +struct curl_tls_ctx { +#ifdef USE_OPENSSL + struct ossl_ctx ossl; +#elif defined(USE_GNUTLS) + struct gtls_ctx gtls; +#elif defined(USE_WOLFSSL) + WOLFSSL_CTX *ssl_ctx; + WOLFSSL *ssl; +#endif +}; + +/** + * Callback passed to `Curl_vquic_tls_init()` that can + * do early initializations on the not otherwise configured TLS + * instances created. This varies by TLS backend: + * - openssl/wolfssl: SSL_CTX* has just been created + * - gnutls: gtls_client_init() has run + */ +typedef CURLcode Curl_vquic_tls_ctx_setup(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + void *cb_user_data); + +/** + * Initialize the QUIC TLS instances based of the SSL configurations + * for the connection filter, transfer and peer. + * @param ctx the TLS context to initialize + * @param cf the connection filter involved + * @param data the transfer involved + * @param peer the peer that will be connected to + * @param alpn the ALPN string in protocol format ((len+bytes+)+), + * may be NULL + * @param alpn_len the overall number of bytes in `alpn` + * @param cb_setup optional callback for very early TLS config + ± @param cb_user_data user_data param for callback + * @param ssl_user_data optional pointer to set in TLS application context + */ +CURLcode Curl_vquic_tls_init(struct curl_tls_ctx *ctx, + struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + struct ssl_peer *peer, + const char *alpn, size_t alpn_len, + Curl_vquic_tls_ctx_setup *cb_setup, + void *cb_user_data, + void *ssl_user_data); + +/** + * Cleanup all data that has been initialized. + */ +void Curl_vquic_tls_cleanup(struct curl_tls_ctx *ctx); + +CURLcode Curl_vquic_tls_before_recv(struct curl_tls_ctx *ctx, + struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data); + +/** + * After the QUIC basic handshake has been, verify that the peer + * (and its certificate) fulfill our requirements. + */ +CURLcode Curl_vquic_tls_verify_peer(struct curl_tls_ctx *ctx, + struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + struct ssl_peer *peer); + +#endif /* !USE_HTTP3 && (USE_OPENSSL || USE_GNUTLS || USE_WOLFSSL) */ + +#endif /* HEADER_CURL_VQUIC_TLS_H */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/vquic.c b/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/vquic.c index 523b807bcc..9ce1e4626d 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/vquic.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/vquic.c @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ #include "curl_trc.h" #include "curl_msh3.h" #include "curl_ngtcp2.h" +#include "curl_osslq.h" #include "curl_quiche.h" #include "rand.h" #include "vquic.h" @@ -58,7 +59,7 @@ #include "memdebug.h" -#ifdef ENABLE_QUIC +#ifdef USE_HTTP3 #ifdef O_BINARY #define QLOGMODE O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_BINARY @@ -74,6 +75,8 @@ void Curl_quic_ver(char *p, size_t len) { #if defined(USE_NGTCP2) && defined(USE_NGHTTP3) Curl_ngtcp2_ver(p, len); +#elif defined(USE_OPENSSL_QUIC) && defined(USE_NGHTTP3) + Curl_osslq_ver(p, len); #elif defined(USE_QUICHE) Curl_quiche_ver(p, len); #elif defined(USE_MSH3) @@ -179,7 +182,7 @@ static CURLcode do_sendmsg(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, qctx->no_gso = TRUE; return send_packet_no_gso(cf, data, qctx, pkt, pktlen, gsolen, psent); } - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); default: failf(data, "sendmsg() returned %zd (errno %d)", sent, SOCKERRNO); return CURLE_SEND_ERROR; @@ -367,12 +370,10 @@ static CURLcode recvmmsg_packets(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, goto out; } if(!cf->connected && SOCKERRNO == ECONNREFUSED) { - const char *r_ip = NULL; - int r_port = 0; - Curl_cf_socket_peek(cf->next, data, NULL, NULL, - &r_ip, &r_port, NULL, NULL); + struct ip_quadruple ip; + Curl_cf_socket_peek(cf->next, data, NULL, NULL, &ip); failf(data, "QUIC: connection to %s port %u refused", - r_ip, r_port); + ip.remote_ip, ip.remote_port); result = CURLE_COULDNT_CONNECT; goto out; } @@ -437,12 +438,10 @@ static CURLcode recvmsg_packets(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, goto out; } if(!cf->connected && SOCKERRNO == ECONNREFUSED) { - const char *r_ip = NULL; - int r_port = 0; - Curl_cf_socket_peek(cf->next, data, NULL, NULL, - &r_ip, &r_port, NULL, NULL); + struct ip_quadruple ip; + Curl_cf_socket_peek(cf->next, data, NULL, NULL, &ip); failf(data, "QUIC: connection to %s port %u refused", - r_ip, r_port); + ip.remote_ip, ip.remote_port); result = CURLE_COULDNT_CONNECT; goto out; } @@ -497,12 +496,10 @@ static CURLcode recvfrom_packets(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, goto out; } if(!cf->connected && SOCKERRNO == ECONNREFUSED) { - const char *r_ip = NULL; - int r_port = 0; - Curl_cf_socket_peek(cf->next, data, NULL, NULL, - &r_ip, &r_port, NULL, NULL); + struct ip_quadruple ip; + Curl_cf_socket_peek(cf->next, data, NULL, NULL, &ip); failf(data, "QUIC: connection to %s port %u refused", - r_ip, r_port); + ip.remote_ip, ip.remote_port); result = CURLE_COULDNT_CONNECT; goto out; } @@ -543,8 +540,13 @@ CURLcode vquic_recv_packets(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, #else result = recvfrom_packets(cf, data, qctx, max_pkts, recv_cb, userp); #endif - if(!result) + if(!result) { + if(!qctx->got_first_byte) { + qctx->got_first_byte = TRUE; + qctx->first_byte_at = qctx->last_op; + } qctx->last_io = qctx->last_op; + } return result; } @@ -603,6 +605,8 @@ CURLcode Curl_cf_quic_create(struct Curl_cfilter **pcf, DEBUGASSERT(transport == TRNSPRT_QUIC); #if defined(USE_NGTCP2) && defined(USE_NGHTTP3) return Curl_cf_ngtcp2_create(pcf, data, conn, ai); +#elif defined(USE_OPENSSL_QUIC) && defined(USE_NGHTTP3) + return Curl_cf_osslq_create(pcf, data, conn, ai); #elif defined(USE_QUICHE) return Curl_cf_quiche_create(pcf, data, conn, ai); #elif defined(USE_MSH3) @@ -622,6 +626,8 @@ bool Curl_conn_is_http3(const struct Curl_easy *data, { #if defined(USE_NGTCP2) && defined(USE_NGHTTP3) return Curl_conn_is_ngtcp2(data, conn, sockindex); +#elif defined(USE_OPENSSL_QUIC) && defined(USE_NGHTTP3) + return Curl_conn_is_osslq(data, conn, sockindex); #elif defined(USE_QUICHE) return Curl_conn_is_quiche(data, conn, sockindex); #elif defined(USE_MSH3) @@ -657,7 +663,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_conn_may_http3(struct Curl_easy *data, return CURLE_OK; } -#else /* ENABLE_QUIC */ +#else /* USE_HTTP3 */ CURLcode Curl_conn_may_http3(struct Curl_easy *data, const struct connectdata *conn) @@ -668,4 +674,4 @@ CURLcode Curl_conn_may_http3(struct Curl_easy *data, return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN; } -#endif /* !ENABLE_QUIC */ +#endif /* !USE_HTTP3 */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/vquic.h b/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/vquic.h index dc73957aaf..c1ca1df6aa 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/vquic.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/vquic.h @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ #include "curl_setup.h" -#ifdef ENABLE_QUIC +#ifdef USE_HTTP3 struct Curl_cfilter; struct Curl_easy; struct connectdata; @@ -52,11 +52,11 @@ bool Curl_conn_is_http3(const struct Curl_easy *data, extern struct Curl_cftype Curl_cft_http3; -#else /* ENABLE_QUIC */ +#else /* USE_HTTP3 */ #define Curl_conn_is_http3(a,b,c) FALSE -#endif /* !ENABLE_QUIC */ +#endif /* !USE_HTTP3 */ CURLcode Curl_conn_may_http3(struct Curl_easy *data, const struct connectdata *conn); diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/vquic_int.h b/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/vquic_int.h index a820f39aec..754e1f5910 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/vquic_int.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vquic/vquic_int.h @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ #include "curl_setup.h" #include "bufq.h" -#ifdef ENABLE_QUIC +#ifdef USE_HTTP3 #define MAX_PKT_BURST 10 #define MAX_UDP_PAYLOAD_SIZE 1452 @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ struct cf_quic_ctx { socklen_t local_addrlen; /* length of local address */ struct bufq sendbuf; /* buffer for sending one or more packets */ + struct curltime first_byte_at; /* when first byte was recvd */ struct curltime last_op; /* last (attempted) send/recv operation */ struct curltime last_io; /* last successful socket IO */ size_t gsolen; /* length of individual packets in send buf */ @@ -48,7 +49,8 @@ struct cf_quic_ctx { #ifdef DEBUGBUILD int wblock_percent; /* percent of writes doing EAGAIN */ #endif - bool no_gso; /* do not use gso on sending */ + BIT(got_first_byte); /* if first byte was received */ + BIT(no_gso); /* do not use gso on sending */ }; CURLcode vquic_ctx_init(struct cf_quic_ctx *qctx); @@ -86,6 +88,6 @@ CURLcode vquic_recv_packets(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, size_t max_pkts, vquic_recv_pkt_cb *recv_cb, void *userp); -#endif /* !ENABLE_QUIC */ +#endif /* !USE_HTTP3 */ #endif /* HEADER_CURL_VQUIC_QUIC_INT_H */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vssh/libssh.c b/vendor/curl/lib/vssh/libssh.c index 97143c4776..d6ba987f1c 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vssh/libssh.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vssh/libssh.c @@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ #include +/* in 0.10.0 or later, ignore deprecated warnings */ +#define SSH_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED #include #include @@ -89,14 +91,6 @@ #include "curl_memory.h" #include "memdebug.h" -/* in 0.10.0 or later, ignore deprecated warnings */ -#if defined(__GNUC__) && \ - (LIBSSH_VERSION_MINOR >= 10) || \ - (LIBSSH_VERSION_MAJOR > 0) -#pragma GCC diagnostic push -#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wdeprecated-declarations" -#endif - /* A recent macro provided by libssh. Or make our own. */ #ifndef SSH_STRING_FREE_CHAR #define SSH_STRING_FREE_CHAR(x) \ @@ -167,7 +161,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_scp = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ myssh_getsock, /* perform_getsock */ scp_disconnect, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_SSH, /* defport */ @@ -194,7 +189,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_sftp = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ myssh_getsock, /* perform_getsock */ sftp_disconnect, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_SSH, /* defport */ @@ -445,11 +441,8 @@ static int myssh_is_known(struct Curl_easy *data) keymatch = CURLKHMATCH_OK; break; case SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS_OTHER: - /* fallthrough */ case SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS_NOT_FOUND: - /* fallthrough */ case SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS_UNKNOWN: - /* fallthrough */ case SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS_ERROR: keymatch = CURLKHMATCH_MISSING; break; @@ -465,7 +458,6 @@ static int myssh_is_known(struct Curl_easy *data) keymatch = CURLKHMATCH_OK; break; case SSH_SERVER_FILE_NOT_FOUND: - /* fallthrough */ case SSH_SERVER_NOT_KNOWN: keymatch = CURLKHMATCH_MISSING; break; @@ -629,7 +621,7 @@ int myssh_auth_interactive(struct connectdata *conn) if(rc < 0) return SSH_ERROR; - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case 1: sshc->kbd_state = 1; @@ -704,7 +696,7 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) ssh_set_blocking(sshc->ssh_session, 0); state(data, SSH_S_STARTUP); - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case SSH_S_STARTUP: rc = ssh_connect(sshc->ssh_session); @@ -719,7 +711,7 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) state(data, SSH_HOSTKEY); - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case SSH_HOSTKEY: rc = myssh_is_known(data); @@ -729,7 +721,7 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) } state(data, SSH_AUTHLIST); - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case SSH_AUTHLIST:{ sshc->authed = FALSE; @@ -910,7 +902,7 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) break; } state(data, SSH_AUTH_PASS); - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case SSH_AUTH_PASS: rc = ssh_userauth_password(sshc->ssh_session, NULL, conn->passwd); @@ -973,7 +965,7 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) break; } state(data, SSH_SFTP_REALPATH); - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case SSH_SFTP_REALPATH: /* * Get the "home" directory @@ -1161,22 +1153,22 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) } else if(statvfs) { #ifdef _MSC_VER - #define LIBSSH_VFS_SIZE_MASK "I64u" + #define CURL_LIBSSH_VFS_SIZE_MASK "I64u" #else - #define LIBSSH_VFS_SIZE_MASK PRIu64 + #define CURL_LIBSSH_VFS_SIZE_MASK PRIu64 #endif char *tmp = aprintf("statvfs:\n" - "f_bsize: %" LIBSSH_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" - "f_frsize: %" LIBSSH_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" - "f_blocks: %" LIBSSH_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" - "f_bfree: %" LIBSSH_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" - "f_bavail: %" LIBSSH_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" - "f_files: %" LIBSSH_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" - "f_ffree: %" LIBSSH_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" - "f_favail: %" LIBSSH_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" - "f_fsid: %" LIBSSH_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" - "f_flag: %" LIBSSH_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" - "f_namemax: %" LIBSSH_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n", + "f_bsize: %" CURL_LIBSSH_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" + "f_frsize: %" CURL_LIBSSH_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" + "f_blocks: %" CURL_LIBSSH_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" + "f_bfree: %" CURL_LIBSSH_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" + "f_bavail: %" CURL_LIBSSH_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" + "f_files: %" CURL_LIBSSH_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" + "f_ffree: %" CURL_LIBSSH_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" + "f_favail: %" CURL_LIBSSH_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" + "f_fsid: %" CURL_LIBSSH_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" + "f_flag: %" CURL_LIBSSH_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" + "f_namemax: %" CURL_LIBSSH_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n", statvfs->f_bsize, statvfs->f_frsize, statvfs->f_blocks, statvfs->f_bfree, statvfs->f_bavail, statvfs->f_files, @@ -1302,10 +1294,10 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) position. */ if(data->state.resume_from > 0) { /* Let's read off the proper amount of bytes from the input. */ - if(conn->seek_func) { + if(data->set.seek_func) { Curl_set_in_callback(data, true); - seekerr = conn->seek_func(conn->seek_client, data->state.resume_from, - SEEK_SET); + seekerr = data->set.seek_func(data->set.seek_client, + data->state.resume_from, SEEK_SET); Curl_set_in_callback(data, false); } @@ -1318,13 +1310,14 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) } /* seekerr == CURL_SEEKFUNC_CANTSEEK (can't seek to offset) */ do { + char scratch[4*1024]; size_t readthisamountnow = - (data->state.resume_from - passed > data->set.buffer_size) ? - (size_t)data->set.buffer_size : - curlx_sotouz(data->state.resume_from - passed); + (data->state.resume_from - passed > + (curl_off_t)sizeof(scratch)) ? + sizeof(scratch) : curlx_sotouz(data->state.resume_from - passed); size_t actuallyread = - data->state.fread_func(data->state.buffer, 1, + data->state.fread_func(scratch, 1, readthisamountnow, data->state.in); passed += actuallyread; @@ -1358,9 +1351,9 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) Curl_pgrsSetUploadSize(data, data->state.infilesize); } /* upload data */ - Curl_setup_transfer(data, -1, -1, FALSE, FIRSTSOCKET); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, -1, -1, FALSE, FIRSTSOCKET); - /* not set by Curl_setup_transfer to preserve keepon bits */ + /* not set by Curl_xfer_setup to preserve keepon bits */ conn->sockfd = conn->writesockfd; /* store this original bitmask setup to use later on if we can't @@ -1370,7 +1363,7 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) /* we want to use the _sending_ function even when the socket turns out readable as the underlying libssh sftp send function will deal with both accordingly */ - conn->cselect_bits = CURL_CSELECT_OUT; + data->state.select_bits = CURL_CSELECT_OUT; /* since we don't really wait for anything at this point, we want the state machine to move on as soon as possible so we set a very short @@ -1560,7 +1553,7 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) sshc->readdir_longentry = NULL; state(data, SSH_SFTP_READDIR_BOTTOM); - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case SSH_SFTP_READDIR_BOTTOM: if(Curl_dyn_addn(&sshc->readdir_buf, "\n", 1)) result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; @@ -1584,7 +1577,7 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) sshc->sftp_dir = NULL; /* no data to transfer */ - Curl_setup_transfer(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); state(data, SSH_STOP); break; @@ -1674,6 +1667,8 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) size = 0; } else { + if((to - from) == CURL_OFF_T_MAX) + return CURLE_RANGE_ERROR; size = to - from + 1; } @@ -1727,20 +1722,20 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) /* Setup the actual download */ if(data->req.size == 0) { /* no data to transfer */ - Curl_setup_transfer(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); infof(data, "File already completely downloaded"); state(data, SSH_STOP); break; } - Curl_setup_transfer(data, FIRSTSOCKET, data->req.size, FALSE, -1); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, FIRSTSOCKET, data->req.size, FALSE, -1); - /* not set by Curl_setup_transfer to preserve keepon bits */ + /* not set by Curl_xfer_setup to preserve keepon bits */ conn->writesockfd = conn->sockfd; /* we want to use the _receiving_ function even when the socket turns out writableable as the underlying libssh recv function will deal with both accordingly */ - conn->cselect_bits = CURL_CSELECT_IN; + data->state.select_bits = CURL_CSELECT_IN; if(result) { /* this should never occur; the close state should be entered @@ -1856,9 +1851,9 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) } /* upload data */ - Curl_setup_transfer(data, -1, data->req.size, FALSE, FIRSTSOCKET); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, -1, data->req.size, FALSE, FIRSTSOCKET); - /* not set by Curl_setup_transfer to preserve keepon bits */ + /* not set by Curl_xfer_setup to preserve keepon bits */ conn->sockfd = conn->writesockfd; /* store this original bitmask setup to use later on if we can't @@ -1868,7 +1863,7 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) /* we want to use the _sending_ function even when the socket turns out readable as the underlying libssh scp send function will deal with both accordingly */ - conn->cselect_bits = CURL_CSELECT_OUT; + data->state.select_bits = CURL_CSELECT_OUT; state(data, SSH_STOP); @@ -1884,7 +1879,7 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) break; } state(data, SSH_SCP_DOWNLOAD); - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case SSH_SCP_DOWNLOAD:{ curl_off_t bytecount; @@ -1900,15 +1895,15 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) /* download data */ bytecount = ssh_scp_request_get_size(sshc->scp_session); data->req.maxdownload = (curl_off_t) bytecount; - Curl_setup_transfer(data, FIRSTSOCKET, bytecount, FALSE, -1); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, FIRSTSOCKET, bytecount, FALSE, -1); - /* not set by Curl_setup_transfer to preserve keepon bits */ + /* not set by Curl_xfer_setup to preserve keepon bits */ conn->writesockfd = conn->sockfd; /* we want to use the _receiving_ function even when the socket turns out writableable as the underlying libssh recv function will deal with both accordingly */ - conn->cselect_bits = CURL_CSELECT_IN; + data->state.select_bits = CURL_CSELECT_IN; state(data, SSH_STOP); break; @@ -1948,7 +1943,7 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) ssh_set_blocking(sshc->ssh_session, 0); state(data, SSH_SESSION_DISCONNECT); - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case SSH_SESSION_DISCONNECT: /* during weird times when we've been prematurely aborted, the channel @@ -1971,7 +1966,7 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) data->state.most_recent_ftp_entrypath = NULL; state(data, SSH_SESSION_FREE); - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case SSH_SESSION_FREE: if(sshc->ssh_session) { ssh_free(sshc->ssh_session); @@ -2022,7 +2017,6 @@ static CURLcode myssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) break; case SSH_QUIT: - /* fallthrough, just stop! */ default: /* internal error */ sshc->nextstate = SSH_NO_STATE; @@ -2613,7 +2607,7 @@ static ssize_t sftp_recv(struct Curl_easy *data, int sockindex, return -1; } - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case 1: conn->proto.sshc.sftp_recv_state = 1; @@ -2957,10 +2951,4 @@ void Curl_ssh_version(char *buffer, size_t buflen) (void)msnprintf(buffer, buflen, "libssh/%s", ssh_version(0)); } -#if defined(__GNUC__) && \ - (LIBSSH_VERSION_MINOR >= 10) || \ - (LIBSSH_VERSION_MAJOR > 0) -#pragma GCC diagnostic pop -#endif - #endif /* USE_LIBSSH */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vssh/libssh2.c b/vendor/curl/lib/vssh/libssh2.c index 11f5f4fd5d..abdf42e558 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vssh/libssh2.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vssh/libssh2.c @@ -138,7 +138,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_scp = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ ssh_getsock, /* perform_getsock */ scp_disconnect, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ssh_attach, /* attach */ PORT_SSH, /* defport */ @@ -167,7 +168,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_sftp = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ ssh_getsock, /* perform_getsock */ sftp_disconnect, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ssh_attach, /* attach */ PORT_SSH, /* defport */ @@ -201,7 +203,8 @@ kbd_callback(const char *name, int name_len, const char *instruction, if(num_prompts == 1) { struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; responses[0].text = strdup(conn->passwd); - responses[0].length = curlx_uztoui(strlen(conn->passwd)); + responses[0].length = + responses[0].text == NULL ? 0 : curlx_uztoui(strlen(conn->passwd)); } (void)prompts; } /* kbd_callback */ @@ -589,10 +592,9 @@ static CURLcode ssh_knownhost(struct Curl_easy *data) switch(rc) { default: /* unknown return codes will equal reject */ - /* FALLTHROUGH */ case CURLKHSTAT_REJECT: state(data, SSH_SESSION_FREE); - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case CURLKHSTAT_DEFER: /* DEFER means bail out but keep the SSH_HOSTKEY state */ result = sshc->actualcode = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; @@ -601,9 +603,8 @@ static CURLcode ssh_knownhost(struct Curl_easy *data) /* remove old host+key that doesn't match */ if(host) libssh2_knownhost_del(sshc->kh, host); - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case CURLKHSTAT_FINE: - /* FALLTHROUGH */ case CURLKHSTAT_FINE_ADD_TO_FILE: /* proceed */ if(keycheck != LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_CHECK_MATCH) { @@ -997,7 +998,7 @@ static CURLcode ssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) } state(data, SSH_S_STARTUP); - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case SSH_S_STARTUP: rc = session_startup(sshc->ssh_session, sock); @@ -1016,7 +1017,7 @@ static CURLcode ssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) state(data, SSH_HOSTKEY); - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case SSH_HOSTKEY: /* * Before we authenticate we should check the hostkey's fingerprint @@ -1085,6 +1086,7 @@ static CURLcode ssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) /* To ponder about: should really the lib be messing about with the HOME environment variable etc? */ char *home = curl_getenv("HOME"); + struct_stat sbuf; /* If no private key file is specified, try some common paths. */ if(home) { @@ -1092,12 +1094,12 @@ static CURLcode ssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) sshc->rsa = aprintf("%s/.ssh/id_rsa", home); if(!sshc->rsa) out_of_memory = TRUE; - else if(access(sshc->rsa, R_OK) != 0) { + else if(stat(sshc->rsa, &sbuf)) { Curl_safefree(sshc->rsa); sshc->rsa = aprintf("%s/.ssh/id_dsa", home); if(!sshc->rsa) out_of_memory = TRUE; - else if(access(sshc->rsa, R_OK) != 0) { + else if(stat(sshc->rsa, &sbuf)) { Curl_safefree(sshc->rsa); } } @@ -1106,10 +1108,10 @@ static CURLcode ssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) if(!out_of_memory && !sshc->rsa) { /* Nothing found; try the current dir. */ sshc->rsa = strdup("id_rsa"); - if(sshc->rsa && access(sshc->rsa, R_OK) != 0) { + if(sshc->rsa && stat(sshc->rsa, &sbuf)) { Curl_safefree(sshc->rsa); sshc->rsa = strdup("id_dsa"); - if(sshc->rsa && access(sshc->rsa, R_OK) != 0) { + if(sshc->rsa && stat(sshc->rsa, &sbuf)) { Curl_safefree(sshc->rsa); /* Out of guesses. Set to the empty string to avoid * surprising info messages. */ @@ -1961,22 +1963,22 @@ static CURLcode ssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) } else if(rc == 0) { #ifdef _MSC_VER - #define LIBSSH2_VFS_SIZE_MASK "I64u" + #define CURL_LIBSSH2_VFS_SIZE_MASK "I64u" #else - #define LIBSSH2_VFS_SIZE_MASK "llu" + #define CURL_LIBSSH2_VFS_SIZE_MASK "llu" #endif char *tmp = aprintf("statvfs:\n" - "f_bsize: %" LIBSSH2_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" - "f_frsize: %" LIBSSH2_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" - "f_blocks: %" LIBSSH2_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" - "f_bfree: %" LIBSSH2_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" - "f_bavail: %" LIBSSH2_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" - "f_files: %" LIBSSH2_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" - "f_ffree: %" LIBSSH2_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" - "f_favail: %" LIBSSH2_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" - "f_fsid: %" LIBSSH2_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" - "f_flag: %" LIBSSH2_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" - "f_namemax: %" LIBSSH2_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n", + "f_bsize: %" CURL_LIBSSH2_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" + "f_frsize: %" CURL_LIBSSH2_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" + "f_blocks: %" CURL_LIBSSH2_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" + "f_bfree: %" CURL_LIBSSH2_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" + "f_bavail: %" CURL_LIBSSH2_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" + "f_files: %" CURL_LIBSSH2_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" + "f_ffree: %" CURL_LIBSSH2_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" + "f_favail: %" CURL_LIBSSH2_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" + "f_fsid: %" CURL_LIBSSH2_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" + "f_flag: %" CURL_LIBSSH2_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n" + "f_namemax: %" CURL_LIBSSH2_VFS_SIZE_MASK "\n", statvfs.f_bsize, statvfs.f_frsize, statvfs.f_blocks, statvfs.f_bfree, statvfs.f_bavail, statvfs.f_files, @@ -2144,10 +2146,10 @@ static CURLcode ssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) position. */ if(data->state.resume_from > 0) { /* Let's read off the proper amount of bytes from the input. */ - if(conn->seek_func) { + if(data->set.seek_func) { Curl_set_in_callback(data, true); - seekerr = conn->seek_func(conn->seek_client, data->state.resume_from, - SEEK_SET); + seekerr = data->set.seek_func(data->set.seek_client, + data->state.resume_from, SEEK_SET); Curl_set_in_callback(data, false); } @@ -2160,14 +2162,15 @@ static CURLcode ssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) } /* seekerr == CURL_SEEKFUNC_CANTSEEK (can't seek to offset) */ do { + char scratch[4*1024]; size_t readthisamountnow = - (data->state.resume_from - passed > data->set.buffer_size) ? - (size_t)data->set.buffer_size : - curlx_sotouz(data->state.resume_from - passed); + (data->state.resume_from - passed > + (curl_off_t)sizeof(scratch)) ? + sizeof(scratch) : curlx_sotouz(data->state.resume_from - passed); size_t actuallyread; Curl_set_in_callback(data, true); - actuallyread = data->state.fread_func(data->state.buffer, 1, + actuallyread = data->state.fread_func(scratch, 1, readthisamountnow, data->state.in); Curl_set_in_callback(data, false); @@ -2196,9 +2199,9 @@ static CURLcode ssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) Curl_pgrsSetUploadSize(data, data->state.infilesize); } /* upload data */ - Curl_setup_transfer(data, -1, -1, FALSE, FIRSTSOCKET); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, -1, -1, FALSE, FIRSTSOCKET); - /* not set by Curl_setup_transfer to preserve keepon bits */ + /* not set by Curl_xfer_setup to preserve keepon bits */ conn->sockfd = conn->writesockfd; if(result) { @@ -2213,7 +2216,7 @@ static CURLcode ssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) /* we want to use the _sending_ function even when the socket turns out readable as the underlying libssh2 sftp send function will deal with both accordingly */ - conn->cselect_bits = CURL_CSELECT_OUT; + data->state.select_bits = CURL_CSELECT_OUT; /* since we don't really wait for anything at this point, we want the state machine to move on as soon as possible so we set a very short @@ -2449,7 +2452,7 @@ static CURLcode ssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) Curl_safefree(sshp->readdir_longentry); /* no data to transfer */ - Curl_setup_transfer(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); state(data, SSH_STOP); break; @@ -2545,6 +2548,8 @@ static CURLcode ssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) size = 0; } else { + if((to - from) == CURL_OFF_T_MAX) + return CURLE_RANGE_ERROR; size = to - from + 1; } @@ -2589,20 +2594,20 @@ static CURLcode ssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) /* Setup the actual download */ if(data->req.size == 0) { /* no data to transfer */ - Curl_setup_transfer(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); infof(data, "File already completely downloaded"); state(data, SSH_STOP); break; } - Curl_setup_transfer(data, FIRSTSOCKET, data->req.size, FALSE, -1); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, FIRSTSOCKET, data->req.size, FALSE, -1); - /* not set by Curl_setup_transfer to preserve keepon bits */ + /* not set by Curl_xfer_setup to preserve keepon bits */ conn->writesockfd = conn->sockfd; /* we want to use the _receiving_ function even when the socket turns out writableable as the underlying libssh2 recv function will deal with both accordingly */ - conn->cselect_bits = CURL_CSELECT_IN; + data->state.select_bits = CURL_CSELECT_IN; if(result) { /* this should never occur; the close state should be entered @@ -2740,9 +2745,9 @@ static CURLcode ssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) /* upload data */ data->req.size = data->state.infilesize; Curl_pgrsSetUploadSize(data, data->state.infilesize); - Curl_setup_transfer(data, -1, -1, FALSE, FIRSTSOCKET); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, -1, -1, FALSE, FIRSTSOCKET); - /* not set by Curl_setup_transfer to preserve keepon bits */ + /* not set by Curl_xfer_setup to preserve keepon bits */ conn->sockfd = conn->writesockfd; if(result) { @@ -2757,7 +2762,7 @@ static CURLcode ssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) /* we want to use the _sending_ function even when the socket turns out readable as the underlying libssh2 scp send function will deal with both accordingly */ - conn->cselect_bits = CURL_CSELECT_OUT; + data->state.select_bits = CURL_CSELECT_OUT; state(data, SSH_STOP); } @@ -2811,15 +2816,15 @@ static CURLcode ssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) /* download data */ bytecount = (curl_off_t)sb.st_size; data->req.maxdownload = (curl_off_t)sb.st_size; - Curl_setup_transfer(data, FIRSTSOCKET, bytecount, FALSE, -1); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, FIRSTSOCKET, bytecount, FALSE, -1); - /* not set by Curl_setup_transfer to preserve keepon bits */ + /* not set by Curl_xfer_setup to preserve keepon bits */ conn->writesockfd = conn->sockfd; /* we want to use the _receiving_ function even when the socket turns out writableable as the underlying libssh2 recv function will deal with both accordingly */ - conn->cselect_bits = CURL_CSELECT_IN; + data->state.select_bits = CURL_CSELECT_IN; if(result) { state(data, SSH_SCP_CHANNEL_FREE); @@ -3024,7 +3029,6 @@ static CURLcode ssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) break; case SSH_QUIT: - /* fallthrough, just stop! */ default: /* internal error */ sshc->nextstate = SSH_NO_STATE; @@ -3193,12 +3197,13 @@ static ssize_t ssh_tls_recv(libssh2_socket_t sock, void *buffer, struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; Curl_recv *backup = conn->recv[0]; struct ssh_conn *ssh = &conn->proto.sshc; + int socknum = Curl_conn_sockindex(data, sock); (void)flags; /* swap in the TLS reader function for this call only, and then swap back the SSH one again */ conn->recv[0] = ssh->tls_recv; - result = Curl_read(data, sock, buffer, length, &nread); + result = Curl_conn_recv(data, socknum, buffer, length, &nread); conn->recv[0] = backup; if(result == CURLE_AGAIN) return -EAGAIN; /* magic return code for libssh2 */ @@ -3212,24 +3217,25 @@ static ssize_t ssh_tls_send(libssh2_socket_t sock, const void *buffer, size_t length, int flags, void **abstract) { struct Curl_easy *data = (struct Curl_easy *)*abstract; - ssize_t nwrite; + size_t nwrite; CURLcode result; struct connectdata *conn = data->conn; Curl_send *backup = conn->send[0]; struct ssh_conn *ssh = &conn->proto.sshc; + int socknum = Curl_conn_sockindex(data, sock); (void)flags; /* swap in the TLS writer function for this call only, and then swap back the SSH one again */ conn->send[0] = ssh->tls_send; - result = Curl_write(data, sock, buffer, length, &nwrite); + result = Curl_conn_send(data, socknum, buffer, length, &nwrite); conn->send[0] = backup; if(result == CURLE_AGAIN) return -EAGAIN; /* magic return code for libssh2 */ else if(result) return -1; /* error */ - Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_DATA_OUT, (char *)buffer, (size_t)nwrite); - return nwrite; + Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_DATA_OUT, (char *)buffer, nwrite); + return (ssize_t)nwrite; } #endif @@ -3270,7 +3276,7 @@ static CURLcode ssh_connect(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) #endif /* CURL_LIBSSH2_DEBUG */ /* libcurl MUST to set custom memory functions so that the kbd_callback - funciton's memory allocations can be properled freed */ + function's memory allocations can be properly freed */ sshc->ssh_session = libssh2_session_init_ex(my_libssh2_malloc, my_libssh2_free, my_libssh2_realloc, data); @@ -3280,7 +3286,6 @@ static CURLcode ssh_connect(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; } -#ifdef HAVE_LIBSSH2_VERSION /* Set the packet read timeout if the libssh2 version supports it */ #if LIBSSH2_VERSION_NUM >= 0x010B00 if(data->set.server_response_timeout > 0) { @@ -3288,10 +3293,30 @@ static CURLcode ssh_connect(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) data->set.server_response_timeout / 1000); } #endif -#endif #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY if(conn->http_proxy.proxytype == CURLPROXY_HTTPS) { + /* + Setup libssh2 callbacks to make it read/write TLS from the socket. + + ssize_t + recvcb(libssh2_socket_t sock, void *buffer, size_t length, + int flags, void **abstract); + + ssize_t + sendcb(libssh2_socket_t sock, const void *buffer, size_t length, + int flags, void **abstract); + + */ +#if LIBSSH2_VERSION_NUM >= 0x010b01 + infof(data, "Uses HTTPS proxy"); + libssh2_session_callback_set2(sshc->ssh_session, + LIBSSH2_CALLBACK_RECV, + (libssh2_cb_generic *)ssh_tls_recv); + libssh2_session_callback_set2(sshc->ssh_session, + LIBSSH2_CALLBACK_SEND, + (libssh2_cb_generic *)ssh_tls_send); +#else /* * This crazy union dance is here to avoid assigning a void pointer a * function pointer as it is invalid C. The problem is of course that @@ -3312,22 +3337,11 @@ static CURLcode ssh_connect(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *done) sshsend.sendptr = ssh_tls_send; infof(data, "Uses HTTPS proxy"); - /* - Setup libssh2 callbacks to make it read/write TLS from the socket. - - ssize_t - recvcb(libssh2_socket_t sock, void *buffer, size_t length, - int flags, void **abstract); - - ssize_t - sendcb(libssh2_socket_t sock, const void *buffer, size_t length, - int flags, void **abstract); - - */ libssh2_session_callback_set(sshc->ssh_session, LIBSSH2_CALLBACK_RECV, sshrecv.recvp); libssh2_session_callback_set(sshc->ssh_session, LIBSSH2_CALLBACK_SEND, sshsend.sendp); +#endif /* Store the underlying TLS recv/send function pointers to be used when reading from the proxy */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vssh/wolfssh.c b/vendor/curl/lib/vssh/wolfssh.c index 4da7e9dea6..6a5aed88f7 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vssh/wolfssh.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vssh/wolfssh.c @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ #include "select.h" #include "multiif.h" #include "warnless.h" +#include "strdup.h" /* The last 3 #include files should be in this order */ #include "curl_printf.h" @@ -92,7 +93,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_scp = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ wssh_getsock, /* perform_getsock */ wscp_disconnect, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_SSH, /* defport */ @@ -121,7 +123,8 @@ const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_sftp = { ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ wssh_getsock, /* perform_getsock */ wsftp_disconnect, /* disconnect */ - ZERO_NULL, /* readwrite */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp */ + ZERO_NULL, /* write_resp_hd */ ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ PORT_SSH, /* defport */ @@ -512,15 +515,9 @@ static CURLcode wssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) return CURLE_OK; } else if(name && (rc == WS_SUCCESS)) { - sshc->homedir = malloc(name->fSz + 1); - if(!sshc->homedir) { + sshc->homedir = Curl_memdup0(name->fName, name->fSz); + if(!sshc->homedir) sshc->actualcode = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - } - else { - memcpy(sshc->homedir, name->fName, name->fSz); - sshc->homedir[name->fSz] = 0; - infof(data, "wolfssh SFTP realpath succeeded"); - } wolfSSH_SFTPNAME_list_free(name); state(data, SSH_STOP); return CURLE_OK; @@ -630,10 +627,10 @@ static CURLcode wssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) if(data->state.resume_from > 0) { /* Let's read off the proper amount of bytes from the input. */ int seekerr = CURL_SEEKFUNC_OK; - if(conn->seek_func) { + if(data->set.seek_func) { Curl_set_in_callback(data, true); - seekerr = conn->seek_func(conn->seek_client, data->state.resume_from, - SEEK_SET); + seekerr = data->set.seek_func(data->set.seek_client, + data->state.resume_from, SEEK_SET); Curl_set_in_callback(data, false); } @@ -646,14 +643,15 @@ static CURLcode wssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) } /* seekerr == CURL_SEEKFUNC_CANTSEEK (can't seek to offset) */ do { + char scratch[4*1024]; size_t readthisamountnow = - (data->state.resume_from - passed > data->set.buffer_size) ? - (size_t)data->set.buffer_size : - curlx_sotouz(data->state.resume_from - passed); + (data->state.resume_from - passed > + (curl_off_t)sizeof(scratch)) ? + sizeof(scratch) : curlx_sotouz(data->state.resume_from - passed); size_t actuallyread; Curl_set_in_callback(data, true); - actuallyread = data->state.fread_func(data->state.buffer, 1, + actuallyread = data->state.fread_func(scratch, 1, readthisamountnow, data->state.in); Curl_set_in_callback(data, false); @@ -682,9 +680,9 @@ static CURLcode wssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) Curl_pgrsSetUploadSize(data, data->state.infilesize); } /* upload data */ - Curl_setup_transfer(data, -1, -1, FALSE, FIRSTSOCKET); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, -1, -1, FALSE, FIRSTSOCKET); - /* not set by Curl_setup_transfer to preserve keepon bits */ + /* not set by Curl_xfer_setup to preserve keepon bits */ conn->sockfd = conn->writesockfd; if(result) { @@ -699,7 +697,7 @@ static CURLcode wssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) /* we want to use the _sending_ function even when the socket turns out readable as the underlying libssh2 sftp send function will deal with both accordingly */ - conn->cselect_bits = CURL_CSELECT_OUT; + data->state.select_bits = CURL_CSELECT_OUT; /* since we don't really wait for anything at this point, we want the state machine to move on as soon as possible so we set a very short @@ -782,20 +780,20 @@ static CURLcode wssh_statemach_act(struct Curl_easy *data, bool *block) /* Setup the actual download */ if(data->req.size == 0) { /* no data to transfer */ - Curl_setup_transfer(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, -1, -1, FALSE, -1); infof(data, "File already completely downloaded"); state(data, SSH_STOP); break; } - Curl_setup_transfer(data, FIRSTSOCKET, data->req.size, FALSE, -1); + Curl_xfer_setup(data, FIRSTSOCKET, data->req.size, FALSE, -1); - /* not set by Curl_setup_transfer to preserve keepon bits */ + /* not set by Curl_xfer_setup to preserve keepon bits */ conn->writesockfd = conn->sockfd; /* we want to use the _receiving_ function even when the socket turns out writableable as the underlying libssh2 recv function will deal with both accordingly */ - conn->cselect_bits = CURL_CSELECT_IN; + data->state.select_bits = CURL_CSELECT_IN; if(result) { /* this should never occur; the close state should be entered diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/bearssl.c b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/bearssl.c index a6566f4d90..a595f54a9c 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/bearssl.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/bearssl.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include #include "bearssl.h" +#include "cipher_suite.h" #include "urldata.h" #include "sendf.h" #include "inet_pton.h" @@ -37,7 +38,6 @@ #include "select.h" #include "multiif.h" #include "curl_printf.h" -#include "strcase.h" /* The last #include files should be: */ #include "curl_memory.h" @@ -120,9 +120,9 @@ static CURLcode load_cafile(struct cafile_source *source, br_x509_pkey *pkey; FILE *fp = 0; unsigned char buf[BUFSIZ]; - const unsigned char *p; + const unsigned char *p = NULL; const char *name; - size_t n, i, pushed; + size_t n = 0, i, pushed; DEBUGASSERT(source->type == CAFILE_SOURCE_PATH || source->type == CAFILE_SOURCE_BLOB); @@ -360,213 +360,121 @@ static const br_x509_class x509_vtable = { x509_get_pkey }; -struct st_cipher { - const char *name; /* Cipher suite IANA name. It starts with "TLS_" prefix */ - const char *alias_name; /* Alias name is the same as OpenSSL cipher name */ - uint16_t num; /* BearSSL cipher suite */ -}; - -/* Macro to initialize st_cipher data structure */ -#define CIPHER_DEF(num, alias) { #num, alias, BR_##num } - -static const struct st_cipher ciphertable[] = { +static const uint16_t ciphertable[] = { /* RFC 2246 TLS 1.0 */ - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, /* 0x000A */ - "DES-CBC3-SHA"), + BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, /* 0x000A */ /* RFC 3268 TLS 1.0 AES */ - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, /* 0x002F */ - "AES128-SHA"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, /* 0x0035 */ - "AES256-SHA"), + BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, /* 0x002F */ + BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, /* 0x0035 */ /* RFC 5246 TLS 1.2 */ - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, /* 0x003C */ - "AES128-SHA256"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, /* 0x003D */ - "AES256-SHA256"), + BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, /* 0x003C */ + BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, /* 0x003D */ /* RFC 5288 TLS 1.2 AES GCM */ - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, /* 0x009C */ - "AES128-GCM-SHA256"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, /* 0x009D */ - "AES256-GCM-SHA384"), + BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, /* 0x009C */ + BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, /* 0x009D */ /* RFC 4492 TLS 1.0 ECC */ - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, /* 0xC003 */ - "ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, /* 0xC004 */ - "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, /* 0xC005 */ - "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, /* 0xC008 */ - "ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, /* 0xC009 */ - "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, /* 0xC00A */ - "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, /* 0xC00D */ - "ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, /* 0xC00E */ - "ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, /* 0xC00F */ - "ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, /* 0xC012 */ - "ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, /* 0xC013 */ - "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, /* 0xC014 */ - "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA"), + BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, /* 0xC003 */ + BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, /* 0xC004 */ + BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, /* 0xC005 */ + BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, /* 0xC008 */ + BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, /* 0xC009 */ + BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, /* 0xC00A */ + BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, /* 0xC00D */ + BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, /* 0xC00E */ + BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, /* 0xC00F */ + BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, /* 0xC012 */ + BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, /* 0xC013 */ + BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, /* 0xC014 */ /* RFC 5289 TLS 1.2 ECC HMAC SHA256/384 */ - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, /* 0xC023 */ - "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, /* 0xC024 */ - "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, /* 0xC025 */ - "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, /* 0xC026 */ - "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, /* 0xC027 */ - "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, /* 0xC028 */ - "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, /* 0xC029 */ - "ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, /* 0xC02A */ - "ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384"), + BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, /* 0xC023 */ + BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, /* 0xC024 */ + BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, /* 0xC025 */ + BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, /* 0xC026 */ + BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, /* 0xC027 */ + BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, /* 0xC028 */ + BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, /* 0xC029 */ + BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, /* 0xC02A */ /* RFC 5289 TLS 1.2 GCM */ - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, /* 0xC02B */ - "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, /* 0xC02C */ - "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, /* 0xC02D */ - "ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, /* 0xC02E */ - "ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, /* 0xC02F */ - "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, /* 0xC030 */ - "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, /* 0xC031 */ - "ECDH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, /* 0xC032 */ - "ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"), -#ifdef BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM + BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, /* 0xC02B */ + BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, /* 0xC02C */ + BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, /* 0xC02D */ + BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, /* 0xC02E */ + BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, /* 0xC02F */ + BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, /* 0xC030 */ + BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, /* 0xC031 */ + BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, /* 0xC032 */ +#ifdef BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM /* RFC 6655 TLS 1.2 CCM Supported since BearSSL 0.6 */ - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, /* 0xC09C */ - "AES128-CCM"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, /* 0xC09D */ - "AES256-CCM"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, /* 0xC0A0 */ - "AES128-CCM8"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, /* 0xC0A1 */ - "AES256-CCM8"), + BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, /* 0xC09C */ + BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, /* 0xC09D */ + BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, /* 0xC0A0 */ + BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, /* 0xC0A1 */ /* RFC 7251 TLS 1.2 ECC CCM Supported since BearSSL 0.6 */ - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, /* 0xC0AC */ - "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-CCM"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, /* 0xC0AD */ - "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-CCM"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, /* 0xC0AE */ - "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-CCM8"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, /* 0xC0AF */ - "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-CCM8"), + BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, /* 0xC0AC */ + BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, /* 0xC0AD */ + BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, /* 0xC0AE */ + BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, /* 0xC0AF */ #endif /* RFC 7905 TLS 1.2 ChaCha20-Poly1305 Supported since BearSSL 0.2 */ - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, /* 0xCCA8 */ - "ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305"), - CIPHER_DEF(TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, /* 0xCCA9 */ - "ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305"), + BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, /* 0xCCA8 */ + BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, /* 0xCCA9 */ }; #define NUM_OF_CIPHERS (sizeof(ciphertable) / sizeof(ciphertable[0])) -#define CIPHER_NAME_BUF_LEN 64 - -static bool is_separator(char c) -{ - /* Return whether character is a cipher list separator. */ - switch(c) { - case ' ': - case '\t': - case ':': - case ',': - case ';': - return true; - } - return false; -} static CURLcode bearssl_set_selected_ciphers(struct Curl_easy *data, br_ssl_engine_context *ssl_eng, const char *ciphers) { - uint16_t selected_ciphers[NUM_OF_CIPHERS]; - size_t selected_count = 0; - char cipher_name[CIPHER_NAME_BUF_LEN]; - const char *cipher_start = ciphers; - const char *cipher_end; - size_t i, j; - - if(!cipher_start) - return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER; - - while(true) { - /* Extract the next cipher name from the ciphers string */ - while(is_separator(*cipher_start)) - ++cipher_start; - if(*cipher_start == '\0') - break; - cipher_end = cipher_start; - while(*cipher_end != '\0' && !is_separator(*cipher_end)) - ++cipher_end; - j = cipher_end - cipher_start < CIPHER_NAME_BUF_LEN - 1 ? - cipher_end - cipher_start : CIPHER_NAME_BUF_LEN - 1; - strncpy(cipher_name, cipher_start, j); - cipher_name[j] = '\0'; - cipher_start = cipher_end; - - /* Lookup the cipher name in the table of available ciphers. If the cipher - name starts with "TLS_" we do the lookup by IANA name. Otherwise, we try - to match cipher name by an (OpenSSL) alias. */ - if(strncasecompare(cipher_name, "TLS_", 4)) { - for(i = 0; i < NUM_OF_CIPHERS && - !strcasecompare(cipher_name, ciphertable[i].name); ++i); + uint16_t selected[NUM_OF_CIPHERS]; + size_t count = 0, i; + const char *ptr, *end; + + for(ptr = ciphers; ptr[0] != '\0' && count < NUM_OF_CIPHERS; ptr = end) { + uint16_t id = Curl_cipher_suite_walk_str(&ptr, &end); + + /* Check if cipher is supported */ + if(id) { + for(i = 0; i < NUM_OF_CIPHERS && ciphertable[i] != id; i++); + if(i == NUM_OF_CIPHERS) + id = 0; } - else { - for(i = 0; i < NUM_OF_CIPHERS && - !strcasecompare(cipher_name, ciphertable[i].alias_name); ++i); - } - if(i == NUM_OF_CIPHERS) { - infof(data, "BearSSL: unknown cipher in list: %s", cipher_name); + if(!id) { + if(ptr[0] != '\0') + infof(data, "BearSSL: unknown cipher in list: \"%.*s\"", + (int) (end - ptr), ptr); continue; } /* No duplicates allowed */ - for(j = 0; j < selected_count && - selected_ciphers[j] != ciphertable[i].num; j++); - if(j < selected_count) { - infof(data, "BearSSL: duplicate cipher in list: %s", cipher_name); + for(i = 0; i < count && selected[i] != id; i++); + if(i < count) { + infof(data, "BearSSL: duplicate cipher in list: \"%.*s\"", + (int) (end - ptr), ptr); continue; } - DEBUGASSERT(selected_count < NUM_OF_CIPHERS); - selected_ciphers[selected_count] = ciphertable[i].num; - ++selected_count; + selected[count++] = id; } - if(selected_count == 0) { + if(count == 0) { failf(data, "BearSSL: no supported cipher in list"); return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER; } - br_ssl_engine_set_suites(ssl_eng, selected_ciphers, selected_count); + br_ssl_engine_set_suites(ssl_eng, selected, count); return CURLE_OK; } @@ -680,7 +588,7 @@ static CURLcode bearssl_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "connect_step1, check session cache"); Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data); - if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(cf, data, &session, NULL)) { + if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(cf, data, &connssl->peer, &session, NULL)) { br_ssl_engine_set_session_parameters(&backend->ctx.eng, session); session_set = 1; infof(data, "BearSSL: reusing session ID"); @@ -701,7 +609,7 @@ static CURLcode bearssl_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, infof(data, VTLS_INFOF_ALPN_OFFER_1STR, proto.data); } - if(connssl->peer.is_ip_address) { + if(connssl->peer.type != CURL_SSL_PEER_DNS) { if(verifyhost) { failf(data, "BearSSL: " "host verification of IP address is not supported"); @@ -824,7 +732,7 @@ static CURLcode bearssl_run_until(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "ssl_recv(len=%zu) -> %zd, %d", len, ret, result); if(ret == 0) { failf(data, "SSL: EOF without close notify"); - return CURLE_READ_ERROR; + return CURLE_RECV_ERROR; } if(ret <= 0) { return result; @@ -840,6 +748,9 @@ static CURLcode bearssl_connect_step2(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx; struct bearssl_ssl_backend_data *backend = (struct bearssl_ssl_backend_data *)connssl->backend; + br_ssl_session_parameters session; + char cipher_str[64]; + char ver_str[16]; CURLcode ret; DEBUGASSERT(backend); @@ -850,6 +761,7 @@ static CURLcode bearssl_connect_step2(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, return CURLE_OK; if(ret == CURLE_OK) { unsigned int tver; + if(br_ssl_engine_current_state(&backend->ctx.eng) == BR_SSL_CLOSED) { failf(data, "SSL: connection closed during handshake"); return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; @@ -857,16 +769,29 @@ static CURLcode bearssl_connect_step2(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_3; /* Informational message */ tver = br_ssl_engine_get_version(&backend->ctx.eng); - if(tver == 0x0303) - infof(data, "SSL connection using TLSv1.2"); - else if(tver == 0x0304) - infof(data, "SSL connection using TLSv1.3"); - else - infof(data, "SSL connection using TLS 0x%x", tver); + if(tver == BR_TLS12) + strcpy(ver_str, "TLSv1.2"); + else if(tver == BR_TLS11) + strcpy(ver_str, "TLSv1.1"); + else if(tver == BR_TLS10) + strcpy(ver_str, "TLSv1.0"); + else { + msnprintf(ver_str, sizeof(ver_str), "TLS 0x%04x", tver); + } + br_ssl_engine_get_session_parameters(&backend->ctx.eng, &session); + Curl_cipher_suite_get_str(session.cipher_suite, cipher_str, + sizeof(cipher_str), true); + infof(data, "BearSSL: %s connection using %s", ver_str, cipher_str); } return ret; } +static void bearssl_session_free(void *sessionid, size_t idsize) +{ + (void)idsize; + free(sessionid); +} + static CURLcode bearssl_connect_step3(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) { @@ -890,7 +815,6 @@ static CURLcode bearssl_connect_step3(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(ssl_config->primary.sessionid) { bool incache; - bool added = FALSE; void *oldsession; br_ssl_session_parameters *session; @@ -899,16 +823,16 @@ static CURLcode bearssl_connect_step3(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; br_ssl_engine_get_session_parameters(&backend->ctx.eng, session); Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data); - incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(cf, data, &oldsession, NULL)); + incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(cf, data, &connssl->peer, + &oldsession, NULL)); if(incache) Curl_ssl_delsessionid(data, oldsession); - ret = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(cf, data, session, 0, &added); + + ret = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(cf, data, &connssl->peer, session, 0, + bearssl_session_free); Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data); - if(!added) - free(session); - if(ret) { - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - } + if(ret) + return ret; } connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_done; @@ -1167,11 +1091,6 @@ static void bearssl_close(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) } } -static void bearssl_session_free(void *ptr) -{ - free(ptr); -} - static CURLcode bearssl_sha256sum(const unsigned char *input, size_t inputlen, unsigned char *sha256sum, @@ -1204,7 +1123,6 @@ const struct Curl_ssl Curl_ssl_bearssl = { bearssl_get_internals, /* get_internals */ bearssl_close, /* close_one */ Curl_none_close_all, /* close_all */ - bearssl_session_free, /* session_free */ Curl_none_set_engine, /* set_engine */ Curl_none_set_engine_default, /* set_engine_default */ Curl_none_engines_list, /* engines_list */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/cipher_suite.c b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/cipher_suite.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a78838d195 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/cipher_suite.c @@ -0,0 +1,716 @@ +/*************************************************************************** + * _ _ ____ _ + * Project ___| | | | _ \| | + * / __| | | | |_) | | + * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ + * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| + * + * Copyright (C) Jan Venekamp, + * + * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which + * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms + * are also available at https://curl.se/docs/copyright.html. + * + * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell + * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is + * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file. + * + * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY + * KIND, either express or implied. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: curl + * + ***************************************************************************/ +#include "curl_setup.h" + +#if defined(USE_MBEDTLS) || defined(USE_BEARSSL) +#include "cipher_suite.h" +#include "curl_printf.h" +#include "strcase.h" +#include + +/* + * To support the CURLOPT_SSL_CIPHER_LIST option on SSL backends + * that do not support it natively, but do support setting a list of + * IANA ids, we need a list of all supported cipher suite names + * (openssl and IANA) to be able to look up the IANA ids. + * + * To keep the binary size of this list down we compress each entry + * down to 2 + 6 bytes using the C preprocessor. + */ + +/* + * mbedTLS NOTE: mbedTLS has mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id() to + * convert a string representation to an IANA id, we do not use that + * because it does not support "standard" openssl cipher suite + * names, nor IANA names. + */ + +/* NOTE: also see tests/unit/unit3205.c */ + +/* Text for cipher suite parts (max 64 entries), + keep indexes below in sync with this! */ +static const char *cs_txt = + "\0" + "TLS" "\0" + "WITH" "\0" + "128" "\0" + "256" "\0" + "3DES" "\0" + "8" "\0" + "AES" "\0" + "AES128" "\0" + "AES256" "\0" + "CBC" "\0" + "CBC3" "\0" + "CCM" "\0" + "CCM8" "\0" + "CHACHA20" "\0" + "DES" "\0" + "DHE" "\0" + "ECDH" "\0" + "ECDHE" "\0" + "ECDSA" "\0" + "EDE" "\0" + "GCM" "\0" + "MD5" "\0" + "NULL" "\0" + "POLY1305" "\0" + "PSK" "\0" + "RSA" "\0" + "SHA" "\0" + "SHA256" "\0" + "SHA384" "\0" +#if defined(USE_MBEDTLS) + "ARIA" "\0" + "ARIA128" "\0" + "ARIA256" "\0" + "CAMELLIA" "\0" + "CAMELLIA128" "\0" + "CAMELLIA256" "\0" +#endif +; +/* Indexes of above cs_txt */ +enum { + CS_TXT_IDX_, + CS_TXT_IDX_TLS, + CS_TXT_IDX_WITH, + CS_TXT_IDX_128, + CS_TXT_IDX_256, + CS_TXT_IDX_3DES, + CS_TXT_IDX_8, + CS_TXT_IDX_AES, + CS_TXT_IDX_AES128, + CS_TXT_IDX_AES256, + CS_TXT_IDX_CBC, + CS_TXT_IDX_CBC3, + CS_TXT_IDX_CCM, + CS_TXT_IDX_CCM8, + CS_TXT_IDX_CHACHA20, + CS_TXT_IDX_DES, + CS_TXT_IDX_DHE, + CS_TXT_IDX_ECDH, + CS_TXT_IDX_ECDHE, + CS_TXT_IDX_ECDSA, + CS_TXT_IDX_EDE, + CS_TXT_IDX_GCM, + CS_TXT_IDX_MD5, + CS_TXT_IDX_NULL, + CS_TXT_IDX_POLY1305, + CS_TXT_IDX_PSK, + CS_TXT_IDX_RSA, + CS_TXT_IDX_SHA, + CS_TXT_IDX_SHA256, + CS_TXT_IDX_SHA384, +#if defined(USE_MBEDTLS) + CS_TXT_IDX_ARIA, + CS_TXT_IDX_ARIA128, + CS_TXT_IDX_ARIA256, + CS_TXT_IDX_CAMELLIA, + CS_TXT_IDX_CAMELLIA128, + CS_TXT_IDX_CAMELLIA256, +#endif + CS_TXT_LEN, +}; + +#define CS_ZIP_IDX(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h) \ +{ \ + (uint8_t) ((a) << 2 | ((b) & 0x3F) >> 4), \ + (uint8_t) ((b) << 4 | ((c) & 0x3F) >> 2), \ + (uint8_t) ((c) << 6 | ((d) & 0x3F)), \ + (uint8_t) ((e) << 2 | ((f) & 0x3F) >> 4), \ + (uint8_t) ((f) << 4 | ((g) & 0x3F) >> 2), \ + (uint8_t) ((g) << 6 | ((h) & 0x3F)) \ +} +#define CS_ENTRY(id, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h) \ +{ \ + id, \ + CS_ZIP_IDX( \ + CS_TXT_IDX_ ## a, CS_TXT_IDX_ ## b, \ + CS_TXT_IDX_ ## c, CS_TXT_IDX_ ## d, \ + CS_TXT_IDX_ ## e, CS_TXT_IDX_ ## f, \ + CS_TXT_IDX_ ## g, CS_TXT_IDX_ ## h \ + ) \ +} + +struct cs_entry { + uint16_t id; + uint8_t zip[6]; +}; + +/* !checksrc! disable COMMANOSPACE all */ +static const struct cs_entry cs_list [] = { + CS_ENTRY(0x002F, TLS,RSA,WITH,AES,128,CBC,SHA,), + CS_ENTRY(0x002F, AES128,SHA,,,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x0035, TLS,RSA,WITH,AES,256,CBC,SHA,), + CS_ENTRY(0x0035, AES256,SHA,,,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x003C, TLS,RSA,WITH,AES,128,CBC,SHA256,), + CS_ENTRY(0x003C, AES128,SHA256,,,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x003D, TLS,RSA,WITH,AES,256,CBC,SHA256,), + CS_ENTRY(0x003D, AES256,SHA256,,,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x009C, TLS,RSA,WITH,AES,128,GCM,SHA256,), + CS_ENTRY(0x009C, AES128,GCM,SHA256,,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x009D, TLS,RSA,WITH,AES,256,GCM,SHA384,), + CS_ENTRY(0x009D, AES256,GCM,SHA384,,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC004, TLS,ECDH,ECDSA,WITH,AES,128,CBC,SHA), + CS_ENTRY(0xC004, ECDH,ECDSA,AES128,SHA,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC005, TLS,ECDH,ECDSA,WITH,AES,256,CBC,SHA), + CS_ENTRY(0xC005, ECDH,ECDSA,AES256,SHA,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC009, TLS,ECDHE,ECDSA,WITH,AES,128,CBC,SHA), + CS_ENTRY(0xC009, ECDHE,ECDSA,AES128,SHA,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC00A, TLS,ECDHE,ECDSA,WITH,AES,256,CBC,SHA), + CS_ENTRY(0xC00A, ECDHE,ECDSA,AES256,SHA,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC00E, TLS,ECDH,RSA,WITH,AES,128,CBC,SHA), + CS_ENTRY(0xC00E, ECDH,RSA,AES128,SHA,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC00F, TLS,ECDH,RSA,WITH,AES,256,CBC,SHA), + CS_ENTRY(0xC00F, ECDH,RSA,AES256,SHA,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC013, TLS,ECDHE,RSA,WITH,AES,128,CBC,SHA), + CS_ENTRY(0xC013, ECDHE,RSA,AES128,SHA,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC014, TLS,ECDHE,RSA,WITH,AES,256,CBC,SHA), + CS_ENTRY(0xC014, ECDHE,RSA,AES256,SHA,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC023, TLS,ECDHE,ECDSA,WITH,AES,128,CBC,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC023, ECDHE,ECDSA,AES128,SHA256,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC024, TLS,ECDHE,ECDSA,WITH,AES,256,CBC,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC024, ECDHE,ECDSA,AES256,SHA384,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC025, TLS,ECDH,ECDSA,WITH,AES,128,CBC,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC025, ECDH,ECDSA,AES128,SHA256,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC026, TLS,ECDH,ECDSA,WITH,AES,256,CBC,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC026, ECDH,ECDSA,AES256,SHA384,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC027, TLS,ECDHE,RSA,WITH,AES,128,CBC,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC027, ECDHE,RSA,AES128,SHA256,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC028, TLS,ECDHE,RSA,WITH,AES,256,CBC,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC028, ECDHE,RSA,AES256,SHA384,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC029, TLS,ECDH,RSA,WITH,AES,128,CBC,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC029, ECDH,RSA,AES128,SHA256,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC02A, TLS,ECDH,RSA,WITH,AES,256,CBC,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC02A, ECDH,RSA,AES256,SHA384,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC02B, TLS,ECDHE,ECDSA,WITH,AES,128,GCM,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC02B, ECDHE,ECDSA,AES128,GCM,SHA256,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC02C, TLS,ECDHE,ECDSA,WITH,AES,256,GCM,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC02C, ECDHE,ECDSA,AES256,GCM,SHA384,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC02D, TLS,ECDH,ECDSA,WITH,AES,128,GCM,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC02D, ECDH,ECDSA,AES128,GCM,SHA256,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC02E, TLS,ECDH,ECDSA,WITH,AES,256,GCM,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC02E, ECDH,ECDSA,AES256,GCM,SHA384,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC02F, TLS,ECDHE,RSA,WITH,AES,128,GCM,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC02F, ECDHE,RSA,AES128,GCM,SHA256,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC030, TLS,ECDHE,RSA,WITH,AES,256,GCM,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC030, ECDHE,RSA,AES256,GCM,SHA384,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC031, TLS,ECDH,RSA,WITH,AES,128,GCM,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC031, ECDH,RSA,AES128,GCM,SHA256,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC032, TLS,ECDH,RSA,WITH,AES,256,GCM,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC032, ECDH,RSA,AES256,GCM,SHA384,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xCCA8, TLS,ECDHE,RSA,WITH,CHACHA20,POLY1305,SHA256,), + CS_ENTRY(0xCCA8, ECDHE,RSA,CHACHA20,POLY1305,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xCCA9, TLS,ECDHE,ECDSA,WITH,CHACHA20,POLY1305,SHA256,), + CS_ENTRY(0xCCA9, ECDHE,ECDSA,CHACHA20,POLY1305,,,,), +#if defined(USE_MBEDTLS) + CS_ENTRY(0x0001, TLS,RSA,WITH,NULL,MD5,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x0001, NULL,MD5,,,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x0002, TLS,RSA,WITH,NULL,SHA,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x0002, NULL,SHA,,,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x002C, TLS,PSK,WITH,NULL,SHA,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x002C, PSK,NULL,SHA,,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x002D, TLS,DHE,PSK,WITH,NULL,SHA,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x002D, DHE,PSK,NULL,SHA,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x002E, TLS,RSA,PSK,WITH,NULL,SHA,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x002E, RSA,PSK,NULL,SHA,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x0033, TLS,DHE,RSA,WITH,AES,128,CBC,SHA), + CS_ENTRY(0x0033, DHE,RSA,AES128,SHA,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x0039, TLS,DHE,RSA,WITH,AES,256,CBC,SHA), + CS_ENTRY(0x0039, DHE,RSA,AES256,SHA,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x003B, TLS,RSA,WITH,NULL,SHA256,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x003B, NULL,SHA256,,,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x0067, TLS,DHE,RSA,WITH,AES,128,CBC,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0x0067, DHE,RSA,AES128,SHA256,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x006B, TLS,DHE,RSA,WITH,AES,256,CBC,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0x006B, DHE,RSA,AES256,SHA256,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x008C, TLS,PSK,WITH,AES,128,CBC,SHA,), + CS_ENTRY(0x008C, PSK,AES128,CBC,SHA,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x008D, TLS,PSK,WITH,AES,256,CBC,SHA,), + CS_ENTRY(0x008D, PSK,AES256,CBC,SHA,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x0090, TLS,DHE,PSK,WITH,AES,128,CBC,SHA), + CS_ENTRY(0x0090, DHE,PSK,AES128,CBC,SHA,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x0091, TLS,DHE,PSK,WITH,AES,256,CBC,SHA), + CS_ENTRY(0x0091, DHE,PSK,AES256,CBC,SHA,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x0094, TLS,RSA,PSK,WITH,AES,128,CBC,SHA), + CS_ENTRY(0x0094, RSA,PSK,AES128,CBC,SHA,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x0095, TLS,RSA,PSK,WITH,AES,256,CBC,SHA), + CS_ENTRY(0x0095, RSA,PSK,AES256,CBC,SHA,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x009E, TLS,DHE,RSA,WITH,AES,128,GCM,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0x009E, DHE,RSA,AES128,GCM,SHA256,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x009F, TLS,DHE,RSA,WITH,AES,256,GCM,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0x009F, DHE,RSA,AES256,GCM,SHA384,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00A8, TLS,PSK,WITH,AES,128,GCM,SHA256,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00A8, PSK,AES128,GCM,SHA256,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00A9, TLS,PSK,WITH,AES,256,GCM,SHA384,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00A9, PSK,AES256,GCM,SHA384,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00AA, TLS,DHE,PSK,WITH,AES,128,GCM,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0x00AA, DHE,PSK,AES128,GCM,SHA256,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00AB, TLS,DHE,PSK,WITH,AES,256,GCM,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0x00AB, DHE,PSK,AES256,GCM,SHA384,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00AC, TLS,RSA,PSK,WITH,AES,128,GCM,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0x00AC, RSA,PSK,AES128,GCM,SHA256,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00AD, TLS,RSA,PSK,WITH,AES,256,GCM,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0x00AD, RSA,PSK,AES256,GCM,SHA384,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00AE, TLS,PSK,WITH,AES,128,CBC,SHA256,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00AE, PSK,AES128,CBC,SHA256,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00AF, TLS,PSK,WITH,AES,256,CBC,SHA384,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00AF, PSK,AES256,CBC,SHA384,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00B0, TLS,PSK,WITH,NULL,SHA256,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00B0, PSK,NULL,SHA256,,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00B1, TLS,PSK,WITH,NULL,SHA384,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00B1, PSK,NULL,SHA384,,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00B2, TLS,DHE,PSK,WITH,AES,128,CBC,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0x00B2, DHE,PSK,AES128,CBC,SHA256,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00B3, TLS,DHE,PSK,WITH,AES,256,CBC,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0x00B3, DHE,PSK,AES256,CBC,SHA384,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00B4, TLS,DHE,PSK,WITH,NULL,SHA256,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00B4, DHE,PSK,NULL,SHA256,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00B5, TLS,DHE,PSK,WITH,NULL,SHA384,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00B5, DHE,PSK,NULL,SHA384,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00B6, TLS,RSA,PSK,WITH,AES,128,CBC,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0x00B6, RSA,PSK,AES128,CBC,SHA256,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00B7, TLS,RSA,PSK,WITH,AES,256,CBC,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0x00B7, RSA,PSK,AES256,CBC,SHA384,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00B8, TLS,RSA,PSK,WITH,NULL,SHA256,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00B8, RSA,PSK,NULL,SHA256,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00B9, TLS,RSA,PSK,WITH,NULL,SHA384,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00B9, RSA,PSK,NULL,SHA384,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x1301, TLS,AES,128,GCM,SHA256,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x1302, TLS,AES,256,GCM,SHA384,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x1303, TLS,CHACHA20,POLY1305,SHA256,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x1304, TLS,AES,128,CCM,SHA256,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x1305, TLS,AES,128,CCM,8,SHA256,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC001, TLS,ECDH,ECDSA,WITH,NULL,SHA,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC001, ECDH,ECDSA,NULL,SHA,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC006, TLS,ECDHE,ECDSA,WITH,NULL,SHA,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC006, ECDHE,ECDSA,NULL,SHA,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC00B, TLS,ECDH,RSA,WITH,NULL,SHA,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC00B, ECDH,RSA,NULL,SHA,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC010, TLS,ECDHE,RSA,WITH,NULL,SHA,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC010, ECDHE,RSA,NULL,SHA,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC035, TLS,ECDHE,PSK,WITH,AES,128,CBC,SHA), + CS_ENTRY(0xC035, ECDHE,PSK,AES128,CBC,SHA,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC036, TLS,ECDHE,PSK,WITH,AES,256,CBC,SHA), + CS_ENTRY(0xC036, ECDHE,PSK,AES256,CBC,SHA,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xCCAB, TLS,PSK,WITH,CHACHA20,POLY1305,SHA256,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xCCAB, PSK,CHACHA20,POLY1305,,,,,), +#endif +#if defined(USE_BEARSSL) + CS_ENTRY(0x000A, TLS,RSA,WITH,3DES,EDE,CBC,SHA,), + CS_ENTRY(0x000A, DES,CBC3,SHA,,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC003, TLS,ECDH,ECDSA,WITH,3DES,EDE,CBC,SHA), + CS_ENTRY(0xC003, ECDH,ECDSA,DES,CBC3,SHA,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC008, TLS,ECDHE,ECDSA,WITH,3DES,EDE,CBC,SHA), + CS_ENTRY(0xC008, ECDHE,ECDSA,DES,CBC3,SHA,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC00D, TLS,ECDH,RSA,WITH,3DES,EDE,CBC,SHA), + CS_ENTRY(0xC00D, ECDH,RSA,DES,CBC3,SHA,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC012, TLS,ECDHE,RSA,WITH,3DES,EDE,CBC,SHA), + CS_ENTRY(0xC012, ECDHE,RSA,DES,CBC3,SHA,,,), +#endif + CS_ENTRY(0xC09C, TLS,RSA,WITH,AES,128,CCM,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC09C, AES128,CCM,,,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC09D, TLS,RSA,WITH,AES,256,CCM,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC09D, AES256,CCM,,,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0A0, TLS,RSA,WITH,AES,128,CCM,8,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0A0, AES128,CCM8,,,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0A1, TLS,RSA,WITH,AES,256,CCM,8,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0A1, AES256,CCM8,,,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0AC, TLS,ECDHE,ECDSA,WITH,AES,128,CCM,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0AC, ECDHE,ECDSA,AES128,CCM,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0AD, TLS,ECDHE,ECDSA,WITH,AES,256,CCM,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0AD, ECDHE,ECDSA,AES256,CCM,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0AE, TLS,ECDHE,ECDSA,WITH,AES,128,CCM,8), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0AE, ECDHE,ECDSA,AES128,CCM8,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0AF, TLS,ECDHE,ECDSA,WITH,AES,256,CCM,8), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0AF, ECDHE,ECDSA,AES256,CCM8,,,,), +#if defined(USE_MBEDTLS) + /* entries marked ns are "non-standard", they are not in openssl */ + CS_ENTRY(0x0041, TLS,RSA,WITH,CAMELLIA,128,CBC,SHA,), + CS_ENTRY(0x0041, CAMELLIA128,SHA,,,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x0045, TLS,DHE,RSA,WITH,CAMELLIA,128,CBC,SHA), + CS_ENTRY(0x0045, DHE,RSA,CAMELLIA128,SHA,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x0084, TLS,RSA,WITH,CAMELLIA,256,CBC,SHA,), + CS_ENTRY(0x0084, CAMELLIA256,SHA,,,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x0088, TLS,DHE,RSA,WITH,CAMELLIA,256,CBC,SHA), + CS_ENTRY(0x0088, DHE,RSA,CAMELLIA256,SHA,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00BA, TLS,RSA,WITH,CAMELLIA,128,CBC,SHA256,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00BA, CAMELLIA128,SHA256,,,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00BE, TLS,DHE,RSA,WITH,CAMELLIA,128,CBC,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0x00BE, DHE,RSA,CAMELLIA128,SHA256,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00C0, TLS,RSA,WITH,CAMELLIA,256,CBC,SHA256,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00C0, CAMELLIA256,SHA256,,,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0x00C4, TLS,DHE,RSA,WITH,CAMELLIA,256,CBC,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0x00C4, DHE,RSA,CAMELLIA256,SHA256,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC037, TLS,ECDHE,PSK,WITH,AES,128,CBC,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC037, ECDHE,PSK,AES128,CBC,SHA256,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC038, TLS,ECDHE,PSK,WITH,AES,256,CBC,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC038, ECDHE,PSK,AES256,CBC,SHA384,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC039, TLS,ECDHE,PSK,WITH,NULL,SHA,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC039, ECDHE,PSK,NULL,SHA,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC03A, TLS,ECDHE,PSK,WITH,NULL,SHA256,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC03A, ECDHE,PSK,NULL,SHA256,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC03B, TLS,ECDHE,PSK,WITH,NULL,SHA384,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC03B, ECDHE,PSK,NULL,SHA384,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC03C, TLS,RSA,WITH,ARIA,128,CBC,SHA256,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC03C, ARIA128,SHA256,,,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC03D, TLS,RSA,WITH,ARIA,256,CBC,SHA384,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC03D, ARIA256,SHA384,,,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC044, TLS,DHE,RSA,WITH,ARIA,128,CBC,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC044, DHE,RSA,ARIA128,SHA256,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC045, TLS,DHE,RSA,WITH,ARIA,256,CBC,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC045, DHE,RSA,ARIA256,SHA384,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC048, TLS,ECDHE,ECDSA,WITH,ARIA,128,CBC,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC048, ECDHE,ECDSA,ARIA128,SHA256,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC049, TLS,ECDHE,ECDSA,WITH,ARIA,256,CBC,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC049, ECDHE,ECDSA,ARIA256,SHA384,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC04A, TLS,ECDH,ECDSA,WITH,ARIA,128,CBC,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC04A, ECDH,ECDSA,ARIA128,SHA256,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC04B, TLS,ECDH,ECDSA,WITH,ARIA,256,CBC,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC04B, ECDH,ECDSA,ARIA256,SHA384,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC04C, TLS,ECDHE,RSA,WITH,ARIA,128,CBC,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC04C, ECDHE,ARIA128,SHA256,,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC04D, TLS,ECDHE,RSA,WITH,ARIA,256,CBC,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC04D, ECDHE,ARIA256,SHA384,,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC04E, TLS,ECDH,RSA,WITH,ARIA,128,CBC,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC04E, ECDH,ARIA128,SHA256,,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC04F, TLS,ECDH,RSA,WITH,ARIA,256,CBC,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC04F, ECDH,ARIA256,SHA384,,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC050, TLS,RSA,WITH,ARIA,128,GCM,SHA256,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC050, ARIA128,GCM,SHA256,,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC051, TLS,RSA,WITH,ARIA,256,GCM,SHA384,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC051, ARIA256,GCM,SHA384,,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC052, TLS,DHE,RSA,WITH,ARIA,128,GCM,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC052, DHE,RSA,ARIA128,GCM,SHA256,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC053, TLS,DHE,RSA,WITH,ARIA,256,GCM,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC053, DHE,RSA,ARIA256,GCM,SHA384,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC05C, TLS,ECDHE,ECDSA,WITH,ARIA,128,GCM,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC05C, ECDHE,ECDSA,ARIA128,GCM,SHA256,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC05D, TLS,ECDHE,ECDSA,WITH,ARIA,256,GCM,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC05D, ECDHE,ECDSA,ARIA256,GCM,SHA384,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC05E, TLS,ECDH,ECDSA,WITH,ARIA,128,GCM,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC05E, ECDH,ECDSA,ARIA128,GCM,SHA256,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC05F, TLS,ECDH,ECDSA,WITH,ARIA,256,GCM,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC05F, ECDH,ECDSA,ARIA256,GCM,SHA384,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC060, TLS,ECDHE,RSA,WITH,ARIA,128,GCM,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC060, ECDHE,ARIA128,GCM,SHA256,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC061, TLS,ECDHE,RSA,WITH,ARIA,256,GCM,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC061, ECDHE,ARIA256,GCM,SHA384,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC062, TLS,ECDH,RSA,WITH,ARIA,128,GCM,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC062, ECDH,ARIA128,GCM,SHA256,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC063, TLS,ECDH,RSA,WITH,ARIA,256,GCM,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC063, ECDH,ARIA256,GCM,SHA384,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC064, TLS,PSK,WITH,ARIA,128,CBC,SHA256,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC064, PSK,ARIA128,SHA256,,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC065, TLS,PSK,WITH,ARIA,256,CBC,SHA384,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC065, PSK,ARIA256,SHA384,,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC066, TLS,DHE,PSK,WITH,ARIA,128,CBC,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC066, DHE,PSK,ARIA128,SHA256,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC067, TLS,DHE,PSK,WITH,ARIA,256,CBC,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC067, DHE,PSK,ARIA256,SHA384,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC068, TLS,RSA,PSK,WITH,ARIA,128,CBC,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC068, RSA,PSK,ARIA128,SHA256,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC069, TLS,RSA,PSK,WITH,ARIA,256,CBC,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC069, RSA,PSK,ARIA256,SHA384,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC06A, TLS,PSK,WITH,ARIA,128,GCM,SHA256,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC06A, PSK,ARIA128,GCM,SHA256,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC06B, TLS,PSK,WITH,ARIA,256,GCM,SHA384,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC06B, PSK,ARIA256,GCM,SHA384,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC06C, TLS,DHE,PSK,WITH,ARIA,128,GCM,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC06C, DHE,PSK,ARIA128,GCM,SHA256,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC06D, TLS,DHE,PSK,WITH,ARIA,256,GCM,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC06D, DHE,PSK,ARIA256,GCM,SHA384,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC06E, TLS,RSA,PSK,WITH,ARIA,128,GCM,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC06E, RSA,PSK,ARIA128,GCM,SHA256,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC06F, TLS,RSA,PSK,WITH,ARIA,256,GCM,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC06F, RSA,PSK,ARIA256,GCM,SHA384,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC070, TLS,ECDHE,PSK,WITH,ARIA,128,CBC,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC070, ECDHE,PSK,ARIA128,SHA256,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC071, TLS,ECDHE,PSK,WITH,ARIA,256,CBC,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC071, ECDHE,PSK,ARIA256,SHA384,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC072, TLS,ECDHE,ECDSA,WITH,CAMELLIA,128,CBC,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC072, ECDHE,ECDSA,CAMELLIA128,SHA256,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC073, TLS,ECDHE,ECDSA,WITH,CAMELLIA,256,CBC,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC073, ECDHE,ECDSA,CAMELLIA256,SHA384,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC074, TLS,ECDH,ECDSA,WITH,CAMELLIA,128,CBC,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC074, ECDH,ECDSA,CAMELLIA128,SHA256,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC075, TLS,ECDH,ECDSA,WITH,CAMELLIA,256,CBC,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC075, ECDH,ECDSA,CAMELLIA256,SHA384,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC076, TLS,ECDHE,RSA,WITH,CAMELLIA,128,CBC,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC076, ECDHE,RSA,CAMELLIA128,SHA256,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC077, TLS,ECDHE,RSA,WITH,CAMELLIA,256,CBC,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC077, ECDHE,RSA,CAMELLIA256,SHA384,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC078, TLS,ECDH,RSA,WITH,CAMELLIA,128,CBC,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC078, ECDH,CAMELLIA128,SHA256,,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC079, TLS,ECDH,RSA,WITH,CAMELLIA,256,CBC,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC079, ECDH,CAMELLIA256,SHA384,,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC07A, TLS,RSA,WITH,CAMELLIA,128,GCM,SHA256,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC07A, CAMELLIA128,GCM,SHA256,,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC07B, TLS,RSA,WITH,CAMELLIA,256,GCM,SHA384,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC07B, CAMELLIA256,GCM,SHA384,,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC07C, TLS,DHE,RSA,WITH,CAMELLIA,128,GCM,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC07C, DHE,RSA,CAMELLIA128,GCM,SHA256,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC07D, TLS,DHE,RSA,WITH,CAMELLIA,256,GCM,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC07D, DHE,RSA,CAMELLIA256,GCM,SHA384,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC086, TLS,ECDHE,ECDSA,WITH,CAMELLIA,128,GCM,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC086, ECDHE,ECDSA,CAMELLIA128,GCM,SHA256,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC087, TLS,ECDHE,ECDSA,WITH,CAMELLIA,256,GCM,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC087, ECDHE,ECDSA,CAMELLIA256,GCM,SHA384,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC088, TLS,ECDH,ECDSA,WITH,CAMELLIA,128,GCM,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC088, ECDH,ECDSA,CAMELLIA128,GCM,SHA256,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC089, TLS,ECDH,ECDSA,WITH,CAMELLIA,256,GCM,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC089, ECDH,ECDSA,CAMELLIA256,GCM,SHA384,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC08A, TLS,ECDHE,RSA,WITH,CAMELLIA,128,GCM,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC08A, ECDHE,CAMELLIA128,GCM,SHA256,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC08B, TLS,ECDHE,RSA,WITH,CAMELLIA,256,GCM,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC08B, ECDHE,CAMELLIA256,GCM,SHA384,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC08C, TLS,ECDH,RSA,WITH,CAMELLIA,128,GCM,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC08C, ECDH,CAMELLIA128,GCM,SHA256,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC08D, TLS,ECDH,RSA,WITH,CAMELLIA,256,GCM,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC08D, ECDH,CAMELLIA256,GCM,SHA384,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC08E, TLS,PSK,WITH,CAMELLIA,128,GCM,SHA256,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC08E, PSK,CAMELLIA128,GCM,SHA256,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC08F, TLS,PSK,WITH,CAMELLIA,256,GCM,SHA384,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC08F, PSK,CAMELLIA256,GCM,SHA384,,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC090, TLS,DHE,PSK,WITH,CAMELLIA,128,GCM,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC090, DHE,PSK,CAMELLIA128,GCM,SHA256,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC091, TLS,DHE,PSK,WITH,CAMELLIA,256,GCM,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC091, DHE,PSK,CAMELLIA256,GCM,SHA384,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC092, TLS,RSA,PSK,WITH,CAMELLIA,128,GCM,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC092, RSA,PSK,CAMELLIA128,GCM,SHA256,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC093, TLS,RSA,PSK,WITH,CAMELLIA,256,GCM,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC093, RSA,PSK,CAMELLIA256,GCM,SHA384,,,), /* ns */ + CS_ENTRY(0xC094, TLS,PSK,WITH,CAMELLIA,128,CBC,SHA256,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC094, PSK,CAMELLIA128,SHA256,,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC095, TLS,PSK,WITH,CAMELLIA,256,CBC,SHA384,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC095, PSK,CAMELLIA256,SHA384,,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC096, TLS,DHE,PSK,WITH,CAMELLIA,128,CBC,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC096, DHE,PSK,CAMELLIA128,SHA256,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC097, TLS,DHE,PSK,WITH,CAMELLIA,256,CBC,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC097, DHE,PSK,CAMELLIA256,SHA384,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC098, TLS,RSA,PSK,WITH,CAMELLIA,128,CBC,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC098, RSA,PSK,CAMELLIA128,SHA256,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC099, TLS,RSA,PSK,WITH,CAMELLIA,256,CBC,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC099, RSA,PSK,CAMELLIA256,SHA384,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC09A, TLS,ECDHE,PSK,WITH,CAMELLIA,128,CBC,SHA256), + CS_ENTRY(0xC09A, ECDHE,PSK,CAMELLIA128,SHA256,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC09B, TLS,ECDHE,PSK,WITH,CAMELLIA,256,CBC,SHA384), + CS_ENTRY(0xC09B, ECDHE,PSK,CAMELLIA256,SHA384,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC09E, TLS,DHE,RSA,WITH,AES,128,CCM,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC09E, DHE,RSA,AES128,CCM,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC09F, TLS,DHE,RSA,WITH,AES,256,CCM,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC09F, DHE,RSA,AES256,CCM,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0A2, TLS,DHE,RSA,WITH,AES,128,CCM,8), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0A2, DHE,RSA,AES128,CCM8,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0A3, TLS,DHE,RSA,WITH,AES,256,CCM,8), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0A3, DHE,RSA,AES256,CCM8,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0A4, TLS,PSK,WITH,AES,128,CCM,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0A4, PSK,AES128,CCM,,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0A5, TLS,PSK,WITH,AES,256,CCM,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0A5, PSK,AES256,CCM,,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0A6, TLS,DHE,PSK,WITH,AES,128,CCM,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0A6, DHE,PSK,AES128,CCM,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0A7, TLS,DHE,PSK,WITH,AES,256,CCM,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0A7, DHE,PSK,AES256,CCM,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0A8, TLS,PSK,WITH,AES,128,CCM,8,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0A8, PSK,AES128,CCM8,,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0A9, TLS,PSK,WITH,AES,256,CCM,8,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0A9, PSK,AES256,CCM8,,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0AA, TLS,PSK,DHE,WITH,AES,128,CCM,8), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0AA, DHE,PSK,AES128,CCM8,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0AB, TLS,PSK,DHE,WITH,AES,256,CCM,8), + CS_ENTRY(0xC0AB, DHE,PSK,AES256,CCM8,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xCCAA, TLS,DHE,RSA,WITH,CHACHA20,POLY1305,SHA256,), + CS_ENTRY(0xCCAA, DHE,RSA,CHACHA20,POLY1305,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xCCAC, TLS,ECDHE,PSK,WITH,CHACHA20,POLY1305,SHA256,), + CS_ENTRY(0xCCAC, ECDHE,PSK,CHACHA20,POLY1305,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xCCAD, TLS,DHE,PSK,WITH,CHACHA20,POLY1305,SHA256,), + CS_ENTRY(0xCCAD, DHE,PSK,CHACHA20,POLY1305,,,,), + CS_ENTRY(0xCCAE, TLS,RSA,PSK,WITH,CHACHA20,POLY1305,SHA256,), + CS_ENTRY(0xCCAE, RSA,PSK,CHACHA20,POLY1305,,,,), +#endif +}; +#define CS_LIST_LEN (sizeof(cs_list) / sizeof(cs_list[0])) + +static int cs_str_to_zip(const char *cs_str, size_t cs_len, + uint8_t zip[6]) +{ + uint8_t indexes[8] = {0}; + const char *entry, *cur; + const char *nxt = cs_str; + const char *end = cs_str + cs_len; + char separator = '-'; + int idx, i = 0; + size_t len; + + /* split the cipher string by '-' or '_' */ + if(strncasecompare(cs_str, "TLS", 3)) + separator = '_'; + + do { + if(i == 8) + return -1; + + /* determine the length of the part */ + cur = nxt; + for(; nxt < end && *nxt != '\0' && *nxt != separator; nxt++); + len = nxt - cur; + + /* lookup index for the part (skip empty string at 0) */ + for(idx = 1, entry = cs_txt + 1; idx < CS_TXT_LEN; idx++) { + size_t elen = strlen(entry); + if(elen == len && strncasecompare(entry, cur, len)) + break; + entry += elen + 1; + } + if(idx == CS_TXT_LEN) + return -1; + + indexes[i++] = (uint8_t) idx; + } while(nxt < end && *(nxt++) != '\0'); + + /* zip the 8 indexes into 48 bits */ + zip[0] = (uint8_t) (indexes[0] << 2 | (indexes[1] & 0x3F) >> 4); + zip[1] = (uint8_t) (indexes[1] << 4 | (indexes[2] & 0x3F) >> 2); + zip[2] = (uint8_t) (indexes[2] << 6 | (indexes[3] & 0x3F)); + zip[3] = (uint8_t) (indexes[4] << 2 | (indexes[5] & 0x3F) >> 4); + zip[4] = (uint8_t) (indexes[5] << 4 | (indexes[6] & 0x3F) >> 2); + zip[5] = (uint8_t) (indexes[6] << 6 | (indexes[7] & 0x3F)); + + return 0; +} + +static int cs_zip_to_str(const uint8_t zip[6], + char *buf, size_t buf_size) +{ + uint8_t indexes[8] = {0}; + const char *entry; + char separator = '-'; + int idx, i, r; + size_t len = 0; + + /* unzip the 8 indexes */ + indexes[0] = zip[0] >> 2; + indexes[1] = ((zip[0] << 4) & 0x3F) | zip[1] >> 4; + indexes[2] = ((zip[1] << 2) & 0x3F) | zip[2] >> 6; + indexes[3] = ((zip[2] << 0) & 0x3F); + indexes[4] = zip[3] >> 2; + indexes[5] = ((zip[3] << 4) & 0x3F) | zip[4] >> 4; + indexes[6] = ((zip[4] << 2) & 0x3F) | zip[5] >> 6; + indexes[7] = ((zip[5] << 0) & 0x3F); + + if(indexes[0] == CS_TXT_IDX_TLS) + separator = '_'; + + for(i = 0; i < 8 && indexes[i] != 0 && len < buf_size; i++) { + if(indexes[i] >= CS_TXT_LEN) + return -1; + + /* lookup the part string for the index (skip empty string at 0) */ + for(idx = 1, entry = cs_txt + 1; idx < indexes[i]; idx++) { + size_t elen = strlen(entry); + entry += elen + 1; + } + + /* append the part string to the buffer */ + if(i > 0) + r = msnprintf(&buf[len], buf_size - len, "%c%s", separator, entry); + else + r = msnprintf(&buf[len], buf_size - len, "%s", entry); + + if(r < 0) + return -1; + len += r; + } + + return 0; +} + +uint16_t Curl_cipher_suite_lookup_id(const char *cs_str, size_t cs_len) +{ + size_t i; + uint8_t zip[6]; + + if(cs_len > 0 && cs_str_to_zip(cs_str, cs_len, zip) == 0) { + for(i = 0; i < CS_LIST_LEN; i++) { + if(memcmp(cs_list[i].zip, zip, sizeof(zip)) == 0) + return cs_list[i].id; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +static bool cs_is_separator(char c) +{ + switch(c) { + case ' ': + case '\t': + case ':': + case ',': + case ';': + return true; + default:; + } + return false; +} + +uint16_t Curl_cipher_suite_walk_str(const char **str, const char **end) +{ + /* move string pointer to first non-separator or end of string */ + for(; cs_is_separator(*str[0]); (*str)++); + + /* move end pointer to next separator or end of string */ + for(*end = *str; *end[0] != '\0' && !cs_is_separator(*end[0]); (*end)++); + + return Curl_cipher_suite_lookup_id(*str, *end - *str); +} + +int Curl_cipher_suite_get_str(uint16_t id, char *buf, size_t buf_size, + bool prefer_rfc) +{ + size_t i, j = CS_LIST_LEN; + int r = -1; + + for(i = 0; i < CS_LIST_LEN; i++) { + if(cs_list[i].id != id) + continue; + if((cs_list[i].zip[0] >> 2 != CS_TXT_IDX_TLS) == !prefer_rfc) { + j = i; + break; + } + if(j == CS_LIST_LEN) + j = i; + } + + if(j < CS_LIST_LEN) + r = cs_zip_to_str(cs_list[j].zip, buf, buf_size); + + if(r < 0) + msnprintf(buf, buf_size, "TLS_UNKNOWN_0x%04x", id); + + return r; +} + +#endif /* defined(USE_MBEDTLS) || defined(USE_BEARSSL) */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/cipher_suite.h b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/cipher_suite.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c1399794fe --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/cipher_suite.h @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +#ifndef HEADER_CURL_CIPHER_SUITE_H +#define HEADER_CURL_CIPHER_SUITE_H +/*************************************************************************** + * _ _ ____ _ + * Project ___| | | | _ \| | + * / __| | | | |_) | | + * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ + * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| + * + * Copyright (C) Jan Venekamp, + * + * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which + * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms + * are also available at https://curl.se/docs/copyright.html. + * + * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell + * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is + * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file. + * + * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY + * KIND, either express or implied. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: curl + * + ***************************************************************************/ + +#include "curl_setup.h" + +#if defined(USE_MBEDTLS) || defined(USE_BEARSSL) +#include + +/* Lookup IANA id for cipher suite string, returns 0 if not recognized */ +uint16_t Curl_cipher_suite_lookup_id(const char *cs_str, size_t cs_len); + +/* Walk over cipher suite string, update str and end pointers to next + cipher suite in string, returns IANA id of that suite if recognized */ +uint16_t Curl_cipher_suite_walk_str(const char **str, const char **end); + +/* Copy openssl or RFC name for cipher suite in supplied buffer. + Caller is responsible to supply sufficiently large buffer (size + of 64 should suffice), excess bytes are silently truncated. */ +int Curl_cipher_suite_get_str(uint16_t id, char *buf, size_t buf_size, + bool prefer_rfc); + +#endif /* defined(USE_MBEDTLS) || defined(USE_BEARSSL) */ +#endif /* HEADER_CURL_CIPHER_SUITE_H */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/gtls.c b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/gtls.c index 4e337f5dd3..5cf3bf9527 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/gtls.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/gtls.c @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ #include "urldata.h" #include "sendf.h" #include "inet_pton.h" +#include "keylog.h" #include "gtls.h" #include "vtls.h" #include "vtls_int.h" @@ -59,6 +60,16 @@ /* The last #include file should be: */ #include "memdebug.h" +#ifndef ARRAYSIZE +#define ARRAYSIZE(A) (sizeof(A)/sizeof((A)[0])) +#endif + +#define QUIC_PRIORITY \ + "NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:-CIPHER-ALL:+AES-128-GCM:+AES-256-GCM:" \ + "+CHACHA20-POLY1305:+AES-128-CCM:-GROUP-ALL:+GROUP-SECP256R1:" \ + "+GROUP-X25519:+GROUP-SECP384R1:+GROUP-SECP521R1:" \ + "%DISABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE" + /* Enable GnuTLS debugging by defining GTLSDEBUG */ /*#define GTLSDEBUG */ @@ -77,22 +88,25 @@ static bool gtls_inited = FALSE; # include struct gtls_ssl_backend_data { - struct gtls_instance gtls; + struct gtls_ctx gtls; }; static ssize_t gtls_push(void *s, const void *buf, size_t blen) { struct Curl_cfilter *cf = s; struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx; + struct gtls_ssl_backend_data *backend = + (struct gtls_ssl_backend_data *)connssl->backend; struct Curl_easy *data = CF_DATA_CURRENT(cf); ssize_t nwritten; CURLcode result; DEBUGASSERT(data); nwritten = Curl_conn_cf_send(cf->next, data, buf, blen, &result); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "gtls_push(len=%zu) -> %zd, err=%d", + blen, nwritten, result); + backend->gtls.io_result = result; if(nwritten < 0) { - struct gtls_ssl_backend_data *backend = - (struct gtls_ssl_backend_data *)connssl->backend; gnutls_transport_set_errno(backend->gtls.session, (CURLE_AGAIN == result)? EAGAIN : EINVAL); nwritten = -1; @@ -104,19 +118,33 @@ static ssize_t gtls_pull(void *s, void *buf, size_t blen) { struct Curl_cfilter *cf = s; struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx; + struct gtls_ssl_backend_data *backend = + (struct gtls_ssl_backend_data *)connssl->backend; struct Curl_easy *data = CF_DATA_CURRENT(cf); ssize_t nread; CURLcode result; DEBUGASSERT(data); + if(!backend->gtls.trust_setup) { + result = Curl_gtls_client_trust_setup(cf, data, &backend->gtls); + if(result) { + gnutls_transport_set_errno(backend->gtls.session, EINVAL); + backend->gtls.io_result = result; + return -1; + } + } + nread = Curl_conn_cf_recv(cf->next, data, buf, blen, &result); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "glts_pull(len=%zu) -> %zd, err=%d", + blen, nread, result); + backend->gtls.io_result = result; if(nread < 0) { - struct gtls_ssl_backend_data *backend = - (struct gtls_ssl_backend_data *)connssl->backend; gnutls_transport_set_errno(backend->gtls.session, (CURLE_AGAIN == result)? EAGAIN : EINVAL); nread = -1; } + else if(nread == 0) + connssl->peer_closed = TRUE; return nread; } @@ -266,8 +294,17 @@ static CURLcode handshake(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, /* socket is readable or writable */ } + backend->gtls.io_result = CURLE_OK; rc = gnutls_handshake(session); + if(!backend->gtls.trust_setup) { + /* After having send off the ClientHello, we prepare the trust + * store to verify the coming certificate from the server */ + CURLcode result = Curl_gtls_client_trust_setup(cf, data, &backend->gtls); + if(result) + return result; + } + if((rc == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN) || (rc == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED)) { connssl->connecting_state = gnutls_record_get_direction(session)? @@ -288,6 +325,9 @@ static CURLcode handshake(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, infof(data, "gnutls_handshake() warning: %s", strerr); continue; } + else if((rc < 0) && backend->gtls.io_result) { + return backend->gtls.io_result; + } else if(rc < 0) { const char *strerr = NULL; @@ -328,6 +368,7 @@ static gnutls_x509_crt_fmt_t do_file_type(const char *type) static CURLcode set_ssl_version_min_max(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct ssl_peer *peer, struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config, const char **prioritylist, const char *tls13support) @@ -335,6 +376,16 @@ set_ssl_version_min_max(struct Curl_easy *data, long ssl_version = conn_config->version; long ssl_version_max = conn_config->version_max; + if(peer->transport == TRNSPRT_QUIC) { + if((ssl_version != CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT) && + (ssl_version < CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_3)) { + failf(data, "QUIC needs at least TLS version 1.3"); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + *prioritylist = QUIC_PRIORITY; + return CURLE_OK; + } + if((ssl_version == CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT) || (ssl_version == CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1)) ssl_version = CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0; @@ -399,62 +450,15 @@ set_ssl_version_min_max(struct Curl_easy *data, return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; } -CURLcode gtls_client_init(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct ssl_primary_config *config, - struct ssl_config_data *ssl_config, - struct ssl_peer *peer, - struct gtls_instance *gtls, - long *pverifyresult) +CURLcode Curl_gtls_client_trust_setup(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + struct gtls_ctx *gtls) { - unsigned int init_flags; + struct ssl_primary_config *config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf); + struct ssl_config_data *ssl_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_config(cf, data); int rc; - bool sni = TRUE; /* default is SNI enabled */ - const char *prioritylist; - const char *err = NULL; - const char *tls13support; - CURLcode result; - - if(!gtls_inited) - gtls_init(); - - *pverifyresult = 0; - - if(config->version == CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2) { - failf(data, "GnuTLS does not support SSLv2"); - return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; - } - else if(config->version == CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3) - sni = FALSE; /* SSLv3 has no SNI */ - - /* allocate a cred struct */ - rc = gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials(>ls->cred); - if(rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) { - failf(data, "gnutls_cert_all_cred() failed: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc)); - return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; - } - -#ifdef USE_GNUTLS_SRP - if(config->username && Curl_auth_allowed_to_host(data)) { - infof(data, "Using TLS-SRP username: %s", config->username); - - rc = gnutls_srp_allocate_client_credentials(>ls->srp_client_cred); - if(rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) { - failf(data, "gnutls_srp_allocate_client_cred() failed: %s", - gnutls_strerror(rc)); - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - } - - rc = gnutls_srp_set_client_credentials(gtls->srp_client_cred, - config->username, - config->password); - if(rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) { - failf(data, "gnutls_srp_set_client_cred() failed: %s", - gnutls_strerror(rc)); - return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; - } - } -#endif + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "setup trust anchors and CRLs"); if(config->verifypeer) { bool imported_native_ca = false; @@ -483,7 +487,7 @@ CURLcode gtls_client_init(struct Curl_easy *data, config->CAfile, gnutls_strerror(rc), (imported_native_ca ? ", continuing anyway" : "")); if(!imported_native_ca) { - *pverifyresult = rc; + ssl_config->certverifyresult = rc; return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE; } } @@ -501,7 +505,7 @@ CURLcode gtls_client_init(struct Curl_easy *data, config->CApath, gnutls_strerror(rc), (imported_native_ca ? ", continuing anyway" : "")); if(!imported_native_ca) { - *pverifyresult = rc; + ssl_config->certverifyresult = rc; return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE; } } @@ -524,6 +528,148 @@ CURLcode gtls_client_init(struct Curl_easy *data, infof(data, "found %d CRL in %s", rc, config->CRLfile); } + gtls->trust_setup = TRUE; + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static void gtls_sessionid_free(void *sessionid, size_t idsize) +{ + (void)idsize; + free(sessionid); +} + +static CURLcode gtls_update_session_id(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + gnutls_session_t session) +{ + struct ssl_config_data *ssl_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_config(cf, data); + struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx; + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + + if(ssl_config->primary.sessionid) { + /* we always unconditionally get the session id here, as even if we + already got it from the cache and asked to use it in the connection, it + might've been rejected and then a new one is in use now and we need to + detect that. */ + void *connect_sessionid; + size_t connect_idsize = 0; + + /* get the session ID data size */ + gnutls_session_get_data(session, NULL, &connect_idsize); + connect_sessionid = malloc(connect_idsize); /* get a buffer for it */ + if(!connect_sessionid) { + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + else { + bool incache; + void *ssl_sessionid; + + /* extract session ID to the allocated buffer */ + gnutls_session_get_data(session, connect_sessionid, &connect_idsize); + + DEBUGF(infof(data, "get session id (len=%zu) and store in cache", + connect_idsize)); + Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data); + incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(cf, data, &connssl->peer, + &ssl_sessionid, NULL)); + if(incache) { + /* there was one before in the cache, so instead of risking that the + previous one was rejected, we just kill that and store the new */ + Curl_ssl_delsessionid(data, ssl_sessionid); + } + + /* store this session id, takes ownership */ + result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(cf, data, &connssl->peer, + connect_sessionid, connect_idsize, + gtls_sessionid_free); + Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data); + } + } + return result; +} + +static int gtls_handshake_cb(gnutls_session_t session, unsigned int htype, + unsigned when, unsigned int incoming, + const gnutls_datum_t *msg) +{ + struct Curl_cfilter *cf = gnutls_session_get_ptr(session); + + (void)msg; + (void)incoming; + if(when) { /* after message has been processed */ + struct Curl_easy *data = CF_DATA_CURRENT(cf); + if(data) { + DEBUGF(infof(data, "handshake: %s message type %d", + incoming? "incoming" : "outgoing", htype)); + switch(htype) { + case GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_NEW_SESSION_TICKET: { + gtls_update_session_id(cf, data, session); + break; + } + default: + break; + } + } + } + return 0; +} + +static CURLcode gtls_client_init(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + struct ssl_peer *peer, + struct gtls_ctx *gtls) +{ + struct ssl_primary_config *config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf); + struct ssl_config_data *ssl_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_config(cf, data); + unsigned int init_flags; + int rc; + bool sni = TRUE; /* default is SNI enabled */ + const char *prioritylist; + const char *err = NULL; + const char *tls13support; + CURLcode result; + + if(!gtls_inited) + gtls_init(); + + if(config->version == CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2) { + failf(data, "GnuTLS does not support SSLv2"); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + else if(config->version == CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3) + sni = FALSE; /* SSLv3 has no SNI */ + + /* allocate a cred struct */ + rc = gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials(>ls->cred); + if(rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) { + failf(data, "gnutls_cert_all_cred() failed: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc)); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + +#ifdef USE_GNUTLS_SRP + if(config->username && Curl_auth_allowed_to_host(data)) { + infof(data, "Using TLS-SRP username: %s", config->username); + + rc = gnutls_srp_allocate_client_credentials(>ls->srp_client_cred); + if(rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) { + failf(data, "gnutls_srp_allocate_client_cred() failed: %s", + gnutls_strerror(rc)); + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + + rc = gnutls_srp_set_client_credentials(gtls->srp_client_cred, + config->username, + config->password); + if(rc != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) { + failf(data, "gnutls_srp_set_client_cred() failed: %s", + gnutls_strerror(rc)); + return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + } + } +#endif + + ssl_config->certverifyresult = 0; + /* Initialize TLS session as a client */ init_flags = GNUTLS_CLIENT; @@ -576,7 +722,8 @@ CURLcode gtls_client_init(struct Curl_easy *data, } /* At this point we know we have a supported TLS version, so set it */ - result = set_ssl_version_min_max(data, config, &prioritylist, tls13support); + result = set_ssl_version_min_max(data, peer, + config, &prioritylist, tls13support); if(result) return result; @@ -584,13 +731,9 @@ CURLcode gtls_client_init(struct Curl_easy *data, /* Only add SRP to the cipher list if SRP is requested. Otherwise * GnuTLS will disable TLS 1.3 support. */ if(config->username) { - size_t len = strlen(prioritylist); - - char *prioritysrp = malloc(len + sizeof(GNUTLS_SRP) + 1); + char *prioritysrp = aprintf("%s:" GNUTLS_SRP, prioritylist); if(!prioritysrp) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - strcpy(prioritysrp, prioritylist); - strcpy(prioritysrp + len, ":" GNUTLS_SRP); rc = gnutls_priority_set_direct(gtls->session, prioritysrp, &err); free(prioritysrp); @@ -613,6 +756,11 @@ CURLcode gtls_client_init(struct Curl_easy *data, } if(config->clientcert) { + if(!gtls->trust_setup) { + result = Curl_gtls_client_trust_setup(cf, data, gtls); + if(result) + return result; + } if(ssl_config->key_passwd) { const unsigned int supported_key_encryption_algorithms = GNUTLS_PKCS_USE_PKCS12_3DES | GNUTLS_PKCS_USE_PKCS12_ARCFOUR | @@ -679,46 +827,78 @@ CURLcode gtls_client_init(struct Curl_easy *data, return CURLE_OK; } -static CURLcode -gtls_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) +static int keylog_callback(gnutls_session_t session, const char *label, + const gnutls_datum_t *secret) +{ + gnutls_datum_t crandom; + gnutls_datum_t srandom; + + gnutls_session_get_random(session, &crandom, &srandom); + if(crandom.size != 32) { + return -1; + } + + Curl_tls_keylog_write(label, crandom.data, secret->data, secret->size); + return 0; +} + +CURLcode Curl_gtls_ctx_init(struct gtls_ctx *gctx, + struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + struct ssl_peer *peer, + const unsigned char *alpn, size_t alpn_len, + Curl_gtls_ctx_setup_cb *cb_setup, + void *cb_user_data, + void *ssl_user_data) { - struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx; - struct gtls_ssl_backend_data *backend = - (struct gtls_ssl_backend_data *)connssl->backend; struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf); - struct ssl_config_data *ssl_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_config(cf, data); - long * const pverifyresult = &ssl_config->certverifyresult; CURLcode result; - DEBUGASSERT(backend); + DEBUGASSERT(gctx); - if(connssl->state == ssl_connection_complete) - /* to make us tolerant against being called more than once for the - same connection */ - return CURLE_OK; - - result = gtls_client_init(data, conn_config, ssl_config, - &connssl->peer, - &backend->gtls, pverifyresult); + result = gtls_client_init(cf, data, peer, gctx); if(result) return result; - if(connssl->alpn) { - struct alpn_proto_buf proto; - gnutls_datum_t alpn[ALPN_ENTRIES_MAX]; - size_t i; + gnutls_session_set_ptr(gctx->session, ssl_user_data); + + if(cb_setup) { + result = cb_setup(cf, data, cb_user_data); + if(result) + return result; + } + + /* Open the file if a TLS or QUIC backend has not done this before. */ + Curl_tls_keylog_open(); + if(Curl_tls_keylog_enabled()) { + gnutls_session_set_keylog_function(gctx->session, keylog_callback); + } - for(i = 0; i < connssl->alpn->count; ++i) { - alpn[i].data = (unsigned char *)connssl->alpn->entries[i]; - alpn[i].size = (unsigned)strlen(connssl->alpn->entries[i]); + /* convert the ALPN string from our arguments to a list of strings + * that gnutls wants and will convert internally back to this very + * string for sending to the server. nice. */ + if(alpn && alpn_len) { + gnutls_datum_t alpns[5]; + size_t i, alen = alpn_len; + unsigned char *s = (unsigned char *)alpn; + unsigned char slen; + for(i = 0; (i < ARRAYSIZE(alpns)) && alen; ++i) { + slen = s[0]; + if(slen >= alen) + return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + alpns[i].data = s + 1; + alpns[i].size = slen; + s += slen + 1; + alen -= (size_t)slen + 1; } - if(gnutls_alpn_set_protocols(backend->gtls.session, alpn, - (unsigned)connssl->alpn->count, 0)) { + if(alen) /* not all alpn chars used, wrong format or too many */ + return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + if(i && gnutls_alpn_set_protocols(gctx->session, + alpns, (unsigned int)i, + GNUTLS_ALPN_MANDATORY)) { failf(data, "failed setting ALPN"); return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; } - Curl_alpn_to_proto_str(&proto, connssl->alpn); - infof(data, VTLS_INFOF_ALPN_OFFER_1STR, proto.data); } /* This might be a reconnect, so we check for a session ID in the cache @@ -728,16 +908,55 @@ gtls_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) size_t ssl_idsize; Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data); - if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(cf, data, &ssl_sessionid, &ssl_idsize)) { + if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(cf, data, peer, &ssl_sessionid, &ssl_idsize)) { /* we got a session id, use it! */ - gnutls_session_set_data(backend->gtls.session, - ssl_sessionid, ssl_idsize); + int rc; - /* Informational message */ - infof(data, "SSL reusing session ID"); + rc = gnutls_session_set_data(gctx->session, ssl_sessionid, ssl_idsize); + if(rc < 0) + infof(data, "SSL failed to set session ID"); + else + infof(data, "SSL reusing session ID (size=%zu)", ssl_idsize); } Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data); } + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static CURLcode +gtls_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx; + struct gtls_ssl_backend_data *backend = + (struct gtls_ssl_backend_data *)connssl->backend; + struct alpn_proto_buf proto; + CURLcode result; + + DEBUGASSERT(backend); + DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_1 == connssl->connecting_state); + + if(connssl->state == ssl_connection_complete) + /* to make us tolerant against being called more than once for the + same connection */ + return CURLE_OK; + + memset(&proto, 0, sizeof(proto)); + if(connssl->alpn) { + result = Curl_alpn_to_proto_buf(&proto, connssl->alpn); + if(result) { + failf(data, "Error determining ALPN"); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + } + + result = Curl_gtls_ctx_init(&backend->gtls, cf, data, &connssl->peer, + proto.data, proto.len, NULL, NULL, cf); + if(result) + return result; + + gnutls_handshake_set_hook_function(backend->gtls.session, + GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_ANY, GNUTLS_HOOK_POST, + gtls_handshake_cb); /* register callback functions and handle to send and receive data. */ gnutls_transport_set_ptr(backend->gtls.session, cf); @@ -822,16 +1041,17 @@ Curl_gtls_verifyserver(struct Curl_easy *data, char certname[65] = ""; /* limited to 64 chars by ASN.1 */ size_t size; time_t certclock; - const char *ptr; int rc; CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS + const char *ptr; unsigned int algo; unsigned int bits; gnutls_protocol_t version = gnutls_protocol_get_version(session); #endif long * const certverifyresult = &ssl_config->certverifyresult; +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS /* the name of the cipher suite used, e.g. ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384. */ ptr = gnutls_cipher_suite_get_name(gnutls_kx_get(session), gnutls_cipher_get(session), @@ -839,6 +1059,7 @@ Curl_gtls_verifyserver(struct Curl_easy *data, infof(data, "SSL connection using %s / %s", gnutls_protocol_get_name(version), ptr); +#endif /* This function will return the peer's raw certificate (chain) as sent by the peer. These certificates are in raw format (DER encoded for @@ -1071,7 +1292,7 @@ Curl_gtls_verifyserver(struct Curl_easy *data, /* Before 3.3.6, gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname() didn't check IP addresses. */ if(!rc) { -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 #define use_addr in6_addr #else #define use_addr in_addr @@ -1081,7 +1302,7 @@ Curl_gtls_verifyserver(struct Curl_easy *data, if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, peer->hostname, addrbuf) > 0) addrlen = 4; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 else if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, peer->hostname, addrbuf) > 0) addrlen = 16; #endif @@ -1245,9 +1466,13 @@ static CURLcode gtls_verifyserver(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx; struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf); struct ssl_config_data *ssl_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_config(cf, data); +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY const char *pinned_key = Curl_ssl_cf_is_proxy(cf)? data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY_PROXY]: data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY]; +#else + const char *pinned_key = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY]; +#endif CURLcode result; result = Curl_gtls_verifyserver(data, session, conn_config, ssl_config, @@ -1266,47 +1491,10 @@ static CURLcode gtls_verifyserver(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, Curl_alpn_set_negotiated(cf, data, NULL, 0); } - if(ssl_config->primary.sessionid) { - /* we always unconditionally get the session id here, as even if we - already got it from the cache and asked to use it in the connection, it - might've been rejected and then a new one is in use now and we need to - detect that. */ - void *connect_sessionid; - size_t connect_idsize = 0; - - /* get the session ID data size */ - gnutls_session_get_data(session, NULL, &connect_idsize); - connect_sessionid = malloc(connect_idsize); /* get a buffer for it */ - - if(connect_sessionid) { - bool incache; - bool added = FALSE; - void *ssl_sessionid; - - /* extract session ID to the allocated buffer */ - gnutls_session_get_data(session, connect_sessionid, &connect_idsize); - - Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data); - incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(cf, data, &ssl_sessionid, NULL)); - if(incache) { - /* there was one before in the cache, so instead of risking that the - previous one was rejected, we just kill that and store the new */ - Curl_ssl_delsessionid(data, ssl_sessionid); - } - - /* store this session id */ - result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(cf, data, connect_sessionid, - connect_idsize, &added); - Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data); - if(!added) - free(connect_sessionid); - if(result) { - result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - } - } - else - result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - } + /* Only on TLSv1.2 or lower do we have the session id now. For + * TLSv1.3 we get it via a SESSION_TICKET message that arrives later. */ + if(gnutls_protocol_get_version(session) < GNUTLS_TLS1_3) + result = gtls_update_session_id(cf, data, session); out: return result; @@ -1418,12 +1606,13 @@ static ssize_t gtls_send(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, (void)data; DEBUGASSERT(backend); + backend->gtls.io_result = CURLE_OK; rc = gnutls_record_send(backend->gtls.session, mem, len); if(rc < 0) { - *curlcode = (rc == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN) - ? CURLE_AGAIN - : CURLE_SEND_ERROR; + *curlcode = (rc == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN)? + CURLE_AGAIN : + (backend->gtls.io_result? backend->gtls.io_result : CURLE_SEND_ERROR); rc = -1; } @@ -1491,7 +1680,7 @@ static int gtls_shutdown(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, bool done = FALSE; char buf[120]; - while(!done) { + while(!done && !connssl->peer_closed) { int what = SOCKET_READABLE(Curl_conn_cf_get_socket(cf, data), SSL_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT); if(what > 0) { @@ -1559,6 +1748,7 @@ static ssize_t gtls_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, (void)data; DEBUGASSERT(backend); + backend->gtls.io_result = CURLE_OK; ret = gnutls_record_recv(backend->gtls.session, buf, buffersize); if((ret == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN) || (ret == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED)) { *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN; @@ -1583,7 +1773,8 @@ static ssize_t gtls_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, failf(data, "GnuTLS recv error (%d): %s", (int)ret, gnutls_strerror((int)ret)); - *curlcode = CURLE_RECV_ERROR; + *curlcode = backend->gtls.io_result? + backend->gtls.io_result : CURLE_RECV_ERROR; ret = -1; goto out; } @@ -1592,11 +1783,6 @@ static ssize_t gtls_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, return ret; } -static void gtls_session_free(void *ptr) -{ - free(ptr); -} - static size_t gtls_version(char *buffer, size_t size) { return msnprintf(buffer, size, "GnuTLS/%s", gnutls_check_version(NULL)); @@ -1663,7 +1849,6 @@ const struct Curl_ssl Curl_ssl_gnutls = { gtls_get_internals, /* get_internals */ gtls_close, /* close_one */ Curl_none_close_all, /* close_all */ - gtls_session_free, /* session_free */ Curl_none_set_engine, /* set_engine */ Curl_none_set_engine_default, /* set_engine_default */ Curl_none_engines_list, /* engines_list */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/gtls.h b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/gtls.h index 1a81c01e93..f8388b37b8 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/gtls.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/gtls.h @@ -45,29 +45,39 @@ struct ssl_primary_config; struct ssl_config_data; struct ssl_peer; -struct gtls_instance { +struct gtls_ctx { gnutls_session_t session; gnutls_certificate_credentials_t cred; #ifdef USE_GNUTLS_SRP gnutls_srp_client_credentials_t srp_client_cred; #endif + CURLcode io_result; /* result of last IO cfilter operation */ + BIT(trust_setup); /* x509 anchors + CRLs have been set up */ }; -CURLcode -gtls_client_init(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct ssl_primary_config *config, - struct ssl_config_data *ssl_config, - struct ssl_peer *peer, - struct gtls_instance *gtls, - long *pverifyresult); +typedef CURLcode Curl_gtls_ctx_setup_cb(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + void *user_data); -CURLcode -Curl_gtls_verifyserver(struct Curl_easy *data, - gnutls_session_t session, - struct ssl_primary_config *config, - struct ssl_config_data *ssl_config, - struct ssl_peer *peer, - const char *pinned_key); +CURLcode Curl_gtls_ctx_init(struct gtls_ctx *gctx, + struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + struct ssl_peer *peer, + const unsigned char *alpn, size_t alpn_len, + Curl_gtls_ctx_setup_cb *cb_setup, + void *cb_user_data, + void *ssl_user_data); + +CURLcode Curl_gtls_client_trust_setup(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + struct gtls_ctx *gtls); + +CURLcode Curl_gtls_verifyserver(struct Curl_easy *data, + gnutls_session_t session, + struct ssl_primary_config *config, + struct ssl_config_data *ssl_config, + struct ssl_peer *peer, + const char *pinned_key); extern const struct Curl_ssl Curl_ssl_gnutls; diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/keylog.c b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/keylog.c index fbcb25cfb6..ab7baaaeca 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/keylog.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/keylog.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include "curl_setup.h" #if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || \ + defined(USE_GNUTLS) || \ defined(USE_WOLFSSL) || \ (defined(USE_NGTCP2) && defined(USE_NGHTTP3)) || \ defined(USE_QUICHE) diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c index 38f7de7f75..1197d2956d 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c @@ -36,6 +36,13 @@ /* Define this to enable lots of debugging for mbedTLS */ /* #define MBEDTLS_DEBUG */ +#ifdef __GNUC__ +#pragma GCC diagnostic push +/* mbedTLS (as of v3.5.1) has a duplicate function declaration + in its public headers. Disable the warning that detects it. */ +#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wredundant-decls" +#endif + #include #if MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x02040000 #include @@ -56,6 +63,12 @@ # endif #endif +#ifdef __GNUC__ +#pragma GCC diagnostic pop +#endif + +#include "cipher_suite.h" +#include "strcase.h" #include "urldata.h" #include "sendf.h" #include "inet_pton.h" @@ -67,6 +80,7 @@ #include "select.h" #include "multiif.h" #include "mbedtls_threadlock.h" +#include "strdup.h" /* The last 3 #include files should be in this order */ #include "curl_printf.h" @@ -95,10 +109,12 @@ struct mbed_ssl_backend_data { #ifdef HAS_ALPN const char *protocols[3]; #endif + int *ciphersuites; }; /* apply threading? */ -#if defined(USE_THREADS_POSIX) || defined(USE_THREADS_WIN32) +#if (defined(USE_THREADS_POSIX) && defined(HAVE_PTHREAD_H)) || \ + defined(_WIN32) #define THREADING_SUPPORT #endif @@ -106,12 +122,15 @@ struct mbed_ssl_backend_data { #define mbedtls_strerror(a,b,c) b[0] = 0 #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x03060000 +#define TLS13_SUPPORT +#endif + #if defined(THREADING_SUPPORT) static mbedtls_entropy_context ts_entropy; static int entropy_init_initialized = 0; -/* start of entropy_init_mutex() */ static void entropy_init_mutex(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx) { /* lock 0 = entropy_init_mutex() */ @@ -122,9 +141,18 @@ static void entropy_init_mutex(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx) } Curl_mbedtlsthreadlock_unlock_function(0); } -/* end of entropy_init_mutex() */ -/* start of entropy_func_mutex() */ +static void entropy_cleanup_mutex(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx) +{ + /* lock 0 = use same lock as init */ + Curl_mbedtlsthreadlock_lock_function(0); + if(entropy_init_initialized == 1) { + mbedtls_entropy_free(ctx); + entropy_init_initialized = 0; + } + Curl_mbedtlsthreadlock_unlock_function(0); +} + static int entropy_func_mutex(void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len) { int ret; @@ -135,7 +163,6 @@ static int entropy_func_mutex(void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len) return ret; } -/* end of entropy_func_mutex() */ #endif /* THREADING_SUPPORT */ @@ -143,17 +170,19 @@ static int entropy_func_mutex(void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len) static void mbed_debug(void *context, int level, const char *f_name, int line_nb, const char *line) { - struct Curl_easy *data = NULL; - - if(!context) - return; - - data = (struct Curl_easy *)context; - - infof(data, "%s", line); + struct Curl_easy *data = (struct Curl_easy *)context; (void) level; + (void) line_nb; + (void) f_name; + + if(data) { + size_t len = strlen(line); + if(len && (line[len - 1] == '\n')) + /* discount any trailing newline */ + len--; + infof(data, "%.*s", (int)len, line); + } } -#else #endif static int mbedtls_bio_cf_write(void *bio, @@ -165,6 +194,9 @@ static int mbedtls_bio_cf_write(void *bio, CURLcode result; DEBUGASSERT(data); + if(!data) + return 0; + nwritten = Curl_conn_cf_send(cf->next, data, (char *)buf, blen, &result); CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "mbedtls_bio_cf_out_write(len=%zu) -> %zd, err=%d", blen, nwritten, result); @@ -182,6 +214,8 @@ static int mbedtls_bio_cf_read(void *bio, unsigned char *buf, size_t blen) CURLcode result; DEBUGASSERT(data); + if(!data) + return 0; /* OpenSSL catches this case, so should we. */ if(!buf) return 0; @@ -221,6 +255,28 @@ static const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_fr = #define PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES (RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES > ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES ? \ RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES : ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES) +#if MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x03020000 +static CURLcode mbedtls_version_from_curl( + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version* mbedver, long version) +{ + switch(version) { + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0: + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1: + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2: + *mbedver = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; + return CURLE_OK; + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_3: +#ifdef TLS13_SUPPORT + *mbedver = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; + return CURLE_OK; +#else + break; +#endif + } + + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; +} +#else static CURLcode mbedtls_version_from_curl(int *mbedver, long version) { #if MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x03000000 @@ -251,6 +307,7 @@ static CURLcode mbedtls_version_from_curl(int *mbedver, long version) return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; } +#endif static CURLcode set_ssl_version_min_max(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) @@ -259,7 +316,14 @@ set_ssl_version_min_max(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) struct mbed_ssl_backend_data *backend = (struct mbed_ssl_backend_data *)connssl->backend; struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf); -#if MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x03000000 +#if MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x03020000 + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version mbedtls_ver_min = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; +#ifdef TLS13_SUPPORT + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version mbedtls_ver_max = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; +#else + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version mbedtls_ver_max = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; +#endif +#elif MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x03000000 int mbedtls_ver_min = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3; int mbedtls_ver_max = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3; #else @@ -282,7 +346,11 @@ set_ssl_version_min_max(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) switch(ssl_version_max) { case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_NONE: case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_DEFAULT: +#ifdef TLS13_SUPPORT + ssl_version_max = CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_3; +#else ssl_version_max = CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_2; +#endif break; } @@ -297,14 +365,123 @@ set_ssl_version_min_max(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) return result; } +#if MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x03020000 + mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_tls_version(&backend->config, mbedtls_ver_min); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_tls_version(&backend->config, mbedtls_ver_max); +#else mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version(&backend->config, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, mbedtls_ver_min); mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version(&backend->config, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, mbedtls_ver_max); +#endif + +#ifdef TLS13_SUPPORT + if(mbedtls_ver_min == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(&backend->config, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED); + } + else { + mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(&backend->config, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL); + } +#else + mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(&backend->config, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL); +#endif return result; } +/* TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 (0xC0FF) is marked experimental + in mbedTLS. The number is not reserved by IANA nor is the + cipher suite present in other SSL implementations. Provide + provisional support for specifying the cipher suite here. */ +#ifdef MBEDTLS_TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 +static int +mbed_cipher_suite_get_str(uint16_t id, char *buf, size_t buf_size, + bool prefer_rfc) +{ + if(id == MBEDTLS_TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8) + msnprintf(buf, buf_size, "%s", "TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8"); + else + return Curl_cipher_suite_get_str(id, buf, buf_size, prefer_rfc); + return 0; +} + +static uint16_t +mbed_cipher_suite_walk_str(const char **str, const char **end) +{ + uint16_t id = Curl_cipher_suite_walk_str(str, end); + size_t len = *end - *str; + + if(!id) { + if(strncasecompare("TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8", *str, len)) + id = MBEDTLS_TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8; + } + return id; +} +#else +#define mbed_cipher_suite_get_str Curl_cipher_suite_get_str +#define mbed_cipher_suite_walk_str Curl_cipher_suite_walk_str +#endif + +static CURLcode +mbed_set_selected_ciphers(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct mbed_ssl_backend_data *backend, + const char *ciphers) +{ + const int *supported; + int *selected; + size_t supported_len, count = 0, i; + const char *ptr, *end; + + supported = mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(); + for(i = 0; supported[i] != 0; i++); + supported_len = i; + + selected = malloc(sizeof(int) * (supported_len + 1)); + if(!selected) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + + for(ptr = ciphers; ptr[0] != '\0' && count < supported_len; ptr = end) { + uint16_t id = mbed_cipher_suite_walk_str(&ptr, &end); + + /* Check if cipher is supported */ + if(id) { + for(i = 0; i < supported_len && supported[i] != id; i++); + if(i == supported_len) + id = 0; + } + if(!id) { + if(ptr[0] != '\0') + infof(data, "mbedTLS: unknown cipher in list: \"%.*s\"", + (int) (end - ptr), ptr); + continue; + } + + /* No duplicates allowed (so selected cannot overflow) */ + for(i = 0; i < count && selected[i] != id; i++); + if(i < count) { + infof(data, "mbedTLS: duplicate cipher in list: \"%.*s\"", + (int) (end - ptr), ptr); + continue; + } + + selected[count++] = id; + } + + selected[count] = 0; + + if(count == 0) { + free(selected); + failf(data, "mbedTLS: no supported cipher in list"); + return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER; + } + + /* mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites(): The ciphersuites array is not copied. + It must remain valid for the lifetime of the SSL configuration */ + backend->ciphersuites = selected; + mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites(&backend->config, backend->ciphersuites); + return CURLE_OK; +} + static CURLcode mbed_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) { @@ -334,8 +511,17 @@ mbed_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN; } +#ifdef TLS13_SUPPORT + ret = psa_crypto_init(); + if(ret != PSA_SUCCESS) { + mbedtls_strerror(ret, errorbuf, sizeof(errorbuf)); + failf(data, "mbedTLS psa_crypto_init returned (-0x%04X) %s", + -ret, errorbuf); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } +#endif /* TLS13_SUPPORT */ + #ifdef THREADING_SUPPORT - entropy_init_mutex(&ts_entropy); mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(&backend->ctr_drbg); ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(&backend->ctr_drbg, entropy_func_mutex, @@ -367,11 +553,10 @@ mbed_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) /* Unfortunately, mbedtls_x509_crt_parse() requires the data to be null terminated even when provided the exact length, forcing us to waste extra memory here. */ - unsigned char *newblob = malloc(ca_info_blob->len + 1); + unsigned char *newblob = Curl_memdup0(ca_info_blob->data, + ca_info_blob->len); if(!newblob) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - memcpy(newblob, ca_info_blob->data, ca_info_blob->len); - newblob[ca_info_blob->len] = 0; /* null terminate */ ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(&backend->cacert, newblob, ca_info_blob->len + 1); free(newblob); @@ -441,11 +626,10 @@ mbed_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) /* Unfortunately, mbedtls_x509_crt_parse() requires the data to be null terminated even when provided the exact length, forcing us to waste extra memory here. */ - unsigned char *newblob = malloc(ssl_cert_blob->len + 1); + unsigned char *newblob = Curl_memdup0(ssl_cert_blob->data, + ssl_cert_blob->len); if(!newblob) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - memcpy(newblob, ssl_cert_blob->data, ssl_cert_blob->len); - newblob[ssl_cert_blob->len] = 0; /* null terminate */ ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(&backend->clicert, newblob, ssl_cert_blob->len + 1); free(newblob); @@ -542,7 +726,7 @@ mbed_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) } #endif - infof(data, "mbedTLS: Connecting to %s:%d", hostname, connssl->port); + infof(data, "mbedTLS: Connecting to %s:%d", hostname, connssl->peer.port); mbedtls_ssl_config_init(&backend->config); ret = mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults(&backend->config, @@ -555,10 +739,6 @@ mbed_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) } mbedtls_ssl_init(&backend->ssl); - if(mbedtls_ssl_setup(&backend->ssl, &backend->config)) { - failf(data, "mbedTLS: ssl_init failed"); - return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; - } /* new profile with RSA min key len = 1024 ... */ mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile(&backend->config, @@ -588,17 +768,34 @@ mbed_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; } - mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(&backend->config, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL); - mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(&backend->config, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &backend->ctr_drbg); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_setup(&backend->ssl, &backend->config); + if(ret) { + mbedtls_strerror(ret, errorbuf, sizeof(errorbuf)); + failf(data, "ssl_setup failed - mbedTLS: (-0x%04X) %s", + -ret, errorbuf); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(&backend->ssl, cf, mbedtls_bio_cf_write, mbedtls_bio_cf_read, NULL /* rev_timeout() */); - mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites(&backend->config, - mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites()); + if(conn_config->cipher_list) { + ret = mbed_set_selected_ciphers(data, backend, conn_config->cipher_list); + if(ret) { + failf(data, "mbedTLS: failed to set cipher suites"); + return ret; + } + } + else { + mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites(&backend->config, + mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites()); + } + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation(&backend->config, @@ -615,7 +812,7 @@ mbed_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) void *old_session = NULL; Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data); - if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(cf, data, &old_session, NULL)) { + if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(cf, data, &connssl->peer, &old_session, NULL)) { ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_session(&backend->ssl, old_session); if(ret) { Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data); @@ -640,14 +837,13 @@ mbed_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) &backend->clicert, &backend->pk); } - if(connssl->peer.sni) { - if(mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(&backend->ssl, connssl->peer.sni)) { - /* mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() sets the name to use in CN/SAN checks and - the name to set in the SNI extension. So even if curl connects to a - host specified as an IP address, this function must be used. */ - failf(data, "Failed to set SNI"); - return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; - } + if(mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(&backend->ssl, connssl->peer.sni? + connssl->peer.sni : connssl->peer.hostname)) { + /* mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() sets the name to use in CN/SAN checks and + the name to set in the SNI extension. So even if curl connects to a + host specified as an IP address, this function must be used. */ + failf(data, "Failed to set SNI"); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; } #ifdef HAS_ALPN @@ -706,9 +902,13 @@ mbed_connect_step2(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) (struct mbed_ssl_backend_data *)connssl->backend; struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf); const mbedtls_x509_crt *peercert; +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY const char * const pinnedpubkey = Curl_ssl_cf_is_proxy(cf)? data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY_PROXY]: data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY]; +#else + const char * const pinnedpubkey = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY]; +#endif DEBUGASSERT(backend); @@ -730,9 +930,18 @@ mbed_connect_step2(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; } - infof(data, "mbedTLS: Handshake complete, cipher is %s", - mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite(&backend->ssl)); - +#if MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x03020000 + { + char cipher_str[64]; + uint16_t cipher_id; + cipher_id = (uint16_t) + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id_from_ssl(&backend->ssl); + mbed_cipher_suite_get_str(cipher_id, cipher_str, sizeof(cipher_str), true); + infof(data, "mbedTLS: Handshake complete, cipher is %s", cipher_str); + } +#else + infof(data, "mbedTLS: Handshake complete"); +#endif ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result(&backend->ssl); if(!conn_config->verifyhost) @@ -761,6 +970,7 @@ mbed_connect_step2(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) peercert = mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert(&backend->ssl); if(peercert && data->set.verbose) { +#ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO const size_t bufsize = 16384; char *buffer = malloc(bufsize); @@ -773,6 +983,9 @@ mbed_connect_step2(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) infof(data, "Unable to dump certificate information"); free(buffer); +#else + infof(data, "Unable to dump certificate information"); +#endif } if(pinnedpubkey) { @@ -861,6 +1074,13 @@ mbed_connect_step2(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) return CURLE_OK; } +static void mbedtls_session_free(void *sessionid, size_t idsize) +{ + (void)idsize; + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(sessionid); + free(sessionid); +} + static CURLcode mbed_connect_step3(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) { @@ -877,7 +1097,6 @@ mbed_connect_step3(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) int ret; mbedtls_ssl_session *our_ssl_sessionid; void *old_ssl_sessionid = NULL; - bool added = FALSE; our_ssl_sessionid = malloc(sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)); if(!our_ssl_sessionid) @@ -896,20 +1115,16 @@ mbed_connect_step3(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) /* If there's already a matching session in the cache, delete it */ Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data); - if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(cf, data, &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL)) + if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(cf, data, &connssl->peer, + &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL)) Curl_ssl_delsessionid(data, old_ssl_sessionid); - retcode = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(cf, data, our_ssl_sessionid, - 0, &added); + retcode = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(cf, data, &connssl->peer, + our_ssl_sessionid, 0, + mbedtls_session_free); Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data); - if(!added) { - mbedtls_ssl_session_free(our_ssl_sessionid); - free(our_ssl_sessionid); - } - if(retcode) { - failf(data, "failed to store ssl session"); + if(retcode) return retcode; - } } connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_done; @@ -964,6 +1179,7 @@ static void mbedtls_close(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) #ifdef MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C mbedtls_x509_crl_free(&backend->crl); #endif + Curl_safefree(backend->ciphersuites); mbedtls_ssl_config_free(&backend->config); mbedtls_ssl_free(&backend->ssl); mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(&backend->ctr_drbg); @@ -992,8 +1208,11 @@ static ssize_t mbed_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, if(ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY) return 0; - *curlcode = (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ) ? - CURLE_AGAIN : CURLE_RECV_ERROR; + *curlcode = ((ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ) +#ifdef TLS13_SUPPORT + || (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) +#endif + ) ? CURLE_AGAIN : CURLE_RECV_ERROR; return -1; } @@ -1002,12 +1221,6 @@ static ssize_t mbed_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, return len; } -static void mbedtls_session_free(void *ptr) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ptr); - free(ptr); -} - static size_t mbedtls_version(char *buffer, size_t size) { #ifdef MBEDTLS_VERSION_C @@ -1202,11 +1415,19 @@ static CURLcode mbedtls_connect(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, */ static int mbedtls_init(void) { - return Curl_mbedtlsthreadlock_thread_setup(); + if(!Curl_mbedtlsthreadlock_thread_setup()) + return 0; +#ifdef THREADING_SUPPORT + entropy_init_mutex(&ts_entropy); +#endif + return 1; } static void mbedtls_cleanup(void) { +#ifdef THREADING_SUPPORT + entropy_cleanup_mutex(&ts_entropy); +#endif (void)Curl_mbedtlsthreadlock_thread_cleanup(); } @@ -1278,7 +1499,6 @@ const struct Curl_ssl Curl_ssl_mbedtls = { mbedtls_get_internals, /* get_internals */ mbedtls_close, /* close_one */ mbedtls_close_all, /* close_all */ - mbedtls_session_free, /* session_free */ Curl_none_set_engine, /* set_engine */ Curl_none_set_engine_default, /* set_engine_default */ Curl_none_engines_list, /* engines_list */ @@ -1291,4 +1511,4 @@ const struct Curl_ssl Curl_ssl_mbedtls = { mbed_send, /* send data to encrypt */ }; -#endif /* USE_MBEDTLS */ +#endif /* USE_MBEDTLS */ \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/mbedtls_threadlock.c b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/mbedtls_threadlock.c index 22b1b221e7..b96a904fcb 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/mbedtls_threadlock.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/mbedtls_threadlock.c @@ -26,12 +26,12 @@ #if defined(USE_MBEDTLS) && \ ((defined(USE_THREADS_POSIX) && defined(HAVE_PTHREAD_H)) || \ - defined(USE_THREADS_WIN32)) + defined(_WIN32)) #if defined(USE_THREADS_POSIX) && defined(HAVE_PTHREAD_H) # include # define MBEDTLS_MUTEX_T pthread_mutex_t -#elif defined(USE_THREADS_WIN32) +#elif defined(_WIN32) # define MBEDTLS_MUTEX_T HANDLE #endif @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ int Curl_mbedtlsthreadlock_thread_setup(void) #if defined(USE_THREADS_POSIX) && defined(HAVE_PTHREAD_H) if(pthread_mutex_init(&mutex_buf[i], NULL)) return 0; /* pthread_mutex_init failed */ -#elif defined(USE_THREADS_WIN32) +#elif defined(_WIN32) mutex_buf[i] = CreateMutex(0, FALSE, 0); if(mutex_buf[i] == 0) return 0; /* CreateMutex failed */ @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ int Curl_mbedtlsthreadlock_thread_cleanup(void) #if defined(USE_THREADS_POSIX) && defined(HAVE_PTHREAD_H) if(pthread_mutex_destroy(&mutex_buf[i])) return 0; /* pthread_mutex_destroy failed */ -#elif defined(USE_THREADS_WIN32) +#elif defined(_WIN32) if(!CloseHandle(mutex_buf[i])) return 0; /* CloseHandle failed */ #endif /* USE_THREADS_POSIX && HAVE_PTHREAD_H */ @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ int Curl_mbedtlsthreadlock_lock_function(int n) "Error: mbedtlsthreadlock_lock_function failed\n")); return 0; /* pthread_mutex_lock failed */ } -#elif defined(USE_THREADS_WIN32) +#elif defined(_WIN32) if(WaitForSingleObject(mutex_buf[n], INFINITE) == WAIT_FAILED) { DEBUGF(fprintf(stderr, "Error: mbedtlsthreadlock_lock_function failed\n")); @@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ int Curl_mbedtlsthreadlock_unlock_function(int n) "Error: mbedtlsthreadlock_unlock_function failed\n")); return 0; /* pthread_mutex_unlock failed */ } -#elif defined(USE_THREADS_WIN32) +#elif defined(_WIN32) if(!ReleaseMutex(mutex_buf[n])) { DEBUGF(fprintf(stderr, "Error: mbedtlsthreadlock_unlock_function failed\n")); diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/mbedtls_threadlock.h b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/mbedtls_threadlock.h index 2b0bd41c8b..484626852f 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/mbedtls_threadlock.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/mbedtls_threadlock.h @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ #ifdef USE_MBEDTLS #if (defined(USE_THREADS_POSIX) && defined(HAVE_PTHREAD_H)) || \ - defined(USE_THREADS_WIN32) + defined(_WIN32) int Curl_mbedtlsthreadlock_thread_setup(void); int Curl_mbedtlsthreadlock_thread_cleanup(void); @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ int Curl_mbedtlsthreadlock_unlock_function(int n); #define Curl_mbedtlsthreadlock_lock_function(x) 1 #define Curl_mbedtlsthreadlock_unlock_function(x) 1 -#endif /* USE_THREADS_POSIX || USE_THREADS_WIN32 */ +#endif /* (USE_THREADS_POSIX && HAVE_PTHREAD_H) || _WIN32 */ #endif /* USE_MBEDTLS */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/openssl.c b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/openssl.c index 8c8f43e836..298a488a09 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/openssl.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/openssl.c @@ -82,6 +82,17 @@ #include #include +#ifdef USE_ECH +# ifndef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL +# include +# endif +# include "curl_base64.h" +# define ECH_ENABLED(__data__) \ + (__data__->set.tls_ech && \ + !(__data__->set.tls_ech & CURLECH_DISABLE)\ + ) +#endif /* USE_ECH */ + #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) #include #endif @@ -193,12 +204,10 @@ * Whether SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback is available. * OpenSSL: supported since 1.1.1 https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2287 * BoringSSL: supported since d28f59c27bac (committed 2015-11-19) - * LibreSSL: supported since 3.5.0 (released 2022-02-24) + * LibreSSL: not supported. 3.5.0+ has a stub function that does nothing. */ #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && \ !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)) || \ - (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \ - LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x3050000fL) || \ defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) #define HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK #endif @@ -298,20 +307,6 @@ typedef unsigned long sslerr_t; #define USE_PRE_1_1_API (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L) #endif /* !LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER */ -struct ossl_ssl_backend_data { - /* these ones requires specific SSL-types */ - SSL_CTX* ctx; - SSL* handle; - X509* server_cert; - BIO_METHOD *bio_method; - CURLcode io_result; /* result of last BIO cfilter operation */ -#ifndef HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK - /* Set to true once a valid keylog entry has been created to avoid dupes. */ - bool keylog_done; -#endif - bool x509_store_setup; /* x509 store has been set up */ -}; - #if defined(HAVE_SSL_X509_STORE_SHARE) struct multi_ssl_backend_data { char *CAfile; /* CAfile path used to generate X509 store */ @@ -726,8 +721,7 @@ static int ossl_bio_cf_out_write(BIO *bio, const char *buf, int blen) { struct Curl_cfilter *cf = BIO_get_data(bio); struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx; - struct ossl_ssl_backend_data *backend = - (struct ossl_ssl_backend_data *)connssl->backend; + struct ossl_ctx *octx = (struct ossl_ctx *)connssl->backend; struct Curl_easy *data = CF_DATA_CURRENT(cf); ssize_t nwritten; CURLcode result = CURLE_SEND_ERROR; @@ -737,7 +731,7 @@ static int ossl_bio_cf_out_write(BIO *bio, const char *buf, int blen) CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "ossl_bio_cf_out_write(len=%d) -> %d, err=%d", blen, (int)nwritten, result); BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); - backend->io_result = result; + octx->io_result = result; if(nwritten < 0) { if(CURLE_AGAIN == result) BIO_set_retry_write(bio); @@ -749,8 +743,7 @@ static int ossl_bio_cf_in_read(BIO *bio, char *buf, int blen) { struct Curl_cfilter *cf = BIO_get_data(bio); struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx; - struct ossl_ssl_backend_data *backend = - (struct ossl_ssl_backend_data *)connssl->backend; + struct ossl_ctx *octx = (struct ossl_ctx *)connssl->backend; struct Curl_easy *data = CF_DATA_CURRENT(cf); ssize_t nread; CURLcode result = CURLE_RECV_ERROR; @@ -764,21 +757,24 @@ static int ossl_bio_cf_in_read(BIO *bio, char *buf, int blen) CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "ossl_bio_cf_in_read(len=%d) -> %d, err=%d", blen, (int)nread, result); BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); - backend->io_result = result; + octx->io_result = result; if(nread < 0) { if(CURLE_AGAIN == result) BIO_set_retry_read(bio); } + else if(nread == 0) { + connssl->peer_closed = TRUE; + } /* Before returning server replies to the SSL instance, we need * to have setup the x509 store or verification will fail. */ - if(!backend->x509_store_setup) { - result = Curl_ssl_setup_x509_store(cf, data, backend->ctx); + if(!octx->x509_store_setup) { + result = Curl_ssl_setup_x509_store(cf, data, octx->ssl_ctx); if(result) { - backend->io_result = result; + octx->io_result = result; return -1; } - backend->x509_store_setup = TRUE; + octx->x509_store_setup = TRUE; } return (int)nread; @@ -954,8 +950,9 @@ static char *ossl_strerror(unsigned long error, char *buf, size_t size) #endif if(!*buf) { - strncpy(buf, (error ? "Unknown error" : "No error"), size); - buf[size - 1] = '\0'; + const char *msg = error ? "Unknown error" : "No error"; + if(strlen(msg) < size) + strcpy(buf, msg); } return buf; @@ -1087,6 +1084,7 @@ static int ssl_ui_reader(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis) UI_set_result(ui, uis, password); return 1; } + FALLTHROUGH(); default: break; } @@ -1105,6 +1103,7 @@ static int ssl_ui_writer(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis) (UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD)) { return 1; } + FALLTHROUGH(); default: break; } @@ -1522,7 +1521,7 @@ int cert_stuff(struct Curl_easy *data, case SSL_FILETYPE_PEM: if(cert_done) break; - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1: cert_use_result = key_blob ? SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_blob(ctx, key_blob, file_type, key_passwd) : @@ -1752,7 +1751,7 @@ static int ossl_init(void) static void ossl_cleanup(void) { #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) && \ - !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) + (!defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) || LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x2070000fL) /* OpenSSL 1.1 deprecates all these cleanup functions and turns them into no-ops in OpenSSL 1.0 compatibility mode */ #else @@ -1877,28 +1876,52 @@ static struct curl_slist *ossl_engines_list(struct Curl_easy *data) static void ossl_close(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) { struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx; - struct ossl_ssl_backend_data *backend = - (struct ossl_ssl_backend_data *)connssl->backend; + struct ossl_ctx *octx = (struct ossl_ctx *)connssl->backend; (void)data; - DEBUGASSERT(backend); + DEBUGASSERT(octx); - if(backend->handle) { - if(cf->next && cf->next->connected) { + if(octx->ssl) { + /* Send the TLS shutdown if we are still connected *and* if + * the peer did not already close the connection. */ + if(cf->next && cf->next->connected && !connssl->peer_closed) { char buf[1024]; int nread, err; long sslerr; /* Maybe the server has already sent a close notify alert. Read it to avoid an RST on the TCP connection. */ - (void)SSL_read(backend->handle, buf, (int)sizeof(buf)); ERR_clear_error(); - if(SSL_shutdown(backend->handle) == 1) { + nread = SSL_read(octx->ssl, buf, (int)sizeof(buf)); + err = SSL_get_error(octx->ssl, nread); + if(!nread && err == SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN) { + CURLcode result; + ssize_t n; + size_t blen = sizeof(buf); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "peer has shutdown TLS"); + /* SSL_read() will not longer touch the socket, let's receive + * directly from the next filter to see if the underlying + * connection has also been closed. */ + n = Curl_conn_cf_recv(cf->next, data, buf, blen, &result); + if(!n) { + connssl->peer_closed = TRUE; + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "peer closed connection"); + } + } + ERR_clear_error(); + if(connssl->peer_closed) { + /* As the peer closed, we do not expect it to read anything more we + * may send. It may be harmful, leading to TCP RST and delaying + * a lingering close. Just leave. */ + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "not from sending TLS shutdown on " + "connection closed by peer"); + } + else if(SSL_shutdown(octx->ssl) == 1) { CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "SSL shutdown finished"); } else { - nread = SSL_read(backend->handle, buf, (int)sizeof(buf)); - err = SSL_get_error(backend->handle, nread); + nread = SSL_read(octx->ssl, buf, (int)sizeof(buf)); + err = SSL_get_error(octx->ssl, nread); switch(err) { case SSL_ERROR_NONE: /* this is not an error */ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: /* no more data */ @@ -1924,20 +1947,20 @@ static void ossl_close(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) } ERR_clear_error(); - SSL_set_connect_state(backend->handle); + SSL_set_connect_state(octx->ssl); } - SSL_free(backend->handle); - backend->handle = NULL; + SSL_free(octx->ssl); + octx->ssl = NULL; } - if(backend->ctx) { - SSL_CTX_free(backend->ctx); - backend->ctx = NULL; - backend->x509_store_setup = FALSE; + if(octx->ssl_ctx) { + SSL_CTX_free(octx->ssl_ctx); + octx->ssl_ctx = NULL; + octx->x509_store_setup = FALSE; } - if(backend->bio_method) { - ossl_bio_cf_method_free(backend->bio_method); - backend->bio_method = NULL; + if(octx->bio_method) { + ossl_bio_cf_method_free(octx->bio_method); + octx->bio_method = NULL; } } @@ -1957,11 +1980,10 @@ static int ossl_shutdown(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, int buffsize; int err; bool done = FALSE; - struct ossl_ssl_backend_data *backend = - (struct ossl_ssl_backend_data *)connssl->backend; + struct ossl_ctx *octx = (struct ossl_ctx *)connssl->backend; int loop = 10; - DEBUGASSERT(backend); + DEBUGASSERT(octx); #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_FTP /* This has only been tested on the proftpd server, and the mod_tls code @@ -1970,10 +1992,10 @@ static int ossl_shutdown(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, we do not send one. Let's hope other servers do the same... */ if(data->set.ftp_ccc == CURLFTPSSL_CCC_ACTIVE) - (void)SSL_shutdown(backend->handle); + (void)SSL_shutdown(octx->ssl); #endif - if(backend->handle) { + if(octx->ssl) { buffsize = (int)sizeof(buf); while(!done && loop--) { int what = SOCKET_READABLE(Curl_conn_cf_get_socket(cf, data), @@ -1983,8 +2005,8 @@ static int ossl_shutdown(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, /* Something to read, let's do it and hope that it is the close notify alert from the server */ - nread = SSL_read(backend->handle, buf, buffsize); - err = SSL_get_error(backend->handle, nread); + nread = SSL_read(octx->ssl, buf, buffsize); + err = SSL_get_error(octx->ssl, nread); switch(err) { case SSL_ERROR_NONE: /* this is not an error */ @@ -2029,7 +2051,7 @@ static int ossl_shutdown(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(data->set.verbose) { #ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET_SHUTDOWN - switch(SSL_get_shutdown(backend->handle)) { + switch(SSL_get_shutdown(octx->ssl)) { case SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN: infof(data, "SSL_get_shutdown() returned SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN"); break; @@ -2044,16 +2066,17 @@ static int ossl_shutdown(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, #endif } - SSL_free(backend->handle); - backend->handle = NULL; + SSL_free(octx->ssl); + octx->ssl = NULL; } return retval; } -static void ossl_session_free(void *ptr) +static void ossl_session_free(void *sessionid, size_t idsize) { /* free the ID */ - SSL_SESSION_free(ptr); + (void)idsize; + SSL_SESSION_free(sessionid); } /* @@ -2131,34 +2154,43 @@ CURLcode Curl_ossl_verifyhost(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, struct ssl_peer *peer, X509 *server_cert) { bool matched = FALSE; - int target = GEN_DNS; /* target type, GEN_DNS or GEN_IPADD */ + int target; /* target type, GEN_DNS or GEN_IPADD */ size_t addrlen = 0; STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *altnames; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 struct in6_addr addr; #else struct in_addr addr; #endif CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; bool dNSName = FALSE; /* if a dNSName field exists in the cert */ - bool iPAddress = FALSE; /* if a iPAddress field exists in the cert */ + bool iPAddress = FALSE; /* if an iPAddress field exists in the cert */ size_t hostlen; (void)conn; hostlen = strlen(peer->hostname); - if(peer->is_ip_address) { -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 - if(conn->bits.ipv6_ip && - Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, peer->hostname, &addr)) { - target = GEN_IPADD; - addrlen = sizeof(struct in6_addr); - } - else + switch(peer->type) { + case CURL_SSL_PEER_IPV4: + if(!Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, peer->hostname, &addr)) + return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; + target = GEN_IPADD; + addrlen = sizeof(struct in_addr); + break; +#ifdef USE_IPV6 + case CURL_SSL_PEER_IPV6: + if(!Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, peer->hostname, &addr)) + return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; + target = GEN_IPADD; + addrlen = sizeof(struct in6_addr); + break; #endif - if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, peer->hostname, &addr)) { - target = GEN_IPADD; - addrlen = sizeof(struct in_addr); - } + case CURL_SSL_PEER_DNS: + target = GEN_DNS; + break; + default: + DEBUGASSERT(0); + failf(data, "unexpected ssl peer type: %d", peer->type); + return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; } /* get a "list" of alternative names */ @@ -2239,9 +2271,12 @@ CURLcode Curl_ossl_verifyhost(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, /* an alternative name matched */ ; else if(dNSName || iPAddress) { - infof(data, " subjectAltName does not match %s", peer->dispname); + const char *tname = (peer->type == CURL_SSL_PEER_DNS) ? "host name" : + (peer->type == CURL_SSL_PEER_IPV4) ? + "ipv4 address" : "ipv6 address"; + infof(data, " subjectAltName does not match %s %s", tname, peer->dispname); failf(data, "SSL: no alternative certificate subject name matches " - "target host name '%s'", peer->dispname); + "target %s '%s'", tname, peer->dispname); result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; } else { @@ -2338,8 +2373,7 @@ static CURLcode verifystatus(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, OCSP_BASICRESP *br = NULL; X509_STORE *st = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *ch = NULL; - struct ossl_ssl_backend_data *backend = - (struct ossl_ssl_backend_data *)connssl->backend; + struct ossl_ctx *octx = (struct ossl_ctx *)connssl->backend; X509 *cert; OCSP_CERTID *id = NULL; int cert_status, crl_reason; @@ -2347,9 +2381,9 @@ static CURLcode verifystatus(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, int ret; long len; - DEBUGASSERT(backend); + DEBUGASSERT(octx); - len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(backend->handle, &status); + len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(octx->ssl, &status); if(!status) { failf(data, "No OCSP response received"); @@ -2379,13 +2413,13 @@ static CURLcode verifystatus(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, goto end; } - ch = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(backend->handle); + ch = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(octx->ssl); if(!ch) { failf(data, "Could not get peer certificate chain"); result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS; goto end; } - st = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(backend->ctx); + st = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(octx->ssl_ctx); #if ((OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= 0x1000201fL) /* Fixed after 1.0.2a */ || \ (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \ @@ -2422,7 +2456,7 @@ static CURLcode verifystatus(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, } /* Compute the certificate's ID */ - cert = SSL_get1_peer_certificate(backend->handle); + cert = SSL_get1_peer_certificate(octx->ssl); if(!cert) { failf(data, "Error getting peer certificate"); result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS; @@ -2837,10 +2871,9 @@ ossl_set_ssl_version_min_max_legacy(ctx_option_t *ctx_options, #ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION { struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx; - struct ossl_ssl_backend_data *backend = - (struct ossl_ssl_backend_data *)connssl->backend; - DEBUGASSERT(backend); - SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(backend->ctx, TLS1_3_VERSION); + struct ossl_ctx *octx = (struct ossl_ctx *)connssl->backend; + DEBUGASSERT(octx); + SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(octx->ssl_ctx, TLS1_3_VERSION); *ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2; } #else @@ -2848,7 +2881,7 @@ ossl_set_ssl_version_min_max_legacy(ctx_option_t *ctx_options, failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " was built without TLS 1.3 support"); return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN; #endif - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2: #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL *ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1; @@ -2856,7 +2889,7 @@ ossl_set_ssl_version_min_max_legacy(ctx_option_t *ctx_options, failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " was built without TLS 1.2 support"); return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN; #endif - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1: #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL *ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1; @@ -2864,7 +2897,7 @@ ossl_set_ssl_version_min_max_legacy(ctx_option_t *ctx_options, failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " was built without TLS 1.1 support"); return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN; #endif - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0: case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1: break; @@ -2875,12 +2908,12 @@ ossl_set_ssl_version_min_max_legacy(ctx_option_t *ctx_options, #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL *ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1; #endif - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_1: #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL *ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2; #endif - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_2: #ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION *ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3; @@ -2898,61 +2931,64 @@ ossl_set_ssl_version_min_max_legacy(ctx_option_t *ctx_options, } #endif -/* The "new session" callback must return zero if the session can be removed - * or non-zero if the session has been put into the session cache. - */ -static int ossl_new_session_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *ssl_sessionid) +CURLcode Curl_ossl_add_session(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + const struct ssl_peer *peer, + SSL_SESSION *session) { - int res = 0; - struct Curl_easy *data; - struct Curl_cfilter *cf; const struct ssl_config_data *config; - struct ssl_connect_data *connssl; bool isproxy; + bool added = FALSE; - cf = (struct Curl_cfilter*) SSL_get_app_data(ssl); - connssl = cf? cf->ctx : NULL; - data = connssl? CF_DATA_CURRENT(cf) : NULL; - /* The sockindex has been stored as a pointer to an array element */ if(!cf || !data) - return 0; + goto out; isproxy = Curl_ssl_cf_is_proxy(cf); config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_config(cf, data); if(config->primary.sessionid) { bool incache; - bool added = FALSE; - void *old_ssl_sessionid = NULL; + void *old_session = NULL; Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data); if(isproxy) incache = FALSE; else - incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(cf, data, &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL)); - if(incache) { - if(old_ssl_sessionid != ssl_sessionid) { - infof(data, "old SSL session ID is stale, removing"); - Curl_ssl_delsessionid(data, old_ssl_sessionid); - incache = FALSE; - } + incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(cf, data, peer, + &old_session, NULL)); + if(incache && (old_session != session)) { + infof(data, "old SSL session ID is stale, removing"); + Curl_ssl_delsessionid(data, old_session); + incache = FALSE; } if(!incache) { - if(!Curl_ssl_addsessionid(cf, data, ssl_sessionid, - 0 /* unknown size */, &added)) { - if(added) { - /* the session has been put into the session cache */ - res = 1; - } - } - else - failf(data, "failed to store ssl session"); + added = TRUE; + Curl_ssl_addsessionid(cf, data, peer, session, 0, ossl_session_free); } Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data); } - return res; +out: + if(!added) + ossl_session_free(session, 0); + return CURLE_OK; +} + +/* The "new session" callback must return zero if the session can be removed + * or non-zero if the session has been put into the session cache. + */ +static int ossl_new_session_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *ssl_sessionid) +{ + struct Curl_cfilter *cf; + struct Curl_easy *data; + struct ssl_connect_data *connssl; + + cf = (struct Curl_cfilter*) SSL_get_app_data(ssl); + connssl = cf? cf->ctx : NULL; + data = connssl? CF_DATA_CURRENT(cf) : NULL; + Curl_ossl_add_session(cf, data, &connssl->peer, ssl_sessionid); + return 1; } static CURLcode load_cacert_from_memory(X509_STORE *store, @@ -3174,6 +3210,8 @@ static CURLcode populate_x509_store(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, bool imported_native_ca = false; bool imported_ca_info_blob = false; + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "populate_x509_store, path=%s, blob=%d", + ssl_cafile? ssl_cafile : "none", !!ca_info_blob); if(!store) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; @@ -3345,7 +3383,7 @@ static bool cached_x509_store_different( static X509_STORE *get_cached_x509_store(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, const struct Curl_easy *data) { - struct Curl_multi *multi = data->multi_easy ? data->multi_easy : data->multi; + struct Curl_multi *multi = data->multi; X509_STORE *store = NULL; DEBUGASSERT(multi); @@ -3365,7 +3403,7 @@ static void set_cached_x509_store(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, X509_STORE *store) { struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf); - struct Curl_multi *multi = data->multi_easy ? data->multi_easy : data->multi; + struct Curl_multi *multi = data->multi; struct multi_ssl_backend_data *mbackend; DEBUGASSERT(multi); @@ -3448,29 +3486,33 @@ CURLcode Curl_ssl_setup_x509_store(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, } #endif /* HAVE_SSL_X509_STORE_SHARE */ -static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, - struct Curl_easy *data) +CURLcode Curl_ossl_ctx_init(struct ossl_ctx *octx, + struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + struct ssl_peer *peer, + int transport, /* TCP or QUIC */ + const unsigned char *alpn, size_t alpn_len, + Curl_ossl_ctx_setup_cb *cb_setup, + void *cb_user_data, + Curl_ossl_new_session_cb *cb_new_session, + void *ssl_user_data) { CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; - char *ciphers; + const char *ciphers; SSL_METHOD_QUAL SSL_METHOD *req_method = NULL; - struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx; ctx_option_t ctx_options = 0; void *ssl_sessionid = NULL; struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf); struct ssl_config_data *ssl_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_config(cf, data); - BIO *bio; const long int ssl_version = conn_config->version; char * const ssl_cert = ssl_config->primary.clientcert; const struct curl_blob *ssl_cert_blob = ssl_config->primary.cert_blob; const char * const ssl_cert_type = ssl_config->cert_type; const bool verifypeer = conn_config->verifypeer; char error_buffer[256]; - struct ossl_ssl_backend_data *backend = - (struct ossl_ssl_backend_data *)connssl->backend; - - DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_1 == connssl->connecting_state); - DEBUGASSERT(backend); +#ifdef USE_ECH + struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx; +#endif /* Make funny stuff to get random input */ result = ossl_seed(data); @@ -3479,56 +3521,74 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, ssl_config->certverifyresult = !X509_V_OK; - /* check to see if we've been told to use an explicit SSL/TLS version */ - - switch(ssl_version) { - case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT: - case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1: - case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0: - case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1: - case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2: - case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_3: - /* it will be handled later with the context options */ -#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) - req_method = TLS_client_method(); + switch(transport) { + case TRNSPRT_TCP: + /* check to see if we've been told to use an explicit SSL/TLS version */ + switch(ssl_version) { + case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT: + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1: + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0: + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1: + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2: + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_3: + /* it will be handled later with the context options */ + #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) + req_method = TLS_client_method(); + #else + req_method = SSLv23_client_method(); + #endif + break; + case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2: + failf(data, "No SSLv2 support"); + return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN; + case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3: + failf(data, "No SSLv3 support"); + return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN; + default: + failf(data, "Unrecognized parameter passed via CURLOPT_SSLVERSION"); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + break; + case TRNSPRT_QUIC: + if((ssl_version != CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT) && + (ssl_version < CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_3)) { + failf(data, "QUIC needs at least TLS version 1.3"); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } +#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_QUIC + req_method = OSSL_QUIC_client_method(); +#elif (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) + req_method = TLS_method(); #else req_method = SSLv23_client_method(); #endif break; - case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2: - failf(data, "No SSLv2 support"); - return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN; - case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3: - failf(data, "No SSLv3 support"); - return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN; default: - failf(data, "Unrecognized parameter passed via CURLOPT_SSLVERSION"); + failf(data, "unsupported transport %d in SSL init", transport); return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; } - if(backend->ctx) { - /* This happens when an error was encountered before in this - * step and we are called to do it again. Get rid of any leftover - * from the previous call. */ - ossl_close(cf, data); - } - backend->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(req_method); - if(!backend->ctx) { + DEBUGASSERT(!octx->ssl_ctx); + octx->ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(req_method); + + if(!octx->ssl_ctx) { failf(data, "SSL: couldn't create a context: %s", ossl_strerror(ERR_peek_error(), error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer))); return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; } -#ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS - SSL_CTX_set_mode(backend->ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS); -#endif + if(cb_setup) { + result = cb_setup(cf, data, cb_user_data); + if(result) + return result; + } #ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK if(data->set.fdebug && data->set.verbose) { /* the SSL trace callback is only used for verbose logging */ - SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(backend->ctx, ossl_trace); - SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(backend->ctx, cf); + SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(octx->ssl_ctx, ossl_trace); + SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(octx->ssl_ctx, cf); } #endif @@ -3608,7 +3668,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3; #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) /* 1.1.0 */ - result = ossl_set_ssl_version_min_max(cf, backend->ctx); + result = ossl_set_ssl_version_min_max(cf, octx->ssl_ctx); #else result = ossl_set_ssl_version_min_max_legacy(&ctx_options, cf, data); #endif @@ -3621,26 +3681,20 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; } - SSL_CTX_set_options(backend->ctx, ctx_options); + SSL_CTX_set_options(octx->ssl_ctx, ctx_options); #ifdef HAS_ALPN - if(connssl->alpn) { - struct alpn_proto_buf proto; - - result = Curl_alpn_to_proto_buf(&proto, connssl->alpn); - if(result || - SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(backend->ctx, proto.data, proto.len)) { + if(alpn && alpn_len) { + if(SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(octx->ssl_ctx, alpn, (int)alpn_len)) { failf(data, "Error setting ALPN"); return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; } - Curl_alpn_to_proto_str(&proto, connssl->alpn); - infof(data, VTLS_INFOF_ALPN_OFFER_1STR, proto.data); } #endif if(ssl_cert || ssl_cert_blob || ssl_cert_type) { if(!result && - !cert_stuff(data, backend->ctx, + !cert_stuff(data, octx->ssl_ctx, ssl_cert, ssl_cert_blob, ssl_cert_type, ssl_config->key, ssl_config->key_blob, ssl_config->key_type, ssl_config->key_passwd)) @@ -3651,10 +3705,10 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, } ciphers = conn_config->cipher_list; - if(!ciphers) - ciphers = (char *)DEFAULT_CIPHER_SELECTION; + if(!ciphers && (peer->transport != TRNSPRT_QUIC)) + ciphers = DEFAULT_CIPHER_SELECTION; if(ciphers) { - if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(backend->ctx, ciphers)) { + if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(octx->ssl_ctx, ciphers)) { failf(data, "failed setting cipher list: %s", ciphers); return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER; } @@ -3663,9 +3717,9 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, #ifdef HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHERSUITES { - char *ciphers13 = conn_config->cipher_list13; + const char *ciphers13 = conn_config->cipher_list13; if(ciphers13) { - if(!SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(backend->ctx, ciphers13)) { + if(!SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(octx->ssl_ctx, ciphers13)) { failf(data, "failed setting TLS 1.3 cipher suite: %s", ciphers13); return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER; } @@ -3676,14 +3730,14 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, #ifdef HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH /* OpenSSL 1.1.1 requires clients to opt-in for PHA */ - SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth(backend->ctx, 1); + SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth(octx->ssl_ctx, 1); #endif #ifdef HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_EC_CURVES { - char *curves = conn_config->curves; + const char *curves = conn_config->curves; if(curves) { - if(!SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list(backend->ctx, curves)) { + if(!SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list(octx->ssl_ctx, curves)) { failf(data, "failed setting curves list: '%s'", curves); return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER; } @@ -3697,18 +3751,18 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, char * const ssl_password = ssl_config->primary.password; infof(data, "Using TLS-SRP username: %s", ssl_username); - if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(backend->ctx, ssl_username)) { + if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(octx->ssl_ctx, ssl_username)) { failf(data, "Unable to set SRP user name"); return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; } - if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(backend->ctx, ssl_password)) { + if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(octx->ssl_ctx, ssl_password)) { failf(data, "failed setting SRP password"); return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; } if(!conn_config->cipher_list) { infof(data, "Setting cipher list SRP"); - if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(backend->ctx, "SRP")) { + if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(octx->ssl_ctx, "SRP")) { failf(data, "failed setting SRP cipher list"); return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER; } @@ -3720,38 +3774,40 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, * fail to connect if the verification fails, or if it should continue * anyway. In the latter case the result of the verification is checked with * SSL_get_verify_result() below. */ - SSL_CTX_set_verify(backend->ctx, + SSL_CTX_set_verify(octx->ssl_ctx, verifypeer ? SSL_VERIFY_PEER : SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL); /* Enable logging of secrets to the file specified in env SSLKEYLOGFILE. */ #ifdef HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK if(Curl_tls_keylog_enabled()) { - SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(backend->ctx, ossl_keylog_callback); + SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(octx->ssl_ctx, ossl_keylog_callback); } #endif - /* Enable the session cache because it's a prerequisite for the "new session" - * callback. Use the "external storage" mode to prevent OpenSSL from creating - * an internal session cache. - */ - SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(backend->ctx, - SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT | - SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL); - SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(backend->ctx, ossl_new_session_cb); + if(cb_new_session) { + /* Enable the session cache because it's a prerequisite for the + * "new session" callback. Use the "external storage" mode to prevent + * OpenSSL from creating an internal session cache. + */ + SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(octx->ssl_ctx, + SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT | + SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL); + SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(octx->ssl_ctx, cb_new_session); + } /* give application a chance to interfere with SSL set up. */ if(data->set.ssl.fsslctx) { /* When a user callback is installed to modify the SSL_CTX, * we need to do the full initialization before calling it. * See: #11800 */ - if(!backend->x509_store_setup) { - result = Curl_ssl_setup_x509_store(cf, data, backend->ctx); + if(!octx->x509_store_setup) { + result = Curl_ssl_setup_x509_store(cf, data, octx->ssl_ctx); if(result) return result; - backend->x509_store_setup = TRUE; + octx->x509_store_setup = TRUE; } Curl_set_in_callback(data, true); - result = (*data->set.ssl.fsslctx)(data, backend->ctx, + result = (*data->set.ssl.fsslctx)(data, octx->ssl_ctx, data->set.ssl.fsslctxp); Curl_set_in_callback(data, false); if(result) { @@ -3761,47 +3817,174 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, } /* Let's make an SSL structure */ - if(backend->handle) - SSL_free(backend->handle); - backend->handle = SSL_new(backend->ctx); - if(!backend->handle) { + if(octx->ssl) + SSL_free(octx->ssl); + octx->ssl = SSL_new(octx->ssl_ctx); + if(!octx->ssl) { failf(data, "SSL: couldn't create a context (handle)"); return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; } - SSL_set_app_data(backend->handle, cf); + SSL_set_app_data(octx->ssl, ssl_user_data); #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && \ !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) if(conn_config->verifystatus) - SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(backend->handle, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp); + SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(octx->ssl, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp); #endif #if (defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) || defined(OPENSSL_IS_AWSLC)) && \ defined(ALLOW_RENEG) - SSL_set_renegotiate_mode(backend->handle, ssl_renegotiate_freely); + SSL_set_renegotiate_mode(octx->ssl, ssl_renegotiate_freely); #endif - SSL_set_connect_state(backend->handle); + SSL_set_connect_state(octx->ssl); - backend->server_cert = 0x0; + octx->server_cert = 0x0; #ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME - if(connssl->peer.sni) { - if(!SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(backend->handle, connssl->peer.sni)) { + if(peer->sni) { + if(!SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(octx->ssl, peer->sni)) { failf(data, "Failed set SNI"); return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; } } -#endif - SSL_set_app_data(backend->handle, cf); +#ifdef USE_ECH + if(ECH_ENABLED(data)) { + unsigned char *ech_config = NULL; + size_t ech_config_len = 0; + char *outername = data->set.str[STRING_ECH_PUBLIC]; + int trying_ech_now = 0; + + if(data->set.tls_ech & CURLECH_GREASE) { + infof(data, "ECH: will GREASE ClientHello"); +# ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL + SSL_set_enable_ech_grease(octx->ssl, 1); +# else + SSL_set_options(octx->ssl, SSL_OP_ECH_GREASE); +# endif + } + else if(data->set.tls_ech & CURLECH_CLA_CFG) { +# ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL + /* have to do base64 decode here for boring */ + const char *b64 = data->set.str[STRING_ECH_CONFIG]; - connssl->reused_session = FALSE; - if(ssl_config->primary.sessionid) { + if(!b64) { + infof(data, "ECH: ECHConfig from command line empty"); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + ech_config_len = 2 * strlen(b64); + result = Curl_base64_decode(b64, &ech_config, &ech_config_len); + if(result || !ech_config) { + infof(data, "ECH: can't base64 decode ECHConfig from command line"); + if(data->set.tls_ech & CURLECH_HARD) + return result; + } + if(SSL_set1_ech_config_list(octx->ssl, ech_config, + ech_config_len) != 1) { + infof(data, "ECH: SSL_ECH_set1_echconfig failed"); + if(data->set.tls_ech & CURLECH_HARD) { + free(ech_config); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + } + free(ech_config); + trying_ech_now = 1; +# else + ech_config = (unsigned char *) data->set.str[STRING_ECH_CONFIG]; + if(!ech_config) { + infof(data, "ECH: ECHConfig from command line empty"); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + ech_config_len = strlen(data->set.str[STRING_ECH_CONFIG]); + if(SSL_ech_set1_echconfig(octx->ssl, ech_config, ech_config_len) != 1) { + infof(data, "ECH: SSL_ECH_set1_echconfig failed"); + if(data->set.tls_ech & CURLECH_HARD) + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + else + trying_ech_now = 1; +# endif + infof(data, "ECH: ECHConfig from command line"); + } + else { + struct Curl_dns_entry *dns = NULL; + + dns = Curl_fetch_addr(data, connssl->peer.hostname, connssl->peer.port); + if(!dns) { + infof(data, "ECH: requested but no DNS info available"); + if(data->set.tls_ech & CURLECH_HARD) + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + else { + struct Curl_https_rrinfo *rinfo = NULL; + + rinfo = dns->hinfo; + if(rinfo && rinfo->echconfiglist) { + unsigned char *ecl = rinfo->echconfiglist; + size_t elen = rinfo->echconfiglist_len; + + infof(data, "ECH: ECHConfig from DoH HTTPS RR"); +# ifndef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL + if(SSL_ech_set1_echconfig(octx->ssl, ecl, elen) != 1) { + infof(data, "ECH: SSL_ECH_set1_echconfig failed"); + if(data->set.tls_ech & CURLECH_HARD) + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } +# else + if(SSL_set1_ech_config_list(octx->ssl, ecl, elen) != 1) { + infof(data, "ECH: SSL_set1_ech_config_list failed (boring)"); + if(data->set.tls_ech & CURLECH_HARD) + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } +# endif + else { + trying_ech_now = 1; + infof(data, "ECH: imported ECHConfigList of length %ld", elen); + } + } + else { + infof(data, "ECH: requested but no ECHConfig available"); + if(data->set.tls_ech & CURLECH_HARD) + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + Curl_resolv_unlock(data, dns); + } + } +# ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL + if(trying_ech_now && outername) { + infof(data, "ECH: setting public_name not supported with boringssl"); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } +# else + if(trying_ech_now && outername) { + infof(data, "ECH: inner: '%s', outer: '%s'", + connssl->peer.hostname, outername); + result = SSL_ech_set_server_names(octx->ssl, + connssl->peer.hostname, outername, + 0 /* do send outer */); + if(result != 1) { + infof(data, "ECH: rv failed to set server name(s) %d [ERROR]", result); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + } +# endif /* not BORING */ + if(trying_ech_now + && SSL_set_min_proto_version(octx->ssl, TLS1_3_VERSION) != 1) { + infof(data, "ECH: Can't force TLSv1.3 [ERROR]"); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + } +#endif /* USE_ECH */ + +#endif + + octx->reused_session = FALSE; + if(ssl_config->primary.sessionid && transport == TRNSPRT_TCP) { Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data); - if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(cf, data, &ssl_sessionid, NULL)) { + if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(cf, data, peer, &ssl_sessionid, NULL)) { /* we got a session id, use it! */ - if(!SSL_set_session(backend->handle, ssl_sessionid)) { + if(!SSL_set_session(octx->ssl, ssl_sessionid)) { Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data); failf(data, "SSL: SSL_set_session failed: %s", ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer, @@ -3810,15 +3993,46 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, } /* Informational message */ infof(data, "SSL reusing session ID"); - connssl->reused_session = TRUE; + octx->reused_session = TRUE; } Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data); } - backend->bio_method = ossl_bio_cf_method_create(); - if(!backend->bio_method) + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx; + struct ossl_ctx *octx = (struct ossl_ctx *)connssl->backend; + struct alpn_proto_buf proto; + BIO *bio; + CURLcode result; + + DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_1 == connssl->connecting_state); + DEBUGASSERT(octx); + memset(&proto, 0, sizeof(proto)); +#ifdef HAS_ALPN + if(connssl->alpn) { + result = Curl_alpn_to_proto_buf(&proto, connssl->alpn); + if(result) { + failf(data, "Error determining ALPN"); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + } +#endif + + result = Curl_ossl_ctx_init(octx, cf, data, &connssl->peer, TRNSPRT_TCP, + proto.data, proto.len, NULL, NULL, + ossl_new_session_cb, cf); + if(result) + return result; + + octx->bio_method = ossl_bio_cf_method_create(); + if(!octx->bio_method) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - bio = BIO_new(backend->bio_method); + bio = BIO_new(octx->bio_method); if(!bio) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; @@ -3830,40 +4044,109 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, * We check on the function in configure, since libressl and friends * each have their own versions to add support for this. */ BIO_up_ref(bio); - SSL_set0_rbio(backend->handle, bio); - SSL_set0_wbio(backend->handle, bio); + SSL_set0_rbio(octx->ssl, bio); + SSL_set0_wbio(octx->ssl, bio); #else - SSL_set_bio(backend->handle, bio, bio); + SSL_set_bio(octx->ssl, bio, bio); #endif - connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2; +#ifdef HAS_ALPN + if(connssl->alpn) { + Curl_alpn_to_proto_str(&proto, connssl->alpn); + infof(data, VTLS_INFOF_ALPN_OFFER_1STR, proto.data); + } +#endif + connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2; return CURLE_OK; } +#ifdef USE_ECH +/* If we have retry configs, then trace those out */ +static void ossl_trace_ech_retry_configs(struct Curl_easy *data, SSL* ssl, + int reason) +{ + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + size_t rcl = 0; + int rv = 1; +# ifndef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL + char *inner = NULL; + unsigned char *rcs = NULL; + char *outer = NULL; +# else + const char *inner = NULL; + const uint8_t *rcs = NULL; + const char *outer = NULL; + size_t out_name_len = 0; + int servername_type = 0; +# endif + + /* nothing to trace if not doing ECH */ + if(!ECH_ENABLED(data)) + return; +# ifndef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL + rv = SSL_ech_get_retry_config(ssl, &rcs, &rcl); +# else + SSL_get0_ech_retry_configs(ssl, &rcs, &rcl); + rv = (int)rcl; +# endif + + if(rv && rcs) { +# define HEXSTR_MAX 800 + char *b64str = NULL; + size_t blen = 0; + + result = Curl_base64_encode((const char *)rcs, rcl, + &b64str, &blen); + if(!result && b64str) + infof(data, "ECH: retry_configs %s", b64str); + free(b64str); +# ifndef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL + rv = SSL_ech_get_status(ssl, &inner, &outer); + infof(data, "ECH: retry_configs for %s from %s, %d %d", + inner ? inner : "NULL", outer ? outer : "NULL", reason, rv); +#else + rv = SSL_ech_accepted(ssl); + servername_type = SSL_get_servername_type(ssl); + inner = SSL_get_servername(ssl, servername_type); + SSL_get0_ech_name_override(ssl, &outer, &out_name_len); + /* TODO: get the inner from boring */ + infof(data, "ECH: retry_configs for %s from %s, %d %d", + inner ? inner : "NULL", outer ? outer : "NULL", reason, rv); +#endif + } + else + infof(data, "ECH: no retry_configs (rv = %d)", rv); +# ifndef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL + OPENSSL_free((void *)rcs); +# endif + return; +} + +#endif + static CURLcode ossl_connect_step2(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) { int err; struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx; - struct ossl_ssl_backend_data *backend = - (struct ossl_ssl_backend_data *)connssl->backend; + struct ossl_ctx *octx = (struct ossl_ctx *)connssl->backend; struct ssl_config_data *ssl_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_config(cf, data); DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state || ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state || ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state); - DEBUGASSERT(backend); + DEBUGASSERT(octx); ERR_clear_error(); - err = SSL_connect(backend->handle); + err = SSL_connect(octx->ssl); - if(!backend->x509_store_setup) { + if(!octx->x509_store_setup) { /* After having send off the ClientHello, we prepare the x509 * store to verify the coming certificate from the server */ - CURLcode result = Curl_ssl_setup_x509_store(cf, data, backend->ctx); + CURLcode result = Curl_ssl_setup_x509_store(cf, data, octx->ssl_ctx); if(result) return result; - backend->x509_store_setup = TRUE; + octx->x509_store_setup = TRUE; } #ifndef HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK @@ -3871,7 +4154,9 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step2(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, /* If key logging is enabled, wait for the handshake to complete and then * proceed with logging secrets (for TLS 1.2 or older). */ - ossl_log_tls12_secret(backend->handle, &backend->keylog_done); + bool done = FALSE; + ossl_log_tls12_secret(octx->ssl, &done); + octx->keylog_done = done; } #endif @@ -3879,7 +4164,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step2(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, 0 is "not successful but was shut down controlled" <0 is "handshake was not successful, because a fatal error occurred" */ if(1 != err) { - int detail = SSL_get_error(backend->handle, err); + int detail = SSL_get_error(octx->ssl, err); if(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ == detail) { connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_reading; @@ -3901,7 +4186,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step2(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, return CURLE_OK; } #endif - if(backend->io_result == CURLE_AGAIN) { + if(octx->io_result == CURLE_AGAIN) { return CURLE_OK; } else { @@ -3929,7 +4214,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step2(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, (reason == SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED))) { result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; - lerr = SSL_get_verify_result(backend->handle); + lerr = SSL_get_verify_result(octx->ssl); if(lerr != X509_V_OK) { ssl_config->certverifyresult = lerr; msnprintf(error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer), @@ -3951,6 +4236,21 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step2(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, result = CURLE_SSL_CLIENTCERT; ossl_strerror(errdetail, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)); } +#endif +#ifdef USE_ECH + else if((lib == ERR_LIB_SSL) && +# ifndef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL + (reason == SSL_R_ECH_REQUIRED)) { +# else + (reason == SSL_R_ECH_REJECTED)) { +# endif + + /* trace retry_configs if we got some */ + ossl_trace_ech_retry_configs(data, octx->ssl, reason); + + result = CURLE_ECH_REQUIRED; + ossl_strerror(errdetail, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)); + } #endif else { result = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; @@ -3971,7 +4271,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step2(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, Curl_strerror(sockerr, extramsg, sizeof(extramsg)); failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_connect: %s in connection to %s:%d ", extramsg[0] ? extramsg : SSL_ERROR_to_str(detail), - connssl->peer.hostname, connssl->port); + connssl->peer.hostname, connssl->peer.port); return result; } @@ -3989,22 +4289,84 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step2(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_3; #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L) - SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(backend->handle, &psigtype_nid); + SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(octx->ssl, &psigtype_nid); #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30200000L) - negotiated_group_name = SSL_get0_group_name(backend->handle); + negotiated_group_name = SSL_get0_group_name(octx->ssl); #else negotiated_group_name = - OBJ_nid2sn(SSL_get_negotiated_group(backend->handle) & 0x0000FFFF); + OBJ_nid2sn(SSL_get_negotiated_group(octx->ssl) & 0x0000FFFF); #endif #endif /* Informational message */ infof(data, "SSL connection using %s / %s / %s / %s", - SSL_get_version(backend->handle), - SSL_get_cipher(backend->handle), + SSL_get_version(octx->ssl), + SSL_get_cipher(octx->ssl), negotiated_group_name? negotiated_group_name : "[blank]", OBJ_nid2sn(psigtype_nid)); +#ifdef USE_ECH +# ifndef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL + if(ECH_ENABLED(data)) { + char *inner = NULL, *outer = NULL; + const char *status = NULL; + int rv; + + rv = SSL_ech_get_status(octx->ssl, &inner, &outer); + switch(rv) { + case SSL_ECH_STATUS_SUCCESS: + status = "succeeded"; + break; + case SSL_ECH_STATUS_GREASE_ECH: + status = "sent GREASE, got retry-configs"; + break; + case SSL_ECH_STATUS_GREASE: + status = "sent GREASE"; + break; + case SSL_ECH_STATUS_NOT_TRIED: + status = "not attempted"; + break; + case SSL_ECH_STATUS_NOT_CONFIGURED: + status = "not configured"; + break; + case SSL_ECH_STATUS_BACKEND: + status = "backend (unexpected)"; + break; + case SSL_ECH_STATUS_FAILED: + status = "failed"; + break; + case SSL_ECH_STATUS_BAD_CALL: + status = "bad call (unexpected)"; + break; + case SSL_ECH_STATUS_BAD_NAME: + status = "bad name (unexpected)"; + break; + default: + status = "unexpected status"; + infof(data, "ECH: unexpected status %d",rv); + } + infof(data, "ECH: result: status is %s, inner is %s, outer is %s", + (status?status:"NULL"), + (inner?inner:"NULL"), + (outer?outer:"NULL")); + OPENSSL_free(inner); + OPENSSL_free(outer); + if(rv == SSL_ECH_STATUS_GREASE_ECH) { + /* trace retry_configs if we got some */ + ossl_trace_ech_retry_configs(data, octx->ssl, 0); + } + if(rv != SSL_ECH_STATUS_SUCCESS + && data->set.tls_ech & CURLECH_HARD) { + infof(data, "ECH: ech-hard failed"); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + } + else { + infof(data, "ECH: result: status is not attempted"); + } +# endif /* BORING */ +#endif /* USE_ECH */ + #ifdef HAS_ALPN /* Sets data and len to negotiated protocol, len is 0 if no protocol was * negotiated @@ -4012,7 +4374,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step2(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(connssl->alpn) { const unsigned char *neg_protocol; unsigned int len; - SSL_get0_alpn_selected(backend->handle, &neg_protocol, &len); + SSL_get0_alpn_selected(octx->ssl, &neg_protocol, &len); return Curl_alpn_set_negotiated(cf, data, neg_protocol, len); } @@ -4149,20 +4511,12 @@ static void infof_certstack(struct Curl_easy *data, const SSL *ssl) #define infof_certstack(data, ssl) #endif -/* - * Get the server cert, verify it and show it, etc., only call failf() if the - * 'strict' argument is TRUE as otherwise all this is for informational - * purposes only! - * - * We check certificates to authenticate the server; otherwise we risk - * man-in-the-middle attack. - */ -static CURLcode servercert(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, - struct Curl_easy *data, - bool strict) +CURLcode Curl_oss_check_peer_cert(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + struct ossl_ctx *octx, + struct ssl_peer *peer) { struct connectdata *conn = cf->conn; - struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx; struct ssl_config_data *ssl_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_config(cf, data); struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf); CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; @@ -4174,10 +4528,9 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, char buffer[2048]; const char *ptr; BIO *mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); - struct ossl_ssl_backend_data *backend = - (struct ossl_ssl_backend_data *)connssl->backend; + bool strict = (conn_config->verifypeer || conn_config->verifyhost); - DEBUGASSERT(backend); + DEBUGASSERT(octx); if(!mem) { failf(data, @@ -4190,10 +4543,10 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(data->set.ssl.certinfo) /* asked to gather certificate info */ - (void)Curl_ossl_certchain(data, backend->handle); + (void)Curl_ossl_certchain(data, octx->ssl); - backend->server_cert = SSL_get1_peer_certificate(backend->handle); - if(!backend->server_cert) { + octx->server_cert = SSL_get1_peer_certificate(octx->ssl); + if(!octx->server_cert) { BIO_free(mem); if(!strict) return CURLE_OK; @@ -4205,19 +4558,19 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, infof(data, "%s certificate:", Curl_ssl_cf_is_proxy(cf)? "Proxy" : "Server"); - rc = x509_name_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(backend->server_cert), + rc = x509_name_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(octx->server_cert), buffer, sizeof(buffer)); infof(data, " subject: %s", rc?"[NONE]":buffer); #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS { long len; - ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get0_notBefore(backend->server_cert)); + ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get0_notBefore(octx->server_cert)); len = BIO_get_mem_data(mem, (char **) &ptr); infof(data, " start date: %.*s", (int)len, ptr); (void)BIO_reset(mem); - ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get0_notAfter(backend->server_cert)); + ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get0_notAfter(octx->server_cert)); len = BIO_get_mem_data(mem, (char **) &ptr); infof(data, " expire date: %.*s", (int)len, ptr); (void)BIO_reset(mem); @@ -4227,16 +4580,15 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, BIO_free(mem); if(conn_config->verifyhost) { - result = Curl_ossl_verifyhost(data, conn, &connssl->peer, - backend->server_cert); + result = Curl_ossl_verifyhost(data, conn, peer, octx->server_cert); if(result) { - X509_free(backend->server_cert); - backend->server_cert = NULL; + X509_free(octx->server_cert); + octx->server_cert = NULL; return result; } } - rc = x509_name_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(backend->server_cert), + rc = x509_name_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(octx->server_cert), buffer, sizeof(buffer)); if(rc) { if(strict) @@ -4260,8 +4612,8 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, " error %s", ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)) ); - X509_free(backend->server_cert); - backend->server_cert = NULL; + X509_free(octx->server_cert); + octx->server_cert = NULL; return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; } } @@ -4273,8 +4625,8 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, " error %s", ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)) ); - X509_free(backend->server_cert); - backend->server_cert = NULL; + X509_free(octx->server_cert); + octx->server_cert = NULL; return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; } @@ -4283,8 +4635,8 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, failf(data, "SSL: Unable to open issuer cert (%s)", conn_config->issuercert); BIO_free(fp); - X509_free(backend->server_cert); - backend->server_cert = NULL; + X509_free(octx->server_cert); + octx->server_cert = NULL; return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR; } } @@ -4296,19 +4648,19 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, conn_config->issuercert); BIO_free(fp); X509_free(issuer); - X509_free(backend->server_cert); - backend->server_cert = NULL; + X509_free(octx->server_cert); + octx->server_cert = NULL; return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR; } - if(X509_check_issued(issuer, backend->server_cert) != X509_V_OK) { + if(X509_check_issued(issuer, octx->server_cert) != X509_V_OK) { if(strict) failf(data, "SSL: Certificate issuer check failed (%s)", conn_config->issuercert); BIO_free(fp); X509_free(issuer); - X509_free(backend->server_cert); - backend->server_cert = NULL; + X509_free(octx->server_cert); + octx->server_cert = NULL; return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR; } @@ -4318,7 +4670,7 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, X509_free(issuer); } - lerr = SSL_get_verify_result(backend->handle); + lerr = SSL_get_verify_result(octx->ssl); ssl_config->certverifyresult = lerr; if(lerr != X509_V_OK) { if(conn_config->verifypeer) { @@ -4338,16 +4690,31 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, infof(data, " SSL certificate verify ok."); } - infof_certstack(data, backend->handle); + infof_certstack(data, octx->ssl); #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && \ !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) - if(conn_config->verifystatus && !connssl->reused_session) { + if(conn_config->verifystatus && !octx->reused_session) { /* don't do this after Session ID reuse */ result = verifystatus(cf, data); if(result) { - X509_free(backend->server_cert); - backend->server_cert = NULL; + /* when verifystatus failed, remove the session id from the cache again + if present */ + if(!Curl_ssl_cf_is_proxy(cf)) { + void *old_ssl_sessionid = NULL; + bool incache; + Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data); + incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(cf, data, peer, + &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL)); + if(incache) { + infof(data, "Remove session ID again from cache"); + Curl_ssl_delsessionid(data, old_ssl_sessionid); + } + Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data); + } + + X509_free(octx->server_cert); + octx->server_cert = NULL; return result; } } @@ -4357,18 +4724,21 @@ static CURLcode servercert(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, /* when not strict, we don't bother about the verify cert problems */ result = CURLE_OK; +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY ptr = Curl_ssl_cf_is_proxy(cf)? data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY_PROXY]: data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY]; +#else + ptr = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY]; +#endif if(!result && ptr) { - result = ossl_pkp_pin_peer_pubkey(data, backend->server_cert, ptr); + result = ossl_pkp_pin_peer_pubkey(data, octx->server_cert, ptr); if(result) failf(data, "SSL: public key does not match pinned public key"); } - X509_free(backend->server_cert); - backend->server_cert = NULL; - connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_done; + X509_free(octx->server_cert); + octx->server_cert = NULL; return result; } @@ -4378,7 +4748,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step3(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, { CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx; - struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf); + struct ossl_ctx *octx = (struct ossl_ctx *)connssl->backend; DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_3 == connssl->connecting_state); @@ -4389,9 +4759,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step3(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, * operations. */ - result = servercert(cf, data, conn_config->verifypeer || - conn_config->verifyhost); - + result = Curl_oss_check_peer_cert(cf, data, octx, &connssl->peer); if(!result) connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_done; @@ -4531,12 +4899,11 @@ static bool ossl_data_pending(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, const struct Curl_easy *data) { struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx; - struct ossl_ssl_backend_data *backend = - (struct ossl_ssl_backend_data *)connssl->backend; + struct ossl_ctx *octx = (struct ossl_ctx *)connssl->backend; (void)data; - DEBUGASSERT(connssl && backend); - if(backend->handle && SSL_pending(backend->handle)) + DEBUGASSERT(connssl && octx); + if(octx->ssl && SSL_pending(octx->ssl)) return TRUE; return FALSE; } @@ -4555,19 +4922,18 @@ static ssize_t ossl_send(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, int memlen; int rc; struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx; - struct ossl_ssl_backend_data *backend = - (struct ossl_ssl_backend_data *)connssl->backend; + struct ossl_ctx *octx = (struct ossl_ctx *)connssl->backend; (void)data; - DEBUGASSERT(backend); + DEBUGASSERT(octx); ERR_clear_error(); memlen = (len > (size_t)INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : (int)len; - rc = SSL_write(backend->handle, mem, memlen); + rc = SSL_write(octx->ssl, mem, memlen); if(rc <= 0) { - err = SSL_get_error(backend->handle, rc); + err = SSL_get_error(octx->ssl, rc); switch(err) { case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: @@ -4582,7 +4948,7 @@ static ssize_t ossl_send(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, { int sockerr = SOCKERRNO; - if(backend->io_result == CURLE_AGAIN) { + if(octx->io_result == CURLE_AGAIN) { *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN; rc = -1; goto out; @@ -4592,10 +4958,10 @@ static ssize_t ossl_send(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, ossl_strerror(sslerror, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)); else if(sockerr) Curl_strerror(sockerr, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)); - else { - strncpy(error_buffer, SSL_ERROR_to_str(err), sizeof(error_buffer)); - error_buffer[sizeof(error_buffer) - 1] = '\0'; - } + else + msnprintf(error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer), "%s", + SSL_ERROR_to_str(err)); + failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_write: %s, errno %d", error_buffer, sockerr); *curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR; @@ -4639,20 +5005,19 @@ static ssize_t ossl_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, int buffsize; struct connectdata *conn = cf->conn; struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx; - struct ossl_ssl_backend_data *backend = - (struct ossl_ssl_backend_data *)connssl->backend; + struct ossl_ctx *octx = (struct ossl_ctx *)connssl->backend; (void)data; - DEBUGASSERT(backend); + DEBUGASSERT(octx); ERR_clear_error(); buffsize = (buffersize > (size_t)INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : (int)buffersize; - nread = (ssize_t)SSL_read(backend->handle, buf, buffsize); + nread = (ssize_t)SSL_read(octx->ssl, buf, buffsize); if(nread <= 0) { /* failed SSL_read */ - int err = SSL_get_error(backend->handle, (int)nread); + int err = SSL_get_error(octx->ssl, (int)nread); switch(err) { case SSL_ERROR_NONE: /* this is not an error */ @@ -4674,7 +5039,7 @@ static ssize_t ossl_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, /* openssl/ssl.h for SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL says "look at error stack/return value/errno" */ /* https://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/ERR_get_error.html */ - if(backend->io_result == CURLE_AGAIN) { + if(octx->io_result == CURLE_AGAIN) { *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN; nread = -1; goto out; @@ -4688,10 +5053,9 @@ static ssize_t ossl_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, ossl_strerror(sslerror, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)); else if(sockerr && err == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL) Curl_strerror(sockerr, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)); - else { - strncpy(error_buffer, SSL_ERROR_to_str(err), sizeof(error_buffer)); - error_buffer[sizeof(error_buffer) - 1] = '\0'; - } + else + msnprintf(error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer), "%s", + SSL_ERROR_to_str(err)); failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_read: %s, errno %d", error_buffer, sockerr); *curlcode = CURLE_RECV_ERROR; @@ -4866,11 +5230,10 @@ static void *ossl_get_internals(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl, CURLINFO info) { /* Legacy: CURLINFO_TLS_SESSION must return an SSL_CTX pointer. */ - struct ossl_ssl_backend_data *backend = - (struct ossl_ssl_backend_data *)connssl->backend; - DEBUGASSERT(backend); + struct ossl_ctx *octx = (struct ossl_ctx *)connssl->backend; + DEBUGASSERT(octx); return info == CURLINFO_TLS_SESSION ? - (void *)backend->ctx : (void *)backend->handle; + (void *)octx->ssl_ctx : (void *)octx->ssl; } static void ossl_free_multi_ssl_backend_data( @@ -4897,10 +5260,13 @@ const struct Curl_ssl Curl_ssl_openssl = { SSLSUPP_SSL_CTX | #ifdef HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHERSUITES SSLSUPP_TLS13_CIPHERSUITES | +#endif +#ifdef USE_ECH + SSLSUPP_ECH | #endif SSLSUPP_HTTPS_PROXY, - sizeof(struct ossl_ssl_backend_data), + sizeof(struct ossl_ctx), ossl_init, /* init */ ossl_cleanup, /* cleanup */ @@ -4916,7 +5282,6 @@ const struct Curl_ssl Curl_ssl_openssl = { ossl_get_internals, /* get_internals */ ossl_close, /* close_one */ ossl_close_all, /* close_all */ - ossl_session_free, /* session_free */ ossl_set_engine, /* set_engine */ ossl_set_engine_default, /* set_engine_default */ ossl_engines_list, /* engines_list */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/openssl.h b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/openssl.h index e802363a4a..55e06bda44 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/openssl.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/openssl.h @@ -36,6 +36,39 @@ #include "urldata.h" +/* Struct to hold a Curl OpenSSL instance */ +struct ossl_ctx { + /* these ones requires specific SSL-types */ + SSL_CTX* ssl_ctx; + SSL* ssl; + X509* server_cert; + BIO_METHOD *bio_method; + CURLcode io_result; /* result of last BIO cfilter operation */ +#ifndef HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK + /* Set to true once a valid keylog entry has been created to avoid dupes. */ + BIT(keylog_done); +#endif + BIT(x509_store_setup); /* x509 store has been set up */ + BIT(reused_session); /* session-ID was reused for this */ +}; + +typedef CURLcode Curl_ossl_ctx_setup_cb(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + void *user_data); + +typedef int Curl_ossl_new_session_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *ssl_sessionid); + +CURLcode Curl_ossl_ctx_init(struct ossl_ctx *octx, + struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + struct ssl_peer *peer, + int transport, /* TCP or QUIC */ + const unsigned char *alpn, size_t alpn_len, + Curl_ossl_ctx_setup_cb *cb_setup, + void *cb_user_data, + Curl_ossl_new_session_cb *cb_new_session, + void *ssl_user_data); + #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000L) #define SSL_get1_peer_certificate SSL_get_peer_certificate #endif @@ -66,5 +99,23 @@ CURLcode Curl_ossl_ctx_configure(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx); +/* + * Add a new session to the cache. Takes ownership of the session. + */ +CURLcode Curl_ossl_add_session(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + const struct ssl_peer *peer, + SSL_SESSION *ssl_sessionid); + +/* + * Get the server cert, verify it and show it, etc., only call failf() if + * ssl config verifypeer or -host is set. Otherwise all this is for + * informational purposes only! + */ +CURLcode Curl_oss_check_peer_cert(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + struct Curl_easy *data, + struct ossl_ctx *octx, + struct ssl_peer *peer); + #endif /* USE_OPENSSL */ #endif /* HEADER_CURL_SSLUSE_H */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/rustls.c b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/rustls.c index 8751fd9813..8b6588a376 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/rustls.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/rustls.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ * * Copyright (C) Jacob Hoffman-Andrews, * + * Copyright (C) kpcyrd, * * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms @@ -45,7 +46,8 @@ struct rustls_ssl_backend_data { const struct rustls_client_config *config; struct rustls_connection *conn; - bool data_pending; + size_t plain_out_buffered; + BIT(data_in_pending); }; /* For a given rustls_result error code, return the best-matching CURLcode. */ @@ -60,7 +62,7 @@ static CURLcode map_error(rustls_result r) case RUSTLS_RESULT_NULL_PARAMETER: return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; default: - return CURLE_READ_ERROR; + return CURLE_RECV_ERROR; } } @@ -73,7 +75,7 @@ cr_data_pending(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, const struct Curl_easy *data) (void)data; DEBUGASSERT(ctx && ctx->backend); backend = (struct rustls_ssl_backend_data *)ctx->backend; - return backend->data_pending; + return backend->data_in_pending; } struct io_ctx { @@ -85,6 +87,7 @@ static int read_cb(void *userdata, uint8_t *buf, uintptr_t len, uintptr_t *out_n) { struct io_ctx *io_ctx = userdata; + struct ssl_connect_data *const connssl = io_ctx->cf->ctx; CURLcode result; int ret = 0; ssize_t nread = Curl_conn_cf_recv(io_ctx->cf->next, io_ctx->data, @@ -96,7 +99,11 @@ read_cb(void *userdata, uint8_t *buf, uintptr_t len, uintptr_t *out_n) else ret = EINVAL; } + else if(nread == 0) + connssl->peer_closed = TRUE; *out_n = (int)nread; + CURL_TRC_CF(io_ctx->data, io_ctx->cf, "cf->next recv(len=%zu) -> %zd, %d", + len, nread, result); return ret; } @@ -116,10 +123,8 @@ write_cb(void *userdata, const uint8_t *buf, uintptr_t len, uintptr_t *out_n) ret = EINVAL; } *out_n = (int)nwritten; - /* - CURL_TRC_CFX(io_ctx->data, io_ctx->cf, "cf->next send(len=%zu) -> %zd, %d", - len, nwritten, result)); - */ + CURL_TRC_CF(io_ctx->data, io_ctx->cf, "cf->next send(len=%zu) -> %zd, %d", + len, nwritten, result); return ret; } @@ -146,7 +151,7 @@ static ssize_t tls_recv_more(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, char buffer[STRERROR_LEN]; failf(data, "reading from socket: %s", Curl_strerror(io_error, buffer, sizeof(buffer))); - *err = CURLE_READ_ERROR; + *err = CURLE_RECV_ERROR; return -1; } @@ -156,12 +161,12 @@ static ssize_t tls_recv_more(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, size_t errorlen; rustls_error(rresult, errorbuf, sizeof(errorbuf), &errorlen); failf(data, "rustls_connection_process_new_packets: %.*s", - errorlen, errorbuf); + (int)errorlen, errorbuf); *err = map_error(rresult); return -1; } - backend->data_pending = TRUE; + backend->data_in_pending = TRUE; *err = CURLE_OK; return (ssize_t)tls_bytes_read; } @@ -196,7 +201,7 @@ cr_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, rconn = backend->conn; while(plain_bytes_copied < plainlen) { - if(!backend->data_pending) { + if(!backend->data_in_pending) { if(tls_recv_more(cf, data, err) < 0) { if(*err != CURLE_AGAIN) { nread = -1; @@ -211,12 +216,12 @@ cr_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, plainlen - plain_bytes_copied, &n); if(rresult == RUSTLS_RESULT_PLAINTEXT_EMPTY) { - backend->data_pending = FALSE; + backend->data_in_pending = FALSE; } else if(rresult == RUSTLS_RESULT_UNEXPECTED_EOF) { failf(data, "rustls: peer closed TCP connection " "without first closing TLS connection"); - *err = CURLE_READ_ERROR; + *err = CURLE_RECV_ERROR; nread = -1; goto out; } @@ -225,8 +230,8 @@ cr_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, char errorbuf[255]; size_t errorlen; rustls_error(rresult, errorbuf, sizeof(errorbuf), &errorlen); - failf(data, "rustls_connection_read: %.*s", errorlen, errorbuf); - *err = CURLE_READ_ERROR; + failf(data, "rustls_connection_read: %.*s", (int)errorlen, errorbuf); + *err = CURLE_RECV_ERROR; nread = -1; goto out; } @@ -261,6 +266,42 @@ cr_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, return nread; } +static CURLcode cr_flush_out(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, + struct rustls_connection *rconn) +{ + struct io_ctx io_ctx; + rustls_io_result io_error; + size_t tlswritten = 0; + size_t tlswritten_total = 0; + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + + io_ctx.cf = cf; + io_ctx.data = data; + + while(rustls_connection_wants_write(rconn)) { + io_error = rustls_connection_write_tls(rconn, write_cb, &io_ctx, + &tlswritten); + if(io_error == EAGAIN || io_error == EWOULDBLOCK) { + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "cf_send: EAGAIN after %zu bytes", + tlswritten_total); + return CURLE_AGAIN; + } + else if(io_error) { + char buffer[STRERROR_LEN]; + failf(data, "writing to socket: %s", + Curl_strerror(io_error, buffer, sizeof(buffer))); + return CURLE_SEND_ERROR; + } + if(tlswritten == 0) { + failf(data, "EOF in swrite"); + return CURLE_SEND_ERROR; + } + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "cf_send: wrote %zu TLS bytes", tlswritten); + tlswritten_total += tlswritten; + } + return result; +} + /* * On each call: * - Copy `plainlen` bytes into rustls' plaintext input buffer (if > 0). @@ -279,29 +320,46 @@ cr_send(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, struct rustls_ssl_backend_data *const backend = (struct rustls_ssl_backend_data *)connssl->backend; struct rustls_connection *rconn = NULL; - struct io_ctx io_ctx; size_t plainwritten = 0; - size_t tlswritten = 0; - size_t tlswritten_total = 0; rustls_result rresult; - rustls_io_result io_error; char errorbuf[256]; size_t errorlen; + const unsigned char *buf = plainbuf; + size_t blen = plainlen; + ssize_t nwritten = 0; DEBUGASSERT(backend); rconn = backend->conn; + DEBUGASSERT(rconn); + + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "cf_send(len=%zu)", plainlen); + + /* If a previous send blocked, we already added its plain bytes + * to rustsls and must not do that again. Flush the TLS bytes and, + * if successful, deduct the previous plain bytes from the current + * send. */ + if(backend->plain_out_buffered) { + *err = cr_flush_out(cf, data, rconn); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "cf_send: flushing %zu previously added bytes -> %d", + backend->plain_out_buffered, *err); + if(*err) + return -1; + if(blen > backend->plain_out_buffered) { + blen -= backend->plain_out_buffered; + buf += backend->plain_out_buffered; + } + else + blen = 0; + nwritten += (ssize_t)backend->plain_out_buffered; + backend->plain_out_buffered = 0; + } - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "cf_send: %ld plain bytes", plainlen); - - io_ctx.cf = cf; - io_ctx.data = data; - - if(plainlen > 0) { - rresult = rustls_connection_write(rconn, plainbuf, plainlen, - &plainwritten); + if(blen > 0) { + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "cf_send: adding %zu plain bytes to rustls", blen); + rresult = rustls_connection_write(rconn, buf, blen, &plainwritten); if(rresult != RUSTLS_RESULT_OK) { rustls_error(rresult, errorbuf, sizeof(errorbuf), &errorlen); - failf(data, "rustls_connection_write: %.*s", errorlen, errorbuf); + failf(data, "rustls_connection_write: %.*s", (int)errorlen, errorbuf); *err = CURLE_WRITE_ERROR; return -1; } @@ -312,37 +370,32 @@ cr_send(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, } } - while(rustls_connection_wants_write(rconn)) { - io_error = rustls_connection_write_tls(rconn, write_cb, &io_ctx, - &tlswritten); - if(io_error == EAGAIN || io_error == EWOULDBLOCK) { - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "cf_send: EAGAIN after %zu bytes", - tlswritten_total); - *err = CURLE_AGAIN; - return -1; - } - else if(io_error) { - char buffer[STRERROR_LEN]; - failf(data, "writing to socket: %s", - Curl_strerror(io_error, buffer, sizeof(buffer))); - *err = CURLE_WRITE_ERROR; - return -1; - } - if(tlswritten == 0) { - failf(data, "EOF in swrite"); - *err = CURLE_WRITE_ERROR; - return -1; + *err = cr_flush_out(cf, data, rconn); + if(*err) { + if(CURLE_AGAIN == *err) { + /* The TLS bytes may have been partially written, but we fail the + * complete send() and remember how much we already added to rustls. */ + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "cf_send: EAGAIN, remember we added %zu plain" + " bytes already to rustls", blen); + backend->plain_out_buffered = plainwritten; + if(nwritten) { + *err = CURLE_OK; + return (ssize_t)nwritten; + } } - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "cf_send: wrote %zu TLS bytes", tlswritten); - tlswritten_total += tlswritten; + return -1; } + else + nwritten += (ssize_t)plainwritten; - return plainwritten; + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "cf_send(len=%zu) -> %d, %zd", + plainlen, *err, nwritten); + return nwritten; } /* A server certificate verify callback for rustls that always returns RUSTLS_RESULT_OK, or in other words disable certificate verification. */ -static enum rustls_result +static uint32_t cr_verify_none(void *userdata UNUSED_PARAM, const rustls_verify_server_cert_params *params UNUSED_PARAM) { @@ -353,12 +406,12 @@ static bool cr_hostname_is_ip(const char *hostname) { struct in_addr in; -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 +#ifdef USE_IPV6 struct in6_addr in6; if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, hostname, &in6) > 0) { return true; } -#endif /* ENABLE_IPV6 */ +#endif /* USE_IPV6 */ if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, hostname, &in) > 0) { return true; } @@ -373,7 +426,10 @@ cr_init_backend(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf); struct rustls_connection *rconn = NULL; struct rustls_client_config_builder *config_builder = NULL; - struct rustls_root_cert_store *roots = NULL; + const struct rustls_root_cert_store *roots = NULL; + struct rustls_root_cert_store_builder *roots_builder = NULL; + struct rustls_web_pki_server_cert_verifier_builder *verifier_builder = NULL; + struct rustls_server_cert_verifier *server_cert_verifier = NULL; const struct curl_blob *ca_info_blob = conn_config->ca_info_blob; const char * const ssl_cafile = /* CURLOPT_CAINFO_BLOB overrides CURLOPT_CAINFO */ @@ -414,54 +470,72 @@ cr_init_backend(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, hostname = "example.invalid"; } } - else if(ca_info_blob) { - roots = rustls_root_cert_store_new(); - - /* Enable strict parsing only if verification isn't disabled. */ - result = rustls_root_cert_store_add_pem(roots, ca_info_blob->data, - ca_info_blob->len, verifypeer); - if(result != RUSTLS_RESULT_OK) { - failf(data, "rustls: failed to parse trusted certificates from blob"); - rustls_root_cert_store_free(roots); - rustls_client_config_free( - rustls_client_config_builder_build(config_builder)); - return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE; + else if(ca_info_blob || ssl_cafile) { + roots_builder = rustls_root_cert_store_builder_new(); + + if(ca_info_blob) { + /* Enable strict parsing only if verification isn't disabled. */ + result = rustls_root_cert_store_builder_add_pem(roots_builder, + ca_info_blob->data, + ca_info_blob->len, + verifypeer); + if(result != RUSTLS_RESULT_OK) { + failf(data, "rustls: failed to parse trusted certificates from blob"); + rustls_root_cert_store_builder_free(roots_builder); + rustls_client_config_free( + rustls_client_config_builder_build(config_builder)); + return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE; + } + } + else if(ssl_cafile) { + /* Enable strict parsing only if verification isn't disabled. */ + result = rustls_root_cert_store_builder_load_roots_from_file( + roots_builder, ssl_cafile, verifypeer); + if(result != RUSTLS_RESULT_OK) { + failf(data, "rustls: failed to load trusted certificates"); + rustls_root_cert_store_builder_free(roots_builder); + rustls_client_config_free( + rustls_client_config_builder_build(config_builder)); + return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE; + } } - result = rustls_client_config_builder_use_roots(config_builder, roots); - rustls_root_cert_store_free(roots); + result = rustls_root_cert_store_builder_build(roots_builder, &roots); + rustls_root_cert_store_builder_free(roots_builder); if(result != RUSTLS_RESULT_OK) { failf(data, "rustls: failed to load trusted certificates"); rustls_client_config_free( rustls_client_config_builder_build(config_builder)); return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE; } - } - else if(ssl_cafile) { - result = rustls_client_config_builder_load_roots_from_file( - config_builder, ssl_cafile); + + verifier_builder = rustls_web_pki_server_cert_verifier_builder_new(roots); + + result = rustls_web_pki_server_cert_verifier_builder_build( + verifier_builder, &server_cert_verifier); + rustls_web_pki_server_cert_verifier_builder_free(verifier_builder); if(result != RUSTLS_RESULT_OK) { failf(data, "rustls: failed to load trusted certificates"); + rustls_server_cert_verifier_free(server_cert_verifier); rustls_client_config_free( rustls_client_config_builder_build(config_builder)); return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE; } + + rustls_client_config_builder_set_server_verifier(config_builder, + server_cert_verifier); } backend->config = rustls_client_config_builder_build(config_builder); DEBUGASSERT(rconn == NULL); - { - /* rustls claims to manage ip address hostnames as well here. So, - * if we have an SNI, we use it, otherwise we pass the hostname */ - char *server = connssl->peer.sni? - connssl->peer.sni : connssl->peer.hostname; - result = rustls_client_connection_new(backend->config, server, &rconn); - } + result = rustls_client_connection_new(backend->config, + connssl->peer.hostname, &rconn); if(result != RUSTLS_RESULT_OK) { rustls_error(result, errorbuf, sizeof(errorbuf), &errorlen); - failf(data, "rustls_client_connection_new: %.*s", errorlen, errorbuf); + failf(data, "rustls_client_connection_new: %.*s", (int)errorlen, errorbuf); return CURLE_COULDNT_CONNECT; } + DEBUGASSERT(rconn); rustls_connection_set_userdata(rconn, backend); backend->conn = rconn; return CURLE_OK; @@ -510,9 +584,12 @@ cr_connect_common(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, DEBUGASSERT(backend); - if(ssl_connection_none == connssl->state) { + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "cr_connect_common, state=%d", connssl->state); + *done = FALSE; + if(!backend->conn) { result = cr_init_backend(cf, data, (struct rustls_ssl_backend_data *)connssl->backend); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "cr_connect_common, init backend -> %d", result); if(result != CURLE_OK) { return result; } @@ -529,21 +606,34 @@ cr_connect_common(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, */ if(!rustls_connection_is_handshaking(rconn)) { infof(data, "Done handshaking"); - /* Done with the handshake. Set up callbacks to send/receive data. */ - connssl->state = ssl_connection_complete; - + /* rustls claims it is no longer handshaking *before* it has + * send its FINISHED message off. We attempt to let it write + * one more time. Oh my. + */ cr_set_negotiated_alpn(cf, data, rconn); - + cr_send(cf, data, NULL, 0, &tmperr); + if(tmperr == CURLE_AGAIN) { + connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_writing; + return CURLE_OK; + } + else if(tmperr != CURLE_OK) { + return tmperr; + } + /* REALLY Done with the handshake. */ + connssl->state = ssl_connection_complete; *done = TRUE; return CURLE_OK; } wants_read = rustls_connection_wants_read(rconn); - wants_write = rustls_connection_wants_write(rconn); + wants_write = rustls_connection_wants_write(rconn) || + backend->plain_out_buffered; DEBUGASSERT(wants_read || wants_write); writefd = wants_write?sockfd:CURL_SOCKET_BAD; readfd = wants_read?sockfd:CURL_SOCKET_BAD; + connssl->connecting_state = wants_write? + ssl_connect_2_writing : ssl_connect_2_reading; /* check allowed time left */ timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE); @@ -555,32 +645,31 @@ cr_connect_common(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, socket_check_timeout = blocking?timeout_ms:0; - what = Curl_socket_check( - readfd, CURL_SOCKET_BAD, writefd, socket_check_timeout); + what = Curl_socket_check(readfd, CURL_SOCKET_BAD, writefd, + socket_check_timeout); if(what < 0) { /* fatal error */ failf(data, "select/poll on SSL socket, errno: %d", SOCKERRNO); return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; } if(blocking && 0 == what) { - failf(data, "rustls connection timeout after %d ms", - socket_check_timeout); + failf(data, "rustls connection timeout after %" + CURL_FORMAT_TIMEDIFF_T " ms", socket_check_timeout); return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT; } if(0 == what) { - infof(data, "Curl_socket_check: %s would block", + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "Curl_socket_check: %s would block", wants_read&&wants_write ? "writing and reading" : wants_write ? "writing" : "reading"); - *done = FALSE; return CURLE_OK; } /* socket is readable or writable */ if(wants_write) { - infof(data, "rustls_connection wants us to write_tls."); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "rustls_connection wants us to write_tls."); cr_send(cf, data, NULL, 0, &tmperr); if(tmperr == CURLE_AGAIN) { - infof(data, "writing would block"); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "writing would block"); /* fall through */ } else if(tmperr != CURLE_OK) { @@ -589,14 +678,13 @@ cr_connect_common(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, } if(wants_read) { - infof(data, "rustls_connection wants us to read_tls."); - + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "rustls_connection wants us to read_tls."); if(tls_recv_more(cf, data, &tmperr) < 0) { if(tmperr == CURLE_AGAIN) { - infof(data, "reading would block"); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "reading would block"); /* fall through */ } - else if(tmperr == CURLE_READ_ERROR) { + else if(tmperr == CURLE_RECV_ERROR) { return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; } else { @@ -619,37 +707,12 @@ cr_connect_nonblocking(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, } static CURLcode -cr_connect_blocking(struct Curl_cfilter *cf UNUSED_PARAM, - struct Curl_easy *data UNUSED_PARAM) +cr_connect_blocking(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) { bool done; /* unused */ return cr_connect_common(cf, data, true, &done); } -static void cr_adjust_pollset(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, - struct Curl_easy *data, - struct easy_pollset *ps) -{ - if(!cf->connected) { - curl_socket_t sock = Curl_conn_cf_get_socket(cf->next, data); - struct ssl_connect_data *const connssl = cf->ctx; - struct rustls_ssl_backend_data *const backend = - (struct rustls_ssl_backend_data *)connssl->backend; - struct rustls_connection *rconn = NULL; - - (void)data; - DEBUGASSERT(backend); - rconn = backend->conn; - - if(rustls_connection_wants_write(rconn)) { - Curl_pollset_add_out(data, ps, sock); - } - if(rustls_connection_wants_read(rconn)) { - Curl_pollset_add_in(data, ps, sock); - } - } -} - static void * cr_get_internals(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl, CURLINFO info UNUSED_PARAM) @@ -670,8 +733,8 @@ cr_close(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) ssize_t n = 0; DEBUGASSERT(backend); - - if(backend->conn) { + if(backend->conn && !connssl->peer_closed) { + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "closing connection, send notify"); rustls_connection_send_close_notify(backend->conn); n = cr_send(cf, data, NULL, 0, &tmperr); if(n < 0) { @@ -696,7 +759,6 @@ static size_t cr_version(char *buffer, size_t size) const struct Curl_ssl Curl_ssl_rustls = { { CURLSSLBACKEND_RUSTLS, "rustls" }, SSLSUPP_CAINFO_BLOB | /* supports */ - SSLSUPP_TLS13_CIPHERSUITES | SSLSUPP_HTTPS_PROXY, sizeof(struct rustls_ssl_backend_data), @@ -710,11 +772,10 @@ const struct Curl_ssl Curl_ssl_rustls = { Curl_none_cert_status_request, /* cert_status_request */ cr_connect_blocking, /* connect */ cr_connect_nonblocking, /* connect_nonblocking */ - cr_adjust_pollset, /* adjust_pollset */ + Curl_ssl_adjust_pollset, /* adjust_pollset */ cr_get_internals, /* get_internals */ cr_close, /* close_one */ Curl_none_close_all, /* close_all */ - Curl_none_session_free, /* session_free */ Curl_none_set_engine, /* set_engine */ Curl_none_set_engine_default, /* set_engine_default */ Curl_none_engines_list, /* engines_list */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/schannel.c b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/schannel.c index ae7f2956da..19cdc4b20b 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/schannel.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/schannel.c @@ -439,6 +439,12 @@ get_cert_location(TCHAR *path, DWORD *store_name, TCHAR **store_path, return CURLE_OK; } #endif + +static bool algo(const char *check, char *namep, size_t nlen) +{ + return (strlen(check) == nlen) && !strncmp(check, namep, nlen); +} + static CURLcode schannel_acquire_credential_handle(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) @@ -660,7 +666,7 @@ schannel_acquire_credential_handle(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, cert_showfilename_error); else failf(data, "schannel: Failed to import cert file %s, " - "last error is 0x%x", + "last error is 0x%lx", cert_showfilename_error, errorcode); return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM; } @@ -671,7 +677,7 @@ schannel_acquire_credential_handle(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(!client_certs[0]) { failf(data, "schannel: Failed to get certificate from file %s" - ", last error is 0x%x", + ", last error is 0x%lx", cert_showfilename_error, GetLastError()); CertCloseStore(cert_store, 0); return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM; @@ -684,10 +690,15 @@ schannel_acquire_credential_handle(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, CERT_STORE_OPEN_EXISTING_FLAG | cert_store_name, cert_store_path); if(!cert_store) { - failf(data, "schannel: Failed to open cert store %x %s, " - "last error is 0x%x", - cert_store_name, cert_store_path, GetLastError()); + char *path_utf8 = + curlx_convert_tchar_to_UTF8(cert_store_path); + failf(data, "schannel: Failed to open cert store %lx %s, " + "last error is 0x%lx", + cert_store_name, + (path_utf8 ? path_utf8 : "(unknown)"), + GetLastError()); free(cert_store_path); + curlx_unicodefree(path_utf8); curlx_unicodefree(cert_path); return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM; } @@ -790,9 +801,7 @@ schannel_acquire_credential_handle(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, char *startCur = ciphers13; int algCount = 0; - char tmp[LONGEST_ALG_ID] = { 0 }; char *nameEnd; - size_t n; disable_aes_gcm_sha384 = TRUE; disable_aes_gcm_sha256 = TRUE; @@ -801,40 +810,34 @@ schannel_acquire_credential_handle(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, disable_aes_ccm_sha256 = TRUE; while(startCur && (0 != *startCur) && (algCount < remaining_ciphers)) { + size_t n; + char *namep; nameEnd = strchr(startCur, ':'); n = nameEnd ? (size_t)(nameEnd - startCur) : strlen(startCur); + namep = startCur; - /* reject too-long cipher names */ - if(n > (LONGEST_ALG_ID - 1)) { - failf(data, "schannel: Cipher name too long, not checked"); - return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER; - } - - strncpy(tmp, startCur, n); - tmp[n] = 0; - - if(disable_aes_gcm_sha384 - && !strcmp("TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", tmp)) { + if(disable_aes_gcm_sha384 && + algo("TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384", namep, n)) { disable_aes_gcm_sha384 = FALSE; } else if(disable_aes_gcm_sha256 - && !strcmp("TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", tmp)) { + && algo("TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", namep, n)) { disable_aes_gcm_sha256 = FALSE; } else if(disable_chacha_poly - && !strcmp("TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", tmp)) { + && algo("TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256", namep, n)) { disable_chacha_poly = FALSE; } else if(disable_aes_ccm_8_sha256 - && !strcmp("TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256", tmp)) { + && algo("TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256", namep, n)) { disable_aes_ccm_8_sha256 = FALSE; } else if(disable_aes_ccm_sha256 - && !strcmp("TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256", tmp)) { + && algo("TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256", namep, n)) { disable_aes_ccm_sha256 = FALSE; } else { - failf(data, "schannel: Unknown TLS 1.3 cipher: %s", tmp); + failf(data, "schannel: Unknown TLS 1.3 cipher: %.*s", (int)n, namep); return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER; } @@ -1068,7 +1071,7 @@ schannel_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) DEBUGASSERT(backend); DEBUGF(infof(data, "schannel: SSL/TLS connection with %s port %d (step 1/3)", - connssl->peer.hostname, connssl->port)); + connssl->peer.hostname, connssl->peer.port)); if(curlx_verify_windows_version(5, 1, 0, PLATFORM_WINNT, VERSION_LESS_THAN_EQUAL)) { @@ -1126,7 +1129,8 @@ schannel_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) /* check for an existing reusable credential handle */ if(ssl_config->primary.sessionid) { Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data); - if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(cf, data, (void **)&old_cred, NULL)) { + if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(cf, data, &connssl->peer, + (void **)&old_cred, NULL)) { backend->cred = old_cred; DEBUGF(infof(data, "schannel: reusing existing credential handle")); @@ -1156,7 +1160,7 @@ schannel_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) } /* Warn if SNI is disabled due to use of an IP address */ - if(connssl->peer.is_ip_address) { + if(connssl->peer.type != CURL_SSL_PEER_DNS) { infof(data, "schannel: using IP address, SNI is not supported by OS."); } @@ -1195,9 +1199,8 @@ schannel_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) cur += proto.len; *list_len = curlx_uitous(cur - list_start_index); - *extension_len = *list_len + - (unsigned short)sizeof(unsigned int) + - (unsigned short)sizeof(unsigned short); + *extension_len = (unsigned int)(*list_len + + sizeof(unsigned int) + sizeof(unsigned short)); InitSecBuffer(&inbuf, SECBUFFER_APPLICATION_PROTOCOLS, alpn_buffer, cur); InitSecBufferDesc(&inbuf_desc, &inbuf, 1); @@ -1333,7 +1336,7 @@ schannel_connect_step2(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) DEBUGF(infof(data, "schannel: SSL/TLS connection with %s port %d (step 2/3)", - connssl->peer.hostname, connssl->port)); + connssl->peer.hostname, connssl->peer.port)); if(!backend->cred || !backend->ctxt) return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; @@ -1567,9 +1570,13 @@ schannel_connect_step2(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) DEBUGF(infof(data, "schannel: SSL/TLS handshake complete")); } +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY pubkey_ptr = Curl_ssl_cf_is_proxy(cf)? data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY_PROXY]: data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY]; +#else + pubkey_ptr = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY]; +#endif if(pubkey_ptr) { result = schannel_pkp_pin_peer_pubkey(cf, data, pubkey_ptr); if(result) { @@ -1668,6 +1675,28 @@ add_cert_to_certinfo(const CERT_CONTEXT *ccert_context, bool reverse_order, return args->result == CURLE_OK; } +static void schannel_session_free(void *sessionid, size_t idsize) +{ + /* this is expected to be called under sessionid lock */ + struct Curl_schannel_cred *cred = sessionid; + + (void)idsize; + if(cred) { + cred->refcount--; + if(cred->refcount == 0) { + s_pSecFn->FreeCredentialsHandle(&cred->cred_handle); + curlx_unicodefree(cred->sni_hostname); +#ifdef HAS_CLIENT_CERT_PATH + if(cred->client_cert_store) { + CertCloseStore(cred->client_cert_store, 0); + cred->client_cert_store = NULL; + } +#endif + Curl_safefree(cred); + } + } +} + static CURLcode schannel_connect_step3(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) { @@ -1687,7 +1716,7 @@ schannel_connect_step3(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) DEBUGF(infof(data, "schannel: SSL/TLS connection with %s port %d (step 3/3)", - connssl->peer.hostname, connssl->port)); + connssl->peer.hostname, connssl->peer.port)); if(!backend->cred) return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; @@ -1745,11 +1774,11 @@ schannel_connect_step3(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) /* save the current session data for possible reuse */ if(ssl_config->primary.sessionid) { bool incache; - bool added = FALSE; struct Curl_schannel_cred *old_cred = NULL; Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data); - incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(cf, data, (void **)&old_cred, NULL)); + incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(cf, data, &connssl->peer, + (void **)&old_cred, NULL)); if(incache) { if(old_cred != backend->cred) { DEBUGF(infof(data, @@ -1760,20 +1789,15 @@ schannel_connect_step3(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) } } if(!incache) { - result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(cf, data, backend->cred, + /* Up ref count since call takes ownership */ + backend->cred->refcount++; + result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(cf, data, &connssl->peer, backend->cred, sizeof(struct Curl_schannel_cred), - &added); + schannel_session_free); if(result) { Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data); - failf(data, "schannel: failed to store credential handle"); return result; } - else if(added) { - /* this cred session is now also referenced by sessionid cache */ - backend->cred->refcount++; - DEBUGF(infof(data, - "schannel: stored credential handle in session cache")); - } } Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data); } @@ -2131,7 +2155,6 @@ schannel_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, infof(data, "schannel: server indicated shutdown in a prior call"); goto cleanup; } - /* It's debatable what to return when !len. Regardless we can't return immediately because there may be data to decrypt (in the case we want to decrypt all encrypted cached data) so handle !len later in cleanup. @@ -2315,10 +2338,10 @@ schannel_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, /* In Windows 2000 SEC_I_CONTEXT_EXPIRED (close_notify) is not returned so we have to work around that in cleanup. */ backend->recv_sspi_close_notify = true; - if(!backend->recv_connection_closed) { + if(!backend->recv_connection_closed) backend->recv_connection_closed = true; - infof(data, "schannel: server closed the connection"); - } + infof(data, + "schannel: server close notification received (close_notify)"); goto cleanup; } } @@ -2332,10 +2355,10 @@ schannel_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, else { #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS char buffer[STRERROR_LEN]; -#endif - *err = CURLE_RECV_ERROR; infof(data, "schannel: failed to read data from server: %s", Curl_sspi_strerror(sspi_status, buffer, sizeof(buffer))); +#endif + *err = CURLE_RECV_ERROR; goto cleanup; } } @@ -2441,32 +2464,14 @@ static bool schannel_data_pending(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(backend->ctxt) /* SSL/TLS is in use */ return (backend->decdata_offset > 0 || - (backend->encdata_offset > 0 && !backend->encdata_is_incomplete)); + (backend->encdata_offset > 0 && !backend->encdata_is_incomplete) || + backend->recv_connection_closed || + backend->recv_sspi_close_notify || + backend->recv_unrecoverable_err); else return FALSE; } -static void schannel_session_free(void *ptr) -{ - /* this is expected to be called under sessionid lock */ - struct Curl_schannel_cred *cred = ptr; - - if(cred) { - cred->refcount--; - if(cred->refcount == 0) { - s_pSecFn->FreeCredentialsHandle(&cred->cred_handle); - curlx_unicodefree(cred->sni_hostname); -#ifdef HAS_CLIENT_CERT_PATH - if(cred->client_cert_store) { - CertCloseStore(cred->client_cert_store, 0); - cred->client_cert_store = NULL; - } -#endif - Curl_safefree(cred); - } - } -} - /* shut down the SSL connection and clean up related memory. this function can be called multiple times on the same connection including if the SSL connection failed (eg connection made but failed handshake). */ @@ -2485,7 +2490,7 @@ static int schannel_shutdown(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(backend->ctxt) { infof(data, "schannel: shutting down SSL/TLS connection with %s port %d", - connssl->peer.hostname, connssl->port); + connssl->peer.hostname, connssl->peer.port); } if(backend->cred && backend->ctxt) { @@ -2550,7 +2555,7 @@ static int schannel_shutdown(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, /* free SSPI Schannel API credential handle */ if(backend->cred) { Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data); - schannel_session_free(backend->cred); + schannel_session_free(backend->cred, 0); Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data); backend->cred = NULL; } @@ -2745,7 +2750,7 @@ HCERTSTORE Curl_schannel_get_cached_cert_store(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, const struct Curl_easy *data) { struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf); - struct Curl_multi *multi = data->multi_easy ? data->multi_easy : data->multi; + struct Curl_multi *multi = data->multi; const struct curl_blob *ca_info_blob = conn_config->ca_info_blob; struct schannel_multi_ssl_backend_data *mbackend; const struct ssl_general_config *cfg = &data->set.general_ssl; @@ -2814,7 +2819,7 @@ bool Curl_schannel_set_cached_cert_store(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, HCERTSTORE cert_store) { struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf); - struct Curl_multi *multi = data->multi_easy ? data->multi_easy : data->multi; + struct Curl_multi *multi = data->multi; const struct curl_blob *ca_info_blob = conn_config->ca_info_blob; struct schannel_multi_ssl_backend_data *mbackend; unsigned char *CAinfo_blob_digest = NULL; @@ -2913,7 +2918,6 @@ const struct Curl_ssl Curl_ssl_schannel = { schannel_get_internals, /* get_internals */ schannel_close, /* close_one */ Curl_none_close_all, /* close_all */ - schannel_session_free, /* session_free */ Curl_none_set_engine, /* set_engine */ Curl_none_set_engine_default, /* set_engine_default */ Curl_none_engines_list, /* engines_list */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/schannel_int.h b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/schannel_int.h index fe7450d453..5e233a9d05 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/schannel_int.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/schannel_int.h @@ -53,6 +53,16 @@ #define CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS 8 #endif +#if defined(_MSC_VER) && (_MSC_VER <= 1600) +/* Workaround for warning: + 'type cast' : conversion from 'int' to 'LPCSTR' of greater size */ +#undef CERT_STORE_PROV_MEMORY +#undef CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_A +#undef CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_W +#define CERT_STORE_PROV_MEMORY ((LPCSTR)(size_t)2) +#define CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_A ((LPCSTR)(size_t)9) +#define CERT_STORE_PROV_SYSTEM_W ((LPCSTR)(size_t)10) +#endif #ifndef SCH_CREDENTIALS_VERSION diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/schannel_verify.c b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/schannel_verify.c index e7c8bc66b9..24146d0bd6 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/schannel_verify.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/schannel_verify.c @@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ static CURLcode add_certs_data_to_store(HCERTSTORE trust_store, /* Sanity check that the cert_context object is the right type */ if(CERT_QUERY_CONTENT_CERT != actual_content_type) { failf(data, - "schannel: unexpected content type '%d' when extracting " + "schannel: unexpected content type '%lu' when extracting " "certificate from CA file '%s'", actual_content_type, ca_file_text); result = CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE; @@ -753,7 +753,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_verify_certificate(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, failf(data, "schannel: CertGetCertificateChain trust error" " CERT_TRUST_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN"); else - failf(data, "schannel: CertGetCertificateChain error mask: 0x%08x", + failf(data, "schannel: CertGetCertificateChain error mask: 0x%08lx", dwTrustErrorMask); result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; } diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/sectransp.c b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/sectransp.c index 0a22ff60be..f49db6481c 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/sectransp.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/sectransp.c @@ -906,7 +906,6 @@ static OSStatus sectransp_bio_cf_out_write(SSLConnectionRef connection, return rtn; } -#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS CF_INLINE const char *TLSCipherNameForNumber(SSLCipherSuite cipher) { /* The first ciphers in the ciphertable are continuous. Here we do small @@ -925,7 +924,6 @@ CF_INLINE const char *TLSCipherNameForNumber(SSLCipherSuite cipher) } return ciphertable[SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL].name; } -#endif /* !CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS */ #if CURL_BUILD_MAC CF_INLINE void GetDarwinVersionNumber(int *major, int *minor) @@ -1455,7 +1453,7 @@ static bool is_cipher_suite_strong(SSLCipherSuite suite_num) return true; } -static bool is_separator(char c) +static bool sectransp_is_separator(char c) { /* Return whether character is a cipher list separator. */ switch(c) { @@ -1549,7 +1547,7 @@ static CURLcode sectransp_set_selected_ciphers(struct Curl_easy *data, if(!ciphers) return CURLE_OK; - while(is_separator(*ciphers)) /* Skip initial separators. */ + while(sectransp_is_separator(*ciphers)) /* Skip initial separators. */ ciphers++; if(!*ciphers) return CURLE_OK; @@ -1563,14 +1561,14 @@ static CURLcode sectransp_set_selected_ciphers(struct Curl_easy *data, size_t i; /* Skip separators */ - while(is_separator(*cipher_start)) + while(sectransp_is_separator(*cipher_start)) cipher_start++; if(*cipher_start == '\0') { break; } /* Find last position of a cipher in the ciphers string */ cipher_end = cipher_start; - while(*cipher_end != '\0' && !is_separator(*cipher_end)) { + while(*cipher_end != '\0' && !sectransp_is_separator(*cipher_end)) { ++cipher_end; } @@ -1638,6 +1636,18 @@ static CURLcode sectransp_set_selected_ciphers(struct Curl_easy *data, return CURLE_OK; } +static void sectransp_session_free(void *sessionid, size_t idsize) +{ + /* ST, as of iOS 5 and Mountain Lion, has no public method of deleting a + cached session ID inside the Security framework. There is a private + function that does this, but I don't want to have to explain to you why I + got your application rejected from the App Store due to the use of a + private API, so the best we can do is free up our own char array that we + created way back in sectransp_connect_step1... */ + (void)idsize; + Curl_safefree(sessionid); +} + static CURLcode sectransp_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) { @@ -2010,7 +2020,7 @@ static CURLcode sectransp_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; } - if(connssl->peer.is_ip_address) { + if(connssl->peer.type != CURL_SSL_PEER_DNS) { infof(data, "WARNING: using IP address, SNI is being disabled by " "the OS."); } @@ -2049,8 +2059,8 @@ static CURLcode sectransp_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, size_t ssl_sessionid_len; Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data); - if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(cf, data, (void **)&ssl_sessionid, - &ssl_sessionid_len)) { + if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(cf, data, &connssl->peer, + (void **)&ssl_sessionid, &ssl_sessionid_len)) { /* we got a session id, use it! */ err = SSLSetPeerID(backend->ssl_ctx, ssl_sessionid, ssl_sessionid_len); Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data); @@ -2069,7 +2079,7 @@ static CURLcode sectransp_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, aprintf("%s:%d:%d:%s:%d", ssl_cafile ? ssl_cafile : "(blob memory)", verifypeer, conn_config->verifyhost, connssl->peer.hostname, - connssl->port); + connssl->peer.port); ssl_sessionid_len = strlen(ssl_sessionid); err = SSLSetPeerID(backend->ssl_ctx, ssl_sessionid, ssl_sessionid_len); @@ -2079,13 +2089,12 @@ static CURLcode sectransp_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; } - result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(cf, data, ssl_sessionid, - ssl_sessionid_len, NULL); + result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(cf, data, &connssl->peer, ssl_sessionid, + ssl_sessionid_len, + sectransp_session_free); Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data); - if(result) { - failf(data, "failed to store ssl session"); + if(result) return result; - } } } @@ -2369,19 +2378,15 @@ static CURLcode verify_cert(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, const struct curl_blob *ca_info_blob, SSLContextRef ctx) { - int result; + CURLcode result; unsigned char *certbuf; size_t buflen; + bool free_certbuf = FALSE; if(ca_info_blob) { CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "verify_peer, CA from config blob"); - certbuf = (unsigned char *)malloc(ca_info_blob->len + 1); - if(!certbuf) { - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - } + certbuf = ca_info_blob->data; buflen = ca_info_blob->len; - memcpy(certbuf, ca_info_blob->data, ca_info_blob->len); - certbuf[ca_info_blob->len]='\0'; } else if(cafile) { CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "verify_peer, CA from file '%s'", cafile); @@ -2389,12 +2394,14 @@ static CURLcode verify_cert(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, failf(data, "SSL: failed to read or invalid CA certificate"); return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE; } + free_certbuf = TRUE; } else return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE; result = verify_cert_buf(cf, data, certbuf, buflen, ctx); - free(certbuf); + if(free_certbuf) + free(certbuf); return result; } @@ -3229,17 +3236,6 @@ static int sectransp_shutdown(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, return rc; } -static void sectransp_session_free(void *ptr) -{ - /* ST, as of iOS 5 and Mountain Lion, has no public method of deleting a - cached session ID inside the Security framework. There is a private - function that does this, but I don't want to have to explain to you why I - got your application rejected from the App Store due to the use of a - private API, so the best we can do is free up our own char array that we - created way back in sectransp_connect_step1... */ - Curl_safefree(ptr); -} - static size_t sectransp_version(char *buffer, size_t size) { return msnprintf(buffer, size, "SecureTransport"); @@ -3473,7 +3469,6 @@ const struct Curl_ssl Curl_ssl_sectransp = { sectransp_get_internals, /* get_internals */ sectransp_close, /* close_one */ Curl_none_close_all, /* close_all */ - sectransp_session_free, /* session_free */ Curl_none_set_engine, /* set_engine */ Curl_none_set_engine_default, /* set_engine_default */ Curl_none_engines_list, /* engines_list */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/vtls.c b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/vtls.c index 34eda3e5a0..570a10d5ac 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/vtls.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/vtls.c @@ -534,10 +534,10 @@ void Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(struct Curl_easy *data) */ bool Curl_ssl_getsessionid(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, + const struct ssl_peer *peer, void **ssl_sessionid, size_t *idsize) /* set 0 if unknown */ { - struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx; struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf); struct ssl_config_data *ssl_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_config(cf, data); struct Curl_ssl_session *check; @@ -567,14 +567,15 @@ bool Curl_ssl_getsessionid(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, if(!check->sessionid) /* not session ID means blank entry */ continue; - if(strcasecompare(connssl->peer.hostname, check->name) && + if(strcasecompare(peer->hostname, check->name) && ((!cf->conn->bits.conn_to_host && !check->conn_to_host) || (cf->conn->bits.conn_to_host && check->conn_to_host && strcasecompare(cf->conn->conn_to_host.name, check->conn_to_host))) && ((!cf->conn->bits.conn_to_port && check->conn_to_port == -1) || (cf->conn->bits.conn_to_port && check->conn_to_port != -1 && cf->conn->conn_to_port == check->conn_to_port)) && - (connssl->port == check->remote_port) && + (peer->port == check->remote_port) && + (peer->transport == check->transport) && strcasecompare(cf->conn->handler->scheme, check->scheme) && match_ssl_primary_config(data, conn_config, &check->ssl_config)) { /* yes, we have a session ID! */ @@ -591,8 +592,7 @@ bool Curl_ssl_getsessionid(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, DEBUGF(infof(data, "%s Session ID in cache for %s %s://%s:%d", no_match? "Didn't find": "Found", Curl_ssl_cf_is_proxy(cf) ? "proxy" : "host", - cf->conn->handler->scheme, connssl->peer.hostname, - connssl->port)); + cf->conn->handler->scheme, peer->hostname, peer->port)); return no_match; } @@ -605,9 +605,10 @@ void Curl_ssl_kill_session(struct Curl_ssl_session *session) /* defensive check */ /* free the ID the SSL-layer specific way */ - Curl_ssl->session_free(session->sessionid); + session->sessionid_free(session->sessionid, session->idsize); session->sessionid = NULL; + session->sessionid_free = NULL; session->age = 0; /* fresh */ Curl_free_primary_ssl_config(&session->ssl_config); @@ -642,45 +643,44 @@ void Curl_ssl_delsessionid(struct Curl_easy *data, void *ssl_sessionid) */ CURLcode Curl_ssl_addsessionid(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, + const struct ssl_peer *peer, void *ssl_sessionid, size_t idsize, - bool *added) + Curl_ssl_sessionid_dtor *sessionid_free_cb) { - struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx; struct ssl_config_data *ssl_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_config(cf, data); struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf); size_t i; struct Curl_ssl_session *store; long oldest_age; - char *clone_host; - char *clone_conn_to_host; + char *clone_host = NULL; + char *clone_conn_to_host = NULL; int conn_to_port; long *general_age; + CURLcode result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - if(added) - *added = FALSE; + DEBUGASSERT(ssl_sessionid); + DEBUGASSERT(sessionid_free_cb); - if(!data->state.session) + if(!data->state.session) { + sessionid_free_cb(ssl_sessionid, idsize); return CURLE_OK; + } store = &data->state.session[0]; oldest_age = data->state.session[0].age; /* zero if unused */ - (void)ssl_config; DEBUGASSERT(ssl_config->primary.sessionid); + (void)ssl_config; - clone_host = strdup(connssl->peer.hostname); + clone_host = strdup(peer->hostname); if(!clone_host) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; /* bail out */ + goto out; if(cf->conn->bits.conn_to_host) { clone_conn_to_host = strdup(cf->conn->conn_to_host.name); - if(!clone_conn_to_host) { - free(clone_host); - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; /* bail out */ - } + if(!clone_conn_to_host) + goto out; } - else - clone_conn_to_host = NULL; if(cf->conn->bits.conn_to_port) conn_to_port = cf->conn->conn_to_port; @@ -713,33 +713,43 @@ CURLcode Curl_ssl_addsessionid(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, store = &data->state.session[i]; /* use this slot */ /* now init the session struct wisely */ + if(!clone_ssl_primary_config(conn_config, &store->ssl_config)) { + Curl_free_primary_ssl_config(&store->ssl_config); + store->sessionid = NULL; /* let caller free sessionid */ + goto out; + } store->sessionid = ssl_sessionid; store->idsize = idsize; + store->sessionid_free = sessionid_free_cb; store->age = *general_age; /* set current age */ /* free it if there's one already present */ free(store->name); free(store->conn_to_host); store->name = clone_host; /* clone host name */ + clone_host = NULL; store->conn_to_host = clone_conn_to_host; /* clone connect to host name */ + clone_conn_to_host = NULL; store->conn_to_port = conn_to_port; /* connect to port number */ /* port number */ - store->remote_port = connssl->port; + store->remote_port = peer->port; store->scheme = cf->conn->handler->scheme; + store->transport = peer->transport; - if(!clone_ssl_primary_config(conn_config, &store->ssl_config)) { - Curl_free_primary_ssl_config(&store->ssl_config); - store->sessionid = NULL; /* let caller free sessionid */ - free(clone_host); - free(clone_conn_to_host); - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - } - - if(added) - *added = TRUE; + result = CURLE_OK; - DEBUGF(infof(data, "Added Session ID to cache for %s://%s:%d [%s]", - store->scheme, store->name, store->remote_port, - Curl_ssl_cf_is_proxy(cf) ? "PROXY" : "server")); +out: + free(clone_host); + free(clone_conn_to_host); + if(result) { + failf(data, "Failed to add Session ID to cache for %s://%s:%d [%s]", + store->scheme, store->name, store->remote_port, + Curl_ssl_cf_is_proxy(cf) ? "PROXY" : "server"); + sessionid_free_cb(ssl_sessionid, idsize); + return result; + } + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "Added Session ID to cache for %s://%s:%d [%s]", + store->scheme, store->name, store->remote_port, + Curl_ssl_cf_is_proxy(cf) ? "PROXY" : "server"); return CURLE_OK; } @@ -774,9 +784,13 @@ void Curl_ssl_adjust_pollset(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, if(sock != CURL_SOCKET_BAD) { if(connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_2_writing) { Curl_pollset_set_out_only(data, ps, sock); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "adjust_pollset, POLLOUT fd=%" + CURL_FORMAT_SOCKET_T, sock); } else { Curl_pollset_set_in_only(data, ps, sock); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "adjust_pollset, POLLIN fd=%" + CURL_FORMAT_SOCKET_T, sock); } } } @@ -883,28 +897,21 @@ CURLcode Curl_ssl_push_certinfo_len(struct Curl_easy *data, size_t valuelen) { struct curl_certinfo *ci = &data->info.certs; - char *output; struct curl_slist *nl; CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; - size_t labellen = strlen(label); - size_t outlen = labellen + 1 + valuelen + 1; /* label:value\0 */ - - output = malloc(outlen); - if(!output) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - - /* sprintf the label and colon */ - msnprintf(output, outlen, "%s:", label); + struct dynbuf build; - /* memcpy the value (it might not be null-terminated) */ - memcpy(&output[labellen + 1], value, valuelen); + Curl_dyn_init(&build, 10000); - /* null-terminate the output */ - output[labellen + 1 + valuelen] = 0; + if(Curl_dyn_add(&build, label) || + Curl_dyn_addn(&build, ":", 1) || + Curl_dyn_addn(&build, value, valuelen)) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - nl = Curl_slist_append_nodup(ci->certinfo[certnum], output); + nl = Curl_slist_append_nodup(ci->certinfo[certnum], + Curl_dyn_ptr(&build)); if(!nl) { - free(output); + Curl_dyn_free(&build); curl_slist_free_all(ci->certinfo[certnum]); result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; } @@ -1002,7 +1009,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_pin_peer_pubkey(struct Curl_easy *data, /* only do this if pinnedpubkey starts with "sha256//", length 8 */ if(strncmp(pinnedpubkey, "sha256//", 8) == 0) { CURLcode encode; - size_t encodedlen = 0, pinkeylen; + size_t encodedlen = 0; char *encoded = NULL, *pinkeycopy, *begin_pos, *end_pos; unsigned char *sha256sumdigest; @@ -1030,13 +1037,11 @@ CURLcode Curl_pin_peer_pubkey(struct Curl_easy *data, infof(data, " public key hash: sha256//%s", encoded); /* it starts with sha256//, copy so we can modify it */ - pinkeylen = strlen(pinnedpubkey) + 1; - pinkeycopy = malloc(pinkeylen); + pinkeycopy = strdup(pinnedpubkey); if(!pinkeycopy) { Curl_safefree(encoded); return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; } - memcpy(pinkeycopy, pinnedpubkey, pinkeylen); /* point begin_pos to the copy, and start extracting keys */ begin_pos = pinkeycopy; do { @@ -1327,7 +1332,6 @@ static const struct Curl_ssl Curl_ssl_multi = { multissl_get_internals, /* get_internals */ multissl_close, /* close_one */ Curl_none_close_all, /* close_all */ - Curl_none_session_free, /* session_free */ Curl_none_set_engine, /* set_engine */ Curl_none_set_engine_default, /* set_engine_default */ Curl_none_engines_list, /* engines_list */ @@ -1422,17 +1426,13 @@ static size_t multissl_version(char *buffer, size_t size) backends_len = p - backends; } - if(!size) - return 0; - - if(size <= backends_len) { - strncpy(buffer, backends, size - 1); - buffer[size - 1] = '\0'; - return size - 1; + if(size) { + if(backends_len < size) + strcpy(buffer, backends); + else + *buffer = 0; /* did not fit */ } - - strcpy(buffer, backends); - return backends_len; + return 0; } static int multissl_setup(const struct Curl_ssl *backend) @@ -1525,7 +1525,7 @@ void Curl_ssl_peer_cleanup(struct ssl_peer *peer) free(peer->sni); free(peer->hostname); peer->hostname = peer->sni = peer->dispname = NULL; - peer->is_ip_address = FALSE; + peer->type = CURL_SSL_PEER_DNS; } static void cf_close(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) @@ -1539,23 +1539,28 @@ static void cf_close(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) cf->connected = FALSE; } -static int is_ip_address(const char *hostname) +static ssl_peer_type get_peer_type(const char *hostname) { -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 - struct in6_addr addr; + if(hostname && hostname[0]) { +#ifdef USE_IPV6 + struct in6_addr addr; #else - struct in_addr addr; + struct in_addr addr; #endif - return (hostname && hostname[0] && (Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, hostname, &addr) -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 - || Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, hostname, &addr) + if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, hostname, &addr)) + return CURL_SSL_PEER_IPV4; +#ifdef USE_IPV6 + else if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, hostname, &addr)) { + return CURL_SSL_PEER_IPV6; + } #endif - )); + } + return CURL_SSL_PEER_DNS; } -CURLcode Curl_ssl_peer_init(struct ssl_peer *peer, struct Curl_cfilter *cf) +CURLcode Curl_ssl_peer_init(struct ssl_peer *peer, struct Curl_cfilter *cf, + int transport) { - struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx; const char *ehostname, *edispname; int eport; @@ -1579,6 +1584,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_ssl_peer_init(struct ssl_peer *peer, struct Curl_cfilter *cf) } /* change if ehostname changed */ + DEBUGASSERT(!ehostname || ehostname[0]); if(ehostname && (!peer->hostname || strcmp(ehostname, peer->hostname))) { Curl_ssl_peer_cleanup(peer); @@ -1597,9 +1603,8 @@ CURLcode Curl_ssl_peer_init(struct ssl_peer *peer, struct Curl_cfilter *cf) } } - peer->sni = NULL; - peer->is_ip_address = is_ip_address(peer->hostname)? TRUE : FALSE; - if(peer->hostname[0] && !peer->is_ip_address) { + peer->type = get_peer_type(peer->hostname); + if(peer->type == CURL_SSL_PEER_DNS && peer->hostname[0]) { /* not an IP address, normalize according to RCC 6066 ch. 3, * max len of SNI is 2^16-1, no trailing dot */ size_t len = strlen(peer->hostname); @@ -1617,7 +1622,8 @@ CURLcode Curl_ssl_peer_init(struct ssl_peer *peer, struct Curl_cfilter *cf) } } - connssl->port = eport; + peer->port = eport; + peer->transport = transport; return CURLE_OK; } @@ -1670,7 +1676,7 @@ static CURLcode ssl_cf_connect(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, goto out; *done = FALSE; - result = Curl_ssl_peer_init(&connssl->peer, cf); + result = Curl_ssl_peer_init(&connssl->peer, cf, TRNSPRT_TCP); if(result) goto out; @@ -1739,7 +1745,8 @@ static ssize_t ssl_cf_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, /* eof */ *err = CURLE_OK; } - CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "cf_recv(len=%zu) -> %zd, %d", len, nread, *err); + CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "cf_recv(len=%zu) -> %zd, %d", len, + nread, *err); CF_DATA_RESTORE(cf, save); return nread; } @@ -1855,9 +1862,11 @@ struct Curl_cftype Curl_cft_ssl = { ssl_cf_query, }; +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY + struct Curl_cftype Curl_cft_ssl_proxy = { "SSL-PROXY", - CF_TYPE_SSL, + CF_TYPE_SSL|CF_TYPE_PROXY, CURL_LOG_LVL_NONE, ssl_cf_destroy, ssl_cf_connect, @@ -1873,6 +1882,8 @@ struct Curl_cftype Curl_cft_ssl_proxy = { Curl_cf_def_query, }; +#endif /* !CURL_DISABLE_PROXY */ + static CURLcode cf_ssl_create(struct Curl_cfilter **pcf, struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn) @@ -1980,8 +1991,12 @@ bool Curl_ssl_supports(struct Curl_easy *data, int option) static struct Curl_cfilter *get_ssl_filter(struct Curl_cfilter *cf) { for(; cf; cf = cf->next) { - if(cf->cft == &Curl_cft_ssl || cf->cft == &Curl_cft_ssl_proxy) + if(cf->cft == &Curl_cft_ssl) return cf; +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY + if(cf->cft == &Curl_cft_ssl_proxy) + return cf; +#endif } return NULL; } @@ -2027,7 +2042,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_ssl_cfilter_remove(struct Curl_easy *data, bool Curl_ssl_cf_is_proxy(struct Curl_cfilter *cf) { - return (cf->cft == &Curl_cft_ssl_proxy); + return (cf->cft->flags & CF_TYPE_SSL) && (cf->cft->flags & CF_TYPE_PROXY); } struct ssl_config_data * diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/vtls.h b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/vtls.h index f1856bd333..c40ff26208 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/vtls.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/vtls.h @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ struct Curl_ssl_session; #define SSLSUPP_HTTPS_PROXY (1<<4) /* supports access via HTTPS proxies */ #define SSLSUPP_TLS13_CIPHERSUITES (1<<5) /* supports TLS 1.3 ciphersuites */ #define SSLSUPP_CAINFO_BLOB (1<<6) +#define SSLSUPP_ECH (1<<7) #define ALPN_ACCEPTED "ALPN: server accepted " @@ -107,7 +108,8 @@ void Curl_ssl_conn_config_update(struct Curl_easy *data, bool for_proxy); /** * Init SSL peer information for filter. Can be called repeatedly. */ -CURLcode Curl_ssl_peer_init(struct ssl_peer *peer, struct Curl_cfilter *cf); +CURLcode Curl_ssl_peer_init(struct ssl_peer *peer, + struct Curl_cfilter *cf, int transport); /** * Free all allocated data and reset peer information. */ @@ -228,7 +230,9 @@ struct ssl_primary_config * Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(struct Curl_cfilter *cf); extern struct Curl_cftype Curl_cft_ssl; +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY extern struct Curl_cftype Curl_cft_ssl_proxy; +#endif #else /* if not USE_SSL */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/vtls_int.h b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/vtls_int.h index af7ae552ed..5259babb25 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/vtls_int.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/vtls_int.h @@ -73,9 +73,8 @@ struct ssl_connect_data { void *backend; /* vtls backend specific props */ struct cf_call_data call_data; /* data handle used in current call */ struct curltime handshake_done; /* time when handshake finished */ - int port; /* remote port at origin */ BIT(use_alpn); /* if ALPN shall be used in handshake */ - BIT(reused_session); /* session-ID was reused for this */ + BIT(peer_closed); /* peer has closed connection */ }; @@ -124,7 +123,6 @@ struct Curl_ssl { void *(*get_internals)(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl, CURLINFO info); void (*close)(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data); void (*close_all)(struct Curl_easy *data); - void (*session_free)(void *ptr); CURLcode (*set_engine)(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *engine); CURLcode (*set_engine_default)(struct Curl_easy *data); @@ -180,18 +178,22 @@ bool Curl_ssl_cf_is_proxy(struct Curl_cfilter *cf); */ bool Curl_ssl_getsessionid(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, + const struct ssl_peer *peer, void **ssl_sessionid, size_t *idsize); /* set 0 if unknown */ /* add a new session ID * Sessionid mutex must be locked (see Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock). * Caller must ensure that it has properly shared ownership of this sessionid * object with cache (e.g. incrementing refcount on success) + * Call takes ownership of `ssl_sessionid`, using `sessionid_free_cb` + * to destroy it in case of failure or later removal. */ CURLcode Curl_ssl_addsessionid(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data, + const struct ssl_peer *peer, void *ssl_sessionid, size_t idsize, - bool *added); + Curl_ssl_sessionid_dtor *sessionid_free_cb); #include "openssl.h" /* OpenSSL versions */ #include "gtls.h" /* GnuTLS versions */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/wolfssl.c b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/wolfssl.c index 5890bb6097..2c92f56ea4 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/wolfssl.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/wolfssl.c @@ -74,6 +74,14 @@ #include "curl_memory.h" #include "memdebug.h" +#ifdef USE_ECH +# include "curl_base64.h" +# define ECH_ENABLED(__data__) \ + (__data__->set.tls_ech && \ + !(__data__->set.tls_ech & CURLECH_DISABLE)\ + ) +#endif /* USE_ECH */ + /* KEEP_PEER_CERT is a product of the presence of build time symbol OPENSSL_EXTRA without NO_CERTS, depending on the version. KEEP_PEER_CERT is in wolfSSL's settings.h, and the latter two are build time symbols in @@ -232,7 +240,6 @@ static const struct group_name_map gnm[] = { static int wolfssl_bio_cf_create(WOLFSSL_BIO *bio) { wolfSSL_BIO_set_shutdown(bio, 1); - wolfSSL_BIO_set_init(bio, 1); wolfSSL_BIO_set_data(bio, NULL); return 1; } @@ -321,6 +328,8 @@ static int wolfssl_bio_cf_in_read(WOLFSSL_BIO *bio, char *buf, int blen) wolfSSL_BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); if(nread < 0 && CURLE_AGAIN == result) BIO_set_retry_read(bio); + else if(nread == 0) + connssl->peer_closed = TRUE; return (int)nread; } @@ -408,11 +417,11 @@ wolfssl_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) #if defined(WOLFSSL_ALLOW_TLSV10) && !defined(NO_OLD_TLS) req_method = TLSv1_client_method(); use_sni(TRUE); + break; #else failf(data, "wolfSSL does not support TLS 1.0"); return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN; #endif - break; case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1: #ifndef NO_OLD_TLS req_method = TLSv1_1_client_method(); @@ -480,6 +489,7 @@ wolfssl_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; } #endif + FALLTHROUGH(); default: break; } @@ -583,12 +593,25 @@ wolfssl_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) if(ssl_config->primary.clientcert && ssl_config->key) { int file_type = do_file_type(ssl_config->cert_type); - if(wolfSSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(backend->ctx, - ssl_config->primary.clientcert, - file_type) != 1) { - failf(data, "unable to use client certificate (no key or wrong pass" - " phrase?)"); - return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + if(file_type == WOLFSSL_FILETYPE_PEM) { + if(wolfSSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(backend->ctx, + ssl_config->primary.clientcert) + != 1) { + failf(data, "unable to use client certificate"); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + } + else if(file_type == WOLFSSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) { + if(wolfSSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(backend->ctx, + ssl_config->primary.clientcert, + file_type) != 1) { + failf(data, "unable to use client certificate"); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + } + else { + failf(data, "unknown cert type"); + return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; } file_type = do_file_type(ssl_config->key_type); @@ -697,7 +720,8 @@ wolfssl_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) void *ssl_sessionid = NULL; Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data); - if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(cf, data, &ssl_sessionid, NULL)) { + if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(cf, data, &connssl->peer, + &ssl_sessionid, NULL)) { /* we got a session id, use it! */ if(!SSL_set_session(backend->handle, ssl_sessionid)) { Curl_ssl_delsessionid(data, ssl_sessionid); @@ -709,6 +733,82 @@ wolfssl_connect_step1(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data); } +#ifdef USE_ECH + if(ECH_ENABLED(data)) { + int trying_ech_now = 0; + + if(data->set.str[STRING_ECH_PUBLIC]) { + infof(data, "ECH: outername not (yet) supported with WolfSSL"); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + if(data->set.tls_ech == CURLECH_GREASE) { + infof(data, "ECH: GREASE'd ECH not yet supported for wolfSSL"); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + if(data->set.tls_ech & CURLECH_CLA_CFG + && data->set.str[STRING_ECH_CONFIG]) { + char *b64val = data->set.str[STRING_ECH_CONFIG]; + word32 b64len = 0; + + b64len = (word32) strlen(b64val); + if(b64len + && wolfSSL_SetEchConfigsBase64(backend->handle, b64val, b64len) + != WOLFSSL_SUCCESS) { + if(data->set.tls_ech & CURLECH_HARD) + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + else { + trying_ech_now = 1; + infof(data, "ECH: ECHConfig from command line"); + } + } + else { + struct Curl_dns_entry *dns = NULL; + + dns = Curl_fetch_addr(data, connssl->peer.hostname, connssl->peer.port); + if(!dns) { + infof(data, "ECH: requested but no DNS info available"); + if(data->set.tls_ech & CURLECH_HARD) + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + else { + struct Curl_https_rrinfo *rinfo = NULL; + + rinfo = dns->hinfo; + if(rinfo && rinfo->echconfiglist) { + unsigned char *ecl = rinfo->echconfiglist; + size_t elen = rinfo->echconfiglist_len; + + infof(data, "ECH: ECHConfig from DoH HTTPS RR"); + if(wolfSSL_SetEchConfigs(backend->handle, ecl, (word32) elen) != + WOLFSSL_SUCCESS) { + infof(data, "ECH: wolfSSL_SetEchConfigs failed"); + if(data->set.tls_ech & CURLECH_HARD) + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + else { + trying_ech_now = 1; + infof(data, "ECH: imported ECHConfigList of length %ld", elen); + } + } + else { + infof(data, "ECH: requested but no ECHConfig available"); + if(data->set.tls_ech & CURLECH_HARD) + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + Curl_resolv_unlock(data, dns); + } + } + + if(trying_ech_now + && SSL_set_min_proto_version(backend->handle, TLS1_3_VERSION) != 1) { + infof(data, "ECH: Can't force TLSv1.3 [ERROR]"); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + + } +#endif /* USE_ECH */ + #ifdef USE_BIO_CHAIN { WOLFSSL_BIO *bio; @@ -742,9 +842,13 @@ wolfssl_connect_step2(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) struct wolfssl_ssl_backend_data *backend = (struct wolfssl_ssl_backend_data *)connssl->backend; struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf); +#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY const char * const pinnedpubkey = Curl_ssl_cf_is_proxy(cf)? data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY_PROXY]: data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY]; +#else + const char * const pinnedpubkey = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY]; +#endif DEBUGASSERT(backend); @@ -838,6 +942,31 @@ wolfssl_connect_step2(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) "continuing anyway"); } } +#endif +#ifdef USE_ECH + else if(-1 == detail) { + /* try access a retry_config ECHConfigList for tracing */ + byte echConfigs[1000]; + word32 echConfigsLen = 1000; + int rv = 0; + + /* this currently doesn't produce the retry_configs */ + rv = wolfSSL_GetEchConfigs(backend->handle, echConfigs, + &echConfigsLen); + if(rv != WOLFSSL_SUCCESS) { + infof(data, "Failed to get ECHConfigs"); + } + else { + char *b64str = NULL; + size_t blen = 0; + + rv = Curl_base64_encode((const char *)echConfigs, echConfigsLen, + &b64str, &blen); + if(!rv && b64str) + infof(data, "ECH: (not yet) retry_configs %s", b64str); + free(b64str); + } + } #endif else if(backend->io_result == CURLE_AGAIN) { return CURLE_OK; @@ -884,6 +1013,7 @@ wolfssl_connect_step2(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) pinnedpubkey, (const unsigned char *)pubkey->header, (size_t)(pubkey->end - pubkey->header)); + wolfSSL_FreeX509(x509); if(result) { failf(data, "SSL: public key does not match pinned public key"); return result; @@ -928,6 +1058,13 @@ wolfssl_connect_step2(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) } +static void wolfssl_session_free(void *sessionid, size_t idsize) +{ + (void)idsize; + wolfSSL_SESSION_free(sessionid); +} + + static CURLcode wolfssl_connect_step3(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) { @@ -941,40 +1078,27 @@ wolfssl_connect_step3(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) DEBUGASSERT(backend); if(ssl_config->primary.sessionid) { - bool incache; - bool added = FALSE; - void *old_ssl_sessionid = NULL; /* wolfSSL_get1_session allocates memory that has to be freed. */ WOLFSSL_SESSION *our_ssl_sessionid = wolfSSL_get1_session(backend->handle); if(our_ssl_sessionid) { + void *old_ssl_sessionid = NULL; + bool incache; Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data); - incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(cf, data, &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL)); + incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(cf, data, &connssl->peer, + &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL)); if(incache) { - if(old_ssl_sessionid != our_ssl_sessionid) { - infof(data, "old SSL session ID is stale, removing"); - Curl_ssl_delsessionid(data, old_ssl_sessionid); - incache = FALSE; - } + Curl_ssl_delsessionid(data, old_ssl_sessionid); } - if(!incache) { - result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(cf, data, our_ssl_sessionid, 0, NULL); - if(result) { - Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data); - wolfSSL_SESSION_free(our_ssl_sessionid); - failf(data, "failed to store ssl session"); - return result; - } - else { - added = TRUE; - } - } + /* call takes ownership of `our_ssl_sessionid` */ + result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(cf, data, &connssl->peer, + our_ssl_sessionid, 0, + wolfssl_session_free); Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data); - - if(!added) { - /* If the session info wasn't added to the cache, free our copy. */ - wolfSSL_SESSION_free(our_ssl_sessionid); + if(result) { + failf(data, "failed to store ssl session"); + return result; } } } @@ -1046,7 +1170,8 @@ static void wolfssl_close(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, struct Curl_easy *data) /* Maybe the server has already sent a close notify alert. Read it to avoid an RST on the TCP connection. */ (void)wolfSSL_read(backend->handle, buf, (int)sizeof(buf)); - (void)wolfSSL_shutdown(backend->handle); + if(!connssl->peer_closed) + (void)wolfSSL_shutdown(backend->handle); wolfSSL_free(backend->handle); backend->handle = NULL; } @@ -1084,9 +1209,7 @@ static ssize_t wolfssl_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, *curlcode = CURLE_OK; return 0; case SSL_ERROR_NONE: - /* FALLTHROUGH */ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: - /* FALLTHROUGH */ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: /* there's data pending, re-invoke wolfSSL_read() */ CURL_TRC_CF(data, cf, "wolfssl_recv(len=%zu) -> AGAIN", blen); @@ -1109,12 +1232,6 @@ static ssize_t wolfssl_recv(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, } -static void wolfssl_session_free(void *ptr) -{ - wolfSSL_SESSION_free(ptr); -} - - static size_t wolfssl_version(char *buffer, size_t size) { #if LIBWOLFSSL_VERSION_HEX >= 0x03006000 @@ -1373,6 +1490,9 @@ const struct Curl_ssl Curl_ssl_wolfssl = { #endif SSLSUPP_CA_PATH | SSLSUPP_CAINFO_BLOB | +#ifdef USE_ECH + SSLSUPP_ECH | +#endif SSLSUPP_SSL_CTX, sizeof(struct wolfssl_ssl_backend_data), @@ -1391,7 +1511,6 @@ const struct Curl_ssl Curl_ssl_wolfssl = { wolfssl_get_internals, /* get_internals */ wolfssl_close, /* close_one */ Curl_none_close_all, /* close_all */ - wolfssl_session_free, /* session_free */ Curl_none_set_engine, /* set_engine */ Curl_none_set_engine_default, /* set_engine_default */ Curl_none_engines_list, /* engines_list */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/x509asn1.c b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/x509asn1.c index 8b1eed63f3..4564ea958a 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/x509asn1.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/vtls/x509asn1.c @@ -97,6 +97,11 @@ #define CURL_ASN1_CHARACTER_STRING 29 #define CURL_ASN1_BMP_STRING 30 +/* Max sixes */ + +#define MAX_X509_STR 10000 +#define MAX_X509_CERT 100000 + #ifdef WANT_EXTRACT_CERTINFO /* ASN.1 OID table entry. */ struct Curl_OID { @@ -155,6 +160,7 @@ static const struct Curl_OID OIDtable[] = { { "2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1", "sha256" }, { "2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.2", "sha384" }, { "2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.3", "sha512" }, + { "1.2.840.113549.1.9.2", "unstructuredName" }, { (const char *) NULL, (const char *) NULL } }; @@ -255,61 +261,61 @@ static const struct Curl_OID *searchOID(const char *oid) } /* - * Convert an ASN.1 Boolean value into its string representation. Return the - * dynamically allocated string, or NULL if source is not an ASN.1 Boolean - * value. + * Convert an ASN.1 Boolean value into its string representation. + * + * Return error code. */ -static const char *bool2str(const char *beg, const char *end) +static CURLcode bool2str(struct dynbuf *store, + const char *beg, const char *end) { if(end - beg != 1) - return NULL; - return strdup(*beg? "TRUE": "FALSE"); + return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + return Curl_dyn_add(store, *beg? "TRUE": "FALSE"); } /* * Convert an ASN.1 octet string to a printable string. - * Return the dynamically allocated string, or NULL if an error occurs. + * + * Return error code. */ -static const char *octet2str(const char *beg, const char *end) +static CURLcode octet2str(struct dynbuf *store, + const char *beg, const char *end) { - struct dynbuf buf; - CURLcode result; - - Curl_dyn_init(&buf, 3 * CURL_ASN1_MAX + 1); - result = Curl_dyn_addn(&buf, "", 0); + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; while(!result && beg < end) - result = Curl_dyn_addf(&buf, "%02x:", (unsigned char) *beg++); + result = Curl_dyn_addf(store, "%02x:", (unsigned char) *beg++); - return Curl_dyn_ptr(&buf); + return result; } -static const char *bit2str(const char *beg, const char *end) +static CURLcode bit2str(struct dynbuf *store, + const char *beg, const char *end) { - /* Convert an ASN.1 bit string to a printable string. - Return the dynamically allocated string, or NULL if an error occurs. */ + /* Convert an ASN.1 bit string to a printable string. */ if(++beg > end) - return NULL; - return octet2str(beg, end); + return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + return octet2str(store, beg, end); } /* * Convert an ASN.1 integer value into its string representation. - * Return the dynamically allocated string, or NULL if source is not an - * ASN.1 integer value. + * + * Returns error. */ -static const char *int2str(const char *beg, const char *end) +static CURLcode int2str(struct dynbuf *store, + const char *beg, const char *end) { unsigned int val = 0; size_t n = end - beg; if(!n) - return NULL; + return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; if(n > 4) - return octet2str(beg, end); + return octet2str(store, beg, end); /* Represent integers <= 32-bit as a single value. */ if(*beg & 0x80) @@ -318,25 +324,24 @@ static const char *int2str(const char *beg, const char *end) do val = (val << 8) | *(const unsigned char *) beg++; while(beg < end); - return curl_maprintf("%s%x", val >= 10? "0x": "", val); + return Curl_dyn_addf(store, "%s%x", val >= 10? "0x": "", val); } /* - * Perform a lazy conversion from an ASN.1 typed string to UTF8. Allocate the - * destination buffer dynamically. The allocation size will normally be too - * large: this is to avoid buffer overflows. - * Terminate the string with a nul byte and return the converted - * string length. + * Convert from an ASN.1 typed string to UTF8. + * + * The result is stored in a dynbuf that is inited by the user of this + * function. + * + * Returns error. */ -static ssize_t -utf8asn1str(char **to, int type, const char *from, const char *end) +static CURLcode +utf8asn1str(struct dynbuf *to, int type, const char *from, const char *end) { size_t inlength = end - from; int size = 1; - size_t outlength; - char *buf; + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; - *to = NULL; switch(type) { case CURL_ASN1_BMP_STRING: size = 2; @@ -352,133 +357,85 @@ utf8asn1str(char **to, int type, const char *from, const char *end) case CURL_ASN1_UTF8_STRING: break; default: - return -1; /* Conversion not supported. */ + return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; /* Conversion not supported. */ } if(inlength % size) - return -1; /* Length inconsistent with character size. */ - if(inlength / size > (SIZE_T_MAX - 1) / 4) - return -1; /* Too big. */ - buf = malloc(4 * (inlength / size) + 1); - if(!buf) - return -1; /* Not enough memory. */ + /* Length inconsistent with character size. */ + return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; if(type == CURL_ASN1_UTF8_STRING) { /* Just copy. */ - outlength = inlength; - if(outlength) - memcpy(buf, from, outlength); + if(inlength) + result = Curl_dyn_addn(to, from, inlength); } else { - for(outlength = 0; from < end;) { - int charsize; - unsigned int wc; + while(!result && (from < end)) { + char buf[4]; /* decode buffer */ + int charsize = 1; + unsigned int wc = 0; - wc = 0; switch(size) { case 4: wc = (wc << 8) | *(const unsigned char *) from++; wc = (wc << 8) | *(const unsigned char *) from++; - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case 2: wc = (wc << 8) | *(const unsigned char *) from++; - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); default: /* case 1: */ wc = (wc << 8) | *(const unsigned char *) from++; } - charsize = 1; if(wc >= 0x00000080) { if(wc >= 0x00000800) { if(wc >= 0x00010000) { if(wc >= 0x00200000) { free(buf); - return -1; /* Invalid char. size for target encoding. */ + /* Invalid char. size for target encoding. */ + return CURLE_WEIRD_SERVER_REPLY; } - buf[outlength + 3] = (char) (0x80 | (wc & 0x3F)); + buf[3] = (char) (0x80 | (wc & 0x3F)); wc = (wc >> 6) | 0x00010000; charsize++; } - buf[outlength + 2] = (char) (0x80 | (wc & 0x3F)); + buf[2] = (char) (0x80 | (wc & 0x3F)); wc = (wc >> 6) | 0x00000800; charsize++; } - buf[outlength + 1] = (char) (0x80 | (wc & 0x3F)); + buf[1] = (char) (0x80 | (wc & 0x3F)); wc = (wc >> 6) | 0x000000C0; charsize++; } - buf[outlength] = (char) wc; - outlength += charsize; + buf[0] = (char) wc; + result = Curl_dyn_addn(to, buf, charsize); } } - buf[outlength] = '\0'; - *to = buf; - return outlength; -} - -/* - * Convert an ASN.1 String into its UTF-8 string representation. - * Return the dynamically allocated string, or NULL if an error occurs. - */ -static const char *string2str(int type, const char *beg, const char *end) -{ - char *buf; - if(utf8asn1str(&buf, type, beg, end) < 0) - return NULL; - return buf; -} - -/* - * Decimal ASCII encode unsigned integer `x' into the buflen sized buffer at - * buf. Return the total number of encoded digits, even if larger than - * `buflen'. - */ -static size_t encodeUint(char *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int x) -{ - size_t i = 0; - unsigned int y = x / 10; - - if(y) { - i = encodeUint(buf, buflen, y); - x -= y * 10; - } - if(i < buflen) - buf[i] = (char) ('0' + x); - i++; - if(i < buflen) - buf[i] = '\0'; /* Store a terminator if possible. */ - return i; + return result; } /* * Convert an ASN.1 OID into its dotted string representation. - * Store the result in th `n'-byte buffer at `buf'. - * Return the converted string length, or 0 on errors. + * + * Return error code. */ -static size_t encodeOID(char *buf, size_t buflen, - const char *beg, const char *end) +static CURLcode encodeOID(struct dynbuf *store, + const char *beg, const char *end) { - size_t i; unsigned int x; unsigned int y; + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; /* Process the first two numbers. */ y = *(const unsigned char *) beg++; x = y / 40; y -= x * 40; - i = encodeUint(buf, buflen, x); - if(i < buflen) - buf[i] = '.'; - i++; - if(i >= buflen) - i += encodeUint(NULL, 0, y); - else - i += encodeUint(buf + i, buflen - i, y); + + result = Curl_dyn_addf(store, "%u.%u", x, y); + if(result) + return result; /* Process the trailing numbers. */ while(beg < end) { - if(i < buflen) - buf[i] = '.'; - i++; x = 0; do { if(x & 0xFF000000) @@ -486,46 +443,44 @@ static size_t encodeOID(char *buf, size_t buflen, y = *(const unsigned char *) beg++; x = (x << 7) | (y & 0x7F); } while(y & 0x80); - if(i >= buflen) - i += encodeUint(NULL, 0, x); - else - i += encodeUint(buf + i, buflen - i, x); + result = Curl_dyn_addf(store, ".%u", x); } - if(i < buflen) - buf[i] = '\0'; - return i; + return result; } /* * Convert an ASN.1 OID into its dotted or symbolic string representation. - * Return the dynamically allocated string, or NULL if an error occurs. + * + * Return error code. */ -static const char *OID2str(const char *beg, const char *end, bool symbolic) +static CURLcode OID2str(struct dynbuf *store, + const char *beg, const char *end, bool symbolic) { - char *buf = NULL; + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; if(beg < end) { - size_t buflen = encodeOID(NULL, 0, beg, end); - if(buflen) { - buf = malloc(buflen + 1); /* one extra for the zero byte */ - if(buf) { - encodeOID(buf, buflen, beg, end); - buf[buflen] = '\0'; - - if(symbolic) { - const struct Curl_OID *op = searchOID(buf); - if(op) { - free(buf); - buf = strdup(op->textoid); - } - } + if(symbolic) { + struct dynbuf buf; + Curl_dyn_init(&buf, MAX_X509_STR); + result = encodeOID(&buf, beg, end); + + if(!result) { + const struct Curl_OID *op = searchOID(Curl_dyn_ptr(&buf)); + if(op) + result = Curl_dyn_add(store, op->textoid); + else + result = CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + Curl_dyn_free(&buf); } } + else + result = encodeOID(store, beg, end); } - return buf; + return result; } -static const char *GTime2str(const char *beg, const char *end) +static CURLcode GTime2str(struct dynbuf *store, + const char *beg, const char *end) { const char *tzp; const char *fracp; @@ -548,12 +503,12 @@ static const char *GTime2str(const char *beg, const char *end) break; case 2: sec1 = fracp[-2]; - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case 1: sec2 = fracp[-1]; break; default: - return NULL; + return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; } /* Scan for timezone, measure fractional seconds. */ @@ -582,7 +537,8 @@ static const char *GTime2str(const char *beg, const char *end) } tzl = end - tzp; - return curl_maprintf("%.4s-%.2s-%.2s %.2s:%.2s:%c%c%s%.*s%s%.*s", + return Curl_dyn_addf(store, + "%.4s-%.2s-%.2s %.2s:%.2s:%c%c%s%.*s%s%.*s", beg, beg + 4, beg + 6, beg + 8, beg + 10, sec1, sec2, fracl? ".": "", (int)fracl, fracp, @@ -590,10 +546,12 @@ static const char *GTime2str(const char *beg, const char *end) } /* - * Convert an ASN.1 UTC time to a printable string. - * Return the dynamically allocated string, or NULL if an error occurs. + * Convert an ASN.1 UTC time to a printable string. + * + * Return error code. */ -static const char *UTime2str(const char *beg, const char *end) +static CURLcode UTime2str(struct dynbuf *store, + const char *beg, const char *end) { const char *tzp; size_t tzl; @@ -606,15 +564,16 @@ static const char *UTime2str(const char *beg, const char *end) switch(tzp - sec) { case 0: sec = "00"; + FALLTHROUGH(); case 2: break; default: - return NULL; + return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; } /* Process timezone. */ if(tzp >= end) - return NULL; + return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; if(*tzp == 'Z') { tzp = "GMT"; end = tzp + 3; @@ -623,7 +582,7 @@ static const char *UTime2str(const char *beg, const char *end) tzp++; tzl = end - tzp; - return curl_maprintf("%u%.2s-%.2s-%.2s %.2s:%.2s:%.2s %.*s", + return Curl_dyn_addf(store, "%u%.2s-%.2s-%.2s %.2s:%.2s:%.2s %.*s", 20 - (*beg >= '5'), beg, beg + 2, beg + 4, beg + 6, beg + 8, sec, (int)tzl, tzp); @@ -631,34 +590,45 @@ static const char *UTime2str(const char *beg, const char *end) /* * Convert an ASN.1 element to a printable string. - * Return the dynamically allocated string, or NULL if an error occurs. + * + * Return error */ -static const char *ASN1tostr(struct Curl_asn1Element *elem, int type) +static CURLcode ASN1tostr(struct dynbuf *store, + struct Curl_asn1Element *elem, int type) { + CURLcode result = CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; if(elem->constructed) - return NULL; /* No conversion of structured elements. */ + return CURLE_OK; /* No conversion of structured elements. */ if(!type) type = elem->tag; /* Type not forced: use element tag as type. */ switch(type) { case CURL_ASN1_BOOLEAN: - return bool2str(elem->beg, elem->end); + result = bool2str(store, elem->beg, elem->end); + break; case CURL_ASN1_INTEGER: case CURL_ASN1_ENUMERATED: - return int2str(elem->beg, elem->end); + result = int2str(store, elem->beg, elem->end); + break; case CURL_ASN1_BIT_STRING: - return bit2str(elem->beg, elem->end); + result = bit2str(store, elem->beg, elem->end); + break; case CURL_ASN1_OCTET_STRING: - return octet2str(elem->beg, elem->end); + result = octet2str(store, elem->beg, elem->end); + break; case CURL_ASN1_NULL: - return strdup(""); + result = Curl_dyn_addn(store, "", 1); + break; case CURL_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER: - return OID2str(elem->beg, elem->end, TRUE); + result = OID2str(store, elem->beg, elem->end, TRUE); + break; case CURL_ASN1_UTC_TIME: - return UTime2str(elem->beg, elem->end); + result = UTime2str(store, elem->beg, elem->end); + break; case CURL_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME: - return GTime2str(elem->beg, elem->end); + result = GTime2str(store, elem->beg, elem->end); + break; case CURL_ASN1_UTF8_STRING: case CURL_ASN1_NUMERIC_STRING: case CURL_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING: @@ -667,87 +637,96 @@ static const char *ASN1tostr(struct Curl_asn1Element *elem, int type) case CURL_ASN1_VISIBLE_STRING: case CURL_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING: case CURL_ASN1_BMP_STRING: - return string2str(type, elem->beg, elem->end); + result = utf8asn1str(store, type, elem->beg, elem->end); + break; } - return NULL; /* Unsupported. */ + return result; } /* - * ASCII encode distinguished name at `dn' into the `buflen'-sized buffer at - * `buf'. + * ASCII encode distinguished name at `dn' into the store dynbuf. * - * Returns the total string length, even if larger than `buflen' or -1 on - * error. + * Returns error. */ -static ssize_t encodeDN(char *buf, size_t buflen, struct Curl_asn1Element *dn) +static CURLcode encodeDN(struct dynbuf *store, struct Curl_asn1Element *dn) { struct Curl_asn1Element rdn; struct Curl_asn1Element atv; struct Curl_asn1Element oid; struct Curl_asn1Element value; - size_t l = 0; const char *p1; const char *p2; const char *p3; const char *str; + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + bool added = FALSE; + struct dynbuf temp; + Curl_dyn_init(&temp, MAX_X509_STR); for(p1 = dn->beg; p1 < dn->end;) { p1 = getASN1Element(&rdn, p1, dn->end); - if(!p1) - return -1; + if(!p1) { + result = CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + goto error; + } for(p2 = rdn.beg; p2 < rdn.end;) { p2 = getASN1Element(&atv, p2, rdn.end); - if(!p2) - return -1; + if(!p2) { + result = CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + goto error; + } p3 = getASN1Element(&oid, atv.beg, atv.end); - if(!p3) - return -1; - if(!getASN1Element(&value, p3, atv.end)) - return -1; - str = ASN1tostr(&oid, 0); - if(!str) - return -1; + if(!p3) { + result = CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + goto error; + } + if(!getASN1Element(&value, p3, atv.end)) { + result = CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + goto error; + } + Curl_dyn_reset(&temp); + result = ASN1tostr(&temp, &oid, 0); + if(result) + goto error; + + str = Curl_dyn_ptr(&temp); /* Encode delimiter. If attribute has a short uppercase name, delimiter is ", ". */ - if(l) { - for(p3 = str; ISUPPER(*p3); p3++) - ; - for(p3 = (*p3 || p3 - str > 2)? "/": ", "; *p3; p3++) { - if(l < buflen) - buf[l] = *p3; - l++; - } + for(p3 = str; ISUPPER(*p3); p3++) + ; + if(added) { + if(p3 - str > 2) + result = Curl_dyn_addn(store, "/", 1); + else + result = Curl_dyn_addn(store, ", ", 2); + if(result) + goto error; } /* Encode attribute name. */ - for(p3 = str; *p3; p3++) { - if(l < buflen) - buf[l] = *p3; - l++; - } - free((char *) str); + result = Curl_dyn_add(store, str); + if(result) + goto error; /* Generate equal sign. */ - if(l < buflen) - buf[l] = '='; - l++; + result = Curl_dyn_addn(store, "=", 1); + if(result) + goto error; /* Generate value. */ - str = ASN1tostr(&value, 0); - if(!str) - return -1; - for(p3 = str; *p3; p3++) { - if(l < buflen) - buf[l] = *p3; - l++; - } - free((char *) str); + result = ASN1tostr(store, &value, 0); + if(result) + goto error; + Curl_dyn_reset(&temp); + added = TRUE; /* use separator for next */ } } +error: + Curl_dyn_free(&temp); - return l; + return result; } #endif /* WANT_EXTRACT_CERTINFO */ @@ -876,25 +855,9 @@ int Curl_parseX509(struct Curl_X509certificate *cert, #ifdef WANT_EXTRACT_CERTINFO -/* - * Copy at most 64-characters, terminate with a newline and returns the - * effective number of stored characters. - */ -static size_t copySubstring(char *to, const char *from) -{ - size_t i; - for(i = 0; i < 64; i++) { - to[i] = *from; - if(!*from++) - break; - } - - to[i++] = '\n'; - return i; -} - -static const char *dumpAlgo(struct Curl_asn1Element *param, - const char *beg, const char *end) +static CURLcode dumpAlgo(struct dynbuf *store, + struct Curl_asn1Element *param, + const char *beg, const char *end) { struct Curl_asn1Element oid; @@ -902,14 +865,16 @@ static const char *dumpAlgo(struct Curl_asn1Element *param, beg = getASN1Element(&oid, beg, end); if(!beg) - return NULL; + return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; param->header = NULL; param->tag = 0; param->beg = param->end = end; - if(beg < end) - if(!getASN1Element(param, beg, end)) - return NULL; - return OID2str(oid.beg, oid.end, TRUE); + if(beg < end) { + const char *p = getASN1Element(param, beg, end); + if(!p) + return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + } + return OID2str(store, oid.beg, oid.end, TRUE); } /* @@ -926,24 +891,47 @@ static CURLcode ssl_push_certinfo(struct Curl_easy *data, return Curl_ssl_push_certinfo_len(data, certnum, label, value, valuelen); } -/* return 0 on success, 1 on error */ -static int do_pubkey_field(struct Curl_easy *data, int certnum, - const char *label, struct Curl_asn1Element *elem) +/* + * This is a convenience function for push_certinfo_len that takes a + * dynbuf value. + * + * It also does the verbose output if !certnum. + */ +static CURLcode ssl_push_certinfo_dyn(struct Curl_easy *data, + int certnum, + const char *label, + struct dynbuf *ptr) { - const char *output; - CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + size_t valuelen = Curl_dyn_len(ptr); + char *value = Curl_dyn_ptr(ptr); + + CURLcode result = Curl_ssl_push_certinfo_len(data, certnum, label, + value, valuelen); + + if(!certnum && !result) + infof(data, " %s: %s", label, value); + + return result; +} + +static CURLcode do_pubkey_field(struct Curl_easy *data, int certnum, + const char *label, + struct Curl_asn1Element *elem) +{ + CURLcode result; + struct dynbuf out; + + Curl_dyn_init(&out, MAX_X509_STR); /* Generate a certificate information record for the public key. */ - output = ASN1tostr(elem, 0); - if(output) { + result = ASN1tostr(&out, elem, 0); + if(!result) { if(data->set.ssl.certinfo) - result = ssl_push_certinfo(data, certnum, label, output); - if(!certnum && !result) - infof(data, " %s: %s", label, output); - free((char *) output); + result = ssl_push_certinfo_dyn(data, certnum, label, &out); + Curl_dyn_free(&out); } - return result ? 1 : 0; + return result; } /* return 0 on success, 1 on error */ @@ -964,7 +952,7 @@ static int do_pubkey(struct Curl_easy *data, int certnum, */ const size_t len = ((pubkey->end - pubkey->beg - 2) * 4); if(!certnum) - infof(data, " ECC Public Key (%lu bits)", len); + infof(data, " ECC Public Key (%zu bits)", len); if(data->set.ssl.certinfo) { char q[sizeof(len) * 8 / 3 + 1]; (void)msnprintf(q, sizeof(q), "%zu", len); @@ -998,7 +986,7 @@ static int do_pubkey(struct Curl_easy *data, int certnum, if(len > 32) elem.beg = q; /* Strip leading zero bytes. */ if(!certnum) - infof(data, " RSA Public Key (%lu bits)", len); + infof(data, " RSA Public Key (%zu bits)", len); if(data->set.ssl.certinfo) { char r[sizeof(len) * 8 / 3 + 1]; msnprintf(r, sizeof(r), "%zu", len); @@ -1049,24 +1037,12 @@ static int do_pubkey(struct Curl_easy *data, int certnum, /* * Convert an ASN.1 distinguished name into a printable string. - * Return the dynamically allocated string, or NULL if an error occurs. + * Return error. */ -static const char *DNtostr(struct Curl_asn1Element *dn) +static CURLcode DNtostr(struct dynbuf *store, + struct Curl_asn1Element *dn) { - char *buf = NULL; - ssize_t buflen = encodeDN(NULL, 0, dn); - - if(buflen >= 0) { - buf = malloc(buflen + 1); - if(buf) { - if(encodeDN(buf, buflen + 1, dn) == -1) { - free(buf); - return NULL; - } - buf[buflen] = '\0'; - } - } - return buf; + return encodeDN(store, dn); } CURLcode Curl_extract_certinfo(struct Curl_easy *data, @@ -1076,19 +1052,19 @@ CURLcode Curl_extract_certinfo(struct Curl_easy *data, { struct Curl_X509certificate cert; struct Curl_asn1Element param; - const char *ccp; - char *cp1; - size_t cl1; - char *cp2; + char *certptr; + size_t clen; + struct dynbuf out; CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; unsigned int version; - size_t i; - size_t j; + const char *ptr; + int rc; if(!data->set.ssl.certinfo) if(certnum) return CURLE_OK; + Curl_dyn_init(&out, MAX_X509_STR); /* Prepare the certificate information for curl_easy_getinfo(). */ /* Extract the certificate ASN.1 elements. */ @@ -1096,135 +1072,126 @@ CURLcode Curl_extract_certinfo(struct Curl_easy *data, return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; /* Subject. */ - ccp = DNtostr(&cert.subject); - if(!ccp) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + result = DNtostr(&out, &cert.subject); + if(result) + goto done; if(data->set.ssl.certinfo) { - result = ssl_push_certinfo(data, certnum, "Subject", ccp); + result = ssl_push_certinfo_dyn(data, certnum, "Subject", &out); if(result) - return result; + goto done; } - if(!certnum) - infof(data, "%2d Subject: %s", certnum, ccp); - free((char *) ccp); + Curl_dyn_reset(&out); /* Issuer. */ - ccp = DNtostr(&cert.issuer); - if(!ccp) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + result = DNtostr(&out, &cert.issuer); + if(result) + goto done; if(data->set.ssl.certinfo) { - result = ssl_push_certinfo(data, certnum, "Issuer", ccp); + result = ssl_push_certinfo_dyn(data, certnum, "Issuer", &out); + if(result) + goto done; } - if(!certnum) - infof(data, " Issuer: %s", ccp); - free((char *) ccp); - if(result) - return result; + Curl_dyn_reset(&out); /* Version (always fits in less than 32 bits). */ version = 0; - for(ccp = cert.version.beg; ccp < cert.version.end; ccp++) - version = (version << 8) | *(const unsigned char *) ccp; + for(ptr = cert.version.beg; ptr < cert.version.end; ptr++) + version = (version << 8) | *(const unsigned char *) ptr; if(data->set.ssl.certinfo) { - ccp = curl_maprintf("%x", version); - if(!ccp) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - result = ssl_push_certinfo(data, certnum, "Version", ccp); - free((char *) ccp); + result = Curl_dyn_addf(&out, "%x", version); + if(result) + goto done; + result = ssl_push_certinfo_dyn(data, certnum, "Version", &out); if(result) - return result; + goto done; + Curl_dyn_reset(&out); } - if(!certnum) - infof(data, " Version: %u (0x%x)", version + 1, version); /* Serial number. */ - ccp = ASN1tostr(&cert.serialNumber, 0); - if(!ccp) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - if(data->set.ssl.certinfo) - result = ssl_push_certinfo(data, certnum, "Serial Number", ccp); - if(!certnum) - infof(data, " Serial Number: %s", ccp); - free((char *) ccp); + result = ASN1tostr(&out, &cert.serialNumber, 0); if(result) - return result; + goto done; + if(data->set.ssl.certinfo) { + result = ssl_push_certinfo_dyn(data, certnum, "Serial Number", &out); + if(result) + goto done; + } + Curl_dyn_reset(&out); /* Signature algorithm .*/ - ccp = dumpAlgo(¶m, cert.signatureAlgorithm.beg, - cert.signatureAlgorithm.end); - if(!ccp) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - if(data->set.ssl.certinfo) - result = ssl_push_certinfo(data, certnum, "Signature Algorithm", ccp); - if(!certnum) - infof(data, " Signature Algorithm: %s", ccp); - free((char *) ccp); + result = dumpAlgo(&out, ¶m, cert.signatureAlgorithm.beg, + cert.signatureAlgorithm.end); if(result) - return result; + goto done; + if(data->set.ssl.certinfo) { + result = ssl_push_certinfo_dyn(data, certnum, "Signature Algorithm", + &out); + if(result) + goto done; + } + Curl_dyn_reset(&out); /* Start Date. */ - ccp = ASN1tostr(&cert.notBefore, 0); - if(!ccp) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - if(data->set.ssl.certinfo) - result = ssl_push_certinfo(data, certnum, "Start Date", ccp); - if(!certnum) - infof(data, " Start Date: %s", ccp); - free((char *) ccp); + result = ASN1tostr(&out, &cert.notBefore, 0); if(result) - return result; + goto done; + if(data->set.ssl.certinfo) { + result = ssl_push_certinfo_dyn(data, certnum, "Start Date", &out); + if(result) + goto done; + } + Curl_dyn_reset(&out); /* Expire Date. */ - ccp = ASN1tostr(&cert.notAfter, 0); - if(!ccp) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - if(data->set.ssl.certinfo) - result = ssl_push_certinfo(data, certnum, "Expire Date", ccp); - if(!certnum) - infof(data, " Expire Date: %s", ccp); - free((char *) ccp); + result = ASN1tostr(&out, &cert.notAfter, 0); if(result) - return result; + goto done; + if(data->set.ssl.certinfo) { + result = ssl_push_certinfo_dyn(data, certnum, "Expire Date", &out); + if(result) + goto done; + } + Curl_dyn_reset(&out); /* Public Key Algorithm. */ - ccp = dumpAlgo(¶m, cert.subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm.beg, - cert.subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm.end); - if(!ccp) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - if(data->set.ssl.certinfo) - result = ssl_push_certinfo(data, certnum, "Public Key Algorithm", - ccp); - if(!result) { - int ret; - if(!certnum) - infof(data, " Public Key Algorithm: %s", ccp); - ret = do_pubkey(data, certnum, ccp, ¶m, &cert.subjectPublicKey); - if(ret) - result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; /* the most likely error */ - } - free((char *) ccp); + result = dumpAlgo(&out, ¶m, cert.subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm.beg, + cert.subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm.end); if(result) - return result; + goto done; + if(data->set.ssl.certinfo) { + result = ssl_push_certinfo_dyn(data, certnum, "Public Key Algorithm", + &out); + if(result) + goto done; + } + + rc = do_pubkey(data, certnum, Curl_dyn_ptr(&out), + ¶m, &cert.subjectPublicKey); + if(rc) { + result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; /* the most likely error */ + goto done; + } + Curl_dyn_reset(&out); /* Signature. */ - ccp = ASN1tostr(&cert.signature, 0); - if(!ccp) - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - if(data->set.ssl.certinfo) - result = ssl_push_certinfo(data, certnum, "Signature", ccp); - if(!certnum) - infof(data, " Signature: %s", ccp); - free((char *) ccp); + result = ASN1tostr(&out, &cert.signature, 0); if(result) - return result; + goto done; + if(data->set.ssl.certinfo) { + result = ssl_push_certinfo_dyn(data, certnum, "Signature", &out); + if(result) + goto done; + } + Curl_dyn_reset(&out); /* Generate PEM certificate. */ result = Curl_base64_encode(cert.certificate.beg, cert.certificate.end - cert.certificate.beg, - &cp1, &cl1); + &certptr, &clen); if(result) - return result; - /* Compute the number of characters in final certificate string. Format is: + goto done; + + /* Generate the final output certificate string. Format is: -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n \n . @@ -1232,207 +1199,34 @@ CURLcode Curl_extract_certinfo(struct Curl_easy *data, . -----END CERTIFICATE-----\n */ - i = 28 + cl1 + (cl1 + 64 - 1) / 64 + 26; - cp2 = malloc(i + 1); - if(!cp2) { - free(cp1); - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - } - /* Build the certificate string. */ - i = copySubstring(cp2, "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----"); - for(j = 0; j < cl1; j += 64) - i += copySubstring(cp2 + i, cp1 + j); - i += copySubstring(cp2 + i, "-----END CERTIFICATE-----"); - cp2[i] = '\0'; - free(cp1); - if(data->set.ssl.certinfo) - result = ssl_push_certinfo(data, certnum, "Cert", cp2); - if(!certnum) - infof(data, "%s", cp2); - free(cp2); - return result; -} -#endif /* WANT_EXTRACT_CERTINFO */ - -#endif /* USE_GNUTLS or USE_WOLFSSL or USE_SCHANNEL or USE_SECTRANSP */ + Curl_dyn_reset(&out); -#ifdef WANT_VERIFYHOST - -static const char *checkOID(const char *beg, const char *end, - const char *oid) -{ - struct Curl_asn1Element e; - const char *ccp; - const char *p; - bool matched; - - /* Check if first ASN.1 element at `beg' is the given OID. - Return a pointer in the source after the OID if found, else NULL. */ - - ccp = getASN1Element(&e, beg, end); - if(!ccp || e.tag != CURL_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER) - return NULL; - - p = OID2str(e.beg, e.end, FALSE); - if(!p) - return NULL; - - matched = !strcmp(p, oid); - free((char *) p); - return matched? ccp: NULL; -} - -CURLcode Curl_verifyhost(struct Curl_cfilter *cf, - struct Curl_easy *data, - const char *beg, const char *end) -{ - struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = cf->ctx; - struct ssl_primary_config *conn_config = Curl_ssl_cf_get_primary_config(cf); - struct Curl_X509certificate cert; - struct Curl_asn1Element dn; - struct Curl_asn1Element elem; - struct Curl_asn1Element ext; - struct Curl_asn1Element name; - const char *p; - const char *q; - char *dnsname; - int matched = -1; - size_t addrlen = (size_t) -1; - ssize_t len; - size_t hostlen; - -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 - struct in6_addr addr; -#else - struct in_addr addr; -#endif - - /* Verify that connection server matches info in X509 certificate at - `beg'..`end'. */ - - if(!conn_config->verifyhost) - return CURLE_OK; - - if(Curl_parseX509(&cert, beg, end)) - return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; - - hostlen = strlen(connssl->peer.hostname); - - /* Get the server IP address. */ -#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 - if(cf->conn->bits.ipv6_ip && - Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, connssl->peer.hostname, &addr)) - addrlen = sizeof(struct in6_addr); - else -#endif - if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, connssl->peer.hostname, &addr)) - addrlen = sizeof(struct in_addr); - - /* Process extensions. */ - for(p = cert.extensions.beg; p < cert.extensions.end && matched != 1;) { - p = getASN1Element(&ext, p, cert.extensions.end); - if(!p) - return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; - - /* Check if extension is a subjectAlternativeName. */ - ext.beg = checkOID(ext.beg, ext.end, sanOID); - if(ext.beg) { - ext.beg = getASN1Element(&elem, ext.beg, ext.end); - if(!ext.beg) - return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; - /* Skip critical if present. */ - if(elem.tag == CURL_ASN1_BOOLEAN) { - ext.beg = getASN1Element(&elem, ext.beg, ext.end); - if(!ext.beg) - return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; - } - /* Parse the octet string contents: is a single sequence. */ - if(!getASN1Element(&elem, elem.beg, elem.end)) - return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; - /* Check all GeneralNames. */ - for(q = elem.beg; matched != 1 && q < elem.end;) { - q = getASN1Element(&name, q, elem.end); - if(!q) - break; - switch(name.tag) { - case 2: /* DNS name. */ - len = utf8asn1str(&dnsname, CURL_ASN1_IA5_STRING, - name.beg, name.end); - if(len > 0 && (size_t)len == strlen(dnsname)) - matched = Curl_cert_hostcheck(dnsname, (size_t)len, - connssl->peer.hostname, hostlen); - else - matched = 0; - free(dnsname); - break; - - case 7: /* IP address. */ - matched = (size_t)(name.end - name.beg) == addrlen && - !memcmp(&addr, name.beg, addrlen); - break; - } - } - } - } - - switch(matched) { - case 1: - /* an alternative name matched the server hostname */ - infof(data, " subjectAltName: %s matched", connssl->dispname); - return CURLE_OK; - case 0: - /* an alternative name field existed, but didn't match and then - we MUST fail */ - infof(data, " subjectAltName does not match %s", connssl->dispname); - return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; - } - - /* Process subject. */ - name.header = NULL; - name.beg = name.end = ""; - q = cert.subject.beg; - /* we have to look to the last occurrence of a commonName in the - distinguished one to get the most significant one. */ - while(q < cert.subject.end) { - q = getASN1Element(&dn, q, cert.subject.end); - if(!q) - break; - for(p = dn.beg; p < dn.end;) { - p = getASN1Element(&elem, p, dn.end); - if(!p) - return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; - /* We have a DN's AttributeTypeAndValue: check it in case it's a CN. */ - elem.beg = checkOID(elem.beg, elem.end, cnOID); - if(elem.beg) - name = elem; /* Latch CN. */ - } - } - - /* Check the CN if found. */ - if(!getASN1Element(&elem, name.beg, name.end)) - failf(data, "SSL: unable to obtain common name from peer certificate"); - else { - len = utf8asn1str(&dnsname, elem.tag, elem.beg, elem.end); - if(len < 0) { - free(dnsname); - return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; - } - if(strlen(dnsname) != (size_t) len) /* Nul byte in string ? */ - failf(data, "SSL: illegal cert name field"); - else if(Curl_cert_hostcheck((const char *) dnsname, - len, connssl->peer.hostname, hostlen)) { - infof(data, " common name: %s (matched)", dnsname); - free(dnsname); - return CURLE_OK; + /* Build the certificate string. */ + result = Curl_dyn_add(&out, "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"); + if(!result) { + size_t j = 0; + + while(!result && (j < clen)) { + size_t chunksize = (clen - j) > 64 ? 64 : (clen - j); + result = Curl_dyn_addn(&out, &certptr[j], chunksize); + if(!result) + result = Curl_dyn_addn(&out, "\n", 1); + j += chunksize; } - else - failf(data, "SSL: certificate subject name '%s' does not match " - "target host name '%s'", dnsname, connssl->dispname); - free(dnsname); + if(!result) + result = Curl_dyn_add(&out, "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"); } + free(certptr); + if(!result) + if(data->set.ssl.certinfo) + result = ssl_push_certinfo_dyn(data, certnum, "Cert", &out); - return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; +done: + Curl_dyn_free(&out); + return result; } -#endif /* WANT_VERIFYHOST */ +#endif /* WANT_EXTRACT_CERTINFO */ + +#endif /* USE_GNUTLS or USE_WOLFSSL or USE_SCHANNEL or USE_SECTRANSP */ diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/warnless.h b/vendor/curl/lib/warnless.h index e5a02c8d94..6adf63a793 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/warnless.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/warnless.h @@ -77,20 +77,6 @@ ssize_t curlx_write(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count); #endif /* _WIN32 */ -#if defined(__INTEL_COMPILER) && defined(__unix__) - -int curlx_FD_ISSET(int fd, fd_set *fdset); - -void curlx_FD_SET(int fd, fd_set *fdset); - -void curlx_FD_ZERO(fd_set *fdset); - -unsigned short curlx_htons(unsigned short usnum); - -unsigned short curlx_ntohs(unsigned short usnum); - -#endif /* __INTEL_COMPILER && __unix__ */ - #endif /* HEADER_CURL_WARNLESS_H */ #ifndef HEADER_CURL_WARNLESS_H_REDEFS diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/ws.c b/vendor/curl/lib/ws.c index adde531f5e..6ccf9e65fd 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/ws.c +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/ws.c @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ #include "curl_setup.h" #include -#ifdef USE_WEBSOCKETS +#if defined(USE_WEBSOCKETS) && !defined(CURL_DISABLE_HTTP) #include "urldata.h" #include "bufq.h" @@ -114,23 +114,23 @@ static void ws_dec_info(struct ws_decoder *dec, struct Curl_easy *data, case 0: break; case 1: - infof(data, "WS-DEC: %s [%s%s]", msg, - ws_frame_name_of_op(dec->head[0]), - (dec->head[0] & WSBIT_FIN)? "" : " NON-FINAL"); + CURL_TRC_WRITE(data, "websocket, decoded %s [%s%s]", msg, + ws_frame_name_of_op(dec->head[0]), + (dec->head[0] & WSBIT_FIN)? "" : " NON-FINAL"); break; default: if(dec->head_len < dec->head_total) { - infof(data, "WS-DEC: %s [%s%s](%d/%d)", msg, - ws_frame_name_of_op(dec->head[0]), - (dec->head[0] & WSBIT_FIN)? "" : " NON-FINAL", - dec->head_len, dec->head_total); + CURL_TRC_WRITE(data, "websocket, decoded %s [%s%s](%d/%d)", msg, + ws_frame_name_of_op(dec->head[0]), + (dec->head[0] & WSBIT_FIN)? "" : " NON-FINAL", + dec->head_len, dec->head_total); } else { - infof(data, "WS-DEC: %s [%s%s payload=%" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T - "/%" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T "]", - msg, ws_frame_name_of_op(dec->head[0]), - (dec->head[0] & WSBIT_FIN)? "" : " NON-FINAL", - dec->payload_offset, dec->payload_len); + CURL_TRC_WRITE(data, "websocket, decoded %s [%s%s payload=%" + CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T "/%" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T "]", + msg, ws_frame_name_of_op(dec->head[0]), + (dec->head[0] & WSBIT_FIN)? "" : " NON-FINAL", + dec->payload_offset, dec->payload_len); } break; } @@ -225,6 +225,10 @@ static CURLcode ws_dec_read_head(struct ws_decoder *dec, dec->payload_len = (dec->head[2] << 8) | dec->head[3]; break; case 10: + if(dec->head[2] > 127) { + failf(data, "WS: frame length longer than 64 signed not supported"); + return CURLE_RECV_ERROR; + } dec->payload_len = ((curl_off_t)dec->head[2] << 56) | (curl_off_t)dec->head[3] << 48 | (curl_off_t)dec->head[4] << 40 | @@ -273,9 +277,8 @@ static CURLcode ws_dec_pass_payload(struct ws_decoder *dec, Curl_bufq_skip(inraw, (size_t)nwritten); dec->payload_offset += (curl_off_t)nwritten; remain = dec->payload_len - dec->payload_offset; - /* infof(data, "WS-DEC: passed %zd bytes payload, %" - CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T " remain", - nwritten, remain); */ + CURL_TRC_WRITE(data, "websocket, passed %zd bytes payload, %" + CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T " remain", nwritten, remain); } return remain? CURLE_AGAIN : CURLE_OK; @@ -296,7 +299,7 @@ static CURLcode ws_dec_pass(struct ws_decoder *dec, case WS_DEC_INIT: ws_dec_reset(dec); dec->state = WS_DEC_HEAD; - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case WS_DEC_HEAD: result = ws_dec_read_head(dec, data, inraw); if(result) { @@ -321,7 +324,7 @@ static CURLcode ws_dec_pass(struct ws_decoder *dec, dec->state = WS_DEC_INIT; break; } - /* FALLTHROUGH */ + FALLTHROUGH(); case WS_DEC_PAYLOAD: result = ws_dec_pass_payload(dec, data, inraw, write_payload, write_ctx); ws_dec_info(dec, data, "passing"); @@ -350,6 +353,138 @@ static void update_meta(struct websocket *ws, ws->frame.bytesleft = (payload_len - payload_offset - cur_len); } +/* WebSockets decoding client writer */ +struct ws_cw_ctx { + struct Curl_cwriter super; + struct bufq buf; +}; + +static CURLcode ws_cw_init(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_cwriter *writer) +{ + struct ws_cw_ctx *ctx = writer->ctx; + (void)data; + Curl_bufq_init2(&ctx->buf, WS_CHUNK_SIZE, 1, BUFQ_OPT_SOFT_LIMIT); + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static void ws_cw_close(struct Curl_easy *data, struct Curl_cwriter *writer) +{ + struct ws_cw_ctx *ctx = writer->ctx; + (void) data; + Curl_bufq_free(&ctx->buf); +} + +struct ws_cw_dec_ctx { + struct Curl_easy *data; + struct websocket *ws; + struct Curl_cwriter *next_writer; + int cw_type; +}; + +static ssize_t ws_cw_dec_next(const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, + int frame_age, int frame_flags, + curl_off_t payload_offset, + curl_off_t payload_len, + void *user_data, + CURLcode *err) +{ + struct ws_cw_dec_ctx *ctx = user_data; + struct Curl_easy *data = ctx->data; + struct websocket *ws = ctx->ws; + curl_off_t remain = (payload_len - (payload_offset + buflen)); + + (void)frame_age; + if((frame_flags & CURLWS_PING) && !remain) { + /* auto-respond to PINGs, only works for single-frame payloads atm */ + size_t bytes; + infof(data, "WS: auto-respond to PING with a PONG"); + /* send back the exact same content as a PONG */ + *err = curl_ws_send(data, buf, buflen, &bytes, 0, CURLWS_PONG); + if(*err) + return -1; + } + else if(buflen || !remain) { + /* forward the decoded frame to the next client writer. */ + update_meta(ws, frame_age, frame_flags, payload_offset, + payload_len, buflen); + + *err = Curl_cwriter_write(data, ctx->next_writer, ctx->cw_type, + (const char *)buf, buflen); + if(*err) + return -1; + } + *err = CURLE_OK; + return (ssize_t)buflen; +} + +static CURLcode ws_cw_write(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct Curl_cwriter *writer, int type, + const char *buf, size_t nbytes) +{ + struct ws_cw_ctx *ctx = writer->ctx; + struct websocket *ws; + CURLcode result; + + if(!(type & CLIENTWRITE_BODY) || data->set.ws_raw_mode) + return Curl_cwriter_write(data, writer->next, type, buf, nbytes); + + ws = data->conn->proto.ws; + if(!ws) { + failf(data, "WS: not a websocket transfer"); + return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + } + + if(nbytes) { + ssize_t nwritten; + nwritten = Curl_bufq_write(&ctx->buf, (const unsigned char *)buf, + nbytes, &result); + if(nwritten < 0) { + infof(data, "WS: error adding data to buffer %d", result); + return result; + } + } + + while(!Curl_bufq_is_empty(&ctx->buf)) { + struct ws_cw_dec_ctx pass_ctx; + pass_ctx.data = data; + pass_ctx.ws = ws; + pass_ctx.next_writer = writer->next; + pass_ctx.cw_type = type; + result = ws_dec_pass(&ws->dec, data, &ctx->buf, + ws_cw_dec_next, &pass_ctx); + if(result == CURLE_AGAIN) { + /* insufficient amount of data, keep it for later. + * we pretend to have written all since we have a copy */ + CURL_TRC_WRITE(data, "websocket, buffered incomplete frame head"); + return CURLE_OK; + } + else if(result) { + infof(data, "WS: decode error %d", (int)result); + return result; + } + } + + if((type & CLIENTWRITE_EOS) && !Curl_bufq_is_empty(&ctx->buf)) { + infof(data, "WS: decode ending with %zd frame bytes remaining", + Curl_bufq_len(&ctx->buf)); + return CURLE_RECV_ERROR; + } + + return CURLE_OK; +} + +/* WebSocket payload decoding client writer. */ +static const struct Curl_cwtype ws_cw_decode = { + "ws-decode", + NULL, + ws_cw_init, + ws_cw_write, + ws_cw_close, + sizeof(struct ws_cw_ctx) +}; + + static void ws_enc_info(struct ws_encoder *enc, struct Curl_easy *data, const char *msg) { @@ -410,6 +545,13 @@ static ssize_t ws_enc_write_head(struct Curl_easy *data, size_t hlen; ssize_t n; + if(payload_len < 0) { + failf(data, "WS: starting new frame with negative payload length %" + CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T, payload_len); + *err = CURLE_SEND_ERROR; + return -1; + } + if(enc->payload_remain > 0) { /* trying to write a new frame before the previous one is finished */ failf(data, "WS: starting new frame with %zd bytes from last one" @@ -576,8 +718,10 @@ CURLcode Curl_ws_request(struct Curl_easy *data, REQTYPE *req) if(result) return result; DEBUGASSERT(randlen < sizeof(keyval)); - if(randlen >= sizeof(keyval)) + if(randlen >= sizeof(keyval)) { + free(randstr); return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + } strcpy(keyval, randstr); free(randstr); for(i = 0; !result && (i < sizeof(heads)/sizeof(heads[0])); i++) { @@ -607,17 +751,32 @@ CURLcode Curl_ws_accept(struct Curl_easy *data, { struct SingleRequest *k = &data->req; struct websocket *ws; + struct Curl_cwriter *ws_dec_writer; CURLcode result; DEBUGASSERT(data->conn); ws = data->conn->proto.ws; if(!ws) { + size_t chunk_size = WS_CHUNK_SIZE; ws = calloc(1, sizeof(*ws)); if(!ws) return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; data->conn->proto.ws = ws; - Curl_bufq_init(&ws->recvbuf, WS_CHUNK_SIZE, WS_CHUNK_COUNT); - Curl_bufq_init2(&ws->sendbuf, WS_CHUNK_SIZE, WS_CHUNK_COUNT, +#ifdef DEBUGBUILD + { + char *p = getenv("CURL_WS_CHUNK_SIZE"); + if(p) { + long l = strtol(p, NULL, 10); + if(l > 0 && l <= (1*1024*1024)) { + chunk_size = (size_t)l; + } + } + } +#endif + DEBUGF(infof(data, "WS, using chunk size %zu", chunk_size)); + Curl_bufq_init2(&ws->recvbuf, chunk_size, WS_CHUNK_COUNT, + BUFQ_OPT_SOFT_LIMIT); + Curl_bufq_init2(&ws->sendbuf, chunk_size, WS_CHUNK_COUNT, BUFQ_OPT_SOFT_LIMIT); ws_dec_init(&ws->dec); ws_enc_init(&ws->enc); @@ -655,6 +814,18 @@ CURLcode Curl_ws_accept(struct Curl_easy *data, infof(data, "Received 101, switch to WebSocket; mask %02x%02x%02x%02x", ws->enc.mask[0], ws->enc.mask[1], ws->enc.mask[2], ws->enc.mask[3]); + /* Install our client writer that decodes WS frames payload */ + result = Curl_cwriter_create(&ws_dec_writer, data, &ws_cw_decode, + CURL_CW_CONTENT_DECODE); + if(result) + return result; + + result = Curl_cwriter_add(data, ws_dec_writer); + if(result) { + Curl_cwriter_free(data, ws_dec_writer); + return result; + } + if(data->set.connect_only) { ssize_t nwritten; /* In CONNECT_ONLY setup, the payloads from `mem` need to be received @@ -666,110 +837,20 @@ CURLcode Curl_ws_accept(struct Curl_easy *data, return result; infof(data, "%zu bytes websocket payload", nread); } - k->upgr101 = UPGR101_RECEIVED; - - return result; -} - -static ssize_t ws_client_write(const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, - int frame_age, int frame_flags, - curl_off_t payload_offset, - curl_off_t payload_len, - void *userp, - CURLcode *err) -{ - struct Curl_easy *data = userp; - struct websocket *ws; - size_t wrote; - curl_off_t remain = (payload_len - (payload_offset + buflen)); - - (void)frame_age; - if(!data->conn || !data->conn->proto.ws) { - *err = CURLE_FAILED_INIT; - return -1; - } - ws = data->conn->proto.ws; - - if((frame_flags & CURLWS_PING) && !remain) { - /* auto-respond to PINGs, only works for single-frame payloads atm */ - size_t bytes; - infof(data, "WS: auto-respond to PING with a PONG"); - /* send back the exact same content as a PONG */ - *err = curl_ws_send(data, buf, buflen, &bytes, 0, CURLWS_PONG); - if(*err) - return -1; - } - else if(buflen || !remain) { - /* deliver the decoded frame to the user callback. The application - * may invoke curl_ws_meta() to access frame information. */ - update_meta(ws, frame_age, frame_flags, payload_offset, - payload_len, buflen); - Curl_set_in_callback(data, true); - wrote = data->set.fwrite_func((char *)buf, 1, - buflen, data->set.out); - Curl_set_in_callback(data, false); - if(wrote != buflen) { - *err = CURLE_RECV_ERROR; - return -1; + else { /* !connect_only */ + /* And pass any additional data to the writers */ + if(nread) { + result = Curl_client_write(data, CLIENTWRITE_BODY, (char *)mem, nread); } } - *err = CURLE_OK; - return (ssize_t)buflen; -} - -/* Curl_ws_writecb() is the write callback for websocket traffic. The - websocket data is provided to this raw, in chunks. This function should - handle/decode the data and call the "real" underlying callback accordingly. -*/ -size_t Curl_ws_writecb(char *buffer, size_t size /* 1 */, - size_t nitems, void *userp) -{ - struct Curl_easy *data = userp; - - if(data->set.ws_raw_mode) - return data->set.fwrite_func(buffer, size, nitems, data->set.out); - else if(nitems) { - struct websocket *ws; - CURLcode result; - - if(!data->conn || !data->conn->proto.ws) { - failf(data, "WS: not a websocket transfer"); - return nitems - 1; - } - ws = data->conn->proto.ws; - - if(buffer) { - ssize_t nwritten; - - nwritten = Curl_bufq_write(&ws->recvbuf, (const unsigned char *)buffer, - nitems, &result); - if(nwritten < 0) { - infof(data, "WS: error adding data to buffer %d", (int)result); - return nitems - 1; - } - buffer = NULL; - } - - while(!Curl_bufq_is_empty(&ws->recvbuf)) { + k->upgr101 = UPGR101_RECEIVED; - result = ws_dec_pass(&ws->dec, data, &ws->recvbuf, - ws_client_write, data); - if(result == CURLE_AGAIN) - /* insufficient amount of data, keep it for later. - * we pretend to have written all since we have a copy */ - return nitems; - else if(result) { - infof(data, "WS: decode error %d", (int)result); - return nitems - 1; - } - } - } - return nitems; + return result; } struct ws_collect { struct Curl_easy *data; - void *buffer; + unsigned char *buffer; size_t buflen; size_t bufidx; int frame_age; @@ -821,7 +902,7 @@ static ssize_t ws_client_collect(const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, return -1; } *err = CURLE_OK; - memcpy(ctx->buffer, buf, nwritten); + memcpy(ctx->buffer + ctx->bufidx, buf, nwritten); ctx->bufidx += nwritten; } return nwritten; @@ -871,10 +952,6 @@ CURL_EXTERN CURLcode curl_ws_recv(struct Curl_easy *data, void *buffer, *nread = 0; *metap = NULL; - /* get a download buffer */ - result = Curl_preconnect(data); - if(result) - return result; memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.data = data; @@ -936,14 +1013,17 @@ static CURLcode ws_flush(struct Curl_easy *data, struct websocket *ws, if(!Curl_bufq_is_empty(&ws->sendbuf)) { CURLcode result; const unsigned char *out; - size_t outlen; - ssize_t n; + size_t outlen, n; while(Curl_bufq_peek(&ws->sendbuf, &out, &outlen)) { if(data->set.connect_only) result = Curl_senddata(data, out, outlen, &n); - else - result = Curl_write(data, data->conn->writesockfd, out, outlen, &n); + else { + result = Curl_xfer_send(data, out, outlen, &n); + if(!result && !n && outlen) + result = CURLE_AGAIN; + } + if(result) { if(result == CURLE_AGAIN) { if(!complete) { @@ -962,8 +1042,8 @@ static CURLcode ws_flush(struct Curl_easy *data, struct websocket *ws, } } else { - infof(data, "WS: flushed %zu bytes", (size_t)n); - Curl_bufq_skip(&ws->sendbuf, (size_t)n); + infof(data, "WS: flushed %zu bytes", n); + Curl_bufq_skip(&ws->sendbuf, n); } } } @@ -976,8 +1056,8 @@ CURL_EXTERN CURLcode curl_ws_send(CURL *data, const void *buffer, unsigned int flags) { struct websocket *ws; - ssize_t nwritten, n; - size_t space; + ssize_t n; + size_t nwritten, space; CURLcode result; *sent = 0; @@ -997,23 +1077,25 @@ CURL_EXTERN CURLcode curl_ws_send(CURL *data, const void *buffer, ws = data->conn->proto.ws; if(data->set.ws_raw_mode) { - if(fragsize || flags) + if(fragsize || flags) { + DEBUGF(infof(data, "ws_send: " + "fragsize and flags cannot be non-zero in raw mode")); return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + } if(!buflen) /* nothing to do */ return CURLE_OK; /* raw mode sends exactly what was requested, and this is from within the write callback */ if(Curl_is_in_callback(data)) { - result = Curl_write(data, data->conn->writesockfd, buffer, buflen, - &nwritten); + result = Curl_xfer_send(data, buffer, buflen, &nwritten); } else result = Curl_senddata(data, buffer, buflen, &nwritten); infof(data, "WS: wanted to send %zu bytes, sent %zu bytes", buflen, nwritten); - *sent = (nwritten >= 0)? (size_t)nwritten : 0; + *sent = nwritten; return result; } @@ -1023,7 +1105,7 @@ CURL_EXTERN CURLcode curl_ws_send(CURL *data, const void *buffer, return result; /* TODO: the current design does not allow partial writes, afaict. - * It is not clear who the application is supposed to react. */ + * It is not clear how the application is supposed to react. */ space = Curl_bufq_space(&ws->sendbuf); DEBUGF(infof(data, "curl_ws_send(len=%zu), sendbuf len=%zu space %zu", buflen, Curl_bufq_len(&ws->sendbuf), space)); @@ -1071,14 +1153,18 @@ static void ws_free(struct connectdata *conn) } } -void Curl_ws_done(struct Curl_easy *data) +static CURLcode ws_setup_conn(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct connectdata *conn) { - (void)data; + /* websockets is 1.1 only (for now) */ + data->state.httpwant = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1; + return Curl_http_setup_conn(data, conn); } -CURLcode Curl_ws_disconnect(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn, - bool dead_connection) + +static CURLcode ws_disconnect(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct connectdata *conn, + bool dead_connection) { (void)data; (void)dead_connection; @@ -1096,6 +1182,59 @@ CURL_EXTERN const struct curl_ws_frame *curl_ws_meta(struct Curl_easy *data) return NULL; } +const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_ws = { + "WS", /* scheme */ + ws_setup_conn, /* setup_connection */ + Curl_http, /* do_it */ + Curl_http_done, /* done */ + ZERO_NULL, /* do_more */ + Curl_http_connect, /* connect_it */ + ZERO_NULL, /* connecting */ + ZERO_NULL, /* doing */ + ZERO_NULL, /* proto_getsock */ + Curl_http_getsock_do, /* doing_getsock */ + ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ + ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ + ws_disconnect, /* disconnect */ + Curl_http_write_resp, /* write_resp */ + Curl_http_write_resp_hd, /* write_resp_hd */ + ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ + ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ + PORT_HTTP, /* defport */ + CURLPROTO_WS, /* protocol */ + CURLPROTO_HTTP, /* family */ + PROTOPT_CREDSPERREQUEST | /* flags */ + PROTOPT_USERPWDCTRL +}; + +#ifdef USE_SSL +const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_wss = { + "WSS", /* scheme */ + ws_setup_conn, /* setup_connection */ + Curl_http, /* do_it */ + Curl_http_done, /* done */ + ZERO_NULL, /* do_more */ + Curl_http_connect, /* connect_it */ + NULL, /* connecting */ + ZERO_NULL, /* doing */ + NULL, /* proto_getsock */ + Curl_http_getsock_do, /* doing_getsock */ + ZERO_NULL, /* domore_getsock */ + ZERO_NULL, /* perform_getsock */ + ws_disconnect, /* disconnect */ + Curl_http_write_resp, /* write_resp */ + Curl_http_write_resp_hd, /* write_resp_hd */ + ZERO_NULL, /* connection_check */ + ZERO_NULL, /* attach connection */ + PORT_HTTPS, /* defport */ + CURLPROTO_WSS, /* protocol */ + CURLPROTO_HTTP, /* family */ + PROTOPT_SSL | PROTOPT_CREDSPERREQUEST | /* flags */ + PROTOPT_USERPWDCTRL +}; +#endif + + #else CURL_EXTERN CURLcode curl_ws_recv(CURL *curl, void *buffer, size_t buflen, diff --git a/vendor/curl/lib/ws.h b/vendor/curl/lib/ws.h index 0308a42545..baa77b4424 100644 --- a/vendor/curl/lib/ws.h +++ b/vendor/curl/lib/ws.h @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ ***************************************************************************/ #include "curl_setup.h" -#ifdef USE_WEBSOCKETS +#if defined(USE_WEBSOCKETS) && !defined(CURL_DISABLE_HTTP) #ifdef USE_HYPER #define REQTYPE void @@ -75,14 +75,15 @@ struct websocket { CURLcode Curl_ws_request(struct Curl_easy *data, REQTYPE *req); CURLcode Curl_ws_accept(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *mem, size_t len); -size_t Curl_ws_writecb(char *buffer, size_t size, size_t nitems, void *userp); -void Curl_ws_done(struct Curl_easy *data); -CURLcode Curl_ws_disconnect(struct Curl_easy *data, - struct connectdata *conn, - bool dead_connection); + +extern const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_ws; +#ifdef USE_SSL +extern const struct Curl_handler Curl_handler_wss; +#endif + + #else #define Curl_ws_request(x,y) CURLE_OK -#define Curl_ws_done(x) Curl_nop_stmt #define Curl_ws_free(x) Curl_nop_stmt #endif diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/README.md b/vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/README.md deleted file mode 100644 index bcf12c0c05..0000000000 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/README.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ -The files in this directory stem from [Project Everest](https://project-everest.github.io/) and are distributed under the Apache 2.0 license. - -This is a formally verified implementation of Curve25519-based handshakes. The C code is automatically derived from the (verified) [original implementation](https://github.com/project-everest/hacl-star/tree/master/code/curve25519) in the [F* language](https://github.com/fstarlang/fstar) by [KreMLin](https://github.com/fstarlang/kremlin). In addition to the improved safety and security of the implementation, it is also significantly faster than the default implementation of Curve25519 in mbedTLS. - -The caveat is that not all platforms are supported, although the version in `everest/library/legacy` should work on most systems. The main issue is that some platforms do not provide a 128-bit integer type and KreMLin therefore has to use additional (also verified) code to simulate them, resulting in less of a performance gain overall. Explicitly supported platforms are currently `x86` and `x86_64` using gcc or clang, and Visual C (2010 and later). diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010/Hacl_Curve25519.h b/vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2013/Hacl_Curve25519.h similarity index 100% rename from vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010/Hacl_Curve25519.h rename to vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2013/Hacl_Curve25519.h diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010/inttypes.h b/vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2013/inttypes.h similarity index 100% rename from vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010/inttypes.h rename to vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2013/inttypes.h diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010/stdbool.h b/vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2013/stdbool.h similarity index 100% rename from vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2010/stdbool.h rename to vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/include/everest/vs2013/stdbool.h diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/library/Hacl_Curve25519_joined.c b/vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/library/Hacl_Curve25519_joined.c index b7d0c929c9..a778160fff 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/library/Hacl_Curve25519_joined.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/everest/library/Hacl_Curve25519_joined.c @@ -18,6 +18,15 @@ * * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) */ +#ifndef _BSD_SOURCE +/* Required to get htole64() from gcc/glibc's endian.h (older systems) + * when we compile with -std=c99 */ +#define _BSD_SOURCE +#endif +#ifndef _DEFAULT_SOURCE +/* (modern version of _BSD_SOURCE) */ +#define _DEFAULT_SOURCE +#endif #include "common.h" diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m/p256-m.c b/vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m/p256-m.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..42c35b5bf5 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m/p256-m.c @@ -0,0 +1,1514 @@ +/* + * Implementation of curve P-256 (ECDH and ECDSA) + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * Author: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "p256-m.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include +#include +#include + +#if defined (MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) + +/* + * Zeroize memory - this should not be optimized away + */ +#define zeroize mbedtls_platform_zeroize + +/* + * Helpers to test constant-time behaviour with valgrind or MemSan. + * + * CT_POISON() is used for secret data. It marks the memory area as + * uninitialised, so that any branch or pointer dereference that depends on it + * (even indirectly) triggers a warning. + * CT_UNPOISON() is used for public data; it marks the area as initialised. + * + * These are macros in order to avoid interfering with origin tracking. + */ +#if defined(CT_MEMSAN) + +#include +#define CT_POISON __msan_allocated_memory +// void __msan_allocated_memory(const volatile void* data, size_t size); +#define CT_UNPOISON __msan_unpoison +// void __msan_unpoison(const volatile void *a, size_t size); + +#elif defined(CT_VALGRIND) + +#include +#define CT_POISON VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED +// VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_UNDEFINED(_qzz_addr,_qzz_len) +#define CT_UNPOISON VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED +// VALGRIND_MAKE_MEM_DEFINED(_qzz_addr,_qzz_len) + +#else +#define CT_POISON(p, sz) +#define CT_UNPOISON(p, sz) +#endif + +/********************************************************************** + * + * Operations on fixed-width unsigned integers + * + * Represented using 32-bit limbs, least significant limb first. + * That is: x = x[0] + 2^32 x[1] + ... + 2^224 x[7] for 256-bit. + * + **********************************************************************/ + +/* + * 256-bit set to 32-bit value + * + * in: x in [0, 2^32) + * out: z = x + */ +static void u256_set32(uint32_t z[8], uint32_t x) +{ + z[0] = x; + for (unsigned i = 1; i < 8; i++) { + z[i] = 0; + } +} + +/* + * 256-bit addition + * + * in: x, y in [0, 2^256) + * out: z = (x + y) mod 2^256 + * c = (x + y) div 2^256 + * That is, z + c * 2^256 = x + y + * + * Note: as a memory area, z must be either equal to x or y, or not overlap. + */ +static uint32_t u256_add(uint32_t z[8], + const uint32_t x[8], const uint32_t y[8]) +{ + uint32_t carry = 0; + + for (unsigned i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + uint64_t sum = (uint64_t) carry + x[i] + y[i]; + z[i] = (uint32_t) sum; + carry = (uint32_t) (sum >> 32); + } + + return carry; +} + +/* + * 256-bit subtraction + * + * in: x, y in [0, 2^256) + * out: z = (x - y) mod 2^256 + * c = 0 if x >=y, 1 otherwise + * That is, z = c * 2^256 + x - y + * + * Note: as a memory area, z must be either equal to x or y, or not overlap. + */ +static uint32_t u256_sub(uint32_t z[8], + const uint32_t x[8], const uint32_t y[8]) +{ + uint32_t carry = 0; + + for (unsigned i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + uint64_t diff = (uint64_t) x[i] - y[i] - carry; + z[i] = (uint32_t) diff; + carry = -(uint32_t) (diff >> 32); + } + + return carry; +} + +/* + * 256-bit conditional assignment + * + * in: x in [0, 2^256) + * c in [0, 1] + * out: z = x if c == 1, z unchanged otherwise + * + * Note: as a memory area, z must be either equal to x, or not overlap. + */ +static void u256_cmov(uint32_t z[8], const uint32_t x[8], uint32_t c) +{ + const uint32_t x_mask = -c; + for (unsigned i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + z[i] = (z[i] & ~x_mask) | (x[i] & x_mask); + } +} + +/* + * 256-bit compare for equality + * + * in: x in [0, 2^256) + * y in [0, 2^256) + * out: 0 if x == y, unspecified non-zero otherwise + */ +static uint32_t u256_diff(const uint32_t x[8], const uint32_t y[8]) +{ + uint32_t diff = 0; + for (unsigned i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + diff |= x[i] ^ y[i]; + } + return diff; +} + +/* + * 256-bit compare to zero + * + * in: x in [0, 2^256) + * out: 0 if x == 0, unspecified non-zero otherwise + */ +static uint32_t u256_diff0(const uint32_t x[8]) +{ + uint32_t diff = 0; + for (unsigned i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + diff |= x[i]; + } + return diff; +} + +/* + * 32 x 32 -> 64-bit multiply-and-accumulate + * + * in: x, y, z, t in [0, 2^32) + * out: x * y + z + t in [0, 2^64) + * + * Note: this computation cannot overflow. + * + * Note: this function has two pure-C implementations (depending on whether + * MUL64_IS_CONSTANT_TIME), and possibly optimised asm implementations. + * Start with the potential asm definitions, and use the C definition only if + * we no have no asm for the current toolchain & CPU. + */ +static uint64_t u32_muladd64(uint32_t x, uint32_t y, uint32_t z, uint32_t t); + +/* This macro is used to mark whether an asm implentation is found */ +#undef MULADD64_ASM +/* This macro is used to mark whether the implementation has a small + * code size (ie, it can be inlined even in an unrolled loop) */ +#undef MULADD64_SMALL + +/* + * Currently assembly optimisations are only supported with GCC/Clang for + * Arm's Cortex-A and Cortex-M lines of CPUs, which start with the v6-M and + * v7-M architectures. __ARM_ARCH_PROFILE is not defined for v6 and earlier. + * Thumb and 32-bit assembly is supported; aarch64 is not supported. + */ +#if defined(__GNUC__) &&\ + defined(__ARM_ARCH) && __ARM_ARCH >= 6 && defined(__ARM_ARCH_PROFILE) && \ + ( __ARM_ARCH_PROFILE == 77 || __ARM_ARCH_PROFILE == 65 ) /* 'M' or 'A' */ && \ + !defined(__aarch64__) + +/* + * This set of CPUs is conveniently partitioned as follows: + * + * 1. Cores that have the DSP extension, which includes a 1-cycle UMAAL + * instruction: M4, M7, M33, all A-class cores. + * 2. Cores that don't have the DSP extension, and also lack a constant-time + * 64-bit multiplication instruction: + * - M0, M0+, M23: 32-bit multiplication only; + * - M3: 64-bit multiplication is not constant-time. + */ +#if defined(__ARM_FEATURE_DSP) + +static uint64_t u32_muladd64(uint32_t x, uint32_t y, uint32_t z, uint32_t t) +{ + __asm__( + /* UMAAL , , , */ + "umaal %[z], %[t], %[x], %[y]" + : [z] "+l" (z), [t] "+l" (t) + : [x] "l" (x), [y] "l" (y) + ); + return ((uint64_t) t << 32) | z; +} +#define MULADD64_ASM +#define MULADD64_SMALL + +#else /* __ARM_FEATURE_DSP */ + +/* + * This implementation only uses 16x16->32 bit multiplication. + * + * It decomposes the multiplicands as: + * x = xh:xl = 2^16 * xh + xl + * y = yh:yl = 2^16 * yh + yl + * and computes their product as: + * x*y = xl*yl + 2**16 (xh*yl + yl*yh) + 2**32 xh*yh + * then adds z and t to the result. + */ +static uint64_t u32_muladd64(uint32_t x, uint32_t y, uint32_t z, uint32_t t) +{ + /* First compute x*y, using 3 temporary registers */ + uint32_t tmp1, tmp2, tmp3; + __asm__( + ".syntax unified\n\t" + /* start by splitting the inputs into halves */ + "lsrs %[u], %[x], #16\n\t" + "lsrs %[v], %[y], #16\n\t" + "uxth %[x], %[x]\n\t" + "uxth %[y], %[y]\n\t" + /* now we have %[x], %[y], %[u], %[v] = xl, yl, xh, yh */ + /* let's compute the 4 products we can form with those */ + "movs %[w], %[v]\n\t" + "muls %[w], %[u]\n\t" + "muls %[v], %[x]\n\t" + "muls %[x], %[y]\n\t" + "muls %[y], %[u]\n\t" + /* now we have %[x], %[y], %[v], %[w] = xl*yl, xh*yl, xl*yh, xh*yh */ + /* let's split and add the first middle product */ + "lsls %[u], %[y], #16\n\t" + "lsrs %[y], %[y], #16\n\t" + "adds %[x], %[u]\n\t" + "adcs %[y], %[w]\n\t" + /* let's finish with the second middle product */ + "lsls %[u], %[v], #16\n\t" + "lsrs %[v], %[v], #16\n\t" + "adds %[x], %[u]\n\t" + "adcs %[y], %[v]\n\t" + : [x] "+l" (x), [y] "+l" (y), + [u] "=&l" (tmp1), [v] "=&l" (tmp2), [w] "=&l" (tmp3) + : /* no read-only inputs */ + : "cc" + ); + (void) tmp1; + (void) tmp2; + (void) tmp3; + + /* Add z and t, using one temporary register */ + __asm__( + ".syntax unified\n\t" + "movs %[u], #0\n\t" + "adds %[x], %[z]\n\t" + "adcs %[y], %[u]\n\t" + "adds %[x], %[t]\n\t" + "adcs %[y], %[u]\n\t" + : [x] "+l" (x), [y] "+l" (y), [u] "=&l" (tmp1) + : [z] "l" (z), [t] "l" (t) + : "cc" + ); + (void) tmp1; + + return ((uint64_t) y << 32) | x; +} +#define MULADD64_ASM + +#endif /* __ARM_FEATURE_DSP */ + +#endif /* GCC/Clang with Cortex-M/A CPU */ + +#if !defined(MULADD64_ASM) +#if defined(MUL64_IS_CONSTANT_TIME) +static uint64_t u32_muladd64(uint32_t x, uint32_t y, uint32_t z, uint32_t t) +{ + return (uint64_t) x * y + z + t; +} +#define MULADD64_SMALL +#else +static uint64_t u32_muladd64(uint32_t x, uint32_t y, uint32_t z, uint32_t t) +{ + /* x = xl + 2**16 xh, y = yl + 2**16 yh */ + const uint16_t xl = (uint16_t) x; + const uint16_t yl = (uint16_t) y; + const uint16_t xh = x >> 16; + const uint16_t yh = y >> 16; + + /* x*y = xl*yl + 2**16 (xh*yl + yl*yh) + 2**32 xh*yh + * = lo + 2**16 (m1 + m2 ) + 2**32 hi */ + const uint32_t lo = (uint32_t) xl * yl; + const uint32_t m1 = (uint32_t) xh * yl; + const uint32_t m2 = (uint32_t) xl * yh; + const uint32_t hi = (uint32_t) xh * yh; + + uint64_t acc = lo + ((uint64_t) (hi + (m1 >> 16) + (m2 >> 16)) << 32); + acc += m1 << 16; + acc += m2 << 16; + acc += z; + acc += t; + + return acc; +} +#endif /* MUL64_IS_CONSTANT_TIME */ +#endif /* MULADD64_ASM */ + +/* + * 288 + 32 x 256 -> 288-bit multiply and add + * + * in: x in [0, 2^32) + * y in [0, 2^256) + * z in [0, 2^288) + * out: z_out = z_in + x * y mod 2^288 + * c = z_in + x * y div 2^288 + * That is, z_out + c * 2^288 = z_in + x * y + * + * Note: as a memory area, z must be either equal to y, or not overlap. + * + * This is a helper for Montgomery multiplication. + */ +static uint32_t u288_muladd(uint32_t z[9], uint32_t x, const uint32_t y[8]) +{ + uint32_t carry = 0; + +#define U288_MULADD_STEP(i) \ + do { \ + uint64_t prod = u32_muladd64(x, y[i], z[i], carry); \ + z[i] = (uint32_t) prod; \ + carry = (uint32_t) (prod >> 32); \ + } while( 0 ) + +#if defined(MULADD64_SMALL) + U288_MULADD_STEP(0); + U288_MULADD_STEP(1); + U288_MULADD_STEP(2); + U288_MULADD_STEP(3); + U288_MULADD_STEP(4); + U288_MULADD_STEP(5); + U288_MULADD_STEP(6); + U288_MULADD_STEP(7); +#else + for (unsigned i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + U288_MULADD_STEP(i); + } +#endif + + uint64_t sum = (uint64_t) z[8] + carry; + z[8] = (uint32_t) sum; + carry = (uint32_t) (sum >> 32); + + return carry; +} + +/* + * 288-bit in-place right shift by 32 bits + * + * in: z in [0, 2^288) + * c in [0, 2^32) + * out: z_out = z_in div 2^32 + c * 2^256 + * = (z_in + c * 2^288) div 2^32 + * + * This is a helper for Montgomery multiplication. + */ +static void u288_rshift32(uint32_t z[9], uint32_t c) +{ + for (unsigned i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + z[i] = z[i + 1]; + } + z[8] = c; +} + +/* + * 256-bit import from big-endian bytes + * + * in: p = p0, ..., p31 + * out: z = p0 * 2^248 + p1 * 2^240 + ... + p30 * 2^8 + p31 + */ +static void u256_from_bytes(uint32_t z[8], const uint8_t p[32]) +{ + for (unsigned i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + unsigned j = 4 * (7 - i); + z[i] = ((uint32_t) p[j + 0] << 24) | + ((uint32_t) p[j + 1] << 16) | + ((uint32_t) p[j + 2] << 8) | + ((uint32_t) p[j + 3] << 0); + } +} + +/* + * 256-bit export to big-endian bytes + * + * in: z in [0, 2^256) + * out: p = p0, ..., p31 such that + * z = p0 * 2^248 + p1 * 2^240 + ... + p30 * 2^8 + p31 + */ +static void u256_to_bytes(uint8_t p[32], const uint32_t z[8]) +{ + for (unsigned i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + unsigned j = 4 * (7 - i); + p[j + 0] = (uint8_t) (z[i] >> 24); + p[j + 1] = (uint8_t) (z[i] >> 16); + p[j + 2] = (uint8_t) (z[i] >> 8); + p[j + 3] = (uint8_t) (z[i] >> 0); + } +} + +/********************************************************************** + * + * Operations modulo a 256-bit prime m + * + * These are done in the Montgomery domain, that is x is represented by + * x * 2^256 mod m + * Numbers need to be converted to that domain before computations, + * and back from it afterwards. + * + * Inversion is computed using Fermat's little theorem. + * + * Assumptions on m: + * - Montgomery operations require that m is odd. + * - Fermat's little theorem require it to be a prime. + * - m256_inv() further requires that m % 2^32 >= 2. + * - m256_inv() also assumes that the value of m is not a secret. + * + * In practice operations are done modulo the curve's p and n, + * both of which satisfy those assumptions. + * + **********************************************************************/ + +/* + * Data associated to a modulus for Montgomery operations. + * + * m in [0, 2^256) - the modulus itself, must be odd + * R2 = 2^512 mod m + * ni = -m^-1 mod 2^32 + */ +typedef struct { + uint32_t m[8]; + uint32_t R2[8]; + uint32_t ni; +} +m256_mod; + +/* + * Data for Montgomery operations modulo the curve's p + */ +static const m256_mod p256_p = { + { /* the curve's p */ + 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0x00000000, + 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000001, 0xFFFFFFFF, + }, + { /* 2^512 mod p */ + 0x00000003, 0x00000000, 0xffffffff, 0xfffffffb, + 0xfffffffe, 0xffffffff, 0xfffffffd, 0x00000004, + }, + 0x00000001, /* -p^-1 mod 2^32 */ +}; + +/* + * Data for Montgomery operations modulo the curve's n + */ +static const m256_mod p256_n = { + { /* the curve's n */ + 0xFC632551, 0xF3B9CAC2, 0xA7179E84, 0xBCE6FAAD, + 0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0x00000000, 0xFFFFFFFF, + }, + { /* 2^512 mod n */ + 0xbe79eea2, 0x83244c95, 0x49bd6fa6, 0x4699799c, + 0x2b6bec59, 0x2845b239, 0xf3d95620, 0x66e12d94, + }, + 0xee00bc4f, /* -n^-1 mod 2^32 */ +}; + +/* + * Modular addition + * + * in: x, y in [0, m) + * mod must point to a valid m256_mod structure + * out: z = (x + y) mod m, in [0, m) + * + * Note: as a memory area, z must be either equal to x or y, or not overlap. + */ +static void m256_add(uint32_t z[8], + const uint32_t x[8], const uint32_t y[8], + const m256_mod *mod) +{ + uint32_t r[8]; + uint32_t carry_add = u256_add(z, x, y); + uint32_t carry_sub = u256_sub(r, z, mod->m); + /* Need to subract m if: + * x+y >= 2^256 > m (that is, carry_add == 1) + * OR z >= m (that is, carry_sub == 0) */ + uint32_t use_sub = carry_add | (1 - carry_sub); + u256_cmov(z, r, use_sub); +} + +/* + * Modular addition mod p + * + * in: x, y in [0, p) + * out: z = (x + y) mod p, in [0, p) + * + * Note: as a memory area, z must be either equal to x or y, or not overlap. + */ +static void m256_add_p(uint32_t z[8], + const uint32_t x[8], const uint32_t y[8]) +{ + m256_add(z, x, y, &p256_p); +} + +/* + * Modular subtraction + * + * in: x, y in [0, m) + * mod must point to a valid m256_mod structure + * out: z = (x - y) mod m, in [0, m) + * + * Note: as a memory area, z must be either equal to x or y, or not overlap. + */ +static void m256_sub(uint32_t z[8], + const uint32_t x[8], const uint32_t y[8], + const m256_mod *mod) +{ + uint32_t r[8]; + uint32_t carry = u256_sub(z, x, y); + (void) u256_add(r, z, mod->m); + /* Need to add m if and only if x < y, that is carry == 1. + * In that case z is in [2^256 - m + 1, 2^256 - 1], so the + * addition will have a carry as well, which cancels out. */ + u256_cmov(z, r, carry); +} + +/* + * Modular subtraction mod p + * + * in: x, y in [0, p) + * out: z = (x + y) mod p, in [0, p) + * + * Note: as a memory area, z must be either equal to x or y, or not overlap. + */ +static void m256_sub_p(uint32_t z[8], + const uint32_t x[8], const uint32_t y[8]) +{ + m256_sub(z, x, y, &p256_p); +} + +/* + * Montgomery modular multiplication + * + * in: x, y in [0, m) + * mod must point to a valid m256_mod structure + * out: z = (x * y) / 2^256 mod m, in [0, m) + * + * Note: as a memory area, z may overlap with x or y. + */ +static void m256_mul(uint32_t z[8], + const uint32_t x[8], const uint32_t y[8], + const m256_mod *mod) +{ + /* + * Algorithm 14.36 in Handbook of Applied Cryptography with: + * b = 2^32, n = 8, R = 2^256 + */ + uint32_t m_prime = mod->ni; + uint32_t a[9]; + + for (unsigned i = 0; i < 9; i++) { + a[i] = 0; + } + + for (unsigned i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + /* the "mod 2^32" is implicit from the type */ + uint32_t u = (a[0] + x[i] * y[0]) * m_prime; + + /* a = (a + x[i] * y + u * m) div b */ + uint32_t c = u288_muladd(a, x[i], y); + c += u288_muladd(a, u, mod->m); + u288_rshift32(a, c); + } + + /* a = a > m ? a - m : a */ + uint32_t carry_add = a[8]; // 0 or 1 since a < 2m, see HAC Note 14.37 + uint32_t carry_sub = u256_sub(z, a, mod->m); + uint32_t use_sub = carry_add | (1 - carry_sub); // see m256_add() + u256_cmov(z, a, 1 - use_sub); +} + +/* + * Montgomery modular multiplication modulo p. + * + * in: x, y in [0, p) + * out: z = (x * y) / 2^256 mod p, in [0, p) + * + * Note: as a memory area, z may overlap with x or y. + */ +static void m256_mul_p(uint32_t z[8], + const uint32_t x[8], const uint32_t y[8]) +{ + m256_mul(z, x, y, &p256_p); +} + +/* + * In-place conversion to Montgomery form + * + * in: z in [0, m) + * mod must point to a valid m256_mod structure + * out: z_out = z_in * 2^256 mod m, in [0, m) + */ +static void m256_prep(uint32_t z[8], const m256_mod *mod) +{ + m256_mul(z, z, mod->R2, mod); +} + +/* + * In-place conversion from Montgomery form + * + * in: z in [0, m) + * mod must point to a valid m256_mod structure + * out: z_out = z_in / 2^256 mod m, in [0, m) + * That is, z_in was z_actual * 2^256 mod m, and z_out is z_actual + */ +static void m256_done(uint32_t z[8], const m256_mod *mod) +{ + uint32_t one[8]; + u256_set32(one, 1); + m256_mul(z, z, one, mod); +} + +/* + * Set to 32-bit value + * + * in: x in [0, 2^32) + * mod must point to a valid m256_mod structure + * out: z = x * 2^256 mod m, in [0, m) + * That is, z is set to the image of x in the Montgomery domain. + */ +static void m256_set32(uint32_t z[8], uint32_t x, const m256_mod *mod) +{ + u256_set32(z, x); + m256_prep(z, mod); +} + +/* + * Modular inversion in Montgomery form + * + * in: x in [0, m) + * mod must point to a valid m256_mod structure + * such that mod->m % 2^32 >= 2, assumed to be public. + * out: z = x^-1 * 2^512 mod m if x != 0, + * z = 0 if x == 0 + * That is, if x = x_actual * 2^256 mod m, then + * z = x_actual^-1 * 2^256 mod m + * + * Note: as a memory area, z may overlap with x. + */ +static void m256_inv(uint32_t z[8], const uint32_t x[8], + const m256_mod *mod) +{ + /* + * Use Fermat's little theorem to compute x^-1 as x^(m-2). + * + * Take advantage of the fact that both p's and n's least significant limb + * is at least 2 to perform the subtraction on the flight (no carry). + * + * Use plain right-to-left binary exponentiation; + * branches are OK as the exponent is not a secret. + */ + uint32_t bitval[8]; + u256_cmov(bitval, x, 1); /* copy x before writing to z */ + + m256_set32(z, 1, mod); + + unsigned i = 0; + uint32_t limb = mod->m[i] - 2; + while (1) { + for (unsigned j = 0; j < 32; j++) { + if ((limb & 1) != 0) { + m256_mul(z, z, bitval, mod); + } + m256_mul(bitval, bitval, bitval, mod); + limb >>= 1; + } + + if (i == 7) + break; + + i++; + limb = mod->m[i]; + } +} + +/* + * Import modular integer from bytes to Montgomery domain + * + * in: p = p0, ..., p32 + * mod must point to a valid m256_mod structure + * out: z = (p0 * 2^248 + ... + p31) * 2^256 mod m, in [0, m) + * return 0 if the number was already in [0, m), or -1. + * z may be incorrect and must be discared when -1 is returned. + */ +static int m256_from_bytes(uint32_t z[8], + const uint8_t p[32], const m256_mod *mod) +{ + u256_from_bytes(z, p); + + uint32_t t[8]; + uint32_t lt_m = u256_sub(t, z, mod->m); + if (lt_m != 1) + return -1; + + m256_prep(z, mod); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Export modular integer from Montgomery domain to bytes + * + * in: z in [0, 2^256) + * mod must point to a valid m256_mod structure + * out: p = p0, ..., p31 such that + * z = (p0 * 2^248 + ... + p31) * 2^256 mod m + */ +static void m256_to_bytes(uint8_t p[32], + const uint32_t z[8], const m256_mod *mod) +{ + uint32_t zi[8]; + u256_cmov(zi, z, 1); + m256_done(zi, mod); + + u256_to_bytes(p, zi); +} + +/********************************************************************** + * + * Operations on curve points + * + * Points are represented in two coordinates system: + * - affine (x, y) - extended to represent 0 (see below) + * - jacobian (x:y:z) + * In either case, coordinates are integers modulo p256_p and + * are always represented in the Montgomery domain. + * + * For background on jacobian coordinates, see for example [GECC] 3.2.2: + * - conversions go (x, y) -> (x:y:1) and (x:y:z) -> (x/z^2, y/z^3) + * - the curve equation becomes y^2 = x^3 - 3 x z^4 + b z^6 + * - 0 (aka the origin aka point at infinity) is (x:y:0) with y^2 = x^3. + * - point negation goes -(x:y:z) = (x:-y:z) + * + * Normally 0 (the point at infinity) can't be represented in affine + * coordinates. However we extend affine coordinates with the convention that + * (0, 0) (which is normally not a point on the curve) is interpreted as 0. + * + * References: + * - [GECC]: Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography; Hankerson, Menezes, + * Vanstone; Springer, 2004. + * - [CMO98]: Efficient Elliptic Curve Exponentiation Using Mixed Coordinates; + * Cohen, Miyaji, Ono; Springer, ASIACRYPT 1998. + * https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/3-540-49649-1_6.pdf + * - [RCB15]: Complete addition formulas for prime order elliptic curves; + * Renes, Costello, Batina; IACR e-print 2015-1060. + * https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1060.pdf + * + **********************************************************************/ + +/* + * The curve's b parameter in the Short Weierstrass equation + * y^2 = x^3 - 3*x + b + * Compared to the standard, this is converted to the Montgomery domain. + */ +static const uint32_t p256_b[8] = { /* b * 2^256 mod p */ + 0x29c4bddf, 0xd89cdf62, 0x78843090, 0xacf005cd, + 0xf7212ed6, 0xe5a220ab, 0x04874834, 0xdc30061d, +}; + +/* + * The curve's conventional base point G. + * Compared to the standard, coordinates converted to the Montgomery domain. + */ +static const uint32_t p256_gx[8] = { /* G_x * 2^256 mod p */ + 0x18a9143c, 0x79e730d4, 0x5fedb601, 0x75ba95fc, + 0x77622510, 0x79fb732b, 0xa53755c6, 0x18905f76, +}; +static const uint32_t p256_gy[8] = { /* G_y * 2^256 mod p */ + 0xce95560a, 0xddf25357, 0xba19e45c, 0x8b4ab8e4, + 0xdd21f325, 0xd2e88688, 0x25885d85, 0x8571ff18, +}; + +/* + * Point-on-curve check - do the coordinates satisfy the curve's equation? + * + * in: x, y in [0, p) (Montgomery domain) + * out: 0 if the point lies on the curve and is not 0, + * unspecified non-zero otherwise + */ +static uint32_t point_check(const uint32_t x[8], const uint32_t y[8]) +{ + uint32_t lhs[8], rhs[8]; + + /* lhs = y^2 */ + m256_mul_p(lhs, y, y); + + /* rhs = x^3 - 3x + b */ + m256_mul_p(rhs, x, x); /* x^2 */ + m256_mul_p(rhs, rhs, x); /* x^3 */ + for (unsigned i = 0; i < 3; i++) + m256_sub_p(rhs, rhs, x); /* x^3 - 3x */ + m256_add_p(rhs, rhs, p256_b); /* x^3 - 3x + b */ + + return u256_diff(lhs, rhs); +} + +/* + * In-place jacobian to affine coordinate conversion + * + * in: (x:y:z) must be on the curve (coordinates in Montegomery domain) + * out: x_out = x_in / z_in^2 (Montgomery domain) + * y_out = y_in / z_in^3 (Montgomery domain) + * z_out unspecified, must be disregarded + * + * Note: if z is 0 (that is, the input point is 0), x_out = y_out = 0. + */ +static void point_to_affine(uint32_t x[8], uint32_t y[8], uint32_t z[8]) +{ + uint32_t t[8]; + + m256_inv(z, z, &p256_p); /* z = z^-1 */ + + m256_mul_p(t, z, z); /* t = z^-2 */ + m256_mul_p(x, x, t); /* x = x * z^-2 */ + + m256_mul_p(t, t, z); /* t = z^-3 */ + m256_mul_p(y, y, t); /* y = y * z^-3 */ +} + +/* + * In-place point doubling in jacobian coordinates (Montgomery domain) + * + * in: P_in = (x:y:z), must be on the curve + * out: (x:y:z) = P_out = 2 * P_in + */ +static void point_double(uint32_t x[8], uint32_t y[8], uint32_t z[8]) +{ + /* + * This is formula 6 from [CMO98], cited as complete in [RCB15] (table 1). + * Notations as in the paper, except u added and t ommited (it's x3). + */ + uint32_t m[8], s[8], u[8]; + + /* m = 3 * x^2 + a * z^4 = 3 * (x + z^2) * (x - z^2) */ + m256_mul_p(s, z, z); + m256_add_p(m, x, s); + m256_sub_p(u, x, s); + m256_mul_p(s, m, u); + m256_add_p(m, s, s); + m256_add_p(m, m, s); + + /* s = 4 * x * y^2 */ + m256_mul_p(u, y, y); + m256_add_p(u, u, u); /* u = 2 * y^2 (used below) */ + m256_mul_p(s, x, u); + m256_add_p(s, s, s); + + /* u = 8 * y^4 (not named in the paper, first term of y3) */ + m256_mul_p(u, u, u); + m256_add_p(u, u, u); + + /* x3 = t = m^2 - 2 * s */ + m256_mul_p(x, m, m); + m256_sub_p(x, x, s); + m256_sub_p(x, x, s); + + /* z3 = 2 * y * z */ + m256_mul_p(z, y, z); + m256_add_p(z, z, z); + + /* y3 = -u + m * (s - t) */ + m256_sub_p(y, s, x); + m256_mul_p(y, y, m); + m256_sub_p(y, y, u); +} + +/* + * In-place point addition in jacobian-affine coordinates (Montgomery domain) + * + * in: P_in = (x1:y1:z1), must be on the curve and not 0 + * Q = (x2, y2), must be on the curve and not P_in or -P_in or 0 + * out: P_out = (x1:y1:z1) = P_in + Q + */ +static void point_add(uint32_t x1[8], uint32_t y1[8], uint32_t z1[8], + const uint32_t x2[8], const uint32_t y2[8]) +{ + /* + * This is formula 5 from [CMO98], with z2 == 1 substituted. We use + * intermediates with neutral names, and names from the paper in comments. + */ + uint32_t t1[8], t2[8], t3[8]; + + /* u1 = x1 and s1 = y1 (no computations) */ + + /* t1 = u2 = x2 z1^2 */ + m256_mul_p(t1, z1, z1); + m256_mul_p(t2, t1, z1); + m256_mul_p(t1, t1, x2); + + /* t2 = s2 = y2 z1^3 */ + m256_mul_p(t2, t2, y2); + + /* t1 = h = u2 - u1 */ + m256_sub_p(t1, t1, x1); /* t1 = x2 * z1^2 - x1 */ + + /* t2 = r = s2 - s1 */ + m256_sub_p(t2, t2, y1); + + /* z3 = z1 * h */ + m256_mul_p(z1, z1, t1); + + /* t1 = h^3 */ + m256_mul_p(t3, t1, t1); + m256_mul_p(t1, t3, t1); + + /* t3 = x1 * h^2 */ + m256_mul_p(t3, t3, x1); + + /* x3 = r^2 - 2 * x1 * h^2 - h^3 */ + m256_mul_p(x1, t2, t2); + m256_sub_p(x1, x1, t3); + m256_sub_p(x1, x1, t3); + m256_sub_p(x1, x1, t1); + + /* y3 = r * (x1 * h^2 - x3) - y1 h^3 */ + m256_sub_p(t3, t3, x1); + m256_mul_p(t3, t3, t2); + m256_mul_p(t1, t1, y1); + m256_sub_p(y1, t3, t1); +} + +/* + * Point addition or doubling (affine to jacobian, Montgomery domain) + * + * in: P = (x1, y1) - must be on the curve and not 0 + * Q = (x2, y2) - must be on the curve and not 0 + * out: (x3, y3) = R = P + Q + * + * Note: unlike point_add(), this function works if P = +- Q; + * however it leaks information on its input through timing, + * branches taken and memory access patterns (if observable). + */ +static void point_add_or_double_leaky( + uint32_t x3[8], uint32_t y3[8], + const uint32_t x1[8], const uint32_t y1[8], + const uint32_t x2[8], const uint32_t y2[8]) +{ + + uint32_t z3[8]; + u256_cmov(x3, x1, 1); + u256_cmov(y3, y1, 1); + m256_set32(z3, 1, &p256_p); + + if (u256_diff(x1, x2) != 0) { + // P != +- Q -> generic addition + point_add(x3, y3, z3, x2, y2); + point_to_affine(x3, y3, z3); + } + else if (u256_diff(y1, y2) == 0) { + // P == Q -> double + point_double(x3, y3, z3); + point_to_affine(x3, y3, z3); + } else { + // P == -Q -> zero + m256_set32(x3, 0, &p256_p); + m256_set32(y3, 0, &p256_p); + } +} + +/* + * Import curve point from bytes + * + * in: p = (x, y) concatenated, fixed-width 256-bit big-endian integers + * out: x, y in Mongomery domain + * return 0 if x and y are both in [0, p) + * and (x, y) is on the curve and not 0 + * unspecified non-zero otherwise. + * x and y are unspecified and must be discarded if returning non-zero. + */ +static int point_from_bytes(uint32_t x[8], uint32_t y[8], const uint8_t p[64]) +{ + int ret; + + ret = m256_from_bytes(x, p, &p256_p); + if (ret != 0) + return ret; + + ret = m256_from_bytes(y, p + 32, &p256_p); + if (ret != 0) + return ret; + + return (int) point_check(x, y); +} + +/* + * Export curve point to bytes + * + * in: x, y affine coordinates of a point (Montgomery domain) + * must be on the curve and not 0 + * out: p = (x, y) concatenated, fixed-width 256-bit big-endian integers + */ +static void point_to_bytes(uint8_t p[64], + const uint32_t x[8], const uint32_t y[8]) +{ + m256_to_bytes(p, x, &p256_p); + m256_to_bytes(p + 32, y, &p256_p); +} + +/********************************************************************** + * + * Scalar multiplication and other scalar-related operations + * + **********************************************************************/ + +/* + * Scalar multiplication + * + * in: P = (px, py), affine (Montgomery), must be on the curve and not 0 + * s in [1, n-1] + * out: R = s * P = (rx, ry), affine coordinates (Montgomery). + * + * Note: as memory areas, none of the parameters may overlap. + */ +static void scalar_mult(uint32_t rx[8], uint32_t ry[8], + const uint32_t px[8], const uint32_t py[8], + const uint32_t s[8]) +{ + /* + * We use a signed binary ladder, see for example slides 10-14 of + * http://ecc2015.math.u-bordeaux1.fr/documents/hamburg.pdf but with + * implicit recoding, and a different loop initialisation to avoid feeding + * 0 to our addition formulas, as they don't support it. + */ + uint32_t s_odd[8], py_neg[8], py_use[8], rz[8]; + + /* + * Make s odd by replacing it with n - s if necessary. + * + * If s was odd, we'll have s_odd = s, and define P' = P. + * Otherwise, we'll have s_odd = n - s and define P' = -P. + * + * Either way, we can compute s * P as s_odd * P'. + */ + u256_sub(s_odd, p256_n.m, s); /* no carry, result still in [1, n-1] */ + uint32_t negate = ~s[0] & 1; + u256_cmov(s_odd, s, 1 - negate); + + /* Compute py_neg = - py mod p (that's the y coordinate of -P) */ + u256_set32(py_use, 0); + m256_sub_p(py_neg, py_use, py); + + /* Initialize R = P' = (x:(-1)^negate * y:1) */ + u256_cmov(rx, px, 1); + u256_cmov(ry, py, 1); + m256_set32(rz, 1, &p256_p); + u256_cmov(ry, py_neg, negate); + + /* + * For any odd number s_odd = b255 ... b1 1, we have + * s_odd = 2^255 + 2^254 sbit(b255) + ... + 2 sbit(b2) + sbit(b1) + * writing + * sbit(b) = 2 * b - 1 = b ? 1 : -1 + * + * Use that to compute s_odd * P' by repeating R = 2 * R +- P': + * s_odd * P' = 2 * ( ... (2 * P' + sbit(b255) P') ... ) + sbit(b1) P' + * + * The loop invariant is that when beginning an iteration we have + * R = s_i P' + * with + * s_i = 2^(255-i) + 2^(254-i) sbit(b_255) + ... + * where the sum has 256 - i terms. + * + * When updating R we need to make sure the input to point_add() is + * neither 0 not +-P'. Since that input is 2 s_i P', it is sufficient to + * see that 1 < 2 s_i < n-1. The lower bound is obvious since s_i is a + * positive integer, and for the upper bound we distinguish three cases. + * + * If i > 1, then s_i < 2^254, so 2 s_i < 2^255 < n-1. + * Otherwise, i == 1 and we have 2 s_i = s_odd - sbit(b1). + * If s_odd <= n-4, then 2 s_1 <= n-3. + * Otherwise, s_odd = n-2, and for this curve's value of n, + * we have b1 == 1, so sbit(b1) = 1 and 2 s_1 <= n-3. + */ + for (unsigned i = 255; i > 0; i--) { + uint32_t bit = (s_odd[i / 32] >> i % 32) & 1; + + /* set (px, py_use) = sbit(bit) P' = sbit(bit) * (-1)^negate P */ + u256_cmov(py_use, py, bit ^ negate); + u256_cmov(py_use, py_neg, (1 - bit) ^ negate); + + /* Update R = 2 * R +- P' */ + point_double(rx, ry, rz); + point_add(rx, ry, rz, px, py_use); + } + + point_to_affine(rx, ry, rz); +} + +/* + * Scalar import from big-endian bytes + * + * in: p = p0, ..., p31 + * out: s = p0 * 2^248 + p1 * 2^240 + ... + p30 * 2^8 + p31 + * return 0 if s in [1, n-1], + * -1 otherwise. + */ +static int scalar_from_bytes(uint32_t s[8], const uint8_t p[32]) +{ + u256_from_bytes(s, p); + + uint32_t r[8]; + uint32_t lt_n = u256_sub(r, s, p256_n.m); + + u256_set32(r, 1); + uint32_t lt_1 = u256_sub(r, s, r); + + if (lt_n && !lt_1) + return 0; + + return -1; +} + +/* Using RNG functions from Mbed TLS as p256-m does not come with a + * cryptographically secure RNG function. + */ +int p256_generate_random(uint8_t *output, unsigned output_size) +{ + int ret; + ret = psa_generate_random(output, output_size); + + if (ret != 0){ + return P256_RANDOM_FAILED; + } + return P256_SUCCESS; +} + +/* + * Scalar generation, with public key + * + * out: sbytes the big-endian bytes representation of the scalar + * s its u256 representation + * x, y the affine coordinates of s * G (Montgomery domain) + * return 0 if OK, -1 on failure + * sbytes, s, x, y must be discarded when returning non-zero. + */ +static int scalar_gen_with_pub(uint8_t sbytes[32], uint32_t s[8], + uint32_t x[8], uint32_t y[8]) +{ + /* generate a random valid scalar */ + int ret; + unsigned nb_tried = 0; + do { + if (nb_tried++ >= 4) + return -1; + + ret = p256_generate_random(sbytes, 32); + CT_POISON(sbytes, 32); + if (ret != 0) + return -1; + + ret = scalar_from_bytes(s, sbytes); + CT_UNPOISON(&ret, sizeof ret); + } + while (ret != 0); + + /* compute and ouput the associated public key */ + scalar_mult(x, y, p256_gx, p256_gy, s); + + /* the associated public key is not a secret */ + CT_UNPOISON(x, 32); + CT_UNPOISON(y, 32); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * ECDH/ECDSA generate pair + */ +int p256_gen_keypair(uint8_t priv[32], uint8_t pub[64]) +{ + uint32_t s[8], x[8], y[8]; + int ret = scalar_gen_with_pub(priv, s, x, y); + zeroize(s, sizeof s); + if (ret != 0) + return P256_RANDOM_FAILED; + + point_to_bytes(pub, x, y); + return 0; +} + +/********************************************************************** + * + * ECDH + * + **********************************************************************/ + +/* + * ECDH compute shared secret + */ +int p256_ecdh_shared_secret(uint8_t secret[32], + const uint8_t priv[32], const uint8_t peer[64]) +{ + CT_POISON(priv, 32); + + uint32_t s[8], px[8], py[8], x[8], y[8]; + int ret; + + ret = scalar_from_bytes(s, priv); + CT_UNPOISON(&ret, sizeof ret); + if (ret != 0) { + ret = P256_INVALID_PRIVKEY; + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = point_from_bytes(px, py, peer); + if (ret != 0) { + ret = P256_INVALID_PUBKEY; + goto cleanup; + } + + scalar_mult(x, y, px, py, s); + + m256_to_bytes(secret, x, &p256_p); + CT_UNPOISON(secret, 32); + +cleanup: + zeroize(s, sizeof s); + return ret; +} + +/********************************************************************** + * + * ECDSA + * + * Reference: + * [SEC1] SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Certicom research, 2009. + * http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf + **********************************************************************/ + +/* + * Reduction mod n of a small number + * + * in: x in [0, 2^256) + * out: x_out = x_in mod n in [0, n) + */ +static void ecdsa_m256_mod_n(uint32_t x[8]) +{ + uint32_t t[8]; + uint32_t c = u256_sub(t, x, p256_n.m); + u256_cmov(x, t, 1 - c); +} + +/* + * Import integer mod n (Montgomery domain) from hash + * + * in: h = h0, ..., h_hlen + * hlen the length of h in bytes + * out: z = (h0 * 2^l-8 + ... + h_l) * 2^256 mod n + * with l = min(32, hlen) + * + * Note: in [SEC1] this is step 5 of 4.1.3 (sign) or step 3 or 4.1.4 (verify), + * with obvious simplications since n's bit-length is a multiple of 8. + */ +static void ecdsa_m256_from_hash(uint32_t z[8], + const uint8_t *h, size_t hlen) +{ + /* convert from h (big-endian) */ + /* hlen is public data so it's OK to branch on it */ + if (hlen < 32) { + uint8_t p[32]; + for (unsigned i = 0; i < 32; i++) + p[i] = 0; + for (unsigned i = 0; i < hlen; i++) + p[32 - hlen + i] = h[i]; + u256_from_bytes(z, p); + } else { + u256_from_bytes(z, h); + } + + /* ensure the result is in [0, n) */ + ecdsa_m256_mod_n(z); + + /* map to Montgomery domain */ + m256_prep(z, &p256_n); +} + +/* + * ECDSA sign + */ +int p256_ecdsa_sign(uint8_t sig[64], const uint8_t priv[32], + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hlen) +{ + CT_POISON(priv, 32); + + /* + * Steps and notations from [SEC1] 4.1.3 + * + * Instead of retrying on r == 0 or s == 0, just abort, + * as those events have negligible probability. + */ + int ret; + + /* Temporary buffers - the first two are mostly stable, so have names */ + uint32_t xr[8], k[8], t3[8], t4[8]; + + /* 1. Set ephemeral keypair */ + uint8_t *kb = (uint8_t *) t4; + /* kb will be erased by re-using t4 for dU - if we exit before that, we + * haven't read the private key yet so we kb isn't sensitive yet */ + ret = scalar_gen_with_pub(kb, k, xr, t3); /* xr = x_coord(k * G) */ + if (ret != 0) + return P256_RANDOM_FAILED; + m256_prep(k, &p256_n); + + /* 2. Convert xr to an integer */ + m256_done(xr, &p256_p); + + /* 3. Reduce xr mod n (extra: output it while at it) */ + ecdsa_m256_mod_n(xr); /* xr = int(xr) mod n */ + + /* xr is public data so it's OK to use a branch */ + if (u256_diff0(xr) == 0) + return P256_RANDOM_FAILED; + + u256_to_bytes(sig, xr); + + m256_prep(xr, &p256_n); + + /* 4. Skipped - we take the hash as an input, not the message */ + + /* 5. Derive an integer from the hash */ + ecdsa_m256_from_hash(t3, hash, hlen); /* t3 = e */ + + /* 6. Compute s = k^-1 * (e + r * dU) */ + + /* Note: dU will be erased by re-using t4 for the value of s (public) */ + ret = scalar_from_bytes(t4, priv); /* t4 = dU (integer domain) */ + CT_UNPOISON(&ret, sizeof ret); /* Result of input validation */ + if (ret != 0) + return P256_INVALID_PRIVKEY; + m256_prep(t4, &p256_n); /* t4 = dU (Montgomery domain) */ + + m256_inv(k, k, &p256_n); /* k^-1 */ + m256_mul(t4, xr, t4, &p256_n); /* t4 = r * dU */ + m256_add(t4, t3, t4, &p256_n); /* t4 = e + r * dU */ + m256_mul(t4, k, t4, &p256_n); /* t4 = s = k^-1 * (e + r * dU) */ + zeroize(k, sizeof k); + + /* 7. Output s (r already outputed at step 3) */ + CT_UNPOISON(t4, 32); + if (u256_diff0(t4) == 0) { + /* undo early output of r */ + u256_to_bytes(sig, t4); + return P256_RANDOM_FAILED; + } + m256_to_bytes(sig + 32, t4, &p256_n); + + return P256_SUCCESS; +} + +/* + * ECDSA verify + */ +int p256_ecdsa_verify(const uint8_t sig[64], const uint8_t pub[64], + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hlen) +{ + /* + * Steps and notations from [SEC1] 4.1.3 + * + * Note: we're using public data only, so branches are OK + */ + int ret; + + /* 1. Validate range of r and s : [1, n-1] */ + uint32_t r[8], s[8]; + ret = scalar_from_bytes(r, sig); + if (ret != 0) + return P256_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + ret = scalar_from_bytes(s, sig + 32); + if (ret != 0) + return P256_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + + /* 2. Skipped - we take the hash as an input, not the message */ + + /* 3. Derive an integer from the hash */ + uint32_t e[8]; + ecdsa_m256_from_hash(e, hash, hlen); + + /* 4. Compute u1 = e * s^-1 and u2 = r * s^-1 */ + uint32_t u1[8], u2[8]; + m256_prep(s, &p256_n); /* s in Montgomery domain */ + m256_inv(s, s, &p256_n); /* s = s^-1 mod n */ + m256_mul(u1, e, s, &p256_n); /* u1 = e * s^-1 mod n */ + m256_done(u1, &p256_n); /* u1 out of Montgomery domain */ + + u256_cmov(u2, r, 1); + m256_prep(u2, &p256_n); /* r in Montgomery domain */ + m256_mul(u2, u2, s, &p256_n); /* u2 = r * s^-1 mod n */ + m256_done(u2, &p256_n); /* u2 out of Montgomery domain */ + + /* 5. Compute R (and re-use (u1, u2) to store its coordinates */ + uint32_t px[8], py[8]; + ret = point_from_bytes(px, py, pub); + if (ret != 0) + return P256_INVALID_PUBKEY; + + scalar_mult(e, s, px, py, u2); /* (e, s) = R2 = u2 * Qu */ + + if (u256_diff0(u1) == 0) { + /* u1 out of range for scalar_mult() - just skip it */ + u256_cmov(u1, e, 1); + /* we don't care about the y coordinate */ + } else { + scalar_mult(px, py, p256_gx, p256_gy, u1); /* (px, py) = R1 = u1 * G */ + + /* (u1, u2) = R = R1 + R2 */ + point_add_or_double_leaky(u1, u2, px, py, e, s); + /* No need to check if R == 0 here: if that's the case, it will be + * caught when comparating rx (which will be 0) to r (which isn't). */ + } + + /* 6. Convert xR to an integer */ + m256_done(u1, &p256_p); + + /* 7. Reduce xR mod n */ + ecdsa_m256_mod_n(u1); + + /* 8. Compare xR mod n to r */ + uint32_t diff = u256_diff(u1, r); + if (diff == 0) + return P256_SUCCESS; + + return P256_INVALID_SIGNATURE; +} + +/********************************************************************** + * + * Key management utilities + * + **********************************************************************/ + +int p256_validate_pubkey(const uint8_t pub[64]) +{ + uint32_t x[8], y[8]; + int ret = point_from_bytes(x, y, pub); + + return ret == 0 ? P256_SUCCESS : P256_INVALID_PUBKEY; +} + +int p256_validate_privkey(const uint8_t priv[32]) +{ + uint32_t s[8]; + int ret = scalar_from_bytes(s, priv); + zeroize(s, sizeof(s)); + + return ret == 0 ? P256_SUCCESS : P256_INVALID_PRIVKEY; +} + +int p256_public_from_private(uint8_t pub[64], const uint8_t priv[32]) +{ + int ret; + uint32_t s[8]; + + ret = scalar_from_bytes(s, priv); + if (ret != 0) + return P256_INVALID_PRIVKEY; + + /* compute and ouput the associated public key */ + uint32_t x[8], y[8]; + scalar_mult(x, y, p256_gx, p256_gy, s); + + /* the associated public key is not a secret, the scalar was */ + CT_UNPOISON(x, 32); + CT_UNPOISON(y, 32); + zeroize(s, sizeof(s)); + + point_to_bytes(pub, x, y); + return P256_SUCCESS; +} + +#endif diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m/p256-m.h b/vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m/p256-m.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c267800248 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m/p256-m.h @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +/* + * Interface of curve P-256 (ECDH and ECDSA) + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * Author: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef P256_M_H +#define P256_M_H + +#include +#include + +/* Status codes */ +#define P256_SUCCESS 0 +#define P256_RANDOM_FAILED -1 +#define P256_INVALID_PUBKEY -2 +#define P256_INVALID_PRIVKEY -3 +#define P256_INVALID_SIGNATURE -4 + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * RNG function - must be provided externally and be cryptographically secure. + * + * in: output - must point to a writable buffer of at least output_size bytes. + * output_size - the number of random bytes to write to output. + * out: output is filled with output_size random bytes. + * return 0 on success, non-zero on errors. + */ +extern int p256_generate_random(uint8_t * output, unsigned output_size); + +/* + * ECDH/ECDSA generate key pair + * + * [in] draws from p256_generate_random() + * [out] priv: on success, holds the private key, as a big-endian integer + * [out] pub: on success, holds the public key, as two big-endian integers + * + * return: P256_SUCCESS on success + * P256_RANDOM_FAILED on failure + */ +int p256_gen_keypair(uint8_t priv[32], uint8_t pub[64]); + +/* + * ECDH compute shared secret + * + * [out] secret: on success, holds the shared secret, as a big-endian integer + * [in] priv: our private key as a big-endian integer + * [in] pub: the peer's public key, as two big-endian integers + * + * return: P256_SUCCESS on success + * P256_INVALID_PRIVKEY if priv is invalid + * P256_INVALID_PUBKEY if pub is invalid + */ +int p256_ecdh_shared_secret(uint8_t secret[32], + const uint8_t priv[32], const uint8_t pub[64]); + +/* + * ECDSA sign + * + * [in] draws from p256_generate_random() + * [out] sig: on success, holds the signature, as two big-endian integers + * [in] priv: our private key as a big-endian integer + * [in] hash: the hash of the message to be signed + * [in] hlen: the size of hash in bytes + * + * return: P256_SUCCESS on success + * P256_RANDOM_FAILED on failure + * P256_INVALID_PRIVKEY if priv is invalid + */ +int p256_ecdsa_sign(uint8_t sig[64], const uint8_t priv[32], + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hlen); + +/* + * ECDSA verify + * + * [in] sig: the signature to be verified, as two big-endian integers + * [in] pub: the associated public key, as two big-endian integers + * [in] hash: the hash of the message that was signed + * [in] hlen: the size of hash in bytes + * + * return: P256_SUCCESS on success - the signature was verified as valid + * P256_INVALID_PUBKEY if pub is invalid + * P256_INVALID_SIGNATURE if the signature was found to be invalid + */ +int p256_ecdsa_verify(const uint8_t sig[64], const uint8_t pub[64], + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hlen); + +/* + * Public key validation + * + * Note: you never need to call this function, as all other functions always + * validate their input; however it's availabe if you want to validate the key + * without performing an operation. + * + * [in] pub: the public key, as two big-endian integers + * + * return: P256_SUCCESS if the key is valid + * P256_INVALID_PUBKEY if pub is invalid + */ +int p256_validate_pubkey(const uint8_t pub[64]); + +/* + * Private key validation + * + * Note: you never need to call this function, as all other functions always + * validate their input; however it's availabe if you want to validate the key + * without performing an operation. + * + * [in] priv: the private key, as a big-endian integer + * + * return: P256_SUCCESS if the key is valid + * P256_INVALID_PRIVKEY if priv is invalid + */ +int p256_validate_privkey(const uint8_t priv[32]); + +/* + * Compute public key from private key + * + * [out] pub: the associated public key, as two big-endian integers + * [in] priv: the private key, as a big-endian integer + * + * return: P256_SUCCESS on success + * P256_INVALID_PRIVKEY if priv is invalid + */ +int p256_public_from_private(uint8_t pub[64], const uint8_t priv[32]); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* P256_M_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m_driver_entrypoints.c b/vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m_driver_entrypoints.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d272dcbb1e --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m_driver_entrypoints.c @@ -0,0 +1,312 @@ +/* + * Driver entry points for p256-m + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "p256-m_driver_entrypoints.h" +#include "p256-m/p256-m.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include +#include +#include "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) + +/* INFORMATION ON PSA KEY EXPORT FORMATS: + * + * PSA exports SECP256R1 keys in two formats: + * 1. Keypair format: 32 byte string which is just the private key (public key + * can be calculated from the private key) + * 2. Public Key format: A leading byte 0x04 (indicating uncompressed format), + * followed by the 64 byte public key. This results in a + * total of 65 bytes. + * + * p256-m's internal format for private keys matches PSA. Its format for public + * keys is only 64 bytes: the same as PSA but without the leading byte (0x04). + * Hence, when passing public keys from PSA to p256-m, the leading byte is + * removed. + * + * Shared secret and signature have the same format between PSA and p256-m. + */ +#define PSA_PUBKEY_SIZE 65 +#define PSA_PUBKEY_HEADER_BYTE 0x04 +#define P256_PUBKEY_SIZE 64 +#define PRIVKEY_SIZE 32 +#define SHARED_SECRET_SIZE 32 +#define SIGNATURE_SIZE 64 + +#define CURVE_BITS 256 + +/* Convert between p256-m and PSA error codes */ +static psa_status_t p256_to_psa_error(int ret) +{ + switch (ret) { + case P256_SUCCESS: + return PSA_SUCCESS; + case P256_INVALID_PUBKEY: + case P256_INVALID_PRIVKEY: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case P256_INVALID_SIGNATURE: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + case P256_RANDOM_FAILED: + default: + return PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + } +} + +psa_status_t p256_transparent_import_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, + size_t *bits) +{ + /* Check the key size */ + if (*bits != 0 && *bits != CURVE_BITS) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + /* Validate the key (and its type and size) */ + psa_key_type_t type = psa_get_key_type(attributes); + if (type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1)) { + if (data_length != PSA_PUBKEY_SIZE) { + return *bits == 0 ? PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED : PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + /* See INFORMATION ON PSA KEY EXPORT FORMATS near top of file */ + if (p256_validate_pubkey(data + 1) != P256_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } else if (type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1)) { + if (data_length != PRIVKEY_SIZE) { + return *bits == 0 ? PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED : PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + if (p256_validate_privkey(data) != P256_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } else { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + *bits = CURVE_BITS; + + /* We only support the export format for input, so just copy. */ + if (key_buffer_size < data_length) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + memcpy(key_buffer, data, data_length); + *key_buffer_length = data_length; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t p256_transparent_export_public_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length) +{ + /* Is this the right curve? */ + size_t bits = psa_get_key_bits(attributes); + psa_key_type_t type = psa_get_key_type(attributes); + if (bits != CURVE_BITS || type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1)) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + /* Validate sizes, as p256-m expects fixed-size buffers */ + if (key_buffer_size != PRIVKEY_SIZE) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + if (data_size < PSA_PUBKEY_SIZE) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + /* See INFORMATION ON PSA KEY EXPORT FORMATS near top of file */ + data[0] = PSA_PUBKEY_HEADER_BYTE; + int ret = p256_public_from_private(data + 1, key_buffer); + if (ret == P256_SUCCESS) { + *data_length = PSA_PUBKEY_SIZE; + } + + return p256_to_psa_error(ret); +} + +psa_status_t p256_transparent_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length) +{ + /* We don't use this argument, but the specification mandates the signature + * of driver entry-points. (void) used to avoid compiler warning. */ + (void) attributes; + + /* Validate sizes, as p256-m expects fixed-size buffers */ + if (key_buffer_size != PRIVKEY_SIZE) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + /* + * p256-m's keypair generation function outputs both public and private + * keys. Allocate a buffer to which the public key will be written. The + * private key will be written to key_buffer, which is passed to this + * function as an argument. */ + uint8_t public_key_buffer[P256_PUBKEY_SIZE]; + + int ret = p256_gen_keypair(key_buffer, public_key_buffer); + if (ret == P256_SUCCESS) { + *key_buffer_length = PRIVKEY_SIZE; + } + + return p256_to_psa_error(ret); +} + +psa_status_t p256_transparent_key_agreement( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *shared_secret, + size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length) +{ + /* We don't use these arguments, but the specification mandates the + * sginature of driver entry-points. (void) used to avoid compiler + * warning. */ + (void) attributes; + (void) alg; + + /* Validate sizes, as p256-m expects fixed-size buffers */ + if (key_buffer_size != PRIVKEY_SIZE || peer_key_length != PSA_PUBKEY_SIZE) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + if (shared_secret_size < SHARED_SECRET_SIZE) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + /* See INFORMATION ON PSA KEY EXPORT FORMATS near top of file */ + const uint8_t *peer_key_p256m = peer_key + 1; + int ret = p256_ecdh_shared_secret(shared_secret, key_buffer, peer_key_p256m); + if (ret == P256_SUCCESS) { + *shared_secret_length = SHARED_SECRET_SIZE; + } + + return p256_to_psa_error(ret); +} + +psa_status_t p256_transparent_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length) +{ + /* We don't use these arguments, but the specification mandates the + * sginature of driver entry-points. (void) used to avoid compiler + * warning. */ + (void) attributes; + (void) alg; + + /* Validate sizes, as p256-m expects fixed-size buffers */ + if (key_buffer_size != PRIVKEY_SIZE) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + if (signature_size < SIGNATURE_SIZE) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + int ret = p256_ecdsa_sign(signature, key_buffer, hash, hash_length); + if (ret == P256_SUCCESS) { + *signature_length = SIGNATURE_SIZE; + } + + return p256_to_psa_error(ret); +} + +/* This function expects the key buffer to contain a PSA public key, + * as exported by psa_export_public_key() */ +static psa_status_t p256_verify_hash_with_public_key( + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length) +{ + /* Validate sizes, as p256-m expects fixed-size buffers */ + if (key_buffer_size != PSA_PUBKEY_SIZE || *key_buffer != PSA_PUBKEY_HEADER_BYTE) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + if (signature_length != SIGNATURE_SIZE) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + } + + /* See INFORMATION ON PSA KEY EXPORT FORMATS near top of file */ + const uint8_t *public_key_p256m = key_buffer + 1; + int ret = p256_ecdsa_verify(signature, public_key_p256m, hash, hash_length); + + return p256_to_psa_error(ret); +} + +psa_status_t p256_transparent_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length) +{ + /* We don't use this argument, but the specification mandates the signature + * of driver entry-points. (void) used to avoid compiler warning. */ + (void) alg; + + psa_status_t status; + uint8_t public_key_buffer[PSA_PUBKEY_SIZE]; + size_t public_key_buffer_size = PSA_PUBKEY_SIZE; + + size_t public_key_length = PSA_PUBKEY_SIZE; + /* As p256-m doesn't require dynamic allocation, we want to avoid it in + * the entrypoint functions as well. psa_driver_wrapper_export_public_key() + * requires size_t*, so we use a pointer to a stack variable. */ + size_t *public_key_length_ptr = &public_key_length; + + /* The contents of key_buffer may either be the 32 byte private key + * (keypair format), or 0x04 followed by the 64 byte public key (public + * key format). To ensure the key is in the latter format, the public key + * is exported. */ + status = psa_driver_wrapper_export_public_key( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + public_key_buffer, + public_key_buffer_size, + public_key_length_ptr); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = p256_verify_hash_with_public_key( + public_key_buffer, + public_key_buffer_size, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_length); + +exit: + return status; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m_driver_entrypoints.h b/vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m_driver_entrypoints.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c740c4522d --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m_driver_entrypoints.h @@ -0,0 +1,219 @@ +/* + * Driver entry points for p256-m + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef P256M_DRIVER_ENTRYPOINTS_H +#define P256M_DRIVER_ENTRYPOINTS_H + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT +#define PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED */ + +#include "psa/crypto_types.h" + +/** Import SECP256R1 key. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] data The raw key material. For private keys + * this must be a big-endian integer of 32 + * bytes; for public key this must be an + * uncompressed ECPoint (65 bytes). + * \param[in] data_length The size of the raw key material. + * \param[out] key_buffer The buffer to contain the key data in + * output format upon successful return. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length The length of the data written in \p + * key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] bits The bitsize of the key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. Keypair generated and stored in buffer. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The input is not supported by this driver (not SECP256R1). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The input is invalid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p key_buffer_size is too small. + */ +psa_status_t p256_transparent_import_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, + size_t *bits); + +/** Export SECP256R1 public key, from the private key. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The private key in the export format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size The size of the private key in bytes. + * \param[out] data The buffer to contain the public key in + * the export format upon successful return. + * \param[in] data_size The size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length The length written to \p data in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. Keypair generated and stored in buffer. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The input is not supported by this driver (not SECP256R1). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The input is invalid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p key_buffer_size is too small. + */ +psa_status_t p256_transparent_export_public_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length); + +/** Generate SECP256R1 ECC Key Pair. + * Interface function which calls the p256-m key generation function and + * places it in the key buffer provided by the caller (Mbed TLS) in the + * correct format. For a SECP256R1 curve this is the 32 bit private key. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[out] key_buffer The buffer to contain the key data in + * output format upon successful return. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length The length of the data written in \p + * key_buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. Keypair generated and stored in buffer. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p key_buffer_size is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR + * The internal RNG failed. + */ +psa_status_t p256_transparent_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length); + +/** Perform raw key agreement using p256-m's ECDH implementation + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the private key + * in the format specified by PSA. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A key agreement algorithm that is + * compatible with the type of the key. + * \param[in] peer_key The buffer containing the peer's public + * key in format specified by PSA. + * \param[in] peer_key_length Size of the \p peer_key buffer in + * bytes. + * \param[out] shared_secret The buffer to which the shared secret + * is to be written. + * \param[in] shared_secret_size Size of the \p shared_secret buffer in + * bytes. + * \param[out] shared_secret_length On success, the number of bytes that + * make up the returned shared secret. + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. Shared secret successfully calculated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The input is invalid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p shared_secret_size is too small. + */ +psa_status_t p256_transparent_key_agreement( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *shared_secret, + size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length); + +/** Sign an already-calculated hash with a private key using p256-m's ECDSA + * implementation + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the private key + * in the format specified by PSA. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible + * with the type of the key. + * \param[in] hash The hash to sign. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer where signature is to be written. + * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. Hash was signed successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The input is invalid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p signature_size is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR + * The internal RNG failed. + */ +psa_status_t p256_transparent_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length); + +/** Verify the signature of a hash using a SECP256R1 public key using p256-m's + * ECDSA implementation. + * + * \note p256-m expects a 64 byte public key, but the contents of the key + buffer may be the 32 byte keypair representation or the 65 byte + public key representation. As a result, this function calls + psa_driver_wrapper_export_public_key() to ensure the public key + can be passed to p256-m. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key + * in the format specified by PSA. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of the key. + * \param[in] hash The hash whose signature is to be + * verified. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The signature is valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed + * signature is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The input is invalid. + */ +psa_status_t p256_transparent_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length); + +#endif /* P256M_DRIVER_ENTRYPOINTS_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/LICENSE b/vendor/mbedtls/LICENSE index d645695673..776ac77eaf 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/LICENSE +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/LICENSE @@ -1,3 +1,10 @@ +Mbed TLS files are provided under a dual [Apache-2.0](https://spdx.org/licenses/Apache-2.0.html) +OR [GPL-2.0-or-later](https://spdx.org/licenses/GPL-2.0-or-later.html) license. +This means that users may choose which of these licenses they take the code +under. + +The full text of each of these licenses is given below. + Apache License Version 2.0, January 2004 @@ -200,3 +207,347 @@ WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. 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See the + GNU General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along + with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., + 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. + +Also add information on how to contact you by electronic and paper mail. + +If the program is interactive, make it output a short notice like this +when it starts in an interactive mode: + + Gnomovision version 69, Copyright (C) year name of author + Gnomovision comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY; for details type `show w'. + This is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it + under certain conditions; type `show c' for details. + +The hypothetical commands `show w' and `show c' should show the appropriate +parts of the General Public License. Of course, the commands you use may +be called something other than `show w' and `show c'; they could even be +mouse-clicks or menu items--whatever suits your program. + +You should also get your employer (if you work as a programmer) or your +school, if any, to sign a "copyright disclaimer" for the program, if +necessary. Here is a sample; alter the names: + + Yoyodyne, Inc., hereby disclaims all copyright interest in the program + `Gnomovision' (which makes passes at compilers) written by James Hacker. + + , 1 April 1989 + Ty Coon, President of Vice + +This General Public License does not permit incorporating your program into +proprietary programs. If your program is a subroutine library, you may +consider it more useful to permit linking proprietary applications with the +library. If this is what you want to do, use the GNU Lesser General +Public License instead of this License. diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/README.md b/vendor/mbedtls/README.md index 875e6bf350..b70c67e030 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/README.md +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/README.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Mbed TLS includes a reference implementation of the [PSA Cryptography API](#psa- Configuration ------------- -Mbed TLS should build out of the box on most systems. Some platform specific options are available in the fully documented configuration file `include/mbedtls/config.h`, which is also the place where features can be selected. This file can be edited manually, or in a more programmatic way using the Python 3 script `scripts/config.py` (use `--help` for usage instructions). +Mbed TLS should build out of the box on most systems. Some platform specific options are available in the fully documented configuration file `include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h`, which is also the place where features can be selected. This file can be edited manually, or in a more programmatic way using the Python 3 script `scripts/config.py` (use `--help` for usage instructions). Compiler options can be set using conventional environment variables such as `CC` and `CFLAGS` when using the Make and CMake build system (see below). @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Documentation for the PSA Cryptography API is available [on GitHub](https://arm- To generate a local copy of the library documentation in HTML format, tailored to your compile-time configuration: -1. Make sure that [Doxygen](http://www.doxygen.nl/) is installed. We use version 1.8.11 but slightly older or more recent versions should work. +1. Make sure that [Doxygen](http://www.doxygen.nl/) is installed. 1. Run `make apidoc`. 1. Browse `apidoc/index.html` or `apidoc/modules.html`. @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ There are currently three active build systems used within Mbed TLS releases: - GNU Make - CMake -- Microsoft Visual Studio (Microsoft Visual Studio 2013 or later) +- Microsoft Visual Studio The main systems used for development are CMake and GNU Make. Those systems are always complete and up-to-date. The others should reflect all changes present in the CMake and Make build system, although features may not be ported there automatically. @@ -46,10 +46,41 @@ The Make and CMake build systems create three libraries: libmbedcrypto, libmbedx You need the following tools to build the library with the provided makefiles: -* GNU Make or a build tool that CMake supports. -* A C99 toolchain (compiler, linker, archiver). We actively test with GCC 5.4, Clang 3.8, IAR8 and Visual Studio 2013. More recent versions should work. Slightly older versions may work. -* Python 3.6 or later to generate the test code. -* Perl to run the tests. +* GNU Make 3.82 or a build tool that CMake supports. +* A C99 toolchain (compiler, linker, archiver). We actively test with GCC 5.4, Clang 3.8, Arm Compiler 6, IAR 8 and Visual Studio 2017. More recent versions should work. Slightly older versions may work. +* Python 3.8 to generate the test code. Python is also needed to integrate PSA drivers and to build the development branch (see next section). +* Perl to run the tests, and to generate some source files in the development branch. +* CMake 3.10.2 or later (if using CMake). +* Microsoft Visual Studio 2017 or later (if using Visual Studio). +* Doxygen 1.8.11 or later (if building the documentation; slightly older versions should work). + +### Git usage + +The `development` branch and the `mbedtls-3.6` long-term support branch of Mbed TLS use a [Git submodule](https://git-scm.com/book/en/v2/Git-Tools-Submodules#_cloning_submodules) ([framework](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls-framework)). This is not needed to merely compile the library at a release tag. This is not needed to consume a release archive (zip or tar). + +### Generated source files in the development branch + +The source code of Mbed TLS includes some files that are automatically generated by scripts and whose content depends only on the Mbed TLS source, not on the platform or on the library configuration. These files are not included in the development branch of Mbed TLS, but the generated files are included in official releases. This section explains how to generate the missing files in the development branch. + +The following tools are required: + +* Perl, for some library source files and for Visual Studio build files. +* Python 3.8 and some Python packages, for some library source files, sample programs and test data. To install the necessary packages, run: + ``` + python3 -m pip install --user -r scripts/basic.requirements.txt + ``` + Depending on your Python installation, you may need to invoke `python` instead of `python3`. To install the packages system-wide, omit the `--user` option. +* A C compiler for the host platform, for some test data. + +If you are cross-compiling, you must set the `CC` environment variable to a C compiler for the host platform when generating the configuration-independent files. + +Any of the following methods are available to generate the configuration-independent files: + +* If not cross-compiling, running `make` with any target, or just `make`, will automatically generate required files. +* On non-Windows systems, when not cross-compiling, CMake will generate the required files automatically. +* Run `make generated_files` to generate all the configuration-independent files. +* On Unix/POSIX systems, run `tests/scripts/check-generated-files.sh -u` to generate all the configuration-independent files. +* On Windows, run `scripts\make_generated_files.bat` to generate all the configuration-independent files. ### Make @@ -159,6 +190,33 @@ Regarding variables, also note that if you set CFLAGS when invoking cmake, your value of CFLAGS doesn't override the content provided by cmake (depending on the build mode as seen above), it's merely prepended to it. +#### Consuming Mbed TLS + +Mbed TLS provides a package config file for consumption as a dependency in other +CMake projects. You can include Mbed TLS's CMake targets yourself with: + + find_package(MbedTLS) + +If prompted, set `MbedTLS_DIR` to `${YOUR_MBEDTLS_INSTALL_DIR}/cmake`. This +creates the following targets: + +- `MbedTLS::mbedcrypto` (Crypto library) +- `MbedTLS::mbedtls` (TLS library) +- `MbedTLS::mbedx509` (X509 library) + +You can then use these directly through `target_link_libraries()`: + + add_executable(xyz) + + target_link_libraries(xyz + PUBLIC MbedTLS::mbedtls + MbedTLS::mbedcrypto + MbedTLS::mbedx509) + +This will link the Mbed TLS libraries to your library or application, and add +its include directories to your target (transitively, in the case of `PUBLIC` or +`INTERFACE` link libraries). + #### Mbed TLS as a subproject Mbed TLS supports being built as a CMake subproject. One can @@ -167,10 +225,12 @@ subproject. ### Microsoft Visual Studio -The build files for Microsoft Visual Studio are generated for Visual Studio 2010. +The build files for Microsoft Visual Studio are generated for Visual Studio 2017. The solution file `mbedTLS.sln` contains all the basic projects needed to build the library and all the programs. The files in tests are not generated and compiled, as these need Python and perl environments as well. However, the selftest program in `programs/test/` is still available. +In the development branch of Mbed TLS, the Visual Studio solution files need to be generated first as described in [“Generated source files in the development branch”](#generated-source-files-in-the-development-branch). + Example programs ---------------- @@ -188,9 +248,9 @@ For machines with a Unix shell and OpenSSL (and optionally GnuTLS) installed, ad - `tests/compat.sh` tests interoperability of every ciphersuite with other implementations. - `tests/scripts/test-ref-configs.pl` test builds in various reduced configurations. - `tests/scripts/depends.py` test builds in configurations with a single curve, key exchange, hash, cipher, or pkalg on. -- `tests/scripts/all.sh` runs a combination of the above tests, plus some more, with various build options (such as ASan, full `config.h`, etc). +- `tests/scripts/all.sh` runs a combination of the above tests, plus some more, with various build options (such as ASan, full `mbedtls_config.h`, etc). -Instead of manually installing the required versions of all tools required for testing, it is possible to use the Docker images from our CI systems, as explained in [our testing infrastructure repository](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls-test/blob/master/README.md#quick-start). +Instead of manually installing the required versions of all tools required for testing, it is possible to use the Docker images from our CI systems, as explained in [our testing infrastructure repository](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls-test/blob/main/README.md#quick-start). Porting Mbed TLS ---------------- @@ -208,6 +268,8 @@ Mbed TLS is mostly written in portable C99; however, it has a few platform requi - Signed integers must be represented using two's complement. - `int` and `size_t` must be at least 32 bits wide. - The types `uint8_t`, `uint16_t`, `uint32_t` and their signed equivalents must be available. +- Mixed-endian platforms are not supported. +- SIZE_MAX must be at least as big as INT_MAX and UINT_MAX. PSA cryptography API -------------------- @@ -231,25 +293,32 @@ Arm welcomes feedback on the design of the API. If you think something could be ### PSA implementation in Mbed TLS Mbed TLS includes a reference implementation of the PSA Cryptography API. -This implementation is not yet as mature as the rest of the library. Some parts of the code have not been reviewed as thoroughly, and some parts of the PSA implementation are not yet well optimized for code size. +However, it does not aim to implement the whole specification; in particular it does not implement all the algorithms. + +The X.509 and TLS code can use PSA cryptography for most operations. To enable this support, activate the compilation option `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` in `mbedtls_config.h`. Note that TLS 1.3 uses PSA cryptography for most operations regardless of this option. See `docs/use-psa-crypto.md` for details. -The X.509 and TLS code can use PSA cryptography for a limited subset of operations. To enable this support, activate the compilation option `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` in `config.h`. +### PSA drivers -There are currently a few deviations where the library does not yet implement the latest version of the specification. Please refer to the [compliance issues on Github](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbed-crypto/labels/compliance) for an up-to-date list. +Mbed TLS supports drivers for cryptographic accelerators, secure elements and random generators. This is work in progress. Please note that the driver interfaces are not fully stable yet and may change without notice. We intend to preserve backward compatibility for application code (using the PSA Crypto API), but the code of the drivers may have to change in future minor releases of Mbed TLS. -### Upcoming features +Please see the [PSA driver example and guide](docs/psa-driver-example-and-guide.md) for information on writing a driver. -Future releases of this library will include: +When using drivers, you will generally want to enable two compilation options (see the reference manual for more information): -* A driver programming interface, which makes it possible to use hardware accelerators instead of the default software implementation for chosen algorithms. -* Support for external keys to be stored and manipulated exclusively in a separate cryptoprocessor. -* A configuration mechanism to compile only the algorithms you need for your application. -* A wider set of cryptographic algorithms. +* `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is necessary so that the X.509 and TLS code calls the PSA drivers rather than the built-in software implementation. +* `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG` allows you to enable PSA cryptographic mechanisms without including the code of the corresponding software implementation. This is not yet supported for all mechanisms. License ------- -Unless specifically indicated otherwise in a file, Mbed TLS files are provided under the [Apache-2.0](https://spdx.org/licenses/Apache-2.0.html) license. See the [LICENSE](LICENSE) file for the full text of this license, and [the 'License and Copyright' section in the contributing guidelines](CONTRIBUTING.md#License-and-Copyright) for more information. +Unless specifically indicated otherwise in a file, Mbed TLS files are provided under a dual [Apache-2.0](https://spdx.org/licenses/Apache-2.0.html) OR [GPL-2.0-or-later](https://spdx.org/licenses/GPL-2.0-or-later.html) license. See the [LICENSE](LICENSE) file for the full text of these licenses, and [the 'License and Copyright' section in the contributing guidelines](CONTRIBUTING.md#License-and-Copyright) for more information. + +### Third-party code included in Mbed TLS + +This project contains code from other projects. This code is located within the `3rdparty/` directory. The original license text is included within project subdirectories, where it differs from the normal Mbed TLS license, and/or in source files. The projects are listed below: + +* `3rdparty/everest/`: Files stem from [Project Everest](https://project-everest.github.io/) and are distributed under the Apache 2.0 license. +* `3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m/`: Files have been taken from the [p256-m](https://github.com/mpg/p256-m) repository. The code in the original repository is distributed under the Apache 2.0 license. It is distributed in Mbed TLS under a dual Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later license with permission from the author. Contributing ------------ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/configs/README.txt b/vendor/mbedtls/configs/README.txt deleted file mode 100644 index d2f9bcb008..0000000000 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/configs/README.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,26 +0,0 @@ -This directory contains example configuration files. - -The examples are generally focused on a particular usage case (eg, support for -a restricted number of ciphersuites) and aim at minimizing resource usage for -this target. They can be used as a basis for custom configurations. - -These files are complete replacements for the default config.h. To use one of -them, you can pick one of the following methods: - -1. Replace the default file include/mbedtls/config.h with the chosen one. - (Depending on your compiler, you may need to adjust the line with - #include "mbedtls/check_config.h" then.) - -2. Define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE and adjust the include path accordingly. - For example, using make: - - CFLAGS="-I$PWD/configs -DMBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE=''" make - - Or, using cmake: - - find . -iname '*cmake*' -not -name CMakeLists.txt -exec rm -rf {} + - CFLAGS="-I$PWD/configs -DMBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE=''" cmake . - make - -Note that the second method also works if you want to keep your custom -configuration file outside the Mbed TLS tree. diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-ccm-psk-dtls1_2.h b/vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-ccm-psk-dtls1_2.h index 5d7e663d65..19e09d957f 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-ccm-psk-dtls1_2.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-ccm-psk-dtls1_2.h @@ -5,19 +5,7 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * Minimal configuration for DTLS 1.2 with PSK and AES-CCM ciphersuites @@ -34,8 +22,6 @@ * * See README.txt for usage instructions. */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H -#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H /* System support */ //#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME /* Optionally used in Hello messages */ @@ -61,7 +47,6 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY @@ -80,7 +65,8 @@ * both ends of the connection! (See comments in "mbedtls/ssl.h".) * The optimal size here depends on the typical size of records. */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN 256 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN 256 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN 256 /* Save RAM at the expense of ROM */ #define MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES @@ -90,10 +76,10 @@ /* * You should adjust this to the exact number of sources you're using: default - * is the "platform_entropy_poll" source plus a weak clock source, but you may - * want to add other ones. Minimum is 3 for the entropy test suite. + * is the "platform_entropy_poll" source, but you may want to add other ones + * Minimum is 2 for the entropy test suite. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES 3 +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES 2 /* These defines are present so that the config modifying scripts can enable * them during tests/scripts/test-ref-configs.pl */ @@ -104,7 +90,3 @@ * (huge code size increase, needed for tests/ssl-opt.sh) */ //#define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C //#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_C - -#include "mbedtls/check_config.h" - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-ccm-psk-tls1_2.h b/vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-ccm-psk-tls1_2.h index 1aa52a7cbc..d49adfd725 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-ccm-psk-tls1_2.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-ccm-psk-tls1_2.h @@ -5,19 +5,7 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * Minimal configuration for TLS 1.2 with PSK and AES-CCM ciphersuites @@ -33,8 +21,6 @@ * * See README.txt for usage instructions. */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H -#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H /* System support */ //#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME /* Optionally used in Hello messages */ @@ -70,7 +56,8 @@ * both ends of the connection! (See comments in "mbedtls/ssl.h".) * The optimal size here depends on the typical size of records. */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN 1024 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN 1024 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN 1024 /* Save RAM at the expense of ROM */ #define MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES @@ -94,7 +81,3 @@ * (huge code size increase, needed for tests/ssl-opt.sh) */ //#define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C //#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_C - -#include "mbedtls/check_config.h" - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-mini-tls1_1.h b/vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-mini-tls1_1.h deleted file mode 100644 index 318e0fba8b..0000000000 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-mini-tls1_1.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,90 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file config-mini-tls1_1.h - * - * \brief Minimal configuration for TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ -/* - * Minimal configuration for TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346), implementing only the - * required ciphersuite: MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * - * See README.txt for usage instructions. - */ - -#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H -#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H - -/* System support */ -#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM -#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME - -/* Mbed TLS feature support */ -#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC -#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 -#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 - -/* Mbed TLS modules */ -#define MBEDTLS_AES_C -#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C -#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C -#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C -#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C -#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C -#define MBEDTLS_DES_C -#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C -#define MBEDTLS_MD_C -#define MBEDTLS_MD5_C -#define MBEDTLS_NET_C -#define MBEDTLS_OID_C -#define MBEDTLS_PK_C -#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C -#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C -#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C -#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C -#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C -#define MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C - -/* For test certificates */ -#define MBEDTLS_BASE64_C -#define MBEDTLS_CERTS_C -#define MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C - -/* For testing with compat.sh */ -#define MBEDTLS_FS_IO - -/* These defines are present so that the config modifying scripts can enable - * them during tests/scripts/test-ref-configs.pl */ -//#define MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO -//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C - -/* With MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C, importing an RSA key requires MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) -#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C -#endif -#include "mbedtls/check_config.h" - -/* Error messages and TLS debugging traces - * (huge code size increase, needed for tests/ssl-opt.sh) */ -//#define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C -//#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_C - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-no-entropy.h b/vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-no-entropy.h index 72006eb6ef..ddb00b41ef 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-no-entropy.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-no-entropy.h @@ -5,19 +5,7 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * Minimal configuration of features that do not require an entropy source @@ -29,9 +17,6 @@ * See README.txt for usage instructions. */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H -#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H - /* System support */ #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME @@ -39,7 +24,6 @@ /* Mbed TLS feature support */ #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 -#define MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES #define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED #define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED #define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED @@ -50,8 +34,6 @@ #define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 #define MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES -#define MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE -#define MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE /* Mbed TLS modules */ #define MBEDTLS_AES_C @@ -74,7 +56,12 @@ #define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C #define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +/* The library does not currently support enabling SHA-224 without SHA-256. + * A future version of the library will have this option disabled + * by default. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA224_C #define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA384_C #define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_C #define MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C @@ -84,7 +71,3 @@ /* Miscellaneous options */ #define MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES - -#include "mbedtls/check_config.h" - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-suite-b.h b/vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-suite-b.h index 545a7912d8..9bba6e6cbd 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-suite-b.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-suite-b.h @@ -5,19 +5,7 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * Minimal configuration for TLS NSA Suite B Profile (RFC 6460) @@ -33,9 +21,6 @@ * See README.txt for usage instructions. */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H -#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H - /* System support */ #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME @@ -64,6 +49,7 @@ #define MBEDTLS_PK_C #define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C #define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA384_C #define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C @@ -73,14 +59,13 @@ /* For test certificates */ #define MBEDTLS_BASE64_C -#define MBEDTLS_CERTS_C #define MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C /* Save RAM at the expense of ROM */ #define MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES /* Save RAM by adjusting to our exact needs */ -#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE 48 // 48 bytes for a 384-bit elliptic curve +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE 48 // 384-bit EC curve = 48 bytes /* Save RAM at the expense of speed, see ecp.h */ #define MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE 2 @@ -107,23 +92,15 @@ * The minimum size here depends on the certificate chain used as well as the * typical size of records. */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN 1024 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN 1024 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN 1024 /* These defines are present so that the config modifying scripts can enable * them during tests/scripts/test-ref-configs.pl */ //#define MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO //#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C -/* With USE_PSA_CRYPTO, some PK operations also need PK_WRITE */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C -#endif - /* Error messages and TLS debugging traces * (huge code size increase, needed for tests/ssl-opt.sh) */ //#define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C //#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_C - -#include "mbedtls/check_config.h" - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-symmetric-only.h b/vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-symmetric-only.h index 3498738a6f..512dd7616c 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-symmetric-only.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-symmetric-only.h @@ -5,24 +5,9 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H -#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H - /* System support */ //#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME @@ -47,11 +32,9 @@ /* Mbed TLS modules */ #define MBEDTLS_AES_C -#define MBEDTLS_ARC4_C #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C #define MBEDTLS_BASE64_C -#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C #define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C #define MBEDTLS_ARIA_C #define MBEDTLS_CCM_C @@ -64,13 +47,10 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C #define MBEDTLS_ERROR_C #define MBEDTLS_GCM_C -//#define MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C #define MBEDTLS_HKDF_C #define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C #define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C #define MBEDTLS_MD_C -#define MBEDTLS_MD2_C -#define MBEDTLS_MD4_C #define MBEDTLS_MD5_C #define MBEDTLS_OID_C #define MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C @@ -85,15 +65,13 @@ #define MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C #define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C #define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +/* The library does not currently support enabling SHA-224 without SHA-256. + * A future version of the library will have this option disabled + * by default. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA224_C #define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +#define MBEDTLS_SHA384_C #define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C //#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_C #define MBEDTLS_TIMING_C #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_C -#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_C - -#include "mbedtls/config_psa.h" - -#include "check_config.h" - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-tfm.h b/vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-tfm.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..14896d40f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-tfm.h @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +/** + * \file config-tfm.h + * + * \brief TF-M medium profile, adapted to work on other platforms. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/* TF-M medium profile: mbedtls legacy configuration */ +#include "../configs/ext/tfm_mbedcrypto_config_profile_medium.h" + +/* TF-M medium profile: PSA crypto configuration */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE "../configs/ext/crypto_config_profile_medium.h" + +/***********************************************************/ +/* Tweak the configuration to remove dependencies on TF-M. */ +/***********************************************************/ + +/* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM needs third-party files, so disable it. */ +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM + +/* Disable buffer-based memory allocator. This isn't strictly required, + * but using the native allocator is faster and works better with + * memory management analysis frameworks such as ASan. */ +#undef MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + +// This macro is enabled in TFM Medium but is disabled here because it is +// incompatible with baremetal builds in Mbed TLS. +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C + +// This macro is enabled in TFM Medium but is disabled here because it is +// incompatible with baremetal builds in Mbed TLS. +#undef MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + +// These platform-related TF-M settings are not useful here. +#undef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS +#undef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR +#undef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO +#undef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT +#undef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS +#undef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE + +/* + * In order to get an example config that works cleanly out-of-the-box + * for both baremetal and non-baremetal builds, we detect baremetal builds + * (either IAR, Arm compiler or __ARM_EABI__ defined), and adjust some + * variables accordingly. + */ +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) || defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(__ARM_EABI__) +#define MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY +#else +/* Use built-in platform entropy functions (TF-M provides its own). */ +#undef MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY +#endif + +/*********************************************************************** + * Local changes to crypto config below this delimiter + **********************************************************************/ + +// We expect TF-M to pick this up soon +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT + +/* CCM is the only cipher/AEAD enabled in TF-M configuration files, but it + * does not need CIPHER_C to be enabled, so we can disable it in order + * to reduce code size further. */ +#undef MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-thread.h b/vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-thread.h index 0de7e1679f..2f81f90078 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-thread.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/configs/config-thread.h @@ -5,19 +5,7 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* @@ -32,9 +20,6 @@ * See README.txt for usage instructions. */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H -#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H - /* System support */ #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM @@ -48,7 +33,6 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS /* Mbed TLS modules */ #define MBEDTLS_AES_C @@ -81,7 +65,7 @@ #define MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES /* Save RAM by adjusting to our exact needs */ -#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE 32 // 32 bytes for a 256-bit elliptic curve +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE 32 // 256-bit EC curve = 32 bytes /* Save ROM and a few bytes of RAM by specifying our own ciphersuite list */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 @@ -90,7 +74,3 @@ * them during tests/scripts/test-ref-configs.pl */ //#define MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO //#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C - -#include "mbedtls/check_config.h" - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/configs/crypto-config-ccm-aes-sha256.h b/vendor/mbedtls/configs/crypto-config-ccm-aes-sha256.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7f8d58768c --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/configs/crypto-config-ccm-aes-sha256.h @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +/** + * \file configs/crypto-config-ccm-aes-sha256.h + * + * \brief PSA crypto configuration with only symmetric cryptography: CCM-AES, + * SHA-256, HMAC and key derivation + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H + +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA 1 + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/configs/ext/config_tfm.h b/vendor/mbedtls/configs/ext/config_tfm.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..60d855ed59 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/configs/ext/config_tfm.h @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +/* + * Empty placeholder + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/* + * This file is intentionally empty. + * + * Having an empty file here allows us to build the TF-M config, which references this file, + * without making any changes to the TF-M config. + */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/configs/ext/crypto_config_profile_medium.h b/vendor/mbedtls/configs/ext/crypto_config_profile_medium.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..af8869f136 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/configs/ext/crypto_config_profile_medium.h @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2018-2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + * + */ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_config.h + * \brief PSA crypto configuration options (set of defines) + * + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) +/** + * When #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is enabled in mbedtls_config.h, + * this file determines which cryptographic mechanisms are enabled + * through the PSA Cryptography API (\c psa_xxx() functions). + * + * To enable a cryptographic mechanism, uncomment the definition of + * the corresponding \c PSA_WANT_xxx preprocessor symbol. + * To disable a cryptographic mechanism, comment out the definition of + * the corresponding \c PSA_WANT_xxx preprocessor symbol. + * The names of cryptographic mechanisms correspond to values + * defined in psa/crypto_values.h, with the prefix \c PSA_WANT_ instead + * of \c PSA_. + * + * Note that many cryptographic mechanisms involve two symbols: one for + * the key type (\c PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx) and one for the algorithm + * (\c PSA_WANT_ALG_xxx). Mechanisms with additional parameters may involve + * additional symbols. + */ +#else +/** + * When \c MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is disabled in mbedtls_config.h, + * this file is not used, and cryptographic mechanisms are supported + * through the PSA API if and only if they are supported through the + * mbedtls_xxx API. + */ +#endif + +#ifndef PROFILE_M_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H +#define PROFILE_M_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H + +/* + * CBC-MAC is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS. + */ +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB 1 +/* PBKDF2-HMAC is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS. + * Note: when adding support, also adjust include/mbedtls/config_psa.h */ +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1 +/* PBKDF2-HMAC is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS. + * Note: when adding support, also adjust include/mbedtls/config_psa.h */ +//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS 1 + +//#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 1 +/* + * SECP224K1 is buggy via the PSA API in Mbed TLS + * (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/3541). Thus, do not enable it by + * default. + */ +//#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1 + +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR 1 /* Deprecated */ +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR 1 /* Deprecated */ +//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 + +/* + * The following symbols extend and deprecate the legacy + * PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR ones. They include the usage of that key in + * the name's suffix. "_USE" is the most generic and it can be used to describe + * a generic suport, whereas other ones add more features on top of that and + * they are more specific. + */ +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE 1 + +#ifdef CRYPTO_HW_ACCELERATOR +#include "crypto_accelerator_config.h" +#endif + +#endif /* PROFILE_M_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/configs/ext/mbedtls_entropy_nv_seed_config.h b/vendor/mbedtls/configs/ext/mbedtls_entropy_nv_seed_config.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..60d855ed59 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/configs/ext/mbedtls_entropy_nv_seed_config.h @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +/* + * Empty placeholder + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/* + * This file is intentionally empty. + * + * Having an empty file here allows us to build the TF-M config, which references this file, + * without making any changes to the TF-M config. + */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/configs/ext/tfm_mbedcrypto_config_profile_medium.h b/vendor/mbedtls/configs/ext/tfm_mbedcrypto_config_profile_medium.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ecdecea5ee --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/configs/ext/tfm_mbedcrypto_config_profile_medium.h @@ -0,0 +1,573 @@ +/** + * \file config.h + * + * \brief Configuration options (set of defines) + * + * This set of compile-time options may be used to enable + * or disable features selectively, and reduce the global + * memory footprint. + */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2006-2023, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 + * + * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may + * not use this file except in compliance with the License. + * You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT + * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + * + * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + */ + +#ifndef PROFILE_M_MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H +#define PROFILE_M_MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H + +#include "config_tfm.h" + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE) +#define _CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE 1 +#endif + +/** + * \name SECTION: System support + * + * This section sets system specific settings. + * \{ + */ + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM + * + * The compiler has support for asm(). + * + * Requires support for asm() in compiler. + * + * Used in: + * library/aria.c + * library/timing.c + * include/mbedtls/bn_mul.h + * + * Required by: + * MBEDTLS_AESNI_C + * MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C + * + * Comment to disable the use of assembly code. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY + * + * Enable the memory allocation layer. + * + * By default mbed TLS uses the system-provided calloc() and free(). + * This allows different allocators (self-implemented or provided) to be + * provided to the platform abstraction layer. + * + * Enabling MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY without the + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{FREE,CALLOC}_MACROs will provide + * "mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free()" allowing you to set an alternative calloc() and + * free() function pointer at runtime. + * + * Enabling MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY and specifying + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{CALLOC,FREE}_MACROs will allow you to specify the + * alternate function at compile time. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + * + * Enable this layer to allow use of alternative memory allocators. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY + +/* \} name SECTION: System support */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: mbed TLS feature support + * + * This section sets support for features that are or are not needed + * within the modules that are enabled. + * \{ + */ + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES + * + * Use precomputed AES tables stored in ROM. + * + * Uncomment this macro to use precomputed AES tables stored in ROM. + * Comment this macro to generate AES tables in RAM at runtime. + * + * Tradeoff: Using precomputed ROM tables reduces RAM usage by ~8kb + * (or ~2kb if \c MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES is used) and reduces the + * initialization time before the first AES operation can be performed. + * It comes at the cost of additional ~8kb ROM use (resp. ~2kb if \c + * MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES below is used), and potentially degraded + * performance if ROM access is slower than RAM access. + * + * This option is independent of \c MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES + * + * Use less ROM/RAM for AES tables. + * + * Uncommenting this macro omits 75% of the AES tables from + * ROM / RAM (depending on the value of \c MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES) + * by computing their values on the fly during operations + * (the tables are entry-wise rotations of one another). + * + * Tradeoff: Uncommenting this reduces the RAM / ROM footprint + * by ~6kb but at the cost of more arithmetic operations during + * runtime. Specifically, one has to compare 4 accesses within + * different tables to 4 accesses with additional arithmetic + * operations within the same table. The performance gain/loss + * depends on the system and memory details. + * + * This option is independent of \c MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM + * + * Enable specific 'modulo p' routines for each NIST prime. + * Depending on the prime and architecture, makes operations 4 to 8 times + * faster on the corresponding curve. + * + * Comment this macro to disable NIST curves optimisation. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY + * + * Do not use built-in platform entropy functions. + * This is useful if your platform does not support + * standards like the /dev/urandom or Windows CryptoAPI. + * + * Uncomment this macro to disable the built-in platform entropy functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + * + * Enable the non-volatile (NV) seed file-based entropy source. + * (Also enables the NV seed read/write functions in the platform layer) + * + * This is crucial (if not required) on systems that do not have a + * cryptographic entropy source (in hardware or kernel) available. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + * + * \note The read/write functions that are used by the entropy source are + * determined in the platform layer, and can be modified at runtime and/or + * compile-time depending on the flags (MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_*) used. + * + * \note If you use the default implementation functions that read a seedfile + * with regular fopen(), please make sure you make a seedfile with the + * proper name (defined in MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE) and at + * least MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE bytes in size that can be read from + * and written to or you will get an entropy source error! The default + * implementation will only use the first MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE + * bytes from the file. + * + * \note The entropy collector will write to the seed file before entropy is + * given to an external source, to update it. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM + * + * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM is defined, the code is built for SPM (Secure + * Partition Manager) integration which separates the code into two parts: a + * NSPE (Non-Secure Process Environment) and an SPE (Secure Process + * Environment). + * + * Module: library/psa_crypto.c + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER + * + * Enable an implementation of SHA-256 that has lower ROM footprint but also + * lower performance. + * + * The default implementation is meant to be a reasonnable compromise between + * performance and size. This version optimizes more aggressively for size at + * the expense of performance. Eg on Cortex-M4 it reduces the size of + * mbedtls_sha256_process() from ~2KB to ~0.5KB for a performance hit of about + * 30%. + * + * Uncomment to enable the smaller implementation of SHA256. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + * + * This setting allows support for cryptographic mechanisms through the PSA + * API to be configured separately from support through the mbedtls API. + * + * When this option is disabled, the PSA API exposes the cryptographic + * mechanisms that can be implemented on top of the `mbedtls_xxx` API + * configured with `MBEDTLS_XXX` symbols. + * + * When this option is enabled, the PSA API exposes the cryptographic + * mechanisms requested by the `PSA_WANT_XXX` symbols defined in + * include/psa/crypto_config.h. The corresponding `MBEDTLS_XXX` settings are + * automatically enabled if required (i.e. if no PSA driver provides the + * mechanism). You may still freely enable additional `MBEDTLS_XXX` symbols + * in mbedtls_config.h. + * + * If the symbol #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE is defined, it specifies + * an alternative header to include instead of include/psa/crypto_config.h. + * + * This feature is still experimental and is not ready for production since + * it is not completed. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + +/* \} name SECTION: mbed TLS feature support */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: mbed TLS modules + * + * This section enables or disables entire modules in mbed TLS + * \{ + */ + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AES_C + * + * Enable the AES block cipher. + * + * Module: library/aes.c + * Caller: library/cipher.c + * library/pem.c + * library/ctr_drbg.c + * + * This module is required to support the TLS ciphersuites that use the AES + * cipher. + * + * PEM_PARSE uses AES for decrypting encrypted keys. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH + * + * Use only 128-bit keys in AES operations to save ROM. + * + * Uncomment this macro to remove support for AES operations that use 192- + * or 256-bit keys. + * + * Uncommenting this macro reduces the size of AES code by ~300 bytes + * on v8-M/Thumb2. + * + * Module: library/aes.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C + */ +#define MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C + * + * Enable the generic cipher layer. + * + * Module: library/cipher.c + * + * Uncomment to enable generic cipher wrappers. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C + * + * Enable the CTR_DRBG AES-based random generator. + * The CTR_DRBG generator uses AES-256 by default. + * To use AES-128 instead, enable MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY below. + * + * Module: library/ctr_drbg.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C + * + * This module provides the CTR_DRBG AES random number generator. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C + * + * Enable the platform-specific entropy code. + * + * Module: library/entropy.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA512_C or MBEDTLS_SHA256_C + * + * This module provides a generic entropy pool + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_HKDF_C + * + * Enable the HKDF algorithm (RFC 5869). + * + * Module: library/hkdf.c + * Caller: + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C + * + * This module adds support for the Hashed Message Authentication Code + * (HMAC)-based key derivation function (HKDF). + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_HKDF_C /* Used for HUK deriviation */ + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + * + * Enable the buffer allocator implementation that makes use of a (stack) + * based buffer to 'allocate' dynamic memory. (replaces calloc() and free() + * calls) + * + * Module: library/memory_buffer_alloc.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY (to use it within mbed TLS) + * + * Enable this module to enable the buffer memory allocator. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + * + * Enable the platform abstraction layer that allows you to re-assign + * functions like calloc(), free(), snprintf(), printf(), fprintf(), exit(). + * + * Enabling MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C enables to use of MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT + * or MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO directives, allowing the functions mentioned + * above to be specified at runtime or compile time respectively. + * + * \note This abstraction layer must be enabled on Windows (including MSYS2) + * as other module rely on it for a fixed snprintf implementation. + * + * Module: library/platform.c + * Caller: Most other .c files + * + * This module enables abstraction of common (libc) functions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR + +#include + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO snprintf +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + * Enable the Platform Security Architecture cryptography API. + * + * Module: library/psa_crypto.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C + * + * Enable the Platform Security Architecture persistent key storage. + * + * Module: library/psa_crypto_storage.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C, + * either MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C or a native implementation of + * the PSA ITS interface + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C + +/* \} name SECTION: mbed TLS modules */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: General configuration options + * + * This section contains Mbed TLS build settings that are not associated + * with a particular module. + * + * \{ + */ + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE + * + * If defined, this is a header which will be included instead of + * `"mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h"`. + * This header file specifies the compile-time configuration of Mbed TLS. + * Unlike other configuration options, this one must be defined on the + * compiler command line: a definition in `mbedtls_config.h` would have + * no effect. + * + * This macro is expanded after an \#include directive. This is a popular but + * non-standard feature of the C language, so this feature is only available + * with compilers that perform macro expansion on an \#include line. + * + * The value of this symbol is typically a path in double quotes, either + * absolute or relative to a directory on the include search path. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE "mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h" + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE + * + * If defined, this is a header which will be included after + * `"mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h"` or #MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE. + * This allows you to modify the default configuration, including the ability + * to undefine options that are enabled by default. + * + * This macro is expanded after an \#include directive. This is a popular but + * non-standard feature of the C language, so this feature is only available + * with compilers that perform macro expansion on an \#include line. + * + * The value of this symbol is typically a path in double quotes, either + * absolute or relative to a directory on the include search path. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE "/dev/null" + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE + * + * If defined, this is a header which will be included instead of + * `"psa/crypto_config.h"`. + * This header file specifies which cryptographic mechanisms are available + * through the PSA API when #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is enabled, and + * is not used when #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is disabled. + * + * This macro is expanded after an \#include directive. This is a popular but + * non-standard feature of the C language, so this feature is only available + * with compilers that perform macro expansion on an \#include line. + * + * The value of this symbol is typically a path in double quotes, either + * absolute or relative to a directory on the include search path. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE "psa/crypto_config.h" + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE + * + * If defined, this is a header which will be included after + * `"psa/crypto_config.h"` or #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE. + * This allows you to modify the default configuration, including the ability + * to undefine options that are enabled by default. + * + * This macro is expanded after an \#include directive. This is a popular but + * non-standard feature of the C language, so this feature is only available + * with compilers that perform macro expansion on an \#include line. + * + * The value of this symbol is typically a path in double quotes, either + * absolute or relative to a directory on the include search path. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE "/dev/null" + +/** \} name SECTION: General configuration options */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: Module configuration options + * + * This section allows for the setting of module specific sizes and + * configuration options. The default values are already present in the + * relevant header files and should suffice for the regular use cases. + * + * Our advice is to enable options and change their values here + * only if you have a good reason and know the consequences. + * + * Please check the respective header file for documentation on these + * parameters (to prevent duplicate documentation). + * \{ + */ + +/* ECP options */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM 0 /**< Disable fixed-point speed-up */ + +/** + * Uncomment to enable p256-m. This is an alternative implementation of + * key generation, ECDH and (randomized) ECDSA on the curve SECP256R1. + * Compared to the default implementation: + * + * - p256-m has a much smaller code size and RAM footprint. + * - p256-m is only available via the PSA API. This includes the pk module + * when #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled. + * - p256-m does not support deterministic ECDSA, EC-JPAKE, custom protocols + * over the core arithmetic, or deterministic derivation of keys. + * + * We recommend enabling this option if your application uses the PSA API + * and the only elliptic curve support it needs is ECDH and ECDSA over + * SECP256R1. + * + * If you enable this option, you do not need to enable any ECC-related + * MBEDTLS_xxx option. You do need to separately request support for the + * cryptographic mechanisms through the PSA API: + * - #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C and #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG for PSA-based + * configuration; + * - #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO if you want to use p256-m from PK, X.509 or TLS; + * - #PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256; + * - #PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH and/or #PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA as needed; + * - #PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY, #PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC, + * #PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT, + * #PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT and/or + * #PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE as needed. + * + * \note To benefit from the smaller code size of p256-m, make sure that you + * do not enable any ECC-related option not supported by p256-m: this + * would cause the built-in ECC implementation to be built as well, in + * order to provide the required option. + * Make sure #PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA, #PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE and + * #PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE, and curves other than + * SECP256R1 are disabled as they are not supported by this driver. + * Also, avoid defining #MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED or + * #MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED as those currently require a subset of + * the built-in ECC implementation, see docs/driver-only-builds.md. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED + +/* \} name SECTION: Customisation configuration options */ + +#if CRYPTO_NV_SEED +#include "tfm_mbedcrypto_config_extra_nv_seed.h" +#endif /* CRYPTO_NV_SEED */ + +#if !defined(CRYPTO_HW_ACCELERATOR) && defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) +#include "mbedtls_entropy_nv_seed_config.h" +#endif + +#ifdef CRYPTO_HW_ACCELERATOR +#include "mbedtls_accelerator_config.h" +#endif + +#endif /* PROFILE_M_MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aes.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aes.h index fb2322a6bb..d5eb1fd5c2 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aes.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aes.h @@ -22,29 +22,14 @@ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_AES_H #define MBEDTLS_AES_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include @@ -64,19 +49,6 @@ /** Invalid input data. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0021 -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** Feature not available. For example, an unsupported AES key size. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x0023 - -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** AES hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0025 - -#if (defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER)) && \ - !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) -#define inline __inline -#endif - #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -89,16 +61,22 @@ extern "C" { * \brief The AES context-type definition. */ typedef struct mbedtls_aes_context { - int nr; /*!< The number of rounds. */ - uint32_t *rk; /*!< AES round keys. */ - uint32_t buf[68]; /*!< Unaligned data buffer. This buffer can - hold 32 extra Bytes, which can be used for - one of the following purposes: -
  • Alignment if VIA padlock is - used.
    • -
  • Simplifying key expansion in the 256-bit - case by generating an extra round key. -
*/ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(nr); /*!< The number of rounds. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(rk_offset); /*!< The offset in array elements to AES + round keys in the buffer. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buf)[44]; /*!< Aligned data buffer to hold + 10 round keys for 128-bit case. */ +#else + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buf)[68]; /*!< Unaligned data buffer. This buffer can + hold 32 extra Bytes, which can be used for + one of the following purposes: +
  • Alignment if VIA padlock is + used.
    • +
  • Simplifying key expansion in the 256-bit + case by generating an extra round key. +
*/ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH && !MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C */ } mbedtls_aes_context; @@ -107,10 +85,10 @@ mbedtls_aes_context; * \brief The AES XTS context-type definition. */ typedef struct mbedtls_aes_xts_context { - mbedtls_aes_context crypt; /*!< The AES context to use for AES block - encryption or decryption. */ - mbedtls_aes_context tweak; /*!< The AES context used for tweak - computation. */ + mbedtls_aes_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(crypt); /*!< The AES context to use for AES block + encryption or decryption. */ + mbedtls_aes_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tweak); /*!< The AES context used for tweak + computation. */ } mbedtls_aes_xts_context; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ @@ -177,6 +155,7 @@ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) /** * \brief This function sets the decryption key. * @@ -195,6 +174,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL int mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) /** @@ -614,6 +594,7 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char input[16], unsigned char output[16]); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) /** * \brief Internal AES block decryption function. This is only * exposed to allow overriding it using see @@ -629,44 +610,7 @@ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char input[16], unsigned char output[16]); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief Deprecated internal AES block encryption function - * without return value. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt() - * - * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption. - * \param input Plaintext block. - * \param output Output (ciphertext) block. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_aes_encrypt(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, - const unsigned char input[16], - unsigned char output[16]); - -/** - * \brief Deprecated internal AES block decryption function - * without return value. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt() - * - * \param ctx The AES context to use for decryption. - * \param input Ciphertext block. - * \param output Output (plaintext) block. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_aes_decrypt(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, - const unsigned char input[16], - unsigned char output[16]); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/arc4.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/arc4.h deleted file mode 100644 index d116dda4e9..0000000000 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/arc4.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,144 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file arc4.h - * - * \brief The ARCFOUR stream cipher - * - * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a - * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead. - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_ARC4_H -#define MBEDTLS_ARC4_H - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#include - -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_ARC4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** ARC4 hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARC4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0019 - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT) -// Regular implementation -// - -/** - * \brief ARC4 context structure - * - * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a - * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead. - * - */ -typedef struct mbedtls_arc4_context { - int x; /*!< permutation index */ - int y; /*!< permutation index */ - unsigned char m[256]; /*!< permutation table */ -} -mbedtls_arc4_context; - -#else /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT */ -#include "arc4_alt.h" -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT */ - -/** - * \brief Initialize ARC4 context - * - * \param ctx ARC4 context to be initialized - * - * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a - * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers - * instead. - * - */ -void mbedtls_arc4_init(mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief Clear ARC4 context - * - * \param ctx ARC4 context to be cleared - * - * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a - * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers - * instead. - * - */ -void mbedtls_arc4_free(mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief ARC4 key schedule - * - * \param ctx ARC4 context to be setup - * \param key the secret key - * \param keylen length of the key, in bytes - * - * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a - * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers - * instead. - * - */ -void mbedtls_arc4_setup(mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int keylen); - -/** - * \brief ARC4 cipher function - * - * \param ctx ARC4 context - * \param length length of the input data - * \param input buffer holding the input data - * \param output buffer for the output data - * - * \return 0 if successful - * - * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a - * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers - * instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_arc4_crypt(mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - -/** - * \brief Checkup routine - * - * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed - * - * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a - * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers - * instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_arc4_self_test(int verbose); - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* arc4.h */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aria.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aria.h index d307ff9e47..c685fc3141 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aria.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aria.h @@ -11,29 +11,14 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ARIA_H #define MBEDTLS_ARIA_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include @@ -47,24 +32,12 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ARIA_MAX_ROUNDS 16 /**< Maximum number of rounds in ARIA. */ #define MBEDTLS_ARIA_MAX_KEYSIZE 32 /**< Maximum size of an ARIA key in bytes. */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT(-0x005C) -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /** Bad input data. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x005C /** Invalid data input length. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x005E -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is deprecated and should not be used. - */ -/** Feature not available. For example, an unsupported ARIA key size. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x005A - -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** ARIA hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0058 - #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -77,9 +50,9 @@ extern "C" { * \brief The ARIA context-type definition. */ typedef struct mbedtls_aria_context { - unsigned char nr; /*!< The number of rounds (12, 14 or 16) */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(nr); /*!< The number of rounds (12, 14 or 16) */ /*! The ARIA round keys. */ - uint32_t rk[MBEDTLS_ARIA_MAX_ROUNDS + 1][MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE / 4]; + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(rk)[MBEDTLS_ARIA_MAX_ROUNDS + 1][MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE / 4]; } mbedtls_aria_context; @@ -125,6 +98,7 @@ int mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) /** * \brief This function sets the decryption key. * @@ -143,6 +117,7 @@ int mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, int mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */ /** * \brief This function performs an ARIA single-block encryption or diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1.h index 82aaee8f30..ff019f432a 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1.h @@ -5,28 +5,14 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ASN1_H #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include @@ -41,8 +27,9 @@ /** * \name ASN1 Error codes - * These error codes are OR'ed to X509 error codes for + * These error codes are combined with other error codes for * higher error granularity. + * e.g. X.509 and PKCS #7 error codes * ASN1 is a standard to specify data structures. * \{ */ @@ -97,15 +84,14 @@ /* Slightly smaller way to check if tag is a string tag * compared to canonical implementation. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_IS_STRING_TAG(tag) \ - ((tag) < 32u && ( \ +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_IS_STRING_TAG(tag) \ + ((unsigned int) (tag) < 32u && ( \ ((1u << (tag)) & ((1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_BMP_STRING) | \ (1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING) | \ (1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_T61_STRING) | \ (1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING) | \ (1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING) | \ - (1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING) | \ - (1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING))) != 0)) + (1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING))) != 0)) /* * Bit masks for each of the components of an ASN.1 tag as specified in @@ -174,7 +160,15 @@ mbedtls_asn1_bitstring; */ typedef struct mbedtls_asn1_sequence { mbedtls_asn1_buf buf; /**< Buffer containing the given ASN.1 item. */ - struct mbedtls_asn1_sequence *next; /**< The next entry in the sequence. */ + + /** The next entry in the sequence. + * + * The details of memory management for sequences are not documented and + * may change in future versions. Set this field to \p NULL when + * initializing a structure, and do not modify it except via Mbed TLS + * library functions. + */ + struct mbedtls_asn1_sequence *next; } mbedtls_asn1_sequence; @@ -184,11 +178,27 @@ mbedtls_asn1_sequence; typedef struct mbedtls_asn1_named_data { mbedtls_asn1_buf oid; /**< The object identifier. */ mbedtls_asn1_buf val; /**< The named value. */ - struct mbedtls_asn1_named_data *next; /**< The next entry in the sequence. */ - unsigned char next_merged; /**< Merge next item into the current one? */ + + /** The next entry in the sequence. + * + * The details of memory management for named data sequences are not + * documented and may change in future versions. Set this field to \p NULL + * when initializing a structure, and do not modify it except via Mbed TLS + * library functions. + */ + struct mbedtls_asn1_named_data *next; + + /** Merge next item into the current one? + * + * This field exists for the sake of Mbed TLS's X.509 certificate parsing + * code and may change in future versions of the library. + */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next_merged); } mbedtls_asn1_named_data; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA) /** * \brief Get the length of an ASN.1 element. * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the length. @@ -235,7 +245,9 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_len(unsigned char **p, int mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, size_t *len, int tag); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) /** * \brief Retrieve a boolean ASN.1 tag and its value. * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full tag. @@ -580,31 +592,49 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null(unsigned char **p, * * \return NULL if not found, or a pointer to the existing entry. */ -mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data(mbedtls_asn1_named_data *list, - const char *oid, size_t len); +const mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data(const mbedtls_asn1_named_data *list, + const char *oid, size_t len); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) /** * \brief Free a mbedtls_asn1_named_data entry * + * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a + * future version of the library. + * Please use mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list() + * or mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(). + * * \param entry The named data entry to free. * This function calls mbedtls_free() on * `entry->oid.p` and `entry->val.p`. */ -void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data(mbedtls_asn1_named_data *entry); +void MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data(mbedtls_asn1_named_data *entry); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /** * \brief Free all entries in a mbedtls_asn1_named_data list. * * \param head Pointer to the head of the list of named data entries to free. - * This function calls mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data() and - * mbedtls_free() on each list element and - * sets \c *head to \c NULL. + * This function calls mbedtls_free() on + * `entry->oid.p` and `entry->val.p` and then on `entry` + * for each list entry, and sets \c *head to \c NULL. */ void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head); +/** + * \brief Free all shallow entries in a mbedtls_asn1_named_data list, + * but do not free internal pointer targets. + * + * \param name Head of the list of named data entries to free. + * This function calls mbedtls_free() on each list element. + */ +void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(mbedtls_asn1_named_data *name); + /** \} name Functions to parse ASN.1 data structures */ /** \} addtogroup asn1_module */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h index f453169e2e..0c5a85ac27 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h @@ -5,28 +5,12 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_H #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" @@ -39,10 +23,21 @@ (g) += ret; \ } while (0) +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_CLEANUP_ADD(g, f) \ + do \ + { \ + if ((ret = (f)) < 0) \ + goto cleanup; \ + else \ + (g) += ret; \ + } while (0) + #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA) /** * \brief Write a length field in ASN.1 format. * @@ -55,7 +50,7 @@ extern "C" { * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_len(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_len(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, size_t len); /** * \brief Write an ASN.1 tag in ASN.1 format. @@ -69,9 +64,11 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_len(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, unsigned char tag); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA*/ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) /** * \brief Write raw buffer data. * @@ -85,7 +82,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *buf, size_t size); #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) @@ -103,7 +100,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const mbedtls_mpi *X); #endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ @@ -119,7 +116,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_null(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start); +int mbedtls_asn1_write_null(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start); /** * \brief Write an OID tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID) and data @@ -135,7 +132,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_null(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start); * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_oid(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_oid(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const char *oid, size_t oid_len); /** @@ -154,7 +151,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_oid(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier(unsigned char **p, - unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *start, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, size_t par_len); @@ -175,7 +172,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier(unsigned char **p, * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier_ext(unsigned char **p, - unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *start, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, size_t par_len, int has_par); @@ -192,7 +189,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier_ext(unsigned char **p, * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_bool(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_bool(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int boolean); /** @@ -209,7 +206,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_bool(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_int(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val); +int mbedtls_asn1_write_int(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int val); /** * \brief Write an enum tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_ENUMERATED) and value @@ -224,7 +221,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_int(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val); * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_enum(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val); +int mbedtls_asn1_write_enum(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int val); /** * \brief Write a string in ASN.1 format using a specific @@ -243,7 +240,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_enum(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val); * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int tag, const char *text, size_t text_len); @@ -263,7 +260,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string(unsigned char **p, - unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *start, const char *text, size_t text_len); /** @@ -281,7 +278,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string(unsigned char **p, * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_utf8_string(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_utf8_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const char *text, size_t text_len); /** @@ -299,7 +296,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_utf8_string(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const char *text, size_t text_len); /** @@ -316,7 +313,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *buf, size_t bits); /** @@ -337,7 +334,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, * \return A negative error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring(unsigned char **p, - unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *buf, size_t bits); @@ -355,7 +352,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring(unsigned char **p, * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *buf, size_t size); /** @@ -377,7 +374,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, * the existing buffer to fit \p val_len. * * \return A pointer to the new / existing entry on success. - * \return \c NULL if if there was a memory allocation error. + * \return \c NULL if there was a memory allocation error. */ mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **list, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, @@ -388,4 +385,6 @@ mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data(mbedtls_asn1_named_data * } #endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/base64.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/base64.h index ec9c408f52..8f459b74c5 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/base64.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/base64.h @@ -5,28 +5,12 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_BASE64_H #define MBEDTLS_BASE64_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/bignum.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/bignum.h index cbed25984e..71d7b97672 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/bignum.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/bignum.h @@ -5,28 +5,13 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_H #define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include @@ -66,15 +51,15 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE) /* - * Maximum window size used for modular exponentiation. Default: 2 + * Maximum window size used for modular exponentiation. Default: 3 * Minimum value: 1. Maximum value: 6. * * Result is an array of ( 2 ** MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE ) MPIs used - * for the sliding window calculation. (So 64 by default) + * for the sliding window calculation. (So 8 by default) * * Reduction in size, reduces speed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE 2 /**< Maximum window size used. */ +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE 3 /**< Maximum window size used. */ #endif /* !MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE) @@ -132,6 +117,7 @@ #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ typedef int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX UINT64_MAX #elif defined(__GNUC__) && ( \ defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ defined(__ppc64__) || defined(__powerpc64__) || \ @@ -144,6 +130,7 @@ typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ typedef int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX UINT64_MAX #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION) /* mbedtls_t_udbl defined as 128-bit unsigned int */ typedef unsigned int mbedtls_t_udbl __attribute__((mode(TI))); @@ -159,6 +146,7 @@ typedef unsigned int mbedtls_t_udbl __attribute__((mode(TI))); #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ typedef int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX UINT64_MAX #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION) /* mbedtls_t_udbl defined as 128-bit unsigned int */ typedef __uint128_t mbedtls_t_udbl; @@ -168,6 +156,7 @@ typedef __uint128_t mbedtls_t_udbl; /* Force 64-bit integers with unknown compiler */ typedef int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX UINT64_MAX #endif #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 */ @@ -178,12 +167,22 @@ typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 */ typedef int32_t mbedtls_mpi_sint; typedef uint32_t mbedtls_mpi_uint; +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX UINT32_MAX #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION) typedef uint64_t mbedtls_t_udbl; #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL #endif /* !MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION */ #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ +/* + * Sanity check that exactly one of MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 or MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 is defined, + * so that code elsewhere doesn't have to check. + */ +#if (!(defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) || defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64))) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64)) +#error "Only 32-bit or 64-bit limbs are supported in bignum" +#endif + /** \typedef mbedtls_mpi_uint * \brief The type of machine digits in a bignum, called _limbs_. * @@ -194,7 +193,7 @@ typedef uint64_t mbedtls_t_udbl; /** \typedef mbedtls_mpi_sint * \brief The signed type corresponding to #mbedtls_mpi_uint. * - * This is always a signed integer type with no padding bits. The size + * This is always an signed integer type with no padding bits. The size * is platform-dependent. */ @@ -206,6 +205,12 @@ extern "C" { * \brief MPI structure */ typedef struct mbedtls_mpi { + /** Pointer to limbs. + * + * This may be \c NULL if \c n is 0. + */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p); + /** Sign: -1 if the mpi is negative, 1 otherwise. * * The number 0 must be represented with `s = +1`. Although many library @@ -217,16 +222,19 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_mpi { * Note that this implies that calloc() or `... = {0}` does not create * a valid MPI representation. You must call mbedtls_mpi_init(). */ - int s; + signed short MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(s); /** Total number of limbs in \c p. */ - size_t n; - - /** Pointer to limbs. - * - * This may be \c NULL if \c n is 0. + unsigned short MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(n); + /* Make sure that MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS fits in n. + * Use the same limit value on all platforms so that we don't have to + * think about different behavior on the rare platforms where + * unsigned short can store values larger than the minimum required by + * the C language, which is 65535. */ - mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; +#if MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS > 65535 +#error "MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS > 65535 is not supported" +#endif } mbedtls_mpi; @@ -597,6 +605,8 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le(const mbedtls_mpi *X, * \brief Perform a left-shift on an MPI: X <<= count * * \param X The MPI to shift. This must point to an initialized MPI. + * The MPI pointed by \p X may be resized to fit + * the resulting number. * \param count The number of bits to shift by. * * \return \c 0 if successful. @@ -992,37 +1002,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gcd(mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, int mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief Perform a Miller-Rabin primality test with error - * probability of 2-80. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext() which allows - * specifying the number of Miller-Rabin rounds. - * - * \param X The MPI to check for primality. - * This must point to an initialized MPI. - * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. - * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. - * This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use a - * context parameter. - * - * \return \c 0 if successful, i.e. \p X is probably prime. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if \p X is not prime. - * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime(const mbedtls_mpi *X, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng); -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /** * \brief Miller-Rabin primality test. * diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/block_cipher.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/block_cipher.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3f60f6f7dd --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/block_cipher.h @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +/** + * \file block_cipher.h + * + * \brief Internal abstraction layer. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_H +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_H + +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) +#include "mbedtls/aria.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#include "mbedtls/camellia.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) +#include "psa/crypto_types.h" +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_NONE = 0, /**< Unset. */ + MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES, /**< The AES cipher. */ + MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA, /**< The Camellia cipher. */ + MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA, /**< The Aria cipher. */ +} mbedtls_block_cipher_id_t; + +/** + * Used internally to indicate whether a context uses legacy or PSA. + * + * Internal use only. + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_LEGACY = 0, + MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_PSA, +} mbedtls_block_cipher_engine_t; + +typedef struct { + mbedtls_block_cipher_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) + mbedtls_block_cipher_engine_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(engine); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psa_key_id); +#endif + union { + unsigned dummy; /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + mbedtls_aes_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(aes); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + mbedtls_aria_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(aria); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + mbedtls_camellia_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(camellia); +#endif + } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); +} mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/blowfish.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/blowfish.h deleted file mode 100644 index 7936d2f8a4..0000000000 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/blowfish.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,287 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file blowfish.h - * - * \brief Blowfish block cipher - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_H -#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_H - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#include -#include - -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" - -#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT 1 -#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT 0 -#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MAX_KEY_BITS 448 -#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MIN_KEY_BITS 32 -#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS 16 /**< Rounds to use. When increasing this value, make sure to extend the initialisation vectors */ -#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE 8 /* Blowfish uses 64 bit blocks */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT(-0x0016) -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ -/** Bad input data. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0016 - -/** Invalid data input length. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0018 - -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. - */ -/** Blowfish hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0017 - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT) -// Regular implementation -// - -/** - * \brief Blowfish context structure - */ -typedef struct mbedtls_blowfish_context { - uint32_t P[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2]; /*!< Blowfish round keys */ - uint32_t S[4][256]; /*!< key dependent S-boxes */ -} -mbedtls_blowfish_context; - -#else /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT */ -#include "blowfish_alt.h" -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT */ - -/** - * \brief Initialize a Blowfish context. - * - * \param ctx The Blowfish context to be initialized. - * This must not be \c NULL. - */ -void mbedtls_blowfish_init(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief Clear a Blowfish context. - * - * \param ctx The Blowfish context to be cleared. - * This may be \c NULL, in which case this function - * returns immediately. If it is not \c NULL, it must - * point to an initialized Blowfish context. - */ -void mbedtls_blowfish_free(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief Perform a Blowfish key schedule operation. - * - * \param ctx The Blowfish context to perform the key schedule on. - * \param key The encryption key. This must be a readable buffer of - * length \p keybits Bits. - * \param keybits The length of \p key in Bits. This must be between - * \c 32 and \c 448 and a multiple of \c 8. - * - * \return \c 0 if successful. - * \return A negative error code on failure. - */ -int mbedtls_blowfish_setkey(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int keybits); - -/** - * \brief Perform a Blowfish-ECB block encryption/decryption operation. - * - * \param ctx The Blowfish context to use. This must be initialized - * and bound to a key. - * \param mode The mode of operation. Possible values are - * #MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT for encryption, or - * #MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT for decryption. - * \param input The input block. This must be a readable buffer - * of size \c 8 Bytes. - * \param output The output block. This must be a writable buffer - * of size \c 8 Bytes. - * - * \return \c 0 if successful. - * \return A negative error code on failure. - */ -int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, - int mode, - const unsigned char input[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], - unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE]); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -/** - * \brief Perform a Blowfish-CBC buffer encryption/decryption operation. - * - * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can - * call the function same function again on the following - * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was - * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. - * If on the other hand you need to retain the contents of the - * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher - * module instead. - * - * \param ctx The Blowfish context to use. This must be initialized - * and bound to a key. - * \param mode The mode of operation. Possible values are - * #MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT for encryption, or - * #MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT for decryption. - * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. This must be - * multiple of \c 8. - * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a read/write buffer - * of length \c 8 Bytes. It is updated by this function. - * \param input The input data. This must be a readable buffer of length - * \p length Bytes. - * \param output The output data. This must be a writable buffer of length - * \p length Bytes. - * - * \return \c 0 if successful. - * \return A negative error code on failure. - */ -int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, - int mode, - size_t length, - unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) -/** - * \brief Perform a Blowfish CFB buffer encryption/decryption operation. - * - * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can - * call the function same function again on the following - * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was - * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage. - * If on the other hand you need to retain the contents of the - * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher - * module instead. - * - * \param ctx The Blowfish context to use. This must be initialized - * and bound to a key. - * \param mode The mode of operation. Possible values are - * #MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT for encryption, or - * #MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT for decryption. - * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. - * \param iv_off The offset in the initialization vector. - * The value pointed to must be smaller than \c 8 Bytes. - * It is updated by this function to support the aforementioned - * streaming usage. - * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a read/write buffer - * of size \c 8 Bytes. It is updated after use. - * \param input The input data. This must be a readable buffer of length - * \p length Bytes. - * \param output The output data. This must be a writable buffer of length - * \p length Bytes. - * - * \return \c 0 if successful. - * \return A negative error code on failure. - */ -int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, - int mode, - size_t length, - size_t *iv_off, - unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output); -#endif /*MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) -/** - * \brief Perform a Blowfish-CTR buffer encryption/decryption operation. - * - * \warning You must never reuse a nonce value with the same key. Doing so - * would void the encryption for the two messages encrypted with - * the same nonce and key. - * - * There are two common strategies for managing nonces with CTR: - * - * 1. You can handle everything as a single message processed over - * successive calls to this function. In that case, you want to - * set \p nonce_counter and \p nc_off to 0 for the first call, and - * then preserve the values of \p nonce_counter, \p nc_off and \p - * stream_block across calls to this function as they will be - * updated by this function. - * - * With this strategy, you must not encrypt more than 2**64 - * blocks of data with the same key. - * - * 2. You can encrypt separate messages by dividing the \p - * nonce_counter buffer in two areas: the first one used for a - * per-message nonce, handled by yourself, and the second one - * updated by this function internally. - * - * For example, you might reserve the first 4 bytes for the - * per-message nonce, and the last 4 bytes for internal use. In that - * case, before calling this function on a new message you need to - * set the first 4 bytes of \p nonce_counter to your chosen nonce - * value, the last 4 to 0, and \p nc_off to 0 (which will cause \p - * stream_block to be ignored). That way, you can encrypt at most - * 2**32 messages of up to 2**32 blocks each with the same key. - * - * The per-message nonce (or information sufficient to reconstruct - * it) needs to be communicated with the ciphertext and must be unique. - * The recommended way to ensure uniqueness is to use a message - * counter. - * - * Note that for both strategies, sizes are measured in blocks and - * that a Blowfish block is 8 bytes. - * - * \warning Upon return, \p stream_block contains sensitive data. Its - * content must not be written to insecure storage and should be - * securely discarded as soon as it's no longer needed. - * - * \param ctx The Blowfish context to use. This must be initialized - * and bound to a key. - * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. - * \param nc_off The offset in the current stream_block (for resuming - * within current cipher stream). The offset pointer - * should be \c 0 at the start of a stream and must be - * smaller than \c 8. It is updated by this function. - * \param nonce_counter The 64-bit nonce and counter. This must point to a - * read/write buffer of length \c 8 Bytes. - * \param stream_block The saved stream-block for resuming. This must point to - * a read/write buffer of length \c 8 Bytes. - * \param input The input data. This must be a readable buffer of - * length \p length Bytes. - * \param output The output data. This must be a writable buffer of - * length \p length Bytes. - * - * \return \c 0 if successful. - * \return A negative error code on failure. - */ -int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, - size_t length, - size_t *nc_off, - unsigned char nonce_counter[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], - unsigned char stream_block[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* blowfish.h */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/build_info.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/build_info.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..eab167f383 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/build_info.h @@ -0,0 +1,176 @@ +/** + * \file mbedtls/build_info.h + * + * \brief Build-time configuration info + * + * Include this file if you need to depend on the + * configuration options defined in mbedtls_config.h or MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BUILD_INFO_H +#define MBEDTLS_BUILD_INFO_H + +/* + * This set of compile-time defines can be used to determine the version number + * of the Mbed TLS library used. Run-time variables for the same can be found in + * version.h + */ + +/** + * The version number x.y.z is split into three parts. + * Major, Minor, Patchlevel + */ +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 3 +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 6 +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 0 + +/** + * The single version number has the following structure: + * MMNNPP00 + * Major version | Minor version | Patch version + */ +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x03060000 +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "3.6.0" +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "Mbed TLS 3.6.0" + +/* Macros for build-time platform detection */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) && \ + (defined(__aarch64__) || defined(_M_ARM64) || defined(_M_ARM64EC)) +#define MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64 +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) && \ + (defined(__arm__) || defined(_M_ARM) || \ + defined(_M_ARMT) || defined(__thumb__) || defined(__thumb2__)) +#define MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32 +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) && \ + (defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ + ((defined(_M_X64) || defined(_M_AMD64)) && !defined(_M_ARM64EC))) +#define MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64 +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) && \ + (defined(__i386__) || defined(_X86_) || \ + (defined(_M_IX86) && !defined(_M_I86))) +#define MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86 +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64) && \ + (defined(_M_ARM64) || defined(_M_ARM64EC)) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64 +#endif + +/* This is defined if the architecture is Armv8-A, or higher */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A) +#if defined(__ARM_ARCH) && defined(__ARM_ARCH_PROFILE) +#if (__ARM_ARCH >= 8) && (__ARM_ARCH_PROFILE == 'A') +/* GCC, clang, armclang and IAR */ +#define MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A +#endif +#elif defined(__ARM_ARCH_8A) +/* Alternative defined by clang */ +#define MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A +#elif defined(_M_ARM64) || defined(_M_ARM64EC) +/* MSVC ARM64 is at least Armv8.0-A */ +#define MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && !defined(__clang__) \ + && !defined(__llvm__) && !defined(__INTEL_COMPILER) +/* Defined if the compiler really is gcc and not clang, etc */ +#define MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC +#define MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION \ + (__GNUC__ * 10000 + __GNUC_MINOR__ * 100 + __GNUC_PATCHLEVEL__) +#endif + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE) +#define _CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE 1 +#endif + +/* Define `inline` on some non-C99-compliant compilers. */ +#if (defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER)) && \ + !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +#define inline __inline +#endif + +/* X.509, TLS and non-PSA crypto configuration */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) +#include "mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h" +#else +#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_VERSION) && ( \ + MBEDTLS_CONFIG_VERSION < 0x03000000 || \ + MBEDTLS_CONFIG_VERSION > MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER) +#error "Invalid config version, defined value of MBEDTLS_CONFIG_VERSION is unsupported" +#endif + +/* Target and application specific configurations + * + * Allow user to override any previous default. + * + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE) +#include MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE +#endif + +/* PSA crypto configuration */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE) +#include MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE +#else +#include "psa/crypto_config.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE) +#include MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE +#endif +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) */ + +/* Auto-enable MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY if + * MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH and MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C defined + * to ensure a 128-bit key size in CTR_DRBG. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) && defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY +#endif + +/* Auto-enable MBEDTLS_MD_C if needed by a module that didn't require it + * in a previous release, to ensure backwards compatibility. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +#endif + +/* PSA crypto specific configuration options + * - If config_psa.h reads a configuration option in preprocessor directive, + * this symbol should be set before its inclusion. (e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_C) + * - If config_psa.h writes a configuration option in conditional directive, + * this symbol should be consulted after its inclusion. + * (e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) /* PSA_WANT_xxx influences MBEDTLS_xxx */ || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) /* MBEDTLS_xxx influences PSA_WANT_xxx */ || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) /* The same as the previous, but with separation only */ +#include "mbedtls/config_psa.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h" + +#include "mbedtls/config_adjust_x509.h" + +#include "mbedtls/config_adjust_ssl.h" + +/* Make sure all configuration symbols are set before including check_config.h, + * even the ones that are calculated programmatically. */ +#include "mbedtls/check_config.h" + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BUILD_INFO_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/camellia.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/camellia.h index e840947d4b..557f472531 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/camellia.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/camellia.h @@ -5,28 +5,13 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_H #define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include @@ -36,20 +21,12 @@ #define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT 1 #define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT 0 -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT(-0x0024) -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /** Bad input data. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0024 /** Invalid data input length. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0026 -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. - */ -/** Camellia hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0027 - #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -62,8 +39,8 @@ extern "C" { * \brief CAMELLIA context structure */ typedef struct mbedtls_camellia_context { - int nr; /*!< number of rounds */ - uint32_t rk[68]; /*!< CAMELLIA round keys */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(nr); /*!< number of rounds */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(rk)[68]; /*!< CAMELLIA round keys */ } mbedtls_camellia_context; @@ -104,6 +81,7 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) /** * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA key schedule operation for decryption. * @@ -119,6 +97,7 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */ /** * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA-ECB block encryption/decryption operation. diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ccm.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ccm.h index f082aba054..1da57c921b 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ccm.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ccm.h @@ -29,41 +29,31 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CCM_H #define MBEDTLS_CCM_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) +#include "mbedtls/block_cipher.h" +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT 0 +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT 2 +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT 3 + /** Bad input parameters to the function. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT -0x000D /** Authenticated decryption failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED -0x000F -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** CCM hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0011 - #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -77,7 +67,30 @@ extern "C" { * to the APIs called. */ typedef struct mbedtls_ccm_context { - mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; /*!< The cipher context used. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(y)[16]; /*!< The Y working buffer */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctr)[16]; /*!< The counter buffer */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(plaintext_len); /*!< Total plaintext length */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(add_len); /*!< Total authentication data length */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tag_len); /*!< Total tag length */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(processed); /*!< Track how many bytes of input data + were processed (chunked input). + Used independently for both auth data + and plaintext/ciphertext. + This variable is set to zero after + auth data input is finished. */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(q); /*!< The Q working value */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mode); /*!< The operation to perform: + #MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT or + #MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT or + #MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT or + #MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */ +#else + mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */ +#endif + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state); /*!< Working value holding context's + state. Used for chunked data input */ } mbedtls_ccm_context; @@ -138,10 +151,10 @@ void mbedtls_ccm_free(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx); * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, * or 13. The length L of the message length field is * 15 - \p iv_len. - * \param add The additional data field. If \p add_len is greater than - * zero, \p add must be a readable buffer of at least that + * \param ad The additional data field. If \p ad_len is greater than + * zero, \p ad must be a readable buffer of at least that * length. - * \param add_len The length of additional data in Bytes. + * \param ad_len The length of additional data in Bytes. * This must be less than `2^16 - 2^8`. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater * than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least @@ -159,7 +172,7 @@ void mbedtls_ccm_free(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx); */ int mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, - const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len); @@ -179,14 +192,15 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, * \param ctx The CCM context to use for encryption. This must be * initialized and bound to a key. * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. + * For tag length = 0, input length is ignored. * \param iv The initialization vector (nonce). This must be a readable * buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes. * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, * or 13. The length L of the message length field is * 15 - \p iv_len. - * \param add The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer of - * at least \p add_len Bytes. - * \param add_len The length of additional data in Bytes. + * \param ad The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer of + * at least \p ad_len Bytes. + * \param ad_len The length of additional data in Bytes. * This must be less than 2^16 - 2^8. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater * than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least @@ -207,7 +221,7 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, */ int mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, - const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len); @@ -223,9 +237,9 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, * or 13. The length L of the message length field is * 15 - \p iv_len. - * \param add The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer - * of at least that \p add_len Bytes.. - * \param add_len The length of additional data in Bytes. + * \param ad The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer + * of at least that \p ad_len Bytes.. + * \param ad_len The length of additional data in Bytes. * This must be less than 2^16 - 2^8. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater * than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least @@ -244,7 +258,7 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, */ int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, - const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len); @@ -260,14 +274,15 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, * \param ctx The CCM context to use for decryption. This must be * initialized and bound to a key. * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. + * For tag length = 0, input length is ignored. * \param iv The initialization vector (nonce). This must be a readable * buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes. * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, * or 13. The length L of the message length field is * 15 - \p iv_len. - * \param add The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer of - * at least that \p add_len Bytes. - * \param add_len The length of additional data in Bytes. + * \param ad The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer of + * at least that \p ad_len Bytes. + * \param ad_len The length of additional data in Bytes. * This must be less than 2^16 - 2^8. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater * than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least @@ -289,11 +304,212 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, */ int mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, - const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +/** + * \brief This function starts a CCM encryption or decryption + * operation. + * + * This function and mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths() must be called + * before calling mbedtls_ccm_update_ad() or + * mbedtls_ccm_update(). This function can be called before + * or after mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(). + * + * \note This function is not implemented in Mbed TLS yet. + * + * \param ctx The CCM context. This must be initialized. + * \param mode The operation to perform: #MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT or + * #MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT or + * #MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT. + * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a readable buffer + * of at least \p iv_len Bytes. + * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, + * or 13. The length L of the message length field is + * 15 - \p iv_len. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT on failure: + * \p ctx is in an invalid state, + * \p mode is invalid, + * \p iv_len is invalid (lower than \c 7 or greater than + * \c 13). + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_starts(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len); + +/** + * \brief This function declares the lengths of the message + * and additional data for a CCM encryption or decryption + * operation. + * + * This function and mbedtls_ccm_starts() must be called + * before calling mbedtls_ccm_update_ad() or + * mbedtls_ccm_update(). This function can be called before + * or after mbedtls_ccm_starts(). + * + * \note This function is not implemented in Mbed TLS yet. + * + * \param ctx The CCM context. This must be initialized. + * \param total_ad_len The total length of additional data in bytes. + * This must be less than `2^16 - 2^8`. + * \param plaintext_len The length in bytes of the plaintext to encrypt or + * result of the decryption (thus not encompassing the + * additional data that are not encrypted). + * \param tag_len The length of the tag to generate in Bytes: + * 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 or 16. + * For CCM*, zero is also valid. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT on failure: + * \p ctx is in an invalid state, + * \p total_ad_len is greater than \c 0xFF00. + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + size_t total_ad_len, + size_t plaintext_len, + size_t tag_len); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer as associated data + * (authenticated but not encrypted data) in a CCM + * encryption or decryption operation. + * + * You may call this function zero, one or more times + * to pass successive parts of the additional data. The + * lengths \p ad_len of the data parts should eventually add + * up exactly to the total length of additional data + * \c total_ad_len passed to mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(). You + * may not call this function after calling + * mbedtls_ccm_update(). + * + * \note This function is not implemented in Mbed TLS yet. + * + * \param ctx The CCM context. This must have been started with + * mbedtls_ccm_starts(), the lengths of the message and + * additional data must have been declared with + * mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths() and this must not have yet + * received any input with mbedtls_ccm_update(). + * \param ad The buffer holding the additional data, or \c NULL + * if \p ad_len is \c 0. + * \param ad_len The length of the additional data. If \c 0, + * \p ad may be \c NULL. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT on failure: + * \p ctx is in an invalid state, + * total input length too long. + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_update_ad(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *ad, + size_t ad_len); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing CCM + * encryption or decryption operation. + * + * You may call this function zero, one or more times + * to pass successive parts of the input: the plaintext to + * encrypt, or the ciphertext (not including the tag) to + * decrypt. After the last part of the input, call + * mbedtls_ccm_finish(). The lengths \p input_len of the + * data parts should eventually add up exactly to the + * plaintext length \c plaintext_len passed to + * mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(). + * + * This function may produce output in one of the following + * ways: + * - Immediate output: the output length is always equal + * to the input length. + * - Buffered output: except for the last part of input data, + * the output consists of a whole number of 16-byte blocks. + * If the total input length so far (not including + * associated data) is 16 \* *B* + *A* with *A* < 16 then + * the total output length is 16 \* *B*. + * For the last part of input data, the output length is + * equal to the input length plus the number of bytes (*A*) + * buffered in the previous call to the function (if any). + * The function uses the plaintext length + * \c plaintext_len passed to mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths() + * to detect the last part of input data. + * + * In particular: + * - It is always correct to call this function with + * \p output_size >= \p input_len + 15. + * - If \p input_len is a multiple of 16 for all the calls + * to this function during an operation (not necessary for + * the last one) then it is correct to use \p output_size + * =\p input_len. + * + * \note This function is not implemented in Mbed TLS yet. + * + * \param ctx The CCM context. This must have been started with + * mbedtls_ccm_starts() and the lengths of the message and + * additional data must have been declared with + * mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(). + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p input_len + * is greater than zero, this must be a readable buffer + * of at least \p input_len bytes. + * \param input_len The length of the input data in bytes. + * \param output The buffer for the output data. If \p output_size + * is greater than zero, this must be a writable buffer of + * at least \p output_size bytes. + * \param output_size The size of the output buffer in bytes. + * See the function description regarding the output size. + * \param output_len On success, \p *output_len contains the actual + * length of the output written in \p output. + * On failure, the content of \p *output_len is + * unspecified. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT on failure: + * \p ctx is in an invalid state, + * total input length too long, + * or \p output_size too small. + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_update(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_len); + +/** + * \brief This function finishes the CCM operation and generates + * the authentication tag. + * + * It wraps up the CCM stream, and generates the + * tag. The tag can have a maximum length of 16 Bytes. + * + * \note This function is not implemented in Mbed TLS yet. + * + * \param ctx The CCM context. This must have been started with + * mbedtls_ccm_starts() and the lengths of the message and + * additional data must have been declared with + * mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(). + * \param tag The buffer for holding the tag. If \p tag_len is greater + * than zero, this must be a writable buffer of at least \p + * tag_len Bytes. + * \param tag_len The length of the tag. Must match the tag length passed to + * mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths() function. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT on failure: + * \p ctx is in an invalid state, + * invalid value of \p tag_len, + * the total amount of additional data passed to + * mbedtls_ccm_update_ad() was lower than the total length of + * additional data \c total_ad_len passed to + * mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(), + * the total amount of input data passed to + * mbedtls_ccm_update() was lower than the plaintext length + * \c plaintext_len passed to mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(). + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_finish(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES) /** * \brief The CCM checkup routine. * diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/certs.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/certs.h deleted file mode 100644 index 0ec6971e83..0000000000 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/certs.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,250 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file certs.h - * - * \brief Sample certificates and DHM parameters for testing - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_CERTS_H -#define MBEDTLS_CERTS_H - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#include - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* List of all PEM-encoded CA certificates, terminated by NULL; - * PEM encoded if MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C is enabled, DER encoded - * otherwise. */ -extern const char *mbedtls_test_cas[]; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_len[]; - -/* List of all DER-encoded CA certificates, terminated by NULL */ -extern const unsigned char *mbedtls_test_cas_der[]; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_der_len[]; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) -/* Concatenation of all CA certificates in PEM format if available */ -extern const char mbedtls_test_cas_pem[]; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_pem_len; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ - -/* - * CA test certificates - */ - -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_pem[]; - -extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der[]; -extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_der[]; -extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_der[]; -extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der[]; -extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der[]; - -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_pem_len; - -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_der_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_der_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_der_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_der_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der_len; - -/* Config-dependent dispatch between PEM and DER encoding - * (PEM if enabled, otherwise DER) */ - -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256[]; - -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_len; - -/* Config-dependent dispatch between SHA-1 and SHA-256 - * (SHA-256 if enabled, otherwise SHA-1) */ - -extern const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa[]; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_len; - -/* Config-dependent dispatch between EC and RSA - * (RSA if enabled, otherwise EC) */ - -extern const char *mbedtls_test_ca_crt; -extern const char *mbedtls_test_ca_key; -extern const char *mbedtls_test_ca_pwd; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_len; - -/* - * Server test certificates - */ - -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_pem[]; - -extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_der[]; -extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_der[]; -extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_der[]; -extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_der[]; -extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_der[]; - -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_pem_len; - -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_der_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_der_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_der_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_der_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_der_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_der_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_der_len; - -/* Config-dependent dispatch between PEM and DER encoding - * (PEM if enabled, otherwise DER) */ - -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256[]; - -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_len; - -/* Config-dependent dispatch between SHA-1 and SHA-256 - * (SHA-256 if enabled, otherwise SHA-1) */ - -extern const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa[]; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_len; - -/* Config-dependent dispatch between EC and RSA - * (RSA if enabled, otherwise EC) */ - -extern const char *mbedtls_test_srv_crt; -extern const char *mbedtls_test_srv_key; -extern const char *mbedtls_test_srv_pwd; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_len; - -/* - * Client test certificates - */ - -extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_pem[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_pem[]; - -extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_der[]; -extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_der[]; -extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_der[]; -extern const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_der[]; - -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_pem_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_pem_len; - -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_der_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_der_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_der_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_der_len; - -/* Config-dependent dispatch between PEM and DER encoding - * (PEM if enabled, otherwise DER) */ - -extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa[]; -extern const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa[]; - -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_len; - -/* Config-dependent dispatch between EC and RSA - * (RSA if enabled, otherwise EC) */ - -extern const char *mbedtls_test_cli_crt; -extern const char *mbedtls_test_cli_key; -extern const char *mbedtls_test_cli_pwd; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_len; -extern const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_len; - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* certs.h */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chacha20.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chacha20.h index cd9f91a931..680fe36046 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chacha20.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chacha20.h @@ -14,29 +14,14 @@ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_H #define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include @@ -44,16 +29,6 @@ /** Invalid input parameter(s). */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0051 -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is deprecated and should not be - * used. */ -/** Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implemented. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x0053 - -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. - */ -/** Chacha20 hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0055 - #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -61,9 +36,9 @@ extern "C" { #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT) typedef struct mbedtls_chacha20_context { - uint32_t state[16]; /*! The state (before round operations). */ - uint8_t keystream8[64]; /*! Leftover keystream bytes. */ - size_t keystream_bytes_used; /*! Number of keystream bytes already used. */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[16]; /*! The state (before round operations). */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(keystream8)[64]; /*! Leftover keystream bytes. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(keystream_bytes_used); /*! Number of keystream bytes already used. */ } mbedtls_chacha20_context; diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chachapoly.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chachapoly.h index c3f1720704..3dc21e380b 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chachapoly.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chachapoly.h @@ -14,29 +14,14 @@ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_H #define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" /* for shared error codes */ #include "mbedtls/poly1305.h" @@ -61,12 +46,12 @@ mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t; #include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" typedef struct mbedtls_chachapoly_context { - mbedtls_chacha20_context chacha20_ctx; /**< The ChaCha20 context. */ - mbedtls_poly1305_context poly1305_ctx; /**< The Poly1305 context. */ - uint64_t aad_len; /**< The length (bytes) of the Additional Authenticated Data. */ - uint64_t ciphertext_len; /**< The length (bytes) of the ciphertext. */ - int state; /**< The current state of the context. */ - mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t mode; /**< Cipher mode (encrypt or decrypt). */ + mbedtls_chacha20_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(chacha20_ctx); /**< The ChaCha20 context. */ + mbedtls_poly1305_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(poly1305_ctx); /**< The Poly1305 context. */ + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(aad_len); /**< The length (bytes) of the Additional Authenticated Data. */ + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ciphertext_len); /**< The length (bytes) of the ciphertext. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state); /**< The current state of the context. */ + mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mode); /**< Cipher mode (encrypt or decrypt). */ } mbedtls_chachapoly_context; diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/check_config.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/check_config.h index dddcb73c75..b3c038dd2e 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/check_config.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/check_config.h @@ -5,24 +5,7 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ - -/* - * It is recommended to include this file from your config.h - * in order to catch dependency issues early. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CHECK_CONFIG_H @@ -38,23 +21,15 @@ #error "Mbed TLS requires a platform with 8-bit chars" #endif -#if defined(_WIN32) +#include + +#if defined(__MINGW32__) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1900) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C is required on Windows" #endif - -/* Fix the config here. Not convenient to put an #ifdef _WIN32 in config.h as - * it would confuse config.py. */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO) -#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO) -#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT -#endif -#endif /* _WIN32 */ +/* See auto-enabling SNPRINTF_ALT and VSNPRINTF_ALT + * in * config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h */ +#endif /* _MINGW32__ || (_MSC_VER && (_MSC_VER <= 1900)) */ #if defined(TARGET_LIKE_MBED) && defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) #error "The NET module is not available for mbed OS - please use the network functions provided by Mbed OS" @@ -69,7 +44,49 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE without MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME does not make sense" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +/* Limitations on ECC key types acceleration: if we have any of `PUBLIC_KEY`, + * `KEY_PAIR_BASIC`, `KEY_PAIR_IMPORT`, `KEY_PAIR_EXPORT` then we must have + * all 4 of them. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) +#error "Unsupported partial support for ECC key type acceleration, see docs/driver-only-builds.md" +#endif /* not all of public, basic, import, export */ +#endif /* one of public, basic, import, export */ + +/* Limitations on ECC curves acceleration: partial curve acceleration is only + * supported with crypto excluding PK, X.509 or TLS. + * Note: no need to check X.509 as it depends on PK. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_192) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_224) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_192) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_224) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_384) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_521) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) +#error "Unsupported partial support for ECC curves acceleration, see docs/driver-only-builds.md" +#endif /* modules beyond what's supported */ +#endif /* not all curves accelerated */ +#endif /* some curve accelerated */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) && !(defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) && \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING))) #error "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -77,12 +94,8 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_DHM_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT defined, but not all prerequisites" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C ) || ( !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) ) ) #error "MBEDTLS_CMAC_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -91,6 +104,36 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) +#error "MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT and PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) +#error "MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT and PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) +#error "MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES) +#error "MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT and PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#error "MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT and MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +#error "MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT and MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT and MBEDTLS_DES_C cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT and MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) #error "MBEDTLS_ECDH_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -113,31 +156,29 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) && \ - ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PK_C with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO needs MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C for ECDSA signature" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PK_C with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO needs MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C for ECDSA verification" +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C && MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) #error "MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \ - ( defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT) || \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE defined, but it cannot coexist with an alternative or PSA-based ECP implementation" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \ - ! defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) -#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE defined, but not MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) -#error "MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED defined, but MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT not disabled" +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE defined, but it cannot coexist with an alternative ECP implementation" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \ @@ -149,7 +190,7 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || ( \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || ( \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) && \ @@ -163,78 +204,46 @@ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) ) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_C defined (or a subset enabled), but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !( \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)) -#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_C requires a DRBG module unless MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG is defined or an alternative implementation is used" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) -#error "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) -#error "MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C defined, but not all prerequisites" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && (!defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ + !(defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) || defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) #error "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) && (MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN > 64) #error "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN value too high" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ - ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) ) \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) || !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512)) \ && defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) && (MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN > 32) #error "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN value too high" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) #error "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(__has_feature) #if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) -#define MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN +#define MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN // #undef at the end of this paragraph #endif #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN) #error "MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN requires building with MemorySanitizer" #endif -#undef MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) && \ - ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined, but not all prerequisites" -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) && \ - ( defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) || defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined, but entropy sources too" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && ( \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_CCM_C defined, but not all prerequisites" -#endif +#undef MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN // temporary macro defined above -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && \ + !(defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_ARIA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_CAMELLIA)) #error "MBEDTLS_CCM_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && ( \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_GCM_C defined, but not all prerequisites" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && \ + !(defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_ARIA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_CAMELLIA)) #error "MBEDTLS_GCM_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -282,10 +291,6 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK defined, but no alternative implementation enabled" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) -#error "MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) #error "MBEDTLS_HKDF_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -295,13 +300,14 @@ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) && \ - ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_CAN_ECDH) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_CAN_ECDH) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -311,7 +317,7 @@ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) + !defined(MBEDTLS_CAN_ECDH) #error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -322,13 +328,14 @@ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ - ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_CAN_ECDH) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) ) #error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) && \ - ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_CAN_ECDH) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -345,18 +352,58 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \ - ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \ + ( !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) || \ + !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) ) #error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +/* Use of EC J-PAKE in TLS requires SHA-256. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) && \ - ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) ) -#error "!MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE requires MBEDTLS_SHA512_C, MBEDTLS_SHA256_C or MBEDTLS_SHA1_C" + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) +#error "!MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE requires SHA-512, SHA-256 or SHA-1". +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512) +#error "MBEDTLS_MD_C defined, but no hash algorithm" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) && \ + ! ( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_LMS_C requires MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C and PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE requires MBEDTLS_LMS_C" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) && \ @@ -372,10 +419,6 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) -#error "MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C defined, but not all prerequisites" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -385,30 +428,24 @@ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) && \ - ( !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) ) + !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) #error "MBEDTLS_PK_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && \ + (!defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C)) #error "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) && \ + (!defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C)) #error "MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) -#error "MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C defined, but not all prerequisites" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#error "MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#warning "MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -423,6 +460,20 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_MACRO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_MACRO) &&\ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SETBUF) ||\ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SETBUF/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) &&\ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) ||\ !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) ) @@ -435,6 +486,16 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_TYPE_MACRO) &&\ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_TYPE_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO) &&\ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) ||\ !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) ) @@ -619,6 +680,11 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C defined, but not all prerequisites (missing RNG)" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) && \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -629,6 +695,14 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#warning "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) && \ ! defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" @@ -655,22 +729,6 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER defined, but it cannot coexist with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO." -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) -#error "MBEDTLS_PK_C in configuration with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and \ - MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C requires MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C to be defined." -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && \ - !( defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C with MBEDTLS_RSA_C requires MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C and MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_RSA_C defined, but not all prerequisites" @@ -686,37 +744,82 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#error "MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 defined without MBEDTLS_SHA512_C" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) +#error "Must only define one of MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_*" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 defined, but not all prerequisites" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_* defined without MBEDTLS_SHA512_C" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT) || defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_SHA512_*ALT can't be used with MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_*" +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT || MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) && !defined(__aarch64__) +#error "MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY defined on non-Aarch64 system" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 defined, but not all prerequisites" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY) +#error "Must only define one of MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_*" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 defined, but not all prerequisites" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_* defined without MBEDTLS_SHA256_C" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT) || defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT) +#error "MBEDTLS_SHA256_*ALT can't be used with MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_*" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL defined, but not all prerequisites" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A) +#error "MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY defined on non-Armv8-A system" +#endif + +/* TLS 1.3 requires separate HKDF parts from PSA, + * and at least one ciphersuite, so at least SHA-256 or SHA-384 + * from PSA to use with HKDF. + * + * Note: for dependencies common with TLS 1.2 (running handshake hash), + * see MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \ + !(defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) && \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) && \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384))) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +#if !( (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + ( defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) || defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) ) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +#if !( defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif +#endif + +/* + * The current implementation of TLS 1.3 requires MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 defined without MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE" #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)) && \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ !(defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ @@ -732,8 +835,21 @@ "but no key exchange methods defined with MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_xxxx" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) || \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) ) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE) && \ + ((MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE < 0) || \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE > UINT32_MAX)) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE must be in the range(0..UINT32_MAX)" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -742,35 +858,36 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && !(defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && (!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C defined, but no protocols are active" +/* TLS 1.2 and 1.3 require SHA-256 or SHA-384 (running handshake hash) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if !(defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384)) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1)) -#error "Illegal protocol selection" +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) || \ + !(defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) || defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)) -#error "Illegal protocol selection" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && (!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1))) -#error "Illegal protocol selection" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C defined, but no protocols are active" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) @@ -804,37 +921,48 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX too large (max 255)" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) && \ - ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) ) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT) && MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT != 0 +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#warning "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT && MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT != 0 */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) ) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C) && \ - !( defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) ) + !( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY) ) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING defined, but not all prerequisites" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_NONCE_LENGTH) && \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_NONCE_LENGTH >= 256 +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_NONCE_LENGTH must be less than 256" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) && \ @@ -846,22 +974,20 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL) #error "MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL +#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL // undef at the end of this paragraph #endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL) #error "MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL +#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL // undef at the end of this paragraph #endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL) #error "MBEDTLS_THREADING_C defined, single threading implementation required" #endif -#undef MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL +#undef MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL // temporary macro defined above -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) #error "MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -869,22 +995,20 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) && \ + (!defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) || \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) ) ) #error "MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) && \ + (!defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) || \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) ) ) #error "MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) -#error "MBEDTLS_CERTS_C defined, but not all prerequisites" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) ) #error "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -905,6 +1029,11 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) #error "MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 and MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 cannot be defined simultaneously" #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 && MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */ @@ -914,30 +1043,6 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32/MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 and MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM cannot be defined simultaneously" #endif /* (MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 || MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#warning "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#warning "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#warning "MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS" -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) ) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -946,10 +1051,71 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) && !( defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) && \ + !( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY) ) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif +/* Reject attempts to enable options that have been removed and that could + * cause a build to succeed but with features removed. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/2599" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4031" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 (SSL v3.0 support) was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4031" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO (SSL v2 ClientHello support) was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4031" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT (compatibility with the buggy implementation of truncated HMAC in Mbed TLS up to 2.7) was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4031" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_CERTIFICATES) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_CERTIFICATES was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See the ChangeLog entry if you really need SHA-1-signed certificates." +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4031" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4313" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4335" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4335" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) //no-check-names +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4341" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C) && ( ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) ) || \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) ) || ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) ) || \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) ) || \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) ) || \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) ) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C is defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + /* * Avoid warning from -pedantic. This is a convenient place for this * workaround since this is included by every single file before the diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cipher.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cipher.h index fa57efeb0b..1dc31c9c24 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cipher.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cipher.h @@ -9,29 +9,14 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CIPHER_H #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" @@ -44,16 +29,11 @@ #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) || \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM #endif -#if (defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER)) && \ - !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) -#define inline __inline -#endif - /** The selected feature is not available. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x6080 /** Bad input parameters. */ @@ -69,10 +49,6 @@ /** The context is invalid. For example, because it was freed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT -0x6380 -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** Cipher hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x6400 - #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN 0x01 /**< Cipher accepts IVs of variable length. */ #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN 0x02 /**< Cipher accepts keys of variable length. */ @@ -83,7 +59,7 @@ extern "C" { /** * \brief Supported cipher types. * - * \warning RC4 and DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use + * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering stronger * ciphers instead. */ @@ -94,8 +70,6 @@ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_DES, /**< The DES cipher. \warning DES is considered weak. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_3DES, /**< The Triple DES cipher. \warning 3DES is considered weak. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA, /**< The Camellia cipher. */ - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_BLOWFISH, /**< The Blowfish cipher. */ - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARC4, /**< The RC4 cipher. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA, /**< The Aria cipher. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CHACHA20, /**< The ChaCha20 cipher. */ } mbedtls_cipher_id_t; @@ -103,7 +77,7 @@ typedef enum { /** * \brief Supported {cipher type, cipher mode} pairs. * - * \warning RC4 and DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use + * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering stronger * ciphers instead. */ @@ -146,17 +120,18 @@ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC, /**< DES cipher with EDE CBC mode. \warning 3DES is considered weak. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, /**< DES cipher with EDE3 ECB mode. \warning 3DES is considered weak. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, /**< DES cipher with EDE3 CBC mode. \warning 3DES is considered weak. */ - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB, /**< Blowfish cipher with ECB mode. */ - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC, /**< Blowfish cipher with CBC mode. */ - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64, /**< Blowfish cipher with CFB64 mode. */ - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR, /**< Blowfish cipher with CTR mode. */ - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, /**< RC4 cipher with 128-bit mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit CCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit CCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit CCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit CCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit CCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit CCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_ECB, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and ECB mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_ECB, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and ECB mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_ECB, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and ECB mode. */ @@ -175,6 +150,9 @@ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and CCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and CCM mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and CCM mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB, /**< AES 128-bit cipher in OFB mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB, /**< AES 192-bit cipher in OFB mode. */ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB, /**< AES 256-bit cipher in OFB mode. */ @@ -201,6 +179,7 @@ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, /**< The GCM cipher mode. */ MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, /**< The stream cipher mode. */ MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, /**< The CCM cipher mode. */ + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< The CCM*-no-tag cipher mode. */ MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS, /**< The XTS cipher mode. */ MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY, /**< The ChaCha-Poly cipher mode. */ MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, /**< The SP800-38F KW mode */ @@ -237,13 +216,13 @@ enum { /** Maximum length of any IV, in Bytes. */ /* This should ideally be derived automatically from list of ciphers. * This should be kept in sync with MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH defined - * in ssl_internal.h. */ + * in library/ssl_misc.h. */ #define MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH 16 /** Maximum block size of any cipher, in Bytes. */ /* This should ideally be derived automatically from list of ciphers. * This should be kept in sync with MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH defined - * in ssl_internal.h. */ + * in library/ssl_misc.h. */ #define MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH 16 /** Maximum key length, in Bytes. */ @@ -251,7 +230,7 @@ enum { * For now, only check whether XTS is enabled which uses 64 Byte keys, * and use 32 Bytes as an upper bound for the maximum key length otherwise. * This should be kept in sync with MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH defined - * in ssl_internal.h, which however deliberately ignores the case of XTS + * in library/ssl_misc.h, which however deliberately ignores the case of XTS * since the latter isn't used in SSL/TLS. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) #define MBEDTLS_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 64 @@ -272,90 +251,110 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_cmac_context_t mbedtls_cmac_context_t; /** * Cipher information. Allows calling cipher functions * in a generic way. + * + * \note The library does not support custom cipher info structures, + * only built-in structures returned by the functions + * mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string(), + * mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(), + * mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values(), + * mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa(). + * + * \note Some fields store a value that has been right-shifted to save + * code-size, so should not be used directly. The accessor + * functions adjust for this and return the "natural" value. */ typedef struct mbedtls_cipher_info_t { - /** Full cipher identifier. For example, - * MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC. - */ - mbedtls_cipher_type_t type; + /** Name of the cipher. */ + const char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name); + + /** The block size, in bytes. */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_size) : 5; - /** The cipher mode. For example, MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC. */ - mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; + /** IV or nonce size, in bytes (right shifted by #MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT). + * For ciphers that accept variable IV sizes, + * this is the recommended size. + */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_size) : 3; - /** The cipher key length, in bits. This is the - * default length for variable sized ciphers. + /** The cipher key length, in bits (right shifted by #MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT). + * This is the default length for variable sized ciphers. * Includes parity bits for ciphers like DES. */ - unsigned int key_bitlen; + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_bitlen) : 4; - /** Name of the cipher. */ - const char *name; + /** The cipher mode (as per mbedtls_cipher_mode_t). + * For example, MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC. + */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mode) : 4; - /** IV or nonce size, in Bytes. - * For ciphers that accept variable IV sizes, - * this is the recommended size. + /** Full cipher identifier (as per mbedtls_cipher_type_t). + * For example, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC. + * + * This could be 7 bits, but 8 bits retains byte alignment for the + * next field, which reduces code size to access that field. */ - unsigned int iv_size; + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type) : 8; /** Bitflag comprised of MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN and * MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN indicating whether the * cipher supports variable IV or variable key sizes, respectively. */ - int flags; - - /** The block size, in Bytes. */ - unsigned int block_size; + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(flags) : 2; - /** Struct for base cipher information and functions. */ - const mbedtls_cipher_base_t *base; + /** Index to LUT for base cipher information and functions. */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(base_idx) : 5; } mbedtls_cipher_info_t; +/* For internal use only. + * These are used to more compactly represent the fields above. */ +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT 6 +#define MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT 2 /** * Generic cipher context. */ typedef struct mbedtls_cipher_context_t { /** Information about the associated cipher. */ - const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info); /** Key length to use. */ - int key_bitlen; + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_bitlen); /** Operation that the key of the context has been * initialized for. */ - mbedtls_operation_t operation; + mbedtls_operation_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(operation); #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) /** Padding functions to use, if relevant for * the specific cipher mode. */ - void (*add_padding)(unsigned char *output, size_t olen, size_t data_len); - int (*get_padding)(unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, size_t *data_len); + void(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(add_padding))(unsigned char *output, size_t olen, size_t data_len); + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(get_padding))(unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, size_t *data_len); #endif /** Buffer for input that has not been processed yet. */ - unsigned char unprocessed_data[MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(unprocessed_data)[MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; /** Number of Bytes that have not been processed yet. */ - size_t unprocessed_len; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(unprocessed_len); /** Current IV or NONCE_COUNTER for CTR-mode, data unit (or sector) number * for XTS-mode. */ - unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv)[MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; /** IV size in Bytes, for ciphers with variable-length IVs. */ - size_t iv_size; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_size); /** The cipher-specific context. */ - void *cipher_ctx; + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_ctx); #if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) /** CMAC-specific context. */ - mbedtls_cmac_context_t *cmac_ctx; + mbedtls_cmac_context_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cmac_ctx); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) /** Indicates whether the cipher operations should be performed * by Mbed TLS' own crypto library or an external implementation * of the PSA Crypto API. @@ -363,8 +362,8 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_cipher_context_t { * mbedtls_cipher_setup(), and set if it was established through * mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(). */ - unsigned char psa_enabled; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psa_enabled); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ } mbedtls_cipher_context_t; @@ -426,6 +425,164 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values(const mbedtls_ciphe int key_bitlen, const mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode); +/** + * \brief Retrieve the identifier for a cipher info structure. + * + * \param[in] info The cipher info structure to query. + * This may be \c NULL. + * + * \return The full cipher identifier (\c MBEDTLS_CIPHER_xxx). + * \return #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE if \p info is \c NULL. + */ +static inline mbedtls_cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_info_get_type( + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info) +{ + if (info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE; + } else { + return (mbedtls_cipher_type_t) info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type); + } +} + +/** + * \brief Retrieve the operation mode for a cipher info structure. + * + * \param[in] info The cipher info structure to query. + * This may be \c NULL. + * + * \return The cipher mode (\c MBEDTLS_MODE_xxx). + * \return #MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE if \p info is \c NULL. + */ +static inline mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode( + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info) +{ + if (info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE; + } else { + return (mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mode); + } +} + +/** + * \brief Retrieve the key size for a cipher info structure. + * + * \param[in] info The cipher info structure to query. + * This may be \c NULL. + * + * \return The key length in bits. + * For variable-sized ciphers, this is the default length. + * For DES, this includes the parity bits. + * \return \c 0 if \p info is \c NULL. + */ +static inline size_t mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen( + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info) +{ + if (info == NULL) { + return 0; + } else { + return ((size_t) info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_bitlen)) << MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT; + } +} + +/** + * \brief Retrieve the human-readable name for a + * cipher info structure. + * + * \param[in] info The cipher info structure to query. + * This may be \c NULL. + * + * \return The cipher name, which is a human readable string, + * with static storage duration. + * \return \c NULL if \p info is \c NULL. + */ +static inline const char *mbedtls_cipher_info_get_name( + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info) +{ + if (info == NULL) { + return NULL; + } else { + return info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name); + } +} + +/** + * \brief This function returns the size of the IV or nonce + * for the cipher info structure, in bytes. + * + * \param info The cipher info structure. This may be \c NULL. + * + * \return The recommended IV size. + * \return \c 0 for ciphers not using an IV or a nonce. + * \return \c 0 if \p info is \c NULL. + */ +static inline size_t mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size( + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info) +{ + if (info == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + return ((size_t) info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_size)) << MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT; +} + +/** + * \brief This function returns the block size of the given + * cipher info structure in bytes. + * + * \param info The cipher info structure. This may be \c NULL. + * + * \return The block size of the cipher. + * \return \c 1 if the cipher is a stream cipher. + * \return \c 0 if \p info is \c NULL. + */ +static inline size_t mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size( + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info) +{ + if (info == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + return (size_t) (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_size)); +} + +/** + * \brief This function returns a non-zero value if the key length for + * the given cipher is variable. + * + * \param info The cipher info structure. This may be \c NULL. + * + * \return Non-zero if the key length is variable, \c 0 otherwise. + * \return \c 0 if the given pointer is \c NULL. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_cipher_info_has_variable_key_bitlen( + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info) +{ + if (info == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + return info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(flags) & MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN; +} + +/** + * \brief This function returns a non-zero value if the IV size for + * the given cipher is variable. + * + * \param info The cipher info structure. This may be \c NULL. + * + * \return Non-zero if the IV size is variable, \c 0 otherwise. + * \return \c 0 if the given pointer is \c NULL. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_cipher_info_has_variable_iv_size( + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info) +{ + if (info == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + return info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(flags) & MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN; +} + /** * \brief This function initializes a \p ctx as NONE. * @@ -449,12 +606,6 @@ void mbedtls_cipher_free(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx); * \brief This function prepares a cipher context for * use with the given cipher primitive. * - * \warning In CBC mode, if mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode() is not called: - * - If MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 is enabled, the - * context will use PKCS7 padding. - * - Otherwise the context uses no padding and the input - * must be a whole number of blocks. - * * \note After calling this function, you should call * mbedtls_cipher_setkey() and, if the mode uses padding, * mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(), then for each @@ -476,27 +627,29 @@ void mbedtls_cipher_free(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx); * parameter-verification failure. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED if allocation of the * cipher-specific context fails. - * - * \internal Currently, the function also clears the structure. - * In future versions, the caller will be required to call - * mbedtls_cipher_init() on the structure first. */ int mbedtls_cipher_setup(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info); #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) /** * \brief This function initializes a cipher context for * PSA-based use with the given cipher primitive. * + * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a + * future version of the library. + * Please use psa_aead_xxx() / psa_cipher_xxx() directly + * instead. + * * \note See #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO for information on PSA. * * \param ctx The context to initialize. May not be \c NULL. * \param cipher_info The cipher to use. * \param taglen For AEAD ciphers, the length in bytes of the * authentication tag to use. Subsequent uses of - * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() or - * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() must provide + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext() or + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext() must provide * the same tag length. * For non-AEAD ciphers, the value must be \c 0. * @@ -506,28 +659,30 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_setup(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED if allocation of the * cipher-specific context fails. */ -int mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, - const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info, - size_t taglen); +int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info, + size_t taglen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /** - * \brief This function returns the block size of the given cipher. + * \brief This function returns the block size of the given cipher + * in bytes. * - * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized. + * \param ctx The context of the cipher. * * \return The block size of the underlying cipher. + * \return \c 1 if the cipher is a stream cipher. * \return \c 0 if \p ctx has not been initialized. */ static inline unsigned int mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) { - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL, 0); - if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { + if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) { return 0; } - return ctx->cipher_info->block_size; + return (unsigned int) ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info)->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_size); } /** @@ -542,12 +697,11 @@ static inline unsigned int mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( static inline mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) { - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE); - if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { + if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE; } - return ctx->cipher_info->mode; + return (mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info)->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mode); } /** @@ -563,16 +717,16 @@ static inline mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) { - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL, 0); - if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { + if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) { return 0; } - if (ctx->iv_size != 0) { - return (int) ctx->iv_size; + if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_size) != 0) { + return (int) ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_size); } - return (int) ctx->cipher_info->iv_size; + return (int) (((int) ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info)->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_size)) << + MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT); } /** @@ -586,13 +740,11 @@ static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size( static inline mbedtls_cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_get_type( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) { - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( - ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE); - if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { + if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE; } - return ctx->cipher_info->type; + return (mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info)->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type); } /** @@ -607,12 +759,11 @@ static inline mbedtls_cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_get_type( static inline const char *mbedtls_cipher_get_name( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) { - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL, 0); - if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { + if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) { return 0; } - return ctx->cipher_info->name; + return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info)->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name); } /** @@ -627,13 +778,12 @@ static inline const char *mbedtls_cipher_get_name( static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) { - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( - ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE); - if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { + if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE; } - return (int) ctx->cipher_info->key_bitlen; + return (int) ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info)->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_bitlen) << + MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT; } /** @@ -647,13 +797,11 @@ static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen( static inline mbedtls_operation_t mbedtls_cipher_get_operation( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) { - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( - ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE); - if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { + if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE; } - return ctx->operation; + return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(operation); } /** @@ -682,6 +830,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_setkey(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, * \brief This function sets the padding mode, for cipher modes * that use padding. * + * * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and * bound to a cipher information structure. * \param mode The padding mode. @@ -703,6 +852,12 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, * \note Some ciphers do not use IVs nor nonce. For these * ciphers, this function has no effect. * + * \note For #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20, the nonce length must + * be 12, and the initial counter value is 0. + * + * \note For #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, the nonce length + * must be 12. + * * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and * bound to a cipher information structure. * \param iv The IV to use, or NONCE_COUNTER for CTR-mode ciphers. This @@ -737,7 +892,8 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, * 2. mbedtls_cipher_reset() * 3. mbedtls_cipher_update_ad() * 4. mbedtls_cipher_update() one or more times - * 5. mbedtls_cipher_check_tag() (for decryption) or + * 5. mbedtls_cipher_finish() + * 6. mbedtls_cipher_check_tag() (for decryption) or * mbedtls_cipher_write_tag() (for encryption). * . * This sequence can be repeated to encrypt or decrypt multiple @@ -755,8 +911,6 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_reset(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx); /** * \brief This function adds additional data for AEAD ciphers. * Currently supported with GCM and ChaCha20+Poly1305. - * This must be called exactly once, after - * mbedtls_cipher_reset(). * * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized. * \param ad The additional data to use. This must be a readable @@ -780,11 +934,6 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update_ad(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, * Exception: For MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, expects a single block * in size. For example, 16 Bytes for AES. * - * \note If the underlying cipher is used in GCM mode, all calls - * to this function, except for the last one before - * mbedtls_cipher_finish(), must have \p ilen as a - * multiple of the block size of the cipher. - * * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and * bound to a key. * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a @@ -909,129 +1058,6 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_crypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ -/** - * \brief The generic authenticated encryption (AEAD) function. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). - * - * \note This function only supports AEAD algorithms, not key - * wrapping algorithms such as NIST_KW; for this, see - * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). - * - * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and - * bound to a key associated with an AEAD algorithm. - * \param iv The nonce to use. This must be a readable buffer of - * at least \p iv_len Bytes and must not be \c NULL. - * \param iv_len The length of the nonce. This must satisfy the - * constraints imposed by the AEAD cipher used. - * \param ad The additional data to authenticate. This must be a - * readable buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes, and may - * be \c NULL is \p ad_len is \c 0. - * \param ad_len The length of \p ad. - * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a - * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and may be - * \c NULL if \p ilen is \c 0. - * \param ilen The length of the input data. - * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be a - * writable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and must - * not be \c NULL. - * \param olen This will be filled with the actual number of Bytes - * written to the \p output buffer. This must point to a - * writable object of type \c size_t. - * \param tag The buffer for the authentication tag. This must be a - * writable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. See note - * below regarding restrictions with PSA-based contexts. - * \param tag_len The desired length of the authentication tag. This - * must match the constraints imposed by the AEAD cipher - * used, and in particular must not be \c 0. - * - * \note If the context is based on PSA (that is, it was set up - * with mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa()), then it is required - * that \c tag == output + ilen. That is, the tag must be - * appended to the ciphertext as recommended by RFC 5116. - * - * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on - * parameter-verification failure. - * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. - */ -int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( - mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, - const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, - const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, - const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, - unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len); - -/** - * \brief The generic authenticated decryption (AEAD) function. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext(). - * - * \note This function only supports AEAD algorithms, not key - * wrapping algorithms such as NIST_KW; for this, see - * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext(). - * - * \note If the data is not authentic, then the output buffer - * is zeroed out to prevent the unauthentic plaintext being - * used, making this interface safer. - * - * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and - * bound to a key associated with an AEAD algorithm. - * \param iv The nonce to use. This must be a readable buffer of - * at least \p iv_len Bytes and must not be \c NULL. - * \param iv_len The length of the nonce. This must satisfy the - * constraints imposed by the AEAD cipher used. - * \param ad The additional data to authenticate. This must be a - * readable buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes, and may - * be \c NULL is \p ad_len is \c 0. - * \param ad_len The length of \p ad. - * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a - * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and may be - * \c NULL if \p ilen is \c 0. - * \param ilen The length of the input data. - * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be a - * writable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and must - * not be \c NULL. - * \param olen This will be filled with the actual number of Bytes - * written to the \p output buffer. This must point to a - * writable object of type \c size_t. - * \param tag The buffer for the authentication tag. This must be a - * readable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. See note - * below regarding restrictions with PSA-based contexts. - * \param tag_len The length of the authentication tag. This must match - * the constraints imposed by the AEAD cipher used, and in - * particular must not be \c 0. - * - * \note If the context is based on PSA (that is, it was set up - * with mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa()), then it is required - * that \c tag == input + len. That is, the tag must be - * appended to the ciphertext as recommended by RFC 5116. - * - * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on - * parameter-verification failure. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED if data is not authentic. - * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure. - */ -int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( - mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, - const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, - const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, - const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, - const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len); -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) /** * \brief The authenticated encryption (AEAD/NIST_KW) function. diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cmac.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cmac.h index 5c3bcbaecb..97b86fc42b 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cmac.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cmac.h @@ -5,32 +5,18 @@ * * The Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) Mode for * Authentication is defined in RFC-4493: The AES-CMAC Algorithm. + * It is supported with AES and DES. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CMAC_H #define MBEDTLS_CMAC_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" @@ -38,23 +24,33 @@ extern "C" { #endif -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_CMAC_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** CMAC hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CMAC_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x007A - #define MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16 #define MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE 8 - -/* Although the CMAC module does not support ARIA or CAMELLIA, we adjust the value of - * MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX to reflect these ciphers. - * This is done to avoid confusion, given the general-purpose name of the macro. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) -#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX 16 /**< The longest block used by CMAC is that of AES. */ +/* We don't support Camellia or ARIA in this module */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 16 /**< The longest block used by CMAC is that of AES. */ #else -#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX 8 /**< The longest block used by CMAC is that of 3DES. */ +#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 8 /**< The longest block used by CMAC is that of 3DES. */ #endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +/** The longest block supported by the cipher module. + * + * \deprecated + * For the maximum block size of a cipher supported by the CMAC module, + * use #MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE. + * For the maximum block size of a cipher supported by the cipher module, + * use #MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH. + */ +/* Before Mbed TLS 3.5, this was the maximum block size supported by the CMAC + * module, so it didn't take Camellia or ARIA into account. Since the name + * of the macro doesn't even convey "CMAC", this was misleading. Now the size + * is sufficient for any cipher, but the name is defined in cmac.h for + * backward compatibility. */ +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) /** @@ -62,14 +58,14 @@ extern "C" { */ struct mbedtls_cmac_context_t { /** The internal state of the CMAC algorithm. */ - unsigned char state[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; /** Unprocessed data - either data that was not block aligned and is still * pending processing, or the final block. */ - unsigned char unprocessed_block[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(unprocessed_block)[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; /** The length of data pending processing. */ - size_t unprocessed_len; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(unprocessed_len); }; #else /* !MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h deleted file mode 100644 index 117c88ae73..0000000000 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2545 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file compat-1.3.h - * - * \brief Compatibility definitions for using Mbed TLS with client code written - * for the PolarSSL naming conventions. - * - * \deprecated Use the new names directly instead - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#warning "Including compat-1.3.h is deprecated" -#endif - -#ifndef MBEDTLS_COMPAT13_H -#define MBEDTLS_COMPAT13_H - -/* - * config.h options - */ -#if defined MBEDTLS_AESNI_C -#define POLARSSL_AESNI_C MBEDTLS_AESNI_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_AES_ALT -#define POLARSSL_AES_ALT MBEDTLS_AES_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_AES_C -#define POLARSSL_AES_C MBEDTLS_AES_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES -#define POLARSSL_AES_ROM_TABLES MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT -#define POLARSSL_ARC4_ALT MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ARC4_C -#define POLARSSL_ARC4_C MBEDTLS_ARC4_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C -#define POLARSSL_ASN1_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C -#define POLARSSL_ASN1_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_BASE64_C -#define POLARSSL_BASE64_C MBEDTLS_BASE64_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C -#define POLARSSL_BIGNUM_C MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT -#define POLARSSL_BLOWFISH_ALT MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C -#define POLARSSL_BLOWFISH_C MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT -#define POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_ALT MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C -#define POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_C MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY -#define POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CCM_C -#define POLARSSL_CCM_C MBEDTLS_CCM_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CERTS_C -#define POLARSSL_CERTS_C MBEDTLS_CERTS_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_C MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_CFB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C -#define POLARSSL_CTR_DRBG_C MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C -#define POLARSSL_DEBUG_C MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED -#define POLARSSL_DEPRECATED_REMOVED MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING -#define POLARSSL_DEPRECATED_WARNING MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_DES_ALT -#define POLARSSL_DES_ALT MBEDTLS_DES_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_DES_C -#define POLARSSL_DES_C MBEDTLS_DES_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_DHM_C -#define POLARSSL_DHM_C MBEDTLS_DHM_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECDH_C -#define POLARSSL_ECDH_C MBEDTLS_ECDH_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C -#define POLARSSL_ECDSA_C MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC -#define POLARSSL_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_C -#define POLARSSL_ECP_C MBEDTLS_ECP_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_M255_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM -#define POLARSSL_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS -#define POLARSSL_ECP_MAX_BITS MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM -#define POLARSSL_ECP_NIST_OPTIM MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE -#define POLARSSL_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES -#define POLARSSL_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C -#define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_C MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 -#define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ERROR_C -#define POLARSSL_ERROR_C MBEDTLS_ERROR_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY -#define POLARSSL_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_FS_IO -#define POLARSSL_FS_IO MBEDTLS_FS_IO -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_GCM_C -#define POLARSSL_GCM_C MBEDTLS_GCM_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_GENPRIME -#define POLARSSL_GENPRIME MBEDTLS_GENPRIME -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C -#define POLARSSL_HAVEGE_C MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM -#define POLARSSL_HAVE_ASM MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 -#define POLARSSL_HAVE_SSE2 MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME -#define POLARSSL_HAVE_TIME MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C -#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_C MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT -#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST -#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT -#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL -#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT -#define POLARSSL_MD2_ALT MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MD2_C -#define POLARSSL_MD2_C MBEDTLS_MD2_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT -#define POLARSSL_MD2_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT -#define POLARSSL_MD4_ALT MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MD4_C -#define POLARSSL_MD4_C MBEDTLS_MD4_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT -#define POLARSSL_MD4_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT -#define POLARSSL_MD5_ALT MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MD5_C -#define POLARSSL_MD5_C MBEDTLS_MD5_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT -#define POLARSSL_MD5_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MD_C -#define POLARSSL_MD_C MBEDTLS_MD_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE -#define POLARSSL_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE -#define POLARSSL_MEMORY_BACKTRACE MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C -#define POLARSSL_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG -#define POLARSSL_MEMORY_DEBUG MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE -#define POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE -#define POLARSSL_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_NET_C -#define POLARSSL_NET_C MBEDTLS_NET_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES -#define POLARSSL_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY -#define POLARSSL_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_OID_C -#define POLARSSL_OID_C MBEDTLS_OID_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C -#define POLARSSL_PADLOCK_C MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C -#define POLARSSL_PEM_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C -#define POLARSSL_PEM_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C -#define POLARSSL_PKCS11_C MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C -#define POLARSSL_PKCS12_C MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 -#define POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15 MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 -#define POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21 MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C -#define POLARSSL_PKCS5_C MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PK_C -#define POLARSSL_PK_C MBEDTLS_PK_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C -#define POLARSSL_PK_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED -#define POLARSSL_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT -#define POLARSSL_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C -#define POLARSSL_PK_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_C MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_MEMORY MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_FREE MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN -#define POLARSSL_PSK_MAX_LEN MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES -#define POLARSSL_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT -#define POLARSSL_RIPEMD160_ALT MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C -#define POLARSSL_RIPEMD160_C MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT -#define POLARSSL_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_RSA_C -#define POLARSSL_RSA_C MBEDTLS_RSA_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT -#define POLARSSL_RSA_NO_CRT MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST -#define POLARSSL_SELF_TEST MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT -#define POLARSSL_SHA1_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA1_C -#define POLARSSL_SHA1_C MBEDTLS_SHA1_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT -#define POLARSSL_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT -#define POLARSSL_SHA256_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA256_C -#define POLARSSL_SHA256_C MBEDTLS_SHA256_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT -#define POLARSSL_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT -#define POLARSSL_SHA512_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA512_C -#define POLARSSL_SHA512_C MBEDTLS_SHA512_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT -#define POLARSSL_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES -#define POLARSSL_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN -#define POLARSSL_SSL_ALPN MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C -#define POLARSSL_SSL_CACHE_C MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING -#define POLARSSL_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C -#define POLARSSL_SSL_CLI_C MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C -#define POLARSSL_SSL_COOKIE_C MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT -#define POLARSSL_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL -#define POLARSSL_SSL_DEBUG_ALL MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY -#define POLARSSL_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT -#define POLARSSL_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY -#define POLARSSL_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC -#define POLARSSL_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET -#define POLARSSL_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV -#define POLARSSL_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL -#define POLARSSL_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS -#define POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_DTLS MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 -#define POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 -#define POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 -#define POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 -#define POLARSSL_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION -#define POLARSSL_SSL_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION -#define POLARSSL_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS -#define POLARSSL_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C -#define POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_C MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE -#define POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO -#define POLARSSL_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C -#define POLARSSL_SSL_TLS_C MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC -#define POLARSSL_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT -#define POLARSSL_THREADING_ALT MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_THREADING_C -#define POLARSSL_THREADING_C MBEDTLS_THREADING_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD -#define POLARSSL_THREADING_PTHREAD MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT -#define POLARSSL_TIMING_ALT MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_TIMING_C -#define POLARSSL_TIMING_C MBEDTLS_TIMING_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_VERSION_C -#define POLARSSL_VERSION_C MBEDTLS_VERSION_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES -#define POLARSSL_VERSION_FEATURES MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 -#define POLARSSL_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION -#define POLARSSL_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION \ - MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE -#define POLARSSL_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE -#define POLARSSL_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C -#define POLARSSL_X509_CREATE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C -#define POLARSSL_X509_CRL_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C -#define POLARSSL_X509_CRT_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C -#define POLARSSL_X509_CRT_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C -#define POLARSSL_X509_CSR_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C -#define POLARSSL_X509_CSR_WRITE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA -#define POLARSSL_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT -#define POLARSSL_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C -#define POLARSSL_X509_USE_C MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT -#define POLARSSL_XTEA_ALT MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_XTEA_C -#define POLARSSL_XTEA_C MBEDTLS_XTEA_C -#endif -#if defined MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT -#define POLARSSL_ZLIB_SUPPORT MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT -#endif - -/* - * Misc names (macros, types, functions, enum constants...) - */ -#define AES_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT -#define AES_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT -#define ASN1_BIT_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING -#define ASN1_BMP_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_BMP_STRING -#define ASN1_BOOLEAN MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN -#define ASN1_CHK_ADD MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD -#define ASN1_CONSTRUCTED MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED -#define ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC -#define ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME -#define ASN1_IA5_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING -#define ASN1_INTEGER MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER -#define ASN1_NULL MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL -#define ASN1_OCTET_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING -#define ASN1_OID MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID -#define ASN1_PRIMITIVE MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRIMITIVE -#define ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING -#define ASN1_SEQUENCE MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE -#define ASN1_SET MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET -#define ASN1_T61_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_T61_STRING -#define ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING -#define ASN1_UTC_TIME MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME -#define ASN1_UTF8_STRING MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING -#define BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH -#define BADCERT_EXPIRED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED -#define BADCERT_FUTURE MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE -#define BADCERT_MISSING MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING -#define BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED -#define BADCERT_OTHER MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER -#define BADCERT_REVOKED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED -#define BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY -#define BADCRL_EXPIRED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED -#define BADCRL_FUTURE MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE -#define BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED -#define BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE -#define BLOWFISH_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT -#define BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT -#define BLOWFISH_MAX_KEY MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MAX_KEY_BITS -#define BLOWFISH_MIN_KEY MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MIN_KEY_BITS -#define BLOWFISH_ROUNDS MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS -#define CAMELLIA_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT -#define CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT -#define COLLECT_SIZE MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE -#define CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE -#define CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN -#define CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS -#define CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE -#define CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT -#define CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST -#define CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT -#define CTR_DRBG_PR_OFF MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_OFF -#define CTR_DRBG_PR_ON MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_ON -#define CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL -#define CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN -#define DEPRECATED MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#define DES_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT -#define DES_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT -#define DES_KEY_SIZE MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE -#define ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE -#define ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER -#define ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE -#define ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES -#define ENTROPY_MIN_HARDCLOCK MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDCLOCK -#define ENTROPY_MIN_HAVEGE MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HAVEGE -#define ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM -#define ENTROPY_SOURCE_MANUAL MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_MANUAL -#define EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER -#define EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS -#define EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES -#define EXT_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS -#define EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE -#define EXT_FRESHEST_CRL MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_FRESHEST_CRL -#define EXT_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY -#define EXT_ISSUER_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_ISSUER_ALT_NAME -#define EXT_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE -#define EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS -#define EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE -#define EXT_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS -#define EXT_POLICY_MAPPINGS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_POLICY_MAPPINGS -#define EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME -#define EXT_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS -#define EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER -#define GCM_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT -#define GCM_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT -#define KU_CRL_SIGN MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN -#define KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT -#define KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE -#define KU_KEY_AGREEMENT MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT -#define KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN -#define KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT -#define KU_NON_REPUDIATION MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION -#define LN_2_DIV_LN_10_SCALE100 MBEDTLS_LN_2_DIV_LN_10_SCALE100 -#define MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC -#define MEMORY_VERIFY_ALWAYS MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALWAYS -#define MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE -#define MEMORY_VERIFY_NONE MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_NONE -#define MPI_CHK MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK -#define NET_PROTO_TCP MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP -#define NET_PROTO_UDP MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP -#define NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL -#define NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA -#define NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING -#define NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA -#define NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED -#define NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA -#define NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT -#define NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER -#define OID_ANSI_X9_62 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 -#define OID_ANSI_X9_62_FIELD_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_FIELD_TYPE -#define OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD -#define OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG -#define OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 -#define OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE -#define OID_AT MBEDTLS_OID_AT -#define OID_AT_CN MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN -#define OID_AT_COUNTRY MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY -#define OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER -#define OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER -#define OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME -#define OID_AT_INITIALS MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS -#define OID_AT_LOCALITY MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY -#define OID_AT_ORGANIZATION MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION -#define OID_AT_ORG_UNIT MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT -#define OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS -#define OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE -#define OID_AT_PSEUDONYM MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM -#define OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER -#define OID_AT_STATE MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE -#define OID_AT_SUR_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME -#define OID_AT_TITLE MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE -#define OID_AT_UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT_UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER -#define OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER -#define OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS -#define OID_CERTICOM MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM -#define OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES MBEDTLS_OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES -#define OID_CLIENT_AUTH MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH -#define OID_CMP MBEDTLS_OID_CMP -#define OID_CODE_SIGNING MBEDTLS_OID_CODE_SIGNING -#define OID_COUNTRY_US MBEDTLS_OID_COUNTRY_US -#define OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS MBEDTLS_OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS -#define OID_CRL_NUMBER MBEDTLS_OID_CRL_NUMBER -#define OID_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_DES_CBC -#define OID_DES_EDE3_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC -#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD2 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD2 -#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD4 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD4 -#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5 -#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1 -#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224 -#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256 -#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384 -#define OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512 -#define OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT -#define OID_ECDSA_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA1 -#define OID_ECDSA_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA224 -#define OID_ECDSA_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA256 -#define OID_ECDSA_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA384 -#define OID_ECDSA_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA512 -#define OID_EC_ALG_ECDH MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_ECDH -#define OID_EC_ALG_UNRESTRICTED MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_UNRESTRICTED -#define OID_EC_BRAINPOOL_V1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_BRAINPOOL_V1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1 -#define OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1 -#define OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION MBEDTLS_OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION -#define OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE -#define OID_FRESHEST_CRL MBEDTLS_OID_FRESHEST_CRL -#define OID_GOV MBEDTLS_OID_GOV -#define OID_HMAC_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA1 -#define OID_ID_CE MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE -#define OID_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY MBEDTLS_OID_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY -#define OID_ISO_CCITT_DS MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_CCITT_DS -#define OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG -#define OID_ISO_ITU_COUNTRY MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_COUNTRY -#define OID_ISO_ITU_US_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_US_ORG -#define OID_ISO_MEMBER_BODIES MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_MEMBER_BODIES -#define OID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME -#define OID_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE -#define OID_KP MBEDTLS_OID_KP -#define OID_MGF1 MBEDTLS_OID_MGF1 -#define OID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS -#define OID_NETSCAPE MBEDTLS_OID_NETSCAPE -#define OID_NS_BASE_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_BASE_URL -#define OID_NS_CA_POLICY_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CA_POLICY_URL -#define OID_NS_CA_REVOCATION_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CA_REVOCATION_URL -#define OID_NS_CERT MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT -#define OID_NS_CERT_SEQUENCE MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_SEQUENCE -#define OID_NS_CERT_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE -#define OID_NS_COMMENT MBEDTLS_OID_NS_COMMENT -#define OID_NS_DATA_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_NS_DATA_TYPE -#define OID_NS_RENEWAL_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_RENEWAL_URL -#define OID_NS_REVOCATION_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_REVOCATION_URL -#define OID_NS_SSL_SERVER_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_NS_SSL_SERVER_NAME -#define OID_OCSP_SIGNING MBEDTLS_OID_OCSP_SIGNING -#define OID_OIW_SECSIG MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG -#define OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG -#define OID_OIW_SECSIG_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_SHA1 -#define OID_ORGANIZATION MBEDTLS_OID_ORGANIZATION -#define OID_ORG_ANSI_X9_62 MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_ANSI_X9_62 -#define OID_ORG_CERTICOM MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_CERTICOM -#define OID_ORG_DOD MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_DOD -#define OID_ORG_GOV MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_GOV -#define OID_ORG_NETSCAPE MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_NETSCAPE -#define OID_ORG_OIW MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_OIW -#define OID_ORG_RSA_DATA_SECURITY MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_RSA_DATA_SECURITY -#define OID_ORG_TELETRUST MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_TELETRUST -#define OID_PKCS MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS -#define OID_PKCS1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 -#define OID_PKCS12 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12 -#define OID_PKCS12_PBE MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE -#define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC -#define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC -#define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC -#define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC -#define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 -#define OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 -#define OID_PKCS1_MD2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD2 -#define OID_PKCS1_MD4 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD4 -#define OID_PKCS1_MD5 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD5 -#define OID_PKCS1_RSA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_RSA -#define OID_PKCS1_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA1 -#define OID_PKCS1_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA224 -#define OID_PKCS1_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA256 -#define OID_PKCS1_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA384 -#define OID_PKCS1_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA512 -#define OID_PKCS5 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 -#define OID_PKCS5_PBES2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBES2 -#define OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC -#define OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_RC2_CBC -#define OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC -#define OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_RC2_CBC -#define OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC -#define OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_RC2_CBC -#define OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2 -#define OID_PKCS5_PBMAC1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBMAC1 -#define OID_PKCS9 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9 -#define OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ -#define OID_PKCS9_EMAIL MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL -#define OID_PKIX MBEDTLS_OID_PKIX -#define OID_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS -#define OID_POLICY_MAPPINGS MBEDTLS_OID_POLICY_MAPPINGS -#define OID_PRIVATE_KEY_USAGE_PERIOD MBEDTLS_OID_PRIVATE_KEY_USAGE_PERIOD -#define OID_RSASSA_PSS MBEDTLS_OID_RSASSA_PSS -#define OID_RSA_COMPANY MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY -#define OID_RSA_SHA_OBS MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_SHA_OBS -#define OID_SERVER_AUTH MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH -#define OID_SIZE MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE -#define OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME -#define OID_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS -#define OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER -#define OID_TELETRUST MBEDTLS_OID_TELETRUST -#define OID_TIME_STAMPING MBEDTLS_OID_TIME_STAMPING -#define PADLOCK_ACE MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE -#define PADLOCK_ALIGN16 MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16 -#define PADLOCK_PHE MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_PHE -#define PADLOCK_PMM MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_PMM -#define PADLOCK_RNG MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_RNG -#define PKCS12_DERIVE_IV MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_IV -#define PKCS12_DERIVE_KEY MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_KEY -#define PKCS12_DERIVE_MAC_KEY MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_MAC_KEY -#define PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT -#define PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT -#define PKCS5_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT -#define PKCS5_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT -#define POLARSSL_AESNI_AES MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES -#define POLARSSL_AESNI_CLMUL MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL -#define POLARSSL_AESNI_H MBEDTLS_AESNI_H -#define POLARSSL_AES_H MBEDTLS_AES_H -#define POLARSSL_ARC4_H MBEDTLS_ARC4_H -#define POLARSSL_ASN1_H MBEDTLS_ASN1_H -#define POLARSSL_ASN1_WRITE_H MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_H -#define POLARSSL_BASE64_H MBEDTLS_BASE64_H -#define POLARSSL_BIGNUM_H MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_H -#define POLARSSL_BLOWFISH_H MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_H -#define POLARSSL_BN_MUL_H MBEDTLS_BN_MUL_H -#define POLARSSL_CAMELLIA_H MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_H -#define POLARSSL_CCM_H MBEDTLS_CCM_H -#define POLARSSL_CERTS_H MBEDTLS_CERTS_H -#define POLARSSL_CHECK_CONFIG_H MBEDTLS_CHECK_CONFIG_H -#define POLARSSL_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS -#define POLARSSL_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG -#define POLARSSL_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128 -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128 -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128 -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ARC4_128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64 -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128 -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CFB128 -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CTR -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CFB128 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CFB128 -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CTR MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CTR -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_H MBEDTLS_CIPHER_H -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_3DES MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_3DES -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_AES MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_ARC4 MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARC4 -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_BLOWFISH MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_BLOWFISH -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_DES MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_DES -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_NONE MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NONE -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_ID_NULL MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NULL -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_NONE MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_NULL MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN -#define POLARSSL_CIPHER_WRAP_H MBEDTLS_CIPHER_WRAP_H -#define POLARSSL_CONFIG_H MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H -#define POLARSSL_CTR_DRBG_H MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_H -#define POLARSSL_DEBUG_H MBEDTLS_DEBUG_H -#define POLARSSL_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_DECRYPT -#define POLARSSL_DES_H MBEDTLS_DES_H -#define POLARSSL_DHM_H MBEDTLS_DHM_H -#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G -#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P -#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_G MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_G -#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_P MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_P -#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_G MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_G -#define POLARSSL_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_P MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_P -#define POLARSSL_ECDH_H MBEDTLS_ECDH_H -#define POLARSSL_ECDH_OURS MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS -#define POLARSSL_ECDH_THEIRS MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS -#define POLARSSL_ECDSA_H MBEDTLS_ECDSA_H -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP256R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP384R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_BP512R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_M255 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_MAX MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_NONE MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192K1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP224K1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP256K1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 -#define POLARSSL_ECP_H MBEDTLS_ECP_H -#define POLARSSL_ECP_MAX_BYTES MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES -#define POLARSSL_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN -#define POLARSSL_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED -#define POLARSSL_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE -#define POLARSSL_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT -#define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_H MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_H -#define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_POLL_H MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_POLL_H -#define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_SHA256_ACCUMULATOR MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA256_ACCUMULATOR -#define POLARSSL_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR -#define POLARSSL_ERROR_H MBEDTLS_ERROR_H -#define POLARSSL_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -#define POLARSSL_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER -#define POLARSSL_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT -#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT -#define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_TIMEOUT MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_READ MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ -#define POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_WRITE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL -#define POLARSSL_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING -#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY -#define POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO -#define POLARSSL_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_MALLOC_FAILED MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG -#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION -#define POLARSSL_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_GCM_H MBEDTLS_GCM_H -#define POLARSSL_HAVEGE_H MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_H -#define POLARSSL_HAVE_INT32 MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 -#define POLARSSL_HAVE_INT64 MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 -#define POLARSSL_HAVE_UDBL MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL -#define POLARSSL_HAVE_X86 MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86 -#define POLARSSL_HAVE_X86_64 MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64 -#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_H MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_H -#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_PR_OFF MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_OFF -#define POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDHE_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED -#define POLARSSL_KEY_LENGTH_DES MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES -#define POLARSSL_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE -#define POLARSSL_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3 MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3 -#define POLARSSL_KEY_LENGTH_NONE MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE -#define POLARSSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH -#define POLARSSL_MD2_H MBEDTLS_MD2_H -#define POLARSSL_MD4_H MBEDTLS_MD4_H -#define POLARSSL_MD5_H MBEDTLS_MD5_H -#define POLARSSL_MD_H MBEDTLS_MD_H -#define POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE -#define POLARSSL_MD_MD2 MBEDTLS_MD_MD2 -#define POLARSSL_MD_MD4 MBEDTLS_MD_MD4 -#define POLARSSL_MD_MD5 MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 -#define POLARSSL_MD_NONE MBEDTLS_MD_NONE -#define POLARSSL_MD_RIPEMD160 MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160 -#define POLARSSL_MD_SHA1 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 -#define POLARSSL_MD_SHA224 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 -#define POLARSSL_MD_SHA256 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 -#define POLARSSL_MD_SHA384 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 -#define POLARSSL_MD_SHA512 MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 -#define POLARSSL_MD_WRAP_H MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H -#define POLARSSL_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_H MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_H -#define POLARSSL_MODE_CBC MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC -#define POLARSSL_MODE_CCM MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM -#define POLARSSL_MODE_CFB MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB -#define POLARSSL_MODE_CTR MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR -#define POLARSSL_MODE_ECB MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB -#define POLARSSL_MODE_GCM MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM -#define POLARSSL_MODE_NONE MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE -#define POLARSSL_MODE_OFB MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB -#define POLARSSL_MODE_STREAM MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM -#define POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_BITS MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS -#define POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_BITS_SCALE100 MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS_SCALE100 -#define POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_LIMBS MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS -#define POLARSSL_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE -#define POLARSSL_NET_H MBEDTLS_NET_SOCKETS_H -#define POLARSSL_NET_LISTEN_BACKLOG MBEDTLS_NET_LISTEN_BACKLOG -#define POLARSSL_OID_H MBEDTLS_OID_H -#define POLARSSL_OPERATION_NONE MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE -#define POLARSSL_PADDING_NONE MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE -#define POLARSSL_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS -#define POLARSSL_PADDING_PKCS7 MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7 -#define POLARSSL_PADDING_ZEROS MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS -#define POLARSSL_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN -#define POLARSSL_PADLOCK_H MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_H -#define POLARSSL_PEM_H MBEDTLS_PEM_H -#define POLARSSL_PKCS11_H MBEDTLS_PKCS11_H -#define POLARSSL_PKCS12_H MBEDTLS_PKCS12_H -#define POLARSSL_PKCS5_H MBEDTLS_PKCS5_H -#define POLARSSL_PK_DEBUG_ECP MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_ECP -#define POLARSSL_PK_DEBUG_MAX_ITEMS MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MAX_ITEMS -#define POLARSSL_PK_DEBUG_MPI MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI -#define POLARSSL_PK_DEBUG_NONE MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_NONE -#define POLARSSL_PK_ECDSA MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA -#define POLARSSL_PK_ECKEY MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY -#define POLARSSL_PK_ECKEY_DH MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH -#define POLARSSL_PK_H MBEDTLS_PK_H -#define POLARSSL_PK_NONE MBEDTLS_PK_NONE -#define POLARSSL_PK_RSA MBEDTLS_PK_RSA -#define POLARSSL_PK_RSASSA_PSS MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS -#define POLARSSL_PK_RSA_ALT MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT -#define POLARSSL_PK_WRAP_H MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H -#define POLARSSL_PLATFORM_H MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_H -#define POLARSSL_PREMASTER_SIZE MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE -#define POLARSSL_RIPEMD160_H MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_H -#define POLARSSL_RSA_H MBEDTLS_RSA_H -#define POLARSSL_SHA1_H MBEDTLS_SHA1_H -#define POLARSSL_SHA256_H MBEDTLS_SHA256_H -#define POLARSSL_SHA512_H MBEDTLS_SHA512_H -#define POLARSSL_SSL_CACHE_H MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_H -#define POLARSSL_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_H MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_H -#define POLARSSL_SSL_COOKIE_H MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_H -#define POLARSSL_SSL_H MBEDTLS_SSL_H -#define POLARSSL_THREADING_H MBEDTLS_THREADING_H -#define POLARSSL_THREADING_IMPL MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL -#define POLARSSL_TIMING_H MBEDTLS_TIMING_H -#define POLARSSL_VERSION_H MBEDTLS_VERSION_H -#define POLARSSL_VERSION_MAJOR MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR -#define POLARSSL_VERSION_MINOR MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR -#define POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER -#define POLARSSL_VERSION_PATCH MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH -#define POLARSSL_VERSION_STRING MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING -#define POLARSSL_VERSION_STRING_FULL MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL -#define POLARSSL_X509_CRL_H MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_H -#define POLARSSL_X509_CRT_H MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_H -#define POLARSSL_X509_CSR_H MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_H -#define POLARSSL_X509_H MBEDTLS_X509_H -#define POLARSSL_XTEA_H MBEDTLS_XTEA_H -#define RSA_CRYPT MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT -#define RSA_PKCS_V15 MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 -#define RSA_PKCS_V21 MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 -#define RSA_PRIVATE MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE -#define RSA_PUBLIC MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC -#define RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY -#define RSA_SIGN MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN -#define SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL -#define SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPTION_FAILED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPTION_FAILED -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_EXPORT_RESTRICTION MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_EXPORT_RESTRICTION -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_RECORD_OVERFLOW MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_RECORD_OVERFLOW -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT -#define SSL_ALERT_MSG_USER_CANCELED MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_USER_CANCELED -#define SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED -#define SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED -#define SSL_ARC4_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED -#define SSL_ARC4_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED -#define SSL_BUFFER_LEN (((MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN) < (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN)) \ - ? (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN) : (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN)) -#define SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES -#define SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT -#define SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED -#define SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED -#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST -#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY -#define SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN -#define SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN -#define SSL_CHANNEL_INBOUND MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_INBOUND -#define SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND -#define SSL_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES -#define SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE -#define SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC -#define SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED -#define SSL_CLIENT_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO -#define SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE -#define SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD -#define SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE -#define SSL_COMPRESS_NULL MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL -#define SSL_DEBUG_BUF MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF -#define SSL_DEBUG_CRT MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT -#define SSL_DEBUG_ECP MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP -#define SSL_DEBUG_MPI MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI -#define SSL_DEBUG_MSG MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG -#define SSL_DEBUG_RET MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET -#define SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME -#define SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX -#define SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN -#define SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO -#define SSL_ETM_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED -#define SSL_ETM_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED -#define SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED -#define SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED -#define SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV -#define SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS -#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER -#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP -#define SSL_HASH_MD5 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5 -#define SSL_HASH_NONE MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE -#define SSL_HASH_SHA1 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1 -#define SSL_HASH_SHA224 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224 -#define SSL_HASH_SHA256 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256 -#define SSL_HASH_SHA384 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384 -#define SSL_HASH_SHA512 MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512 -#define SSL_HELLO_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST -#define SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE -#define SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST -#define SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY -#define SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO -#define SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE -#define SSL_HS_FINISHED MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED -#define SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST -#define SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST -#define SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET -#define SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO -#define SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE -#define SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE -#define SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE -#define SSL_IS_CLIENT MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT -#define SSL_IS_FALLBACK MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK -#define SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK -#define SSL_IS_SERVER MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER -#define SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION -#define SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE -#define SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION -#define SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION -#define SSL_MAC_ADD MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD -#define SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 -#define SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN -#define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024 -#define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048 -#define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096 -#define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512 -#define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID -#define SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE -#define SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION -#define SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION -#define SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 -#define SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 -#define SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 -#define SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 -#define SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION -#define SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION -#define SSL_MSG_ALERT MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT -#define SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA -#define SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC -#define SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE -#define SSL_PADDING_ADD MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD -#define SSL_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION -#define SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED -#define SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE -#define SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED -#define SSL_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ENFORCED MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ENFORCED -#define SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING -#define SSL_RENEGO_MAX_RECORDS_DEFAULT MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGO_MAX_RECORDS_DEFAULT -#define SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED -#define SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING -#define SSL_RETRANS_SENDING MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING -#define SSL_RETRANS_WAITING MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING -#define SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION -#define SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE -#define SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC -#define SSL_SERVER_FINISHED MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED -#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO -#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE -#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT -#define SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE -#define SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET -#define SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED -#define SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED -#define SSL_SIG_ANON MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON -#define SSL_SIG_ECDSA MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA -#define SSL_SIG_RSA MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA -#define SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM -#define SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM -#define SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN -#define SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED -#define SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED -#define SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN -#define SSL_VERIFY_NONE MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE -#define SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL -#define SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 -#define TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA -#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA -#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA -#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -#define TLS_EXT_ALPN MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN -#define TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC -#define TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET -#define TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH -#define TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO -#define TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME -#define TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME -#define TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET -#define TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG -#define TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES -#define TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS -#define TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT -#define TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 -#define TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 -#define TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 -#define TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -#define X509_CRT_VERSION_1 MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1 -#define X509_CRT_VERSION_2 MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_2 -#define X509_CRT_VERSION_3 MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3 -#define X509_FORMAT_DER MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER -#define X509_FORMAT_PEM MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM -#define X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE -#define X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN -#define X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN -#define XTEA_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT -#define XTEA_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT -#define _asn1_bitstring mbedtls_asn1_bitstring -#define _asn1_buf mbedtls_asn1_buf -#define _asn1_named_data mbedtls_asn1_named_data -#define _asn1_sequence mbedtls_asn1_sequence -#define _ssl_cache_context mbedtls_ssl_cache_context -#define _ssl_cache_entry mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry -#define _ssl_ciphersuite_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t -#define _ssl_context mbedtls_ssl_context -#define _ssl_flight_item mbedtls_ssl_flight_item -#define _ssl_handshake_params mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params -#define _ssl_key_cert mbedtls_ssl_key_cert -#define _ssl_premaster_secret mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret -#define _ssl_session mbedtls_ssl_session -#define _ssl_transform mbedtls_ssl_transform -#define _x509_crl mbedtls_x509_crl -#define _x509_crl_entry mbedtls_x509_crl_entry -#define _x509_crt mbedtls_x509_crt -#define _x509_csr mbedtls_x509_csr -#define _x509_time mbedtls_x509_time -#define _x509write_cert mbedtls_x509write_cert -#define _x509write_csr mbedtls_x509write_csr -#define aes_context mbedtls_aes_context -#define aes_crypt_cbc mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc -#define aes_crypt_cfb128 mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128 -#define aes_crypt_cfb8 mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8 -#define aes_crypt_ctr mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr -#define aes_crypt_ecb mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb -#define aes_free mbedtls_aes_free -#define aes_init mbedtls_aes_init -#define aes_self_test mbedtls_aes_self_test -#define aes_setkey_dec mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec -#define aes_setkey_enc mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc -#define aesni_crypt_ecb mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb -#define aesni_gcm_mult mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult -#define aesni_inverse_key mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key -#define aesni_setkey_enc mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc -#define aesni_supports mbedtls_aesni_has_support -#define alarmed mbedtls_timing_alarmed -#define arc4_context mbedtls_arc4_context -#define arc4_crypt mbedtls_arc4_crypt -#define arc4_free mbedtls_arc4_free -#define arc4_init mbedtls_arc4_init -#define arc4_self_test mbedtls_arc4_self_test -#define arc4_setup mbedtls_arc4_setup -#define asn1_bitstring mbedtls_asn1_bitstring -#define asn1_buf mbedtls_asn1_buf -#define asn1_find_named_data mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data -#define asn1_free_named_data mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data -#define asn1_free_named_data_list mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list -#define asn1_get_alg mbedtls_asn1_get_alg -#define asn1_get_alg_null mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null -#define asn1_get_bitstring mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring -#define asn1_get_bitstring_null mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null -#define asn1_get_bool mbedtls_asn1_get_bool -#define asn1_get_int mbedtls_asn1_get_int -#define asn1_get_len mbedtls_asn1_get_len -#define asn1_get_mpi mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi -#define asn1_get_sequence_of mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of -#define asn1_get_tag mbedtls_asn1_get_tag -#define asn1_named_data mbedtls_asn1_named_data -#define asn1_sequence mbedtls_asn1_sequence -#define asn1_store_named_data mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data -#define asn1_write_algorithm_identifier mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier -#define asn1_write_bitstring mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring -#define asn1_write_bool mbedtls_asn1_write_bool -#define asn1_write_ia5_string mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string -#define asn1_write_int mbedtls_asn1_write_int -#define asn1_write_len mbedtls_asn1_write_len -#define asn1_write_mpi mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi -#define asn1_write_null mbedtls_asn1_write_null -#define asn1_write_octet_string mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string -#define asn1_write_oid mbedtls_asn1_write_oid -#define asn1_write_printable_string mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string -#define asn1_write_raw_buffer mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer -#define asn1_write_tag mbedtls_asn1_write_tag -#define base64_decode mbedtls_base64_decode -#define base64_encode mbedtls_base64_encode -#define base64_self_test mbedtls_base64_self_test -#define blowfish_context mbedtls_blowfish_context -#define blowfish_crypt_cbc mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc -#define blowfish_crypt_cfb64 mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64 -#define blowfish_crypt_ctr mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr -#define blowfish_crypt_ecb mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb -#define blowfish_free mbedtls_blowfish_free -#define blowfish_init mbedtls_blowfish_init -#define blowfish_setkey mbedtls_blowfish_setkey -#define camellia_context mbedtls_camellia_context -#define camellia_crypt_cbc mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc -#define camellia_crypt_cfb128 mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128 -#define camellia_crypt_ctr mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr -#define camellia_crypt_ecb mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb -#define camellia_free mbedtls_camellia_free -#define camellia_init mbedtls_camellia_init -#define camellia_self_test mbedtls_camellia_self_test -#define camellia_setkey_dec mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec -#define camellia_setkey_enc mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc -#define ccm_auth_decrypt mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt -#define ccm_context mbedtls_ccm_context -#define ccm_encrypt_and_tag mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag -#define ccm_free mbedtls_ccm_free -#define ccm_init mbedtls_ccm_init -#define ccm_self_test mbedtls_ccm_self_test -#define cipher_auth_decrypt mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt -#define cipher_auth_encrypt mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt -#define cipher_base_t mbedtls_cipher_base_t -#define cipher_check_tag mbedtls_cipher_check_tag -#define cipher_context_t mbedtls_cipher_context_t -#define cipher_crypt mbedtls_cipher_crypt -#define cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definition_t -#define cipher_definitions mbedtls_cipher_definitions -#define cipher_finish mbedtls_cipher_finish -#define cipher_free mbedtls_cipher_free -#define cipher_get_block_size mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size -#define cipher_get_cipher_mode mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode -#define cipher_get_iv_size mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size -#define cipher_get_key_size mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen -#define cipher_get_name mbedtls_cipher_get_name -#define cipher_get_operation mbedtls_cipher_get_operation -#define cipher_get_type mbedtls_cipher_get_type -#define cipher_id_t mbedtls_cipher_id_t -#define cipher_info_from_string mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string -#define cipher_info_from_type mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type -#define cipher_info_from_values mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values -#define cipher_info_t mbedtls_cipher_info_t -#define cipher_init mbedtls_cipher_init -#define cipher_init_ctx mbedtls_cipher_setup -#define cipher_list mbedtls_cipher_list -#define cipher_mode_t mbedtls_cipher_mode_t -#define cipher_padding_t mbedtls_cipher_padding_t -#define cipher_reset mbedtls_cipher_reset -#define cipher_set_iv mbedtls_cipher_set_iv -#define cipher_set_padding_mode mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode -#define cipher_setkey mbedtls_cipher_setkey -#define cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_type_t -#define cipher_update mbedtls_cipher_update -#define cipher_update_ad mbedtls_cipher_update_ad -#define cipher_write_tag mbedtls_cipher_write_tag -#define ctr_drbg_context mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context -#define ctr_drbg_free mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free -#define ctr_drbg_init mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init -#define ctr_drbg_random mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random -#define ctr_drbg_random_with_add mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add -#define ctr_drbg_reseed mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed -#define ctr_drbg_self_test mbedtls_ctr_drbg_self_test -#define ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len -#define ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance -#define ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval -#define ctr_drbg_update mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update -#define ctr_drbg_update_seed_file mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file -#define ctr_drbg_write_seed_file mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file -#define debug_print_buf mbedtls_debug_print_buf -#define debug_print_crt mbedtls_debug_print_crt -#define debug_print_ecp mbedtls_debug_print_ecp -#define debug_print_mpi mbedtls_debug_print_mpi -#define debug_print_msg mbedtls_debug_print_msg -#define debug_print_ret mbedtls_debug_print_ret -#define debug_set_threshold mbedtls_debug_set_threshold -#define des3_context mbedtls_des3_context -#define des3_crypt_cbc mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc -#define des3_crypt_ecb mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb -#define des3_free mbedtls_des3_free -#define des3_init mbedtls_des3_init -#define des3_set2key_dec mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec -#define des3_set2key_enc mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc -#define des3_set3key_dec mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec -#define des3_set3key_enc mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc -#define des_context mbedtls_des_context -#define des_crypt_cbc mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc -#define des_crypt_ecb mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb -#define des_free mbedtls_des_free -#define des_init mbedtls_des_init -#define des_key_check_key_parity mbedtls_des_key_check_key_parity -#define des_key_check_weak mbedtls_des_key_check_weak -#define des_key_set_parity mbedtls_des_key_set_parity -#define des_self_test mbedtls_des_self_test -#define des_setkey_dec mbedtls_des_setkey_dec -#define des_setkey_enc mbedtls_des_setkey_enc -#define dhm_calc_secret mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret -#define dhm_context mbedtls_dhm_context -#define dhm_free mbedtls_dhm_free -#define dhm_init mbedtls_dhm_init -#define dhm_make_params mbedtls_dhm_make_params -#define dhm_make_public mbedtls_dhm_make_public -#define dhm_parse_dhm mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm -#define dhm_parse_dhmfile mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile -#define dhm_read_params mbedtls_dhm_read_params -#define dhm_read_public mbedtls_dhm_read_public -#define dhm_self_test mbedtls_dhm_self_test -#define ecdh_calc_secret mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret -#define ecdh_compute_shared mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared -#define ecdh_context mbedtls_ecdh_context -#define ecdh_free mbedtls_ecdh_free -#define ecdh_gen_public mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public -#define ecdh_get_params mbedtls_ecdh_get_params -#define ecdh_init mbedtls_ecdh_init -#define ecdh_make_params mbedtls_ecdh_make_params -#define ecdh_make_public mbedtls_ecdh_make_public -#define ecdh_read_params mbedtls_ecdh_read_params -#define ecdh_read_public mbedtls_ecdh_read_public -#define ecdh_side mbedtls_ecdh_side -#define ecdsa_context mbedtls_ecdsa_context -#define ecdsa_free mbedtls_ecdsa_free -#define ecdsa_from_keypair mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair -#define ecdsa_genkey mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey -#define ecdsa_info mbedtls_ecdsa_info -#define ecdsa_init mbedtls_ecdsa_init -#define ecdsa_read_signature mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature -#define ecdsa_sign mbedtls_ecdsa_sign -#define ecdsa_sign_det mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det -#define ecdsa_verify mbedtls_ecdsa_verify -#define ecdsa_write_signature mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature -#define ecdsa_write_signature_det mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det -#define eckey_info mbedtls_eckey_info -#define eckeydh_info mbedtls_eckeydh_info -#define ecp_check_privkey mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey -#define ecp_check_pub_priv mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv -#define ecp_check_pubkey mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey -#define ecp_copy mbedtls_ecp_copy -#define ecp_curve_info mbedtls_ecp_curve_info -#define ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id -#define ecp_curve_info_from_name mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name -#define ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id -#define ecp_curve_list mbedtls_ecp_curve_list -#define ecp_gen_key mbedtls_ecp_gen_key -#define ecp_gen_keypair mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair -#define ecp_group mbedtls_ecp_group -#define ecp_group_copy mbedtls_ecp_group_copy -#define ecp_group_free mbedtls_ecp_group_free -#define ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecp_group_id -#define ecp_group_init mbedtls_ecp_group_init -#define ecp_grp_id_list mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list -#define ecp_is_zero mbedtls_ecp_is_zero -#define ecp_keypair mbedtls_ecp_keypair -#define ecp_keypair_free mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free -#define ecp_keypair_init mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init -#define ecp_mul mbedtls_ecp_mul -#define ecp_point mbedtls_ecp_point -#define ecp_point_free mbedtls_ecp_point_free -#define ecp_point_init mbedtls_ecp_point_init -#define ecp_point_read_binary mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary -#define ecp_point_read_string mbedtls_ecp_point_read_string -#define ecp_point_write_binary mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary -#define ecp_self_test mbedtls_ecp_self_test -#define ecp_set_zero mbedtls_ecp_set_zero -#define ecp_tls_read_group mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group -#define ecp_tls_read_point mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point -#define ecp_tls_write_group mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group -#define ecp_tls_write_point mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point -#define ecp_use_known_dp mbedtls_ecp_group_load -#define entropy_add_source mbedtls_entropy_add_source -#define entropy_context mbedtls_entropy_context -#define entropy_free mbedtls_entropy_free -#define entropy_func mbedtls_entropy_func -#define entropy_gather mbedtls_entropy_gather -#define entropy_init mbedtls_entropy_init -#define entropy_self_test mbedtls_entropy_self_test -#define entropy_update_manual mbedtls_entropy_update_manual -#define entropy_update_seed_file mbedtls_entropy_update_seed_file -#define entropy_write_seed_file mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file -#define error_strerror mbedtls_strerror -#define f_source_ptr mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr -#define gcm_auth_decrypt mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt -#define gcm_context mbedtls_gcm_context -#define gcm_crypt_and_tag mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag -#define gcm_finish mbedtls_gcm_finish -#define gcm_free mbedtls_gcm_free -#define gcm_init mbedtls_gcm_init -#define gcm_self_test mbedtls_gcm_self_test -#define gcm_starts mbedtls_gcm_starts -#define gcm_update mbedtls_gcm_update -#define get_timer mbedtls_timing_get_timer -#define hardclock mbedtls_timing_hardclock -#define hardclock_poll mbedtls_hardclock_poll -#define havege_free mbedtls_havege_free -#define havege_init mbedtls_havege_init -#define havege_poll mbedtls_havege_poll -#define havege_random mbedtls_havege_random -#define havege_state mbedtls_havege_state -#define hmac_drbg_context mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context -#define hmac_drbg_free mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free -#define hmac_drbg_init mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init -#define hmac_drbg_random mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random -#define hmac_drbg_random_with_add mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add -#define hmac_drbg_reseed mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed -#define hmac_drbg_self_test mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test -#define hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len -#define hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance -#define hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval -#define hmac_drbg_update mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update -#define hmac_drbg_update_seed_file mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file -#define hmac_drbg_write_seed_file mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file -#define hr_time mbedtls_timing_hr_time -#define key_exchange_type_t mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t -#define md mbedtls_md -#define md2 mbedtls_md2 -#define md2_context mbedtls_md2_context -#define md2_finish mbedtls_md2_finish -#define md2_free mbedtls_md2_free -#define md2_info mbedtls_md2_info -#define md2_init mbedtls_md2_init -#define md2_process mbedtls_md2_process -#define md2_self_test mbedtls_md2_self_test -#define md2_starts mbedtls_md2_starts -#define md2_update mbedtls_md2_update -#define md4 mbedtls_md4 -#define md4_context mbedtls_md4_context -#define md4_finish mbedtls_md4_finish -#define md4_free mbedtls_md4_free -#define md4_info mbedtls_md4_info -#define md4_init mbedtls_md4_init -#define md4_process mbedtls_md4_process -#define md4_self_test mbedtls_md4_self_test -#define md4_starts mbedtls_md4_starts -#define md4_update mbedtls_md4_update -#define md5 mbedtls_md5 -#define md5_context mbedtls_md5_context -#define md5_finish mbedtls_md5_finish -#define md5_free mbedtls_md5_free -#define md5_info mbedtls_md5_info -#define md5_init mbedtls_md5_init -#define md5_process mbedtls_md5_process -#define md5_self_test mbedtls_md5_self_test -#define md5_starts mbedtls_md5_starts -#define md5_update mbedtls_md5_update -#define md_context_t mbedtls_md_context_t -#define md_file mbedtls_md_file -#define md_finish mbedtls_md_finish -#define md_free mbedtls_md_free -#define md_get_name mbedtls_md_get_name -#define md_get_size mbedtls_md_get_size -#define md_get_type mbedtls_md_get_type -#define md_hmac mbedtls_md_hmac -#define md_hmac_finish mbedtls_md_hmac_finish -#define md_hmac_reset mbedtls_md_hmac_reset -#define md_hmac_starts mbedtls_md_hmac_starts -#define md_hmac_update mbedtls_md_hmac_update -#define md_info_from_string mbedtls_md_info_from_string -#define md_info_from_type mbedtls_md_info_from_type -#define md_info_t mbedtls_md_info_t -#define md_init mbedtls_md_init -#define md_init_ctx mbedtls_md_init_ctx -#define md_list mbedtls_md_list -#define md_process mbedtls_md_process -#define md_starts mbedtls_md_starts -#define md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_t -#define md_update mbedtls_md_update -#define memory_buffer_alloc_cur_get mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_cur_get -#define memory_buffer_alloc_free mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free -#define memory_buffer_alloc_init mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init -#define memory_buffer_alloc_max_get mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_get -#define memory_buffer_alloc_max_reset mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_reset -#define memory_buffer_alloc_self_test mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_self_test -#define memory_buffer_alloc_status mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status -#define memory_buffer_alloc_verify mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify -#define memory_buffer_set_verify mbedtls_memory_buffer_set_verify -#define mpi mbedtls_mpi -#define mpi_add_abs mbedtls_mpi_add_abs -#define mpi_add_int mbedtls_mpi_add_int -#define mpi_add_mpi mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi -#define mpi_cmp_abs mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs -#define mpi_cmp_int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int -#define mpi_cmp_mpi mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi -#define mpi_copy mbedtls_mpi_copy -#define mpi_div_int mbedtls_mpi_div_int -#define mpi_div_mpi mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi -#define mpi_exp_mod mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod -#define mpi_fill_random mbedtls_mpi_fill_random -#define mpi_free mbedtls_mpi_free -#define mpi_gcd mbedtls_mpi_gcd -#define mpi_gen_prime mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime -#define mpi_get_bit mbedtls_mpi_get_bit -#define mpi_grow mbedtls_mpi_grow -#define mpi_init mbedtls_mpi_init -#define mpi_inv_mod mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod -#define mpi_is_prime mbedtls_mpi_is_prime -#define mpi_lsb mbedtls_mpi_lsb -#define mpi_lset mbedtls_mpi_lset -#define mpi_mod_int mbedtls_mpi_mod_int -#define mpi_mod_mpi mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi -#define mpi_msb mbedtls_mpi_bitlen -#define mpi_mul_int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int -#define mpi_mul_mpi mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi -#define mpi_read_binary mbedtls_mpi_read_binary -#define mpi_read_file mbedtls_mpi_read_file -#define mpi_read_string mbedtls_mpi_read_string -#define mpi_safe_cond_assign mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign -#define mpi_safe_cond_swap mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap -#define mpi_self_test mbedtls_mpi_self_test -#define mpi_set_bit mbedtls_mpi_set_bit -#define mpi_shift_l mbedtls_mpi_shift_l -#define mpi_shift_r mbedtls_mpi_shift_r -#define mpi_shrink mbedtls_mpi_shrink -#define mpi_size mbedtls_mpi_size -#define mpi_sub_abs mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs -#define mpi_sub_int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int -#define mpi_sub_mpi mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi -#define mpi_swap mbedtls_mpi_swap -#define mpi_write_binary mbedtls_mpi_write_binary -#define mpi_write_file mbedtls_mpi_write_file -#define mpi_write_string mbedtls_mpi_write_string -#define net_accept mbedtls_net_accept -#define net_bind mbedtls_net_bind -#define net_close mbedtls_net_free -#define net_connect mbedtls_net_connect -#define net_recv mbedtls_net_recv -#define net_recv_timeout mbedtls_net_recv_timeout -#define net_send mbedtls_net_send -#define net_set_block mbedtls_net_set_block -#define net_set_nonblock mbedtls_net_set_nonblock -#define net_usleep mbedtls_net_usleep -#define oid_descriptor_t mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t -#define oid_get_attr_short_name mbedtls_oid_get_attr_short_name -#define oid_get_cipher_alg mbedtls_oid_get_cipher_alg -#define oid_get_ec_grp mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp -#define oid_get_extended_key_usage mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage -#define oid_get_md_alg mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg -#define oid_get_numeric_string mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string -#define oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp -#define oid_get_oid_by_md mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md -#define oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg -#define oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg -#define oid_get_pk_alg mbedtls_oid_get_pk_alg -#define oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg -#define oid_get_sig_alg mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg -#define oid_get_sig_alg_desc mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg_desc -#define oid_get_x509_ext_type mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type -#define operation_t mbedtls_operation_t -#define padlock_supports mbedtls_padlock_has_support -#define padlock_xcryptcbc mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc -#define padlock_xcryptecb mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb -#define pem_context mbedtls_pem_context -#define pem_free mbedtls_pem_free -#define pem_init mbedtls_pem_init -#define pem_read_buffer mbedtls_pem_read_buffer -#define pem_write_buffer mbedtls_pem_write_buffer -#define pk_can_do mbedtls_pk_can_do -#define pk_check_pair mbedtls_pk_check_pair -#define pk_context mbedtls_pk_context -#define pk_debug mbedtls_pk_debug -#define pk_debug_item mbedtls_pk_debug_item -#define pk_debug_type mbedtls_pk_debug_type -#define pk_decrypt mbedtls_pk_decrypt -#define pk_ec mbedtls_pk_ec -#define pk_encrypt mbedtls_pk_encrypt -#define pk_free mbedtls_pk_free -#define pk_get_len mbedtls_pk_get_len -#define pk_get_name mbedtls_pk_get_name -#define pk_get_size mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen -#define pk_get_type mbedtls_pk_get_type -#define pk_info_from_type mbedtls_pk_info_from_type -#define pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_info_t -#define pk_init mbedtls_pk_init -#define pk_init_ctx mbedtls_pk_setup -#define pk_init_ctx_rsa_alt mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt -#define pk_load_file mbedtls_pk_load_file -#define pk_parse_key mbedtls_pk_parse_key -#define pk_parse_keyfile mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile -#define pk_parse_public_key mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key -#define pk_parse_public_keyfile mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile -#define pk_parse_subpubkey mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey -#define pk_rsa mbedtls_pk_rsa -#define pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func -#define pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func -#define pk_rsa_alt_sign_func mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_sign_func -#define pk_rsassa_pss_options mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options -#define pk_sign mbedtls_pk_sign -#define pk_type_t mbedtls_pk_type_t -#define pk_verify mbedtls_pk_verify -#define pk_verify_ext mbedtls_pk_verify_ext -#define pk_write_key_der mbedtls_pk_write_key_der -#define pk_write_key_pem mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem -#define pk_write_pubkey mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey -#define pk_write_pubkey_der mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der -#define pk_write_pubkey_pem mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem -#define pkcs11_context mbedtls_pkcs11_context -#define pkcs11_decrypt mbedtls_pkcs11_decrypt -#define pkcs11_priv_key_free mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_free -#define pkcs11_priv_key_init mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_bind -#define pkcs11_sign mbedtls_pkcs11_sign -#define pkcs11_x509_cert_init mbedtls_pkcs11_x509_cert_bind -#define pkcs12_derivation mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation -#define pkcs12_pbe mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe -#define pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128 mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128 -#define pkcs5_pbes2 mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2 -#define pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac -#define pkcs5_self_test mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test -#define platform_entropy_poll mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll -#define platform_set_exit mbedtls_platform_set_exit -#define platform_set_fprintf mbedtls_platform_set_fprintf -#define platform_set_printf mbedtls_platform_set_printf -#define platform_set_snprintf mbedtls_platform_set_snprintf -#define polarssl_exit mbedtls_exit -#define polarssl_fprintf mbedtls_fprintf -#define polarssl_free mbedtls_free -#define polarssl_mutex_free mbedtls_mutex_free -#define polarssl_mutex_init mbedtls_mutex_init -#define polarssl_mutex_lock mbedtls_mutex_lock -#define polarssl_mutex_unlock mbedtls_mutex_unlock -#define polarssl_printf mbedtls_printf -#define polarssl_snprintf mbedtls_snprintf -#define polarssl_strerror mbedtls_strerror -#define ripemd160 mbedtls_ripemd160 -#define ripemd160_context mbedtls_ripemd160_context -#define ripemd160_finish mbedtls_ripemd160_finish -#define ripemd160_free mbedtls_ripemd160_free -#define ripemd160_info mbedtls_ripemd160_info -#define ripemd160_init mbedtls_ripemd160_init -#define ripemd160_process mbedtls_ripemd160_process -#define ripemd160_self_test mbedtls_ripemd160_self_test -#define ripemd160_starts mbedtls_ripemd160_starts -#define ripemd160_update mbedtls_ripemd160_update -#define rsa_alt_context mbedtls_rsa_alt_context -#define rsa_alt_info mbedtls_rsa_alt_info -#define rsa_check_privkey mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey -#define rsa_check_pub_priv mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv -#define rsa_check_pubkey mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey -#define rsa_context mbedtls_rsa_context -#define rsa_copy mbedtls_rsa_copy -#define rsa_free mbedtls_rsa_free -#define rsa_gen_key mbedtls_rsa_gen_key -#define rsa_info mbedtls_rsa_info -#define rsa_init mbedtls_rsa_init -#define rsa_pkcs1_decrypt mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt -#define rsa_pkcs1_encrypt mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt -#define rsa_pkcs1_sign mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign -#define rsa_pkcs1_verify mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify -#define rsa_private mbedtls_rsa_private -#define rsa_public mbedtls_rsa_public -#define rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt -#define rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt -#define rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt -#define rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt -#define rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign -#define rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify -#define rsa_rsassa_pss_sign mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign -#define rsa_rsassa_pss_verify mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify -#define rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext -#define rsa_self_test mbedtls_rsa_self_test -#define rsa_set_padding mbedtls_rsa_set_padding -#define safer_memcmp mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp -#define set_alarm mbedtls_set_alarm -#define sha1 mbedtls_sha1 -#define sha1_context mbedtls_sha1_context -#define sha1_finish mbedtls_sha1_finish -#define sha1_free mbedtls_sha1_free -#define sha1_info mbedtls_sha1_info -#define sha1_init mbedtls_sha1_init -#define sha1_process mbedtls_sha1_process -#define sha1_self_test mbedtls_sha1_self_test -#define sha1_starts mbedtls_sha1_starts -#define sha1_update mbedtls_sha1_update -#define sha224_info mbedtls_sha224_info -#define sha256 mbedtls_sha256 -#define sha256_context mbedtls_sha256_context -#define sha256_finish mbedtls_sha256_finish -#define sha256_free mbedtls_sha256_free -#define sha256_info mbedtls_sha256_info -#define sha256_init mbedtls_sha256_init -#define sha256_process mbedtls_sha256_process -#define sha256_self_test mbedtls_sha256_self_test -#define sha256_starts mbedtls_sha256_starts -#define sha256_update mbedtls_sha256_update -#define sha384_info mbedtls_sha384_info -#define sha512 mbedtls_sha512 -#define sha512_context mbedtls_sha512_context -#define sha512_finish mbedtls_sha512_finish -#define sha512_free mbedtls_sha512_free -#define sha512_info mbedtls_sha512_info -#define sha512_init mbedtls_sha512_init -#define sha512_process mbedtls_sha512_process -#define sha512_self_test mbedtls_sha512_self_test -#define sha512_starts mbedtls_sha512_starts -#define sha512_update mbedtls_sha512_update -#define source_state mbedtls_entropy_source_state -#define ssl_cache_context mbedtls_ssl_cache_context -#define ssl_cache_entry mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry -#define ssl_cache_free mbedtls_ssl_cache_free -#define ssl_cache_get mbedtls_ssl_cache_get -#define ssl_cache_init mbedtls_ssl_cache_init -#define ssl_cache_set mbedtls_ssl_cache_set -#define ssl_cache_set_max_entries mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_max_entries -#define ssl_cache_set_timeout mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_timeout -#define ssl_check_cert_usage mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage -#define ssl_ciphersuite_from_id mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id -#define ssl_ciphersuite_from_string mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_string -#define ssl_ciphersuite_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t -#define ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec -#define ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk -#define ssl_close_notify mbedtls_ssl_close_notify -#define ssl_context mbedtls_ssl_context -#define ssl_cookie_check mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check -#define ssl_cookie_check_t mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t -#define ssl_cookie_ctx mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx -#define ssl_cookie_free mbedtls_ssl_cookie_free -#define ssl_cookie_init mbedtls_ssl_cookie_init -#define ssl_cookie_set_timeout mbedtls_ssl_cookie_set_timeout -#define ssl_cookie_setup mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup -#define ssl_cookie_write mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write -#define ssl_cookie_write_t mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t -#define ssl_derive_keys mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys -#define ssl_dtls_replay_check mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check -#define ssl_dtls_replay_update mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update -#define ssl_fetch_input mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input -#define ssl_flight_item mbedtls_ssl_flight_item -#define ssl_flush_output mbedtls_ssl_flush_output -#define ssl_free mbedtls_ssl_free -#define ssl_get_alpn_protocol mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol -#define ssl_get_bytes_avail mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail -#define ssl_get_ciphersuite mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite -#define ssl_get_ciphersuite_id mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id -#define ssl_get_ciphersuite_name mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name -#define ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg -#define ssl_get_peer_cert mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert -#define ssl_get_record_expansion mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion -#define ssl_get_session mbedtls_ssl_get_session -#define ssl_get_verify_result mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result -#define ssl_get_version mbedtls_ssl_get_version -#define ssl_handshake mbedtls_ssl_handshake -#define ssl_handshake_client_step mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step -#define ssl_handshake_free mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free -#define ssl_handshake_params mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params -#define ssl_handshake_server_step mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step -#define ssl_handshake_step mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step -#define ssl_handshake_wrapup mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup -#define ssl_hdr_len mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len -#define ssl_hs_hdr_len mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len -#define ssl_hw_record_activate mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate -#define ssl_hw_record_finish mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish -#define ssl_hw_record_init mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init -#define ssl_hw_record_read mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read -#define ssl_hw_record_reset mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset -#define ssl_hw_record_write mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write -#define ssl_init mbedtls_ssl_init -#define ssl_key_cert mbedtls_ssl_key_cert -#define ssl_legacy_renegotiation mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation -#define ssl_list_ciphersuites mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites -#define ssl_md_alg_from_hash mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash -#define ssl_optimize_checksum mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum -#define ssl_own_cert mbedtls_ssl_own_cert -#define ssl_own_key mbedtls_ssl_own_key -#define ssl_parse_certificate mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate -#define ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec -#define ssl_parse_finished mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished -#define ssl_pk_alg_from_sig mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig -#define ssl_pkcs11_decrypt mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_decrypt -#define ssl_pkcs11_key_len mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_key_len -#define ssl_pkcs11_sign mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_sign -#define ssl_psk_derive_premaster mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster -#define ssl_read mbedtls_ssl_read -#define ssl_read_record mbedtls_ssl_read_record -#define ssl_read_version mbedtls_ssl_read_version -#define ssl_recv_flight_completed mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed -#define ssl_renegotiate mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate -#define ssl_resend mbedtls_ssl_resend -#define ssl_reset_checksum mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum -#define ssl_send_alert_message mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message -#define ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure -#define ssl_send_flight_completed mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed -#define ssl_session mbedtls_ssl_session -#define ssl_session_free mbedtls_ssl_session_free -#define ssl_session_init mbedtls_ssl_session_init -#define ssl_session_reset mbedtls_ssl_session_reset -#define ssl_set_alpn_protocols mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols -#define ssl_set_arc4_support mbedtls_ssl_conf_arc4_support -#define ssl_set_authmode mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode -#define ssl_set_bio mbedtls_ssl_set_bio -#define ssl_set_ca_chain mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain -#define ssl_set_cbc_record_splitting mbedtls_ssl_conf_cbc_record_splitting -#define ssl_set_ciphersuites mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites -#define ssl_set_ciphersuites_for_version mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version -#define ssl_set_client_transport_id mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id -#define ssl_set_curves mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves -#define ssl_set_dbg mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg -#define ssl_set_dh_param mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param -#define ssl_set_dh_param_ctx mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_ctx -#define ssl_set_dtls_anti_replay mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay -#define ssl_set_dtls_badmac_limit mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit -#define ssl_set_dtls_cookies mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies -#define ssl_set_encrypt_then_mac mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac -#define ssl_set_endpoint mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint -#define ssl_set_extended_master_secret mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret -#define ssl_set_fallback mbedtls_ssl_conf_fallback -#define ssl_set_handshake_timeout mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout -#define ssl_set_hostname mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname -#define ssl_set_max_frag_len mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len -#define ssl_set_max_version mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version -#define ssl_set_min_version mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version -#define ssl_set_own_cert mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert -#define ssl_set_psk mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk -#define ssl_set_psk_cb mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb -#define ssl_set_renegotiation mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation -#define ssl_set_renegotiation_enforced mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_enforced -#define ssl_set_renegotiation_period mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_period -#define ssl_set_rng mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng -#define ssl_set_session mbedtls_ssl_set_session -#define ssl_set_session_cache mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache -#define ssl_set_session_tickets mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets -#define ssl_set_sni mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni -#define ssl_set_transport mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport -#define ssl_set_truncated_hmac mbedtls_ssl_conf_truncated_hmac -#define ssl_set_verify mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify -#define ssl_sig_from_pk mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk -#define ssl_states mbedtls_ssl_states -#define ssl_transform mbedtls_ssl_transform -#define ssl_transform_free mbedtls_ssl_transform_free -#define ssl_write mbedtls_ssl_write -#define ssl_write_certificate mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate -#define ssl_write_change_cipher_spec mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec -#define ssl_write_finished mbedtls_ssl_write_finished -#define ssl_write_record mbedtls_ssl_write_record -#define ssl_write_version mbedtls_ssl_write_version -#define supported_ciphers mbedtls_cipher_supported -#define t_sint mbedtls_mpi_sint -#define t_udbl mbedtls_t_udbl -#define t_uint mbedtls_mpi_uint -#define test_ca_crt mbedtls_test_ca_crt -#define test_ca_crt_ec mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec -#define test_ca_crt_rsa mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa -#define test_ca_key mbedtls_test_ca_key -#define test_ca_key_ec mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec -#define test_ca_key_rsa mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa -#define test_ca_list mbedtls_test_cas_pem -#define test_ca_pwd mbedtls_test_ca_pwd -#define test_ca_pwd_ec mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec -#define test_ca_pwd_rsa mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa -#define test_cli_crt mbedtls_test_cli_crt -#define test_cli_crt_ec mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec -#define test_cli_crt_rsa mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa -#define test_cli_key mbedtls_test_cli_key -#define test_cli_key_ec mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec -#define test_cli_key_rsa mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa -#define test_srv_crt mbedtls_test_srv_crt -#define test_srv_crt_ec mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec -#define test_srv_crt_rsa mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa -#define test_srv_key mbedtls_test_srv_key -#define test_srv_key_ec mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec -#define test_srv_key_rsa mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa -#define threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_mutex_t -#define threading_set_alt mbedtls_threading_set_alt -#define timing_self_test mbedtls_timing_self_test -#define version_check_feature mbedtls_version_check_feature -#define version_get_number mbedtls_version_get_number -#define version_get_string mbedtls_version_get_string -#define version_get_string_full mbedtls_version_get_string_full -#define x509_bitstring mbedtls_x509_bitstring -#define x509_buf mbedtls_x509_buf -#define x509_crl mbedtls_x509_crl -#define x509_crl_entry mbedtls_x509_crl_entry -#define x509_crl_free mbedtls_x509_crl_free -#define x509_crl_info mbedtls_x509_crl_info -#define x509_crl_init mbedtls_x509_crl_init -#define x509_crl_parse mbedtls_x509_crl_parse -#define x509_crl_parse_der mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der -#define x509_crl_parse_file mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file -#define x509_crt mbedtls_x509_crt -#define x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage -#define x509_crt_check_key_usage mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage -#define x509_crt_free mbedtls_x509_crt_free -#define x509_crt_info mbedtls_x509_crt_info -#define x509_crt_init mbedtls_x509_crt_init -#define x509_crt_parse mbedtls_x509_crt_parse -#define x509_crt_parse_der mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der -#define x509_crt_parse_file mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file -#define x509_crt_parse_path mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path -#define x509_crt_revoked mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked -#define x509_crt_verify mbedtls_x509_crt_verify -#define x509_csr mbedtls_x509_csr -#define x509_csr_free mbedtls_x509_csr_free -#define x509_csr_info mbedtls_x509_csr_info -#define x509_csr_init mbedtls_x509_csr_init -#define x509_csr_parse mbedtls_x509_csr_parse -#define x509_csr_parse_der mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der -#define x509_csr_parse_file mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file -#define x509_dn_gets mbedtls_x509_dn_gets -#define x509_get_alg mbedtls_x509_get_alg -#define x509_get_alg_null mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null -#define x509_get_ext mbedtls_x509_get_ext -#define x509_get_name mbedtls_x509_get_name -#define x509_get_rsassa_pss_params mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params -#define x509_get_serial mbedtls_x509_get_serial -#define x509_get_sig mbedtls_x509_get_sig -#define x509_get_sig_alg mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg -#define x509_get_time mbedtls_x509_get_time -#define x509_key_size_helper mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper -#define x509_name mbedtls_x509_name -#define x509_self_test mbedtls_x509_self_test -#define x509_sequence mbedtls_x509_sequence -#define x509_serial_gets mbedtls_x509_serial_gets -#define x509_set_extension mbedtls_x509_set_extension -#define x509_sig_alg_gets mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets -#define x509_string_to_names mbedtls_x509_string_to_names -#define x509_time mbedtls_x509_time -#define x509_time_expired mbedtls_x509_time_is_past -#define x509_time_future mbedtls_x509_time_is_future -#define x509_write_extensions mbedtls_x509_write_extensions -#define x509_write_names mbedtls_x509_write_names -#define x509_write_sig mbedtls_x509_write_sig -#define x509write_cert mbedtls_x509write_cert -#define x509write_crt_der mbedtls_x509write_crt_der -#define x509write_crt_free mbedtls_x509write_crt_free -#define x509write_crt_init mbedtls_x509write_crt_init -#define x509write_crt_pem mbedtls_x509write_crt_pem -#define x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier \ - mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier -#define x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints -#define x509write_crt_set_extension mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension -#define x509write_crt_set_issuer_key mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key -#define x509write_crt_set_issuer_name mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_name -#define x509write_crt_set_key_usage mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage -#define x509write_crt_set_md_alg mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_md_alg -#define x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type -#define x509write_crt_set_serial mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial -#define x509write_crt_set_subject_key mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key -#define x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier -#define x509write_crt_set_subject_name mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_name -#define x509write_crt_set_validity mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_validity -#define x509write_crt_set_version mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_version -#define x509write_csr mbedtls_x509write_csr -#define x509write_csr_der mbedtls_x509write_csr_der -#define x509write_csr_free mbedtls_x509write_csr_free -#define x509write_csr_init mbedtls_x509write_csr_init -#define x509write_csr_pem mbedtls_x509write_csr_pem -#define x509write_csr_set_extension mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension -#define x509write_csr_set_key mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key -#define x509write_csr_set_key_usage mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage -#define x509write_csr_set_md_alg mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_md_alg -#define x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type -#define x509write_csr_set_subject_name mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_name -#define xtea_context mbedtls_xtea_context -#define xtea_crypt_cbc mbedtls_xtea_crypt_cbc -#define xtea_crypt_ecb mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb -#define xtea_free mbedtls_xtea_free -#define xtea_init mbedtls_xtea_init -#define xtea_self_test mbedtls_xtea_self_test -#define xtea_setup mbedtls_xtea_setup - -#endif /* compat-1.3.h */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/compat-2.x.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/compat-2.x.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..096341ba76 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/compat-2.x.h @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/** + * \file compat-2.x.h + * + * \brief Compatibility definitions + * + * \deprecated Use the new names directly instead + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#warning "Including compat-2.x.h is deprecated" +#endif + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_COMPAT2X_H +#define MBEDTLS_COMPAT2X_H + +/* + * Macros for renamed functions + */ +#define mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update +#define mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update +#define mbedtls_md5_starts_ret mbedtls_md5_starts +#define mbedtls_md5_update_ret mbedtls_md5_update +#define mbedtls_md5_finish_ret mbedtls_md5_finish +#define mbedtls_md5_ret mbedtls_md5 +#define mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret mbedtls_ripemd160_starts +#define mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret mbedtls_ripemd160_update +#define mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret mbedtls_ripemd160_finish +#define mbedtls_ripemd160_ret mbedtls_ripemd160 +#define mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret mbedtls_sha1_starts +#define mbedtls_sha1_update_ret mbedtls_sha1_update +#define mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret mbedtls_sha1_finish +#define mbedtls_sha1_ret mbedtls_sha1 +#define mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret mbedtls_sha256_starts +#define mbedtls_sha256_update_ret mbedtls_sha256_update +#define mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret mbedtls_sha256_finish +#define mbedtls_sha256_ret mbedtls_sha256 +#define mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret mbedtls_sha512_starts +#define mbedtls_sha512_update_ret mbedtls_sha512_update +#define mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret mbedtls_sha512_finish +#define mbedtls_sha512_ret mbedtls_sha512 + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_COMPAT2X_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9b06041228 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h @@ -0,0 +1,457 @@ +/** + * \file mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h + * \brief Adjust legacy configuration configuration + * + * Automatically enable certain dependencies. Generally, MBEDLTS_xxx + * configurations need to be explicitly enabled by the user: enabling + * MBEDTLS_xxx_A but not MBEDTLS_xxx_B when A requires B results in a + * compilation error. However, we do automatically enable certain options + * in some circumstances. One case is if MBEDTLS_xxx_B is an internal option + * used to identify parts of a module that are used by other module, and we + * don't want to make the symbol MBEDTLS_xxx_B part of the public API. + * Another case is if A didn't depend on B in earlier versions, and we + * want to use B in A but we need to preserve backward compatibility with + * configurations that explicitly activate MBEDTLS_xxx_A but not + * MBEDTLS_xxx_B. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_LEGACY_CRYPTO_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_LEGACY_CRYPTO_H + +/* Ideally, we'd set those as defaults in mbedtls_config.h, but + * putting an #ifdef _WIN32 in mbedtls_config.h would confuse config.py. + * + * So, adjust it here. + * Not related to crypto, but this is the bottom of the stack. */ +#if defined(__MINGW32__) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1900) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT +#endif +#endif /* _MINGW32__ || (_MSC_VER && (_MSC_VER <= 1900)) */ + +/* Auto-enable CIPHER_C when any of the unauthenticated ciphers is builtin + * in PSA. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CFB) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_OFB) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG)) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C +#endif + +/* Auto-enable MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT based on MBEDTLS_MD_C. + * This allows checking for MD_LIGHT rather than MD_LIGHT || MD_C. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT +#endif + +/* Auto-enable MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT if needed by a module that didn't require it + * in a previous release, to ensure backwards compatibility. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT) +/* + * - MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_xxx is defined if the md module can perform xxx. + * - MBEDTLS_MD_xxx_VIA_PSA is defined if the md module may perform xxx via PSA + * (see below). + * - MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA is defined if at least one algorithm may be performed + * via PSA (see below). + * - MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_LEGACY is defined if at least one algorithm may be performed + * via a direct legacy call (see below). + * + * The md module performs an algorithm via PSA if there is a PSA hash + * accelerator and the PSA driver subsytem is initialized at the time the + * operation is started, and makes a direct legacy call otherwise. + */ + +/* PSA accelerated implementations */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD5) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_MD5_VIA_PSA +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_1) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1_VIA_PSA +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_224) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224_VIA_PSA +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256_VIA_PSA +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_384) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384_VIA_PSA +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_512) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512_VIA_PSA +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RIPEMD160) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160_VIA_PSA +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA3_224) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224_VIA_PSA +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA3_256) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256_VIA_PSA +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA3_384) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384_VIA_PSA +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA3_512) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512_VIA_PSA +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + +/* Built-in implementations */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_LEGACY +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_LEGACY +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_LEGACY +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_LEGACY +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_LEGACY +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_LEGACY +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_LEGACY +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160 +#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_LEGACY +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT */ + +/* BLOCK_CIPHER module can dispatch to PSA when: + * - PSA is enabled and drivers have been initialized + * - desired key type is supported on the PSA side + * If the above conditions are not met, but the legacy support is enabled, then + * BLOCK_CIPHER will dynamically fallback to it. + * + * In case BLOCK_CIPHER is defined (see below) the following symbols/helpers + * can be used to define its capabilities: + * - MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA: there is at least 1 key type between AES, + * ARIA and Camellia which is supported through a driver; + * - MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_xxx_VIA_PSA: xxx key type is supported through a + * driver; + * - MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_xxx_VIA_LEGACY: xxx key type is supported through + * a legacy module (i.e. MBEDTLS_xxx_C) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_AES) +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_AES_VIA_PSA +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ARIA_VIA_PSA +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_VIA_PSA +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_AES_VIA_LEGACY +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ARIA_VIA_LEGACY +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_VIA_LEGACY +#endif + +/* Helpers to state that BLOCK_CIPHER module supports AES, ARIA and/or Camellia + * block ciphers via either PSA or legacy. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_AES_VIA_PSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_AES_VIA_LEGACY) +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAN_AES +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ARIA_VIA_PSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ARIA_VIA_LEGACY) +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAN_ARIA +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_VIA_PSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_VIA_LEGACY) +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAN_CAMELLIA +#endif + +/* GCM_C and CCM_C can either depend on (in order of preference) BLOCK_CIPHER_C + * or CIPHER_C. The former is auto-enabled when: + * - CIPHER_C is not defined, which is also the legacy solution; + * - BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA because in this case BLOCK_CIPHER can take advantage + * of the driver's acceleration. + */ +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)) && \ + (!defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)) +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C +#endif + +/* Helpers for GCM/CCM capabilities */ +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAN_AES)) +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES +#endif + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAN_ARIA)) +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_ARIA +#endif + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAN_CAMELLIA)) +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_CAMELLIA +#endif + +/* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT is auto-enabled by the following symbols: + * - MBEDTLS_ECP_C because now it consists of MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT plus functions + * for curve arithmetic. As a consequence if MBEDTLS_ECP_C is required for + * some reason, then MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT should be enabled as well. + * - MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED and MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED because + * these features are not supported in PSA so the only way to have them is + * to enable the built-in solution. + * Both of them are temporary dependencies: + * - PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED will be removed after #7779 and #7789 + * - support for compressed points should also be added to PSA, but in this + * case there is no associated issue to track it yet. + * - PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE because Weierstrass key derivation + * still depends on ECP_LIGHT. + * - PK_C + USE_PSA + PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA is a temporary dependency which will + * be fixed by #7453. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT +#endif + +/* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED is introduced in Mbed TLS version 3.5, while + * in previous version compressed points were automatically supported as long + * as PK_PARSE_C and ECP_C were enabled. As a consequence, for backward + * compatibility, we auto-enable PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED when these conditions + * are met. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED +#endif + +/* Helper symbol to state that there is support for ECDH, either through + * library implementation (ECDH_C) or through PSA. */ +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH)) || \ + (!defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C)) +#define MBEDTLS_CAN_ECDH +#endif + +/* PK module can achieve ECDSA functionalities by means of either software + * implementations (ECDSA_C) or through a PSA driver. The following defines + * are meant to list these capabilities in a general way which abstracts how + * they are implemented under the hood. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN +#define MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY) || defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME +#endif + +/* If MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is defined, make sure MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT + * is defined as well to include all PSA code. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + +/* Helpers to state that each key is supported either on the builtin or PSA side. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP521R1 +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP512R1 +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE448 +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP384R1 +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1 +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP256R1 +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256K1 +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1 +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519 +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224K1 +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224R1 +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192K1 +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192R1 +#endif + +/* Helper symbol to state that the PK module has support for EC keys. This + * can either be provided through the legacy ECP solution or through the + * PSA friendly MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA (see pk.h for its description). */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA || MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +/* Historically pkparse did not check the CBC padding when decrypting + * a key. This was a bug, which is now fixed. As a consequence, pkparse + * now needs PKCS7 padding support, but existing configurations might not + * enable it, so we enable it here. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +#endif + +/* Backwards compatibility for some macros which were renamed to reflect that + * they are related to Armv8, not aarch64. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY) +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY +#endif + +/* psa_util file features some ECDSA conversion functions, to convert between + * legacy's ASN.1 DER format and PSA's raw one. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA))) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA +#endif + +/* Some internal helpers to determine which keys are availble. */ +#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES)) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES +#endif +#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA)) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA +#endif +#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA)) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA +#endif + +/* Some internal helpers to determine which operation modes are availble. */ +#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING)) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC +#endif + +#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM)) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM +#endif + +#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM)) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM +#endif + +#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305)) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_LEGACY_CRYPTO_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0091e246b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h @@ -0,0 +1,888 @@ +/** + * \file mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h + * \brief Adjust PSA configuration: activate legacy implementations + * + * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is enabled, activate legacy implementations + * of cryptographic mechanisms as needed to fulfill the needs of the PSA + * configuration. Generally speaking, we activate a legacy mechanism if + * it's needed for a requested PSA mechanism and there is no PSA driver + * for it. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_LEGACY_FROM_PSA_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_LEGACY_FROM_PSA_H + +/* Define appropriate ACCEL macros for the p256-m driver. + * In the future, those should be generated from the drivers JSON description. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +#endif + +/* + * ECC: support for a feature is controlled by a triplet or a pair: + * (curve, key_type public/basic, alg) or (curve, key_type_). + * + * A triplet/pair is accelerated if all of is components are accelerated; + * otherwise each component needs to be built in. + * + * We proceed in two passes: + * 1. Check if acceleration is complete for curves, key types, algs. + * 2. Then enable built-ins for each thing that's either not accelerated of + * doesn't have complete acceleration of the other triplet/pair components. + * + * Note: this needs psa/crypto_adjust_keypair_types.h to have been included + * already, so that we know the full set of key types that are requested. + */ + +/* ECC: curves: is acceleration complete? */ +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_192)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_224)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_256)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_384)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_521)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_192)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_224)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_256)) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES +#endif + +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448)) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES +#endif + +/* ECC: algs: is acceleration complete? */ +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_JPAKE)) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS +#endif + +/* ECC: key types: is acceleration complete? */ +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES_BASIC +#endif + +/* Special case: we don't support cooked key derivation in drivers yet */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE +#endif + +/* Note: the condition about key derivation is always true as DERIVE can't be + * accelerated yet */ +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE)) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES +#endif + +/* ECC: curves: enable built-ins as needed. + * + * We need the curve built-in: + * - if it's not accelerated, or + * - if there's a key type with missing acceleration, or + * - if there's a alg with missing acceleration. + */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_192) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_192 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_224) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_224 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_256 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_384) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_521) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_192) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_192 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_224) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_224 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED +/* https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/3541 */ +#error "SECP224K1 is buggy via the PSA API in Mbed TLS." +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_256 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 */ + +/* ECC: algs: enable built-ins as needed. + * + * We need the alg built-in: + * - if it's not accelerated, or + * - if there's a relevant curve (see below) with missing acceleration, or + * - if there's a key type among (public, basic) with missing acceleration. + * + * Relevant curves are: + * - all curves for ECDH + * - Weierstrass curves for (deterministic) ECDSA + * - secp256r1 for EC J-PAKE + */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES_BASIC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC +#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES_BASIC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES_BASIC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_JPAKE) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES_BASIC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */ + +/* ECC: key types: enable built-ins as needed. + * + * We need the key type built-in: + * - if it's not accelerated, or + * - if there's a curve with missing acceleration, or + * - only for public/basic: if there's an alg with missing acceleration. + */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */ + +/* Note: the condition is always true as DERIVE can't be accelerated yet */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE 1 +#endif /* missing accel */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#endif + +/* End of ECC section */ + +/* + * DH key types follow the same pattern used above for EC keys. They are defined + * by a triplet (group, key_type, alg). A triplet is accelerated if all its + * component are accelerated, otherwise each component needs to be builtin. + */ + +/* DH: groups: is acceleration complete? */ +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_2048)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_3072)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_4096)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_6144)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_8192)) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_GROUPS +#endif + +/* DH: algs: is acceleration complete? */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_FFDH) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS +#endif + +/* DH: key types: is acceleration complete? */ +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_2048) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_3072) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_4096) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_6144) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_8192) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_FFDH) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_GROUPS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH 1 +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_FFDH */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_GROUPS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_GROUPS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_GROUPS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_GROUPS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY */ + +/* End of DH section */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF) +/* + * The PSA implementation has its own implementation of HKDF, separate from + * hkdf.c. No need to enable MBEDTLS_HKDF_C here. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) +/* + * The PSA implementation has its own implementation of HKDF, separate from + * hkdf.c. No need to enable MBEDTLS_HKDF_C here. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) +/* + * The PSA implementation has its own implementation of HKDF, separate from + * hkdf.c. No need to enable MBEDTLS_HKDF_C here. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD5) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5 1 +#define MBEDTLS_MD5_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RIPEMD160) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_OAEP) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_OAEP */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_1) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_224) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA224_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_384) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA384_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_512) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA3_224) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA3_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA3_256) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA3_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA3_384) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA3_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA3_512) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA3_C +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2_HMAC 1 +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PRF) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PRF */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 +#define MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#define MBEDTLS_OID_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C +#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY */ + +/* If any of the block modes are requested that don't have an + * associated HW assist, define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE for checking + * in the block cipher key types. */ +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CTR)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CFB)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_OFB)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_PKCS7)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC)) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE 1 +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 1 +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2_CMAC 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_AES) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_AES */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 +#define MBEDTLS_AES_C +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARIA */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_C +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DES) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DES */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_DES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 +#define MBEDTLS_DES_C +#endif /*PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_DES || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +#endif /*!MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 */ + +/* If any of the software block ciphers are selected, define + * PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER, which can be used in any of these + * situations. */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_DES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER 1 +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_MAC) +#error "CBC-MAC is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS." +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_MAC 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_MAC */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2_HMAC) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2_CMAC) +#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2 1 +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2_HMAC || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2_CMAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CTR) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CFB) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CFB 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_OFB) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_OFB 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1 +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1 +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CCM) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_C +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG 1 +#define MBEDTLS_CCM_C +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_GCM) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM 1 +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_C +#endif +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) +#define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C +#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C +#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_LEGACY_FROM_PSA_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_from_legacy.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_from_legacy.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3456615943 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_from_legacy.h @@ -0,0 +1,349 @@ +/** + * \file mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_from_legacy.h + * \brief Adjust PSA configuration: construct PSA configuration from legacy + * + * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is disabled, we automatically enable + * cryptographic mechanisms through the PSA interface when the corresponding + * legacy mechanism is enabled. In many cases, this just enables the PSA + * wrapper code around the legacy implementation, but we also do this for + * some mechanisms where PSA has its own independent implementation so + * that high-level modules that can use either cryptographic API have the + * same feature set in both cases. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_PSA_FROM_LEGACY_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_PSA_FROM_LEGACY_H + +/* + * Ensure PSA_WANT_* defines are setup properly if MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG + * is not defined + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM 1 +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY 1 + +// Only add in DETERMINISTIC support if ECDSA is also enabled +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 +/* Normally we wouldn't enable this because it's not implemented in ecp.c, + * but since it used to be available any time ECP_C was enabled, let's enable + * it anyway for the sake of backwards compatibility */ +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 +/* See comment for PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE above. */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH 1 +#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 1 +#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 1 +#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 1 +#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 1 +#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +/* Enable PSA HKDF algorithm if mbedtls HKDF is supported. + * PSA HKDF EXTRACT and PSA HKDF EXPAND have minimal cost when + * PSA HKDF is enabled, so enable both algorithms together + * with PSA HKDF. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HKDF_C */ + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC 1 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1 +/* ALG_STREAM_CIPHER requires CIPHER_C in order to be supported in PSA */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1 +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CFB 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_OFB 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_192 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_192 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 1 +#endif + +/* SECP224K1 is buggy via the PSA API (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/3541) */ +#if 0 && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 1 +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_PSA_FROM_LEGACY_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_superset_legacy.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_superset_legacy.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3a55c3f6e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_superset_legacy.h @@ -0,0 +1,142 @@ +/** + * \file mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_superset_legacy.h + * \brief Adjust PSA configuration: automatic enablement from legacy + * + * To simplify some edge cases, we automatically enable certain cryptographic + * mechanisms in the PSA API if they are enabled in the legacy API. The general + * idea is that if legacy module M uses mechanism A internally, and A has + * both a legacy and a PSA implementation, we enable A through PSA whenever + * it's enabled through legacy. This facilitates the transition to PSA + * implementations of A for users of M. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_PSA_SUPERSET_LEGACY_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_PSA_SUPERSET_LEGACY_H + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Hashes that are built in are also enabled in PSA. + * This simplifies dependency declarations especially + * for modules that obey MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO. */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 1 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512 1 +#endif + +/* Ensure that the PSA's supported curves (PSA_WANT_ECC_xxx) are always a + * superset of the builtin ones (MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx). */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 */ +#endif /*MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224) +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192) +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +/* SECP224K1 is buggy via the PSA API (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/3541) */ +#if 0 && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 1 +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_PSA_SUPERSET_LEGACY_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_ssl.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_ssl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..39c7b3b117 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_ssl.h @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +/** + * \file mbedtls/config_adjust_ssl.h + * \brief Adjust TLS configuration + * + * Automatically enable certain dependencies. Generally, MBEDLTS_xxx + * configurations need to be explicitly enabled by the user: enabling + * MBEDTLS_xxx_A but not MBEDTLS_xxx_B when A requires B results in a + * compilation error. However, we do automatically enable certain options + * in some circumstances. One case is if MBEDTLS_xxx_B is an internal option + * used to identify parts of a module that are used by other module, and we + * don't want to make the symbol MBEDTLS_xxx_B part of the public API. + * Another case is if A didn't depend on B in earlier versions, and we + * want to use B in A but we need to preserve backward compatibility with + * configurations that explicitly activate MBEDTLS_xxx_A but not + * MBEDTLS_xxx_B. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_SSL_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_SSL_H + +/* The following blocks make it easier to disable all of TLS, + * or of TLS 1.2 or 1.3 or DTLS, without having to manually disable all + * key exchanges, options and extensions related to them. */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS +#endif + +#if !(defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)) +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION +#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED +#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED +#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED +#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED +#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED +#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED +#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED +#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED +#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED +#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED +#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_2_SOME_ECC +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_SSL_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_x509.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_x509.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..346c8ae6d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_x509.h @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +/** + * \file mbedtls/config_adjust_x509.h + * \brief Adjust X.509 configuration + * + * Automatically enable certain dependencies. Generally, MBEDLTS_xxx + * configurations need to be explicitly enabled by the user: enabling + * MBEDTLS_xxx_A but not MBEDTLS_xxx_B when A requires B results in a + * compilation error. However, we do automatically enable certain options + * in some circumstances. One case is if MBEDTLS_xxx_B is an internal option + * used to identify parts of a module that are used by other module, and we + * don't want to make the symbol MBEDTLS_xxx_B part of the public API. + * Another case is if A didn't depend on B in earlier versions, and we + * want to use B in A but we need to preserve backward compatibility with + * configurations that explicitly activate MBEDTLS_xxx_A but not + * MBEDTLS_xxx_B. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_X509_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_X509_H + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_X509_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h index 67d5df11b3..17da61b3e8 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h @@ -3,835 +3,53 @@ * \brief PSA crypto configuration options (set of defines) * * This set of compile-time options takes settings defined in - * include/mbedtls/config.h and include/psa/crypto_config.h and uses + * include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h and include/psa/crypto_config.h and uses * those definitions to define symbols used in the library code. * * Users and integrators should not edit this file, please edit - * include/mbedtls/config.h for MBEDTLS_XXX settings or + * include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h for MBEDTLS_XXX settings or * include/psa/crypto_config.h for PSA_WANT_XXX settings. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_PSA_H #define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_PSA_H -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE) -#include MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE -#else -#include "psa/crypto_config.h" -#endif -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE) -#include MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - - - -/****************************************************************/ -/* De facto synonyms */ -/****************************************************************/ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY -#elif !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW -#elif !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS) -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT -#elif !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS) -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS -#endif +#include "psa/crypto_legacy.h" +#include "psa/crypto_adjust_config_synonyms.h" - -/****************************************************************/ -/* Require built-in implementations based on PSA requirements */ -/****************************************************************/ +#include "mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_superset_legacy.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1 -#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC -#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C -#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C -#define MBEDTLS_MD_C -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH 1 -#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_C -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C -#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA 1 -#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C -#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C -#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C -#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF) -/* - * The PSA implementation has its own implementation of HKDF, separate from - * hkdf.c. No need to enable MBEDTLS_HKDF_C here. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF 1 -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD2) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD2 1 -#define MBEDTLS_MD2_C -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD4) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD4 1 -#define MBEDTLS_MD4_C -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD5) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5 1 -#define MBEDTLS_MD5_C -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RIPEMD160) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 -#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_OAEP) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 -#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C -#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C -#define MBEDTLS_OID_C -#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 -#define MBEDTLS_MD_C -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_OAEP */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 -#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C -#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C -#define MBEDTLS_OID_C -#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 -#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C -#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C -#define MBEDTLS_OID_C -#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 -#define MBEDTLS_MD_C -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 -#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C -#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C -#define MBEDTLS_OID_C -#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 -#define MBEDTLS_MD_C -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_1) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1 1 -#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_224) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224 1 -#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256 1 -#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_384) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384 1 -#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_512) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512 1 -#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PRF) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1 -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PRF */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1 -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR 1 -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C -#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C -#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR 1 -#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C -#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C -#define MBEDTLS_OID_C -#define MBEDTLS_GENPRIME -#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C -#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C -#define MBEDTLS_PK_C -#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C -#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 -#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C -#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C -#define MBEDTLS_OID_C -#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C -#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C -#define MBEDTLS_PK_C -#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C -#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY */ - -/* If any of the block modes are requested that don't have an - * associated HW assist, define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE for checking - * in the block cipher key types. */ -#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CTR)) || \ - (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CFB)) || \ - (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_OFB)) || \ - defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) || \ - (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING)) || \ - (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_PKCS7)) || \ - (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC)) -#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE 1 -#endif - -#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_GCM)) || \ - (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CCM)) -#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_AEAD 1 -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_AES) -#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_AES */ -#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ - defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) || \ - defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_AEAD) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 -#define MBEDTLS_AES_C -#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARC4) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 1 -#define MBEDTLS_ARC4_C -#endif /*!MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) -#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1 -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARIA */ -#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \ - defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) || \ - defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_AEAD) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1 -#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_C -#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) -#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA */ -#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) || \ - defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) || \ - defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_AEAD) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 -#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C -#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DES) -#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DES */ -#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_DES) || \ - defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 -#define MBEDTLS_DES_C -#endif /*PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_DES || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1 -#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C -#endif /*!MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 */ - -/* If any of the software block ciphers are selected, define - * PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER, which can be used in any of these - * situations. */ -#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ - defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \ - defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_DES) || \ - defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) -#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER 1 -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_MAC) -#error "CBC-MAC is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS." -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_MAC 1 -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_MAC */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_MAC */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC) || \ - defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC 1 -#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CTR) || \ - defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR 1 -#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR -#endif -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CFB) || \ - defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CFB 1 -#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB -#endif -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_OFB) || \ - defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_OFB 1 -#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB -#endif -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1 -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) || \ - defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) -#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1 -#endif -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) || \ - defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) -#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1 -#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 -#endif -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CCM) || \ - defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ - defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \ - defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM 1 -#define MBEDTLS_CCM_C -#endif -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_GCM) || \ - defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ - defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \ - defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM 1 -#define MBEDTLS_GCM_C -#endif -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) -#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) -#define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C -#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C -#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1 -#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 */ -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 1 -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 1 -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 1 -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 1 -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) -/* - * Curve448 is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS - * (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4249). - */ -#error "Curve448 is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS." -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 1 -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_192) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_192 1 -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_192 */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_224) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_224 1 -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_224 */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_256) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_256 1 -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_256 */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_384) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1 -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_384 */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_521) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1 -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_521 */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_192) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_192 1 -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_192 */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_224) -/* - * SECP224K1 is buggy via the PSA API in Mbed TLS - * (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/3541). - */ -#error "SECP224K1 is buggy via the PSA API in Mbed TLS." -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_224 1 -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_224 */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_256) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_256 1 -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_256 */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 */ +/* Require built-in implementations based on PSA requirements */ +/* We need this to have a complete list of requirements + * before we deduce what built-ins are required. */ +#include "psa/crypto_adjust_config_key_pair_types.h" - -/****************************************************************/ -/* Infer PSA requirements from Mbed TLS capabilities */ -/****************************************************************/ +#include "mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h" #else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG */ -/* - * Ensure PSA_WANT_* defines are setup properly if MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG - * is not defined - */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM 1 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC 1 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH 1 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY 1 - -// Only add in DETERMINISTIC support if ECDSA is also enabled -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR 1 -#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR 1 -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 -#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM 1 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC 1 -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF 1 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HKDF_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC 1 -#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC 1 -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1 -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD2 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 1 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD4 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 1 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 1 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW 1 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR 1 -#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR 1 -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 -#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 1 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224 1 -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 1 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 1 -#endif -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 1 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) -#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 1 -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) -#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1 -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) -#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) -#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1 -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1 -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1 -#endif -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1 -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1 -#endif -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CFB 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB 1 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR 1 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_OFB 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB 1 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 1 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 1 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 1 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 1 -#endif - -/* Curve448 is not yet supported via the PSA API (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4249) */ -#if 0 && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 1 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_192 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 1 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_224 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 1 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_256 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 1 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_192 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 1 -#endif +/* Infer PSA requirements from Mbed TLS capabilities */ -/* SECP224K1 is buggy via the PSA API (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/3541) */ -#if 0 && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_224 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 1 -#endif +#include "mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_from_legacy.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_256 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 1 -#endif +/* Hopefully the file above will have enabled keypair symbols in a consistent + * way, but including this here fixes them if that wasn't the case. */ +#include "psa/crypto_adjust_config_key_pair_types.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG */ -/* These features are always enabled. */ -#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE 1 -#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA 1 - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SOME_PAKE 1 #endif +#include "psa/crypto_adjust_auto_enabled.h" + #endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_PSA_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/constant_time.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/constant_time.h index 8419c99138..d31bff677e 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/constant_time.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/constant_time.h @@ -1,20 +1,9 @@ /** * Constant-time functions - * + */ +/* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_H @@ -22,20 +11,22 @@ #include - /** Constant-time buffer comparison without branches. * * This is equivalent to the standard memcmp function, but is likely to be - * compiled to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * compiled to code using bitwise operations rather than a branch, such that + * the time taken is constant w.r.t. the data pointed to by \p a and \p b, + * and w.r.t. whether \p a and \p b are equal or not. It is not constant-time + * w.r.t. \p n . * * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches * with bit operations using masks. * - * \param a Pointer to the first buffer. - * \param b Pointer to the second buffer. - * \param n The number of bytes to compare in the buffer. + * \param a Pointer to the first buffer, containing at least \p n bytes. May not be NULL. + * \param b Pointer to the second buffer, containing at least \p n bytes. May not be NULL. + * \param n The number of bytes to compare. * - * \return Zero if the content of the two buffer is the same, + * \return Zero if the contents of the two buffers are the same, * otherwise non-zero. */ int mbedtls_ct_memcmp(const void *a, diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h index 1bf427c437..c00756df1b 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h @@ -16,38 +16,31 @@ * The security strength as defined in NIST SP 800-90A is * 128 bits when AES-128 is used (\c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY enabled) * and 256 bits otherwise, provided that #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN is - * kept at its default value (and not overridden in config.h) and that the + * kept at its default value (and not overridden in mbedtls_config.h) and that the * DRBG instance is set up with default parameters. * See the documentation of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() for more * information. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_H #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +/* In case AES_C is defined then it is the primary option for backward + * compatibility purposes. If that's not available, PSA is used instead */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" #else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE +#include "psa/crypto.h" #endif -#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#include "entropy.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) #include "mbedtls/threading.h" @@ -87,7 +80,7 @@ * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. - * Either change them in config.h or define them using the compiler command + * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them using the compiler command * line. * \{ */ @@ -97,17 +90,14 @@ * \brief The amount of entropy used per seed by default, in bytes. */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) -/** This is 48 bytes because the entropy module uses SHA-512 - * (\c MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 is disabled). +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) +/** This is 48 bytes because the entropy module uses SHA-512. */ #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN 48 -#else /* defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR */ -/** This is 32 bytes because the entropy module uses SHA-256 - * (the SHA512 module is disabled or - * \c MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 is enabled). +/** This is 32 bytes because the entropy module uses SHA-256. */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) /** \warning To achieve a 256-bit security strength, you must pass a nonce @@ -115,7 +105,7 @@ */ #endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) */ #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN 32 -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR */ #endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL) @@ -167,40 +157,51 @@ extern "C" { #define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN (MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN + 1) / 2 #endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +typedef struct mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context { + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id; + psa_cipher_operation_t operation; +} mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context; +#endif + /** * \brief The CTR_DRBG context structure. */ typedef struct mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context { - unsigned char counter[16]; /*!< The counter (V). */ - int reseed_counter; /*!< The reseed counter. - * This is the number of requests that have - * been made since the last (re)seeding, - * minus one. - * Before the initial seeding, this field - * contains the amount of entropy in bytes - * to use as a nonce for the initial seeding, - * or -1 if no nonce length has been explicitly - * set (see mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len()). - */ - int prediction_resistance; /*!< This determines whether prediction - resistance is enabled, that is - whether to systematically reseed before - each random generation. */ - size_t entropy_len; /*!< The amount of entropy grabbed on each - seed or reseed operation, in bytes. */ - int reseed_interval; /*!< The reseed interval. - * This is the maximum number of requests - * that can be made between reseedings. */ - - mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx; /*!< The AES context. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(counter)[16]; /*!< The counter (V). */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(reseed_counter); /*!< The reseed counter. + * This is the number of requests that have + * been made since the last (re)seeding, + * minus one. + * Before the initial seeding, this field + * contains the amount of entropy in bytes + * to use as a nonce for the initial seeding, + * or -1 if no nonce length has been explicitly + * set (see mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len()). + */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(prediction_resistance); /*!< This determines whether prediction + resistance is enabled, that is + whether to systematically reseed before + each random generation. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(entropy_len); /*!< The amount of entropy grabbed on each + seed or reseed operation, in bytes. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(reseed_interval); /*!< The reseed interval. + * This is the maximum number of requests + * that can be made between reseedings. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + mbedtls_aes_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(aes_ctx); /*!< The AES context. */ +#else + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psa_ctx); /*!< The PSA context. */ +#endif /* * Callbacks (Entropy) */ - int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_entropy))(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); /*!< The entropy callback function. */ - void *p_entropy; /*!< The context for the entropy function. */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_entropy); /*!< The context for the entropy function. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) /* Invariant: the mutex is initialized if and only if f_entropy != NULL. @@ -210,7 +211,7 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context { * Note that this invariant may change without notice. Do not rely on it * and do not access the mutex directly in application code. */ - mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex); #endif } mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context; @@ -465,9 +466,9 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT. * \return An error from the underlying AES cipher on failure. */ -int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *additional, - size_t add_len); +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, + size_t add_len); /** * \brief This function updates a CTR_DRBG instance with additional @@ -531,35 +532,6 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng, int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t output_len); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief This function updates the state of the CTR_DRBG context. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret() - * in 2.16.0. - * - * \note If \p add_len is greater than - * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT, only the first - * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT Bytes are used. - * The remaining Bytes are silently discarded. - * - * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context. - * \param additional The data to update the state with. - * \param add_len Length of \p additional data. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update( - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *additional, - size_t add_len); -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) /** * \brief This function writes a seed file. diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/debug.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/debug.h index bcc640c611..424ed4b3fd 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/debug.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/debug.h @@ -5,28 +5,12 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_DEBUG_H #define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" @@ -59,9 +43,13 @@ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(level, text, crt) \ mbedtls_debug_print_crt(ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, text, crt) -#endif +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(level, text, crt) do { } while (0) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(level, ecdh, attr) \ @@ -131,6 +119,15 @@ #endif \ /* (defined(__MINGW32__) && __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO == 0) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1800) */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PRINTF_MS_TIME) +#include +#if !defined(PRId64) +#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_MS_TIME MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_MS_TIME PRId64 +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PRINTF_MS_TIME */ + #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -152,161 +149,8 @@ extern "C" { */ void mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(int threshold); -/** - * \brief Print a message to the debug output. This function is always used - * through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG() macro, which supplies the ssl - * context, file and line number parameters. - * - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param level error level of the debug message - * \param file file the message has occurred in - * \param line line number the message has occurred at - * \param format format specifier, in printf format - * \param ... variables used by the format specifier - * - * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the - * library only. - */ -void mbedtls_debug_print_msg(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, - const char *file, int line, - const char *format, ...) MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(5, 6); - -/** - * \brief Print the return value of a function to the debug output. This - * function is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET() macro, - * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters. - * - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param level error level of the debug message - * \param file file the error has occurred in - * \param line line number the error has occurred in - * \param text the name of the function that returned the error - * \param ret the return code value - * - * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the - * library only. - */ -void mbedtls_debug_print_ret(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, - const char *file, int line, - const char *text, int ret); - -/** - * \brief Output a buffer of size len bytes to the debug output. This function - * is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF() macro, - * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters. - * - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param level error level of the debug message - * \param file file the error has occurred in - * \param line line number the error has occurred in - * \param text a name or label for the buffer being dumped. Normally the - * variable or buffer name - * \param buf the buffer to be outputted - * \param len length of the buffer - * - * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the - * library only. - */ -void mbedtls_debug_print_buf(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, - const char *file, int line, const char *text, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t len); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) -/** - * \brief Print a MPI variable to the debug output. This function is always - * used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI() macro, which supplies the - * ssl context, file and line number parameters. - * - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param level error level of the debug message - * \param file file the error has occurred in - * \param line line number the error has occurred in - * \param text a name or label for the MPI being output. Normally the - * variable name - * \param X the MPI variable - * - * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the - * library only. - */ -void mbedtls_debug_print_mpi(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, - const char *file, int line, - const char *text, const mbedtls_mpi *X); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -/** - * \brief Print an ECP point to the debug output. This function is always - * used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP() macro, which supplies the - * ssl context, file and line number parameters. - * - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param level error level of the debug message - * \param file file the error has occurred in - * \param line line number the error has occurred in - * \param text a name or label for the ECP point being output. Normally the - * variable name - * \param X the ECP point - * - * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the - * library only. - */ -void mbedtls_debug_print_ecp(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, - const char *file, int line, - const char *text, const mbedtls_ecp_point *X); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -/** - * \brief Print a X.509 certificate structure to the debug output. This - * function is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT() macro, - * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters. - * - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param level error level of the debug message - * \param file file the error has occurred in - * \param line line number the error has occurred in - * \param text a name or label for the certificate being output - * \param crt X.509 certificate structure - * - * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the - * library only. - */ -void mbedtls_debug_print_crt(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, - const char *file, int line, - const char *text, const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) -typedef enum { - MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q, - MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP, - MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z, -} mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr; - -/** - * \brief Print a field of the ECDH structure in the SSL context to the debug - * output. This function is always used through the - * MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH() macro, which supplies the ssl context, file - * and line number parameters. - * - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param level error level of the debug message - * \param file file the error has occurred in - * \param line line number the error has occurred in - * \param ecdh the ECDH context - * \param attr the identifier of the attribute being output - * - * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the - * library only. - */ -void mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, - const char *file, int line, - const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ecdh, - mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr attr); -#endif - #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif -#endif /* debug.h */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/des.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/des.h index f2bc58138e..2b097a13dd 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/des.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/des.h @@ -9,29 +9,14 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later * */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_DES_H #define MBEDTLS_DES_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include @@ -43,10 +28,6 @@ /** The data input has an invalid length. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0032 -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** DES hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0033 - #define MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE 8 #ifdef __cplusplus @@ -65,7 +46,7 @@ extern "C" { * instead. */ typedef struct mbedtls_des_context { - uint32_t sk[32]; /*!< DES subkeys */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sk)[32]; /*!< DES subkeys */ } mbedtls_des_context; @@ -77,7 +58,7 @@ mbedtls_des_context; * instead. */ typedef struct mbedtls_des3_context { - uint32_t sk[96]; /*!< 3DES subkeys */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sk)[96]; /*!< 3DES subkeys */ } mbedtls_des3_context; diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/dhm.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/dhm.h index 117af93400..fcba3d2af0 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/dhm.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/dhm.h @@ -45,29 +45,14 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_DHM_H #define MBEDTLS_DHM_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" /* @@ -91,14 +76,19 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED -0x3400 /** Read or write of file failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x3480 - -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** DHM hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x3500 - /** Setting the modulus and generator failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED -0x3580 +/** Which parameter to access in mbedtls_dhm_get_value(). */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_P, /*!< The prime modulus. */ + MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_G, /*!< The generator. */ + MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_X, /*!< Our secret value. */ + MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_GX, /*!< Our public key = \c G^X mod \c P. */ + MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_GY, /*!< The public key of the peer = \c G^Y mod \c P. */ + MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_K, /*!< The shared secret = \c G^(XY) mod \c P. */ +} mbedtls_dhm_parameter; + #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -109,17 +99,16 @@ extern "C" { * \brief The DHM context structure. */ typedef struct mbedtls_dhm_context { - size_t len; /*!< The size of \p P in Bytes. */ - mbedtls_mpi P; /*!< The prime modulus. */ - mbedtls_mpi G; /*!< The generator. */ - mbedtls_mpi X; /*!< Our secret value. */ - mbedtls_mpi GX; /*!< Our public key = \c G^X mod \c P. */ - mbedtls_mpi GY; /*!< The public key of the peer = \c G^Y mod \c P. */ - mbedtls_mpi K; /*!< The shared secret = \c G^(XY) mod \c P. */ - mbedtls_mpi RP; /*!< The cached value = \c R^2 mod \c P. */ - mbedtls_mpi Vi; /*!< The blinding value. */ - mbedtls_mpi Vf; /*!< The unblinding value. */ - mbedtls_mpi pX; /*!< The previous \c X. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(P); /*!< The prime modulus. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(G); /*!< The generator. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(X); /*!< Our secret value. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(GX); /*!< Our public key = \c G^X mod \c P. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(GY); /*!< The public key of the peer = \c G^Y mod \c P. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(K); /*!< The shared secret = \c G^(XY) mod \c P. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(RP); /*!< The cached value = \c R^2 mod \c P. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Vi); /*!< The blinding value. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Vf); /*!< The unblinding value. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pX); /*!< The previous \c X. */ } mbedtls_dhm_context; @@ -282,10 +271,10 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_make_public(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, * \param output_size The size of the destination buffer. This must be at * least the size of \c ctx->len (the size of \c P). * \param olen On exit, holds the actual number of Bytes written. - * \param f_rng The RNG function, for blinding purposes. This may - * b \c NULL if blinding isn't needed. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng - * doesn't need a context argument. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. Must not be \c NULL. Used for + * blinding. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure. @@ -295,6 +284,42 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); +/** + * \brief This function returns the size of the prime modulus in bits. + * + * \param ctx The DHM context to query. + * + * \return The size of the prime modulus in bits, + * i.e. the number n such that 2^(n-1) <= P < 2^n. + */ +size_t mbedtls_dhm_get_bitlen(const mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function returns the size of the prime modulus in bytes. + * + * \param ctx The DHM context to query. + * + * \return The size of the prime modulus in bytes, + * i.e. the number n such that 2^(8*(n-1)) <= P < 2^(8*n). + */ +size_t mbedtls_dhm_get_len(const mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function copies a parameter of a DHM key. + * + * \param ctx The DHM context to query. + * \param param The parameter to copy. + * \param dest The MPI object to copy the value into. It must be + * initialized. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p param is invalid. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX error code if the copy fails. + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_get_value(const mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + mbedtls_dhm_parameter param, + mbedtls_mpi *dest); + /** * \brief This function frees and clears the components * of a DHM context. @@ -396,161 +421,6 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_self_test(int verbose); * */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) - -/** - * \warning The origin of the primes in RFC 5114 is not documented and - * their use therefore constitutes a security risk! - * - * \deprecated The hex-encoded primes from RFC 5114 are deprecated and are - * likely to be removed in a future version of the library without - * replacement. - */ - -/** - * The hexadecimal presentation of the prime underlying the - * 2048-bit MODP Group with 224-bit Prime Order Subgroup, as defined - * in RFC-5114: Additional Diffie-Hellman Groups for Use with - * IETF Standards. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_P \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \ - "AD107E1E9123A9D0D660FAA79559C51FA20D64E5683B9FD1" \ - "B54B1597B61D0A75E6FA141DF95A56DBAF9A3C407BA1DF15" \ - "EB3D688A309C180E1DE6B85A1274A0A66D3F8152AD6AC212" \ - "9037C9EDEFDA4DF8D91E8FEF55B7394B7AD5B7D0B6C12207" \ - "C9F98D11ED34DBF6C6BA0B2C8BBC27BE6A00E0A0B9C49708" \ - "B3BF8A317091883681286130BC8985DB1602E714415D9330" \ - "278273C7DE31EFDC7310F7121FD5A07415987D9ADC0A486D" \ - "CDF93ACC44328387315D75E198C641A480CD86A1B9E587E8" \ - "BE60E69CC928B2B9C52172E413042E9B23F10B0E16E79763" \ - "C9B53DCF4BA80A29E3FB73C16B8E75B97EF363E2FFA31F71" \ - "CF9DE5384E71B81C0AC4DFFE0C10E64F") - -/** - * The hexadecimal presentation of the chosen generator of the 2048-bit MODP - * Group with 224-bit Prime Order Subgroup, as defined in RFC-5114: - * Additional Diffie-Hellman Groups for Use with IETF Standards. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC5114_MODP_2048_G \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \ - "AC4032EF4F2D9AE39DF30B5C8FFDAC506CDEBE7B89998CAF" \ - "74866A08CFE4FFE3A6824A4E10B9A6F0DD921F01A70C4AFA" \ - "AB739D7700C29F52C57DB17C620A8652BE5E9001A8D66AD7" \ - "C17669101999024AF4D027275AC1348BB8A762D0521BC98A" \ - "E247150422EA1ED409939D54DA7460CDB5F6C6B250717CBE" \ - "F180EB34118E98D119529A45D6F834566E3025E316A330EF" \ - "BB77A86F0C1AB15B051AE3D428C8F8ACB70A8137150B8EEB" \ - "10E183EDD19963DDD9E263E4770589EF6AA21E7F5F2FF381" \ - "B539CCE3409D13CD566AFBB48D6C019181E1BCFE94B30269" \ - "EDFE72FE9B6AA4BD7B5A0F1C71CFFF4C19C418E1F6EC0179" \ - "81BC087F2A7065B384B890D3191F2BFA") - -/** - * The hexadecimal presentation of the prime underlying the 2048-bit MODP - * Group, as defined in RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) - * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). - * - * \deprecated The hex-encoded primes from RFC 3625 are deprecated and - * superseded by the corresponding macros providing them as - * binary constants. Their hex-encoded constants are likely - * to be removed in a future version of the library. - * - */ -#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \ - "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD1" \ - "29024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DD" \ - "EF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245" \ - "E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7ED" \ - "EE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3D" \ - "C2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F" \ - "83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D" \ - "670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32905E462E36CE3B" \ - "E39E772C180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9" \ - "DE2BCBF6955817183995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA0510" \ - "15728E5A8AACAA68FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF") - -/** - * The hexadecimal presentation of the chosen generator of the 2048-bit MODP - * Group, as defined in RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) - * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). - */ -#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT("02") - -/** - * The hexadecimal presentation of the prime underlying the 3072-bit MODP - * Group, as defined in RFC-3072: More Modular Exponential (MODP) - * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). - */ -#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_P \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \ - "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD1" \ - "29024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DD" \ - "EF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245" \ - "E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7ED" \ - "EE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3D" \ - "C2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F" \ - "83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D" \ - "670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32905E462E36CE3B" \ - "E39E772C180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9" \ - "DE2BCBF6955817183995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA0510" \ - "15728E5A8AAAC42DAD33170D04507A33A85521ABDF1CBA64" \ - "ECFB850458DBEF0A8AEA71575D060C7DB3970F85A6E1E4C7" \ - "ABF5AE8CDB0933D71E8C94E04A25619DCEE3D2261AD2EE6B" \ - "F12FFA06D98A0864D87602733EC86A64521F2B18177B200C" \ - "BBE117577A615D6C770988C0BAD946E208E24FA074E5AB31" \ - "43DB5BFCE0FD108E4B82D120A93AD2CAFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF") - -/** - * The hexadecimal presentation of the chosen generator of the 3072-bit MODP - * Group, as defined in RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) - * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). - */ -#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_G \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT("02") - -/** - * The hexadecimal presentation of the prime underlying the 4096-bit MODP - * Group, as defined in RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) - * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). - */ -#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_4096_P \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT( \ - "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD1" \ - "29024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DD" \ - "EF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245" \ - "E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7ED" \ - "EE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3D" \ - "C2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F" \ - "83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D" \ - "670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32905E462E36CE3B" \ - "E39E772C180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9" \ - "DE2BCBF6955817183995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA0510" \ - "15728E5A8AAAC42DAD33170D04507A33A85521ABDF1CBA64" \ - "ECFB850458DBEF0A8AEA71575D060C7DB3970F85A6E1E4C7" \ - "ABF5AE8CDB0933D71E8C94E04A25619DCEE3D2261AD2EE6B" \ - "F12FFA06D98A0864D87602733EC86A64521F2B18177B200C" \ - "BBE117577A615D6C770988C0BAD946E208E24FA074E5AB31" \ - "43DB5BFCE0FD108E4B82D120A92108011A723C12A787E6D7" \ - "88719A10BDBA5B2699C327186AF4E23C1A946834B6150BDA" \ - "2583E9CA2AD44CE8DBBBC2DB04DE8EF92E8EFC141FBECAA6" \ - "287C59474E6BC05D99B2964FA090C3A2233BA186515BE7ED" \ - "1F612970CEE2D7AFB81BDD762170481CD0069127D5B05AA9" \ - "93B4EA988D8FDDC186FFB7DC90A6C08F4DF435C934063199" \ - "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF") - -/** - * The hexadecimal presentation of the chosen generator of the 4096-bit MODP - * Group, as defined in RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) - * Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). - */ -#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_4096_G \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT("02") - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /* * Trustworthy DHM parameters in binary form */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h index aade25a42e..a0909d6b44 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h @@ -14,32 +14,36 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ECDH_H #define MBEDTLS_ECDH_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +/* + * Mbed TLS supports two formats for ECDH contexts (#mbedtls_ecdh_context + * defined in `ecdh.h`). For most applications, the choice of format makes + * no difference, since all library functions can work with either format, + * except that the new format is incompatible with MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE. + + * The new format used when this option is disabled is smaller + * (56 bytes on a 32-bit platform). In future versions of the library, it + * will support alternative implementations of ECDH operations. + * The new format is incompatible with applications that access + * context fields directly and with restartable ECP operations. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT +#else +#undef MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) #undef MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT #include "everest/everest.h" @@ -80,13 +84,13 @@ typedef enum { * mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed. */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed { - mbedtls_ecp_group grp; /*!< The elliptic curve used. */ - mbedtls_mpi d; /*!< The private key. */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Q; /*!< The public key. */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Qp; /*!< The value of the public key of the peer. */ - mbedtls_mpi z; /*!< The shared secret. */ + mbedtls_ecp_group MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp); /*!< The elliptic curve used. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(d); /*!< The private key. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q); /*!< The public key. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Qp); /*!< The value of the public key of the peer. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(z); /*!< The shared secret. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx rs; /*!< The restart context for EC computations. */ + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(rs); /*!< The restart context for EC computations. */ #endif } mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed; #endif @@ -100,43 +104,56 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed { */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecdh_context { #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) - mbedtls_ecp_group grp; /*!< The elliptic curve used. */ - mbedtls_mpi d; /*!< The private key. */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Q; /*!< The public key. */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Qp; /*!< The value of the public key of the peer. */ - mbedtls_mpi z; /*!< The shared secret. */ - int point_format; /*!< The format of point export in TLS messages. */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Vi; /*!< The blinding value. */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Vf; /*!< The unblinding value. */ - mbedtls_mpi _d; /*!< The previous \p d. */ + mbedtls_ecp_group MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp); /*!< The elliptic curve used. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(d); /*!< The private key. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q); /*!< The public key. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Qp); /*!< The value of the public key of the peer. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(z); /*!< The shared secret. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(point_format); /*!< The format of point export in TLS messages. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Vi); /*!< The blinding value. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Vf); /*!< The unblinding value. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(_d); /*!< The previous \p d. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - int restart_enabled; /*!< The flag for restartable mode. */ - mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx rs; /*!< The restart context for EC computations. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(restart_enabled); /*!< The flag for restartable mode. */ + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(rs); /*!< The restart context for EC computations. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ #else - uint8_t point_format; /*!< The format of point export in TLS messages - as defined in RFC 4492. */ - mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id;/*!< The elliptic curve used. */ - mbedtls_ecdh_variant var; /*!< The ECDH implementation/structure used. */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(point_format); /*!< The format of point export in TLS messages + as defined in RFC 4492. */ + mbedtls_ecp_group_id MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp_id);/*!< The elliptic curve used. */ + mbedtls_ecdh_variant MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(var); /*!< The ECDH implementation/structure used. */ union { - mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed mbed_ecdh; + mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mbed_ecdh); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) - mbedtls_ecdh_context_everest everest_ecdh; + mbedtls_ecdh_context_everest MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(everest_ecdh); #endif - } ctx; /*!< Implementation-specific context. The - context in use is specified by the \c var - field. */ + } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); /*!< Implementation-specific context. The + context in use is specified by the \c var + field. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - uint8_t restart_enabled; /*!< The flag for restartable mode. Functions of - an alternative implementation not supporting - restartable mode must return - MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED error - if this flag is set. */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(restart_enabled); /*!< The flag for restartable mode. Functions of + an alternative implementation not supporting + restartable mode must return + MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED error + if this flag is set. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT */ } mbedtls_ecdh_context; +/** + * \brief Return the ECP group for provided context. + * + * \note To access group specific fields, users should use + * `mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id` or + * `mbedtls_ecp_group_load` on the extracted `group_id`. + * + * \param ctx The ECDH context to parse. This must not be \c NULL. + * + * \return The \c mbedtls_ecp_group_id of the context. + */ +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecdh_get_grp_id(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx); + /** * \brief Check whether a given group can be used for ECDH. * @@ -197,10 +214,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_ * This must be initialized. * \param d Our secret exponent (private key). * This must be initialized. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. This may be \c NULL if randomization - * of intermediate results during the ECP computations is - * not needed (discouraged). See the documentation of - * mbedtls_ecp_mul() for more. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a * context argument. @@ -403,8 +417,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, * \param buf The buffer to write the generated shared key to. This * must be a writable buffer of size \p blen Bytes. * \param blen The length of the destination buffer \p buf in Bytes. - * \param f_rng The RNG function, for blinding purposes. This may - * b \c NULL if blinding isn't needed. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG context. This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng * doesn't need a context argument. * diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h index b7029d7d56..2ecf349115 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h @@ -12,29 +12,14 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ECDSA_H #define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" #include "mbedtls/md.h" @@ -74,6 +59,11 @@ extern "C" { * \warning Performing multiple operations concurrently on the same * ECDSA context is not supported; objects of this type * should not be shared between multiple threads. + * + * \note pk_wrap module assumes that "ecdsa_context" is identical + * to "ecp_keypair" (see for example structure + * "mbedtls_eckey_info" where ECDSA sign/verify functions + * are used also for EC key) */ typedef mbedtls_ecp_keypair mbedtls_ecdsa_context; @@ -106,12 +96,12 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx; * \brief General context for resuming ECDSA operations */ typedef struct { - mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx ecp; /*!< base context for ECP restart and - shared administrative info */ - mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx *ver; /*!< ecdsa_verify() sub-context */ - mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx *sig; /*!< ecdsa_sign() sub-context */ + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ecp); /*!< base context for ECP restart and + shared administrative info */ + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ver); /*!< ecdsa_verify() sub-context */ + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig); /*!< ecdsa_sign() sub-context */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) - mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx *det; /*!< ecdsa_sign_det() sub-context */ + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(det); /*!< ecdsa_sign_det() sub-context */ #endif } mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx; @@ -137,7 +127,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do(mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid); * previously-hashed message. * * \note The deterministic version implemented in - * mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() is usually preferred. + * mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() is usually preferred. * * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated @@ -173,67 +163,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature of a - * previously-hashed message, deterministic version. - * - * For more information, see RFC-6979: Deterministic - * Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic - * Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). - * - * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the - * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as - * defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group - * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section - * 4.1.3, step 5. - * - * \warning Since the output of the internal RNG is always the same for - * the same key and message, this limits the efficiency of - * blinding and leaks information through side channels. For - * secure behavior use mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() instead. - * - * (Optimally the blinding is a random value that is different - * on every execution. In this case the blinding is still - * random from the attackers perspective, but is the same on - * each execution. This means that this blinding does not - * prevent attackers from recovering secrets by combining - * several measurement traces, but may prevent some attacks - * that exploit relationships between secret data.) - * - * \see ecp.h - * - * \param grp The context for the elliptic curve to use. - * This must be initialized and have group parameters - * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). - * \param r The MPI context in which to store the first part - * the signature. This must be initialized. - * \param s The MPI context in which to store the second part - * the signature. This must be initialized. - * \param d The private signing key. This must be initialized - * and setup, for example through mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(). - * \param buf The hashed content to be signed. This must be a readable - * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if - * \p blen is zero. - * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes. - * \param md_alg The hash algorithm used to hash the original data. - * - * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX - * error code on failure. - */ -int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, - mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg) MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED; -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /** * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature of a * previously-hashed message, deterministic version. @@ -267,8 +196,8 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, * \param f_rng_blind The RNG function used for blinding. This must not be * \c NULL. * \param p_rng_blind The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng_blind. This - * may be \c NULL if \p f_rng_blind doesn't need - * a context parameter. + * may be \c NULL if \p f_rng_blind doesn't need a context + * parameter. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX @@ -282,6 +211,135 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, void *p_rng_blind); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) +/** + * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature of a + * previously-hashed message, in a restartable way. + * + * \note The deterministic version implemented in + * mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable() is usually + * preferred. + * + * \note This function is like \c mbedtls_ecdsa_sign() but + * it can return early and restart according to the + * limit set with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to + * reduce blocking. + * + * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger + * than the bitlength of the group order, then the + * hash is truncated as defined in Standards for + * Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic + * Curve Cryptography, section 4.1.3, step 5. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param grp The context for the elliptic curve to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param r The MPI context in which to store the first part + * the signature. This must be initialized. + * \param s The MPI context in which to store the second part + * the signature. This must be initialized. + * \param d The private signing key. This must be initialized + * and setup, for example through + * mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(). + * \param buf The hashed content to be signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if + * \p blen is zero. + * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter. + * \param f_rng_blind The RNG function used for blinding. This must not be + * \c NULL. + * \param p_rng_blind The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter. + * \param rs_ctx The restart context to use. This may be \c NULL + * to disable restarting. If it is not \c NULL, it + * must point to an initialized restart context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c + * mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX, \c + * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX + * error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_restartable( + mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, + const mbedtls_mpi *d, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng_blind, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx); + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) + +/** + * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature of a + * previously-hashed message, in a restartable way. + * + * \note This function is like \c + * mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() but it can return + * early and restart according to the limit set with + * \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking. + * + * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger + * than the bitlength of the group order, then the + * hash is truncated as defined in Standards for + * Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic + * Curve Cryptography, section 4.1.3, step 5. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param grp The context for the elliptic curve to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param r The MPI context in which to store the first part + * the signature. This must be initialized. + * \param s The MPI context in which to store the second part + * the signature. This must be initialized. + * \param d The private signing key. This must be initialized + * and setup, for example through + * mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(). + * \param buf The hashed content to be signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if + * \p blen is zero. + * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes. + * \param md_alg The hash algorithm used to hash the original data. + * \param f_rng_blind The RNG function used for blinding. This must not be + * \c NULL. + * \param p_rng_blind The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng_blind. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng_blind doesn't need a context parameter. + * \param rs_ctx The restart context to use. This may be \c NULL + * to disable restarting. If it is not \c NULL, it + * must point to an initialized restart context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c + * mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX, \c + * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX + * error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( + mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, + const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng_blind, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ + /** * \brief This function verifies the ECDSA signature of a * previously-hashed message. @@ -317,6 +375,51 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) +/** + * \brief This function verifies the ECDSA signature of a + * previously-hashed message, in a restartable manner + * + * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the + * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as + * defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group + * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section + * 4.1.4, step 3. + * + * \see ecp.h + * + * \param grp The ECP group to use. + * This must be initialized and have group parameters + * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). + * \param buf The hashed content that was signed. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if + * \p blen is zero. + * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes. + * \param Q The public key to use for verification. This must be + * initialized and setup. + * \param r The first integer of the signature. + * This must be initialized. + * \param s The second integer of the signature. + * This must be initialized. + * \param rs_ctx The restart context to use. This may be \c NULL to disable + * restarting. If it is not \c NULL, it must point to an + * initialized restart context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of + * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(). + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX + * error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *r, + const mbedtls_mpi *s, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx); + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */ + /** * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature and writes it * to a buffer, serialized as defined in RFC-4492: @@ -352,6 +455,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, * size of the curve used, plus 9. For example, 73 Bytes if * a 256-bit curve is used. A buffer length of * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN is always safe. + * \param sig_size The size of the \p sig buffer in bytes. * \param slen The address at which to store the actual length of * the signature written. Must not be \c NULL. * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL if @@ -368,7 +472,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *slen, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); @@ -394,6 +498,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, * size of the curve used, plus 9. For example, 73 Bytes if * a 256-bit curve is used. A buffer length of * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN is always safe. + * \param sig_size The size of the \p sig buffer in bytes. * \param slen The address at which to store the actual length of * the signature written. Must not be \c NULL. * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL if @@ -414,69 +519,11 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *slen, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief This function computes an ECDSA signature and writes - * it to a buffer, serialized as defined in RFC-4492: - * Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for - * Transport Layer Security (TLS). - * - * The deterministic version is defined in RFC-6979: - * Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) - * and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). - * - * \warning It is not thread-safe to use the same context in - * multiple threads. - * - * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the - * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as - * defined in Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group - * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, section - * 4.1.3, step 5. - * - * \see ecp.h - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature() in - * Mbed TLS version 2.0 and later. - * - * \param ctx The ECDSA context to use. This must be initialized - * and have a group and private key bound to it, for example - * via mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey() or mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(). - * \param hash The message hash to be signed. This must be a readable - * buffer of length \p hlen Bytes. - * \param hlen The length of the hash \p hash in Bytes. - * \param sig The buffer to which to write the signature. This must be a - * writable buffer of length at least twice as large as the - * size of the curve used, plus 9. For example, 73 Bytes if - * a 256-bit curve is used. A buffer length of - * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN is always safe. - * \param slen The address at which to store the actual length of - * the signature written. Must not be \c NULL. - * \param md_alg The message digest that was used to hash the message. - * - * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX, \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX or - * \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure. - */ -int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg) MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED; -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ - /** * \brief This function reads and verifies an ECDSA signature. * diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h index b9928386dc..c2148a2bd1 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h @@ -5,22 +5,11 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_H #define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" /* * J-PAKE is a password-authenticated key exchange that allows deriving a @@ -38,11 +27,7 @@ * The payloads are serialized in a way suitable for use in TLS, but could * also be use outside TLS. */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" #include "mbedtls/md.h" @@ -57,6 +42,7 @@ extern "C" { typedef enum { MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT = 0, /**< Client */ MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER, /**< Server */ + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_NONE, /**< Undefined */ } mbedtls_ecjpake_role; #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT) @@ -72,21 +58,21 @@ typedef enum { * description as a pair C: client name, S: server name */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecjpake_context { - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; /**< Hash to use */ - mbedtls_ecp_group grp; /**< Elliptic curve */ - mbedtls_ecjpake_role role; /**< Are we client or server? */ - int point_format; /**< Format for point export */ + mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_type); /**< Hash to use */ + mbedtls_ecp_group MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp); /**< Elliptic curve */ + mbedtls_ecjpake_role MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(role); /**< Are we client or server? */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(point_format); /**< Format for point export */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Xm1; /**< My public key 1 C: X1, S: X3 */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Xm2; /**< My public key 2 C: X2, S: X4 */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Xp1; /**< Peer public key 1 C: X3, S: X1 */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Xp2; /**< Peer public key 2 C: X4, S: X2 */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Xp; /**< Peer public key C: Xs, S: Xc */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Xm1); /**< My public key 1 C: X1, S: X3 */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Xm2); /**< My public key 2 C: X2, S: X4 */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Xp1); /**< Peer public key 1 C: X3, S: X1 */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Xp2); /**< Peer public key 2 C: X4, S: X2 */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Xp); /**< Peer public key C: Xs, S: Xc */ - mbedtls_mpi xm1; /**< My private key 1 C: x1, S: x3 */ - mbedtls_mpi xm2; /**< My private key 2 C: x2, S: x4 */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(xm1); /**< My private key 1 C: x1, S: x3 */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(xm2); /**< My private key 2 C: x2, S: x4 */ - mbedtls_mpi s; /**< Pre-shared secret (passphrase) */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(s); /**< Pre-shared secret (passphrase) */ } mbedtls_ecjpake_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ @@ -115,7 +101,7 @@ void mbedtls_ecjpake_init(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx); * \param curve The identifier of the elliptic curve to use, * for example #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1. * \param secret The pre-shared secret (passphrase). This must be - * a readable buffer of length \p len Bytes. It need + * a readable not empty buffer of length \p len Bytes. It need * only be valid for the duration of this call. * \param len The length of the pre-shared secret \p secret. * @@ -129,6 +115,21 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_setup(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, const unsigned char *secret, size_t len); +/** + * \brief Set the point format for future reads and writes. + * + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to configure. + * \param point_format The point format to use: + * #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED (default) + * or #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p point_format + * is invalid. + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_set_point_format(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + int point_format); + /** * \brief Check if an ECJPAKE context is ready for use. * @@ -245,6 +246,29 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); +/** + * \brief Write the shared key material to be passed to a Key + * Derivation Function as described in RFC8236. + * + * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to use. This must be initialized, + * set up and have performed both round one and two. + * \param buf The buffer to write the derived secret to. This must + * be a writable buffer of length \p len Bytes. + * \param len The length of \p buf in Bytes. + * \param olen The address at which to store the total number of bytes + * written to \p buf. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This + * may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use a context. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_shared_key(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng); + /** * \brief This clears an ECJPAKE context and frees any * embedded data structure. diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecp.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecp.h index 4995090f9b..d8f73ae965 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecp.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecp.h @@ -16,37 +16,18 @@ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ECP_H #define MBEDTLS_ECP_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" -#if (defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER)) && \ - !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) -#define inline __inline -#endif - /* * ECP error codes */ @@ -66,11 +47,6 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY -0x4C80 /** The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH -0x4C00 - -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** The ECP hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x4B80 - /** Operation in progress, call again with the same parameters to continue. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS -0x4B00 @@ -111,16 +87,17 @@ extern "C" { * - Add it at the end of this enum, otherwise you'll break the ABI by * changing the numerical value for existing curves. * - Increment MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX below if needed. - * - Update the calculation of MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN below. + * - Update the calculation of MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS below. * - Add the corresponding MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx_ENABLED macro definition to - * config.h. + * mbedtls_config.h. * - List the curve as a dependency of MBEDTLS_ECP_C and * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C if supported in check_config.h. * - Add the curve to the appropriate curve type macro * MBEDTLS_ECP_yyy_ENABLED above. * - Add the necessary definitions to ecp_curves.c. * - Add the curve to the ecp_supported_curves array in ecp.c. - * - Add the curve to applicable profiles in x509_crt.c if applicable. + * - Add the curve to applicable profiles in x509_crt.c. + * - Add the curve to applicable presets in ssl_tls.c. */ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE = 0, /*!< Curve not defined. */ @@ -141,10 +118,8 @@ typedef enum { /** * The number of supported curves, plus one for #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE. - * - * \note Montgomery curves are currently excluded. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX 12 +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX 14 /* * Curve types @@ -157,6 +132,10 @@ typedef enum { /** * Curve information, for use by other modules. + * + * The fields of this structure are part of the public API and can be + * accessed directly by applications. Future versions of the library may + * add extra fields or reorder existing fields. */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_curve_info { mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; /*!< An internal identifier. */ @@ -177,46 +156,12 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_curve_info { * coordinates. */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_point { - mbedtls_mpi X; /*!< The X coordinate of the ECP point. */ - mbedtls_mpi Y; /*!< The Y coordinate of the ECP point. */ - mbedtls_mpi Z; /*!< The Z coordinate of the ECP point. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(X); /*!< The X coordinate of the ECP point. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Y); /*!< The Y coordinate of the ECP point. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Z); /*!< The Z coordinate of the ECP point. */ } mbedtls_ecp_point; -/* Determine the minimum safe value of MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS. */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 0 -/* Note: the curves must be listed in DECREASING size! */ -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 521 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 512 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 448 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 384 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 384 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 256 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 256 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 256 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 255 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 225 // n is slightly above 2^224 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 224 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 192 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN 192 -#else -#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_C enabled, but no curve?" -#endif - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) /* * default Mbed TLS elliptic curve arithmetic implementation @@ -274,10 +219,16 @@ mbedtls_ecp_point; * additions or subtractions. Therefore, it is only an approximative modular * reduction. It must return 0 on success and non-zero on failure. * - * \note Alternative implementations must keep the group IDs distinct. If - * two group structures have the same ID, then they must be - * identical. - * + * \note Alternative implementations of the ECP module must obey the + * following constraints. + * * Group IDs must be distinct: if two group structures have + * the same ID, then they must be identical. + * * The fields \c id, \c P, \c A, \c B, \c G, \c N, + * \c pbits and \c nbits must have the same type and semantics + * as in the built-in implementation. + * They must be available for reading, but direct modification + * of these fields does not need to be supported. + * They do not need to be at the same offset in the structure. */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_group { mbedtls_ecp_group_id id; /*!< An internal group identifier. */ @@ -295,14 +246,16 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_group { size_t nbits; /*!< For Short Weierstrass: The number of bits in \p P. For Montgomery curves: the number of bits in the private keys. */ - unsigned int h; /*!< \internal 1 if the constants are static. */ - int (*modp)(mbedtls_mpi *); /*!< The function for fast pseudo-reduction - mod \p P (see above).*/ - int (*t_pre)(mbedtls_ecp_point *, void *); /*!< Unused. */ - int (*t_post)(mbedtls_ecp_point *, void *); /*!< Unused. */ - void *t_data; /*!< Unused. */ - mbedtls_ecp_point *T; /*!< Pre-computed points for ecp_mul_comb(). */ - size_t T_size; /*!< The number of pre-computed points. */ + /* End of public fields */ + + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(h); /*!< \internal 1 if the constants are static. */ + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(modp))(mbedtls_mpi *); /*!< The function for fast pseudo-reduction + mod \p P (see above).*/ + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(t_pre))(mbedtls_ecp_point *, void *); /*!< Unused. */ + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(t_post))(mbedtls_ecp_point *, void *); /*!< Unused. */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(t_data); /*!< Unused. */ + mbedtls_ecp_point *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(T); /*!< Pre-computed points for ecp_mul_comb(). */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(T_size); /*!< The number of dynamic allocated pre-computed points. */ } mbedtls_ecp_group; @@ -310,32 +263,10 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group; * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. - * Either change them in config.h, or define them using the compiler command line. + * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h, or define them using the compiler command line. * \{ */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS) - -#if MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS < MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN -#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS is smaller than the largest supported curve" -#endif - -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -/** - * The maximum size of the groups, that is, of \c N and \c P. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS_MIN - -#else -/* MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS is not relevant without MBEDTLS_ECP_C, but set it - * to a nonzero value so that code that unconditionally allocates an array - * of a size based on it keeps working if built without ECC support. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 1 -#endif - -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ((MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS + 7) / 8) -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN (2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES + 1) - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE) /* * Maximum "window" size used for point multiplication. @@ -362,15 +293,16 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group; #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM) /* - * Trade memory for speed on fixed-point multiplication. + * Trade code size for speed on fixed-point multiplication. * * This speeds up repeated multiplication of the generator (that is, the * multiplication in ECDSA signatures, and half of the multiplications in * ECDSA verification and ECDHE) by a factor roughly 3 to 4. * - * The cost is increasing EC peak memory usage by a factor roughly 2. + * For each n-bit Short Weierstrass curve that is enabled, this adds 4n bytes + * of code size if n < 384 and 8n otherwise. * - * Change this value to 0 to reduce peak memory usage. + * Change this value to 0 to reduce code size. */ #define MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM 1 /**< Enable fixed-point speed-up. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM */ @@ -381,6 +313,47 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group; #include "ecp_alt.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ +/** + * The maximum size of the groups, that is, of \c N and \c P. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) +/* Dummy definition to help code that has optional ECP support and + * defines an MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES-sized array unconditionally. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 1 +/* Note: the curves must be listed in DECREASING size! */ +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 521 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 512 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 448 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 384 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 384 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 256 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 256 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 256 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 255 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 225 // n is slightly above 2^224 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 224 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 192 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 192 +#else /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */ +#error "Missing definition of MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS" +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */ + +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ((MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS + 7) / 8) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN (2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES + 1) + #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) /** @@ -401,10 +374,10 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx; * \brief General context for resuming ECC operations */ typedef struct { - unsigned ops_done; /*!< current ops count */ - unsigned depth; /*!< call depth (0 = top-level) */ - mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx *rsm; /*!< ecp_mul_comb() sub-context */ - mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx *ma; /*!< ecp_muladd() sub-context */ + unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ops_done); /*!< current ops count */ + unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(depth); /*!< call depth (0 = top-level) */ + mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(rsm); /*!< ecp_mul_comb() sub-context */ + mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ma); /*!< ecp_muladd() sub-context */ } mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx; /* @@ -453,17 +426,28 @@ typedef void mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx; * ::mbedtls_ecdsa_context structure. */ typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_keypair { - mbedtls_ecp_group grp; /*!< Elliptic curve and base point */ - mbedtls_mpi d; /*!< our secret value */ - mbedtls_ecp_point Q; /*!< our public value */ + mbedtls_ecp_group MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp); /*!< Elliptic curve and base point */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(d); /*!< our secret value */ + mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q); /*!< our public value */ } mbedtls_ecp_keypair; -/* - * Point formats, from RFC 4492's enum ECPointFormat +/** + * The uncompressed point format for Short Weierstrass curves + * (MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP_XXX and MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP_XXX). */ -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED 0 /**< Uncompressed point format. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED 1 /**< Compressed point format. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED 0 +/** + * The compressed point format for Short Weierstrass curves + * (MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP_XXX and MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP_XXX). + * + * \warning While this format is supported for all concerned curves for + * writing, when it comes to parsing, it is not supported for all + * curves. Specifically, parsing compressed points on + * MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 and MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1 is not + * supported. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED 1 /* * Some other constants from RFC 4492 @@ -501,6 +485,12 @@ mbedtls_ecp_keypair; * only enabled for specific sides and key exchanges * (currently only for clients and ECDHE-ECDSA). * + * \warning Using the PSA interruptible interfaces with keys in local + * storage and no accelerator driver will also call this + * function to set the values specified via those interfaces, + * overwriting values previously set. Care should be taken if + * mixing these two interfaces. + * * \param max_ops Maximum number of basic operations done in a row. * Default: 0 (unlimited). * Lower (non-zero) values mean ECC functions will block for @@ -792,6 +782,9 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, * belongs to the given group, see mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey() * for that. * + * \note For compressed points, see #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED for + * limitations. + * * \param grp The group to which the point should belong. * This must be initialized and have group parameters * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load(). @@ -951,15 +944,8 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, * \note To prevent timing attacks, this function * executes the exact same sequence of base-field * operations for any valid \p m. It avoids any if-branch or - * array index depending on the value of \p m. - * - * \note If \p f_rng is not NULL, it is used to randomize - * intermediate results to prevent potential timing attacks - * targeting these results. We recommend always providing - * a non-NULL \p f_rng. The overhead is negligible. - * Note: unless #MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG is defined, when - * \p f_rng is NULL, an internal RNG (seeded from the value - * of \p m) will be used instead. + * array index depending on the value of \p m. It also uses + * \p f_rng to randomize some intermediate results. * * \param grp The ECP group to use. * This must be initialized and have group parameters @@ -968,9 +954,9 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, * This must be initialized. * \param m The integer by which to multiply. This must be initialized. * \param P The point to multiply. This must be initialized. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. This may be \c NULL if randomization - * of intermediate results isn't desired (discouraged). - * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p p_rng. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c + * NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if \p m is not a valid private @@ -999,9 +985,9 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_mul(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, * This must be initialized. * \param m The integer by which to multiply. This must be initialized. * \param P The point to multiply. This must be initialized. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. This may be \c NULL if randomization - * of intermediate results isn't desired (discouraged). - * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p p_rng. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c + * NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. * \param rs_ctx The restart context (NULL disables restart). * * \return \c 0 on success. @@ -1035,7 +1021,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, */ static inline int mbedtls_ecp_group_a_is_minus_3(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp) { - return grp->A.p == NULL; + return grp->A.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p) == NULL; } /** @@ -1274,9 +1260,56 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); +/** \brief Set the public key in a key pair object. + * + * \note This function does not check that the point actually + * belongs to the given group. Call mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey() + * on \p Q before calling this function to check that. + * + * \note This function does not check that the public key matches + * the private key that is already in \p key, if any. + * To check the consistency of the resulting key pair object, + * call mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() after setting both + * the public key and the private key. + * + * \param grp_id The ECP group identifier. + * \param key The key pair object. It must be initialized. + * If its group has already been set, it must match \p grp_id. + * If its group has not been set, it will be set to \p grp_id. + * If the public key has already been set, it is overwritten. + * \param Q The public key to copy. This must be a point on the + * curve indicated by \p grp_id. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p key does not + * match \p grp_id. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the operation for + * the group is not implemented. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q); + /** * \brief This function reads an elliptic curve private key. * + * \note This function does not set the public key in the + * key pair object. Without a public key, the key pair object + * cannot be used with operations that require the public key. + * Call mbedtls_ecp_keypair_calc_public() to set the public + * key from the private key. Alternatively, you can call + * mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key() to set the public key part, + * and then optionally mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() to check + * that the private and public parts are consistent. + * + * \note If a public key has already been set in the key pair + * object, this function does not check that it is consistent + * with the private key. Call mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() + * after setting both the public key and the private key + * to make that check. + * * \param grp_id The ECP group identifier. * \param key The destination key. * \param buf The buffer containing the binary representation of the @@ -1295,24 +1328,106 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, int mbedtls_ecp_read_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) /** * \brief This function exports an elliptic curve private key. * + * \deprecated Note that although this function accepts an output + * buffer that is smaller or larger than the key, most key + * import interfaces require the output to have exactly + * key's nominal length. It is generally simplest to + * pass the key's nominal length as \c buflen, after + * checking that the output buffer is large enough. + * See the description of the \p buflen parameter for + * how to calculate the nominal length. + * To avoid this difficulty, use mbedtls_ecp_write_key_ext() + * instead. + * mbedtls_ecp_write_key() is deprecated and will be + * removed in a future version of the library. + * + * \note If the private key was not set in \p key, + * the output is unspecified. Future versions + * may return an error in that case. + * * \param key The private key. * \param buf The output buffer for containing the binary representation - * of the key. (Big endian integer for Weierstrass curves, byte - * string for Montgomery curves.) + * of the key. + * For Weierstrass curves, this is the big-endian + * representation, padded with null bytes at the beginning + * to reach \p buflen bytes. + * For Montgomery curves, this is the standard byte string + * representation (which is little-endian), padded with + * null bytes at the end to reach \p buflen bytes. + * \param buflen The total length of the buffer in bytes. + * The length of the output is + * (`grp->nbits` + 7) / 8 bytes + * where `grp->nbits` is the private key size in bits. + * For Weierstrass keys, if the output buffer is smaller, + * leading zeros are trimmed to fit if possible. For + * Montgomery keys, the output buffer must always be large + * enough for the nominal length. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the \p key + * representation is larger than the available space in \p buf. + * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. + */ +int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_ecp_write_key(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/** + * \brief This function exports an elliptic curve private key. + * + * \param key The private key. + * \param olen On success, the length of the private key. + * This is always (`grp->nbits` + 7) / 8 bytes + * where `grp->nbits` is the private key size in bits. + * \param buf The output buffer for containing the binary representation + * of the key. * \param buflen The total length of the buffer in bytes. + * #MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES is always sufficient. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the \p key - representation is larger than the available space in \p buf. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the operation for - * the group is not implemented. + * representation is larger than the available space in \p buf. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if no private key is + * set in \p key. * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure. */ -int mbedtls_ecp_write_key(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, - unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen); +int mbedtls_ecp_write_key_ext(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + size_t *olen, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen); + +/** + * \brief This function exports an elliptic curve public key. + * + * \note If the public key was not set in \p key, + * the output is unspecified. Future versions + * may return an error in that case. + * + * \param key The public key. + * \param format The point format. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED or #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED. + * (For groups without these formats, this parameter is + * ignored. But it still has to be either of the above + * values.) + * \param olen The address at which to store the length of + * the output in Bytes. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param buf The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer + * of length \p buflen Bytes. + * \param buflen The length of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the output buffer + * is too small to hold the point. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the point format + * or the export for the given group is not implemented. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_write_public_key(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + int format, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen); /** * \brief This function checks that the keypair objects @@ -1325,14 +1440,74 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_write_key(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, * part is ignored. * \param prv The keypair structure holding the full keypair. * This must be initialized. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c + * NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. * * \return \c 0 on success, meaning that the keys are valid and match. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the keys are invalid or do not match. * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or an \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX * error code on calculation failure. */ -int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, - const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv); +int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); + +/** \brief Calculate the public key from a private key in a key pair. + * + * \param key A keypair structure. It must have a private key set. + * If the public key is set, it will be overwritten. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c + * NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. The key pair object can be used for + * operations that require the public key. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or an \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX + * error code on calculation failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_keypair_calc_public( + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); + +/** \brief Query the group that a key pair belongs to. + * + * \param key The key pair to query. + * + * \return The group ID for the group registered in the key pair + * object. + * This is \c MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if no group has been set + * in the key pair object. + */ +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecp_keypair_get_group_id( + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key); + +/** + * \brief This function exports generic key-pair parameters. + * + * Each of the output parameters can be a null pointer + * if you do not need that parameter. + * + * \note If the private key or the public key was not set in \p key, + * the corresponding output is unspecified. Future versions + * may return an error in that case. + * + * \param key The key pair to export from. + * \param grp Slot for exported ECP group. + * It must either be null or point to an initialized ECP group. + * \param d Slot for the exported secret value. + * It must either be null or point to an initialized mpi. + * \param Q Slot for the exported public value. + * It must either be null or point to an initialized ECP point. + * + * \return \c 0 on success, + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if key id doesn't + * correspond to a known group. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_export(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/entropy.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/entropy.h index 4075d2ae60..20fd6872b8 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/entropy.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/entropy.h @@ -5,38 +5,27 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_H #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) -#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#include "md.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MD MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE 64 /**< Block size of entropy accumulator (SHA-512) */ #else -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA256_ACCUMULATOR -#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MD MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE 32 /**< Block size of entropy accumulator (SHA-256) */ #endif #endif @@ -44,9 +33,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/threading.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) -#include "mbedtls/havege.h" -#endif /** Critical entropy source failure. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED -0x003C @@ -63,7 +49,7 @@ * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. - * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line. * \{ */ @@ -77,12 +63,6 @@ /** \} name SECTION: Module settings */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) -#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE 64 /**< Block size of entropy accumulator (SHA-512) */ -#else -#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE 32 /**< Block size of entropy accumulator (SHA-256) */ -#endif - #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE 1024 /**< Maximum size of seed we read from seed file */ #define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_MANUAL MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES @@ -111,11 +91,11 @@ typedef int (*mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr)(void *data, unsigned char *output, s * \brief Entropy source state */ typedef struct mbedtls_entropy_source_state { - mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr f_source; /**< The entropy source callback */ - void *p_source; /**< The callback data pointer */ - size_t size; /**< Amount received in bytes */ - size_t threshold; /**< Minimum bytes required before release */ - int strong; /**< Is the source strong? */ + mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_source); /**< The entropy source callback */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_source); /**< The callback data pointer */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(size); /**< Amount received in bytes */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(threshold); /**< Minimum bytes required before release */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(strong); /**< Is the source strong? */ } mbedtls_entropy_source_state; @@ -123,28 +103,29 @@ mbedtls_entropy_source_state; * \brief Entropy context structure */ typedef struct mbedtls_entropy_context { - int accumulator_started; /* 0 after init. - * 1 after the first update. - * -1 after free. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) - mbedtls_sha512_context accumulator; -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA256_ACCUMULATOR) - mbedtls_sha256_context accumulator; -#endif - int source_count; /* Number of entries used in source. */ - mbedtls_entropy_source_state source[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES]; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) - mbedtls_havege_state havege_data; -#endif + mbedtls_md_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(accumulator); + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(accumulator_started); /* 0 after init. + * 1 after the first update. + * -1 after free. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(source_count); /* Number of entries used in source. */ + mbedtls_entropy_source_state MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(source)[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES]; #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; /*!< mutex */ + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex); /*!< mutex */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) - int initial_entropy_run; + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(initial_entropy_run); #endif } mbedtls_entropy_context; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) +/** + * \brief Platform-specific entropy poll callback + */ +int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll(void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen); +#endif + /** * \brief Initialize the context * diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/entropy_poll.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/entropy_poll.h deleted file mode 100644 index fed686235f..0000000000 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/entropy_poll.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,108 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file entropy_poll.h - * - * \brief Platform-specific and custom entropy polling functions - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_POLL_H -#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_POLL_H - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#include - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/* - * Default thresholds for built-in sources, in bytes - */ -#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM 32 /**< Minimum for platform source */ -#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HAVEGE 32 /**< Minimum for HAVEGE */ -#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDCLOCK 4 /**< Minimum for mbedtls_timing_hardclock() */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE) -#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE 32 /**< Minimum for the hardware source */ -#endif - -/** - * \brief Entropy poll callback that provides 0 entropy. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) -int mbedtls_null_entropy_poll(void *data, - unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen); -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) -/** - * \brief Platform-specific entropy poll callback - */ -int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll(void *data, - unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) -/** - * \brief HAVEGE based entropy poll callback - * - * Requires an HAVEGE state as its data pointer. - */ -int mbedtls_havege_poll(void *data, - unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) -/** - * \brief mbedtls_timing_hardclock-based entropy poll callback - */ -int mbedtls_hardclock_poll(void *data, - unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) -/** - * \brief Entropy poll callback for a hardware source - * - * \warning This is not provided by Mbed TLS! - * See \c MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT in config.h. - * - * \note This must accept NULL as its first argument. - */ -int mbedtls_hardware_poll(void *data, - unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) -/** - * \brief Entropy poll callback for a non-volatile seed file - * - * \note This must accept NULL as its first argument. - */ -int mbedtls_nv_seed_poll(void *data, - unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen); -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* entropy_poll.h */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/error.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/error.h index 0d6230f597..186589ac5b 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/error.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/error.h @@ -5,36 +5,15 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ERROR_H #define MBEDTLS_ERROR_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include -#if (defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER)) && \ - !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) -#define inline __inline -#endif - /** * Error code layout. * @@ -60,12 +39,10 @@ * Module Nr Codes assigned * ERROR 2 0x006E 0x0001 * MPI 7 0x0002-0x0010 - * GCM 3 0x0012-0x0014 0x0013-0x0013 - * BLOWFISH 3 0x0016-0x0018 0x0017-0x0017 + * GCM 3 0x0012-0x0016 0x0013-0x0013 * THREADING 3 0x001A-0x001E * AES 5 0x0020-0x0022 0x0021-0x0025 * CAMELLIA 3 0x0024-0x0026 0x0027-0x0027 - * XTEA 2 0x0028-0x0028 0x0029-0x0029 * BASE64 2 0x002A-0x002C * OID 1 0x002E-0x002E 0x000B-0x000B * PADLOCK 1 0x0030-0x0030 @@ -79,18 +56,17 @@ * PBKDF2 1 0x007C-0x007C * HMAC_DRBG 4 0x0003-0x0009 * CCM 3 0x000D-0x0011 - * ARC4 1 0x0019-0x0019 - * MD2 1 0x002B-0x002B - * MD4 1 0x002D-0x002D * MD5 1 0x002F-0x002F * RIPEMD160 1 0x0031-0x0031 * SHA1 1 0x0035-0x0035 0x0073-0x0073 * SHA256 1 0x0037-0x0037 0x0074-0x0074 * SHA512 1 0x0039-0x0039 0x0075-0x0075 + * SHA-3 1 0x0076-0x0076 * CHACHA20 3 0x0051-0x0055 * POLY1305 3 0x0057-0x005B * CHACHAPOLY 2 0x0054-0x0056 * PLATFORM 2 0x0070-0x0072 + * LMS 5 0x0011-0x0019 * * High-level module nr (3 bits - 0x0...-0x7...) * Name ID Nr of Errors @@ -104,10 +80,12 @@ * ECP 4 10 (Started from top) * MD 5 5 * HKDF 5 1 (Started from top) + * PKCS7 5 12 (Started from 0x5300) * SSL 5 2 (Started from 0x5F00) * CIPHER 6 8 (Started from 0x6080) - * SSL 6 24 (Started from top, plus 0x6000) - * SSL 7 32 + * SSL 6 22 (Started from top, plus 0x6000) + * SSL 7 20 (Started from 0x7000, gaps at + * 0x7380, 0x7900-0x7980, 0x7A80-0x7E80) * * Module dependent error code (5 bits 0x.00.-0x.F8.) */ @@ -121,6 +99,11 @@ extern "C" { /** This is a bug in the library */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED -0x006E +/** Hardware accelerator failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0070 +/** The requested feature is not supported by the platform */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED -0x0072 + /** * \brief Combines a high-level and low-level error code together. * diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/gcm.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/gcm.h index c04088388c..98faa43612 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/gcm.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/gcm.h @@ -13,32 +13,21 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_GCM_H #define MBEDTLS_GCM_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) +#include "mbedtls/block_cipher.h" +#endif + #include #define MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT 1 @@ -46,13 +35,10 @@ /** Authenticated decryption failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED -0x0012 - -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** GCM hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0013 - /** Bad input parameters to function. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT -0x0014 +/** An output buffer is too small. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x0016 #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { @@ -60,21 +46,31 @@ extern "C" { #if !defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE) +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE 256 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE 16 +#endif + /** * \brief The GCM context structure. */ typedef struct mbedtls_gcm_context { - mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; /*!< The cipher context used. */ - uint64_t HL[16]; /*!< Precalculated HTable low. */ - uint64_t HH[16]; /*!< Precalculated HTable high. */ - uint64_t len; /*!< The total length of the encrypted data. */ - uint64_t add_len; /*!< The total length of the additional data. */ - unsigned char base_ectr[16]; /*!< The first ECTR for tag. */ - unsigned char y[16]; /*!< The Y working value. */ - unsigned char buf[16]; /*!< The buf working value. */ - int mode; /*!< The operation to perform: - #MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT or - #MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */ +#else + mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */ +#endif + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(H)[MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE][2]; /*!< Precalculated HTable. */ + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(len); /*!< The total length of the encrypted data. */ + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(add_len); /*!< The total length of the additional data. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(base_ectr)[16]; /*!< The first ECTR for tag. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(y)[16]; /*!< The Y working value. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buf)[16]; /*!< The buf working value. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mode); /*!< The operation to perform: + #MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT or + #MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(acceleration); /*!< The acceleration to use. */ } mbedtls_gcm_context; @@ -233,6 +229,27 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a readable buffer of * at least \p iv_len Bytes. * \param iv_len The length of the IV. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + */ +int mbedtls_gcm_starts(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer as associated data + * (authenticated but not encrypted data) in a GCM + * encryption or decryption operation. + * + * Call this function after mbedtls_gcm_starts() to pass + * the associated data. If the associated data is empty, + * you do not need to call this function. You may not + * call this function after calling mbedtls_cipher_update(). + * + * \param ctx The GCM context. This must have been started with + * mbedtls_gcm_starts() and must not have yet received + * any input with mbedtls_gcm_update(). * \param add The buffer holding the additional data, or \c NULL * if \p add_len is \c 0. * \param add_len The length of the additional data. If \c 0, @@ -240,42 +257,65 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, * * \return \c 0 on success. */ -int mbedtls_gcm_starts(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, - int mode, - const unsigned char *iv, - size_t iv_len, - const unsigned char *add, - size_t add_len); +int mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *add, + size_t add_len); /** * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing GCM * encryption or decryption operation. * - * ` The function expects input to be a multiple of 16 - * Bytes. Only the last call before calling - * mbedtls_gcm_finish() can be less than 16 Bytes. + * You may call this function zero, one or more times + * to pass successive parts of the input: the plaintext to + * encrypt, or the ciphertext (not including the tag) to + * decrypt. After the last part of the input, call + * mbedtls_gcm_finish(). + * + * This function may produce output in one of the following + * ways: + * - Immediate output: the output length is always equal + * to the input length. + * - Buffered output: the output consists of a whole number + * of 16-byte blocks. If the total input length so far + * (not including associated data) is 16 \* *B* + *A* + * with *A* < 16 then the total output length is 16 \* *B*. + * + * In particular: + * - It is always correct to call this function with + * \p output_size >= \p input_length + 15. + * - If \p input_length is a multiple of 16 for all the calls + * to this function during an operation, then it is + * correct to use \p output_size = \p input_length. * * \note For decryption, the output buffer cannot be the same as * input buffer. If the buffers overlap, the output buffer * must trail at least 8 Bytes behind the input buffer. * - * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized. - * \param length The length of the input data. This must be a multiple of - * 16 except in the last call before mbedtls_gcm_finish(). - * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater - * than zero, this must be a readable buffer of at least that - * size in Bytes. - * \param output The buffer for holding the output data. If \p length is - * greater than zero, this must be a writable buffer of at - * least that size in Bytes. + * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized. + * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p input_length + * is greater than zero, this must be a readable buffer + * of at least \p input_length bytes. + * \param input_length The length of the input data in bytes. + * \param output The buffer for the output data. If \p output_size + * is greater than zero, this must be a writable buffer of + * of at least \p output_size bytes. + * \param output_size The size of the output buffer in bytes. + * See the function description regarding the output size. + * \param output_length On success, \p *output_length contains the actual + * length of the output written in \p output. + * On failure, the content of \p *output_length is + * unspecified. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT on failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT on failure: + * total input length too long, + * unsupported input/output buffer overlap detected, + * or \p output_size too small. */ int mbedtls_gcm_update(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, - size_t length, - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output); + const unsigned char *input, size_t input_length, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); /** * \brief This function finishes the GCM operation and generates @@ -289,13 +329,31 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_update(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, * buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes. * \param tag_len The length of the tag to generate. This must be at least * four. + * \param output The buffer for the final output. + * If \p output_size is nonzero, this must be a writable + * buffer of at least \p output_size bytes. + * \param output_size The size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * This must be large enough for the output that + * mbedtls_gcm_update() has not produced. In particular: + * - If mbedtls_gcm_update() produces immediate output, + * or if the total input size is a multiple of \c 16, + * then mbedtls_gcm_finish() never produces any output, + * so \p output_size can be \c 0. + * - \p output_size never needs to be more than \c 15. + * \param output_length On success, \p *output_length contains the actual + * length of the output written in \p output. + * On failure, the content of \p *output_length is + * unspecified. * * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT on failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT on failure: + * invalid value of \p tag_len, + * or \p output_size too small. */ int mbedtls_gcm_finish(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, - unsigned char *tag, - size_t tag_len); + unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len); /** * \brief This function clears a GCM context and the underlying diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/havege.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/havege.h deleted file mode 100644 index 7d042d1966..0000000000 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/havege.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,79 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file havege.h - * - * \brief HAVEGE: HArdware Volatile Entropy Gathering and Expansion - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_H -#define MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_H - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#include -#include - -#define MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE 1024 - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** - * \brief HAVEGE state structure - */ -typedef struct mbedtls_havege_state { - uint32_t PT1, PT2, offset[2]; - uint32_t pool[MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE]; - uint32_t WALK[8192]; -} -mbedtls_havege_state; - -/** - * \brief HAVEGE initialization - * - * \param hs HAVEGE state to be initialized - */ -void mbedtls_havege_init(mbedtls_havege_state *hs); - -/** - * \brief Clear HAVEGE state - * - * \param hs HAVEGE state to be cleared - */ -void mbedtls_havege_free(mbedtls_havege_state *hs); - -/** - * \brief HAVEGE rand function - * - * \param p_rng A HAVEGE state - * \param output Buffer to fill - * \param len Length of buffer - * - * \return 0 - */ -int mbedtls_havege_random(void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t len); - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* havege.h */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hkdf.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hkdf.h index 3118369f0d..930e93f325 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hkdf.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hkdf.h @@ -8,28 +8,12 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_HKDF_H #define MBEDTLS_HKDF_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/md.h" diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h index 6b2248531b..18b1b75a69 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h @@ -9,28 +9,13 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_H #define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/md.h" @@ -54,7 +39,7 @@ * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. - * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line. * \{ */ @@ -89,19 +74,19 @@ extern "C" { typedef struct mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context { /* Working state: the key K is not stored explicitly, * but is implied by the HMAC context */ - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; /*!< HMAC context (inc. K) */ - unsigned char V[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; /*!< V in the spec */ - int reseed_counter; /*!< reseed counter */ + mbedtls_md_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_ctx); /*!< HMAC context (inc. K) */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(V)[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; /*!< V in the spec */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(reseed_counter); /*!< reseed counter */ /* Administrative state */ - size_t entropy_len; /*!< entropy bytes grabbed on each (re)seed */ - int prediction_resistance; /*!< enable prediction resistance (Automatic - reseed before every random generation) */ - int reseed_interval; /*!< reseed interval */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(entropy_len); /*!< entropy bytes grabbed on each (re)seed */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(prediction_resistance); /*!< enable prediction resistance (Automatic + reseed before every random generation) */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(reseed_interval); /*!< reseed interval */ /* Callbacks */ - int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); /*!< entropy function */ - void *p_entropy; /*!< context for the entropy function */ + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_entropy))(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); /*!< entropy function */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_entropy); /*!< context for the entropy function */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) /* Invariant: the mutex is initialized if and only if @@ -112,7 +97,7 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context { * Note that this invariant may change without notice. Do not rely on it * and do not access the mutex directly in application code. */ - mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex); #endif } mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context; @@ -297,8 +282,8 @@ void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, * \return \c 0 on success, or an error from the underlying * hash calculation. */ -int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len); +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len); /** * \brief This function reseeds the HMAC_DRBG context, that is @@ -400,30 +385,6 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t out_len) */ void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief This function updates the state of the HMAC_DRBG context. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret() - * in 2.16.0. - * - * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context. - * \param additional The data to update the state with. - * If this is \c NULL, there is no additional data. - * \param add_len Length of \p additional in bytes. - * Unused if \p additional is \c NULL. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len); -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) /** * \brief This function writes a seed file. diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/lms.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/lms.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..95fce21337 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/lms.h @@ -0,0 +1,440 @@ +/** + * \file lms.h + * + * \brief This file provides an API for the LMS post-quantum-safe stateful-hash + public-key signature scheme as defined in RFC8554 and NIST.SP.200-208. + * This implementation currently only supports a single parameter set + * MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10 in order to reduce complexity. This is one + * of the signature schemes recommended by the IETF draft SUIT standard + * for IOT firmware upgrades (RFC9019). + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_LMS_H +#define MBEDTLS_LMS_H + +#include +#include + +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0011 /**< Bad data has been input to an LMS function */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_OUT_OF_PRIVATE_KEYS -0x0013 /**< Specified LMS key has utilised all of its private keys */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED -0x0015 /**< LMS signature verification failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_ALLOC_FAILED -0x0017 /**< LMS failed to allocate space for a private key */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x0019 /**< Input/output buffer is too small to contain requited data */ + +/* Currently only defined for SHA256, 32 is the max hash output size */ +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX (32u) +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT_MAX (34u) +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(type) ((type) == MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8 ? 32u : 0) +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN (16u) +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN (4u) +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN (4u) +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT(type) ((type) == MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8 ? 34u : 0) +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_C_RANDOM_VALUE_LEN(type) (MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(type)) + +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN(type) (MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_C_RANDOM_VALUE_LEN(type) + \ + (MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT(type) * \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(type))) + + +#define MBEDTLS_LMS_TYPE_LEN (4) +#define MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(type) ((type) == MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10 ? 10u : 0) + +/* The length of a hash output, Currently only implemented for SHA256. + * Max is 32 bytes. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(type) ((type) == MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10 ? 32 : 0) +#define MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES_MAX 32 + +#define MBEDTLS_LMS_SIG_LEN(type, otstype) (MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN(otstype) + \ + MBEDTLS_LMS_TYPE_LEN + \ + (MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(type) * \ + MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(type))) + +#define MBEDTLS_LMS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(type) (MBEDTLS_LMS_TYPE_LEN + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN + \ + MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(type)) + + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** The Identifier of the LMS parameter set, as per + * https://www.iana.org/assignments/leighton-micali-signatures/leighton-micali-signatures.xhtml + * We are only implementing a subset of the types, particularly H10, for the sake of simplicity. + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10 = 0x6, +} mbedtls_lms_algorithm_type_t; + +/** The Identifier of the LMOTS parameter set, as per + * https://www.iana.org/assignments/leighton-micali-signatures/leighton-micali-signatures.xhtml. + * We are only implementing a subset of the types, particularly N32_W8, for the sake of simplicity. + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8 = 4 +} mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t; + +/** LMOTS parameters structure. + * + * This contains the metadata associated with an LMOTS key, detailing the + * algorithm type, the key ID, and the leaf identifier should be key be part of + * a LMS key. + */ +typedef struct { + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(I_key_identifier[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN]); /*!< The key + identifier. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(q_leaf_identifier[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN]); /*!< Which + leaf of the LMS key this is. + 0 if the key is not part of an LMS key. */ + mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type); /*!< The LM-OTS key type identifier as + per IANA. Only SHA256_N32_W8 is + currently supported. */ +} mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t; + +/** LMOTS public context structure. + * + * A LMOTS public key is a hash output, and the applicable parameter set. + * + * The context must be initialized before it is used. A public key must either + * be imported or generated from a private context. + * + * \dot + * digraph lmots_public_t { + * UNINITIALIZED -> INIT [label="init"]; + * HAVE_PUBLIC_KEY -> INIT [label="free"]; + * INIT -> HAVE_PUBLIC_KEY [label="import_public_key"]; + * INIT -> HAVE_PUBLIC_KEY [label="calculate_public_key from private key"]; + * HAVE_PUBLIC_KEY -> HAVE_PUBLIC_KEY [label="export_public_key"]; + * } + * \enddot + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(params); + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(public_key)[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX]; + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(have_public_key); /*!< Whether the context contains a public key. + Boolean values only. */ +} mbedtls_lmots_public_t; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) +/** LMOTS private context structure. + * + * A LMOTS private key is one hash output for each of digit of the digest + + * checksum, and the applicable parameter set. + * + * The context must be initialized before it is used. A public key must either + * be imported or generated from a private context. + * + * \dot + * digraph lmots_public_t { + * UNINITIALIZED -> INIT [label="init"]; + * HAVE_PRIVATE_KEY -> INIT [label="free"]; + * INIT -> HAVE_PRIVATE_KEY [label="generate_private_key"]; + * HAVE_PRIVATE_KEY -> INIT [label="sign"]; + * } + * \enddot + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(params); + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(private_key)[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT_MAX][ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX]; + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(have_private_key); /*!< Whether the context contains a private key. + Boolean values only. */ +} mbedtls_lmots_private_t; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) */ + + +/** LMS parameters structure. + * + * This contains the metadata associated with an LMS key, detailing the + * algorithm type, the type of the underlying OTS algorithm, and the key ID. + */ +typedef struct { + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(I_key_identifier[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN]); /*!< The key + identifier. */ + mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(otstype); /*!< The LM-OTS key type identifier as + per IANA. Only SHA256_N32_W8 is + currently supported. */ + mbedtls_lms_algorithm_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type); /*!< The LMS key type identifier as per + IANA. Only SHA256_M32_H10 is currently + supported. */ +} mbedtls_lms_parameters_t; + +/** LMS public context structure. + * + * A LMS public key is the hash output that is the root of the Merkle tree, and + * the applicable parameter set + * + * The context must be initialized before it is used. A public key must either + * be imported or generated from a private context. + * + * \dot + * digraph lms_public_t { + * UNINITIALIZED -> INIT [label="init"]; + * HAVE_PUBLIC_KEY -> INIT [label="free"]; + * INIT -> HAVE_PUBLIC_KEY [label="import_public_key"]; + * INIT -> HAVE_PUBLIC_KEY [label="calculate_public_key from private key"]; + * HAVE_PUBLIC_KEY -> HAVE_PUBLIC_KEY [label="export_public_key"]; + * } + * \enddot + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_lms_parameters_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(params); + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(T_1_pub_key)[MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES_MAX]; /*!< The public key, in + the form of the Merkle tree root node. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(have_public_key); /*!< Whether the context contains a public key. + Boolean values only. */ +} mbedtls_lms_public_t; + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) +/** LMS private context structure. + * + * A LMS private key is a set of LMOTS private keys, an index to the next usable + * key, and the applicable parameter set. + * + * The context must be initialized before it is used. A public key must either + * be imported or generated from a private context. + * + * \dot + * digraph lms_public_t { + * UNINITIALIZED -> INIT [label="init"]; + * HAVE_PRIVATE_KEY -> INIT [label="free"]; + * INIT -> HAVE_PRIVATE_KEY [label="generate_private_key"]; + * } + * \enddot + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_lms_parameters_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(params); + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(q_next_usable_key); /*!< The index of the next OTS key that has not + been used. */ + mbedtls_lmots_private_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ots_private_keys); /*!< The private key material. One OTS key + for each leaf node in the Merkle tree. NULL + when have_private_key is 0 and non-NULL otherwise. + is 2^MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(type) in length. */ + mbedtls_lmots_public_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ots_public_keys); /*!< The OTS key public keys, used to + build the Merkle tree. NULL + when have_private_key is 0 and + non-NULL otherwise. + Is 2^MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(type) + in length. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(have_private_key); /*!< Whether the context contains a private key. + Boolean values only. */ +} mbedtls_lms_private_t; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) */ + +/** + * \brief This function initializes an LMS public context + * + * \param ctx The uninitialized LMS context that will then be + * initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_lms_public_init(mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function uninitializes an LMS public context + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMS context that will then be + * uninitialized. + */ +void mbedtls_lms_public_free(mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function imports an LMS public key into a + * public LMS context. + * + * \note Before this function is called, the context must + * have been initialized. + * + * \note See IETF RFC8554 for details of the encoding of + * this public key. + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMS context store the key in. + * \param key The buffer from which the key will be read. + * #MBEDTLS_LMS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN bytes will be read from + * this. + * \param key_size The size of the key being imported. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lms_import_public_key(mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, size_t key_size); + +/** + * \brief This function exports an LMS public key from a + * LMS public context that already contains a public + * key. + * + * \note Before this function is called, the context must + * have been initialized and the context must contain + * a public key. + * + * \note See IETF RFC8554 for details of the encoding of + * this public key. + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMS public context that contains + * the public key. + * \param key The buffer into which the key will be output. Must + * be at least #MBEDTLS_LMS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN in size. + * \param key_size The size of the key buffer. + * \param key_len If not NULL, will be written with the size of the + * key. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lms_export_public_key(const mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx, + unsigned char *key, size_t key_size, + size_t *key_len); + +/** + * \brief This function verifies a LMS signature, using a + * LMS context that contains a public key. + * + * \note Before this function is called, the context must + * have been initialized and must contain a public key + * (either by import or generation). + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMS public context from which the + * public key will be read. + * \param msg The buffer from which the message will be read. + * \param msg_size The size of the message that will be read. + * \param sig The buf from which the signature will be read. + * #MBEDTLS_LMS_SIG_LEN bytes will be read from + * this. + * \param sig_size The size of the signature to be verified. + * + * \return \c 0 on successful verification. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lms_verify(const mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *msg, size_t msg_size, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) +/** + * \brief This function initializes an LMS private context + * + * \param ctx The uninitialized LMS private context that will + * then be initialized. */ +void mbedtls_lms_private_init(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function uninitializes an LMS private context + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMS private context that will then + * be uninitialized. + */ +void mbedtls_lms_private_free(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function generates an LMS private key, and + * stores in into an LMS private context. + * + * \warning This function is **not intended for use in + * production**, due to as-yet unsolved problems with + * handling stateful keys. The API for this function + * may change considerably in future versions. + * + * \note The seed must have at least 256 bits of entropy. + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context to generate the key + * into. + * \param type The LMS parameter set identifier. + * \param otstype The LMOTS parameter set identifier. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to be used to generate the key ID. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to f_rng + * \param seed The seed used to deterministically generate the + * key. + * \param seed_size The length of the seed. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lms_generate_private_key(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx, + mbedtls_lms_algorithm_type_t type, + mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t otstype, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, const unsigned char *seed, + size_t seed_size); + +/** + * \brief This function calculates an LMS public key from a + * LMS context that already contains a private key. + * + * \note Before this function is called, the context must + * have been initialized and the context must contain + * a private key. + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMS public context to calculate the key + * from and store it into. + * + * \param priv_ctx The LMS private context to read the private key + * from. This must have been initialized and contain a + * private key. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lms_calculate_public_key(mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx, + const mbedtls_lms_private_t *priv_ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function creates a LMS signature, using a + * LMS context that contains unused private keys. + * + * \warning This function is **not intended for use in + * production**, due to as-yet unsolved problems with + * handling stateful keys. The API for this function + * may change considerably in future versions. + * + * \note Before this function is called, the context must + * have been initialized and must contain a private + * key. + * + * \note Each of the LMOTS private keys inside a LMS private + * key can only be used once. If they are reused, then + * attackers may be able to forge signatures with that + * key. This is all handled transparently, but it is + * important to not perform copy operations on LMS + * contexts that contain private key material. + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMS private context from which the + * private key will be read. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to be used for signature + * generation. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to f_rng + * \param msg The buffer from which the message will be read. + * \param msg_size The size of the message that will be read. + * \param sig The buf into which the signature will be stored. + * Must be at least #MBEDTLS_LMS_SIG_LEN in size. + * \param sig_size The size of the buffer the signature will be + * written into. + * \param sig_len If not NULL, will be written with the size of the + * signature. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lms_sign(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, const unsigned char *msg, + unsigned int msg_size, unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, + size_t *sig_len); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_LMS_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h similarity index 75% rename from vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h rename to vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h index 7b1f38aa9e..35921412c6 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /** - * \file config.h + * \file mbedtls_config.h * * \brief Configuration options (set of defines) * @@ -9,27 +9,17 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H -#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H - -#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE) -#define _CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE 1 -#endif +/** + * This is an optional version symbol that enables compatibility handling of + * config files. + * + * It is equal to the #MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER of the Mbed TLS version that + * introduced the config format we want to be compatible with. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_VERSION 0x03000000 /** * \name SECTION: System support @@ -46,11 +36,14 @@ * Requires support for asm() in compiler. * * Used in: + * library/aesni.h * library/aria.c - * library/timing.c - * include/mbedtls/bn_mul.h + * library/bn_mul.h + * library/constant_time.c + * library/padlock.h * * Required by: + * MBEDTLS_AESCE_C * MBEDTLS_AESNI_C (on some platforms) * MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C * @@ -256,6 +249,7 @@ * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of specific base * platform function */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT @@ -264,6 +258,7 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT /** * Uncomment the macro to let Mbed TLS use your alternate implementation of @@ -286,21 +281,24 @@ /** * Uncomment the macro to let Mbed TLS use your alternate implementation of - * mbedtls_platform_zeroize(). This replaces the default implementation in - * platform_util.c. - * - * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() is a widely used function across the library to - * zero a block of memory. The implementation is expected to be secure in the - * sense that it has been written to prevent the compiler from removing calls - * to mbedtls_platform_zeroize() as part of redundant code elimination - * optimizations. However, it is difficult to guarantee that calls to - * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() will not be optimized by the compiler as older - * versions of the C language standards do not provide a secure implementation - * of memset(). Therefore, MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT enables users to - * configure their own implementation of mbedtls_platform_zeroize(), for - * example by using directives specific to their compiler, features from newer - * C standards (e.g using memset_s() in C11) or calling a secure memset() from - * their system (e.g explicit_bzero() in BSD). + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize(), to wipe sensitive data in memory. This replaces + * the default implementation in platform_util.c. + * + * By default, the library uses a system function such as memset_s() + * (optional feature of C11), explicit_bzero() (BSD and compatible), or + * SecureZeroMemory (Windows). If no such function is detected, the library + * falls back to a plain C implementation. Compilers are technically + * permitted to optimize this implementation out, meaning that the memory is + * not actually wiped. The library tries to prevent that, but the C language + * makes it impossible to guarantee that the memory will always be wiped. + * + * If your platform provides a guaranteed method to wipe memory which + * `platform_util.c` does not detect, define this macro to the name of + * a function that takes two arguments, a `void *` pointer and a length, + * and wipes that many bytes starting at the specified address. For example, + * if your platform has explicit_bzero() but `platform_util.c` does not + * detect its presence, define `MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT` to be + * `explicit_bzero` to use that function as mbedtls_platform_zeroize(). */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT @@ -331,72 +329,6 @@ */ //#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS - * - * This configuration option controls whether the library validates more of - * the parameters passed to it. - * - * When this flag is not defined, the library only attempts to validate an - * input parameter if: (1) they may come from the outside world (such as the - * network, the filesystem, etc.) or (2) not validating them could result in - * internal memory errors such as overflowing a buffer controlled by the - * library. On the other hand, it doesn't attempt to validate parameters whose - * values are fully controlled by the application (such as pointers). - * - * When this flag is defined, the library additionally attempts to validate - * parameters that are fully controlled by the application, and should always - * be valid if the application code is fully correct and trusted. - * - * For example, when a function accepts as input a pointer to a buffer that may - * contain untrusted data, and its documentation mentions that this pointer - * must not be NULL: - * - The pointer is checked to be non-NULL only if this option is enabled. - * - The content of the buffer is always validated. - * - * When this flag is defined, if a library function receives a parameter that - * is invalid: - * 1. The function will invoke the macro MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(). - * 2. If MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() did not terminate the program, the function - * will immediately return. If the function returns an Mbed TLS error code, - * the error code in this case is MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx_BAD_INPUT_DATA. - * - * When defining this flag, you also need to arrange a definition for - * MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(). You can do this by any of the following methods: - * - By default, the library defines MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() to call a - * function mbedtls_param_failed(), but the library does not define this - * function. If you do not make any other arrangements, you must provide - * the function mbedtls_param_failed() in your application. - * See `platform_util.h` for its prototype. - * - If you enable the macro #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT, then the - * library defines MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(\c cond) to be `assert(cond)`. - * You can still supply an alternative definition of - * MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(), which may call `assert`. - * - If you define a macro MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() before including `config.h` - * or you uncomment the definition of MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() in `config.h`, - * the library will call the macro that you defined and will not supply - * its own version. Note that if MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() calls `assert`, - * you need to enable #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT so that library source - * files include ``. - * - * Uncomment to enable validation of application-controlled parameters. - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS - -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT - * - * Allow MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() to call `assert`, and make it default to - * `assert`. This macro is only used if #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS is defined. - * - * If this macro is not defined, then MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() defaults to - * calling a function mbedtls_param_failed(). See the documentation of - * #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS for details. - * - * Uncomment to allow MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() to call `assert`. - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT - /** \} name SECTION: System support */ /** @@ -410,7 +342,7 @@ /** * \def MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT * - * Uncomment to provide your own alternate implementation for mbedtls_timing_hardclock(), + * Uncomment to provide your own alternate implementation for * mbedtls_timing_get_timer(), mbedtls_set_alarm(), mbedtls_set/get_delay() * * Only works if you have MBEDTLS_TIMING_C enabled. @@ -439,16 +371,14 @@ * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding * module. * - * \warning MD2, MD4, MD5, ARC4, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their + * \warning MD5, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their * use constitutes a security risk. If possible, we recommend * avoiding dependencies on them, and considering stronger message * digests and ciphers instead. * */ //#define MBEDTLS_AES_ALT -//#define MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT -//#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT @@ -459,8 +389,6 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT -//#define MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT -//#define MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT @@ -468,7 +396,6 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT -//#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT /* * When replacing the elliptic curve module, please consider, that it is @@ -482,7 +409,7 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT /** - * \def MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT * * MBEDTLS__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT: Uncomment a macro to let Mbed TLS use you * alternate core implementation of symmetric crypto or hash function. Keep in @@ -497,12 +424,6 @@ * of mbedtls_sha1_context, so your implementation of mbedtls_sha1_process must be compatible * with this definition. * - * \note Because of a signature change, the core AES encryption and decryption routines are - * currently named mbedtls_aes_internal_encrypt and mbedtls_aes_internal_decrypt, - * respectively. When setting up alternative implementations, these functions should - * be overridden, but the wrapper functions mbedtls_aes_decrypt and mbedtls_aes_encrypt - * must stay untouched. - * * \note If you use the AES_xxx_ALT macros, then it is recommended to also set * MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES in order to help the linker garbage-collect the AES * tables. @@ -510,7 +431,7 @@ * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding * function. * - * \warning MD2, MD4, MD5, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their use + * \warning MD5, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their use * constitutes a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding * dependencies on them, and considering stronger message digests * and ciphers instead. @@ -521,13 +442,9 @@ * alternative implementations should use the RNG only for generating * the ephemeral key and nothing else. If this is not possible, then * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC should be disabled and an alternative - * implementation should be provided for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() - * (and for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() too if backward compatibility is - * desirable). + * implementation should be provided for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext(). * */ -//#define MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT -//#define MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT @@ -611,23 +528,6 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY - * - * Enables testing and use of Mbed TLS without any configured entropy sources. - * This permits use of the library on platforms before an entropy source has - * been integrated (see for example the MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT or the - * MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED switches). - * - * WARNING! This switch MUST be disabled in production builds, and is suitable - * only for development. - * Enabling the switch negates any security provided by the library. - * - * Requires MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES - * - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY - /** * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT * @@ -635,7 +535,8 @@ * hardware entropy collector. * * Your function must be called \c mbedtls_hardware_poll(), have the same - * prototype as declared in entropy_poll.h, and accept NULL as first argument. + * prototype as declared in library/entropy_poll.h, and accept NULL as first + * argument. * * Uncomment to use your own hardware entropy collector. */ @@ -657,7 +558,6 @@ * performance if ROM access is slower than RAM access. * * This option is independent of \c MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES. - * */ //#define MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES @@ -679,10 +579,40 @@ * depends on the system and memory details. * * This option is independent of \c MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES. - * */ //#define MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH + * + * Use only 128-bit keys in AES operations to save ROM. + * + * Uncomment this macro to remove support for AES operations that use 192- + * or 256-bit keys. + * + * Uncommenting this macro reduces the size of AES code by ~300 bytes + * on v8-M/Thumb2. + * + * Module: library/aes.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH + +/* + * Disable plain C implementation for AES. + * + * When the plain C implementation is enabled, and an implementation using a + * special CPU feature (such as MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) is also enabled, runtime + * detection will be used to select between them. + * + * If only one implementation is present, runtime detection will not be used. + * This configuration will crash at runtime if running on a CPU without the + * necessary features. It will not build unless at least one of MBEDTLS_AESCE_C + * and/or MBEDTLS_AESNI_C is enabled & present in the build. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY + /** * \def MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY * @@ -757,8 +687,7 @@ * Warning: Only do so when you know what you are doing. This allows for * encryption or channels without any security! * - * Requires MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES as well to enable - * the following ciphersuites: + * To enable the following ciphersuites: * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA @@ -802,67 +731,20 @@ /** \def MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY * * Uncomment this macro to use a 128-bit key in the CTR_DRBG module. - * By default, CTR_DRBG uses a 256-bit key. + * Without this, CTR_DRBG uses a 256-bit key + * unless \c MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH is set. */ //#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES - * - * Enable weak ciphersuites in SSL / TLS. - * Warning: Only do so when you know what you are doing. This allows for - * channels with virtually no security at all! - * - * This enables the following ciphersuites: - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA - * - * Uncomment this macro to enable weak ciphersuites - * - * \warning DES is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a - * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead. - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES - -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES - * - * Remove RC4 ciphersuites by default in SSL / TLS. - * This flag removes the ciphersuites based on RC4 from the default list as - * returned by mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(). However, it is still possible to - * enable (some of) them with mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites() by including them - * explicitly. - * - * Uncomment this macro to remove RC4 ciphersuites by default. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES - -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES - * - * Remove 3DES ciphersuites by default in SSL / TLS. - * This flag removes the ciphersuites based on 3DES from the default list as - * returned by mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(). However, it is still possible - * to enable (some of) them with mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites() by including - * them explicitly. - * - * A man-in-the-browser attacker can recover authentication tokens sent through - * a TLS connection using a 3DES based cipher suite (see "On the Practical - * (In-)Security of 64-bit Block Ciphers" by Karthikeyan Bhargavan and Gaëtan - * Leurent, see https://sweet32.info/SWEET32_CCS16.pdf). If this attack falls - * in your threat model or you are unsure, then you should keep this option - * enabled to remove 3DES based cipher suites. - * - * Comment this macro to keep 3DES in the default ciphersuite list. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES - /** * Enable the verified implementations of ECDH primitives from Project Everest * (currently only Curve25519). This feature changes the layout of ECDH * contexts and therefore is a compatibility break for applications that access * fields of a mbedtls_ecdh_context structure directly. See also * MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT in include/mbedtls/ecdh.h. + * + * The Everest code is provided under the Apache 2.0 license only; therefore enabling this + * option is not compatible with taking the library under the GPL v2.0-or-later license. */ //#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED @@ -901,28 +783,6 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG - * - * When this option is disabled, mbedtls_ecp_mul() will make use of an - * internal RNG when called with a NULL \c f_rng argument, in order to protect - * against some side-channel attacks. - * - * This protection introduces a dependency of the ECP module on one of the - * DRBG modules. For very constrained implementations that don't require this - * protection (for example, because you're only doing signature verification, - * so not manipulating any secret, or because local/physical side-channel - * attacks are outside your threat model), it might be desirable to get rid of - * that dependency. - * - * \warning Enabling this option makes some uses of ECP vulnerable to some - * side-channel attacks. Only enable it if you know that's not a problem for - * your use case. - * - * Uncomment this macro to disable some counter-measures in ECP. - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG - /** * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE * @@ -952,7 +812,7 @@ * ECDHE-ECDSA key exchange (not other key exchanges) to make all ECC * computations restartable: * - ECDH operations from the key exchange, only for Short Weierstrass - * curves; + * curves, only when MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is not enabled. * - verification of the server's key exchange signature; * - verification of the server's certificate chain; * - generation of the client's signature if client authentication is used, @@ -962,10 +822,15 @@ * mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), can now return * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS. * + * \note When this option and MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO are both enabled, + * restartable operations in PK, X.509 and TLS (see above) are not + * using PSA. On the other hand, ECDH computations in TLS are using + * PSA, and are not restartable. These are temporary limitations that + * should be lifted in the future. + * * \note This option only works with the default software implementation of * elliptic curve functionality. It is incompatible with - * MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDH_XXX_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_XXX_ALT, - * MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT, and MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO. + * MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDH_XXX_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_XXX_ALT. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C * @@ -974,32 +839,12 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE /** - * \def MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT - * - * Use a backward compatible ECDH context. + * Uncomment to enable using new bignum code in the ECC modules. * - * Mbed TLS supports two formats for ECDH contexts (#mbedtls_ecdh_context - * defined in `ecdh.h`). For most applications, the choice of format makes - * no difference, since all library functions can work with either format, - * except that the new format is incompatible with MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE. - - * The new format used when this option is disabled is smaller - * (56 bytes on a 32-bit platform). In future versions of the library, it - * will support alternative implementations of ECDH operations. - * The new format is incompatible with applications that access - * context fields directly and with restartable ECP operations. - * - * Define this macro if you enable MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE or if you - * want to access ECDH context fields directly. Otherwise you should - * comment out this macro definition. - * - * This option has no effect if #MBEDTLS_ECDH_C is not enabled. - * - * \note This configuration option is experimental. Future versions of the - * library may modify the way the ECDH context layout is configured - * and may modify the layout of the new context type. + * \warning This is currently experimental, incomplete and therefore should not + * be used in production. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT +//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT /** * \def MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC @@ -1032,8 +877,6 @@ * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 - * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED @@ -1056,8 +899,6 @@ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 - * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA * * \warning Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it * is not possible to validate custom DH parameters. @@ -1073,7 +914,7 @@ * * Enable the ECDHE-PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C or (MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) * * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are * enabled as well): @@ -1083,8 +924,6 @@ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED @@ -1108,8 +947,6 @@ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED @@ -1135,9 +972,6 @@ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 */ #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED @@ -1163,7 +997,6 @@ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA * * \warning Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it * is not possible to validate custom DH parameters. @@ -1179,7 +1012,9 @@ * * Enable the ECDHE-RSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15, + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C or (MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) + * MBEDTLS_RSA_C + * MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C * * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are @@ -1194,8 +1029,6 @@ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED @@ -1204,7 +1037,9 @@ * * Enable the ECDHE-ECDSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C, + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C or (MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) + * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C or (MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C * * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are * enabled as well): @@ -1218,8 +1053,6 @@ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */ #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED @@ -1228,12 +1061,12 @@ * * Enable the ECDH-ECDSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C or (MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) + * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C or (MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C * * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are * enabled as well): - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 @@ -1252,12 +1085,12 @@ * * Enable the ECDH-RSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C or (MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) + * MBEDTLS_RSA_C + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C * * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are * enabled as well): - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 @@ -1280,10 +1113,14 @@ * Thread v1.0.0 specification; incompatible changes to the specification * might still happen. For this reason, this is disabled by default. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C - * MBEDTLS_SHA256_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C or (MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) + * SHA-256 (via MBEDTLS_SHA256_C or a PSA driver) * MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED * + * \warning If SHA-256 is provided only by a PSA driver, you must call + * psa_crypto_init() before the first hanshake (even if + * MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is disabled). + * * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are * enabled as well): * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 @@ -1304,6 +1141,19 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED + * + * Enable the support for parsing public keys of type Short Weierstrass + * (MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP_XXX and MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP_XXX) which are using the + * compressed point format. This parsing is done through ECP module's functions. + * + * \note As explained in the description of MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED (in ecp.h) + * the only unsupported curves are MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 and + * MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED + /** * \def MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY * @@ -1338,8 +1188,7 @@ /** * \def MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES * - * Do not add default entropy sources. These are the platform specific, - * mbedtls_timing_hardclock and HAVEGE based poll functions. + * Do not add default entropy sources in mbedtls_entropy_init(). * * This is useful to have more control over the added entropy sources in an * application. @@ -1411,7 +1260,7 @@ * which is currently hard-coded to be int32_t. * * Note that this option is meant for internal use only and may be removed - * without notice. It is incompatible with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO. + * without notice. */ //#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER @@ -1465,7 +1314,10 @@ * * Enable support for PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C + * + * \warning If using a hash that is only provided by PSA drivers, you must + * call psa_crypto_init() before doing any PKCS#1 v2.1 operation. * * This enables support for RSAES-OAEP and RSASSA-PSS operations. */ @@ -1503,17 +1355,6 @@ */ //#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT -/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS - * - * Enable support for the experimental PSA crypto driver interface. - * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C - * - * \warning This interface is experimental and may change or be removed - * without notice. - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS - /** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG * * Make the PSA Crypto module use an external random generator provided @@ -1560,12 +1401,60 @@ * NSPE (Non-Secure Process Environment) and an SPE (Secure Process * Environment). * + * If you enable this option, your build environment must include a header + * file `"crypto_spe.h"` (either in the `psa` subdirectory of the Mbed TLS + * header files, or in another directory on the compiler's include search + * path). Alternatively, your platform may customize the header + * `psa/crypto_platform.h`, in which case it can skip or replace the + * inclusion of `"crypto_spe.h"`. + * * Module: library/psa_crypto.c * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C * */ //#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM +/** + * Uncomment to enable p256-m. This is an alternative implementation of + * key generation, ECDH and (randomized) ECDSA on the curve SECP256R1. + * Compared to the default implementation: + * + * - p256-m has a much smaller code size and RAM footprint. + * - p256-m is only available via the PSA API. This includes the pk module + * when #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled. + * - p256-m does not support deterministic ECDSA, EC-JPAKE, custom protocols + * over the core arithmetic, or deterministic derivation of keys. + * + * We recommend enabling this option if your application uses the PSA API + * and the only elliptic curve support it needs is ECDH and ECDSA over + * SECP256R1. + * + * If you enable this option, you do not need to enable any ECC-related + * MBEDTLS_xxx option. You do need to separately request support for the + * cryptographic mechanisms through the PSA API: + * - #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C and #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG for PSA-based + * configuration; + * - #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO if you want to use p256-m from PK, X.509 or TLS; + * - #PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256; + * - #PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH and/or #PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA as needed; + * - #PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY, #PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC, + * #PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT, + * #PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT and/or + * #PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE as needed. + * + * \note To benefit from the smaller code size of p256-m, make sure that you + * do not enable any ECC-related option not supported by p256-m: this + * would cause the built-in ECC implementation to be built as well, in + * order to provide the required option. + * Make sure #PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA, #PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE and + * #PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE, and curves other than + * SECP256R1 are disabled as they are not supported by this driver. + * Also, avoid defining #MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED or + * #MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED as those currently require a subset of + * the built-in ECC implementation, see docs/driver-only-builds.md. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED + /** * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY * @@ -1579,6 +1468,26 @@ */ //#define MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS + * + * Assume all buffers passed to PSA functions are owned exclusively by the + * PSA function and are not stored in shared memory. + * + * This option may be enabled if all buffers passed to any PSA function reside + * in memory that is accessible only to the PSA function during its execution. + * + * This option MUST be disabled whenever buffer arguments are in memory shared + * with an untrusted party, for example where arguments to PSA calls are passed + * across a trust boundary. + * + * \note Enabling this option reduces memory usage and code size. + * + * \note Enabling this option causes overlap of input and output buffers + * not to be supported by PSA functions. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS + /** * \def MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT * @@ -1623,18 +1532,6 @@ */ //#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 - * - * Disable the SHA-384 option of the SHA-512 module. Use this to save some - * code size on devices that don't use SHA-384. - * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA512_C - * - * Uncomment to disable SHA-384 - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 - /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES * @@ -1649,36 +1546,18 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING - * - * Enable the function mbedtls_ssl_check_record() which can be used to check - * the validity and authenticity of an incoming record, to verify that it has - * not been seen before. These checks are performed without modifying the - * externally visible state of the SSL context. - * - * See mbedtls_ssl_check_record() for more information. - * - * Uncomment to enable support for record checking. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING - /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID * - * Enable support for the DTLS Connection ID extension - * (version draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05, - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05) + * Enable support for the DTLS Connection ID (CID) extension, * which allows to identify DTLS connections across changes - * in the underlying transport. + * in the underlying transport. The CID functionality is described + * in RFC 9146. * * Setting this option enables the SSL APIs `mbedtls_ssl_set_cid()`, - * `mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid()` and `mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid()`. - * See the corresponding documentation for more information. - * - * \warning The Connection ID extension is still in draft state. - * We make no stability promises for the availability - * or the shape of the API controlled by this option. + * mbedtls_ssl_get_own_cid()`, `mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid()` and + * `mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid()`. See the corresponding documentation for + * more information. * * The maximum lengths of outgoing and incoming CIDs can be configured * through the options @@ -1689,7 +1568,30 @@ * * Uncomment to enable the Connection ID extension. */ -//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID + + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT + * + * Defines whether RFC 9146 (default) or the legacy version + * (version draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05, + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05) + * is used. + * + * Set the value to 0 for the standard version, and + * 1 for the legacy draft version. + * + * \deprecated Support for the legacy version of the DTLS + * Connection ID feature is deprecated. Please + * switch to the standardized version defined + * in RFC 9146 enabled by utilizing + * MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID without use + * of MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT 0 /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE @@ -1699,6 +1601,7 @@ * module to perform private key operations instead of performing the * operation inside the library. * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE @@ -1757,9 +1660,7 @@ * * This only affects CBC ciphersuites, and is useless if none is defined. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 or - * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 or - * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 * * Comment this macro to disable support for Encrypt-then-MAC */ @@ -1775,32 +1676,12 @@ * renegotiation), since it actually fixes a more fundamental issue in the * original SSL/TLS design, and has implications beyond Triple Handshake. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 or - * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 or - * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 * * Comment this macro to disable support for Extended Master Secret. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV - * - * Enable support for RFC 7507: Fallback Signaling Cipher Suite Value (SCSV) - * for Preventing Protocol Downgrade Attacks. - * - * For servers, it is recommended to always enable this, unless you support - * only one version of TLS, or know for sure that none of your clients - * implements a fallback strategy. - * - * For clients, you only need this if you're using a fallback strategy, which - * is not recommended in the first place, unless you absolutely need it to - * interoperate with buggy (version-intolerant) servers. - * - * Comment this macro to disable support for FALLBACK_SCSV - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV - /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE * @@ -1818,36 +1699,13 @@ * still ensure that certificates do not change during renegotiation, * for example by keeping a hash of the peer's certificate. * + * \note This option is required if MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 is set. + * * Comment this macro to disable storing the peer's certificate * after the handshake. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL - * - * Enable hooking functions in SSL module for hardware acceleration of - * individual records. - * - * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a future - * version of Mbed TLS. - * - * Uncomment this macro to enable hooking functions. - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL - -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING - * - * Enable 1/n-1 record splitting for CBC mode in SSLv3 and TLS 1.0. - * - * This is a countermeasure to the BEAST attack, which also minimizes the risk - * of interoperability issues compared to sending 0-length records. - * - * Comment this macro to disable 1/n-1 record splitting. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING - /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION * @@ -1859,6 +1717,8 @@ * it has been associated with security issues in the past and is easy to * misuse/misunderstand. * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * * Comment this to disable support for renegotiation. * * \note Even if this option is disabled, both client and server are aware @@ -1871,117 +1731,160 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION /** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + * + * Enable support for RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension in SSL. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for the max_fragment_length extension + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT * - * Enable support for receiving and parsing SSLv2 Client Hello messages for the - * SSL Server module (MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C). + * Enable support for RFC 8449 record_size_limit extension in SSL (TLS 1.3 only). * - * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a future - * version of Mbed TLS. + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 * - * Uncomment this macro to enable support for SSLv2 Client Hello messages. + * Uncomment this macro to enable support for the record_size_limit extension */ -//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT /** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 * - * Pick the ciphersuite according to the client's preferences rather than ours - * in the SSL Server module (MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C). + * Enable support for TLS 1.2 (and DTLS 1.2 if DTLS is enabled). + * + * Requires: Without MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO: MBEDTLS_MD_C and + * (MBEDTLS_SHA256_C or MBEDTLS_SHA384_C or + * SHA-256 or SHA-512 provided by a PSA driver) + * With MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO: + * PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 or PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 * - * Uncomment this macro to respect client's ciphersuite order + * \warning If building with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO, or if the hash(es) used + * are only provided by PSA drivers, you must call psa_crypto_init() before + * doing any TLS operations. + * + * Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.2 / DTLS 1.2 */ -//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 /** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 * - * Enable support for RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension in SSL. + * Enable support for TLS 1.3. * - * Comment this macro to disable support for the max_fragment_length extension + * \note See docs/architecture/tls13-support.md for a description of the TLS + * 1.3 support that this option enables. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + * \note TLS 1.3 uses PSA crypto for cryptographic operations that are + * directly performed by TLS 1.3 code. As a consequence, you must + * call psa_crypto_init() before the first TLS 1.3 handshake. + * + * \note Cryptographic operations performed indirectly via another module + * (X.509, PK) or by code shared with TLS 1.2 (record protection, + * running handshake hash) only use PSA crypto if + * #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled. + * + * Uncomment this macro to enable the support for TLS 1.3. */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 /** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE * - * Enable support for SSL 3.0. + * Enable TLS 1.3 middlebox compatibility mode. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD5_C - * MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + * As specified in Section D.4 of RFC 8446, TLS 1.3 offers a compatibility + * mode to make a TLS 1.3 connection more likely to pass through middle boxes + * expecting TLS 1.2 traffic. * - * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a future - * version of Mbed TLS. + * Turning on the compatibility mode comes at the cost of a few added bytes + * on the wire, but it doesn't affect compatibility with TLS 1.3 implementations + * that don't use it. Therefore, unless transmission bandwidth is critical and + * you know that middlebox compatibility issues won't occur, it is therefore + * recommended to set this option. + * + * Comment to disable compatibility mode for TLS 1.3. If + * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 is not enabled, this option does not have any + * effect on the build. * - * Comment this macro to disable support for SSL 3.0 */ -//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE /** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED * - * Enable support for TLS 1.0. + * Enable TLS 1.3 PSK key exchange mode. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD5_C - * MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + * Comment to disable support for the PSK key exchange mode in TLS 1.3. If + * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 is not enabled, this option does not have any + * effect on the build. * - * Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.0 */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED /** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED + * + * Enable TLS 1.3 ephemeral key exchange mode. * - * Enable support for TLS 1.1 (and DTLS 1.0 if DTLS is enabled). + * Requires: PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH or PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * and at least one of: + * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C or (MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) + * MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD5_C - * MBEDTLS_SHA1_C + * Comment to disable support for the ephemeral key exchange mode in TLS 1.3. + * If MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 is not enabled, this option does not have any + * effect on the build. * - * Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.1 / DTLS 1.0 */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED /** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED * - * Enable support for TLS 1.2 (and DTLS 1.2 if DTLS is enabled). + * Enable TLS 1.3 PSK ephemeral key exchange mode. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA1_C or MBEDTLS_SHA256_C or MBEDTLS_SHA512_C - * (Depends on ciphersuites) + * Requires: PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH or PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH + * + * Comment to disable support for the PSK ephemeral key exchange mode in + * TLS 1.3. If MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 is not enabled, this option does not + * have any effect on the build. * - * Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.2 / DTLS 1.2 */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED /** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA + * + * Enable support for RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 early data. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS and either + * MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED * - * This macro is used to selectively enable experimental parts - * of the code that contribute to the ongoing development of - * the prototype TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3 implementation, and provide - * no other purpose. + * Comment this to disable support for early data. If MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 + * is not enabled, this option does not have any effect on the build. * - * \warning TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3 aren't yet supported in Mbed TLS, - * and no feature exposed through this macro is part of the - * public API. In particular, features under the control - * of this macro are experimental and don't come with any - * stability guarantees. + * \note The maximum amount of early data can be set with + * MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE. * - * Uncomment this macro to enable experimental and partial - * functionality specific to TLS 1.3. */ -//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS * * Enable support for DTLS (all available versions). * - * Enable this and MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 to enable DTLS 1.0, - * and/or this and MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 to enable DTLS 1.2. + * Enable this and MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 to enable DTLS 1.2. * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 - * or MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 * * Comment this macro to disable support for DTLS */ @@ -2043,7 +1946,7 @@ * (see Section 5 of RFC 5764), are not handled by this feature. * Instead, after successful completion of a handshake negotiating * the use of DTLS-SRTP, the extended key exporter API - * mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb() should be used to implement + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_cb() should be used to implement * the key exporter described in Section 4.2 of RFC 5764 and RFC 5705 * (this is implemented in the SSL example programs). * The resulting key should then be passed to an SRTP stack. @@ -2076,17 +1979,6 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT - * - * Enable support for a limit of records with bad MAC. - * - * See mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit(). - * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT - /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS * @@ -2101,16 +1993,6 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS - * - * Enable support for exporting key block and master secret. - * This is required for certain users of TLS, e.g. EAP-TLS. - * - * Comment this macro to disable support for key export - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS - /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION * @@ -2122,39 +2004,6 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC - * - * Enable support for RFC 6066 truncated HMAC in SSL. - * - * Comment this macro to disable support for truncated HMAC in SSL - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC - -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT - * - * Fallback to old (pre-2.7), non-conforming implementation of the truncated - * HMAC extension which also truncates the HMAC key. Note that this option is - * only meant for a transitory upgrade period and will be removed in a future - * version of the library. - * - * \warning The old implementation is non-compliant and has a security weakness - * (2^80 brute force attack on the HMAC key used for a single, - * uninterrupted connection). This should only be enabled temporarily - * when (1) the use of truncated HMAC is essential in order to save - * bandwidth, and (2) the peer is an Mbed TLS stack that doesn't use - * the fixed implementation yet (pre-2.7). - * - * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a - * future version of Mbed TLS. - * - * Uncomment to fallback to old, non-compliant truncated HMAC implementation. - * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT - /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH * @@ -2165,23 +2014,6 @@ */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH -/** - * Allow SHA-1 in the default TLS configuration for TLS 1.2 handshake - * signature and ciphersuite selection. Without this build-time option, SHA-1 - * support must be activated explicitly through mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes. - * The use of SHA-1 in TLS <= 1.1 and in HMAC-SHA-1 is always allowed by - * default. At the time of writing, there is no practical attack on the use - * of SHA-1 in handshake signatures, hence this option is turned on by default - * to preserve compatibility with existing peers, but the general - * warning applies nonetheless: - * - * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes - * a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies - * on it, and considering stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE - /** * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN * @@ -2263,21 +2095,26 @@ /** * \def MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO * - * Make the X.509 and TLS library use PSA for cryptographic operations, and - * enable new APIs for using keys handled by PSA Crypto. + * Make the X.509 and TLS libraries use PSA for cryptographic operations as + * much as possible, and enable new APIs for using keys handled by PSA Crypto. * * \note Development of this option is currently in progress, and parts of Mbed * TLS's X.509 and TLS modules are not ported to PSA yet. However, these parts * will still continue to work as usual, so enabling this option should not * break backwards compatibility. * - * \note See docs/use-psa-crypto.md for a complete description of what this - * option currently does, and of parts that are not affected by it so far. + * \warning If you enable this option, you need to call `psa_crypto_init()` + * before calling any function from the SSL/TLS, X.509 or PK modules, except + * for the various mbedtls_xxx_init() functions which can be called at any time. + * + * \note An important and desirable effect of this option is that it allows + * PK, X.509 and TLS to take advantage of PSA drivers. For example, enabling + * this option is what allows use of drivers for ECDSA, ECDH and EC J-PAKE in + * those modules. However, note that even with this option disabled, some code + * in PK, X.509, TLS or the crypto library might still use PSA drivers, if it + * can determine it's safe to do so; currently that's the case for hashes. * - * \warning This option enables new Mbed TLS APIs which are currently - * considered experimental and may change in incompatible ways at any time. - * That is, the APIs enabled by this option are not covered by the usual - * promises of API stability. + * \note See docs/use-psa-crypto.md for a complete description this option. * * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C. * @@ -2300,17 +2137,20 @@ * include/psa/crypto_config.h. The corresponding `MBEDTLS_XXX` settings are * automatically enabled if required (i.e. if no PSA driver provides the * mechanism). You may still freely enable additional `MBEDTLS_XXX` symbols - * in config.h. + * in mbedtls_config.h. * * If the symbol #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE is defined, it specifies * an alternative header to include instead of include/psa/crypto_config.h. * - * If you enable this option and write your own configuration file, you must - * include mbedtls/config_psa.h in your configuration file. The default - * provided mbedtls/config.h contains the necessary inclusion. - * - * This feature is still experimental and is not ready for production since - * it is not completed. + * \warning This option is experimental, in that the set of `PSA_WANT_XXX` + * symbols is not completely finalized yet, and the configuration + * tooling is not ideally adapted to having two separate configuration + * files. + * Future minor releases of Mbed TLS may make minor changes to those + * symbols, but we will endeavor to provide a transition path. + * Nonetheless, this option is considered mature enough to use in + * production, as long as you accept that you may need to make + * minor changes to psa/crypto_config.h when upgrading Mbed TLS. */ //#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG @@ -2327,28 +2167,6 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 - * - * If set, the X509 parser will not break-off when parsing an X509 certificate - * and encountering an extension in a v1 or v2 certificate. - * - * Uncomment to prevent an error. - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 - -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION - * - * If set, the X509 parser will not break-off when parsing an X509 certificate - * and encountering an unknown critical extension. - * - * \warning Depending on your PKI use, enabling this can be a security risk! - * - * Uncomment to prevent an error. - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION - /** * \def MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK * @@ -2364,36 +2182,22 @@ * See the documentation of `mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb()` and * `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()` for more information. * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C + * * Uncomment to enable trusted certificate callbacks. */ //#define MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK /** - * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE - * - * Enable verification of the keyUsage extension (CA and leaf certificates). - * - * Disabling this avoids problems with mis-issued and/or misused - * (intermediate) CA and leaf certificates. - * - * \warning Depending on your PKI use, disabling this can be a security risk! - * - * Comment to skip keyUsage checking for both CA and leaf certificates. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE - -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE - * - * Enable verification of the extendedKeyUsage extension (leaf certificates). + * \def MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO * - * Disabling this avoids problems with mis-issued and/or misused certificates. + * Disable mbedtls_x509_*_info() and related APIs. * - * \warning Depending on your PKI use, disabling this can be a security risk! - * - * Comment to skip extendedKeyUsage checking for certificates. + * Uncomment to omit mbedtls_x509_*_info(), as well as mbedtls_debug_print_crt() + * and other functions/constants only used by these functions, thus reducing + * the code footprint by several KB. */ -#define MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO /** * \def MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT @@ -2401,38 +2205,15 @@ * Enable parsing and verification of X.509 certificates, CRLs and CSRS * signed with RSASSA-PSS (aka PKCS#1 v2.1). * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 + * * Comment this macro to disallow using RSASSA-PSS in certificates. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT +/** \} name SECTION: Mbed TLS feature support */ /** - * \def MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT - * - * If set, the SSL/TLS module uses ZLIB to support compression and - * decompression of packet data. - * - * \warning TLS-level compression MAY REDUCE SECURITY! See for example the - * CRIME attack. Before enabling this option, you should examine with care if - * CRIME or similar exploits may be applicable to your use case. - * - * \note Currently compression can't be used with DTLS. - * - * \deprecated This feature is deprecated and will be removed - * in the next major revision of the library. - * - * Used in: library/ssl_tls.c - * library/ssl_cli.c - * library/ssl_srv.c - * - * This feature requires zlib library and headers to be present. - * - * Uncomment to enable use of ZLIB - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT -/** \} name SECTION: Mbed TLS feature support */ - -/** - * \name SECTION: Mbed TLS modules + * \name SECTION: Mbed TLS modules * * This section enables or disables entire modules in Mbed TLS * \{ @@ -2444,7 +2225,7 @@ * Enable AES-NI support on x86-64 or x86-32. * * \note AESNI is only supported with certain compilers and target options: - * - Visual Studio 2013: supported. + * - Visual Studio: supported * - GCC, x86-64, target not explicitly supporting AESNI: * requires MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM. * - GCC, x86-32, target not explicitly supporting AESNI: @@ -2470,6 +2251,32 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_AESNI_C +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_AESCE_C + * + * Enable AES cryptographic extension support on Armv8. + * + * Module: library/aesce.c + * Caller: library/aes.c + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C + * + * \warning Runtime detection only works on Linux. For non-Linux operating + * system, Armv8-A Cryptographic Extensions must be supported by + * the CPU when this option is enabled. + * + * \note Minimum compiler versions for this feature when targeting aarch64 + * are Clang 4.0; armclang 6.6; GCC 6.0; or MSVC 2019 version 16.11.2. + * Minimum compiler versions for this feature when targeting 32-bit + * Arm or Thumb are Clang 11.0; armclang 6.20; or GCC 6.0. + * + * \note \c CFLAGS must be set to a minimum of \c -march=armv8-a+crypto for + * armclang <= 6.9 + * + * This module adds support for the AES Armv8-A Cryptographic Extensions on Armv8 systems. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_AESCE_C + /** * \def MBEDTLS_AES_C * @@ -2545,34 +2352,6 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_AES_C -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_ARC4_C - * - * Enable the ARCFOUR stream cipher. - * - * Module: library/arc4.c - * Caller: library/cipher.c - * - * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are - * enabled as well): - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - * - * \warning ARC4 is considered a weak cipher and its use constitutes a - * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on - * it, and considering stronger ciphers instead. - * - */ -#define MBEDTLS_ARC4_C - /** * \def MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C * @@ -2613,32 +2392,48 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_BASE64_C +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT + * + * Remove decryption operation for AES, ARIA and Camellia block cipher. + * + * \note This feature is incompatible with insecure block cipher, + * MBEDTLS_DES_C, and cipher modes which always require decryption + * operation, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS and + * MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C. When #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is enabled, + * this feature is incompatible with following supported PSA equivalence, + * PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING, PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING, + * PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 and PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES. + * + * Module: library/aes.c + * library/aesce.c + * library/aesni.c + * library/aria.c + * library/camellia.c + * library/cipher.c + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT + /** * \def MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C * * Enable the multi-precision integer library. * * Module: library/bignum.c + * library/bignum_core.c + * library/bignum_mod.c + * library/bignum_mod_raw.c * Caller: library/dhm.c * library/ecp.c * library/ecdsa.c * library/rsa.c - * library/rsa_internal.c + * library/rsa_alt_helpers.c * library/ssl_tls.c * * This module is required for RSA, DHM and ECC (ECDH, ECDSA) support. */ #define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C - * - * Enable the Blowfish block cipher. - * - * Module: library/blowfish.c - */ -#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C - /** * \def MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C * @@ -2744,7 +2539,7 @@ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 */ -//#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_C +#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_CCM_C @@ -2753,25 +2548,14 @@ * * Module: library/ccm.c * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C or + * MBEDTLS_ARIA_C * * This module enables the AES-CCM ciphersuites, if other requisites are * enabled as well. */ #define MBEDTLS_CCM_C -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_CERTS_C - * - * Enable the test certificates. - * - * Module: library/certs.c - * Caller: - * - * This module is used for testing (ssl_client/server). - */ -#define MBEDTLS_CERTS_C - /** * \def MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C * @@ -2798,7 +2582,19 @@ * Enable the generic cipher layer. * * Module: library/cipher.c - * Caller: library/ssl_tls.c + * Caller: library/ccm.c + * library/cmac.c + * library/gcm.c + * library/nist_kw.c + * library/pkcs12.c + * library/pkcs5.c + * library/psa_crypto_aead.c + * library/psa_crypto_mac.c + * library/ssl_ciphersuites.c + * library/ssl_msg.c + * library/ssl_ticket.c (unless MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled) + * Auto-enabled by: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C depending on which ciphers are enabled + * (see the documentation of that option for details). * * Uncomment to enable generic cipher wrappers. */ @@ -2817,10 +2613,10 @@ * * Module: library/cmac.c * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_DES_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_DES_C * */ -//#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C +#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C @@ -2829,6 +2625,15 @@ * The CTR_DRBG generator uses AES-256 by default. * To use AES-128 instead, enable \c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY above. * + * AES support can either be achived through builtin (MBEDTLS_AES_C) or PSA. + * Builtin is the default option when MBEDTLS_AES_C is defined otherwise PSA + * is used. + * + * \warning When using PSA, the user should call `psa_crypto_init()` before + * using any CTR_DRBG operation (except `mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init()`). + * + * \note AES-128 will be used if \c MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH is set. + * * \note To achieve a 256-bit security strength with CTR_DRBG, * you must use AES-256 *and* use sufficient entropy. * See ctr_drbg.h for more details. @@ -2836,7 +2641,9 @@ * Module: library/ctr_drbg.c * Caller: * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or + * (PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING and + * MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) * * This module provides the CTR_DRBG AES random number generator. */ @@ -2848,9 +2655,10 @@ * Enable the debug functions. * * Module: library/debug.c - * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c - * library/ssl_srv.c + * Caller: library/ssl_msg.c * library/ssl_tls.c + * library/ssl_tls12_*.c + * library/ssl_tls13_*.c * * This module provides debugging functions. */ @@ -2865,19 +2673,6 @@ * Caller: library/pem.c * library/cipher.c * - * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are - * enabled as well): - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - * * PEM_PARSE uses DES/3DES for decrypting encrypted keys. * * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a @@ -2891,8 +2686,9 @@ * Enable the Diffie-Hellman-Merkle module. * * Module: library/dhm.c - * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c - * library/ssl_srv.c + * Caller: library/ssl_tls.c + * library/ssl*_client.c + * library/ssl*_server.c * * This module is used by the following key exchanges: * DHE-RSA, DHE-PSK @@ -2912,8 +2708,10 @@ * Enable the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman library. * * Module: library/ecdh.c - * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c - * library/ssl_srv.c + * Caller: library/psa_crypto.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * library/ssl*_client.c + * library/ssl*_server.c * * This module is used by the following key exchanges: * ECDHE-ECDSA, ECDHE-RSA, DHE-PSK @@ -2944,9 +2742,9 @@ * * Enable the elliptic curve J-PAKE library. * - * \warning This is currently experimental. EC J-PAKE support is based on the - * Thread v1.0.0 specification; incompatible changes to the specification - * might still happen. For this reason, this is disabled by default. + * \note EC J-PAKE support is based on the Thread v1.0.0 specification. + * It has not been reviewed for compliance with newer standards such as + * Thread v1.1 or RFC 8236. * * Module: library/ecjpake.c * Caller: @@ -2954,9 +2752,12 @@ * This module is used by the following key exchanges: * ECJPAKE * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C and either MBEDTLS_MD_C or MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + * \warning If using a hash that is only provided by PSA drivers, you must + * call psa_crypto_init() before doing any EC J-PAKE operations. */ -//#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C +#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_C @@ -3005,7 +2806,8 @@ * * Module: library/gcm.c * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C or MBEDTLS_ARIA_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C or + * MBEDTLS_ARIA_C * * This module enables the AES-GCM and CAMELLIA-GCM ciphersuites, if other * requisites are enabled as well. @@ -3013,27 +2815,20 @@ #define MBEDTLS_GCM_C /** - * \def MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C - * - * Enable the HAVEGE random generator. + * \def MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE * - * Warning: the HAVEGE random generator is not suitable for virtualized - * environments + * Enable large pre-computed tables for Galois/Counter Mode (GCM). + * Can significantly increase throughput on systems without GCM hardware + * acceleration (e.g., AESNI, AESCE). * - * Warning: the HAVEGE random generator is dependent on timing and specific - * processor traits. It is therefore not advised to use HAVEGE as - * your applications primary random generator or primary entropy pool - * input. As a secondary input to your entropy pool, it IS able add - * the (limited) extra entropy it provides. + * The mbedtls_gcm_context size will increase by 3840 bytes. + * The code size will increase by roughly 344 bytes. * - * Module: library/havege.c - * Caller: - * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_TIMING_C + * Module: library/gcm.c * - * Uncomment to enable the HAVEGE random generator. + * Requires: MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -//#define MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C +//#define MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE /** * \def MBEDTLS_HKDF_C @@ -3065,63 +2860,76 @@ #define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C /** - * \def MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C + * \def MBEDTLS_LMS_C * - * Enable the Key Wrapping mode for 128-bit block ciphers, - * as defined in NIST SP 800-38F. Only KW and KWP modes - * are supported. At the moment, only AES is approved by NIST. + * Enable the LMS stateful-hash asymmetric signature algorithm. * - * Module: library/nist_kw.c + * Module: library/lms.c + * Caller: * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C and MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + * + * Uncomment to enable the LMS verification algorithm and public key operations. */ -//#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C +#define MBEDTLS_LMS_C /** - * \def MBEDTLS_MD_C + * \def MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE * - * Enable the generic message digest layer. + * Enable LMS private-key operations and signing code. Functions enabled by this + * option are experimental, and should not be used in production. * - * Module: library/md.c - * Caller: + * Requires: MBEDTLS_LMS_C * - * Uncomment to enable generic message digest wrappers. + * Uncomment to enable the LMS signature algorithm and private key operations. */ -#define MBEDTLS_MD_C +//#define MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE /** - * \def MBEDTLS_MD2_C - * - * Enable the MD2 hash algorithm. - * - * Module: library/md2.c - * Caller: + * \def MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C * - * Uncomment to enable support for (rare) MD2-signed X.509 certs. + * Enable the Key Wrapping mode for 128-bit block ciphers, + * as defined in NIST SP 800-38F. Only KW and KWP modes + * are supported. At the moment, only AES is approved by NIST. * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a - * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on - * it, and considering stronger message digests instead. + * Module: library/nist_kw.c * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C and MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ -//#define MBEDTLS_MD2_C +#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C /** - * \def MBEDTLS_MD4_C - * - * Enable the MD4 hash algorithm. - * - * Module: library/md4.c - * Caller: + * \def MBEDTLS_MD_C * - * Uncomment to enable support for (rare) MD4-signed X.509 certs. + * Enable the generic layer for message digest (hashing) and HMAC. * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a - * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on - * it, and considering stronger message digests instead. + * Requires: one of: MBEDTLS_MD5_C, MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C, MBEDTLS_SHA1_C, + * MBEDTLS_SHA224_C, MBEDTLS_SHA256_C, MBEDTLS_SHA384_C, + * MBEDTLS_SHA512_C, or MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C with at least + * one hash. + * Module: library/md.c + * Caller: library/constant_time.c + * library/ecdsa.c + * library/ecjpake.c + * library/hkdf.c + * library/hmac_drbg.c + * library/pk.c + * library/pkcs5.c + * library/pkcs12.c + * library/psa_crypto_ecp.c + * library/psa_crypto_rsa.c + * library/rsa.c + * library/ssl_cookie.c + * library/ssl_msg.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * library/x509.c + * library/x509_crt.c + * library/x509write_crt.c + * library/x509write_csr.c * + * Uncomment to enable generic message digest wrappers. */ -//#define MBEDTLS_MD4_C +#define MBEDTLS_MD_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_MD5_C @@ -3133,10 +2941,9 @@ * library/pem.c * library/ssl_tls.c * - * This module is required for SSL/TLS up to version 1.1, and for TLS 1.2 - * depending on the handshake parameters. Further, it is used for checking - * MD5-signed certificates, and for PBKDF1 when decrypting PEM-encoded - * encrypted keys. + * This module is required for TLS 1.2 depending on the handshake parameters. + * Further, it is used for checking MD5-signed certificates, and for PBKDF1 + * when decrypting PEM-encoded encrypted keys. * * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on @@ -3230,6 +3037,10 @@ * library/x509_csr.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_BASE64_C + * optionally MBEDTLS_MD5_C, or PSA Crypto with MD5 (see below) + * + * \warning When parsing password-protected files, if MD5 is provided only by + * a PSA driver, you must call psa_crypto_init() before the first file. * * This modules adds support for decoding / parsing PEM files. */ @@ -3257,11 +3068,13 @@ * Enable the generic public (asymmetric) key layer. * * Module: library/pk.c - * Caller: library/ssl_tls.c - * library/ssl_cli.c - * library/ssl_srv.c + * Caller: library/psa_crypto_rsa.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * library/ssl*_client.c + * library/ssl*_server.c + * library/x509.c * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C or MBEDTLS_ECP_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C or MBEDTLS_ECP_C * * Uncomment to enable generic public key wrappers. */ @@ -3276,7 +3089,7 @@ * Caller: library/x509_crt.c * library/x509_csr.c * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_PK_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, MBEDTLS_PK_C * * Uncomment to enable generic public key parse functions. */ @@ -3290,7 +3103,7 @@ * Module: library/pkwrite.c * Caller: library/x509write.c * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_PK_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, MBEDTLS_PK_C * * Uncomment to enable generic public key write functions. */ @@ -3303,29 +3116,30 @@ * * Module: library/pkcs5.c * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C + * Auto-enables: MBEDTLS_MD_C + * + * \warning If using a hash that is only provided by PSA drivers, you must + * call psa_crypto_init() before doing any PKCS5 operations. * * This module adds support for the PKCS#5 functions. */ #define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C /** - * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C + * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C * - * Enable wrapper for PKCS#11 smartcard support via the pkcs11-helper library. + * Enable PKCS #7 core for using PKCS #7-formatted signatures. + * RFC Link - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315 * - * \deprecated This option is deprecated and will be removed in a future - * version of Mbed TLS. + * Module: library/pkcs7.c * - * Module: library/pkcs11.c - * Caller: library/pk.c + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C, + * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C, + * MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_PK_C - * - * This module enables SSL/TLS PKCS #11 smartcard support. - * Requires the presence of the PKCS#11 helper library (libpkcs11-helper) + * This module is required for the PKCS #7 parsing modules. */ -//#define MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C @@ -3336,8 +3150,11 @@ * Module: library/pkcs12.c * Caller: library/pkparse.c * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C - * Can use: MBEDTLS_ARC4_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C and either MBEDTLS_MD_C or + * MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C. + * + * \warning If using a hash that is only provided by PSA drivers, you must + * call psa_crypto_init() before doing any PKCS12 operations. * * This module enables PKCS#12 functions. */ @@ -3354,7 +3171,7 @@ * above to be specified at runtime or compile time respectively. * * \note This abstraction layer must be enabled on Windows (including MSYS2) - * as other module rely on it for a fixed snprintf implementation. + * as other modules rely on it for a fixed snprintf implementation. * * Module: library/platform.c * Caller: Most other .c files @@ -3383,18 +3200,23 @@ * Requires: either MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, * or MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C and MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, * or MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG. - * + * Auto-enables: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C if any unauthenticated (ie, non-AEAD) cipher + * is enabled in PSA (unless it's fully accelerated, see + * docs/driver-only-builds.md about that). */ #define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C /** * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C * - * Enable secure element support in the Platform Security Architecture + * Enable dynamic secure element support in the Platform Security Architecture * cryptography API. * - * \warning This feature is not yet suitable for production. It is provided - * for API evaluation and testing purposes only. + * \deprecated This feature is deprecated. Please switch to the PSA driver + * interface. + * + * \warning This feature is not thread-safe, and should not be used in a + * multi-threaded environment. * * Module: library/psa_crypto_se.c * @@ -3445,11 +3267,12 @@ * Enable the RSA public-key cryptosystem. * * Module: library/rsa.c - * library/rsa_internal.c - * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c - * library/ssl_srv.c + * library/rsa_alt_helpers.c + * Caller: library/pk.c + * library/psa_crypto.c * library/ssl_tls.c - * library/x509.c + * library/ssl*_client.c + * library/ssl*_server.c * * This module is used by the following key exchanges: * RSA, DHE-RSA, ECDHE-RSA, RSA-PSK @@ -3465,13 +3288,10 @@ * * Module: library/sha1.c * Caller: library/md.c - * library/ssl_cli.c - * library/ssl_srv.c - * library/ssl_tls.c - * library/x509write_crt.c + * library/psa_crypto_hash.c * - * This module is required for SSL/TLS up to version 1.1, for TLS 1.2 - * depending on the handshake parameters, and for SHA1-signed certificates. + * This module is required for TLS 1.2 depending on the handshake parameters, + * and for SHA1-signed certificates. * * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes * a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies @@ -3480,38 +3300,216 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA224_C + * + * Enable the SHA-224 cryptographic hash algorithm. + * + * Module: library/sha256.c + * Caller: library/md.c + * library/ssl_cookie.c + * + * This module adds support for SHA-224. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA224_C + /** * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_C * - * Enable the SHA-224 and SHA-256 cryptographic hash algorithms. + * Enable the SHA-256 cryptographic hash algorithm. * * Module: library/sha256.c * Caller: library/entropy.c * library/md.c - * library/ssl_cli.c - * library/ssl_srv.c * library/ssl_tls.c + * library/ssl*_client.c + * library/ssl*_server.c * - * This module adds support for SHA-224 and SHA-256. + * This module adds support for SHA-256. * This module is required for the SSL/TLS 1.2 PRF function. */ #define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT + * + * Enable acceleration of the SHA-256 and SHA-224 cryptographic hash algorithms + * with the ARMv8 cryptographic extensions if they are available at runtime. + * If not, the library will fall back to the C implementation. + * + * \note If MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT is defined when building + * for a non-Armv8-A build it will be silently ignored. + * + * \note Minimum compiler versions for this feature are Clang 4.0, + * armclang 6.6 or GCC 6.0. + * + * \note \c CFLAGS must be set to a minimum of \c -march=armv8-a+crypto for + * armclang <= 6.9 + * + * \note This was previously known as MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT. + * That name is deprecated, but may still be used as an alternative form for this + * option. + * + * \warning MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT cannot be defined at the + * same time as MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA256_C. + * + * Module: library/sha256.c + * + * Uncomment to have the library check for the Armv8-A SHA-256 crypto extensions + * and use them if available. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT + * + * \deprecated This is now known as MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT. + * This name is now deprecated, but may still be used as an alternative form for + * this option. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY + * + * Enable acceleration of the SHA-256 and SHA-224 cryptographic hash algorithms + * with the ARMv8 cryptographic extensions, which must be available at runtime + * or else an illegal instruction fault will occur. + * + * \note This allows builds with a smaller code size than with + * MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT + * + * \note Minimum compiler versions for this feature are Clang 4.0, + * armclang 6.6 or GCC 6.0. + * + * \note \c CFLAGS must be set to a minimum of \c -march=armv8-a+crypto for + * armclang <= 6.9 + * + * \note This was previously known as MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY. + * That name is deprecated, but may still be used as an alternative form for this + * option. + * + * \warning MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY cannot be defined at the same + * time as MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA256_C. + * + * Module: library/sha256.c + * + * Uncomment to have the library use the Armv8-A SHA-256 crypto extensions + * unconditionally. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY + * + * \deprecated This is now known as MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY. + * This name is now deprecated, but may still be used as an alternative form for + * this option. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA384_C + * + * Enable the SHA-384 cryptographic hash algorithm. + * + * Module: library/sha512.c + * Caller: library/md.c + * library/psa_crypto_hash.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * library/ssl*_client.c + * library/ssl*_server.c + * + * Comment to disable SHA-384 + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA384_C + /** * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_C * - * Enable the SHA-384 and SHA-512 cryptographic hash algorithms. + * Enable SHA-512 cryptographic hash algorithms. * * Module: library/sha512.c * Caller: library/entropy.c * library/md.c - * library/ssl_cli.c - * library/ssl_srv.c + * library/ssl_tls.c + * library/ssl_cookie.c * - * This module adds support for SHA-384 and SHA-512. + * This module adds support for SHA-512. */ #define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA3_C + * + * Enable the SHA3 cryptographic hash algorithm. + * + * Module: library/sha3.c + * + * This module adds support for SHA3. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SHA3_C + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT + * + * Enable acceleration of the SHA-512 and SHA-384 cryptographic hash algorithms + * with the ARMv8 cryptographic extensions if they are available at runtime. + * If not, the library will fall back to the C implementation. + * + * \note If MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT is defined when building + * for a non-Aarch64 build it will be silently ignored. + * + * \note Minimum compiler versions for this feature are Clang 7.0, + * armclang 6.9 or GCC 8.0. + * + * \note \c CFLAGS must be set to a minimum of \c -march=armv8.2-a+sha3 for + * armclang 6.9 + * + * \warning MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT cannot be defined at the + * same time as MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA512_C. + * + * Module: library/sha512.c + * + * Uncomment to have the library check for the A64 SHA-512 crypto extensions + * and use them if available. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY + * + * Enable acceleration of the SHA-512 and SHA-384 cryptographic hash algorithms + * with the ARMv8 cryptographic extensions, which must be available at runtime + * or else an illegal instruction fault will occur. + * + * \note This allows builds with a smaller code size than with + * MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT + * + * \note Minimum compiler versions for this feature are Clang 7.0, + * armclang 6.9 or GCC 8.0. + * + * \note \c CFLAGS must be set to a minimum of \c -march=armv8.2-a+sha3 for + * armclang 6.9 + * + * \warning MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY cannot be defined at the same + * time as MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT. + * + * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA512_C. + * + * Module: library/sha512.c + * + * Uncomment to have the library use the A64 SHA-512 crypto extensions + * unconditionally. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY + /** * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C * @@ -3542,8 +3540,8 @@ * Module: library/ssl_ticket.c * Caller: * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C && - * ( MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C ) + * Requires: (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C || MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && + * (MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C @@ -3552,7 +3550,7 @@ * * Enable the SSL/TLS client code. * - * Module: library/ssl_cli.c + * Module: library/ssl*_client.c * Caller: * * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C @@ -3566,7 +3564,7 @@ * * Enable the SSL/TLS server code. * - * Module: library/ssl_srv.c + * Module: library/ssl*_server.c * Caller: * * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C @@ -3581,8 +3579,8 @@ * Enable the generic SSL/TLS code. * * Module: library/ssl_tls.c - * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c - * library/ssl_srv.c + * Caller: library/ssl*_client.c + * library/ssl*_server.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C * and at least one of the MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_XXX defines @@ -3634,9 +3632,6 @@ * https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/how-to/how-do-i-port-mbed-tls-to-a-new-environment-OS * * Module: library/timing.c - * Caller: library/havege.c - * - * This module is used by the HAVEGE random number generator. */ #define MBEDTLS_TIMING_C @@ -3661,8 +3656,11 @@ * library/x509_crt.c * library/x509_csr.c * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, - * MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C, + * (MBEDTLS_MD_C or MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + * + * \warning If building with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO, you must call + * psa_crypto_init() before doing any X.509 operation. * * This module is required for the X.509 parsing modules. */ @@ -3674,9 +3672,9 @@ * Enable X.509 certificate parsing. * * Module: library/x509_crt.c - * Caller: library/ssl_cli.c - * library/ssl_srv.c - * library/ssl_tls.c + * Caller: library/ssl_tls.c + * library/ssl*_client.c + * library/ssl*_server.c * * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C * @@ -3719,7 +3717,11 @@ * * Module: library/x509_create.c * - * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C + * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C, + * (MBEDTLS_MD_C or MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + * + * \warning If building with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO, you must call + * psa_crypto_init() before doing any X.509 create operation. * * This module is the basis for creating X.509 certificates and CSRs. */ @@ -3751,16 +3753,6 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C -/** - * \def MBEDTLS_XTEA_C - * - * Enable the XTEA block cipher. - * - * Module: library/xtea.c - * Caller: - */ -#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_C - /** \} name SECTION: Mbed TLS modules */ /** @@ -3776,10 +3768,11 @@ * \def MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE * * If defined, this is a header which will be included instead of - * `"mbedtls/config.h"`. + * `"mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h"`. * This header file specifies the compile-time configuration of Mbed TLS. * Unlike other configuration options, this one must be defined on the - * compiler command line: a definition in `config.h` would have no effect. + * compiler command line: a definition in `mbedtls_config.h` would have + * no effect. * * This macro is expanded after an \#include directive. This is a popular but * non-standard feature of the C language, so this feature is only available @@ -3788,13 +3781,13 @@ * The value of this symbol is typically a path in double quotes, either * absolute or relative to a directory on the include search path. */ -//#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE "mbedtls/config.h" +//#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE "mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h" /** * \def MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE * * If defined, this is a header which will be included after - * `"mbedtls/config.h"` or #MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE. + * `"mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h"` or #MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE. * This allows you to modify the default configuration, including the ability * to undefine options that are enabled by default. * @@ -3842,6 +3835,53 @@ */ //#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE "/dev/null" +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_FILE + * + * If defined, this is a header which will be included instead of + * `"psa/crypto_platform.h"`. This file should declare the same identifiers + * as the one in Mbed TLS, but with definitions adapted to the platform on + * which the library code will run. + * + * \note The required content of this header can vary from one version of + * Mbed TLS to the next. Integrators who provide an alternative file + * should review the changes in the original file whenever they + * upgrade Mbed TLS. + * + * This macro is expanded after an \#include directive. This is a popular but + * non-standard feature of the C language, so this feature is only available + * with compilers that perform macro expansion on an \#include line. + * + * The value of this symbol is typically a path in double quotes, either + * absolute or relative to a directory on the include search path. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_FILE "psa/crypto_platform_alt.h" + +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_FILE + * + * If defined, this is a header which will be included instead of + * `"psa/crypto_struct.h"`. This file should declare the same identifiers + * as the one in Mbed TLS, but with definitions adapted to the environment + * in which the library code will run. The typical use for this feature + * is to provide alternative type definitions on the client side in + * client-server integrations of PSA crypto, where operation structures + * contain handles instead of cryptographic data. + * + * \note The required content of this header can vary from one version of + * Mbed TLS to the next. Integrators who provide an alternative file + * should review the changes in the original file whenever they + * upgrade Mbed TLS. + * + * This macro is expanded after an \#include directive. This is a popular but + * non-standard feature of the C language, so this feature is only available + * with compilers that perform macro expansion on an \#include line. + * + * The value of this symbol is typically a path in double quotes, either + * absolute or relative to a directory on the include search path. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_FILE "psa/crypto_struct_alt.h" + /** \} name SECTION: General configuration options */ /** @@ -3881,7 +3921,6 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 /**< Maximum size of (re)seed buffer */ /* ECP options */ -//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 521 /**< Maximum bit size of groups. Normally determined automatically from the configured curves. */ //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE 4 /**< Maximum window size used */ //#define MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM 1 /**< Enable fixed-point speed-up */ @@ -3918,6 +3957,7 @@ * See the description of #MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY for more details (same principles as for MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC apply). */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE free +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SETBUF setbuf /**< Default setbuf to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT exit /**< Default exit to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME time /**< Default time to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF fprintf /**< Default fprintf to use, can be undefined */ @@ -3935,6 +3975,7 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO calloc /**< Default allocator macro to use, can be undefined. See MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC for requirements. */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO free /**< Default free macro to use, can be undefined. See MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE for requirements. */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO exit /**< Default exit macro to use, can be undefined */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_MACRO setbuf /**< Default setbuf macro to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO time /**< Default time macro to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO time_t /**< Default time macro to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO fprintf /**< Default fprintf macro to use, can be undefined */ @@ -3944,42 +3985,8 @@ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO vsnprintf /**< Default vsnprintf macro to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read /**< Default nv_seed_read function to use, can be undefined */ //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write /**< Default nv_seed_write function to use, can be undefined */ - -/** - * \brief This macro is invoked by the library when an invalid parameter - * is detected that is only checked with #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS - * (see the documentation of that option for context). - * - * When you leave this undefined here, the library provides - * a default definition. If the macro #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT - * is defined, the default definition is `assert(cond)`, - * otherwise the default definition calls a function - * mbedtls_param_failed(). This function is declared in - * `platform_util.h` for the benefit of the library, but - * you need to define in your application. - * - * When you define this here, this replaces the default - * definition in platform_util.h (which no longer declares the - * function mbedtls_param_failed()) and it is your responsibility - * to make sure this macro expands to something suitable (in - * particular, that all the necessary declarations are visible - * from within the library - you can ensure that by providing - * them in this file next to the macro definition). - * If you define this macro to call `assert`, also define - * #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT so that library source files - * include ``. - * - * Note that you may define this macro to expand to nothing, in - * which case you don't have to worry about declarations or - * definitions. However, you will then be notified about invalid - * parameters only in non-void functions, and void function will - * just silently return early on invalid parameters, which - * partially negates the benefits of enabling - * #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS in the first place, so is discouraged. - * - * \param cond The expression that should evaluate to true, but doesn't. - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED( cond ) assert( cond ) +//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_TYPE_MACRO int64_t //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_TYPE_MACRO int64_t /**< Default milliseconds time macro to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled. It must be signed, and at least 64 bits. If it is changed from the default, MBEDTLS_PRINTF_MS_TIME must be updated to match.*/ +//#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_MS_TIME PRId64 /**< Default fmt for printf. That's avoid compiler warning if mbedtls_ms_time_t is redefined */ /** \def MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN * @@ -4028,38 +4035,15 @@ */ //#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT 32 +/* RSA OPTIONS */ +//#define MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS 1024 /**< Minimum RSA key size that can be generated in bits (Minimum possible value is 128 bits) */ + /* SSL Cache options */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT 86400 /**< 1 day */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES 50 /**< Maximum entries in cache */ /* SSL options */ -/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN - * - * Maximum length (in bytes) of incoming and outgoing plaintext fragments. - * - * This determines the size of both the incoming and outgoing TLS I/O buffers - * in such a way that both are capable of holding the specified amount of - * plaintext data, regardless of the protection mechanism used. - * - * To configure incoming and outgoing I/O buffers separately, use - * #MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN and #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, - * which overwrite the value set by this option. - * - * \note When using a value less than the default of 16KB on the client, it is - * recommended to use the Maximum Fragment Length (MFL) extension to - * inform the server about this limitation. On the server, there - * is no supported, standardized way of informing the client about - * restriction on the maximum size of incoming messages, and unless - * the limitation has been communicated by other means, it is recommended - * to only change the outgoing buffer size #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - * while keeping the default value of 16KB for the incoming buffer. - * - * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of both - * incoming and outgoing I/O buffers. - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN 16384 - /** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN * * Maximum length (in bytes) of incoming plaintext fragments. @@ -4068,9 +4052,6 @@ * that it is capable of holding the specified amount of plaintext data, * regardless of the protection mechanism used. * - * If this option is undefined, it inherits its value from - * #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN. - * * \note When using a value less than the default of 16KB on the client, it is * recommended to use the Maximum Fragment Length (MFL) extension to * inform the server about this limitation. On the server, there @@ -4080,8 +4061,7 @@ * to only change the outgoing buffer size #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN * while keeping the default value of 16KB for the incoming buffer. * - * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of the incoming I/O buffer - * independently of the outgoing I/O buffer. + * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of the incoming I/O buffer. */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN 16384 @@ -4099,27 +4079,10 @@ */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX 32 -/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY - * - * This option controls the use of record plaintext padding - * when using the Connection ID extension in DTLS 1.2. - * - * The padding will always be chosen so that the length of the - * padded plaintext is a multiple of the value of this option. - * - * Note: A value of \c 1 means that no padding will be used - * for outgoing records. - * - * Note: On systems lacking division instructions, - * a power of two should be preferred. - * - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY 16 - -/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY +/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY * * This option controls the use of record plaintext padding - * in TLS 1.3. + * in TLS 1.3 and when using the Connection ID extension in DTLS 1.2. * * The padding will always be chosen so that the length of the * padded plaintext is a multiple of the value of this option. @@ -4130,7 +4093,7 @@ * Note: On systems lacking division instructions, * a power of two should be preferred. */ -//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY 1 +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY 16 /** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN * @@ -4140,9 +4103,6 @@ * that it is capable of holding the specified amount of plaintext data, * regardless of the protection mechanism used. * - * If this option undefined, it inherits its value from - * #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN. - * * It is possible to save RAM by setting a smaller outward buffer, while keeping * the default inward 16384 byte buffer to conform to the TLS specification. * @@ -4151,8 +4111,7 @@ * The specific size requirement depends on the configured ciphers and any * certificate data which is sent during the handshake. * - * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of the outgoing I/O buffer - * independently of the incoming I/O buffer. + * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of the outgoing I/O buffer. */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN 16384 @@ -4173,21 +4132,9 @@ */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING 32768 -//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME 86400 /**< Lifetime of session tickets (if enabled) */ -//#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 32 /**< Max size of TLS pre-shared keys, in bytes (default 256 bits) */ +//#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 32 /**< Max size of TLS pre-shared keys, in bytes (default 256 or 384 bits) */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT 60 /**< Default expiration delay of DTLS cookies, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, or in number of cookies issued */ -/** \def MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID - * - * At the time of writing, the CID extension has not been assigned its - * final value. Set this configuration option to make Mbed TLS use a - * different value. - * - * A future minor revision of Mbed TLS may change the default value of - * this option to match evolving standards and usage. - */ -//#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID 254 - /** * Complete list of ciphersuites to use, in order of preference. * @@ -4202,25 +4149,63 @@ */ //#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -/* X509 options */ -//#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA 8 /**< Maximum number of intermediate CAs in a verification chain. */ -//#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN 512 /**< Maximum length of a path/filename string in bytes including the null terminator character ('\0'). */ +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE + * + * The default maximum amount of 0-RTT data. See the documentation of + * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_early_data_size() for more information. + * + * It must be positive and smaller than UINT32_MAX. + * + * If MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA is not defined, this default value does not + * have any impact on the build. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE 1024 -/** \} name SECTION: Module configuration options */ +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_AGE_TOLERANCE + * + * Maximum allowed ticket age difference in milliseconds tolerated between + * server and client. Default value is 6000. This is not used in TLS 1.2. + * + * - The client ticket age is the time difference between the time when the + * client proposes to the server to use the ticket and the time the client + * received the ticket from the server. + * - The server ticket age is the time difference between the time when the + * server receives a proposition from the client to use the ticket and the + * time when the ticket was created by the server. + * + * The ages might be different due to the client and server clocks not running + * at the same pace. The typical accuracy of an RTC crystal is ±100 to ±20 parts + * per million (360 to 72 milliseconds per hour). Default tolerance window is + * 6s, thus in the worst case clients and servers must sync up their system time + * every 6000/360/2~=8 hours. + * + * See section 8.3 of the TLS 1.3 specification(RFC 8446) for more information. + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_AGE_TOLERANCE 6000 -/* Target and application specific configurations +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_NONCE_LENGTH * - * Allow user to override any previous default. + * Size in bytes of a ticket nonce. This is not used in TLS 1.2. * + * This must be less than 256. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE) -#include MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_NONCE_LENGTH 32 -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) -#include "mbedtls/config_psa.h" -#endif +/** + * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_DEFAULT_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS + * + * Default number of NewSessionTicket messages to be sent by a TLS 1.3 server + * after handshake completion. This is not used in TLS 1.2 and relevant only if + * the MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS option is enabled. + * + */ +//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_DEFAULT_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS 1 -#include "mbedtls/check_config.h" +/* X509 options */ +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA 8 /**< Maximum number of intermediate CAs in a verification chain. */ +//#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN 512 /**< Maximum length of a path/filename string in bytes including the null terminator character ('\0'). */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H */ +/** \} name SECTION: Module configuration options */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md.h index db4d14c044..478e9f7667 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md.h @@ -1,37 +1,23 @@ /** * \file md.h * - * \brief This file contains the generic message-digest wrapper. + * \brief This file contains the generic functions for message-digest + * (hashing) and HMAC. * * \author Adriaan de Jong */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_MD_H #define MBEDTLS_MD_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" #include -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" /** The selected feature is not available. */ @@ -43,10 +29,6 @@ /** Opening or reading of file failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x5200 -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** MD hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x5280 - #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -54,79 +36,107 @@ extern "C" { /** * \brief Supported message digests. * - * \warning MD2, MD4, MD5 and SHA-1 are considered weak message digests and + * \warning MD5 and SHA-1 are considered weak message digests and * their use constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering * stronger message digests instead. * */ +/* Note: these are aligned with the definitions of PSA_ALG_ macros for hashes, + * in order to enable an efficient implementation of conversion functions. + * This is tested by md_to_from_psa() in test_suite_md. */ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_MD_NONE=0, /**< None. */ - MBEDTLS_MD_MD2, /**< The MD2 message digest. */ - MBEDTLS_MD_MD4, /**< The MD4 message digest. */ - MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, /**< The MD5 message digest. */ - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, /**< The SHA-1 message digest. */ - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, /**< The SHA-224 message digest. */ - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, /**< The SHA-256 message digest. */ - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, /**< The SHA-384 message digest. */ - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, /**< The SHA-512 message digest. */ - MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, /**< The RIPEMD-160 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_MD5=0x03, /**< The MD5 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160=0x04, /**< The RIPEMD-160 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1=0x05, /**< The SHA-1 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224=0x08, /**< The SHA-224 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256=0x09, /**< The SHA-256 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384=0x0a, /**< The SHA-384 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512=0x0b, /**< The SHA-512 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224=0x10, /**< The SHA3-224 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256=0x11, /**< The SHA3-256 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384=0x12, /**< The SHA3-384 message digest. */ + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512=0x13, /**< The SHA3-512 message digest. */ } mbedtls_md_type_t; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +/* Note: this should always be >= PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE + * in all builds with both CRYPTO_C and MD_LIGHT. + * + * This is to make things easier for modules such as TLS that may define a + * buffer size using MD_MAX_SIZE in a part of the code that's common to PSA + * and legacy, then assume the buffer's size is PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE in another + * part of the code based on PSA. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) || defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512) #define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE 64 /* longest known is SHA512 */ +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) || defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE 48 /* longest known is SHA384 */ +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) || defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE 32 /* longest known is SHA256 */ +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) || defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE 28 /* longest known is SHA224 */ #else -#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE 32 /* longest known is SHA256 or less */ +#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE 20 /* longest known is SHA1 or RIPE MD-160 + or smaller (MD5 and earlier) */ #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 144 /* the longest known is SHA3-224 */ +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 136 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) || defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) #define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 128 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 104 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512) +#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 72 #else #define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 64 #endif /** - * Opaque struct defined in md_internal.h. + * Opaque struct. + * + * Constructed using either #mbedtls_md_info_from_string or + * #mbedtls_md_info_from_type. + * + * Fields can be accessed with #mbedtls_md_get_size, + * #mbedtls_md_get_type and #mbedtls_md_get_name. */ +/* Defined internally in library/md_wrap.h. */ typedef struct mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md_info_t; +/** + * Used internally to indicate whether a context uses legacy or PSA. + * + * Internal use only. + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_LEGACY = 0, + MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_PSA, +} mbedtls_md_engine_t; + /** * The generic message-digest context. */ typedef struct mbedtls_md_context_t { /** Information about the associated message digest. */ - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_info); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA) + /** Are hash operations dispatched to PSA or legacy? */ + mbedtls_md_engine_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(engine); +#endif - /** The digest-specific context. */ - void *md_ctx; + /** The digest-specific context (legacy) or the PSA operation. */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_ctx); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) /** The HMAC part of the context. */ - void *hmac_ctx; + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hmac_ctx); +#endif } mbedtls_md_context_t; -/** - * \brief This function returns the list of digests supported by the - * generic digest module. - * - * \note The list starts with the strongest available hashes. - * - * \return A statically allocated array of digests. Each element - * in the returned list is an integer belonging to the - * message-digest enumeration #mbedtls_md_type_t. - * The last entry is 0. - */ -const int *mbedtls_md_list(void); - -/** - * \brief This function returns the message-digest information - * associated with the given digest name. - * - * \param md_name The name of the digest to search for. - * - * \return The message-digest information associated with \p md_name. - * \return NULL if the associated message-digest information is not found. - */ -const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_string(const char *md_name); - /** * \brief This function returns the message-digest information * associated with the given digest type. @@ -163,34 +173,6 @@ void mbedtls_md_init(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx); */ void mbedtls_md_free(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief This function selects the message digest algorithm to use, - * and allocates internal structures. - * - * It should be called after mbedtls_md_init() or mbedtls_md_free(). - * Makes it necessary to call mbedtls_md_free() later. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md_setup() in 2.0.0 - * - * \param ctx The context to set up. - * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm - * to use. - * - * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification - * failure. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. - */ -int mbedtls_md_init_ctx(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info) MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED; -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /** * \brief This function selects the message digest algorithm to use, @@ -232,6 +214,10 @@ int mbedtls_md_setup(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if both contexts are + * not using the same engine. This can be avoided by moving + * the call to psa_crypto_init() before the first call to + * mbedtls_md_setup(). */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL int mbedtls_md_clone(mbedtls_md_context_t *dst, @@ -249,26 +235,29 @@ int mbedtls_md_clone(mbedtls_md_context_t *dst, unsigned char mbedtls_md_get_size(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info); /** - * \brief This function extracts the message-digest type from the - * message-digest information structure. + * \brief This function gives the message-digest size associated to + * message-digest type. * - * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm - * to use. + * \param md_type The message-digest type. * - * \return The type of the message digest. + * \return The size of the message-digest output in Bytes, + * or 0 if the message-digest type is not known. */ -mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_get_type(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info); +static inline unsigned char mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type) +{ + return mbedtls_md_get_size(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_type)); +} /** - * \brief This function extracts the message-digest name from the + * \brief This function extracts the message-digest type from the * message-digest information structure. * * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm * to use. * - * \return The name of the message digest. + * \return The type of the message digest. */ -const char *mbedtls_md_get_name(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info); +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_get_type(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info); /** * \brief This function starts a message-digest computation. @@ -348,6 +337,54 @@ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL int mbedtls_md(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output); +/** + * \brief This function returns the list of digests supported by the + * generic digest module. + * + * \note The list starts with the strongest available hashes. + * + * \return A statically allocated array of digests. Each element + * in the returned list is an integer belonging to the + * message-digest enumeration #mbedtls_md_type_t. + * The last entry is 0. + */ +const int *mbedtls_md_list(void); + +/** + * \brief This function returns the message-digest information + * associated with the given digest name. + * + * \param md_name The name of the digest to search for. + * + * \return The message-digest information associated with \p md_name. + * \return NULL if the associated message-digest information is not found. + */ +const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_string(const char *md_name); + +/** + * \brief This function returns the name of the message digest for + * the message-digest information structure given. + * + * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm + * to use. + * + * \return The name of the message digest. + */ +const char *mbedtls_md_get_name(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info); + +/** + * \brief This function returns the message-digest information + * from the given context. + * + * \param ctx The context from which to extract the information. + * This must be initialized (or \c NULL). + * + * \return The message-digest information associated with \p ctx. + * \return \c NULL if \p ctx is \c NULL. + */ +const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_ctx( + const mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx); + #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) /** * \brief This function calculates the message-digest checksum @@ -482,10 +519,6 @@ int mbedtls_md_hmac(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output); -/* Internal use */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL -int mbedtls_md_process(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *data); - #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md2.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md2.h deleted file mode 100644 index 68b0d32712..0000000000 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md2.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,304 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file md2.h - * - * \brief MD2 message digest algorithm (hash function) - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a - * security risk. We recommend considering stronger message digests - * instead. - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_MD2_H -#define MBEDTLS_MD2_H - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#include - -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_MD2_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** MD2 hardware accelerator failed */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD2_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x002B - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT) -// Regular implementation -// - -/** - * \brief MD2 context structure - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -typedef struct mbedtls_md2_context { - unsigned char cksum[16]; /*!< checksum of the data block */ - unsigned char state[48]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ - unsigned char buffer[16]; /*!< data block being processed */ - size_t left; /*!< amount of data in buffer */ -} -mbedtls_md2_context; - -#else /* MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT */ -#include "md2_alt.h" -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT */ - -/** - * \brief Initialize MD2 context - * - * \param ctx MD2 context to be initialized - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -void mbedtls_md2_init(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief Clear MD2 context - * - * \param ctx MD2 context to be cleared - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -void mbedtls_md2_free(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief Clone (the state of) an MD2 context - * - * \param dst The destination context - * \param src The context to be cloned - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -void mbedtls_md2_clone(mbedtls_md2_context *dst, - const mbedtls_md2_context *src); - -/** - * \brief MD2 context setup - * - * \param ctx context to be initialized - * - * \return 0 if successful - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_md2_starts_ret(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief MD2 process buffer - * - * \param ctx MD2 context - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * - * \return 0 if successful - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_md2_update_ret(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen); - -/** - * \brief MD2 final digest - * - * \param ctx MD2 context - * \param output MD2 checksum result - * - * \return 0 if successful - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_md2_finish_ret(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16]); - -/** - * \brief MD2 process data block (internal use only) - * - * \param ctx MD2 context - * - * \return 0 if successful - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_internal_md2_process(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief MD2 context setup - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md2_starts_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx context to be initialized - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2_starts(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief MD2 process buffer - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md2_update_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx MD2 context - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2_update(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen); - -/** - * \brief MD2 final digest - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md2_finish_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx MD2 context - * \param output MD2 checksum result - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2_finish(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16]); - -/** - * \brief MD2 process data block (internal use only) - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_md2_process() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx MD2 context - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2_process(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - -/** - * \brief Output = MD2( input buffer ) - * - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * \param output MD2 checksum result - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_md2_ret(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16]); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief Output = MD2( input buffer ) - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md2_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * \param output MD2 checksum result - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md2(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16]); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - -/** - * \brief Checkup routine - * - * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed - * - * \warning MD2 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_md2_self_test(int verbose); - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* mbedtls_md2.h */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md4.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md4.h deleted file mode 100644 index fd64710a1b..0000000000 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md4.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,309 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file md4.h - * - * \brief MD4 message digest algorithm (hash function) - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a - * security risk. We recommend considering stronger message digests - * instead. - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_MD4_H -#define MBEDTLS_MD4_H - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#include -#include - -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_MD4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** MD4 hardware accelerator failed */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x002D - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT) -// Regular implementation -// - -/** - * \brief MD4 context structure - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -typedef struct mbedtls_md4_context { - uint32_t total[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */ - uint32_t state[4]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ - unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< data block being processed */ -} -mbedtls_md4_context; - -#else /* MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT */ -#include "md4_alt.h" -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT */ - -/** - * \brief Initialize MD4 context - * - * \param ctx MD4 context to be initialized - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -void mbedtls_md4_init(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief Clear MD4 context - * - * \param ctx MD4 context to be cleared - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -void mbedtls_md4_free(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief Clone (the state of) an MD4 context - * - * \param dst The destination context - * \param src The context to be cloned - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -void mbedtls_md4_clone(mbedtls_md4_context *dst, - const mbedtls_md4_context *src); - -/** - * \brief MD4 context setup - * - * \param ctx context to be initialized - * - * \return 0 if successful - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - */ -int mbedtls_md4_starts_ret(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief MD4 process buffer - * - * \param ctx MD4 context - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * - * \return 0 if successful - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_md4_update_ret(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen); - -/** - * \brief MD4 final digest - * - * \param ctx MD4 context - * \param output MD4 checksum result - * - * \return 0 if successful - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_md4_finish_ret(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16]); - -/** - * \brief MD4 process data block (internal use only) - * - * \param ctx MD4 context - * \param data buffer holding one block of data - * - * \return 0 if successful - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_internal_md4_process(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64]); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief MD4 context setup - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md4_starts_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx context to be initialized - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4_starts(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief MD4 process buffer - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md4_update_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx MD4 context - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4_update(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen); - -/** - * \brief MD4 final digest - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md4_finish_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx MD4 context - * \param output MD4 checksum result - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4_finish(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16]); - -/** - * \brief MD4 process data block (internal use only) - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_md4_process() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx MD4 context - * \param data buffer holding one block of data - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4_process(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64]); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - -/** - * \brief Output = MD4( input buffer ) - * - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * \param output MD4 checksum result - * - * \return 0 if successful - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_md4_ret(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16]); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief Output = MD4( input buffer ) - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md4_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * \param output MD4 checksum result - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md4(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16]); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - -/** - * \brief Checkup routine - * - * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed - * - * \warning MD4 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -int mbedtls_md4_self_test(int verbose); - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* mbedtls_md4.h */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md5.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md5.h index 04f71ee3f5..6bf0754a4a 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md5.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md5.h @@ -9,36 +9,17 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_MD5_H #define MBEDTLS_MD5_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_MD5_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** MD5 hardware accelerator failed */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD5_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x002F - #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -56,9 +37,9 @@ extern "C" { * */ typedef struct mbedtls_md5_context { - uint32_t total[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */ - uint32_t state[4]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ - unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< data block being processed */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(total)[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[4]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer)[64]; /*!< data block being processed */ } mbedtls_md5_context; @@ -116,7 +97,7 @@ void mbedtls_md5_clone(mbedtls_md5_context *dst, * stronger message digests instead. * */ -int mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx); +int mbedtls_md5_starts(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx); /** * \brief MD5 process buffer @@ -132,9 +113,9 @@ int mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx); * stronger message digests instead. * */ -int mbedtls_md5_update_ret(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen); +int mbedtls_md5_update(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen); /** * \brief MD5 final digest @@ -149,8 +130,8 @@ int mbedtls_md5_update_ret(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, * stronger message digests instead. * */ -int mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16]); +int mbedtls_md5_finish(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[16]); /** * \brief MD5 process data block (internal use only) @@ -168,79 +149,6 @@ int mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, int mbedtls_internal_md5_process(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64]); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief MD5 context setup - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md5_starts_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx context to be initialized - * - * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5_starts(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief MD5 process buffer - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md5_update_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx MD5 context - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * - * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5_update(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen); - -/** - * \brief MD5 final digest - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md5_finish_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx MD5 context - * \param output MD5 checksum result - * - * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5_finish(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16]); - -/** - * \brief MD5 process data block (internal use only) - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_md5_process() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx MD5 context - * \param data buffer holding one block of data - * - * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5_process(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64]); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /** * \brief Output = MD5( input buffer ) * @@ -255,36 +163,9 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5_process(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, * stronger message digests instead. * */ -int mbedtls_md5_ret(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16]); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief Output = MD5( input buffer ) - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_md5_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * \param output MD5 checksum result - * - * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_md5(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16]); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +int mbedtls_md5(const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[16]); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md_internal.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md_internal.h deleted file mode 100644 index 9e10f2409d..0000000000 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md_internal.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,89 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file md_internal.h - * - * \brief Message digest wrappers. - * - * \warning This in an internal header. Do not include directly. - * - * \author Adriaan de Jong - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H -#define MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#include "mbedtls/md.h" - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -/** - * Message digest information. - * Allows message digest functions to be called in a generic way. - */ -struct mbedtls_md_info_t { - /** Name of the message digest */ - const char *name; - - /** Digest identifier */ - mbedtls_md_type_t type; - - /** Output length of the digest function in bytes */ - unsigned char size; - - /** Block length of the digest function in bytes */ - unsigned char block_size; -}; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) -extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md2_info; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) -extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md4_info; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) -extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md5_info; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) -extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_ripemd160_info; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) -extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha1_info; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha224_info; -extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha256_info; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) -extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha384_info; -#endif -extern const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha512_info; -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h index bc28252113..b527d9b665 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h @@ -5,28 +5,12 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_H #define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include @@ -34,7 +18,7 @@ * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. - * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line. * \{ */ @@ -95,6 +79,14 @@ void mbedtls_memory_buffer_set_verify(int verify); */ void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status(void); +/** + * \brief Get the number of alloc/free so far. + * + * \param alloc_count Number of allocations. + * \param free_count Number of frees. + */ +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_count_get(size_t *alloc_count, size_t *free_count); + /** * \brief Get the peak heap usage so far * diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net.h deleted file mode 100644 index 66921887da..0000000000 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,35 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file net.h - * - * \brief Deprecated header file that includes net_sockets.h - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls/net_sockets.h - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#warning "Deprecated header file: Superseded by mbedtls/net_sockets.h" -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h index 6bcd9208f9..85c11971d8 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h @@ -21,28 +21,13 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_NET_SOCKETS_H #define MBEDTLS_NET_SOCKETS_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" @@ -96,7 +81,13 @@ extern "C" { * structures for hand-made UDP demultiplexing). */ typedef struct mbedtls_net_context { - int fd; /**< The underlying file descriptor */ + /** The underlying file descriptor. + * + * This field is only guaranteed to be present on POSIX/Unix-like platforms. + * On other platforms, it may have a different type, have a different + * meaning, or be absent altogether. + */ + int fd; } mbedtls_net_context; @@ -152,7 +143,7 @@ int mbedtls_net_bind(mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *bind_ip, const char * * \param client_ctx Will contain the connected client socket * \param client_ip Will contain the client IP address, can be NULL * \param buf_size Size of the client_ip buffer - * \param ip_len Will receive the size of the client IP written, + * \param cip_len Will receive the size of the client IP written, * can be NULL if client_ip is null * * \return 0 if successful, or @@ -165,7 +156,7 @@ int mbedtls_net_bind(mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *bind_ip, const char * */ int mbedtls_net_accept(mbedtls_net_context *bind_ctx, mbedtls_net_context *client_ctx, - void *client_ip, size_t buf_size, size_t *ip_len); + void *client_ip, size_t buf_size, size_t *cip_len); /** * \brief Check and wait for the context to be ready for read/write diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/nist_kw.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/nist_kw.h index 8d3a4a53b1..d353f3d1a8 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/nist_kw.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/nist_kw.h @@ -17,29 +17,14 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_H #define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" @@ -64,7 +49,7 @@ typedef enum { * Don't make any assumptions on this context! */ typedef struct { - mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; /*!< The cipher context used. */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */ } mbedtls_nist_kw_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_NIST_key wrapping_ALT */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/oid.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/oid.h index a64eaebef2..fdc25ebf88 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/oid.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/oid.h @@ -5,28 +5,13 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_OID_H #define MBEDTLS_OID_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #include "mbedtls/pk.h" @@ -37,9 +22,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) #include "mbedtls/md.h" -#endif /** OID is not found. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND -0x002E @@ -68,6 +51,11 @@ #define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_FRESHEST_CRL (1 << 14) #define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE (1 << 16) +/* + * Maximum number of OID components allowed + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_MAX_COMPONENTS 128 + /* * Top level OID tuples */ @@ -95,6 +83,9 @@ #define MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_OIW "\x03" #define MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG "\x02" #define MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG "\x1a" +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_THAWTE "\x65" /* thawte(101) */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_THAWTE MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG \ + MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_THAWTE #define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_CERTICOM "\x81\x04" /* certicom(132) */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG \ MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_CERTICOM @@ -151,6 +142,7 @@ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x2E" /**< id-at-dnQualifier AttributeType:= {id-at 46} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x41" /**< id-at-pseudonym AttributeType:= {id-at 65} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_UID "\x09\x92\x26\x89\x93\xF2\x2C\x64\x01\x01" /** id-domainComponent AttributeType:= {itu-t(0) data(9) pss(2342) ucl(19200300) pilot(100) pilotAttributeType(1) uid(1)} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT "\x09\x92\x26\x89\x93\xF2\x2C\x64\x01\x19" /** id-domainComponent AttributeType:= {itu-t(0) data(9) pss(2342) ucl(19200300) pilot(100) pilotAttributeType(1) domainComponent(25)} */ /* @@ -228,6 +220,7 @@ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x01" /**< pkcs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) 1 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x01" /**< pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x05" /**< pkcs-5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 5 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x07" /**< pkcs-7 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 7 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x09" /**< pkcs-9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 9 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x0c" /**< pkcs-12 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 12 } */ @@ -235,8 +228,6 @@ * PKCS#1 OIDs */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_RSA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x01" /**< rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1 } */ -#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x02" /**< md2WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 2 } */ -#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD4 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x03" /**< md4WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 3 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD5 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x04" /**< md5WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 4 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x05" /**< sha1WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 5 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x0e" /**< sha224WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 14 } */ @@ -255,8 +246,6 @@ /* * Digest algorithms */ -#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD2 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x02" /**< id-mbedtls_md2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 2 } */ -#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD4 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x04" /**< id-mbedtls_md4 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 4 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x05" /**< id-mbedtls_md5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 5 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG \ MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_SHA1 /**< id-mbedtls_sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 } */ @@ -269,6 +258,15 @@ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_RIPEMD160 MBEDTLS_OID_TELETRUST "\x03\x02\x01" /**< id-ripemd160 OBJECT IDENTIFIER :: { iso(1) identified-organization(3) teletrust(36) algorithm(3) hashAlgorithm(2) ripemd160(1) } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA3_224 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x07" /**< id-sha3-224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) hashalgs(2) sha3-224(7) } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA3_256 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x08" /**< id-sha3-256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) hashalgs(2) sha3-256(8) } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA3_384 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x09" /**< id-sha3-384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) hashalgs(2) sha3-384(9) } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA3_512 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x0a" /**< id-sha3-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) hashalgs(2) sha3-512(10) } */ + + #define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x07" /**< id-hmacWithSHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 7 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x08" /**< id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 8 } */ @@ -279,13 +277,28 @@ #define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x0B" /**< id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 11 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA3_224 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x0d" /**< id-hmacWithSHA3-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) hashalgs(2) hmacWithSHA3-224(13) } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA3_256 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x0e" /**< id-hmacWithSHA3-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) hashalgs(2) hmacWithSHA3-256(14) } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA3_384 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x0f" /**< id-hmacWithSHA3-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) hashalgs(2) hmacWithSHA3-384(15) } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA3_512 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x10" /**< id-hmacWithSHA3-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) hashalgs(2) hmacWithSHA3-512(16) } */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_RIPEMD160 MBEDTLS_OID_INTERNET "\x05\x05\x08\x01\x04" /**< id-hmacWithSHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) iso-identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) ipsec(8) isakmpOakley(1) hmacRIPEMD160(4)} */ + /* - * Encryption algorithms + * Encryption algorithms, + * the following standardized object identifiers are specified at + * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8018#appendix-C. */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG \ MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG "\x07" /**< desCBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 7 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x03\x07" /**< des-ede3-cbc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) -- us(840) rsadsi(113549) encryptionAlgorithm(3) 7 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AES MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x01" /** aes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 1 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES_128_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x02" /** aes128-cbc-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) aes(1) aes128-CBC-PAD(2) } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES_192_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x16" /** aes192-cbc-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) aes(1) aes192-CBC-PAD(22) } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES_256_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x2a" /** aes256-cbc-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) aes(1) aes256-CBC-PAD(42) } */ /* * Key Wrapping algorithms @@ -309,13 +322,21 @@ /* * PKCS#5 PBES1 algorithms */ -#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x01" /**< pbeWithMD2AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 1} */ -#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD2_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x04" /**< pbeWithMD2AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 4} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x03" /**< pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 3} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x06" /**< pbeWithMD5AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 6} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x0a" /**< pbeWithSHA1AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 10} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x0b" /**< pbeWithSHA1AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 11} */ +/* + * PKCS#7 OIDs + */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_DATA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7 "\x01" /**< Content type is Data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-7 1} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7 "\x02" /**< Content type is Signed Data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-7 2} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7 "\x03" /**< Content type is Enveloped Data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-7 3} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_AND_ENVELOPED_DATA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7 "\x04" /**< Content type is Signed and Enveloped Data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-7 4} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7 "\x05" /**< Content type is Digested Data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-7 5} */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7 "\x06" /**< Content type is Encrypted Data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-7 6} */ + /* * PKCS#8 OIDs */ @@ -326,8 +347,6 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12 "\x01" /**< pkcs-12PbeIds OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12 1} */ -#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x01" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd128BitRC4 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 1} */ -#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x02" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd40BitRC4 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 2} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x03" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd3-KeyTripleDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 3} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x04" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd2-KeyTripleDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 4} */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x05" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd128BitRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 5} */ @@ -438,6 +457,15 @@ * ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 "\x04" +/* + * EC key algorithms from RFC 8410 + */ + +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X25519 MBEDTLS_OID_THAWTE "\x6e" /**< id-X25519 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 101 110 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_X448 MBEDTLS_OID_THAWTE "\x6f" /**< id-X448 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 101 111 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ED25519 MBEDTLS_OID_THAWTE "\x70" /**< id-Ed25519 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 101 112 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_ED448 MBEDTLS_OID_THAWTE "\x71" /**< id-Ed448 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 101 113 } */ + #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -446,10 +474,12 @@ extern "C" { * \brief Base OID descriptor structure */ typedef struct mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t { - const char *asn1; /*!< OID ASN.1 representation */ - size_t asn1_len; /*!< length of asn1 */ - const char *name; /*!< official name (e.g. from RFC) */ - const char *description; /*!< human friendly description */ + const char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(asn1); /*!< OID ASN.1 representation */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(asn1_len); /*!< length of asn1 */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) + const char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name); /*!< official name (e.g. from RFC) */ + const char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(description); /*!< human friendly description */ +#endif } mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t; /** @@ -465,6 +495,25 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t { */ int mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid); +/** + * \brief Translate a string containing a dotted-decimal + * representation of an ASN.1 OID into its encoded form + * (e.g. "1.2.840.113549" into "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D"). + * On success, this function allocates oid->buf from the + * heap. It must be freed by the caller using mbedtls_free(). + * + * \param oid #mbedtls_asn1_buf to populate with the DER-encoded OID + * \param oid_str string representation of the OID to parse + * \param size length of the OID string, not including any null terminator + * + * \return 0 if successful + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA if \p oid_str does not + * represent a valid OID + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED if the function fails to + * allocate oid->buf + */ +int mbedtls_oid_from_numeric_string(mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, const char *oid_str, size_t size); + /** * \brief Translate an X.509 extension OID into local values * @@ -508,7 +557,7 @@ int mbedtls_oid_get_pk_alg(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_al int mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg, const char **oid, size_t *olen); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) /** * \brief Translate NamedCurve OID into an EC group identifier * @@ -530,9 +579,32 @@ int mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_ecp_group_id *gr */ int mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, const char **oid, size_t *olen); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +/** + * \brief Translate AlgorithmIdentifier OID into an EC group identifier, + * for curves that are directly encoded at this level + * + * \param oid OID to use + * \param grp_id place to store group id + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp_algid(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id); + +/** + * \brief Translate EC group identifier into AlgorithmIdentifier OID, + * for curves that are directly encoded at this level + * + * \param grp_id EC group identifier + * \param oid place to store ASN.1 OID string pointer + * \param olen length of the OID + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND + */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp_algid(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, + const char **oid, size_t *olen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + /** * \brief Translate SignatureAlgorithm OID into md_type and pk_type * @@ -569,26 +641,26 @@ int mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t m const char **oid, size_t *olen); /** - * \brief Translate hash algorithm OID into md_type + * \brief Translate hmac algorithm OID into md_type * * \param oid OID to use - * \param md_alg place to store message digest algorithm + * \param md_hmac place to store message hmac algorithm * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND */ -int mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg); +int mbedtls_oid_get_md_hmac(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_hmac); /** - * \brief Translate hmac algorithm OID into md_type + * \brief Translate hash algorithm OID into md_type * * \param oid OID to use - * \param md_hmac place to store message hmac algorithm + * \param md_alg place to store message digest algorithm * * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND */ -int mbedtls_oid_get_md_hmac(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_hmac); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) /** * \brief Translate Extended Key Usage OID into description * @@ -598,6 +670,7 @@ int mbedtls_oid_get_md_hmac(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_h * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND */ int mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, const char **desc); +#endif /** * \brief Translate certificate policies OID into description @@ -630,7 +703,6 @@ int mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const char **oid, size_t * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND */ int mbedtls_oid_get_cipher_alg(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_cipher_type_t *cipher_alg); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) /** @@ -646,6 +718,7 @@ int mbedtls_oid_get_cipher_alg(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_cipher_type_ int mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_cipher_type_t *cipher_alg); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ #ifdef __cplusplus } diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pem.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pem.h index fee32a3bdb..3c6a28d98d 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pem.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pem.h @@ -5,28 +5,13 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PEM_H #define MBEDTLS_PEM_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include @@ -65,9 +50,9 @@ extern "C" { * \brief PEM context structure */ typedef struct mbedtls_pem_context { - unsigned char *buf; /*!< buffer for decoded data */ - size_t buflen; /*!< length of the buffer */ - unsigned char *info; /*!< buffer for extra header information */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buf); /*!< buffer for decoded data */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buflen); /*!< length of the buffer */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(info); /*!< buffer for extra header information */ } mbedtls_pem_context; @@ -88,16 +73,20 @@ void mbedtls_pem_init(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx); * \param data source data to look in (must be nul-terminated) * \param pwd password for decryption (can be NULL) * \param pwdlen length of password - * \param use_len destination for total length used (set after header is - * correctly read, so unless you get + * \param use_len destination for total length used from data buffer. It is + * set after header is correctly read, so unless you get * MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA or * MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT, use_len is - * the length to skip) + * the length to skip. * * \note Attempts to check password correctness by verifying if * the decrypted text starts with an ASN.1 sequence of * appropriate length * + * \note \c mbedtls_pem_free must be called on PEM context before + * the PEM context can be reused in another call to + * \c mbedtls_pem_read_buffer + * * \return 0 on success, or a specific PEM error code */ int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const char *footer, @@ -105,6 +94,25 @@ int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, size_t *use_len); +/** + * \brief Get the pointer to the decoded binary data in a PEM context. + * + * \param ctx PEM context to access. + * \param buflen On success, this will contain the length of the binary data. + * This must be a valid (non-null) pointer. + * + * \return A pointer to the decoded binary data. + * + * \note The returned pointer remains valid only until \p ctx is + modified or freed. + */ +static inline const unsigned char *mbedtls_pem_get_buffer(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, size_t *buflen) +{ + *buflen = ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buflen); + return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buf); +} + + /** * \brief PEM context memory freeing * diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pk.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pk.h index 0e9d58aec6..fde302f872 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pk.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pk.h @@ -5,29 +5,14 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PK_H #define MBEDTLS_PK_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/md.h" @@ -43,15 +28,10 @@ #include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) #include "psa/crypto.h" #endif -#if (defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER)) && \ - !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) -#define inline __inline -#endif - /** Memory allocation failed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED -0x3F80 /** Type mismatch, eg attempt to encrypt with an ECDSA key */ @@ -80,10 +60,8 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x3980 /** The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH -0x3900 - -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** PK hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x3880 +/** The output buffer is too small. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x3880 #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { @@ -108,7 +86,23 @@ typedef enum { * See \c mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext() */ typedef struct mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options { + /** The digest to use for MGF1 in PSS. + * + * \note When #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled and #MBEDTLS_RSA_C is + * disabled, this must be equal to the \c md_alg argument passed + * to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(). In a future version of the library, + * this constraint may apply whenever #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is + * enabled regardless of the status of #MBEDTLS_RSA_C. + */ mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id; + + /** The expected length of the salt, in bytes. This may be + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY to accept any salt length. + * + * \note When #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, only + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY is valid. Any other value may be + * ignored (allowing any salt length). + */ int expected_salt_len; } mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options; @@ -132,7 +126,7 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options { /* For RSA, the signature can be as large as the bignum module allows. * For RSA_ALT, the signature size is not necessarily tied to what the * bignum module can do, but in the absence of any specific setting, - * we use that (rsa_alt_sign_wrap in pk_wrap will check). */ + * we use that (rsa_alt_sign_wrap in library/pk_wrap.h will check). */ #undef MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE #define MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE #endif @@ -165,6 +159,28 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options { #endif #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) */ +/* Internal helper to define which fields in the pk_context structure below + * should be used for EC keys: legacy ecp_keypair or the raw (PSA friendly) + * format. It should be noted that this only affects how data is stored, not + * which functions are used for various operations. The overall picture looks + * like this: + * - if USE_PSA is not defined and ECP_C is defined then use ecp_keypair data + * structure and legacy functions + * - if USE_PSA is defined and + * - if ECP_C then use ecp_keypair structure, convert data to a PSA friendly + * format and use PSA functions + * - if !ECP_C then use new raw data and PSA functions directly. + * + * The main reason for the "intermediate" (USE_PSA + ECP_C) above is that as long + * as ECP_C is defined mbedtls_pk_ec() gives the user a read/write access to the + * ecp_keypair structure inside the pk_context so they can modify it using + * ECP functions which are not under PK module's control. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA +#endif + /** * \brief Types for interfacing with the debug module */ @@ -172,15 +188,16 @@ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_NONE = 0, MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI, MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_ECP, + MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_PSA_EC, } mbedtls_pk_debug_type; /** * \brief Item to send to the debug module */ typedef struct mbedtls_pk_debug_item { - mbedtls_pk_debug_type type; - const char *name; - void *value; + mbedtls_pk_debug_type MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type); + const char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(value); } mbedtls_pk_debug_item; /** Maximum number of item send for debugging, plus 1 */ @@ -188,15 +205,63 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_pk_debug_item { /** * \brief Public key information and operations + * + * \note The library does not support custom pk info structures, + * only built-in structures returned by + * mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(). */ typedef struct mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_info_t; +#define MBEDTLS_PK_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_RAW_LEN \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) /** * \brief Public key container */ typedef struct mbedtls_pk_context { - const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; /**< Public key information */ - void *pk_ctx; /**< Underlying public key context */ + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_info); /**< Public key information */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_ctx); /**< Underlying public key context */ + /* The following field is used to store the ID of a private key in the + * following cases: + * - opaque key when MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is defined + * - normal key when MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA is defined. In this case: + * - the pk_ctx above is not not used to store the private key anymore. + * Actually that field not populated at all in this case because also + * the public key will be stored in raw format as explained below + * - this ID is used for all private key operations (ex: sign, check + * key pair, key write, etc) using PSA functions + * + * Note: this private key storing solution only affects EC keys, not the + * other ones. The latters still use the pk_ctx to store their own + * context. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(priv_id); /**< Key ID for opaque keys */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + /* The following fields are meant for storing the public key in raw format + * which is handy for: + * - easily importing it into the PSA context + * - reducing the ECP module dependencies in the PK one. + * + * When MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA is enabled: + * - the pk_ctx above is not used anymore for storing the public key + * inside the ecp_keypair structure + * - the following fields are used for all public key operations: signature + * verify, key pair check and key write. + * - For a key pair, priv_id contains the private key. For a public key, + * priv_id is null. + * Of course, when MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA is not enabled, the legacy + * ecp_keypair structure is used for storing the public key and performing + * all the operations. + * + * Note: This new public key storing solution only works for EC keys, not + * other ones. The latters still use pk_ctx to store their own + * context. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pub_raw)[MBEDTLS_PK_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_RAW_LEN]; /**< Raw public key */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pub_raw_len); /**< Valid bytes in "pub_raw" */ + psa_ecc_family_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ec_family); /**< EC family of pk */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ec_bits); /**< Curve's bits of pk */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ } mbedtls_pk_context; #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) @@ -204,8 +269,8 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_pk_context { * \brief Context for resuming operations */ typedef struct { - const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; /**< Public key information */ - void *rs_ctx; /**< Underlying restart context */ + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_info); /**< Public key information */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(rs_ctx); /**< Underlying restart context */ } mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx; #else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ /* Now we can declare functions that take a pointer to that */ @@ -216,14 +281,13 @@ typedef void mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx; /** * \brief Types for RSA-alt abstraction */ -typedef int (*mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func)(void *ctx, int mode, size_t *olen, +typedef int (*mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func)(void *ctx, size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, size_t output_max_len); typedef int (*mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_sign_func)(void *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - unsigned int hashlen, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig); typedef size_t (*mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func)(void *ctx); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ @@ -302,8 +366,8 @@ int mbedtls_pk_setup(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info); * storing and manipulating the key material directly. * * \param ctx The context to initialize. It must be empty (type NONE). - * \param key The PSA key to wrap, which must hold an ECC key pair - * (see notes below). + * \param key The PSA key to wrap, which must hold an ECC or RSA key + * pair (see notes below). * * \note The wrapped key must remain valid as long as the * wrapping PK context is in use, that is at least between @@ -311,8 +375,8 @@ int mbedtls_pk_setup(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info); * mbedtls_pk_free() is called on this context. The wrapped * key might then be independently used or destroyed. * - * \note This function is currently only available for ECC key - * pairs (that is, ECC keys containing private key material). + * \note This function is currently only available for ECC or RSA + * key pairs (that is, keys containing private key material). * Support for other key types may be added later. * * \return \c 0 on success. @@ -323,7 +387,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_setup(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info); * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED on allocation failure. */ int mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, - const psa_key_id_t key); + const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key); #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) @@ -383,34 +447,298 @@ static inline size_t mbedtls_pk_get_len(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx) */ int mbedtls_pk_can_do(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_type_t type); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/** + * \brief Tell if context can do the operation given by PSA algorithm + * + * \param ctx The context to query. It must have been initialized. + * \param alg PSA algorithm to check against, the following are allowed: + * PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(hash), + * PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(hash), + * PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, + * PSA_ALG_ECDSA(hash), + * PSA_ALG_ECDH, where hash is a specific hash. + * \param usage PSA usage flag to check against, must be composed of: + * PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH + * PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT + * PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE. + * Context key must match all passed usage flags. + * + * \warning Since the set of allowed algorithms and usage flags may be + * expanded in the future, the return value \c 0 should not + * be taken in account for non-allowed algorithms and usage + * flags. + * + * \return 1 if the context can do operations on the given type. + * \return 0 if the context cannot do the operations on the given + * type, for non-allowed algorithms and usage flags, or + * for a context that has been initialized but not set up + * or that has been cleared with mbedtls_pk_free(). + */ +int mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, psa_algorithm_t alg, + psa_key_usage_t usage); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) +/** + * \brief Determine valid PSA attributes that can be used to + * import a key into PSA. + * + * The attributes determined by this function are suitable + * for calling mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa() to create + * a PSA key with the same key material. + * + * The typical flow of operations involving this function is + * ``` + * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + * int ret = mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(pk, &attributes); + * if (ret != 0) ...; // error handling omitted + * // Tweak attributes if desired + * psa_key_id_t key_id = 0; + * ret = mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa(pk, &attributes, &key_id); + * if (ret != 0) ...; // error handling omitted + * ``` + * + * \note This function does not support RSA-alt contexts + * (set up with mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt()). + * + * \param[in] pk The PK context to use. It must have been set up. + * It can either contain a key pair or just a public key. + * \param usage A single `PSA_KEY_USAGE_xxx` flag among the following: + * - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT: \p pk must contain a + * key pair. The output \p attributes will contain a + * key pair type, and the usage policy will allow + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT as well as + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT. + * - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE: \p pk must contain a + * key pair. The output \p attributes will contain a + * key pair type. + * - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT: The output + * \p attributes will contain a public key type. + * - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH: \p pk must contain a + * key pair. The output \p attributes will contain a + * key pair type, and the usage policy will allow + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH as well as + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH. + * - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE: \p pk must contain a + * key pair. The output \p attributes will contain a + * key pair type, and the usage policy will allow + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE as well as + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE. + * - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH: The output + * \p attributes will contain a public key type. + * - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE: The output + * \p attributes will contain a public key type. + * \param[out] attributes + * On success, valid attributes to import the key into PSA. + * - The lifetime and key identifier are unchanged. If the + * attribute structure was initialized or reset before + * calling this function, this will result in a volatile + * key. Call psa_set_key_identifier() before or after this + * function if you wish to create a persistent key. Call + * psa_set_key_lifetime() before or after this function if + * you wish to import the key in a secure element. + * - The key type and bit-size are determined by the contents + * of the PK context. If the PK context contains a key + * pair, the key type can be either a key pair type or + * the corresponding public key type, depending on + * \p usage. If the PK context contains a public key, + * the key type is a public key type. + * - The key's policy is determined by the key type and + * the \p usage parameter. The usage always allows + * \p usage, exporting and copying the key, and + * possibly other permissions as documented for the + * \p usage parameter. + * The permitted algorithm policy is determined as follows + * based on the #mbedtls_pk_type_t type of \p pk, + * the chosen \p usage and other factors: + * - #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA whose underlying + * #mbedtls_rsa_context has the padding mode + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: + * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(#PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + * if \p usage is SIGN/VERIFY, and + * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT + * if \p usage is ENCRYPT/DECRYPT. + * - #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA whose underlying + * #mbedtls_rsa_context has the padding mode + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 and the digest type + * corresponding to the PSA algorithm \c hash: + * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(#PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + * if \p usage is SIGN/VERIFY, and + * #PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(\c hash) + * if \p usage is ENCRYPT/DECRYPT. + * - #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT: not supported. + * - #MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA or #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY + * if \p usage is SIGN/VERIFY: + * #PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(#PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + * if #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC is enabled, + * otherwise #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(#PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH). + * - #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH or #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY + * if \p usage is DERIVE: + * #PSA_ALG_ECDH. + * - #MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE: same as the primary algorithm + * set for the underlying PSA key, except that + * sign/decrypt flags are removed if the type is + * set to a public key type. + * The underlying key must allow \p usage. + * Note that the enrollment algorithm set with + * psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm() is not copied. + * + * \return 0 on success. + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH if \p pk does not contain + * a key of the type identified in \p attributes. + * Another error code on other failures. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + +/** + * \brief Import a key into the PSA key store. + * + * This function is equivalent to calling psa_import_key() + * with the key material from \p pk. + * + * The typical way to use this function is: + * -# Call mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes() to obtain + * attributes for the given key. + * -# If desired, modify the attributes, for example: + * - To create a persistent key, call + * psa_set_key_identifier() and optionally + * psa_set_key_lifetime(). + * - To import only the public part of a key pair: + * + * psa_set_key_type(&attributes, + * PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR( + * psa_get_key_type(&attributes))); + * - Restrict the key usage if desired. + * -# Call mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa(). + * + * \note This function does not support RSA-alt contexts + * (set up with mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt()). + * + * \param[in] pk The PK context to use. It must have been set up. + * It can either contain a key pair or just a public key. + * \param[in] attributes + * The attributes to use for the new key. They must be + * compatible with \p pk. In particular, the key type + * must match the content of \p pk. + * If \p pk contains a key pair, the key type in + * attributes can be either the key pair type or the + * corresponding public key type (to import only the + * public part). + * \param[out] key_id + * On success, the identifier of the newly created key. + * On error, this is #MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT. + * + * \return 0 on success. + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH if \p pk does not contain + * a key of the type identified in \p attributes. + * Another error code on other failures. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key_id); + +/** + * \brief Create a PK context starting from a key stored in PSA. + * This key: + * - must be exportable and + * - must be an RSA or EC key pair or public key (FFDH is not supported in PK). + * + * The resulting PK object will be a transparent type: + * - #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA for RSA keys or + * - #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY for EC keys. + * + * Once this functions returns the PK object will be completely + * independent from the original PSA key that it was generated + * from. + * Calling mbedtls_pk_sign(), mbedtls_pk_verify(), + * mbedtls_pk_encrypt(), mbedtls_pk_decrypt() on the resulting + * PK context will perform the corresponding algorithm for that + * PK context type. + * * For ECDSA, the choice of deterministic vs randomized will + * be based on the compile-time setting #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC. + * * For an RSA key, the output PK context will allow both + * encrypt/decrypt and sign/verify regardless of the original + * key's policy. + * The original key's policy determines the output key's padding + * mode: PCKS1 v2.1 is set if the PSA key policy is OAEP or PSS, + * otherwise PKCS1 v1.5 is set. + * + * \param key_id The key identifier of the key stored in PSA. + * \param pk The PK context that will be filled. It must be initialized, + * but not set up. + * + * \return 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA in case the provided input + * parameters are not correct. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, mbedtls_pk_context *pk); + +/** + * \brief Create a PK context for the public key of a PSA key. + * + * The key must be an RSA or ECC key. It can be either a + * public key or a key pair, and only the public key is copied. + * The resulting PK object will be a transparent type: + * - #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA for RSA keys or + * - #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY for EC keys. + * + * Once this functions returns the PK object will be completely + * independent from the original PSA key that it was generated + * from. + * Calling mbedtls_pk_verify() or + * mbedtls_pk_encrypt() on the resulting + * PK context will perform the corresponding algorithm for that + * PK context type. + * + * For an RSA key, the output PK context will allow both + * encrypt and verify regardless of the original key's policy. + * The original key's policy determines the output key's padding + * mode: PCKS1 v2.1 is set if the PSA key policy is OAEP or PSS, + * otherwise PKCS1 v1.5 is set. + * + * \param key_id The key identifier of the key stored in PSA. + * \param pk The PK context that will be filled. It must be initialized, + * but not set up. + * + * \return 0 on success. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA in case the provided input + * parameters are not correct. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_copy_public_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, mbedtls_pk_context *pk); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ + /** * \brief Verify signature (including padding if relevant). * * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up. - * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes) + * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used. + * This can be #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if the signature algorithm + * does not rely on a hash algorithm (non-deterministic + * ECDSA, RSA PKCS#1 v1.5). + * For PKCS#1 v1.5, if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, then + * \p hash is the DigestInfo structure used by RFC 8017 + * §9.2 steps 3–6. If \p md_alg is a valid hash + * algorithm then \p hash is the digest itself, and this + * function calculates the DigestInfo encoding internally. * \param hash Hash of the message to sign - * \param hash_len Hash length or 0 (see notes) + * \param hash_len Hash length * \param sig Signature to verify * \param sig_len Signature length * + * \note For keys of type #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, the signature algorithm is + * either PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS (accepting any salt length), + * depending on the padding mode in the underlying RSA context. + * For a pk object constructed by parsing, this is PKCS#1 v1.5 + * by default. Use mbedtls_pk_verify_ext() to explicitly select + * a different algorithm. + * * \return 0 on success (signature is valid), * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH if there is a valid * signature in \p sig but its length is less than \p sig_len, * or a specific error code. - * - * \note For RSA keys, the default padding type is PKCS#1 v1.5. - * Use \c mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS, ... ) - * to verify RSASSA_PSS signatures. - * - * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto - * subsystem must have been initialized by calling - * psa_crypto_init() before calling this function, - * if the key might be an ECC (ECDSA) key. - * - * \note If hash_len is 0, then the length associated with md_alg - * is used instead, or an error returned if it is invalid. - * - * \note md_alg may be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, only if hash_len != 0 */ int mbedtls_pk_verify(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, @@ -469,7 +797,9 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, * * \note If type is MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS, then options must point * to a mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options structure, - * otherwise it must be NULL. + * otherwise it must be NULL. Note that if + * #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is defined, the salt length is not + * verified as PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT is used. */ int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options, mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, @@ -483,34 +813,73 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options, * with a private key. * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes) * \param hash Hash of the message to sign - * \param hash_len Hash length or 0 (see notes) + * \param hash_len Hash length * \param sig Place to write the signature. * It must have enough room for the signature. * #MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE is always enough. * You may use a smaller buffer if it is large enough * given the key type. + * \param sig_size The size of the \p sig buffer in bytes. * \param sig_len On successful return, * the number of bytes written to \p sig. - * \param f_rng RNG function + * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng RNG parameter * - * \return 0 on success, or a specific error code. - * - * \note For RSA keys, the default padding type is PKCS#1 v1.5. - * There is no interface in the PK module to make RSASSA-PSS - * signatures yet. + * \note For keys of type #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, the signature algorithm is + * either PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS (using the largest possible salt + * length up to the hash length), depending on the padding mode + * in the underlying RSA context. For a pk object constructed + * by parsing, this is PKCS#1 v1.5 by default. Use + * mbedtls_pk_verify_ext() to explicitly select a different + * algorithm. * - * \note If hash_len is 0, then the length associated with md_alg - * is used instead, or an error returned if it is invalid. + * \return 0 on success, or a specific error code. * * \note For RSA, md_alg may be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if hash_len != 0. * For ECDSA, md_alg may never be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. */ int mbedtls_pk_sign(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); +/** + * \brief Make signature given a signature type. + * + * \param pk_type Signature type. + * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up + * with a private key. + * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes) + * \param hash Hash of the message to sign + * \param hash_len Hash length + * \param sig Place to write the signature. + * It must have enough room for the signature. + * #MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE is always enough. + * You may use a smaller buffer if it is large enough + * given the key type. + * \param sig_size The size of the \p sig buffer in bytes. + * \param sig_len On successful return, + * the number of bytes written to \p sig. + * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng RNG parameter + * + * \return 0 on success, or a specific error code. + * + * \note When \p pk_type is #MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS, + * see #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS for a description of PSS options used. + * + * \note For RSA, md_alg may be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if hash_len != 0. + * For ECDSA, md_alg may never be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * + */ +int mbedtls_pk_sign_ext(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type, + mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng); + /** * \brief Restartable version of \c mbedtls_pk_sign() * @@ -523,15 +892,16 @@ int mbedtls_pk_sign(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, * with a private key. * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes for mbedtls_pk_sign()) * \param hash Hash of the message to sign - * \param hash_len Hash length or 0 (see notes for mbedtls_pk_sign()) + * \param hash_len Hash length * \param sig Place to write the signature. * It must have enough room for the signature. * #MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE is always enough. * You may use a smaller buffer if it is large enough * given the key type. + * \param sig_size The size of the \p sig buffer in bytes. * \param sig_len On successful return, * the number of bytes written to \p sig. - * \param f_rng RNG function + * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng RNG parameter * \param rs_ctx Restart context (NULL to disable restart) * @@ -542,7 +912,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_sign(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, int mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx); @@ -556,10 +926,13 @@ int mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, * \param output Decrypted output * \param olen Decrypted message length * \param osize Size of the output buffer - * \param f_rng RNG function + * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng RNG parameter * - * \note For RSA keys, the default padding type is PKCS#1 v1.5. + * \note For keys of type #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, the signature algorithm is + * either PKCS#1 v1.5 or OAEP, depending on the padding mode in + * the underlying RSA context. For a pk object constructed by + * parsing, this is PKCS#1 v1.5 by default. * * \return 0 on success, or a specific error code. */ @@ -577,10 +950,15 @@ int mbedtls_pk_decrypt(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, * \param output Encrypted output * \param olen Encrypted output length * \param osize Size of the output buffer - * \param f_rng RNG function + * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng RNG parameter * - * \note For RSA keys, the default padding type is PKCS#1 v1.5. + * \note For keys of type #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, the signature algorithm is + * either PKCS#1 v1.5 or OAEP, depending on the padding mode in + * the underlying RSA context. For a pk object constructed by + * parsing, this is PKCS#1 v1.5 by default. + * + * \note \p f_rng is used for padding generation. * * \return 0 on success, or a specific error code. */ @@ -594,6 +972,8 @@ int mbedtls_pk_encrypt(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, * * \param pub Context holding a public key. * \param prv Context holding a private (and public) key. + * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng RNG parameter * * \return \c 0 on success (keys were checked and match each other). * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the keys could not @@ -601,7 +981,10 @@ int mbedtls_pk_encrypt(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA if a context is invalid. * \return Another non-zero value if the keys do not match. */ -int mbedtls_pk_check_pair(const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, const mbedtls_pk_context *prv); +int mbedtls_pk_check_pair(const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, + const mbedtls_pk_context *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng); /** * \brief Export debug information @@ -647,7 +1030,7 @@ static inline mbedtls_rsa_context *mbedtls_pk_rsa(const mbedtls_pk_context pk) { switch (mbedtls_pk_get_type(&pk)) { case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: - return (mbedtls_rsa_context *) (pk).pk_ctx; + return (mbedtls_rsa_context *) (pk).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_ctx); default: return NULL; } @@ -672,7 +1055,7 @@ static inline mbedtls_ecp_keypair *mbedtls_pk_ec(const mbedtls_pk_context pk) case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: - return (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) (pk).pk_ctx; + return (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) (pk).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_ctx); default: return NULL; } @@ -684,6 +1067,10 @@ static inline mbedtls_ecp_keypair *mbedtls_pk_ec(const mbedtls_pk_context pk) /** * \brief Parse a private key in PEM or DER format * + * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto + * subsystem must have been initialized by calling + * psa_crypto_init() before calling this function. + * * \param ctx The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized * but not set up. * \param key Input buffer to parse. @@ -700,6 +1087,8 @@ static inline mbedtls_ecp_keypair *mbedtls_pk_ec(const mbedtls_pk_context pk) * The empty password is not supported. * \param pwdlen Size of the password in bytes. * Ignored if \p pwd is \c NULL. + * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL. Used for blinding. + * \param p_rng RNG parameter * * \note On entry, ctx must be empty, either freshly initialised * with mbedtls_pk_init() or reset with mbedtls_pk_free(). If you need a @@ -711,12 +1100,17 @@ static inline mbedtls_ecp_keypair *mbedtls_pk_ec(const mbedtls_pk_context pk) */ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, - const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen); + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); /** \ingroup pk_module */ /** * \brief Parse a public key in PEM or DER format * + * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto + * subsystem must have been initialized by calling + * psa_crypto_init() before calling this function. + * * \param ctx The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized * but not set up. * \param key Input buffer to parse. @@ -731,6 +1125,9 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, * with mbedtls_pk_init() or reset with mbedtls_pk_free(). If you need a * specific key type, check the result with mbedtls_pk_can_do(). * + * \note For compressed points, see #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED for + * limitations. + * * \note The key is also checked for correctness. * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific PK or PEM error code @@ -743,6 +1140,10 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, /** * \brief Load and parse a private key * + * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto + * subsystem must have been initialized by calling + * psa_crypto_init() before calling this function. + * * \param ctx The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized * but not set up. * \param path filename to read the private key from @@ -751,6 +1152,8 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, * Pass a null-terminated string if expecting an encrypted * key; a non-encrypted key will also be accepted. * The empty password is not supported. + * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL. Used for blinding. + * \param p_rng RNG parameter * * \note On entry, ctx must be empty, either freshly initialised * with mbedtls_pk_init() or reset with mbedtls_pk_free(). If you need a @@ -761,7 +1164,8 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, * \return 0 if successful, or a specific PK or PEM error code */ int mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, - const char *path, const char *password); + const char *path, const char *password, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); /** \ingroup pk_module */ /** @@ -798,7 +1202,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const char *path); * \return length of data written if successful, or a specific * error code */ -int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size); +int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size); /** * \brief Write a public key to a SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER structure @@ -813,7 +1217,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t * \return length of data written if successful, or a specific * error code */ -int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size); +int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size); #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) /** @@ -826,7 +1230,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, siz * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code */ -int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size); +int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size); /** * \brief Write a private key to a PKCS#1 or SEC1 PEM string @@ -838,7 +1242,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, siz * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code */ -int mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size); +int mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ @@ -877,40 +1281,6 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const mbedtls_pk_context *key); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ -/* - * Internal module functions. You probably do not want to use these unless you - * know you do. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) -int mbedtls_pk_load_file(const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -/** - * \brief Turn an EC key into an opaque one. - * - * \warning This is a temporary utility function for tests. It might - * change or be removed at any time without notice. - * - * \note Only ECDSA keys are supported so far. Signing with the - * specified hash is the only allowed use of that key. - * - * \param pk Input: the EC key to import to a PSA key. - * Output: a PK context wrapping that PSA key. - * \param key Output: a PSA key identifier. - * It's the caller's responsibility to call - * psa_destroy_key() on that key identifier after calling - * mbedtls_pk_free() on the PK context. - * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm to allow for use with that key. - * - * \return \c 0 if successful. - * \return An Mbed TLS error code otherwise. - */ -int mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, - psa_key_id_t *key, - psa_algorithm_t hash_alg); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs11.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs11.h deleted file mode 100644 index 908a1bc35c..0000000000 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs11.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,253 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file pkcs11.h - * - * \brief Wrapper for PKCS#11 library libpkcs11-helper - * - * \author Adriaan de Jong - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_PKCS11_H -#define MBEDTLS_PKCS11_H - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) - -#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" - -#include - -#if (defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER)) && \ - !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) -#define inline __inline -#endif - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) - -/** - * Context for PKCS #11 private keys. - */ -typedef struct mbedtls_pkcs11_context { - pkcs11h_certificate_t pkcs11h_cert; - int len; -} mbedtls_pkcs11_context; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif - -/** - * Initialize a mbedtls_pkcs11_context. - * (Just making memory references valid.) - * - * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a - * future version of the library. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_pkcs11_init(mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx); - -/** - * Fill in a Mbed TLS certificate, based on the given PKCS11 helper certificate. - * - * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a - * future version of the library. - * - * \param cert X.509 certificate to fill - * \param pkcs11h_cert PKCS #11 helper certificate - * - * \return 0 on success. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_pkcs11_x509_cert_bind(mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, - pkcs11h_certificate_t pkcs11h_cert); - -/** - * Set up a mbedtls_pkcs11_context storing the given certificate. Note that the - * mbedtls_pkcs11_context will take over control of the certificate, freeing it when - * done. - * - * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a - * future version of the library. - * - * \param priv_key Private key structure to fill. - * \param pkcs11_cert PKCS #11 helper certificate - * - * \return 0 on success - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_bind( - mbedtls_pkcs11_context *priv_key, - pkcs11h_certificate_t pkcs11_cert); - -/** - * Free the contents of the given private key context. Note that the structure - * itself is not freed. - * - * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a - * future version of the library. - * - * \param priv_key Private key structure to cleanup - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_free( - mbedtls_pkcs11_context *priv_key); - -/** - * \brief Do an RSA private key decrypt, then remove the message - * padding - * - * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a future - * version of the library. - * - * \param ctx PKCS #11 context - * \param mode must be MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, for compatibility with rsa.c's signature - * \param input buffer holding the encrypted data - * \param output buffer that will hold the plaintext - * \param olen will contain the plaintext length - * \param output_max_len maximum length of the output buffer - * - * \return 0 if successful, or an MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code - * - * \note The output buffer must be as large as the size - * of ctx->N (eg. 128 bytes if RSA-1024 is used) otherwise - * an error is thrown. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_pkcs11_decrypt(mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx, - int mode, size_t *olen, - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output, - size_t output_max_len); - -/** - * \brief Do a private RSA to sign a message digest - * - * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a future - * version of the library. - * - * \param ctx PKCS #11 context - * \param mode must be MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, for compatibility with rsa.c's signature - * \param md_alg a MBEDTLS_MD_XXX (use MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data) - * \param hashlen message digest length (for MBEDTLS_MD_NONE only) - * \param hash buffer holding the message digest - * \param sig buffer that will hold the ciphertext - * - * \return 0 if the signing operation was successful, - * or an MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code - * - * \note The "sig" buffer must be as large as the size - * of ctx->N (eg. 128 bytes if RSA-1024 is used). - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_pkcs11_sign(mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx, - int mode, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - unsigned int hashlen, - const unsigned char *hash, - unsigned char *sig); - -/** - * SSL/TLS wrappers for PKCS#11 functions - * - * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a future - * version of the library. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED static inline int mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_decrypt(void *ctx, - int mode, - size_t *olen, - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output, - size_t output_max_len) -{ - return mbedtls_pkcs11_decrypt((mbedtls_pkcs11_context *) ctx, mode, olen, input, output, - output_max_len); -} - -/** - * \brief This function signs a message digest using RSA. - * - * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a future - * version of the library. - * - * \param ctx The PKCS #11 context. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. This parameter is unused. - * \param p_rng The RNG context. This parameter is unused. - * \param mode The operation to run. This must be set to - * MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, for compatibility with rsa.c's - * signature. - * \param md_alg The message digest algorithm. One of the MBEDTLS_MD_XXX - * must be passed to this function and MBEDTLS_MD_NONE can be - * used for signing raw data. - * \param hashlen The message digest length (for MBEDTLS_MD_NONE only). - * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest. - * \param sig The buffer that will hold the ciphertext. - * - * \return \c 0 if the signing operation was successful. - * \return A non-zero error code on failure. - * - * \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size of - * ctx->N. For example, 128 bytes if RSA-1024 is - * used. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED static inline int mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_sign(void *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, - unsigned char *, - size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - unsigned int hashlen, - const unsigned char *hash, - unsigned char *sig) -{ - ((void) f_rng); - ((void) p_rng); - return mbedtls_pkcs11_sign((mbedtls_pkcs11_context *) ctx, mode, md_alg, - hashlen, hash, sig); -} - -/** - * This function gets the length of the private key. - * - * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a future - * version of the library. - * - * \param ctx The PKCS #11 context. - * - * \return The length of the private key. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_pkcs11_key_len(void *ctx) -{ - return ((mbedtls_pkcs11_context *) ctx)->len; -} - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS11_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h index 63e2e63b58..87f7681f29 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h @@ -5,28 +5,12 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PKCS12_H #define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/md.h" #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" @@ -47,34 +31,16 @@ #define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_IV 2 /**< initialization vector */ #define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_MAC_KEY 3 /**< integrity / MAC key */ -#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT 0 -#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_DECRYPT +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) - -/** - * \brief PKCS12 Password Based function (encryption / decryption) - * for pbeWithSHAAnd128BitRC4 - * - * \param pbe_params an ASN1 buffer containing the pkcs-12PbeParams structure - * \param mode either MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT - * \param pwd the password used (may be NULL if no password is used) - * \param pwdlen length of the password (may be 0) - * \param input the input data - * \param len data length - * \param output the output buffer - * - * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code - */ -int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, - const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, - const unsigned char *input, size_t len, - unsigned char *output); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) /** * \brief PKCS12 Password Based function (encryption / decryption) * for cipher-based and mbedtls_md-based PBE's @@ -82,6 +48,10 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, * \note When encrypting, #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 must * be enabled at compile time. * + * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a + * future version of the library. + * Please use mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext() instead. + * * \warning When decrypting: * - if #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 is enabled at compile * time, this function validates the CBC padding and returns @@ -116,11 +86,13 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, * * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code */ -int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, - mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, - const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, - const unsigned char *data, size_t len, - unsigned char *output); +int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + const unsigned char *data, size_t len, + unsigned char *output); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) @@ -173,7 +145,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ /** * \brief The PKCS#12 derivation function uses a password and a salt @@ -191,7 +163,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, * no byte order mark and with a null terminator (i.e. the * last two bytes should be 0x00 0x00). * \param pwdlen length of the password (may be 0). - * \param salt Salt buffer to use This may only be \c NULL when + * \param salt Salt buffer to use. This may only be \c NULL when * \p saltlen is 0. * \param saltlen length of the salt (may be zero) * \param mbedtls_md mbedtls_md type to use during the derivation diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h index e995d3d9d6..9ba5689d4a 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h @@ -7,31 +7,17 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PKCS5_H #define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #include #include @@ -45,21 +31,26 @@ /** Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -0x2e00 -#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT 0 -#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_DECRYPT +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) /** * \brief PKCS#5 PBES2 function * * \note When encrypting, #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 must * be enabled at compile time. * + * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a + * future version of the library. + * Please use mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext() instead. + * * \warning When decrypting: * - if #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 is enabled at compile * time, this function validates the CBC padding and returns @@ -90,10 +81,11 @@ extern "C" { * * \returns 0 on success, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code if verification fails. */ -int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, - const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, - const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, - unsigned char *output); +int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, + unsigned char *output); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) @@ -138,11 +130,35 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C*/ +/** + * \brief PKCS#5 PBKDF2 using HMAC without using the HMAC context + * + * \param md_type Hash algorithm used + * \param password Password to use when generating key + * \param plen Length of password + * \param salt Salt to use when generating key + * \param slen Length of salt + * \param iteration_count Iteration count + * \param key_length Length of generated key in bytes + * \param output Generated key. Must be at least as big as key_length + * + * \returns 0 on success, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code if verification fails. + */ +int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac_ext(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const unsigned char *password, + size_t plen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen, + unsigned int iteration_count, + uint32_t key_length, unsigned char *output); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) /** * \brief PKCS#5 PBKDF2 using HMAC * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac_ext(). + * * \param ctx Generic HMAC context * \param password Password to use when generating key * \param plen Length of password @@ -154,11 +170,16 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, * * \returns 0 on success, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code if verification fails. */ -int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *password, - size_t plen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen, - unsigned int iteration_count, - uint32_t key_length, unsigned char *output); - +int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *password, + size_t plen, + const unsigned char *salt, + size_t slen, + unsigned int iteration_count, + uint32_t key_length, + unsigned char *output); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs7.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs7.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e9b482208e --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs7.h @@ -0,0 +1,240 @@ +/** + * \file pkcs7.h + * + * \brief PKCS #7 generic defines and structures + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315 + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/** + * Note: For the time being, this implementation of the PKCS #7 cryptographic + * message syntax is a partial implementation of RFC 2315. + * Differences include: + * - The RFC specifies 6 different content types. The only type currently + * supported in Mbed TLS is the signed-data content type. + * - The only supported PKCS #7 Signed Data syntax version is version 1 + * - The RFC specifies support for BER. This implementation is limited to + * DER only. + * - The RFC specifies that multiple digest algorithms can be specified + * in the Signed Data type. Only one digest algorithm is supported in Mbed TLS. + * - The RFC specifies the Signed Data type can contain multiple X.509 or PKCS #6 extended + * certificates. In Mbed TLS, this list can only contain 0 or 1 certificates + * and they must be in X.509 format. + * - The RFC specifies the Signed Data type can contain + * certificate-revocation lists (CRLs). This implementation has no support + * for CRLs so it is assumed to be an empty list. + * - The RFC allows for SignerInfo structure to optionally contain + * unauthenticatedAttributes and authenticatedAttributes. In Mbed TLS it is + * assumed these fields are empty. + * - The RFC allows for the signed Data type to contain contentInfo. This + * implementation assumes the type is DATA and the content is empty. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PKCS7_H +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS7_H + +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" + +/** + * \name PKCS #7 Module Error codes + * \{ + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT -0x5300 /**< The format is invalid, e.g. different type expected. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x5380 /**< Unavailable feature, e.g. anything other than signed data. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_VERSION -0x5400 /**< The PKCS #7 version element is invalid or cannot be parsed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO -0x5480 /**< The PKCS #7 content info is invalid or cannot be parsed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_ALG -0x5500 /**< The algorithm tag or value is invalid or cannot be parsed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CERT -0x5580 /**< The certificate tag or value is invalid or cannot be parsed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNATURE -0x5600 /**< Error parsing the signature */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO -0x5680 /**< Error parsing the signer's info */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x5700 /**< Input invalid. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_ALLOC_FAILED -0x5780 /**< Allocation of memory failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL -0x5800 /**< Verification Failed */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_CERT_DATE_INVALID -0x5880 /**< The PKCS #7 date issued/expired dates are invalid */ +/* \} name */ + +/** + * \name PKCS #7 Supported Version + * \{ + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PKCS7_SUPPORTED_VERSION 0x01 +/* \} name */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * Type-length-value structure that allows for ASN.1 using DER. + */ +typedef mbedtls_asn1_buf mbedtls_pkcs7_buf; + +/** + * Container for ASN.1 named information objects. + * It allows for Relative Distinguished Names (e.g. cn=localhost,ou=code,etc.). + */ +typedef mbedtls_asn1_named_data mbedtls_pkcs7_name; + +/** + * Container for a sequence of ASN.1 items + */ +typedef mbedtls_asn1_sequence mbedtls_pkcs7_sequence; + +/** + * PKCS #7 types + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_PKCS7_NONE=0, + MBEDTLS_PKCS7_DATA, + MBEDTLS_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA, + MBEDTLS_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA, + MBEDTLS_PKCS7_SIGNED_AND_ENVELOPED_DATA, + MBEDTLS_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA, + MBEDTLS_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA, +} +mbedtls_pkcs7_type; + +/** + * Structure holding PKCS #7 signer info + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info { + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(version); + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(serial); + mbedtls_x509_name MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(issuer); + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(issuer_raw); + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg_identifier); + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_alg_identifier); + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig); + struct mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next); +} +mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info; + +/** + * Structure holding the signed data section + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data { + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(version); + mbedtls_pkcs7_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(digest_alg_identifiers); + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(no_of_certs); + mbedtls_x509_crt MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(certs); + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(no_of_crls); + mbedtls_x509_crl MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(crl); + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(no_of_signers); + mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(signers); +} +mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data; + +/** + * Structure holding PKCS #7 structure, only signed data for now + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_pkcs7 { + mbedtls_pkcs7_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(raw); + mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(signed_data); +} +mbedtls_pkcs7; + +/** + * \brief Initialize mbedtls_pkcs7 structure. + * + * \param pkcs7 mbedtls_pkcs7 structure. + */ +void mbedtls_pkcs7_init(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7); + +/** + * \brief Parse a single DER formatted PKCS #7 detached signature. + * + * \param pkcs7 The mbedtls_pkcs7 structure to be filled by the parser. + * \param buf The buffer holding only the DER encoded PKCS #7 content. + * \param buflen The size in bytes of \p buf. The size must be exactly the + * length of the DER encoded PKCS #7 content. + * + * \note This function makes an internal copy of the PKCS #7 buffer + * \p buf. In particular, \p buf may be destroyed or reused + * after this call returns. + * \note Signatures with internal data are not supported. + * + * \return The \c mbedtls_pkcs7_type of \p buf, if successful. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_pkcs7_parse_der(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7, const unsigned char *buf, + const size_t buflen); + +/** + * \brief Verification of PKCS #7 signature against a caller-supplied + * certificate. + * + * For each signer in the PKCS structure, this function computes + * a signature over the supplied data, using the supplied + * certificate and the same digest algorithm as specified by the + * signer. It then compares this signature against the + * signer's signature; verification succeeds if any comparison + * matches. + * + * This function does not use the certificates held within the + * PKCS #7 structure itself, and does not check that the + * certificate is signed by a trusted certification authority. + * + * \param pkcs7 mbedtls_pkcs7 structure containing signature. + * \param cert Certificate containing key to verify signature. + * \param data Plain data on which signature has to be verified. + * \param datalen Length of the data. + * + * \note This function internally calculates the hash on the supplied + * plain data for signature verification. + * + * \return 0 if the signature verifies, or a negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data_verify(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7, + const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + const unsigned char *data, + size_t datalen); + +/** + * \brief Verification of PKCS #7 signature against a caller-supplied + * certificate. + * + * For each signer in the PKCS structure, this function + * validates a signature over the supplied hash, using the + * supplied certificate and the same digest algorithm as + * specified by the signer. Verification succeeds if any + * signature is good. + * + * This function does not use the certificates held within the + * PKCS #7 structure itself, and does not check that the + * certificate is signed by a trusted certification authority. + * + * \param pkcs7 PKCS #7 structure containing signature. + * \param cert Certificate containing key to verify signature. + * \param hash Hash of the plain data on which signature has to be verified. + * \param hashlen Length of the hash. + * + * \note This function is different from mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data_verify() + * in that it is directly passed the hash of the data. + * + * \return 0 if the signature verifies, or a negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_hash_verify(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7, + const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hashlen); + +/** + * \brief Unallocate all PKCS #7 data and zeroize the memory. + * It doesn't free \p pkcs7 itself. This should be done by the caller. + * + * \param pkcs7 mbedtls_pkcs7 structure to free. + */ +void mbedtls_pkcs7_free(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* pkcs7.h */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform.h index c8c6e63f01..de3d71d9dc 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform.h @@ -21,38 +21,18 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_H #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) #include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" #endif -/** Hardware accelerator failed */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0070 -/** The requested feature is not supported by the platform */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED -0x0072 - #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -61,7 +41,7 @@ extern "C" { * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. - * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line. * \{ */ @@ -106,6 +86,9 @@ extern "C" { #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE) #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE free /**< The default \c free function to use. */ #endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SETBUF) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SETBUF setbuf /**< The default \c setbuf function to use. */ +#endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT) #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT exit /**< The default \c exit function to use. */ #endif @@ -310,6 +293,59 @@ int mbedtls_platform_set_vsnprintf(int (*vsnprintf_func)(char *s, size_t n, #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT */ +/* + * The function pointers for setbuf + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT) +#include +/** + * \brief Function pointer to call for `setbuf()` functionality + * (changing the internal buffering on stdio calls). + * + * \note The library calls this function to disable + * buffering when reading or writing sensitive data, + * to avoid having extra copies of sensitive data + * remaining in stdio buffers after the file is + * closed. If this is not a concern, for example if + * your platform's stdio doesn't have any buffering, + * you can set mbedtls_setbuf to a function that + * does nothing. + * + * The library always calls this function with + * `buf` equal to `NULL`. + */ +extern void (*mbedtls_setbuf)(FILE *stream, char *buf); + +/** + * \brief Dynamically configure the function that is called + * when the mbedtls_setbuf() function is called by the + * library. + * + * \param setbuf_func The \c setbuf function implementation + * + * \return \c 0 + */ +int mbedtls_platform_set_setbuf(void (*setbuf_func)( + FILE *stream, char *buf)); +#else +#undef mbedtls_setbuf +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_MACRO) +/** + * \brief Macro defining the function for the library to + * call for `setbuf` functionality (changing the + * internal buffering on stdio calls). + * + * \note See extra comments on the mbedtls_setbuf() function + * pointer above. + * + * \return \c 0 on success, negative on error. + */ +#define mbedtls_setbuf MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_MACRO +#else +#define mbedtls_setbuf setbuf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_MACRO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT */ + /* * The function pointers for exit */ @@ -402,7 +438,7 @@ int mbedtls_platform_set_nv_seed( * setup or teardown operations. */ typedef struct mbedtls_platform_context { - char dummy; /**< A placeholder member, as empty structs are not portable. */ + char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy); /**< A placeholder member, as empty structs are not portable. */ } mbedtls_platform_context; diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_time.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_time.h index 112286bef8..97f1963aba 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_time.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_time.h @@ -5,28 +5,12 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_H #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { @@ -43,6 +27,29 @@ typedef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO mbedtls_time_t; typedef time_t mbedtls_time_t; #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_TYPE_MACRO) +typedef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_TYPE_MACRO mbedtls_ms_time_t; +#else +#include +#include +typedef int64_t mbedtls_ms_time_t; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_TYPE_MACRO */ + +/** + * \brief Get time in milliseconds. + * + * \return Monotonically-increasing current time in milliseconds. + * + * \note Define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT to be able to provide an + * alternative implementation + * + * \warning This function returns a monotonically-increasing time value from a + * start time that will differ from platform to platform, and possibly + * from run to run of the process. + * + */ +mbedtls_ms_time_t mbedtls_ms_time(void); + /* * The function pointers for time */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h index 62f6d70388..1b371ef3f4 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h @@ -6,28 +6,12 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_UTIL_H #define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_UTIL_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) @@ -39,85 +23,9 @@ extern "C" { #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS) - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT) -/* Allow the user to define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED to something like assert - * (which is what our config.h suggests). */ -#include -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED) -/** An alternative definition of MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED has been set in config.h. - * - * This flag can be used to check whether it is safe to assume that - * MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED() will expand to a call to mbedtls_param_failed(). - */ -#define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT - -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT) -#define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(cond) assert(cond) -#define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED_ALT - -#else /* MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED */ -#define MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(cond) \ - mbedtls_param_failed( #cond, __FILE__, __LINE__) - -/** - * \brief User supplied callback function for parameter validation failure. - * See #MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS for context. - * - * This function will be called unless an alternative treatment - * is defined through the #MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED macro. - * - * This function can return, and the operation will be aborted, or - * alternatively, through use of setjmp()/longjmp() can resume - * execution in the application code. - * - * \param failure_condition The assertion that didn't hold. - * \param file The file where the assertion failed. - * \param line The line in the file where the assertion failed. - */ -void mbedtls_param_failed(const char *failure_condition, - const char *file, - int line); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED */ - -/* Internal macro meant to be called only from within the library. */ -#define MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, ret) \ - do { \ - if (!(cond)) \ - { \ - MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(cond); \ - return ret; \ - } \ - } while (0) - -/* Internal macro meant to be called only from within the library. */ -#define MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) \ - do { \ - if (!(cond)) \ - { \ - MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(cond); \ - return; \ - } \ - } while (0) - -#else /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS */ - -/* Internal macros meant to be called only from within the library. */ -#define MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, ret) do { } while (0) -#define MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) do { } while (0) - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS */ - /* Internal helper macros for deprecating API constants. */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -/* Deliberately don't (yet) export MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED here - * to avoid conflict with other headers which define and use - * it, too. We might want to move all these definitions here at - * some point for uniformity. */ #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED typedef char const *mbedtls_deprecated_string_constant_t; #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT(VAL) \ @@ -125,15 +33,15 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED typedef char const *mbedtls_deprecated_string_constant_t; MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED typedef int mbedtls_deprecated_numeric_constant_t; #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT(VAL) \ ((mbedtls_deprecated_numeric_constant_t) (VAL)) -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #else /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ +#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT(VAL) VAL #define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT(VAL) VAL #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /* Implementation of the check-return facility. - * See the user documentation in config.h. + * See the user documentation in mbedtls_config.h. * * Do not use this macro directly to annotate function: instead, * use one of MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL or MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/poly1305.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/poly1305.h index 7b1faa51f3..61bcaa6b64 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/poly1305.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/poly1305.h @@ -14,29 +14,14 @@ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_POLY1305_H #define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include @@ -44,16 +29,6 @@ /** Invalid input parameter(s). */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0057 -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is deprecated and should not be - * used. */ -/** Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implemented. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x0059 - -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. - */ -/** Poly1305 hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x005B - #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -61,11 +36,11 @@ extern "C" { #if !defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT) typedef struct mbedtls_poly1305_context { - uint32_t r[4]; /** The value for 'r' (low 128 bits of the key). */ - uint32_t s[4]; /** The value for 's' (high 128 bits of the key). */ - uint32_t acc[5]; /** The accumulator number. */ - uint8_t queue[16]; /** The current partial block of data. */ - size_t queue_len; /** The number of bytes stored in 'queue'. */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(r)[4]; /** The value for 'r' (low 128 bits of the key). */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(s)[4]; /** The value for 's' (high 128 bits of the key). */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(acc)[5]; /** The accumulator number. */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(queue)[16]; /** The current partial block of data. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(queue_len); /** The number of bytes stored in 'queue'. */ } mbedtls_poly1305_context; diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/private_access.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/private_access.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..580f3eb446 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/private_access.h @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +/** + * \file private_access.h + * + * \brief Macro wrapper for struct's members. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PRIVATE_ACCESS_H +#define MBEDTLS_PRIVATE_ACCESS_H + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ALLOW_PRIVATE_ACCESS +#define MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(member) private_##member +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(member) member +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PRIVATE_ACCESS_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h index 9a1a2eae2f..c78cc23333 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -2,457 +2,43 @@ * \file psa_util.h * * \brief Utility functions for the use of the PSA Crypto library. - * - * \warning This function is not part of the public API and may - * change at any time. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H #define MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "psa/crypto.h" -#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" -#include "mbedtls/md.h" -#include "mbedtls/pk.h" -#include "mbedtls/oid.h" - -#include - -/* Translations for symmetric crypto. */ - -static inline psa_key_type_t mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type( - mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher) -{ - switch (cipher) { - case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM: - case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM: - case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM: - case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM: - case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM: - case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM: - case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC: - case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC: - case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC: - case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB: - case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB: - case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB: - return PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; - - /* ARIA not yet supported in PSA. */ - /* case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM: - case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM: - case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM: - case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM: - case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM: - case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM: - case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC: - case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC: - case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC: - return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA ); */ - - default: - return 0; - } -} - -static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_mode( - mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode, size_t taglen) -{ - switch (mode) { - case MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB: - return PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING; - case MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM: - return PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, taglen); - case MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM: - return PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen); - case MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC: - if (taglen == 0) { - return PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING; - } else { - return 0; - } - default: - return 0; - } -} - -static inline psa_key_usage_t mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_operation( - mbedtls_operation_t op) -{ - switch (op) { - case MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT: - return PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT; - case MBEDTLS_DECRYPT: - return PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT; - default: - return 0; - } -} - -/* Translations for hashing. */ - -static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_psa_translate_md(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg) -{ - switch (md_alg) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: - return PSA_ALG_MD2; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: - return PSA_ALG_MD4; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: - return PSA_ALG_MD5; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: - return PSA_ALG_SHA_1; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: - return PSA_ALG_SHA_224; - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: - return PSA_ALG_SHA_256; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: - return PSA_ALG_SHA_384; - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: - return PSA_ALG_SHA_512; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: - return PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160; -#endif - case MBEDTLS_MD_NONE: - return 0; - default: - return 0; - } -} +/* ASN1 defines used in the ECDSA conversion functions. + * Note: intentionally not adding MBEDTLS_ASN1_[PARSE|WRITE]_C guards here + * otherwise error codes would be unknown in test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data.*/ +#include -/* Translations for ECC. */ - -static inline int mbedtls_psa_get_ecc_oid_from_id( - psa_ecc_family_t curve, size_t bits, - char const **oid, size_t *oid_len) -{ - switch (curve) { - case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1: - switch (bits) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) - case 192: - *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1; - *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1); - return 0; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) - case 224: - *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1; - *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1); - return 0; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) - case 256: - *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1; - *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1); - return 0; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) - case 384: - *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1; - *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1); - return 0; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) - case 521: - *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1; - *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1); - return 0; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ - } - break; - case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1: - switch (bits) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) - case 192: - *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1; - *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1); - return 0; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) - case 224: - *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1; - *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1); - return 0; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) - case 256: - *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1; - *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1); - return 0; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ - } - break; - case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1: - switch (bits) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) - case 256: - *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1; - *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1); - return 0; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) - case 384: - *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1; - *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1); - return 0; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) - case 512: - *oid = MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1; - *oid_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1); - return 0; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ - } - break; - } - (void) oid; - (void) oid_len; - return -1; -} - -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH 1 - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) -#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < (2 * ((192 + 7) / 8) + 1) -#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH (2 * ((192 + 7) / 8) + 1) -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) -#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < (2 * ((224 + 7) / 8) + 1) -#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH (2 * ((224 + 7) / 8) + 1) -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) -#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < (2 * ((256 + 7) / 8) + 1) -#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH (2 * ((256 + 7) / 8) + 1) -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) -#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < (2 * ((384 + 7) / 8) + 1) -#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH (2 * ((384 + 7) / 8) + 1) -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) -#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < (2 * ((521 + 7) / 8) + 1) -#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH (2 * ((521 + 7) / 8) + 1) -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) -#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < (2 * ((192 + 7) / 8) + 1) -#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH (2 * ((192 + 7) / 8) + 1) -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) -#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < (2 * ((224 + 7) / 8) + 1) -#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH (2 * ((224 + 7) / 8) + 1) -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) -#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < (2 * ((256 + 7) / 8) + 1) -#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH (2 * ((256 + 7) / 8) + 1) -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) -#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < (2 * ((256 + 7) / 8) + 1) -#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH (2 * ((256 + 7) / 8) + 1) -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) -#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < (2 * ((384 + 7) / 8) + 1) -#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH (2 * ((384 + 7) / 8) + 1) -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) -#if MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH < (2 * ((512 + 7) / 8) + 1) -#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH (2 * ((512 + 7) / 8) + 1) -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ - - -/* Translations for PK layer */ - -static inline int mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk(psa_status_t status) -{ - switch (status) { - case PSA_SUCCESS: - return 0; - case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY: - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED; - case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY: - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; - case PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE: - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - /* All other failures */ - case PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE: - case PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE: - case PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED: - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - default: /* We return the same as for the 'other failures', - * but list them separately nonetheless to indicate - * which failure conditions we have considered. */ - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } -} - -/* Translations for ECC */ - -/* This function transforms an ECC group identifier from - * https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-8 - * into a PSA ECC group identifier. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -static inline psa_key_type_t mbedtls_psa_parse_tls_ecc_group( - uint16_t tls_ecc_grp_reg_id, size_t *bits) -{ - const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info = - mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id(tls_ecc_grp_reg_id); - if (curve_info == NULL) { - return 0; - } - return PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( - mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(curve_info->grp_id, bits)); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ - -/* This function takes a buffer holding an EC public key - * exported through psa_export_public_key(), and converts - * it into an ECPoint structure to be put into a ClientKeyExchange - * message in an ECDHE exchange. - * - * Both the present and the foreseeable future format of EC public keys - * used by PSA have the ECPoint structure contained in the exported key - * as a subbuffer, and the function merely selects this subbuffer instead - * of making a copy. - */ -static inline int mbedtls_psa_tls_psa_ec_to_ecpoint(unsigned char *src, - size_t srclen, - unsigned char **dst, - size_t *dstlen) -{ - *dst = src; - *dstlen = srclen; - return 0; -} - -/* This function takes a buffer holding an ECPoint structure - * (as contained in a TLS ServerKeyExchange message for ECDHE - * exchanges) and converts it into a format that the PSA key - * agreement API understands. - */ -static inline int mbedtls_psa_tls_ecpoint_to_psa_ec(unsigned char const *src, - size_t srclen, - unsigned char *dst, - size_t dstlen, - size_t *olen) -{ - if (srclen > dstlen) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; - } - - memcpy(dst, src, srclen); - *olen = srclen; - return 0; -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - -/* Expose whatever RNG the PSA subsystem uses to applications using the - * mbedtls_xxx API. The declarations and definitions here need to be - * consistent with the implementation in library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h. - * See that file for implementation documentation. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) - -/* The type of a `f_rng` random generator function that many library functions - * take. - * - * This type name is not part of the Mbed TLS stable API. It may be renamed - * or moved without warning. - */ -typedef int mbedtls_f_rng_t(void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t output_size); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) /** The random generator function for the PSA subsystem. * * This function is suitable as the `f_rng` random generator function - * parameter of many `mbedtls_xxx` functions. Use #MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE - * to obtain the \p p_rng parameter. + * parameter of many `mbedtls_xxx` functions. * * The implementation of this function depends on the configuration of the * library. * - * \note Depending on the configuration, this may be a function or - * a pointer to a function. - * * \note This function may only be used if the PSA crypto subsystem is active. * This means that you must call psa_crypto_init() before any call to * this function, and you must not call this function after calling * mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(). * - * \param p_rng The random generator context. This must be - * #MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE. No other state is - * supported. + * \param p_rng This parameter is only kept for backward compatibility + * reasons with legacy `f_rng` functions and it's ignored. + * Set to #MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE or NULL. * \param output The buffer to fill. It must have room for * \c output_size bytes. * \param output_size The number of bytes to write to \p output. @@ -474,33 +60,129 @@ int mbedtls_psa_get_random(void *p_rng, /** The random generator state for the PSA subsystem. * - * This macro expands to an expression which is suitable as the `p_rng` - * random generator state parameter of many `mbedtls_xxx` functions. - * It must be used in combination with the random generator function - * mbedtls_psa_get_random(). + * This macro always expands to NULL because the `p_rng` parameter is unused + * in mbedtls_psa_get_random(), but it's kept for interface's backward + * compatibility. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE NULL + +/** \defgroup psa_tls_helpers TLS helper functions + * @{ + */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +#include + +/** Convert an ECC curve identifier from the Mbed TLS encoding to PSA. + * + * \param grpid An Mbed TLS elliptic curve identifier + * (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`). + * \param[out] bits On success the bit size of the curve; 0 on failure. + * + * \return If the curve is supported in the PSA API, this function + * returns the proper PSA curve identifier + * (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`). This holds even if the curve is + * not supported by the ECP module. + * \return \c 0 if the curve is not supported in the PSA API. + */ +psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid, + size_t *bits); + +/** Convert an ECC curve identifier from the PSA encoding to Mbed TLS. + * + * \param family A PSA elliptic curve family identifier + * (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`). + * \param bits The bit-length of a private key on \p curve. * - * The implementation of this macro depends on the configuration of the - * library. Do not make any assumption on its nature. + * \return If the curve is supported in the PSA API, this function + * returns the corresponding Mbed TLS elliptic curve + * identifier (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if the combination of \c curve + * and \p bits is not supported. */ -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE NULL +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t family, + size_t bits); +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ -#else /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) */ +/** + * \brief This function returns the PSA algorithm identifier + * associated with the given digest type. + * + * \param md_type The type of digest to search for. Must not be NONE. + * + * \warning If \p md_type is \c MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this function will + * not return \c PSA_ALG_NONE, but an invalid algorithm. + * + * \warning This function does not check if the algorithm is + * supported, it always returns the corresponding identifier. + * + * \return The PSA algorithm identifier associated with \p md_type, + * regardless of whether it is supported or not. + */ +static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type) +{ + return PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | (psa_algorithm_t) md_type; +} -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) -#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" -typedef mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t; -static mbedtls_f_rng_t *const mbedtls_psa_get_random = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random; -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) -#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" -typedef mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t; -static mbedtls_f_rng_t *const mbedtls_psa_get_random = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random; -#endif -extern mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *const mbedtls_psa_random_state; +/** + * \brief This function returns the given digest type + * associated with the PSA algorithm identifier. + * + * \param psa_alg The PSA algorithm identifier to search for. + * + * \warning This function does not check if the algorithm is + * supported, it always returns the corresponding identifier. + * + * \return The MD type associated with \p psa_alg, + * regardless of whether it is supported or not. + */ +static inline mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa_alg) +{ + return (mbedtls_md_type_t) (psa_alg & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE mbedtls_psa_random_state +/** Convert an ECDSA signature from raw format to DER ASN.1 format. + * + * \param bits Size of each coordinate in bits. + * \param raw Buffer that contains the signature in raw format. + * \param raw_len Length of \p raw in bytes. This must be + * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits) bytes. + * \param[out] der Buffer that will be filled with the converted DER + * output. It can overlap with raw buffer. + * \param der_size Size of \p der in bytes. It is enough if \p der_size + * is at least the size of the actual output. (The size + * of the output can vary depending on the presence of + * leading zeros in the data.) You can use + * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN(\p bits) to determine a + * size that is large enough for all signatures for a + * given value of \p bits. + * \param[out] der_len On success it contains the amount of valid data + * (in bytes) written to \p der. It's undefined + * in case of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(size_t bits, const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len, + unsigned char *der, size_t der_size, size_t *der_len); + +/** Convert an ECDSA signature from DER ASN.1 format to raw format. + * + * \param bits Size of each coordinate in bits. + * \param der Buffer that contains the signature in DER format. + * \param der_len Size of \p der in bytes. + * \param[out] raw Buffer that will be filled with the converted raw + * signature. It can overlap with der buffer. + * \param raw_size Size of \p raw in bytes. Must be at least + * 2 * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits) bytes. + * \param[out] raw_len On success it is updated with the amount of valid + * data (in bytes) written to \p raw. It's undefined + * in case of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(size_t bits, const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, + unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_size, size_t *raw_len); -#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ +/**@}*/ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ripemd160.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ripemd160.h index 6d9a1a2a32..279f92b512 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ripemd160.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ripemd160.h @@ -5,37 +5,17 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_H #define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_RIPEMD160_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. - */ -/** RIPEMD160 hardware accelerator failed */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RIPEMD160_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0031 - #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -48,9 +28,9 @@ extern "C" { * \brief RIPEMD-160 context structure */ typedef struct mbedtls_ripemd160_context { - uint32_t total[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */ - uint32_t state[5]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ - unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< data block being processed */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(total)[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[5]; /*!< intermediate digest state */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer)[64]; /*!< data block being processed */ } mbedtls_ripemd160_context; @@ -88,7 +68,7 @@ void mbedtls_ripemd160_clone(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *dst, * * \return 0 if successful */ -int mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx); +int mbedtls_ripemd160_starts(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx); /** * \brief RIPEMD-160 process buffer @@ -99,9 +79,9 @@ int mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx); * * \return 0 if successful */ -int mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen); +int mbedtls_ripemd160_update(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen); /** * \brief RIPEMD-160 final digest @@ -111,8 +91,8 @@ int mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, * * \return 0 if successful */ -int mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[20]); +int mbedtls_ripemd160_finish(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20]); /** * \brief RIPEMD-160 process data block (internal use only) @@ -125,63 +105,6 @@ int mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, int mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64]); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief RIPEMD-160 context setup - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx context to be initialized - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160_starts( - mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief RIPEMD-160 process buffer - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160_update( - mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen); - -/** - * \brief RIPEMD-160 final digest - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context - * \param output RIPEMD-160 checksum result - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160_finish( - mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[20]); - -/** - * \brief RIPEMD-160 process data block (internal use only) - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context - * \param data buffer holding one block of data - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160_process( - mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64]); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /** * \brief Output = RIPEMD-160( input buffer ) * @@ -191,31 +114,9 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160_process( * * \return 0 if successful */ -int mbedtls_ripemd160_ret(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[20]); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief Output = RIPEMD-160( input buffer ) - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ripemd160_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param input buffer holding the data - * \param ilen length of the input data - * \param output RIPEMD-160 checksum result - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_ripemd160(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[20]); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160(const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[20]); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/rsa.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/rsa.h index 37f07c0766..c1e76b3927 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/rsa.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/rsa.h @@ -11,28 +11,13 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_RSA_H #define MBEDTLS_RSA_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" #include "mbedtls/md.h" @@ -63,20 +48,9 @@ /** The random generator failed to generate non-zeros. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED -0x4480 -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION is deprecated and should not be used. - */ -/** The implementation does not offer the requested operation, for example, because of security violations or lack of functionality. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION -0x4500 - -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** RSA hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x4580 - /* * RSA constants */ -#define MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC 0 /**< Request private key operation. */ -#define MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE 1 /**< Request public key operation. */ #define MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 0 /**< Use PKCS#1 v1.5 encoding. */ #define MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 1 /**< Use PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding. */ @@ -99,49 +73,51 @@ extern "C" { // Regular implementation // +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS) +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS 1024 +#elif MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS < 128 +#error "MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS must be at least 128 bits" +#endif + /** * \brief The RSA context structure. - * - * \note Direct manipulation of the members of this structure - * is deprecated. All manipulation should instead be done through - * the public interface functions. */ typedef struct mbedtls_rsa_context { - int ver; /*!< Reserved for internal purposes. - * Do not set this field in application - * code. Its meaning might change without - * notice. */ - size_t len; /*!< The size of \p N in Bytes. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ver); /*!< Reserved for internal purposes. + * Do not set this field in application + * code. Its meaning might change without + * notice. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(len); /*!< The size of \p N in Bytes. */ - mbedtls_mpi N; /*!< The public modulus. */ - mbedtls_mpi E; /*!< The public exponent. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(N); /*!< The public modulus. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(E); /*!< The public exponent. */ - mbedtls_mpi D; /*!< The private exponent. */ - mbedtls_mpi P; /*!< The first prime factor. */ - mbedtls_mpi Q; /*!< The second prime factor. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(D); /*!< The private exponent. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(P); /*!< The first prime factor. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q); /*!< The second prime factor. */ - mbedtls_mpi DP; /*!< D % (P - 1). */ - mbedtls_mpi DQ; /*!< D % (Q - 1). */ - mbedtls_mpi QP; /*!< 1 / (Q % P). */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(DP); /*!< D % (P - 1). */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(DQ); /*!< D % (Q - 1). */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(QP); /*!< 1 / (Q % P). */ - mbedtls_mpi RN; /*!< cached R^2 mod N. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(RN); /*!< cached R^2 mod N. */ - mbedtls_mpi RP; /*!< cached R^2 mod P. */ - mbedtls_mpi RQ; /*!< cached R^2 mod Q. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(RP); /*!< cached R^2 mod P. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(RQ); /*!< cached R^2 mod Q. */ - mbedtls_mpi Vi; /*!< The cached blinding value. */ - mbedtls_mpi Vf; /*!< The cached un-blinding value. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Vi); /*!< The cached blinding value. */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Vf); /*!< The cached un-blinding value. */ - int padding; /*!< Selects padding mode: - #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 for 1.5 padding and - #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 for OAEP or PSS. */ - int hash_id; /*!< Hash identifier of mbedtls_md_type_t type, - as specified in md.h for use in the MGF - mask generating function used in the - EME-OAEP and EMSA-PSS encodings. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(padding); /*!< Selects padding mode: + #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 for 1.5 padding and + #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 for OAEP or PSS. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hash_id); /*!< Hash identifier of mbedtls_md_type_t type, + as specified in md.h for use in the MGF + mask generating function used in the + EME-OAEP and EMSA-PSS encodings. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) /* Invariant: the mutex is initialized iff ver != 0. */ - mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; /*!< Thread-safety mutex. */ + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex); /*!< Thread-safety mutex. */ #endif } mbedtls_rsa_context; @@ -153,33 +129,73 @@ mbedtls_rsa_context; /** * \brief This function initializes an RSA context. * + * \note This function initializes the padding and the hash + * identifier to respectively #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 and + * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. See mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() for more + * information about those parameters. + * + * \param ctx The RSA context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_rsa_init(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function sets padding for an already initialized RSA + * context. + * * \note Set padding to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 for the RSAES-OAEP * encryption scheme and the RSASSA-PSS signature scheme. * * \note The \p hash_id parameter is ignored when using * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 padding. * - * \note The choice of padding mode is strictly enforced for private key - * operations, since there might be security concerns in + * \note The choice of padding mode is strictly enforced for private + * key operations, since there might be security concerns in * mixing padding modes. For public key operations it is * a default value, which can be overridden by calling specific - * \c rsa_rsaes_xxx or \c rsa_rsassa_xxx functions. + * \c mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_xxx or \c mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_xxx + * functions. * * \note The hash selected in \p hash_id is always used for OEAP * encryption. For PSS signatures, it is always used for * making signatures, but can be overridden for verifying them. * If set to #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it is always overridden. * - * \param ctx The RSA context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to be configured. * \param padding The padding mode to use. This must be either * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21. - * \param hash_id The hash identifier of ::mbedtls_md_type_t type, if - * \p padding is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21. It is unused - * otherwise. + * \param hash_id The hash identifier for PSS or OAEP, if \p padding is + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21. #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE is accepted by this + * function but may be not suitable for some operations. + * Ignored if \p padding is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING failure: + * \p padding or \p hash_id is invalid. */ -void mbedtls_rsa_init(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int padding, - int hash_id); +int mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int padding, + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_id); + +/** + * \brief This function retrieves padding mode of initialized + * RSA context. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context. + * + * \return RSA padding mode. + * + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function retrieves hash identifier of mbedtls_md_type_t + * type. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context. + * + * \return Hash identifier of mbedtls_md_type_t type. + * + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_get_md_alg(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx); /** * \brief This function imports a set of core parameters into an @@ -238,7 +254,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_import(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \param N The RSA modulus. This may be \c NULL. * \param N_len The Byte length of \p N; it is ignored if \p N == NULL. * \param P The first prime factor of \p N. This may be \c NULL. - * \param P_len The Byte length of \p P; it ns ignored if \p P == NULL. + * \param P_len The Byte length of \p P; it is ignored if \p P == NULL. * \param Q The second prime factor of \p N. This may be \c NULL. * \param Q_len The Byte length of \p Q; it is ignored if \p Q == NULL. * \param D The private exponent. This may be \c NULL. @@ -411,16 +427,14 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_mpi *DP, mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP); /** - * \brief This function sets padding for an already initialized RSA - * context. See mbedtls_rsa_init() for details. + * \brief This function retrieves the length of the RSA modulus in bits. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context. + * + * \return The length of the RSA modulus in bits. * - * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to be configured. - * \param padding The padding mode to use. This must be either - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21. - * \param hash_id The #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 hash identifier. */ -void mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int padding, - int hash_id); +size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx); /** * \brief This function retrieves the length of RSA modulus in Bytes. @@ -440,7 +454,7 @@ size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_len(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx); * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context used to hold the key. * \param f_rng The RNG function to be used for key generation. - * This must not be \c NULL. + * This is mandatory and must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. * This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. * \param nbits The size of the public key in bits. @@ -561,11 +575,9 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_public(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * of a PRNG. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. - * \param f_rng The RNG function, used for blinding. It is discouraged - * and deprecated to pass \c NULL here, in which case - * blinding will be omitted. + * \param f_rng The RNG function, used for blinding. It is mandatory. * \param p_rng The RNG context to pass to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL - * if \p f_rng is \c NULL or if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. + * if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. * \param input The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. @@ -588,29 +600,13 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * operation. * * It is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1 encryption - * operation using the \p mode from the context. - * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. + * operation. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. - * \param f_rng The RNG to use. It is mandatory for PKCS#1 v2.1 padding - * encoding, and for PKCS#1 v1.5 padding encoding when used - * with \p mode set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. For PKCS#1 v1.5 - * padding encoding and \p mode set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, - * it is used for blinding and should be provided in this - * case; see mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. + * \param f_rng The RNG to use. It is used for padding generation + * and it is mandatory. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. May be - * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or if \p f_rng doesn't - * need a context argument. - * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated). + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * \param ilen The length of the plaintext in Bytes. * \param input The input data to encrypt. This must be a readable * buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if @@ -625,7 +621,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, size_t ilen, + size_t ilen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output); @@ -633,25 +629,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption operation * (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5-ENCRYPT). * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. - * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. - * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. It is needed for padding generation - * if \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. If \p mode is - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (discouraged), it is used for - * blinding and should be provided; see mbedtls_rsa_private(). + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. It is mandatory and used for + * padding generation. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may - * be \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or if \p f_rng - * doesn't need a context argument. - * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated). + * be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * \param ilen The length of the plaintext in Bytes. * \param input The input data to encrypt. This must be a readable * buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if @@ -666,7 +648,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, size_t ilen, + size_t ilen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output); @@ -677,22 +659,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \note The output buffer must be as large as the size * of ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used. * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. - * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This is needed for padding - * generation and must be provided. + * generation and is mandatory. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may * be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. - * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated). * \param label The buffer holding the custom label to use. * This must be a readable buffer of length \p label_len * Bytes. It may be \c NULL if \p label_len is \c 0. @@ -711,7 +682,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, size_t ilen, const unsigned char *input, @@ -722,7 +692,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * message padding. * * It is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1 decryption - * operation using the \p mode from the context. + * operation. + * + * \warning When \p ctx->padding is set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, + * mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt() is called, which is an + * inherently dangerous function (CWE-242). * * \note The output buffer length \c output_max_len should be * as large as the size \p ctx->len of \p ctx->N (for example, @@ -731,24 +705,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * hold the decryption of the particular ciphertext provided, * the function returns \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE. * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. - * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, - * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see - * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. If \p mode is - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, it is ignored. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This is used for blinding and is + * mandatory; see mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be - * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. - * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. * \param olen The address at which to store the length of * the plaintext. This must not be \c NULL. * \param input The ciphertext buffer. This must be a readable buffer @@ -764,7 +725,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, size_t *olen, + size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, size_t output_max_len); @@ -773,6 +734,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption * operation (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5-DECRYPT). * + * \warning This is an inherently dangerous function (CWE-242). Unless + * it is used in a side channel free and safe way (eg. + * implementing the TLS protocol as per 7.4.7.1 of RFC 5246), + * the calling code is vulnerable. + * * \note The output buffer length \c output_max_len should be * as large as the size \p ctx->len of \p ctx->N, for example, * 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used, to be able to hold an @@ -780,24 +746,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * hold the decryption of the particular ciphertext provided, * the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE. * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. - * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, - * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see - * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. If \p mode is - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, it is ignored. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This is used for blinding and is + * mandatory; see mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be - * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. - * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. * \param olen The address at which to store the length of * the plaintext. This must not be \c NULL. * \param input The ciphertext buffer. This must be a readable buffer @@ -814,7 +767,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, size_t *olen, + size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, size_t output_max_len); @@ -831,24 +784,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * ciphertext provided, the function returns * #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE. * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. - * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, - * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see - * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. If \p mode is - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, it is ignored. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This is used for blinding and is + * mandatory. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be - * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. - * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. * \param label The buffer holding the custom label to use. * This must be a readable buffer of length \p label_len * Bytes. It may be \c NULL if \p label_len is \c 0. @@ -868,7 +808,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, @@ -880,7 +819,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * a message digest using PKCS#1. * * It is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1 - * signature using the \p mode from the context. + * signature. * * \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size * of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used. @@ -889,34 +828,18 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign() for details on * \p md_alg and \p hash_id. * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. - * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. - * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If the padding mode is PKCS#1 v2.1, - * this must be provided. If the padding mode is PKCS#1 v1.5 and - * \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, it is used for blinding - * and should be provided; see mbedtls_rsa_private() for more - * more. It is ignored otherwise. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This is mandatory and + * must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL - * if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context argument. - * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). + * if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. - * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. - * Ths is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes. + * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the + * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm. * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. - * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable - * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not - * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length - * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes. * \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of @@ -928,7 +851,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, @@ -938,33 +860,18 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 signature * operation (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-SIGN). * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. - * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, - * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see - * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. If \p mode is - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, it is ignored. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This is used for blinding and is + * mandatory; see mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL - * if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context argument. - * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). + * if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. - * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. - * Ths is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes. + * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the + * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm. * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. - * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable - * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not - * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length - * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes. * \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of @@ -976,19 +883,18 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) /** * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 PSS signature * operation (RSASSA-PSS-SIGN). * - * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx (when calling - * mbedtls_rsa_init() or by calling mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() - * afterwards) selects the hash used for the + * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx by calling + * mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() selects the hash used for the * encoding operation and for the mask generation function * (MGF1). For more details on the encoding operation and the * mask generation function, consult RFC-3447: Public-Key @@ -1003,18 +909,16 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. It must not be \c NULL. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. It is mandatory and must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL * if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. - * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. - * Ths is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes. + * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the + * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm. * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. - * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable - * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not - * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length - * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes. * \param saltlen The length of the salt that should be used. * If passed #MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, the function will use * the largest possible salt length up to the hash length, @@ -1041,9 +945,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 PSS signature * operation (RSASSA-PSS-SIGN). * - * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx (when calling - * mbedtls_rsa_init() or by calling mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() - * afterwards) selects the hash used for the + * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx by calling + * mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() selects the hash used for the * encoding operation and for the mask generation function * (MGF1). For more details on the encoding operation and the * mask generation function, consult RFC-3447: Public-Key @@ -1060,30 +963,17 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * the key size in bytes), this function returns * #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA. * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. - * * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use. - * \param f_rng The RNG function. It must not be \c NULL. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. It is mandatory and must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL * if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. - * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. - * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. - * This is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes. + * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the + * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm. * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. - * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable - * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not - * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length - * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes. * \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of @@ -1095,49 +985,31 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ /** * \brief This function performs a public RSA operation and checks * the message digest. * * This is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1 - * verification using the mode from the context. + * verification. * * \note For PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding, see comments on * mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify() about \c md_alg and * \c hash_id. * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. - * * \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use. - * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, - * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see - * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. Otherwise, it is ignored. - * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be - * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. - * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated). * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. - * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. - * This is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes. + * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the + * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm. * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. - * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable - * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not - * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length - * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes. * \param sig The buffer holding the signature. This must be a readable * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. @@ -1146,9 +1018,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, @@ -1158,32 +1027,14 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 verification * operation (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY). * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. - * * \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use. - * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, - * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see - * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. Otherwise, it is ignored. - * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be - * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. - * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated). * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. - * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. - * This is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes. + * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the + * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm. * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. - * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable - * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not - * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length - * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes. * \param sig The buffer holding the signature. This must be a readable * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. @@ -1192,9 +1043,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, @@ -1204,42 +1052,24 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 PSS verification * operation (RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY). * - * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx (when calling - * mbedtls_rsa_init() or by calling mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() - * afterwards) selects the hash used for the + * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx by calling + * mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() selects the hash used for the * encoding operation and for the mask generation function * (MGF1). For more details on the encoding operation and the * mask generation function, consult RFC-3447: Public-Key * Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography - * Specifications. If the \c hash_id set in \p ctx is - * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, the \p md_alg parameter is used. - * - * \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function - * in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE mode. Future versions of the library - * are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it - * implicitly set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC. - * - * \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support - * mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead - * return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED. + * Specifications. If the \c hash_id set in \p ctx by + * mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, the \p md_alg + * parameter is used. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use. - * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, - * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see - * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. Otherwise, it is ignored. - * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be - * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. - * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE (deprecated). * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. - * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. - * This is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes. + * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the + * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm. * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. - * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable - * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not - * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length - * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes. * \param sig The buffer holding the signature. This must be a readable * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. @@ -1248,9 +1078,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, @@ -1263,27 +1090,17 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size * of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used. * - * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx (when calling - * mbedtls_rsa_init() or by calling mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() - * afterwards) is ignored. + * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx by mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() is + * ignored. * * \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use. - * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. If \p mode is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, - * this is used for blinding and should be provided; see - * mbedtls_rsa_private() for more. Otherwise, it is ignored. - * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be - * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a context. - * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE. * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data. * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data. - * \param hashlen The length of the message digest. - * This is only used if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes. + * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the + * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm. * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data. - * If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must be a readable - * buffer of length \p hashlen Bytes. If \p md_alg is not - * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it must be a readable buffer of length - * the size of the hash corresponding to \p md_alg. + * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes. * \param mgf1_hash_id The message digest algorithm used for the * verification operation and the mask generation * function (MGF1). For more details on the encoding @@ -1301,9 +1118,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha1.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha1.h index 7a7319f26a..592ffd13f2 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha1.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha1.h @@ -12,35 +12,17 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SHA1_H #define MBEDTLS_SHA1_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** SHA-1 hardware accelerator failed */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0035 /** SHA-1 input data was malformed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0073 @@ -61,9 +43,9 @@ extern "C" { * */ typedef struct mbedtls_sha1_context { - uint32_t total[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */ - uint32_t state[5]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */ - unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< The data block being processed. */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(total)[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[5]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer)[64]; /*!< The data block being processed. */ } mbedtls_sha1_context; @@ -126,7 +108,7 @@ void mbedtls_sha1_clone(mbedtls_sha1_context *dst, * \return A negative error code on failure. * */ -int mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx); +int mbedtls_sha1_starts(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx); /** * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing SHA-1 @@ -145,9 +127,9 @@ int mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx); * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen); +int mbedtls_sha1_update(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen); /** * \brief This function finishes the SHA-1 operation, and writes @@ -165,8 +147,8 @@ int mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[20]); +int mbedtls_sha1_finish(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20]); /** * \brief SHA-1 process data block (internal use only). @@ -186,85 +168,6 @@ int mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, int mbedtls_internal_sha1_process(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64]); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief This function starts a SHA-1 checksum calculation. - * - * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to initialize. This must be initialized. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1_starts(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing SHA-1 - * checksum calculation. - * - * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha1_update_ret() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-1 context. This must be initialized and - * have a hash operation started. - * \param input The buffer holding the input data. - * This must be a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. - * \param ilen The length of the input data \p input in Bytes. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1_update(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen); - -/** - * \brief This function finishes the SHA-1 operation, and writes - * the result to the output buffer. - * - * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-1 context. This must be initialized and - * have a hash operation started. - * \param output The SHA-1 checksum result. - * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 20 Bytes. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1_finish(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[20]); - -/** - * \brief SHA-1 process data block (internal use only). - * - * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_sha1_process() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-1 context. This must be initialized. - * \param data The data block being processed. - * This must be a readable buffer of length \c 64 bytes. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1_process(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64]); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /** * \brief This function calculates the SHA-1 checksum of a buffer. * @@ -288,44 +191,9 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1_process(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, * \return A negative error code on failure. * */ -int mbedtls_sha1_ret(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[20]); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief This function calculates the SHA-1 checksum of a buffer. - * - * The function allocates the context, performs the - * calculation, and frees the context. - * - * The SHA-1 result is calculated as - * output = SHA-1(input buffer). - * - * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use - * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering - * stronger message digests instead. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha1_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param input The buffer holding the input data. - * This must be a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. - * \param ilen The length of the input data \p input in Bytes. - * \param output The SHA-1 checksum result. This must be a writable - * buffer of size \c 20 Bytes. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha1(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[20]); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +int mbedtls_sha1(const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[20]); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha256.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha256.h index 00bd17d0cf..ca568e291e 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha256.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha256.h @@ -8,35 +8,17 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SHA256_H #define MBEDTLS_SHA256_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** SHA-256 hardware accelerator failed */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0037 /** SHA-256 input data was malformed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0074 @@ -53,14 +35,16 @@ extern "C" { * * The structure is used both for SHA-256 and for SHA-224 * checksum calculations. The choice between these two is - * made in the call to mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(). + * made in the call to mbedtls_sha256_starts(). */ typedef struct mbedtls_sha256_context { - uint32_t total[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */ - uint32_t state[8]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */ - unsigned char buffer[64]; /*!< The data block being processed. */ - int is224; /*!< Determines which function to use: - 0: Use SHA-256, or 1: Use SHA-224. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer)[64]; /*!< The data block being processed. */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(total)[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[8]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(is224); /*!< Determines which function to use: + 0: Use SHA-256, or 1: Use SHA-224. */ +#endif } mbedtls_sha256_context; @@ -101,10 +85,14 @@ void mbedtls_sha256_clone(mbedtls_sha256_context *dst, * \param is224 This determines which function to use. This must be * either \c 0 for SHA-256, or \c 1 for SHA-224. * + * \note is224 must be defined accordingly to the enabled + * MBEDTLS_SHA224_C/MBEDTLS_SHA256_C symbols otherwise the + * function will return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA. + * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224); +int mbedtls_sha256_starts(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224); /** * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing @@ -119,9 +107,9 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224); * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen); +int mbedtls_sha256_update(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen); /** * \brief This function finishes the SHA-256 operation, and writes @@ -130,13 +118,14 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. This must be initialized * and have a hash operation started. * \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result. - * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 32 Bytes. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 32 bytes + * for SHA-256, \c 28 bytes for SHA-224. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[32]); +int mbedtls_sha256_finish(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + unsigned char *output); /** * \brief This function processes a single data block within @@ -153,72 +142,6 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64]); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief This function starts a SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum - * calculation. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The context to use. This must be initialized. - * \param is224 Determines which function to use. This must be - * either \c 0 for SHA-256, or \c 1 for SHA-224. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256_starts(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - int is224); - -/** - * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing - * SHA-256 checksum calculation. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha256_update_ret() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-256 context to use. This must be - * initialized and have a hash operation started. - * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable - * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. - * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256_update(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen); - -/** - * \brief This function finishes the SHA-256 operation, and writes - * the result to the output buffer. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. This must be initialized and - * have a hash operation started. - * \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result. This must be - * a writable buffer of length \c 32 Bytes. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256_finish(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[32]); - -/** - * \brief This function processes a single data block within - * the ongoing SHA-256 computation. This function is for - * internal use only. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_sha256_process() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. This must be initialized. - * \param data The buffer holding one block of data. This must be - * a readable buffer of size \c 64 Bytes. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256_process(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64]); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /** * \brief This function calculates the SHA-224 or SHA-256 * checksum of a buffer. @@ -232,63 +155,41 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256_process(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. - * \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result. This must - * be a writable buffer of length \c 32 Bytes. + * \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 32 bytes + * for SHA-256, \c 28 bytes for SHA-224. * \param is224 Determines which function to use. This must be * either \c 0 for SHA-256, or \c 1 for SHA-224. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_sha256_ret(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[32], - int is224); +int mbedtls_sha256(const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, + int is224); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) /** - * \brief This function calculates the SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum - * of a buffer. + * \brief The SHA-224 checkup routine. * - * The function allocates the context, performs the - * calculation, and frees the context. - * - * The SHA-256 result is calculated as - * output = SHA-256(input buffer). - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha256_ret() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable - * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. - * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. - * \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result. This must be - * a writable buffer of length \c 32 Bytes. - * \param is224 Determines which function to use. This must be either - * \c 0 for SHA-256, or \c 1 for SHA-224. + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha256(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[32], - int is224); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +int mbedtls_sha224_self_test(int verbose); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA224_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) /** - * \brief The SHA-224 and SHA-256 checkup routine. + * \brief The SHA-256 checkup routine. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return \c 1 on failure. */ int mbedtls_sha256_self_test(int verbose); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha3.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha3.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3eeee65e66 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha3.h @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +/** + * \file sha3.h + * + * \brief This file contains SHA-3 definitions and functions. + * + * The Secure Hash Algorithms cryptographic + * hash functions are defined in FIPS 202: SHA-3 Standard: + * Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions . + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SHA3_H +#define MBEDTLS_SHA3_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include +#include + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** SHA-3 input data was malformed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA3_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0076 + +/** + * SHA-3 family id. + * + * It identifies the family (SHA3-256, SHA3-512, etc.) + */ + +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_SHA3_NONE = 0, /*!< Operation not defined. */ + MBEDTLS_SHA3_224, /*!< SHA3-224 */ + MBEDTLS_SHA3_256, /*!< SHA3-256 */ + MBEDTLS_SHA3_384, /*!< SHA3-384 */ + MBEDTLS_SHA3_512, /*!< SHA3-512 */ +} mbedtls_sha3_id; + +/** + * \brief The SHA-3 context structure. + * + * The structure is used SHA-3 checksum calculations. + */ +typedef struct { + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state[25]); + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(index); + uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(olen); + uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_block_size); +} +mbedtls_sha3_context; + +/** + * \brief This function initializes a SHA-3 context. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-3 context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL. + */ +void mbedtls_sha3_init(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function clears a SHA-3 context. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-3 context to clear. This may be \c NULL, in which + * case this function returns immediately. If it is not \c NULL, + * it must point to an initialized SHA-3 context. + */ +void mbedtls_sha3_free(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function clones the state of a SHA-3 context. + * + * \param dst The destination context. This must be initialized. + * \param src The context to clone. This must be initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_sha3_clone(mbedtls_sha3_context *dst, + const mbedtls_sha3_context *src); + +/** + * \brief This function starts a SHA-3 checksum + * calculation. + * + * \param ctx The context to use. This must be initialized. + * \param id The id of the SHA-3 family. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha3_starts(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx, mbedtls_sha3_id id); + +/** + * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing + * SHA-3 checksum calculation. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-3 context. This must be initialized + * and have a hash operation started. + * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha3_update(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t ilen); + +/** + * \brief This function finishes the SHA-3 operation, and writes + * the result to the output buffer. + * + * \param ctx The SHA-3 context. This must be initialized + * and have a hash operation started. + * \param output The SHA-3 checksum result. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \c olen bytes. + * \param olen Defines the length of output buffer (in bytes). For SHA-3 224, SHA-3 256, + * SHA-3 384 and SHA-3 512 \c olen must equal to 28, 32, 48 and 64, + * respectively. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha3_finish(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx, + uint8_t *output, size_t olen); + +/** + * \brief This function calculates the SHA-3 + * checksum of a buffer. + * + * The function allocates the context, performs the + * calculation, and frees the context. + * + * The SHA-3 result is calculated as + * output = SHA-3(id, input buffer, d). + * + * \param id The id of the SHA-3 family. + * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable + * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. + * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. + * \param output The SHA-3 checksum result. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \c olen bytes. + * \param olen Defines the length of output buffer (in bytes). For SHA-3 224, SHA-3 256, + * SHA-3 384 and SHA-3 512 \c olen must equal to 28, 32, 48 and 64, + * respectively. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_sha3(mbedtls_sha3_id id, const uint8_t *input, + size_t ilen, + uint8_t *output, + size_t olen); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/** + * \brief Checkup routine for the algorithms implemented + * by this module: SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512. + * + * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed. + */ +int mbedtls_sha3_self_test(int verbose); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* mbedtls_sha3.h */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha512.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha512.h index 1df87f99f7..1c20e4c228 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha512.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha512.h @@ -7,35 +7,17 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SHA512_H #define MBEDTLS_SHA512_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include #include -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** SHA-512 hardware accelerator failed */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0039 /** SHA-512 input data was malformed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0075 @@ -52,15 +34,15 @@ extern "C" { * * The structure is used both for SHA-384 and for SHA-512 * checksum calculations. The choice between these two is - * made in the call to mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(). + * made in the call to mbedtls_sha512_starts(). */ typedef struct mbedtls_sha512_context { - uint64_t total[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */ - uint64_t state[8]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */ - unsigned char buffer[128]; /*!< The data block being processed. */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - int is384; /*!< Determines which function to use: - 0: Use SHA-512, or 1: Use SHA-384. */ + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(total)[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */ + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[8]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer)[128]; /*!< The data block being processed. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(is384); /*!< Determines which function to use: + 0: Use SHA-512, or 1: Use SHA-384. */ #endif } mbedtls_sha512_context; @@ -104,14 +86,14 @@ void mbedtls_sha512_clone(mbedtls_sha512_context *dst, * \param is384 Determines which function to use. This must be * either \c 0 for SHA-512, or \c 1 for SHA-384. * - * \note When \c MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 is defined, \p is384 must - * be \c 0, or the function will return - * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA. + * \note is384 must be defined accordingly to the enabled + * MBEDTLS_SHA384_C/MBEDTLS_SHA512_C symbols otherwise the + * function will return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384); +int mbedtls_sha512_starts(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384); /** * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing @@ -126,9 +108,9 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384); * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen); +int mbedtls_sha512_update(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen); /** * \brief This function finishes the SHA-512 operation, and writes @@ -137,13 +119,14 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized * and have a hash operation started. * \param output The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum result. - * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 64 Bytes. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 64 bytes + * for SHA-512, \c 48 bytes for SHA-384. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[64]); +int mbedtls_sha512_finish(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + unsigned char *output); /** * \brief This function processes a single data block within @@ -159,75 +142,6 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, */ int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[128]); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif -/** - * \brief This function starts a SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum - * calculation. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param ctx The SHA-512 context to use. This must be initialized. - * \param is384 Determines which function to use. This must be either - * \c 0 for SHA-512 or \c 1 for SHA-384. - * - * \note When \c MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 is defined, \p is384 must - * be \c 0, or the function will fail to work. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512_starts(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - int is384); - -/** - * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing - * SHA-512 checksum calculation. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha512_update_ret() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized - * and have a hash operation started. - * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable - * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. - * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512_update(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen); - -/** - * \brief This function finishes the SHA-512 operation, and writes - * the result to the output buffer. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized - * and have a hash operation started. - * \param output The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum result. This must - * be a writable buffer of size \c 64 Bytes. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512_finish(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[64]); - -/** - * \brief This function processes a single data block within - * the ongoing SHA-512 computation. This function is for - * internal use only. - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_internal_sha512_process() in 2.7.0. - * - * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized. - * \param data The buffer holding one block of data. This must be - * a readable buffer of length \c 128 Bytes. - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512_process( - mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[128]); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /** * \brief This function calculates the SHA-512 or SHA-384 @@ -243,69 +157,48 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512_process( * a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. * \param output The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum result. - * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 64 Bytes. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 64 bytes + * for SHA-512, \c 48 bytes for SHA-384. * \param is384 Determines which function to use. This must be either * \c 0 for SHA-512, or \c 1 for SHA-384. * - * \note When \c MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 is defined, \p is384 must - * be \c 0, or the function will return + * \note is384 must be defined accordingly with the supported + * symbols in the config file. If: + * - is384 is 0, but \c MBEDTLS_SHA384_C is not defined, or + * - is384 is 1, but \c MBEDTLS_SHA512_C is not defined + * then the function will return * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_sha512_ret(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[64], - int is384); +int mbedtls_sha512(const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, + int is384); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) /** - * \brief This function calculates the SHA-512 or SHA-384 - * checksum of a buffer. + * \brief The SHA-384 checkup routine. * - * The function allocates the context, performs the - * calculation, and frees the context. - * - * The SHA-512 result is calculated as - * output = SHA-512(input buffer). - * - * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_sha512_ret() in 2.7.0 - * - * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a - * readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes. - * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes. - * \param output The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum result. This must - * be a writable buffer of length \c 64 Bytes. - * \param is384 Determines which function to use. This must be either - * \c 0 for SHA-512, or \c 1 for SHA-384. - * - * \note When \c MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 is defined, \p is384 must - * be \c 0, or the function will fail to work. + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c 1 on failure. */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED void mbedtls_sha512(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[64], - int is384); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +int mbedtls_sha384_self_test(int verbose); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) /** - * \brief The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checkup routine. + * \brief The SHA-512 checkup routine. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return \c 1 on failure. */ int mbedtls_sha512_self_test(int verbose); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #ifdef __cplusplus diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl.h index 3ec558b4f2..172d4693b2 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl.h @@ -5,28 +5,14 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_H #define MBEDTLS_SSL_H +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" @@ -42,41 +28,23 @@ #include "mbedtls/dhm.h" #endif -/* Adding guard for MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C to ensure no compile errors due - * to guards also being in ssl_srv.c and ssl_cli.c. There is a gap - * in functionality that access to ecdh_ctx structure is needed for - * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C which does not seem correct. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) -#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#warning \ - "Record compression support via MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT is deprecated and will be removed in the next major revision of the library" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -#error \ - "Record compression support via MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT is deprecated and cannot be used if MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED is set" -#endif +#include "mbedtls/md.h" -#include "zlib.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED) +#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) #include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #include "psa/crypto.h" -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /* * SSL Error codes */ +/** A cryptographic operation is in progress. Try again later. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS -0x7000 /** The requested feature is not available. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x7080 /** Bad input parameters to function. */ @@ -87,18 +55,17 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD -0x7200 /** The connection indicated an EOF. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF -0x7280 -/** An unknown cipher was received. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER -0x7300 -/** The server has no ciphersuites in common with the client. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN -0x7380 +/** A message could not be parsed due to a syntactic error. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR -0x7300 +/* Error space gap */ /** No RNG was provided to the SSL module. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG -0x7400 /** No client certification received from the client, but required by the authentication mode. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE -0x7480 -/** Our own certificate(s) is/are too large to send in an SSL message. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE -0x7500 -/** The own certificate is not set, but needed by the server. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED -0x7580 +/** Client received an extended server hello containing an unsupported extension */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION -0x7500 +/** No ALPN protocols supported that the client advertises */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL -0x7580 /** The own private key or pre-shared key is not set, but needed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED -0x7600 /** No CA Chain is set, but required to operate. */ @@ -107,46 +74,50 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE -0x7700 /** A fatal alert message was received from our peer. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE -0x7780 -/** Verification of our peer failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED -0x7800 +/** No server could be identified matching the client's SNI. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME -0x7800 /** The peer notified us that the connection is going to be closed. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY -0x7880 -/** Processing of the ClientHello handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO -0x7900 -/** Processing of the ServerHello handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO -0x7980 +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ /** Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE -0x7A00 -/** Processing of the CertificateRequest handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST -0x7A80 -/** Processing of the ServerKeyExchange handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE -0x7B00 -/** Processing of the ServerHelloDone handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE -0x7B80 -/** Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE -0x7C00 -/** Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Read Public. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP -0x7C80 -/** Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Calculate Secret. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS -0x7D00 -/** Processing of the CertificateVerify handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY -0x7D80 -/** Processing of the ChangeCipherSpec handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC -0x7E00 -/** Processing of the Finished handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED -0x7E80 +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE -0x7A00 +/* Error space gap */ +/** + * Received NewSessionTicket Post Handshake Message. + * This error code is experimental and may be changed or removed without notice. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET -0x7B00 +/** Not possible to read early data */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA -0x7B80 +/** + * Early data has been received as part of an on-going handshake. + * This error code can be returned only on server side if and only if early + * data has been enabled by means of the mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data() API. + * This error code can then be returned by mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), + * mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), mbedtls_ssl_read() or mbedtls_ssl_write() if + * early data has been received as part of the handshake sequence they + * triggered. To read the early data, call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA -0x7C00 +/** Not possible to write early data */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA -0x7C80 +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/** Cache entry not found */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CACHE_ENTRY_NOT_FOUND -0x7E80 /** Memory allocation failed */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED -0x7F00 /** Hardware acceleration function returned with error */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x7F80 /** Hardware acceleration function skipped / left alone data */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH -0x6F80 -/** Processing of the compression / decompression failed */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED -0x6F00 /** Handshake protocol not within min/max boundaries */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION -0x6E80 -/** Processing of the NewSessionTicket handshake message failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET -0x6E00 +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION -0x6E80 +/** The handshake negotiation failed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE -0x6E00 /** Session ticket has expired. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED -0x6D80 /** Public key type mismatch (eg, asked for RSA key exchange and presented EC key) */ @@ -163,8 +134,7 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED -0x6A80 /** A buffer is too small to receive or write a message */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x6A00 -/** None of the common ciphersuites is usable (eg, no suitable certificate, see debug messages). */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE -0x6980 +/* Error space gap */ /** No data of requested type currently available on underlying transport. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ -0x6900 /** Connection requires a write call. */ @@ -177,34 +147,123 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD -0x6700 /** The alert message received indicates a non-fatal error. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL -0x6680 -/** Couldn't set the hash for verifying CertificateVerify */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH -0x6600 +/** A field in a message was incorrect or inconsistent with other fields. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER -0x6600 /** Internal-only message signaling that further message-processing should be done */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING -0x6580 /** The asynchronous operation is not completed yet. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS -0x6500 /** Internal-only message signaling that a message arrived early. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE -0x6480 +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ +/* Error space gap */ /** An encrypted DTLS-frame with an unexpected CID was received. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID -0x6000 /** An operation failed due to an unexpected version or configuration. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH -0x5F00 -/** A cryptographic operation is in progress. Try again later. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS -0x7000 /** Invalid value in SSL config */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG -0x5E80 -/** Cache entry not found */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CACHE_ENTRY_NOT_FOUND -0x5E00 + +/* + * Constants from RFC 8446 for TLS 1.3 PSK modes + * + * Those are used in the Pre-Shared Key Exchange Modes extension. + * See Section 4.2.9 in RFC 8446. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_MODE_PURE 0 /* Pure PSK-based exchange */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_MODE_ECDHE 1 /* PSK+ECDHE-based exchange */ + +/* + * TLS 1.3 NamedGroup values + * + * From RF 8446 + * enum { + * // Elliptic Curve Groups (ECDHE) + * secp256r1(0x0017), secp384r1(0x0018), secp521r1(0x0019), + * x25519(0x001D), x448(0x001E), + * // Finite Field Groups (DHE) + * ffdhe2048(0x0100), ffdhe3072(0x0101), ffdhe4096(0x0102), + * ffdhe6144(0x0103), ffdhe8192(0x0104), + * // Reserved Code Points + * ffdhe_private_use(0x01FC..0x01FF), + * ecdhe_private_use(0xFE00..0xFEFF), + * (0xFFFF) + * } NamedGroup; + * + */ + +/* Elliptic Curve Groups (ECDHE) */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NONE 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192K1 0x0012 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192R1 0x0013 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224K1 0x0014 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224R1 0x0015 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256K1 0x0016 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1 0x0017 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1 0x0018 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1 0x0019 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP256R1 0x001A +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP384R1 0x001B +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP512R1 0x001C +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519 0x001D +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448 0x001E +/* Finite Field Groups (DHE) */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE2048 0x0100 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE3072 0x0101 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE4096 0x0102 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE6144 0x0103 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192 0x0104 + +/* + * TLS 1.3 Key Exchange Modes + * + * Mbed TLS internal identifiers for use with the SSL configuration API + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_key_exchange_modes(). + */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK (1u << 0) /*!< Pure-PSK TLS 1.3 key exchange, + * encompassing both externally agreed PSKs + * as well as resumption PSKs. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL (1u << 1) /*!< Pure-Ephemeral TLS 1.3 key exchanges, + * including for example ECDHE and DHE + * key exchanges. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL (1u << 2) /*!< PSK-Ephemeral TLS 1.3 key exchanges, + * using both a PSK and an ephemeral + * key exchange. */ + +/* Convenience macros for sets of key exchanges. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_ALL \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL) /*!< All TLS 1.3 key exchanges */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL) /*!< All PSK-based TLS 1.3 key exchanges */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL) /*!< All ephemeral TLS 1.3 key exchanges */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_NONE (0) /* * Various constants */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +/* These are the high and low bytes of ProtocolVersion as defined by: + * - RFC 5246: ProtocolVersion version = { 3, 3 }; // TLS v1.2 + * - RFC 8446: see section 4.2.1 + */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 3 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 0 /*!< SSL v3.0 */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 1 /*!< TLS v1.0 */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 2 /*!< TLS v1.1 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 3 /*!< TLS v1.2 */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 4 /*!< TLS v1.3 (experimental) */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 4 /*!< TLS v1.3 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM 0 /*!< TLS */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM 1 /*!< DTLS */ @@ -226,9 +285,6 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER 1 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK 0 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK 1 - #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED 1 @@ -239,7 +295,6 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL 0 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL 1 @@ -269,21 +324,28 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED 1 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED 0 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED 1 - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED 0 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED 1 - #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_SUITEB 2 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_DISABLED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED 1 + #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_CLIENT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_SERVER 0 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_RESUMPTION_KEY_LEN 48 +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_RESUMPTION_KEY_LEN 32 +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ /* * Default range for DTLS retransmission timer value, in milliseconds. * RFC 6347 4.2.4.1 says from 1 second to 60 seconds. @@ -291,18 +353,34 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN 1000 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX 60000 +/* + * Whether early data record should be discarded or not and how. + * + * The client has indicated early data and the server has rejected them. + * The server has then to skip past early data by either: + * - attempting to deprotect received records using the handshake traffic + * key, discarding records which fail deprotection (up to the configured + * max_early_data_size). Once a record is deprotected successfully, + * it is treated as the start of the client's second flight and the + * server proceeds as with an ordinary 1-RTT handshake. + * - skipping all records with an external content type of + * "application_data" (indicating that they are encrypted), up to the + * configured max_early_data_size. This is the expected behavior if the + * server has sent an HelloRetryRequest message. The server ignores + * application data message before 2nd ClientHello. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD 2 + /** * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. - * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line. * \{ */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME 86400 /**< Lifetime of session tickets (if enabled) */ -#endif - /* * Maximum fragment length in bytes, * determines the size of each of the two internal I/O buffers. @@ -314,16 +392,12 @@ * if you're using the Max Fragment Length extension and you know all your * peers are using it too! */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN 16384 /**< Size of the input / output buffer */ -#endif - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN 16384 #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN 16384 #endif /* @@ -345,30 +419,45 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX 32 #endif -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY 16 +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY 16 +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE 1024 #endif -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY 1 +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_AGE_TOLERANCE) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_AGE_TOLERANCE 6000 +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_NONCE_LENGTH) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_NONCE_LENGTH 32 +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_DEFAULT_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_DEFAULT_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS 1 #endif /** \} name SECTION: Module settings */ +/* + * Default to standard CID mode + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT 0 +#endif + /* * Length of the verify data for secure renegotiation */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN 36 -#else #define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN 12 -#endif /* * Signaling ciphersuite values (SCSV) */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO 0xFF /**< renegotiation info ext */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE 0x5600 /**< RFC 7507 section 2 */ /* * Supported Signature and Hash algorithms (For TLS 1.2) @@ -386,6 +475,41 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA 1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA 3 +/* + * TLS 1.3 signature algorithms + * RFC 8446, Section 4.2.3 + */ + +/* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithms */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 0x0401 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384 0x0501 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512 0x0601 + +/* ECDSA algorithms */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256 0x0403 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384 0x0503 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512 0x0603 + +/* RSASSA-PSS algorithms with public key OID rsaEncryption */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256 0x0804 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384 0x0805 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512 0x0806 + +/* EdDSA algorithms */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ED25519 0x0807 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ED448 0x0808 + +/* RSASSA-PSS algorithms with public key OID RSASSA-PSS */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA256 0x0809 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA384 0x080A +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA512 0x080B + +/* LEGACY ALGORITHMS */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1 0x0201 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SHA1 0x0203 + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE 0x0 + /* * Client Certificate Types * RFC 5246 section 7.4.4 plus RFC 4492 section 5.5 @@ -430,9 +554,11 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 86 /* 0x56 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_USER_CANCELED 90 /* 0x5A */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION 100 /* 0x64 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_MISSING_EXTENSION 109 /* 0x6d -- new in TLS 1.3 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT 110 /* 0x6E */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME 112 /* 0x70 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY 115 /* 0x73 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REQUIRED 116 /* 0x74 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL 120 /* 0x78 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST 0 @@ -440,6 +566,8 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO 2 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 4 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA 5 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS 8 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE 11 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 12 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 13 @@ -447,6 +575,7 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY 15 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 16 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED 20 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_MESSAGE_HASH 254 /* * TLS extensions @@ -457,30 +586,44 @@ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH 1 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC 4 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST 5 /* RFC 6066 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES 10 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS 10 /* RFC 8422,7919 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS 11 -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG 13 - +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG 13 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP 14 - +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT 15 /* RFC 6520 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN 16 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SCT 18 /* RFC 6962 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CLI_CERT_TYPE 19 /* RFC 7250 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERV_CERT_TYPE 20 /* RFC 7250 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PADDING 21 /* RFC 7685 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC 22 /* 0x16 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET 0x0017 /* 23 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT 28 /* RFC 8449 (implemented for TLS 1.3 only) */ + #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET 35 -/* The value of the CID extension is still TBD as of - * draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 - * (https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05). - * - * A future minor revision of Mbed TLS may change the default value of - * this option to match evolving standards and usage. - */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID) -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID 254 /* TBD */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY 41 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EARLY_DATA 42 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS 43 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_COOKIE 44 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES 45 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CERT_AUTH 47 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_OID_FILTERS 48 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH 49 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG_CERT 50 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE 51 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */ + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT == 0 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID 54 /* RFC 9146 DTLS 1.2 CID */ +#else +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID 254 /* Pre-RFC 9146 DTLS 1.2 CID */ #endif #define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP 256 /* experimental */ @@ -491,8 +634,22 @@ * Size defines */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN) -#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 32 /* 256 bits */ +/* + * If the library supports TLS 1.3 tickets and the cipher suite + * TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, set the PSK maximum length to 48 instead of 32. + * That way, the TLS 1.3 client and server are able to resume sessions where + * the cipher suite is TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 (pre-shared keys are 48 + * bytes long in that case). + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 48 /* 384 bits */ +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 32 /* 256 bits */ #endif +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN */ /* Dummy type used only for its size */ union mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret { @@ -530,6 +687,12 @@ union mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret { #define MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE sizeof(union mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret) +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE + + +/* Length in number of bytes of the TLS sequence number */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN 8 + #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif @@ -554,23 +717,38 @@ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED, MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP, - MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER, - MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_BEFORE_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO, + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO, + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH, } mbedtls_ssl_states; /* - * The tls_prf function types. + * Early data status, client side only. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) typedef enum { - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE, - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SSL3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_TLS1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384, - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256 -} -mbedtls_tls_prf_types; +/* + * See documentation of mbedtls_ssl_get_early_data_status(). + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_INDICATED, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED, +} mbedtls_ssl_early_data_status; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + /** * \brief Callback type: send data on the network. * @@ -686,7 +864,7 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_session mbedtls_ssl_session; typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_context mbedtls_ssl_context; typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_config mbedtls_ssl_config; -/* Defined in ssl_internal.h */ +/* Defined in library/ssl_misc.h */ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_transform mbedtls_ssl_transform; typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params; typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t; @@ -697,6 +875,69 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert mbedtls_ssl_key_cert; typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item mbedtls_ssl_flight_item; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_PSK_RESUMPTION \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK /* 1U << 0 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_PSK_EPHEMERAL_RESUMPTION \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL /* 1U << 2 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_EARLY_DATA (1U << 3) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_PSK_RESUMPTION | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_PSK_EPHEMERAL_RESUMPTION | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_EARLY_DATA) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +/** + * \brief Callback type: server-side session cache getter + * + * The session cache is logically a key value store, with + * keys being session IDs and values being instances of + * mbedtls_ssl_session. + * + * This callback retrieves an entry in this key-value store. + * + * \param data The address of the session cache structure to query. + * \param session_id The buffer holding the session ID to query. + * \param session_id_len The length of \p session_id in Bytes. + * \param session The address of the session structure to populate. + * It is initialized with mbdtls_ssl_session_init(), + * and the callback must always leave it in a state + * where it can safely be freed via + * mbedtls_ssl_session_free() independent of the + * return code of this function. + * + * \return \c 0 on success + * \return A non-zero return value on failure. + * + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_t(void *data, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len, + mbedtls_ssl_session *session); +/** + * \brief Callback type: server-side session cache setter + * + * The session cache is logically a key value store, with + * keys being session IDs and values being instances of + * mbedtls_ssl_session. + * + * This callback sets an entry in this key-value store. + * + * \param data The address of the session cache structure to modify. + * \param session_id The buffer holding the session ID to query. + * \param session_id_len The length of \p session_id in Bytes. + * \param session The address of the session to be stored in the + * session cache. + * + * \return \c 0 on success + * \return A non-zero return value on failure. + */ +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_t(void *data, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len, + const mbedtls_ssl_session *session); + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** @@ -912,13 +1153,13 @@ typedef void mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN 48 -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 32 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 48 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 20 #else @@ -928,6 +1169,13 @@ typedef void mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +typedef struct { + unsigned char client_application_traffic_secret_N[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char server_application_traffic_secret_N[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char exporter_master_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char resumption_master_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; +} mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets; + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) #define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH 255 @@ -952,16 +1200,23 @@ typedef uint16_t mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile; typedef struct mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info_t { /*! The SRTP profile that was negotiated. */ - mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile chosen_dtls_srtp_profile; + mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(chosen_dtls_srtp_profile); /*! The length of mki_value. */ - uint16_t mki_len; + uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mki_len); /*! The mki_value used, with max size of 256 bytes. */ - unsigned char mki_value[MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH]; + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mki_value)[MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH]; } mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ +/** Human-friendly representation of the (D)TLS protocol version. */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN, /*!< Context not in use or version not yet negotiated. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 = 0x0303, /*!< (D)TLS 1.2 */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 = 0x0304, /*!< (D)TLS 1.3 */ +} mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version; + /* * This structure is used for storing current session data. * @@ -975,60 +1230,192 @@ mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info; */ struct mbedtls_ssl_session { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) - unsigned char mfl_code; /*!< MaxFragmentLength negotiated by peer */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mfl_code); /*!< MaxFragmentLength negotiated by peer */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ +/*!< RecordSizeLimit received from the peer */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(record_size_limit); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ + + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(exported); + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(endpoint); /*!< 0: client, 1: server */ + + /** TLS version negotiated in the session. Used if and when renegotiating + * or resuming a session instead of the configured minor TLS version. + */ + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls_version); + #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - mbedtls_time_t start; /*!< starting time */ + mbedtls_time_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(start); /*!< start time of current session */ #endif - int ciphersuite; /*!< chosen ciphersuite */ - int compression; /*!< chosen compression */ - size_t id_len; /*!< session id length */ - unsigned char id[32]; /*!< session identifier */ - unsigned char master[48]; /*!< the master secret */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ciphersuite); /*!< chosen ciphersuite */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id_len); /*!< session id length */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id)[32]; /*!< session identifier */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(master)[48]; /*!< the master secret */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - mbedtls_x509_crt *peer_cert; /*!< peer X.509 cert chain */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_cert); /*!< peer X.509 cert chain */ #else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ /*! The digest of the peer's end-CRT. This must be kept to detect CRT * changes during renegotiation, mitigating the triple handshake attack. */ - unsigned char *peer_cert_digest; - size_t peer_cert_digest_len; - mbedtls_md_type_t peer_cert_digest_type; + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_cert_digest); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_cert_digest_len); + mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_cert_digest_type); #endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - uint32_t verify_result; /*!< verification result */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(verify_result); /*!< verification result */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - unsigned char *ticket; /*!< RFC 5077 session ticket */ - size_t ticket_len; /*!< session ticket length */ - uint32_t ticket_lifetime; /*!< ticket lifetime hint */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket); /*!< RFC 5077 session ticket */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_len); /*!< session ticket length */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_lifetime); /*!< ticket lifetime hint */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - int trunc_hmac; /*!< flag for truncated hmac activation */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + /*! When a ticket is created by a TLS server as part of an established TLS + * session, the ticket creation time may need to be saved for the ticket + * module to be able to check the ticket age when the ticket is used. + * That's the purpose of this field. + * Before creating a new ticket, an Mbed TLS server set this field with + * its current time in milliseconds. This time may then be saved in the + * session ticket data by the session ticket writing function and + * recovered by the ticket parsing function later when the ticket is used. + * The ticket module may then use this time to compute the ticket age and + * determine if it has expired or not. + * The Mbed TLS implementations of the session ticket writing and parsing + * functions save and retrieve the ticket creation time as part of the + * session ticket data. The session ticket parsing function relies on + * the mbedtls_ssl_session_get_ticket_creation_time() API to get the + * ticket creation time from the session ticket data. + */ + mbedtls_ms_time_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_creation_time); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_age_add); /*!< Randomly generated value used to obscure the age of the ticket */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_flags); /*!< Ticket flags */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(resumption_key_len); /*!< resumption_key length */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(resumption_key)[MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_RESUMPTION_KEY_LEN]; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hostname); /*!< host name binded with tickets */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + char *ticket_alpn; /*!< ALPN negotiated in the session + during which the ticket was generated. */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + /*! Time in milliseconds when the last ticket was received. */ + mbedtls_ms_time_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_reception_time); +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_early_data_size); /*!< maximum amount of early data in tickets */ +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - int encrypt_then_mac; /*!< flag for EtM activation */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(encrypt_then_mac); /*!< flag for EtM activation */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(app_secrets); #endif }; +/* + * Identifiers for PRFs used in various versions of TLS. + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HKDF_EXPAND_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HKDF_EXPAND_SHA256 +} +mbedtls_tls_prf_types; + +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS12_MASTER_SECRET = 0, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_EARLY_SECRET, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ +} mbedtls_ssl_key_export_type; + +/** + * \brief Callback type: Export key alongside random values for + * session identification, and PRF for + * implementation of TLS key exporters. + * + * \param p_expkey Context for the callback. + * \param type The type of the key that is being exported. + * \param secret The address of the buffer holding the secret + * that's being exporterd. + * \param secret_len The length of \p secret in bytes. + * \param client_random The client random bytes. + * \param server_random The server random bytes. + * \param tls_prf_type The identifier for the PRF used in the handshake + * to which the key belongs. + */ +typedef void mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t(void *p_expkey, + mbedtls_ssl_key_export_type type, + const unsigned char *secret, + size_t secret_len, + const unsigned char client_random[32], + const unsigned char server_random[32], + mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_type); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/** + * \brief Callback type: generic handshake callback + * + * \note Callbacks may use user_data funcs to set/get app user data. + * See \c mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_p() + * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_n() + * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_p() + * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_n() + * + * \param ssl \c mbedtls_ssl_context on which the callback is run + * + * \return The return value of the callback is 0 if successful, + * or a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code, which will cause + * the handshake to be aborted. + */ +typedef int (*mbedtls_ssl_hs_cb_t)(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif + +/* A type for storing user data in a library structure. + * + * The representation of type may change in future versions of the library. + * Only the behaviors guaranteed by documented accessor functions are + * guaranteed to remain stable. + */ +typedef union { + uintptr_t n; /* typically a handle to an associated object */ + void *p; /* typically a pointer to extra data */ +} mbedtls_ssl_user_data_t; + /** * SSL/TLS configuration to be shared between mbedtls_ssl_context structures. */ struct mbedtls_ssl_config { - /* Group items by size and reorder them to maximize usage of immediate offset access. */ + /* Group items mostly by size. This helps to reduce memory wasted to + * padding. It also helps to keep smaller fields early in the structure, + * so that elements tend to be in the 128-element direct access window + * on Arm Thumb, which reduces the code size. */ - /* - * Numerical settings (char) - */ - - unsigned char max_major_ver; /*!< max. major version used */ - unsigned char max_minor_ver; /*!< max. minor version used */ - unsigned char min_major_ver; /*!< min. major version used */ - unsigned char min_minor_ver; /*!< min. minor version used */ + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_tls_version); /*!< max. TLS version used */ + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(min_tls_version); /*!< min. TLS version used */ /* * Flags (could be bit-fields to save RAM, but separate bytes make @@ -1036,418 +1423,494 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_config { * byte access). */ - uint8_t endpoint /*bool*/; /*!< 0: client, 1: server */ - uint8_t transport /*bool*/; /*!< stream (TLS) or datagram (DTLS) */ - uint8_t authmode /*2 bits*/; /*!< MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_XXX */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(endpoint); /*!< 0: client, 1: server */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transport); /*!< 0: stream (TLS), 1: datagram (DTLS) */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(authmode); /*!< MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_XXX */ /* needed even with renego disabled for LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE */ - uint8_t allow_legacy_renegotiation /*2 bits*/; /*!< MBEDTLS_LEGACY_XXX */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - uint8_t arc4_disabled /*bool*/; /*!< blacklist RC4 ciphersuites? */ -#endif + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(allow_legacy_renegotiation); /*!< MBEDTLS_LEGACY_XXX */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) - uint8_t mfl_code /*3 bits*/; /*!< desired fragment length */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mfl_code); /*!< desired fragment length indicator + (MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_XXX) */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - uint8_t encrypt_then_mac /*bool*/; /*!< negotiate encrypt-then-mac? */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(encrypt_then_mac); /*!< negotiate encrypt-then-mac? */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) - uint8_t extended_ms /*bool*/; /*!< negotiate extended master secret? */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(extended_ms); /*!< negotiate extended master secret? */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) - uint8_t anti_replay /*bool*/; /*!< detect and prevent replay? */ -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) - uint8_t cbc_record_splitting /*bool*/; /*!< do cbc record splitting */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(anti_replay); /*!< detect and prevent replay? */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - uint8_t disable_renegotiation /*bool*/; /*!< disable renegotiation? */ -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - uint8_t trunc_hmac /*bool*/; /*!< negotiate truncated hmac? */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(disable_renegotiation); /*!< disable renegotiation? */ #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) - uint8_t session_tickets /*bool*/; /*!< use session tickets? */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_tickets); /*!< use session tickets? */ #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - uint8_t fallback /*bool*/; /*!< is this a fallback? */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(new_session_tickets_count); /*!< number of NewSessionTicket */ #endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - uint8_t cert_req_ca_list /*bool*/; /*!< enable sending CA list in - Certificate Request messages? */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cert_req_ca_list); /*!< enable sending CA list in + Certificate Request messages? */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(respect_cli_pref); /*!< pick the ciphersuite according to + the client's preferences rather + than ours? */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - uint8_t ignore_unexpected_cid /*bool*/; /*!< Determines whether DTLS - * record with unexpected CID - * should lead to failure. */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ignore_unexpected_cid); /*!< Should DTLS record with + * unexpected CID + * lead to failure? */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) - uint8_t dtls_srtp_mki_support /*bool*/; /*!< support having mki_value - in the use_srtp extension? */ -#endif - - /* - * Numerical settings (int or larger) - */ - - uint32_t read_timeout; /*!< timeout for mbedtls_ssl_read (ms) */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - uint32_t hs_timeout_min; /*!< initial value of the handshake - retransmission timeout (ms) */ - uint32_t hs_timeout_max; /*!< maximum value of the handshake - retransmission timeout (ms) */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - int renego_max_records; /*!< grace period for renegotiation */ - unsigned char renego_period[8]; /*!< value of the record counters - that triggers renegotiation */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) - unsigned int badmac_limit; /*!< limit of records with a bad MAC */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - unsigned int dhm_min_bitlen; /*!< min. bit length of the DHM prime */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dtls_srtp_mki_support); /* support having mki_value + in the use_srtp extension? */ #endif /* * Pointers */ - const int *ciphersuite_list[4]; /*!< allowed ciphersuites per version */ + /** Allowed ciphersuites for (D)TLS 1.2 (0-terminated) */ + const int *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ciphersuite_list); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + /** Allowed TLS 1.3 key exchange modes. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls13_kex_modes); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ /** Callback for printing debug output */ - void (*f_dbg)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *); - void *p_dbg; /*!< context for the debug function */ + void(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_dbg))(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_dbg); /*!< context for the debug function */ /** Callback for getting (pseudo-)random numbers */ - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); - void *p_rng; /*!< context for the RNG function */ + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_rng))(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_rng); /*!< context for the RNG function */ /** Callback to retrieve a session from the cache */ - int (*f_get_cache)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *); + mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_get_cache); /** Callback to store a session into the cache */ - int (*f_set_cache)(void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *); - void *p_cache; /*!< context for cache callbacks */ + mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_set_cache); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_cache); /*!< context for cache callbacks */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) /** Callback for setting cert according to SNI extension */ - int (*f_sni)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); - void *p_sni; /*!< context for SNI callback */ + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_sni))(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_sni); /*!< context for SNI callback */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** Callback to customize X.509 certificate chain verification */ - int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *); - void *p_vrfy; /*!< context for X.509 verify calllback */ + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_vrfy))(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_vrfy); /*!< context for X.509 verify calllback */ #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) /** Callback to retrieve PSK key from identity */ - int (*f_psk)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); - void *p_psk; /*!< context for PSK callback */ + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_psk))(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_psk); /*!< context for PSK callback */ +#endif #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) /** Callback to create & write a cookie for ClientHello verification */ - int (*f_cookie_write)(void *, unsigned char **, unsigned char *, - const unsigned char *, size_t); + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_cookie_write))(void *, unsigned char **, unsigned char *, + const unsigned char *, size_t); /** Callback to verify validity of a ClientHello cookie */ - int (*f_cookie_check)(void *, const unsigned char *, size_t, - const unsigned char *, size_t); - void *p_cookie; /*!< context for the cookie callbacks */ + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_cookie_check))(void *, const unsigned char *, size_t, + const unsigned char *, size_t); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_cookie); /*!< context for the cookie callbacks */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) /** Callback to create & write a session ticket */ - int (*f_ticket_write)(void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *, - unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, size_t *, uint32_t *); + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_ticket_write))(void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *, + unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, size_t *, + uint32_t *); /** Callback to parse a session ticket into a session structure */ - int (*f_ticket_parse)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *, unsigned char *, size_t); - void *p_ticket; /*!< context for the ticket callbacks */ + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_ticket_parse))(void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *, unsigned char *, size_t); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_ticket); /*!< context for the ticket callbacks */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) - /** Callback to export key block and master secret */ - int (*f_export_keys)(void *, const unsigned char *, - const unsigned char *, size_t, size_t, size_t); - /** Callback to export key block, master secret, - * tls_prf and random bytes. Should replace f_export_keys */ - int (*f_export_keys_ext)(void *, const unsigned char *, - const unsigned char *, size_t, size_t, size_t, - const unsigned char[32], const unsigned char[32], - mbedtls_tls_prf_types); - void *p_export_keys; /*!< context for key export callback */ -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - size_t cid_len; /*!< The length of CIDs for incoming DTLS records. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cid_len); /*!< The length of CIDs for incoming DTLS records. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *cert_profile; /*!< verification profile */ - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; /*!< own certificate/key pair(s) */ - mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain; /*!< trusted CAs */ - mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl; /*!< trusted CAs CRLs */ + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cert_profile); /*!< verification profile */ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_cert); /*!< own certificate/key pair(s) */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ca_chain); /*!< trusted CAs */ + mbedtls_x509_crl *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ca_crl); /*!< trusted CAs CRLs */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) - mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb; - void *p_ca_cb; + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_ca_cb); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_ca_cb); #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t *f_async_sign_start; /*!< start asynchronous signature operation */ - mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t *f_async_decrypt_start; /*!< start asynchronous decryption operation */ + mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_async_sign_start); /*!< start asynchronous signature operation */ + mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_async_decrypt_start); /*!< start asynchronous decryption operation */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t *f_async_resume; /*!< resume asynchronous operation */ - mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t *f_async_cancel; /*!< cancel asynchronous operation */ - void *p_async_config_data; /*!< Configuration data set by mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb(). */ + mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_async_resume); /*!< resume asynchronous operation */ + mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_async_cancel); /*!< cancel asynchronous operation */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_async_config_data); /*!< Configuration data set by mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb(). */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) - const int *sig_hashes; /*!< allowed signature hashes */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + const int *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_hashes); /*!< allowed signature hashes */ #endif + const uint16_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_algs); /*!< allowed signature algorithms */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curve_list; /*!< allowed curves */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(curve_list); /*!< allowed curves */ #endif + const uint16_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(group_list); /*!< allowed IANA NamedGroups */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) - mbedtls_mpi dhm_P; /*!< prime modulus for DHM */ - mbedtls_mpi dhm_G; /*!< generator for DHM */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dhm_P); /*!< prime modulus for DHM */ + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dhm_G); /*!< generator for DHM */ #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_key_id_t psk_opaque; /*!< PSA key slot holding opaque PSK. This field - * should only be set via - * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque(). - * If either no PSK or a raw PSK have been - * configured, this has value \c 0. - */ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psk_opaque); /*!< PSA key slot holding opaque PSK. This field + * should only be set via + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque(). + * If either no PSK or a raw PSK have been + * configured, this has value \c 0. + */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psk); /*!< The raw pre-shared key. This field should + * only be set via mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). + * If either no PSK or an opaque PSK + * have been configured, this has value NULL. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psk_len); /*!< The length of the raw pre-shared key. + * This field should only be set via + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). + * Its value is non-zero if and only if + * \c psk is not \c NULL. */ + + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psk_identity); /*!< The PSK identity for PSK negotiation. + * This field should only be set via + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). + * This is set if and only if either + * \c psk or \c psk_opaque are set. */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psk_identity_len);/*!< The length of PSK identity. + * This field should only be set via + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). + * Its value is non-zero if and only if + * \c psk is not \c NULL or \c psk_opaque + * is not \c 0. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(early_data_enabled); /*!< Early data enablement: + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED, + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED */ - unsigned char *psk; /*!< The raw pre-shared key. This field should - * only be set via mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). - * If either no PSK or an opaque PSK - * have been configured, this has value NULL. */ - size_t psk_len; /*!< The length of the raw pre-shared key. - * This field should only be set via - * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). - * Its value is non-zero if and only if - * \c psk is not \c NULL. */ - - unsigned char *psk_identity; /*!< The PSK identity for PSK negotiation. - * This field should only be set via - * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). - * This is set if and only if either - * \c psk or \c psk_opaque are set. */ - size_t psk_identity_len;/*!< The length of PSK identity. - * This field should only be set via - * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(). - * Its value is non-zero if and only if - * \c psk is not \c NULL or \c psk_opaque - * is not \c 0. */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* The maximum amount of 0-RTT data. RFC 8446 section 4.6.1 */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_early_data_size); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) - const char **alpn_list; /*!< ordered list of protocols */ + const char **MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alpn_list); /*!< ordered list of protocols */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) /*! ordered list of supported srtp profile */ - const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *dtls_srtp_profile_list; + const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dtls_srtp_profile_list); /*! number of supported profiles */ - size_t dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dtls_srtp_profile_list_len); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + + /* + * Numerical settings (int) + */ + + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(read_timeout); /*!< timeout for mbedtls_ssl_read (ms) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hs_timeout_min); /*!< initial value of the handshake + retransmission timeout (ms) */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hs_timeout_max); /*!< maximum value of the handshake + retransmission timeout (ms) */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(renego_max_records); /*!< grace period for renegotiation */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(renego_period)[8]; /*!< value of the record counters + that triggers renegotiation */ +#endif + + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(badmac_limit); /*!< limit of records with a bad MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dhm_min_bitlen); /*!< min. bit length of the DHM prime */ +#endif + + /** User data pointer or handle. + * + * The library sets this to \p 0 when creating a context and does not + * access it afterwards. + */ + mbedtls_ssl_user_data_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + mbedtls_ssl_hs_cb_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_cert_cb); /*!< certificate selection callback */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + const mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dn_hints);/*!< acceptable client cert issuers */ +#endif }; struct mbedtls_ssl_context { - const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf; /*!< configuration information */ + const mbedtls_ssl_config *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(conf); /*!< configuration information */ /* * Miscellaneous */ - int state; /*!< SSL handshake: current state */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state); /*!< SSL handshake: current state */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - int renego_status; /*!< Initial, in progress, pending? */ - int renego_records_seen; /*!< Records since renego request, or with DTLS, - number of retransmissions of request if - renego_max_records is < 0 */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(renego_status); /*!< Initial, in progress, pending? */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(renego_records_seen); /*!< Records since renego request, or with DTLS, + number of retransmissions of request if + renego_max_records is < 0 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ - int major_ver; /*!< equal to MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 */ - int minor_ver; /*!< either 0 (SSL3) or 1 (TLS1.0) */ + /** + * Maximum TLS version to be negotiated, then negotiated TLS version. + * + * It is initialized as the configured maximum TLS version to be + * negotiated by mbedtls_ssl_setup(). + * + * When renegotiating or resuming a session, it is overwritten in the + * ClientHello writing preparation stage with the previously negotiated + * TLS version. + * + * On client side, it is updated to the TLS version selected by the server + * for the handshake when the ServerHello is received. + * + * On server side, it is updated to the TLS version the server selects for + * the handshake when the ClientHello is received. + */ + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls_version); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) - unsigned badmac_seen; /*!< records with a bad MAC received */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + /** + * State of the negotiation and transfer of early data. Reset to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IDLE when the context is reset. + */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(early_data_state); +#endif + + unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(badmac_seen); /*!< records with a bad MAC received */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** Callback to customize X.509 certificate chain verification */ - int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *); - void *p_vrfy; /*!< context for X.509 verify callback */ + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_vrfy))(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_vrfy); /*!< context for X.509 verify callback */ #endif - mbedtls_ssl_send_t *f_send; /*!< Callback for network send */ - mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *f_recv; /*!< Callback for network receive */ - mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t *f_recv_timeout; + mbedtls_ssl_send_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_send); /*!< Callback for network send */ + mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_recv); /*!< Callback for network receive */ + mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_recv_timeout); /*!< Callback for network receive with timeout */ - void *p_bio; /*!< context for I/O operations */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_bio); /*!< context for I/O operations */ /* * Session layer */ - mbedtls_ssl_session *session_in; /*!< current session data (in) */ - mbedtls_ssl_session *session_out; /*!< current session data (out) */ - mbedtls_ssl_session *session; /*!< negotiated session data */ - mbedtls_ssl_session *session_negotiate; /*!< session data in negotiation */ + mbedtls_ssl_session *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_in); /*!< current session data (in) */ + mbedtls_ssl_session *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_out); /*!< current session data (out) */ + mbedtls_ssl_session *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session); /*!< negotiated session data */ + mbedtls_ssl_session *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_negotiate); /*!< session data in negotiation */ - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake; /*!< params required only during - the handshake process */ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(handshake); /*!< params required only during + the handshake process */ /* * Record layer transformations */ - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_in; /*!< current transform params (in) */ - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_out; /*!< current transform params (in) */ - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform; /*!< negotiated transform params */ - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_negotiate; /*!< transform params in negotiation */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transform_in); /*!< current transform params (in) + * This is always a reference, + * never an owning pointer. */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transform_out); /*!< current transform params (out) + * This is always a reference, + * never an owning pointer. */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transform); /*!< negotiated transform params + * This pointer owns the transform + * it references. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + mbedtls_ssl_transform *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transform_negotiate); /*!< transform params in negotiation + * This pointer owns the transform + * it references. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + /*! The application data transform in TLS 1.3. + * This pointer owns the transform it references. */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transform_application); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ /* * Timers */ - void *p_timer; /*!< context for the timer callbacks */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_timer); /*!< context for the timer callbacks */ - mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t *f_set_timer; /*!< set timer callback */ - mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t *f_get_timer; /*!< get timer callback */ + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_set_timer); /*!< set timer callback */ + mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_get_timer); /*!< get timer callback */ /* * Record layer (incoming data) */ - unsigned char *in_buf; /*!< input buffer */ - unsigned char *in_ctr; /*!< 64-bit incoming message counter - TLS: maintained by us - DTLS: read from peer */ - unsigned char *in_hdr; /*!< start of record header */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_buf); /*!< input buffer */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_ctr); /*!< 64-bit incoming message counter + TLS: maintained by us + DTLS: read from peer */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_hdr); /*!< start of record header */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - unsigned char *in_cid; /*!< The start of the CID; - * (the end is marked by in_len). */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_cid); /*!< The start of the CID; + * (the end is marked by in_len). */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ - unsigned char *in_len; /*!< two-bytes message length field */ - unsigned char *in_iv; /*!< ivlen-byte IV */ - unsigned char *in_msg; /*!< message contents (in_iv+ivlen) */ - unsigned char *in_offt; /*!< read offset in application data */ - - int in_msgtype; /*!< record header: message type */ - size_t in_msglen; /*!< record header: message length */ - size_t in_left; /*!< amount of data read so far */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_len); /*!< two-bytes message length field */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_iv); /*!< ivlen-byte IV */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_msg); /*!< message contents (in_iv+ivlen) */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_offt); /*!< read offset in application data */ + + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_msgtype); /*!< record header: message type */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_msglen); /*!< record header: message length */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_left); /*!< amount of data read so far */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) - size_t in_buf_len; /*!< length of input buffer */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_buf_len); /*!< length of input buffer */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - uint16_t in_epoch; /*!< DTLS epoch for incoming records */ - size_t next_record_offset; /*!< offset of the next record in datagram - (equal to in_left if none) */ + uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_epoch); /*!< DTLS epoch for incoming records */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next_record_offset); /*!< offset of the next record in datagram + (equal to in_left if none) */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) - uint64_t in_window_top; /*!< last validated record seq_num */ - uint64_t in_window; /*!< bitmask for replay detection */ + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_window_top); /*!< last validated record seq_num */ + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_window); /*!< bitmask for replay detection */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ - size_t in_hslen; /*!< current handshake message length, - including the handshake header */ - int nb_zero; /*!< # of 0-length encrypted messages */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_hslen); /*!< current handshake message length, + including the handshake header */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(nb_zero); /*!< # of 0-length encrypted messages */ - int keep_current_message; /*!< drop or reuse current message - on next call to record layer? */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(keep_current_message); /*!< drop or reuse current message + on next call to record layer? */ + + /* The following three variables indicate if and, if yes, + * what kind of alert is pending to be sent. + */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(send_alert); /*!< Determines if a fatal alert + should be sent. Values: + - \c 0 , no alert is to be sent. + - \c 1 , alert is to be sent. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alert_type); /*!< Type of alert if send_alert + != 0 */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alert_reason); /*!< The error code to be returned + to the user once the fatal alert + has been sent. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - uint8_t disable_datagram_packing; /*!< Disable packing multiple records - * within a single datagram. */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(disable_datagram_packing); /*!< Disable packing multiple records + * within a single datagram. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* + * One of: + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD + */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(discard_early_data_record); +#endif + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(total_early_data_size); /*!< Number of received/written early data bytes */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + /* * Record layer (outgoing data) */ - unsigned char *out_buf; /*!< output buffer */ - unsigned char *out_ctr; /*!< 64-bit outgoing message counter */ - unsigned char *out_hdr; /*!< start of record header */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_buf); /*!< output buffer */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_ctr); /*!< 64-bit outgoing message counter */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_hdr); /*!< start of record header */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - unsigned char *out_cid; /*!< The start of the CID; - * (the end is marked by in_len). */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_cid); /*!< The start of the CID; + * (the end is marked by in_len). */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ - unsigned char *out_len; /*!< two-bytes message length field */ - unsigned char *out_iv; /*!< ivlen-byte IV */ - unsigned char *out_msg; /*!< message contents (out_iv+ivlen) */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_len); /*!< two-bytes message length field */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_iv); /*!< ivlen-byte IV */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_msg); /*!< message contents (out_iv+ivlen) */ - int out_msgtype; /*!< record header: message type */ - size_t out_msglen; /*!< record header: message length */ - size_t out_left; /*!< amount of data not yet written */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_msgtype); /*!< record header: message type */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_msglen); /*!< record header: message length */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_left); /*!< amount of data not yet written */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) - size_t out_buf_len; /*!< length of output buffer */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_buf_len); /*!< length of output buffer */ #endif - unsigned char cur_out_ctr[8]; /*!< Outgoing record sequence number. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cur_out_ctr)[MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN]; /*!< Outgoing record sequence number. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - uint16_t mtu; /*!< path mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */ + uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mtu); /*!< path mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - unsigned char *compress_buf; /*!< zlib data buffer */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) - signed char split_done; /*!< current record already split? */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */ - - /* - * PKI layer - */ - int client_auth; /*!< flag for client auth. */ - /* * User settings */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - char *hostname; /*!< expected peer CN for verification - (and SNI if available) */ + char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hostname); /*!< expected peer CN for verification + (and SNI if available) */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) - const char *alpn_chosen; /*!< negotiated protocol */ + const char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alpn_chosen); /*!< negotiated protocol */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) /* * use_srtp extension */ - mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info dtls_srtp_info; + mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dtls_srtp_info); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ /* * Information for DTLS hello verify */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - unsigned char *cli_id; /*!< transport-level ID of the client */ - size_t cli_id_len; /*!< length of cli_id */ + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cli_id); /*!< transport-level ID of the client */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cli_id_len); /*!< length of cli_id */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ /* * Secure renegotiation */ /* needed to know when to send extension on server */ - int secure_renegotiation; /*!< does peer support legacy or - secure renegotiation */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(secure_renegotiation); /*!< does peer support legacy or + secure renegotiation */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - size_t verify_data_len; /*!< length of verify data stored */ - char own_verify_data[MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN]; /*!< previous handshake verify data */ - char peer_verify_data[MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN]; /*!< previous handshake verify data */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(verify_data_len); /*!< length of verify data stored */ + char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(own_verify_data)[MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN]; /*!< previous handshake verify data */ + char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_verify_data)[MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN]; /*!< previous handshake verify data */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) @@ -1457,52 +1920,29 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_context { * all subsequent handshakes. This may be different from the * CID currently used in case the user has re-configured the CID * after an initial handshake. */ - unsigned char own_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX]; - uint8_t own_cid_len; /*!< The length of \c own_cid. */ - uint8_t negotiate_cid; /*!< This indicates whether the CID extension should - * be negotiated in the next handshake or not. - * Possible values are #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED - * and #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(own_cid)[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX]; + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(own_cid_len); /*!< The length of \c own_cid. */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(negotiate_cid); /*!< This indicates whether the CID extension should + * be negotiated in the next handshake or not. + * Possible values are #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED + * and #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ -}; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT(0) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_INBOUND MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT(1) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ - -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init)( - mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *key_enc, const unsigned char *key_dec, - size_t keylen, - const unsigned char *iv_enc, const unsigned char *iv_dec, - size_t ivlen, - const unsigned char *mac_enc, const unsigned char *mac_dec, - size_t maclen); -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate)( - mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - int direction); -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset)( - mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write)( - mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read)( - mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED extern int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish)( - mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); - -#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ + /** Callback to export key block and master secret */ + mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_export_keys); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_export_keys); /*!< context for key export callback */ + + /** User data pointer or handle. + * + * The library sets this to \p 0 when creating a context and does not + * access it afterwards. + * + * \warning Serializing and restoring an SSL context with + * mbedtls_ssl_context_save() and mbedtls_ssl_context_load() + * does not currently restore the user data. + */ + mbedtls_ssl_user_data_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data); +}; /** * \brief Return the name of the ciphersuite associated with the @@ -1566,9 +2006,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_setup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * pointers and data. * * \param ssl SSL context - * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED, - MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED or - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED or + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED */ int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); @@ -1580,6 +2019,19 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int endpoint); +/** + * \brief Get the current endpoint type + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * + * \return Endpoint type, either MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT + * or MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_endpoint(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ + return conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(endpoint); +} + /** * \brief Set the transport type (TLS or DTLS). * Default: TLS @@ -1624,6 +2076,67 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int transport); */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int authmode); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +/** + * \brief Set the early data mode + * Default: disabled on server and client + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration to use. + * \param early_data_enabled can be: + * + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED: + * Early data functionality is disabled. This is the default on client and + * server. + * + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED: + * Early data functionality is enabled and may be negotiated in the handshake. + * Application using early data functionality needs to be aware that the + * security properties for early data (also refered to as 0-RTT data) are + * weaker than those for other kinds of TLS data. See the documentation of + * mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data() and mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() for more + * information. + * When early data functionality is enabled on server and only in that case, + * the call to one of the APIs that trigger or resume an handshake sequence, + * namely mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), + * mbedtls_ssl_read() or mbedtls_ssl_write() may return with the error code + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA indicating that some early data have + * been received. To read the early data, call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() + * before calling the original function again. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int early_data_enabled); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/** + * \brief Set the maximum amount of 0-RTT data in bytes + * Default: #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE + * + * This function sets the value of the max_early_data_size + * field of the early data indication extension included in + * the NewSessionTicket messages that the server may send. + * + * The value defines the maximum amount of 0-RTT data + * in bytes that a client will be allowed to send when using + * one of the tickets defined by the NewSessionTicket messages. + * + * \note When resuming a session using a ticket, if the server receives more + * early data than allowed for the ticket, it terminates the connection. + * The maximum amount of 0-RTT data should thus be large enough + * to allow a minimum of early data to be exchanged. + * + * \param[in] conf The SSL configuration to use. + * \param[in] max_early_data_size The maximum amount of 0-RTT data. + * + * \warning This interface DOES NOT influence/limit the amount of early data + * that can be received through previously created and issued tickets, + * which clients may have stored. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_early_data_size( + mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t max_early_data_size); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** * \brief Set the verification callback (Optional). @@ -1649,7 +2162,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, * \brief Set the random number generator callback * * \param conf SSL configuration - * \param f_rng RNG function + * \param f_rng RNG function (mandatory) * \param p_rng RNG parameter */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, @@ -1674,6 +2187,22 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, void (*f_dbg)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *), void *p_dbg); +/** + * \brief Return the SSL configuration structure associated + * with the given SSL context. + * + * \note The pointer returned by this function is guaranteed to + * remain valid until the context is freed. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to query. + * \return Pointer to the SSL configuration associated with \p ssl. + */ +static inline const mbedtls_ssl_config *mbedtls_ssl_context_get_config( + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(conf); +} + /** * \brief Set the underlying BIO callbacks for write, read and * read-with-timeout. @@ -1719,8 +2248,9 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * \brief Configure the use of the Connection ID (CID) * extension in the next handshake. * - * Reference: draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * Reference: RFC 9146 (or draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * for legacy version) * * The DTLS CID extension allows the reliable association of * DTLS records to DTLS connections across changes in the @@ -1777,7 +2307,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * the `ServerHello` contains the CID extension, too, * the CID extension will actually be put to use. * - On the Server, enabling the use of the CID through - * this call implies that that the server will look for + * this call implies that the server will look for * the CID extension in a `ClientHello` from the client, * and, if present, reply with a CID extension in its * `ServerHello`. @@ -1803,6 +2333,40 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_set_cid(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char const *own_cid, size_t own_cid_len); +/** + * \brief Get information about our request for usage of the CID + * extension in the current connection. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to query. + * \param enabled The address at which to store whether the CID extension + * is requested to be used or not. If the CID is + * requested, `*enabled` is set to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; otherwise, it is set to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. + * \param own_cid The address of the buffer in which to store our own + * CID (if the CID extension is requested). This may be + * \c NULL in case the value of our CID isn't needed. If + * it is not \c NULL, \p own_cid_len must not be \c NULL. + * \param own_cid_len The address at which to store the size of our own CID + * (if the CID extension is requested). This is also the + * number of Bytes in \p own_cid that have been written. + * This may be \c NULL in case the length of our own CID + * isn't needed. If it is \c NULL, \p own_cid must be + * \c NULL, too. + * + *\note If we are requesting an empty CID this function sets + * `*enabled` to #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED (the rationale + * for this is that the resulting outcome is the + * same as if the CID extensions wasn't requested). + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_get_own_cid(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int *enabled, + unsigned char own_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX], + size_t *own_cid_len); + /** * \brief Get information about the use of the CID extension * in the current connection. @@ -1883,9 +2447,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * \note Values lower than the current record layer expansion will * result in an error when trying to send data. * - * \note Using record compression together with a non-zero MTU value - * will result in an error when trying to send data. - * * \param ssl SSL context * \param mtu Value of the path MTU in bytes */ @@ -1934,7 +2495,6 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_set_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_read_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t timeout); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING) /** * \brief Check whether a buffer contains a valid and authentic record * that has not been seen before. (DTLS only). @@ -1982,7 +2542,6 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_read_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t timeout); int mbedtls_ssl_check_record(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING */ /** * \brief Set the timer callbacks (Mandatory for DTLS.) @@ -2009,6 +2568,24 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t *f_set_timer, mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t *f_get_timer); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/** + * \brief Set the certificate selection callback (server-side only). + * + * If set, the callback is always called for each handshake, + * after `ClientHello` processing has finished. + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the callback with. + * \param f_cert_cb The callback for selecting server certificate after + * `ClientHello` processing has finished. + */ +static inline void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_hs_cb_t f_cert_cb) +{ + conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_cert_cb) = f_cert_cb; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + /** * \brief Callback type: generate and write session ticket * @@ -2035,70 +2612,6 @@ typedef int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t(void *p_ticket, size_t *tlen, uint32_t *lifetime); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) -/** - * \brief Callback type: Export key block and master secret - * - * \note This is required for certain uses of TLS, e.g. EAP-TLS - * (RFC 5216) and Thread. The key pointers are ephemeral and - * therefore must not be stored. The master secret and keys - * should not be used directly except as an input to a key - * derivation function. - * - * \param p_expkey Context for the callback - * \param ms Pointer to master secret (fixed length: 48 bytes) - * \param kb Pointer to key block, see RFC 5246 section 6.3 - * (variable length: 2 * maclen + 2 * keylen + 2 * ivlen). - * \param maclen MAC length - * \param keylen Key length - * \param ivlen IV length - * - * \return 0 if successful, or - * a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code. - */ -typedef int mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t(void *p_expkey, - const unsigned char *ms, - const unsigned char *kb, - size_t maclen, - size_t keylen, - size_t ivlen); - -/** - * \brief Callback type: Export key block, master secret, - * handshake randbytes and the tls_prf function - * used to derive keys. - * - * \note This is required for certain uses of TLS, e.g. EAP-TLS - * (RFC 5216) and Thread. The key pointers are ephemeral and - * therefore must not be stored. The master secret and keys - * should not be used directly except as an input to a key - * derivation function. - * - * \param p_expkey Context for the callback. - * \param ms Pointer to master secret (fixed length: 48 bytes). - * \param kb Pointer to key block, see RFC 5246 section 6.3. - * (variable length: 2 * maclen + 2 * keylen + 2 * ivlen). - * \param maclen MAC length. - * \param keylen Key length. - * \param ivlen IV length. - * \param client_random The client random bytes. - * \param server_random The server random bytes. - * \param tls_prf_type The tls_prf enum type. - * - * \return 0 if successful, or - * a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code. - */ -typedef int mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_ext_t(void *p_expkey, - const unsigned char *ms, - const unsigned char *kb, - size_t maclen, - size_t keylen, - size_t ivlen, - const unsigned char client_random[32], - const unsigned char server_random[32], - mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_type); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ - /** * \brief Callback type: parse and load session ticket * @@ -2146,39 +2659,220 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t *f_ticket_write, mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t *f_ticket_parse, void *p_ticket); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +/** + * \brief Get the creation time of a session ticket. + * + * \note See the documentation of \c ticket_creation_time for information about + * the intended usage of this function. + * + * \param session SSL session + * \param ticket_creation_time On exit, holds the ticket creation time in + * milliseconds. + * + * \return 0 on success, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if an input is not valid. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_session_get_ticket_creation_time( + mbedtls_ssl_session *session, mbedtls_ms_time_t *ticket_creation_time) +{ + if (session == NULL || ticket_creation_time == NULL || + session->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(endpoint) != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + *ticket_creation_time = session->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_creation_time); + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) /** - * \brief Configure key export callback. - * (Default: none.) + * \brief Get the session-id buffer. * - * \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t. + * \param session SSL session. * - * \param conf SSL configuration context - * \param f_export_keys Callback for exporting keys - * \param p_export_keys Context for the callback + * \return The address of the session-id buffer. */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *f_export_keys, - void *p_export_keys); +static inline unsigned const char (*mbedtls_ssl_session_get_id(const mbedtls_ssl_session * + session))[32] +{ + return &session->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); +} /** - * \brief Configure extended key export callback. - * (Default: none.) + * \brief Get the size of the session-id. * - * \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_ext_t. - * \warning Exported key material must not be used for any purpose - * before the (D)TLS handshake is completed + * \param session SSL session. * - * \param conf SSL configuration context - * \param f_export_keys_ext Callback for exporting keys - * \param p_export_keys Context for the callback + * \return size_t size of session-id buffer. */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_ext_t *f_export_keys_ext, - void *p_export_keys); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_session_get_id_len(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + return session->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id_len); +} + +/** + * \brief Get the ciphersuite-id. + * + * \param session SSL session. + * + * \return int represetation for ciphersuite. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_session_get_ciphersuite_id(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + return session->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ciphersuite); +} + +/** + * \brief Configure a key export callback. + * (Default: none.) + * + * This API can be used for two purposes: + * - Debugging: Use this API to e.g. generate an NSSKeylog + * file and use it to inspect encrypted traffic in tools + * such as Wireshark. + * - Application-specific export: Use this API to implement + * key exporters, e.g. for EAP-TLS or DTLS-SRTP. + * + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to which the export + * callback should be attached. + * \param f_export_keys The callback for the key export. + * \param p_export_keys The opaque context pointer to be passed to the + * callback \p f_export_keys. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_export_keys_cb(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *f_export_keys, + void *p_export_keys); + +/** \brief Set the user data in an SSL configuration to a pointer. + * + * You can retrieve this value later with mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_p(). + * + * \note The library stores \c p without accessing it. It is the responsibility + * of the caller to ensure that the pointer remains valid. + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration context to modify. + * \param p The new value of the user data. + */ +static inline void mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_p( + mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + void *p) +{ + conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).p = p; +} + +/** \brief Set the user data in an SSL configuration to an integer. + * + * You can retrieve this value later with mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_n(). + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration context to modify. + * \param n The new value of the user data. + */ +static inline void mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_n( + mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + uintptr_t n) +{ + conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).n = n; +} + +/** \brief Retrieve the user data in an SSL configuration as a pointer. + * + * This is the value last set with mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_p(), or + * \c NULL if mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_p() has not previously been + * called. The value is undefined if mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_n() has + * been called without a subsequent call to mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_p(). + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration context to modify. + * \return The current value of the user data. + */ +static inline void *mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_p( + mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ + return conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).p; +} + +/** \brief Retrieve the user data in an SSL configuration as an integer. + * + * This is the value last set with mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_n(), or + * \c 0 if mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_n() has not previously been + * called. The value is undefined if mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_p() has + * been called without a subsequent call to mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_n(). + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration context to modify. + * \return The current value of the user data. + */ +static inline uintptr_t mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_n( + mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ + return conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).n; +} + +/** \brief Set the user data in an SSL context to a pointer. + * + * You can retrieve this value later with mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_p(). + * + * \note The library stores \c p without accessing it. It is the responsibility + * of the caller to ensure that the pointer remains valid. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to modify. + * \param p The new value of the user data. + */ +static inline void mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + void *p) +{ + ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).p = p; +} + +/** \brief Set the user data in an SSL context to an integer. + * + * You can retrieve this value later with mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_n(). + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to modify. + * \param n The new value of the user data. + */ +static inline void mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uintptr_t n) +{ + ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).n = n; +} + +/** \brief Retrieve the user data in an SSL context as a pointer. + * + * This is the value last set with mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p(), or + * \c NULL if mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p() has not previously been + * called. The value is undefined if mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n() has + * been called without a subsequent call to mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p(). + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to modify. + * \return The current value of the user data. + */ +static inline void *mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_p( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).p; +} + +/** \brief Retrieve the user data in an SSL context as an integer. + * + * This is the value last set with mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n(), or + * \c 0 if mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n() has not previously been + * called. The value is undefined if mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p() has + * been called without a subsequent call to mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n(). + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to modify. + * \return The current value of the user data. + */ +static inline uintptr_t mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_n( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).n; +} #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) /** @@ -2372,7 +3066,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char mode); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) /** * \brief Set a limit on the number of records with a bad MAC * before terminating the connection. @@ -2397,7 +3090,6 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char mode); * many bogus packets. */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned limit); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) @@ -2506,24 +3198,55 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t min, */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, void *p_cache, - int (*f_get_cache)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *), - int (*f_set_cache)(void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *)); + mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_t *f_get_cache, + mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_t *f_set_cache); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) /** - * \brief Request resumption of session (client-side only) - * Session data is copied from presented session structure. + * \brief Load a session for session resumption. + * + * Sessions loaded through this call will be considered + * for session resumption in the next handshake. + * + * \note Even if this call succeeds, it is not guaranteed that + * the next handshake will indeed be shortened through the + * use of session resumption: The server is always free + * to reject any attempt for resumption and fall back to + * a full handshake. + * + * \note This function can handle a variety of mechanisms for session + * resumption: For TLS 1.2, both session ID-based resumption and + * ticket-based resumption will be considered. For TLS 1.3, + * once implemented, sessions equate to tickets, and loading + * one or more sessions via this call will lead to their + * corresponding tickets being advertised as resumption PSKs + * by the client. + * + * \note Calling this function multiple times will only be useful + * once TLS 1.3 is supported. For TLS 1.2 connections, this + * function should be called at most once. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context representing the connection which should + * be attempted to be setup using session resumption. This + * must be initialized via mbedtls_ssl_init() and bound to + * an SSL configuration via mbedtls_ssl_setup(), but + * the handshake must not yet have been started. + * \param session The session to be considered for session resumption. + * This must be a session previously exported via + * mbedtls_ssl_get_session(), and potentially serialized and + * deserialized through mbedtls_ssl_session_save() and + * mbedtls_ssl_session_load() in the meantime. * - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param session session context - * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if used server-side or - * arguments are otherwise invalid + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the session + * could not be loaded because of an implementation limitation. + * This error is non-fatal, and has no observable effect on + * the SSL context or the session that was attempted to be loaded. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. * * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_session() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_session_load() */ int mbedtls_ssl_set_session(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ @@ -2572,7 +3295,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_session_load(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, * of session cache or session tickets. * * \see mbedtls_ssl_session_load() - * \see mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer() * * \param session The session structure to be saved. * \param buf The buffer to write the serialized data to. It must be a @@ -2595,41 +3317,97 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_session_save(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen); -/** - * \brief Get a pointer to the current session structure, for example - * to serialize it. - * - * \warning Ownership of the session remains with the SSL context, and - * the returned pointer is only guaranteed to be valid until - * the next API call operating on the same \p ssl context. - * - * \see mbedtls_ssl_session_save() - * - * \param ssl The SSL context. - * - * \return A pointer to the current session if successful. - * \return \c NULL if no session is active. - */ -const mbedtls_ssl_session *mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); - /** * \brief Set the list of allowed ciphersuites and the preference * order. First in the list has the highest preference. - * (Overrides all version-specific lists) - * - * The ciphersuites array is not copied, and must remain - * valid for the lifetime of the ssl_config. * - * Note: The server uses its own preferences - * over the preference of the client unless - * MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE is defined! + * For TLS 1.2, the notion of ciphersuite determines both + * the key exchange mechanism and the suite of symmetric + * algorithms to be used during and after the handshake. + * + * For TLS 1.3 (in development), the notion of ciphersuite + * only determines the suite of symmetric algorithms to be + * used during and after the handshake, while key exchange + * mechanisms are configured separately. + * + * In Mbed TLS, ciphersuites for both TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 + * are configured via this function. For users of TLS 1.3, + * there will be separate API for the configuration of key + * exchange mechanisms. + * + * The list of ciphersuites passed to this function may + * contain a mixture of TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 ciphersuite + * identifiers. This is useful if negotiation of TLS 1.3 + * should be attempted, but a fallback to TLS 1.2 would + * be tolerated. + * + * \note By default, the server chooses its preferred + * ciphersuite among those that the client supports. If + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_preference_order() is called to prefer + * the client's preferences, the server instead chooses + * the client's preferred ciphersuite among those that + * the server supports. + * + * \warning The ciphersuites array \p ciphersuites is not copied. + * It must remain valid for the lifetime of the SSL + * configuration \p conf. * - * \param conf SSL configuration - * \param ciphersuites 0-terminated list of allowed ciphersuites + * \param conf The SSL configuration to modify. + * \param ciphersuites A 0-terminated list of IANA identifiers of supported + * ciphersuites, accessible through \c MBEDTLS_TLS_XXX + * and \c MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_XXX macros defined in + * ssl_ciphersuites.h. */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const int *ciphersuites); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +/** + * \brief Set the supported key exchange modes for TLS 1.3 connections. + * + * In contrast to TLS 1.2, the ciphersuite concept in TLS 1.3 does not + * include the choice of key exchange mechanism. It is therefore not + * covered by the API mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites(). See the + * documentation of mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites() for more + * information on the ciphersuite concept in TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3. + * + * The present function is specific to TLS 1.3 and allows users to + * configure the set of supported key exchange mechanisms in TLS 1.3. + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration the change should apply to. + * \param kex_modes A bitwise combination of one or more of the following: + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK + * This flag enables pure-PSK key exchanges. + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL + * This flag enables combined PSK-ephemeral key exchanges. + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL + * This flag enables pure-ephemeral key exchanges. + * For convenience, the following pre-defined macros are + * available for combinations of the above: + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_ALL + * Includes all of pure-PSK, PSK-ephemeral and pure-ephemeral. + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL + * Includes both pure-PSK and combined PSK-ephemeral + * key exchanges, but excludes pure-ephemeral key exchanges. + * - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL + * Includes both pure-ephemeral and combined PSK-ephemeral + * key exchanges. + * + * \note If a PSK-based key exchange mode shall be supported, applications + * must also use the APIs mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque() + * to configure the PSKs to be used. + * + * \note If a pure-ephemeral key exchange mode shall be supported, + * server-side applications must also provide a certificate via + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert(). + * + */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_key_exchange_modes(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const int kex_modes); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE 0 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_FAIL 1 @@ -2669,29 +3447,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, size_t len, int ignore_other_cids); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ -/** - * \brief Set the list of allowed ciphersuites and the - * preference order for a specific version of the protocol. - * (Only useful on the server side) - * - * The ciphersuites array is not copied, and must remain - * valid for the lifetime of the ssl_config. - * - * \param conf SSL configuration - * \param ciphersuites 0-terminated list of allowed ciphersuites - * \param major Major version number (only MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 - * supported) - * \param minor Minor version number (MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 and MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2, - * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 supported) - * - * \note With DTLS, use MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 for DTLS 1.0 - * and MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for DTLS 1.2 - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const int *ciphersuites, - int major, int minor); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** * \brief Set the X.509 security profile used for verification @@ -2721,6 +3476,26 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain, mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) +/** + * \brief Set DN hints sent to client in CertificateRequest message + * + * \note If not set, subject distinguished names (DNs) are taken + * from \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() + * or \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain()) + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param crt crt chain whose subject DNs are issuer DNs of client certs + * from which the client should select client peer certificate. + */ +static inline +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dn_hints(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt) +{ + conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dn_hints) = crt; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) /** * \brief Set the trusted certificate callback. @@ -2819,10 +3594,16 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key); #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED) /** - * \brief Configure a pre-shared key (PSK) and identity - * to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites. + * \brief Configure pre-shared keys (PSKs) and their + * identities to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites. + * + * Only one PSK can be registered, through either + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque(). + * If you attempt to register more than one PSK, this function + * fails, though this may change in future versions, which + * may add support for multiple PSKs. * * \note This is mainly useful for clients. Servers will usually * want to use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() instead. @@ -2830,13 +3611,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, * \note A PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() in the PSK callback * takes precedence over a PSK configured by this function. * - * \warning Currently, clients can only register a single pre-shared key. - * Calling this function or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque() more - * than once will overwrite values configured in previous calls. - * Support for setting multiple PSKs on clients and selecting - * one based on the identity hint is not a planned feature, - * but feedback is welcomed. - * * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the PSK with. * \param psk The pointer to the pre-shared key to use. * \param psk_len The length of the pre-shared key in bytes. @@ -2849,7 +3623,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, * of the SSL configuration. * * \return \c 0 if successful. - * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if no more PSKs + * can be configured. In this case, the old PSK(s) remain intact. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len, @@ -2857,8 +3633,14 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) /** - * \brief Configure an opaque pre-shared key (PSK) and identity - * to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites. + * \brief Configure one or more opaque pre-shared keys (PSKs) and + * their identities to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites. + * + * Only one PSK can be registered, through either + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque(). + * If you attempt to register more than one PSK, this function + * fails, though this may change in future versions, which + * may add support for multiple PSKs. * * \note This is mainly useful for clients. Servers will usually * want to use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() instead. @@ -2867,13 +3649,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, * the PSK callback takes precedence over an opaque PSK * configured by this function. * - * \warning Currently, clients can only register a single pre-shared key. - * Calling this function or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() more than - * once will overwrite values configured in previous calls. - * Support for setting multiple PSKs on clients and selecting - * one based on the identity hint is not a planned feature, - * but feedback is welcomed. - * * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the PSK with. * \param psk The identifier of the key slot holding the PSK. * Until \p conf is destroyed or this function is successfully @@ -2890,10 +3665,12 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, * SSL configuration. * * \return \c 0 if successful. - * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if no more PSKs + * can be configured. In this case, the old PSK(s) remain intact. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - psa_key_id_t psk, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psk, const unsigned char *psk_identity, size_t psk_identity_len); #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ @@ -2939,9 +3716,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure. */ int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - psa_key_id_t psk); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psk); #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) /** * \brief Set the PSK callback (server-side only). * @@ -2984,37 +3762,10 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int (*f_psk)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_psk); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif - -/** - * \brief Set the Diffie-Hellman public P and G values, - * read as hexadecimal strings (server-side only) - * (Default values: MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_[PG]) - * - * \param conf SSL configuration - * \param dhm_P Diffie-Hellman-Merkle modulus - * \param dhm_G Diffie-Hellman-Merkle generator - * - * \deprecated Superseded by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin. - * - * \return 0 if successful - */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const char *dhm_P, - const char *dhm_G); - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /** * \brief Set the Diffie-Hellman public P and G values * from big-endian binary presentations. @@ -3058,11 +3809,9 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, #endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) /** * \brief Set the allowed curves in order of preference. - * (Default: all defined curves in order of decreasing size, - * except that Montgomery curves come last. This order - * is likely to change in a future version.) * * On server: this only affects selection of the ECDHE curve; * the curves used for ECDH and ECDSA are determined by the @@ -3074,6 +3823,8 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, * Both sides: limits the set of curves accepted for use in * ECDHE and in the peer's end-entity certificate. * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups(). + * * \note This has no influence on which curves are allowed inside the * certificate chains, see \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile() * for that. For the end-entity certificate however, the key @@ -3083,20 +3834,72 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, * \note This list should be ordered by decreasing preference * (preferred curve first). * + * \note The default list is the same set of curves that + * #mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default allows, plus + * ECDHE-only curves selected according to the same criteria. + * The order favors curves with the lowest resource usage. + * + * \note New minor versions of Mbed TLS may extend this list, + * for example if new curves are added to the library. + * New minor versions of Mbed TLS will not remove items + * from this list unless serious security concerns require it. + * New minor versions of Mbed TLS may change the order in + * keeping with the general principle of favoring the lowest + * resource usage. + * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param curves Ordered list of allowed curves, * terminated by MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE. */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curves); +void MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curves); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/** + * \brief Set the allowed groups in order of preference. + * + * On server: This only affects the choice of key agreement mechanism + * + * On client: this affects the list of groups offered for any + * use. The server can override our preference order. + * + * Both sides: limits the set of groups accepted for use in + * key sharing. + * + * \note This function replaces the deprecated mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves(), + * which only allows ECP curves to be configured. + * + * \note The most recent invocation of either mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves() + * or mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups() nullifies all previous invocations + * of both. + * + * \note This list should be ordered by decreasing preference + * (preferred group first). + * + * \note When this function is not called, a default list is used, + * consisting of all supported curves at 255 bits and above, + * and all supported finite fields at 2048 bits and above. + * The order favors groups with the lowest resource usage. + * + * \note New minor versions of Mbed TLS will not remove items + * from the default list unless serious security concerns require it. + * New minor versions of Mbed TLS may change the order in + * keeping with the general principle of favoring the lowest + * resource usage. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param groups List of allowed groups ordered by preference, terminated by 0. + * Must contain valid IANA NamedGroup IDs (provided via either an integer + * or using MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_NAMED_GROUP_XXX macros). + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const uint16_t *groups); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) /** * \brief Set the allowed hashes for signatures during the handshake. - * (Default: all SHA-2 hashes, largest first. Also SHA-1 if - * the compile-time option - * `MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE` is enabled.) * * \note This only affects which hashes are offered and can be used * for signatures during the handshake. Hashes for message @@ -3105,16 +3908,46 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, * used for certificate signature are controlled by the * verification profile, see \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile(). * + * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_algs(). + * * \note This list should be ordered by decreasing preference * (preferred hash first). * + * \note By default, all supported hashes whose length is at least + * 256 bits are allowed. This is the same set as the default + * for certificate verification + * (#mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default). + * The preference order is currently unspecified and may + * change in future versions. + * + * \note New minor versions of Mbed TLS may extend this list, + * for example if new curves are added to the library. + * New minor versions of Mbed TLS will not remove items + * from this list unless serious security concerns require it. + * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param hashes Ordered list of allowed signature hashes, * terminated by \c MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const int *hashes); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ +void MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const int *hashes); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +/** + * \brief Configure allowed signature algorithms for use in TLS + * + * \param conf The SSL configuration to use. + * \param sig_algs List of allowed IANA values for TLS 1.3 signature algorithms, + * terminated by #MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE. The list must remain + * available throughout the lifetime of the conf object. + * - For TLS 1.3, values of \c MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_XXXX should be + * used. + * - For TLS 1.2, values should be given as + * "(HashAlgorithm << 8) | SignatureAlgorithm". + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_algs(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const uint16_t *sig_algs); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** @@ -3136,14 +3969,53 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, * On too long input failure, old hostname is unchanged. */ int mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const char *hostname); + +/** + * \brief Get the hostname that checked against the received + * server certificate. It is used to set the ServerName + * TLS extension, too, if that extension is enabled. + * (client-side only) + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return const pointer to the hostname value + */ +static inline const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_hostname(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hostname); +} #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +/** + * \brief Retrieve SNI extension value for the current handshake. + * Available in \c f_cert_cb of \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_cb(), + * this is the same value passed to \c f_sni callback of + * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni() and may be used instead of + * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni(). + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param name_len pointer into which to store length of returned value. + * 0 if SNI extension is not present or not yet processed. + * + * \return const pointer to SNI extension value. + * - value is valid only when called in \c f_cert_cb + * registered with \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_cb(). + * - value is NULL if SNI extension is not present. + * - value is not '\0'-terminated. Use \c name_len for len. + * - value must not be freed. + */ +const unsigned char *mbedtls_ssl_get_hs_sni(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t *name_len); + /** * \brief Set own certificate and key for the current handshake * * \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert() but for use within - * the SNI callback. + * the SNI callback or the certificate selection callback. + * + * \note Passing null \c own_cert clears the certificate list for + * the current handshake. * * \param ssl SSL context * \param own_cert own public certificate chain @@ -3160,7 +4032,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * current handshake * * \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() but for use within - * the SNI callback. + * the SNI callback or the certificate selection callback. * * \param ssl SSL context * \param ca_chain trusted CA chain (meaning all fully trusted top-level CAs) @@ -3170,11 +4042,26 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain, mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) +/** + * \brief Set DN hints sent to client in CertificateRequest message + * + * \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_dn_hints() but for use within + * the SNI callback or the certificate selection callback. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param crt crt chain whose subject DNs are issuer DNs of client certs + * from which the client should select client peer certificate. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_dn_hints(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ + /** * \brief Set authmode for the current handshake. * * \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode() but for use within - * the SNI callback. + * the SNI callback or the certificate selection callback. * * \param ssl SSL context * \param authmode MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL or @@ -3199,8 +4086,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_authmode(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain() as well as the client * authentication mode with \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_authmode(), * then must return 0. If no matching name is found, the - * callback must either set a default cert, or - * return non-zero to abort the handshake at this point. + * callback may return non-zero to abort the handshake. * * \param conf SSL configuration * \param f_sni verification function @@ -3223,9 +4109,10 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, * \note The SSL context needs to be already set up. The right place * to call this function is between \c mbedtls_ssl_setup() or * \c mbedtls_ssl_reset() and \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake(). + * Password cannot be empty (see RFC 8236). * * \param ssl SSL context - * \param pw EC J-PAKE password (pre-shared secret) + * \param pw EC J-PAKE password (pre-shared secret). It cannot be empty * \param pw_len length of pw in bytes * * \return 0 on success, or a negative error code. @@ -3233,6 +4120,23 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *pw, size_t pw_len); + +/** + * \brief Set the EC J-PAKE opaque password for current handshake. + * + * \note The key must remain valid until the handshake is over. + * + * \note The SSL context needs to be already set up. The right place + * to call this function is between \c mbedtls_ssl_setup() or + * \c mbedtls_ssl_reset() and \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake(). + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param pwd EC J-PAKE opaque password + * + * \return 0 on success, or a negative error code. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password_opaque(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t pwd); #endif /*MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) @@ -3360,66 +4264,102 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_get_dtls_srtp_negotiation_result(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info *dtls_srtp_info); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) /** * \brief Set the maximum supported version sent from the client side - * and/or accepted at the server side - * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION) + * and/or accepted at the server side. + * + * See also the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version(). * * \note This ignores ciphersuites from higher versions. * - * \note With DTLS, use MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 for DTLS 1.0 and - * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for DTLS 1.2 + * \note This function is deprecated and has been replaced by + * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_tls_version(). * * \param conf SSL configuration - * \param major Major version number (only MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 supported) - * \param minor Minor version number (MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 and MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2, - * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 supported) + * \param major Major version number (#MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3) + * \param minor Minor version number + * (#MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for (D)TLS 1.2, + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 for TLS 1.3) + */ +void MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, + int minor); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/** + * \brief Set the maximum supported version sent from the client side + * and/or accepted at the server side. + * + * \note After the handshake, you can call + * mbedtls_ssl_get_version_number() to see what version was + * negotiated. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param tls_version TLS protocol version number (\c mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version) + * (#MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN is not valid) */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor); +static inline void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_tls_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version) +{ + conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_tls_version) = tls_version; +} +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) /** * \brief Set the minimum accepted SSL/TLS protocol version - * (Default: TLS 1.0) + * + * \note By default, all supported versions are accepted. + * Future versions of the library may disable older + * protocol versions by default if they become deprecated. + * + * \note The following versions are supported (if enabled at + * compile time): + * - (D)TLS 1.2: \p major = #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, + * \p minor = #MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 + * - TLS 1.3: \p major = #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, + * \p minor = #MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 + * + * Note that the numbers in the constant names are the + * TLS internal protocol numbers, and the minor versions + * differ by one from the human-readable versions! * * \note Input outside of the SSL_MAX_XXXXX_VERSION and * SSL_MIN_XXXXX_VERSION range is ignored. * - * \note MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 (SSL v3) should be avoided. + * \note After the handshake, you can call + * mbedtls_ssl_get_version_number() to see what version was + * negotiated. * - * \note With DTLS, use MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 for DTLS 1.0 and - * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for DTLS 1.2 + * \note This function is deprecated and has been replaced by + * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_tls_version(). * * \param conf SSL configuration - * \param major Major version number (only MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 supported) - * \param minor Minor version number (MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 and MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2, - * MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 supported) + * \param major Major version number (#MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3) + * \param minor Minor version number + * (#MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for (D)TLS 1.2, + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 for TLS 1.3) */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor); +void MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, + int minor); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) /** - * \brief Set the fallback flag (client-side only). - * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK). + * \brief Set the minimum supported version sent from the client side + * and/or accepted at the server side. * - * \note Set to MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK when preparing a fallback - * connection, that is a connection with max_version set to a - * lower value than the value you're willing to use. Such - * fallback connections are not recommended but are sometimes - * necessary to interoperate with buggy (version-intolerant) - * servers. + * \note After the handshake, you can call + * mbedtls_ssl_get_version_number() to see what version was + * negotiated. * - * \warning You should NOT set this to MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK for - * non-fallback connections! This would appear to work for a - * while, then cause failures when the server is upgraded to - * support a newer TLS version. - * - * \param conf SSL configuration - * \param fallback MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK or MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param tls_version TLS protocol version number (\c mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version) + * (#MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN is not valid) */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_fallback(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char fallback); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +static inline void mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_tls_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version) +{ + conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(min_tls_version) = tls_version; +} #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) /** @@ -3451,25 +4391,6 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char etm); void mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char ems); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -/** - * \brief Disable or enable support for RC4 - * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED) - * - * \warning Use of RC4 in DTLS/TLS has been prohibited by RFC 7465 - * for security reasons. Use at your own risk. - * - * \note This function is deprecated and will be removed in - * a future version of the library. - * RC4 is disabled by default at compile time and needs to be - * actively enabled for use with legacy systems. - * - * \param conf SSL configuration - * \param arc4 MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED or MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_arc4_support(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char arc4); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) /** * \brief Whether to send a list of acceptable CAs in @@ -3522,34 +4443,21 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_req_ca_list(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned char mfl_code); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) -/** - * \brief Activate negotiation of truncated HMAC - * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED) - * - * \param conf SSL configuration - * \param truncate Enable or disable (MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED or - * MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED) - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_truncated_hmac(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int truncate); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) /** - * \brief Enable / Disable 1/n-1 record splitting - * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED) - * - * \note Only affects SSLv3 and TLS 1.0, not higher versions. - * Does not affect non-CBC ciphersuites in any version. + * \brief Pick the ciphersuites order according to the second parameter + * in the SSL Server module (MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C). + * (Default, if never called: MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_SERVER) * * \param conf SSL configuration - * \param split MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED or - * MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED + * \param order Server or client (MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_SERVER + * or MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_CLIENT) */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cbc_record_splitting(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char split); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_preference_order(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int order); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) /** * \brief Enable / Disable session tickets (client only). * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED.) @@ -3561,7 +4469,34 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cbc_record_splitting(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char split) * MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED) */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int use_tickets); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +/** + * \brief Number of NewSessionTicket messages for the server to send + * after handshake completion. + * + * \note The default value is + * \c MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_DEFAULT_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS. + * + * \note In case of a session resumption, this setting only partially apply. + * At most one ticket is sent in that case to just renew the pool of + * tickets of the client. The rationale is to avoid the number of + * tickets on the server to become rapidly out of control when the + * server has the same configuration for all its connection instances. + * + * \param conf SSL configuration + * \param num_tickets Number of NewSessionTicket. + * + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_new_session_tickets(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + uint16_t num_tickets); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && + MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3*/ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) /** @@ -3754,103 +4689,69 @@ size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); /** - * \brief Return the name of the current ciphersuite + * \brief Return the id of the current ciphersuite * * \param ssl SSL context * - * \return a string containing the ciphersuite name + * \return a ciphersuite id */ -const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +int mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id_from_ssl(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); /** - * \brief Return the current SSL version (SSLv3/TLSv1/etc) + * \brief Return the name of the current ciphersuite * * \param ssl SSL context * - * \return a string containing the SSL version + * \return a string containing the ciphersuite name */ -const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_version(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -/** - * \brief Return the (maximum) number of bytes added by the record - * layer: header + encryption/MAC overhead (inc. padding) - * - * \note This function is not available (always returns an error) - * when record compression is enabled. - * - * \param ssl SSL context - * - * \return Current maximum record expansion in bytes, or - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if compression is - * enabled, which makes expansion much less predictable - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) /** - * \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for - * the output buffer. For the client, this is the configured - * value. For the server, it is the minimum of two - the - * configured value and the negotiated one. + * \brief Return the (D)TLS protocol version negotiated in the + * given connection. * - * \sa mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len() - * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_record_payload() - * - * \param ssl SSL context + * \note If you call this function too early during the initial + * handshake, before the two sides have agreed on a version, + * this function returns #MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN. * - * \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer. + * \param ssl The SSL context to query. + * \return The negotiated protocol version. */ -size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +static inline mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version mbedtls_ssl_get_version_number( + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls_version); +} /** - * \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for - * the input buffer. This is the negotiated maximum fragment - * length, or, if there is none, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN. - * If it is not defined either, the value is 2^14. This function - * works as its predecessor, \c mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len(). - * - * \sa mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len() - * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_record_payload() + * \brief Return the current TLS version * * \param ssl SSL context * - * \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer. + * \return a string containing the TLS version */ -size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED -#endif +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_version(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); /** - * \brief This function is a deprecated approach to getting the max - * fragment length. Its an alias for - * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(), as the behaviour - * is the same. See \c mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len() for - * more detail. - * - * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len() - * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len() + * \brief Return the (maximum) number of bytes added by the record + * layer: header + encryption/MAC overhead (inc. padding) * * \param ssl SSL context * - * \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer. + * \return Current maximum record expansion in bytes */ -MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( - const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ +int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); /** * \brief Return the current maximum outgoing record payload in bytes. - * This takes into account the config.h setting \c - * MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, the configured and negotiated - * max fragment length extension if used, and for DTLS the - * path MTU as configured and current record expansion. + * + * \note The logic to determine the maximum outgoing record payload is + * version-specific. It takes into account various factors, such as + * the mbedtls_config.h setting \c MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, extensions + * such as the max fragment length or record size limit extension if + * used, and for DTLS the path MTU as configured and current + * record expansion. * * \note With DTLS, \c mbedtls_ssl_write() will return an error if * called with a larger length value. @@ -3859,12 +4760,7 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( * to the caller to call \c mbedtls_ssl_write() again in * order to send the remaining bytes if any. * - * \note This function is not available (always returns an error) - * when record compression is enabled. - * - * \sa mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu() - * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len() - * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload() * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion() * * \param ssl SSL context @@ -3874,6 +4770,26 @@ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( */ int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +/** + * \brief Return the current maximum incoming record payload in bytes. + * + * \note The logic to determine the maximum incoming record payload is + * version-specific. It takes into account various factors, such as + * the mbedtls_config.h setting \c MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN, extensions + * such as the max fragment length extension or record size limit + * extension if used, and the current record expansion. + * + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_in_record_payload() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion() + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return Current maximum payload for an incoming record, + * or a negative error code. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_in_record_payload(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** * \brief Return the peer certificate from the current connection. @@ -3910,32 +4826,41 @@ const mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) /** - * \brief Save session in order to resume it later (client-side only) - * Session data is copied to presented session structure. - * - * - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param session session context - * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if used server-side or - * arguments are otherwise invalid. - * - * \note Only the server certificate is copied, and not the full chain, - * so you should not attempt to validate the certificate again - * by calling \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() on it. - * Instead, you should use the results from the verification - * in the original handshake by calling \c mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result() - * after loading the session again into a new SSL context - * using \c mbedtls_ssl_set_session(). - * - * \note Once the session object is not needed anymore, you should - * free it by calling \c mbedtls_ssl_session_free(). + * \brief Export a session in order to resume it later. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context representing the connection for which to + * to export a session structure for later resumption. + * \param session The target structure in which to store the exported session. + * This must have been initialized with mbedtls_ssl_session_init() + * but otherwise be unused. + * + * \note This function can handle a variety of mechanisms for session + * resumption: For TLS 1.2, both session ID-based resumption and + * ticket-based resumption will be considered. For TLS 1.3, + * once implemented, sessions equate to tickets, and calling + * this function multiple times will export the available + * tickets one a time until no further tickets are available, + * in which case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE will + * be returned. + * + * \note Calling this function multiple times will only be useful + * once TLS 1.3 is supported. For TLS 1.2 connections, this + * function should be called at most once. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. In this case, \p session can be used for + * session resumption by passing it to mbedtls_ssl_set_session(), + * and serialized for storage via mbedtls_ssl_session_save(). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if no further session + * is available for export. + * This error is a non-fatal, and has no observable effect on + * the SSL context or the destination session. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. * * \sa mbedtls_ssl_set_session() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_session_save() */ -int mbedtls_ssl_get_session(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_session *session); +int mbedtls_ssl_get_session(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_session *session); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ /** @@ -3960,6 +4885,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_session(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_session * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED if DTLS is in use * and the client did not demonstrate reachability yet - in * this case you must stop using the context (see below). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA if early data, as + * defined in RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3 specification), has been + * received as part of the handshake. This is server specific + * and may occur only if the early data feature has been + * enabled on server (see mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data() + * documentation). You must call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() + * to read the early data before resuming the handshake. * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using * the context (see below). * @@ -3968,7 +4900,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_session(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_session * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or - * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA, * you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing, * and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() * on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current @@ -3988,18 +4921,48 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_session(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_session * currently being processed might or might not contain further * DTLS records. * - * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto + * \note If the context is configured to allow TLS 1.3, or if + * #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto * subsystem must have been initialized by calling * psa_crypto_init() before calling this function. */ int mbedtls_ssl_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +/** + * \brief After calling mbedtls_ssl_handshake() to start the SSL + * handshake you can call this function to check whether the + * handshake is over for a given SSL context. This function + * should be also used to determine when to stop calling + * mbedtls_handshake_step() for that context. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return \c 1 if handshake is over, \c 0 if it is still ongoing. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state) >= MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER; +} + /** * \brief Perform a single step of the SSL handshake * * \note The state of the context (ssl->state) will be at * the next state after this function returns \c 0. Do not - * call this function if state is MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER. + * call this function if mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over() + * returns \c 1. + * + * \warning Whilst in the past you may have used direct access to the + * context state (ssl->state) in order to ascertain when to + * stop calling this function and although you can still do + * so with something like ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state) or by + * defining MBEDTLS_ALLOW_PRIVATE_ACCESS, this is now + * considered deprecated and could be broken in any future + * release. If you still find you have good reason for such + * direct access, then please do contact the team to explain + * this (raise an issue or post to the mailing list), so that + * we can add a solution to your problem that will be + * guaranteed to work in the future. * * \param ssl SSL context * @@ -4007,8 +4970,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); * * \warning If this function returns something other than \c 0, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, - * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or - * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, you must stop using + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA, you must stop using * the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it * or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before * re-using it for a new connection; the current connection @@ -4076,6 +5040,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT if we're at the server * side of a DTLS connection and the client is initiating a * new connection using the same source port. See below. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA if early data, as + * defined in RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3 specification), has been + * received as part of the handshake. This is server specific + * and may occur only if the early data feature has been + * enabled on server (see mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data() + * documentation). You must call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() + * to read the early data before resuming the handshake. * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using * the context (see below). * @@ -4084,8 +5055,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS, - * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or - * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA, * you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing, * and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() * on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current @@ -4150,6 +5122,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len); * operation is in progress (see mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()) - * in this case you must call this function again to complete * the handshake when you're done attending other tasks. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA if early data, as + * defined in RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3 specification), has been + * received as part of the handshake. This is server specific + * and may occur only if the early data feature has been + * enabled on server (see mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data() + * documentation). You must call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() + * to read the early data before resuming the handshake. * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using * the context (see below). * @@ -4157,8 +5136,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len); * a non-negative value, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, - * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or - * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA, * you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing, * and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() * on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current @@ -4166,7 +5146,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len); * * \note When this function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE/READ, * it must be called later with the *same* arguments, - * until it returns a value greater that or equal to 0. When + * until it returns a value greater than or equal to 0. When * the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE there may be * some partial data in the output buffer, however this is not * yet sent. @@ -4176,7 +5156,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len); * or negotiated with the peer), then: * - with TLS, less bytes than requested are written. * - with DTLS, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA is returned. - * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len() may be used to + * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload() may be used to * query the active maximum fragment length. * * \note Attempting to write 0 bytes will result in an empty TLS @@ -4218,6 +5198,179 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, */ int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/** + * \brief Read at most 'len' bytes of early data + * + * \note This API is server specific. + * + * \warning Early data is defined in the TLS 1.3 specification, RFC 8446. + * IMPORTANT NOTE from section 2.3 of the specification: + * + * The security properties for 0-RTT data are weaker than + * those for other kinds of TLS data. Specifically: + * - This data is not forward secret, as it is encrypted + * solely under keys derived using the offered PSK. + * - There are no guarantees of non-replay between connections. + * Protection against replay for ordinary TLS 1.3 1-RTT data + * is provided via the server's Random value, but 0-RTT data + * does not depend on the ServerHello and therefore has + * weaker guarantees. This is especially relevant if the + * data is authenticated either with TLS client + * authentication or inside the application protocol. The + * same warnings apply to any use of the + * early_exporter_master_secret. + * + * \warning Mbed TLS does not implement any of the anti-replay defenses + * defined in section 8 of the TLS 1.3 specification: + * single-use of tickets or ClientHello recording within a + * given time window. + * + * \note This function is used in conjunction with + * mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), + * mbedtls_ssl_read() and mbedtls_ssl_write() to read early + * data when these functions return + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA. + * + * \param ssl SSL context, it must have been initialized and set up. + * \param buf buffer that will hold the data + * \param len maximum number of bytes to read + * + * \return The (positive) number of bytes read if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input data is invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA if it is not + * possible to read early data for the SSL context \p ssl. Note + * that this function is intended to be called for an SSL + * context \p ssl only after a call to mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), + * mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), mbedtls_ssl_read() or + * mbedtls_ssl_write() for \p ssl that has returned + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +/** + * \brief Try to write exactly 'len' application data bytes while + * performing the handshake (early data). + * + * \warning Early data is defined in the TLS 1.3 specification, RFC 8446. + * IMPORTANT NOTE from section 2.3 of the specification: + * + * The security properties for 0-RTT data are weaker than + * those for other kinds of TLS data. Specifically: + * - This data is not forward secret, as it is encrypted + * solely under keys derived using the offered PSK. + * - There are no guarantees of non-replay between connections. + * Protection against replay for ordinary TLS 1.3 1-RTT data + * is provided via the server's Random value, but 0-RTT data + * does not depend on the ServerHello and therefore has + * weaker guarantees. This is especially relevant if the + * data is authenticated either with TLS client + * authentication or inside the application protocol. The + * same warnings apply to any use of the + * early_exporter_master_secret. + * + * \note This function behaves mainly as mbedtls_ssl_write(). The + * specification of mbedtls_ssl_write() relevant to TLS 1.3 + * (thus not the parts specific to (D)TLS1.2) applies to this + * function and the present documentation is mainly restricted + * to the differences with mbedtls_ssl_write(). One noticeable + * difference though is that mbedtls_ssl_write() aims to + * complete the handshake before to write application data + * while mbedtls_ssl_write_early() aims to drive the handshake + * just past the point where it is not possible to send early + * data anymore. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param buf buffer holding the data + * \param len how many bytes must be written + * + * \return The (non-negative) number of bytes actually written if + * successful (may be less than \p len). + * + * \return One additional specific error code compared to + * mbedtls_ssl_write(): + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA. + * + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA is returned when it + * is not possible to write early data for the SSL context + * \p ssl. + * + * It may have been possible and it is not possible + * anymore because the client received the server Finished + * message, the server rejected early data or the maximum + * number of allowed early data for the PSK in use has been + * reached. + * + * It may never have been possible and will never be possible + * for the SSL context \p ssl because the use of early data + * is disabled for that context or more generally the context + * is not suitably configured to enable early data or the first + * call to the function was done while the handshake was + * already completed. + * + * It is not possible to write early data for the SSL context + * \p ssl and any subsequent call to this API will return this + * error code. But this does not preclude for using it with + * mbedtls_ssl_write(), mbedtls_ssl_read() or + * mbedtls_ssl_handshake() and the handshake can be + * completed by calling one of these APIs. + * + * \note This function may write early data only if the SSL context + * has been configured for the handshake with a PSK for which + * early data is allowed. + * + * \note To maximize the number of early data that can be written in + * the course of the handshake, it is expected that this + * function starts the handshake for the SSL context \p ssl. + * But this is not mandatory. + * + * \note This function does not provide any information on whether + * the server has accepted or will accept early data or not. + * When it returns a positive value, it just means that it + * has written early data to the server. To know whether the + * server has accepted early data or not, you should call + * mbedtls_ssl_get_early_data_status() with the handshake + * completed. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len); + +/** + * \brief Get the status of the negotiation of the use of early data. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to query + * + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if this function is called + * from the server-side. + * + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if this function is called + * prior to completion of the handshake. + * + * \return #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_INDICATED if the client + * has not indicated the use of early data to the server. + * + * \return #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED if the client has + * indicated the use of early data and the server has accepted + * it. + * + * \return #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED if the client has + * indicated the use of early data but the server has rejected + * it. In this situation, the client may want to re-send the + * early data it may have tried to send by calling + * mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data() as ordinary post-handshake + * application data by calling mbedtls_ssl_write(). + * + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_get_early_data_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + /** * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL context and clear memory * @@ -4234,6 +5387,14 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); * * \see mbedtls_ssl_context_load() * + * \note The serialized data only contains the data that is + * necessary to resume the connection: negotiated protocol + * options, session identifier, keys, etc. + * Loading a saved SSL context does not restore settings and + * state related to how the application accesses the context, + * such as configured callback functions, user data, pending + * incoming or outgoing data, etc. + * * \note This feature is currently only available under certain * conditions, see the documentation of the return value * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA for details. @@ -4312,8 +5473,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_context_save(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * (unless they were already set before calling * mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() and the values are suitable for * the present connection). Specifically, you want to call - * at least mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() and - * mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(). All other SSL setter functions + * at least mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(), + * mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(), and + * mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n() or + * mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p() if they were set originally. + * All other SSL setter functions * are not necessary to call, either because they're only used * in handshakes, or because the setting is already saved. You * might choose to call them anyway, for example in order to diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h index b1ea801930..a1307b4508 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h @@ -5,28 +5,13 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_H #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" @@ -38,7 +23,7 @@ * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. - * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line. * \{ */ @@ -64,25 +49,27 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry; */ struct mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry { #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - mbedtls_time_t timestamp; /*!< entry timestamp */ -#endif - mbedtls_ssl_session session; /*!< entry session */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - mbedtls_x509_buf peer_cert; /*!< entry peer_cert */ + mbedtls_time_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(timestamp); /*!< entry timestamp */ #endif - mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *next; /*!< chain pointer */ + + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_id)[32]; /*!< session ID */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_id_len); + + unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session); /*!< serialized session */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_len); + + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next); /*!< chain pointer */ }; /** * \brief Cache context */ struct mbedtls_ssl_cache_context { - mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *chain; /*!< start of the chain */ - int timeout; /*!< cache entry timeout */ - int max_entries; /*!< maximum entries */ + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(chain); /*!< start of the chain */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(timeout); /*!< cache entry timeout */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_entries); /*!< maximum entries */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; /*!< mutex */ + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex); /*!< mutex */ #endif }; @@ -97,27 +84,58 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_cache_init(mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache); * \brief Cache get callback implementation * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled) * - * \param data SSL cache context - * \param session session to retrieve entry for + * \param data The SSL cache context to use. + * \param session_id The pointer to the buffer holding the session ID + * for the session to load. + * \param session_id_len The length of \p session_id in bytes. + * \param session The address at which to store the session + * associated with \p session_id, if present. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CACHE_ENTRY_NOT_FOUND if there is * no cache entry with specified session ID found, or * any other negative error code for other failures. */ -int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get(void *data, mbedtls_ssl_session *session); +int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get(void *data, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len, + mbedtls_ssl_session *session); /** * \brief Cache set callback implementation * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled) * - * \param data SSL cache context - * \param session session to store entry for + * \param data The SSL cache context to use. + * \param session_id The pointer to the buffer holding the session ID + * associated to \p session. + * \param session_id_len The length of \p session_id in bytes. + * \param session The session to store. * * \return \c 0 on success. * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set(void *data, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session); +int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set(void *data, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len, + const mbedtls_ssl_session *session); + +/** + * \brief Remove the cache entry by the session ID + * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled) + * + * \param data The SSL cache context to use. + * \param session_id The pointer to the buffer holding the session ID + * associated to session. + * \param session_id_len The length of \p session_id in bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. This indicates the cache entry for + * the session with provided ID is removed or does not + * exist. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_cache_remove(void *data, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len); #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) /** @@ -130,6 +148,20 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set(void *data, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session); * \param timeout cache entry timeout in seconds */ void mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache, int timeout); + +/** + * \brief Get the cache timeout + * + * A timeout of 0 indicates no timeout. + * + * \param cache SSL cache context + * + * \return cache entry timeout in seconds + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache) +{ + return cache->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(timeout); +} #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ /** diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h index cdf724c229..12d446200f 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h @@ -5,28 +5,13 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_H #define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/pk.h" #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" @@ -42,15 +27,6 @@ extern "C" { #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 0x01 /**< Weak! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x02 /**< Weak! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 0x04 -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x05 -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA 0x09 /**< Weak! Not in TLS 1.2 */ - -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x0A - -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA 0x15 /**< Weak! Not in TLS 1.2 */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x16 - #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x2C /**< Weak! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x2D /**< Weak! */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x2E /**< Weak! */ @@ -73,18 +49,12 @@ extern "C" { #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x84 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x88 -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x8A -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x8B #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x8C #define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x8D -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x8E -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x8F #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x90 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x91 -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x92 -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x93 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x94 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x95 @@ -122,28 +92,20 @@ extern "C" { #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 0xC4 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC001 /**< Weak! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC002 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC003 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC004 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC005 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC004 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC005 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC006 /**< Weak! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC007 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC008 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC009 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00A /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC009 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00A #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC00B /**< Weak! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC00C /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC00D /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC00E /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00F /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC00E +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00F #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC010 /**< Weak! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC011 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC012 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC013 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC014 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC013 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC014 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC023 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC024 /**< TLS 1.2 */ @@ -163,15 +125,13 @@ extern "C" { #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC031 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC032 /**< TLS 1.2 */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC033 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC034 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC035 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC036 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC037 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC038 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC039 /**< Weak! No SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0xC03A /**< Weak! No SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 0xC03B /**< Weak! No SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC035 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC036 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC037 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC038 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC039 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0xC03A +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 0xC03B #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC03C /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC03D /**< TLS 1.2 */ @@ -212,14 +172,14 @@ extern "C" { #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC070 /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC071 /**< TLS 1.2 */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC072 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC073 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC074 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC075 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC076 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC077 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC078 /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC079 /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC072 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC073 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC074 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC075 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC076 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC077 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC078 +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC079 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC07A /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC07B /**< TLS 1.2 */ @@ -247,8 +207,8 @@ extern "C" { #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC097 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC098 #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC099 -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC09A /**< Not in SSL3! */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC09B /**< Not in SSL3! */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC09A +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC09B #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0xC09C /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0xC09D /**< TLS 1.2 */ @@ -284,6 +244,13 @@ extern "C" { #define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAD /**< TLS 1.2 */ #define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAE /**< TLS 1.2 */ +/* RFC 8446, Appendix B.4 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x1301 /**< TLS 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x1302 /**< TLS 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0x1303 /**< TLS 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 0x1304 /**< TLS 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 0x1305 /**< TLS 1.3 */ + /* Reminder: update mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret when adding a new key exchange. * Reminder: update MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__xxx below */ @@ -313,16 +280,49 @@ typedef enum { #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED #endif -/* Key exchanges allowing client certificate requests */ +/* Key exchanges in either TLS 1.2 or 1.3 which are using an ECDSA + * signature */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_ECDSA_ANY_ENABLED +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED +#endif + +/* Key exchanges allowing client certificate requests. + * + * Note: that's almost the same as MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED + * above, except RSA-PSK uses a server certificate but no client cert. + * + * Note: this difference is specific to TLS 1.2, as with TLS 1.3, things are + * more symmetrical: client certs and server certs are either both allowed + * (Ephemeral mode) or both disallowed (PSK and PKS-Ephemeral modes). + */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED #endif +/* Helper to state that certificate-based client authentication through ECDSA + * is supported in TLS 1.2 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) && defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED +#endif + +/* ECDSA required for certificates in either TLS 1.2 or 1.3 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED +#endif + /* Key exchanges involving server signature in ServerKeyExchange */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ @@ -375,6 +375,62 @@ typedef enum { #define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED #endif +/* TLS 1.2 key exchanges using ECDH or ECDHE*/ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED +#endif + +/* TLS 1.3 PSK key exchanges */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED +#endif + +/* TLS 1.2 or 1.3 key exchanges with PSK */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED +#endif + +/* TLS 1.3 ephemeral key exchanges */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED +#endif + +/* TLS 1.3 key exchanges using ECDHE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) && \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED +#endif + +/* TLS 1.2 or 1.3 key exchanges using ECDH or ECDHE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED +#endif + +/* TLS 1.2 XXDH key exchanges: ECDH or ECDHE or FFDH */ +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED)) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_1_2_ENABLED +#endif + +/* The handshake params structure has a set of fields called xxdh_psa which are used: + * - by TLS 1.2 with `USE_PSA` to do ECDH or ECDHE; + * - by TLS 1.3 to do ECDHE or FFDHE. + * The following macros can be used to guard their declaration and use. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_PSA_1_2_ENABLED +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_PSA_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_PSA_ANY_ENABLED +#endif + typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t; #define MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK 0x01 /**< Weak ciphersuite flag */ @@ -384,21 +440,22 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t; /** * \brief This structure is used for storing ciphersuite information + * + * \note members are defined using integral types instead of enums + * in order to pack structure and reduce memory usage by internal + * \c ciphersuite_definitions[] */ struct mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t { - int id; - const char *name; - - mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher; - mbedtls_md_type_t mac; - mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_exchange; + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); + const char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name); - int min_major_ver; - int min_minor_ver; - int max_major_ver; - int max_minor_ver; + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher); /* mbedtls_cipher_type_t */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mac); /* mbedtls_md_type_t */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange); /* mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(flags); - unsigned char flags; + uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(min_tls_version); /* mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version */ + uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_tls_version); /* mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version */ }; const int *mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(void); @@ -406,140 +463,17 @@ const int *mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(void); const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_string(const char *ciphersuite_name); const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(int ciphersuite_id); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) -mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); -mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); -#endif - -int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); -int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED) -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_has_pfs(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) -{ - switch (info->key_exchange) { - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE: - return 1; - - default: - return 0; - } -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED) -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_no_pfs(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) -{ - switch (info->key_exchange) { - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: - return 1; - - default: - return 0; - } -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdh(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +static inline const char *mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_get_name(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) { - switch (info->key_exchange) { - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: - return 1; - - default: - return 0; - } + return info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED */ -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_get_id(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) { - switch (info->key_exchange) { - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: - return 1; - - default: - return 0; - } + return info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); } -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) -{ - switch (info->key_exchange) { - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: - return 1; - - default: - return 0; - } -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED) -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_dhe(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) -{ - switch (info->key_exchange) { - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: - return 1; - - default: - return 0; - } -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED) */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdhe(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) -{ - switch (info->key_exchange) { - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: - return 1; - - default: - return 0; - } -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) -{ - switch (info->key_exchange) { - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: - return 1; - - default: - return 0; - } -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ +size_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_get_cipher_key_bitlen(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); #ifdef __cplusplus } diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h index 334c005a82..71c258ea48 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h @@ -5,40 +5,27 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_H #define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) #include "mbedtls/threading.h" #endif +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /** * \name SECTION: Module settings * * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section. - * Either change them in config.h or define them on the compiler command line. + * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line. * \{ */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT @@ -55,16 +42,23 @@ extern "C" { * \brief Context for the default cookie functions. */ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx { - mbedtls_md_context_t hmac_ctx; /*!< context for the HMAC portion */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psa_hmac_key); /*!< key id for the HMAC portion */ + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psa_hmac_alg); /*!< key algorithm for the HMAC portion */ +#else + mbedtls_md_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hmac_ctx); /*!< context for the HMAC portion */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - unsigned long serial; /*!< serial number for expiration */ + unsigned long MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(serial); /*!< serial number for expiration */ #endif - unsigned long timeout; /*!< timeout delay, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, - or in number of tickets issued */ + unsigned long MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(timeout); /*!< timeout delay, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, + or in number of tickets issued */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex); #endif +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx; /** diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h deleted file mode 100644 index b1915c8a1b..0000000000 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1340 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file ssl_internal.h - * - * \brief Internal functions shared by the SSL modules - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_INTERNAL_H -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INTERNAL_H - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" -#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -#include "psa/crypto.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) -#include "mbedtls/md5.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) -#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) -#include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -#include "psa/crypto.h" -#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - -#if (defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER)) && \ - !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) -#define inline __inline -#endif - -/* Determine minimum supported version */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 -#else -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 -#else -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 -#else -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 - -/* Determine maximum supported version */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 -#else -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 -#else -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 -#else -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - -/* Shorthand for restartable ECC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED -#endif - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE 0 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS 1 /* In progress */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE 2 /* Done or aborted */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING 3 /* Requested (server only) */ - -/* - * DTLS retransmission states, see RFC 6347 4.2.4 - * - * The SENDING state is merged in PREPARING for initial sends, - * but is distinct for resends. - * - * Note: initial state is wrong for server, but is not used anyway. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING 0 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING 1 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING 2 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED 3 - -/* - * Allow extra bytes for record, authentication and encryption overhead: - * counter (8) + header (5) + IV(16) + MAC (16-48) + padding (0-256) - * and allow for a maximum of 1024 of compression expansion if - * enabled. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD 1024 -#else -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD 0 -#endif - -/* This macro determines whether CBC is supported. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC -#endif - -/* This macro determines whether the CBC construct used in TLS 1.0-1.2 (as - * opposed to the very different CBC construct used in SSLv3) is supported. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) -/* Ciphersuites using HMAC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 48 /* SHA-384 used for HMAC */ -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 32 /* SHA-256 used for HMAC */ -#else -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 20 /* SHA-1 used for HMAC */ -#endif -#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ -/* AEAD ciphersuites: GCM and CCM use a 128 bits tag */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 16 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 256 -#else -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 0 -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY -#else -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION 0 -#endif - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD (MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD + \ - MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH + \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD + \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD + \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION \ - ) - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN (MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \ - (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN)) - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN (MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \ - (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN)) - -/* The maximum number of buffered handshake messages. */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS 4 - -/* Maximum length we can advertise as our max content length for - RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension negotiation purposes - (the lesser of both sizes, if they are unequal.) - */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ( \ - (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) \ - ? (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) \ - : (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) \ - ) - -/* Maximum size in bytes of list in sig-hash algorithm ext., RFC 5246 */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_HASH_ALG_LIST_LEN 65534 - -/* Maximum size in bytes of list in supported elliptic curve ext., RFC 4492 */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CURVE_LIST_LEN 65535 - -/* - * Check that we obey the standard's message size bounds - */ - -#if MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN > 16384 -#error "Bad configuration - record content too large." -#endif - -#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN -#error \ - "Bad configuration - incoming record content should not be larger than MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN." -#endif - -#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN -#error \ - "Bad configuration - outgoing record content should not be larger than MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN." -#endif - -#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 2048 -#error "Bad configuration - incoming protected record payload too large." -#endif - -#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 2048 -#error "Bad configuration - outgoing protected record payload too large." -#endif - -/* Calculate buffer sizes */ - -/* Note: Even though the TLS record header is only 5 bytes - long, we're internally using 8 bytes to store the - implicit sequence number. */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN 13 - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ - ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ - ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN) \ - + (MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX)) -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ - ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ - ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN) \ - + (MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX)) -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) -static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(ctx) - + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD - + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX; -#else - return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(ctx) - + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD; -#endif -} - -static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - return mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len(ctx) - + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD - + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX; -#else - return mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len(ctx) - + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD; -#endif -} -#endif - -#ifdef MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT -/* Compression buffer holds both IN and OUT buffers, so should be size of the larger */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN ( \ - (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN) \ - ? MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ - : MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ - ) -#endif - -/* - * TLS extension flags (for extensions with outgoing ServerHello content - * that need it (e.g. for RENEGOTIATION_INFO the server already knows because - * of state of the renegotiation flag, so no indicator is required) - */ -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT (1 << 0) -#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK (1 << 1) - -/** - * \brief This function checks if the remaining size in a buffer is - * greater or equal than a needed space. - * - * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer. - * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer. - * \param need Needed space in bytes. - * - * \return Zero if the needed space is available in the buffer, non-zero - * otherwise. - */ -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr(const uint8_t *cur, - const uint8_t *end, size_t need) -{ - return (cur > end) || (need > (size_t) (end - cur)); -} - -/** - * \brief This macro checks if the remaining size in a buffer is - * greater or equal than a needed space. If it is not the case, - * it returns an SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL error. - * - * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer. - * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer. - * \param need Needed space in bytes. - * - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(cur, end, need) \ - do { \ - if (mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr((cur), (end), (need)) != 0) \ - { \ - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; \ - } \ - } while (0) - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) -/* - * Abstraction for a grid of allowed signature-hash-algorithm pairs. - */ -struct mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t { - /* At the moment, we only need to remember a single suitable - * hash algorithm per signature algorithm. As long as that's - * the case - and we don't need a general lookup function - - * we can implement the sig-hash-set as a map from signatures - * to hash algorithms. */ - mbedtls_md_type_t rsa; - mbedtls_md_type_t ecdsa; -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ - -typedef int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const char *label, - const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, - unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen); - -/* cipher.h exports the maximum IV, key and block length from - * all ciphers enabled in the config, regardless of whether those - * ciphers are actually usable in SSL/TLS. Notably, XTS is enabled - * in the default configuration and uses 64 Byte keys, but it is - * not used for record protection in SSL/TLS. - * - * In order to prevent unnecessary inflation of key structures, - * we introduce SSL-specific variants of the max-{key,block,IV} - * macros here which are meant to only take those ciphers into - * account which can be negotiated in SSL/TLS. - * - * Since the current definitions of MBEDTLS_MAX_{KEY|BLOCK|IV}_LENGTH - * in cipher.h are rough overapproximations of the real maxima, here - * we content ourselves with replicating those overapproximations - * for the maximum block and IV length, and excluding XTS from the - * computation of the maximum key length. */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH 16 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH 16 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 32 - -/** - * \brief The data structure holding the cryptographic material (key and IV) - * used for record protection in TLS 1.3. - */ -struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set { - /*! The key for client->server records. */ - unsigned char client_write_key[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; - /*! The key for server->client records. */ - unsigned char server_write_key[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; - /*! The IV for client->server records. */ - unsigned char client_write_iv[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; - /*! The IV for server->client records. */ - unsigned char server_write_iv[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; - - size_t key_len; /*!< The length of client_write_key and - * server_write_key, in Bytes. */ - size_t iv_len; /*!< The length of client_write_iv and - * server_write_iv, in Bytes. */ -}; -typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set mbedtls_ssl_key_set; - -/* - * This structure contains the parameters only needed during handshake. - */ -struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params { - /* - * Handshake specific crypto variables - */ - - uint8_t max_major_ver; /*!< max. major version client*/ - uint8_t max_minor_ver; /*!< max. minor version client*/ - uint8_t resume; /*!< session resume indicator*/ - uint8_t cli_exts; /*!< client extension presence*/ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - uint8_t sni_authmode; /*!< authmode from SNI callback */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) - uint8_t new_session_ticket; /*!< use NewSessionTicket? */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) - uint8_t extended_ms; /*!< use Extended Master Secret? */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) - uint8_t async_in_progress; /*!< an asynchronous operation is in progress */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - unsigned char retransmit_state; /*!< Retransmission state */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - uint8_t ecrs_enabled; /*!< Handshake supports EC restart? */ - enum { /* this complements ssl->state with info on intra-state operations */ - ssl_ecrs_none = 0, /*!< nothing going on (yet) */ - ssl_ecrs_crt_verify, /*!< Certificate: crt_verify() */ - ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing, /*!< ServerKeyExchange: pk_verify() */ - ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret, /*!< ClientKeyExchange: ECDH step 2 */ - ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign, /*!< CertificateVerify: pk_sign() */ - } ecrs_state; /*!< current (or last) operation */ - mbedtls_x509_crt *ecrs_peer_cert; /*!< The peer's CRT chain. */ - size_t ecrs_n; /*!< place for saving a length */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) - mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t hash_algs; /*!< Set of suitable sig-hash pairs */ -#endif - - size_t pmslen; /*!< premaster length */ - - mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t const *ciphersuite_info; - - void (*update_checksum)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); - void (*calc_verify)(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *); - void (*calc_finished)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int); - mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) - mbedtls_dhm_context dhm_ctx; /*!< DHM key exchange */ -#endif - -/* Adding guard for MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C to ensure no compile errors due - * to guards also being in ssl_srv.c and ssl_cli.c. There is a gap - * in functionality that access to ecdh_ctx structure is needed for - * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C which does not seem correct. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh_ctx; /*!< ECDH key exchange */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_key_type_t ecdh_psa_type; - uint16_t ecdh_bits; - psa_key_id_t ecdh_psa_privkey; - unsigned char ecdh_psa_peerkey[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; - size_t ecdh_psa_peerkey_len; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - mbedtls_ecjpake_context ecjpake_ctx; /*!< EC J-PAKE key exchange */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - unsigned char *ecjpake_cache; /*!< Cache for ClientHello ext */ - size_t ecjpake_cache_len; /*!< Length of cached data */ -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curves; /*!< Supported elliptic curves */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_key_id_t psk_opaque; /*!< Opaque PSK from the callback */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - unsigned char *psk; /*!< PSK from the callback */ - size_t psk_len; /*!< Length of PSK from callback */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; /*!< chosen key/cert pair (server) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *sni_key_cert; /*!< key/cert list from SNI */ - mbedtls_x509_crt *sni_ca_chain; /*!< trusted CAs from SNI callback */ - mbedtls_x509_crl *sni_ca_crl; /*!< trusted CAs CRLs from SNI */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx ecrs_ctx; /*!< restart context */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - mbedtls_pk_context peer_pubkey; /*!< The public key from the peer. */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - struct { - size_t total_bytes_buffered; /*!< Cumulative size of heap allocated - * buffers used for message buffering. */ - - uint8_t seen_ccs; /*!< Indicates if a CCS message has - * been seen in the current flight. */ - - struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer { - unsigned is_valid : 1; - unsigned is_fragmented : 1; - unsigned is_complete : 1; - unsigned char *data; - size_t data_len; - } hs[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS]; - - struct { - unsigned char *data; - size_t len; - unsigned epoch; - } future_record; - - } buffering; - - unsigned int out_msg_seq; /*!< Outgoing handshake sequence number */ - unsigned int in_msg_seq; /*!< Incoming handshake sequence number */ - - unsigned char *verify_cookie; /*!< Cli: HelloVerifyRequest cookie - Srv: unused */ - unsigned char verify_cookie_len; /*!< Cli: cookie length - Srv: flag for sending a cookie */ - - uint32_t retransmit_timeout; /*!< Current value of timeout */ - mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight; /*!< Current outgoing flight */ - mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur_msg; /*!< Current message in flight */ - unsigned char *cur_msg_p; /*!< Position in current message */ - unsigned int in_flight_start_seq; /*!< Minimum message sequence in the - flight being received */ - mbedtls_ssl_transform *alt_transform_out; /*!< Alternative transform for - resending messages */ - unsigned char alt_out_ctr[8]; /*!< Alternative record epoch/counter - for resending messages */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - /* The state of CID configuration in this handshake. */ - - uint8_t cid_in_use; /*!< This indicates whether the use of the CID extension - * has been negotiated. Possible values are - * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED and - * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */ - unsigned char peer_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX]; /*! The peer's CID */ - uint8_t peer_cid_len; /*!< The length of - * \c peer_cid. */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ - - uint16_t mtu; /*!< Handshake mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - - /* - * Checksum contexts - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - mbedtls_md5_context fin_md5; - mbedtls_sha1_context fin_sha1; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha256_psa; -#else - mbedtls_sha256_context fin_sha256; -#endif -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha384_psa; -#else - mbedtls_sha512_context fin_sha512; -#endif -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - - unsigned char randbytes[64]; /*!< random bytes */ - unsigned char premaster[MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE]; - /*!< premaster secret */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) - /** Asynchronous operation context. This field is meant for use by the - * asynchronous operation callbacks (mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_sign_start, - * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_decrypt_start, - * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_resume, mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_cancel). - * The library does not use it internally. */ - void *user_async_ctx; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ -}; - -typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer; - -/* - * Representation of decryption/encryption transformations on records - * - * There are the following general types of record transformations: - * - Stream transformations (TLS versions <= 1.2 only) - * Transformation adding a MAC and applying a stream-cipher - * to the authenticated message. - * - CBC block cipher transformations ([D]TLS versions <= 1.2 only) - * In addition to the distinction of the order of encryption and - * authentication, there's a fundamental difference between the - * handling in SSL3 & TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2: For SSL3 - * and TLS 1.0, the final IV after processing a record is used - * as the IV for the next record. No explicit IV is contained - * in an encrypted record. The IV for the first record is extracted - * at key extraction time. In contrast, for TLS 1.1 and 1.2, no - * IV is generated at key extraction time, but every encrypted - * record is explicitly prefixed by the IV with which it was encrypted. - * - AEAD transformations ([D]TLS versions >= 1.2 only) - * These come in two fundamentally different versions, the first one - * used in TLS 1.2, excluding ChaChaPoly ciphersuites, and the second - * one used for ChaChaPoly ciphersuites in TLS 1.2 as well as for TLS 1.3. - * In the first transformation, the IV to be used for a record is obtained - * as the concatenation of an explicit, static 4-byte IV and the 8-byte - * record sequence number, and explicitly prepending this sequence number - * to the encrypted record. In contrast, in the second transformation - * the IV is obtained by XOR'ing a static IV obtained at key extraction - * time with the 8-byte record sequence number, without prepending the - * latter to the encrypted record. - * - * Additionally, DTLS 1.2 + CID as well as TLS 1.3 use an inner plaintext - * which allows to add flexible length padding and to hide a record's true - * content type. - * - * In addition to type and version, the following parameters are relevant: - * - The symmetric cipher algorithm to be used. - * - The (static) encryption/decryption keys for the cipher. - * - For stream/CBC, the type of message digest to be used. - * - For stream/CBC, (static) encryption/decryption keys for the digest. - * - For AEAD transformations, the size (potentially 0) of an explicit, - * random initialization vector placed in encrypted records. - * - For some transformations (currently AEAD and CBC in SSL3 and TLS 1.0) - * an implicit IV. It may be static (e.g. AEAD) or dynamic (e.g. CBC) - * and (if present) is combined with the explicit IV in a transformation- - * dependent way (e.g. appending in TLS 1.2 and XOR'ing in TLS 1.3). - * - For stream/CBC, a flag determining the order of encryption and MAC. - * - The details of the transformation depend on the SSL/TLS version. - * - The length of the authentication tag. - * - * Note: Except for CBC in SSL3 and TLS 1.0, these parameters are - * constant across multiple encryption/decryption operations. - * For CBC, the implicit IV needs to be updated after each - * operation. - * - * The struct below refines this abstract view as follows: - * - The cipher underlying the transformation is managed in - * cipher contexts cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}, which must have the - * same cipher type. The mode of these cipher contexts determines - * the type of the transformation in the sense above: e.g., if - * the type is MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC resp. MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM - * then the transformation has type CBC resp. AEAD. - * - The cipher keys are never stored explicitly but - * are maintained within cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}. - * - For stream/CBC transformations, the message digest contexts - * used for the MAC's are stored in md_ctx_{enc/dec}. These contexts - * are unused for AEAD transformations. - * - For stream/CBC transformations and versions > SSL3, the - * MAC keys are not stored explicitly but maintained within - * md_ctx_{enc/dec}. - * - For stream/CBC transformations and version SSL3, the MAC - * keys are stored explicitly in mac_enc, mac_dec and have - * a fixed size of 20 bytes. These fields are unused for - * AEAD transformations or transformations >= TLS 1.0. - * - For transformations using an implicit IV maintained within - * the transformation context, its contents are stored within - * iv_{enc/dec}. - * - The value of ivlen indicates the length of the IV. - * This is redundant in case of stream/CBC transformations - * which always use 0 resp. the cipher's block length as the - * IV length, but is needed for AEAD ciphers and may be - * different from the underlying cipher's block length - * in this case. - * - The field fixed_ivlen is nonzero for AEAD transformations only - * and indicates the length of the static part of the IV which is - * constant throughout the communication, and which is stored in - * the first fixed_ivlen bytes of the iv_{enc/dec} arrays. - * Note: For CBC in SSL3 and TLS 1.0, the fields iv_{enc/dec} - * still store IV's for continued use across multiple transformations, - * so it is not true that fixed_ivlen == 0 means that iv_{enc/dec} are - * not being used! - * - minor_ver denotes the SSL/TLS version - * - For stream/CBC transformations, maclen denotes the length of the - * authentication tag, while taglen is unused and 0. - * - For AEAD transformations, taglen denotes the length of the - * authentication tag, while maclen is unused and 0. - * - For CBC transformations, encrypt_then_mac determines the - * order of encryption and authentication. This field is unused - * in other transformations. - * - */ -struct mbedtls_ssl_transform { - /* - * Session specific crypto layer - */ - size_t minlen; /*!< min. ciphertext length */ - size_t ivlen; /*!< IV length */ - size_t fixed_ivlen; /*!< Fixed part of IV (AEAD) */ - size_t maclen; /*!< MAC(CBC) len */ - size_t taglen; /*!< TAG(AEAD) len */ - - unsigned char iv_enc[16]; /*!< IV (encryption) */ - unsigned char iv_dec[16]; /*!< IV (decryption) */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - /* Needed only for SSL v3.0 secret */ - unsigned char mac_enc[20]; /*!< SSL v3.0 secret (enc) */ - unsigned char mac_dec[20]; /*!< SSL v3.0 secret (dec) */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ - - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_enc; /*!< MAC (encryption) */ - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_dec; /*!< MAC (decryption) */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - int encrypt_then_mac; /*!< flag for EtM activation */ -#endif - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ - - mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_enc; /*!< encryption context */ - mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_dec; /*!< decryption context */ - int minor_ver; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - uint8_t in_cid_len; - uint8_t out_cid_len; - unsigned char in_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX]; - unsigned char out_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX]; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ - - /* - * Session specific compression layer - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - z_stream ctx_deflate; /*!< compression context */ - z_stream ctx_inflate; /*!< decompression context */ -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) - /* We need the Hello random bytes in order to re-derive keys from the - * Master Secret and other session info, see ssl_populate_transform() */ - unsigned char randbytes[64]; /*!< ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ -}; - -/* - * Return 1 if the transform uses an AEAD cipher, 0 otherwise. - * Equivalently, return 0 if a separate MAC is used, 1 otherwise. - */ -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_transform_uses_aead( - const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) - return transform->maclen == 0 && transform->taglen != 0; -#else - (void) transform; - return 1; -#endif -} - -/* - * Internal representation of record frames - * - * Instances come in two flavors: - * (1) Encrypted - * These always have data_offset = 0 - * (2) Unencrypted - * These have data_offset set to the amount of - * pre-expansion during record protection. Concretely, - * this is the length of the fixed part of the explicit IV - * used for encryption, or 0 if no explicit IV is used - * (e.g. for CBC in TLS 1.0, or stream ciphers). - * - * The reason for the data_offset in the unencrypted case - * is to allow for in-place conversion of an unencrypted to - * an encrypted record. If the offset wasn't included, the - * encrypted content would need to be shifted afterwards to - * make space for the fixed IV. - * - */ -#if MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX -#else -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX -#endif - -typedef struct { - uint8_t ctr[8]; /* In TLS: The implicit record sequence number. - * In DTLS: The 2-byte epoch followed by - * the 6-byte sequence number. - * This is stored as a raw big endian byte array - * as opposed to a uint64_t because we rarely - * need to perform arithmetic on this, but do - * need it as a Byte array for the purpose of - * MAC computations. */ - uint8_t type; /* The record content type. */ - uint8_t ver[2]; /* SSL/TLS version as present on the wire. - * Convert to internal presentation of versions - * using mbedtls_ssl_read_version() and - * mbedtls_ssl_write_version(). - * Keep wire-format for MAC computations. */ - - unsigned char *buf; /* Memory buffer enclosing the record content */ - size_t buf_len; /* Buffer length */ - size_t data_offset; /* Offset of record content */ - size_t data_len; /* Length of record content */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - uint8_t cid_len; /* Length of the CID (0 if not present) */ - unsigned char cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX]; /* The CID */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ -} mbedtls_record; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -/* - * List of certificate + private key pairs - */ -struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert { - mbedtls_x509_crt *cert; /*!< cert */ - mbedtls_pk_context *key; /*!< private key */ - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *next; /*!< next key/cert pair */ -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -/* - * List of handshake messages kept around for resending - */ -struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item { - unsigned char *p; /*!< message, including handshake headers */ - size_t len; /*!< length of p */ - unsigned char type; /*!< type of the message: handshake or CCS */ - mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *next; /*!< next handshake message(s) */ -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) - -/* Find an entry in a signature-hash set matching a given hash algorithm. */ -mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find(mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, - mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg); -/* Add a signature-hash-pair to a signature-hash set */ -void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add(mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, - mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg); -/* Allow exactly one hash algorithm for each signature. */ -void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash(mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg); - -/* Setup an empty signature-hash set */ -static inline void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_init(mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash(set, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ - -/** - * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL transform context and clear - * memory - * - * \param transform SSL transform context - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform); - -/** - * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL handshake context and clear - * memory - * - * \param ssl SSL context - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); - -void mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); - -/** - * \brief Update record layer - * - * This function roughly separates the implementation - * of the logic of (D)TLS from the implementation - * of the secure transport. - * - * \param ssl The SSL context to use. - * \param update_hs_digest This indicates if the handshake digest - * should be automatically updated in case - * a handshake message is found. - * - * \return 0 or non-zero error code. - * - * \note A clarification on what is called 'record layer' here - * is in order, as many sensible definitions are possible: - * - * The record layer takes as input an untrusted underlying - * transport (stream or datagram) and transforms it into - * a serially multiplexed, secure transport, which - * conceptually provides the following: - * - * (1) Three datagram based, content-agnostic transports - * for handshake, alert and CCS messages. - * (2) One stream- or datagram-based transport - * for application data. - * (3) Functionality for changing the underlying transform - * securing the contents. - * - * The interface to this functionality is given as follows: - * - * a Updating - * [Currently implemented by mbedtls_ssl_read_record] - * - * Check if and on which of the four 'ports' data is pending: - * Nothing, a controlling datagram of type (1), or application - * data (2). In any case data is present, internal buffers - * provide access to the data for the user to process it. - * Consumption of type (1) datagrams is done automatically - * on the next update, invalidating that the internal buffers - * for previous datagrams, while consumption of application - * data (2) is user-controlled. - * - * b Reading of application data - * [Currently manual adaption of ssl->in_offt pointer] - * - * As mentioned in the last paragraph, consumption of data - * is different from the automatic consumption of control - * datagrams (1) because application data is treated as a stream. - * - * c Tracking availability of application data - * [Currently manually through decreasing ssl->in_msglen] - * - * For efficiency and to retain datagram semantics for - * application data in case of DTLS, the record layer - * provides functionality for checking how much application - * data is still available in the internal buffer. - * - * d Changing the transformation securing the communication. - * - * Given an opaque implementation of the record layer in the - * above sense, it should be possible to implement the logic - * of (D)TLS on top of it without the need to know anything - * about the record layer's internals. This is done e.g. - * in all the handshake handling functions, and in the - * application data reading function mbedtls_ssl_read. - * - * \note The above tries to give a conceptual picture of the - * record layer, but the current implementation deviates - * from it in some places. For example, our implementation of - * the update functionality through mbedtls_ssl_read_record - * discards datagrams depending on the current state, which - * wouldn't fall under the record layer's responsibility - * following the above definition. - * - */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_read_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned update_hs_digest); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want); - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_write_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); - -void mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_ex); - -/** - * Get the first defined PSK by order of precedence: - * 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() in the PSK callback - * 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() - * Return a code and update the pair (PSK, PSK length) passed to this function - */ -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_get_psk(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char **psk, size_t *psk_len) -{ - if (ssl->handshake->psk != NULL && ssl->handshake->psk_len > 0) { - *psk = ssl->handshake->psk; - *psk_len = ssl->handshake->psk_len; - } else if (ssl->conf->psk != NULL && ssl->conf->psk_len > 0) { - *psk = ssl->conf->psk; - *psk_len = ssl->conf->psk_len; - } else { - *psk = NULL; - *psk_len = 0; - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED; - } - - return 0; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -/** - * Get the first defined opaque PSK by order of precedence: - * 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque() in the PSK - * callback - * 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque() - * Return an opaque PSK - */ -static inline psa_key_id_t mbedtls_ssl_get_opaque_psk( - const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque)) { - return ssl->handshake->psk_opaque; - } - - if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->conf->psk_opaque)) { - return ssl->conf->psk_opaque; - } - - return MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) -unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk(mbedtls_pk_context *pk); -unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(mbedtls_pk_type_t type); -mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig(unsigned char sig); -#endif - -mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(unsigned char hash); -unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(int md); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int md); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t tls_id); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_md_type_t md); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) -static inline mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value - (const uint16_t srtp_profile_value) -{ - switch (srtp_profile_value) { - case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80: - case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32: - case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80: - case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32: - return srtp_profile_value; - default: break; - } - return MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; -} -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -static inline mbedtls_pk_context *mbedtls_ssl_own_key(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; - - if (ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL) { - key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert; - } else { - key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert; - } - - return key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->key; -} - -static inline mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; - - if (ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL) { - key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert; - } else { - key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert; - } - - return key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->cert; -} - -/* - * Check usage of a certificate wrt extensions: - * keyUsage, extendedKeyUsage (later), and nSCertType (later). - * - * Warning: cert_endpoint is the endpoint of the cert (ie, of our peer when we - * check a cert we received from them)! - * - * Return 0 if everything is OK, -1 if not. - */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite, - int cert_endpoint, - uint32_t *flags); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - -void mbedtls_ssl_write_version(int major, int minor, int transport, - unsigned char ver[2]); -void mbedtls_ssl_read_version(int *major, int *minor, int transport, - const unsigned char ver[2]); - -static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - ((void) ssl); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - return 13; - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - { - return 5; - } -} - -static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - return (size_t) (ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_hdr); -} - -static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - return 12; - } -#else - ((void) ssl); -#endif - return 4; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_resend(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -#endif - -/* Visible for testing purposes only */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl); -void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -#endif - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, - const mbedtls_ssl_session *src); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *output, - unsigned char *data, size_t data_len); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -/* The hash buffer must have at least MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE bytes of length. */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen, - unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -void mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, - mbedtls_record *rec, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, - mbedtls_record *rec); - -/* Length of the "epoch" field in the record header */ -static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_ep_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - return 2; - } -#else - ((void) ssl); -#endif - return 0; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - -void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint32_t millisecs); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_check_timer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); - -void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -void mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform); -void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) -void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -#endif - -void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -int mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -void mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); -void mbedtls_ssl_flight_free(mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) -int mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( - mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len, - const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, - unsigned char *obuf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen); -#endif - -#endif /* ssl_internal.h */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h index 401df7c854..2ee1400210 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h @@ -5,28 +5,13 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_H #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" /* * This implementation of the session ticket callbacks includes key @@ -37,6 +22,14 @@ #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) #include "mbedtls/threading.h" #endif @@ -45,13 +38,30 @@ extern "C" { #endif +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_MAX_KEY_BYTES 32 /*!< Max supported key length in bytes */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES 4 /*!< key name length in bytes */ + /** * \brief Information for session ticket protection */ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key { - unsigned char name[4]; /*!< random key identifier */ - uint32_t generation_time; /*!< key generation timestamp (seconds) */ - mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx; /*!< context for auth enc/decryption */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name)[MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES]; + /*!< random key identifier */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + mbedtls_time_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(generation_time); /*!< key generation timestamp (seconds) */ +#endif + /*! Lifetime of the key in seconds. This is also the lifetime of the + * tickets created under that key. + */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(lifetime); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); /*!< context for auth enc/decryption */ +#else + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key); /*!< key used for auth enc/decryption */ + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); /*!< algorithm of auth enc/decryption */ + psa_key_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_type); /*!< key type */ + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_bits); /*!< key length in bits */ +#endif } mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key; @@ -59,17 +69,17 @@ mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key; * \brief Context for session ticket handling functions */ typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context { - mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key keys[2]; /*!< ticket protection keys */ - unsigned char active; /*!< index of the currently active key */ + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(keys)[2]; /*!< ticket protection keys */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(active); /*!< index of the currently active key */ - uint32_t ticket_lifetime; /*!< lifetime of tickets in seconds */ + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_lifetime); /*!< lifetime of tickets in seconds */ /** Callback for getting (pseudo-)random numbers */ - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); - void *p_rng; /*!< context for the RNG function */ + int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_rng))(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_rng); /*!< context for the RNG function */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex); #endif } mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context; @@ -87,7 +97,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_init(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx); * \brief Prepare context to be actually used * * \param ctx Context to be set up - * \param f_rng RNG callback function + * \param f_rng RNG callback function (mandatory) * \param p_rng RNG callback context * \param cipher AEAD cipher to use for ticket protection. * Recommended value: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM. @@ -98,10 +108,16 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_init(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx); * least as strong as the strongest ciphersuite * supported. Usually that means a 256-bit key. * - * \note The lifetime of the keys is twice the lifetime of tickets. - * It is recommended to pick a reasonable lifetime so as not + * \note It is recommended to pick a reasonable lifetime so as not * to negate the benefits of forward secrecy. * + * \note The TLS 1.3 specification states that ticket lifetime must + * be smaller than seven days. If ticket lifetime has been + * set to a value greater than seven days in this module then + * if the TLS 1.3 is configured to send tickets after the + * handshake it will fail the connection when trying to send + * the first ticket. + * * \return 0 if successful, * or a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX error code */ @@ -110,6 +126,49 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher, uint32_t lifetime); +/** + * \brief Rotate session ticket encryption key to new specified key. + * Provides for external control of session ticket encryption + * key rotation, e.g. for synchronization between different + * machines. If this function is not used, or if not called + * before ticket lifetime expires, then a new session ticket + * encryption key is generated internally in order to avoid + * unbounded session ticket encryption key lifetimes. + * + * \param ctx Context to be set up + * \param name Session ticket encryption key name + * \param nlength Session ticket encryption key name length in bytes + * \param k Session ticket encryption key + * \param klength Session ticket encryption key length in bytes + * \param lifetime Tickets lifetime in seconds + * Recommended value: 86400 (one day). + * + * \note \c name and \c k are recommended to be cryptographically + * random data. + * + * \note \c nlength must match sizeof( ctx->name ) + * + * \note \c klength must be sufficient for use by cipher specified + * to \c mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup + * + * \note It is recommended to pick a reasonable lifetime so as not + * to negate the benefits of forward secrecy. + * + * \note The TLS 1.3 specification states that ticket lifetime must + * be smaller than seven days. If ticket lifetime has been + * set to a value greater than seven days in this module then + * if the TLS 1.3 is configured to send tickets after the + * handshake it will fail the connection when trying to send + * the first ticket. + * + * \return 0 if successful, + * or a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX error code + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_rotate(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *name, size_t nlength, + const unsigned char *k, size_t klength, + uint32_t lifetime); + /** * \brief Implementation of the ticket write callback * diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/threading.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/threading.h index 5b5efca620..d50d04ead1 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/threading.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/threading.h @@ -5,28 +5,13 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_THREADING_H #define MBEDTLS_THREADING_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include @@ -34,11 +19,6 @@ extern "C" { #endif -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is deprecated and should not be - * used. */ -/** The selected feature is not available. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x001A - /** Bad input parameters to function. */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x001C /** Locking / unlocking / free failed with error code. */ @@ -47,11 +27,15 @@ extern "C" { #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) #include typedef struct mbedtls_threading_mutex_t { - pthread_mutex_t mutex; - /* is_valid is 0 after a failed init or a free, and nonzero after a - * successful init. This field is not considered part of the public - * API of Mbed TLS and may change without notice. */ - char is_valid; + pthread_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex); + + /* WARNING - state should only be accessed when holding the mutex lock in + * tests/src/threading_helpers.c, otherwise corruption can occur. + * state will be 0 after a failed init or a free, and nonzero after a + * successful init. This field is for testing only and thus not considered + * part of the public API of Mbed TLS and may change without notice.*/ + char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state); + } mbedtls_threading_mutex_t; #endif @@ -116,6 +100,34 @@ extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex; extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex; #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE && !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +/* + * A mutex used to make the PSA subsystem thread safe. + * + * key_slot_mutex protects the registered_readers and + * state variable for all key slots in &global_data.key_slots. + * + * This mutex must be held when any read from or write to a state or + * registered_readers field is performed, i.e. when calling functions: + * psa_key_slot_state_transition(), psa_register_read(), psa_unregister_read(), + * psa_key_slot_has_readers() and psa_wipe_key_slot(). */ +extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex; + +/* + * A mutex used to make the non-rng PSA global_data struct members thread safe. + * + * This mutex must be held when reading or writing to any of the PSA global_data + * structure members, other than the rng_state or rng struct. */ +extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex; + +/* + * A mutex used to make the PSA global_data rng data thread safe. + * + * This mutex must be held when reading or writing to the PSA + * global_data rng_state or rng struct members. */ +extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex; +#endif + #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ #ifdef __cplusplus diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/timing.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/timing.h index 597ef75211..62ae1022d9 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/timing.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/timing.h @@ -5,28 +5,13 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_TIMING_H #define MBEDTLS_TIMING_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include @@ -42,67 +27,25 @@ extern "C" { * \brief timer structure */ struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time { - unsigned char opaque[32]; + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(opaque)[4]; }; /** * \brief Context for mbedtls_timing_set/get_delay() */ typedef struct mbedtls_timing_delay_context { - struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time timer; - uint32_t int_ms; - uint32_t fin_ms; + struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(timer); + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(int_ms); + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(fin_ms); } mbedtls_timing_delay_context; #else /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */ #include "timing_alt.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */ -extern volatile int mbedtls_timing_alarmed; - -/** - * \brief Return the CPU cycle counter value - * - * \warning This is only a best effort! Do not rely on this! - * In particular, it is known to be unreliable on virtual - * machines. - * - * \note This value starts at an unspecified origin and - * may wrap around. - */ -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock(void); - -/** - * \brief Return the elapsed time in milliseconds - * - * \param val points to a timer structure - * \param reset If 0, query the elapsed time. Otherwise (re)start the timer. - * - * \return Elapsed time since the previous reset in ms. When - * restarting, this is always 0. - * - * \note To initialize a timer, call this function with reset=1. - * - * Determining the elapsed time and resetting the timer is not - * atomic on all platforms, so after the sequence - * `{ get_timer(1); ...; time1 = get_timer(1); ...; time2 = - * get_timer(0) }` the value time1+time2 is only approximately - * the delay since the first reset. - */ +/* Internal use */ unsigned long mbedtls_timing_get_timer(struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time *val, int reset); -/** - * \brief Setup an alarm clock - * - * \param seconds delay before the "mbedtls_timing_alarmed" flag is set - * (must be >=0) - * - * \warning Only one alarm at a time is supported. In a threaded - * context, this means one for the whole process, not one per - * thread. - */ -void mbedtls_set_alarm(int seconds); - /** * \brief Set a pair of delays to watch * (See \c mbedtls_timing_get_delay().) @@ -133,14 +76,16 @@ void mbedtls_timing_set_delay(void *data, uint32_t int_ms, uint32_t fin_ms); */ int mbedtls_timing_get_delay(void *data); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /** - * \brief Checkup routine + * \brief Get the final timing delay + * + * \param data Pointer to timing data + * Must point to a valid \c mbedtls_timing_delay_context struct. * - * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if a test failed + * \return Final timing delay in milliseconds. */ -int mbedtls_timing_self_test(int verbose); -#endif +uint32_t mbedtls_timing_get_final_delay( + const mbedtls_timing_delay_context *data); #ifdef __cplusplus } diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h index 4fe37c2224..637f9d38bf 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h @@ -5,49 +5,17 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* - * This set of compile-time defines and run-time variables can be used to - * determine the version number of the Mbed TLS library used. + * This set of run-time variables can be used to determine the version number of + * the Mbed TLS library used. Compile-time version defines for the same can be + * found in build_info.h */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_VERSION_H #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -/** - * The version number x.y.z is split into three parts. - * Major, Minor, Patchlevel - */ -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 2 -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 28 -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 5 - -/** - * The single version number has the following structure: - * MMNNPP00 - * Major version | Minor version | Patch version - */ -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x021C0500 -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.28.5" -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "Mbed TLS 2.28.5" +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) @@ -90,7 +58,7 @@ void mbedtls_version_get_string_full(char *string); * * \note only checks against defines in the sections "System * support", "Mbed TLS modules" and "Mbed TLS feature - * support" in config.h + * support" in mbedtls_config.h * * \param feature The string for the define to check (e.g. "MBEDTLS_AES_C") * diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509.h index f00f3a6679..453f598c74 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509.h @@ -5,28 +5,13 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_H #define MBEDTLS_X509_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #include "mbedtls/pk.h" @@ -151,7 +136,7 @@ /* * X.509 v3 Key Usage Extension flags - * Reminder: update x509_info_key_usage() when adding new flags. + * Reminder: update mbedtls_x509_info_key_usage() when adding new flags. */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE (0x80) /* bit 0 */ #define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION (0x40) /* bit 1 */ @@ -246,6 +231,17 @@ typedef mbedtls_asn1_named_data mbedtls_x509_name; */ typedef mbedtls_asn1_sequence mbedtls_x509_sequence; +/* + * Container for the fields of the Authority Key Identifier object + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_x509_authority { + mbedtls_x509_buf keyIdentifier; + mbedtls_x509_sequence authorityCertIssuer; + mbedtls_x509_buf authorityCertSerialNumber; + mbedtls_x509_buf raw; +} +mbedtls_x509_authority; + /** Container for date and time (precision in seconds). */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_time { int year, mon, day; /**< Date. */ @@ -253,7 +249,65 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_time { } mbedtls_x509_time; +/** + * From RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6: + * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { + * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } + * + * Future versions of the library may add new fields to this structure or + * to its embedded union and structure. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_x509_san_other_name { + /** + * The type_id is an OID as defined in RFC 5280. + * To check the value of the type id, you should use + * \p MBEDTLS_OID_CMP with a known OID mbedtls_x509_buf. + */ + mbedtls_x509_buf type_id; /**< The type id. */ + union { + /** + * From RFC 4108 section 5: + * HardwareModuleName ::= SEQUENCE { + * hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * hwSerialNum OCTET STRING } + */ + struct { + mbedtls_x509_buf oid; /**< The object identifier. */ + mbedtls_x509_buf val; /**< The named value. */ + } + hardware_module_name; + } + value; +} +mbedtls_x509_san_other_name; + +/** + * A structure for holding the parsed Subject Alternative Name, + * according to type. + * + * Future versions of the library may add new fields to this structure or + * to its embedded union and structure. + */ +typedef struct mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name { + int type; /**< The SAN type, value of MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_XXX. */ + union { + mbedtls_x509_san_other_name other_name; + mbedtls_x509_name directory_name; + mbedtls_x509_buf unstructured_name; /**< The buffer for the unstructured types. rfc822Name, dnsName and uniformResourceIdentifier are currently supported. */ + } + san; /**< A union of the supported SAN types */ +} +mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name; + +typedef struct mbedtls_x509_san_list { + mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name node; + struct mbedtls_x509_san_list *next; +} +mbedtls_x509_san_list; + /** \} name Structures for parsing X.509 certificates, CRLs and CSRs */ +/** \} addtogroup x509_module */ /** * \brief Store the certificate DN in printable form into buf; @@ -268,6 +322,43 @@ mbedtls_x509_time; */ int mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_name *dn); +/** + * \brief Convert the certificate DN string \p name into + * a linked list of mbedtls_x509_name (equivalent to + * mbedtls_asn1_named_data). + * + * \note This function allocates a linked list, and places the head + * pointer in \p head. This list must later be freed by a + * call to mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list(). + * + * \param[out] head Address in which to store the pointer to the head of the + * allocated list of mbedtls_x509_name + * \param[in] name The string representation of a DN to convert + * + * \return 0 on success, or a negative error code. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_string_to_names(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *name); + +/** + * \brief Return the next relative DN in an X509 name. + * + * \note Intended use is to compare function result to dn->next + * in order to detect boundaries of multi-valued RDNs. + * + * \param dn Current node in the X509 name + * + * \return Pointer to the first attribute-value pair of the + * next RDN in sequence, or NULL if end is reached. + */ +static inline mbedtls_x509_name *mbedtls_x509_dn_get_next( + mbedtls_x509_name *dn) +{ + while (dn->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next_merged) && dn->next != NULL) { + dn = dn->next; + } + return dn->next; +} + /** * \brief Store the certificate serial in printable form into buf; * no more than size characters will be written. @@ -281,6 +372,31 @@ int mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_name *dn); */ int mbedtls_x509_serial_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *serial); +/** + * \brief Compare pair of mbedtls_x509_time. + * + * \param t1 mbedtls_x509_time to compare + * \param t2 mbedtls_x509_time to compare + * + * \return < 0 if t1 is before t2 + * 0 if t1 equals t2 + * > 0 if t1 is after t2 + */ +int mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(const mbedtls_x509_time *t1, const mbedtls_x509_time *t2); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) +/** + * \brief Fill mbedtls_x509_time with provided mbedtls_time_t. + * + * \param tt mbedtls_time_t to convert + * \param now mbedtls_x509_time to fill with converted mbedtls_time_t + * + * \return \c 0 on success + * \return A non-zero return value on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_time_gmtime(mbedtls_time_t tt, mbedtls_x509_time *now); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ + /** * \brief Check a given mbedtls_x509_time against the system time * and tell if it's in the past. @@ -309,60 +425,63 @@ int mbedtls_x509_time_is_past(const mbedtls_x509_time *to); */ int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future(const mbedtls_x509_time *from); -/** \} addtogroup x509_module */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - /** - * \brief Checkup routine + * \brief This function parses an item in the SubjectAlternativeNames + * extension. Please note that this function might allocate + * additional memory for a subject alternative name, thus + * mbedtls_x509_free_subject_alt_name has to be called + * to dispose of this additional memory afterwards. * - * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed + * \param san_buf The buffer holding the raw data item of the subject + * alternative name. + * \param san The target structure to populate with the parsed presentation + * of the subject alternative name encoded in \p san_buf. + * + * \note Supported GeneralName types, as defined in RFC 5280: + * "rfc822Name", "dnsName", "directoryName", + * "uniformResourceIdentifier" and "hardware_module_name" + * of type "otherName", as defined in RFC 4108. + * + * \note This function should be called on a single raw data of + * subject alternative name. For example, after successful + * certificate parsing, one must iterate on every item in the + * \c crt->subject_alt_names sequence, and pass it to + * this function. + * + * \warning The target structure contains pointers to the raw data of the + * parsed certificate, and its lifetime is restricted by the + * lifetime of the certificate. + * + * \return \c 0 on success + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE for an unsupported + * SAN type. + * \return Another negative value for any other failure. */ -int mbedtls_x509_self_test(int verbose); - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf, + mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san); +/** + * \brief Unallocate all data related to subject alternative name + * + * \param san SAN structure - extra memory owned by this structure will be freed + */ +void mbedtls_x509_free_subject_alt_name(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san); -/* - * Internal module functions. You probably do not want to use these unless you - * know you do. +/** + * \brief This function parses a CN string as an IP address. + * + * \param cn The CN string to parse. CN string MUST be null-terminated. + * \param dst The target buffer to populate with the binary IP address. + * The buffer MUST be 16 bytes to save IPv6, and should be + * 4-byte aligned if the result will be used as struct in_addr. + * e.g. uint32_t dst[4] + * + * \note \p cn is parsed as an IPv6 address if string contains ':', + * else \p cn is parsed as an IPv4 address. + * + * \return Length of binary IP address; num bytes written to target. + * \return \c 0 on failure to parse CN string as an IP address. */ -int mbedtls_x509_get_name(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_name *cur); -int mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_buf *alg); -int mbedtls_x509_get_alg(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_buf *alg, mbedtls_x509_buf *params); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) -int mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params(const mbedtls_x509_buf *params, - mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t *mgf_md, - int *salt_len); -#endif -int mbedtls_x509_get_sig(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *sig); -int mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg(const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_params, - mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg, - void **sig_opts); -int mbedtls_x509_get_time(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_time *t); -int mbedtls_x509_get_serial(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_buf *serial); -int mbedtls_x509_get_ext(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_buf *ext, int tag); -int mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, - mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - const void *sig_opts); -int mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper(char *buf, size_t buf_size, const char *name); -int mbedtls_x509_string_to_names(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *name); -int mbedtls_x509_set_extension(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, - int critical, const unsigned char *val, - size_t val_len); -int mbedtls_x509_write_extensions(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first); -int mbedtls_x509_write_names(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first); -int mbedtls_x509_write_sig(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - const char *oid, size_t oid_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t size, - mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg); +size_t mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_cn_inet_pton(const char *cn, void *dst); #define MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF \ do { \ @@ -377,4 +496,4 @@ int mbedtls_x509_write_sig(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, } #endif -#endif /* x509.h */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crl.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crl.h index 1405021407..6625a44f46 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crl.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crl.h @@ -5,28 +5,13 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_H #define MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/x509.h" @@ -46,16 +31,28 @@ extern "C" { /** * Certificate revocation list entry. * Contains the CA-specific serial numbers and revocation dates. + * + * Some fields of this structure are publicly readable. Do not modify + * them except via Mbed TLS library functions: the effect of modifying + * those fields or the data that those fields points to is unspecified. */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crl_entry { + /** Direct access to the whole entry inside the containing buffer. */ mbedtls_x509_buf raw; - + /** The serial number of the revoked certificate. */ mbedtls_x509_buf serial; - + /** The revocation date of this entry. */ mbedtls_x509_time revocation_date; - + /** Direct access to the list of CRL entry extensions + * (an ASN.1 constructed sequence). + * + * If there are no extensions, `entry_ext.len == 0` and + * `entry_ext.p == NULL`. */ mbedtls_x509_buf entry_ext; + /** Next element in the linked list of entries. + * \p NULL indicates the end of the list. + * Do not modify this field directly. */ struct mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *next; } mbedtls_x509_crl_entry; @@ -82,12 +79,15 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crl { mbedtls_x509_buf crl_ext; - mbedtls_x509_buf sig_oid2; - mbedtls_x509_buf sig; - mbedtls_md_type_t sig_md; /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */ - mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_pk; /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */ - void *sig_opts; /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */ + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_oid2); + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig); + mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_md); /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */ + mbedtls_pk_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_pk); /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_opts); /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */ + /** Next element in the linked list of CRL. + * \p NULL indicates the end of the list. + * Do not modify this field directly. */ struct mbedtls_x509_crl *next; } mbedtls_x509_crl; @@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse(mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const unsigned char *buf, si int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file(mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const char *path); #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) /** * \brief Returns an informational string about the CRL. * @@ -157,6 +158,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file(mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const char *path); */ int mbedtls_x509_crl_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ /** * \brief Initialize a CRL (chain) diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h index bf883e8e96..1ce0d23619 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h @@ -5,28 +5,13 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_H #define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/x509.h" #include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h" @@ -48,10 +33,14 @@ extern "C" { /** * Container for an X.509 certificate. The certificate may be chained. + * + * Some fields of this structure are publicly readable. Do not modify + * them except via Mbed TLS library functions: the effect of modifying + * those fields or the data that those fields points to is unspecified. */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crt { - int own_buffer; /**< Indicates if \c raw is owned - * by the structure or not. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(own_buffer); /**< Indicates if \c raw is owned + * by the structure or not. */ mbedtls_x509_buf raw; /**< The raw certificate data (DER). */ mbedtls_x509_buf tbs; /**< The raw certificate body (DER). The part that is To Be Signed. */ @@ -74,72 +63,34 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crt { mbedtls_x509_buf issuer_id; /**< Optional X.509 v2/v3 issuer unique identifier. */ mbedtls_x509_buf subject_id; /**< Optional X.509 v2/v3 subject unique identifier. */ mbedtls_x509_buf v3_ext; /**< Optional X.509 v3 extensions. */ - mbedtls_x509_sequence subject_alt_names; /**< Optional list of raw entries of Subject Alternative Names extension (currently only dNSName and OtherName are listed). */ + mbedtls_x509_sequence subject_alt_names; /**< Optional list of raw entries of Subject Alternative Names extension. These can be later parsed by mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name. */ + mbedtls_x509_buf subject_key_id; /**< Optional X.509 v3 extension subject key identifier. */ + mbedtls_x509_authority authority_key_id; /**< Optional X.509 v3 extension authority key identifier. */ mbedtls_x509_sequence certificate_policies; /**< Optional list of certificate policies (Only anyPolicy is printed and enforced, however the rest of the policies are still listed). */ - int ext_types; /**< Bit string containing detected and parsed extensions */ - int ca_istrue; /**< Optional Basic Constraint extension value: 1 if this certificate belongs to a CA, 0 otherwise. */ - int max_pathlen; /**< Optional Basic Constraint extension value: The maximum path length to the root certificate. Path length is 1 higher than RFC 5280 'meaning', so 1+ */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ext_types); /**< Bit string containing detected and parsed extensions */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ca_istrue); /**< Optional Basic Constraint extension value: 1 if this certificate belongs to a CA, 0 otherwise. */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_pathlen); /**< Optional Basic Constraint extension value: The maximum path length to the root certificate. Path length is 1 higher than RFC 5280 'meaning', so 1+ */ - unsigned int key_usage; /**< Optional key usage extension value: See the values in x509.h */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_usage); /**< Optional key usage extension value: See the values in x509.h */ mbedtls_x509_sequence ext_key_usage; /**< Optional list of extended key usage OIDs. */ - unsigned char ns_cert_type; /**< Optional Netscape certificate type extension value: See the values in x509.h */ + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ns_cert_type); /**< Optional Netscape certificate type extension value: See the values in x509.h */ - mbedtls_x509_buf sig; /**< Signature: hash of the tbs part signed with the private key. */ - mbedtls_md_type_t sig_md; /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */ - mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_pk; /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */ - void *sig_opts; /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */ + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig); /**< Signature: hash of the tbs part signed with the private key. */ + mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_md); /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */ + mbedtls_pk_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_pk); /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_opts); /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */ - struct mbedtls_x509_crt *next; /**< Next certificate in the CA-chain. */ + /** Next certificate in the linked list that constitutes the CA chain. + * \p NULL indicates the end of the list. + * Do not modify this field directly. */ + struct mbedtls_x509_crt *next; } mbedtls_x509_crt; -/** - * From RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6: - * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { - * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, - * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } - */ -typedef struct mbedtls_x509_san_other_name { - /** - * The type_id is an OID as defined in RFC 5280. - * To check the value of the type id, you should use - * \p MBEDTLS_OID_CMP with a known OID mbedtls_x509_buf. - */ - mbedtls_x509_buf type_id; /**< The type id. */ - union { - /** - * From RFC 4108 section 5: - * HardwareModuleName ::= SEQUENCE { - * hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, - * hwSerialNum OCTET STRING } - */ - struct { - mbedtls_x509_buf oid; /**< The object identifier. */ - mbedtls_x509_buf val; /**< The named value. */ - } - hardware_module_name; - } - value; -} -mbedtls_x509_san_other_name; - -/** - * A structure for holding the parsed Subject Alternative Name, according to type - */ -typedef struct mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name { - int type; /**< The SAN type, value of MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_XXX. */ - union { - mbedtls_x509_san_other_name other_name; /**< The otherName supported type. */ - mbedtls_x509_buf unstructured_name; /**< The buffer for the un constructed types. Only dnsName currently supported */ - } - san; /**< A union of the supported SAN types */ -} -mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name; - /** * Build flag from an algorithm/curve identifier (pk, md, ecp) * Since 0 is always XXX_NONE, ignore it. @@ -150,6 +101,26 @@ mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name; * Security profile for certificate verification. * * All lists are bitfields, built by ORing flags from MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(). + * + * The fields of this structure are part of the public API and can be + * manipulated directly by applications. Future versions of the library may + * add extra fields or reorder existing fields. + * + * You can create custom profiles by starting from a copy of + * an existing profile, such as mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default or + * mbedtls_x509_ctr_profile_none and then tune it to your needs. + * + * For example to allow SHA-224 in addition to the default: + * + * mbedtls_x509_crt_profile my_profile = mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default; + * my_profile.allowed_mds |= MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 ); + * + * Or to allow only RSA-3072+ with SHA-256: + * + * mbedtls_x509_crt_profile my_profile = mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_none; + * my_profile.allowed_mds = MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ); + * my_profile.allowed_pks = MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ); + * my_profile.rsa_min_bitlen = 3072; */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crt_profile { uint32_t allowed_mds; /**< MDs for signatures */ @@ -165,36 +136,120 @@ mbedtls_x509_crt_profile; #define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_2 1 #define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3 2 -#define MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN 32 +#define MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN 20 #define MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN 15 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN) #define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN 512 #endif +/* This macro unfolds to the concatenation of macro invocations + * X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO( error code, + * error code as string, + * human readable description ) + * where X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO is defined by the user. + * See x509_crt.c for an example of how to use this. */ +#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO_LIST \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED", \ + "The certificate validity has expired") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED", \ + "The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL)") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH", \ + "The certificate Common Name (CN) does not match with the expected CN") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED", \ + "The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED", \ + "The CRL is not correctly signed by the trusted CA") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED", \ + "The CRL is expired") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING", \ + "Certificate was missing") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY", \ + "Certificate verification was skipped") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER", \ + "Other reason (can be used by verify callback)") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE", \ + "The certificate validity starts in the future") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE", \ + "The CRL is from the future") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE", \ + "Usage does not match the keyUsage extension") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE", \ + "Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE", \ + "Usage does not match the nsCertType extension") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD", \ + "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable hash.") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK", \ + "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA).") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY", \ + "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short).") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD", \ + "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable hash.") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK", \ + "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA).") \ + X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_KEY, \ + "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_KEY", \ + "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short).") + /** * Container for writing a certificate (CRT) */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509write_cert { - int version; - mbedtls_mpi serial; - mbedtls_pk_context *subject_key; - mbedtls_pk_context *issuer_key; - mbedtls_asn1_named_data *subject; - mbedtls_asn1_named_data *issuer; - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; - char not_before[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN + 1]; - char not_after[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN + 1]; - mbedtls_asn1_named_data *extensions; + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(version); + unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(serial)[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN]; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(serial_len); + mbedtls_pk_context *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(subject_key); + mbedtls_pk_context *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(issuer_key); + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(subject); + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(issuer); + mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_alg); + char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(not_before)[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN + 1]; + char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(not_after)[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN + 1]; + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(extensions); } mbedtls_x509write_cert; +/** + * \brief Set Subject Alternative Name + * + * \param ctx Certificate context to use + * \param san_list List of SAN values + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED + * + * \note "dnsName", "uniformResourceIdentifier", "IP address", + * "otherName", and "DirectoryName", as defined in RFC 5280, + * are supported. + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_alternative_name(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const mbedtls_x509_san_list *san_list); + /** * Item in a verification chain: cert and flags for it */ typedef struct { - mbedtls_x509_crt *crt; - uint32_t flags; + mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(crt); + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(flags); } mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item; /** @@ -206,15 +261,15 @@ typedef struct { * Verification chain as built by \c mbedtls_crt_verify_chain() */ typedef struct { - mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item items[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE]; - unsigned len; + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(items)[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE]; + unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(len); #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) /* This stores the list of potential trusted signers obtained from * the CA callback used for the CRT verification, if configured. * We must track it somewhere because the callback passes its * ownership to the caller. */ - mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca_cb_result; + mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(trust_ca_cb_result); #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ } mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain; @@ -225,23 +280,23 @@ typedef struct { */ typedef struct { /* for check_signature() */ - mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx pk; + mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk); /* for find_parent_in() */ - mbedtls_x509_crt *parent; /* non-null iff parent_in in progress */ - mbedtls_x509_crt *fallback_parent; - int fallback_signature_is_good; + mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(parent); /* non-null iff parent_in in progress */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(fallback_parent); + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(fallback_signature_is_good); /* for find_parent() */ - int parent_is_trusted; /* -1 if find_parent is not in progress */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(parent_is_trusted); /* -1 if find_parent is not in progress */ /* for verify_chain() */ enum { x509_crt_rs_none, x509_crt_rs_find_parent, - } in_progress; /* none if no operation is in progress */ - int self_cnt; - mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain ver_chain; + } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_progress); /* none if no operation is in progress */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(self_cnt); + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ver_chain); } mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx; @@ -258,12 +313,12 @@ typedef void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx; * and compatibility with current deployments. * * This profile permits: - * - SHA2 hashes. - * - All supported elliptic curves. + * - SHA2 hashes with at least 256 bits: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512. + * - Elliptic curves with 255 bits and above except secp256k1. * - RSA with 2048 bits and above. * * New minor versions of Mbed TLS may extend this profile, for example if - * new curves are added to the library. New minor versions of Mbed TLS will + * new algorithms are added to the library. New minor versions of Mbed TLS will * not reduce this profile unless serious security concerns require it. */ extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default; @@ -271,6 +326,7 @@ extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default; /** * Expected next default profile. Recommended for new deployments. * Currently targets a 128-bit security level, except for allowing RSA-2048. + * This profile may change at any time. */ extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next; @@ -279,6 +335,12 @@ extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next; */ extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb; +/** + * Empty profile that allows nothing. Useful as a basis for constructing + * custom profiles. + */ +extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_none; + /** * \brief Parse a single DER formatted certificate and add it * to the end of the provided chained list. @@ -412,7 +474,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, * mbedtls_x509_crt_init(). * \param buf The address of the readable buffer holding the DER encoded * certificate to use. On success, this buffer must be - * retained and not be changed for the liftetime of the + * retained and not be changed for the lifetime of the * CRT chain \p chain, that is, until \p chain is destroyed * through a call to mbedtls_x509_crt_free(). * \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buf. @@ -502,35 +564,8 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path); int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path); #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ -/** - * \brief This function parses an item in the SubjectAlternativeNames - * extension. - * - * \param san_buf The buffer holding the raw data item of the subject - * alternative name. - * \param san The target structure to populate with the parsed presentation - * of the subject alternative name encoded in \p san_buf. - * - * \note Only "dnsName" and "otherName" of type hardware_module_name - * as defined in RFC 4180 is supported. - * - * \note This function should be called on a single raw data of - * subject alternative name. For example, after successful - * certificate parsing, one must iterate on every item in the - * \c crt->subject_alt_names sequence, and pass it to - * this function. - * - * \warning The target structure contains pointers to the raw data of the - * parsed certificate, and its lifetime is restricted by the - * lifetime of the certificate. - * - * \return \c 0 on success - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE for an unsupported - * SAN type. - * \return Another negative value for any other failure. - */ -int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf, - mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) /** * \brief Returns an informational string about the * certificate. @@ -560,6 +595,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, */ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, uint32_t flags); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ /** * \brief Verify a chain of certificates. @@ -608,8 +644,12 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, * \param cn The expected Common Name. This will be checked to be * present in the certificate's subjectAltNames extension or, * if this extension is absent, as a CN component in its - * Subject name. Currently only DNS names are supported. This - * may be \c NULL if the CN need not be verified. + * Subject name. DNS names and IP addresses are fully + * supported, while the URI subtype is partially supported: + * only exact matching, without any normalization procedures + * described in 7.4 of RFC5280, will result in a positive + * URI verification. + * This may be \c NULL if the CN need not be verified. * \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification. * If the verification couldn't be completed, the flag value is * set to (uint32_t) -1. @@ -778,7 +818,6 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) /** * \brief Check usage of certificate against keyUsage extension. * @@ -802,9 +841,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, */ int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, unsigned int usage); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) /** * \brief Check usage of certificate against extendedKeyUsage. * @@ -821,7 +858,6 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const char *usage_oid, size_t usage_len); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) /** @@ -863,6 +899,35 @@ void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free(mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +/** + * \brief Query certificate for given extension type + * + * \param[in] ctx Certificate context to be queried, must not be \c NULL + * \param ext_type Extension type being queried for, must be a valid + * extension type. Must be one of the MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_XXX + * values + * + * \return 0 if the given extension type is not present, + * non-zero otherwise + */ +static inline int mbedtls_x509_crt_has_ext_type(const mbedtls_x509_crt *ctx, + int ext_type) +{ + return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ext_types) & ext_type; +} + +/** + * \brief Access the ca_istrue field + * + * \param[in] crt Certificate to be queried, must not be \c NULL + * + * \return \c 1 if this a CA certificate \c 0 otherwise. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS if the certificate does not contain + * the Optional Basic Constraint extension. + * + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_get_ca_istrue(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt); + /** \} name Structures and functions for parsing and writing X.509 certificates */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C) @@ -883,15 +948,43 @@ void mbedtls_x509write_crt_init(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx); */ void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_version(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, int version); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) /** * \brief Set the serial number for a Certificate. * + * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a + * future version of the library. Please use + * mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial_raw() instead. + * + * \note Even though the MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C guard looks redundant since + * X509 depends on PK and PK depends on BIGNUM, this emphasizes + * a direct dependency between X509 and BIGNUM which is going + * to be deprecated in the future. + * * \param ctx CRT context to use * \param serial serial number to set * * \return 0 if successful */ -int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *serial); +int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial( + mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *serial); +#endif // MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED + +/** + * \brief Set the serial number for a Certificate. + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * \param serial A raw array of bytes containing the serial number in big + * endian format + * \param serial_len Length of valid bytes (expressed in bytes) in \p serial + * input buffer + * + * \return 0 if successful, or + * MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the provided input buffer + * is too big (longer than MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN) + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial_raw(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + unsigned char *serial, size_t serial_len); /** * \brief Set the validity period for a Certificate @@ -997,7 +1090,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, int is_ca, int max_pathlen); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) /** * \brief Set the subjectKeyIdentifier extension for a CRT * Requires that mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key() has been @@ -1019,7 +1112,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED */ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ /** * \brief Set the Key Usage Extension flags @@ -1033,6 +1126,19 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier(mbedtls_x509write_cert *c int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned int key_usage); +/** + * \brief Set the Extended Key Usage Extension + * (e.g. MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH) + * + * \param ctx CRT context to use + * \param exts extended key usage extensions to set, a sequence of + * MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID objects + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ext_key_usage(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const mbedtls_asn1_sequence *exts); + /** * \brief Set the Netscape Cert Type flags * (e.g. MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT | MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL) @@ -1061,16 +1167,13 @@ void mbedtls_x509write_crt_free(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx); * \param ctx certificate to write away * \param buf buffer to write to * \param size size of the buffer - * \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note) + * \param f_rng RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng RNG parameter * * \return length of data written if successful, or a specific * error code * - * \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the - * signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable - * for countermeasures against timing attacks). - * ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng. + * \note \p f_rng is used for the signature operation. */ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), @@ -1083,15 +1186,12 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char *buf, s * \param ctx certificate to write away * \param buf buffer to write to * \param size size of the buffer - * \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note) + * \param f_rng RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng RNG parameter * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code * - * \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the - * signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable - * for countermeasures against timing attacks). - * ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng. + * \note \p f_rng is used for the signature operation. */ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_pem(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h index 6daf57b662..8c31c09af4 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h @@ -5,28 +5,13 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_H #define MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/x509.h" @@ -45,6 +30,10 @@ extern "C" { /** * Certificate Signing Request (CSR) structure. + * + * Some fields of this structure are publicly readable. Do not modify + * them except via Mbed TLS library functions: the effect of modifying + * those fields or the data that those fields point to is unspecified. */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_csr { mbedtls_x509_buf raw; /**< The raw CSR data (DER). */ @@ -57,11 +46,17 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_csr { mbedtls_pk_context pk; /**< Container for the public key context. */ + unsigned int key_usage; /**< Optional key usage extension value: See the values in x509.h */ + unsigned char ns_cert_type; /**< Optional Netscape certificate type extension value: See the values in x509.h */ + mbedtls_x509_sequence subject_alt_names; /**< Optional list of raw entries of Subject Alternative Names extension. These can be later parsed by mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name. */ + + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ext_types); /**< Bit string containing detected and parsed extensions */ + mbedtls_x509_buf sig_oid; - mbedtls_x509_buf sig; - mbedtls_md_type_t sig_md; /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */ - mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_pk; /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */ - void *sig_opts; /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */ + mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig); + mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_md); /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */ + mbedtls_pk_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_pk); /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */ + void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_opts); /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */ } mbedtls_x509_csr; @@ -69,10 +64,10 @@ mbedtls_x509_csr; * Container for writing a CSR */ typedef struct mbedtls_x509write_csr { - mbedtls_pk_context *key; - mbedtls_asn1_named_data *subject; - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; - mbedtls_asn1_named_data *extensions; + mbedtls_pk_context *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key); + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(subject); + mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_alg); + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(extensions); } mbedtls_x509write_csr; @@ -80,7 +75,9 @@ mbedtls_x509write_csr; /** * \brief Load a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) in DER format * - * \note CSR attributes (if any) are currently silently ignored. + * \note Any unsupported requested extensions are silently + * ignored, unless the critical flag is set, in which case + * the CSR is rejected. * * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto * subsystem must have been initialized by calling @@ -95,6 +92,67 @@ mbedtls_x509write_csr; int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen); +/** + * \brief The type of certificate extension callbacks. + * + * Callbacks of this type are passed to and used by the + * mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der_with_ext_cb() routine when + * it encounters either an unsupported extension. + * Future versions of the library may invoke the callback + * in other cases, if and when the need arises. + * + * \param p_ctx An opaque context passed to the callback. + * \param csr The CSR being parsed. + * \param oid The OID of the extension. + * \param critical Whether the extension is critical. + * \param p Pointer to the start of the extension value + * (the content of the OCTET STRING). + * \param end End of extension value. + * + * \note The callback must fail and return a negative error code + * if it can not parse or does not support the extension. + * When the callback fails to parse a critical extension + * mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der_with_ext_cb() also fails. + * When the callback fails to parse a non critical extension + * mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der_with_ext_cb() simply skips + * the extension and continues parsing. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +typedef int (*mbedtls_x509_csr_ext_cb_t)(void *p_ctx, + mbedtls_x509_csr const *csr, + mbedtls_x509_buf const *oid, + int critical, + const unsigned char *p, + const unsigned char *end); + +/** + * \brief Load a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) in DER format + * + * \note Any unsupported requested extensions are silently + * ignored, unless the critical flag is set, in which case + * the result of the callback function decides whether + * CSR is rejected. + * + * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto + * subsystem must have been initialized by calling + * psa_crypto_init() before calling this function. + * + * \param csr CSR context to fill + * \param buf buffer holding the CRL data + * \param buflen size of the buffer + * \param cb A callback invoked for every unsupported certificate + * extension. + * \param p_ctx An opaque context passed to the callback. + * + * \return 0 if successful, or a specific X509 error code + */ +int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der_with_ext_cb(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, + mbedtls_x509_csr_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx); + /** * \brief Load a Certificate Signing Request (CSR), DER or PEM format * @@ -127,6 +185,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const unsigned char *buf, size int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const char *path); #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) /** * \brief Returns an informational string about the * CSR. @@ -141,6 +200,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const char *path); */ int mbedtls_x509_csr_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, const mbedtls_x509_csr *csr); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ /** * \brief Initialize a CSR @@ -219,6 +279,20 @@ void mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_md_alg(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, mbedtls_md_typ */ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char key_usage); +/** + * \brief Set Subject Alternative Name + * + * \param ctx CSR context to use + * \param san_list List of SAN values + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED + * + * \note Only "dnsName", "uniformResourceIdentifier" and "otherName", + * as defined in RFC 5280, are supported. + */ +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_alternative_name(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, + const mbedtls_x509_san_list *san_list); + /** * \brief Set the Netscape Cert Type flags * (e.g. MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT | MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL) @@ -238,6 +312,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, * \param ctx CSR context to use * \param oid OID of the extension * \param oid_len length of the OID + * \param critical Set to 1 to mark the extension as critical, 0 otherwise. * \param val value of the extension OCTET STRING * \param val_len length of the value data * @@ -245,6 +320,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, */ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + int critical, const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len); /** @@ -264,16 +340,13 @@ void mbedtls_x509write_csr_free(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx); * \param ctx CSR to write away * \param buf buffer to write to * \param size size of the buffer - * \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note) + * \param f_rng RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng RNG parameter * * \return length of data written if successful, or a specific * error code * - * \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the - * signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable - * for countermeasures against timing attacks). - * ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng. + * \note \p f_rng is used for the signature operation. */ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_der(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), @@ -287,15 +360,12 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_der(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, si * \param ctx CSR to write away * \param buf buffer to write to * \param size size of the buffer - * \param f_rng RNG function (for signature, see note) + * \param f_rng RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. * \param p_rng RNG parameter * * \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code * - * \note f_rng may be NULL if RSA is used for signature and the - * signature is made offline (otherwise f_rng is desirable - * for countermeasures against timing attacks). - * ECDSA signatures always require a non-NULL f_rng. + * \note \p f_rng is used for the signature operation. */ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_pem(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/xtea.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/xtea.h deleted file mode 100644 index 9b12a1bb52..0000000000 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/xtea.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,138 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file xtea.h - * - * \brief XTEA block cipher (32-bit) - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_XTEA_H -#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_H - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#include -#include - -#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT 1 -#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT 0 - -/** The data input has an invalid length. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0028 - -/* MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */ -/** XTEA hardware accelerator failed. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0029 - -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT) -// Regular implementation -// - -/** - * \brief XTEA context structure - */ -typedef struct mbedtls_xtea_context { - uint32_t k[4]; /*!< key */ -} -mbedtls_xtea_context; - -#else /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT */ -#include "xtea_alt.h" -#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT */ - -/** - * \brief Initialize XTEA context - * - * \param ctx XTEA context to be initialized - */ -void mbedtls_xtea_init(mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief Clear XTEA context - * - * \param ctx XTEA context to be cleared - */ -void mbedtls_xtea_free(mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx); - -/** - * \brief XTEA key schedule - * - * \param ctx XTEA context to be initialized - * \param key the secret key - */ -void mbedtls_xtea_setup(mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[16]); - -/** - * \brief XTEA cipher function - * - * \param ctx XTEA context - * \param mode MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT - * \param input 8-byte input block - * \param output 8-byte output block - * - * \return 0 if successful - */ -int mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, - int mode, - const unsigned char input[8], - unsigned char output[8]); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -/** - * \brief XTEA CBC cipher function - * - * \param ctx XTEA context - * \param mode MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT - * \param length the length of input, multiple of 8 - * \param iv initialization vector for CBC mode - * \param input input block - * \param output output block - * - * \return 0 if successful, - * MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH if the length % 8 != 0 - */ -int mbedtls_xtea_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, - int mode, - size_t length, - unsigned char iv[8], - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - -/** - * \brief Checkup routine - * - * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed - */ -int mbedtls_xtea_self_test(int verbose); - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif - -#endif /* xtea.h */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/build_info.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/build_info.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3ee6cd7b1b --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/build_info.h @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +/** + * \file psa/build_info.h + * + * \brief Build-time PSA configuration info + * + * Include this file if you need to depend on the + * configuration options defined in mbedtls_config.h or MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE + * in PSA cryptography core specific files. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_BUILD_INFO_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_BUILD_INFO_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_BUILD_INFO_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto.h index 3c1c109a94..7083bd911b 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto.h @@ -4,25 +4,17 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_H #define PSA_CRYPTO_H +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_FILE) +#include MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_FILE +#else #include "crypto_platform.h" +#endif #include @@ -112,12 +104,6 @@ psa_status_t psa_crypto_init(void); * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a key attribute structure * of type #psa_key_attributes_t. */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ -/* This is an example definition for documentation purposes. - * Implementations should define a suitable value in `crypto_struct.h`. - */ -#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT { 0 } -#endif /** Return an initial value for a key attributes structure. */ @@ -133,8 +119,9 @@ static psa_key_attributes_t psa_key_attributes_init(void); * value in the structure. * The persistent key will be written to storage when the attribute * structure is passed to a key creation function such as - * psa_import_key(), psa_generate_key(), - * psa_key_derivation_output_key() or psa_copy_key(). + * psa_import_key(), psa_generate_key(), psa_generate_key_ext(), + * psa_key_derivation_output_key(), psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext() + * or psa_copy_key(). * * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, @@ -177,8 +164,9 @@ static void mbedtls_set_key_owner_id(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, * value in the structure. * The persistent key will be written to storage when the attribute * structure is passed to a key creation function such as - * psa_import_key(), psa_generate_key(), - * psa_key_derivation_output_key() or psa_copy_key(). + * psa_import_key(), psa_generate_key(), psa_generate_key_ext(), + * psa_key_derivation_output_key(), psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext() + * or psa_copy_key(). * * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro, @@ -531,7 +519,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_copy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t source_key, * * This function destroys a key from both volatile * memory and, if applicable, non-volatile storage. Implementations shall - * make a best effort to ensure that that the key material cannot be recovered. + * make a best effort to ensure that the key material cannot be recovered. * * This function also erases any metadata such as policies and frees * resources associated with the key. @@ -539,6 +527,11 @@ psa_status_t psa_copy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t source_key, * If a key is currently in use in a multipart operation, then destroying the * key will cause the multipart operation to fail. * + * \warning We can only guarantee that the the key material will + * eventually be wiped from memory. With threading enabled + * and during concurrent execution, copies of the key material may + * still exist until all threads have finished using the key. + * * \param key Identifier of the key to erase. If this is \c 0, do nothing and * return #PSA_SUCCESS. * @@ -931,8 +924,8 @@ psa_status_t psa_hash_compare(psa_algorithm_t alg, * \endcode * * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not - * make any assumptions about the content of this structure except - * as directed by the documentation of a specific implementation. */ + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure. + * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */ typedef struct psa_hash_operation_s psa_hash_operation_t; /** \def PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT @@ -940,12 +933,6 @@ typedef struct psa_hash_operation_s psa_hash_operation_t; * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a hash operation object * of type #psa_hash_operation_t. */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ -/* This is an example definition for documentation purposes. - * Implementations should define a suitable value in `crypto_struct.h`. - */ -#define PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } -#endif /** Return an initial value for a hash operation object. */ @@ -1294,9 +1281,10 @@ psa_status_t psa_mac_verify(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, * operation = psa_mac_operation_init(); * \endcode * + * * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not - * make any assumptions about the content of this structure except - * as directed by the documentation of a specific implementation. */ + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure. + * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */ typedef struct psa_mac_operation_s psa_mac_operation_t; /** \def PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT @@ -1304,12 +1292,6 @@ typedef struct psa_mac_operation_s psa_mac_operation_t; * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a MAC operation object of type * #psa_mac_operation_t. */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ -/* This is an example definition for documentation purposes. - * Implementations should define a suitable value in `crypto_struct.h`. - */ -#define PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } -#endif /** Return an initial value for a MAC operation object. */ @@ -1714,8 +1696,8 @@ psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, * \endcode * * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not - * make any assumptions about the content of this structure except - * as directed by the documentation of a specific implementation. */ + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure. + * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */ typedef struct psa_cipher_operation_s psa_cipher_operation_t; /** \def PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT @@ -1723,12 +1705,6 @@ typedef struct psa_cipher_operation_s psa_cipher_operation_t; * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a cipher operation object of * type #psa_cipher_operation_t. */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ -/* This is an example definition for documentation purposes. - * Implementations should define a suitable value in `crypto_struct.h`. - */ -#define PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } -#endif /** Return an initial value for a cipher operation object. */ @@ -2238,8 +2214,8 @@ psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, * \endcode * * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not - * make any assumptions about the content of this structure except - * as directed by the documentation of a specific implementation. */ + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure. + * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */ typedef struct psa_aead_operation_s psa_aead_operation_t; /** \def PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT @@ -2247,12 +2223,6 @@ typedef struct psa_aead_operation_s psa_aead_operation_t; * This macro returns a suitable initializer for an AEAD operation object of * type #psa_aead_operation_t. */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ -/* This is an example definition for documentation purposes. - * Implementations should define a suitable value in `crypto_struct.h`. - */ -#define PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } -#endif /** Return an initial value for an AEAD operation object. */ @@ -2861,7 +2831,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_aead_abort(psa_aead_operation_t *operation); * * \note To perform a multi-part hash-and-sign signature algorithm, first use * a multi-part hash operation and then pass the resulting hash to - * psa_sign_hash(). PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(\p alg) can be used to determine the + * psa_sign_hash(). PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(\p alg) can be used to determine the * hash algorithm to use. * * \param[in] key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. @@ -2927,7 +2897,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_sign_message(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, * \note To perform a multi-part hash-and-sign signature verification * algorithm, first use a multi-part hash operation to hash the message * and then pass the resulting hash to psa_verify_hash(). - * PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(\p alg) can be used to determine the hash algorithm + * PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(\p alg) can be used to determine the hash algorithm * to use. * * \param[in] key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. @@ -3230,8 +3200,8 @@ psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, * \endcode * * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not - * make any assumptions about the content of this structure except - * as directed by the documentation of a specific implementation. + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure. + * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */ typedef struct psa_key_derivation_s psa_key_derivation_operation_t; @@ -3240,12 +3210,6 @@ typedef struct psa_key_derivation_s psa_key_derivation_operation_t; * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a key derivation operation * object of type #psa_key_derivation_operation_t. */ -#ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ -/* This is an example definition for documentation purposes. - * Implementations should define a suitable value in `crypto_struct.h`. - */ -#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } -#endif /** Return an initial value for a key derivation operation object. */ @@ -3269,7 +3233,8 @@ static psa_key_derivation_operation_t psa_key_derivation_operation_init(void); * psa_key_derivation_set_capacity(). You may do this before, in the middle * of or after providing inputs. For some algorithms, this step is mandatory * because the output depends on the maximum capacity. - * -# To derive a key, call psa_key_derivation_output_key(). + * -# To derive a key, call psa_key_derivation_output_key() or + * psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext(). * To derive a byte string for a different purpose, call * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(). * Successive calls to these functions use successive output bytes @@ -3419,6 +3384,48 @@ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length); +/** Provide a numeric input for key derivation or key agreement. + * + * Which inputs are required and in what order depends on the algorithm. + * However, when an algorithm requires a particular order, numeric inputs + * usually come first as they tend to be configuration parameters. + * Refer to the documentation of each key derivation or key agreement + * algorithm for information. + * + * This function is used for inputs which are fixed-size non-negative + * integers. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to use. + * It must have been set up with + * psa_key_derivation_setup() and must not + * have produced any output yet. + * \param step Which step the input data is for. + * \param[in] value The value of the numeric input. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm, or + * \c step does not allow numeric inputs. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid for this input \p step, or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_integer( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + uint64_t value); + /** Provide an input for key derivation in the form of a key. * * Which inputs are required and in what order depends on the algorithm. @@ -3443,12 +3450,30 @@ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( * \param step Which step the input data is for. * \param key Identifier of the key. It must have an * appropriate type for step and must allow the - * usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE. + * usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE or + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION (see note) + * and the algorithm used by the operation. + * + * \note Once all inputs steps are completed, the operations will allow: + * - psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() if each input was either a direct input + * or a key with #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE set; + * - psa_key_derivation_output_key() or psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext() + * if the input for step + * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET or #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD + * was from a key slot with #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE and each other input was + * either a direct input or a key with #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE set; + * - psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() if each input was either a direct input + * or a key with #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION set; + * - psa_key_derivation_verify_key() under the same conditions as + * psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes(). * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Success. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription - * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The key allows neither #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE nor + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION, or it doesn't allow this + * algorithm. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * \c step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm, or * \c step does not allow key inputs of the given type @@ -3557,6 +3582,9 @@ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_key_agreement( * \param output_length Number of bytes to output. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * One of the inputs was a key whose policy didn't allow + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA * The operation's capacity was less than * \p output_length bytes. Note that in this case, @@ -3613,11 +3641,11 @@ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( * The following key types defined in this specification follow this scheme: * * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; - * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4; * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE; - * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC. + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC; + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH. * * - For ECC keys on a Montgomery elliptic curve * (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(\c curve) where \c curve designates a @@ -3678,7 +3706,16 @@ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( * Future versions of this specification may include additional restrictions * on the derived key based on the attributes and strength of the secret key. * + * \note This function is equivalent to calling + * psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext() + * with the production parameters #PSA_KEY_PRODUCTION_PARAMETERS_INIT + * and `params_data_length == 0` (i.e. `params->data` is empty). + * * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key. + * If the key type to be created is + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH then the algorithm in + * the policy must be the same as in the current + * operation. * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from. * \param[out] key On success, an identifier for the newly created * key. For persistent keys, this is the key @@ -3703,8 +3740,10 @@ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT * The provided key attributes are not valid for the operation. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED - * The #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET input was not provided through - * a key. + * The #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET or + * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input was not provided through a + * key; or one of the inputs was a key whose policy didn't allow + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription @@ -3725,6 +3764,205 @@ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_key( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key); +/** Derive a key from an ongoing key derivation operation with custom + * production parameters. + * + * See the description of psa_key_derivation_out_key() for the operation of + * this function with the default production parameters. + * Mbed TLS currently does not currently support any non-default production + * parameters. + * + * \note This function is experimental and may change in future minor + * versions of Mbed TLS. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key. + * If the key type to be created is + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH then the algorithm in + * the policy must be the same as in the current + * operation. + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from. + * \param[in] params Customization parameters for the key derivation. + * When this is #PSA_KEY_PRODUCTION_PARAMETERS_INIT + * with \p params_data_length = 0, + * this function is equivalent to + * psa_key_derivation_output_key(). + * Mbed TLS currently only supports the default + * production parameters, i.e. + * #PSA_KEY_PRODUCTION_PARAMETERS_INIT, + * for all key types. + * \param params_data_length + * Length of `params->data` in bytes. + * \param[out] key On success, an identifier for the newly created + * key. For persistent keys, this is the key + * identifier defined in \p attributes. + * \c 0 on failure. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata + * have been saved to persistent storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is + * already a persistent key with the given identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA + * There was not enough data to create the desired key. + * Note that in this case, no output is written to the output buffer. + * The operation's capacity is set to 0, thus subsequent calls to + * this function will not succeed, even with a smaller output buffer. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The key type or key size is not supported, either by the + * implementation in general or in this particular location. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The provided key attributes are not valid for the operation. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET or + * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input was not provided through a + * key; or one of the inputs was a key whose policy didn't allow + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed + * all required input steps), or the library has not been previously + * initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, + size_t params_data_length, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key); + +/** Compare output data from a key derivation operation to an expected value. + * + * This function calculates output bytes from a key derivation algorithm and + * compares those bytes to an expected value in constant time. + * If you view the key derivation's output as a stream of bytes, this + * function destructively reads the expected number of bytes from the + * stream before comparing them. + * The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes read. + * + * This is functionally equivalent to the following code: + * \code + * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(operation, tmp, output_length); + * if (memcmp(output, tmp, output_length) != 0) + * return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + * \endcode + * except (1) it works even if the key's policy does not allow outputting the + * bytes, and (2) the comparison will be done in constant time. + * + * If this function returns an error status other than + * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA or #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE, + * the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling + * psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from. + * \param[in] expected_output Buffer containing the expected derivation output. + * \param output_length Length of the expected output; this is also the + * number of bytes that will be read. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The output was read successfully, but it differs from the expected + * output. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * One of the inputs was a key whose policy didn't allow + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA + * The operation's capacity was less than + * \p output_length bytes. Note that in this case, + * the operation's capacity is set to 0, thus + * subsequent calls to this function will not + * succeed, even with a smaller expected output. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed + * all required input steps), or the library has not been previously + * initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *expected_output, + size_t output_length); + +/** Compare output data from a key derivation operation to an expected value + * stored in a key object. + * + * This function calculates output bytes from a key derivation algorithm and + * compares those bytes to an expected value, provided as key of type + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH. + * If you view the key derivation's output as a stream of bytes, this + * function destructively reads the number of bytes corresponding to the + * length of the expected value from the stream before comparing them. + * The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes read. + * + * This is functionally equivalent to exporting the key and calling + * psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() on the result, except that it + * works even if the key cannot be exported. + * + * If this function returns an error status other than + * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA or #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE, + * the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling + * psa_key_derivation_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from. + * \param[in] expected A key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH + * containing the expected output. Its policy must + * include the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION flag + * and the permitted algorithm must match the + * operation. The value of this key was likely + * computed by a previous call to + * psa_key_derivation_output_key() or + * psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext(). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The output was read successfully, but if differs from the expected + * output. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * The key passed as the expected value does not exist. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key passed as the expected value has an invalid type. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The key passed as the expected value does not allow this usage or + * this algorithm; or one of the inputs was a key whose policy didn't + * allow #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA + * The operation's capacity was less than + * the length of the expected value. In this case, + * the operation's capacity is set to 0, thus + * subsequent calls to this function will not + * succeed, even with a smaller expected output. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed + * all required input steps), or the library has not been previously + * initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_verify_key( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_id_t expected); + /** Abort a key derivation operation. * * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the \c @@ -3857,6 +4095,10 @@ psa_status_t psa_generate_random(uint8_t *output, * between 2^{n-1} and 2^n where n is the bit size specified in the * attributes. * + * \note This function is equivalent to calling psa_generate_key_ext() + * with the production parameters #PSA_KEY_PRODUCTION_PARAMETERS_INIT + * and `params_data_length == 0` (i.e. `params->data` is empty). + * * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key. * \param[out] key On success, an identifier for the newly created * key. For persistent keys, this is the key @@ -3889,6 +4131,685 @@ psa_status_t psa_generate_random(uint8_t *output, psa_status_t psa_generate_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key); +/** + * \brief Generate a key or key pair using custom production parameters. + * + * See the description of psa_generate_key() for the operation of this + * function with the default production parameters. In addition, this function + * supports the following production customizations, described in more detail + * in the documentation of ::psa_key_production_parameters_t: + * + * - RSA keys: generation with a custom public exponent. + * + * \note This function is experimental and may change in future minor + * versions of Mbed TLS. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key. + * \param[in] params Customization parameters for the key generation. + * When this is #PSA_KEY_PRODUCTION_PARAMETERS_INIT + * with \p params_data_length = 0, + * this function is equivalent to + * psa_generate_key(). + * \param params_data_length + * Length of `params->data` in bytes. + * \param[out] key On success, an identifier for the newly created + * key. For persistent keys, this is the key + * identifier defined in \p attributes. + * \c 0 on failure. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata + * have been saved to persistent storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is + * already a persistent key with the given identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_generate_key_ext(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, + size_t params_data_length, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key); + +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup interruptible_hash Interruptible sign/verify hash + * @{ + */ + +/** The type of the state data structure for interruptible hash + * signing operations. + * + * Before calling any function on a sign hash operation object, the + * application must initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation; + * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer + * #PSA_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT, for example: + * \code + * psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation = + * PSA_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function + * psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_init() to the structure, for + * example: + * \code + * psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation; + * operation = psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_init(); + * \endcode + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure. + * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */ +typedef struct psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_s psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t; + +/** The type of the state data structure for interruptible hash + * verification operations. + * + * Before calling any function on a sign hash operation object, the + * application must initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation; + * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer + * #PSA_VERIFY_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT, for example: + * \code + * psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation = + * PSA_VERIFY_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function + * psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_init() to the structure, for + * example: + * \code + * psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation; + * operation = psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_init(); + * \endcode + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure. + * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */ +typedef struct psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_s psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t; + +/** + * \brief Set the maximum number of ops allowed to be + * executed by an interruptible function in a + * single call. + * + * \warning This is a beta API, and thus subject to change + * at any point. It is not bound by the usual + * interface stability promises. + * + * \note The time taken to execute a single op is + * implementation specific and depends on + * software, hardware, the algorithm, key type and + * curve chosen. Even within a single operation, + * successive ops can take differing amounts of + * time. The only guarantee is that lower values + * for \p max_ops means functions will block for a + * lesser maximum amount of time. The functions + * \c psa_sign_interruptible_get_num_ops() and + * \c psa_verify_interruptible_get_num_ops() are + * provided to help with tuning this value. + * + * \note This value defaults to + * #PSA_INTERRUPTIBLE_MAX_OPS_UNLIMITED, which + * means the whole operation will be done in one + * go, regardless of the number of ops required. + * + * \note If more ops are needed to complete a + * computation, #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE will be + * returned by the function performing the + * computation. It is then the caller's + * responsibility to either call again with the + * same operation context until it returns 0 or an + * error code; or to call the relevant abort + * function if the answer is no longer required. + * + * \note The interpretation of \p max_ops is also + * implementation defined. On a hard real time + * system, this can indicate a hard deadline, as a + * real-time system needs a guarantee of not + * spending more than X time, however care must be + * taken in such an implementation to avoid the + * situation whereby calls just return, not being + * able to do any actual work within the allotted + * time. On a non-real-time system, the + * implementation can be more relaxed, but again + * whether this number should be interpreted as as + * hard or soft limit or even whether a less than + * or equals as regards to ops executed in a + * single call is implementation defined. + * + * \note For keys in local storage when no accelerator + * driver applies, please see also the + * documentation for \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(), + * which is the internal implementation in these + * cases. + * + * \warning With implementations that interpret this number + * as a hard limit, setting this number too small + * may result in an infinite loop, whereby each + * call results in immediate return with no ops + * done (as there is not enough time to execute + * any), and thus no result will ever be achieved. + * + * \note This only applies to functions whose + * documentation mentions they may return + * #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE. + * + * \param max_ops The maximum number of ops to be executed in a + * single call. This can be a number from 0 to + * #PSA_INTERRUPTIBLE_MAX_OPS_UNLIMITED, where 0 + * is the least amount of work done per call. + */ +void psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(uint32_t max_ops); + +/** + * \brief Get the maximum number of ops allowed to be + * executed by an interruptible function in a + * single call. This will return the last + * value set by + * \c psa_interruptible_set_max_ops() or + * #PSA_INTERRUPTIBLE_MAX_OPS_UNLIMITED if + * that function has never been called. + * + * \warning This is a beta API, and thus subject to change + * at any point. It is not bound by the usual + * interface stability promises. + * + * \return Maximum number of ops allowed to be + * executed by an interruptible function in a + * single call. + */ +uint32_t psa_interruptible_get_max_ops(void); + +/** + * \brief Get the number of ops that a hash signing + * operation has taken so far. If the operation + * has completed, then this will represent the + * number of ops required for the entire + * operation. After initialization or calling + * \c psa_sign_hash_interruptible_abort() on + * the operation, a value of 0 will be returned. + * + * \note This interface is guaranteed re-entrant and + * thus may be called from driver code. + * + * \warning This is a beta API, and thus subject to change + * at any point. It is not bound by the usual + * interface stability promises. + * + * This is a helper provided to help you tune the + * value passed to \c + * psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(). + * + * \param operation The \c psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to use. This must be initialized first. + * + * \return Number of ops that the operation has taken so + * far. + */ +uint32_t psa_sign_hash_get_num_ops( + const psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation); + +/** + * \brief Get the number of ops that a hash verification + * operation has taken so far. If the operation + * has completed, then this will represent the + * number of ops required for the entire + * operation. After initialization or calling \c + * psa_verify_hash_interruptible_abort() on the + * operation, a value of 0 will be returned. + * + * \warning This is a beta API, and thus subject to change + * at any point. It is not bound by the usual + * interface stability promises. + * + * This is a helper provided to help you tune the + * value passed to \c + * psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(). + * + * \param operation The \c + * psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t to + * use. This must be initialized first. + * + * \return Number of ops that the operation has taken so + * far. + */ +uint32_t psa_verify_hash_get_num_ops( + const psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation); + +/** + * \brief Start signing a hash or short message with a + * private key, in an interruptible manner. + * + * \see \c psa_sign_hash_complete() + * + * \warning This is a beta API, and thus subject to change + * at any point. It is not bound by the usual + * interface stability promises. + * + * \note This function combined with \c + * psa_sign_hash_complete() is equivalent to + * \c psa_sign_hash() but + * \c psa_sign_hash_complete() can return early and + * resume according to the limit set with \c + * psa_interruptible_set_max_ops() to reduce the + * maximum time spent in a function call. + * + * \note Users should call \c psa_sign_hash_complete() + * repeatedly on the same context after a + * successful call to this function until \c + * psa_sign_hash_complete() either returns 0 or an + * error. \c psa_sign_hash_complete() will return + * #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE if there is more work + * to do. Alternatively users can call + * \c psa_sign_hash_abort() at any point if they no + * longer want the result. + * + * \note If this function returns an error status, the + * operation enters an error state and must be + * aborted by calling \c psa_sign_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in, out] operation The \c psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to use. This must be initialized first. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * It must be an asymmetric key pair. The key must + * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH. + * \param alg A signature algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX + * value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(\p alg) + * is true), that is compatible with + * the type of \p key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign. + * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The operation started successfully - call \c psa_sign_hash_complete() + * with the same context to complete the operation + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH flag, or it does + * not permit the requested algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * An operation has previously been started on this context, and is + * still in progress. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_start( + psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length); + +/** + * \brief Continue and eventually complete the action of + * signing a hash or short message with a private + * key, in an interruptible manner. + * + * \see \c psa_sign_hash_start() + * + * \warning This is a beta API, and thus subject to change + * at any point. It is not bound by the usual + * interface stability promises. + * + * \note This function combined with \c + * psa_sign_hash_start() is equivalent to + * \c psa_sign_hash() but this function can return + * early and resume according to the limit set with + * \c psa_interruptible_set_max_ops() to reduce the + * maximum time spent in a function call. + * + * \note Users should call this function on the same + * operation object repeatedly until it either + * returns 0 or an error. This function will return + * #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE if there is more work + * to do. Alternatively users can call + * \c psa_sign_hash_abort() at any point if they no + * longer want the result. + * + * \note When this function returns successfully, the + * operation becomes inactive. If this function + * returns an error status, the operation enters an + * error state and must be aborted by calling + * \c psa_sign_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in, out] operation The \c psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to use. This must be initialized first, and have + * had \c psa_sign_hash_start() called with it + * first. + * + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. This + * must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - The required signature size is + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c + * key_bits, \c alg) where \c key_type and \c + * key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of key. + * - #PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the + * maximum signature size of any supported + * signature algorithm. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes that make up + * the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Operation completed successfully + * + * \retval #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE + * Operation was interrupted due to the setting of \c + * psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(). There is still work to be done. + * Call this function again with the same operation object. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \c alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of \c key. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * An operation was not previously started on this context via + * \c psa_sign_hash_start(). + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has either not been previously initialized by + * psa_crypto_init() or you did not previously call + * psa_sign_hash_start() with this operation object. It is + * implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize results in + * this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_complete( + psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length); + +/** + * \brief Abort a sign hash operation. + * + * \warning This is a beta API, and thus subject to change + * at any point. It is not bound by the usual + * interface stability promises. + * + * \note This function is the only function that clears + * the number of ops completed as part of the + * operation. Please ensure you copy this value via + * \c psa_sign_hash_get_num_ops() if required + * before calling. + * + * \note Aborting an operation frees all associated + * resources except for the \p operation structure + * itself. Once aborted, the operation object can + * be reused for another operation by calling \c + * psa_sign_hash_start() again. + * + * \note You may call this function any time after the + * operation object has been initialized. In + * particular, calling \c psa_sign_hash_abort() + * after the operation has already been terminated + * by a call to \c psa_sign_hash_abort() or + * psa_sign_hash_complete() is safe. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized sign hash operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The operation was aborted successfully. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_abort( + psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation); + +/** + * \brief Start reading and verifying a hash or short + * message, in an interruptible manner. + * + * \see \c psa_verify_hash_complete() + * + * \warning This is a beta API, and thus subject to change + * at any point. It is not bound by the usual + * interface stability promises. + * + * \note This function combined with \c + * psa_verify_hash_complete() is equivalent to + * \c psa_verify_hash() but \c + * psa_verify_hash_complete() can return early and + * resume according to the limit set with \c + * psa_interruptible_set_max_ops() to reduce the + * maximum time spent in a function. + * + * \note Users should call \c psa_verify_hash_complete() + * repeatedly on the same operation object after a + * successful call to this function until \c + * psa_verify_hash_complete() either returns 0 or + * an error. \c psa_verify_hash_complete() will + * return #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE if there is + * more work to do. Alternatively users can call + * \c psa_verify_hash_abort() at any point if they + * no longer want the result. + * + * \note If this function returns an error status, the + * operation enters an error state and must be + * aborted by calling \c psa_verify_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in, out] operation The \c psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to use. This must be initialized first. + * + * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. + * The key must allow the usage + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH. + * \param alg A signature algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX + * value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(\p alg) + * is true), that is compatible with + * the type of \p key. + * \param[in] hash The hash whose signature is to be verified. + * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The operation started successfully - please call \c + * psa_verify_hash_complete() with the same context to complete the + * operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * Another operation has already been started on this context, and is + * still in progress. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH flag, or it does + * not permit the requested algorithm. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_start( + psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length); + +/** + * \brief Continue and eventually complete the action of + * reading and verifying a hash or short message + * signed with a private key, in an interruptible + * manner. + * + * \see \c psa_verify_hash_start() + * + * \warning This is a beta API, and thus subject to change + * at any point. It is not bound by the usual + * interface stability promises. + * + * \note This function combined with \c + * psa_verify_hash_start() is equivalent to + * \c psa_verify_hash() but this function can + * return early and resume according to the limit + * set with \c psa_interruptible_set_max_ops() to + * reduce the maximum time spent in a function + * call. + * + * \note Users should call this function on the same + * operation object repeatedly until it either + * returns 0 or an error. This function will return + * #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE if there is more work + * to do. Alternatively users can call + * \c psa_verify_hash_abort() at any point if they + * no longer want the result. + * + * \note When this function returns successfully, the + * operation becomes inactive. If this function + * returns an error status, the operation enters an + * error state and must be aborted by calling + * \c psa_verify_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in, out] operation The \c psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to use. This must be initialized first, and have + * had \c psa_verify_hash_start() called with it + * first. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Operation completed successfully, and the passed signature is valid. + * + * \retval #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE + * Operation was interrupted due to the setting of \c + * psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(). There is still work to be done. + * Call this function again with the same operation object. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed + * signature is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * An operation was not previously started on this context via + * \c psa_verify_hash_start(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has either not been previously initialized by + * psa_crypto_init() or you did not previously call + * psa_verify_hash_start() on this object. It is + * implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize results in + * this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_complete( + psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation); + +/** + * \brief Abort a verify hash operation. + * + * \warning This is a beta API, and thus subject to change at + * any point. It is not bound by the usual interface + * stability promises. + * + * \note This function is the only function that clears the + * number of ops completed as part of the operation. + * Please ensure you copy this value via + * \c psa_verify_hash_get_num_ops() if required + * before calling. + * + * \note Aborting an operation frees all associated + * resources except for the operation structure + * itself. Once aborted, the operation object can be + * reused for another operation by calling \c + * psa_verify_hash_start() again. + * + * \note You may call this function any time after the + * operation object has been initialized. + * In particular, calling \c psa_verify_hash_abort() + * after the operation has already been terminated by + * a call to \c psa_verify_hash_abort() or + * psa_verify_hash_complete() is safe. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized verify hash operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The operation was aborted successfully. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_abort( + psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation); + + /**@}*/ #ifdef __cplusplus @@ -3901,7 +4822,11 @@ psa_status_t psa_generate_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, /* The file "crypto_struct.h" contains definitions for * implementation-specific structs that are declared above. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_FILE) +#include MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_FILE +#else #include "crypto_struct.h" +#endif /* The file "crypto_extra.h" contains vendor-specific definitions. This * can include vendor-defined algorithms, extra functions, etc. */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_auto_enabled.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_auto_enabled.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..63fb29e85b --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_auto_enabled.h @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_adjust_auto_enabled.h + * \brief Adjust PSA configuration: enable always-on features + * + * Always enable certain features which require a negligible amount of code + * to implement, to avoid some edge cases in the configuration combinatorics. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ADJUST_AUTO_ENABLED_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_ADJUST_AUTO_ENABLED_H + +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA 1 + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ADJUST_AUTO_ENABLED_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_config_key_pair_types.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_config_key_pair_types.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..63afc0e402 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_config_key_pair_types.h @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_adjust_config_key_pair_types.h + * \brief Adjust PSA configuration for key pair types. + * + * See docs/proposed/psa-conditional-inclusion-c.md. + * - Support non-basic operations in a keypair type implicitly enables basic + * support for that keypair type. + * - Support for a keypair type implicitly enables the corresponding public + * key type. + * - Basic support for a keypair type implicilty enables import/export support + * for that keypair type. Warning: this is implementation-specific (mainly + * for the benefit of testing) and may change in the future! + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ADJUST_KEYPAIR_TYPES_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_ADJUST_KEYPAIR_TYPES_H + +/***************************************************************** + * ANYTHING -> BASIC + ****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#endif + +/***************************************************************** + * BASIC -> corresponding PUBLIC + ****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#endif + +/***************************************************************** + * BASIC -> IMPORT+EXPORT + * + * (Implementation-specific, may change in the future.) + ****************************************************************/ + +/* Even though KEY_PAIR symbols' feature several level of support (BASIC, IMPORT, + * EXPORT, GENERATE, DERIVE) we're not planning to have support only for BASIC + * without IMPORT/EXPORT since these last 2 features are strongly used in tests. + * In general it is allowed to include more feature than what is strictly + * requested. + * As a consequence IMPORT and EXPORT features will be automatically enabled + * as soon as the BASIC one is. */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ADJUST_KEYPAIR_TYPES_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_config_synonyms.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_config_synonyms.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..332b622c9b --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_config_synonyms.h @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_adjust_config_synonyms.h + * \brief Adjust PSA configuration: enable quasi-synonyms + * + * When two features require almost the same code, we automatically enable + * both when either one is requested, to reduce the combinatorics of + * possible configurations. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ADJUST_CONFIG_SYNONYMS_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_ADJUST_CONFIG_SYNONYMS_H + +/****************************************************************/ +/* De facto synonyms */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY +#elif !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW +#elif !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT +#elif !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS) +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ADJUST_CONFIG_SYNONYMS_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h index 63cb17342f..c14f5dd110 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h @@ -7,34 +7,32 @@ * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must * include psa/crypto.h. * - * \note This header and its content is not part of the Mbed TLS API and + * \note This header and its content are not part of the Mbed TLS API and * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the * multi-part state objects of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers. The - * definition of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h to define the + * definitions of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h to define the * implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_COMPOSITES_H #define PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_COMPOSITES_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" #include +#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) +#include "mbedtls/ccm.h" +#endif +#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" + /* * MAC multi-part operation definitions. */ @@ -43,40 +41,174 @@ #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD 1 -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) || defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) typedef struct { /** The HMAC algorithm in use */ - psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); /** The hash context. */ struct psa_hash_operation_s hash_ctx; /** The HMAC part of the context. */ - uint8_t opad[PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(opad)[PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; } mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t; #define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_OPERATION_INIT { 0, PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT, { 0 } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ -#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" - typedef struct { - psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); union { - unsigned dummy; /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */ + unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy); /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) || defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t hmac; + mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hmac); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) || defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - mbedtls_cipher_context_t cmac; + mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cmac); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ - } ctx; + } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); } mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t; #define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT { 0, { 0 } } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD 1 +#endif + +/* Context structure for the Mbed TLS AEAD implementation. */ +typedef struct { + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); + psa_key_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_type); + + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(is_encrypt) : 1; + + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tag_length); + + union { + unsigned dummy; /* Enable easier initializing of the union. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + mbedtls_ccm_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ccm); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + mbedtls_gcm_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(gcm); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + mbedtls_chachapoly_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(chachapoly); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + + } ctx; + +} mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, 0, { 0 } } + +#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" + +/* Context structure for the Mbed TLS interruptible sign hash implementation. */ +typedef struct { +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_ecdsa_context *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(restart_ctx); + + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(num_ops); + + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(coordinate_bytes); + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); + mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_alg); + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hash)[PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)]; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hash_length); + +#else + /* Make the struct non-empty if algs not supported. */ + unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy); + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ +} mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t; + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { { 0 }, { 0 }, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 } +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } +#endif + +/* Context structure for the Mbed TLS interruptible verify hash + * implementation.*/ +typedef struct { +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + + mbedtls_ecdsa_context *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(restart_ctx); + + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(num_ops); + + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hash)[PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)]; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hash_length); + + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(r); + mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(s); + +#else + /* Make the struct non-empty if algs not supported. */ + unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy); + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ + +} mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t; + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +#define MBEDTLS_VERIFY_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { { 0 }, { 0 }, 0, 0, 0, 0, { 0 }, \ + { 0 } } +#else +#define MBEDTLS_VERIFY_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } +#endif + + +/* EC-JPAKE operation definitions */ + +#include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE 1 +#endif + +/* Note: the format for mbedtls_ecjpake_read/write function has an extra + * length byte for each step, plus an extra 3 bytes for ECParameters in the + * server's 2nd round. */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_JPAKE_BUFFER_SIZE ((3 + 1 + 65 + 1 + 65 + 1 + 32) * 2) + +typedef struct { + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); + + uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password_len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE) + mbedtls_ecjpake_role MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(role); + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer[MBEDTLS_PSA_JPAKE_BUFFER_SIZE]); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer_length); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer_offset); +#endif + /* Context structure for the Mbed TLS EC-JPAKE implementation. */ + union { + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE) + mbedtls_ecjpake_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(jpake); +#endif + } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); + +} mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT { { 0 } } + #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_COMPOSITES_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_key_derivation.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_key_derivation.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6b91ae73f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_key_derivation.h @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +/* + * Context structure declaration of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers + * called through the PSA Crypto driver dispatch layer. + * This file contains the context structures of key derivation algorithms + * which need to rely on other algorithms. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * \note This header and its content are not part of the Mbed TLS API and + * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the + * multi-part state objects of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers. The + * definitions of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h to define the + * implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEY_DERIVATION_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEY_DERIVATION_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) +typedef struct { + uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(info); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(info_length); +#if PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE > 0xff +#error "PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE does not fit in uint8_t" +#endif + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(offset_in_block); + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_number); + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state) : 2; + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(info_set) : 1; + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(output_block)[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(prk)[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + struct psa_mac_operation_s MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hmac); +} psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF || + MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT || + MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) +typedef struct { + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(data)[PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_DATA_SIZE]; +} psa_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_t; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +typedef enum { + PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_INIT, /* no input provided */ + PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_SEED_SET, /* seed has been set */ + PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OTHER_KEY_SET, /* other key has been set - optional */ + PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_KEY_SET, /* key has been set */ + PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_LABEL_SET, /* label has been set */ + PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OUTPUT /* output has been started */ +} psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_state_t; + +typedef struct psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_s { +#if PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE > 0xff +#error "PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE does not fit in uint8_t" +#endif + + /* Indicates how many bytes in the current HMAC block have + * not yet been read by the user. */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(left_in_block); + + /* The 1-based number of the block. */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_number); + + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_state_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state); + + uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(secret); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(secret_length); + uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(seed); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(seed_length); + uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(label); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(label_length); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(other_secret); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(other_secret_length); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Ai)[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + + /* `HMAC_hash( prk, A( i ) + seed )` in the notation of RFC 5246, Sect. 5. */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(output_block)[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; +} psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || + * MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2) +typedef enum { + PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_INIT, /* no input provided */ + PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_INPUT_COST_SET, /* input cost has been set */ + PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_SALT_SET, /* salt has been set */ + PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_PASSWORD_SET, /* password has been set */ + PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_OUTPUT /* output has been started */ +} psa_pbkdf2_key_derivation_state_t; + +typedef struct { + psa_pbkdf2_key_derivation_state_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state); + uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(input_cost); + uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(salt); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(salt_length); + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password)[PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password_length); + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(output_block)[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(bytes_used); + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_number); +} psa_pbkdf2_key_derivation_t; +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2 */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEY_DERIVATION_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h index 6989cfed69..98ab4d3339 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h @@ -7,31 +7,20 @@ * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must * include psa/crypto.h. * - * \note This header and its content is not part of the Mbed TLS API and + * \note This header and its content are not part of the Mbed TLS API and * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the * multi-part state objects of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers. The - * definition of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h to define the + * definitions of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h to define the * implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_PRIMITIVES_H #define PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_PRIMITIVES_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" #include @@ -39,36 +28,31 @@ * Hash multi-part operation definitions. */ -#include "mbedtls/md2.h" -#include "mbedtls/md4.h" #include "mbedtls/md5.h" #include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" #include "mbedtls/sha1.h" #include "mbedtls/sha256.h" #include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha3.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD2) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD4) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) || \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH #endif typedef struct { - psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); union { unsigned dummy; /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD2) - mbedtls_md2_context md2; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD4) - mbedtls_md4_context md4; -#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) mbedtls_md5_context md5; #endif @@ -86,7 +70,13 @@ typedef struct { defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) mbedtls_sha512_context sha512; #endif - } ctx; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) + mbedtls_sha3_context sha3; +#endif + } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); } mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t; #define MBEDTLS_PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT { 0, { 0 } } @@ -103,19 +93,20 @@ typedef struct { defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_OFB) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER 1 #endif typedef struct { /* Context structure for the Mbed TLS cipher implementation. */ - psa_algorithm_t alg; - uint8_t iv_length; - uint8_t block_length; + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_length); + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_length); union { - unsigned int dummy; - mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher; - } ctx; + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy); + mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher); + } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); } mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t; #define MBEDTLS_PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, { 0 } } diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_compat.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_compat.h index 24239f5bbf..2a226c01a8 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_compat.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_compat.h @@ -12,19 +12,7 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_COMPAT_H @@ -55,371 +43,6 @@ static inline int psa_key_handle_is_null(psa_key_handle_t handle) return mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(handle); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) - -/* - * Mechanism for declaring deprecated values - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated)) -#else -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED -#endif - -typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED size_t mbedtls_deprecated_size_t; -typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED psa_status_t mbedtls_deprecated_psa_status_t; -typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED psa_key_usage_t mbedtls_deprecated_psa_key_usage_t; -typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_deprecated_psa_ecc_family_t; -typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED psa_dh_family_t mbedtls_deprecated_psa_dh_family_t; -typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED psa_ecc_family_t psa_ecc_curve_t; -typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED psa_dh_family_t psa_dh_group_t; -typedef MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_deprecated_psa_algorithm_t; - -#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_GET_CURVE PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY -#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_GET_GROUP PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GET_FAMILY - -#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(type, value) \ - ((mbedtls_deprecated_##type) (value)) - -/* - * Deprecated PSA Crypto error code definitions (PSA Crypto API <= 1.0 beta2) - */ -#define PSA_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_status_t, PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR) -#define PSA_ERROR_OCCUPIED_SLOT \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_status_t, PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS) -#define PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_status_t, PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) -#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_CAPACITY \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_status_t, PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA) -#define PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_status_t, PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED) - -/* - * Deprecated PSA Crypto numerical encodings (PSA Crypto API <= 1.0 beta3) - */ -#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_key_usage_t, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH) -#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_key_usage_t, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH) - -/* - * Deprecated PSA Crypto size calculation macros (PSA Crypto API <= 1.0 beta3) - */ -#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(size_t, PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE) -#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(size_t, PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg)) -#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_MAX_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(size_t, PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits)) -#define PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE(type) \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(size_t, PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(type)) -#define PSA_MAX_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(size_t, PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE) -#define PSA_HASH_SIZE(alg) \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(size_t, PSA_HASH_LENGTH(alg)) -#define PSA_MAC_FINAL_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(size_t, PSA_MAC_LENGTH(key_type, key_bits, alg)) -#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_MAX_PSK_LEN \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(size_t, PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE) - -/* - * Deprecated PSA Crypto function names (PSA Crypto API <= 1.0 beta3) - */ -MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED static inline psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_sign(psa_key_handle_t key, - psa_algorithm_t alg, - const uint8_t *hash, - size_t hash_length, - uint8_t *signature, - size_t signature_size, - size_t *signature_length) -{ - return psa_sign_hash(key, alg, hash, hash_length, signature, signature_size, signature_length); -} - -MBEDTLS_PSA_DEPRECATED static inline psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_verify(psa_key_handle_t key, - psa_algorithm_t alg, - const uint8_t *hash, - size_t hash_length, - const uint8_t *signature, - size_t signature_length) -{ - return psa_verify_hash(key, alg, hash, hash_length, signature, signature_length); -} - -/* - * Size-specific elliptic curve families. - */ -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP160K1 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP192K1 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP224K1 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256K1 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP160R1 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP192R1 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP224R1 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP521R1 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP160R2 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT163K1 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT233K1 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT239K1 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT283K1 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT409K1 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT571K1 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT163R1 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT193R1 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT233R1 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT283R1 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT409R1 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT571R1 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT163R2 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT193R2 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P256R1 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P384R1 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P512R1 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_CURVE25519 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_CURVE448 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY) - -/* - * Curves that changed name due to PSA specification. - */ -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP_K1 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP_R1 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP_R2 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT_K1 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT_R1 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT_R2 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1) -#define PSA_ECC_CURVE_MONTGOMERY \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_ecc_family_t, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY) - -/* - * Finite-field Diffie-Hellman families. - */ -#define PSA_DH_GROUP_FFDHE2048 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_dh_family_t, PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919) -#define PSA_DH_GROUP_FFDHE3072 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_dh_family_t, PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919) -#define PSA_DH_GROUP_FFDHE4096 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_dh_family_t, PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919) -#define PSA_DH_GROUP_FFDHE6144 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_dh_family_t, PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919) -#define PSA_DH_GROUP_FFDHE8192 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_dh_family_t, PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919) - -/* - * Diffie-Hellman families that changed name due to PSA specification. - */ -#define PSA_DH_GROUP_RFC7919 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_dh_family_t, PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919) -#define PSA_DH_GROUP_CUSTOM \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_dh_family_t, PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM) - -/* - * Deprecated PSA Crypto stream cipher algorithms (PSA Crypto API <= 1.0 beta3) - */ -#define PSA_ALG_ARC4 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_algorithm_t, PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER) -#define PSA_ALG_CHACHA20 \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_algorithm_t, PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER) - -/* - * Renamed AEAD tag length macros (PSA Crypto API <= 1.0 beta3) - */ -#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH(aead_alg) \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_algorithm_t, PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG(aead_alg)) -#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_TAG_LENGTH(aead_alg, tag_length) \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(psa_algorithm_t, \ - PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, tag_length)) - -/* - * Deprecated PSA AEAD output size macros (PSA Crypto API <= 1.0 beta3) - */ - -/** The tag size for an AEAD algorithm, in bytes. - * - * \param alg An AEAD algorithm - * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that - * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). - * - * \return The tag size for the specified algorithm. - * If the AEAD algorithm does not have an identified - * tag that can be distinguished from the rest of - * the ciphertext, return 0. - * If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0. - */ -#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_1_ARG(alg) \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(size_t, \ - PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) ? \ - PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) : \ - 0) - -/** The maximum size of the output of psa_aead_encrypt(), in bytes. - * - * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is - * guaranteed that psa_aead_encrypt() will not fail due to an - * insufficient buffer size. Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of - * the ciphertext may be smaller. - * - * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or - * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain - * side effects. - * - * \param alg An AEAD algorithm - * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that - * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). - * \param plaintext_length Size of the plaintext in bytes. - * - * \return The AEAD ciphertext size for the specified - * algorithm. - * If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0. - */ -#define PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE_2_ARG(alg, plaintext_length) \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(size_t, \ - PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) ? \ - (plaintext_length) + PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) : \ - 0) - -/** The maximum size of the output of psa_aead_decrypt(), in bytes. - * - * If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is - * guaranteed that psa_aead_decrypt() will not fail due to an - * insufficient buffer size. Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of - * the plaintext may be smaller. - * - * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or - * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain - * side effects. - * - * \param alg An AEAD algorithm - * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that - * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). - * \param ciphertext_length Size of the plaintext in bytes. - * - * \return The AEAD ciphertext size for the specified - * algorithm. - * If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0. - */ -#define PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE_2_ARG(alg, ciphertext_length) \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(size_t, \ - PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) && \ - (ciphertext_length) > PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) ? \ - (ciphertext_length) - PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) : \ - 0) - -/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_update(). - * - * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is - * guaranteed that psa_aead_update() will not fail due to an - * insufficient buffer size. The actual size of the output may be smaller - * in any given call. - * - * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or - * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain - * side effects. - * - * \param alg An AEAD algorithm - * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that - * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). - * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. - * - * \return A sufficient output buffer size for the specified - * algorithm. - * If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0. - */ -/* For all the AEAD modes defined in this specification, it is possible - * to emit output without delay. However, hardware may not always be - * capable of this. So for modes based on a block cipher, allow the - * implementation to delay the output until it has a full block. */ -#define PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE_2_ARG(alg, input_length) \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(size_t, \ - PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ? \ - PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE, \ - (input_length)) : \ - (input_length)) - -/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_aead_finish(). - * - * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is - * guaranteed that psa_aead_finish() will not fail due to an - * insufficient ciphertext buffer size. The actual size of the output may - * be smaller in any given call. - * - * \param alg An AEAD algorithm - * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that - * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). - * - * \return A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for the - * specified algorithm. - * If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0. - */ -#define PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE_1_ARG(alg) \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(size_t, \ - PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ? \ - PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE : \ - 0) - -/** A sufficient plaintext buffer size for psa_aead_verify(). - * - * If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is - * guaranteed that psa_aead_verify() will not fail due to an - * insufficient plaintext buffer size. The actual size of the output may - * be smaller in any given call. - * - * \param alg An AEAD algorithm - * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that - * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). - * - * \return A sufficient plaintext buffer size for the - * specified algorithm. - * If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0. - */ -#define PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE_1_ARG(alg) \ - MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_CONSTANT(size_t, \ - PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ? \ - PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE : \ - 0) - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /** Open a handle to an existing persistent key. * * Open a handle to a persistent key. A key is persistent if it was created @@ -523,6 +146,83 @@ psa_status_t psa_open_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, */ psa_status_t psa_close_key(psa_key_handle_t handle); +/** \addtogroup attributes + * @{ + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +/** Custom Diffie-Hellman group. + * + * Mbed TLS does not support custom DH groups. + * + * \deprecated This value is not useful, so this macro will be removed in + * a future version of the library. + */ +#define PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM \ + ((psa_dh_family_t) MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT(0x7e)) + +/** + * \brief Set domain parameters for a key. + * + * \deprecated Mbed TLS no longer supports any domain parameters. + * This function only does the equivalent of + * psa_set_key_type() and will be removed in a future version + * of the library. + * + * \param[in,out] attributes Attribute structure where \p type will be set. + * \param type Key type (a \c PSA_KEY_TYPE_XXX value). + * \param[in] data Ignored. + * \param data_length Must be 0. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + */ +static inline psa_status_t MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED psa_set_key_domain_parameters( + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_type_t type, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length) +{ + (void) data; + if (data_length != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + psa_set_key_type(attributes, type); + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/** + * \brief Get domain parameters for a key. + * + * \deprecated Mbed TLS no longer supports any domain parameters. + * This function alwaya has an empty output and will be + * removed in a future version of the library. + + * \param[in] attributes Ignored. + * \param[out] data Ignored. + * \param data_size Ignored. + * \param[out] data_length Set to 0. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + */ +static inline psa_status_t MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED psa_get_key_domain_parameters( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length) +{ + (void) attributes; + (void) data; + (void) data_size; + *data_length = 0; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/** Safe output buffer size for psa_get_key_domain_parameters(). + * + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \ + MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT(1u) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +/**@}*/ + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_config.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_config.h index f261e013e0..36e937ad35 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_config.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_config.h @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) /** - * When #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is enabled in config.h, + * When #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is enabled in mbedtls_config.h, * this file determines which cryptographic mechanisms are enabled * through the PSA Cryptography API (\c psa_xxx() functions). * @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ */ #else /** - * When \c MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is disabled in config.h, + * When \c MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is disabled in mbedtls_config.h, * this file is not used, and cryptographic mechanisms are supported * through the PSA API if and only if they are supported through the * mbedtls_xxx API. @@ -32,19 +32,7 @@ #endif /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H @@ -57,6 +45,7 @@ #define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1 @@ -64,14 +53,18 @@ #define PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 1 -#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD4 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 @@ -82,10 +75,16 @@ #define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1 -/* PBKDF2-HMAC is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS. +#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS 1 + +/* XTS is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS. * Note: when adding support, also adjust include/mbedtls/config_psa.h */ //#define PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS 1 @@ -93,12 +92,7 @@ #define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 1 #define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 1 #define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 1 -/* - * Curve448 is not yet supported via the PSA API in Mbed TLS - * (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4249). Thus, do not enable it by - * default. - */ -//#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 1 +#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 1 #define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 1 /* * SECP224K1 is buggy via the PSA API in Mbed TLS @@ -109,22 +103,57 @@ #define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 1 #define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 1 #define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 1 +/* For secp256r1, consider enabling #MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED + * (see the description in mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h for details). */ #define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 1 #define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1 #define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1 +#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 1 +#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 1 +#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 1 +#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 1 +#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 1 + #define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH 1 #define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC 1 #define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES 1 -#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 1 #define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1 #define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1 #define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1 #define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES 1 -#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR 1 /* Deprecated */ #define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY 1 #define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA 1 -#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR 1 /* Deprecated */ #define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +/* + * The following symbols extend and deprecate the legacy + * PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR ones. They include the usage of that key in + * the name's suffix. "_USE" is the most generic and it can be used to describe + * a generic suport, whereas other ones add more features on top of that and + * they are more specific. + */ +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE 1 + +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE 1 /* Not supported */ + +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 +//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE 1 /* Not supported */ + #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_common.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_common.h index 26363c6b2f..cc11d3b9a2 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_common.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_common.h @@ -17,19 +17,7 @@ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_COMMON_H #define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_COMMON_H diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h index 34e6fd61c3..d717c51909 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h @@ -9,26 +9,14 @@ * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must * include psa/crypto.h. * - * \note This header and its content is not part of the Mbed TLS API and + * \note This header and its content are not part of the Mbed TLS API and * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the * multi-part state objects of the PSA drivers included in the cryptographic - * library. The definition of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h + * library. The definitions of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h * to define the implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects. */ /* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_COMPOSITES_H @@ -70,7 +58,50 @@ typedef mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t #define MBEDTLS_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_MAC_OPERATION_INIT \ MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT -#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1 && LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD) +typedef libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_aead_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT \ + LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT +#else +typedef mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_aead_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1 && LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE) + +typedef libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_pake_operation_t; +typedef libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_pake_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT \ + LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT +#define MBEDTLS_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT \ + LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT + +#else +typedef mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_pake_operation_t; +typedef mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_pake_operation_t; + +#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT +#define MBEDTLS_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1 && LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE */ + #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ /* Define the context to be used for an operation that is executed through the @@ -78,7 +109,7 @@ typedef mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t * * The union members are the driver's context structures, and the member names * are formatted as `'drivername'_ctx`. This allows for procedural generation - * of both this file and the content of psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c */ + * of both this file and the content of psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h */ typedef union { unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */ @@ -89,5 +120,32 @@ typedef union { #endif } psa_driver_mac_context_t; +typedef union { + unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */ + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t mbedtls_ctx; +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_aead_operation_t transparent_test_driver_ctx; +#endif +} psa_driver_aead_context_t; + +typedef union { + unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */ + mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t mbedtls_ctx; +} psa_driver_sign_hash_interruptible_context_t; + +typedef union { + unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */ + mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t mbedtls_ctx; +} psa_driver_verify_hash_interruptible_context_t; + +typedef union { + unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */ + mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t mbedtls_ctx; +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_pake_operation_t transparent_test_driver_ctx; + mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_pake_operation_t opaque_test_driver_ctx; +#endif +} psa_driver_pake_context_t; + #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_COMPOSITES_H */ /* End of automatically generated file. */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_key_derivation.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_key_derivation.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..21190515ce --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_key_derivation.h @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/* + * Declaration of context structures for use with the PSA driver wrapper + * interface. This file contains the context structures for key derivation + * operations. + * + * Warning: This file will be auto-generated in the future. + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * \note This header and its content are not part of the Mbed TLS API and + * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the + * multi-part state objects of the PSA drivers included in the cryptographic + * library. The definitions of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h + * to define the implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_KEY_DERIVATION_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_KEY_DERIVATION_H + +#include "psa/crypto_driver_common.h" + +/* Include the context structure definitions for the Mbed TLS software drivers */ +#include "psa/crypto_builtin_key_derivation.h" + +/* Include the context structure definitions for those drivers that were + * declared during the autogeneration process. */ + +typedef union { + unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) + psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hkdf); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls12_prf); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) + psa_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls12_ecjpake_to_pms); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2) + psa_pbkdf2_key_derivation_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pbkdf2); +#endif +} psa_driver_key_derivation_context_t; + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_KEY_DERIVATION_H */ +/* End of automatically generated file. */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h index 620a4b3a77..c90a5fbe74 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h @@ -8,26 +8,14 @@ * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must * include psa/crypto.h. * - * \note This header and its content is not part of the Mbed TLS API and + * \note This header and its content are not part of the Mbed TLS API and * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the * multi-part state objects of the PSA drivers included in the cryptographic - * library. The definition of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h + * library. The definitions of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h * to define the implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects. */ /* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_PRIMITIVES_H @@ -94,7 +82,7 @@ typedef struct { * * The union members are the driver's context structures, and the member names * are formatted as `'drivername'_ctx`. This allows for procedural generation - * of both this file and the content of psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c */ + * of both this file and the content of psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h */ typedef union { unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_extra.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_extra.h index 92f0b6887b..6ed1f6c43a 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_extra.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_extra.h @@ -10,25 +10,12 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H #define PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H - -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" #include "crypto_types.h" #include "crypto_compat.h" @@ -40,7 +27,7 @@ extern "C" { /* UID for secure storage seed */ #define PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID 0xFFFFFF52 -/* See config.h for definition */ +/* See mbedtls_config.h for definition */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT 32 #endif @@ -72,7 +59,7 @@ static inline void psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, psa_algorithm_t alg2) { - attributes->core.policy.alg2 = alg2; + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg2) = alg2; } /** Retrieve the enrollment algorithm policy from key attributes. @@ -84,7 +71,7 @@ static inline void psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm( static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) { - return attributes->core.policy.alg2; + return attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg2); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) @@ -142,8 +129,8 @@ static inline void psa_set_key_slot_number( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number) { - attributes->core.flags |= MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_FLAG_HAS_SLOT_NUMBER; - attributes->slot_number = slot_number; + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(has_slot_number) = 1; + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(slot_number) = slot_number; } /** Remove the slot number attribute from a key attribute structure. @@ -155,7 +142,7 @@ static inline void psa_set_key_slot_number( static inline void psa_clear_key_slot_number( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) { - attributes->core.flags &= ~MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_FLAG_HAS_SLOT_NUMBER; + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(has_slot_number) = 0; } /** Register a key that is already present in a secure element. @@ -210,6 +197,8 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_register_se_key( * * This function clears all data associated with the PSA layer, * including the whole key store. + * This function is not thread safe, it wipes every key slot regardless of + * state and reader count. It should only be called when no slot is in use. * * This is an Mbed TLS extension. */ @@ -223,26 +212,26 @@ void mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(void); */ typedef struct mbedtls_psa_stats_s { /** Number of slots containing key material for a volatile key. */ - size_t volatile_slots; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(volatile_slots); /** Number of slots containing key material for a key which is in * internal persistent storage. */ - size_t persistent_slots; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(persistent_slots); /** Number of slots containing a reference to a key in a * secure element. */ - size_t external_slots; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(external_slots); /** Number of slots which are occupied, but do not contain * key material yet. */ - size_t half_filled_slots; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(half_filled_slots); /** Number of slots that contain cache data. */ - size_t cache_slots; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cache_slots); /** Number of slots that are not used for anything. */ - size_t empty_slots; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(empty_slots); /** Number of slots that are locked. */ - size_t locked_slots; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(locked_slots); /** Largest key id value among open keys in internal persistent storage. */ - psa_key_id_t max_open_internal_key_id; + psa_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_open_internal_key_id); /** Largest key id value among open keys in secure elements. */ - psa_key_id_t max_open_external_key_id; + psa_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_open_external_key_id); } mbedtls_psa_stats_t; /** \brief Get statistics about @@ -303,8 +292,10 @@ void mbedtls_psa_get_stats(mbedtls_psa_stats_t *stats); * \param[in] seed Buffer containing the seed value to inject. * \param[in] seed_size Size of the \p seed buffer. * The size of the seed in bytes must be greater - * or equal to both #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM - * and #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE. + * or equal to both #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE + * and the value of \c MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM + * in `library/entropy_poll.h` in the Mbed TLS source + * code. * It must be less or equal to * #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE. * @@ -417,246 +408,13 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(const uint8_t *seed, * @{ */ -/** Custom Diffie-Hellman group. - * - * For keys of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(#PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM) or - * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(#PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM), the group data comes - * from domain parameters set by psa_set_key_domain_parameters(). - */ -#define PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM ((psa_dh_family_t) 0x7e) - - -/** - * \brief Set domain parameters for a key. - * - * Some key types require additional domain parameters in addition to - * the key type identifier and the key size. Use this function instead - * of psa_set_key_type() when you need to specify domain parameters. - * - * The format for the required domain parameters varies based on the key type. - * - * - For RSA keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY or #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR), - * the domain parameter data consists of the public exponent, - * represented as a big-endian integer with no leading zeros. - * This information is used when generating an RSA key pair. - * When importing a key, the public exponent is read from the imported - * key data and the exponent recorded in the attribute structure is ignored. - * As an exception, the public exponent 65537 is represented by an empty - * byte string. - * - For DSA keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY or #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEY_PAIR), - * the `Dss-Params` format as defined by RFC 3279 §2.3.2. - * ``` - * Dss-Params ::= SEQUENCE { - * p INTEGER, - * q INTEGER, - * g INTEGER - * } - * ``` - * - For Diffie-Hellman key exchange keys - * (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(#PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM) or - * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(#PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM)), the - * `DomainParameters` format as defined by RFC 3279 §2.3.3. - * ``` - * DomainParameters ::= SEQUENCE { - * p INTEGER, -- odd prime, p=jq +1 - * g INTEGER, -- generator, g - * q INTEGER, -- factor of p-1 - * j INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- subgroup factor - * validationParams ValidationParams OPTIONAL - * } - * ValidationParams ::= SEQUENCE { - * seed BIT STRING, - * pgenCounter INTEGER - * } - * ``` - * - * \note This function may allocate memory or other resources. - * Once you have called this function on an attribute structure, - * you must call psa_reset_key_attributes() to free these resources. - * - * \note This is an experimental extension to the interface. It may change - * in future versions of the library. - * - * \param[in,out] attributes Attribute structure where the specified domain - * parameters will be stored. - * If this function fails, the content of - * \p attributes is not modified. - * \param type Key type (a \c PSA_KEY_TYPE_XXX value). - * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key domain parameters. - * The content of this buffer is interpreted - * according to \p type as described above. - * \param data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. - * - * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription - * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription - * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription - * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription - */ -psa_status_t psa_set_key_domain_parameters(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - psa_key_type_t type, - const uint8_t *data, - size_t data_length); - -/** - * \brief Get domain parameters for a key. - * - * Get the domain parameters for a key with this function, if any. The format - * of the domain parameters written to \p data is specified in the - * documentation for psa_set_key_domain_parameters(). - * - * \note This is an experimental extension to the interface. It may change - * in future versions of the library. - * - * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query. - * \param[out] data On success, the key domain parameters. - * \param data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. - * The buffer is guaranteed to be large - * enough if its size in bytes is at least - * the value given by - * PSA_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(). - * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes - * that make up the key domain parameters data. - * - * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription - * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL \emptydescription - */ -psa_status_t psa_get_key_domain_parameters( - const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - uint8_t *data, - size_t data_size, - size_t *data_length); - -/** Safe output buffer size for psa_get_key_domain_parameters(). - * - * This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are - * compile-time constants. - * - * \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or - * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain - * side effects. - * - * \note This is an experimental extension to the interface. It may change - * in future versions of the library. - * - * \param key_type A supported key type. - * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits. - * - * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return - * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that - * psa_get_key_domain_parameters() will not fail with - * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. - * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported - * by the implementation, this macro shall return either a - * sensible size or 0. - * If the parameters are not valid, the - * return value is unspecified. - */ -#define PSA_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \ - (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? sizeof(int) : \ - PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(key_type) ? PSA_DH_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_bits) : \ - PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DSA(key_type) ? PSA_DSA_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_bits) : \ - 0) -#define PSA_DH_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_bits) \ - (4 + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) + 5) * 3 /*without optional parts*/) -#define PSA_DSA_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_bits) \ - (4 + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) + 5) * 2 /*p, g*/ + 34 /*q*/) +/** PAKE operation stages. */ +#define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_SETUP 0 +#define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS 1 +#define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COMPUTATION 2 /**@}*/ -/** \defgroup psa_tls_helpers TLS helper functions - * @{ - */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -#include - -/** Convert an ECC curve identifier from the Mbed TLS encoding to PSA. - * - * \note This function is provided solely for the convenience of - * Mbed TLS and may be removed at any time without notice. - * - * \param grpid An Mbed TLS elliptic curve identifier - * (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`). - * \param[out] bits On success, the bit size of the curve. - * - * \return The corresponding PSA elliptic curve identifier - * (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`). - * \return \c 0 on failure (\p grpid is not recognized). - */ -static inline psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid, - size_t *bits) -{ - switch (grpid) { - case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1: - *bits = 192; - return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1; - case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1: - *bits = 224; - return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1; - case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1: - *bits = 256; - return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1; - case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1: - *bits = 384; - return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1; - case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1: - *bits = 521; - return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1; - case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1: - *bits = 256; - return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1; - case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1: - *bits = 384; - return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1; - case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1: - *bits = 512; - return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1; - case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: - *bits = 255; - return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY; - case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1: - *bits = 192; - return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1; - case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1: - *bits = 224; - return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1; - case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1: - *bits = 256; - return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1; - case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: - *bits = 448; - return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY; - default: - *bits = 0; - return 0; - } -} - -/** Convert an ECC curve identifier from the PSA encoding to Mbed TLS. - * - * \note This function is provided solely for the convenience of - * Mbed TLS and may be removed at any time without notice. - * - * \param curve A PSA elliptic curve identifier - * (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`). - * \param bits The bit-length of a private key on \p curve. - * \param bits_is_sloppy If true, \p bits may be the bit-length rounded up - * to the nearest multiple of 8. This allows the caller - * to infer the exact curve from the length of a key - * which is supplied as a byte string. - * - * \return The corresponding Mbed TLS elliptic curve identifier - * (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`). - * \return #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if \c curve is not recognized. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if \p bits is not - * correct for \p curve. - */ -mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve, - size_t bits, - int bits_is_sloppy); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ - -/**@}*/ /** \defgroup psa_external_rng External random generator * @{ @@ -807,6 +565,1317 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_platform_get_builtin_key( /** @} */ +/** \addtogroup crypto_types + * @{ + */ + +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_PAKE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0a000000) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) + * algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_PAKE) + +/** The Password-authenticated key exchange by juggling (J-PAKE) algorithm. + * + * This is J-PAKE as defined by RFC 8236, instantiated with the following + * parameters: + * + * - The group can be either an elliptic curve or defined over a finite field. + * - Schnorr NIZK proof as defined by RFC 8235 and using the same group as the + * J-PAKE algorithm. + * - A cryptographic hash function. + * + * To select these parameters and set up the cipher suite, call these functions + * in any order: + * + * \code + * psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm(cipher_suite, PSA_ALG_JPAKE); + * psa_pake_cs_set_primitive(cipher_suite, + * PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(type, family, bits)); + * psa_pake_cs_set_hash(cipher_suite, hash); + * \endcode + * + * For more information on how to set a specific curve or field, refer to the + * documentation of the individual \c PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_XXX constants. + * + * After initializing a J-PAKE operation, call + * + * \code + * psa_pake_setup(operation, cipher_suite); + * psa_pake_set_user(operation, ...); + * psa_pake_set_peer(operation, ...); + * psa_pake_set_password_key(operation, ...); + * \endcode + * + * The password is provided as a key. This can be the password text itself, + * in an agreed character encoding, or some value derived from the password + * as required by a higher level protocol. + * + * (The implementation converts the key material to a number as described in + * Section 2.3.8 of _SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography_ + * (https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf), before reducing it modulo \c q. Here + * \c q is order of the group defined by the primitive set in the cipher suite. + * The \c psa_pake_set_password_key() function returns an error if the result + * of the reduction is 0.) + * + * The key exchange flow for J-PAKE is as follows: + * -# To get the first round data that needs to be sent to the peer, call + * \code + * // Get g1 + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * // Get the ZKP public key for x1 + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...); + * // Get the ZKP proof for x1 + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...); + * // Get g2 + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * // Get the ZKP public key for x2 + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...); + * // Get the ZKP proof for x2 + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...); + * \endcode + * -# To provide the first round data received from the peer to the operation, + * call + * \code + * // Set g3 + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * // Set the ZKP public key for x3 + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...); + * // Set the ZKP proof for x3 + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...); + * // Set g4 + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * // Set the ZKP public key for x4 + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...); + * // Set the ZKP proof for x4 + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...); + * \endcode + * -# To get the second round data that needs to be sent to the peer, call + * \code + * // Get A + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * // Get ZKP public key for x2*s + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...); + * // Get ZKP proof for x2*s + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...); + * \endcode + * -# To provide the second round data received from the peer to the operation, + * call + * \code + * // Set B + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * // Set ZKP public key for x4*s + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...); + * // Set ZKP proof for x4*s + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...); + * \endcode + * -# To access the shared secret call + * \code + * // Get Ka=Kb=K + * psa_pake_get_implicit_key() + * \endcode + * + * For more information consult the documentation of the individual + * \c PSA_PAKE_STEP_XXX constants. + * + * At this point there is a cryptographic guarantee that only the authenticated + * party who used the same password is able to compute the key. But there is no + * guarantee that the peer is the party it claims to be and was able to do so. + * + * That is, the authentication is only implicit (the peer is not authenticated + * at this point, and no action should be taken that assume that they are - like + * for example accessing restricted files). + * + * To make the authentication explicit there are various methods, see Section 5 + * of RFC 8236 for two examples. + * + */ +#define PSA_ALG_JPAKE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0a000100) + +/** @} */ + +/** \defgroup pake Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) + * + * This is a proposed PAKE interface for the PSA Crypto API. It is not part of + * the official PSA Crypto API yet. + * + * \note The content of this section is not part of the stable API and ABI + * of Mbed TLS and may change arbitrarily from version to version. + * Same holds for the corresponding macros #PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_PAKE and + * #PSA_ALG_JPAKE. + * @{ + */ + +/** \brief Encoding of the application role of PAKE + * + * Encodes the application's role in the algorithm is being executed. For more + * information see the documentation of individual \c PSA_PAKE_ROLE_XXX + * constants. + */ +typedef uint8_t psa_pake_role_t; + +/** Encoding of input and output indicators for PAKE. + * + * Some PAKE algorithms need to exchange more data than just a single key share. + * This type is for encoding additional input and output data for such + * algorithms. + */ +typedef uint8_t psa_pake_step_t; + +/** Encoding of the type of the PAKE's primitive. + * + * Values defined by this standard will never be in the range 0x80-0xff. + * Vendors who define additional types must use an encoding in this range. + * + * For more information see the documentation of individual + * \c PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_XXX constants. + */ +typedef uint8_t psa_pake_primitive_type_t; + +/** \brief Encoding of the family of the primitive associated with the PAKE. + * + * For more information see the documentation of individual + * \c PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_XXX constants. + */ +typedef uint8_t psa_pake_family_t; + +/** \brief Encoding of the primitive associated with the PAKE. + * + * For more information see the documentation of the #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE macro. + */ +typedef uint32_t psa_pake_primitive_t; + +/** A value to indicate no role in a PAKE algorithm. + * This value can be used in a call to psa_pake_set_role() for symmetric PAKE + * algorithms which do not assign roles. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x00) + +/** The first peer in a balanced PAKE. + * + * Although balanced PAKE algorithms are symmetric, some of them needs an + * ordering of peers for the transcript calculations. If the algorithm does not + * need this, both #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_FIRST and #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SECOND are + * accepted. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_FIRST ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x01) + +/** The second peer in a balanced PAKE. + * + * Although balanced PAKE algorithms are symmetric, some of them needs an + * ordering of peers for the transcript calculations. If the algorithm does not + * need this, either #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_FIRST or #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SECOND are + * accepted. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SECOND ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x02) + +/** The client in an augmented PAKE. + * + * Augmented PAKE algorithms need to differentiate between client and server. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x11) + +/** The server in an augmented PAKE. + * + * Augmented PAKE algorithms need to differentiate between client and server. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x12) + +/** The PAKE primitive type indicating the use of elliptic curves. + * + * The values of the \c family and \c bits fields of the cipher suite identify a + * specific elliptic curve, using the same mapping that is used for ECC + * (::psa_ecc_family_t) keys. + * + * (Here \c family means the value returned by psa_pake_cs_get_family() and + * \c bits means the value returned by psa_pake_cs_get_bits().) + * + * Input and output during the operation can involve group elements and scalar + * values: + * -# The format for group elements is the same as for public keys on the + * specific curve would be. For more information, consult the documentation of + * psa_export_public_key(). + * -# The format for scalars is the same as for private keys on the specific + * curve would be. For more information, consult the documentation of + * psa_export_key(). + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC ((psa_pake_primitive_type_t) 0x01) + +/** The PAKE primitive type indicating the use of Diffie-Hellman groups. + * + * The values of the \c family and \c bits fields of the cipher suite identify + * a specific Diffie-Hellman group, using the same mapping that is used for + * Diffie-Hellman (::psa_dh_family_t) keys. + * + * (Here \c family means the value returned by psa_pake_cs_get_family() and + * \c bits means the value returned by psa_pake_cs_get_bits().) + * + * Input and output during the operation can involve group elements and scalar + * values: + * -# The format for group elements is the same as for public keys on the + * specific group would be. For more information, consult the documentation of + * psa_export_public_key(). + * -# The format for scalars is the same as for private keys on the specific + * group would be. For more information, consult the documentation of + * psa_export_key(). + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_DH ((psa_pake_primitive_type_t) 0x02) + +/** Construct a PAKE primitive from type, family and bit-size. + * + * \param pake_type The type of the primitive + * (value of type ::psa_pake_primitive_type_t). + * \param pake_family The family of the primitive + * (the type and interpretation of this parameter depends + * on \p pake_type, for more information consult the + * documentation of individual ::psa_pake_primitive_type_t + * constants). + * \param pake_bits The bit-size of the primitive + * (Value of type \c size_t. The interpretation + * of this parameter depends on \p pake_family, for more + * information consult the documentation of individual + * ::psa_pake_primitive_type_t constants). + * + * \return The constructed primitive value of type ::psa_pake_primitive_t. + * Return 0 if the requested primitive can't be encoded as + * ::psa_pake_primitive_t. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(pake_type, pake_family, pake_bits) \ + ((pake_bits & 0xFFFF) != pake_bits) ? 0 : \ + ((psa_pake_primitive_t) (((pake_type) << 24 | \ + (pake_family) << 16) | (pake_bits))) + +/** The key share being sent to or received from the peer. + * + * The format for both input and output at this step is the same as for public + * keys on the group determined by the primitive (::psa_pake_primitive_t) would + * be. + * + * For more information on the format, consult the documentation of + * psa_export_public_key(). + * + * For information regarding how the group is determined, consult the + * documentation #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE ((psa_pake_step_t) 0x01) + +/** A Schnorr NIZKP public key. + * + * This is the ephemeral public key in the Schnorr Non-Interactive + * Zero-Knowledge Proof (the value denoted by the letter 'V' in RFC 8235). + * + * The format for both input and output at this step is the same as for public + * keys on the group determined by the primitive (::psa_pake_primitive_t) would + * be. + * + * For more information on the format, consult the documentation of + * psa_export_public_key(). + * + * For information regarding how the group is determined, consult the + * documentation #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC ((psa_pake_step_t) 0x02) + +/** A Schnorr NIZKP proof. + * + * This is the proof in the Schnorr Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof (the + * value denoted by the letter 'r' in RFC 8235). + * + * Both for input and output, the value at this step is an integer less than + * the order of the group selected in the cipher suite. The format depends on + * the group as well: + * + * - For Montgomery curves, the encoding is little endian. + * - For everything else the encoding is big endian (see Section 2.3.8 of + * _SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography_ at https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf). + * + * In both cases leading zeroes are allowed as long as the length in bytes does + * not exceed the byte length of the group order. + * + * For information regarding how the group is determined, consult the + * documentation #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF ((psa_pake_step_t) 0x03) + +/** The type of the data structure for PAKE cipher suites. + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure. + * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. + */ +typedef struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s psa_pake_cipher_suite_t; + +/** Return an initial value for a PAKE cipher suite object. + */ +static psa_pake_cipher_suite_t psa_pake_cipher_suite_init(void); + +/** Retrieve the PAKE algorithm from a PAKE cipher suite. + * + * \param[in] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to query. + * + * \return The PAKE algorithm stored in the cipher suite structure. + */ +static psa_algorithm_t psa_pake_cs_get_algorithm( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite); + +/** Declare the PAKE algorithm for the cipher suite. + * + * This function overwrites any PAKE algorithm + * previously set in \p cipher_suite. + * + * \param[out] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to write to. + * \param algorithm The PAKE algorithm to write. + * (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type ::psa_algorithm_t + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true.) + * If this is 0, the PAKE algorithm in + * \p cipher_suite becomes unspecified. + */ +static void psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm(psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite, + psa_algorithm_t algorithm); + +/** Retrieve the primitive from a PAKE cipher suite. + * + * \param[in] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to query. + * + * \return The primitive stored in the cipher suite structure. + */ +static psa_pake_primitive_t psa_pake_cs_get_primitive( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite); + +/** Declare the primitive for a PAKE cipher suite. + * + * This function overwrites any primitive previously set in \p cipher_suite. + * + * \param[out] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to write to. + * \param primitive The primitive to write. If this is 0, the + * primitive type in \p cipher_suite becomes + * unspecified. + */ +static void psa_pake_cs_set_primitive(psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite, + psa_pake_primitive_t primitive); + +/** Retrieve the PAKE family from a PAKE cipher suite. + * + * \param[in] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to query. + * + * \return The PAKE family stored in the cipher suite structure. + */ +static psa_pake_family_t psa_pake_cs_get_family( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite); + +/** Retrieve the PAKE primitive bit-size from a PAKE cipher suite. + * + * \param[in] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to query. + * + * \return The PAKE primitive bit-size stored in the cipher suite structure. + */ +static uint16_t psa_pake_cs_get_bits( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite); + +/** Retrieve the hash algorithm from a PAKE cipher suite. + * + * \param[in] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to query. + * + * \return The hash algorithm stored in the cipher suite structure. The return + * value is 0 if the PAKE is not parametrised by a hash algorithm or if + * the hash algorithm is not set. + */ +static psa_algorithm_t psa_pake_cs_get_hash( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite); + +/** Declare the hash algorithm for a PAKE cipher suite. + * + * This function overwrites any hash algorithm + * previously set in \p cipher_suite. + * + * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` + * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) + * for more information. + * + * \param[out] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to write to. + * \param hash The hash involved in the cipher suite. + * (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type ::psa_algorithm_t + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\c alg) is true.) + * If this is 0, the hash algorithm in + * \p cipher_suite becomes unspecified. + */ +static void psa_pake_cs_set_hash(psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite, + psa_algorithm_t hash); + +/** The type of the state data structure for PAKE operations. + * + * Before calling any function on a PAKE operation object, the application + * must initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_pake_operation_t operation; + * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_pake_operation_t operation = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT, + * for example: + * \code + * psa_pake_operation_t operation = PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function psa_pake_operation_init() + * to the structure, for example: + * \code + * psa_pake_operation_t operation; + * operation = psa_pake_operation_init(); + * \endcode + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure. + * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */ +typedef struct psa_pake_operation_s psa_pake_operation_t; + +/** The type of input values for PAKE operations. */ +typedef struct psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_s psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t; + +/** The type of computation stage for J-PAKE operations. */ +typedef struct psa_jpake_computation_stage_s psa_jpake_computation_stage_t; + +/** Return an initial value for a PAKE operation object. + */ +static psa_pake_operation_t psa_pake_operation_init(void); + +/** Get the length of the password in bytes from given inputs. + * + * \param[in] inputs Operation inputs. + * \param[out] password_len Password length. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * Password hasn't been set yet. + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_password_len( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + size_t *password_len); + +/** Get the password from given inputs. + * + * \param[in] inputs Operation inputs. + * \param[out] buffer Return buffer for password. + * \param buffer_size Size of the return buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] buffer_length Actual size of the password in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * Password hasn't been set yet. + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_password( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + uint8_t *buffer, size_t buffer_size, size_t *buffer_length); + +/** Get the length of the user id in bytes from given inputs. + * + * \param[in] inputs Operation inputs. + * \param[out] user_len User id length. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * User id hasn't been set yet. + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_user_len( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + size_t *user_len); + +/** Get the length of the peer id in bytes from given inputs. + * + * \param[in] inputs Operation inputs. + * \param[out] peer_len Peer id length. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * Peer id hasn't been set yet. + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_peer_len( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + size_t *peer_len); + +/** Get the user id from given inputs. + * + * \param[in] inputs Operation inputs. + * \param[out] user_id User id. + * \param user_id_size Size of \p user_id in bytes. + * \param[out] user_id_len Size of the user id in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * User id hasn't been set yet. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p user_id is too small. + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_user( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + uint8_t *user_id, size_t user_id_size, size_t *user_id_len); + +/** Get the peer id from given inputs. + * + * \param[in] inputs Operation inputs. + * \param[out] peer_id Peer id. + * \param peer_id_size Size of \p peer_id in bytes. + * \param[out] peer_id_length Size of the peer id in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * Peer id hasn't been set yet. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p peer_id is too small. + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_peer( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + uint8_t *peer_id, size_t peer_id_size, size_t *peer_id_length); + +/** Get the cipher suite from given inputs. + * + * \param[in] inputs Operation inputs. + * \param[out] cipher_suite Return buffer for role. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * Cipher_suite hasn't been set yet. + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_cipher_suite( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite); + +/** Set the session information for a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * The sequence of operations to set up a password-authenticated key exchange + * is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_pake_operation_t, e.g. + * #PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_pake_setup() to specify the cipher suite. + * -# Call \c psa_pake_set_xxx() functions on the operation to complete the + * setup. The exact sequence of \c psa_pake_set_xxx() functions that needs + * to be called depends on the algorithm in use. + * + * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` + * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) + * for more information. + * + * A typical sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key + * exchange: + * -# Call psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...) to get the + * key share that needs to be sent to the peer. + * -# Call psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...) to provide + * the key share that was received from the peer. + * -# Depending on the algorithm additional calls to psa_pake_output() and + * psa_pake_input() might be necessary. + * -# Call psa_pake_get_implicit_key() for accessing the shared secret. + * + * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` + * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) + * for more information. + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_pake_setup(), + * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_pake_abort(). The + * application may call psa_pake_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_pake_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an + * operation: + * - A call to psa_pake_abort(). + * - A successful call to psa_pake_get_implicit_key(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized but not set up yet. + * \param[in] cipher_suite The cipher suite to use. (A cipher suite fully + * characterizes a PAKE algorithm and determines + * the algorithm as well.) + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The algorithm in \p cipher_suite is not a PAKE algorithm, or the + * PAKE primitive in \p cipher_suite is not compatible with the + * PAKE algorithm, or the hash algorithm in \p cipher_suite is invalid + * or not compatible with the PAKE algorithm and primitive. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The algorithm in \p cipher_suite is not a supported PAKE algorithm, + * or the PAKE primitive in \p cipher_suite is not supported or not + * compatible with the PAKE algorithm, or the hash algorithm in + * \p cipher_suite is not supported or not compatible with the PAKE + * algorithm and primitive. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid, or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_setup(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite); + +/** Set the password for a password-authenticated key exchange from key ID. + * + * Call this function when the password, or a value derived from the password, + * is already present in the key store. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set the password for. It + * must have been set up by psa_pake_setup() and + * not yet in use (neither psa_pake_output() nor + * psa_pake_input() has been called yet). It must + * be on operation for which the password hasn't + * been set yet (psa_pake_set_password_key() + * hasn't been called yet). + * \param password Identifier of the key holding the password or a + * value derived from the password (eg. by a + * memory-hard function). It must remain valid + * until the operation terminates. It must be of + * type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD or + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH. It has to allow + * the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \p password is not a valid key identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE flag, or it does not + * permit the \p operation's algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key type for \p password is not #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD or + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH, or \p password is not compatible with + * the \p operation's cipher suite. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The key type or key size of \p password is not supported with the + * \p operation's cipher suite. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must have been set up.), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_set_password_key(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t password); + +/** Set the user ID for a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * Call this function to set the user ID. For PAKE algorithms that associate a + * user identifier with each side of the session you need to call + * psa_pake_set_peer() as well. For PAKE algorithms that associate a single + * user identifier with the session, call psa_pake_set_user() only. + * + * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` + * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) + * for more information. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set the user ID for. It + * must have been set up by psa_pake_setup() and + * not yet in use (neither psa_pake_output() nor + * psa_pake_input() has been called yet). It must + * be on operation for which the user ID hasn't + * been set (psa_pake_set_user() hasn't been + * called yet). + * \param[in] user_id The user ID to authenticate with. + * \param user_id_len Size of the \p user_id buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p user_id is not valid for the \p operation's algorithm and cipher + * suite. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The value of \p user_id is not supported by the implementation. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid, or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_set_user(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *user_id, + size_t user_id_len); + +/** Set the peer ID for a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * Call this function in addition to psa_pake_set_user() for PAKE algorithms + * that associate a user identifier with each side of the session. For PAKE + * algorithms that associate a single user identifier with the session, call + * psa_pake_set_user() only. + * + * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` + * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) + * for more information. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set the peer ID for. It + * must have been set up by psa_pake_setup() and + * not yet in use (neither psa_pake_output() nor + * psa_pake_input() has been called yet). It must + * be on operation for which the peer ID hasn't + * been set (psa_pake_set_peer() hasn't been + * called yet). + * \param[in] peer_id The peer's ID to authenticate. + * \param peer_id_len Size of the \p peer_id buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p peer_id is not valid for the \p operation's algorithm and cipher + * suite. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The algorithm doesn't associate a second identity with the session. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * Calling psa_pake_set_peer() is invalid with the \p operation's + * algorithm, the operation state is not valid, or the library has not + * been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_set_peer(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *peer_id, + size_t peer_id_len); + +/** Set the application role for a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * Not all PAKE algorithms need to differentiate the communicating entities. + * It is optional to call this function for PAKEs that don't require a role + * to be specified. For such PAKEs the application role parameter is ignored, + * or #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE can be passed as \c role. + * + * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` + * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) + * for more information. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to specify the + * application's role for. It must have been set up + * by psa_pake_setup() and not yet in use (neither + * psa_pake_output() nor psa_pake_input() has been + * called yet). It must be on operation for which + * the application's role hasn't been specified + * (psa_pake_set_role() hasn't been called yet). + * \param role A value of type ::psa_pake_role_t indicating the + * application's role in the PAKE the algorithm + * that is being set up. For more information see + * the documentation of \c PSA_PAKE_ROLE_XXX + * constants. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The \p role is not a valid PAKE role in the \p operation’s algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The \p role for this algorithm is not supported or is not valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid, or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_set_role(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_pake_role_t role); + +/** Get output for a step of a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * Depending on the algorithm being executed, you might need to call this + * function several times or you might not need to call this at all. + * + * The exact sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key + * exchange depends on the algorithm in use. Refer to the documentation of + * individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type + * ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) for more + * information. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_pake_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active PAKE operation. + * \param step The step of the algorithm for which the output is + * requested. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written in the + * format appropriate for this \p step. Refer to + * the documentation of the individual + * \c PSA_PAKE_STEP_XXX constants for more + * information. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. This must + * be at least #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c alg, \c + * primitive, \p output_step) where \c alg and + * \p primitive are the PAKE algorithm and primitive + * in the operation's cipher suite, and \p step is + * the output step. + * + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes of the returned + * output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p step is not supported with the operation's algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, and fully set + * up, and this call must conform to the algorithm's requirements + * for ordering of input and output steps), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_output(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_pake_step_t step, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Provide input for a step of a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * Depending on the algorithm being executed, you might need to call this + * function several times or you might not need to call this at all. + * + * The exact sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key + * exchange depends on the algorithm in use. Refer to the documentation of + * individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type + * ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) for more + * information. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_pake_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active PAKE operation. + * \param step The step for which the input is provided. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the input in the format + * appropriate for this \p step. Refer to the + * documentation of the individual + * \c PSA_PAKE_STEP_XXX constants for more + * information. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The verification fails for a #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF input step. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p input_length is not compatible with the \p operation’s algorithm, + * or the \p input is not valid for the \p operation's algorithm, + * cipher suite or \p step. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p step p is not supported with the \p operation's algorithm, or the + * \p input is not supported for the \p operation's algorithm, cipher + * suite or \p step. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, and fully set + * up, and this call must conform to the algorithm's requirements + * for ordering of input and output steps), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_input(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_pake_step_t step, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Get implicitly confirmed shared secret from a PAKE. + * + * At this point there is a cryptographic guarantee that only the authenticated + * party who used the same password is able to compute the key. But there is no + * guarantee that the peer is the party it claims to be and was able to do so. + * + * That is, the authentication is only implicit. Since the peer is not + * authenticated yet, no action should be taken yet that assumes that the peer + * is who it claims to be. For example, do not access restricted files on the + * peer's behalf until an explicit authentication has succeeded. + * + * This function can be called after the key exchange phase of the operation + * has completed. It imports the shared secret output of the PAKE into the + * provided derivation operation. The input step + * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is used when placing the shared key + * material in the key derivation operation. + * + * The exact sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key + * exchange depends on the algorithm in use. Refer to the documentation of + * individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type + * ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) for more + * information. + * + * When this function returns successfully, \p operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, both \p operation + * and \c key_derivation operations enter an error state and must be aborted by + * calling psa_pake_abort() and psa_key_derivation_abort() respectively. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active PAKE operation. + * \param[out] output A key derivation operation that is ready + * for an input step of type + * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is not compatible with the + * algorithm in the \p output key derivation operation. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Input from a PAKE is not supported by the algorithm in the \p output + * key derivation operation. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The PAKE operation state is not valid (it must be active, but beyond + * that validity is specific to the algorithm), or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(), + * or the state of \p output is not valid for + * the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET step. This can happen if the + * step is out of order or the application has done this step already + * and it may not be repeated. + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_get_implicit_key(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *output); + +/** Abort a PAKE operation. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the \c + * operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object can be reused + * for another operation by calling psa_pake_setup() again. + * + * This function may be called at any time after the operation + * object has been initialized as described in #psa_pake_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling psa_pake_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to psa_pake_abort() or psa_pake_get_implicit_key() + * is safe and has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation to abort. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_abort(psa_pake_operation_t *operation); + +/**@}*/ + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_pake_output(). + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_pake_output() will not fail due to an insufficient output buffer + * size. The actual size of the output might be smaller in any given call. + * + * See also #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE + * + * \param alg A PAKE algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\p alg) is true). + * \param primitive A primitive of type ::psa_pake_primitive_t that is + * compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * \param output_step A value of type ::psa_pake_step_t that is valid for the + * algorithm \p alg. + * \return A sufficient output buffer size for the specified + * PAKE algorithm, primitive, and output step. If the + * PAKE algorithm, primitive, or output step is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, primitive, output_step) \ + (alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE && \ + primitive == PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, \ + PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256) ? \ + ( \ + output_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE ? 65 : \ + output_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC ? 65 : \ + 32 \ + ) : \ + 0) + +/** A sufficient input buffer size for psa_pake_input(). + * + * The value returned by this macro is guaranteed to be large enough for any + * valid input to psa_pake_input() in an operation with the specified + * parameters. + * + * See also #PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE + * + * \param alg A PAKE algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\p alg) is true). + * \param primitive A primitive of type ::psa_pake_primitive_t that is + * compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * \param input_step A value of type ::psa_pake_step_t that is valid for the + * algorithm \p alg. + * \return A sufficient input buffer size for the specified + * input, cipher suite and algorithm. If the cipher suite, + * the input type or PAKE algorithm is not recognized, or + * the parameters are incompatible, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE(alg, primitive, input_step) \ + (alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE && \ + primitive == PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, \ + PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256) ? \ + ( \ + input_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE ? 65 : \ + input_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC ? 65 : \ + 32 \ + ) : \ + 0) + +/** Output buffer size for psa_pake_output() for any of the supported PAKE + * algorithm and primitive suites and output step. + * + * This macro must expand to a compile-time constant integer. + * + * The value of this macro must be at least as large as the largest value + * returned by PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE() + * + * See also #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p alg, \p primitive, \p output_step). + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE 65 + +/** Input buffer size for psa_pake_input() for any of the supported PAKE + * algorithm and primitive suites and input step. + * + * This macro must expand to a compile-time constant integer. + * + * The value of this macro must be at least as large as the largest value + * returned by PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE() + * + * See also #PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE(\p alg, \p primitive, \p output_step). + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE 65 + +/** Returns a suitable initializer for a PAKE cipher suite object of type + * psa_pake_cipher_suite_t. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_CIPHER_SUITE_INIT { PSA_ALG_NONE, 0, 0, 0, PSA_ALG_NONE } + +/** Returns a suitable initializer for a PAKE operation object of type + * psa_pake_operation_t. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } +#else +#define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT { 0, PSA_ALG_NONE, 0, PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_SETUP, \ + { 0 }, { { 0 } } } +#endif + +struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s { + psa_algorithm_t algorithm; + psa_pake_primitive_type_t type; + psa_pake_family_t family; + uint16_t bits; + psa_algorithm_t hash; +}; + +static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_pake_cs_get_algorithm( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite) +{ + return cipher_suite->algorithm; +} + +static inline void psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm( + psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite, + psa_algorithm_t algorithm) +{ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(algorithm)) { + cipher_suite->algorithm = 0; + } else { + cipher_suite->algorithm = algorithm; + } +} + +static inline psa_pake_primitive_t psa_pake_cs_get_primitive( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite) +{ + return PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(cipher_suite->type, cipher_suite->family, + cipher_suite->bits); +} + +static inline void psa_pake_cs_set_primitive( + psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite, + psa_pake_primitive_t primitive) +{ + cipher_suite->type = (psa_pake_primitive_type_t) (primitive >> 24); + cipher_suite->family = (psa_pake_family_t) (0xFF & (primitive >> 16)); + cipher_suite->bits = (uint16_t) (0xFFFF & primitive); +} + +static inline psa_pake_family_t psa_pake_cs_get_family( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite) +{ + return cipher_suite->family; +} + +static inline uint16_t psa_pake_cs_get_bits( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite) +{ + return cipher_suite->bits; +} + +static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_pake_cs_get_hash( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite) +{ + return cipher_suite->hash; +} + +static inline void psa_pake_cs_set_hash(psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite, + psa_algorithm_t hash) +{ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash)) { + cipher_suite->hash = 0; + } else { + cipher_suite->hash = hash; + } +} + +struct psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_s { + uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password_len); + uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_len); + uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_len); + psa_key_attributes_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(attributes); + psa_pake_cipher_suite_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_suite); +}; + +typedef enum psa_crypto_driver_pake_step { + PSA_JPAKE_STEP_INVALID = 0, /* Invalid step */ + PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE = 1, /* Round 1: input/output key share (for ephemeral private key X1).*/ + PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC = 2, /* Round 1: input/output Schnorr NIZKP public key for the X1 key */ + PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PROOF = 3, /* Round 1: input/output Schnorr NIZKP proof for the X1 key */ + PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_KEY_SHARE = 4, /* Round 1: input/output key share (for ephemeral private key X2).*/ + PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC = 5, /* Round 1: input/output Schnorr NIZKP public key for the X2 key */ + PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PROOF = 6, /* Round 1: input/output Schnorr NIZKP proof for the X2 key */ + PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_KEY_SHARE = 7, /* Round 2: output X2S key (our key) */ + PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC = 8, /* Round 2: output Schnorr NIZKP public key for the X2S key (our key) */ + PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_ZK_PROOF = 9, /* Round 2: output Schnorr NIZKP proof for the X2S key (our key) */ + PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_KEY_SHARE = 10, /* Round 2: input X4S key (from peer) */ + PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC = 11, /* Round 2: input Schnorr NIZKP public key for the X4S key (from peer) */ + PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_ZK_PROOF = 12 /* Round 2: input Schnorr NIZKP proof for the X4S key (from peer) */ +} psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t; + +typedef enum psa_jpake_round { + PSA_JPAKE_FIRST = 0, + PSA_JPAKE_SECOND = 1, + PSA_JPAKE_FINISHED = 2 +} psa_jpake_round_t; + +typedef enum psa_jpake_io_mode { + PSA_JPAKE_INPUT = 0, + PSA_JPAKE_OUTPUT = 1 +} psa_jpake_io_mode_t; + +struct psa_jpake_computation_stage_s { + /* The J-PAKE round we are currently on */ + psa_jpake_round_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(round); + /* The 'mode' we are currently in (inputting or outputting) */ + psa_jpake_io_mode_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(io_mode); + /* The number of completed inputs so far this round */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(inputs); + /* The number of completed outputs so far this round */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(outputs); + /* The next expected step (KEY_SHARE, ZK_PUBLIC or ZK_PROOF) */ + psa_pake_step_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(step); +}; + +#define PSA_JPAKE_EXPECTED_INPUTS(round) ((round) == PSA_JPAKE_FINISHED ? 0 : \ + ((round) == PSA_JPAKE_FIRST ? 2 : 1)) +#define PSA_JPAKE_EXPECTED_OUTPUTS(round) ((round) == PSA_JPAKE_FINISHED ? 0 : \ + ((round) == PSA_JPAKE_FIRST ? 2 : 1)) + +struct psa_pake_operation_s { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle; +#else + /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the + * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping + * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. + * ID values are auto-generated in psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h + * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to + * any driver (i.e. none of the driver contexts are active). */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); + /* Algorithm of the PAKE operation */ + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); + /* A primitive of type compatible with algorithm */ + psa_pake_primitive_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(primitive); + /* Stage of the PAKE operation: waiting for the setup, collecting inputs + * or computing. */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(stage); + /* Holds computation stage of the PAKE algorithms. */ + union { + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy); +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) + psa_jpake_computation_stage_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(jpake); +#endif + } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(computation_stage); + union { + psa_driver_pake_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); + psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(inputs); + } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(data); +#endif +}; + +static inline struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s psa_pake_cipher_suite_init(void) +{ + const struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s v = PSA_PAKE_CIPHER_SUITE_INIT; + return v; +} + +static inline struct psa_pake_operation_s psa_pake_operation_init(void) +{ + const struct psa_pake_operation_s v = PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT; + return v; +} + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_legacy.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_legacy.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7df3614d6a --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_legacy.h @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_legacy.h + * + * \brief Add temporary suppport for deprecated symbols before they are + * removed from the library. + * + * PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR and MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR + * symbols are deprecated. + * New symols add a suffix to that base name in order to clearly state what is + * the expected use for the key (use, import, export, generate, derive). + * Here we define some backward compatibility support for uses stil using + * the legacy symbols. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_LEGACY_H +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_LEGACY_H + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) //no-check-names +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) //no-check-names +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) //no-check-names +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) //no-check-names +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +#endif +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_LEGACY_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_platform.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_platform.h index a173c78346..a871ee1246 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_platform.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_platform.h @@ -15,44 +15,25 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_H #define PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" -/* Include the Mbed TLS configuration file, the way Mbed TLS does it - * in each of its header files. */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -/* Translate between classic MBEDTLS_xxx feature symbols and PSA_xxx - * feature symbols. */ -#include "mbedtls/config_psa.h" +/* + * Include the build-time configuration information header. Here, we do not + * include `"mbedtls/build_info.h"` directly but `"psa/build_info.h"`, which + * is basically just an alias to it. This is to ease the maintenance of the + * TF-PSA-Crypto repository which has a different build system and + * configuration. + */ +#include "psa/build_info.h" /* PSA requires several types which C99 provides in stdint.h. */ #include -#if (defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER)) && \ - !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) -#define inline __inline -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) /* Building for the PSA Crypto service on a PSA platform, a key owner is a PSA @@ -104,8 +85,18 @@ static inline int mbedtls_key_owner_id_equal(mbedtls_key_owner_id_t id1, * are expected to replace it with a custom definition. */ typedef struct { - uintptr_t opaque[2]; + uintptr_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(opaque)[2]; } mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t; #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +/** The type of the client handle used in context structures + * + * When a client view of the multipart context structures is required, + * this handle is used to keep a mapping with the service side of the + * context which contains the actual data. + */ +typedef uint32_t mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t; +#endif + #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h index a7c42dc7ad..9ce14bba62 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h @@ -17,22 +17,11 @@ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_H #define PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" #include "crypto_driver_common.h" @@ -97,21 +86,21 @@ typedef struct { * - psa_destroy_key() causes a call to * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy. */ - const void *const persistent_data; + const void *const MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(persistent_data); /** The size of \c persistent_data in bytes. * * This is always equal to the value of the `persistent_data_size` field * of the ::psa_drv_se_t structure when the driver is registered. */ - const size_t persistent_data_size; + const size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(persistent_data_size); /** Driver transient data. * * The core initializes this value to 0 and does not read or modify it * afterwards. The driver may store whatever it wants in this field. */ - uintptr_t transient_data; + uintptr_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transient_data); } psa_drv_se_context_t; /** \brief A driver initialization function. @@ -323,28 +312,28 @@ typedef struct { /**The size in bytes of the hardware-specific secure element MAC context * structure */ - size_t context_size; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(context_size); /** Function that performs a MAC setup operation */ - psa_drv_se_mac_setup_t p_setup; + psa_drv_se_mac_setup_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_setup); /** Function that performs a MAC update operation */ - psa_drv_se_mac_update_t p_update; + psa_drv_se_mac_update_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_update); /** Function that completes a MAC operation */ - psa_drv_se_mac_finish_t p_finish; + psa_drv_se_mac_finish_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_finish); /** Function that completes a MAC operation with a verify check */ - psa_drv_se_mac_finish_verify_t p_finish_verify; + psa_drv_se_mac_finish_verify_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_finish_verify); /** Function that aborts a previously started MAC operation */ - psa_drv_se_mac_abort_t p_abort; + psa_drv_se_mac_abort_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_abort); /** Function that performs a MAC operation in one call */ - psa_drv_se_mac_generate_t p_mac; + psa_drv_se_mac_generate_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_mac); /** Function that performs a MAC and verify operation in one call */ - psa_drv_se_mac_verify_t p_mac_verify; + psa_drv_se_mac_verify_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_mac_verify); } psa_drv_se_mac_t; /**@}*/ @@ -510,22 +499,22 @@ typedef struct { /** The size in bytes of the hardware-specific secure element cipher * context structure */ - size_t context_size; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(context_size); /** Function that performs a cipher setup operation */ - psa_drv_se_cipher_setup_t p_setup; + psa_drv_se_cipher_setup_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_setup); /** Function that sets a cipher IV (if necessary) */ - psa_drv_se_cipher_set_iv_t p_set_iv; + psa_drv_se_cipher_set_iv_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_set_iv); /** Function that performs a cipher update operation */ - psa_drv_se_cipher_update_t p_update; + psa_drv_se_cipher_update_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_update); /** Function that completes a cipher operation */ - psa_drv_se_cipher_finish_t p_finish; + psa_drv_se_cipher_finish_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_finish); /** Function that aborts a cipher operation */ - psa_drv_se_cipher_abort_t p_abort; + psa_drv_se_cipher_abort_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_abort); /** Function that performs ECB mode for a cipher operation * (Danger: ECB mode should not be used directly by clients of the PSA * Crypto Client API) */ - psa_drv_se_cipher_ecb_t p_ecb; + psa_drv_se_cipher_ecb_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_ecb); } psa_drv_se_cipher_t; /**@}*/ @@ -681,13 +670,13 @@ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_asymmetric_decrypt_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *dr */ typedef struct { /** Function that performs an asymmetric sign operation */ - psa_drv_se_asymmetric_sign_t p_sign; + psa_drv_se_asymmetric_sign_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_sign); /** Function that performs an asymmetric verify operation */ - psa_drv_se_asymmetric_verify_t p_verify; + psa_drv_se_asymmetric_verify_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_verify); /** Function that performs an asymmetric encrypt operation */ - psa_drv_se_asymmetric_encrypt_t p_encrypt; + psa_drv_se_asymmetric_encrypt_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_encrypt); /** Function that performs an asymmetric decrypt operation */ - psa_drv_se_asymmetric_decrypt_t p_decrypt; + psa_drv_se_asymmetric_decrypt_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_decrypt); } psa_drv_se_asymmetric_t; /**@}*/ @@ -798,9 +787,9 @@ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_aead_decrypt_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_cont */ typedef struct { /** Function that performs the AEAD encrypt operation */ - psa_drv_se_aead_encrypt_t p_encrypt; + psa_drv_se_aead_encrypt_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_encrypt); /** Function that performs the AEAD decrypt operation */ - psa_drv_se_aead_decrypt_t p_decrypt; + psa_drv_se_aead_decrypt_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_decrypt); } psa_drv_se_aead_t; /**@}*/ @@ -1119,19 +1108,19 @@ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_generate_key_t)( */ typedef struct { /** Function that allocates a slot for a key. */ - psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t p_allocate; + psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_allocate); /** Function that checks the validity of a slot for a key. */ - psa_drv_se_validate_slot_number_t p_validate_slot_number; + psa_drv_se_validate_slot_number_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_validate_slot_number); /** Function that performs a key import operation */ - psa_drv_se_import_key_t p_import; + psa_drv_se_import_key_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_import); /** Function that performs a generation */ - psa_drv_se_generate_key_t p_generate; + psa_drv_se_generate_key_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_generate); /** Function that performs a key destroy operation */ - psa_drv_se_destroy_key_t p_destroy; + psa_drv_se_destroy_key_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_destroy); /** Function that performs a key export operation */ - psa_drv_se_export_key_t p_export; + psa_drv_se_export_key_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_export); /** Function that performs a public key export operation */ - psa_drv_se_export_key_t p_export_public; + psa_drv_se_export_key_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_export_public); } psa_drv_se_key_management_t; /**@}*/ @@ -1262,16 +1251,16 @@ typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export_t)(void *op_context, */ typedef struct { /** The driver-specific size of the key derivation context */ - size_t context_size; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(context_size); /** Function that performs a key derivation setup */ - psa_drv_se_key_derivation_setup_t p_setup; + psa_drv_se_key_derivation_setup_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_setup); /** Function that sets key derivation collateral */ - psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral_t p_collateral; + psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_collateral); /** Function that performs a final key derivation step */ - psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive_t p_derive; + psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_derive); /** Function that performs a final key derivation or agreement and * exports the key */ - psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export_t p_export; + psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_export); } psa_drv_se_key_derivation_t; /**@}*/ @@ -1292,7 +1281,7 @@ typedef struct { * a different version of this specification. * Use #PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION. */ - uint32_t hal_version; + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hal_version); /** The size of the driver's persistent data in bytes. * @@ -1302,7 +1291,7 @@ typedef struct { * for more information about why and how a driver can use * persistent data. */ - size_t persistent_data_size; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(persistent_data_size); /** The driver initialization function. * @@ -1314,14 +1303,14 @@ typedef struct { * If this field is \c NULL, it is equivalent to a function that does * nothing and returns #PSA_SUCCESS. */ - psa_drv_se_init_t p_init; - - const psa_drv_se_key_management_t *key_management; - const psa_drv_se_mac_t *mac; - const psa_drv_se_cipher_t *cipher; - const psa_drv_se_aead_t *aead; - const psa_drv_se_asymmetric_t *asymmetric; - const psa_drv_se_key_derivation_t *derivation; + psa_drv_se_init_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_init); + + const psa_drv_se_key_management_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_management); + const psa_drv_se_mac_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mac); + const psa_drv_se_cipher_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher); + const psa_drv_se_aead_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(aead); + const psa_drv_se_asymmetric_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(asymmetric); + const psa_drv_se_key_derivation_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(derivation); } psa_drv_se_t; /** The current version of the secure element driver HAL. diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h index 9f58c7fb5e..635ee98f80 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h @@ -22,34 +22,25 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SIZES_H #define PSA_CRYPTO_SIZES_H -/* Include the Mbed TLS configuration file, the way Mbed TLS does it - * in each of its header files. */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +/* + * Include the build-time configuration information header. Here, we do not + * include `"mbedtls/build_info.h"` directly but `"psa/build_info.h"`, which + * is basically just an alias to it. This is to ease the maintenance of the + * TF-PSA-Crypto repository which has a different build system and + * configuration. + */ +#include "psa/build_info.h" -#define PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits) (((bits) + 7) / 8) -#define PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(bytes) ((bytes) * 8) +#define PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits) (((bits) + 7u) / 8u) +#define PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(bytes) ((bytes) * 8u) +#define PSA_MAX_OF_THREE(a, b, c) ((a) <= (b) ? (b) <= (c) ? \ + (c) : (b) : (a) <= (c) ? (c) : (a)) #define PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(block_size, length) \ (((length) + (block_size) - 1) / (block_size) * (block_size)) @@ -68,22 +59,20 @@ */ #define PSA_HASH_LENGTH(alg) \ ( \ - PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD2 ? 16 : \ - PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD4 ? 16 : \ - PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD5 ? 16 : \ - PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ? 20 : \ - PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ? 20 : \ - PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ? 28 : \ - PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ? 32 : \ - PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ? 48 : \ - PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ? 64 : \ - PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ? 28 : \ - PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ? 32 : \ - PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ? 28 : \ - PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ? 32 : \ - PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ? 48 : \ - PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ? 64 : \ - 0) + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD5 ? 16u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ? 20u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ? 20u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ? 28u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ? 32u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ? 48u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ? 64u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ? 28u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ? 32u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ? 28u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ? 32u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ? 48u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ? 64u : \ + 0u) /** The input block size of a hash algorithm, in bytes. * @@ -102,22 +91,20 @@ */ #define PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(alg) \ ( \ - PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD2 ? 16 : \ - PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD4 ? 64 : \ - PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD5 ? 64 : \ - PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ? 64 : \ - PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ? 64 : \ - PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ? 64 : \ - PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ? 64 : \ - PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ? 128 : \ - PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ? 128 : \ - PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ? 128 : \ - PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ? 128 : \ - PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ? 144 : \ - PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ? 136 : \ - PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ? 104 : \ - PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ? 72 : \ - 0) + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD5 ? 64u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ? 64u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ? 64u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ? 64u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ? 64u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ? 128u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ? 128u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ? 128u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ? 128u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ? 144u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ? 136u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ? 104u : \ + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ? 72u : \ + 0u) /** \def PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE * @@ -126,15 +113,41 @@ * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value * is the maximum size of a hash in bytes. */ -/* Note: for HMAC-SHA-3, the block size is 144 bytes for HMAC-SHA3-226, +/* Note: for HMAC-SHA-3, the block size is 144 bytes for HMAC-SHA3-224, * 136 bytes for HMAC-SHA3-256, 104 bytes for SHA3-384, 72 bytes for * HMAC-SHA3-512. */ -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) -#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 64 -#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128 -#else -#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 32 -#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 64 +/* Note: PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE should be kept in sync with MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE, + * see the note on MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE for details. */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224) +#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 144u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256) +#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 136u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) +#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) +#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384) +#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 104u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512) +#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 72u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) +#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 64u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224) +#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 64u +#else /* SHA-1 or smaller */ +#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 64u +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512) +#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 64u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384) +#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 48u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256) +#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 32u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224) +#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 28u +#else /* SHA-1 or smaller */ +#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 20u #endif /** \def PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE @@ -175,13 +188,13 @@ #define PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(key_type, key_bits, alg) \ (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 ? \ PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) : \ - ((void) (key_bits), 0)) + ((void) (key_bits), 0u)) /** The maximum tag size for all supported AEAD algorithms, in bytes. * * See also #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\p key_type, \p key_bits, \p alg). */ -#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE 16 +#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE 16u /* The maximum size of an RSA key on this implementation, in bits. * This is a vendor-specific macro. @@ -196,38 +209,66 @@ * * Note that an implementation may set different size limits for different * operations, and does not need to accept all key sizes up to the limit. */ -#define PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS 4096 +#define PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS 4096u + +/* The minimum size of an RSA key on this implementation, in bits. + * This is a vendor-specific macro. + * + * Limits RSA key generation to a minimum due to avoid accidental misuse. + * This value cannot be less than 128 bits. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS) +#define PSA_VENDOR_RSA_GENERATE_MIN_KEY_BITS MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS +#else +#define PSA_VENDOR_RSA_GENERATE_MIN_KEY_BITS 1024 +#endif + +/* The maximum size of an DH key on this implementation, in bits. + * This is a vendor-specific macro.*/ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192) +#define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 8192u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144) +#define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 6144u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096) +#define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 4096u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072) +#define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 3072u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048) +#define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 2048u +#else +#define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 0u +#endif /* The maximum size of an ECC key on this implementation, in bits. * This is a vendor-specific macro. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) -#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 521 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) -#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 512 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) -#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 448 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) -#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 384 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) -#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 384 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) -#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 256 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) -#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 256 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) -#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 256 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) -#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 255 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) -#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 224 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) -#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 224 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) -#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 192 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) -#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 192 +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 521u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 512u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 448u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 384u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 384u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 256u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 256u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 256u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 255u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 224u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 224u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 192u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192) +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 192u #else -#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 0 +#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 0u #endif /** This macro returns the maximum supported length of the PSK for the @@ -245,10 +286,23 @@ * Therefore, no implementation should define a value smaller than 64 * for #PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE. */ -#define PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE 128 +#define PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE 128u + +/* The expected size of input passed to psa_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_input, + * which is expected to work with P-256 curve only. */ +#define PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_INPUT_SIZE 65u + +/* The size of a serialized K.X coordinate to be used in + * psa_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_input. This function only accepts the P-256 + * curve. */ +#define PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_DATA_SIZE 32u + +/* The maximum number of iterations for PBKDF2 on this implementation, in bits. + * This is a vendor-specific macro. This can be configured if necessary */ +#define PSA_VENDOR_PBKDF2_MAX_ITERATIONS 0xffffffffU /** The maximum size of a block cipher. */ -#define PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE 16 +#define PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE 16u /** The size of the output of psa_mac_sign_finish(), in bytes. * @@ -275,7 +329,7 @@ ((alg) & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK ? PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(alg) : \ PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(alg) ? PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg)) : \ PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC(alg) ? PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \ - ((void) (key_type), (void) (key_bits), 0)) + ((void) (key_type), (void) (key_bits), 0u)) /** The maximum size of the output of psa_aead_encrypt(), in bytes. * @@ -306,7 +360,7 @@ #define PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, plaintext_length) \ (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 ? \ (plaintext_length) + PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) : \ - 0) + 0u) /** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_encrypt(), for any of the * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. @@ -360,7 +414,7 @@ (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 && \ (ciphertext_length) > PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) ? \ (ciphertext_length) - PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) : \ - 0) + 0u) /** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_decrypt(), for any of the * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. @@ -410,12 +464,12 @@ */ #define PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) \ (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) == 16 ? \ - MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(alg, PSA_ALG_CCM) ? 13 : \ - MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(alg, PSA_ALG_GCM) ? 12 : \ - 0 : \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(alg, PSA_ALG_CCM) ? 13u : \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(alg, PSA_ALG_GCM) ? 12u : \ + 0u : \ (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 && \ - MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(alg, PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) ? 12 : \ - 0) + MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(alg, PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) ? 12u : \ + 0u) /** The maximum default nonce size among all supported pairs of key types and * AEAD algorithms, in bytes. @@ -428,7 +482,7 @@ * just the largest size that may be generated by * #psa_aead_generate_nonce(). */ -#define PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE 13 +#define PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE 13u /** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_update(). * @@ -465,7 +519,7 @@ PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ? \ PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type), (input_length)) : \ (input_length) : \ - 0) + 0u) /** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_update(), for any of the * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. @@ -505,7 +559,7 @@ (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 && \ PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ? \ PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \ - 0) + 0u) /** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_aead_finish(), for any of the * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. @@ -539,7 +593,7 @@ (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 && \ PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ? \ PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \ - 0) + 0u) /** A sufficient plaintext buffer size for psa_aead_verify(), for any of the * supported key types and AEAD algorithms. @@ -550,8 +604,8 @@ #define PSA_RSA_MINIMUM_PADDING_SIZE(alg) \ (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) ? \ - 2 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH(alg)) + 1 : \ - 11 /*PKCS#1v1.5*/) + 2u * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH(alg)) + 1u : \ + 11u /*PKCS#1v1.5*/) /** * \brief ECDSA signature size for a given curve bit size @@ -562,7 +616,7 @@ * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its argument is one. */ #define PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(curve_bits) \ - (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(curve_bits) * 2) + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(curve_bits) * 2u) /** Sufficient signature buffer size for psa_sign_hash(). * @@ -592,7 +646,7 @@ #define PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? ((void) alg, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits)) : \ PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(key_type) ? PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(key_bits) : \ - ((void) alg, 0)) + ((void) alg, 0u)) #define PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE \ PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) @@ -604,10 +658,18 @@ * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value * is the maximum size of a signature in bytes. */ -#define PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE \ - (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) > PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE ? \ - PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) : \ - PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE) +#define PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE 1 + +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + (PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE > PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE) +#undef PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +#define PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +#endif +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS)) && \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) > PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE) +#undef PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE +#define PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) +#endif /** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_encrypt(). * @@ -637,7 +699,7 @@ #define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? \ ((void) alg, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits)) : \ - 0) + 0u) /** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_encrypt(), for any * supported asymmetric encryption. @@ -676,7 +738,7 @@ #define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? \ PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) - PSA_RSA_MINIMUM_PADDING_SIZE(alg) : \ - 0) + 0u) /** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_decrypt(), for any * supported asymmetric decryption. @@ -699,7 +761,7 @@ * - 0 to 1 bytes of leading 0 due to the sign bit. */ #define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(bits) \ - ((bits) / 8 + 5) + ((bits) / 8u + 5u) /* Maximum size of the export encoding of an RSA public key. * Assumes that the public exponent is less than 2^32. @@ -713,7 +775,7 @@ * - 7 bytes for the public exponent. */ #define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ - (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) + 11) + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) + 11u) /* Maximum size of the export encoding of an RSA key pair. * Assumes that the public exponent is less than 2^32 and that the size @@ -738,7 +800,7 @@ * - 7 bytes for the public exponent. */ #define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ - (9 * PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE((key_bits) / 2 + 1) + 14) + (9u * PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE((key_bits) / 2u + 1u) + 14u) /* Maximum size of the export encoding of a DSA public key. * @@ -757,7 +819,7 @@ * - 1 + 1 + 32 bytes for 1 sub-size INTEGER (q <= 256 bits). */ #define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ - (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) * 3 + 59) + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) * 3u + 59u) /* Maximum size of the export encoding of a DSA key pair. * @@ -776,7 +838,7 @@ * - 2 * (1 + 1 + 32) bytes for 2 sub-size INTEGERs (q, x <= 256 bits). */ #define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ - (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) * 3 + 75) + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) * 3u + 75u) /* Maximum size of the export encoding of an ECC public key. * @@ -789,7 +851,7 @@ * - 1 byte + 2 * point size. */ #define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ - (2 * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) + 1) + (2u * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) + 1u) /* Maximum size of the export encoding of an ECC key pair. * @@ -798,6 +860,18 @@ #define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits)) +/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an DH key pair. + * + * An DH key pair is represented by the secret value. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_FFDH_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits)) + +/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an DH public key. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_FFDH_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits)) + /** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_export_key() or * psa_export_public_key(). * @@ -839,13 +913,14 @@ */ #define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED(key_type) ? PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) : \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(key_type) ? PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) : \ (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEY_PAIR ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ - 0) + 0u) /** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_export_public_key(). * @@ -895,7 +970,8 @@ #define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \ - 0) + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(key_type) ? PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) : \ + 0u) /** Sufficient buffer size for exporting any asymmetric key pair. * @@ -905,11 +981,29 @@ * * See also #PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits). */ -#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE \ - (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) > \ - PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) ? \ - PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) : \ - PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)) +#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE 1 + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \ + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) > \ + PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE) +#undef PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE +#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \ + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) > \ + PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE) +#undef PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE +#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \ + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_FFDH_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS) > \ + PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE) +#undef PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE +#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_FFDH_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS) +#endif /** Sufficient buffer size for exporting any asymmetric public key. * @@ -920,11 +1014,29 @@ * * See also #PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits). */ -#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE \ - (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) > \ - PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) ? \ - PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) : \ - PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)) +#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE 1 + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) && \ + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) > \ + PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE) +#undef PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE +#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) && \ + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) > \ + PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE) +#undef PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE +#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) && \ + (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_FFDH_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS) > \ + PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE) +#undef PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE +#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_FFDH_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS) +#endif /** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_raw_key_agreement(). * @@ -949,11 +1061,9 @@ * If the parameters are not valid, * the return value is unspecified. */ -/* FFDH is not yet supported in PSA. */ #define PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \ - (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(key_type) ? \ - PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) : \ - 0) + ((PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(key_type) || \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR(key_type)) ? PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) : 0u) /** Maximum size of the output from psa_raw_key_agreement(). * @@ -962,8 +1072,18 @@ * * See also #PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits). */ -#define PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE \ - (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)) +#define PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE 1 + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) && \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) > PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE) +#undef PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE +#define PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) && \ + (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS) > PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE) +#undef PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE +#define PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS) +#endif /** The default IV size for a cipher algorithm, in bytes. * @@ -998,14 +1118,15 @@ (alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING || \ (alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) ? PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \ (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 && \ - (alg) == PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER ? 12 : \ - 0) + (alg) == PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER ? 12u : \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG ? 13u : \ + 0u) /** The maximum IV size for all supported cipher algorithms, in bytes. * * See also #PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(). */ -#define PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE 16 +#define PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE 16u /** The maximum size of the output of psa_cipher_encrypt(), in bytes. * @@ -1030,15 +1151,15 @@ * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, * return 0. */ -#define PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \ - (alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 ? \ - (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) != 0 ? \ - PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type), \ - (input_length) + 1) + \ - PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH((key_type), (alg)) : 0) : \ - (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) ? \ - (input_length) + PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH((key_type), (alg)) : \ - 0)) +#define PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \ + (alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 ? \ + (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) != 0 ? \ + PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type), \ + (input_length) + 1u) + \ + PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH((key_type), (alg)) : 0u) : \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) ? \ + (input_length) + PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH((key_type), (alg)) : \ + 0u)) /** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_encrypt(), for any of the * supported key types and cipher algorithms. @@ -1051,9 +1172,9 @@ * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes. * */ -#define PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \ - (PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE, \ - (input_length) + 1) + \ +#define PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \ + (PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE, \ + (input_length) + 1u) + \ PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE) /** The maximum size of the output of psa_cipher_decrypt(), in bytes. @@ -1075,11 +1196,11 @@ * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, * return 0. */ -#define PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \ - (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) && \ +#define PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) && \ ((key_type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ? \ - (input_length) : \ - 0) + (input_length) : \ + 0u) /** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_decrypt(), for any of the * supported key types and cipher algorithms. @@ -1112,16 +1233,16 @@ * algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, return 0. */ -#define PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \ - (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) ? \ - (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) != 0 ? \ - (((alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 || \ - (alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING || \ - (alg) == PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) ? \ - PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type), \ - input_length) : \ - (input_length)) : 0) : \ - 0) +#define PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) ? \ + (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) != 0 ? \ + (((alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 || \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING || \ + (alg) == PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) ? \ + PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type), \ + input_length) : \ + (input_length)) : 0u) : \ + 0u) /** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_update(), for any of the * supported key types and cipher algorithms. @@ -1157,8 +1278,8 @@ (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) ? \ (alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 ? \ PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \ - 0) : \ - 0) + 0u) : \ + 0u) /** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_cipher_finish(), for any of the * supported key types and cipher algorithms. diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_struct.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_struct.h index 18cbcf4644..3913551aa8 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_struct.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_struct.h @@ -43,55 +43,49 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_H #define PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif -/* Include the Mbed TLS configuration file, the way Mbed TLS does it - * in each of its header files. */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif - -#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" -#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" +/* + * Include the build-time configuration information header. Here, we do not + * include `"mbedtls/build_info.h"` directly but `"psa/build_info.h"`, which + * is basically just an alias to it. This is to ease the maintenance of the + * TF-PSA-Crypto repository which has a different build system and + * configuration. + */ +#include "psa/build_info.h" /* Include the context definition for the compiled-in drivers for the primitive * algorithms. */ #include "psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h" struct psa_hash_operation_s { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle; +#else /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. * ID values are auto-generated in psa_driver_wrappers.h. * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to * any driver (i.e. the driver context is not active, in use). */ - unsigned int id; - psa_driver_hash_context_t ctx; + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); + psa_driver_hash_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); +#endif }; - +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#define PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } +#else #define PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT { 0, { 0 } } +#endif static inline struct psa_hash_operation_s psa_hash_operation_init(void) { const struct psa_hash_operation_s v = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; @@ -99,23 +93,31 @@ static inline struct psa_hash_operation_s psa_hash_operation_init(void) } struct psa_cipher_operation_s { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle; +#else /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. * ID values are auto-generated in psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to * any driver (i.e. none of the driver contexts are active). */ - unsigned int id; + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); - unsigned int iv_required : 1; - unsigned int iv_set : 1; + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_required) : 1; + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_set) : 1; - uint8_t default_iv_length; + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(default_iv_length); - psa_driver_cipher_context_t ctx; + psa_driver_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); +#endif }; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#define PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } +#else #define PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, 0, { 0 } } +#endif static inline struct psa_cipher_operation_s psa_cipher_operation_init(void) { const struct psa_cipher_operation_s v = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; @@ -127,19 +129,27 @@ static inline struct psa_cipher_operation_s psa_cipher_operation_init(void) #include "psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h" struct psa_mac_operation_s { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle; +#else /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. * ID values are auto-generated in psa_driver_wrappers.h * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to * any driver (i.e. none of the driver contexts are active). */ - unsigned int id; - uint8_t mac_size; - unsigned int is_sign : 1; - psa_driver_mac_context_t ctx; + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mac_size); + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(is_sign) : 1; + psa_driver_mac_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); +#endif }; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#define PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } +#else #define PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, { 0 } } +#endif static inline struct psa_mac_operation_s psa_mac_operation_init(void) { const struct psa_mac_operation_s v = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; @@ -147,109 +157,92 @@ static inline struct psa_mac_operation_s psa_mac_operation_init(void) } struct psa_aead_operation_s { - psa_algorithm_t alg; - unsigned int key_set : 1; - unsigned int iv_set : 1; - uint8_t iv_size; - uint8_t block_size; - union { - unsigned dummy; /* Enable easier initializing of the union. */ - mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher; - } ctx; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle; +#else + /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the + * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping + * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. + * ID values are auto-generated in psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h + * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to + * any driver (i.e. none of the driver contexts are active). */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); + + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); + psa_key_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_type); + + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ad_remaining); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(body_remaining); + + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(nonce_set) : 1; + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(lengths_set) : 1; + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ad_started) : 1; + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(body_started) : 1; + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(is_encrypt) : 1; + + psa_driver_aead_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); +#endif }; -#define PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, { 0 } } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#define PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } +#else +#define PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, { 0 } } +#endif static inline struct psa_aead_operation_s psa_aead_operation_init(void) { const struct psa_aead_operation_s v = PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT; return v; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) -typedef struct { - uint8_t *info; - size_t info_length; -#if PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE > 0xff -#error "PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE does not fit in uint8_t" -#endif - uint8_t offset_in_block; - uint8_t block_number; - unsigned int state : 2; - unsigned int info_set : 1; - uint8_t output_block[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; - uint8_t prk[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; - struct psa_mac_operation_s hmac; -} psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) -typedef enum { - PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_INIT, /* no input provided */ - PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_SEED_SET, /* seed has been set */ - PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_KEY_SET, /* key has been set */ - PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_LABEL_SET, /* label has been set */ - PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OUTPUT /* output has been started */ -} psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_state_t; - -typedef struct psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_s { -#if PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE > 0xff -#error "PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE does not fit in uint8_t" -#endif - - /* Indicates how many bytes in the current HMAC block have - * not yet been read by the user. */ - uint8_t left_in_block; - - /* The 1-based number of the block. */ - uint8_t block_number; - - psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_state_t state; - - uint8_t *secret; - size_t secret_length; - uint8_t *seed; - size_t seed_length; - uint8_t *label; - size_t label_length; - - uint8_t Ai[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; - - /* `HMAC_hash( prk, A(i) + seed )` in the notation of RFC 5246, Sect. 5. */ - uint8_t output_block[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; -} psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || - * MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ +/* Include the context definition for the compiled-in drivers for the key + * derivation algorithms. */ +#include "psa/crypto_driver_contexts_key_derivation.h" struct psa_key_derivation_s { - psa_algorithm_t alg; - unsigned int can_output_key : 1; - size_t capacity; - union { - /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */ - uint8_t dummy; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) - psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t hkdf; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) - psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t tls12_prf; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle; +#else + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(can_output_key) : 1; + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(capacity); + psa_driver_key_derivation_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); #endif - } ctx; }; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } +#else /* This only zeroes out the first byte in the union, the rest is unspecified. */ #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, { 0 } } -static inline struct psa_key_derivation_s psa_key_derivation_operation_init(void) +#endif +static inline struct psa_key_derivation_s psa_key_derivation_operation_init( + void) { const struct psa_key_derivation_s v = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; return v; } +struct psa_key_production_parameters_s { + /* Future versions may add other fields in this structure. */ + uint32_t flags; + uint8_t data[]; +}; + +/** The default production parameters for key generation or key derivation. + * + * Calling psa_generate_key_ext() or psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext() + * with `params=PSA_KEY_PRODUCTION_PARAMETERS_INIT` and + * `params_data_length == 0` is equivalent to + * calling psa_generate_key() or psa_key_derivation_output_key() + * respectively. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_PRODUCTION_PARAMETERS_INIT { 0 } + struct psa_key_policy_s { - psa_key_usage_t usage; - psa_algorithm_t alg; - psa_algorithm_t alg2; + psa_key_usage_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(usage); + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); + psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg2); }; typedef struct psa_key_policy_s psa_key_policy_t; @@ -265,7 +258,7 @@ static inline struct psa_key_policy_s psa_key_policy_init(void) typedef uint16_t psa_key_bits_t; /* The maximum value of the type used to represent bit-sizes. * This is used to mark an invalid key size. */ -#define PSA_KEY_BITS_TOO_LARGE ((psa_key_bits_t) (-1)) +#define PSA_KEY_BITS_TOO_LARGE ((psa_key_bits_t) -1) /* The maximum size of a key in bits. * Currently defined as the maximum that can be represented, rounded down * to a whole number of bytes. @@ -273,55 +266,39 @@ typedef uint16_t psa_key_bits_t; * conditionals. */ #define PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS 0xfff8 -/** A mask of flags that can be stored in key attributes. - * - * This type is also used internally to store flags in slots. Internal - * flags are defined in library/psa_crypto_core.h. Internal flags may have - * the same value as external flags if they are properly handled during - * key creation and in psa_get_key_attributes. - */ -typedef uint16_t psa_key_attributes_flag_t; - -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_FLAG_HAS_SLOT_NUMBER \ - ((psa_key_attributes_flag_t) 0x0001) - -/* A mask of key attribute flags used externally only. - * Only meant for internal checks inside the library. */ -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY ( \ - MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_FLAG_HAS_SLOT_NUMBER | \ - 0) - -/* A mask of key attribute flags used both internally and externally. - * Currently there aren't any. */ -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_DUAL_USE ( \ - 0) - -typedef struct { - psa_key_type_t type; - psa_key_bits_t bits; - psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime; - mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id; - psa_key_policy_t policy; - psa_key_attributes_flag_t flags; -} psa_core_key_attributes_t; - -#define PSA_CORE_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT { PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE, 0, PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE, \ - MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT, PSA_KEY_POLICY_INIT, 0 } - struct psa_key_attributes_s { - psa_core_key_attributes_t core; #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) - psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number; + psa_key_slot_number_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(slot_number); + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(has_slot_number); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ - void *domain_parameters; - size_t domain_parameters_size; + psa_key_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type); + psa_key_bits_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(bits); + psa_key_lifetime_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(lifetime); + psa_key_policy_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy); + /* This type has a different layout in the client view wrt the + * service view of the key id, i.e. in service view usually is + * expected to have MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER defined + * thus adding an owner field to the standard psa_key_id_t. For + * implementations with client/service separation, this means the + * object will be marshalled through a transport channel and + * interpreted differently at each side of the transport. Placing + * it at the end of structures allows to interpret the structure + * at the client without reorganizing the memory layout of the + * struct + */ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); }; #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) -#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT { PSA_CORE_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT, 0, NULL, 0 } +#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_MAYBE_SLOT_NUMBER 0, 0, #else -#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT { PSA_CORE_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT, NULL, 0 } +#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_MAYBE_SLOT_NUMBER #endif +#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT { PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_MAYBE_SLOT_NUMBER \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE, 0, \ + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE, \ + PSA_KEY_POLICY_INIT, \ + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT } static inline struct psa_key_attributes_s psa_key_attributes_init(void) { @@ -332,12 +309,12 @@ static inline struct psa_key_attributes_s psa_key_attributes_init(void) static inline void psa_set_key_id(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) { - psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = attributes->core.lifetime; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(lifetime); - attributes->core.id = key; + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id) = key; if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(lifetime)) { - attributes->core.lifetime = + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(lifetime) = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT, PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(lifetime)); @@ -347,26 +324,26 @@ static inline void psa_set_key_id(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_get_key_id( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) { - return attributes->core.id; + return attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); } #ifdef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER static inline void mbedtls_set_key_owner_id(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, mbedtls_key_owner_id_t owner) { - attributes->core.id.owner = owner; + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner) = owner; } #endif static inline void psa_set_key_lifetime(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime) { - attributes->core.lifetime = lifetime; + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(lifetime) = lifetime; if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(lifetime)) { #ifdef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER - attributes->core.id.key_id = 0; + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id) = 0; #else - attributes->core.id = 0; + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id) = 0; #endif } } @@ -374,7 +351,7 @@ static inline void psa_set_key_lifetime(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, static inline psa_key_lifetime_t psa_get_key_lifetime( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) { - return attributes->core.lifetime; + return attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(lifetime); } static inline void psa_extend_key_usage_flags(psa_key_usage_t *usage_flags) @@ -392,69 +369,129 @@ static inline void psa_set_key_usage_flags(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, psa_key_usage_t usage_flags) { psa_extend_key_usage_flags(&usage_flags); - attributes->core.policy.usage = usage_flags; + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(usage) = usage_flags; } static inline psa_key_usage_t psa_get_key_usage_flags( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) { - return attributes->core.policy.usage; + return attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(usage); } static inline void psa_set_key_algorithm(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, psa_algorithm_t alg) { - attributes->core.policy.alg = alg; + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg) = alg; } static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_get_key_algorithm( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) { - return attributes->core.policy.alg; + return attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); } -/* This function is declared in crypto_extra.h, which comes after this - * header file, but we need the function here, so repeat the declaration. */ -psa_status_t psa_set_key_domain_parameters(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - psa_key_type_t type, - const uint8_t *data, - size_t data_length); - static inline void psa_set_key_type(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, psa_key_type_t type) { - if (attributes->domain_parameters == NULL) { - /* Common case: quick path */ - attributes->core.type = type; - } else { - /* Call the bigger function to free the old domain parameters. - * Ignore any errors which may arise due to type requiring - * non-default domain parameters, since this function can't - * report errors. */ - (void) psa_set_key_domain_parameters(attributes, type, NULL, 0); - } + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type) = type; } static inline psa_key_type_t psa_get_key_type( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) { - return attributes->core.type; + return attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type); } static inline void psa_set_key_bits(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, size_t bits) { if (bits > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) { - attributes->core.bits = PSA_KEY_BITS_TOO_LARGE; + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(bits) = PSA_KEY_BITS_TOO_LARGE; } else { - attributes->core.bits = (psa_key_bits_t) bits; + attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(bits) = (psa_key_bits_t) bits; } } static inline size_t psa_get_key_bits( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) { - return attributes->core.bits; + return attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(bits); +} + +/** + * \brief The context for PSA interruptible hash signing. + */ +struct psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_s { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle; +#else + /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the + * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping + * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. + * ID values are auto-generated in psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h + * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to + * any driver (i.e. none of the driver contexts are active). */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); + + psa_driver_sign_hash_interruptible_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); + + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(error_occurred) : 1; + + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(num_ops); +#endif +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#define PSA_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } +#else +#define PSA_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { 0, { 0 }, 0, 0 } +#endif + +static inline struct psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_s +psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_init(void) +{ + const struct psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_s v = + PSA_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT; + + return v; +} + +/** + * \brief The context for PSA interruptible hash verification. + */ +struct psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_s { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle; +#else + /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the + * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping + * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. + * ID values are auto-generated in psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h + * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to + * any driver (i.e. none of the driver contexts are active). */ + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); + + psa_driver_verify_hash_interruptible_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); + + unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(error_occurred) : 1; + + uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(num_ops); +#endif +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#define PSA_VERIFY_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } +#else +#define PSA_VERIFY_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { 0, { 0 }, 0, 0 } +#endif + +static inline struct psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_s +psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_init(void) +{ + const struct psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_s v = + PSA_VERIFY_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT; + + return v; } #ifdef __cplusplus diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_types.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_types.h index d47d3ebf00..c21bad86cc 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_types.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_types.h @@ -15,32 +15,29 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_TYPES_H #define PSA_CRYPTO_TYPES_H -#include "crypto_platform.h" - -/* If MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is defined, make sure MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT - * is defined as well to include all PSA code. +/* + * Include the build-time configuration information header. Here, we do not + * include `"mbedtls/build_info.h"` directly but `"psa/build_info.h"`, which + * is basically just an alias to it. This is to ease the maintenance of the + * TF-PSA-Crypto repository which has a different build system and + * configuration. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ +#include "psa/build_info.h" + +/* Define the MBEDTLS_PRIVATE macro. */ +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_FILE) +#include MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_FILE +#else +#include "crypto_platform.h" +#endif #include @@ -301,8 +298,8 @@ typedef psa_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_t; * functions such as psa_open_key(). */ typedef struct { - psa_key_id_t key_id; - mbedtls_key_owner_id_t owner; + psa_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id); + mbedtls_key_owner_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner); } mbedtls_svc_key_id_t; #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ @@ -458,6 +455,30 @@ typedef uint64_t psa_key_slot_number_t; */ typedef uint16_t psa_key_derivation_step_t; +/** \brief Custom parameters for key generation or key derivation. + * + * This is a structure type with at least the following fields: + * + * - \c flags: an unsigned integer type. 0 for the default production parameters. + * - \c data: a flexible array of bytes. + * + * The interpretation of this structure depend on the type of the + * created key. + * + * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR: + * - \c flags: must be 0. + * - \c data: the public exponent, in little-endian order. + * This must be an odd integer and must not be 1. + * Implementations must support 65537, should support 3 and may + * support other values. + * When not using a driver, Mbed TLS supports values up to \c INT_MAX. + * If this is empty or if the custom production parameters are omitted + * altogether, the default value 65537 is used. + * - Other key types: reserved for future use. \c flags must be 0. + * + */ +typedef struct psa_key_production_parameters_s psa_key_production_parameters_t; + /**@}*/ #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_TYPES_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_values.h b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_values.h index a6214bda98..1d678dbfc2 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_values.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_values.h @@ -21,23 +21,12 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H #define PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" /** \defgroup error Error codes * @{ @@ -290,6 +279,11 @@ * to read from a resource. */ #define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA ((psa_status_t)-143) +/** This can be returned if a function can no longer operate correctly. + * For example, if an essential initialization operation failed or + * a mutex operation failed. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-144) + /** The key identifier is not valid. See also :ref:\`key-handles\`. */ #define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ((psa_status_t)-136) @@ -334,6 +328,13 @@ */ #define PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ((psa_status_t)-153) +/** The function that returns this status is defined as interruptible and + * still has work to do, thus the user should call the function again with the + * same operation context until it either returns #PSA_SUCCESS or any other + * error. This is not an error per se, more a notification of status. + */ +#define PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE ((psa_status_t)-248) + /* *INDENT-ON* */ /**@}*/ @@ -412,7 +413,7 @@ ((type) | PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR) /** The public key type corresponding to a key pair type. * - * You may also pass a key pair type as \p type, it will be left unchanged. + * You may also pass a public key type as \p type, it will be left unchanged. * * \param type A public key type or key pair type. * @@ -440,12 +441,56 @@ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1100) /** A secret for key derivation. + * + * This key type is for high-entropy secrets only. For low-entropy secrets, + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD should be used instead. + * + * These keys can be used as the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET or + * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input of key derivation algorithms. * * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key * can be used for. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1200) +/** A low-entropy secret for password hashing or key derivation. + * + * This key type is suitable for passwords and passphrases which are typically + * intended to be memorizable by humans, and have a low entropy relative to + * their size. It can be used for randomly generated or derived keys with + * maximum or near-maximum entropy, but #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE is more suitable + * for such keys. It is not suitable for passwords with extremely low entropy, + * such as numerical PINs. + * + * These keys can be used as the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input of + * key derivation algorithms. Algorithms that accept such an input were + * designed to accept low-entropy secret and are known as password hashing or + * key stretching algorithms. + * + * These keys cannot be used as the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET input of + * key derivation algorithms, as the algorithms that take such an input expect + * it to be high-entropy. + * + * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key can be + * used for, among the permissible subset defined above. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1203) + +/** A secret value that can be used to verify a password hash. + * + * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key + * can be used for, among the same permissible subset as for + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1205) + +/** A secret value that can be used in when computing a password hash. + * + * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key + * can be used for, among the subset of algorithms that can use pepper. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1206) + /** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the AES block cipher. * * The size of the key can be 16 bytes (AES-128), 24 bytes (AES-192) or @@ -472,18 +517,16 @@ * Camellia block cipher. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2403) -/** Key for the ARC4 stream cipher (also known as RC4 or ARCFOUR). - * - * Note that ARC4 is weak and deprecated and should only be used in - * legacy protocols. */ -#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2002) - /** Key for the ChaCha20 stream cipher or the Chacha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm. * * ChaCha20 and the ChaCha20_Poly1305 construction are defined in RFC 7539. * - * Implementations must support 12-byte nonces, may support 8-byte nonces, - * and should reject other sizes. + * \note For ChaCha20 and ChaCha20_Poly1305, Mbed TLS only supports + * 12-byte nonces. + * + * \note For ChaCha20, the initial counter value is 0. To encrypt or decrypt + * with the initial counter value 1, you can process and discard a + * 64-byte block before the real data. */ #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2004) @@ -546,6 +589,9 @@ ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) : \ 0)) +/** Check if the curve of given family is Weierstrass elliptic curve. */ +#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_IS_WEIERSTRASS(family) ((family & 0xc0) == 0) + /** SEC Koblitz curves over prime fields. * * This family comprises the following curves: @@ -553,19 +599,23 @@ * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf + * + * \note For secp224k1, the bit-size is 225 (size of a private value). + * + * \note Mbed TLS only supports secp192k1 and secp256k1. */ #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x17) /** SEC random curves over prime fields. * * This family comprises the following curves: - * secp192k1, secp224r1, secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1. + * secp192r1, secp224r1, secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1. * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf */ #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x12) -/* SECP160R2 (SEC2 v1, obsolete) */ +/* SECP160R2 (SEC2 v1, obsolete, not supported in Mbed TLS) */ #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x1b) /** SEC Koblitz curves over binary fields. @@ -575,6 +625,8 @@ * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf + * + * \note Mbed TLS does not support any curve in this family. */ #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x27) @@ -585,6 +637,8 @@ * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf + * + * \note Mbed TLS does not support any curve in this family. */ #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x22) @@ -595,6 +649,8 @@ * It is defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_, * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_. * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf + * + * \note Mbed TLS does not support any curve in this family. */ #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x2b) @@ -604,6 +660,9 @@ * brainpoolP160r1, brainpoolP192r1, brainpoolP224r1, brainpoolP256r1, * brainpoolP320r1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1. * It is defined in RFC 5639. + * + * \note Mbed TLS only supports the 256-bit, 384-bit and 512-bit curves + * in this family. */ #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x30) @@ -632,6 +691,8 @@ * - 448-bit: Edwards448, the twisted Edwards curve birationally equivalent * to Curve448. * Hamburg, _Ed448-Goldilocks, a new elliptic curve_, NIST ECC Workshop, 2015. + * + * \note Mbed TLS does not support Edwards curves yet. */ #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x42) @@ -827,16 +888,30 @@ #define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) \ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION) +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a key stretching / password hashing + * algorithm. + * + * A key stretching / password hashing algorithm is a key derivation algorithm + * that is suitable for use with a low-entropy secret such as a password. + * Equivalently, it's a key derivation algorithm that uses a + * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input step. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a key stretching / password hashing algorithm, 0 + * otherwise. This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a + * supported algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) && \ + (alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING_FLAG) + /** An invalid algorithm identifier value. */ /* *INDENT-OFF* (https://github.com/ARM-software/psa-arch-tests/issues/337) */ #define PSA_ALG_NONE ((psa_algorithm_t)0) /* *INDENT-ON* */ #define PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x000000ff) -/** MD2 */ -#define PSA_ALG_MD2 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000001) -/** MD4 */ -#define PSA_ALG_MD4 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000002) /** MD5 */ #define PSA_ALG_MD5 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000003) /** PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 */ @@ -1098,7 +1173,6 @@ * * The underlying stream cipher is determined by the key type. * - To use ChaCha20, use a key type of #PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20. - * - To use ARC4, use a key type of #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4. */ #define PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04800100) @@ -1189,6 +1263,17 @@ */ #define PSA_ALG_CCM ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x05500100) +/** The CCM* cipher mode without authentication. + * + * This is CCM* as specified in IEEE 802.15.4 §7, with a tag length of 0. + * For CCM* with a nonzero tag length, use the AEAD algorithm #PSA_ALG_CCM. + * + * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. + * + * Currently only 13-byte long IV's are supported. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04c01300) + /** The GCM authenticated encryption algorithm. * * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. @@ -1671,6 +1756,13 @@ 0) /** RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption. + * + * \warning Calling psa_asymmetric_decrypt() with this algorithm as a + * parameter is considered an inherently dangerous function + * (CWE-242). Unless it is used in a side channel free and safe + * way (eg. implementing the TLS protocol as per 7.4.7.1 of + * RFC 5246), the calling code is vulnerable. + * */ #define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x07000200) @@ -1712,6 +1804,12 @@ * You may pass #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO at any time after steup and before * starting to generate output. * + * \warning HKDF processes the salt as follows: first hash it with hash_alg + * if the salt is longer than the block size of the hash algorithm; then + * pad with null bytes up to the block size. As a result, it is possible + * for distinct salt inputs to result in the same outputs. To ensure + * unique outputs, it is recommended to use a fixed length for salt values. + * * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). * @@ -1737,6 +1835,112 @@ #define PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000400) +/** Macro to build an HKDF-Extract algorithm. + * + * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` is + * HKDF-Extract using HMAC-SHA-256. + * + * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs: + * - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt. + * - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the input keying material used in the + * "extract" step. + * The inputs are mandatory and must be passed in the order above. + * Each input may only be passed once. + * + * \warning HKDF-Extract is not meant to be used on its own. PSA_ALG_HKDF + * should be used instead if possible. PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT is provided + * as a separate algorithm for the sake of protocols that use it as a + * building block. It may also be a slight performance optimization + * in applications that use HKDF with the same salt and key but many + * different info strings. + * + * \warning HKDF processes the salt as follows: first hash it with hash_alg + * if the salt is longer than the block size of the hash algorithm; then + * pad with null bytes up to the block size. As a result, it is possible + * for distinct salt inputs to result in the same outputs. To ensure + * unique outputs, it is recommended to use a fixed length for salt values. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding HKDF-Extract algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF-Extract algorithm. + * + * HKDF-Extract is a family of key derivation algorithms that are based + * on a hash function and the HMAC construction. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is an HKDF-Extract algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * key derivation algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE) + +#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000500) +/** Macro to build an HKDF-Expand algorithm. + * + * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` is + * HKDF-Expand using HMAC-SHA-256. + * + * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs: + * - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the pseudorandom key (PRK). + * - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO is the info string. + * + * The inputs are mandatory and must be passed in the order above. + * Each input may only be passed once. + * + * \warning HKDF-Expand is not meant to be used on its own. `PSA_ALG_HKDF` + * should be used instead if possible. `PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND` is provided as + * a separate algorithm for the sake of protocols that use it as a building + * block. It may also be a slight performance optimization in applications + * that use HKDF with the same salt and key but many different info strings. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding HKDF-Expand algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF-Expand algorithm. + * + * HKDF-Expand is a family of key derivation algorithms that are based + * on a hash function and the HMAC construction. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is an HKDF-Expand algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * key derivation algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF or HKDF-Extract or + * HKDF-Expand algorithm. + * + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is any HKDF type algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * key derivation algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_ANY_HKDF(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE || \ + ((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE || \ + ((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE) + #define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000200) /** Macro to build a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm. * @@ -1792,13 +1996,37 @@ * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be * passed in the order given here: * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED is the seed. + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET is the other secret for the + * computation of the premaster secret. This input is optional; + * if omitted, it defaults to a string of null bytes with the same length + * as the secret (PSK) input. * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key. * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL is the label. * * For the application to TLS-1.2, the seed (which is * forwarded to the TLS-1.2 PRF) is the concatenation of the * ClientHello.Random + ServerHello.Random, - * and the label is "master secret" or "extended master secret". + * the label is "master secret" or "extended master secret" and + * the other secret depends on the key exchange specified in the cipher suite: + * - for a plain PSK cipher suite (RFC 4279, Section 2), omit + * PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET + * - for a DHE-PSK (RFC 4279, Section 3) or ECDHE-PSK cipher suite + * (RFC 5489, Section 2), the other secret should be the output of the + * PSA_ALG_FFDH or PSA_ALG_ECDH key agreement performed with the peer. + * The recommended way to pass this input is to use a key derivation + * algorithm constructed as + * PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(ka_alg, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(hash_alg)) + * and to call psa_key_derivation_key_agreement(). Alternatively, + * this input may be an output of `psa_raw_key_agreement()` passed with + * psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(), or an equivalent input passed with + * psa_key_derivation_input_bytes() or psa_key_derivation_input_key(). + * - for a RSA-PSK cipher suite (RFC 4279, Section 4), the other secret + * should be the 48-byte client challenge (the PreMasterSecret of + * (RFC 5246, Section 7.4.7.1)) concatenation of the TLS version and + * a 46-byte random string chosen by the client. On the server, this is + * typically an output of psa_asymmetric_decrypt() using + * PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, passed to the key derivation operation + * with `psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()`. * * For example, `PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` represents the * TLS-1.2 PSK to MasterSecret derivation PRF using HMAC-SHA-256. @@ -1826,6 +2054,86 @@ #define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \ (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +/* The TLS 1.2 ECJPAKE-to-PMS KDF. It takes the shared secret K (an EC point + * in case of EC J-PAKE) and calculates SHA256(K.X) that the rest of TLS 1.2 + * will use to derive the session secret, as defined by step 2 of + * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-01#section-8.7. + * Uses PSA_ALG_SHA_256. + * This function takes a single input: + * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the shared secret K from EC J-PAKE. + * The only supported curve is secp256r1 (the 256-bit curve in + * #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1), so the input must be exactly 65 bytes. + * The output has to be read as a single chunk of 32 bytes, defined as + * PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_DATA_SIZE. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000609) + +/* This flag indicates whether the key derivation algorithm is suitable for + * use on low-entropy secrets such as password - these algorithms are also + * known as key stretching or password hashing schemes. These are also the + * algorithms that accepts inputs of type #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD. + * + * Those algorithms cannot be combined with a key agreement algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00800000) + +#define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08800100) +/** Macro to build a PBKDF2-HMAC password hashing / key stretching algorithm. + * + * PBKDF2 is defined by PKCS#5, republished as RFC 8018 (section 5.2). + * This macro specifies the PBKDF2 algorithm constructed using a PRF based on + * HMAC with the specified hash. + * For example, `PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` specifies PBKDF2 + * using the PRF HMAC-SHA-256. + * + * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be + * provided in the following order: + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_COST is the iteration count. + * This input step must be used exactly once. + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt. + * This input step must be used one or more times; if used several times, the + * inputs will be concatenated. This can be used to build the final salt + * from multiple sources, both public and secret (also known as pepper). + * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD is the password to be hashed. + * This input step must be used exactly once. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * + * \return The corresponding PBKDF2-HMAC-XXX algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a PBKDF2-HMAC algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \c alg is a PBKDF2-HMAC algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported + * key derivation algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_BASE) +#define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_GET_HASH(pbkdf2_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((pbkdf2_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +/** The PBKDF2-AES-CMAC-PRF-128 password hashing / key stretching algorithm. + * + * PBKDF2 is defined by PKCS#5, republished as RFC 8018 (section 5.2). + * This macro specifies the PBKDF2 algorithm constructed using the + * AES-CMAC-PRF-128 PRF specified by RFC 4615. + * + * This key derivation algorithm uses the same inputs as + * #PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC() with the same constraints. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08800200) + +#define PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2(kdf_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(kdf_alg) || \ + ((kdf_alg) == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128)) + #define PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0xfe00ffff) #define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0xffff0000) @@ -1963,6 +2271,18 @@ (alg & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0 : \ (alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) +/** Get the hash used by a composite algorithm. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return The underlying hash algorithm if alg is a composite algorithm that + * uses a hash algorithm. + * + * \return \c 0 if alg is not a composite algorithm that uses a hash. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(alg) \ + (((alg) & 0x000000ff) == 0 ? ((psa_algorithm_t) 0) : 0x02000000 | ((alg) & 0x000000ff)) + /**@}*/ /** \defgroup key_lifetimes Key lifetimes @@ -2159,8 +2479,8 @@ static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) #else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ #define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT ((mbedtls_svc_key_id_t){ 0, 0 }) -#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(id) ((id).key_id) -#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID(id) ((id).owner) +#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(id) ((id).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id)) +#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID(id) ((id).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner)) /** Utility to initialize a key identifier at runtime. * @@ -2170,8 +2490,8 @@ static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( mbedtls_key_owner_id_t owner_id, psa_key_id_t key_id) { - return (mbedtls_svc_key_id_t){ .key_id = key_id, - .owner = owner_id }; + return (mbedtls_svc_key_id_t){ .MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id) = key_id, + .MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner) = owner_id }; } /** Compare two key identifiers. @@ -2184,8 +2504,8 @@ static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_make( static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id1, mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id2) { - return (id1.key_id == id2.key_id) && - mbedtls_key_owner_id_equal(id1.owner, id2.owner); + return (id1.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id) == id2.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id)) && + mbedtls_key_owner_id_equal(id1.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner), id2.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner)); } /** Check whether a key identifier is null. @@ -2196,7 +2516,7 @@ static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id1, */ static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) { - return key.key_id == 0; + return key.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id) == 0; } #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ @@ -2297,16 +2617,41 @@ static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) * * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC verification operation * or for an asymmetric signature verification operation, - * if otherwise permitted by by the key's type and policy. + * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy. * * For a key pair, this concerns the public key. */ #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00002000) -/** Whether the key may be used to derive other keys. +/** Whether the key may be used to derive other keys or produce a password + * hash. + * + * This flag allows the key to be used for a key derivation operation or for + * a key agreement operation, if otherwise permitted by the key's type and + * policy. + * + * If this flag is present on all keys used in calls to + * psa_key_derivation_input_key() for a key derivation operation, then it + * permits calling psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() or + * psa_key_derivation_output_key() at the end of the operation. */ #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00004000) +/** Whether the key may be used to verify the result of a key derivation, + * including password hashing. + * + * This flag allows the key to be used: + * + * This flag allows the key to be used in a key derivation operation, if + * otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy. + * + * If this flag is present on all keys used in calls to + * psa_key_derivation_input_key() for a key derivation operation, then it + * permits calling psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() or + * psa_key_derivation_verify_key() at the end of the operation. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00008000) + /**@}*/ /** \defgroup derivation Key derivation @@ -2326,10 +2671,41 @@ static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) * The secret can also be a direct input (passed to * key_derivation_input_bytes()). In this case, the derivation operation * may not be used to derive keys: the operation will only allow - * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(), not psa_key_derivation_output_key(). + * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(), + * psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes(), or + * psa_key_derivation_verify_key(), but not + * psa_key_derivation_output_key(). */ #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0101) +/** A low-entropy secret input for password hashing / key stretching. + * + * This is usually a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD (passed to + * psa_key_derivation_input_key()) or a direct input (passed to + * psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()) that is a password or passphrase. It can + * also be high-entropy secret such as a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE or + * the shared secret resulting from a key agreement. + * + * The secret can also be a direct input (passed to + * key_derivation_input_bytes()). In this case, the derivation operation + * may not be used to derive keys: the operation will only allow + * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(), + * psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes(), or + * psa_key_derivation_verify_key(), but not + * psa_key_derivation_output_key(). + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0102) + +/** A high-entropy additional secret input for key derivation. + * + * This is typically the shared secret resulting from a key agreement obtained + * via `psa_key_derivation_key_agreement()`. It may alternatively be a key of + * type `PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE` passed to `psa_key_derivation_input_key()`, or + * a direct input passed to `psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()`. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET \ + ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0103) + /** A label for key derivation. * * This should be a direct input. @@ -2340,7 +2716,8 @@ static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) /** A salt for key derivation. * * This should be a direct input. - * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA. + * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA or + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER. */ #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0202) @@ -2358,6 +2735,12 @@ static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) */ #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0204) +/** A cost parameter for password hashing / key stretching. + * + * This must be a direct input, passed to psa_key_derivation_input_integer(). + */ +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_COST ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0205) + /**@}*/ /** \defgroup helper_macros Helper macros @@ -2383,4 +2766,18 @@ static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) /**@}*/ +/**@}*/ + +/** \defgroup interruptible Interruptible operations + * @{ + */ + +/** Maximum value for use with \c psa_interruptible_set_max_ops() to determine + * the maximum number of ops allowed to be executed by an interruptible + * function in a single call. + */ +#define PSA_INTERRUPTIBLE_MAX_OPS_UNLIMITED UINT32_MAX + +/**@}*/ + #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/aes.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/aes.c index d2a3c8958e..b1a5c3ed10 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/aes.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/aes.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * FIPS-197 compliant AES implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * The AES block cipher was designed by Vincent Rijmen and Joan Daemen. @@ -33,22 +21,51 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) +#if !((defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A) && defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) && defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) && defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C))) +#error "MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) +#error "MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) +#error "MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY cannot be defined when " \ + "MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C is set" +#endif +#endif +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) -#include "mbedtls/padlock.h" +#include "padlock.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) -#include "mbedtls/aesni.h" +#include "aesni.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) +#include "aesce.h" #endif #include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "ctr.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ALT) +/* + * This is a convenience shorthand macro to check if we need reverse S-box and + * reverse tables. It's private and only defined in this file. + */ +#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) || \ + (!defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY))) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) +#define MBEDTLS_AES_NEED_REVERSE_TABLES +#endif -/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ -#define AES_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define AES_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ALT) #if defined(MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE) static int aes_padlock_ace = -1; @@ -58,9 +75,7 @@ static int aes_padlock_ace = -1; /* * Forward S-box */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT) || !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) -static const unsigned char FSb[256] = +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const unsigned char FSb[256] = { 0x63, 0x7C, 0x77, 0x7B, 0xF2, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0xC5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2B, 0xFE, 0xD7, 0xAB, 0x76, @@ -95,8 +110,6 @@ static const unsigned char FSb[256] = 0x8C, 0xA1, 0x89, 0x0D, 0xBF, 0xE6, 0x42, 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2D, 0x0F, 0xB0, 0x54, 0xBB, 0x16 }; -#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT) || !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) */ /* * Forward tables @@ -168,36 +181,28 @@ static const unsigned char FSb[256] = V(C3, 41, 41, 82), V(B0, 99, 99, 29), V(77, 2D, 2D, 5A), V(11, 0F, 0F, 1E), \ V(CB, B0, B0, 7B), V(FC, 54, 54, A8), V(D6, BB, BB, 6D), V(3A, 16, 16, 2C) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT) #define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##a##b##c##d -static const uint32_t FT0[256] = { FT }; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t FT0[256] = { FT }; #undef V -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) - #define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##b##c##d##a -static const uint32_t FT1[256] = { FT }; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t FT1[256] = { FT }; #undef V #define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##c##d##a##b -static const uint32_t FT2[256] = { FT }; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t FT2[256] = { FT }; #undef V #define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##d##a##b##c -static const uint32_t FT3[256] = { FT }; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t FT3[256] = { FT }; #undef V -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ - -#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT) */ - #undef FT -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) /* * Reverse S-box */ -static const unsigned char RSb[256] = +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const unsigned char RSb[256] = { 0x52, 0x09, 0x6A, 0xD5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xA5, 0x38, 0xBF, 0x40, 0xA3, 0x9E, 0x81, 0xF3, 0xD7, 0xFB, @@ -232,7 +237,6 @@ static const unsigned char RSb[256] = 0x17, 0x2B, 0x04, 0x7E, 0xBA, 0x77, 0xD6, 0x26, 0xE1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0C, 0x7D }; -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT)) */ /* * Reverse tables @@ -304,84 +308,60 @@ static const unsigned char RSb[256] = V(71, 01, A8, 39), V(DE, B3, 0C, 08), V(9C, E4, B4, D8), V(90, C1, 56, 64), \ V(61, 84, CB, 7B), V(70, B6, 32, D5), V(74, 5C, 6C, 48), V(42, 57, B8, D0) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) || !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) #define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##a##b##c##d -static const uint32_t RT0[256] = { RT }; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t RT0[256] = { RT }; #undef V -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) - #define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##b##c##d##a -static const uint32_t RT1[256] = { RT }; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t RT1[256] = { RT }; #undef V #define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##c##d##a##b -static const uint32_t RT2[256] = { RT }; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t RT2[256] = { RT }; #undef V #define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##d##a##b##c -static const uint32_t RT3[256] = { RT }; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t RT3[256] = { RT }; #undef V -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ - -#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) || !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) */ - #undef RT -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) /* * Round constants */ -static const uint32_t RCON[10] = +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t round_constants[10] = { 0x00000001, 0x00000002, 0x00000004, 0x00000008, 0x00000010, 0x00000020, 0x00000040, 0x00000080, 0x0000001B, 0x00000036 }; -#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) */ #else /* MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES */ /* * Forward S-box & tables */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT) || !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) -static unsigned char FSb[256]; -#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT) || !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT) || !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) -static uint32_t FT0[256]; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) -static uint32_t FT1[256]; -static uint32_t FT2[256]; -static uint32_t FT3[256]; -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ -#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT) || !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) */ +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static unsigned char FSb[256]; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t FT0[256]; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t FT1[256]; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t FT2[256]; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t FT3[256]; /* * Reverse S-box & tables */ -#if !(defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT)) -static unsigned char RSb[256]; -#endif /* !(defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT)) */ +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static unsigned char RSb[256]; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) || !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) -static uint32_t RT0[256]; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) -static uint32_t RT1[256]; -static uint32_t RT2[256]; -static uint32_t RT3[256]; -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ -#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) || !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) */ +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t RT0[256]; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t RT1[256]; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t RT2[256]; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t RT3[256]; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) /* * Round constants */ -static uint32_t RCON[10]; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t round_constants[10]; /* * Tables generation code @@ -390,48 +370,53 @@ static uint32_t RCON[10]; #define XTIME(x) (((x) << 1) ^ (((x) & 0x80) ? 0x1B : 0x00)) #define MUL(x, y) (((x) && (y)) ? pow[(log[(x)]+log[(y)]) % 255] : 0) -static int aes_init_done = 0; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static int aes_init_done = 0; -static void aes_gen_tables(void) +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static void aes_gen_tables(void) { - int i, x, y, z; - int pow[256]; - int log[256]; + int i; + uint8_t x, y, z; + uint8_t pow[256]; + uint8_t log[256]; /* * compute pow and log tables over GF(2^8) */ for (i = 0, x = 1; i < 256; i++) { pow[i] = x; - log[x] = i; - x = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(x ^ XTIME(x)); + log[x] = (uint8_t) i; + x ^= XTIME(x); } /* * calculate the round constants */ for (i = 0, x = 1; i < 10; i++) { - RCON[i] = (uint32_t) x; - x = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(XTIME(x)); + round_constants[i] = x; + x = XTIME(x); } /* * generate the forward and reverse S-boxes */ FSb[0x00] = 0x63; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_NEED_REVERSE_TABLES) RSb[0x63] = 0x00; +#endif for (i = 1; i < 256; i++) { x = pow[255 - log[i]]; - y = x; y = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0((y << 1) | (y >> 7)); - x ^= y; y = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0((y << 1) | (y >> 7)); - x ^= y; y = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0((y << 1) | (y >> 7)); - x ^= y; y = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0((y << 1) | (y >> 7)); + y = x; y = (y << 1) | (y >> 7); + x ^= y; y = (y << 1) | (y >> 7); + x ^= y; y = (y << 1) | (y >> 7); + x ^= y; y = (y << 1) | (y >> 7); x ^= y ^ 0x63; - FSb[i] = (unsigned char) x; + FSb[i] = x; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_NEED_REVERSE_TABLES) RSb[x] = (unsigned char) i; +#endif } /* @@ -439,8 +424,8 @@ static void aes_gen_tables(void) */ for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) { x = FSb[i]; - y = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(XTIME(x)); - z = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(y ^ x); + y = XTIME(x); + z = y ^ x; FT0[i] = ((uint32_t) y) ^ ((uint32_t) x << 8) ^ @@ -453,9 +438,9 @@ static void aes_gen_tables(void) FT3[i] = ROTL8(FT2[i]); #endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_NEED_REVERSE_TABLES) x = RSb[i]; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) || !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) RT0[i] = ((uint32_t) MUL(0x0E, x)) ^ ((uint32_t) MUL(0x09, x) << 8) ^ ((uint32_t) MUL(0x0D, x) << 16) ^ @@ -466,12 +451,10 @@ static void aes_gen_tables(void) RT2[i] = ROTL8(RT1[i]); RT3[i] = ROTL8(RT2[i]); #endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ -#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) || !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_NEED_REVERSE_TABLES */ } } -#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) */ - #undef ROTL8 #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES */ @@ -508,8 +491,6 @@ static void aes_gen_tables(void) void mbedtls_aes_init(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx) { - AES_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_aes_context)); } @@ -525,8 +506,6 @@ void mbedtls_aes_free(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx) #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) void mbedtls_aes_xts_init(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx) { - AES_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx->crypt); mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx->tweak); } @@ -548,14 +527,12 @@ void mbedtls_aes_xts_free(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx) * Note that the offset is in units of elements of buf, i.e. 32-bit words, * i.e. an offset of 1 means 4 bytes and so on. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE) || \ +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE)) || \ (defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2) #define MAY_NEED_TO_ALIGN #endif -#if defined(MAY_NEED_TO_ALIGN) || !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) -static unsigned mbedtls_aes_rk_offset(uint32_t *buf) +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static unsigned mbedtls_aes_rk_offset(uint32_t *buf) { #if defined(MAY_NEED_TO_ALIGN) int align_16_bytes = 0; @@ -591,8 +568,6 @@ static unsigned mbedtls_aes_rk_offset(uint32_t *buf) return 0; } -#endif /* defined(MAY_NEED_TO_ALIGN) || !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) */ /* * AES key schedule (encryption) @@ -601,16 +576,14 @@ static unsigned mbedtls_aes_rk_offset(uint32_t *buf) int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits) { - unsigned int i; uint32_t *RK; - AES_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - switch (keybits) { case 128: ctx->nr = 10; break; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) case 192: ctx->nr = 12; break; case 256: ctx->nr = 14; break; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ default: return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH; } @@ -621,23 +594,31 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, } #endif - ctx->rk = RK = ctx->buf + mbedtls_aes_rk_offset(ctx->buf); + ctx->rk_offset = mbedtls_aes_rk_offset(ctx->buf); + RK = ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset; #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES)) { - return mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc((unsigned char *) ctx->rk, key, keybits); + return mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc((unsigned char *) RK, key, keybits); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE) + if (MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT()) { + return mbedtls_aesce_setkey_enc((unsigned char *) RK, key, keybits); } #endif - for (i = 0; i < (keybits >> 5); i++) { +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < (keybits >> 5); i++) { RK[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, i << 2); } switch (ctx->nr) { case 10: - for (i = 0; i < 10; i++, RK += 4) { - RK[4] = RK[0] ^ RCON[i] ^ + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 10; i++, RK += 4) { + RK[4] = RK[0] ^ round_constants[i] ^ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(RK[3])]) ^ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(RK[3])] << 8) ^ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(RK[3])] << 16) ^ @@ -649,10 +630,11 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, } break; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) case 12: - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++, RK += 6) { - RK[6] = RK[0] ^ RCON[i] ^ + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 8; i++, RK += 6) { + RK[6] = RK[0] ^ round_constants[i] ^ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(RK[5])]) ^ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(RK[5])] << 8) ^ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(RK[5])] << 16) ^ @@ -668,8 +650,8 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, case 14: - for (i = 0; i < 7; i++, RK += 8) { - RK[8] = RK[0] ^ RCON[i] ^ + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 7; i++, RK += 8) { + RK[8] = RK[0] ^ round_constants[i] ^ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(RK[7])]) ^ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(RK[7])] << 8) ^ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(RK[7])] << 16) ^ @@ -690,30 +672,33 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, RK[15] = RK[7] ^ RK[14]; } break; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ } return 0; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY */ } #endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT */ /* * AES key schedule (decryption) */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) int mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits) { - int i, j, ret; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) + uint32_t *SK; +#endif + int ret; mbedtls_aes_context cty; uint32_t *RK; - uint32_t *SK; - AES_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); mbedtls_aes_init(&cty); - ctx->rk = RK = ctx->buf + mbedtls_aes_rk_offset(ctx->buf); + ctx->rk_offset = mbedtls_aes_rk_offset(ctx->buf); + RK = ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset; /* Also checks keybits */ if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&cty, key, keybits)) != 0) { @@ -724,21 +709,32 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES)) { - mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key((unsigned char *) ctx->rk, - (const unsigned char *) cty.rk, ctx->nr); + mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key((unsigned char *) RK, + (const unsigned char *) (cty.buf + cty.rk_offset), ctx->nr); goto exit; } #endif - SK = cty.rk + cty.nr * 4; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE) + if (MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT()) { + mbedtls_aesce_inverse_key( + (unsigned char *) RK, + (const unsigned char *) (cty.buf + cty.rk_offset), + ctx->nr); + goto exit; + } +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) + SK = cty.buf + cty.rk_offset + cty.nr * 4; *RK++ = *SK++; *RK++ = *SK++; *RK++ = *SK++; *RK++ = *SK++; - - for (i = ctx->nr - 1, SK -= 8; i > 0; i--, SK -= 8) { - for (j = 0; j < 4; j++, SK++) { + SK -= 8; + for (int i = ctx->nr - 1; i > 0; i--, SK -= 8) { + for (int j = 0; j < 4; j++, SK++) { *RK++ = AES_RT0(FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(*SK)]) ^ AES_RT1(FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(*SK)]) ^ AES_RT2(FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(*SK)]) ^ @@ -750,13 +746,13 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, *RK++ = *SK++; *RK++ = *SK++; *RK++ = *SK++; - +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY */ exit: mbedtls_aes_free(&cty); return ret; } -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT && !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) static int mbedtls_aes_xts_decode_keys(const unsigned char *key, @@ -791,9 +787,6 @@ int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key1, *key2; unsigned int key1bits, key2bits; - AES_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - ret = mbedtls_aes_xts_decode_keys(key, keybits, &key1, &key1bits, &key2, &key2bits); if (ret != 0) { @@ -818,9 +811,6 @@ int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key1, *key2; unsigned int key1bits, key2bits; - AES_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - ret = mbedtls_aes_xts_decode_keys(key, keybits, &key1, &key1bits, &key2, &key2bits); if (ret != 0) { @@ -895,7 +885,7 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, unsigned char output[16]) { int i; - uint32_t *RK = ctx->rk; + uint32_t *RK = ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset; struct { uint32_t X[4]; uint32_t Y[4]; @@ -948,25 +938,16 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, } #endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_aes_encrypt(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, - const unsigned char input[16], - unsigned char output[16]) -{ - MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN(mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt(ctx, input, output)); -} -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /* * AES-ECB block decryption */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char input[16], unsigned char output[16]) { int i; - uint32_t *RK = ctx->rk; + uint32_t *RK = ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset; struct { uint32_t X[4]; uint32_t Y[4]; @@ -1017,40 +998,25 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, return 0; } -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT && !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_aes_decrypt(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, - const unsigned char input[16], - unsigned char output[16]) -{ - MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN(mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt(ctx, input, output)); -} -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - -#if defined(MAY_NEED_TO_ALIGN) /* VIA Padlock and our intrinsics-based implementation of AESNI require * the round keys to be aligned on a 16-byte boundary. We take care of this * before creating them, but the AES context may have moved (this can happen * if the library is called from a language with managed memory), and in later * calls it might have a different alignment with respect to 16-byte memory. * So we may need to realign. - * NOTE: In the LTS branch, the context contains a pointer to within itself, - * so if it has been moved, things will probably go pear-shaped. We keep this - * code for compatibility with the development branch, in case of future changes. */ -static void aes_maybe_realign(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx) +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static void aes_maybe_realign(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx) { - unsigned current_offset = (unsigned) (ctx->rk - ctx->buf); unsigned new_offset = mbedtls_aes_rk_offset(ctx->buf); - if (new_offset != current_offset) { + if (new_offset != ctx->rk_offset) { memmove(ctx->buf + new_offset, // new address - ctx->buf + current_offset, // current address + ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset, // current address (ctx->nr + 1) * 16); // number of round keys * bytes per rk - ctx->rk = ctx->buf + new_offset; + ctx->rk_offset = new_offset; } } -#endif /* * AES-ECB block encryption/decryption @@ -1060,11 +1026,9 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char input[16], unsigned char output[16]) { - AES_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT); + if (mode != MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } #if defined(MAY_NEED_TO_ALIGN) aes_maybe_realign(ctx); @@ -1076,20 +1040,32 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, } #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE) + if (MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT()) { + return mbedtls_aesce_crypt_ecb(ctx, mode, input, output); + } +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE) - if (aes_padlock_ace) { + if (aes_padlock_ace > 0) { return mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb(ctx, mode, input, output); } #endif - if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT) { - return mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt(ctx, input, output); - } else { +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { return mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt(ctx, input, output); + } else +#endif + { + return mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt(ctx, input, output); } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY */ } #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + /* * AES-CBC buffer encryption/decryption */ @@ -1100,23 +1076,24 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) { - int i; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char temp[16]; - AES_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); + if (mode != MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Nothing to do if length is zero. */ + if (length == 0) { + return 0; + } if (length % 16) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE) - if (aes_padlock_ace) { + if (aes_padlock_ace > 0) { if (mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc(ctx, mode, length, iv, input, output) == 0) { return 0; } @@ -1127,6 +1104,8 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, } #endif + const unsigned char *ivp = iv; + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { while (length > 0) { memcpy(temp, input, 16); @@ -1134,10 +1113,10 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } - - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { - output[i] = (unsigned char) (output[i] ^ iv[i]); - } + /* Avoid using the NEON implementation of mbedtls_xor. Because of the dependency on + * the result for the next block in CBC, and the cost of transferring that data from + * NEON registers, NEON is slower on aarch64. */ + mbedtls_xor_no_simd(output, output, iv, 16); memcpy(iv, temp, 16); @@ -1147,20 +1126,19 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, } } else { while (length > 0) { - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { - output[i] = (unsigned char) (input[i] ^ iv[i]); - } + mbedtls_xor_no_simd(output, input, ivp, 16); ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(ctx, mode, output, output); if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } - memcpy(iv, output, 16); + ivp = output; input += 16; output += 16; length -= 16; } + memcpy(iv, ivp, 16); } ret = 0; @@ -1181,8 +1159,11 @@ typedef unsigned char mbedtls_be128[16]; * for machine endianness and hence works correctly on both big and little * endian machines. */ -static void mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble(unsigned char r[16], - const unsigned char x[16]) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) +MBEDTLS_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE +#endif +static inline void mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble(unsigned char r[16], + const unsigned char x[16]) { uint64_t a, b, ra, rb; @@ -1198,7 +1179,13 @@ static void mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble(unsigned char r[16], /* * AES-XTS buffer encryption/decryption + * + * Use of MBEDTLS_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE here and for mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble() + * is a 3x performance improvement for gcc -Os, if we have hardware AES support. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) +MBEDTLS_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE +#endif int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, @@ -1213,12 +1200,9 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, unsigned char prev_tweak[16]; unsigned char tmp[16]; - AES_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(data_unit != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); + if (mode != MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } /* Data units must be at least 16 bytes long. */ if (length < 16) { @@ -1238,9 +1222,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, } while (blocks--) { - size_t i; - - if (leftover && (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) && blocks == 0) { + if (MBEDTLS_UNLIKELY(leftover && (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) && blocks == 0)) { /* We are on the last block in a decrypt operation that has * leftover bytes, so we need to use the next tweak for this block, * and this tweak for the leftover bytes. Save the current tweak for @@ -1250,18 +1232,14 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble(tweak, tweak); } - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { - tmp[i] = input[i] ^ tweak[i]; - } + mbedtls_xor(tmp, input, tweak, 16); ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx->crypt, mode, tmp, tmp); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { - output[i] = tmp[i] ^ tweak[i]; - } + mbedtls_xor(output, tmp, tweak, 16); /* Update the tweak for the next block. */ mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble(tweak, tweak); @@ -1281,19 +1259,17 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, unsigned char *prev_output = output - 16; /* Copy ciphertext bytes from the previous block to our output for each - * byte of ciphertext we won't steal. At the same time, copy the - * remainder of the input for this final round (since the loop bounds - * are the same). */ + * byte of ciphertext we won't steal. */ for (i = 0; i < leftover; i++) { output[i] = prev_output[i]; - tmp[i] = input[i] ^ t[i]; } + /* Copy the remainder of the input for this final round. */ + mbedtls_xor(tmp, input, t, leftover); + /* Copy ciphertext bytes from the previous block for input in this * round. */ - for (; i < 16; i++) { - tmp[i] = prev_output[i] ^ t[i]; - } + mbedtls_xor(tmp + i, prev_output + i, t + i, 16 - i); ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx->crypt, mode, tmp, tmp); if (ret != 0) { @@ -1302,9 +1278,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, /* Write the result back to the previous block, overriding the previous * output we copied. */ - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { - prev_output[i] = tmp[i] ^ t[i]; - } + mbedtls_xor(prev_output, tmp, t, 16); } return 0; @@ -1327,13 +1301,9 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n; - AES_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(iv_off != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); + if (mode != MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } n = *iv_off; @@ -1392,12 +1362,9 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, unsigned char c; unsigned char ov[17]; - AES_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); + if (mode != MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } while (length--) { memcpy(ov, iv, 16); ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv); @@ -1438,12 +1405,6 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, int ret = 0; size_t n; - AES_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(iv_off != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - n = *iv_off; if (n > 15) { @@ -1481,43 +1442,38 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) { - int c, i; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t n; - - AES_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(nc_off != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(nonce_counter != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(stream_block != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - AES_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - n = *nc_off; + size_t offset = *nc_off; - if (n > 0x0F) { + if (offset > 0x0F) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - while (length--) { - if (n == 0) { + for (size_t i = 0; i < length;) { + size_t n = 16; + if (offset == 0) { ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, nonce_counter, stream_block); if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } - - for (i = 16; i > 0; i--) { - if (++nonce_counter[i - 1] != 0) { - break; - } - } + mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(nonce_counter); + } else { + n -= offset; } - c = *input++; - *output++ = (unsigned char) (c ^ stream_block[n]); - n = (n + 1) & 0x0F; + if (n > (length - i)) { + n = (length - i); + } + mbedtls_xor(&output[i], &input[i], &stream_block[offset], n); + // offset might be non-zero for the last block, but in that case, we don't use it again + offset = 0; + i += n; } - *nc_off = n; + // capture offset for future resumption + *nc_off = (*nc_off + length) % 16; + ret = 0; exit: @@ -1533,45 +1489,55 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, * * http://csrc.nist.gov/archive/aes/rijndael/rijndael-vals.zip */ -static const unsigned char aes_test_ecb_dec[3][16] = +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) +static const unsigned char aes_test_ecb_dec[][16] = { { 0x44, 0x41, 0x6A, 0xC2, 0xD1, 0xF5, 0x3C, 0x58, 0x33, 0x03, 0x91, 0x7E, 0x6B, 0xE9, 0xEB, 0xE0 }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0x48, 0xE3, 0x1E, 0x9E, 0x25, 0x67, 0x18, 0xF2, 0x92, 0x29, 0x31, 0x9C, 0x19, 0xF1, 0x5B, 0xA4 }, { 0x05, 0x8C, 0xCF, 0xFD, 0xBB, 0xCB, 0x38, 0x2D, 0x1F, 0x6F, 0x56, 0x58, 0x5D, 0x8A, 0x4A, 0xDE } +#endif }; +#endif -static const unsigned char aes_test_ecb_enc[3][16] = +static const unsigned char aes_test_ecb_enc[][16] = { { 0xC3, 0x4C, 0x05, 0x2C, 0xC0, 0xDA, 0x8D, 0x73, 0x45, 0x1A, 0xFE, 0x5F, 0x03, 0xBE, 0x29, 0x7F }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0xF3, 0xF6, 0x75, 0x2A, 0xE8, 0xD7, 0x83, 0x11, 0x38, 0xF0, 0x41, 0x56, 0x06, 0x31, 0xB1, 0x14 }, { 0x8B, 0x79, 0xEE, 0xCC, 0x93, 0xA0, 0xEE, 0x5D, 0xFF, 0x30, 0xB4, 0xEA, 0x21, 0x63, 0x6D, 0xA4 } +#endif }; #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -static const unsigned char aes_test_cbc_dec[3][16] = +static const unsigned char aes_test_cbc_dec[][16] = { { 0xFA, 0xCA, 0x37, 0xE0, 0xB0, 0xC8, 0x53, 0x73, 0xDF, 0x70, 0x6E, 0x73, 0xF7, 0xC9, 0xAF, 0x86 }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0x5D, 0xF6, 0x78, 0xDD, 0x17, 0xBA, 0x4E, 0x75, 0xB6, 0x17, 0x68, 0xC6, 0xAD, 0xEF, 0x7C, 0x7B }, { 0x48, 0x04, 0xE1, 0x81, 0x8F, 0xE6, 0x29, 0x75, 0x19, 0xA3, 0xE8, 0x8C, 0x57, 0x31, 0x04, 0x13 } +#endif }; -static const unsigned char aes_test_cbc_enc[3][16] = +static const unsigned char aes_test_cbc_enc[][16] = { { 0x8A, 0x05, 0xFC, 0x5E, 0x09, 0x5A, 0xF4, 0x84, 0x8A, 0x08, 0xD3, 0x28, 0xD3, 0x68, 0x8E, 0x3D }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0x7B, 0xD9, 0x66, 0xD5, 0x3A, 0xD8, 0xC1, 0xBB, 0x85, 0xD2, 0xAD, 0xFA, 0xE8, 0x7B, 0xB1, 0x04 }, { 0xFE, 0x3C, 0x53, 0x65, 0x3E, 0x2F, 0x45, 0xB5, 0x6F, 0xCD, 0x88, 0xB2, 0xCC, 0x89, 0x8F, 0xF0 } +#endif }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ @@ -1581,10 +1547,11 @@ static const unsigned char aes_test_cbc_enc[3][16] = * * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf */ -static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_key[3][32] = +static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_key[][32] = { { 0x2B, 0x7E, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0xA6, 0xAB, 0xF7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xCF, 0x4F, 0x3C }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0x8E, 0x73, 0xB0, 0xF7, 0xDA, 0x0E, 0x64, 0x52, 0xC8, 0x10, 0xF3, 0x2B, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xE5, 0x62, 0xF8, 0xEA, 0xD2, 0x52, 0x2C, 0x6B, 0x7B }, @@ -1592,6 +1559,7 @@ static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_key[3][32] = 0x2B, 0x73, 0xAE, 0xF0, 0x85, 0x7D, 0x77, 0x81, 0x1F, 0x35, 0x2C, 0x07, 0x3B, 0x61, 0x08, 0xD7, 0x2D, 0x98, 0x10, 0xA3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xDF, 0xF4 } +#endif }; static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_iv[16] = @@ -1612,7 +1580,7 @@ static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_pt[64] = 0xAD, 0x2B, 0x41, 0x7B, 0xE6, 0x6C, 0x37, 0x10 }; -static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_ct[3][64] = +static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_ct[][64] = { { 0x3B, 0x3F, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xB7, 0x2D, 0xAD, 0x20, 0x33, 0x34, 0x49, 0xF8, 0xE8, 0x3C, 0xFB, 0x4A, @@ -1622,6 +1590,7 @@ static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_ct[3][64] = 0xB1, 0x80, 0x8C, 0xF1, 0x87, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0xDF, 0xC0, 0x4B, 0x05, 0x35, 0x7C, 0x5D, 0x1C, 0x0E, 0xEA, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x6F, 0x9F, 0xF7, 0xF2, 0xE6 }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0xCD, 0xC8, 0x0D, 0x6F, 0xDD, 0xF1, 0x8C, 0xAB, 0x34, 0xC2, 0x59, 0x09, 0xC9, 0x9A, 0x41, 0x74, 0x67, 0xCE, 0x7F, 0x7F, 0x81, 0x17, 0x36, 0x21, @@ -1638,6 +1607,7 @@ static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_ct[3][64] = 0xA1, 0x3E, 0xD0, 0xA8, 0x26, 0x7A, 0xE2, 0xF9, 0x75, 0xA3, 0x85, 0x74, 0x1A, 0xB9, 0xCE, 0xF8, 0x20, 0x31, 0x62, 0x3D, 0x55, 0xB1, 0xE4, 0x71 } +#endif }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ @@ -1647,10 +1617,11 @@ static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_ct[3][64] = * * https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38a/final */ -static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_key[3][32] = +static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_key[][32] = { { 0x2B, 0x7E, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0xA6, 0xAB, 0xF7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xCF, 0x4F, 0x3C }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0x8E, 0x73, 0xB0, 0xF7, 0xDA, 0x0E, 0x64, 0x52, 0xC8, 0x10, 0xF3, 0x2B, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xE5, 0x62, 0xF8, 0xEA, 0xD2, 0x52, 0x2C, 0x6B, 0x7B }, @@ -1658,6 +1629,7 @@ static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_key[3][32] = 0x2B, 0x73, 0xAE, 0xF0, 0x85, 0x7D, 0x77, 0x81, 0x1F, 0x35, 0x2C, 0x07, 0x3B, 0x61, 0x08, 0xD7, 0x2D, 0x98, 0x10, 0xA3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xDF, 0xF4 } +#endif }; static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_iv[16] = @@ -1678,7 +1650,7 @@ static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_pt[64] = 0xAD, 0x2B, 0x41, 0x7B, 0xE6, 0x6C, 0x37, 0x10 }; -static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_ct[3][64] = +static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_ct[][64] = { { 0x3B, 0x3F, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xB7, 0x2D, 0xAD, 0x20, 0x33, 0x34, 0x49, 0xF8, 0xE8, 0x3C, 0xFB, 0x4A, @@ -1688,6 +1660,7 @@ static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_ct[3][64] = 0x43, 0x44, 0xf7, 0xa8, 0x22, 0x60, 0xed, 0xcc, 0x30, 0x4c, 0x65, 0x28, 0xf6, 0x59, 0xc7, 0x78, 0x66, 0xa5, 0x10, 0xd9, 0xc1, 0xd6, 0xae, 0x5e }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0xCD, 0xC8, 0x0D, 0x6F, 0xDD, 0xF1, 0x8C, 0xAB, 0x34, 0xC2, 0x59, 0x09, 0xC9, 0x9A, 0x41, 0x74, 0xfc, 0xc2, 0x8b, 0x8d, 0x4c, 0x63, 0x83, 0x7c, @@ -1704,6 +1677,7 @@ static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_ct[3][64] = 0xf3, 0x9d, 0x1c, 0x5b, 0xba, 0x97, 0xc4, 0x08, 0x01, 0x26, 0x14, 0x1d, 0x67, 0xf3, 0x7b, 0xe8, 0x53, 0x8f, 0x5a, 0x8b, 0xe7, 0x40, 0xe4, 0x84 } +#endif }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ @@ -1714,7 +1688,7 @@ static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_ct[3][64] = * http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc3686.html */ -static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_key[3][16] = +static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_key[][16] = { { 0xAE, 0x68, 0x52, 0xF8, 0x12, 0x10, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x4B, 0xF7, 0xA5, 0x76, 0x55, 0x77, 0xF3, 0x9E }, @@ -1724,7 +1698,7 @@ static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_key[3][16] = 0xAC, 0x6E, 0x61, 0x85, 0x29, 0xF9, 0xA0, 0xDC } }; -static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_nonce_counter[3][16] = +static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_nonce_counter[][16] = { { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 }, @@ -1734,11 +1708,10 @@ static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_nonce_counter[3][16] = 0x4A, 0x17, 0x86, 0xF0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 } }; -static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_pt[3][48] = +static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_pt[][48] = { { 0x53, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x6C, 0x65, 0x20, 0x62, 0x6C, 0x6F, 0x63, 0x6B, 0x20, 0x6D, 0x73, 0x67 }, - { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, @@ -1751,7 +1724,7 @@ static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_pt[3][48] = 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23 } }; -static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_ct[3][48] = +static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_ct[][48] = { { 0xE4, 0x09, 0x5D, 0x4F, 0xB7, 0xA7, 0xB3, 0x79, 0x2D, 0x61, 0x75, 0xA3, 0x26, 0x13, 0x11, 0xB8 }, @@ -1875,315 +1848,359 @@ int mbedtls_aes_self_test(int verbose) #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ALT) mbedtls_printf(" AES note: alternative implementation.\n"); #else /* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE) - if (mbedtls_padlock_has_support(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE)) { - mbedtls_printf(" AES note: using VIA Padlock.\n"); - } else -#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) - if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES)) { - mbedtls_printf(" AES note: using AESNI via "); #if MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 1 - mbedtls_printf("assembly"); + mbedtls_printf(" AES note: AESNI code present (assembly implementation).\n"); #elif MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2 - mbedtls_printf("intrinsics"); + mbedtls_printf(" AES note: AESNI code present (intrinsics implementation).\n"); #else - mbedtls_printf("(unknown)"); +#error "Unrecognised value for MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE" #endif - mbedtls_printf(".\n"); + if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES)) { + mbedtls_printf(" AES note: using AESNI.\n"); } else #endif - mbedtls_printf(" AES note: built-in implementation.\n"); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE) + if (mbedtls_padlock_has_support(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE)) { + mbedtls_printf(" AES note: using VIA Padlock.\n"); + } else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE) + if (MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT()) { + mbedtls_printf(" AES note: using AESCE.\n"); + } else +#endif + { +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) + mbedtls_printf(" AES note: built-in implementation.\n"); +#endif + } #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */ } /* * ECB mode */ - for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { - u = i >> 1; - keybits = 128 + u * 64; - mode = i & 1; + { + static const int num_tests = + sizeof(aes_test_ecb_enc) / sizeof(*aes_test_ecb_enc); - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" AES-ECB-%3u (%s): ", keybits, - (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); - } + for (i = 0; i < num_tests << 1; i++) { + u = i >> 1; + keybits = 128 + u * 64; + mode = i & 1; - memset(buf, 0, 16); + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" AES-ECB-%3u (%s): ", keybits, + (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); + } + continue; + } +#endif - if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { - ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&ctx, key, keybits); - aes_tests = aes_test_ecb_dec[u]; - } else { - ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, keybits); - aes_tests = aes_test_ecb_enc[u]; - } + memset(buf, 0, 16); - /* - * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when - * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when - * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. - */ - if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192) { - mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); - continue; - } else if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&ctx, key, keybits); + aes_tests = aes_test_ecb_dec[u]; + } else +#endif + { + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, keybits); + aes_tests = aes_test_ecb_enc[u]; + } - for (j = 0; j < 10000; j++) { - ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx, mode, buf, buf); - if (ret != 0) { + /* + * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when + * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when + * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. + */ + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192) { + mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); + continue; + } else if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } - } - if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, 16) != 0) { - ret = 1; - goto exit; + for (j = 0; j < 10000; j++) { + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx, mode, buf, buf); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } + + if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, 16) != 0) { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } } if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + mbedtls_printf("\n"); } } - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("\n"); - } - #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) /* * CBC mode */ - for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { - u = i >> 1; - keybits = 128 + u * 64; - mode = i & 1; + { + static const int num_tests = + sizeof(aes_test_cbc_dec) / sizeof(*aes_test_cbc_dec); - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" AES-CBC-%3u (%s): ", keybits, - (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); - } + for (i = 0; i < num_tests << 1; i++) { + u = i >> 1; + keybits = 128 + u * 64; + mode = i & 1; - memset(iv, 0, 16); - memset(prv, 0, 16); - memset(buf, 0, 16); + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" AES-CBC-%3u (%s): ", keybits, + (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); + } - if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { - ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&ctx, key, keybits); - aes_tests = aes_test_cbc_dec[u]; - } else { - ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, keybits); - aes_tests = aes_test_cbc_enc[u]; - } + memset(iv, 0, 16); + memset(prv, 0, 16); + memset(buf, 0, 16); - /* - * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when - * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when - * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. - */ - if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192) { - mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); - continue; - } else if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&ctx, key, keybits); + aes_tests = aes_test_cbc_dec[u]; + } else { + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, keybits); + aes_tests = aes_test_cbc_enc[u]; + } + + /* + * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when + * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when + * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. + */ + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192) { + mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); + continue; + } else if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + for (j = 0; j < 10000; j++) { + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT) { + unsigned char tmp[16]; - for (j = 0; j < 10000; j++) { - if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT) { - unsigned char tmp[16]; + memcpy(tmp, prv, 16); + memcpy(prv, buf, 16); + memcpy(buf, tmp, 16); + } + + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(&ctx, mode, 16, iv, buf, buf); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } - memcpy(tmp, prv, 16); - memcpy(prv, buf, 16); - memcpy(buf, tmp, 16); } - ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(&ctx, mode, 16, iv, buf, buf); - if (ret != 0) { + if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, 16) != 0) { + ret = 1; goto exit; } - } - - if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, 16) != 0) { - ret = 1; - goto exit; + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } } if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + mbedtls_printf("\n"); } } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("\n"); - } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) /* * CFB128 mode */ - for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { - u = i >> 1; - keybits = 128 + u * 64; - mode = i & 1; + { + static const int num_tests = + sizeof(aes_test_cfb128_key) / sizeof(*aes_test_cfb128_key); - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" AES-CFB128-%3u (%s): ", keybits, - (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); - } + for (i = 0; i < num_tests << 1; i++) { + u = i >> 1; + keybits = 128 + u * 64; + mode = i & 1; - memcpy(iv, aes_test_cfb128_iv, 16); - memcpy(key, aes_test_cfb128_key[u], keybits / 8); + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" AES-CFB128-%3u (%s): ", keybits, + (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); + } - offset = 0; - ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, keybits); - /* - * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when - * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when - * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. - */ - if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192) { - mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); - continue; - } else if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } + memcpy(iv, aes_test_cfb128_iv, 16); + memcpy(key, aes_test_cfb128_key[u], keybits / 8); - if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { - memcpy(buf, aes_test_cfb128_ct[u], 64); - aes_tests = aes_test_cfb128_pt; - } else { - memcpy(buf, aes_test_cfb128_pt, 64); - aes_tests = aes_test_cfb128_ct[u]; - } + offset = 0; + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, keybits); + /* + * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when + * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when + * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. + */ + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192) { + mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); + continue; + } else if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } - ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128(&ctx, mode, 64, &offset, iv, buf, buf); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + memcpy(buf, aes_test_cfb128_ct[u], 64); + aes_tests = aes_test_cfb128_pt; + } else { + memcpy(buf, aes_test_cfb128_pt, 64); + aes_tests = aes_test_cfb128_ct[u]; + } - if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, 64) != 0) { - ret = 1; - goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128(&ctx, mode, 64, &offset, iv, buf, buf); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, 64) != 0) { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } } if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + mbedtls_printf("\n"); } } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("\n"); - } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) /* * OFB mode */ - for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { - u = i >> 1; - keybits = 128 + u * 64; - mode = i & 1; + { + static const int num_tests = + sizeof(aes_test_ofb_key) / sizeof(*aes_test_ofb_key); - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" AES-OFB-%3u (%s): ", keybits, - (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); - } + for (i = 0; i < num_tests << 1; i++) { + u = i >> 1; + keybits = 128 + u * 64; + mode = i & 1; - memcpy(iv, aes_test_ofb_iv, 16); - memcpy(key, aes_test_ofb_key[u], keybits / 8); + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" AES-OFB-%3u (%s): ", keybits, + (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); + } - offset = 0; - ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, keybits); - /* - * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when - * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when - * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. - */ - if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192) { - mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); - continue; - } else if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } + memcpy(iv, aes_test_ofb_iv, 16); + memcpy(key, aes_test_ofb_key[u], keybits / 8); - if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { - memcpy(buf, aes_test_ofb_ct[u], 64); - aes_tests = aes_test_ofb_pt; - } else { - memcpy(buf, aes_test_ofb_pt, 64); - aes_tests = aes_test_ofb_ct[u]; - } + offset = 0; + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, keybits); + /* + * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when + * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when + * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. + */ + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192) { + mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); + continue; + } else if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } - ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb(&ctx, 64, &offset, iv, buf, buf); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + memcpy(buf, aes_test_ofb_ct[u], 64); + aes_tests = aes_test_ofb_pt; + } else { + memcpy(buf, aes_test_ofb_pt, 64); + aes_tests = aes_test_ofb_ct[u]; + } - if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, 64) != 0) { - ret = 1; - goto exit; + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb(&ctx, 64, &offset, iv, buf, buf); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, 64) != 0) { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } } if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + mbedtls_printf("\n"); } } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("\n"); - } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) /* * CTR mode */ - for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { - u = i >> 1; - mode = i & 1; + { + static const int num_tests = + sizeof(aes_test_ctr_key) / sizeof(*aes_test_ctr_key); - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" AES-CTR-128 (%s): ", - (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); - } + for (i = 0; i < num_tests << 1; i++) { + u = i >> 1; + mode = i & 1; - memcpy(nonce_counter, aes_test_ctr_nonce_counter[u], 16); - memcpy(key, aes_test_ctr_key[u], 16); + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" AES-CTR-128 (%s): ", + (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); + } - offset = 0; - if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, 128)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } + memcpy(nonce_counter, aes_test_ctr_nonce_counter[u], 16); + memcpy(key, aes_test_ctr_key[u], 16); - len = aes_test_ctr_len[u]; + offset = 0; + if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, 128)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } - if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { - memcpy(buf, aes_test_ctr_ct[u], len); - aes_tests = aes_test_ctr_pt[u]; - } else { - memcpy(buf, aes_test_ctr_pt[u], len); - aes_tests = aes_test_ctr_ct[u]; - } + len = aes_test_ctr_len[u]; - ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr(&ctx, len, &offset, nonce_counter, - stream_block, buf, buf); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + memcpy(buf, aes_test_ctr_ct[u], len); + aes_tests = aes_test_ctr_pt[u]; + } else { + memcpy(buf, aes_test_ctr_pt[u], len); + aes_tests = aes_test_ctr_ct[u]; + } - if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, len) != 0) { - ret = 1; - goto exit; - } + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr(&ctx, len, &offset, nonce_counter, + stream_block, buf, buf); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, len) != 0) { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } } } @@ -2193,14 +2210,14 @@ int mbedtls_aes_self_test(int verbose) #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + /* + * XTS mode + */ { static const int num_tests = sizeof(aes_test_xts_key) / sizeof(*aes_test_xts_key); mbedtls_aes_xts_context ctx_xts; - /* - * XTS mode - */ mbedtls_aes_xts_init(&ctx_xts); for (i = 0; i < num_tests << 1; i++) { diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/aesce.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/aesce.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6a9e0a1c6b --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/aesce.c @@ -0,0 +1,618 @@ +/* + * Armv8-A Cryptographic Extension support functions for Aarch64 + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#if defined(__clang__) && (__clang_major__ >= 4) + +/* Ideally, we would simply use MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A in the following #if, + * but that is defined by build_info.h, and we need this block to happen first. */ +#if defined(__ARM_ARCH) +#if __ARM_ARCH >= 8 +#define MBEDTLS_AESCE_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A) && !defined(__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO) +/* TODO: Re-consider above after https://reviews.llvm.org/D131064 merged. + * + * The intrinsic declaration are guarded by predefined ACLE macros in clang: + * these are normally only enabled by the -march option on the command line. + * By defining the macros ourselves we gain access to those declarations without + * requiring -march on the command line. + * + * `arm_neon.h` is included by common.h, so we put these defines + * at the top of this file, before any includes. + */ +#define __ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO 1 +/* See: https://arm-software.github.io/acle/main/acle.html#cryptographic-extensions + * + * `__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO` is deprecated, but we need to continue to specify it + * for older compilers. + */ +#define __ARM_FEATURE_AES 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ENABLE_ARM_CRYPTO_EXTENSIONS_COMPILER_FLAG +#endif + +#endif /* defined(__clang__) && (__clang_major__ >= 4) */ + +#include +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) + +#include "aesce.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE) + +/* Compiler version checks. */ +#if defined(__clang__) +# if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) && (__clang_major__ < 11) +# error "Minimum version of Clang for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C on 32-bit Arm or Thumb is 11.0." +# elif defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) && (__clang_major__ < 4) +# error "Minimum version of Clang for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C on aarch64 is 4.0." +# endif +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +# if __GNUC__ < 6 +# error "Minimum version of GCC for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C is 6.0." +# endif +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +/* TODO: We haven't verified MSVC from 1920 to 1928. If someone verified that, + * please update this and document of `MBEDTLS_AESCE_C` in + * `mbedtls_config.h`. */ +# if _MSC_VER < 1929 +# error "Minimum version of MSVC for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C is 2019 version 16.11.2." +# endif +#elif defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) +# if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) && (__ARMCC_VERSION < 6200002) +/* TODO: We haven't verified armclang for 32-bit Arm/Thumb prior to 6.20. + * If someone verified that, please update this and document of + * `MBEDTLS_AESCE_C` in `mbedtls_config.h`. */ +# error "Minimum version of armclang for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C on 32-bit Arm is 6.20." +# elif defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) && (__ARMCC_VERSION < 6060000) +# error "Minimum version of armclang for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C on aarch64 is 6.6." +# endif +#endif + +#if !(defined(__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO) || defined(__ARM_FEATURE_AES)) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ENABLE_ARM_CRYPTO_EXTENSIONS_COMPILER_FLAG) +# if defined(__ARMCOMPILER_VERSION) +# if __ARMCOMPILER_VERSION <= 6090000 +# error "Must use minimum -march=armv8-a+crypto for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C" +# else +# pragma clang attribute push (__attribute__((target("aes"))), apply_to=function) +# define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +# endif +# elif defined(__clang__) +# pragma clang attribute push (__attribute__((target("aes"))), apply_to=function) +# define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +# elif defined(__GNUC__) +# pragma GCC push_options +# pragma GCC target ("+crypto") +# define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +# elif defined(_MSC_VER) +# error "Required feature(__ARM_FEATURE_AES) is not enabled." +# endif +#endif /* !(__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO || __ARM_FEATURE_AES) || + MBEDTLS_ENABLE_ARM_CRYPTO_EXTENSIONS_COMPILER_FLAG */ + +#if defined(__linux__) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) + +#include +#if !defined(HWCAP_NEON) +#define HWCAP_NEON (1 << 12) +#endif +#if !defined(HWCAP2_AES) +#define HWCAP2_AES (1 << 0) +#endif +#if !defined(HWCAP_AES) +#define HWCAP_AES (1 << 3) +#endif +#if !defined(HWCAP_ASIMD) +#define HWCAP_ASIMD (1 << 1) +#endif + +signed char mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result = -1; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) +/* + * AES instruction support detection routine + */ +int mbedtls_aesce_has_support_impl(void) +{ + /* To avoid many calls to getauxval, cache the result. This is + * thread-safe, because we store the result in a char so cannot + * be vulnerable to non-atomic updates. + * It is possible that we could end up setting result more than + * once, but that is harmless. + */ + if (mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result == -1) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) + unsigned long auxval = getauxval(AT_HWCAP); + unsigned long auxval2 = getauxval(AT_HWCAP2); + if (((auxval & HWCAP_NEON) == HWCAP_NEON) && + ((auxval2 & HWCAP2_AES) == HWCAP2_AES)) { + mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result = 1; + } else { + mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result = 0; + } +#else + unsigned long auxval = getauxval(AT_HWCAP); + if ((auxval & (HWCAP_ASIMD | HWCAP_AES)) == + (HWCAP_ASIMD | HWCAP_AES)) { + mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result = 1; + } else { + mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result = 0; + } +#endif + } + return mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result; +} +#endif + +#endif /* defined(__linux__) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) */ + +/* Single round of AESCE encryption */ +#define AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND \ + block = vaeseq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys)); \ + block = vaesmcq_u8(block); \ + keys += 16 +/* Two rounds of AESCE encryption */ +#define AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND_X2 AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND; AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND + +MBEDTLS_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE +static uint8x16_t aesce_encrypt_block(uint8x16_t block, + unsigned char *keys, + int rounds) +{ + /* 10, 12 or 14 rounds. Unroll loop. */ + if (rounds == 10) { + goto rounds_10; + } + if (rounds == 12) { + goto rounds_12; + } + AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND_X2; +rounds_12: + AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND_X2; +rounds_10: + AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND_X2; + AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND_X2; + AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND_X2; + AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND_X2; + AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND; + + /* AES AddRoundKey for the previous round. + * SubBytes, ShiftRows for the final round. */ + block = vaeseq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys)); + keys += 16; + + /* Final round: no MixColumns */ + + /* Final AddRoundKey */ + block = veorq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys)); + + return block; +} + +/* Single round of AESCE decryption + * + * AES AddRoundKey, SubBytes, ShiftRows + * + * block = vaesdq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys)); + * + * AES inverse MixColumns for the next round. + * + * This means that we switch the order of the inverse AddRoundKey and + * inverse MixColumns operations. We have to do this as AddRoundKey is + * done in an atomic instruction together with the inverses of SubBytes + * and ShiftRows. + * + * It works because MixColumns is a linear operation over GF(2^8) and + * AddRoundKey is an exclusive or, which is equivalent to addition over + * GF(2^8). (The inverse of MixColumns needs to be applied to the + * affected round keys separately which has been done when the + * decryption round keys were calculated.) + * + * block = vaesimcq_u8(block); + */ +#define AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND \ + block = vaesdq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys)); \ + block = vaesimcq_u8(block); \ + keys += 16 +/* Two rounds of AESCE decryption */ +#define AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND_X2 AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND; AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) +static uint8x16_t aesce_decrypt_block(uint8x16_t block, + unsigned char *keys, + int rounds) +{ + /* 10, 12 or 14 rounds. Unroll loop. */ + if (rounds == 10) { + goto rounds_10; + } + if (rounds == 12) { + goto rounds_12; + } + AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND_X2; +rounds_12: + AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND_X2; +rounds_10: + AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND_X2; + AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND_X2; + AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND_X2; + AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND_X2; + AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND; + + /* The inverses of AES AddRoundKey, SubBytes, ShiftRows finishing up the + * last full round. */ + block = vaesdq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys)); + keys += 16; + + /* Inverse AddRoundKey for inverting the initial round key addition. */ + block = veorq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys)); + + return block; +} +#endif + +/* + * AES-ECB block en(de)cryption + */ +int mbedtls_aesce_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16]) +{ + uint8x16_t block = vld1q_u8(&input[0]); + unsigned char *keys = (unsigned char *) (ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + block = aesce_decrypt_block(block, keys, ctx->nr); + } else +#else + (void) mode; +#endif + { + block = aesce_encrypt_block(block, keys, ctx->nr); + } + vst1q_u8(&output[0], block); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Compute decryption round keys from encryption round keys + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) +void mbedtls_aesce_inverse_key(unsigned char *invkey, + const unsigned char *fwdkey, + int nr) +{ + int i, j; + j = nr; + vst1q_u8(invkey, vld1q_u8(fwdkey + j * 16)); + for (i = 1, j--; j > 0; i++, j--) { + vst1q_u8(invkey + i * 16, + vaesimcq_u8(vld1q_u8(fwdkey + j * 16))); + } + vst1q_u8(invkey + i * 16, vld1q_u8(fwdkey + j * 16)); + +} +#endif + +static inline uint32_t aes_rot_word(uint32_t word) +{ + return (word << (32 - 8)) | (word >> 8); +} + +static inline uint32_t aes_sub_word(uint32_t in) +{ + uint8x16_t v = vreinterpretq_u8_u32(vdupq_n_u32(in)); + uint8x16_t zero = vdupq_n_u8(0); + + /* vaeseq_u8 does both SubBytes and ShiftRows. Taking the first row yields + * the correct result as ShiftRows doesn't change the first row. */ + v = vaeseq_u8(zero, v); + return vgetq_lane_u32(vreinterpretq_u32_u8(v), 0); +} + +/* + * Key expansion function + */ +static void aesce_setkey_enc(unsigned char *rk, + const unsigned char *key, + const size_t key_bit_length) +{ + static uint8_t const rcon[] = { 0x01, 0x02, 0x04, 0x08, 0x10, + 0x20, 0x40, 0x80, 0x1b, 0x36 }; + /* See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.197.pdf + * - Section 5, Nr = Nk + 6 + * - Section 5.2, the length of round keys is Nb*(Nr+1) + */ + const size_t key_len_in_words = key_bit_length / 32; /* Nk */ + const size_t round_key_len_in_words = 4; /* Nb */ + const size_t rounds_needed = key_len_in_words + 6; /* Nr */ + const size_t round_keys_len_in_words = + round_key_len_in_words * (rounds_needed + 1); /* Nb*(Nr+1) */ + const uint32_t *rko_end = (uint32_t *) rk + round_keys_len_in_words; + + memcpy(rk, key, key_len_in_words * 4); + + for (uint32_t *rki = (uint32_t *) rk; + rki + key_len_in_words < rko_end; + rki += key_len_in_words) { + + size_t iteration = (size_t) (rki - (uint32_t *) rk) / key_len_in_words; + uint32_t *rko; + rko = rki + key_len_in_words; + rko[0] = aes_rot_word(aes_sub_word(rki[key_len_in_words - 1])); + rko[0] ^= rcon[iteration] ^ rki[0]; + rko[1] = rko[0] ^ rki[1]; + rko[2] = rko[1] ^ rki[2]; + rko[3] = rko[2] ^ rki[3]; + if (rko + key_len_in_words > rko_end) { + /* Do not write overflow words.*/ + continue; + } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + switch (key_bit_length) { + case 128: + break; + case 192: + rko[4] = rko[3] ^ rki[4]; + rko[5] = rko[4] ^ rki[5]; + break; + case 256: + rko[4] = aes_sub_word(rko[3]) ^ rki[4]; + rko[5] = rko[4] ^ rki[5]; + rko[6] = rko[5] ^ rki[6]; + rko[7] = rko[6] ^ rki[7]; + break; + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ + } +} + +/* + * Key expansion, wrapper + */ +int mbedtls_aesce_setkey_enc(unsigned char *rk, + const unsigned char *key, + size_t bits) +{ + switch (bits) { + case 128: + case 192: + case 256: + aesce_setkey_enc(rk, key, bits); + break; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH; + } + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) + +#if defined(__clang__) +/* On clang for A32/T32, work around some missing intrinsics and types which are listed in + * [ACLE](https://arm-software.github.io/acle/neon_intrinsics/advsimd.html#polynomial-1) + * These are only required for GCM. + */ +#define vreinterpretq_u64_p64(a) ((uint64x2_t) a) + +typedef uint8x16_t poly128_t; + +static inline poly128_t vmull_p64(poly64_t a, poly64_t b) +{ + poly128_t r; + asm ("vmull.p64 %[r], %[a], %[b]" : [r] "=w" (r) : [a] "w" (a), [b] "w" (b) :); + return r; +} + +/* This is set to cause some more missing intrinsics to be defined below */ +#define COMMON_MISSING_INTRINSICS + +static inline poly128_t vmull_high_p64(poly64x2_t a, poly64x2_t b) +{ + return vmull_p64((poly64_t) (vget_high_u64((uint64x2_t) a)), + (poly64_t) (vget_high_u64((uint64x2_t) b))); +} + +#endif /* defined(__clang__) */ + +static inline uint8x16_t vrbitq_u8(uint8x16_t x) +{ + /* There is no vrbitq_u8 instruction in A32/T32, so provide + * an equivalent non-Neon implementation. Reverse bit order in each + * byte with 4x rbit, rev. */ + asm ("ldm %[p], { r2-r5 } \n\t" + "rbit r2, r2 \n\t" + "rev r2, r2 \n\t" + "rbit r3, r3 \n\t" + "rev r3, r3 \n\t" + "rbit r4, r4 \n\t" + "rev r4, r4 \n\t" + "rbit r5, r5 \n\t" + "rev r5, r5 \n\t" + "stm %[p], { r2-r5 } \n\t" + : + /* Output: 16 bytes of memory pointed to by &x */ + "+m" (*(uint8_t(*)[16]) &x) + : + [p] "r" (&x) + : + "r2", "r3", "r4", "r5" + ); + return x; +} + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && __GNUC__ == 5 +/* Some intrinsics are not available for GCC 5.X. */ +#define COMMON_MISSING_INTRINSICS +#endif /* MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC && __GNUC__ == 5 */ + + +#if defined(COMMON_MISSING_INTRINSICS) + +/* Missing intrinsics common to both GCC 5, and Clang on 32-bit */ + +#define vreinterpretq_p64_u8(a) ((poly64x2_t) a) +#define vreinterpretq_u8_p128(a) ((uint8x16_t) a) + +static inline poly64x1_t vget_low_p64(poly64x2_t a) +{ + uint64x1_t r = vget_low_u64(vreinterpretq_u64_p64(a)); + return (poly64x1_t) r; + +} + +#endif /* COMMON_MISSING_INTRINSICS */ + +/* vmull_p64/vmull_high_p64 wrappers. + * + * Older compilers miss some intrinsic functions for `poly*_t`. We use + * uint8x16_t and uint8x16x3_t as input/output parameters. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) +/* GCC reports incompatible type error without cast. GCC think poly64_t and + * poly64x1_t are different, that is different with MSVC and Clang. */ +#define MBEDTLS_VMULL_P64(a, b) vmull_p64((poly64_t) a, (poly64_t) b) +#else +/* MSVC reports `error C2440: 'type cast'` with cast. Clang does not report + * error with/without cast. And I think poly64_t and poly64x1_t are same, no + * cast for clang also. */ +#define MBEDTLS_VMULL_P64(a, b) vmull_p64(a, b) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC */ + +static inline uint8x16_t pmull_low(uint8x16_t a, uint8x16_t b) +{ + + return vreinterpretq_u8_p128( + MBEDTLS_VMULL_P64( + (poly64_t) vget_low_p64(vreinterpretq_p64_u8(a)), + (poly64_t) vget_low_p64(vreinterpretq_p64_u8(b)) + )); +} + +static inline uint8x16_t pmull_high(uint8x16_t a, uint8x16_t b) +{ + return vreinterpretq_u8_p128( + vmull_high_p64(vreinterpretq_p64_u8(a), + vreinterpretq_p64_u8(b))); +} + +/* GHASH does 128b polynomial multiplication on block in GF(2^128) defined by + * `x^128 + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1`. + * + * Arm64 only has 64b->128b polynomial multipliers, we need to do 4 64b + * multiplies to generate a 128b. + * + * `poly_mult_128` executes polynomial multiplication and outputs 256b that + * represented by 3 128b due to code size optimization. + * + * Output layout: + * | | | | + * |------------|-------------|-------------| + * | ret.val[0] | h3:h2:00:00 | high 128b | + * | ret.val[1] | :m2:m1:00 | middle 128b | + * | ret.val[2] | : :l1:l0 | low 128b | + */ +static inline uint8x16x3_t poly_mult_128(uint8x16_t a, uint8x16_t b) +{ + uint8x16x3_t ret; + uint8x16_t h, m, l; /* retval high/middle/low */ + uint8x16_t c, d, e; + + h = pmull_high(a, b); /* h3:h2:00:00 = a1*b1 */ + l = pmull_low(a, b); /* : :l1:l0 = a0*b0 */ + c = vextq_u8(b, b, 8); /* :c1:c0 = b0:b1 */ + d = pmull_high(a, c); /* :d2:d1:00 = a1*b0 */ + e = pmull_low(a, c); /* :e2:e1:00 = a0*b1 */ + m = veorq_u8(d, e); /* :m2:m1:00 = d + e */ + + ret.val[0] = h; + ret.val[1] = m; + ret.val[2] = l; + return ret; +} + +/* + * Modulo reduction. + * + * See: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285612706_Implementing_GCM_on_ARMv8 + * + * Section 4.3 + * + * Modular reduction is slightly more complex. Write the GCM modulus as f(z) = + * z^128 +r(z), where r(z) = z^7+z^2+z+ 1. The well known approach is to + * consider that z^128 ≡r(z) (mod z^128 +r(z)), allowing us to write the 256-bit + * operand to be reduced as a(z) = h(z)z^128 +l(z)≡h(z)r(z) + l(z). That is, we + * simply multiply the higher part of the operand by r(z) and add it to l(z). If + * the result is still larger than 128 bits, we reduce again. + */ +static inline uint8x16_t poly_mult_reduce(uint8x16x3_t input) +{ + uint8x16_t const ZERO = vdupq_n_u8(0); + + uint64x2_t r = vreinterpretq_u64_u8(vdupq_n_u8(0x87)); +#if defined(__GNUC__) + /* use 'asm' as an optimisation barrier to prevent loading MODULO from + * memory. It is for GNUC compatible compilers. + */ + asm volatile ("" : "+w" (r)); +#endif + uint8x16_t const MODULO = vreinterpretq_u8_u64(vshrq_n_u64(r, 64 - 8)); + uint8x16_t h, m, l; /* input high/middle/low 128b */ + uint8x16_t c, d, e, f, g, n, o; + h = input.val[0]; /* h3:h2:00:00 */ + m = input.val[1]; /* :m2:m1:00 */ + l = input.val[2]; /* : :l1:l0 */ + c = pmull_high(h, MODULO); /* :c2:c1:00 = reduction of h3 */ + d = pmull_low(h, MODULO); /* : :d1:d0 = reduction of h2 */ + e = veorq_u8(c, m); /* :e2:e1:00 = m2:m1:00 + c2:c1:00 */ + f = pmull_high(e, MODULO); /* : :f1:f0 = reduction of e2 */ + g = vextq_u8(ZERO, e, 8); /* : :g1:00 = e1:00 */ + n = veorq_u8(d, l); /* : :n1:n0 = d1:d0 + l1:l0 */ + o = veorq_u8(n, f); /* o1:o0 = f1:f0 + n1:n0 */ + return veorq_u8(o, g); /* = o1:o0 + g1:00 */ +} + +/* + * GCM multiplication: c = a times b in GF(2^128) + */ +void mbedtls_aesce_gcm_mult(unsigned char c[16], + const unsigned char a[16], + const unsigned char b[16]) +{ + uint8x16_t va, vb, vc; + va = vrbitq_u8(vld1q_u8(&a[0])); + vb = vrbitq_u8(vld1q_u8(&b[0])); + vc = vrbitq_u8(poly_mult_reduce(poly_mult_128(va, vb))); + vst1q_u8(&c[0], vc); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA) +#if defined(__clang__) +#pragma clang attribute pop +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +#pragma GCC pop_options +#endif +#undef MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESCE_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/aesce.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/aesce.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a14d085efa --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/aesce.h @@ -0,0 +1,136 @@ +/** + * \file aesce.h + * + * \brief Support hardware AES acceleration on Armv8-A processors with + * the Armv8-A Cryptographic Extension. + * + * \warning These functions are only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call them directly. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_AESCE_H +#define MBEDTLS_AESCE_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" +#include "common.h" + +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) \ + && defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS) \ + && (defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) || defined(__clang__) || defined(MSC_VER)) + +/* MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE is defined if we have a suitable target platform, and a + * potentially suitable compiler (compiler version & flags are not checked when defining + * this). */ +#define MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if defined(__linux__) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) + +extern signed char mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result; + +/** + * \brief Internal function to detect the crypto extension in CPUs. + * + * \return 1 if CPU has support for the feature, 0 otherwise + */ +int mbedtls_aesce_has_support_impl(void); + +#define MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT() (mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result == -1 ? \ + mbedtls_aesce_has_support_impl() : \ + mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result) + +#else /* defined(__linux__) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) */ + +/* If we are not on Linux, we can't detect support so assume that it's supported. + * Similarly, assume support if MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY is set. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT() 1 + +#endif /* defined(__linux__) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) */ + +/** + * \brief Internal AES-ECB block encryption and decryption + * + * \warning This assumes that the context specifies either 10, 12 or 14 + * rounds and will behave incorrectly if this is not the case. + * + * \param ctx AES context + * \param mode MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT + * \param input 16-byte input block + * \param output 16-byte output block + * + * \return 0 on success (cannot fail) + */ +int mbedtls_aesce_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16]); + +/** + * \brief Internal GCM multiplication: c = a * b in GF(2^128) + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. + * + * \param c Result + * \param a First operand + * \param b Second operand + * + * \note Both operands and result are bit strings interpreted as + * elements of GF(2^128) as per the GCM spec. + */ +void mbedtls_aesce_gcm_mult(unsigned char c[16], + const unsigned char a[16], + const unsigned char b[16]); + + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) +/** + * \brief Internal round key inversion. This function computes + * decryption round keys from the encryption round keys. + * + * \param invkey Round keys for the equivalent inverse cipher + * \param fwdkey Original round keys (for encryption) + * \param nr Number of rounds (that is, number of round keys minus one) + */ +void mbedtls_aesce_inverse_key(unsigned char *invkey, + const unsigned char *fwdkey, + int nr); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */ + +/** + * \brief Internal key expansion for encryption + * + * \param rk Destination buffer where the round keys are written + * \param key Encryption key + * \param bits Key size in bits (must be 128, 192 or 256) + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH + */ +int mbedtls_aesce_setkey_enc(unsigned char *rk, + const unsigned char *key, + size_t bits); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#else + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A) +#error "AES hardware acceleration not supported on this platform / compiler" +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESCE_C && MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A && MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS && + (MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC || __clang__ || MSC_VER) */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESCE_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/aesni.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/aesni.c index 866b6cbfbf..8e5bd55ab9 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/aesni.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/aesni.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * AES-NI support functions * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* @@ -26,27 +14,35 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) -#include "mbedtls/aesni.h" +#include "aesni.h" #include -/* *INDENT-OFF* */ -#ifndef asm -#define asm __asm -#endif -/* *INDENT-ON* */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) #if MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2 -#if !defined(_WIN32) +#if defined(__GNUC__) #include -#else +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) #include +#else +#error "`__cpuid` required by MBEDTLS_AESNI_C is not supported by the compiler" #endif #include #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) +#pragma GCC push_options +#pragma GCC target ("pclmul,sse2,aes") +#define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +#elif defined(__clang__) && (__clang_major__ >= 5) +#pragma clang attribute push (__attribute__((target("pclmul,sse2,aes"))), apply_to=function) +#define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +#endif +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) /* * AES-NI support detection routine */ @@ -57,7 +53,7 @@ int mbedtls_aesni_has_support(unsigned int what) if (!done) { #if MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2 - static unsigned info[4] = { 0, 0, 0, 0 }; + static int info[4] = { 0, 0, 0, 0 }; #if defined(_MSC_VER) __cpuid(info, 1); #else @@ -76,6 +72,7 @@ int mbedtls_aesni_has_support(unsigned int what) return (c & what) != 0; } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY */ #if MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2 @@ -87,7 +84,7 @@ int mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char input[16], unsigned char output[16]) { - const __m128i *rk = (const __m128i *) (ctx->rk); + const __m128i *rk = (const __m128i *) (ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset); unsigned nr = ctx->nr; // Number of remaining rounds // Load round key 0 @@ -97,14 +94,19 @@ int mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, ++rk; --nr; - if (mode == 0) { +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { while (nr != 0) { state = _mm_aesdec_si128(state, *rk); ++rk; --nr; } state = _mm_aesdeclast_si128(state, *rk); - } else { + } else +#else + (void) mode; +#endif + { while (nr != 0) { state = _mm_aesenc_si128(state, *rk); ++rk; @@ -191,7 +193,7 @@ void mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult(unsigned char c[16], const unsigned char a[16], const unsigned char b[16]) { - __m128i aa, bb, cc, dd; + __m128i aa = { 0 }, bb = { 0 }, cc, dd; /* The inputs are in big-endian order, so byte-reverse them */ for (size_t i = 0; i < 16; i++) { @@ -221,6 +223,7 @@ void mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult(unsigned char c[16], /* * Compute decryption round keys from encryption round keys */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) void mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key(unsigned char *invkey, const unsigned char *fwdkey, int nr) { @@ -233,6 +236,7 @@ void mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key(unsigned char *invkey, } *ik = *fk; } +#endif /* * Key expansion, 128-bit case @@ -281,6 +285,7 @@ static void aesni_setkey_enc_128(unsigned char *rk_bytes, /* * Key expansion, 192-bit case */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static void aesni_set_rk_192(__m128i *state0, __m128i *state1, __m128i xword, unsigned char *rk) { @@ -335,10 +340,12 @@ static void aesni_setkey_enc_192(unsigned char *rk, aesni_set_rk_192(&state0, &state1, _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state1, 0x40), rk + 24 * 7); aesni_set_rk_192(&state0, &state1, _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state1, 0x80), rk + 24 * 8); } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ /* * Key expansion, 256-bit case */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static void aesni_set_rk_256(__m128i state0, __m128i state1, __m128i xword, __m128i *rk0, __m128i *rk1) { @@ -395,6 +402,16 @@ static void aesni_setkey_enc_256(unsigned char *rk_bytes, aesni_set_rk_256(rk[10], rk[11], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[11], 0x20), &rk[12], &rk[13]); aesni_set_rk_256(rk[12], rk[13], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[13], 0x40), &rk[14], &rk[15]); } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA) +#if defined(__clang__) +#pragma clang attribute pop +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +#pragma GCC pop_options +#endif +#undef MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +#endif #else /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 1 */ @@ -455,6 +472,7 @@ int mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, "jnz 1b \n\t" "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" // load round key AESENCLAST(xmm1_xmm0) // last round +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) "jmp 3f \n\t" "2: \n\t" // decryption loop @@ -465,11 +483,12 @@ int mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, "jnz 2b \n\t" "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" // load round key AESDECLAST(xmm1_xmm0) // last round +#endif "3: \n\t" "movdqu %%xmm0, (%4) \n\t" // export output : - : "r" (ctx->nr), "r" (ctx->rk), "r" (mode), "r" (input), "r" (output) + : "r" (ctx->nr), "r" (ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset), "r" (mode), "r" (input), "r" (output) : "memory", "cc", "xmm0", "xmm1"); @@ -591,6 +610,7 @@ void mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult(unsigned char c[16], /* * Compute decryption round keys from encryption round keys */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) void mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key(unsigned char *invkey, const unsigned char *fwdkey, int nr) { @@ -610,6 +630,7 @@ void mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key(unsigned char *invkey, memcpy(ik, fk, 16); } +#endif /* * Key expansion, 128-bit case @@ -664,6 +685,7 @@ static void aesni_setkey_enc_128(unsigned char *rk, /* * Key expansion, 192-bit case */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static void aesni_setkey_enc_192(unsigned char *rk, const unsigned char *key) { @@ -717,10 +739,12 @@ static void aesni_setkey_enc_192(unsigned char *rk, : "r" (rk), "r" (key) : "memory", "cc", "0"); } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ /* * Key expansion, 256-bit case */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static void aesni_setkey_enc_256(unsigned char *rk, const unsigned char *key) { @@ -783,6 +807,7 @@ static void aesni_setkey_enc_256(unsigned char *rk, : "r" (rk), "r" (key) : "memory", "cc", "0"); } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE */ @@ -795,8 +820,10 @@ int mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc(unsigned char *rk, { switch (bits) { case 128: aesni_setkey_enc_128(rk, key); break; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) case 192: aesni_setkey_enc_192(rk, key); break; case 256: aesni_setkey_enc_256(rk, key); break; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ default: return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH; } diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aesni.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/aesni.h similarity index 70% rename from vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aesni.h rename to vendor/mbedtls/library/aesni.h index 0da40a0a3c..59e27afd3e 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aesni.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/aesni.h @@ -8,57 +8,26 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_AESNI_H #define MBEDTLS_AESNI_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/aes.h" #define MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES 0x02000000u #define MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL 0x00000002u -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) && \ - (defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ - defined(_M_X64) || defined(_M_AMD64)) && \ - !defined(_M_ARM64EC) -#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64 -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86) && \ - (defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86)) -#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86 -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) || defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86)) + (defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86)) /* Can we do AESNI with intrinsics? * (Only implemented with certain compilers, only for certain targets.) - * - * NOTE: MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS and MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE are internal - * macros that may change in future releases. */ #undef MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS -#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(__clang__) /* Visual Studio supports AESNI intrinsics since VS 2008 SP1. We only support * VS 2013 and up for other reasons anyway, so no need to check the version. */ #define MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS @@ -66,24 +35,30 @@ /* GCC-like compilers: currently, we only support intrinsics if the requisite * target flag is enabled when building the library (e.g. `gcc -mpclmul -msse2` * or `clang -maes -mpclmul`). */ -#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__AES__) && defined(__PCLMUL__) +#if (defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)) && defined(__AES__) && defined(__PCLMUL__) +#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS +#endif +/* For 32-bit, we only support intrinsics */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) && (defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)) #define MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS #endif -/* Choose the implementation of AESNI, if one is available. */ -#undef MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE -/* To minimize disruption when releasing the intrinsics-based implementation, - * favor the assembly-based implementation if it's available. We intend to - * revise this in a later release of Mbed TLS 3.x. In the long run, we will - * likely remove the assembly implementation. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ - defined(__GNUC__) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64) +/* Choose the implementation of AESNI, if one is available. + * + * Favor the intrinsics-based implementation if it's available, for better + * maintainability. + * Performance is about the same (see #7380). + * In the long run, we will likely remove the assembly implementation. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS) +#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE 2 // via intrinsics +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ + (defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) /* Can we do AESNI with inline assembly? * (Only implemented with gas syntax, only for 64-bit.) */ #define MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE 1 // via assembly -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS) -#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE 2 // via intrinsics +#else +#error "MBEDTLS_AESNI_C defined, but neither intrinsics nor assembly available" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) @@ -103,7 +78,11 @@ extern "C" { * * \return 1 if CPU has support for the feature, 0 otherwise */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) int mbedtls_aesni_has_support(unsigned int what); +#else +#define mbedtls_aesni_has_support(what) 1 +#endif /** * \brief Internal AES-NI AES-ECB block encryption and decryption @@ -140,6 +119,7 @@ void mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult(unsigned char c[16], const unsigned char a[16], const unsigned char b[16]); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) /** * \brief Internal round key inversion. This function computes * decryption round keys from the encryption round keys. @@ -154,6 +134,7 @@ void mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult(unsigned char c[16], void mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key(unsigned char *invkey, const unsigned char *fwdkey, int nr); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */ /** * \brief Internal key expansion for encryption @@ -176,6 +157,6 @@ int mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc(unsigned char *rk, #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_C && (MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86_64 || MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_C && (MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64 || MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/alignment.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/alignment.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a17001dd91 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/alignment.h @@ -0,0 +1,684 @@ +/** + * \file alignment.h + * + * \brief Utility code for dealing with unaligned memory accesses + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_ALIGNMENT_H +#define MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_ALIGNMENT_H + +#include +#include +#include + +/* + * Define MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS for architectures where unaligned memory + * accesses are known to be efficient. + * + * All functions defined here will behave correctly regardless, but might be less + * efficient when this is not defined. + */ +#if defined(__ARM_FEATURE_UNALIGNED) \ + || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) \ + || defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64) +/* + * __ARM_FEATURE_UNALIGNED is defined where appropriate by armcc, gcc 7, clang 9 + * (and later versions) for Arm v7 and later; all x86 platforms should have + * efficient unaligned access. + * + * https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/build/arm64-windows-abi-conventions?view=msvc-170#alignment + * specifies that on Windows-on-Arm64, unaligned access is safe (except for uncached + * device memory). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS +#endif + +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) \ + || defined(__ICCRX__) || defined(__ICCRL78__) || defined(__ICCRISCV__)) +#pragma language=save +#pragma language=extended +#define MBEDTLS_POP_IAR_LANGUAGE_PRAGMA +/* IAR recommend this technique for accessing unaligned data in + * https://www.iar.com/knowledge/support/technical-notes/compiler/accessing-unaligned-data + * This results in a single load / store instruction (if unaligned access is supported). + * According to that document, this is only supported on certain architectures. + */ + #define UINT_UNALIGNED +typedef uint16_t __packed mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t; +typedef uint32_t __packed mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t; +typedef uint64_t __packed mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && (MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION >= 40504) && \ + ((MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION < 60300) || (!defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS))) +/* + * gcc may generate a branch to memcpy for calls like `memcpy(dest, src, 4)` rather than + * generating some LDR or LDRB instructions (similar for stores). + * + * This is architecture dependent: x86-64 seems fine even with old gcc; 32-bit Arm + * is affected. To keep it simple, we enable for all architectures. + * + * For versions of gcc < 5.4.0 this issue always happens. + * For gcc < 6.3.0, this issue happens at -O0 + * For all versions, this issue happens iff unaligned access is not supported. + * + * For gcc 4.x, this implementation will generate byte-by-byte loads even if unaligned access is + * supported, which is correct but not optimal. + * + * For performance (and code size, in some cases), we want to avoid the branch and just generate + * some inline load/store instructions since the access is small and constant-size. + * + * The manual states: + * "The packed attribute specifies that a variable or structure field should have the smallest + * possible alignment—one byte for a variable" + * https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.5.4/gcc/Variable-Attributes.html + * + * Previous implementations used __attribute__((__aligned__(1)), but had issues with a gcc bug: + * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=94662 + * + * Tested with several versions of GCC from 4.5.0 up to 13.2.0 + * We don't enable for older than 4.5.0 as this has not been tested. + */ + #define UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT +typedef struct { + uint16_t x; +} __attribute__((packed)) mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t; +typedef struct { + uint32_t x; +} __attribute__((packed)) mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t; +typedef struct { + uint64_t x; +} __attribute__((packed)) mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t; + #endif + +/* + * We try to force mbedtls_(get|put)_unaligned_uintXX to be always inline, because this results + * in code that is both smaller and faster. IAR and gcc both benefit from this when optimising + * for size. + */ + +/** + * Read the unsigned 16 bits integer from the given address, which need not + * be aligned. + * + * \param p pointer to 2 bytes of data + * \return Data at the given address + */ +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) +#endif +static inline uint16_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16(const void *p) +{ + uint16_t r; +#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) + mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p; + r = *p16; +#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT) + mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p; + r = p16->x; +#else + memcpy(&r, p, sizeof(r)); +#endif + return r; +} + +/** + * Write the unsigned 16 bits integer to the given address, which need not + * be aligned. + * + * \param p pointer to 2 bytes of data + * \param x data to write + */ +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) +#endif +static inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16(void *p, uint16_t x) +{ +#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) + mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p; + *p16 = x; +#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT) + mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p; + p16->x = x; +#else + memcpy(p, &x, sizeof(x)); +#endif +} + +/** + * Read the unsigned 32 bits integer from the given address, which need not + * be aligned. + * + * \param p pointer to 4 bytes of data + * \return Data at the given address + */ +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) +#endif +static inline uint32_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(const void *p) +{ + uint32_t r; +#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) + mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p; + r = *p32; +#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT) + mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p; + r = p32->x; +#else + memcpy(&r, p, sizeof(r)); +#endif + return r; +} + +/** + * Write the unsigned 32 bits integer to the given address, which need not + * be aligned. + * + * \param p pointer to 4 bytes of data + * \param x data to write + */ +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) +#endif +static inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(void *p, uint32_t x) +{ +#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) + mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p; + *p32 = x; +#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT) + mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p; + p32->x = x; +#else + memcpy(p, &x, sizeof(x)); +#endif +} + +/** + * Read the unsigned 64 bits integer from the given address, which need not + * be aligned. + * + * \param p pointer to 8 bytes of data + * \return Data at the given address + */ +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) +#endif +static inline uint64_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(const void *p) +{ + uint64_t r; +#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) + mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p; + r = *p64; +#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT) + mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p; + r = p64->x; +#else + memcpy(&r, p, sizeof(r)); +#endif + return r; +} + +/** + * Write the unsigned 64 bits integer to the given address, which need not + * be aligned. + * + * \param p pointer to 8 bytes of data + * \param x data to write + */ +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) +#endif +static inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(void *p, uint64_t x) +{ +#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) + mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p; + *p64 = x; +#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT) + mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p; + p64->x = x; +#else + memcpy(p, &x, sizeof(x)); +#endif +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POP_IAR_LANGUAGE_PRAGMA) +#pragma language=restore +#endif + +/** Byte Reading Macros + * + * Given a multi-byte integer \p x, MBEDTLS_BYTE_n retrieves the n-th + * byte from x, where byte 0 is the least significant byte. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(x) ((uint8_t) ((x) & 0xff)) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 8) & 0xff)) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 16) & 0xff)) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 24) & 0xff)) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_4(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 32) & 0xff)) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_5(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 40) & 0xff)) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_6(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 48) & 0xff)) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_7(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 56) & 0xff)) + +/* + * Detect GCC built-in byteswap routines + */ +#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__GNUC_PREREQ) +#if __GNUC_PREREQ(4, 8) +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP16 __builtin_bswap16 +#endif /* __GNUC_PREREQ(4,8) */ +#if __GNUC_PREREQ(4, 3) +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 __builtin_bswap32 +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP64 __builtin_bswap64 +#endif /* __GNUC_PREREQ(4,3) */ +#endif /* defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__GNUC_PREREQ) */ + +/* + * Detect Clang built-in byteswap routines + */ +#if defined(__clang__) && defined(__has_builtin) +#if __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap16) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP16) +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP16 __builtin_bswap16 +#endif /* __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap16) */ +#if __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap32) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP32) +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 __builtin_bswap32 +#endif /* __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap32) */ +#if __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap64) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP64) +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP64 __builtin_bswap64 +#endif /* __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap64) */ +#endif /* defined(__clang__) && defined(__has_builtin) */ + +/* + * Detect MSVC built-in byteswap routines + */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP16) +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP16 _byteswap_ushort +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP32) +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 _byteswap_ulong +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP64) +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP64 _byteswap_uint64 +#endif +#endif /* defined(_MSC_VER) */ + +/* Detect armcc built-in byteswap routine */ +#if defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && (__ARMCC_VERSION >= 410000) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP32) +#if defined(__ARM_ACLE) /* ARM Compiler 6 - earlier versions don't need a header */ +#include +#endif +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 __rev +#endif + +/* Detect IAR built-in byteswap routine */ +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#if defined(__ARM_ACLE) +#include +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP16(x) ((uint16_t) __rev16((uint32_t) (x))) +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 __rev +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP64 __revll +#endif +#endif + +/* + * Where compiler built-ins are not present, fall back to C code that the + * compiler may be able to detect and transform into the relevant bswap or + * similar instruction. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP16) +static inline uint16_t mbedtls_bswap16(uint16_t x) +{ + return + (x & 0x00ff) << 8 | + (x & 0xff00) >> 8; +} +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP16 mbedtls_bswap16 +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP16) */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP32) +static inline uint32_t mbedtls_bswap32(uint32_t x) +{ + return + (x & 0x000000ff) << 24 | + (x & 0x0000ff00) << 8 | + (x & 0x00ff0000) >> 8 | + (x & 0xff000000) >> 24; +} +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 mbedtls_bswap32 +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP32) */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP64) +static inline uint64_t mbedtls_bswap64(uint64_t x) +{ + return + (x & 0x00000000000000ffULL) << 56 | + (x & 0x000000000000ff00ULL) << 40 | + (x & 0x0000000000ff0000ULL) << 24 | + (x & 0x00000000ff000000ULL) << 8 | + (x & 0x000000ff00000000ULL) >> 8 | + (x & 0x0000ff0000000000ULL) >> 24 | + (x & 0x00ff000000000000ULL) >> 40 | + (x & 0xff00000000000000ULL) >> 56; +} +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP64 mbedtls_bswap64 +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP64) */ + +#if !defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) + +#if defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) +/* IAR defines __xxx_ENDIAN__, but not __BYTE_ORDER__ */ +#define MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN 0 +#elif defined(__BIG_ENDIAN__) +#define MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN 1 +#else +static const uint16_t mbedtls_byte_order_detector = { 0x100 }; +#define MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN (*((unsigned char *) (&mbedtls_byte_order_detector)) == 0x01) +#endif + +#else + +#if (__BYTE_ORDER__) == (__ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__) +#define MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN 1 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN 0 +#endif + +#endif /* !defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) */ + +/** + * Get the unsigned 32 bits integer corresponding to four bytes in + * big-endian order (MSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the four bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and most significant + * byte of the four bytes to build the 32 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(data, offset) \ + ((MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + ? mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset)) \ + : MBEDTLS_BSWAP32(mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset))) \ + ) + +/** + * Put in memory a 32 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order. + * + * \param n 32 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 32 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the most significant + * byte of the 32 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(n, data, offset) \ + { \ + if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset), (uint32_t) (n)); \ + } \ + else \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset), MBEDTLS_BSWAP32((uint32_t) (n))); \ + } \ + } + +/** + * Get the unsigned 32 bits integer corresponding to four bytes in + * little-endian order (LSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the four bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and least significant + * byte of the four bytes to build the 32 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, offset) \ + ((MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + ? MBEDTLS_BSWAP32(mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset))) \ + : mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset)) \ + ) + + +/** + * Put in memory a 32 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order. + * + * \param n 32 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 32 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the least significant + * byte of the 32 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(n, data, offset) \ + { \ + if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset), MBEDTLS_BSWAP32((uint32_t) (n))); \ + } \ + else \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset), ((uint32_t) (n))); \ + } \ + } + +/** + * Get the unsigned 16 bits integer corresponding to two bytes in + * little-endian order (LSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the two bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and least significant + * byte of the two bytes to build the 16 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_LE(data, offset) \ + ((MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + ? MBEDTLS_BSWAP16(mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset))) \ + : mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset)) \ + ) + +/** + * Put in memory a 16 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order. + * + * \param n 16 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 16 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the least significant + * byte of the 16 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE(n, data, offset) \ + { \ + if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset), MBEDTLS_BSWAP16((uint16_t) (n))); \ + } \ + else \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset), (uint16_t) (n)); \ + } \ + } + +/** + * Get the unsigned 16 bits integer corresponding to two bytes in + * big-endian order (MSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the two bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and most significant + * byte of the two bytes to build the 16 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(data, offset) \ + ((MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + ? mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset)) \ + : MBEDTLS_BSWAP16(mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset))) \ + ) + +/** + * Put in memory a 16 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order. + * + * \param n 16 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 16 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the most significant + * byte of the 16 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(n, data, offset) \ + { \ + if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset), (uint16_t) (n)); \ + } \ + else \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset), MBEDTLS_BSWAP16((uint16_t) (n))); \ + } \ + } + +/** + * Get the unsigned 24 bits integer corresponding to three bytes in + * big-endian order (MSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the three bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and most significant + * byte of the three bytes to build the 24 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(data, offset) \ + ( \ + ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset)] << 16) \ + | ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset) + 1] << 8) \ + | ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset) + 2]) \ + ) + +/** + * Put in memory a 24 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order. + * + * \param n 24 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 24 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the most significant + * byte of the 24 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT24_BE(n, data, offset) \ + { \ + (data)[(offset)] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(n); \ + (data)[(offset) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(n); \ + (data)[(offset) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(n); \ + } + +/** + * Get the unsigned 24 bits integer corresponding to three bytes in + * little-endian order (LSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the three bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and least significant + * byte of the three bytes to build the 24 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_LE(data, offset) \ + ( \ + ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset)]) \ + | ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset) + 1] << 8) \ + | ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset) + 2] << 16) \ + ) + +/** + * Put in memory a 24 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order. + * + * \param n 24 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 24 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the least significant + * byte of the 24 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT24_LE(n, data, offset) \ + { \ + (data)[(offset)] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(n); \ + (data)[(offset) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(n); \ + (data)[(offset) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(n); \ + } + +/** + * Get the unsigned 64 bits integer corresponding to eight bytes in + * big-endian order (MSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the eight bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and most significant + * byte of the eight bytes to build the 64 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(data, offset) \ + ((MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + ? mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset)) \ + : MBEDTLS_BSWAP64(mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset))) \ + ) + +/** + * Put in memory a 64 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order. + * + * \param n 64 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 64 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the most significant + * byte of the 64 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(n, data, offset) \ + { \ + if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset), (uint64_t) (n)); \ + } \ + else \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset), MBEDTLS_BSWAP64((uint64_t) (n))); \ + } \ + } + +/** + * Get the unsigned 64 bits integer corresponding to eight bytes in + * little-endian order (LSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the eight bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and least significant + * byte of the eight bytes to build the 64 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE(data, offset) \ + ((MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + ? MBEDTLS_BSWAP64(mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset))) \ + : mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset)) \ + ) + +/** + * Put in memory a 64 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order. + * + * \param n 64 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 64 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the least significant + * byte of the 64 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE(n, data, offset) \ + { \ + if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset), MBEDTLS_BSWAP64((uint64_t) (n))); \ + } \ + else \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset), (uint64_t) (n)); \ + } \ + } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_ALIGNMENT_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/arc4.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/arc4.c deleted file mode 100644 index aa5e3a2b3a..0000000000 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/arc4.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,192 +0,0 @@ -/* - * An implementation of the ARCFOUR algorithm - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ -/* - * The ARCFOUR algorithm was publicly disclosed on 94/09. - * - * http://groups.google.com/group/sci.crypt/msg/10a300c9d21afca0 - */ - -#include "common.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - -#include "mbedtls/arc4.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" - -#include - -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT) - -void mbedtls_arc4_init(mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx) -{ - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_arc4_context)); -} - -void mbedtls_arc4_free(mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx) -{ - if (ctx == NULL) { - return; - } - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_arc4_context)); -} - -/* - * ARC4 key schedule - */ -void mbedtls_arc4_setup(mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int keylen) -{ - int i, j, a; - unsigned int k; - unsigned char *m; - - ctx->x = 0; - ctx->y = 0; - m = ctx->m; - - for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) { - m[i] = (unsigned char) i; - } - - j = k = 0; - - for (i = 0; i < 256; i++, k++) { - if (k >= keylen) { - k = 0; - } - - a = m[i]; - j = (j + a + key[k]) & 0xFF; - m[i] = m[j]; - m[j] = (unsigned char) a; - } -} - -/* - * ARC4 cipher function - */ -int mbedtls_arc4_crypt(mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output) -{ - int x, y, a, b; - size_t i; - unsigned char *m; - - x = ctx->x; - y = ctx->y; - m = ctx->m; - - for (i = 0; i < length; i++) { - x = (x + 1) & 0xFF; a = m[x]; - y = (y + a) & 0xFF; b = m[y]; - - m[x] = (unsigned char) b; - m[y] = (unsigned char) a; - - output[i] = (unsigned char) - (input[i] ^ m[(unsigned char) (a + b)]); - } - - ctx->x = x; - ctx->y = y; - - return 0; -} - -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -/* - * ARC4 tests vectors as posted by Eric Rescorla in sep. 1994: - * - * http://groups.google.com/group/comp.security.misc/msg/10a300c9d21afca0 - */ -static const unsigned char arc4_test_key[3][8] = -{ - { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF }, - { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF }, - { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } -}; - -static const unsigned char arc4_test_pt[3][8] = -{ - { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF }, - { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, - { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } -}; - -static const unsigned char arc4_test_ct[3][8] = -{ - { 0x75, 0xB7, 0x87, 0x80, 0x99, 0xE0, 0xC5, 0x96 }, - { 0x74, 0x94, 0xC2, 0xE7, 0x10, 0x4B, 0x08, 0x79 }, - { 0xDE, 0x18, 0x89, 0x41, 0xA3, 0x37, 0x5D, 0x3A } -}; - -/* - * Checkup routine - */ -int mbedtls_arc4_self_test(int verbose) -{ - int i, ret = 0; - unsigned char ibuf[8]; - unsigned char obuf[8]; - mbedtls_arc4_context ctx; - - mbedtls_arc4_init(&ctx); - - for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" ARC4 test #%d: ", i + 1); - } - - memcpy(ibuf, arc4_test_pt[i], 8); - - mbedtls_arc4_setup(&ctx, arc4_test_key[i], 8); - mbedtls_arc4_crypt(&ctx, 8, ibuf, obuf); - - if (memcmp(obuf, arc4_test_ct[i], 8) != 0) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); - } - - ret = 1; - goto exit; - } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); - } - } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("\n"); - } - -exit: - mbedtls_arc4_free(&ctx); - - return ret; -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/aria.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/aria.c index d958ef615d..d9f84cc59d 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/aria.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/aria.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * ARIA implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* @@ -37,12 +25,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" -/* Parameter validation macros */ -#define ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define ARIA_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - /* * modify byte order: ( A B C D ) -> ( B A D C ), i.e. swap pairs of bytes * @@ -98,47 +80,8 @@ static inline uint32_t aria_p1(uint32_t x) * modify byte order: ( A B C D ) -> ( D C B A ), i.e. change endianness * * This is submatrix P3 in [1] Appendix B.1 - * - * Some compilers fail to translate this to a single instruction, - * so let's provide asm versions for common platforms with C fallback. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) -#if defined(__arm__) /* rev available from v6 up */ -/* armcc5 --gnu defines __GNUC__ but doesn't support GNU's extended asm */ -#if defined(__GNUC__) && \ - (!defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || __ARMCC_VERSION >= 6000000) && \ - __ARM_ARCH >= 6 -static inline uint32_t aria_p3(uint32_t x) -{ - uint32_t r; - __asm("rev %0, %1" : "=l" (r) : "l" (x)); - return r; -} -#define ARIA_P3 aria_p3 -#elif defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && __ARMCC_VERSION < 6000000 && \ - (__TARGET_ARCH_ARM >= 6 || __TARGET_ARCH_THUMB >= 3) -static inline uint32_t aria_p3(uint32_t x) -{ - uint32_t r; - __asm("rev r, x"); - return r; -} -#define ARIA_P3 aria_p3 -#endif -#endif /* arm */ -#if defined(__GNUC__) && \ - defined(__i386__) || defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) -static inline uint32_t aria_p3(uint32_t x) -{ - __asm("bswap %0" : "=r" (x) : "0" (x)); - return x; -} -#define ARIA_P3 aria_p3 -#endif /* x86 gnuc */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && GNUC */ -#if !defined(ARIA_P3) -#define ARIA_P3(x) ARIA_P2(ARIA_P1(x)) -#endif +#define ARIA_P3(x) MBEDTLS_BSWAP32(x) /* * ARIA Affine Transform @@ -414,8 +357,6 @@ int mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, int i; uint32_t w[4][4], *w2; - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); if (keybits != 128 && keybits != 192 && keybits != 256) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -464,12 +405,11 @@ int mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, /* * Set decryption key */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) int mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits) { int i, j, k, ret; - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); ret = mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(ctx, key, keybits); if (ret != 0) { @@ -493,6 +433,7 @@ int mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, return 0; } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */ /* * Encrypt a block @@ -504,9 +445,6 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, int i; uint32_t a, b, c, d; - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); a = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 0); b = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 4); @@ -554,7 +492,6 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, /* Initialize context */ void mbedtls_aria_init(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx) { - ARIA_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_aria_context)); } @@ -579,15 +516,11 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) { - int i; unsigned char temp[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE]; - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); + if ((mode != MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT) && (mode != MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } if (length % MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH; @@ -598,9 +531,7 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, memcpy(temp, input, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE); mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(ctx, input, output); - for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; i++) { - output[i] = (unsigned char) (output[i] ^ iv[i]); - } + mbedtls_xor(output, output, iv, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE); memcpy(iv, temp, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE); @@ -610,9 +541,7 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, } } else { while (length > 0) { - for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; i++) { - output[i] = (unsigned char) (input[i] ^ iv[i]); - } + mbedtls_xor(output, input, iv, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE); mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(ctx, output, output); memcpy(iv, output, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE); @@ -642,19 +571,14 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, unsigned char c; size_t n; - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(iv_off != NULL); + if ((mode != MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT) && (mode != MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } n = *iv_off; /* An overly large value of n can lead to an unlimited - * buffer overflow. Therefore, guard against this - * outside of parameter validation. */ + * buffer overflow. */ if (n >= MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -704,17 +628,9 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, int c, i; size_t n; - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(nonce_counter != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(stream_block != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(nc_off != NULL); - n = *nc_off; /* An overly large value of n can lead to an unlimited - * buffer overflow. Therefore, guard against this - * outside of parameter validation. */ + * buffer overflow. */ if (n >= MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -928,12 +844,18 @@ int mbedtls_aria_self_test(int verbose) /* test ECB decryption */ if (verbose) { mbedtls_printf(" ARIA-ECB-%d (dec): ", 128 + 64 * i); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); +#endif } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec(&ctx, aria_test1_ecb_key, 128 + 64 * i); mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(&ctx, aria_test1_ecb_ct[i], blk); ARIA_SELF_TEST_ASSERT( memcmp(blk, aria_test1_ecb_pt, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE) != 0); +#endif } if (verbose) { mbedtls_printf("\n"); diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/asn1parse.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/asn1parse.c index 6a8cd6c545..e33fdf71da 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/asn1parse.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/asn1parse.c @@ -2,24 +2,13 @@ * Generic ASN.1 parsing * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA) #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" @@ -47,47 +36,18 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_len(unsigned char **p, if ((**p & 0x80) == 0) { *len = *(*p)++; } else { - switch (**p & 0x7F) { - case 1: - if ((end - *p) < 2) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA; - } - - *len = (*p)[1]; - (*p) += 2; - break; - - case 2: - if ((end - *p) < 3) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA; - } - - *len = ((size_t) (*p)[1] << 8) | (*p)[2]; - (*p) += 3; - break; - - case 3: - if ((end - *p) < 4) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA; - } - - *len = ((size_t) (*p)[1] << 16) | - ((size_t) (*p)[2] << 8) | (*p)[3]; - (*p) += 4; - break; - - case 4: - if ((end - *p) < 5) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA; - } - - *len = ((size_t) (*p)[1] << 24) | ((size_t) (*p)[2] << 16) | - ((size_t) (*p)[3] << 8) | (*p)[4]; - (*p) += 5; - break; - - default: - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH; + int n = (**p) & 0x7F; + if (n == 0 || n > 4) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH; + } + if ((end - *p) <= n) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA; + } + *len = 0; + (*p)++; + while (n--) { + *len = (*len << 8) | **p; + (*p)++; } } @@ -114,7 +74,9 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(unsigned char **p, return mbedtls_asn1_get_len(p, end, len); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) int mbedtls_asn1_get_bool(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, int *val) @@ -332,7 +294,6 @@ void mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(mbedtls_asn1_sequence *seq) { while (seq != NULL) { mbedtls_asn1_sequence *next = seq->next; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(seq, sizeof(*seq)); mbedtls_free(seq); seq = next; } @@ -455,6 +416,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null(unsigned char **p, return 0; } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data(mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur) { if (cur == NULL) { @@ -466,6 +428,7 @@ void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data(mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur) mbedtls_platform_zeroize(cur, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_named_data)); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head) { @@ -473,13 +436,22 @@ void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head) while ((cur = *head) != NULL) { *head = cur->next; - mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data(cur); + mbedtls_free(cur->oid.p); + mbedtls_free(cur->val.p); mbedtls_free(cur); } } -mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data(mbedtls_asn1_named_data *list, - const char *oid, size_t len) +void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(mbedtls_asn1_named_data *name) +{ + for (mbedtls_asn1_named_data *next; name != NULL; name = next) { + next = name->next; + mbedtls_free(name); + } +} + +const mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data(const mbedtls_asn1_named_data *list, + const char *oid, size_t len) { while (list != NULL) { if (list->oid.len == len && diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/asn1write.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/asn1write.c index a499bead45..775a9ef530 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/asn1write.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/asn1write.c @@ -2,24 +2,13 @@ * ASN.1 buffer writing functionality * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA) #include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" @@ -28,71 +17,43 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -int mbedtls_asn1_write_len(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, size_t len) -{ - if (len < 0x80) { - if (*p - start < 1) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#endif - *--(*p) = (unsigned char) len; - return 1; +int mbedtls_asn1_write_len(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, size_t len) +{ +#if SIZE_MAX > 0xFFFFFFFF + if (len > 0xFFFFFFFF) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH; } +#endif - if (len <= 0xFF) { - if (*p - start < 2) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; - } + int required = 1; - *--(*p) = (unsigned char) len; - *--(*p) = 0x81; - return 2; - } - - if (len <= 0xFFFF) { - if (*p - start < 3) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + if (len >= 0x80) { + for (size_t l = len; l != 0; l >>= 8) { + required++; } - - *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(len); - *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(len); - *--(*p) = 0x82; - return 3; } - if (len <= 0xFFFFFF) { - if (*p - start < 4) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; - } - - *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(len); - *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(len); - *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(len); - *--(*p) = 0x83; - return 4; + if (required > (*p - start)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; } - int len_is_valid = 1; -#if SIZE_MAX > 0xFFFFFFFF - len_is_valid = (len <= 0xFFFFFFFF); -#endif - if (len_is_valid) { - if (*p - start < 5) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; - } - + do { *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(len); - *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(len); - *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(len); - *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(len); - *--(*p) = 0x84; - return 5; + len >>= 8; + } while (len); + + if (required > 1) { + *--(*p) = (unsigned char) (0x80 + required - 1); } - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH; + return required; } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, unsigned char tag) +int mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, unsigned char tag) { if (*p - start < 1) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; @@ -102,8 +63,23 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, unsigned cha return 1; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) +static int mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *start, + size_t len, + unsigned char tag) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, tag)); -int mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + return (int) len; +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *buf, size_t size) { size_t len = 0; @@ -120,7 +96,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, } #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) -int mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const mbedtls_mpi *X) +int mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const mbedtls_mpi *X) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; @@ -154,30 +130,21 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const mbedtl len += 1; } - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)); - - ret = (int) len; + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER); cleanup: return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ -int mbedtls_asn1_write_null(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start) +int mbedtls_asn1_write_null(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t len = 0; - // Write NULL // - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, 0)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL)); - - return (int) len; + return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, 0, MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_oid(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_oid(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const char *oid, size_t oid_len) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; @@ -185,20 +152,17 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_oid(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(p, start, (const unsigned char *) oid, oid_len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)); - - return (int) len; + return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, size_t par_len) { return mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier_ext(p, start, oid, oid_len, par_len, 1); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier_ext(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier_ext(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, size_t par_len, int has_par) { @@ -215,17 +179,12 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier_ext(unsigned char **p, unsigned char MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_oid(p, start, oid, oid_len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); - - return (int) len; + return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_bool(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int boolean) +int mbedtls_asn1_write_bool(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int boolean) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; if (*p - start < 1) { @@ -235,15 +194,11 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_bool(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int boolean *--(*p) = (boolean) ? 255 : 0; len++; - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN)); - - return (int) len; + return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN); } -static int asn1_write_tagged_int(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val, int tag) +static int asn1_write_tagged_int(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int val, int tag) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; do { @@ -263,23 +218,20 @@ static int asn1_write_tagged_int(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int va len += 1; } - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, tag)); - - return (int) len; + return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, tag); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_int(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val) +int mbedtls_asn1_write_int(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int val) { return asn1_write_tagged_int(p, start, val, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_enum(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val) +int mbedtls_asn1_write_enum(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int val) { return asn1_write_tagged_int(p, start, val, MBEDTLS_ASN1_ENUMERATED); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int tag, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int tag, const char *text, size_t text_len) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; @@ -289,33 +241,30 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, in (const unsigned char *) text, text_len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, tag)); - - return (int) len; + return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, tag); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_utf8_string(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_utf8_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const char *text, size_t text_len) { return mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING, text, text_len); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const char *text, size_t text_len) { return mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING, text, text_len); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const char *text, size_t text_len) { return mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING, text, text_len); } int mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring(unsigned char **p, - unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *buf, size_t bits) { @@ -358,10 +307,9 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring(unsigned char **p, return mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring(p, start, buf, bits); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *buf, size_t bits) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; size_t unused_bits, byte_len; @@ -385,13 +333,10 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, /* Write unused bits */ *--(*p) = (unsigned char) unused_bits; - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING)); - - return (int) len; + return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING); } -int mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *buf, size_t size) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; @@ -399,13 +344,11 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(p, start, buf, size)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)); - - return (int) len; + return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING); } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) /* This is a copy of the ASN.1 parsing function mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data(), * which is replicated to avoid a dependency ASN1_WRITE_C on ASN1_PARSE_C. */ static mbedtls_asn1_named_data *asn1_find_named_data( @@ -423,6 +366,10 @@ static mbedtls_asn1_named_data *asn1_find_named_data( return list; } +#else +#define asn1_find_named_data(list, oid, len) \ + ((mbedtls_asn1_named_data *) mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data(list, oid, len)) +#endif mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/base64.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/base64.c index 4170610642..9677dee5b2 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/base64.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/base64.c @@ -2,26 +2,17 @@ * RFC 1521 base64 encoding/decoding * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ +#include + #include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) #include "mbedtls/base64.h" +#include "base64_internal.h" #include "constant_time_internal.h" #include @@ -31,7 +22,38 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ -#define BASE64_SIZE_T_MAX ((size_t) -1) /* SIZE_T_MAX is not standard */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +unsigned char mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char(unsigned char value) +{ + unsigned char digit = 0; + /* For each range of values, if value is in that range, mask digit with + * the corresponding value. Since value can only be in a single range, + * only at most one masking will change digit. */ + digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if(0, 25, value, 'A' + value); + digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if(26, 51, value, 'a' + value - 26); + digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if(52, 61, value, '0' + value - 52); + digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if(62, 62, value, '+'); + digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if(63, 63, value, '/'); + return digit; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +signed char mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value(unsigned char c) +{ + unsigned char val = 0; + /* For each range of digits, if c is in that range, mask val with + * the corresponding value. Since c can only be in a single range, + * only at most one masking will change val. Set val to one plus + * the desired value so that it stays 0 if c is in none of the ranges. */ + val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if('A', 'Z', c, c - 'A' + 0 + 1); + val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if('a', 'z', c, c - 'a' + 26 + 1); + val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if('0', '9', c, c - '0' + 52 + 1); + val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if('+', '+', c, c - '+' + 62 + 1); + val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if('/', '/', c, c - '/' + 63 + 1); + /* At this point, val is 0 if c is an invalid digit and v+1 if c is + * a digit with the value v. */ + return val - 1; +} /* * Encode a buffer into base64 format @@ -50,8 +72,8 @@ int mbedtls_base64_encode(unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, n = slen / 3 + (slen % 3 != 0); - if (n > (BASE64_SIZE_T_MAX - 1) / 4) { - *olen = BASE64_SIZE_T_MAX; + if (n > (SIZE_MAX - 1) / 4) { + *olen = SIZE_MAX; return MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; } @@ -94,7 +116,7 @@ int mbedtls_base64_encode(unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, *p++ = '='; } - *olen = p - dst; + *olen = (size_t) (p - dst); *p = 0; return 0; @@ -203,7 +225,7 @@ int mbedtls_base64_decode(unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, } } - *olen = p - dst; + *olen = (size_t) (p - dst); return 0; } diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/base64_internal.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/base64_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a09bd23777 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/base64_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/** + * \file base64_internal.h + * + * \brief RFC 1521 base64 encoding/decoding: interfaces for invasive testing + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BASE64_INTERNAL +#define MBEDTLS_BASE64_INTERNAL + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + +/** Given a value in the range 0..63, return the corresponding Base64 digit. + * + * The implementation assumes that letters are consecutive (e.g. ASCII + * but not EBCDIC). + * + * \param value A value in the range 0..63. + * + * \return A base64 digit converted from \p value. + */ +unsigned char mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char(unsigned char value); + +/** Given a Base64 digit, return its value. + * + * If c is not a Base64 digit ('A'..'Z', 'a'..'z', '0'..'9', '+' or '/'), + * return -1. + * + * The implementation assumes that letters are consecutive (e.g. ASCII + * but not EBCDIC). + * + * \param c A base64 digit. + * + * \return The value of the base64 digit \p c. + */ +signed char mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value(unsigned char c); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_INTERNAL */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum.c index 384b9246b8..c45fd5bf24 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * Multi-precision integer library * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* @@ -38,7 +26,8 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" -#include "mbedtls/bn_mul.h" +#include "bignum_core.h" +#include "bn_mul.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "constant_time_internal.h" @@ -48,37 +37,148 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#define MPI_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define MPI_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) -#define ciL (sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) /* chars in limb */ -#define biL (ciL << 3) /* bits in limb */ -#define biH (ciL << 2) /* half limb size */ -#define MPI_SIZE_T_MAX ((size_t) -1) /* SIZE_T_MAX is not standard */ +/* + * Conditionally select an MPI sign in constant time. + * (MPI sign is the field s in mbedtls_mpi. It is unsigned short and only 1 and -1 are valid + * values.) + */ +static inline signed short mbedtls_ct_mpi_sign_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t cond, + signed short sign1, signed short sign2) +{ + return (signed short) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(cond, sign1 + 1, sign2 + 1) - 1; +} /* - * Convert between bits/chars and number of limbs - * Divide first in order to avoid potential overflows + * Compare signed values in constant time */ -#define BITS_TO_LIMBS(i) ((i) / biL + ((i) % biL != 0)) -#define CHARS_TO_LIMBS(i) ((i) / ciL + ((i) % ciL != 0)) +int mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct(const mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *Y, + unsigned *ret) +{ + mbedtls_ct_condition_t different_sign, X_is_negative, Y_is_negative, result; -/* Implementation that should never be optimized out by the compiler */ -static void mbedtls_mpi_zeroize(mbedtls_mpi_uint *v, size_t n) + if (X->n != Y->n) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * Set N_is_negative to MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE if N >= 0, MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if N < 0. + * We know that N->s == 1 if N >= 0 and N->s == -1 if N < 0. + */ + X_is_negative = mbedtls_ct_bool((X->s & 2) >> 1); + Y_is_negative = mbedtls_ct_bool((Y->s & 2) >> 1); + + /* + * If the signs are different, then the positive operand is the bigger. + * That is if X is negative (X_is_negative == 1), then X < Y is true and it + * is false if X is positive (X_is_negative == 0). + */ + different_sign = mbedtls_ct_bool_ne(X_is_negative, Y_is_negative); // true if different sign + result = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(different_sign, X_is_negative); + + /* + * Assuming signs are the same, compare X and Y. We switch the comparison + * order if they are negative so that we get the right result, regardles of + * sign. + */ + + /* This array is used to conditionally swap the pointers in const time */ + void * const p[2] = { X->p, Y->p }; + size_t i = mbedtls_ct_size_if_else_0(X_is_negative, 1); + mbedtls_ct_condition_t lt = mbedtls_mpi_core_lt_ct(p[i], p[i ^ 1], X->n); + + /* + * Store in result iff the signs are the same (i.e., iff different_sign == false). If + * the signs differ, result has already been set, so we don't change it. + */ + result = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(result, + mbedtls_ct_bool_and(mbedtls_ct_bool_not(different_sign), lt)); + + *ret = mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(result, 1); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Conditionally assign X = Y, without leaking information + * about whether the assignment was made or not. + * (Leaking information about the respective sizes of X and Y is ok however.) + */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64) && \ + (_MSC_FULL_VER < 193131103) +/* + * MSVC miscompiles this function if it's inlined prior to Visual Studio 2022 version 17.1. See: + * https://developercommunity.visualstudio.com/t/c-compiler-miscompiles-part-of-mbedtls-library-on/1646989 + */ +__declspec(noinline) +#endif +int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign(mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *Y, + unsigned char assign) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(v, ciL * n); + int ret = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, Y->n)); + + { + mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_assign = mbedtls_ct_bool(assign); + + X->s = mbedtls_ct_mpi_sign_if(do_assign, Y->s, X->s); + + mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(X->p, Y->p, Y->n, do_assign); + + mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_not_assign = mbedtls_ct_bool_not(do_assign); + for (size_t i = Y->n; i < X->n; i++) { + X->p[i] = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if_else_0(do_not_assign, X->p[i]); + } + } + +cleanup: + return ret; } +/* + * Conditionally swap X and Y, without leaking information + * about whether the swap was made or not. + * Here it is not ok to simply swap the pointers, which would lead to + * different memory access patterns when X and Y are used afterwards. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap(mbedtls_mpi *X, + mbedtls_mpi *Y, + unsigned char swap) +{ + int ret = 0; + int s; + + if (X == Y) { + return 0; + } + + mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_swap = mbedtls_ct_bool(swap); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, Y->n)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(Y, X->n)); + + s = X->s; + X->s = mbedtls_ct_mpi_sign_if(do_swap, Y->s, X->s); + Y->s = mbedtls_ct_mpi_sign_if(do_swap, s, Y->s); + + mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_swap(X->p, Y->p, X->n, do_swap); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* Implementation that should never be optimized out by the compiler */ +#define mbedtls_mpi_zeroize_and_free(v, n) mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(v, ciL * (n)) + /* * Initialize one MPI */ void mbedtls_mpi_init(mbedtls_mpi *X) { - MPI_VALIDATE(X != NULL); - X->s = 1; X->n = 0; X->p = NULL; @@ -94,8 +194,7 @@ void mbedtls_mpi_free(mbedtls_mpi *X) } if (X->p != NULL) { - mbedtls_mpi_zeroize(X->p, X->n); - mbedtls_free(X->p); + mbedtls_mpi_zeroize_and_free(X->p, X->n); } X->s = 1; @@ -109,7 +208,6 @@ void mbedtls_mpi_free(mbedtls_mpi *X) int mbedtls_mpi_grow(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs) { mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); if (nblimbs > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; @@ -122,11 +220,12 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_grow(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs) if (X->p != NULL) { memcpy(p, X->p, X->n * ciL); - mbedtls_mpi_zeroize(X->p, X->n); - mbedtls_free(X->p); + mbedtls_mpi_zeroize_and_free(X->p, X->n); } - X->n = nblimbs; + /* nblimbs fits in n because we ensure that MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS + * fits, and we've checked that nblimbs <= MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS. */ + X->n = (unsigned short) nblimbs; X->p = p; } @@ -141,7 +240,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_shrink(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs) { mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; size_t i; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); if (nblimbs > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; @@ -170,11 +268,12 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_shrink(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs) if (X->p != NULL) { memcpy(p, X->p, i * ciL); - mbedtls_mpi_zeroize(X->p, X->n); - mbedtls_free(X->p); + mbedtls_mpi_zeroize_and_free(X->p, X->n); } - X->n = i; + /* i fits in n because we ensure that MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS + * fits, and we've checked that i <= nblimbs <= MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS. */ + X->n = (unsigned short) i; X->p = p; return 0; @@ -202,15 +301,12 @@ static int mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t limbs) * This function is not constant-time. Leading zeros in Y may be removed. * * Ensure that X does not shrink. This is not guaranteed by the public API, - * but some code in the bignum module relies on this property, for example - * in mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(). + * but some code in the bignum module might still rely on this property. */ int mbedtls_mpi_copy(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y) { int ret = 0; size_t i; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(Y != NULL); if (X == Y) { return 0; @@ -252,8 +348,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_copy(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y) void mbedtls_mpi_swap(mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi *Y) { mbedtls_mpi T; - MPI_VALIDATE(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE(Y != NULL); memcpy(&T, X, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); memcpy(X, Y, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); @@ -272,19 +366,22 @@ static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_sint_abs(mbedtls_mpi_sint z) return (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 0 - (mbedtls_mpi_uint) z; } +/* Convert x to a sign, i.e. to 1, if x is positive, or -1, if x is negative. + * This looks awkward but generates smaller code than (x < 0 ? -1 : 1) */ +#define TO_SIGN(x) ((mbedtls_mpi_sint) (((mbedtls_mpi_uint) x) >> (biL - 1)) * -2 + 1) + /* * Set value from integer */ int mbedtls_mpi_lset(mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, 1)); memset(X->p, 0, X->n * ciL); X->p[0] = mpi_sint_abs(z); - X->s = (z < 0) ? -1 : 1; + X->s = TO_SIGN(z); cleanup: @@ -296,8 +393,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_lset(mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z) */ int mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos) { - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - if (X->n * biL <= pos) { return 0; } @@ -305,10 +400,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos) return (X->p[pos / biL] >> (pos % biL)) & 0x01; } -/* Get a specific byte, without range checks. */ -#define GET_BYTE(X, i) \ - (((X)->p[(i) / ciL] >> (((i) % ciL) * 8)) & 0xff) - /* * Set a bit to a specific value of 0 or 1 */ @@ -317,7 +408,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos, unsigned char val) int ret = 0; size_t off = pos / biL; size_t idx = pos % biL; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); if (val != 0 && val != 1) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -344,59 +434,44 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos, unsigned char val) */ size_t mbedtls_mpi_lsb(const mbedtls_mpi *X) { - size_t i, j, count = 0; - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL, 0); + size_t i; + +#if defined(__has_builtin) +#if (MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX == UINT_MAX) && __has_builtin(__builtin_ctz) + #define mbedtls_mpi_uint_ctz __builtin_ctz +#elif (MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX == ULONG_MAX) && __has_builtin(__builtin_ctzl) + #define mbedtls_mpi_uint_ctz __builtin_ctzl +#elif (MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX == ULLONG_MAX) && __has_builtin(__builtin_ctzll) + #define mbedtls_mpi_uint_ctz __builtin_ctzll +#endif +#endif +#if defined(mbedtls_mpi_uint_ctz) for (i = 0; i < X->n; i++) { - for (j = 0; j < biL; j++, count++) { + if (X->p[i] != 0) { + return i * biL + mbedtls_mpi_uint_ctz(X->p[i]); + } + } +#else + size_t count = 0; + for (i = 0; i < X->n; i++) { + for (size_t j = 0; j < biL; j++, count++) { if (((X->p[i] >> j) & 1) != 0) { return count; } } } +#endif return 0; } -/* - * Count leading zero bits in a given integer - */ -static size_t mbedtls_clz(const mbedtls_mpi_uint x) -{ - size_t j; - mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << (biL - 1); - - for (j = 0; j < biL; j++) { - if (x & mask) { - break; - } - - mask >>= 1; - } - - return j; -} - /* * Return the number of bits */ size_t mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(const mbedtls_mpi *X) { - size_t i, j; - - if (X->n == 0) { - return 0; - } - - for (i = X->n - 1; i > 0; i--) { - if (X->p[i] != 0) { - break; - } - } - - j = biL - mbedtls_clz(X->p[i]); - - return (i * biL) + j; + return mbedtls_mpi_core_bitlen(X->p, X->n); } /* @@ -441,8 +516,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_read_string(mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, const char *s) int sign = 1; mbedtls_mpi_uint d; mbedtls_mpi T; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(s != NULL); if (radix < 2 || radix > 16) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -463,7 +536,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_read_string(mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, const char *s) slen = strlen(s); if (radix == 16) { - if (slen > MPI_SIZE_T_MAX >> 2) { + if (slen > SIZE_MAX >> 2) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -545,9 +618,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_write_string(const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, size_t n; char *p; mbedtls_mpi T; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(buflen == 0 || buf != NULL); if (radix < 2 || radix > 16) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -613,7 +683,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_write_string(const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, } *p++ = '\0'; - *olen = p - buf; + *olen = (size_t) (p - buf); cleanup: @@ -637,9 +707,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_read_file(mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE *fin) */ char s[MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE]; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(fin != NULL); - if (radix < 2 || radix > 16) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -683,7 +750,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_write_file(const char *p, const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE * newline characters and '\0' */ char s[MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE]; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); if (radix < 2 || radix > 16) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -717,111 +783,22 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_write_file(const char *p, const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE } #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ - -/* Convert a big-endian byte array aligned to the size of mbedtls_mpi_uint - * into the storage form used by mbedtls_mpi. */ - -static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host_c(mbedtls_mpi_uint x) -{ - uint8_t i; - unsigned char *x_ptr; - mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp = 0; - - for (i = 0, x_ptr = (unsigned char *) &x; i < ciL; i++, x_ptr++) { - tmp <<= CHAR_BIT; - tmp |= (mbedtls_mpi_uint) *x_ptr; - } - - return tmp; -} - -static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host(mbedtls_mpi_uint x) -{ -#if defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) - -/* Nothing to do on bigendian systems. */ -#if (__BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__) - return x; -#endif /* __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__ */ - -#if (__BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__) - -/* For GCC and Clang, have builtins for byte swapping. */ -#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__GNUC_PREREQ) -#if __GNUC_PREREQ(4, 3) -#define have_bswap -#endif -#endif - -#if defined(__clang__) && defined(__has_builtin) -#if __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap32) && \ - __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap64) -#define have_bswap -#endif -#endif - -#if defined(have_bswap) - /* The compiler is hopefully able to statically evaluate this! */ - switch (sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) { - case 4: - return __builtin_bswap32(x); - case 8: - return __builtin_bswap64(x); - } -#endif -#endif /* __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__ */ -#endif /* __BYTE_ORDER__ */ - - /* Fall back to C-based reordering if we don't know the byte order - * or we couldn't use a compiler-specific builtin. */ - return mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host_c(x); -} - -static void mpi_bigendian_to_host(mbedtls_mpi_uint * const p, size_t limbs) -{ - mbedtls_mpi_uint *cur_limb_left; - mbedtls_mpi_uint *cur_limb_right; - if (limbs == 0) { - return; - } - - /* - * Traverse limbs and - * - adapt byte-order in each limb - * - swap the limbs themselves. - * For that, simultaneously traverse the limbs from left to right - * and from right to left, as long as the left index is not bigger - * than the right index (it's not a problem if limbs is odd and the - * indices coincide in the last iteration). - */ - for (cur_limb_left = p, cur_limb_right = p + (limbs - 1); - cur_limb_left <= cur_limb_right; - cur_limb_left++, cur_limb_right--) { - mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp; - /* Note that if cur_limb_left == cur_limb_right, - * this code effectively swaps the bytes only once. */ - tmp = mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host(*cur_limb_left); - *cur_limb_left = mpi_uint_bigendian_to_host(*cur_limb_right); - *cur_limb_right = tmp; - } -} - /* * Import X from unsigned binary data, little endian + * + * This function is guaranteed to return an MPI with exactly the necessary + * number of limbs (in particular, it does not skip 0s in the input). */ int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le(mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t i; - size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(buflen); + const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(buflen); /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear(X, limbs)); - for (i = 0; i < buflen; i++) { - X->p[i / ciL] |= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) buf[i]) << ((i % ciL) << 3); - } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_core_read_le(X->p, X->n, buf, buflen)); cleanup: @@ -835,28 +812,19 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le(mbedtls_mpi *X, /* * Import X from unsigned binary data, big endian + * + * This function is guaranteed to return an MPI with exactly the necessary + * number of limbs (in particular, it does not skip 0s in the input). */ int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(buflen); - size_t const overhead = (limbs * ciL) - buflen; - unsigned char *Xp; - - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(buflen == 0 || buf != NULL); + const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(buflen); /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear(X, limbs)); - /* Avoid calling `memcpy` with NULL source or destination argument, - * even if buflen is 0. */ - if (buflen != 0) { - Xp = (unsigned char *) X->p; - memcpy(Xp + overhead, buf, buflen); - - mpi_bigendian_to_host(X->p, limbs); - } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_core_read_be(X->p, X->n, buf, buflen)); cleanup: @@ -874,34 +842,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buf int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le(const mbedtls_mpi *X, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) { - size_t stored_bytes = X->n * ciL; - size_t bytes_to_copy; - size_t i; - - if (stored_bytes < buflen) { - bytes_to_copy = stored_bytes; - } else { - bytes_to_copy = buflen; - - /* The output buffer is smaller than the allocated size of X. - * However X may fit if its leading bytes are zero. */ - for (i = bytes_to_copy; i < stored_bytes; i++) { - if (GET_BYTE(X, i) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; - } - } - } - - for (i = 0; i < bytes_to_copy; i++) { - buf[i] = GET_BYTE(X, i); - } - - if (stored_bytes < buflen) { - /* Write trailing 0 bytes */ - memset(buf + stored_bytes, 0, buflen - stored_bytes); - } - - return 0; + return mbedtls_mpi_core_write_le(X->p, X->n, buf, buflen); } /* @@ -910,42 +851,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le(const mbedtls_mpi *X, int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(const mbedtls_mpi *X, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) { - size_t stored_bytes; - size_t bytes_to_copy; - unsigned char *p; - size_t i; - - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(buflen == 0 || buf != NULL); - - stored_bytes = X->n * ciL; - - if (stored_bytes < buflen) { - /* There is enough space in the output buffer. Write initial - * null bytes and record the position at which to start - * writing the significant bytes. In this case, the execution - * trace of this function does not depend on the value of the - * number. */ - bytes_to_copy = stored_bytes; - p = buf + buflen - stored_bytes; - memset(buf, 0, buflen - stored_bytes); - } else { - /* The output buffer is smaller than the allocated size of X. - * However X may fit if its leading bytes are zero. */ - bytes_to_copy = buflen; - p = buf; - for (i = bytes_to_copy; i < stored_bytes; i++) { - if (GET_BYTE(X, i) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; - } - } - } - - for (i = 0; i < bytes_to_copy; i++) { - p[bytes_to_copy - i - 1] = GET_BYTE(X, i); - } - - return 0; + return mbedtls_mpi_core_write_be(X->p, X->n, buf, buflen); } /* @@ -954,12 +860,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(const mbedtls_mpi *X, int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t i, v0, t1; - mbedtls_mpi_uint r0 = 0, r1; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - - v0 = count / (biL); - t1 = count & (biL - 1); + size_t i; i = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(X) + count; @@ -969,31 +870,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count) ret = 0; - /* - * shift by count / limb_size - */ - if (v0 > 0) { - for (i = X->n; i > v0; i--) { - X->p[i - 1] = X->p[i - v0 - 1]; - } - - for (; i > 0; i--) { - X->p[i - 1] = 0; - } - } - - /* - * shift by count % limb_size - */ - if (t1 > 0) { - for (i = v0; i < X->n; i++) { - r1 = X->p[i] >> (biL - t1); - X->p[i] <<= t1; - X->p[i] |= r0; - r0 = r1; - } - } - + mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_l(X->p, X->n, count); cleanup: return ret; @@ -1004,42 +881,9 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count) */ int mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count) { - size_t i, v0, v1; - mbedtls_mpi_uint r0 = 0, r1; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - - v0 = count / biL; - v1 = count & (biL - 1); - - if (v0 > X->n || (v0 == X->n && v1 > 0)) { - return mbedtls_mpi_lset(X, 0); + if (X->n != 0) { + mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_r(X->p, X->n, count); } - - /* - * shift by count / limb_size - */ - if (v0 > 0) { - for (i = 0; i < X->n - v0; i++) { - X->p[i] = X->p[i + v0]; - } - - for (; i < X->n; i++) { - X->p[i] = 0; - } - } - - /* - * shift by count % limb_size - */ - if (v1 > 0) { - for (i = X->n; i > 0; i--) { - r1 = X->p[i - 1] << (biL - v1); - X->p[i - 1] >>= v1; - X->p[i - 1] |= r0; - r0 = r1; - } - } - return 0; } @@ -1049,8 +893,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count) int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs(const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y) { size_t i, j; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(Y != NULL); for (i = X->n; i > 0; i--) { if (X->p[i - 1] != 0) { @@ -1064,9 +906,8 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs(const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y) } } - if (i == 0 && j == 0) { - return 0; - } + /* If i == j == 0, i.e. abs(X) == abs(Y), + * we end up returning 0 at the end of the function. */ if (i > j) { return 1; @@ -1093,8 +934,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs(const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y) int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y) { size_t i, j; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(Y != NULL); for (i = X->n; i > 0; i--) { if (X->p[i - 1] != 0) { @@ -1145,10 +984,9 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(const mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z) { mbedtls_mpi Y; mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); *p = mpi_sint_abs(z); - Y.s = (z < 0) ? -1 : 1; + Y.s = TO_SIGN(z); Y.n = 1; Y.p = p; @@ -1161,11 +999,9 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(const mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z) int mbedtls_mpi_add_abs(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t i, j; - mbedtls_mpi_uint *o, *p, c, tmp; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(B != NULL); + size_t j; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; + mbedtls_mpi_uint c; if (X == B) { const mbedtls_mpi *T = A; A = X; B = T; @@ -1176,7 +1012,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_add_abs(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi } /* - * X should always be positive as a result of unsigned additions. + * X must always be positive as a result of unsigned additions. */ X->s = 1; @@ -1194,24 +1030,23 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_add_abs(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, j)); - o = B->p; p = X->p; c = 0; + /* j is the number of non-zero limbs of B. Add those to X. */ - /* - * tmp is used because it might happen that p == o - */ - for (i = 0; i < j; i++, o++, p++) { - tmp = *o; - *p += c; c = (*p < c); - *p += tmp; c += (*p < tmp); - } + p = X->p; + + c = mbedtls_mpi_core_add(p, p, B->p, j); + + p += j; + + /* Now propagate any carry */ while (c != 0) { - if (i >= X->n) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, i + 1)); - p = X->p + i; + if (j >= X->n) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, j + 1)); + p = X->p + j; } - *p += c; c = (*p < c); i++; p++; + *p += c; c = (*p < c); j++; p++; } cleanup: @@ -1219,39 +1054,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_add_abs(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi return ret; } -/** - * Helper for mbedtls_mpi subtraction. - * - * Calculate l - r where l and r have the same size. - * This function operates modulo (2^ciL)^n and returns the carry - * (1 if there was a wraparound, i.e. if `l < r`, and 0 otherwise). - * - * d may be aliased to l or r. - * - * \param n Number of limbs of \p d, \p l and \p r. - * \param[out] d The result of the subtraction. - * \param[in] l The left operand. - * \param[in] r The right operand. - * - * \return 1 if `l < r`. - * 0 if `l >= r`. - */ -static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_sub_hlp(size_t n, - mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint *l, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint *r) -{ - size_t i; - mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0, t, z; - - for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { - z = (l[i] < c); t = l[i] - c; - c = (t < r[i]) + z; d[i] = t - r[i]; - } - - return c; -} - /* * Unsigned subtraction: X = |A| - |B| (HAC 14.9, 14.10) */ @@ -1260,9 +1062,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n; mbedtls_mpi_uint carry; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(B != NULL); for (n = B->n; n > 0; n--) { if (B->p[n - 1] != 0) { @@ -1287,19 +1086,16 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi memset(X->p + A->n, 0, (X->n - A->n) * ciL); } - carry = mpi_sub_hlp(n, X->p, A->p, B->p); + carry = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(X->p, A->p, B->p, n); if (carry != 0) { - /* Propagate the carry to the first nonzero limb of X. */ - for (; n < X->n && X->p[n] == 0; n++) { - --X->p[n]; - } - /* If we ran out of space for the carry, it means that the result - * is negative. */ - if (n == X->n) { + /* Propagate the carry through the rest of X. */ + carry = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub_int(X->p + n, X->p + n, carry, X->n - n); + + /* If we have further carry/borrow, the result is negative. */ + if (carry != 0) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE; goto cleanup; } - --X->p[n]; } /* X should always be positive as a result of unsigned subtractions. */ @@ -1317,9 +1113,6 @@ static int add_sub_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *X, int flip_B) { int ret, s; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(B != NULL); s = A->s; if (A->s * B->s * flip_B < 0) { @@ -1368,11 +1161,9 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_add_int(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b { mbedtls_mpi B; mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); p[0] = mpi_sint_abs(b); - B.s = (b < 0) ? -1 : 1; + B.s = TO_SIGN(b); B.n = 1; B.p = p; @@ -1386,98 +1177,15 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b { mbedtls_mpi B; mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); p[0] = mpi_sint_abs(b); - B.s = (b < 0) ? -1 : 1; + B.s = TO_SIGN(b); B.n = 1; B.p = p; return mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(X, A, &B); } -/** Helper for mbedtls_mpi multiplication. - * - * Add \p b * \p s to \p d. - * - * \param i The number of limbs of \p s. - * \param[in] s A bignum to multiply, of size \p i. - * It may overlap with \p d, but only if - * \p d <= \p s. - * Its leading limb must not be \c 0. - * \param[in,out] d The bignum to add to. - * It must be sufficiently large to store the - * result of the multiplication. This means - * \p i + 1 limbs if \p d[\p i - 1] started as 0 and \p b - * is not known a priori. - * \param b A scalar to multiply. - */ -static -#if defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__arm__) -/* - * Apple LLVM version 4.2 (clang-425.0.24) (based on LLVM 3.2svn) - * appears to need this to prevent bad ARM code generation at -O3. - */ -__attribute__((noinline)) -#endif -void mpi_mul_hlp(size_t i, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint *s, - mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, - mbedtls_mpi_uint b) -{ - mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0, t = 0; - (void) t; /* Unused in some architectures */ - -#if defined(MULADDC_HUIT) - for (; i >= 8; i -= 8) { - MULADDC_INIT - MULADDC_HUIT - MULADDC_STOP - } - - for (; i > 0; i--) { - MULADDC_INIT - MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_STOP - } -#else /* MULADDC_HUIT */ - for (; i >= 16; i -= 16) { - MULADDC_INIT - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_STOP - } - - for (; i >= 8; i -= 8) { - MULADDC_INIT - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_CORE MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_STOP - } - - for (; i > 0; i--) { - MULADDC_INIT - MULADDC_CORE - MULADDC_STOP - } -#endif /* MULADDC_HUIT */ - - while (c != 0) { - *d += c; c = (*d < c); d++; - } -} - /* * Baseline multiplication: X = A * B (HAC 14.12) */ @@ -1487,11 +1195,9 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi size_t i, j; mbedtls_mpi TA, TB; int result_is_zero = 0; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(B != NULL); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&TA); mbedtls_mpi_init(&TB); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&TA); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&TB); if (X == A) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&TA, A)); A = &TA; @@ -1521,9 +1227,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, i + j)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(X, 0)); - for (; j > 0; j--) { - mpi_mul_hlp(i, A->p, X->p + j - 1, B->p[j - 1]); - } + mbedtls_mpi_core_mul(X->p, A->p, i, B->p, j); /* If the result is 0, we don't shortcut the operation, which reduces * but does not eliminate side channels leaking the zero-ness. We do @@ -1547,22 +1251,17 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi */ int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_uint b) { - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); - - /* mpi_mul_hlp can't deal with a leading 0. */ size_t n = A->n; while (n > 0 && A->p[n - 1] == 0) { --n; } - /* The general method below doesn't work if n==0 or b==0. By chance - * calculating the result is trivial in those cases. */ + /* The general method below doesn't work if b==0. */ if (b == 0 || n == 0) { return mbedtls_mpi_lset(X, 0); } - /* Calculate A*b as A + A*(b-1) to take advantage of mpi_mul_hlp */ + /* Calculate A*b as A + A*(b-1) to take advantage of mbedtls_mpi_core_mla */ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; /* In general, A * b requires 1 limb more than b. If * A->p[n - 1] * b / b == A->p[n - 1], then A * b fits in the same @@ -1571,10 +1270,13 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_uint b * making the call to grow() unconditional causes slightly fewer * calls to calloc() in ECP code, presumably because it reuses the * same mpi for a while and this way the mpi is more likely to directly - * grow to its final size. */ + * grow to its final size. + * + * Note that calculating A*b as 0 + A*b doesn't work as-is because + * A,X can be the same. */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, n + 1)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(X, A)); - mpi_mul_hlp(n, A->p, X->p, b - 1); + mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(X->p, X->n, A->p, n, b - 1); cleanup: return ret; @@ -1633,7 +1335,7 @@ static mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_int_div_int(mbedtls_mpi_uint u1, /* * Normalize the divisor, d, and dividend, u0, u1 */ - s = mbedtls_clz(d); + s = mbedtls_mpi_core_clz(d); d = d << s; u1 = u1 << s; @@ -1694,8 +1396,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, size_t i, n, t, k; mbedtls_mpi X, Y, Z, T1, T2; mbedtls_mpi_uint TP2[3]; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(B != NULL); if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(B, 0) == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO; @@ -1818,10 +1518,9 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_div_int(mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, { mbedtls_mpi B; mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); p[0] = mpi_sint_abs(b); - B.s = (b < 0) ? -1 : 1; + B.s = TO_SIGN(b); B.n = 1; B.p = p; @@ -1834,9 +1533,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_div_int(mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, int mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(R != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(B != NULL); if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(B, 0) < 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE; @@ -1864,8 +1560,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_mod_int(mbedtls_mpi_uint *r, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_s { size_t i; mbedtls_mpi_uint x, y, z; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(r != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); if (b == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO; @@ -1916,161 +1610,11 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_mod_int(mbedtls_mpi_uint *r, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_s return 0; } -/* - * Fast Montgomery initialization (thanks to Tom St Denis) - */ -static void mpi_montg_init(mbedtls_mpi_uint *mm, const mbedtls_mpi *N) -{ - mbedtls_mpi_uint x, m0 = N->p[0]; - unsigned int i; - - x = m0; - x += ((m0 + 2) & 4) << 1; - - for (i = biL; i >= 8; i /= 2) { - x *= (2 - (m0 * x)); - } - - *mm = ~x + 1; -} - -/** Montgomery multiplication: A = A * B * R^-1 mod N (HAC 14.36) - * - * \param[in,out] A One of the numbers to multiply. - * It must have at least as many limbs as N - * (A->n >= N->n), and any limbs beyond n are ignored. - * On successful completion, A contains the result of - * the multiplication A * B * R^-1 mod N where - * R = (2^ciL)^n. - * \param[in] B One of the numbers to multiply. - * It must be nonzero and must not have more limbs than N - * (B->n <= N->n). - * \param[in] N The modulo. N must be odd. - * \param mm The value calculated by `mpi_montg_init(&mm, N)`. - * This is -N^-1 mod 2^ciL. - * \param[in,out] T A bignum for temporary storage. - * It must be at least twice the limb size of N plus 2 - * (T->n >= 2 * (N->n + 1)). - * Its initial content is unused and - * its final content is indeterminate. - * Note that unlike the usual convention in the library - * for `const mbedtls_mpi*`, the content of T can change. - */ -static void mpi_montmul(mbedtls_mpi *A, - const mbedtls_mpi *B, - const mbedtls_mpi *N, - mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, - const mbedtls_mpi *T) -{ - size_t i, n, m; - mbedtls_mpi_uint u0, u1, *d; - - memset(T->p, 0, T->n * ciL); - - d = T->p; - n = N->n; - m = (B->n < n) ? B->n : n; - - for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { - /* - * T = (T + u0*B + u1*N) / 2^biL - */ - u0 = A->p[i]; - u1 = (d[0] + u0 * B->p[0]) * mm; - - mpi_mul_hlp(m, B->p, d, u0); - mpi_mul_hlp(n, N->p, d, u1); - - *d++ = u0; d[n + 1] = 0; - } - - /* At this point, d is either the desired result or the desired result - * plus N. We now potentially subtract N, avoiding leaking whether the - * subtraction is performed through side channels. */ - - /* Copy the n least significant limbs of d to A, so that - * A = d if d < N (recall that N has n limbs). */ - memcpy(A->p, d, n * ciL); - /* If d >= N then we want to set A to d - N. To prevent timing attacks, - * do the calculation without using conditional tests. */ - /* Set d to d0 + (2^biL)^n - N where d0 is the current value of d. */ - d[n] += 1; - d[n] -= mpi_sub_hlp(n, d, d, N->p); - /* If d0 < N then d < (2^biL)^n - * so d[n] == 0 and we want to keep A as it is. - * If d0 >= N then d >= (2^biL)^n, and d <= (2^biL)^n + N < 2 * (2^biL)^n - * so d[n] == 1 and we want to set A to the result of the subtraction - * which is d - (2^biL)^n, i.e. the n least significant limbs of d. - * This exactly corresponds to a conditional assignment. */ - mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign(n, A->p, d, (unsigned char) d[n]); -} - -/* - * Montgomery reduction: A = A * R^-1 mod N - * - * See mpi_montmul() regarding constraints and guarantees on the parameters. - */ -static void mpi_montred(mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N, - mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, const mbedtls_mpi *T) -{ - mbedtls_mpi_uint z = 1; - mbedtls_mpi U; - - U.n = U.s = (int) z; - U.p = &z; - - mpi_montmul(A, &U, N, mm, T); -} - -/** - * Select an MPI from a table without leaking the index. - * - * This is functionally equivalent to mbedtls_mpi_copy(R, T[idx]) except it - * reads the entire table in order to avoid leaking the value of idx to an - * attacker able to observe memory access patterns. - * - * \param[out] R Where to write the selected MPI. - * \param[in] T The table to read from. - * \param[in] T_size The number of elements in the table. - * \param[in] idx The index of the element to select; - * this must satisfy 0 <= idx < T_size. - * - * \return \c 0 on success, or a negative error code. - */ -static int mpi_select(mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *T, size_t T_size, size_t idx) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - for (size_t i = 0; i < T_size; i++) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign(R, &T[i], - (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq(i, - idx))); - } - -cleanup: - return ret; -} - -/* - * Sliding-window exponentiation: X = A^E mod N (HAC 14.85) - */ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *E, const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *prec_RR) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t window_bitsize; - size_t i, j, nblimbs; - size_t bufsize, nbits; - size_t exponent_bits_in_window = 0; - mbedtls_mpi_uint ei, mm, state; - mbedtls_mpi RR, T, W[(size_t) 1 << MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE], WW, Apos; - int neg; - - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(E != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(N != NULL); if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(N, 0) <= 0 || (N->p[0] & 1) == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -2086,261 +1630,88 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, } /* - * Init temps and window size + * Ensure that the exponent that we are passing to the core is not NULL. */ - mpi_montg_init(&mm, N); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&RR); mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&Apos); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&WW); - memset(W, 0, sizeof(W)); - - i = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(E); - - window_bitsize = (i > 671) ? 6 : (i > 239) ? 5 : - (i > 79) ? 4 : (i > 23) ? 3 : 1; - -#if (MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE < 6) - if (window_bitsize > MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE) { - window_bitsize = MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE; + if (E->n == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_mpi_lset(X, 1); + return ret; } -#endif - - const size_t w_table_used_size = (size_t) 1 << window_bitsize; - - /* - * This function is not constant-trace: its memory accesses depend on the - * exponent value. To defend against timing attacks, callers (such as RSA - * and DHM) should use exponent blinding. However this is not enough if the - * adversary can find the exponent in a single trace, so this function - * takes extra precautions against adversaries who can observe memory - * access patterns. - * - * This function performs a series of multiplications by table elements and - * squarings, and we want the prevent the adversary from finding out which - * table element was used, and from distinguishing between multiplications - * and squarings. Firstly, when multiplying by an element of the window - * W[i], we do a constant-trace table lookup to obfuscate i. This leaves - * squarings as having a different memory access patterns from other - * multiplications. So secondly, we put the accumulator in the table as - * well, and also do a constant-trace table lookup to multiply by the - * accumulator which is W[x_index]. - * - * This way, all multiplications take the form of a lookup-and-multiply. - * The number of lookup-and-multiply operations inside each iteration of - * the main loop still depends on the bits of the exponent, but since the - * other operations in the loop don't have an easily recognizable memory - * trace, an adversary is unlikely to be able to observe the exact - * patterns. - * - * An adversary may still be able to recover the exponent if they can - * observe both memory accesses and branches. However, branch prediction - * exploitation typically requires many traces of execution over the same - * data, which is defeated by randomized blinding. - */ - const size_t x_index = 0; - mbedtls_mpi_init(&W[x_index]); - - j = N->n + 1; - /* All W[i] including the accumulator must have at least N->n limbs for - * the mpi_montmul() and mpi_montred() calls later. Here we ensure that - * W[1] and the accumulator W[x_index] are large enough. later we'll grow - * other W[i] to the same length. They must not be shrunk midway through - * this function! - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&W[x_index], j)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&W[1], j)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&T, j * 2)); /* - * Compensate for negative A (and correct at the end) + * Allocate working memory for mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod() */ - neg = (A->s == -1); - if (neg) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&Apos, A)); - Apos.s = 1; - A = &Apos; + size_t T_limbs = mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_working_limbs(N->n, E->n); + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) mbedtls_calloc(T_limbs, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); + if (T == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; } + mbedtls_mpi RR; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&RR); + /* * If 1st call, pre-compute R^2 mod N */ if (prec_RR == NULL || prec_RR->p == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&RR, 1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(&RR, N->n * 2 * biL)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&RR, &RR, N)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_core_get_mont_r2_unsafe(&RR, N)); if (prec_RR != NULL) { - memcpy(prec_RR, &RR, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); + *prec_RR = RR; } } else { - memcpy(&RR, prec_RR, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(prec_RR, N->n)); + RR = *prec_RR; } /* - * W[1] = A * R^2 * R^-1 mod N = A * R mod N + * To preserve constness we need to make a copy of A. Using X for this to + * save memory. */ - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(A, N) >= 0) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&W[1], A, N)); - /* This should be a no-op because W[1] is already that large before - * mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(), but it's necessary to avoid an overflow - * in mpi_montmul() below, so let's make sure. */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&W[1], N->n + 1)); - } else { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&W[1], A)); - } - - /* Note that this is safe because W[1] always has at least N->n limbs - * (it grew above and was preserved by mbedtls_mpi_copy()). */ - mpi_montmul(&W[1], &RR, N, mm, &T); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(X, A)); /* - * W[x_index] = R^2 * R^-1 mod N = R mod N + * Compensate for negative A (and correct at the end). */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&W[x_index], &RR)); - mpi_montred(&W[x_index], N, mm, &T); - - - if (window_bitsize > 1) { - /* - * W[i] = W[1] ^ i - * - * The first bit of the sliding window is always 1 and therefore we - * only need to store the second half of the table. - * - * (There are two special elements in the table: W[0] for the - * accumulator/result and W[1] for A in Montgomery form. Both of these - * are already set at this point.) - */ - j = w_table_used_size / 2; - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&W[j], N->n + 1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&W[j], &W[1])); - - for (i = 0; i < window_bitsize - 1; i++) { - mpi_montmul(&W[j], &W[j], N, mm, &T); - } - - /* - * W[i] = W[i - 1] * W[1] - */ - for (i = j + 1; i < w_table_used_size; i++) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&W[i], N->n + 1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&W[i], &W[i - 1])); - - mpi_montmul(&W[i], &W[1], N, mm, &T); - } - } - - nblimbs = E->n; - bufsize = 0; - nbits = 0; - state = 0; - - while (1) { - if (bufsize == 0) { - if (nblimbs == 0) { - break; - } - - nblimbs--; - - bufsize = sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) << 3; - } - - bufsize--; - - ei = (E->p[nblimbs] >> bufsize) & 1; - - /* - * skip leading 0s - */ - if (ei == 0 && state == 0) { - continue; - } - - if (ei == 0 && state == 1) { - /* - * out of window, square W[x_index] - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mpi_select(&WW, W, w_table_used_size, x_index)); - mpi_montmul(&W[x_index], &WW, N, mm, &T); - continue; - } - - /* - * add ei to current window - */ - state = 2; - - nbits++; - exponent_bits_in_window |= (ei << (window_bitsize - nbits)); - - if (nbits == window_bitsize) { - /* - * W[x_index] = W[x_index]^window_bitsize R^-1 mod N - */ - for (i = 0; i < window_bitsize; i++) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mpi_select(&WW, W, w_table_used_size, - x_index)); - mpi_montmul(&W[x_index], &WW, N, mm, &T); - } - - /* - * W[x_index] = W[x_index] * W[exponent_bits_in_window] R^-1 mod N - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mpi_select(&WW, W, w_table_used_size, - exponent_bits_in_window)); - mpi_montmul(&W[x_index], &WW, N, mm, &T); - - state--; - nbits = 0; - exponent_bits_in_window = 0; - } - } + X->s = 1; /* - * process the remaining bits + * Make sure that X is in a form that is safe for consumption by + * the core functions. + * + * - The core functions will not touch the limbs of X above N->n. The + * result will be correct if those limbs are 0, which the mod call + * ensures. + * - Also, X must have at least as many limbs as N for the calls to the + * core functions. */ - for (i = 0; i < nbits; i++) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mpi_select(&WW, W, w_table_used_size, x_index)); - mpi_montmul(&W[x_index], &WW, N, mm, &T); - - exponent_bits_in_window <<= 1; - - if ((exponent_bits_in_window & ((size_t) 1 << window_bitsize)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mpi_select(&WW, W, w_table_used_size, 1)); - mpi_montmul(&W[x_index], &WW, N, mm, &T); - } + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(X, N) >= 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(X, X, N)); } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, N->n)); /* - * W[x_index] = A^E * R * R^-1 mod N = A^E mod N + * Convert to and from Montgomery around mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(). */ - mpi_montred(&W[x_index], N, mm, &T); - - if (neg && E->n != 0 && (E->p[0] & 1) != 0) { - W[x_index].s = -1; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&W[x_index], N, &W[x_index])); + { + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(N->p); + mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(X->p, X->p, N->p, N->n, mm, RR.p, T); + mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(X->p, X->p, N->p, N->n, E->p, E->n, RR.p, T); + mbedtls_mpi_core_from_mont_rep(X->p, X->p, N->p, N->n, mm, T); } /* - * Load the result in the output variable. + * Correct for negative A. */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(X, &W[x_index])); - -cleanup: + if (A->s == -1 && (E->p[0] & 1) != 0) { + mbedtls_ct_condition_t is_x_non_zero = mbedtls_mpi_core_check_zero_ct(X->p, X->n); + X->s = mbedtls_ct_mpi_sign_if(is_x_non_zero, -1, 1); - /* The first bit of the sliding window is always 1 and therefore the first - * half of the table was unused. */ - for (i = w_table_used_size/2; i < w_table_used_size; i++) { - mbedtls_mpi_free(&W[i]); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(X, N, X)); } - mbedtls_mpi_free(&W[x_index]); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&W[1]); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&Apos); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&WW); +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_zeroize_and_free(T, T_limbs); if (prec_RR == NULL || prec_RR->p == NULL) { mbedtls_mpi_free(&RR); @@ -2358,10 +1729,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gcd(mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B) size_t lz, lzt; mbedtls_mpi TA, TB; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(G != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(B != NULL); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&TA); mbedtls_mpi_init(&TB); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&TA, A)); @@ -2459,50 +1826,18 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gcd(mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B) return ret; } -/* Fill X with n_bytes random bytes. - * X must already have room for those bytes. - * The ordering of the bytes returned from the RNG is suitable for - * deterministic ECDSA (see RFC 6979 §3.3 and mbedtls_mpi_random()). - * The size and sign of X are unchanged. - * n_bytes must not be 0. - */ -static int mpi_fill_random_internal( - mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t n_bytes, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(n_bytes); - const size_t overhead = (limbs * ciL) - n_bytes; - - if (X->n < limbs) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - memset(X->p, 0, overhead); - memset((unsigned char *) X->p + limbs * ciL, 0, (X->n - limbs) * ciL); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(f_rng(p_rng, (unsigned char *) X->p + overhead, n_bytes)); - mpi_bigendian_to_host(X->p, limbs); - -cleanup: - return ret; -} - /* * Fill X with size bytes of random. - * - * Use a temporary bytes representation to make sure the result is the same - * regardless of the platform endianness (useful when f_rng is actually - * deterministic, eg for tests). + * The bytes returned from the RNG are used in a specific order which + * is suitable for deterministic ECDSA (see the specification of + * mbedtls_mpi_random() and the implementation in mbedtls_mpi_fill_random()). */ int mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t size, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t const limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(size); - - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); + const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(size); /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear(X, limbs)); @@ -2510,7 +1845,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t size, return 0; } - ret = mpi_fill_random_internal(X, size, f_rng, p_rng); + ret = mbedtls_mpi_core_fill_random(X->p, X->n, size, f_rng, p_rng); cleanup: return ret; @@ -2522,13 +1857,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_random(mbedtls_mpi *X, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - int count; - unsigned lt_lower = 1, lt_upper = 0; - size_t n_bits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(N); - size_t n_bytes = (n_bits + 7) / 8; - mbedtls_mpi lower_bound; - if (min < 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -2536,58 +1864,15 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_random(mbedtls_mpi *X, return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - /* - * When min == 0, each try has at worst a probability 1/2 of failing - * (the msb has a probability 1/2 of being 0, and then the result will - * be < N), so after 30 tries failure probability is a most 2**(-30). - * - * When N is just below a power of 2, as is the case when generating - * a random scalar on most elliptic curves, 1 try is enough with - * overwhelming probability. When N is just above a power of 2, - * as when generating a random scalar on secp224k1, each try has - * a probability of failing that is almost 1/2. - * - * The probabilities are almost the same if min is nonzero but negligible - * compared to N. This is always the case when N is crypto-sized, but - * it's convenient to support small N for testing purposes. When N - * is small, use a higher repeat count, otherwise the probability of - * failure is macroscopic. - */ - count = (n_bytes > 4 ? 30 : 250); - - mbedtls_mpi_init(&lower_bound); - /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the same number of limbs * as the upper bound, even if the upper bound has leading zeros. - * This is necessary for the mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct() check. */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear(X, N->n)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&lower_bound, N->n)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&lower_bound, min)); - - /* - * Match the procedure given in RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA) - * when f_rng is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG: - * - use the same byte ordering; - * - keep the leftmost n_bits bits of the generated octet string; - * - try until result is in the desired range. - * This also avoids any bias, which is especially important for ECDSA. - */ - do { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mpi_fill_random_internal(X, n_bytes, f_rng, p_rng)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(X, 8 * n_bytes - n_bits)); - - if (--count == 0) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; - goto cleanup; - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct(X, &lower_bound, <_lower)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct(X, N, <_upper)); - } while (lt_lower != 0 || lt_upper == 0); + * This is necessary for mbedtls_mpi_core_random. */ + int ret = mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear(X, N->n); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } -cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free(&lower_bound); - return ret; + return mbedtls_mpi_core_random(X->p, min, N->p, X->n, f_rng, p_rng); } /* @@ -2597,9 +1882,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi G, TA, TU, U1, U2, TB, TV, V1, V2; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(N != NULL); if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(N, 1) <= 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -2683,29 +1965,30 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi #if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) -static const int small_prime[] = -{ - 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, - 29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 47, 53, 59, - 61, 67, 71, 73, 79, 83, 89, 97, - 101, 103, 107, 109, 113, 127, 131, 137, - 139, 149, 151, 157, 163, 167, 173, 179, - 181, 191, 193, 197, 199, 211, 223, 227, - 229, 233, 239, 241, 251, 257, 263, 269, - 271, 277, 281, 283, 293, 307, 311, 313, - 317, 331, 337, 347, 349, 353, 359, 367, - 373, 379, 383, 389, 397, 401, 409, 419, - 421, 431, 433, 439, 443, 449, 457, 461, - 463, 467, 479, 487, 491, 499, 503, 509, - 521, 523, 541, 547, 557, 563, 569, 571, - 577, 587, 593, 599, 601, 607, 613, 617, - 619, 631, 641, 643, 647, 653, 659, 661, - 673, 677, 683, 691, 701, 709, 719, 727, - 733, 739, 743, 751, 757, 761, 769, 773, - 787, 797, 809, 811, 821, 823, 827, 829, - 839, 853, 857, 859, 863, 877, 881, 883, - 887, 907, 911, 919, 929, 937, 941, 947, - 953, 967, 971, 977, 983, 991, 997, -103 +/* Gaps between primes, starting at 3. https://oeis.org/A001223 */ +static const unsigned char small_prime_gaps[] = { + 2, 2, 4, 2, 4, 2, 4, 6, + 2, 6, 4, 2, 4, 6, 6, 2, + 6, 4, 2, 6, 4, 6, 8, 4, + 2, 4, 2, 4, 14, 4, 6, 2, + 10, 2, 6, 6, 4, 6, 6, 2, + 10, 2, 4, 2, 12, 12, 4, 2, + 4, 6, 2, 10, 6, 6, 6, 2, + 6, 4, 2, 10, 14, 4, 2, 4, + 14, 6, 10, 2, 4, 6, 8, 6, + 6, 4, 6, 8, 4, 8, 10, 2, + 10, 2, 6, 4, 6, 8, 4, 2, + 4, 12, 8, 4, 8, 4, 6, 12, + 2, 18, 6, 10, 6, 6, 2, 6, + 10, 6, 6, 2, 6, 6, 4, 2, + 12, 10, 2, 4, 6, 6, 2, 12, + 4, 6, 8, 10, 8, 10, 8, 6, + 6, 4, 8, 6, 4, 8, 4, 14, + 10, 12, 2, 10, 2, 4, 2, 10, + 14, 4, 2, 4, 14, 4, 2, 4, + 20, 4, 8, 10, 8, 4, 6, 6, + 14, 4, 6, 6, 8, 6, /*reaches 997*/ + 0 /* the last entry is effectively unused */ }; /* @@ -2722,20 +2005,20 @@ static int mpi_check_small_factors(const mbedtls_mpi *X) int ret = 0; size_t i; mbedtls_mpi_uint r; + unsigned p = 3; /* The first odd prime */ if ((X->p[0] & 1) == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; } - for (i = 0; small_prime[i] > 0; i++) { - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(X, small_prime[i]) <= 0) { - return 1; - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_int(&r, X, small_prime[i])); - + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(small_prime_gaps); p += small_prime_gaps[i], i++) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_int(&r, X, p)); if (r == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(X, p) == 0) { + return 1; + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + } } } @@ -2754,9 +2037,6 @@ static int mpi_miller_rabin(const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t rounds, size_t i, j, k, s; mbedtls_mpi W, R, T, A, RR; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&W); mbedtls_mpi_init(&R); mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); mbedtls_mpi_init(&A); mbedtls_mpi_init(&RR); @@ -2844,8 +2124,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext(const mbedtls_mpi *X, int rounds, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi XX; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); XX.s = 1; XX.n = X->n; @@ -2871,26 +2149,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext(const mbedtls_mpi *X, int rounds, return mpi_miller_rabin(&XX, rounds, f_rng, p_rng); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -/* - * Pseudo-primality test, error probability 2^-80 - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime(const mbedtls_mpi *X, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng) -{ - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - - /* - * In the past our key generation aimed for an error rate of at most - * 2^-80. Since this function is deprecated, aim for the same certainty - * here as well. - */ - return mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext(X, 40, f_rng, p_rng); -} -#endif - /* * Prime number generation * @@ -2915,9 +2173,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int flags, mbedtls_mpi_uint r; mbedtls_mpi Y; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - if (nbits < 3 || nbits > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_core.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_core.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1a3e0b9b6f --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_core.c @@ -0,0 +1,895 @@ +/* + * Core bignum functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "bignum_core.h" +#include "bn_mul.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" + +size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_clz(mbedtls_mpi_uint a) +{ +#if defined(__has_builtin) +#if (MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX == UINT_MAX) && __has_builtin(__builtin_clz) + #define core_clz __builtin_clz +#elif (MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX == ULONG_MAX) && __has_builtin(__builtin_clzl) + #define core_clz __builtin_clzl +#elif (MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX == ULLONG_MAX) && __has_builtin(__builtin_clzll) + #define core_clz __builtin_clzll +#endif +#endif +#if defined(core_clz) + return (size_t) core_clz(a); +#else + size_t j; + mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << (biL - 1); + + for (j = 0; j < biL; j++) { + if (a & mask) { + break; + } + + mask >>= 1; + } + + return j; +#endif +} + +size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_bitlen(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, size_t A_limbs) +{ + int i; + size_t j; + + for (i = ((int) A_limbs) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { + if (A[i] != 0) { + j = biL - mbedtls_mpi_core_clz(A[i]); + return (i * biL) + j; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_bigendian_to_host(mbedtls_mpi_uint a) +{ + if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) { + /* Nothing to do on bigendian systems. */ + return a; + } else { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) + return (mbedtls_mpi_uint) MBEDTLS_BSWAP32(a); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) + return (mbedtls_mpi_uint) MBEDTLS_BSWAP64(a); +#endif + } +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_core_bigendian_to_host(mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t A_limbs) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *cur_limb_left; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *cur_limb_right; + if (A_limbs == 0) { + return; + } + + /* + * Traverse limbs and + * - adapt byte-order in each limb + * - swap the limbs themselves. + * For that, simultaneously traverse the limbs from left to right + * and from right to left, as long as the left index is not bigger + * than the right index (it's not a problem if limbs is odd and the + * indices coincide in the last iteration). + */ + for (cur_limb_left = A, cur_limb_right = A + (A_limbs - 1); + cur_limb_left <= cur_limb_right; + cur_limb_left++, cur_limb_right--) { + mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp; + /* Note that if cur_limb_left == cur_limb_right, + * this code effectively swaps the bytes only once. */ + tmp = mpi_bigendian_to_host(*cur_limb_left); + *cur_limb_left = mpi_bigendian_to_host(*cur_limb_right); + *cur_limb_right = tmp; + } +} + +/* Whether min <= A, in constant time. + * A_limbs must be at least 1. */ +mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_mpi_core_uint_le_mpi(mbedtls_mpi_uint min, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t A_limbs) +{ + /* min <= least significant limb? */ + mbedtls_ct_condition_t min_le_lsl = mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(A[0], min); + + /* limbs other than the least significant one are all zero? */ + mbedtls_ct_condition_t msll_mask = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE; + for (size_t i = 1; i < A_limbs; i++) { + msll_mask = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(msll_mask, mbedtls_ct_bool(A[i])); + } + + /* min <= A iff the lowest limb of A is >= min or the other limbs + * are not all zero. */ + return mbedtls_ct_bool_or(msll_mask, min_le_lsl); +} + +mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_mpi_core_lt_ct(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + size_t limbs) +{ + mbedtls_ct_condition_t ret = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE, cond = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE, done = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE; + + for (size_t i = limbs; i > 0; i--) { + /* + * If B[i - 1] < A[i - 1] then A < B is false and the result must + * remain 0. + * + * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and + * the fact that we are done and continue looping. + */ + cond = mbedtls_ct_uint_lt(B[i - 1], A[i - 1]); + done = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(done, cond); + + /* + * If A[i - 1] < B[i - 1] then A < B is true. + * + * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and + * the fact that we are done and continue looping. + */ + cond = mbedtls_ct_uint_lt(A[i - 1], B[i - 1]); + ret = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(ret, mbedtls_ct_bool_and(cond, mbedtls_ct_bool_not(done))); + done = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(done, cond); + } + + /* + * If all the limbs were equal, then the numbers are equal, A < B is false + * and leaving the result 0 is correct. + */ + + return ret; +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t limbs, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t assign) +{ + if (X == A) { + return; + } + + /* This function is very performance-sensitive for RSA. For this reason + * we have the loop below, instead of calling mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if + * (this is more optimal since here we don't have to handle the case where + * we copy awkwardly sized data). + */ + for (size_t i = 0; i < limbs; i++) { + X[i] = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if(assign, A[i], X[i]); + } +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_swap(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *Y, + size_t limbs, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t swap) +{ + if (X == Y) { + return; + } + + for (size_t i = 0; i < limbs; i++) { + mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp = X[i]; + X[i] = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if(swap, Y[i], X[i]); + Y[i] = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if(swap, tmp, Y[i]); + } +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_core_read_le(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + size_t X_limbs, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t input_length) +{ + const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(input_length); + + if (X_limbs < limbs) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + if (X != NULL) { + memset(X, 0, X_limbs * ciL); + + for (size_t i = 0; i < input_length; i++) { + size_t offset = ((i % ciL) << 3); + X[i / ciL] |= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) input[i]) << offset; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_core_read_be(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + size_t X_limbs, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t input_length) +{ + const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(input_length); + + if (X_limbs < limbs) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + /* If X_limbs is 0, input_length must also be 0 (from previous test). + * Nothing to do. */ + if (X_limbs == 0) { + return 0; + } + + memset(X, 0, X_limbs * ciL); + + /* memcpy() with (NULL, 0) is undefined behaviour */ + if (input_length != 0) { + size_t overhead = (X_limbs * ciL) - input_length; + unsigned char *Xp = (unsigned char *) X; + memcpy(Xp + overhead, input, input_length); + } + + mbedtls_mpi_core_bigendian_to_host(X, X_limbs); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_core_write_le(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t A_limbs, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_length) +{ + size_t stored_bytes = A_limbs * ciL; + size_t bytes_to_copy; + + if (stored_bytes < output_length) { + bytes_to_copy = stored_bytes; + } else { + bytes_to_copy = output_length; + + /* The output buffer is smaller than the allocated size of A. + * However A may fit if its leading bytes are zero. */ + for (size_t i = bytes_to_copy; i < stored_bytes; i++) { + if (GET_BYTE(A, i) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + } + } + + for (size_t i = 0; i < bytes_to_copy; i++) { + output[i] = GET_BYTE(A, i); + } + + if (stored_bytes < output_length) { + /* Write trailing 0 bytes */ + memset(output + stored_bytes, 0, output_length - stored_bytes); + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_core_write_be(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + size_t X_limbs, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_length) +{ + size_t stored_bytes; + size_t bytes_to_copy; + unsigned char *p; + + stored_bytes = X_limbs * ciL; + + if (stored_bytes < output_length) { + /* There is enough space in the output buffer. Write initial + * null bytes and record the position at which to start + * writing the significant bytes. In this case, the execution + * trace of this function does not depend on the value of the + * number. */ + bytes_to_copy = stored_bytes; + p = output + output_length - stored_bytes; + memset(output, 0, output_length - stored_bytes); + } else { + /* The output buffer is smaller than the allocated size of X. + * However X may fit if its leading bytes are zero. */ + bytes_to_copy = output_length; + p = output; + for (size_t i = bytes_to_copy; i < stored_bytes; i++) { + if (GET_BYTE(X, i) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + } + } + + for (size_t i = 0; i < bytes_to_copy; i++) { + p[bytes_to_copy - i - 1] = GET_BYTE(X, i); + } + + return 0; +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_r(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t limbs, + size_t count) +{ + size_t i, v0, v1; + mbedtls_mpi_uint r0 = 0, r1; + + v0 = count / biL; + v1 = count & (biL - 1); + + if (v0 > limbs || (v0 == limbs && v1 > 0)) { + memset(X, 0, limbs * ciL); + return; + } + + /* + * shift by count / limb_size + */ + if (v0 > 0) { + for (i = 0; i < limbs - v0; i++) { + X[i] = X[i + v0]; + } + + for (; i < limbs; i++) { + X[i] = 0; + } + } + + /* + * shift by count % limb_size + */ + if (v1 > 0) { + for (i = limbs; i > 0; i--) { + r1 = X[i - 1] << (biL - v1); + X[i - 1] >>= v1; + X[i - 1] |= r0; + r0 = r1; + } + } +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_l(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t limbs, + size_t count) +{ + size_t i, v0, v1; + mbedtls_mpi_uint r0 = 0, r1; + + v0 = count / (biL); + v1 = count & (biL - 1); + + /* + * shift by count / limb_size + */ + if (v0 > 0) { + for (i = limbs; i > v0; i--) { + X[i - 1] = X[i - v0 - 1]; + } + + for (; i > 0; i--) { + X[i - 1] = 0; + } + } + + /* + * shift by count % limb_size + */ + if (v1 > 0) { + for (i = v0; i < limbs; i++) { + r1 = X[i] >> (biL - v1); + X[i] <<= v1; + X[i] |= r0; + r0 = r1; + } + } +} + +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_add(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + size_t limbs) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < limbs; i++) { + mbedtls_mpi_uint t = c + A[i]; + c = (t < A[i]); + t += B[i]; + c += (t < B[i]); + X[i] = t; + } + + return c; +} + +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_add_if(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t limbs, + unsigned cond) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0; + + mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_add = mbedtls_ct_bool(cond); + + for (size_t i = 0; i < limbs; i++) { + mbedtls_mpi_uint add = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if_else_0(do_add, A[i]); + mbedtls_mpi_uint t = c + X[i]; + c = (t < X[i]); + t += add; + c += (t < add); + X[i] = t; + } + + return c; +} + +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + size_t limbs) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < limbs; i++) { + mbedtls_mpi_uint z = (A[i] < c); + mbedtls_mpi_uint t = A[i] - c; + c = (t < B[i]) + z; + X[i] = t - B[i]; + } + + return c; +} + +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, size_t d_len, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *s, size_t s_len, + mbedtls_mpi_uint b) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0; /* carry */ + /* + * It is a documented precondition of this function that d_len >= s_len. + * If that's not the case, we swap these round: this turns what would be + * a buffer overflow into an incorrect result. + */ + if (d_len < s_len) { + s_len = d_len; + } + size_t excess_len = d_len - s_len; + size_t steps_x8 = s_len / 8; + size_t steps_x1 = s_len & 7; + + while (steps_x8--) { + MULADDC_X8_INIT + MULADDC_X8_CORE + MULADDC_X8_STOP + } + + while (steps_x1--) { + MULADDC_X1_INIT + MULADDC_X1_CORE + MULADDC_X1_STOP + } + + while (excess_len--) { + *d += c; + c = (*d < c); + d++; + } + + return c; +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_core_mul(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, size_t A_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, size_t B_limbs) +{ + memset(X, 0, (A_limbs + B_limbs) * ciL); + + for (size_t i = 0; i < B_limbs; i++) { + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(X + i, A_limbs + 1, A, A_limbs, B[i]); + } +} + +/* + * Fast Montgomery initialization (thanks to Tom St Denis). + */ +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint x = N[0]; + + x += ((N[0] + 2) & 4) << 1; + + for (unsigned int i = biL; i >= 8; i /= 2) { + x *= (2 - (N[0] * x)); + } + + return ~x + 1; +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + size_t B_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t AN_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T) +{ + memset(T, 0, (2 * AN_limbs + 1) * ciL); + + for (size_t i = 0; i < AN_limbs; i++) { + /* T = (T + u0*B + u1*N) / 2^biL */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint u0 = A[i]; + mbedtls_mpi_uint u1 = (T[0] + u0 * B[0]) * mm; + + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(T, AN_limbs + 2, B, B_limbs, u0); + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(T, AN_limbs + 2, N, AN_limbs, u1); + + T++; + } + + /* + * The result we want is (T >= N) ? T - N : T. + * + * For better constant-time properties in this function, we always do the + * subtraction, with the result in X. + * + * We also look to see if there was any carry in the final additions in the + * loop above. + */ + + mbedtls_mpi_uint carry = T[AN_limbs]; + mbedtls_mpi_uint borrow = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(X, T, N, AN_limbs); + + /* + * Using R as the Montgomery radix (auxiliary modulus) i.e. 2^(biL*AN_limbs): + * + * T can be in one of 3 ranges: + * + * 1) T < N : (carry, borrow) = (0, 1): we want T + * 2) N <= T < R : (carry, borrow) = (0, 0): we want X + * 3) T >= R : (carry, borrow) = (1, 1): we want X + * + * and (carry, borrow) = (1, 0) can't happen. + * + * So the correct return value is already in X if (carry ^ borrow) = 0, + * but is in (the lower AN_limbs limbs of) T if (carry ^ borrow) = 1. + */ + mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(mbedtls_ct_bool(carry ^ borrow), + (unsigned char *) X, + (unsigned char *) T, + NULL, + AN_limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_core_get_mont_r2_unsafe(mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(X, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(X, N->n * 2 * biL)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(X, X, N)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shrink(X, N->n)); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +void mbedtls_mpi_core_ct_uint_table_lookup(mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *table, + size_t limbs, + size_t count, + size_t index) +{ + for (size_t i = 0; i < count; i++, table += limbs) { + mbedtls_ct_condition_t assign = mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(i, index); + mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(dest, table, limbs, assign); + } +} + +/* Fill X with n_bytes random bytes. + * X must already have room for those bytes. + * The ordering of the bytes returned from the RNG is suitable for + * deterministic ECDSA (see RFC 6979 §3.3 and the specification of + * mbedtls_mpi_core_random()). + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_core_fill_random( + mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs, + size_t n_bytes, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(n_bytes); + const size_t overhead = (limbs * ciL) - n_bytes; + + if (X_limbs < limbs) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + memset(X, 0, overhead); + memset((unsigned char *) X + limbs * ciL, 0, (X_limbs - limbs) * ciL); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(f_rng(p_rng, (unsigned char *) X + overhead, n_bytes)); + mbedtls_mpi_core_bigendian_to_host(X, limbs); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_core_random(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + mbedtls_mpi_uint min, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t limbs, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + mbedtls_ct_condition_t ge_lower = MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, lt_upper = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE; + size_t n_bits = mbedtls_mpi_core_bitlen(N, limbs); + size_t n_bytes = (n_bits + 7) / 8; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* + * When min == 0, each try has at worst a probability 1/2 of failing + * (the msb has a probability 1/2 of being 0, and then the result will + * be < N), so after 30 tries failure probability is a most 2**(-30). + * + * When N is just below a power of 2, as is the case when generating + * a random scalar on most elliptic curves, 1 try is enough with + * overwhelming probability. When N is just above a power of 2, + * as when generating a random scalar on secp224k1, each try has + * a probability of failing that is almost 1/2. + * + * The probabilities are almost the same if min is nonzero but negligible + * compared to N. This is always the case when N is crypto-sized, but + * it's convenient to support small N for testing purposes. When N + * is small, use a higher repeat count, otherwise the probability of + * failure is macroscopic. + */ + int count = (n_bytes > 4 ? 30 : 250); + + /* + * Match the procedure given in RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA) + * when f_rng is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG: + * - use the same byte ordering; + * - keep the leftmost n_bits bits of the generated octet string; + * - try until result is in the desired range. + * This also avoids any bias, which is especially important for ECDSA. + */ + do { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_core_fill_random(X, limbs, + n_bytes, + f_rng, p_rng)); + mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_r(X, limbs, 8 * n_bytes - n_bits); + + if (--count == 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + goto cleanup; + } + + ge_lower = mbedtls_mpi_core_uint_le_mpi(min, X, limbs); + lt_upper = mbedtls_mpi_core_lt_ct(X, N, limbs); + } while (mbedtls_ct_bool_and(ge_lower, lt_upper) == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +static size_t exp_mod_get_window_size(size_t Ebits) +{ +#if MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE >= 6 + return (Ebits > 671) ? 6 : (Ebits > 239) ? 5 : (Ebits > 79) ? 4 : 1; +#elif MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE == 5 + return (Ebits > 239) ? 5 : (Ebits > 79) ? 4 : 1; +#elif MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE > 1 + return (Ebits > 79) ? MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE : 1; +#else + (void) Ebits; + return 1; +#endif +} + +size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_working_limbs(size_t AN_limbs, size_t E_limbs) +{ + const size_t wsize = exp_mod_get_window_size(E_limbs * biL); + const size_t welem = ((size_t) 1) << wsize; + + /* How big does each part of the working memory pool need to be? */ + const size_t table_limbs = welem * AN_limbs; + const size_t select_limbs = AN_limbs; + const size_t temp_limbs = 2 * AN_limbs + 1; + + return table_limbs + select_limbs + temp_limbs; +} + +static void exp_mod_precompute_window(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t AN_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR, + size_t welem, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *Wtable, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *temp) +{ + /* W[0] = 1 (in Montgomery presentation) */ + memset(Wtable, 0, AN_limbs * ciL); + Wtable[0] = 1; + mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(Wtable, Wtable, RR, AN_limbs, N, AN_limbs, mm, temp); + + /* W[1] = A (already in Montgomery presentation) */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *W1 = Wtable + AN_limbs; + memcpy(W1, A, AN_limbs * ciL); + + /* W[i+1] = W[i] * W[1], i >= 2 */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *Wprev = W1; + for (size_t i = 2; i < welem; i++) { + mbedtls_mpi_uint *Wcur = Wprev + AN_limbs; + mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(Wcur, Wprev, W1, AN_limbs, N, AN_limbs, mm, temp); + Wprev = Wcur; + } +} + +/* Exponentiation: X := A^E mod N. + * + * A must already be in Montgomery form. + * + * As in other bignum functions, assume that AN_limbs and E_limbs are nonzero. + * + * RR must contain 2^{2*biL} mod N. + * + * The algorithm is a variant of Left-to-right k-ary exponentiation: HAC 14.82 + * (The difference is that the body in our loop processes a single bit instead + * of a full window.) + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t AN_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *E, + size_t E_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T) +{ + const size_t wsize = exp_mod_get_window_size(E_limbs * biL); + const size_t welem = ((size_t) 1) << wsize; + + /* This is how we will use the temporary storage T, which must have space + * for table_limbs, select_limbs and (2 * AN_limbs + 1) for montmul. */ + const size_t table_limbs = welem * AN_limbs; + const size_t select_limbs = AN_limbs; + + /* Pointers to specific parts of the temporary working memory pool */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *const Wtable = T; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *const Wselect = Wtable + table_limbs; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *const temp = Wselect + select_limbs; + + /* + * Window precomputation + */ + + const mbedtls_mpi_uint mm = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(N); + + /* Set Wtable[i] = A^(2^i) (in Montgomery representation) */ + exp_mod_precompute_window(A, N, AN_limbs, + mm, RR, + welem, Wtable, temp); + + /* + * Fixed window exponentiation + */ + + /* X = 1 (in Montgomery presentation) initially */ + memcpy(X, Wtable, AN_limbs * ciL); + + /* We'll process the bits of E from most significant + * (limb_index=E_limbs-1, E_bit_index=biL-1) to least significant + * (limb_index=0, E_bit_index=0). */ + size_t E_limb_index = E_limbs; + size_t E_bit_index = 0; + /* At any given time, window contains window_bits bits from E. + * window_bits can go up to wsize. */ + size_t window_bits = 0; + mbedtls_mpi_uint window = 0; + + do { + /* Square */ + mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(X, X, X, AN_limbs, N, AN_limbs, mm, temp); + + /* Move to the next bit of the exponent */ + if (E_bit_index == 0) { + --E_limb_index; + E_bit_index = biL - 1; + } else { + --E_bit_index; + } + /* Insert next exponent bit into window */ + ++window_bits; + window <<= 1; + window |= (E[E_limb_index] >> E_bit_index) & 1; + + /* Clear window if it's full. Also clear the window at the end, + * when we've finished processing the exponent. */ + if (window_bits == wsize || + (E_bit_index == 0 && E_limb_index == 0)) { + /* Select Wtable[window] without leaking window through + * memory access patterns. */ + mbedtls_mpi_core_ct_uint_table_lookup(Wselect, Wtable, + AN_limbs, welem, window); + /* Multiply X by the selected element. */ + mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(X, X, Wselect, AN_limbs, N, AN_limbs, mm, + temp); + window = 0; + window_bits = 0; + } + } while (!(E_bit_index == 0 && E_limb_index == 0)); +} + +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_sub_int(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + mbedtls_mpi_uint c, /* doubles as carry */ + size_t limbs) +{ + for (size_t i = 0; i < limbs; i++) { + mbedtls_mpi_uint s = A[i]; + mbedtls_mpi_uint t = s - c; + c = (t > s); + X[i] = t; + } + + return c; +} + +mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_mpi_core_check_zero_ct(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t limbs) +{ + volatile const mbedtls_mpi_uint *force_read_A = A; + mbedtls_mpi_uint bits = 0; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < limbs; i++) { + bits |= force_read_A[i]; + } + + return mbedtls_ct_bool(bits); +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t AN_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *rr, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(X, A, rr, AN_limbs, N, AN_limbs, mm, T); +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_core_from_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t AN_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T) +{ + const mbedtls_mpi_uint Rinv = 1; /* 1/R in Mont. rep => 1 */ + + mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(X, A, &Rinv, 1, N, AN_limbs, mm, T); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_core.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_core.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..92c8d47db5 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_core.h @@ -0,0 +1,763 @@ +/** + * Core bignum functions + * + * This interface should only be used by the legacy bignum module (bignum.h) + * and the modular bignum modules (bignum_mod.c, bignum_mod_raw.c). All other + * modules should use the high-level modular bignum interface (bignum_mod.h) + * or the legacy bignum interface (bignum.h). + * + * This module is about processing non-negative integers with a fixed upper + * bound that's of the form 2^n-1 where n is a multiple of #biL. + * These can be thought of integers written in base 2^#biL with a fixed + * number of digits. Digits in this base are called *limbs*. + * Many operations treat these numbers as the principal representation of + * a number modulo 2^n or a smaller bound. + * + * The functions in this module obey the following conventions unless + * explicitly indicated otherwise: + * + * - **Overflow**: some functions indicate overflow from the range + * [0, 2^n-1] by returning carry parameters, while others operate + * modulo and so cannot overflow. This should be clear from the function + * documentation. + * - **Bignum parameters**: Bignums are passed as pointers to an array of + * limbs. A limb has the type #mbedtls_mpi_uint. Unless otherwise specified: + * - Bignum parameters called \p A, \p B, ... are inputs, and are + * not modified by the function. + * - For operations modulo some number, the modulus is called \p N + * and is input-only. + * - Bignum parameters called \p X, \p Y are outputs or input-output. + * The initial content of output-only parameters is ignored. + * - Some functions use different names that reflect traditional + * naming of operands of certain operations (e.g. + * divisor/dividend/quotient/remainder). + * - \p T is a temporary storage area. The initial content of such + * parameter is ignored and the final content is unspecified. + * - **Bignum sizes**: bignum sizes are always expressed in limbs. + * Most functions work on bignums of a given size and take a single + * \p limbs parameter that applies to all parameters that are limb arrays. + * All bignum sizes must be at least 1 and must be significantly less than + * #SIZE_MAX. The behavior if a size is 0 is undefined. The behavior if the + * total size of all parameters overflows #SIZE_MAX is undefined. + * - **Parameter ordering**: for bignum parameters, outputs come before inputs. + * Temporaries come last. + * - **Aliasing**: in general, output bignums may be aliased to one or more + * inputs. As an exception, parameters that are documented as a modulus value + * may not be aliased to an output. Outputs may not be aliased to one another. + * Temporaries may not be aliased to any other parameter. + * - **Overlap**: apart from aliasing of limb array pointers (where two + * arguments are equal pointers), overlap is not supported and may result + * in undefined behavior. + * - **Error handling**: This is a low-level module. Functions generally do not + * try to protect against invalid arguments such as nonsensical sizes or + * null pointers. Note that some functions that operate on bignums of + * different sizes have constraints about their size, and violating those + * constraints may lead to buffer overflows. + * - **Modular representatives**: functions that operate modulo \p N expect + * all modular inputs to be in the range [0, \p N - 1] and guarantee outputs + * in the range [0, \p N - 1]. If an input is out of range, outputs are + * fully unspecified, though bignum values out of range should not cause + * buffer overflows (beware that this is not extensively tested). + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_CORE_H +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_CORE_H + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#endif + +#include "constant_time_internal.h" + +#define ciL (sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) /** chars in limb */ +#define biL (ciL << 3) /** bits in limb */ +#define biH (ciL << 2) /** half limb size */ + +/* + * Convert between bits/chars and number of limbs + * Divide first in order to avoid potential overflows + */ +#define BITS_TO_LIMBS(i) ((i) / biL + ((i) % biL != 0)) +#define CHARS_TO_LIMBS(i) ((i) / ciL + ((i) % ciL != 0)) +/* Get a specific byte, without range checks. */ +#define GET_BYTE(X, i) \ + (((X)[(i) / ciL] >> (((i) % ciL) * 8)) & 0xff) + +/** Count leading zero bits in a given integer. + * + * \warning The result is undefined if \p a == 0 + * + * \param a Integer to count leading zero bits. + * + * \return The number of leading zero bits in \p a, if \p a != 0. + * If \p a == 0, the result is undefined. + */ +size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_clz(mbedtls_mpi_uint a); + +/** Return the minimum number of bits required to represent the value held + * in the MPI. + * + * \note This function returns 0 if all the limbs of \p A are 0. + * + * \param[in] A The address of the MPI. + * \param A_limbs The number of limbs of \p A. + * + * \return The number of bits in \p A. + */ +size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_bitlen(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, size_t A_limbs); + +/** Convert a big-endian byte array aligned to the size of mbedtls_mpi_uint + * into the storage form used by mbedtls_mpi. + * + * \param[in,out] A The address of the MPI. + * \param A_limbs The number of limbs of \p A. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_bigendian_to_host(mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t A_limbs); + +/** \brief Compare a machine integer with an MPI. + * + * This function operates in constant time with respect + * to the values of \p min and \p A. + * + * \param min A machine integer. + * \param[in] A An MPI. + * \param A_limbs The number of limbs of \p A. + * This must be at least 1. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p min is less than or equal to \p A, otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + */ +mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_mpi_core_uint_le_mpi(mbedtls_mpi_uint min, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t A_limbs); + +/** + * \brief Check if one unsigned MPI is less than another in constant + * time. + * + * \param A The left-hand MPI. This must point to an array of limbs + * with the same allocated length as \p B. + * \param B The right-hand MPI. This must point to an array of limbs + * with the same allocated length as \p A. + * \param limbs The number of limbs in \p A and \p B. + * This must not be 0. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p A is less than \p B. + * MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE if \p A is greater than or equal to \p B. + */ +mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_mpi_core_lt_ct(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + size_t limbs); + +/** + * \brief Perform a safe conditional copy of an MPI which doesn't reveal + * whether assignment was done or not. + * + * \param[out] X The address of the destination MPI. + * This must be initialized. Must have enough limbs to + * store the full value of \p A. + * \param[in] A The address of the source MPI. This must be initialized. + * \param limbs The number of limbs of \p A. + * \param assign The condition deciding whether to perform the + * assignment or not. Callers will need to use + * the constant time interface (e.g. `mbedtls_ct_bool()`) + * to construct this argument. + * + * \note This function avoids leaking any information about whether + * the assignment was done or not. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t limbs, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t assign); + +/** + * \brief Perform a safe conditional swap of two MPIs which doesn't reveal + * whether the swap was done or not. + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the first MPI. + * This must be initialized. + * \param[in,out] Y The address of the second MPI. + * This must be initialized. + * \param limbs The number of limbs of \p X and \p Y. + * \param swap The condition deciding whether to perform + * the swap or not. + * + * \note This function avoids leaking any information about whether + * the swap was done or not. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_swap(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *Y, + size_t limbs, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t swap); + +/** Import X from unsigned binary data, little-endian. + * + * The MPI needs to have enough limbs to store the full value (including any + * most significant zero bytes in the input). + * + * \param[out] X The address of the MPI. + * \param X_limbs The number of limbs of \p X. + * \param[in] input The input buffer to import from. + * \param input_length The length bytes of \p input. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p X isn't + * large enough to hold the value in \p input. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_core_read_le(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + size_t X_limbs, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Import X from unsigned binary data, big-endian. + * + * The MPI needs to have enough limbs to store the full value (including any + * most significant zero bytes in the input). + * + * \param[out] X The address of the MPI. + * May only be #NULL if \p X_limbs is 0 and \p input_length + * is 0. + * \param X_limbs The number of limbs of \p X. + * \param[in] input The input buffer to import from. + * May only be #NULL if \p input_length is 0. + * \param input_length The length in bytes of \p input. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p X isn't + * large enough to hold the value in \p input. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_core_read_be(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + size_t X_limbs, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Export A into unsigned binary data, little-endian. + * + * \note If \p output is shorter than \p A the export is still successful if the + * value held in \p A fits in the buffer (that is, if enough of the most + * significant bytes of \p A are 0). + * + * \param[in] A The address of the MPI. + * \param A_limbs The number of limbs of \p A. + * \param[out] output The output buffer to export to. + * \param output_length The length in bytes of \p output. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p output isn't + * large enough to hold the value of \p A. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_core_write_le(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t A_limbs, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_length); + +/** Export A into unsigned binary data, big-endian. + * + * \note If \p output is shorter than \p A the export is still successful if the + * value held in \p A fits in the buffer (that is, if enough of the most + * significant bytes of \p A are 0). + * + * \param[in] A The address of the MPI. + * \param A_limbs The number of limbs of \p A. + * \param[out] output The output buffer to export to. + * \param output_length The length in bytes of \p output. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p output isn't + * large enough to hold the value of \p A. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_core_write_be(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t A_limbs, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_length); + +/** \brief Shift an MPI in-place right by a number of bits. + * + * Shifting by more bits than there are bit positions + * in \p X is valid and results in setting \p X to 0. + * + * This function's execution time depends on the value + * of \p count (and of course \p limbs). + * + * \param[in,out] X The number to shift. + * \param limbs The number of limbs of \p X. This must be at least 1. + * \param count The number of bits to shift by. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_r(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t limbs, + size_t count); + +/** + * \brief Shift an MPI in-place left by a number of bits. + * + * Shifting by more bits than there are bit positions + * in \p X will produce an unspecified result. + * + * This function's execution time depends on the value + * of \p count (and of course \p limbs). + * \param[in,out] X The number to shift. + * \param limbs The number of limbs of \p X. This must be at least 1. + * \param count The number of bits to shift by. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_l(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t limbs, + size_t count); + +/** + * \brief Add two fixed-size large unsigned integers, returning the carry. + * + * Calculates `A + B` where `A` and `B` have the same size. + * + * This function operates modulo `2^(biL*limbs)` and returns the carry + * (1 if there was a wraparound, and 0 otherwise). + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B. + * + * \param[out] X The result of the addition. + * \param[in] A Little-endian presentation of the left operand. + * \param[in] B Little-endian presentation of the right operand. + * \param limbs Number of limbs of \p X, \p A and \p B. + * + * \return 1 if `A + B >= 2^(biL*limbs)`, 0 otherwise. + */ +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_add(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + size_t limbs); + +/** + * \brief Conditional addition of two fixed-size large unsigned integers, + * returning the carry. + * + * Functionally equivalent to + * + * ``` + * if( cond ) + * X += A; + * return carry; + * ``` + * + * This function operates modulo `2^(biL*limbs)`. + * + * \param[in,out] X The pointer to the (little-endian) array + * representing the bignum to accumulate onto. + * \param[in] A The pointer to the (little-endian) array + * representing the bignum to conditionally add + * to \p X. This may be aliased to \p X but may not + * overlap otherwise. + * \param limbs Number of limbs of \p X and \p A. + * \param cond Condition bit dictating whether addition should + * happen or not. This must be \c 0 or \c 1. + * + * \warning If \p cond is neither 0 nor 1, the result of this function + * is unspecified, and the resulting value in \p X might be + * neither its original value nor \p X + \p A. + * + * \return 1 if `X + cond * A >= 2^(biL*limbs)`, 0 otherwise. + */ +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_add_if(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t limbs, + unsigned cond); + +/** + * \brief Subtract two fixed-size large unsigned integers, returning the borrow. + * + * Calculate `A - B` where \p A and \p B have the same size. + * This function operates modulo `2^(biL*limbs)` and returns the carry + * (1 if there was a wraparound, i.e. if `A < B`, and 0 otherwise). + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap + * either otherwise. + * + * \param[out] X The result of the subtraction. + * \param[in] A Little-endian presentation of left operand. + * \param[in] B Little-endian presentation of right operand. + * \param limbs Number of limbs of \p X, \p A and \p B. + * + * \return 1 if `A < B`. + * 0 if `A >= B`. + */ +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + size_t limbs); + +/** + * \brief Perform a fixed-size multiply accumulate operation: X += b * A + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A (when \p X_limbs == \p A_limbs), but may not + * otherwise overlap. + * + * This function operates modulo `2^(biL*X_limbs)`. + * + * \param[in,out] X The pointer to the (little-endian) array + * representing the bignum to accumulate onto. + * \param X_limbs The number of limbs of \p X. This must be + * at least \p A_limbs. + * \param[in] A The pointer to the (little-endian) array + * representing the bignum to multiply with. + * This may be aliased to \p X but may not overlap + * otherwise. + * \param A_limbs The number of limbs of \p A. + * \param b X scalar to multiply with. + * + * \return The carry at the end of the operation. + */ +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, size_t A_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_uint b); + +/** + * \brief Perform a known-size multiplication + * + * \p X may not be aliased to any of the inputs for this function. + * \p A may be aliased to \p B. + * + * \param[out] X The pointer to the (little-endian) array to receive + * the product of \p A_limbs and \p B_limbs. + * This must be of length \p A_limbs + \p B_limbs. + * \param[in] A The pointer to the (little-endian) array + * representing the first factor. + * \param A_limbs The number of limbs in \p A. + * \param[in] B The pointer to the (little-endian) array + * representing the second factor. + * \param B_limbs The number of limbs in \p B. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_mul(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, size_t A_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, size_t B_limbs); + +/** + * \brief Calculate initialisation value for fast Montgomery modular + * multiplication + * + * \param[in] N Little-endian presentation of the modulus. This must have + * at least one limb. + * + * \return The initialisation value for fast Montgomery modular multiplication + */ +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N); + +/** + * \brief Montgomery multiplication: X = A * B * R^-1 mod N (HAC 14.36) + * + * \p A and \p B must be in canonical form. That is, < \p N. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p N, or even \p B (if \p AN_limbs == + * \p B_limbs) but may not overlap any parameters otherwise. + * + * \p A and \p B may alias each other, if \p AN_limbs == \p B_limbs. They may + * not alias \p N (since they must be in canonical form, they cannot == \p N). + * + * \param[out] X The destination MPI, as a little-endian array of + * length \p AN_limbs. + * On successful completion, X contains the result of + * the multiplication `A * B * R^-1` mod N where + * `R = 2^(biL*AN_limbs)`. + * \param[in] A Little-endian presentation of first operand. + * Must have the same number of limbs as \p N. + * \param[in] B Little-endian presentation of second operand. + * \param[in] B_limbs The number of limbs in \p B. + * Must be <= \p AN_limbs. + * \param[in] N Little-endian presentation of the modulus. + * This must be odd, and have exactly the same number + * of limbs as \p A. + * It may alias \p X, but must not alias or otherwise + * overlap any of the other parameters. + * \param[in] AN_limbs The number of limbs in \p X, \p A and \p N. + * \param mm The Montgomery constant for \p N: -N^-1 mod 2^biL. + * This can be calculated by `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init()`. + * \param[in,out] T Temporary storage of size at least 2*AN_limbs+1 limbs. + * Its initial content is unused and + * its final content is indeterminate. + * It must not alias or otherwise overlap any of the + * other parameters. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, size_t B_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, size_t AN_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, mbedtls_mpi_uint *T); + +/** + * \brief Calculate the square of the Montgomery constant. (Needed + * for conversion and operations in Montgomery form.) + * + * \param[out] X A pointer to the result of the calculation of + * the square of the Montgomery constant: + * 2^{2*n*biL} mod N. + * \param[in] N Little-endian presentation of the modulus, which must be odd. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if there is not enough space + * to store the value of Montgomery constant squared. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO if \p N modulus is zero. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE if \p N modulus is negative. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_core_get_mont_r2_unsafe(mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *N); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +/** + * Copy an MPI from a table without leaking the index. + * + * \param dest The destination buffer. This must point to a writable + * buffer of at least \p limbs limbs. + * \param table The address of the table. This must point to a readable + * array of \p count elements of \p limbs limbs each. + * \param limbs The number of limbs in each table entry. + * \param count The number of entries in \p table. + * \param index The (secret) table index to look up. This must be in the + * range `0 .. count-1`. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_ct_uint_table_lookup(mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *table, + size_t limbs, + size_t count, + size_t index); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +/** + * \brief Fill an integer with a number of random bytes. + * + * \param X The destination MPI. + * \param X_limbs The number of limbs of \p X. + * \param bytes The number of random bytes to generate. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X does not have + * enough room for \p bytes bytes. + * \return A negative error code on RNG failure. + * + * \note The bytes obtained from the RNG are interpreted + * as a big-endian representation of an MPI; this can + * be relevant in applications like deterministic ECDSA. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_core_fill_random(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs, + size_t bytes, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng); + +/** Generate a random number uniformly in a range. + * + * This function generates a random number between \p min inclusive and + * \p N exclusive. + * + * The procedure complies with RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA) + * when the RNG is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG + * and \p min is \c 1. + * + * \note There are `N - min` possible outputs. The lower bound + * \p min can be reached, but the upper bound \p N cannot. + * + * \param X The destination MPI, with \p limbs limbs. + * It must not be aliased with \p N or otherwise overlap it. + * \param min The minimum value to return. + * \param N The upper bound of the range, exclusive, with \p limbs limbs. + * In other words, this is one plus the maximum value to return. + * \p N must be strictly larger than \p min. + * \param limbs The number of limbs of \p N and \p X. + * This must not be 0. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if the implementation was + * unable to find a suitable value within a limited number + * of attempts. This has a negligible probability if \p N + * is significantly larger than \p min, which is the case + * for all usual cryptographic applications. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_core_random(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + mbedtls_mpi_uint min, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t limbs, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng); + +/** + * \brief Returns the number of limbs of working memory required for + * a call to `mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod()`. + * + * \note This will always be at least + * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(AN_limbs)`, + * i.e. sufficient for a call to `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul()`. + * + * \param AN_limbs The number of limbs in the input `A` and the modulus `N` + * (they must be the same size) that will be given to + * `mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod()`. + * \param E_limbs The number of limbs in the exponent `E` that will be given + * to `mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod()`. + * + * \return The number of limbs of working memory required by + * `mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod()`. + */ +size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_working_limbs(size_t AN_limbs, size_t E_limbs); + +/** + * \brief Perform a modular exponentiation with secret exponent: + * X = A^E mod N, where \p A is already in Montgomery form. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A, but not to \p RR or \p E, even if \p E_limbs == + * \p AN_limbs. + * + * \param[out] X The destination MPI, as a little endian array of length + * \p AN_limbs. + * \param[in] A The base MPI, as a little endian array of length \p AN_limbs. + * Must be in Montgomery form. + * \param[in] N The modulus, as a little endian array of length \p AN_limbs. + * \param AN_limbs The number of limbs in \p X, \p A, \p N, \p RR. + * \param[in] E The exponent, as a little endian array of length \p E_limbs. + * \param E_limbs The number of limbs in \p E. + * \param[in] RR The precomputed residue of 2^{2*biL} modulo N, as a little + * endian array of length \p AN_limbs. + * \param[in,out] T Temporary storage of at least the number of limbs returned + * by `mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_working_limbs()`. + * Its initial content is unused and its final content is + * indeterminate. + * It must not alias or otherwise overlap any of the other + * parameters. + * It is up to the caller to zeroize \p T when it is no + * longer needed, and before freeing it if it was dynamically + * allocated. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, size_t AN_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *E, size_t E_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T); + +/** + * \brief Subtract unsigned integer from known-size large unsigned integers. + * Return the borrow. + * + * \param[out] X The result of the subtraction. + * \param[in] A The left operand. + * \param b The unsigned scalar to subtract. + * \param limbs Number of limbs of \p X and \p A. + * + * \return 1 if `A < b`. + * 0 if `A >= b`. + */ +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_sub_int(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + mbedtls_mpi_uint b, + size_t limbs); + +/** + * \brief Determine if a given MPI has the value \c 0 in constant time with + * respect to the value (but not with respect to the number of limbs). + * + * \param[in] A The MPI to test. + * \param limbs Number of limbs in \p A. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE if `A == 0` + * MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if `A != 0`. + */ +mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_mpi_core_check_zero_ct(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t limbs); + +/** + * \brief Returns the number of limbs of working memory required for + * a call to `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul()`. + * + * \param AN_limbs The number of limbs in the input `A` and the modulus `N` + * (they must be the same size) that will be given to + * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul()` or one of the other functions + * that specifies this as the amount of working memory needed. + * + * \return The number of limbs of working memory required by + * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul()` (or other similar function). + */ +static inline size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(size_t AN_limbs) +{ + return 2 * AN_limbs + 1; +} + +/** Convert an MPI into Montgomery form. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A, but may not otherwise overlap it. + * + * \p X may not alias \p N (it is in canonical form, so must be strictly less + * than \p N). Nor may it alias or overlap \p rr (this is unlikely to be + * required in practice.) + * + * This function is a thin wrapper around `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul()` that is + * an alternative to calling `mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_to_mont_rep()` when we + * don't want to allocate memory. + * + * \param[out] X The result of the conversion. + * Must have the same number of limbs as \p A. + * \param[in] A The MPI to convert into Montgomery form. + * Must have the same number of limbs as the modulus. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus, which gives the size of + * the base `R` = 2^(biL*N->limbs). + * \param[in] AN_limbs The number of limbs in \p X, \p A, \p N and \p rr. + * \param mm The Montgomery constant for \p N: -N^-1 mod 2^biL. + * This can be determined by calling + * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init()`. + * \param[in] rr The residue for `2^{2*n*biL} mod N`. + * \param[in,out] T Temporary storage of size at least + * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(AN_limbs)` + * limbs. + * Its initial content is unused and + * its final content is indeterminate. + * It must not alias or otherwise overlap any of the + * other parameters. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t AN_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *rr, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T); + +/** Convert an MPI from Montgomery form. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A, but may not otherwise overlap it. + * + * \p X may not alias \p N (it is in canonical form, so must be strictly less + * than \p N). + * + * This function is a thin wrapper around `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul()` that is + * an alternative to calling `mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_from_mont_rep()` when we + * don't want to allocate memory. + * + * \param[out] X The result of the conversion. + * Must have the same number of limbs as \p A. + * \param[in] A The MPI to convert from Montgomery form. + * Must have the same number of limbs as the modulus. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus, which gives the size of + * the base `R` = 2^(biL*N->limbs). + * \param[in] AN_limbs The number of limbs in \p X, \p A and \p N. + * \param mm The Montgomery constant for \p N: -N^-1 mod 2^biL. + * This can be determined by calling + * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init()`. + * \param[in,out] T Temporary storage of size at least + * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(AN_limbs)` + * limbs. + * Its initial content is unused and + * its final content is indeterminate. + * It must not alias or otherwise overlap any of the + * other parameters. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_from_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t AN_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_CORE_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dfd332a703 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod.c @@ -0,0 +1,394 @@ +/** + * Modular bignum functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT) + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "bignum_core.h" +#include "bignum_mod.h" +#include "bignum_mod_raw.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, + size_t p_limbs) +{ + if (p_limbs != N->limbs || !mbedtls_mpi_core_lt_ct(p, N->p, N->limbs)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + r->limbs = N->limbs; + r->p = p; + + return 0; +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_release(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r) +{ + if (r == NULL) { + return; + } + + r->limbs = 0; + r->p = NULL; +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_init(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + if (N == NULL) { + return; + } + + N->p = NULL; + N->limbs = 0; + N->bits = 0; + N->int_rep = MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_INVALID; +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + if (N == NULL) { + return; + } + + switch (N->int_rep) { + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY: + if (N->rep.mont.rr != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free((mbedtls_mpi_uint *) N->rep.mont.rr, + N->limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); + N->rep.mont.rr = NULL; + } + N->rep.mont.mm = 0; + break; + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED: + N->rep.ored.modp = NULL; + break; + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_INVALID: + break; + } + + N->p = NULL; + N->limbs = 0; + N->bits = 0; + N->int_rep = MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_INVALID; +} + +static int set_mont_const_square(const mbedtls_mpi_uint **X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t limbs) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi N; + mbedtls_mpi RR; + *X = NULL; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&N); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&RR); + + if (A == NULL || limbs == 0 || limbs >= (MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS / 2) - 2) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if (mbedtls_mpi_grow(&N, limbs)) { + goto cleanup; + } + + memcpy(N.p, A, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * limbs); + + ret = mbedtls_mpi_core_get_mont_r2_unsafe(&RR, &N); + + if (ret == 0) { + *X = RR.p; + RR.p = NULL; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&N); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&RR); + ret = (ret != 0) ? MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED : 0; + return ret; +} + +static inline void standard_modulus_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, + size_t p_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_rep_selector int_rep) +{ + N->p = p; + N->limbs = p_limbs; + N->bits = mbedtls_mpi_core_bitlen(p, p_limbs); + N->int_rep = int_rep; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, + size_t p_limbs) +{ + int ret = 0; + standard_modulus_setup(N, p, p_limbs, MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY); + N->rep.mont.mm = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(N->p); + ret = set_mont_const_square(&N->rep.mont.rr, N->p, N->limbs); + + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free(N); + } + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_optred_modulus_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, + size_t p_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_modp_fn modp) +{ + standard_modulus_setup(N, p, p_limbs, MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED); + N->rep.ored.modp = modp; + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_mul(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + if (N->limbs == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (X->limbs != N->limbs || A->limbs != N->limbs || B->limbs != N->limbs) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T = mbedtls_calloc(N->limbs * 2 + 1, ciL); + if (T == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_mul(X->p, A->p, B->p, N, T); + + mbedtls_free(T); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_sub(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + if (X->limbs != N->limbs || A->limbs != N->limbs || B->limbs != N->limbs) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_sub(X->p, A->p, B->p, N); + + return 0; +} + +static int mbedtls_mpi_mod_inv_mont(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *working_memory) +{ + /* Input already in Montgomery form, so there's little to do */ + mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime(X->p, A->p, + N->p, N->limbs, + N->rep.mont.rr, + working_memory); + return 0; +} + +static int mbedtls_mpi_mod_inv_non_mont(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *working_memory) +{ + /* Need to convert input into Montgomery form */ + + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus Nmont; + mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_init(&Nmont); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup(&Nmont, N->p, N->limbs)); + + /* We'll use X->p to hold the Montgomery form of the input A->p */ + mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(X->p, A->p, Nmont.p, Nmont.limbs, + Nmont.rep.mont.mm, Nmont.rep.mont.rr, + working_memory); + + mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime(X->p, X->p, + Nmont.p, Nmont.limbs, + Nmont.rep.mont.rr, + working_memory); + + /* And convert back from Montgomery form */ + + mbedtls_mpi_core_from_mont_rep(X->p, X->p, Nmont.p, Nmont.limbs, + Nmont.rep.mont.mm, working_memory); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free(&Nmont); + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_inv(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + if (X->limbs != N->limbs || A->limbs != N->limbs) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Zero has the same value regardless of Montgomery form or not */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_core_check_zero_ct(A->p, A->limbs) == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + size_t working_limbs = + mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime_working_limbs(N->limbs); + + mbedtls_mpi_uint *working_memory = mbedtls_calloc(working_limbs, + sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); + if (working_memory == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + switch (N->int_rep) { + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY: + ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_inv_mont(X, A, N, working_memory); + break; + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED: + ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_inv_non_mont(X, A, N, working_memory); + break; + default: + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + break; + } + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(working_memory, + working_limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_add(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + if (X->limbs != N->limbs || A->limbs != N->limbs || B->limbs != N->limbs) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_add(X->p, A->p, B->p, N); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_random(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + mbedtls_mpi_uint min, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + if (X->limbs != N->limbs) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + return mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_random(X->p, min, N, f_rng, p_rng); +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_read(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + + /* Do our best to check if r and m have been set up */ + if (r->limbs == 0 || N->limbs == 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + if (r->limbs != N->limbs) { + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_read(r->p, N, buf, buflen, ext_rep); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + r->limbs = N->limbs; + + ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_canonical_to_modulus_rep(r->p, N); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_write(const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep) +{ + /* Do our best to check if r and m have been set up */ + if (r->limbs == 0 || N->limbs == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if (r->limbs != N->limbs) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *working_memory = r->p; + size_t working_memory_len = sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * r->limbs; + + if (N->int_rep == MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY) { + + working_memory = mbedtls_calloc(r->limbs, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); + + if (working_memory == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + memcpy(working_memory, r->p, working_memory_len); + + ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_from_mont_rep(working_memory, N); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + } + + ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_write(working_memory, N, buf, buflen, ext_rep); + +cleanup: + + if (N->int_rep == MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY && + working_memory != NULL) { + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(working_memory, working_memory_len); + } + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..963d8881ac --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod.h @@ -0,0 +1,452 @@ +/** + * Modular bignum functions + * + * This module implements operations on integers modulo some fixed modulus. + * + * The functions in this module obey the following conventions unless + * explicitly indicated otherwise: + * + * - **Modulus parameters**: the modulus is passed as a pointer to a structure + * of type #mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus. The structure must be set up with an + * array of limbs storing the bignum value of the modulus. The modulus must + * be odd and is assumed to have no leading zeroes. The modulus is usually + * named \c N and is usually input-only. Functions which take a parameter + * of type \c const #mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus* must not modify its value. + * - **Bignum parameters**: Bignums are passed as pointers to an array of + * limbs or to a #mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue structure. A limb has the type + * #mbedtls_mpi_uint. Residues must be initialized before use, and must be + * associated with the modulus \c N. Unless otherwise specified: + * - Bignum parameters called \c A, \c B, ... are inputs and are not + * modified by the function. Functions which take a parameter of + * type \c const #mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue* must not modify its value. + * - Bignum parameters called \c X, \c Y, ... are outputs or input-output. + * The initial bignum value of output-only parameters is ignored, but + * they must be set up and associated with the modulus \c N. Some + * functions (typically constant-flow) require that the limbs in an + * output residue are initialized. + * - Bignum parameters called \c p are inputs used to set up a modulus or + * residue. These must be pointers to an array of limbs. + * - \c T is a temporary storage area. The initial content of such a + * parameter is ignored and the final content is unspecified. + * - Some functions use different names, such as \c r for the residue. + * - **Bignum sizes**: bignum sizes are always expressed in limbs. Both + * #mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus and #mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue have a \c limbs + * member storing its size. All bignum parameters must have the same + * number of limbs as the modulus. All bignum sizes must be at least 1 and + * must be significantly less than #SIZE_MAX. The behavior if a size is 0 is + * undefined. + * - **Bignum representation**: the representation of inputs and outputs is + * specified by the \c int_rep field of the modulus. + * - **Parameter ordering**: for bignum parameters, outputs come before inputs. + * The modulus is passed after residues. Temporaries come last. + * - **Aliasing**: in general, output bignums may be aliased to one or more + * inputs. Modulus values may not be aliased to any other parameter. Outputs + * may not be aliased to one another. Temporaries may not be aliased to any + * other parameter. + * - **Overlap**: apart from aliasing of residue pointers (where two residue + * arguments are equal pointers), overlap is not supported and may result + * in undefined behavior. + * - **Error handling**: functions generally check compatibility of input + * sizes. Most functions will not check that input values are in canonical + * form (i.e. that \c A < \c N), this is only checked during setup of a + * residue structure. + * - **Modular representatives**: all functions expect inputs to be in the + * range [0, \c N - 1] and guarantee outputs in the range [0, \c N - 1]. + * Residues are set up with an associated modulus, and operations are only + * guaranteed to work if the modulus is associated with all residue + * parameters. If a residue is passed with a modulus other than the one it + * is associated with, then it may be out of range. If an input is out of + * range, outputs are fully unspecified, though bignum values out of range + * should not cause buffer overflows (beware that this is not extensively + * tested). + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_H +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_H + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#endif + +/** How residues associated with a modulus are represented. + * + * This also determines which fields of the modulus structure are valid and + * what their contents are (see #mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus). + */ +typedef enum { + /** Representation not chosen (makes the modulus structure invalid). */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_INVALID = 0, + /* Skip 1 as it is slightly easier to accidentally pass to functions. */ + /** Montgomery representation. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY = 2, + /* Optimised reduction available. This indicates a coordinate modulus (P) + * and one or more of the following have been configured: + * - A nist curve (MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECPXXXR1_ENABLED) & MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM. + * - A Kobliz Curve. + * - A Fast Reduction Curve CURVE25519 or CURVE448. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED, +} mbedtls_mpi_mod_rep_selector; + +/* Make mbedtls_mpi_mod_rep_selector and mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep disjoint to + * make it easier to catch when they are accidentally swapped. */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_INVALID = 0, + MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE = 8, + MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE +} mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep; + +typedef struct { + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; + size_t limbs; +} mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue; + +typedef struct { + mbedtls_mpi_uint const *rr; /* The residue for 2^{2*n*biL} mod N */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm; /* Montgomery const for -N^{-1} mod 2^{ciL} */ +} mbedtls_mpi_mont_struct; + +typedef int (*mbedtls_mpi_modp_fn)(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); + +typedef struct { + mbedtls_mpi_modp_fn modp; /* The optimised reduction function pointer */ +} mbedtls_mpi_opt_red_struct; + +typedef struct { + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; + size_t limbs; // number of limbs + size_t bits; // bitlen of p + mbedtls_mpi_mod_rep_selector int_rep; // selector to signal the active member of the union + union rep { + /* if int_rep == #MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY */ + mbedtls_mpi_mont_struct mont; + /* if int_rep == #MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED */ + mbedtls_mpi_opt_red_struct ored; + } rep; +} mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus; + +/** Setup a residue structure. + * + * The residue will be set up with the buffer \p p and modulus \p N. + * + * The memory pointed to by \p p will be used by the resulting residue structure. + * The value at the pointed-to memory will be the initial value of \p r and must + * hold a value that is less than the modulus. This value will be used as-is + * and interpreted according to the value of the `N->int_rep` field. + * + * The modulus \p N will be the modulus associated with \p r. The residue \p r + * should only be used in operations where the modulus is \p N. + * + * \param[out] r The address of the residue to setup. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus related to \p r. + * \param[in] p The address of the limb array containing the value of \p r. + * The memory pointed to by \p p will be used by \p r and must + * not be modified in any way until after + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_release() is called. The data + * pointed to by \p p must be less than the modulus (the value + * pointed to by `N->p`) and already in the representation + * indicated by `N->int_rep`. + * \param p_limbs The number of limbs of \p p. Must be the same as the number + * of limbs in the modulus \p N. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p p_limbs is less than the + * limbs in \p N or if \p p is not less than \p N. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, + size_t p_limbs); + +/** Unbind elements of a residue structure. + * + * This function removes the reference to the limb array that was passed to + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup() to make it safe to free or use again. + * + * This function invalidates \p r and it must not be used until after + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup() is called on it again. + * + * \param[out] r The address of residue to release. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_release(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r); + +/** Initialize a modulus structure. + * + * \param[out] N The address of the modulus structure to initialize. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_init(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** Setup a modulus structure. + * + * \param[out] N The address of the modulus structure to populate. + * \param[in] p The address of the limb array storing the value of \p N. + * The memory pointed to by \p p will be used by \p N and must + * not be modified in any way until after + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free() is called. + * \param p_limbs The number of limbs of \p p. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, + size_t p_limbs); + +/** Setup an optimised-reduction compatible modulus structure. + * + * \param[out] N The address of the modulus structure to populate. + * \param[in] p The address of the limb array storing the value of \p N. + * The memory pointed to by \p p will be used by \p N and must + * not be modified in any way until after + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free() is called. + * \param p_limbs The number of limbs of \p p. + * \param modp A pointer to the optimised reduction function to use. \p p. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_optred_modulus_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, + size_t p_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_modp_fn modp); + +/** Free elements of a modulus structure. + * + * This function frees any memory allocated by mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup(). + * + * \warning This function does not free the limb array passed to + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup() only removes the reference to it, + * making it safe to free or to use it again. + * + * \param[in,out] N The address of the modulus structure to free. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** \brief Multiply two residues, returning the residue modulo the specified + * modulus. + * + * \note Currently handles the case when `N->int_rep` is + * MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY. + * + * The size of the operation is determined by \p N. \p A, \p B and \p X must + * all be associated with the modulus \p N and must all have the same number + * of limbs as \p N. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap + * either otherwise. They may not alias \p N (since they must be in canonical + * form, they cannot == \p N). + * + * \param[out] X The address of the result MPI. Must have the same + * number of limbs as \p N. + * On successful completion, \p X contains the result of + * the multiplication `A * B * R^-1` mod N where + * `R = 2^(biL * N->limbs)`. + * \param[in] A The address of the first MPI. + * \param[in] B The address of the second MPI. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus. Used to perform a modulo + * operation on the result of the multiplication. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if all the parameters do not + * have the same number of limbs or \p N is invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_mul(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** + * \brief Perform a fixed-size modular subtraction. + * + * Calculate `A - B modulo N`. + * + * \p A, \p B and \p X must all have the same number of limbs as \p N. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap + * either otherwise. + * + * \note This function does not check that \p A or \p B are in canonical + * form (that is, are < \p N) - that will have been done by + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup(). + * + * \param[out] X The address of the result MPI. Must be initialized. + * Must have the same number of limbs as the modulus \p N. + * \param[in] A The address of the first MPI. + * \param[in] B The address of the second MPI. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus. Used to perform a modulo + * operation on the result of the subtraction. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the given MPIs do not + * have the correct number of limbs. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_sub(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** + * \brief Perform modular inversion of an MPI with respect to a modulus \p N. + * + * \p A and \p X must be associated with the modulus \p N and will therefore + * have the same number of limbs as \p N. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A. + * + * \warning Currently only supports prime moduli, but does not check for them. + * + * \param[out] X The modular inverse of \p A with respect to \p N. + * \param[in] A The number to calculate the modular inverse of. + * Must not be 0. + * \param[in] N The modulus to use. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p A and \p N do not + * have the same number of limbs. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p A is zero. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if couldn't allocate enough + * memory (needed for conversion to and from Mongtomery form + * when not in Montgomery form already, and for temporary use + * by the inversion calculation itself). + */ + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_inv(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); +/** + * \brief Perform a fixed-size modular addition. + * + * Calculate `A + B modulo N`. + * + * \p A, \p B and \p X must all be associated with the modulus \p N and must + * all have the same number of limbs as \p N. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap + * either otherwise. + * + * \note This function does not check that \p A or \p B are in canonical + * form (that is, are < \p N) - that will have been done by + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup(). + * + * \param[out] X The address of the result residue. Must be initialized. + * Must have the same number of limbs as the modulus \p N. + * \param[in] A The address of the first input residue. + * \param[in] B The address of the second input residue. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus. Used to perform a modulo + * operation on the result of the addition. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the given MPIs do not + * have the correct number of limbs. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_add(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** Generate a random number uniformly in a range. + * + * This function generates a random number between \p min inclusive and + * \p N exclusive. + * + * The procedure complies with RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA) + * when the RNG is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG + * and \p min is \c 1. + * + * \note There are `N - min` possible outputs. The lower bound + * \p min can be reached, but the upper bound \p N cannot. + * + * \param X The destination residue. + * \param min The minimum value to return. It must be strictly smaller + * than \b N. + * \param N The modulus. + * This is the upper bound of the output range, exclusive. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if the implementation was + * unable to find a suitable value within a limited number + * of attempts. This has a negligible probability if \p N + * is significantly larger than \p min, which is the case + * for all usual cryptographic applications. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_random(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + mbedtls_mpi_uint min, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng); + +/** Read a residue from a byte buffer. + * + * The residue will be automatically converted to the internal representation + * based on the value of the `N->int_rep` field. + * + * The modulus \p N will be the modulus associated with \p r. The residue \p r + * should only be used in operations where the modulus is \p N or a modulus + * equivalent to \p N (in the sense that all their fields or memory pointed by + * their fields hold the same value). + * + * \param[out] r The address of the residue. It must have exactly the same + * number of limbs as the modulus \p N. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus. + * \param[in] buf The input buffer to import from. + * \param buflen The length in bytes of \p buf. + * \param ext_rep The endianness of the number in the input buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p r isn't + * large enough to hold the value in \p buf. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p ext_rep + * is invalid or the value in the buffer is not less than \p N. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_read(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep); + +/** Write a residue into a byte buffer. + * + * The modulus \p N must be the modulus associated with \p r (see + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup() and mbedtls_mpi_mod_read()). + * + * The residue will be automatically converted from the internal representation + * based on the value of `N->int_rep` field. + * + * \warning If the buffer is smaller than `N->bits`, the number of + * leading zeroes is leaked through timing. If \p r is + * secret, the caller must ensure that \p buflen is at least + * (`N->bits`+7)/8. + * + * \param[in] r The address of the residue. It must have the same number of + * limbs as the modulus \p N. (\p r is an input parameter, but + * its value will be modified during execution and restored + * before the function returns.) + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus associated with \p r. + * \param[out] buf The output buffer to export to. + * \param buflen The length in bytes of \p buf. + * \param ext_rep The endianness in which the number should be written into + * the output buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf isn't + * large enough to hold the value of \p r (without leading + * zeroes). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p ext_rep is invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if couldn't allocate enough + * memory for conversion. Can occur only for moduli with + * MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_write(const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5343bc650d --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw.c @@ -0,0 +1,276 @@ +/* + * Low-level modular bignum functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT) + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "bignum_core.h" +#include "bignum_mod_raw.h" +#include "bignum_mod.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" + +#include "bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h" + +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_cond_assign(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + unsigned char assign) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(X, A, N->limbs, mbedtls_ct_bool(assign)); +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_cond_swap(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *Y, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + unsigned char swap) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_swap(X, Y, N->limbs, mbedtls_ct_bool(swap)); +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_read(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t input_length, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + switch (ext_rep) { + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE: + ret = mbedtls_mpi_core_read_le(X, N->limbs, + input, input_length); + break; + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE: + ret = mbedtls_mpi_core_read_be(X, N->limbs, + input, input_length); + break; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if (!mbedtls_mpi_core_lt_ct(X, N->p, N->limbs)) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_write(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_length, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep) +{ + switch (ext_rep) { + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE: + return mbedtls_mpi_core_write_le(A, N->limbs, + output, output_length); + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE: + return mbedtls_mpi_core_write_be(A, N->limbs, + output, output_length); + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_sub(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(X, A, B, N->limbs); + + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add_if(X, N->p, N->limbs, (unsigned) c); +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_fix_quasi_reduction(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(X, X, N->p, N->limbs); + + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add_if(X, N->p, N->limbs, (unsigned) c); +} + + +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_mul(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T) +{ + /* Standard (A * B) multiplication stored into pre-allocated T + * buffer of fixed limb size of (2N + 1). + * + * The space may not not fully filled by when + * MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED is used. */ + const size_t T_limbs = BITS_TO_LIMBS(N->bits) * 2; + switch (N->int_rep) { + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY: + mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(X, A, B, N->limbs, N->p, N->limbs, + N->rep.mont.mm, T); + break; + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED: + mbedtls_mpi_core_mul(T, A, N->limbs, B, N->limbs); + + /* Optimised Reduction */ + (*N->rep.ored.modp)(T, T_limbs); + + /* Convert back to canonical representation */ + mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_fix_quasi_reduction(T, N); + memcpy(X, T, N->limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); + break; + default: + break; + } + +} + +size_t mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime_working_limbs(size_t AN_limbs) +{ + /* mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime() needs a temporary for the exponent, + * which will be the same size as the modulus and input (AN_limbs), + * and additional space to pass to mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(). */ + return AN_limbs + + mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_working_limbs(AN_limbs, AN_limbs); +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t AN_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T) +{ + /* Inversion by power: g^|G| = 1 => g^(-1) = g^(|G|-1), and + * |G| = N - 1, so we want + * g^(|G|-1) = g^(N - 2) + */ + + /* Use the first AN_limbs of T to hold N - 2 */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *Nminus2 = T; + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_sub_int(Nminus2, N, 2, AN_limbs); + + /* Rest of T is given to exp_mod for its working space */ + mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(X, + A, N, AN_limbs, Nminus2, AN_limbs, + RR, T + AN_limbs); +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_add(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint carry, borrow; + carry = mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, A, B, N->limbs); + borrow = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(X, X, N->p, N->limbs); + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add_if(X, N->p, N->limbs, (unsigned) (carry ^ borrow)); +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_canonical_to_modulus_rep( + mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + switch (N->int_rep) { + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY: + return mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_to_mont_rep(X, N); + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED: + return 0; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_modulus_to_canonical_rep( + mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + switch (N->int_rep) { + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY: + return mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_from_mont_rep(X, N); + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED: + return 0; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_random(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + mbedtls_mpi_uint min, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = mbedtls_mpi_core_random(X, min, N->p, N->limbs, f_rng, p_rng); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + return mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_canonical_to_modulus_rep(X, N); +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_to_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T; + const size_t t_limbs = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(N->limbs); + + if ((T = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) mbedtls_calloc(t_limbs, ciL)) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(X, X, N->p, N->limbs, + N->rep.mont.mm, N->rep.mont.rr, T); + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(T, t_limbs * ciL); + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_from_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + const size_t t_limbs = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(N->limbs); + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T; + + if ((T = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) mbedtls_calloc(t_limbs, ciL)) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_core_from_mont_rep(X, X, N->p, N->limbs, N->rep.mont.mm, T); + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(T, t_limbs * ciL); + return 0; +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_neg(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(X, N->p, A, N->limbs); + + /* If A=0 initially, then X=N now. Detect this by + * subtracting N and catching the carry. */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint borrow = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(X, X, N->p, N->limbs); + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add_if(X, N->p, N->limbs, (unsigned) borrow); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7bb4ca3cf5 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw.h @@ -0,0 +1,416 @@ +/** + * Low-level modular bignum functions + * + * This interface should only be used by the higher-level modular bignum + * module (bignum_mod.c) and the ECP module (ecp.c, ecp_curves.c). All other + * modules should use the high-level modular bignum interface (bignum_mod.h) + * or the legacy bignum interface (bignum.h). + * + * This is a low-level interface to operations on integers modulo which + * has no protection against passing invalid arguments such as arrays of + * the wrong size. The functions in bignum_mod.h provide a higher-level + * interface that includes protections against accidental misuse, at the + * expense of code size and sometimes more cumbersome memory management. + * + * The functions in this module obey the following conventions unless + * explicitly indicated otherwise: + * - **Modulus parameters**: the modulus is passed as a pointer to a structure + * of type #mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus. The structure must be set up with an + * array of limbs storing the bignum value of the modulus. The modulus must + * be odd and is assumed to have no leading zeroes. The modulus is usually + * named \c N and is usually input-only. + * - **Bignum parameters**: Bignums are passed as pointers to an array of + * limbs. A limb has the type #mbedtls_mpi_uint. Unless otherwise specified: + * - Bignum parameters called \c A, \c B, ... are inputs, and are not + * modified by the function. + * - Bignum parameters called \c X, \c Y are outputs or input-output. + * The initial content of output-only parameters is ignored. + * - \c T is a temporary storage area. The initial content of such a + * parameter is ignored and the final content is unspecified. + * - **Bignum sizes**: bignum sizes are usually expressed by the \c limbs + * member of the modulus argument. All bignum parameters must have the same + * number of limbs as the modulus. All bignum sizes must be at least 1 and + * must be significantly less than #SIZE_MAX. The behavior if a size is 0 is + * undefined. + * - **Bignum representation**: the representation of inputs and outputs is + * specified by the \c int_rep field of the modulus for arithmetic + * functions. Utility functions may allow for different representation. + * - **Parameter ordering**: for bignum parameters, outputs come before inputs. + * The modulus is passed after other bignum input parameters. Temporaries + * come last. + * - **Aliasing**: in general, output bignums may be aliased to one or more + * inputs. Modulus values may not be aliased to any other parameter. Outputs + * may not be aliased to one another. Temporaries may not be aliased to any + * other parameter. + * - **Overlap**: apart from aliasing of limb array pointers (where two + * arguments are equal pointers), overlap is not supported and may result + * in undefined behavior. + * - **Error handling**: This is a low-level module. Functions generally do not + * try to protect against invalid arguments such as nonsensical sizes or + * null pointers. Note that passing bignums with a different size than the + * modulus may lead to buffer overflows. Some functions which allocate + * memory or handle reading/writing of bignums will return an error if + * memory allocation fails or if buffer sizes are invalid. + * - **Modular representatives**: all functions expect inputs to be in the + * range [0, \c N - 1] and guarantee outputs in the range [0, \c N - 1]. If + * an input is out of range, outputs are fully unspecified, though bignum + * values out of range should not cause buffer overflows (beware that this is + * not extensively tested). + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_RAW_H +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_RAW_H + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#endif + +#include "bignum_mod.h" + +/** + * \brief Perform a safe conditional copy of an MPI which doesn't reveal + * whether the assignment was done or not. + * + * The size to copy is determined by \p N. + * + * \param[out] X The address of the destination MPI. + * This must be initialized. Must have enough limbs to + * store the full value of \p A. + * \param[in] A The address of the source MPI. This must be initialized. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus related to \p X and \p A. + * \param assign The condition deciding whether to perform the + * assignment or not. Must be either 0 or 1: + * * \c 1: Perform the assignment `X = A`. + * * \c 0: Keep the original value of \p X. + * + * \note This function avoids leaking any information about whether + * the assignment was done or not. + * + * \warning If \p assign is neither 0 nor 1, the result of this function + * is indeterminate, and the resulting value in \p X might be + * neither its original value nor the value in \p A. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_cond_assign(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + unsigned char assign); + +/** + * \brief Perform a safe conditional swap of two MPIs which doesn't reveal + * whether the swap was done or not. + * + * The size to swap is determined by \p N. + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the first MPI. This must be initialized. + * \param[in,out] Y The address of the second MPI. This must be initialized. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus related to \p X and \p Y. + * \param swap The condition deciding whether to perform + * the swap or not. Must be either 0 or 1: + * * \c 1: Swap the values of \p X and \p Y. + * * \c 0: Keep the original values of \p X and \p Y. + * + * \note This function avoids leaking any information about whether + * the swap was done or not. + * + * \warning If \p swap is neither 0 nor 1, the result of this function + * is indeterminate, and both \p X and \p Y might end up with + * values different to either of the original ones. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_cond_swap(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *Y, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + unsigned char swap); + +/** Import X from unsigned binary data. + * + * The MPI needs to have enough limbs to store the full value (including any + * most significant zero bytes in the input). + * + * \param[out] X The address of the MPI. The size is determined by \p N. + * (In particular, it must have at least as many limbs as + * the modulus \p N.) + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus related to \p X. + * \param[in] input The input buffer to import from. + * \param input_length The length in bytes of \p input. + * \param ext_rep The endianness of the number in the input buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p X isn't + * large enough to hold the value in \p input. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the external representation + * of \p N is invalid or \p X is not less than \p N. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_read(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t input_length, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep); + +/** Export A into unsigned binary data. + * + * \param[in] A The address of the MPI. The size is determined by \p N. + * (In particular, it must have at least as many limbs as + * the modulus \p N.) + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus related to \p A. + * \param[out] output The output buffer to export to. + * \param output_length The length in bytes of \p output. + * \param ext_rep The endianness in which the number should be written into the output buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p output isn't + * large enough to hold the value of \p A. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the external representation + * of \p N is invalid. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_write(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_length, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep); + +/** \brief Subtract two MPIs, returning the residue modulo the specified + * modulus. + * + * The size of the operation is determined by \p N. \p A and \p B must have + * the same number of limbs as \p N. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap + * either otherwise. + * + * \param[out] X The address of the result MPI. + * This must be initialized. Must have enough limbs to + * store the full value of the result. + * \param[in] A The address of the first MPI. This must be initialized. + * \param[in] B The address of the second MPI. This must be initialized. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus. Used to perform a modulo + * operation on the result of the subtraction. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_sub(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** \brief Multiply two MPIs, returning the residue modulo the specified + * modulus. + * + * \note Currently handles the case when `N->int_rep` is + * MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY. + * + * The size of the operation is determined by \p N. \p A, \p B and \p X must + * all be associated with the modulus \p N and must all have the same number + * of limbs as \p N. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap + * either otherwise. They may not alias \p N (since they must be in canonical + * form, they cannot == \p N). + * + * \param[out] X The address of the result MPI. Must have the same + * number of limbs as \p N. + * On successful completion, \p X contains the result of + * the multiplication `A * B * R^-1` mod N where + * `R = 2^(biL * N->limbs)`. + * \param[in] A The address of the first MPI. + * \param[in] B The address of the second MPI. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus. Used to perform a modulo + * operation on the result of the multiplication. + * \param[in,out] T Temporary storage of size at least 2 * N->limbs + 1 + * limbs. Its initial content is unused and + * its final content is indeterminate. + * It must not alias or otherwise overlap any of the + * other parameters. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_mul(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T); + +/** + * \brief Returns the number of limbs of working memory required for + * a call to `mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime()`. + * + * \note This will always be at least + * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(AN_limbs)`, + * i.e. sufficient for a call to `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul()`. + * + * \param AN_limbs The number of limbs in the input `A` and the modulus `N` + * (they must be the same size) that will be given to + * `mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime()`. + * + * \return The number of limbs of working memory required by + * `mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime()`. + */ +size_t mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime_working_limbs(size_t AN_limbs); + +/** + * \brief Perform fixed-width modular inversion of a Montgomery-form MPI with + * respect to a modulus \p N that must be prime. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A, but not to \p N or \p RR. + * + * \param[out] X The modular inverse of \p A with respect to \p N. + * Will be in Montgomery form. + * \param[in] A The number to calculate the modular inverse of. + * Must be in Montgomery form. Must not be 0. + * \param[in] N The modulus, as a little-endian array of length \p AN_limbs. + * Must be prime. + * \param AN_limbs The number of limbs in \p A, \p N and \p RR. + * \param[in] RR The precomputed residue of 2^{2*biL} modulo N, as a little- + * endian array of length \p AN_limbs. + * \param[in,out] T Temporary storage of at least the number of limbs returned + * by `mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime_working_limbs()`. + * Its initial content is unused and its final content is + * indeterminate. + * It must not alias or otherwise overlap any of the other + * parameters. + * It is up to the caller to zeroize \p T when it is no + * longer needed, and before freeing it if it was dynamically + * allocated. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t AN_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T); + +/** + * \brief Perform a known-size modular addition. + * + * Calculate `A + B modulo N`. + * + * The number of limbs in each operand, and the result, is given by the + * modulus \p N. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap + * either otherwise. + * + * \param[out] X The result of the modular addition. + * \param[in] A Little-endian presentation of the left operand. This + * must be smaller than \p N. + * \param[in] B Little-endian presentation of the right operand. This + * must be smaller than \p N. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_add(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** Convert an MPI from canonical representation (little-endian limb array) + * to the representation associated with the modulus. + * + * \param[in,out] X The limb array to convert. + * It must have as many limbs as \p N. + * It is converted in place. + * If this function returns an error, the content of \p X + * is unspecified. + * \param[in] N The modulus structure. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * Otherwise an \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_xxx error code. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_canonical_to_modulus_rep( + mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** Convert an MPI from the representation associated with the modulus + * to canonical representation (little-endian limb array). + * + * \param[in,out] X The limb array to convert. + * It must have as many limbs as \p N. + * It is converted in place. + * If this function returns an error, the content of \p X + * is unspecified. + * \param[in] N The modulus structure. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * Otherwise an \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_xxx error code. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_modulus_to_canonical_rep( + mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** Generate a random number uniformly in a range. + * + * This function generates a random number between \p min inclusive and + * \p N exclusive. + * + * The procedure complies with RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA) + * when the RNG is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG + * and \p min is \c 1. + * + * \note There are `N - min` possible outputs. The lower bound + * \p min can be reached, but the upper bound \p N cannot. + * + * \param X The destination MPI, in canonical representation modulo \p N. + * It must not be aliased with \p N or otherwise overlap it. + * \param min The minimum value to return. It must be strictly smaller + * than \b N. + * \param N The modulus. + * This is the upper bound of the output range, exclusive. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if the implementation was + * unable to find a suitable value within a limited number + * of attempts. This has a negligible probability if \p N + * is significantly larger than \p min, which is the case + * for all usual cryptographic applications. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_random(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + mbedtls_mpi_uint min, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng); + +/** Convert an MPI into Montgomery form. + * + * \param X The address of the MPI. + * Must have the same number of limbs as \p N. + * \param N The address of the modulus, which gives the size of + * the base `R` = 2^(biL*N->limbs). + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_to_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** Convert an MPI back from Montgomery representation. + * + * \param X The address of the MPI. + * Must have the same number of limbs as \p N. + * \param N The address of the modulus, which gives the size of + * the base `R`= 2^(biL*N->limbs). + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_from_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** \brief Perform fixed width modular negation. + * + * The size of the operation is determined by \p N. \p A must have + * the same number of limbs as \p N. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A. + * + * \param[out] X The result of the modular negation. + * This must be initialized. + * \param[in] A Little-endian presentation of the input operand. This + * must be less than or equal to \p N. + * \param[in] N The modulus to use. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_neg(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_RAW_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..94a0d06cf0 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +/** + * \file bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h + * + * \brief Function declarations for invasive functions of Low-level + * modular bignum. + */ +/** + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_RAW_INVASIVE_H +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_RAW_INVASIVE_H + +#include "common.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "bignum_mod.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + +/** Convert the result of a quasi-reduction to its canonical representative. + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. Must have the + * same number of limbs as \p N. The input value must + * be in range 0 <= X < 2N. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_fix_quasi_reduction(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_RAW_INVASIVE_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/block_cipher.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/block_cipher.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..04cd7fb444 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/block_cipher.c @@ -0,0 +1,203 @@ +/** + * \file block_cipher.c + * + * \brief Lightweight abstraction layer for block ciphers with 128 bit blocks, + * for use by the GCM and CCM modules. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#endif + +#include "block_cipher_internal.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) +static psa_key_type_t psa_key_type_from_block_cipher_id(mbedtls_block_cipher_id_t cipher_id) +{ + switch (cipher_id) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_AES_VIA_PSA) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES: + return PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ARIA_VIA_PSA) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA: + return PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_VIA_PSA) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA: + return PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; +#endif + default: + return PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE; + } +} + +static int mbedtls_cipher_error_from_psa(psa_status_t status) +{ + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR_LIST(status, psa_to_cipher_errors, + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA */ + +void mbedtls_block_cipher_free(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) + if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_PSA) { + psa_destroy_key(ctx->psa_key_id); + return; + } +#endif + switch (ctx->id) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES: + mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx->ctx.aes); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA: + mbedtls_aria_free(&ctx->ctx.aria); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA: + mbedtls_camellia_free(&ctx->ctx.camellia); + break; +#endif + default: + break; + } + ctx->id = MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_NONE; +} + +int mbedtls_block_cipher_setup(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id) +{ + ctx->id = (cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES) ? MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES : + (cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA) ? MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA : + (cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA) ? MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA : + MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_NONE; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) + psa_key_type_t psa_key_type = psa_key_type_from_block_cipher_id(ctx->id); + if (psa_key_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE && + psa_can_do_cipher(psa_key_type, PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING)) { + ctx->engine = MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_PSA; + return 0; + } + ctx->engine = MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_LEGACY; +#endif + + switch (ctx->id) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES: + mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx->ctx.aes); + return 0; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA: + mbedtls_aria_init(&ctx->ctx.aria); + return 0; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA: + mbedtls_camellia_init(&ctx->ctx.camellia); + return 0; +#endif + default: + ctx->id = MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_NONE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +} + +int mbedtls_block_cipher_setkey(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned key_bitlen) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) + if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_PSA) { + psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + + psa_set_key_type(&key_attr, psa_key_type_from_block_cipher_id(ctx->id)); + psa_set_key_bits(&key_attr, key_bitlen); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attr, PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT); + + status = psa_import_key(&key_attr, key, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bitlen), &ctx->psa_key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return mbedtls_cipher_error_from_psa(status); + } + psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attr); + + return 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA */ + + switch (ctx->id) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES: + return mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx->ctx.aes, key, key_bitlen); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA: + return mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(&ctx->ctx.aria, key, key_bitlen); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA: + return mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc(&ctx->ctx.camellia, key, key_bitlen); +#endif + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT; + } +} + +int mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16]) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) + if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_PSA) { + psa_status_t status; + size_t olen; + + status = psa_cipher_encrypt(ctx->psa_key_id, PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING, + input, 16, output, 16, &olen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return mbedtls_cipher_error_from_psa(status); + } + return 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA */ + + switch (ctx->id) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES: + return mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx->ctx.aes, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + input, output); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA: + return mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(&ctx->ctx.aria, input, output); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA: + return mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb(&ctx->ctx.camellia, + MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT, + input, output); +#endif + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT; + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/block_cipher_internal.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/block_cipher_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c57338b751 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/block_cipher_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +/** + * \file block_cipher_internal.h + * + * \brief Lightweight abstraction layer for block ciphers with 128 bit blocks, + * for use by the GCM and CCM modules. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_INTERNAL_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +#include "mbedtls/block_cipher.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Initialize the context. + * This must be the first API call before using the context. + * + * \param ctx The context to initialize. + */ +static inline void mbedtls_block_cipher_init(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); +} + +/** + * \brief Set the block cipher to use with this context. + * This must be called after mbedtls_block_cipher_init(). + * + * \param ctx The context to set up. + * \param cipher_id The identifier of the cipher to use. + * This must be either AES, ARIA or Camellia. + * Warning: this is a ::mbedtls_cipher_id_t, + * not a ::mbedtls_block_cipher_id_t! + * + * \retval \c 0 on success. + * \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p cipher_id was + * invalid. + */ +int mbedtls_block_cipher_setup(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id); + +/** + * \brief Set the key into the context. + * + * \param ctx The context to configure. + * \param key The buffer holding the key material. + * \param key_bitlen The size of the key in bits. + * + * \retval \c 0 on success. + * \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT if the context was not + * properly set up before calling this function. + * \retval One of #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p key_bitlen is + * invalid. + */ +int mbedtls_block_cipher_setkey(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned key_bitlen); + +/** + * \brief Encrypt one block (16 bytes) with the configured key. + * + * \param ctx The context holding the key. + * \param input The buffer holding the input block. Must be 16 bytes. + * \param output The buffer to which the output block will be written. + * Must be writable and 16 bytes long. + * This must either not overlap with \p input, or be equal. + * + * \retval \c 0 on success. + * \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT if the context was not + * properly set up before calling this function. + * \retval Another negative value if encryption failed. + */ +int mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16]); +/** + * \brief Clear the context. + * + * \param ctx The context to clear. + */ +void mbedtls_block_cipher_free(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/blowfish.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/blowfish.c deleted file mode 100644 index f56bb65bfd..0000000000 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/blowfish.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,656 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Blowfish implementation - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ -/* - * The Blowfish block cipher was designed by Bruce Schneier in 1993. - * http://www.schneier.com/blowfish.html - * http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blowfish_%28cipher%29 - * - */ - -#include "common.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) - -#include "mbedtls/blowfish.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" - -#include - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT) - -/* Parameter validation macros */ -#define BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define BLOWFISH_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - -static const uint32_t P[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2] = { - 0x243F6A88L, 0x85A308D3L, 0x13198A2EL, 0x03707344L, - 0xA4093822L, 0x299F31D0L, 0x082EFA98L, 0xEC4E6C89L, - 0x452821E6L, 0x38D01377L, 0xBE5466CFL, 0x34E90C6CL, - 0xC0AC29B7L, 0xC97C50DDL, 0x3F84D5B5L, 0xB5470917L, - 0x9216D5D9L, 0x8979FB1BL -}; - -/* declarations of data at the end of this file */ -static const uint32_t S[4][256]; - -static uint32_t F(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, uint32_t x) -{ - unsigned short a, b, c, d; - uint32_t y; - - d = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(x); - x >>= 8; - c = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(x); - x >>= 8; - b = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(x); - x >>= 8; - a = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(x); - y = ctx->S[0][a] + ctx->S[1][b]; - y = y ^ ctx->S[2][c]; - y = y + ctx->S[3][d]; - - return y; -} - -static void blowfish_enc(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, uint32_t *xl, uint32_t *xr) -{ - uint32_t Xl, Xr, temp; - short i; - - Xl = *xl; - Xr = *xr; - - for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS; ++i) { - Xl = Xl ^ ctx->P[i]; - Xr = F(ctx, Xl) ^ Xr; - - temp = Xl; - Xl = Xr; - Xr = temp; - } - - temp = Xl; - Xl = Xr; - Xr = temp; - - Xr = Xr ^ ctx->P[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS]; - Xl = Xl ^ ctx->P[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 1]; - - *xl = Xl; - *xr = Xr; -} - -static void blowfish_dec(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, uint32_t *xl, uint32_t *xr) -{ - uint32_t Xl, Xr, temp; - short i; - - Xl = *xl; - Xr = *xr; - - for (i = MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 1; i > 1; --i) { - Xl = Xl ^ ctx->P[i]; - Xr = F(ctx, Xl) ^ Xr; - - temp = Xl; - Xl = Xr; - Xr = temp; - } - - temp = Xl; - Xl = Xr; - Xr = temp; - - Xr = Xr ^ ctx->P[1]; - Xl = Xl ^ ctx->P[0]; - - *xl = Xl; - *xr = Xr; -} - -void mbedtls_blowfish_init(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx) -{ - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_blowfish_context)); -} - -void mbedtls_blowfish_free(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx) -{ - if (ctx == NULL) { - return; - } - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_blowfish_context)); -} - -/* - * Blowfish key schedule - */ -int mbedtls_blowfish_setkey(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int keybits) -{ - unsigned int i, j, k; - uint32_t data, datal, datar; - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - - if (keybits < MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MIN_KEY_BITS || - keybits > MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_MAX_KEY_BITS || - keybits % 8 != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - keybits >>= 3; - - for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { - for (j = 0; j < 256; j++) { - ctx->S[i][j] = S[i][j]; - } - } - - j = 0; - for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2; ++i) { - data = 0x00000000; - for (k = 0; k < 4; ++k) { - data = (data << 8) | key[j++]; - if (j >= keybits) { - j = 0; - } - } - ctx->P[i] = P[i] ^ data; - } - - datal = 0x00000000; - datar = 0x00000000; - - for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2; i += 2) { - blowfish_enc(ctx, &datal, &datar); - ctx->P[i] = datal; - ctx->P[i + 1] = datar; - } - - for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { - for (j = 0; j < 256; j += 2) { - blowfish_enc(ctx, &datal, &datar); - ctx->S[i][j] = datal; - ctx->S[i][j + 1] = datar; - } - } - return 0; -} - -/* - * Blowfish-ECB block encryption/decryption - */ -int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, - int mode, - const unsigned char input[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], - unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE]) -{ - uint32_t X0, X1; - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - - X0 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(input, 0); - X1 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(input, 4); - - if (mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT) { - blowfish_dec(ctx, &X0, &X1); - } else { /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT */ - blowfish_enc(ctx, &X0, &X1); - } - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(X0, output, 0); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(X1, output, 4); - - return 0; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -/* - * Blowfish-CBC buffer encryption/decryption - */ -int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, - int mode, - size_t length, - unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output) -{ - int i; - unsigned char temp[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE]; - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); - - if (length % MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH; - } - - if (mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT) { - while (length > 0) { - memcpy(temp, input, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE); - mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb(ctx, mode, input, output); - - for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; i++) { - output[i] = (unsigned char) (output[i] ^ iv[i]); - } - - memcpy(iv, temp, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE); - - input += MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; - output += MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; - length -= MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; - } - } else { - while (length > 0) { - for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; i++) { - output[i] = (unsigned char) (input[i] ^ iv[i]); - } - - mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb(ctx, mode, output, output); - memcpy(iv, output, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE); - - input += MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; - output += MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; - length -= MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; - } - } - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) -/* - * Blowfish CFB buffer encryption/decryption - */ -int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, - int mode, - size_t length, - size_t *iv_off, - unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output) -{ - int c; - size_t n; - - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(iv_off != NULL); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); - - n = *iv_off; - if (n >= 8) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - if (mode == MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_DECRYPT) { - while (length--) { - if (n == 0) { - mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb(ctx, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT, iv, iv); - } - - c = *input++; - *output++ = (unsigned char) (c ^ iv[n]); - iv[n] = (unsigned char) c; - - n = (n + 1) % MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; - } - } else { - while (length--) { - if (n == 0) { - mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb(ctx, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT, iv, iv); - } - - iv[n] = *output++ = (unsigned char) (iv[n] ^ *input++); - - n = (n + 1) % MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; - } - } - - *iv_off = n; - - return 0; -} -#endif /*MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) -/* - * Blowfish CTR buffer encryption/decryption - */ -int mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr(mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx, - size_t length, - size_t *nc_off, - unsigned char nonce_counter[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], - unsigned char stream_block[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE], - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output) -{ - int c, i; - size_t n; - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(nonce_counter != NULL); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(stream_block != NULL); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(nc_off != NULL); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - BLOWFISH_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); - - n = *nc_off; - if (n >= 8) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - while (length--) { - if (n == 0) { - mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb(ctx, MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ENCRYPT, nonce_counter, - stream_block); - - for (i = MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i--) { - if (++nonce_counter[i - 1] != 0) { - break; - } - } - } - c = *input++; - *output++ = (unsigned char) (c ^ stream_block[n]); - - n = (n + 1) % MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; - } - - *nc_off = n; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ - -static const uint32_t S[4][256] = { - { 0xD1310BA6L, 0x98DFB5ACL, 0x2FFD72DBL, 0xD01ADFB7L, - 0xB8E1AFEDL, 0x6A267E96L, 0xBA7C9045L, 0xF12C7F99L, - 0x24A19947L, 0xB3916CF7L, 0x0801F2E2L, 0x858EFC16L, - 0x636920D8L, 0x71574E69L, 0xA458FEA3L, 0xF4933D7EL, - 0x0D95748FL, 0x728EB658L, 0x718BCD58L, 0x82154AEEL, - 0x7B54A41DL, 0xC25A59B5L, 0x9C30D539L, 0x2AF26013L, - 0xC5D1B023L, 0x286085F0L, 0xCA417918L, 0xB8DB38EFL, - 0x8E79DCB0L, 0x603A180EL, 0x6C9E0E8BL, 0xB01E8A3EL, - 0xD71577C1L, 0xBD314B27L, 0x78AF2FDAL, 0x55605C60L, - 0xE65525F3L, 0xAA55AB94L, 0x57489862L, 0x63E81440L, - 0x55CA396AL, 0x2AAB10B6L, 0xB4CC5C34L, 0x1141E8CEL, - 0xA15486AFL, 0x7C72E993L, 0xB3EE1411L, 0x636FBC2AL, - 0x2BA9C55DL, 0x741831F6L, 0xCE5C3E16L, 0x9B87931EL, - 0xAFD6BA33L, 0x6C24CF5CL, 0x7A325381L, 0x28958677L, - 0x3B8F4898L, 0x6B4BB9AFL, 0xC4BFE81BL, 0x66282193L, - 0x61D809CCL, 0xFB21A991L, 0x487CAC60L, 0x5DEC8032L, - 0xEF845D5DL, 0xE98575B1L, 0xDC262302L, 0xEB651B88L, - 0x23893E81L, 0xD396ACC5L, 0x0F6D6FF3L, 0x83F44239L, - 0x2E0B4482L, 0xA4842004L, 0x69C8F04AL, 0x9E1F9B5EL, - 0x21C66842L, 0xF6E96C9AL, 0x670C9C61L, 0xABD388F0L, - 0x6A51A0D2L, 0xD8542F68L, 0x960FA728L, 0xAB5133A3L, - 0x6EEF0B6CL, 0x137A3BE4L, 0xBA3BF050L, 0x7EFB2A98L, - 0xA1F1651DL, 0x39AF0176L, 0x66CA593EL, 0x82430E88L, - 0x8CEE8619L, 0x456F9FB4L, 0x7D84A5C3L, 0x3B8B5EBEL, - 0xE06F75D8L, 0x85C12073L, 0x401A449FL, 0x56C16AA6L, - 0x4ED3AA62L, 0x363F7706L, 0x1BFEDF72L, 0x429B023DL, - 0x37D0D724L, 0xD00A1248L, 0xDB0FEAD3L, 0x49F1C09BL, - 0x075372C9L, 0x80991B7BL, 0x25D479D8L, 0xF6E8DEF7L, - 0xE3FE501AL, 0xB6794C3BL, 0x976CE0BDL, 0x04C006BAL, - 0xC1A94FB6L, 0x409F60C4L, 0x5E5C9EC2L, 0x196A2463L, - 0x68FB6FAFL, 0x3E6C53B5L, 0x1339B2EBL, 0x3B52EC6FL, - 0x6DFC511FL, 0x9B30952CL, 0xCC814544L, 0xAF5EBD09L, - 0xBEE3D004L, 0xDE334AFDL, 0x660F2807L, 0x192E4BB3L, - 0xC0CBA857L, 0x45C8740FL, 0xD20B5F39L, 0xB9D3FBDBL, - 0x5579C0BDL, 0x1A60320AL, 0xD6A100C6L, 0x402C7279L, - 0x679F25FEL, 0xFB1FA3CCL, 0x8EA5E9F8L, 0xDB3222F8L, - 0x3C7516DFL, 0xFD616B15L, 0x2F501EC8L, 0xAD0552ABL, - 0x323DB5FAL, 0xFD238760L, 0x53317B48L, 0x3E00DF82L, - 0x9E5C57BBL, 0xCA6F8CA0L, 0x1A87562EL, 0xDF1769DBL, - 0xD542A8F6L, 0x287EFFC3L, 0xAC6732C6L, 0x8C4F5573L, - 0x695B27B0L, 0xBBCA58C8L, 0xE1FFA35DL, 0xB8F011A0L, - 0x10FA3D98L, 0xFD2183B8L, 0x4AFCB56CL, 0x2DD1D35BL, - 0x9A53E479L, 0xB6F84565L, 0xD28E49BCL, 0x4BFB9790L, - 0xE1DDF2DAL, 0xA4CB7E33L, 0x62FB1341L, 0xCEE4C6E8L, - 0xEF20CADAL, 0x36774C01L, 0xD07E9EFEL, 0x2BF11FB4L, - 0x95DBDA4DL, 0xAE909198L, 0xEAAD8E71L, 0x6B93D5A0L, - 0xD08ED1D0L, 0xAFC725E0L, 0x8E3C5B2FL, 0x8E7594B7L, - 0x8FF6E2FBL, 0xF2122B64L, 0x8888B812L, 0x900DF01CL, - 0x4FAD5EA0L, 0x688FC31CL, 0xD1CFF191L, 0xB3A8C1ADL, - 0x2F2F2218L, 0xBE0E1777L, 0xEA752DFEL, 0x8B021FA1L, - 0xE5A0CC0FL, 0xB56F74E8L, 0x18ACF3D6L, 0xCE89E299L, - 0xB4A84FE0L, 0xFD13E0B7L, 0x7CC43B81L, 0xD2ADA8D9L, - 0x165FA266L, 0x80957705L, 0x93CC7314L, 0x211A1477L, - 0xE6AD2065L, 0x77B5FA86L, 0xC75442F5L, 0xFB9D35CFL, - 0xEBCDAF0CL, 0x7B3E89A0L, 0xD6411BD3L, 0xAE1E7E49L, - 0x00250E2DL, 0x2071B35EL, 0x226800BBL, 0x57B8E0AFL, - 0x2464369BL, 0xF009B91EL, 0x5563911DL, 0x59DFA6AAL, - 0x78C14389L, 0xD95A537FL, 0x207D5BA2L, 0x02E5B9C5L, - 0x83260376L, 0x6295CFA9L, 0x11C81968L, 0x4E734A41L, - 0xB3472DCAL, 0x7B14A94AL, 0x1B510052L, 0x9A532915L, - 0xD60F573FL, 0xBC9BC6E4L, 0x2B60A476L, 0x81E67400L, - 0x08BA6FB5L, 0x571BE91FL, 0xF296EC6BL, 0x2A0DD915L, - 0xB6636521L, 0xE7B9F9B6L, 0xFF34052EL, 0xC5855664L, - 0x53B02D5DL, 0xA99F8FA1L, 0x08BA4799L, 0x6E85076AL }, - { 0x4B7A70E9L, 0xB5B32944L, 0xDB75092EL, 0xC4192623L, - 0xAD6EA6B0L, 0x49A7DF7DL, 0x9CEE60B8L, 0x8FEDB266L, - 0xECAA8C71L, 0x699A17FFL, 0x5664526CL, 0xC2B19EE1L, - 0x193602A5L, 0x75094C29L, 0xA0591340L, 0xE4183A3EL, - 0x3F54989AL, 0x5B429D65L, 0x6B8FE4D6L, 0x99F73FD6L, - 0xA1D29C07L, 0xEFE830F5L, 0x4D2D38E6L, 0xF0255DC1L, - 0x4CDD2086L, 0x8470EB26L, 0x6382E9C6L, 0x021ECC5EL, - 0x09686B3FL, 0x3EBAEFC9L, 0x3C971814L, 0x6B6A70A1L, - 0x687F3584L, 0x52A0E286L, 0xB79C5305L, 0xAA500737L, - 0x3E07841CL, 0x7FDEAE5CL, 0x8E7D44ECL, 0x5716F2B8L, - 0xB03ADA37L, 0xF0500C0DL, 0xF01C1F04L, 0x0200B3FFL, - 0xAE0CF51AL, 0x3CB574B2L, 0x25837A58L, 0xDC0921BDL, - 0xD19113F9L, 0x7CA92FF6L, 0x94324773L, 0x22F54701L, - 0x3AE5E581L, 0x37C2DADCL, 0xC8B57634L, 0x9AF3DDA7L, - 0xA9446146L, 0x0FD0030EL, 0xECC8C73EL, 0xA4751E41L, - 0xE238CD99L, 0x3BEA0E2FL, 0x3280BBA1L, 0x183EB331L, - 0x4E548B38L, 0x4F6DB908L, 0x6F420D03L, 0xF60A04BFL, - 0x2CB81290L, 0x24977C79L, 0x5679B072L, 0xBCAF89AFL, - 0xDE9A771FL, 0xD9930810L, 0xB38BAE12L, 0xDCCF3F2EL, - 0x5512721FL, 0x2E6B7124L, 0x501ADDE6L, 0x9F84CD87L, - 0x7A584718L, 0x7408DA17L, 0xBC9F9ABCL, 0xE94B7D8CL, - 0xEC7AEC3AL, 0xDB851DFAL, 0x63094366L, 0xC464C3D2L, - 0xEF1C1847L, 0x3215D908L, 0xDD433B37L, 0x24C2BA16L, - 0x12A14D43L, 0x2A65C451L, 0x50940002L, 0x133AE4DDL, - 0x71DFF89EL, 0x10314E55L, 0x81AC77D6L, 0x5F11199BL, - 0x043556F1L, 0xD7A3C76BL, 0x3C11183BL, 0x5924A509L, - 0xF28FE6EDL, 0x97F1FBFAL, 0x9EBABF2CL, 0x1E153C6EL, - 0x86E34570L, 0xEAE96FB1L, 0x860E5E0AL, 0x5A3E2AB3L, - 0x771FE71CL, 0x4E3D06FAL, 0x2965DCB9L, 0x99E71D0FL, - 0x803E89D6L, 0x5266C825L, 0x2E4CC978L, 0x9C10B36AL, - 0xC6150EBAL, 0x94E2EA78L, 0xA5FC3C53L, 0x1E0A2DF4L, - 0xF2F74EA7L, 0x361D2B3DL, 0x1939260FL, 0x19C27960L, - 0x5223A708L, 0xF71312B6L, 0xEBADFE6EL, 0xEAC31F66L, - 0xE3BC4595L, 0xA67BC883L, 0xB17F37D1L, 0x018CFF28L, - 0xC332DDEFL, 0xBE6C5AA5L, 0x65582185L, 0x68AB9802L, - 0xEECEA50FL, 0xDB2F953BL, 0x2AEF7DADL, 0x5B6E2F84L, - 0x1521B628L, 0x29076170L, 0xECDD4775L, 0x619F1510L, - 0x13CCA830L, 0xEB61BD96L, 0x0334FE1EL, 0xAA0363CFL, - 0xB5735C90L, 0x4C70A239L, 0xD59E9E0BL, 0xCBAADE14L, - 0xEECC86BCL, 0x60622CA7L, 0x9CAB5CABL, 0xB2F3846EL, - 0x648B1EAFL, 0x19BDF0CAL, 0xA02369B9L, 0x655ABB50L, - 0x40685A32L, 0x3C2AB4B3L, 0x319EE9D5L, 0xC021B8F7L, - 0x9B540B19L, 0x875FA099L, 0x95F7997EL, 0x623D7DA8L, - 0xF837889AL, 0x97E32D77L, 0x11ED935FL, 0x16681281L, - 0x0E358829L, 0xC7E61FD6L, 0x96DEDFA1L, 0x7858BA99L, - 0x57F584A5L, 0x1B227263L, 0x9B83C3FFL, 0x1AC24696L, - 0xCDB30AEBL, 0x532E3054L, 0x8FD948E4L, 0x6DBC3128L, - 0x58EBF2EFL, 0x34C6FFEAL, 0xFE28ED61L, 0xEE7C3C73L, - 0x5D4A14D9L, 0xE864B7E3L, 0x42105D14L, 0x203E13E0L, - 0x45EEE2B6L, 0xA3AAABEAL, 0xDB6C4F15L, 0xFACB4FD0L, - 0xC742F442L, 0xEF6ABBB5L, 0x654F3B1DL, 0x41CD2105L, - 0xD81E799EL, 0x86854DC7L, 0xE44B476AL, 0x3D816250L, - 0xCF62A1F2L, 0x5B8D2646L, 0xFC8883A0L, 0xC1C7B6A3L, - 0x7F1524C3L, 0x69CB7492L, 0x47848A0BL, 0x5692B285L, - 0x095BBF00L, 0xAD19489DL, 0x1462B174L, 0x23820E00L, - 0x58428D2AL, 0x0C55F5EAL, 0x1DADF43EL, 0x233F7061L, - 0x3372F092L, 0x8D937E41L, 0xD65FECF1L, 0x6C223BDBL, - 0x7CDE3759L, 0xCBEE7460L, 0x4085F2A7L, 0xCE77326EL, - 0xA6078084L, 0x19F8509EL, 0xE8EFD855L, 0x61D99735L, - 0xA969A7AAL, 0xC50C06C2L, 0x5A04ABFCL, 0x800BCADCL, - 0x9E447A2EL, 0xC3453484L, 0xFDD56705L, 0x0E1E9EC9L, - 0xDB73DBD3L, 0x105588CDL, 0x675FDA79L, 0xE3674340L, - 0xC5C43465L, 0x713E38D8L, 0x3D28F89EL, 0xF16DFF20L, - 0x153E21E7L, 0x8FB03D4AL, 0xE6E39F2BL, 0xDB83ADF7L }, - { 0xE93D5A68L, 0x948140F7L, 0xF64C261CL, 0x94692934L, - 0x411520F7L, 0x7602D4F7L, 0xBCF46B2EL, 0xD4A20068L, - 0xD4082471L, 0x3320F46AL, 0x43B7D4B7L, 0x500061AFL, - 0x1E39F62EL, 0x97244546L, 0x14214F74L, 0xBF8B8840L, - 0x4D95FC1DL, 0x96B591AFL, 0x70F4DDD3L, 0x66A02F45L, - 0xBFBC09ECL, 0x03BD9785L, 0x7FAC6DD0L, 0x31CB8504L, - 0x96EB27B3L, 0x55FD3941L, 0xDA2547E6L, 0xABCA0A9AL, - 0x28507825L, 0x530429F4L, 0x0A2C86DAL, 0xE9B66DFBL, - 0x68DC1462L, 0xD7486900L, 0x680EC0A4L, 0x27A18DEEL, - 0x4F3FFEA2L, 0xE887AD8CL, 0xB58CE006L, 0x7AF4D6B6L, - 0xAACE1E7CL, 0xD3375FECL, 0xCE78A399L, 0x406B2A42L, - 0x20FE9E35L, 0xD9F385B9L, 0xEE39D7ABL, 0x3B124E8BL, - 0x1DC9FAF7L, 0x4B6D1856L, 0x26A36631L, 0xEAE397B2L, - 0x3A6EFA74L, 0xDD5B4332L, 0x6841E7F7L, 0xCA7820FBL, - 0xFB0AF54EL, 0xD8FEB397L, 0x454056ACL, 0xBA489527L, - 0x55533A3AL, 0x20838D87L, 0xFE6BA9B7L, 0xD096954BL, - 0x55A867BCL, 0xA1159A58L, 0xCCA92963L, 0x99E1DB33L, - 0xA62A4A56L, 0x3F3125F9L, 0x5EF47E1CL, 0x9029317CL, - 0xFDF8E802L, 0x04272F70L, 0x80BB155CL, 0x05282CE3L, - 0x95C11548L, 0xE4C66D22L, 0x48C1133FL, 0xC70F86DCL, - 0x07F9C9EEL, 0x41041F0FL, 0x404779A4L, 0x5D886E17L, - 0x325F51EBL, 0xD59BC0D1L, 0xF2BCC18FL, 0x41113564L, - 0x257B7834L, 0x602A9C60L, 0xDFF8E8A3L, 0x1F636C1BL, - 0x0E12B4C2L, 0x02E1329EL, 0xAF664FD1L, 0xCAD18115L, - 0x6B2395E0L, 0x333E92E1L, 0x3B240B62L, 0xEEBEB922L, - 0x85B2A20EL, 0xE6BA0D99L, 0xDE720C8CL, 0x2DA2F728L, - 0xD0127845L, 0x95B794FDL, 0x647D0862L, 0xE7CCF5F0L, - 0x5449A36FL, 0x877D48FAL, 0xC39DFD27L, 0xF33E8D1EL, - 0x0A476341L, 0x992EFF74L, 0x3A6F6EABL, 0xF4F8FD37L, - 0xA812DC60L, 0xA1EBDDF8L, 0x991BE14CL, 0xDB6E6B0DL, - 0xC67B5510L, 0x6D672C37L, 0x2765D43BL, 0xDCD0E804L, - 0xF1290DC7L, 0xCC00FFA3L, 0xB5390F92L, 0x690FED0BL, - 0x667B9FFBL, 0xCEDB7D9CL, 0xA091CF0BL, 0xD9155EA3L, - 0xBB132F88L, 0x515BAD24L, 0x7B9479BFL, 0x763BD6EBL, - 0x37392EB3L, 0xCC115979L, 0x8026E297L, 0xF42E312DL, - 0x6842ADA7L, 0xC66A2B3BL, 0x12754CCCL, 0x782EF11CL, - 0x6A124237L, 0xB79251E7L, 0x06A1BBE6L, 0x4BFB6350L, - 0x1A6B1018L, 0x11CAEDFAL, 0x3D25BDD8L, 0xE2E1C3C9L, - 0x44421659L, 0x0A121386L, 0xD90CEC6EL, 0xD5ABEA2AL, - 0x64AF674EL, 0xDA86A85FL, 0xBEBFE988L, 0x64E4C3FEL, - 0x9DBC8057L, 0xF0F7C086L, 0x60787BF8L, 0x6003604DL, - 0xD1FD8346L, 0xF6381FB0L, 0x7745AE04L, 0xD736FCCCL, - 0x83426B33L, 0xF01EAB71L, 0xB0804187L, 0x3C005E5FL, - 0x77A057BEL, 0xBDE8AE24L, 0x55464299L, 0xBF582E61L, - 0x4E58F48FL, 0xF2DDFDA2L, 0xF474EF38L, 0x8789BDC2L, - 0x5366F9C3L, 0xC8B38E74L, 0xB475F255L, 0x46FCD9B9L, - 0x7AEB2661L, 0x8B1DDF84L, 0x846A0E79L, 0x915F95E2L, - 0x466E598EL, 0x20B45770L, 0x8CD55591L, 0xC902DE4CL, - 0xB90BACE1L, 0xBB8205D0L, 0x11A86248L, 0x7574A99EL, - 0xB77F19B6L, 0xE0A9DC09L, 0x662D09A1L, 0xC4324633L, - 0xE85A1F02L, 0x09F0BE8CL, 0x4A99A025L, 0x1D6EFE10L, - 0x1AB93D1DL, 0x0BA5A4DFL, 0xA186F20FL, 0x2868F169L, - 0xDCB7DA83L, 0x573906FEL, 0xA1E2CE9BL, 0x4FCD7F52L, - 0x50115E01L, 0xA70683FAL, 0xA002B5C4L, 0x0DE6D027L, - 0x9AF88C27L, 0x773F8641L, 0xC3604C06L, 0x61A806B5L, - 0xF0177A28L, 0xC0F586E0L, 0x006058AAL, 0x30DC7D62L, - 0x11E69ED7L, 0x2338EA63L, 0x53C2DD94L, 0xC2C21634L, - 0xBBCBEE56L, 0x90BCB6DEL, 0xEBFC7DA1L, 0xCE591D76L, - 0x6F05E409L, 0x4B7C0188L, 0x39720A3DL, 0x7C927C24L, - 0x86E3725FL, 0x724D9DB9L, 0x1AC15BB4L, 0xD39EB8FCL, - 0xED545578L, 0x08FCA5B5L, 0xD83D7CD3L, 0x4DAD0FC4L, - 0x1E50EF5EL, 0xB161E6F8L, 0xA28514D9L, 0x6C51133CL, - 0x6FD5C7E7L, 0x56E14EC4L, 0x362ABFCEL, 0xDDC6C837L, - 0xD79A3234L, 0x92638212L, 0x670EFA8EL, 0x406000E0L }, - { 0x3A39CE37L, 0xD3FAF5CFL, 0xABC27737L, 0x5AC52D1BL, - 0x5CB0679EL, 0x4FA33742L, 0xD3822740L, 0x99BC9BBEL, - 0xD5118E9DL, 0xBF0F7315L, 0xD62D1C7EL, 0xC700C47BL, - 0xB78C1B6BL, 0x21A19045L, 0xB26EB1BEL, 0x6A366EB4L, - 0x5748AB2FL, 0xBC946E79L, 0xC6A376D2L, 0x6549C2C8L, - 0x530FF8EEL, 0x468DDE7DL, 0xD5730A1DL, 0x4CD04DC6L, - 0x2939BBDBL, 0xA9BA4650L, 0xAC9526E8L, 0xBE5EE304L, - 0xA1FAD5F0L, 0x6A2D519AL, 0x63EF8CE2L, 0x9A86EE22L, - 0xC089C2B8L, 0x43242EF6L, 0xA51E03AAL, 0x9CF2D0A4L, - 0x83C061BAL, 0x9BE96A4DL, 0x8FE51550L, 0xBA645BD6L, - 0x2826A2F9L, 0xA73A3AE1L, 0x4BA99586L, 0xEF5562E9L, - 0xC72FEFD3L, 0xF752F7DAL, 0x3F046F69L, 0x77FA0A59L, - 0x80E4A915L, 0x87B08601L, 0x9B09E6ADL, 0x3B3EE593L, - 0xE990FD5AL, 0x9E34D797L, 0x2CF0B7D9L, 0x022B8B51L, - 0x96D5AC3AL, 0x017DA67DL, 0xD1CF3ED6L, 0x7C7D2D28L, - 0x1F9F25CFL, 0xADF2B89BL, 0x5AD6B472L, 0x5A88F54CL, - 0xE029AC71L, 0xE019A5E6L, 0x47B0ACFDL, 0xED93FA9BL, - 0xE8D3C48DL, 0x283B57CCL, 0xF8D56629L, 0x79132E28L, - 0x785F0191L, 0xED756055L, 0xF7960E44L, 0xE3D35E8CL, - 0x15056DD4L, 0x88F46DBAL, 0x03A16125L, 0x0564F0BDL, - 0xC3EB9E15L, 0x3C9057A2L, 0x97271AECL, 0xA93A072AL, - 0x1B3F6D9BL, 0x1E6321F5L, 0xF59C66FBL, 0x26DCF319L, - 0x7533D928L, 0xB155FDF5L, 0x03563482L, 0x8ABA3CBBL, - 0x28517711L, 0xC20AD9F8L, 0xABCC5167L, 0xCCAD925FL, - 0x4DE81751L, 0x3830DC8EL, 0x379D5862L, 0x9320F991L, - 0xEA7A90C2L, 0xFB3E7BCEL, 0x5121CE64L, 0x774FBE32L, - 0xA8B6E37EL, 0xC3293D46L, 0x48DE5369L, 0x6413E680L, - 0xA2AE0810L, 0xDD6DB224L, 0x69852DFDL, 0x09072166L, - 0xB39A460AL, 0x6445C0DDL, 0x586CDECFL, 0x1C20C8AEL, - 0x5BBEF7DDL, 0x1B588D40L, 0xCCD2017FL, 0x6BB4E3BBL, - 0xDDA26A7EL, 0x3A59FF45L, 0x3E350A44L, 0xBCB4CDD5L, - 0x72EACEA8L, 0xFA6484BBL, 0x8D6612AEL, 0xBF3C6F47L, - 0xD29BE463L, 0x542F5D9EL, 0xAEC2771BL, 0xF64E6370L, - 0x740E0D8DL, 0xE75B1357L, 0xF8721671L, 0xAF537D5DL, - 0x4040CB08L, 0x4EB4E2CCL, 0x34D2466AL, 0x0115AF84L, - 0xE1B00428L, 0x95983A1DL, 0x06B89FB4L, 0xCE6EA048L, - 0x6F3F3B82L, 0x3520AB82L, 0x011A1D4BL, 0x277227F8L, - 0x611560B1L, 0xE7933FDCL, 0xBB3A792BL, 0x344525BDL, - 0xA08839E1L, 0x51CE794BL, 0x2F32C9B7L, 0xA01FBAC9L, - 0xE01CC87EL, 0xBCC7D1F6L, 0xCF0111C3L, 0xA1E8AAC7L, - 0x1A908749L, 0xD44FBD9AL, 0xD0DADECBL, 0xD50ADA38L, - 0x0339C32AL, 0xC6913667L, 0x8DF9317CL, 0xE0B12B4FL, - 0xF79E59B7L, 0x43F5BB3AL, 0xF2D519FFL, 0x27D9459CL, - 0xBF97222CL, 0x15E6FC2AL, 0x0F91FC71L, 0x9B941525L, - 0xFAE59361L, 0xCEB69CEBL, 0xC2A86459L, 0x12BAA8D1L, - 0xB6C1075EL, 0xE3056A0CL, 0x10D25065L, 0xCB03A442L, - 0xE0EC6E0EL, 0x1698DB3BL, 0x4C98A0BEL, 0x3278E964L, - 0x9F1F9532L, 0xE0D392DFL, 0xD3A0342BL, 0x8971F21EL, - 0x1B0A7441L, 0x4BA3348CL, 0xC5BE7120L, 0xC37632D8L, - 0xDF359F8DL, 0x9B992F2EL, 0xE60B6F47L, 0x0FE3F11DL, - 0xE54CDA54L, 0x1EDAD891L, 0xCE6279CFL, 0xCD3E7E6FL, - 0x1618B166L, 0xFD2C1D05L, 0x848FD2C5L, 0xF6FB2299L, - 0xF523F357L, 0xA6327623L, 0x93A83531L, 0x56CCCD02L, - 0xACF08162L, 0x5A75EBB5L, 0x6E163697L, 0x88D273CCL, - 0xDE966292L, 0x81B949D0L, 0x4C50901BL, 0x71C65614L, - 0xE6C6C7BDL, 0x327A140AL, 0x45E1D006L, 0xC3F27B9AL, - 0xC9AA53FDL, 0x62A80F00L, 0xBB25BFE2L, 0x35BDD2F6L, - 0x71126905L, 0xB2040222L, 0xB6CBCF7CL, 0xCD769C2BL, - 0x53113EC0L, 0x1640E3D3L, 0x38ABBD60L, 0x2547ADF0L, - 0xBA38209CL, 0xF746CE76L, 0x77AFA1C5L, 0x20756060L, - 0x85CBFE4EL, 0x8AE88DD8L, 0x7AAAF9B0L, 0x4CF9AA7EL, - 0x1948C25CL, 0x02FB8A8CL, 0x01C36AE4L, 0xD6EBE1F9L, - 0x90D4F869L, 0xA65CDEA0L, 0x3F09252DL, 0xC208E69FL, - 0xB74E6132L, 0xCE77E25BL, 0x578FDFE3L, 0x3AC372E6L } -}; - -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/bn_mul.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/bn_mul.h similarity index 75% rename from vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/bn_mul.h rename to vendor/mbedtls/library/bn_mul.h index 6414e54291..0738469db4 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/bn_mul.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/bn_mul.h @@ -5,19 +5,7 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * Multiply source vector [s] with b, add result @@ -36,11 +24,7 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_BN_MUL_H #define MBEDTLS_BN_MUL_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" @@ -87,10 +71,6 @@ /* *INDENT-OFF* */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) -#ifndef asm -#define asm __asm -#endif - /* armcc5 --gnu defines __GNUC__ but doesn't support GNU's extended asm */ #if defined(__GNUC__) && \ ( !defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || __ARMCC_VERSION >= 6000000 ) @@ -119,7 +99,8 @@ */ #if defined(__i386__) && defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && !defined(MULADDC_CANNOT_USE_EBX) -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ + { mbedtls_mpi_uint t; \ asm( \ "movl %%ebx, %0 \n\t" \ "movl %5, %%esi \n\t" \ @@ -127,7 +108,7 @@ "movl %7, %%ecx \n\t" \ "movl %8, %%ebx \n\t" -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ "lodsl \n\t" \ "mull %%ebx \n\t" \ "addl %%ecx, %%eax \n\t" \ @@ -137,9 +118,21 @@ "movl %%edx, %%ecx \n\t" \ "stosl \n\t" +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ + "movl %4, %%ebx \n\t" \ + "movl %%ecx, %1 \n\t" \ + "movl %%edi, %2 \n\t" \ + "movl %%esi, %3 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (t), "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (t), "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "eax", "ebx", "ecx", "edx", "esi", "edi" \ + ); } + #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2) -#define MULADDC_HUIT \ +#define MULADDC_X8_INIT MULADDC_X1_INIT + +#define MULADDC_X8_CORE \ "movd %%ecx, %%mm1 \n\t" \ "movd %%ebx, %%mm0 \n\t" \ "movd (%%edi), %%mm3 \n\t" \ @@ -202,7 +195,7 @@ "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ "movd %%mm1, %%ecx \n\t" -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X8_STOP \ "emms \n\t" \ "movl %4, %%ebx \n\t" \ "movl %%ecx, %1 \n\t" \ @@ -211,29 +204,19 @@ : "=m" (t), "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ : "m" (t), "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ : "eax", "ebx", "ecx", "edx", "esi", "edi" \ - ); + ); } \ -#else - -#define MULADDC_STOP \ - "movl %4, %%ebx \n\t" \ - "movl %%ecx, %1 \n\t" \ - "movl %%edi, %2 \n\t" \ - "movl %%esi, %3 \n\t" \ - : "=m" (t), "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ - : "m" (t), "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ - : "eax", "ebx", "ecx", "edx", "esi", "edi" \ - ); #endif /* SSE2 */ + #endif /* i386 */ #if defined(__amd64__) || defined (__x86_64__) -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ asm( \ "xorq %%r8, %%r8\n" -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ "movq (%%rsi), %%rax\n" \ "mulq %%rbx\n" \ "addq $8, %%rsi\n" \ @@ -245,7 +228,7 @@ "adcq %%rdx, %%rcx\n" \ "addq $8, %%rdi\n" -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ : "+c" (c), "+D" (d), "+S" (s), "+m" (*(uint64_t (*)[16]) d) \ : "b" (b), "m" (*(const uint64_t (*)[16]) s) \ : "rax", "rdx", "r8" \ @@ -253,33 +236,45 @@ #endif /* AMD64 */ -#if defined(__aarch64__) +// The following assembly code assumes that a pointer will fit in a 64-bit register +// (including ILP32 __aarch64__ ABIs such as on watchOS, hence the 2^32 - 1) +#if defined(__aarch64__) && (UINTPTR_MAX == 0xfffffffful || UINTPTR_MAX == 0xfffffffffffffffful) -#define MULADDC_INIT \ - asm( +/* + * There are some issues around different compilers requiring different constraint + * syntax for updating pointers from assembly code (see notes for + * MBEDTLS_ASM_AARCH64_PTR_CONSTRAINT in common.h), especially on aarch64_32 (aka ILP32). + * + * For this reason we cast the pointers to/from uintptr_t here. + */ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ + do { uintptr_t muladdc_d = (uintptr_t) d, muladdc_s = (uintptr_t) s; asm( -#define MULADDC_CORE \ - "ldr x4, [%2], #8 \n\t" \ - "ldr x5, [%1] \n\t" \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ + "ldr x4, [%x2], #8 \n\t" \ + "ldr x5, [%x1] \n\t" \ "mul x6, x4, %4 \n\t" \ "umulh x7, x4, %4 \n\t" \ "adds x5, x5, x6 \n\t" \ "adc x7, x7, xzr \n\t" \ "adds x5, x5, %0 \n\t" \ "adc %0, x7, xzr \n\t" \ - "str x5, [%1], #8 \n\t" + "str x5, [%x1], #8 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_STOP \ - : "+r" (c), "+r" (d), "+r" (s), "+m" (*(uint64_t (*)[16]) d) \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ + : "+r" (c), \ + "+r" (muladdc_d), \ + "+r" (muladdc_s), \ + "+m" (*(uint64_t (*)[16]) d) \ : "r" (b), "m" (*(const uint64_t (*)[16]) s) \ : "x4", "x5", "x6", "x7", "cc" \ - ); + ); d = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *)muladdc_d; s = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *)muladdc_s; } while (0); #endif /* Aarch64 */ #if defined(__mc68020__) || defined(__mcpu32__) -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ asm( \ "movl %3, %%a2 \n\t" \ "movl %4, %%a3 \n\t" \ @@ -287,7 +282,7 @@ "movl %6, %%d2 \n\t" \ "moveq #0, %%d0 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \ "addl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \ @@ -296,7 +291,7 @@ "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ "addxl %%d4, %%d3 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ "movl %%d3, %0 \n\t" \ "movl %%a3, %1 \n\t" \ "movl %%a2, %2 \n\t" \ @@ -305,7 +300,9 @@ : "d0", "d1", "d2", "d3", "d4", "a2", "a3" \ ); -#define MULADDC_HUIT \ +#define MULADDC_X8_INIT MULADDC_X1_INIT + +#define MULADDC_X8_CORE \ "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \ "addxl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \ @@ -348,13 +345,15 @@ "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" +#define MULADDC_X8_STOP MULADDC_X1_STOP + #endif /* MC68000 */ #if defined(__powerpc64__) || defined(__ppc64__) #if defined(__MACH__) && defined(__APPLE__) -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ asm( \ "ld r3, %3 \n\t" \ "ld r4, %4 \n\t" \ @@ -364,7 +363,7 @@ "addi r4, r4, -8 \n\t" \ "addic r5, r5, 0 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ "ldu r7, 8(r3) \n\t" \ "mulld r8, r7, r6 \n\t" \ "mulhdu r9, r7, r6 \n\t" \ @@ -374,7 +373,7 @@ "addc r8, r8, r7 \n\t" \ "stdu r8, 8(r4) \n\t" -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ "addze r5, r5 \n\t" \ "addi r4, r4, 8 \n\t" \ "addi r3, r3, 8 \n\t" \ @@ -389,7 +388,7 @@ #else /* __MACH__ && __APPLE__ */ -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ asm( \ "ld %%r3, %3 \n\t" \ "ld %%r4, %4 \n\t" \ @@ -399,7 +398,7 @@ "addi %%r4, %%r4, -8 \n\t" \ "addic %%r5, %%r5, 0 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ "ldu %%r7, 8(%%r3) \n\t" \ "mulld %%r8, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \ "mulhdu %%r9, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \ @@ -409,7 +408,7 @@ "addc %%r8, %%r8, %%r7 \n\t" \ "stdu %%r8, 8(%%r4) \n\t" -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ "addze %%r5, %%r5 \n\t" \ "addi %%r4, %%r4, 8 \n\t" \ "addi %%r3, %%r3, 8 \n\t" \ @@ -427,7 +426,7 @@ #if defined(__MACH__) && defined(__APPLE__) -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ asm( \ "lwz r3, %3 \n\t" \ "lwz r4, %4 \n\t" \ @@ -437,7 +436,7 @@ "addi r4, r4, -4 \n\t" \ "addic r5, r5, 0 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ "lwzu r7, 4(r3) \n\t" \ "mullw r8, r7, r6 \n\t" \ "mulhwu r9, r7, r6 \n\t" \ @@ -447,7 +446,7 @@ "addc r8, r8, r7 \n\t" \ "stwu r8, 4(r4) \n\t" -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ "addze r5, r5 \n\t" \ "addi r4, r4, 4 \n\t" \ "addi r3, r3, 4 \n\t" \ @@ -461,7 +460,7 @@ #else /* __MACH__ && __APPLE__ */ -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ asm( \ "lwz %%r3, %3 \n\t" \ "lwz %%r4, %4 \n\t" \ @@ -471,7 +470,7 @@ "addi %%r4, %%r4, -4 \n\t" \ "addic %%r5, %%r5, 0 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ "lwzu %%r7, 4(%%r3) \n\t" \ "mullw %%r8, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \ "mulhwu %%r9, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \ @@ -481,7 +480,7 @@ "addc %%r8, %%r8, %%r7 \n\t" \ "stwu %%r8, 4(%%r4) \n\t" -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ "addze %%r5, %%r5 \n\t" \ "addi %%r4, %%r4, 4 \n\t" \ "addi %%r3, %%r3, 4 \n\t" \ @@ -504,14 +503,14 @@ #if 0 && defined(__sparc__) #if defined(__sparc64__) -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ asm( \ "ldx %3, %%o0 \n\t" \ "ldx %4, %%o1 \n\t" \ "ld %5, %%o2 \n\t" \ "ld %6, %%o3 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ "ld [%%o0], %%o4 \n\t" \ "inc 4, %%o0 \n\t" \ "ld [%%o1], %%o5 \n\t" \ @@ -524,7 +523,7 @@ "addx %%g1, 0, %%o2 \n\t" \ "inc 4, %%o1 \n\t" - #define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ "st %%o2, %0 \n\t" \ "stx %%o1, %1 \n\t" \ "stx %%o0, %2 \n\t" \ @@ -536,14 +535,14 @@ #else /* __sparc64__ */ -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ asm( \ "ld %3, %%o0 \n\t" \ "ld %4, %%o1 \n\t" \ "ld %5, %%o2 \n\t" \ "ld %6, %%o3 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ "ld [%%o0], %%o4 \n\t" \ "inc 4, %%o0 \n\t" \ "ld [%%o1], %%o5 \n\t" \ @@ -556,7 +555,7 @@ "addx %%g1, 0, %%o2 \n\t" \ "inc 4, %%o1 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ "st %%o2, %0 \n\t" \ "st %%o1, %1 \n\t" \ "st %%o0, %2 \n\t" \ @@ -571,7 +570,7 @@ #if defined(__microblaze__) || defined(microblaze) -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ asm( \ "lwi r3, %3 \n\t" \ "lwi r4, %4 \n\t" \ @@ -592,7 +591,7 @@ "lhui r9, r3, 0 \n\t" #endif -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ MULADDC_LHUI \ "addi r3, r3, 2 \n\t" \ "mul r10, r9, r6 \n\t" \ @@ -617,7 +616,7 @@ "swi r12, r4, 0 \n\t" \ "addi r4, r4, 4 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ "swi r5, %0 \n\t" \ "swi r4, %1 \n\t" \ "swi r3, %2 \n\t" \ @@ -631,7 +630,7 @@ #if defined(__tricore__) -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ asm( \ "ld.a %%a2, %3 \n\t" \ "ld.a %%a3, %4 \n\t" \ @@ -639,7 +638,7 @@ "ld.w %%d1, %6 \n\t" \ "xor %%d5, %%d5 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ "ld.w %%d0, [%%a2+] \n\t" \ "madd.u %%e2, %%e4, %%d0, %%d1 \n\t" \ "ld.w %%d0, [%%a3] \n\t" \ @@ -648,7 +647,7 @@ "mov %%d4, %%d3 \n\t" \ "st.w [%%a3+], %%d2 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ "st.w %0, %%d4 \n\t" \ "st.a %1, %%a3 \n\t" \ "st.a %2, %%a2 \n\t" \ @@ -659,6 +658,16 @@ #endif /* TriCore */ +#if defined(__arm__) + +#if defined(__thumb__) && !defined(__thumb2__) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) +/* + * Thumb 1 ISA. This code path has only been tested successfully on gcc; + * it does not compile on clang or armclang. + */ + +#if !defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && defined(__GNUC__) /* * Note, gcc -O0 by default uses r7 for the frame pointer, so it complains about * our use of r7 below, unless -fomit-frame-pointer is passed. @@ -667,41 +676,39 @@ * x !=0, which we can detect using __OPTIMIZE__ (which is also defined by * clang and armcc5 under the same conditions). * - * So, only use the optimized assembly below for optimized build, which avoids - * the build error and is pretty reasonable anyway. - */ -#if defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__OPTIMIZE__) -#define MULADDC_CANNOT_USE_R7 -#endif - -#if defined(__arm__) && !defined(MULADDC_CANNOT_USE_R7) - -#if defined(__thumb__) && !defined(__thumb2__) -#if !defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && !defined(__clang__) \ - && !defined(__llvm__) && !defined(__INTEL_COMPILER) -/* - * Thumb 1 ISA. This code path has only been tested successfully on gcc; - * it does not compile on clang or armclang. - * - * Other compilers which define __GNUC__ may not work. The above macro - * attempts to exclude these untested compilers. + * If gcc needs to use r7, we use r1 as a scratch register and have a few extra + * instructions to preserve/restore it; otherwise, we can use r7 and avoid + * the preserve/restore overhead. */ - -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_SCRATCH "RS .req r1 \n\t" +#define MULADDC_PRESERVE_SCRATCH "mov r10, r1 \n\t" +#define MULADDC_RESTORE_SCRATCH "mov r1, r10 \n\t" +#define MULADDC_SCRATCH_CLOBBER "r10" +#else /* !defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && defined(__GNUC__) */ +#define MULADDC_SCRATCH "RS .req r7 \n\t" +#define MULADDC_PRESERVE_SCRATCH "" +#define MULADDC_RESTORE_SCRATCH "" +#define MULADDC_SCRATCH_CLOBBER "r7" +#endif /* !defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && defined(__GNUC__) */ + +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ asm( \ + MULADDC_SCRATCH \ "ldr r0, %3 \n\t" \ "ldr r1, %4 \n\t" \ "ldr r2, %5 \n\t" \ "ldr r3, %6 \n\t" \ - "lsr r7, r3, #16 \n\t" \ - "mov r9, r7 \n\t" \ - "lsl r7, r3, #16 \n\t" \ - "lsr r7, r7, #16 \n\t" \ - "mov r8, r7 \n\t" + "lsr r4, r3, #16 \n\t" \ + "mov r9, r4 \n\t" \ + "lsl r4, r3, #16 \n\t" \ + "lsr r4, r4, #16 \n\t" \ + "mov r8, r4 \n\t" \ -#define MULADDC_CORE \ + +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ + MULADDC_PRESERVE_SCRATCH \ "ldmia r0!, {r6} \n\t" \ - "lsr r7, r6, #16 \n\t" \ + "lsr RS, r6, #16 \n\t" \ "lsl r6, r6, #16 \n\t" \ "lsr r6, r6, #16 \n\t" \ "mov r4, r8 \n\t" \ @@ -709,12 +716,12 @@ "mov r3, r9 \n\t" \ "mul r6, r3 \n\t" \ "mov r5, r9 \n\t" \ - "mul r5, r7 \n\t" \ + "mul r5, RS \n\t" \ "mov r3, r8 \n\t" \ - "mul r7, r3 \n\t" \ + "mul RS, r3 \n\t" \ "lsr r3, r6, #16 \n\t" \ "add r5, r5, r3 \n\t" \ - "lsr r3, r7, #16 \n\t" \ + "lsr r3, RS, #16 \n\t" \ "add r5, r5, r3 \n\t" \ "add r4, r4, r2 \n\t" \ "mov r2, #0 \n\t" \ @@ -722,86 +729,137 @@ "lsl r3, r6, #16 \n\t" \ "add r4, r4, r3 \n\t" \ "adc r5, r2 \n\t" \ - "lsl r3, r7, #16 \n\t" \ + "lsl r3, RS, #16 \n\t" \ "add r4, r4, r3 \n\t" \ "adc r5, r2 \n\t" \ + MULADDC_RESTORE_SCRATCH \ "ldr r3, [r1] \n\t" \ "add r4, r4, r3 \n\t" \ "adc r2, r5 \n\t" \ "stmia r1!, {r4} \n\t" -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ "str r2, %0 \n\t" \ "str r1, %1 \n\t" \ "str r0, %2 \n\t" \ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ : "r0", "r1", "r2", "r3", "r4", "r5", \ - "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9", "cc" \ + "r6", MULADDC_SCRATCH_CLOBBER, "r8", "r9", "cc" \ ); - -#endif /* Compiler is gcc */ +#endif /* !defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && !defined(__clang__) */ #elif (__ARM_ARCH >= 6) && \ defined (__ARM_FEATURE_DSP) && (__ARM_FEATURE_DSP == 1) +/* Armv6-M (or later) with DSP Instruction Set Extensions. + * Requires support for either Thumb 2 or Arm ISA. + */ -#define MULADDC_INIT \ - asm( - -#define MULADDC_CORE \ - "ldr r0, [%0], #4 \n\t" \ - "ldr r1, [%1] \n\t" \ - "umaal r1, %2, %3, r0 \n\t" \ - "str r1, [%1], #4 \n\t" - -#define MULADDC_STOP \ - : "=r" (s), "=r" (d), "=r" (c) \ - : "r" (b), "0" (s), "1" (d), "2" (c) \ - : "r0", "r1", "memory" \ - ); - -#else - -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ + { \ + mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp_a, tmp_b; \ + asm volatile ( + +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ + ".p2align 2 \n\t" \ + "ldr %[a], [%[in]], #4 \n\t" \ + "ldr %[b], [%[acc]] \n\t" \ + "umaal %[b], %[carry], %[scalar], %[a] \n\t" \ + "str %[b], [%[acc]], #4 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ + : [a] "=&r" (tmp_a), \ + [b] "=&r" (tmp_b), \ + [in] "+r" (s), \ + [acc] "+r" (d), \ + [carry] "+l" (c) \ + : [scalar] "r" (b) \ + : "memory" \ + ); \ + } + +#define MULADDC_X2_INIT \ + { \ + mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp_a0, tmp_b0; \ + mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp_a1, tmp_b1; \ + asm volatile ( + + /* - Make sure loop is 4-byte aligned to avoid stalls + * upon repeated non-word aligned instructions in + * some microarchitectures. + * - Don't use ldm with post-increment or back-to-back + * loads with post-increment and same address register + * to avoid stalls on some microarchitectures. + * - Bunch loads and stores to reduce latency on some + * microarchitectures. E.g., on Cortex-M4, the first + * in a series of load/store operations has latency + * 2 cycles, while subsequent loads/stores are single-cycle. */ +#define MULADDC_X2_CORE \ + ".p2align 2 \n\t" \ + "ldr %[a0], [%[in]], #+8 \n\t" \ + "ldr %[b0], [%[acc]], #+8 \n\t" \ + "ldr %[a1], [%[in], #-4] \n\t" \ + "ldr %[b1], [%[acc], #-4] \n\t" \ + "umaal %[b0], %[carry], %[scalar], %[a0] \n\t" \ + "umaal %[b1], %[carry], %[scalar], %[a1] \n\t" \ + "str %[b0], [%[acc], #-8] \n\t" \ + "str %[b1], [%[acc], #-4] \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X2_STOP \ + : [a0] "=&r" (tmp_a0), \ + [b0] "=&r" (tmp_b0), \ + [a1] "=&r" (tmp_a1), \ + [b1] "=&r" (tmp_b1), \ + [in] "+r" (s), \ + [acc] "+r" (d), \ + [carry] "+l" (c) \ + : [scalar] "r" (b) \ + : "memory" \ + ); \ + } + +#else /* Thumb 2 or Arm ISA, without DSP extensions */ + +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ asm( \ "ldr r0, %3 \n\t" \ "ldr r1, %4 \n\t" \ "ldr r2, %5 \n\t" \ "ldr r3, %6 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ "ldr r4, [r0], #4 \n\t" \ "mov r5, #0 \n\t" \ "ldr r6, [r1] \n\t" \ "umlal r2, r5, r3, r4 \n\t" \ - "adds r7, r6, r2 \n\t" \ + "adds r4, r6, r2 \n\t" \ "adc r2, r5, #0 \n\t" \ - "str r7, [r1], #4 \n\t" + "str r4, [r1], #4 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ "str r2, %0 \n\t" \ "str r1, %1 \n\t" \ "str r0, %2 \n\t" \ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ : "r0", "r1", "r2", "r3", "r4", "r5", \ - "r6", "r7", "cc" \ + "r6", "cc" \ ); -#endif /* Thumb */ +#endif /* ISA codepath selection */ -#endif /* ARMv3 */ +#endif /* defined(__arm__) */ #if defined(__alpha__) -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ asm( \ "ldq $1, %3 \n\t" \ "ldq $2, %4 \n\t" \ "ldq $3, %5 \n\t" \ "ldq $4, %6 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ "ldq $6, 0($1) \n\t" \ "addq $1, 8, $1 \n\t" \ "mulq $6, $4, $7 \n\t" \ @@ -816,7 +874,7 @@ "addq $6, $3, $3 \n\t" \ "addq $5, $3, $3 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ "stq $3, %0 \n\t" \ "stq $2, %1 \n\t" \ "stq $1, %2 \n\t" \ @@ -828,14 +886,14 @@ #if defined(__mips__) && !defined(__mips64) -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ asm( \ "lw $10, %3 \n\t" \ "lw $11, %4 \n\t" \ "lw $12, %5 \n\t" \ "lw $13, %6 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ "lw $14, 0($10) \n\t" \ "multu $13, $14 \n\t" \ "addi $10, $10, 4 \n\t" \ @@ -851,7 +909,7 @@ "addu $12, $12, $14 \n\t" \ "addi $11, $11, 4 \n\t" -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ "sw $12, %0 \n\t" \ "sw $11, %1 \n\t" \ "sw $10, %2 \n\t" \ @@ -865,13 +923,13 @@ #if (defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_IX86)) || defined(__WATCOMC__) -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ __asm mov esi, s \ __asm mov edi, d \ __asm mov ecx, c \ __asm mov ebx, b -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ __asm lodsd \ __asm mul ebx \ __asm add eax, ecx \ @@ -881,11 +939,18 @@ __asm mov ecx, edx \ __asm stosd +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ + __asm mov c, ecx \ + __asm mov d, edi \ + __asm mov s, esi + #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2) #define EMIT __asm _emit -#define MULADDC_HUIT \ +#define MULADDC_X8_INIT MULADDC_X1_INIT + +#define MULADDC_X8_CORE \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0xC9 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0xC3 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x1F \ @@ -948,33 +1013,26 @@ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0xC9 -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X8_STOP \ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x77 \ __asm mov c, ecx \ __asm mov d, edi \ - __asm mov s, esi \ - -#else - -#define MULADDC_STOP \ - __asm mov c, ecx \ - __asm mov d, edi \ - __asm mov s, esi \ + __asm mov s, esi #endif /* SSE2 */ #endif /* MSVC */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM */ -#if !defined(MULADDC_CORE) +#if !defined(MULADDC_X1_CORE) #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL) -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ { \ mbedtls_t_udbl r; \ mbedtls_mpi_uint r0, r1; -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ r = *(s++) * (mbedtls_t_udbl) b; \ r0 = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) r; \ r1 = (mbedtls_mpi_uint)( r >> biL ); \ @@ -982,18 +1040,19 @@ r0 += *d; r1 += (r0 < *d); \ c = r1; *(d++) = r0; -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ } -#else -#define MULADDC_INIT \ +#else /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL */ + +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ { \ mbedtls_mpi_uint s0, s1, b0, b1; \ mbedtls_mpi_uint r0, r1, rx, ry; \ b0 = ( b << biH ) >> biH; \ b1 = ( b >> biH ); -#define MULADDC_CORE \ +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ s0 = ( *s << biH ) >> biH; \ s1 = ( *s >> biH ); s++; \ rx = s0 * b1; r0 = s0 * b0; \ @@ -1007,11 +1066,29 @@ r0 += *d; r1 += (r0 < *d); \ c = r1; *(d++) = r0; -#define MULADDC_STOP \ +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ } -#endif /* C (generic) */ #endif /* C (longlong) */ +#endif /* C (generic) */ + +#if !defined(MULADDC_X2_CORE) +#define MULADDC_X2_INIT MULADDC_X1_INIT +#define MULADDC_X2_STOP MULADDC_X1_STOP +#define MULADDC_X2_CORE MULADDC_X1_CORE MULADDC_X1_CORE +#endif /* MULADDC_X2_CORE */ + +#if !defined(MULADDC_X4_CORE) +#define MULADDC_X4_INIT MULADDC_X2_INIT +#define MULADDC_X4_STOP MULADDC_X2_STOP +#define MULADDC_X4_CORE MULADDC_X2_CORE MULADDC_X2_CORE +#endif /* MULADDC_X4_CORE */ + +#if !defined(MULADDC_X8_CORE) +#define MULADDC_X8_INIT MULADDC_X4_INIT +#define MULADDC_X8_STOP MULADDC_X4_STOP +#define MULADDC_X8_CORE MULADDC_X4_CORE MULADDC_X4_CORE +#endif /* MULADDC_X8_CORE */ /* *INDENT-ON* */ #endif /* bn_mul.h */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/camellia.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/camellia.c index ce034d74fb..b1c0a08ca2 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/camellia.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/camellia.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * Camellia implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * The Camellia block cipher was designed by NTT and Mitsubishi Electric @@ -36,12 +24,6 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT) -/* Parameter validation macros */ -#define CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define CAMELLIA_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - static const unsigned char SIGMA_CHARS[6][8] = { { 0xa0, 0x9e, 0x66, 0x7f, 0x3b, 0xcc, 0x90, 0x8b }, @@ -291,7 +273,6 @@ static void camellia_feistel(const uint32_t x[2], const uint32_t k[2], void mbedtls_camellia_init(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx) { - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_camellia_context)); } @@ -319,9 +300,6 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, uint32_t KC[16]; uint32_t TK[20]; - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - RK = ctx->rk; memset(t, 0, 64); @@ -421,6 +399,7 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, /* * Camellia key schedule (decryption) */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits) @@ -430,8 +409,6 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, mbedtls_camellia_context cty; uint32_t *RK; uint32_t *SK; - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); mbedtls_camellia_init(&cty); @@ -468,6 +445,7 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, return ret; } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */ /* * Camellia-ECB block encryption/decryption @@ -479,11 +457,9 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, { int NR; uint32_t *RK, X[4]; - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); + if (mode != MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } ((void) mode); @@ -547,14 +523,10 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) { - int i; unsigned char temp[16]; - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); + if (mode != MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } if (length % 16) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH; @@ -565,9 +537,7 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, memcpy(temp, input, 16); mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb(ctx, mode, input, output); - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { - output[i] = (unsigned char) (output[i] ^ iv[i]); - } + mbedtls_xor(output, output, iv, 16); memcpy(iv, temp, 16); @@ -577,9 +547,7 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, } } else { while (length > 0) { - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { - output[i] = (unsigned char) (input[i] ^ iv[i]); - } + mbedtls_xor(output, input, iv, 16); mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb(ctx, mode, output, output); memcpy(iv, output, 16); @@ -608,13 +576,9 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, { int c; size_t n; - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(iv_off != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); + if (mode != MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } n = *iv_off; if (n >= 16) { @@ -665,12 +629,6 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, { int c, i; size_t n; - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(nonce_counter != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(stream_block != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(nc_off != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - CAMELLIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); n = *nc_off; if (n >= 16) { @@ -932,14 +890,26 @@ int mbedtls_camellia_self_test(int verbose) (v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + if (v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); + } + continue; + } +#endif + for (i = 0; i < CAMELLIA_TESTS_ECB; i++) { memcpy(key, camellia_test_ecb_key[u][i], 16 + 8 * u); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) if (v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) { mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec(&ctx, key, 128 + u * 64); memcpy(src, camellia_test_ecb_cipher[u][i], 16); memcpy(dst, camellia_test_ecb_plain[i], 16); - } else { /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT */ + } else +#endif + { /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT */ mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, 128 + u * 64); memcpy(src, camellia_test_ecb_plain[i], 16); memcpy(dst, camellia_test_ecb_cipher[u][i], 16); diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ccm.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ccm.c index 79a04a275a..45ed697dd3 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ccm.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ccm.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * NIST SP800-38C compliant CCM implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* @@ -35,26 +23,29 @@ #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) +#include "block_cipher_internal.h" +#endif + #include +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT) -#define CCM_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT) -#define CCM_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - -#define CCM_ENCRYPT 0 -#define CCM_DECRYPT 1 /* * Initialize context */ void mbedtls_ccm_init(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx) { - CCM_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ccm_context)); } @@ -64,10 +55,19 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_setkey(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, unsigned int keybits) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + mbedtls_block_cipher_free(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setup(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, cipher)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setkey(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, key, keybits)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } +#else + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values(cipher, keybits, MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB); @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_setkey(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; } - if (cipher_info->block_size != 16) { + if (mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(cipher_info) != 16) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; } @@ -89,8 +89,9 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_setkey(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT)) != 0) { return ret; } +#endif - return 0; + return ret; } /* @@ -101,89 +102,88 @@ void mbedtls_ccm_free(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx) if (ctx == NULL) { return; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + mbedtls_block_cipher_free(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx); +#else mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx->cipher_ctx); +#endif mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_ccm_context)); } -/* - * Macros for common operations. - * Results in smaller compiled code than static inline functions. - */ +#define CCM_STATE__CLEAR 0 +#define CCM_STATE__STARTED (1 << 0) +#define CCM_STATE__LENGTHS_SET (1 << 1) +#define CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_STARTED (1 << 2) +#define CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_FINISHED (1 << 3) +#define CCM_STATE__ERROR (1 << 4) /* - * Update the CBC-MAC state in y using a block in b - * (Always using b as the source helps the compiler optimise a bit better.) + * Encrypt or decrypt a partial block with CTR */ -#define UPDATE_CBC_MAC \ - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) \ - y[i] ^= b[i]; \ - \ - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, y, 16, y, &olen)) != 0) \ +static int mbedtls_ccm_crypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + size_t offset, size_t use_len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char tmp_buf[16] = { 0 }; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->ctr, tmp_buf); +#else + size_t olen = 0; + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->ctr, 16, tmp_buf, &olen); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { + ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf)); + return ret; + } + + mbedtls_xor(output, input, tmp_buf + offset, use_len); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf)); return ret; +} -/* - * Encrypt or decrypt a partial block with CTR - * Warning: using b for temporary storage! src and dst must not be b! - * This avoids allocating one more 16 bytes buffer while allowing src == dst. - */ -#define CTR_CRYPT(dst, src, len) \ - do \ - { \ - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctr, \ - 16, b, &olen)) != 0) \ - { \ - return ret; \ - } \ - \ - for (i = 0; i < (len); i++) \ - (dst)[i] = (src)[i] ^ b[i]; \ - } while (0) +static void mbedtls_ccm_clear_state(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx) +{ + ctx->state = CCM_STATE__CLEAR; + memset(ctx->y, 0, 16); + memset(ctx->ctr, 0, 16); +} -/* - * Authenticated encryption or decryption - */ -static int ccm_auth_crypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, - const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, - const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, - const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, - unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) +static int ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char i; - unsigned char q; - size_t len_left, olen; - unsigned char b[16]; - unsigned char y[16]; - unsigned char ctr[16]; - const unsigned char *src; - unsigned char *dst; + size_t len_left; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + size_t olen; +#endif - /* - * Check length requirements: SP800-38C A.1 - * Additional requirement: a < 2^16 - 2^8 to simplify the code. - * 'length' checked later (when writing it to the first block) - * - * Also, loosen the requirements to enable support for CCM* (IEEE 802.15.4). + /* length calculation can be done only after both + * mbedtls_ccm_starts() and mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths() have been executed */ - if (tag_len == 2 || tag_len > 16 || tag_len % 2 != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; - } - - /* Also implies q is within bounds */ - if (iv_len < 7 || iv_len > 13) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + if (!(ctx->state & CCM_STATE__STARTED) || !(ctx->state & CCM_STATE__LENGTHS_SET)) { + return 0; } - if (add_len >= 0xFF00) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + /* CCM expects non-empty tag. + * CCM* allows empty tag. For CCM* without tag, ignore plaintext length. + */ + if (ctx->tag_len == 0) { + if (ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT || ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT) { + ctx->plaintext_len = 0; + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } } - q = 16 - 1 - (unsigned char) iv_len; - /* - * First block B_0: + * First block: * 0 .. 0 flags - * 1 .. iv_len nonce (aka iv) + * 1 .. iv_len nonce (aka iv) - set by: mbedtls_ccm_starts() * iv_len+1 .. 15 length * * With flags as (bits): @@ -192,57 +192,46 @@ static int ccm_auth_crypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, * 5 .. 3 (t - 2) / 2 * 2 .. 0 q - 1 */ - b[0] = 0; - b[0] |= (add_len > 0) << 6; - b[0] |= ((tag_len - 2) / 2) << 3; - b[0] |= q - 1; - - memcpy(b + 1, iv, iv_len); + ctx->y[0] |= (ctx->add_len > 0) << 6; + ctx->y[0] |= ((ctx->tag_len - 2) / 2) << 3; + ctx->y[0] |= ctx->q - 1; - for (i = 0, len_left = length; i < q; i++, len_left >>= 8) { - b[15-i] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(len_left); + for (i = 0, len_left = ctx->plaintext_len; i < ctx->q; i++, len_left >>= 8) { + ctx->y[15-i] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(len_left); } if (len_left > 0) { + ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR; return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; } + /* Start CBC-MAC with first block*/ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y); +#else + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { + ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR; + return ret; + } - /* Start CBC-MAC with first block */ - memset(y, 0, 16); - UPDATE_CBC_MAC; - - /* - * If there is additional data, update CBC-MAC with - * add_len, add, 0 (padding to a block boundary) - */ - if (add_len > 0) { - size_t use_len; - len_left = add_len; - src = add; - - memset(b, 0, 16); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(add_len, b, 0); - - use_len = len_left < 16 - 2 ? len_left : 16 - 2; - memcpy(b + 2, src, use_len); - len_left -= use_len; - src += use_len; - - UPDATE_CBC_MAC; - - while (len_left > 0) { - use_len = len_left > 16 ? 16 : len_left; - - memset(b, 0, 16); - memcpy(b, src, use_len); - UPDATE_CBC_MAC; + return 0; +} - len_left -= use_len; - src += use_len; - } +int mbedtls_ccm_starts(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len) +{ + /* Also implies q is within bounds */ + if (iv_len < 7 || iv_len > 13) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; } + ctx->mode = mode; + ctx->q = 16 - 1 - (unsigned char) iv_len; + /* * Prepare counter block for encryption: * 0 .. 0 flags @@ -253,62 +242,302 @@ static int ccm_auth_crypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, * 7 .. 3 0 * 2 .. 0 q - 1 */ - ctr[0] = q - 1; - memcpy(ctr + 1, iv, iv_len); - memset(ctr + 1 + iv_len, 0, q); - ctr[15] = 1; + memset(ctx->ctr, 0, 16); + ctx->ctr[0] = ctx->q - 1; + memcpy(ctx->ctr + 1, iv, iv_len); + memset(ctx->ctr + 1 + iv_len, 0, ctx->q); + ctx->ctr[15] = 1; /* - * Authenticate and {en,de}crypt the message. + * See ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready() for block layout description + */ + memcpy(ctx->y + 1, iv, iv_len); + + ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__STARTED; + return ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready(ctx); +} + +int mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + size_t total_ad_len, + size_t plaintext_len, + size_t tag_len) +{ + /* + * Check length requirements: SP800-38C A.1 + * Additional requirement: a < 2^16 - 2^8 to simplify the code. + * 'length' checked later (when writing it to the first block) * - * The only difference between encryption and decryption is - * the respective order of authentication and {en,de}cryption. + * Also, loosen the requirements to enable support for CCM* (IEEE 802.15.4). */ - len_left = length; - src = input; - dst = output; + if (tag_len == 2 || tag_len > 16 || tag_len % 2 != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + if (total_ad_len >= 0xFF00) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + ctx->plaintext_len = plaintext_len; + ctx->add_len = total_ad_len; + ctx->tag_len = tag_len; + ctx->processed = 0; - while (len_left > 0) { - size_t use_len = len_left > 16 ? 16 : len_left; + ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__LENGTHS_SET; + return ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready(ctx); +} - if (mode == CCM_ENCRYPT) { - memset(b, 0, 16); - memcpy(b, src, use_len); - UPDATE_CBC_MAC; +int mbedtls_ccm_update_ad(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *add, + size_t add_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t use_len, offset; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + size_t olen; +#endif + + if (ctx->state & CCM_STATE__ERROR) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + if (add_len > 0) { + if (ctx->state & CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_FINISHED) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; } - CTR_CRYPT(dst, src, use_len); + if (!(ctx->state & CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_STARTED)) { + if (add_len > ctx->add_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } - if (mode == CCM_DECRYPT) { - memset(b, 0, 16); - memcpy(b, dst, use_len); - UPDATE_CBC_MAC; + ctx->y[0] ^= (unsigned char) ((ctx->add_len >> 8) & 0xFF); + ctx->y[1] ^= (unsigned char) ((ctx->add_len) & 0xFF); + + ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_STARTED; + } else if (ctx->processed + add_len > ctx->add_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; } - dst += use_len; - src += use_len; - len_left -= use_len; - - /* - * Increment counter. - * No need to check for overflow thanks to the length check above. - */ - for (i = 0; i < q; i++) { - if (++ctr[15-i] != 0) { - break; + while (add_len > 0) { + offset = (ctx->processed + 2) % 16; /* account for y[0] and y[1] + * holding total auth data length */ + use_len = 16 - offset; + + if (use_len > add_len) { + use_len = add_len; + } + + mbedtls_xor(ctx->y + offset, ctx->y + offset, add, use_len); + + ctx->processed += use_len; + add_len -= use_len; + add += use_len; + + if (use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->add_len) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y); +#else + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { + ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR; + return ret; + } } } + + if (ctx->processed == ctx->add_len) { + ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_FINISHED; + ctx->processed = 0; // prepare for mbedtls_ccm_update() + } + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ccm_update(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char i; + size_t use_len, offset; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + size_t olen; +#endif + + unsigned char local_output[16]; + + if (ctx->state & CCM_STATE__ERROR) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + /* Check against plaintext length only if performing operation with + * authentication + */ + if (ctx->tag_len != 0 && ctx->processed + input_len > ctx->plaintext_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + if (output_size < input_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + *output_len = input_len; + + ret = 0; + + while (input_len > 0) { + offset = ctx->processed % 16; + + use_len = 16 - offset; + + if (use_len > input_len) { + use_len = input_len; + } + + ctx->processed += use_len; + + if (ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT || \ + ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT) { + mbedtls_xor(ctx->y + offset, ctx->y + offset, input, use_len); + + if (use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->plaintext_len) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y); +#else + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { + ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR; + goto exit; + } + } + + ret = mbedtls_ccm_crypt(ctx, offset, use_len, input, output); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } + + if (ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT || \ + ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT) { + /* Since output may be in shared memory, we cannot be sure that + * it will contain what we wrote to it. Therefore, we should avoid using + * it as input to any operations. + * Write decrypted data to local_output to avoid using output variable as + * input in the XOR operation for Y. + */ + ret = mbedtls_ccm_crypt(ctx, offset, use_len, input, local_output); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_xor(ctx->y + offset, ctx->y + offset, local_output, use_len); + + memcpy(output, local_output, use_len); + + if (use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->plaintext_len) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y); +#else + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { + ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR; + goto exit; + } + } + } + + if (use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->plaintext_len) { + for (i = 0; i < ctx->q; i++) { + if (++(ctx->ctr)[15-i] != 0) { + break; + } + } + } + + input_len -= use_len; + input += use_len; + output += use_len; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(local_output, 16); + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ccm_finish(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char i; + + if (ctx->state & CCM_STATE__ERROR) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + + if (ctx->add_len > 0 && !(ctx->state & CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_FINISHED)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + if (ctx->plaintext_len > 0 && ctx->processed != ctx->plaintext_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; } /* * Authentication: reset counter and crypt/mask internal tag */ - for (i = 0; i < q; i++) { - ctr[15-i] = 0; + for (i = 0; i < ctx->q; i++) { + ctx->ctr[15-i] = 0; } - CTR_CRYPT(y, y, 16); - memcpy(tag, y, tag_len); + ret = mbedtls_ccm_crypt(ctx, 0, 16, ctx->y, ctx->y); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + if (tag != NULL) { + memcpy(tag, ctx->y, tag_len); + } + mbedtls_ccm_clear_state(ctx); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Authenticated encryption or decryption + */ +static int ccm_auth_crypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ccm_starts(ctx, mode, iv, iv_len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(ctx, add_len, length, tag_len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ccm_update_ad(ctx, add, add_len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ccm_update(ctx, input, length, + output, length, &olen)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ccm_finish(ctx, tag, tag_len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } return 0; } @@ -322,13 +551,7 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) { - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(add_len == 0 || add != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL); - return ccm_auth_crypt(ctx, CCM_ENCRYPT, length, iv, iv_len, + return ccm_auth_crypt(ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT, length, iv, iv_len, add, add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len); } @@ -338,80 +561,74 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) { - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(add_len == 0 || add != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL); - if (tag_len == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; - } - - return mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag(ctx, length, iv, iv_len, add, - add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len); + return ccm_auth_crypt(ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT, length, iv, iv_len, + add, add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len); } /* * Authenticated decryption */ -int mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, - const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, - const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, - const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, - const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) +static int mbedtls_ccm_compare_tags(const unsigned char *tag1, + const unsigned char *tag2, + size_t tag_len) +{ + /* Check tag in "constant-time" */ + int diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(tag1, tag2, tag_len); + + if (diff != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int ccm_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char check_tag[16]; - int diff; - - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(add_len == 0 || add != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL); - if ((ret = ccm_auth_crypt(ctx, CCM_DECRYPT, length, + if ((ret = ccm_auth_crypt(ctx, mode, length, iv, iv_len, add, add_len, input, output, check_tag, tag_len)) != 0) { return ret; } - /* Check tag in "constant-time" */ - diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(tag, check_tag, tag_len); - - if (diff != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ccm_compare_tags(tag, check_tag, tag_len)) != 0) { mbedtls_platform_zeroize(output, length); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED; + return ret; } return 0; } +int mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) +{ + return ccm_auth_decrypt(ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT, length, + iv, iv_len, add, add_len, + input, output, tag, tag_len); +} + int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) { - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(add_len == 0 || add != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); - CCM_VALIDATE_RET(tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL); - - if (tag_len == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; - } - - return mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt(ctx, length, iv, iv_len, add, - add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len); + return ccm_auth_decrypt(ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT, length, + iv, iv_len, add, add_len, + input, output, tag, tag_len); } #endif /* !MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES) /* * Examples 1 to 3 from SP800-38C Appendix C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/certs.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/certs.c deleted file mode 100644 index 5b2948d652..0000000000 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/certs.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1746 +0,0 @@ -/* - * X.509 test certificates - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ - -#include "common.h" - -#include "mbedtls/certs.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) - -/* - * Test CA Certificates - * - * We define test CA certificates for each choice of the following parameters: - * - PEM or DER encoding - * - SHA-1 or SHA-256 hash - * - RSA or EC key - * - * Things to add: - * - multiple EC curve types - * - */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/test-ca2.crt */ -/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CA_CRT_EC_PEM tests/data_files/test-ca2.crt */ -#define TEST_CA_CRT_EC_PEM \ - "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ - "MIICBDCCAYigAwIBAgIJAMFD4n5iQ8zoMAwGCCqGSM49BAMCBQAwPjELMAkGA1UE\r\n" \ - "BhMCTkwxETAPBgNVBAoMCFBvbGFyU1NMMRwwGgYDVQQDDBNQb2xhcnNzbCBUZXN0\r\n" \ - "IEVDIENBMB4XDTE5MDIxMDE0NDQwMFoXDTI5MDIxMDE0NDQwMFowPjELMAkGA1UE\r\n" \ - "BhMCTkwxETAPBgNVBAoMCFBvbGFyU1NMMRwwGgYDVQQDDBNQb2xhcnNzbCBUZXN0\r\n" \ - "IEVDIENBMHYwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACIDYgAEw9orNEE3WC+HVv78ibopQ0tO\r\n" \ - "4G7DDldTMzlY1FK0kZU5CyPfXxckYkj8GpUpziwth8KIUoCv1mqrId240xxuWLjK\r\n" \ - "6LJpjvNBrSnDtF91p0dv1RkpVWmaUzsgtGYWYDMeo1AwTjAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/\r\n" \ - "MB0GA1UdDgQWBBSdbSAkSQE/K8t4tRm8fiTJ2/s2fDAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBSdbSAk\r\n" \ - "SQE/K8t4tRm8fiTJ2/s2fDAMBggqhkjOPQQDAgUAA2gAMGUCMFHKrjAPpHB0BN1a\r\n" \ - "LH8TwcJ3vh0AxeKZj30mRdOKBmg/jLS3rU3g8VQBHpn8sOTTBwIxANxPO5AerimZ\r\n" \ - "hCjMe0d4CTHf1gFZMF70+IqEP+o5VHsIp2Cqvflb0VGWFC5l9a4cQg==\r\n" \ - "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is generated from tests/data_files/test-ca2.crt.der using `xxd -i`. */ -/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CA_CRT_EC_DER tests/data_files/test-ca2.crt.der */ -#define TEST_CA_CRT_EC_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x04, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x88, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ - 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x43, 0xe2, 0x7e, 0x62, 0x43, 0xcc, 0xe8, \ - 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, \ - 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, \ - 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ - 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ - 0x31, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x1a, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x13, 0x50, \ - 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x73, 0x73, 0x6c, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, \ - 0x20, 0x45, 0x43, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x31, 0x39, \ - 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, 0x5a, 0x17, \ - 0x0d, 0x32, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, \ - 0x30, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x3e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, \ - 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ - 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ - 0x31, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x1a, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x13, 0x50, \ - 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x73, 0x73, 0x6c, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, \ - 0x20, 0x45, 0x43, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x76, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x07, \ - 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x81, 0x04, \ - 0x00, 0x22, 0x03, 0x62, 0x00, 0x04, 0xc3, 0xda, 0x2b, 0x34, 0x41, 0x37, \ - 0x58, 0x2f, 0x87, 0x56, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0x89, 0xba, 0x29, 0x43, 0x4b, 0x4e, \ - 0xe0, 0x6e, 0xc3, 0x0e, 0x57, 0x53, 0x33, 0x39, 0x58, 0xd4, 0x52, 0xb4, \ - 0x91, 0x95, 0x39, 0x0b, 0x23, 0xdf, 0x5f, 0x17, 0x24, 0x62, 0x48, 0xfc, \ - 0x1a, 0x95, 0x29, 0xce, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x87, 0xc2, 0x88, 0x52, 0x80, 0xaf, \ - 0xd6, 0x6a, 0xab, 0x21, 0xdd, 0xb8, 0xd3, 0x1c, 0x6e, 0x58, 0xb8, 0xca, \ - 0xe8, 0xb2, 0x69, 0x8e, 0xf3, 0x41, 0xad, 0x29, 0xc3, 0xb4, 0x5f, 0x75, \ - 0xa7, 0x47, 0x6f, 0xd5, 0x19, 0x29, 0x55, 0x69, 0x9a, 0x53, 0x3b, 0x20, \ - 0xb4, 0x66, 0x16, 0x60, 0x33, 0x1e, 0xa3, 0x50, 0x30, 0x4e, 0x30, 0x0c, \ - 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x05, 0x30, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, \ - 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0x9d, \ - 0x6d, 0x20, 0x24, 0x49, 0x01, 0x3f, 0x2b, 0xcb, 0x78, 0xb5, 0x19, 0xbc, \ - 0x7e, 0x24, 0xc9, 0xdb, 0xfb, 0x36, 0x7c, 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ - 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x80, 0x14, 0x9d, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x24, \ - 0x49, 0x01, 0x3f, 0x2b, 0xcb, 0x78, 0xb5, 0x19, 0xbc, 0x7e, 0x24, 0xc9, \ - 0xdb, 0xfb, 0x36, 0x7c, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, \ - 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x68, 0x00, 0x30, 0x65, 0x02, \ - 0x30, 0x51, 0xca, 0xae, 0x30, 0x0f, 0xa4, 0x70, 0x74, 0x04, 0xdd, 0x5a, \ - 0x2c, 0x7f, 0x13, 0xc1, 0xc2, 0x77, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x00, 0xc5, 0xe2, 0x99, \ - 0x8f, 0x7d, 0x26, 0x45, 0xd3, 0x8a, 0x06, 0x68, 0x3f, 0x8c, 0xb4, 0xb7, \ - 0xad, 0x4d, 0xe0, 0xf1, 0x54, 0x01, 0x1e, 0x99, 0xfc, 0xb0, 0xe4, 0xd3, \ - 0x07, 0x02, 0x31, 0x00, 0xdc, 0x4f, 0x3b, 0x90, 0x1e, 0xae, 0x29, 0x99, \ - 0x84, 0x28, 0xcc, 0x7b, 0x47, 0x78, 0x09, 0x31, 0xdf, 0xd6, 0x01, 0x59, \ - 0x30, 0x5e, 0xf4, 0xf8, 0x8a, 0x84, 0x3f, 0xea, 0x39, 0x54, 0x7b, 0x08, \ - 0xa7, 0x60, 0xaa, 0xbd, 0xf9, 0x5b, 0xd1, 0x51, 0x96, 0x14, 0x2e, 0x65, \ - 0xf5, 0xae, 0x1c, 0x42 \ -} -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/test-ca2.key.enc */ -/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CA_KEY_EC_PEM tests/data_files/test-ca2.key.enc */ -#define TEST_CA_KEY_EC_PEM \ - "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" \ - "Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED\r\n" \ - "DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,307EAB469933D64E\r\n" \ - "\r\n" \ - "IxbrRmKcAzctJqPdTQLA4SWyBYYGYJVkYEna+F7Pa5t5Yg/gKADrFKcm6B72e7DG\r\n" \ - "ihExtZI648s0zdYw6qSJ74vrPSuWDe5qm93BqsfVH9svtCzWHW0pm1p0KTBCFfUq\r\n" \ - "UsuWTITwJImcnlAs1gaRZ3sAWm7cOUidL0fo2G0fYUFNcYoCSLffCFTEHBuPnagb\r\n" \ - "a77x/sY1Bvii8S9/XhDTb6pTMx06wzrm\r\n" \ - "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" -/* END FILE */ - -#define TEST_CA_PWD_EC_PEM "PolarSSLTest" - -/* This is generated from tests/data_files/test-ca2.key.der using `xxd -i`. */ -/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CA_KEY_EC_DER tests/data_files/test-ca2.key.der */ -#define TEST_CA_KEY_EC_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x81, 0xa4, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x30, 0x83, 0xd9, 0x15, 0x0e, \ - 0xa0, 0x71, 0xf0, 0x57, 0x10, 0x33, 0xa3, 0x38, 0xb8, 0x86, 0xc1, 0xa6, \ - 0x11, 0x5d, 0x6d, 0xb4, 0x03, 0xe1, 0x29, 0x76, 0x45, 0xd7, 0x87, 0x6f, \ - 0x23, 0xab, 0x44, 0x20, 0xea, 0x64, 0x7b, 0x85, 0xb1, 0x76, 0xe7, 0x85, \ - 0x95, 0xaa, 0x74, 0xd6, 0xd1, 0xa4, 0x5e, 0xea, 0xa0, 0x07, 0x06, 0x05, \ - 0x2b, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x22, 0xa1, 0x64, 0x03, 0x62, 0x00, 0x04, 0xc3, \ - 0xda, 0x2b, 0x34, 0x41, 0x37, 0x58, 0x2f, 0x87, 0x56, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0x89, \ - 0xba, 0x29, 0x43, 0x4b, 0x4e, 0xe0, 0x6e, 0xc3, 0x0e, 0x57, 0x53, 0x33, \ - 0x39, 0x58, 0xd4, 0x52, 0xb4, 0x91, 0x95, 0x39, 0x0b, 0x23, 0xdf, 0x5f, \ - 0x17, 0x24, 0x62, 0x48, 0xfc, 0x1a, 0x95, 0x29, 0xce, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x87, \ - 0xc2, 0x88, 0x52, 0x80, 0xaf, 0xd6, 0x6a, 0xab, 0x21, 0xdd, 0xb8, 0xd3, \ - 0x1c, 0x6e, 0x58, 0xb8, 0xca, 0xe8, 0xb2, 0x69, 0x8e, 0xf3, 0x41, 0xad, \ - 0x29, 0xc3, 0xb4, 0x5f, 0x75, 0xa7, 0x47, 0x6f, 0xd5, 0x19, 0x29, 0x55, \ - 0x69, 0x9a, 0x53, 0x3b, 0x20, 0xb4, 0x66, 0x16, 0x60, 0x33, 0x1e \ -} -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/test-ca-sha256.crt. */ -/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM tests/data_files/test-ca-sha256.crt */ -#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM \ - "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ - "MIIDQTCCAimgAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" \ - "MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ - "MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDAwWhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDAwWjA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ - "A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwggEiMA0G\r\n" \ - "CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDA3zf8F7vglp0/ht6WMn1EpRagzSHx\r\n" \ - "mdTs6st8GFgIlKXsm8WL3xoemTiZhx57wI053zhdcHgH057Zk+i5clHFzqMwUqny\r\n" \ - "50BwFMtEonILwuVA+T7lpg6z+exKY8C4KQB0nFc7qKUEkHHxvYPZP9al4jwqj+8n\r\n" \ - "YMPGn8u67GB9t+aEMr5P+1gmIgNb1LTV+/Xjli5wwOQuvfwu7uJBVcA0Ln0kcmnL\r\n" \ - "R7EUQIN9Z/SG9jGr8XmksrUuEvmEF/Bibyc+E1ixVA0hmnM3oTDPb5Lc9un8rNsu\r\n" \ - "KNF+AksjoBXyOGVkCeoMbo4bF6BxyLObyavpw/LPh5aPgAIynplYb6LVAgMBAAGj\r\n" \ - "UDBOMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wHQYDVR0OBBYEFLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/\r\n" \ - "MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUA\r\n" \ - "A4IBAQA4qFSCth2q22uJIdE4KGHJsJjVEfw2/xn+MkTvCMfxVrvmRvqCtjE4tKDl\r\n" \ - "oK4MxFOek07oDZwvtAT9ijn1hHftTNS7RH9zd/fxNpfcHnMZXVC4w4DNA1fSANtW\r\n" \ - "5sY1JB5Je9jScrsLSS+mAjyv0Ow3Hb2Bix8wu7xNNrV5fIf7Ubm+wt6SqEBxu3Kb\r\n" \ - "+EfObAT4huf3czznhH3C17ed6NSbXwoXfby7stWUDeRJv08RaFOykf/Aae7bY5PL\r\n" \ - "yTVrkAnikMntJ9YI+hNNYt3inqq11A5cN0+rVTst8UKCxzQ4GpvroSwPKTFkbMw4\r\n" \ - "/anT1dVxr/BtwJfiESoK3/4CeXR1\r\n" \ - "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is generated from tests/data_files/test-ca-sha256.crt.der - * using `xxd -i`. */ -/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER tests/data_files/test-ca-sha256.crt.der */ -#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0x41, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x29, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ - 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x03, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, \ - 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, \ - 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, \ - 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, \ - 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ - 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ - 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, \ - 0x31, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, \ - 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, \ - 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ - 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ - 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ - 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, \ - 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, \ - 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, \ - 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, \ - 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, \ - 0x01, 0x00, 0xc0, 0xdf, 0x37, 0xfc, 0x17, 0xbb, 0xe0, 0x96, 0x9d, 0x3f, \ - 0x86, 0xde, 0x96, 0x32, 0x7d, 0x44, 0xa5, 0x16, 0xa0, 0xcd, 0x21, 0xf1, \ - 0x99, 0xd4, 0xec, 0xea, 0xcb, 0x7c, 0x18, 0x58, 0x08, 0x94, 0xa5, 0xec, \ - 0x9b, 0xc5, 0x8b, 0xdf, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0x99, 0x38, 0x99, 0x87, 0x1e, 0x7b, \ - 0xc0, 0x8d, 0x39, 0xdf, 0x38, 0x5d, 0x70, 0x78, 0x07, 0xd3, 0x9e, 0xd9, \ - 0x93, 0xe8, 0xb9, 0x72, 0x51, 0xc5, 0xce, 0xa3, 0x30, 0x52, 0xa9, 0xf2, \ - 0xe7, 0x40, 0x70, 0x14, 0xcb, 0x44, 0xa2, 0x72, 0x0b, 0xc2, 0xe5, 0x40, \ - 0xf9, 0x3e, 0xe5, 0xa6, 0x0e, 0xb3, 0xf9, 0xec, 0x4a, 0x63, 0xc0, 0xb8, \ - 0x29, 0x00, 0x74, 0x9c, 0x57, 0x3b, 0xa8, 0xa5, 0x04, 0x90, 0x71, 0xf1, \ - 0xbd, 0x83, 0xd9, 0x3f, 0xd6, 0xa5, 0xe2, 0x3c, 0x2a, 0x8f, 0xef, 0x27, \ - 0x60, 0xc3, 0xc6, 0x9f, 0xcb, 0xba, 0xec, 0x60, 0x7d, 0xb7, 0xe6, 0x84, \ - 0x32, 0xbe, 0x4f, 0xfb, 0x58, 0x26, 0x22, 0x03, 0x5b, 0xd4, 0xb4, 0xd5, \ - 0xfb, 0xf5, 0xe3, 0x96, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc0, 0xe4, 0x2e, 0xbd, 0xfc, 0x2e, \ - 0xee, 0xe2, 0x41, 0x55, 0xc0, 0x34, 0x2e, 0x7d, 0x24, 0x72, 0x69, 0xcb, \ - 0x47, 0xb1, 0x14, 0x40, 0x83, 0x7d, 0x67, 0xf4, 0x86, 0xf6, 0x31, 0xab, \ - 0xf1, 0x79, 0xa4, 0xb2, 0xb5, 0x2e, 0x12, 0xf9, 0x84, 0x17, 0xf0, 0x62, \ - 0x6f, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x13, 0x58, 0xb1, 0x54, 0x0d, 0x21, 0x9a, 0x73, 0x37, \ - 0xa1, 0x30, 0xcf, 0x6f, 0x92, 0xdc, 0xf6, 0xe9, 0xfc, 0xac, 0xdb, 0x2e, \ - 0x28, 0xd1, 0x7e, 0x02, 0x4b, 0x23, 0xa0, 0x15, 0xf2, 0x38, 0x65, 0x64, \ - 0x09, 0xea, 0x0c, 0x6e, 0x8e, 0x1b, 0x17, 0xa0, 0x71, 0xc8, 0xb3, 0x9b, \ - 0xc9, 0xab, 0xe9, 0xc3, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0x87, 0x96, 0x8f, 0x80, 0x02, 0x32, \ - 0x9e, 0x99, 0x58, 0x6f, 0xa2, 0xd5, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0xa3, \ - 0x50, 0x30, 0x4e, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x05, \ - 0x30, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, \ - 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0xb4, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, \ - 0xf6, 0xb9, 0xd5, 0xa6, 0x95, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, \ - 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x80, \ - 0x14, 0xb4, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, 0xf6, 0xb9, 0xd5, \ - 0xa6, 0x95, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, \ - 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, \ - 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x38, 0xa8, 0x54, 0x82, 0xb6, 0x1d, 0xaa, \ - 0xdb, 0x6b, 0x89, 0x21, 0xd1, 0x38, 0x28, 0x61, 0xc9, 0xb0, 0x98, 0xd5, \ - 0x11, 0xfc, 0x36, 0xff, 0x19, 0xfe, 0x32, 0x44, 0xef, 0x08, 0xc7, 0xf1, \ - 0x56, 0xbb, 0xe6, 0x46, 0xfa, 0x82, 0xb6, 0x31, 0x38, 0xb4, 0xa0, 0xe5, \ - 0xa0, 0xae, 0x0c, 0xc4, 0x53, 0x9e, 0x93, 0x4e, 0xe8, 0x0d, 0x9c, 0x2f, \ - 0xb4, 0x04, 0xfd, 0x8a, 0x39, 0xf5, 0x84, 0x77, 0xed, 0x4c, 0xd4, 0xbb, \ - 0x44, 0x7f, 0x73, 0x77, 0xf7, 0xf1, 0x36, 0x97, 0xdc, 0x1e, 0x73, 0x19, \ - 0x5d, 0x50, 0xb8, 0xc3, 0x80, 0xcd, 0x03, 0x57, 0xd2, 0x00, 0xdb, 0x56, \ - 0xe6, 0xc6, 0x35, 0x24, 0x1e, 0x49, 0x7b, 0xd8, 0xd2, 0x72, 0xbb, 0x0b, \ - 0x49, 0x2f, 0xa6, 0x02, 0x3c, 0xaf, 0xd0, 0xec, 0x37, 0x1d, 0xbd, 0x81, \ - 0x8b, 0x1f, 0x30, 0xbb, 0xbc, 0x4d, 0x36, 0xb5, 0x79, 0x7c, 0x87, 0xfb, \ - 0x51, 0xb9, 0xbe, 0xc2, 0xde, 0x92, 0xa8, 0x40, 0x71, 0xbb, 0x72, 0x9b, \ - 0xf8, 0x47, 0xce, 0x6c, 0x04, 0xf8, 0x86, 0xe7, 0xf7, 0x73, 0x3c, 0xe7, \ - 0x84, 0x7d, 0xc2, 0xd7, 0xb7, 0x9d, 0xe8, 0xd4, 0x9b, 0x5f, 0x0a, 0x17, \ - 0x7d, 0xbc, 0xbb, 0xb2, 0xd5, 0x94, 0x0d, 0xe4, 0x49, 0xbf, 0x4f, 0x11, \ - 0x68, 0x53, 0xb2, 0x91, 0xff, 0xc0, 0x69, 0xee, 0xdb, 0x63, 0x93, 0xcb, \ - 0xc9, 0x35, 0x6b, 0x90, 0x09, 0xe2, 0x90, 0xc9, 0xed, 0x27, 0xd6, 0x08, \ - 0xfa, 0x13, 0x4d, 0x62, 0xdd, 0xe2, 0x9e, 0xaa, 0xb5, 0xd4, 0x0e, 0x5c, \ - 0x37, 0x4f, 0xab, 0x55, 0x3b, 0x2d, 0xf1, 0x42, 0x82, 0xc7, 0x34, 0x38, \ - 0x1a, 0x9b, 0xeb, 0xa1, 0x2c, 0x0f, 0x29, 0x31, 0x64, 0x6c, 0xcc, 0x38, \ - 0xfd, 0xa9, 0xd3, 0xd5, 0xd5, 0x71, 0xaf, 0xf0, 0x6d, 0xc0, 0x97, 0xe2, \ - 0x11, 0x2a, 0x0a, 0xdf, 0xfe, 0x02, 0x79, 0x74, 0x75 \ -} -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/test-ca-sha1.crt. */ -/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM tests/data_files/test-ca-sha1.crt */ -#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM \ - "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ - "MIIDQTCCAimgAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" \ - "MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ - "MTEwMjEyMTQ0NDAwWhcNMjEwMjEyMTQ0NDAwWjA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ - "A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwggEiMA0G\r\n" \ - "CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDA3zf8F7vglp0/ht6WMn1EpRagzSHx\r\n" \ - "mdTs6st8GFgIlKXsm8WL3xoemTiZhx57wI053zhdcHgH057Zk+i5clHFzqMwUqny\r\n" \ - "50BwFMtEonILwuVA+T7lpg6z+exKY8C4KQB0nFc7qKUEkHHxvYPZP9al4jwqj+8n\r\n" \ - "YMPGn8u67GB9t+aEMr5P+1gmIgNb1LTV+/Xjli5wwOQuvfwu7uJBVcA0Ln0kcmnL\r\n" \ - "R7EUQIN9Z/SG9jGr8XmksrUuEvmEF/Bibyc+E1ixVA0hmnM3oTDPb5Lc9un8rNsu\r\n" \ - "KNF+AksjoBXyOGVkCeoMbo4bF6BxyLObyavpw/LPh5aPgAIynplYb6LVAgMBAAGj\r\n" \ - "UDBOMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wHQYDVR0OBBYEFLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/\r\n" \ - "MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFLRa5KWz3tJS9rnVppUP6z68x/3/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUA\r\n" \ - "A4IBAQABE3OEPfEd/bcJW5ZdU3/VgPNS4tMzh8gnJP/V2FcvFtGylMpQq6YnEBYI\r\n" \ - "yBHAL4DRvlMY5rnXGBp3ODR8MpqHC6AquRTCLzjS57iYff//4QFQqW9n92zctspv\r\n" \ - "czkaPKgjqo1No3Uq0Xaz10rcxyTUPrf5wNVRZ2V0KvllvAAVSzbI4mpdUXztjhST\r\n" \ - "S5A2BeWQAAOr0zq1F7TSRVJpJs7jmB2ai/igkh1IAjcuwV6VwlP+sbw0gjQ0NpGM\r\n" \ - "iHpnlzRAi/tIbtOvMIGOBU2TIfax/5jq1agUx5aPmT5TWAiJPOOP6l5xXnDwxeYS\r\n" \ - "NWqiX9GyusBZjezaCaHabjDLU0qQ\r\n" \ - "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/test-ca-sha1.crt.der. */ -/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER tests/data_files/test-ca-sha1.crt.der */ -#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0x41, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x29, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ - 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x03, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, \ - 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, \ - 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, \ - 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, \ - 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ - 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ - 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, \ - 0x31, 0x31, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x32, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, \ - 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x32, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, \ - 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ - 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ - 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ - 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, \ - 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, \ - 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, \ - 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, \ - 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, \ - 0x01, 0x00, 0xc0, 0xdf, 0x37, 0xfc, 0x17, 0xbb, 0xe0, 0x96, 0x9d, 0x3f, \ - 0x86, 0xde, 0x96, 0x32, 0x7d, 0x44, 0xa5, 0x16, 0xa0, 0xcd, 0x21, 0xf1, \ - 0x99, 0xd4, 0xec, 0xea, 0xcb, 0x7c, 0x18, 0x58, 0x08, 0x94, 0xa5, 0xec, \ - 0x9b, 0xc5, 0x8b, 0xdf, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0x99, 0x38, 0x99, 0x87, 0x1e, 0x7b, \ - 0xc0, 0x8d, 0x39, 0xdf, 0x38, 0x5d, 0x70, 0x78, 0x07, 0xd3, 0x9e, 0xd9, \ - 0x93, 0xe8, 0xb9, 0x72, 0x51, 0xc5, 0xce, 0xa3, 0x30, 0x52, 0xa9, 0xf2, \ - 0xe7, 0x40, 0x70, 0x14, 0xcb, 0x44, 0xa2, 0x72, 0x0b, 0xc2, 0xe5, 0x40, \ - 0xf9, 0x3e, 0xe5, 0xa6, 0x0e, 0xb3, 0xf9, 0xec, 0x4a, 0x63, 0xc0, 0xb8, \ - 0x29, 0x00, 0x74, 0x9c, 0x57, 0x3b, 0xa8, 0xa5, 0x04, 0x90, 0x71, 0xf1, \ - 0xbd, 0x83, 0xd9, 0x3f, 0xd6, 0xa5, 0xe2, 0x3c, 0x2a, 0x8f, 0xef, 0x27, \ - 0x60, 0xc3, 0xc6, 0x9f, 0xcb, 0xba, 0xec, 0x60, 0x7d, 0xb7, 0xe6, 0x84, \ - 0x32, 0xbe, 0x4f, 0xfb, 0x58, 0x26, 0x22, 0x03, 0x5b, 0xd4, 0xb4, 0xd5, \ - 0xfb, 0xf5, 0xe3, 0x96, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc0, 0xe4, 0x2e, 0xbd, 0xfc, 0x2e, \ - 0xee, 0xe2, 0x41, 0x55, 0xc0, 0x34, 0x2e, 0x7d, 0x24, 0x72, 0x69, 0xcb, \ - 0x47, 0xb1, 0x14, 0x40, 0x83, 0x7d, 0x67, 0xf4, 0x86, 0xf6, 0x31, 0xab, \ - 0xf1, 0x79, 0xa4, 0xb2, 0xb5, 0x2e, 0x12, 0xf9, 0x84, 0x17, 0xf0, 0x62, \ - 0x6f, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x13, 0x58, 0xb1, 0x54, 0x0d, 0x21, 0x9a, 0x73, 0x37, \ - 0xa1, 0x30, 0xcf, 0x6f, 0x92, 0xdc, 0xf6, 0xe9, 0xfc, 0xac, 0xdb, 0x2e, \ - 0x28, 0xd1, 0x7e, 0x02, 0x4b, 0x23, 0xa0, 0x15, 0xf2, 0x38, 0x65, 0x64, \ - 0x09, 0xea, 0x0c, 0x6e, 0x8e, 0x1b, 0x17, 0xa0, 0x71, 0xc8, 0xb3, 0x9b, \ - 0xc9, 0xab, 0xe9, 0xc3, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0x87, 0x96, 0x8f, 0x80, 0x02, 0x32, \ - 0x9e, 0x99, 0x58, 0x6f, 0xa2, 0xd5, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0xa3, \ - 0x50, 0x30, 0x4e, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x05, \ - 0x30, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, \ - 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0xb4, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, \ - 0xf6, 0xb9, 0xd5, 0xa6, 0x95, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, \ - 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x80, \ - 0x14, 0xb4, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, 0xf6, 0xb9, 0xd5, \ - 0xa6, 0x95, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, \ - 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, \ - 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x13, 0x73, 0x84, 0x3d, 0xf1, 0x1d, \ - 0xfd, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x5b, 0x96, 0x5d, 0x53, 0x7f, 0xd5, 0x80, 0xf3, 0x52, \ - 0xe2, 0xd3, 0x33, 0x87, 0xc8, 0x27, 0x24, 0xff, 0xd5, 0xd8, 0x57, 0x2f, \ - 0x16, 0xd1, 0xb2, 0x94, 0xca, 0x50, 0xab, 0xa6, 0x27, 0x10, 0x16, 0x08, \ - 0xc8, 0x11, 0xc0, 0x2f, 0x80, 0xd1, 0xbe, 0x53, 0x18, 0xe6, 0xb9, 0xd7, \ - 0x18, 0x1a, 0x77, 0x38, 0x34, 0x7c, 0x32, 0x9a, 0x87, 0x0b, 0xa0, 0x2a, \ - 0xb9, 0x14, 0xc2, 0x2f, 0x38, 0xd2, 0xe7, 0xb8, 0x98, 0x7d, 0xff, 0xff, \ - 0xe1, 0x01, 0x50, 0xa9, 0x6f, 0x67, 0xf7, 0x6c, 0xdc, 0xb6, 0xca, 0x6f, \ - 0x73, 0x39, 0x1a, 0x3c, 0xa8, 0x23, 0xaa, 0x8d, 0x4d, 0xa3, 0x75, 0x2a, \ - 0xd1, 0x76, 0xb3, 0xd7, 0x4a, 0xdc, 0xc7, 0x24, 0xd4, 0x3e, 0xb7, 0xf9, \ - 0xc0, 0xd5, 0x51, 0x67, 0x65, 0x74, 0x2a, 0xf9, 0x65, 0xbc, 0x00, 0x15, \ - 0x4b, 0x36, 0xc8, 0xe2, 0x6a, 0x5d, 0x51, 0x7c, 0xed, 0x8e, 0x14, 0x93, \ - 0x4b, 0x90, 0x36, 0x05, 0xe5, 0x90, 0x00, 0x03, 0xab, 0xd3, 0x3a, 0xb5, \ - 0x17, 0xb4, 0xd2, 0x45, 0x52, 0x69, 0x26, 0xce, 0xe3, 0x98, 0x1d, 0x9a, \ - 0x8b, 0xf8, 0xa0, 0x92, 0x1d, 0x48, 0x02, 0x37, 0x2e, 0xc1, 0x5e, 0x95, \ - 0xc2, 0x53, 0xfe, 0xb1, 0xbc, 0x34, 0x82, 0x34, 0x34, 0x36, 0x91, 0x8c, \ - 0x88, 0x7a, 0x67, 0x97, 0x34, 0x40, 0x8b, 0xfb, 0x48, 0x6e, 0xd3, 0xaf, \ - 0x30, 0x81, 0x8e, 0x05, 0x4d, 0x93, 0x21, 0xf6, 0xb1, 0xff, 0x98, 0xea, \ - 0xd5, 0xa8, 0x14, 0xc7, 0x96, 0x8f, 0x99, 0x3e, 0x53, 0x58, 0x08, 0x89, \ - 0x3c, 0xe3, 0x8f, 0xea, 0x5e, 0x71, 0x5e, 0x70, 0xf0, 0xc5, 0xe6, 0x12, \ - 0x35, 0x6a, 0xa2, 0x5f, 0xd1, 0xb2, 0xba, 0xc0, 0x59, 0x8d, 0xec, 0xda, \ - 0x09, 0xa1, 0xda, 0x6e, 0x30, 0xcb, 0x53, 0x4a, 0x90 \ -} -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/test-ca.key */ -/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_PEM tests/data_files/test-ca.key */ -#define TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_PEM \ - "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" \ - "Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED\r\n" \ - "AES-128-CBC,781840E6B804AE83D2AF71127C4CE314\r\n" \ - "\r\n" \ - "etQ3xgGLbuYF9vR1km03TH5fwfly1hOlix0PtfQ+t9HG065vTtSEHYc/OyHwdy79\r\n" \ - "NCLX5RUrPh06E/XlKzMNVHAXqkwFnIwNzRLsOozeP1L7iZEZb9QMeiN5Org+btCO\r\n" \ - "bylXPB4YirfuE7GSJalWY/pq3FQtD33zTIKmNhXfVj3sbwGI/8D9XjaKUb8PODOB\r\n" \ - "skOalmx6RvYRvg0lmRxB3+T3wejIsrrDPweYqte9B6dVHIVG1ZmvoA6/wnKZZZeV\r\n" \ - "sjj8OpL3OwUBrjuGSknE9Rs6kCuSCbHOYVK8VzcZmCYpie0TFnb3Sk8M6vjfW+45\r\n" \ - "U7WUMlSAPxKH6lJDzWdwHqLvsVJwuNnaAaBXg9/8U/rzQEWuq8Ar3s8fw2Jg3F1G\r\n" \ - "L6N5ZAEfCz3Sa0N9WKafR/RSQj+rq8Z3w4POAafhbzk249uo5K8B1Z3cQwLxeXIl\r\n" \ - "UbRQz1TZy4oNTfQzCahYruPNyvwgTkfwAFFvbLAdaiJd2ZtLBoqYE64TYakYnvcC\r\n" \ - "itim1bmySIKoxlMfBGFmMuF03epT0pSx701jlGzGi0l0m16NEjoVxDwo5j93SmiM\r\n" \ - "sQdjC1lOGk2iCLkphIQqHFjFJYWjvh1UUIqWZf+ZWOOxlf4x9a1pUVj6FvtECxNB\r\n" \ - "/mA/m4Iq4LAuVXHE1MpHeq067lJ6wWlrsb2WVmiNGfQ2AC7fMtpcPuunBVT9NV1m\r\n" \ - "1rbDzIgLIWAzqz/cy3N8Q8vfxnrFtmNUyM191Zyq+YF14hIKWX9J1qR4LXwWAzVV\r\n" \ - "UrC8IL4pA2mtRkW4qFsB0EmHAxO/cedDTPjVFty5WSzhNuvYZxX45HAkGIfK6d21\r\n" \ - "7WHPhHG+zaaUTWMUVixB0IcKp6RecjYPFzBHS0YeX88Ue2cyT/90jMiQ9ssOgRrG\r\n" \ - "ZJRJvZAc3TSCnY9sNPYoGrJPiZuCnlUj3ENNurYVy12ai0WFxwnNUZjRUhDS6hjm\r\n" \ - "cDHD5TlI9MZ6M+Mb/Bw4Ig8HuTHOtQBYD9vhtXsG+B7H/j6cS+1umaKjrnG/kK4W\r\n" \ - "R6YXwM2faAi+DwgjjoMXSzRqSTF8PdTIWbAXo3bc2qsXPTMBA8PEp4nb5scHZ4Ts\r\n" \ - "EcBNp2jv0j4gBkRmGIab17cWMrlagjFy89DhqZUFwKdeZs+yJ92A5xstWxOUfpEP\r\n" \ - "90T/bsp1G5d7WW5fl2TRJvYJNDM+djkKIh0zCkduiZ36oVM6nDdbjmXqjQXopeSD\r\n" \ - "gtOourBRF8g99W0fW8QT+yPhP0Pkyz6EG8eQO6Zwh439xdoVwu9jUzQAPmZ0uNeR\r\n" \ - "xTXXihYyv72z27rInjLiIPXL25K9eDVLlcSR3RyG7YYgjdQAL2VJDLcBz5jox1uQ\r\n" \ - "0guoD5wmfu2FWLqYE7HeTYntdY53lCflwq0GHRMjrrsVpx+5VDQ6Yi47Ny9SWLcp\r\n" \ - "fPI3iBkXuGRWupzs6N4pQdSO0dU28KfpMM5QvFoLIn67brCHEQij4dgFrCTYEyBX\r\n" \ - "9+jiNImUFYUhAFuxvUbfZt4O/ABLIElvHLfJs1oYCmI/nWpvLFqXB5rnzPNfEi0H\r\n" \ - "PGGe1Hj/t+CJIp/6ios3yNy2QtXO754TZH2UVu51Ykyig5PFjZVoUkbRvHQYcWfU\r\n" \ - "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" -/* END FILE */ - -#define TEST_CA_PWD_RSA_PEM "PolarSSLTest" - -/* This was generated from test-ca.key.der using `xxd -i`. */ -/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_DER tests/data_files/test-ca.key.der */ -#define TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x82, 0x04, 0xa4, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, \ - 0xc0, 0xdf, 0x37, 0xfc, 0x17, 0xbb, 0xe0, 0x96, 0x9d, 0x3f, 0x86, 0xde, \ - 0x96, 0x32, 0x7d, 0x44, 0xa5, 0x16, 0xa0, 0xcd, 0x21, 0xf1, 0x99, 0xd4, \ - 0xec, 0xea, 0xcb, 0x7c, 0x18, 0x58, 0x08, 0x94, 0xa5, 0xec, 0x9b, 0xc5, \ - 0x8b, 0xdf, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0x99, 0x38, 0x99, 0x87, 0x1e, 0x7b, 0xc0, 0x8d, \ - 0x39, 0xdf, 0x38, 0x5d, 0x70, 0x78, 0x07, 0xd3, 0x9e, 0xd9, 0x93, 0xe8, \ - 0xb9, 0x72, 0x51, 0xc5, 0xce, 0xa3, 0x30, 0x52, 0xa9, 0xf2, 0xe7, 0x40, \ - 0x70, 0x14, 0xcb, 0x44, 0xa2, 0x72, 0x0b, 0xc2, 0xe5, 0x40, 0xf9, 0x3e, \ - 0xe5, 0xa6, 0x0e, 0xb3, 0xf9, 0xec, 0x4a, 0x63, 0xc0, 0xb8, 0x29, 0x00, \ - 0x74, 0x9c, 0x57, 0x3b, 0xa8, 0xa5, 0x04, 0x90, 0x71, 0xf1, 0xbd, 0x83, \ - 0xd9, 0x3f, 0xd6, 0xa5, 0xe2, 0x3c, 0x2a, 0x8f, 0xef, 0x27, 0x60, 0xc3, \ - 0xc6, 0x9f, 0xcb, 0xba, 0xec, 0x60, 0x7d, 0xb7, 0xe6, 0x84, 0x32, 0xbe, \ - 0x4f, 0xfb, 0x58, 0x26, 0x22, 0x03, 0x5b, 0xd4, 0xb4, 0xd5, 0xfb, 0xf5, \ - 0xe3, 0x96, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc0, 0xe4, 0x2e, 0xbd, 0xfc, 0x2e, 0xee, 0xe2, \ - 0x41, 0x55, 0xc0, 0x34, 0x2e, 0x7d, 0x24, 0x72, 0x69, 0xcb, 0x47, 0xb1, \ - 0x14, 0x40, 0x83, 0x7d, 0x67, 0xf4, 0x86, 0xf6, 0x31, 0xab, 0xf1, 0x79, \ - 0xa4, 0xb2, 0xb5, 0x2e, 0x12, 0xf9, 0x84, 0x17, 0xf0, 0x62, 0x6f, 0x27, \ - 0x3e, 0x13, 0x58, 0xb1, 0x54, 0x0d, 0x21, 0x9a, 0x73, 0x37, 0xa1, 0x30, \ - 0xcf, 0x6f, 0x92, 0xdc, 0xf6, 0xe9, 0xfc, 0xac, 0xdb, 0x2e, 0x28, 0xd1, \ - 0x7e, 0x02, 0x4b, 0x23, 0xa0, 0x15, 0xf2, 0x38, 0x65, 0x64, 0x09, 0xea, \ - 0x0c, 0x6e, 0x8e, 0x1b, 0x17, 0xa0, 0x71, 0xc8, 0xb3, 0x9b, 0xc9, 0xab, \ - 0xe9, 0xc3, 0xf2, 0xcf, 0x87, 0x96, 0x8f, 0x80, 0x02, 0x32, 0x9e, 0x99, \ - 0x58, 0x6f, 0xa2, 0xd5, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, \ - 0x00, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0x07, 0xd3, 0x34, 0x6f, 0xdb, 0xc9, 0x37, 0xb7, 0x84, \ - 0xdc, 0x37, 0x45, 0xe1, 0x63, 0xad, 0xb8, 0xb6, 0x75, 0xb1, 0xc7, 0x35, \ - 0xb4, 0x77, 0x2a, 0x5b, 0x77, 0xf9, 0x7e, 0xe0, 0xc1, 0xa3, 0xd1, 0xb7, \ - 0xcb, 0xa9, 0x5a, 0xc1, 0x87, 0xda, 0x5a, 0xfa, 0x17, 0xe4, 0xd5, 0x38, \ - 0x03, 0xde, 0x68, 0x98, 0x81, 0xec, 0xb5, 0xf2, 0x2a, 0x8d, 0xe9, 0x2c, \ - 0xf3, 0xa6, 0xe5, 0x32, 0x17, 0x7f, 0x33, 0x81, 0xe8, 0x38, 0x72, 0xd5, \ - 0x9c, 0xfa, 0x4e, 0xfb, 0x26, 0xf5, 0x15, 0x0b, 0xaf, 0x84, 0x66, 0xab, \ - 0x02, 0xe0, 0x18, 0xd5, 0x91, 0x7c, 0xd6, 0x8f, 0xc9, 0x4b, 0x76, 0x08, \ - 0x2b, 0x1d, 0x81, 0x68, 0x30, 0xe1, 0xfa, 0x70, 0x6c, 0x13, 0x4e, 0x10, \ - 0x03, 0x35, 0x3e, 0xc5, 0xca, 0x58, 0x20, 0x8a, 0x21, 0x18, 0x38, 0xa0, \ - 0x0f, 0xed, 0xc4, 0xbb, 0x45, 0x6f, 0xf5, 0x84, 0x5b, 0xb0, 0xcf, 0x4e, \ - 0x9d, 0x58, 0x13, 0x6b, 0x35, 0x35, 0x69, 0xa1, 0xd2, 0xc4, 0xf2, 0xc1, \ - 0x48, 0x04, 0x20, 0x51, 0xb9, 0x6b, 0xa4, 0x5d, 0xa5, 0x4b, 0x84, 0x88, \ - 0x43, 0x48, 0x99, 0x2c, 0xbb, 0xa4, 0x97, 0xd6, 0xd6, 0x18, 0xf6, 0xec, \ - 0x5c, 0xd1, 0x31, 0x49, 0xc9, 0xf2, 0x8f, 0x0b, 0x4d, 0xef, 0x09, 0x02, \ - 0xfe, 0x7d, 0xfd, 0xbb, 0xaf, 0x2b, 0x83, 0x94, 0x22, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x3e, \ - 0x66, 0xf5, 0xe0, 0x57, 0xdc, 0xf2, 0xed, 0x2c, 0x3e, 0x81, 0x74, 0x76, \ - 0x1e, 0x96, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x1e, 0x32, 0x0e, 0x14, 0x31, 0xd0, 0x74, 0xf0, \ - 0xf4, 0x07, 0xbd, 0xc3, 0xd1, 0x22, 0xc2, 0xa8, 0x95, 0x92, 0x06, 0x7f, \ - 0x43, 0x02, 0x91, 0xbc, 0xdd, 0x23, 0x01, 0x89, 0x94, 0x20, 0x44, 0x64, \ - 0xf5, 0x1d, 0x67, 0xd2, 0x8f, 0xe8, 0x69, 0xa5, 0x29, 0x25, 0xe6, 0x50, \ - 0x9c, 0xe3, 0xe9, 0xcb, 0x75, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xe2, 0x29, 0x3e, \ - 0xaa, 0x6b, 0xd5, 0x59, 0x1e, 0x9c, 0xe6, 0x47, 0xd5, 0xb6, 0xd7, 0xe3, \ - 0xf1, 0x8e, 0x9e, 0xe9, 0x83, 0x5f, 0x10, 0x9f, 0x63, 0xec, 0x04, 0x44, \ - 0xcc, 0x3f, 0xf8, 0xd9, 0x3a, 0x17, 0xe0, 0x4f, 0xfe, 0xd8, 0x4d, 0xcd, \ - 0x46, 0x54, 0x74, 0xbf, 0x0a, 0xc4, 0x67, 0x9c, 0xa7, 0xd8, 0x89, 0x65, \ - 0x4c, 0xfd, 0x58, 0x2a, 0x47, 0x0f, 0xf4, 0x37, 0xb6, 0x55, 0xb0, 0x1d, \ - 0xed, 0xa7, 0x39, 0xfc, 0x4f, 0xa3, 0xc4, 0x75, 0x3a, 0xa3, 0x98, 0xa7, \ - 0x45, 0xf5, 0x66, 0xcb, 0x7c, 0x65, 0xfb, 0x80, 0x23, 0xe6, 0xff, 0xfd, \ - 0x99, 0x1f, 0x8e, 0x6b, 0xff, 0x5e, 0x93, 0x66, 0xdf, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0xc3, \ - 0xf6, 0x38, 0x2e, 0xff, 0x69, 0xb5, 0xac, 0xae, 0xbb, 0xc6, 0x71, 0x16, \ - 0x6b, 0xd0, 0xf8, 0x22, 0xd9, 0xf8, 0xa2, 0x72, 0x20, 0xd2, 0xe2, 0x3a, \ - 0x70, 0x4b, 0xde, 0xab, 0x2f, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xda, 0x51, 0x9b, \ - 0xb8, 0xb2, 0x2a, 0x14, 0x75, 0x58, 0x40, 0x8d, 0x27, 0x70, 0xfa, 0x31, \ - 0x48, 0xb0, 0x20, 0x21, 0x34, 0xfa, 0x4c, 0x57, 0xa8, 0x11, 0x88, 0xf3, \ - 0xa7, 0xae, 0x21, 0xe9, 0xb6, 0x2b, 0xd1, 0xcd, 0xa7, 0xf8, 0xd8, 0x0c, \ - 0x8a, 0x76, 0x22, 0x35, 0x44, 0xce, 0x3f, 0x25, 0x29, 0x83, 0x7d, 0x79, \ - 0xa7, 0x31, 0xd6, 0xec, 0xb2, 0xbf, 0xda, 0x34, 0xb6, 0xf6, 0xb2, 0x3b, \ - 0xf3, 0x78, 0x5a, 0x04, 0x83, 0x33, 0x3e, 0xa2, 0xe2, 0x81, 0x82, 0x13, \ - 0xd4, 0x35, 0x17, 0x63, 0x9b, 0x9e, 0xc4, 0x8d, 0x91, 0x4c, 0x03, 0x77, \ - 0xc7, 0x71, 0x5b, 0xee, 0x83, 0x6d, 0xd5, 0x78, 0x88, 0xf6, 0x2c, 0x79, \ - 0xc2, 0x4a, 0xb4, 0x79, 0x90, 0x70, 0xbf, 0xdf, 0x34, 0x56, 0x96, 0x71, \ - 0xe3, 0x0e, 0x68, 0x91, 0xbc, 0xea, 0xcb, 0x33, 0xc0, 0xbe, 0x45, 0xd7, \ - 0xfc, 0x30, 0xfd, 0x01, 0x3b, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xd2, 0x9f, 0x2a, \ - 0xb7, 0x38, 0x19, 0xc7, 0x17, 0x95, 0x73, 0x78, 0xae, 0xf5, 0xcb, 0x75, \ - 0x83, 0x7f, 0x19, 0x4b, 0xcb, 0x86, 0xfb, 0x4a, 0x15, 0x9a, 0xb6, 0x17, \ - 0x04, 0x49, 0x07, 0x8d, 0xf6, 0x66, 0x4a, 0x06, 0xf6, 0x05, 0xa7, 0xdf, \ - 0x66, 0x82, 0x3c, 0xff, 0xb6, 0x1d, 0x57, 0x89, 0x33, 0x5f, 0x9c, 0x05, \ - 0x75, 0x7f, 0xf3, 0x5d, 0xdc, 0x34, 0x65, 0x72, 0x85, 0x22, 0xa4, 0x14, \ - 0x1b, 0x41, 0xc3, 0xe4, 0xd0, 0x9e, 0x69, 0xd5, 0xeb, 0x38, 0x74, 0x70, \ - 0x43, 0xdc, 0xd9, 0x50, 0xe4, 0x97, 0x6d, 0x73, 0xd6, 0xfb, 0xc8, 0xa7, \ - 0xfa, 0xb4, 0xc2, 0xc4, 0x9d, 0x5d, 0x0c, 0xd5, 0x9f, 0x79, 0xb3, 0x54, \ - 0xc2, 0xb7, 0x6c, 0x3d, 0x7d, 0xcb, 0x2d, 0xf8, 0xc4, 0xf3, 0x78, 0x5a, \ - 0x33, 0x2a, 0xb8, 0x0c, 0x6d, 0x06, 0xfa, 0xf2, 0x62, 0xd3, 0x42, 0xd0, \ - 0xbd, 0xc8, 0x4a, 0xa5, 0x0d, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xd4, 0xa9, 0x90, \ - 0x15, 0xde, 0xbf, 0x2c, 0xc4, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0xfb, 0xa1, 0xc2, 0xe4, 0x83, \ - 0xe3, 0x79, 0x65, 0x22, 0xd3, 0xb7, 0x49, 0x6c, 0x4d, 0x94, 0x1f, 0x22, \ - 0xb1, 0x60, 0xe7, 0x3a, 0x00, 0xb1, 0x38, 0xa2, 0xab, 0x0f, 0xb4, 0x6c, \ - 0xaa, 0xe7, 0x9e, 0x34, 0xe3, 0x7c, 0x40, 0x78, 0x53, 0xb2, 0xf9, 0x23, \ - 0xea, 0xa0, 0x9a, 0xea, 0x60, 0xc8, 0x8f, 0xa6, 0xaf, 0xdf, 0x29, 0x09, \ - 0x4b, 0x06, 0x1e, 0x31, 0xad, 0x17, 0xda, 0xd8, 0xd1, 0xe9, 0x33, 0xab, \ - 0x5b, 0x18, 0x08, 0x5b, 0x87, 0xf8, 0xa5, 0x1f, 0xfd, 0xbb, 0xdc, 0xd8, \ - 0xed, 0x97, 0x57, 0xe4, 0xc3, 0x73, 0xd6, 0xf0, 0x9e, 0x01, 0xa6, 0x9b, \ - 0x48, 0x8e, 0x7a, 0xb4, 0xbb, 0xe5, 0x88, 0x91, 0xc5, 0x2a, 0xdf, 0x4b, \ - 0xba, 0xd0, 0x8b, 0x3e, 0x03, 0x97, 0x77, 0x2f, 0x47, 0x7e, 0x51, 0x0c, \ - 0xae, 0x65, 0x8d, 0xde, 0x87, 0x02, 0x81, 0x80, 0x20, 0x24, 0x0f, 0xd2, \ - 0xaf, 0xc2, 0x28, 0x3b, 0x97, 0x20, 0xb2, 0x92, 0x49, 0xeb, 0x09, 0x68, \ - 0x40, 0xb2, 0xbe, 0xd1, 0xc3, 0x83, 0x94, 0x34, 0x38, 0xd6, 0xc9, 0xec, \ - 0x34, 0x09, 0xf9, 0x41, 0x6d, 0x5c, 0x42, 0x94, 0xf7, 0x04, 0xfc, 0x32, \ - 0x39, 0x69, 0xbc, 0x1c, 0xfb, 0x3e, 0x61, 0x98, 0xc0, 0x80, 0xd8, 0x36, \ - 0x47, 0xc3, 0x6d, 0xc2, 0x2e, 0xe7, 0x81, 0x2a, 0x17, 0x34, 0x64, 0x30, \ - 0x4e, 0x96, 0xbb, 0x26, 0x16, 0xb9, 0x41, 0x36, 0xfe, 0x8a, 0xd6, 0x53, \ - 0x7c, 0xaa, 0xec, 0x39, 0x42, 0x50, 0xef, 0xe3, 0xb3, 0x01, 0x28, 0x32, \ - 0xca, 0x6d, 0xf5, 0x9a, 0x1e, 0x9f, 0x37, 0xbe, 0xfe, 0x38, 0x20, 0x22, \ - 0x91, 0x8c, 0xcd, 0x95, 0x02, 0xf2, 0x4d, 0x6f, 0x1a, 0xb4, 0x43, 0xf0, \ - 0x19, 0xdf, 0x65, 0xc0, 0x92, 0xe7, 0x9d, 0x2f, 0x09, 0xe7, 0xec, 0x69, \ - 0xa8, 0xc2, 0x8f, 0x0d \ -} -/* END FILE */ - -/* - * Test server Certificates - * - * Test server certificates are defined for each choice - * of the following parameters: - * - PEM or DER encoding - * - SHA-1 or SHA-256 hash - * - RSA or EC key - * - * Things to add: - * - multiple EC curve types - */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/server5.crt. */ -/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_PEM tests/data_files/server5.crt */ -#define TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_PEM \ - "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ - "MIICHzCCAaWgAwIBAgIBCTAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjA+MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ - "A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxHDAaBgNVBAMME1BvbGFyc3NsIFRlc3QgRUMgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ - "MjMwNjE1MDMzNDE4WhcNMzMwNjEyMDMzNDE4WjA0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ - "A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxEjAQBgNVBAMMCWxvY2FsaG9zdDBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEG\r\n" \ - "CCqGSM49AwEHA0IABDfMVtl2CR5acj7HWS3/IG7ufPkGkXTQrRS192giWWKSTuUA\r\n" \ - "2CMR/+ov0jRdXRa9iojCa3cNVc2KKg76Aci07f+jgZ0wgZowCQYDVR0TBAIwADAd\r\n" \ - "BgNVHQ4EFgQUUGGlj9QH2deCAQzlZX+MY0anE74wbgYDVR0jBGcwZYAUnW0gJEkB\r\n" \ - "PyvLeLUZvH4kydv7NnyhQqRAMD4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAk5MMREwDwYDVQQKDAhQb2xh\r\n" \ - "clNTTDEcMBoGA1UEAwwTUG9sYXJzc2wgVGVzdCBFQyBDQYIJAMFD4n5iQ8zoMAoG\r\n" \ - "CCqGSM49BAMCA2gAMGUCMAHFbGEzx8dZaUlIltT5s1QO9FvKmvFer4uRY3ntEy9S\r\n" \ - "k7DCCozM86WWLjfzbJ78bwIxAJYRPF1CzNEiXPHb9O46ZPHKo2S5x//g/54RowAK\r\n" \ - "uZz+hKPuMi6YY6cIm81jfeaSZQ==\r\n" \ - "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is generated from tests/data_files/server5.crt.der using `xxd -i`. */ -/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_DER tests/data_files/server5.crt.der */ -#define TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x1f, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0xa5, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ - 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x09, 0x30, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, \ - 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x30, 0x3e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ - 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ - 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ - 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x1a, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, \ - 0x13, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x73, 0x73, 0x6c, 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, \ - 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x45, 0x43, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, \ - 0x32, 0x33, 0x30, 0x36, 0x31, 0x35, 0x30, 0x33, 0x33, 0x34, 0x31, 0x38, \ - 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x33, 0x33, 0x30, 0x36, 0x31, 0x32, 0x30, 0x33, 0x33, \ - 0x34, 0x31, 0x38, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x34, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ - 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ - 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ - 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x12, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, \ - 0x09, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x63, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x68, 0x6f, 0x73, 0x74, 0x30, 0x59, \ - 0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, \ - 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0x03, 0x42, 0x00, \ - 0x04, 0x37, 0xcc, 0x56, 0xd9, 0x76, 0x09, 0x1e, 0x5a, 0x72, 0x3e, 0xc7, \ - 0x59, 0x2d, 0xff, 0x20, 0x6e, 0xee, 0x7c, 0xf9, 0x06, 0x91, 0x74, 0xd0, \ - 0xad, 0x14, 0xb5, 0xf7, 0x68, 0x22, 0x59, 0x62, 0x92, 0x4e, 0xe5, 0x00, \ - 0xd8, 0x23, 0x11, 0xff, 0xea, 0x2f, 0xd2, 0x34, 0x5d, 0x5d, 0x16, 0xbd, \ - 0x8a, 0x88, 0xc2, 0x6b, 0x77, 0x0d, 0x55, 0xcd, 0x8a, 0x2a, 0x0e, 0xfa, \ - 0x01, 0xc8, 0xb4, 0xed, 0xff, 0xa3, 0x81, 0x9d, 0x30, 0x81, 0x9a, 0x30, \ - 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00, 0x30, 0x1d, \ - 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0x50, 0x61, 0xa5, \ - 0x8f, 0xd4, 0x07, 0xd9, 0xd7, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0c, 0xe5, 0x65, 0x7f, 0x8c, \ - 0x63, 0x46, 0xa7, 0x13, 0xbe, 0x30, 0x6e, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, \ - 0x04, 0x67, 0x30, 0x65, 0x80, 0x14, 0x9d, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x24, 0x49, 0x01, \ - 0x3f, 0x2b, 0xcb, 0x78, 0xb5, 0x19, 0xbc, 0x7e, 0x24, 0xc9, 0xdb, 0xfb, \ - 0x36, 0x7c, 0xa1, 0x42, 0xa4, 0x40, 0x30, 0x3e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, \ - 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, \ - 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, \ - 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x1a, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, \ - 0x03, 0x0c, 0x13, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x73, 0x73, 0x6c, 0x20, \ - 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x45, 0x43, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x82, 0x09, \ - 0x00, 0xc1, 0x43, 0xe2, 0x7e, 0x62, 0x43, 0xcc, 0xe8, 0x30, 0x0a, 0x06, \ - 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x03, 0x68, 0x00, \ - 0x30, 0x65, 0x02, 0x30, 0x01, 0xc5, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x33, 0xc7, 0xc7, 0x59, \ - 0x69, 0x49, 0x48, 0x96, 0xd4, 0xf9, 0xb3, 0x54, 0x0e, 0xf4, 0x5b, 0xca, \ - 0x9a, 0xf1, 0x5e, 0xaf, 0x8b, 0x91, 0x63, 0x79, 0xed, 0x13, 0x2f, 0x52, \ - 0x93, 0xb0, 0xc2, 0x0a, 0x8c, 0xcc, 0xf3, 0xa5, 0x96, 0x2e, 0x37, 0xf3, \ - 0x6c, 0x9e, 0xfc, 0x6f, 0x02, 0x31, 0x00, 0x96, 0x11, 0x3c, 0x5d, 0x42, \ - 0xcc, 0xd1, 0x22, 0x5c, 0xf1, 0xdb, 0xf4, 0xee, 0x3a, 0x64, 0xf1, 0xca, \ - 0xa3, 0x64, 0xb9, 0xc7, 0xff, 0xe0, 0xff, 0x9e, 0x11, 0xa3, 0x00, 0x0a, \ - 0xb9, 0x9c, 0xfe, 0x84, 0xa3, 0xee, 0x32, 0x2e, 0x98, 0x63, 0xa7, 0x08, \ - 0x9b, 0xcd, 0x63, 0x7d, 0xe6, 0x92, 0x65 \ -} -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/server5.key. */ -/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_PEM tests/data_files/server5.key */ -#define TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_PEM \ - "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" \ - "MHcCAQEEIPEqEyB2AnCoPL/9U/YDHvdqXYbIogTywwyp6/UfDw6noAoGCCqGSM49\r\n" \ - "AwEHoUQDQgAEN8xW2XYJHlpyPsdZLf8gbu58+QaRdNCtFLX3aCJZYpJO5QDYIxH/\r\n" \ - "6i/SNF1dFr2KiMJrdw1VzYoqDvoByLTt/w==\r\n" \ - "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is generated from tests/data_files/server5.key.der using `xxd -i`. */ -/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_DER tests/data_files/server5.key.der */ -#define TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x77, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x20, 0xf1, 0x2a, 0x13, 0x20, 0x76, \ - 0x02, 0x70, 0xa8, 0x3c, 0xbf, 0xfd, 0x53, 0xf6, 0x03, 0x1e, 0xf7, 0x6a, \ - 0x5d, 0x86, 0xc8, 0xa2, 0x04, 0xf2, 0xc3, 0x0c, 0xa9, 0xeb, 0xf5, 0x1f, \ - 0x0f, 0x0e, 0xa7, 0xa0, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, \ - 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0xa1, 0x44, 0x03, 0x42, 0x00, 0x04, 0x37, 0xcc, 0x56, \ - 0xd9, 0x76, 0x09, 0x1e, 0x5a, 0x72, 0x3e, 0xc7, 0x59, 0x2d, 0xff, 0x20, \ - 0x6e, 0xee, 0x7c, 0xf9, 0x06, 0x91, 0x74, 0xd0, 0xad, 0x14, 0xb5, 0xf7, \ - 0x68, 0x22, 0x59, 0x62, 0x92, 0x4e, 0xe5, 0x00, 0xd8, 0x23, 0x11, 0xff, \ - 0xea, 0x2f, 0xd2, 0x34, 0x5d, 0x5d, 0x16, 0xbd, 0x8a, 0x88, 0xc2, 0x6b, \ - 0x77, 0x0d, 0x55, 0xcd, 0x8a, 0x2a, 0x0e, 0xfa, 0x01, 0xc8, 0xb4, 0xed, \ - 0xff \ -} -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/server2-sha256.crt. */ -/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM tests/data_files/server2-sha256.crt */ -#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM \ - "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ - "MIIDNzCCAh+gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" \ - "MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ - "MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WjA0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ - "A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxEjAQBgNVBAMMCWxvY2FsaG9zdDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN\r\n" \ - "AQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMFNo93nzR3RBNdJcriZrA545Do8Ss86ExbQWuTN\r\n" \ - "owCIp+4ea5anUrSQ7y1yej4kmvy2NKwk9XfgJmSMnLAofaHa6ozmyRyWvP7BBFKz\r\n" \ - "NtSj+uGxdtiQwWG0ZlI2oiZTqqt0Xgd9GYLbKtgfoNkNHC1JZvdbJXNG6AuKT2kM\r\n" \ - "tQCQ4dqCEGZ9rlQri2V5kaHiYcPNQEkI7mgM8YuG0ka/0LiqEQMef1aoGh5EGA8P\r\n" \ - "hYvai0Re4hjGYi/HZo36Xdh98yeJKQHFkA4/J/EwyEoO79bex8cna8cFPXrEAjya\r\n" \ - "HT4P6DSYW8tzS1KW2BGiLICIaTla0w+w3lkvEcf36hIBMJcCAwEAAaNNMEswCQYD\r\n" \ - "VR0TBAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUpQXoZLjc32APUBJNYKhkr02LQ5MwHwYDVR0jBBgw\r\n" \ - "FoAUtFrkpbPe0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH/f8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAC465FJh\r\n" \ - "Pqel7zJngHIHJrqj/wVAxGAFOTF396XKATGAp+HRCqJ81Ry60CNK1jDzk8dv6M6U\r\n" \ - "HoS7RIFiM/9rXQCbJfiPD5xMTejZp5n5UYHAmxsxDaazfA5FuBhkfokKK6jD4Eq9\r\n" \ - "1C94xGKb6X4/VkaPF7cqoBBw/bHxawXc0UEPjqayiBpCYU/rJoVZgLqFVP7Px3sv\r\n" \ - "a1nOrNx8rPPI1hJ+ZOg8maiPTxHZnBVLakSSLQy/sWeWyazO1RnrbxjrbgQtYKz0\r\n" \ - "e3nwGpu1w13vfckFmUSBhHXH7AAS/HpKC4IH7G2GAk3+n8iSSN71sZzpxonQwVbo\r\n" \ - "pMZqLmbBm/7WPLc=\r\n" \ - "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/server2-sha256.crt.der. */ -/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER tests/data_files/server2-sha256.crt.der */ -#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0x37, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x1f, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ - 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, \ - 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, \ - 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, \ - 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, \ - 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ - 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ - 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, \ - 0x31, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x36, \ - 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, \ - 0x34, 0x30, 0x36, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x34, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ - 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ - 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ - 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x12, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, \ - 0x09, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x63, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x68, 0x6f, 0x73, 0x74, 0x30, 0x82, \ - 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, \ - 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, \ - 0x01, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x4d, 0xa3, 0xdd, 0xe7, \ - 0xcd, 0x1d, 0xd1, 0x04, 0xd7, 0x49, 0x72, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xac, 0x0e, 0x78, \ - 0xe4, 0x3a, 0x3c, 0x4a, 0xcf, 0x3a, 0x13, 0x16, 0xd0, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xcd, \ - 0xa3, 0x00, 0x88, 0xa7, 0xee, 0x1e, 0x6b, 0x96, 0xa7, 0x52, 0xb4, 0x90, \ - 0xef, 0x2d, 0x72, 0x7a, 0x3e, 0x24, 0x9a, 0xfc, 0xb6, 0x34, 0xac, 0x24, \ - 0xf5, 0x77, 0xe0, 0x26, 0x64, 0x8c, 0x9c, 0xb0, 0x28, 0x7d, 0xa1, 0xda, \ - 0xea, 0x8c, 0xe6, 0xc9, 0x1c, 0x96, 0xbc, 0xfe, 0xc1, 0x04, 0x52, 0xb3, \ - 0x36, 0xd4, 0xa3, 0xfa, 0xe1, 0xb1, 0x76, 0xd8, 0x90, 0xc1, 0x61, 0xb4, \ - 0x66, 0x52, 0x36, 0xa2, 0x26, 0x53, 0xaa, 0xab, 0x74, 0x5e, 0x07, 0x7d, \ - 0x19, 0x82, 0xdb, 0x2a, 0xd8, 0x1f, 0xa0, 0xd9, 0x0d, 0x1c, 0x2d, 0x49, \ - 0x66, 0xf7, 0x5b, 0x25, 0x73, 0x46, 0xe8, 0x0b, 0x8a, 0x4f, 0x69, 0x0c, \ - 0xb5, 0x00, 0x90, 0xe1, 0xda, 0x82, 0x10, 0x66, 0x7d, 0xae, 0x54, 0x2b, \ - 0x8b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x91, 0xa1, 0xe2, 0x61, 0xc3, 0xcd, 0x40, 0x49, 0x08, \ - 0xee, 0x68, 0x0c, 0xf1, 0x8b, 0x86, 0xd2, 0x46, 0xbf, 0xd0, 0xb8, 0xaa, \ - 0x11, 0x03, 0x1e, 0x7f, 0x56, 0xa8, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0x44, 0x18, 0x0f, 0x0f, \ - 0x85, 0x8b, 0xda, 0x8b, 0x44, 0x5e, 0xe2, 0x18, 0xc6, 0x62, 0x2f, 0xc7, \ - 0x66, 0x8d, 0xfa, 0x5d, 0xd8, 0x7d, 0xf3, 0x27, 0x89, 0x29, 0x01, 0xc5, \ - 0x90, 0x0e, 0x3f, 0x27, 0xf1, 0x30, 0xc8, 0x4a, 0x0e, 0xef, 0xd6, 0xde, \ - 0xc7, 0xc7, 0x27, 0x6b, 0xc7, 0x05, 0x3d, 0x7a, 0xc4, 0x02, 0x3c, 0x9a, \ - 0x1d, 0x3e, 0x0f, 0xe8, 0x34, 0x98, 0x5b, 0xcb, 0x73, 0x4b, 0x52, 0x96, \ - 0xd8, 0x11, 0xa2, 0x2c, 0x80, 0x88, 0x69, 0x39, 0x5a, 0xd3, 0x0f, 0xb0, \ - 0xde, 0x59, 0x2f, 0x11, 0xc7, 0xf7, 0xea, 0x12, 0x01, 0x30, 0x97, 0x02, \ - 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0xa3, 0x4d, 0x30, 0x4b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ - 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ - 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0xa5, 0x05, 0xe8, 0x64, 0xb8, 0xdc, \ - 0xdf, 0x60, 0x0f, 0x50, 0x12, 0x4d, 0x60, 0xa8, 0x64, 0xaf, 0x4d, 0x8b, \ - 0x43, 0x93, 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, \ - 0x16, 0x80, 0x14, 0xb4, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, 0xf6, \ - 0xb9, 0xd5, 0xa6, 0x95, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x30, \ - 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, \ - 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x2e, 0x3a, 0xe4, 0x52, 0x61, \ - 0x3e, 0xa7, 0xa5, 0xef, 0x32, 0x67, 0x80, 0x72, 0x07, 0x26, 0xba, 0xa3, \ - 0xff, 0x05, 0x40, 0xc4, 0x60, 0x05, 0x39, 0x31, 0x77, 0xf7, 0xa5, 0xca, \ - 0x01, 0x31, 0x80, 0xa7, 0xe1, 0xd1, 0x0a, 0xa2, 0x7c, 0xd5, 0x1c, 0xba, \ - 0xd0, 0x23, 0x4a, 0xd6, 0x30, 0xf3, 0x93, 0xc7, 0x6f, 0xe8, 0xce, 0x94, \ - 0x1e, 0x84, 0xbb, 0x44, 0x81, 0x62, 0x33, 0xff, 0x6b, 0x5d, 0x00, 0x9b, \ - 0x25, 0xf8, 0x8f, 0x0f, 0x9c, 0x4c, 0x4d, 0xe8, 0xd9, 0xa7, 0x99, 0xf9, \ - 0x51, 0x81, 0xc0, 0x9b, 0x1b, 0x31, 0x0d, 0xa6, 0xb3, 0x7c, 0x0e, 0x45, \ - 0xb8, 0x18, 0x64, 0x7e, 0x89, 0x0a, 0x2b, 0xa8, 0xc3, 0xe0, 0x4a, 0xbd, \ - 0xd4, 0x2f, 0x78, 0xc4, 0x62, 0x9b, 0xe9, 0x7e, 0x3f, 0x56, 0x46, 0x8f, \ - 0x17, 0xb7, 0x2a, 0xa0, 0x10, 0x70, 0xfd, 0xb1, 0xf1, 0x6b, 0x05, 0xdc, \ - 0xd1, 0x41, 0x0f, 0x8e, 0xa6, 0xb2, 0x88, 0x1a, 0x42, 0x61, 0x4f, 0xeb, \ - 0x26, 0x85, 0x59, 0x80, 0xba, 0x85, 0x54, 0xfe, 0xcf, 0xc7, 0x7b, 0x2f, \ - 0x6b, 0x59, 0xce, 0xac, 0xdc, 0x7c, 0xac, 0xf3, 0xc8, 0xd6, 0x12, 0x7e, \ - 0x64, 0xe8, 0x3c, 0x99, 0xa8, 0x8f, 0x4f, 0x11, 0xd9, 0x9c, 0x15, 0x4b, \ - 0x6a, 0x44, 0x92, 0x2d, 0x0c, 0xbf, 0xb1, 0x67, 0x96, 0xc9, 0xac, 0xce, \ - 0xd5, 0x19, 0xeb, 0x6f, 0x18, 0xeb, 0x6e, 0x04, 0x2d, 0x60, 0xac, 0xf4, \ - 0x7b, 0x79, 0xf0, 0x1a, 0x9b, 0xb5, 0xc3, 0x5d, 0xef, 0x7d, 0xc9, 0x05, \ - 0x99, 0x44, 0x81, 0x84, 0x75, 0xc7, 0xec, 0x00, 0x12, 0xfc, 0x7a, 0x4a, \ - 0x0b, 0x82, 0x07, 0xec, 0x6d, 0x86, 0x02, 0x4d, 0xfe, 0x9f, 0xc8, 0x92, \ - 0x48, 0xde, 0xf5, 0xb1, 0x9c, 0xe9, 0xc6, 0x89, 0xd0, 0xc1, 0x56, 0xe8, \ - 0xa4, 0xc6, 0x6a, 0x2e, 0x66, 0xc1, 0x9b, 0xfe, 0xd6, 0x3c, 0xb7 \ -} -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/server2.crt. */ -/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM tests/data_files/server2.crt */ -#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM \ - "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ - "MIIDNzCCAh+gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" \ - "MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ - "MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WjA0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ - "A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxEjAQBgNVBAMMCWxvY2FsaG9zdDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN\r\n" \ - "AQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMFNo93nzR3RBNdJcriZrA545Do8Ss86ExbQWuTN\r\n" \ - "owCIp+4ea5anUrSQ7y1yej4kmvy2NKwk9XfgJmSMnLAofaHa6ozmyRyWvP7BBFKz\r\n" \ - "NtSj+uGxdtiQwWG0ZlI2oiZTqqt0Xgd9GYLbKtgfoNkNHC1JZvdbJXNG6AuKT2kM\r\n" \ - "tQCQ4dqCEGZ9rlQri2V5kaHiYcPNQEkI7mgM8YuG0ka/0LiqEQMef1aoGh5EGA8P\r\n" \ - "hYvai0Re4hjGYi/HZo36Xdh98yeJKQHFkA4/J/EwyEoO79bex8cna8cFPXrEAjya\r\n" \ - "HT4P6DSYW8tzS1KW2BGiLICIaTla0w+w3lkvEcf36hIBMJcCAwEAAaNNMEswCQYD\r\n" \ - "VR0TBAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUpQXoZLjc32APUBJNYKhkr02LQ5MwHwYDVR0jBBgw\r\n" \ - "FoAUtFrkpbPe0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH/f8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggEBAJklg3Q4\r\n" \ - "cB7v7BzsxM/vLyKccO6op0/gZzM4ghuLq2Y32kl0sM6kSNUUmduuq3u/+GmUZN2A\r\n" \ - "O/7c+Hw7hDFEIvZk98aBGjCLqn3DmgHIv8ToQ67nellQxx2Uj309PdgjNi/r9HOc\r\n" \ - "KNAYPbBcg6MJGWWj2TI6vNaceios/DhOYx5V0j5nfqSJ/pnU0g9Ign2LAhgYpGJE\r\n" \ - "iEM9wW7hEMkwmk0h/sqZsrJsGH5YsF/VThSq/JVO1e2mZH2vruyZKJVBq+8tDNYp\r\n" \ - "HkK6tSyVYQhzIt3StMJWKMl/o5k2AYz6tSC164+1oG+ML3LWg8XrGKa91H4UOKap\r\n" \ - "Awgk0+4m0T25cNs=\r\n" \ - "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/server2.crt.der. */ -/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER tests/data_files/server2.crt.der */ -#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0x37, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x1f, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ - 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, \ - 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, \ - 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, \ - 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, \ - 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ - 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ - 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, \ - 0x31, 0x31, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x32, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x36, \ - 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x32, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, \ - 0x34, 0x30, 0x36, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x34, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ - 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ - 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ - 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x12, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, \ - 0x09, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x63, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x68, 0x6f, 0x73, 0x74, 0x30, 0x82, \ - 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, \ - 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, \ - 0x01, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x4d, 0xa3, 0xdd, 0xe7, \ - 0xcd, 0x1d, 0xd1, 0x04, 0xd7, 0x49, 0x72, 0xb8, 0x99, 0xac, 0x0e, 0x78, \ - 0xe4, 0x3a, 0x3c, 0x4a, 0xcf, 0x3a, 0x13, 0x16, 0xd0, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xcd, \ - 0xa3, 0x00, 0x88, 0xa7, 0xee, 0x1e, 0x6b, 0x96, 0xa7, 0x52, 0xb4, 0x90, \ - 0xef, 0x2d, 0x72, 0x7a, 0x3e, 0x24, 0x9a, 0xfc, 0xb6, 0x34, 0xac, 0x24, \ - 0xf5, 0x77, 0xe0, 0x26, 0x64, 0x8c, 0x9c, 0xb0, 0x28, 0x7d, 0xa1, 0xda, \ - 0xea, 0x8c, 0xe6, 0xc9, 0x1c, 0x96, 0xbc, 0xfe, 0xc1, 0x04, 0x52, 0xb3, \ - 0x36, 0xd4, 0xa3, 0xfa, 0xe1, 0xb1, 0x76, 0xd8, 0x90, 0xc1, 0x61, 0xb4, \ - 0x66, 0x52, 0x36, 0xa2, 0x26, 0x53, 0xaa, 0xab, 0x74, 0x5e, 0x07, 0x7d, \ - 0x19, 0x82, 0xdb, 0x2a, 0xd8, 0x1f, 0xa0, 0xd9, 0x0d, 0x1c, 0x2d, 0x49, \ - 0x66, 0xf7, 0x5b, 0x25, 0x73, 0x46, 0xe8, 0x0b, 0x8a, 0x4f, 0x69, 0x0c, \ - 0xb5, 0x00, 0x90, 0xe1, 0xda, 0x82, 0x10, 0x66, 0x7d, 0xae, 0x54, 0x2b, \ - 0x8b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x91, 0xa1, 0xe2, 0x61, 0xc3, 0xcd, 0x40, 0x49, 0x08, \ - 0xee, 0x68, 0x0c, 0xf1, 0x8b, 0x86, 0xd2, 0x46, 0xbf, 0xd0, 0xb8, 0xaa, \ - 0x11, 0x03, 0x1e, 0x7f, 0x56, 0xa8, 0x1a, 0x1e, 0x44, 0x18, 0x0f, 0x0f, \ - 0x85, 0x8b, 0xda, 0x8b, 0x44, 0x5e, 0xe2, 0x18, 0xc6, 0x62, 0x2f, 0xc7, \ - 0x66, 0x8d, 0xfa, 0x5d, 0xd8, 0x7d, 0xf3, 0x27, 0x89, 0x29, 0x01, 0xc5, \ - 0x90, 0x0e, 0x3f, 0x27, 0xf1, 0x30, 0xc8, 0x4a, 0x0e, 0xef, 0xd6, 0xde, \ - 0xc7, 0xc7, 0x27, 0x6b, 0xc7, 0x05, 0x3d, 0x7a, 0xc4, 0x02, 0x3c, 0x9a, \ - 0x1d, 0x3e, 0x0f, 0xe8, 0x34, 0x98, 0x5b, 0xcb, 0x73, 0x4b, 0x52, 0x96, \ - 0xd8, 0x11, 0xa2, 0x2c, 0x80, 0x88, 0x69, 0x39, 0x5a, 0xd3, 0x0f, 0xb0, \ - 0xde, 0x59, 0x2f, 0x11, 0xc7, 0xf7, 0xea, 0x12, 0x01, 0x30, 0x97, 0x02, \ - 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0xa3, 0x4d, 0x30, 0x4b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ - 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ - 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0xa5, 0x05, 0xe8, 0x64, 0xb8, 0xdc, \ - 0xdf, 0x60, 0x0f, 0x50, 0x12, 0x4d, 0x60, 0xa8, 0x64, 0xaf, 0x4d, 0x8b, \ - 0x43, 0x93, 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, \ - 0x16, 0x80, 0x14, 0xb4, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, 0xf6, \ - 0xb9, 0xd5, 0xa6, 0x95, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x30, \ - 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, \ - 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x73, 0x0b, 0x4a, 0xc5, \ - 0xcb, 0xa0, 0xde, 0xf1, 0x63, 0x1c, 0x76, 0x04, 0x2b, 0x13, 0x0d, 0xc0, \ - 0x84, 0x11, 0xc5, 0x8f, 0x3a, 0xa7, 0xc5, 0x9c, 0x35, 0x7a, 0x77, 0xb8, \ - 0x20, 0x14, 0x82, 0xee, 0x54, 0xf0, 0xf2, 0xb0, 0x52, 0xcb, 0x78, 0xce, \ - 0x59, 0x07, 0x4f, 0x51, 0x69, 0xfe, 0xd3, 0x2f, 0xe9, 0x09, 0xe7, 0x85, \ - 0x92, 0xd8, 0xba, 0xb1, 0xeb, 0xc5, 0x76, 0x5d, 0x61, 0x2d, 0xe9, 0x86, \ - 0xb5, 0xde, 0x2a, 0xf9, 0x3f, 0x53, 0x28, 0x42, 0x86, 0x83, 0x73, 0x43, \ - 0xe0, 0x04, 0x5f, 0x07, 0x90, 0x14, 0x65, 0x9f, 0x6e, 0x10, 0x7a, 0xbc, \ - 0x58, 0x19, 0x22, 0xc2, 0xeb, 0x39, 0x72, 0x51, 0x92, 0xd7, 0xb4, 0x1d, \ - 0x75, 0x2f, 0xd3, 0x3a, 0x2b, 0x01, 0xe7, 0xdb, 0x50, 0xae, 0xe2, 0xf1, \ - 0xd4, 0x4d, 0x5b, 0x3c, 0xbb, 0x41, 0x2b, 0x2a, 0xa4, 0xe2, 0x4a, 0x02, \ - 0xe5, 0x60, 0x14, 0x2c, 0x9c, 0x1f, 0xa6, 0xcc, 0x06, 0x4b, 0x25, 0x89, \ - 0x4e, 0x96, 0x30, 0x22, 0x9c, 0x5c, 0x58, 0x4d, 0xc3, 0xda, 0xd0, 0x6e, \ - 0x50, 0x1e, 0x8c, 0x65, 0xf5, 0xd9, 0x17, 0x35, 0xa6, 0x58, 0x43, 0xb2, \ - 0x29, 0xb7, 0xa8, 0x5e, 0x35, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x60, 0x42, 0x1a, 0x01, 0xcb, \ - 0xcb, 0x0b, 0xd8, 0x0e, 0xc1, 0x90, 0xdf, 0xa1, 0xd2, 0x1a, 0xd1, 0x2c, \ - 0x02, 0xf4, 0x76, 0x41, 0xa4, 0xcb, 0x4b, 0x15, 0x98, 0x71, 0xf9, 0x35, \ - 0x7d, 0xb0, 0xe7, 0xe2, 0x34, 0x96, 0x91, 0xbe, 0x32, 0x67, 0x2d, 0x6b, \ - 0xd3, 0x55, 0x04, 0x8a, 0x01, 0x50, 0xb4, 0xe3, 0x62, 0x78, 0x6c, 0x11, \ - 0x15, 0xa5, 0x2a, 0x11, 0xc1, 0x49, 0x1c, 0x9b, 0xc4, 0x10, 0x65, 0x60, \ - 0x87, 0xd9, 0x1e, 0x69, 0x59, 0x4e, 0x8f, 0x6b, 0xeb, 0xc1, 0xfe, 0x6b, \ - 0xe2, 0x63, 0x78, 0x95, 0x6e, 0xe0, 0x2d, 0xd7, 0xa7, 0x37, 0xa8 \ -} -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/server2.key. */ -/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_PEM tests/data_files/server2.key */ -#define TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_PEM \ - "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" \ - "MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAwU2j3efNHdEE10lyuJmsDnjkOjxKzzoTFtBa5M2jAIin7h5r\r\n" \ - "lqdStJDvLXJ6PiSa/LY0rCT1d+AmZIycsCh9odrqjObJHJa8/sEEUrM21KP64bF2\r\n" \ - "2JDBYbRmUjaiJlOqq3ReB30Zgtsq2B+g2Q0cLUlm91slc0boC4pPaQy1AJDh2oIQ\r\n" \ - "Zn2uVCuLZXmRoeJhw81ASQjuaAzxi4bSRr/QuKoRAx5/VqgaHkQYDw+Fi9qLRF7i\r\n" \ - "GMZiL8dmjfpd2H3zJ4kpAcWQDj8n8TDISg7v1t7HxydrxwU9esQCPJodPg/oNJhb\r\n" \ - "y3NLUpbYEaIsgIhpOVrTD7DeWS8Rx/fqEgEwlwIDAQABAoIBAQCXR0S8EIHFGORZ\r\n" \ - "++AtOg6eENxD+xVs0f1IeGz57Tjo3QnXX7VBZNdj+p1ECvhCE/G7XnkgU5hLZX+G\r\n" \ - "Z0jkz/tqJOI0vRSdLBbipHnWouyBQ4e/A1yIJdlBtqXxJ1KE/ituHRbNc4j4kL8Z\r\n" \ - "/r6pvwnTI0PSx2Eqs048YdS92LT6qAv4flbNDxMn2uY7s4ycS4Q8w1JXnCeaAnYm\r\n" \ - "WYI5wxO+bvRELR2Mcz5DmVnL8jRyml6l6582bSv5oufReFIbyPZbQWlXgYnpu6He\r\n" \ - "GTc7E1zKYQGG/9+DQUl/1vQuCPqQwny0tQoX2w5tdYpdMdVm+zkLtbajzdTviJJa\r\n" \ - "TWzL6lt5AoGBAN86+SVeJDcmQJcv4Eq6UhtRr4QGMiQMz0Sod6ettYxYzMgxtw28\r\n" \ - "CIrgpozCc+UaZJLo7UxvC6an85r1b2nKPCLQFaggJ0H4Q0J/sZOhBIXaoBzWxveK\r\n" \ - "nupceKdVxGsFi8CDy86DBfiyFivfBj+47BbaQzPBj7C4rK7UlLjab2rDAoGBAN2u\r\n" \ - "AM2gchoFiu4v1HFL8D7lweEpi6ZnMJjnEu/dEgGQJFjwdpLnPbsj4c75odQ4Gz8g\r\n" \ - "sw9lao9VVzbusoRE/JGI4aTdO0pATXyG7eG1Qu+5Yc1YGXcCrliA2xM9xx+d7f+s\r\n" \ - "mPzN+WIEg5GJDYZDjAzHG5BNvi/FfM1C9dOtjv2dAoGAF0t5KmwbjWHBhcVqO4Ic\r\n" \ - "BVvN3BIlc1ue2YRXEDlxY5b0r8N4XceMgKmW18OHApZxfl8uPDauWZLXOgl4uepv\r\n" \ - "whZC3EuWrSyyICNhLY21Ah7hbIEBPF3L3ZsOwC+UErL+dXWLdB56Jgy3gZaBeW7b\r\n" \ - "vDrEnocJbqCm7IukhXHOBK8CgYEAwqdHB0hqyNSzIOGY7v9abzB6pUdA3BZiQvEs\r\n" \ - "3LjHVd4HPJ2x0N8CgrBIWOE0q8+0hSMmeE96WW/7jD3fPWwCR5zlXknxBQsfv0gP\r\n" \ - "3BC5PR0Qdypz+d+9zfMf625kyit4T/hzwhDveZUzHnk1Cf+IG7Q+TOEnLnWAWBED\r\n" \ - "ISOWmrUCgYAFEmRxgwAc/u+D6t0syCwAYh6POtscq9Y0i9GyWk89NzgC4NdwwbBH\r\n" \ - "4AgahOxIxXx2gxJnq3yfkJfIjwf0s2DyP0kY2y6Ua1OeomPeY9mrIS4tCuDQ6LrE\r\n" \ - "TB6l9VGoxJL4fyHnZb8L5gGvnB1bbD8cL6YPaDiOhcRseC9vBiEuVg==\r\n" \ - "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" -/* END FILE */ - -/* This was generated from tests/data_files/server2.key.der using `xxd -i`. */ -/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_DER tests/data_files/server2.key.der */ -#define TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x82, 0x04, 0xa4, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, \ - 0xc1, 0x4d, 0xa3, 0xdd, 0xe7, 0xcd, 0x1d, 0xd1, 0x04, 0xd7, 0x49, 0x72, \ - 0xb8, 0x99, 0xac, 0x0e, 0x78, 0xe4, 0x3a, 0x3c, 0x4a, 0xcf, 0x3a, 0x13, \ - 0x16, 0xd0, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xcd, 0xa3, 0x00, 0x88, 0xa7, 0xee, 0x1e, 0x6b, \ - 0x96, 0xa7, 0x52, 0xb4, 0x90, 0xef, 0x2d, 0x72, 0x7a, 0x3e, 0x24, 0x9a, \ - 0xfc, 0xb6, 0x34, 0xac, 0x24, 0xf5, 0x77, 0xe0, 0x26, 0x64, 0x8c, 0x9c, \ - 0xb0, 0x28, 0x7d, 0xa1, 0xda, 0xea, 0x8c, 0xe6, 0xc9, 0x1c, 0x96, 0xbc, \ - 0xfe, 0xc1, 0x04, 0x52, 0xb3, 0x36, 0xd4, 0xa3, 0xfa, 0xe1, 0xb1, 0x76, \ - 0xd8, 0x90, 0xc1, 0x61, 0xb4, 0x66, 0x52, 0x36, 0xa2, 0x26, 0x53, 0xaa, \ - 0xab, 0x74, 0x5e, 0x07, 0x7d, 0x19, 0x82, 0xdb, 0x2a, 0xd8, 0x1f, 0xa0, \ - 0xd9, 0x0d, 0x1c, 0x2d, 0x49, 0x66, 0xf7, 0x5b, 0x25, 0x73, 0x46, 0xe8, \ - 0x0b, 0x8a, 0x4f, 0x69, 0x0c, 0xb5, 0x00, 0x90, 0xe1, 0xda, 0x82, 0x10, \ - 0x66, 0x7d, 0xae, 0x54, 0x2b, 0x8b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x91, 0xa1, 0xe2, 0x61, \ - 0xc3, 0xcd, 0x40, 0x49, 0x08, 0xee, 0x68, 0x0c, 0xf1, 0x8b, 0x86, 0xd2, \ - 0x46, 0xbf, 0xd0, 0xb8, 0xaa, 0x11, 0x03, 0x1e, 0x7f, 0x56, 0xa8, 0x1a, \ - 0x1e, 0x44, 0x18, 0x0f, 0x0f, 0x85, 0x8b, 0xda, 0x8b, 0x44, 0x5e, 0xe2, \ - 0x18, 0xc6, 0x62, 0x2f, 0xc7, 0x66, 0x8d, 0xfa, 0x5d, 0xd8, 0x7d, 0xf3, \ - 0x27, 0x89, 0x29, 0x01, 0xc5, 0x90, 0x0e, 0x3f, 0x27, 0xf1, 0x30, 0xc8, \ - 0x4a, 0x0e, 0xef, 0xd6, 0xde, 0xc7, 0xc7, 0x27, 0x6b, 0xc7, 0x05, 0x3d, \ - 0x7a, 0xc4, 0x02, 0x3c, 0x9a, 0x1d, 0x3e, 0x0f, 0xe8, 0x34, 0x98, 0x5b, \ - 0xcb, 0x73, 0x4b, 0x52, 0x96, 0xd8, 0x11, 0xa2, 0x2c, 0x80, 0x88, 0x69, \ - 0x39, 0x5a, 0xd3, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0xde, 0x59, 0x2f, 0x11, 0xc7, 0xf7, 0xea, \ - 0x12, 0x01, 0x30, 0x97, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, \ - 0x01, 0x00, 0x97, 0x47, 0x44, 0xbc, 0x10, 0x81, 0xc5, 0x18, 0xe4, 0x59, \ - 0xfb, 0xe0, 0x2d, 0x3a, 0x0e, 0x9e, 0x10, 0xdc, 0x43, 0xfb, 0x15, 0x6c, \ - 0xd1, 0xfd, 0x48, 0x78, 0x6c, 0xf9, 0xed, 0x38, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x09, 0xd7, \ - 0x5f, 0xb5, 0x41, 0x64, 0xd7, 0x63, 0xfa, 0x9d, 0x44, 0x0a, 0xf8, 0x42, \ - 0x13, 0xf1, 0xbb, 0x5e, 0x79, 0x20, 0x53, 0x98, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x7f, 0x86, \ - 0x67, 0x48, 0xe4, 0xcf, 0xfb, 0x6a, 0x24, 0xe2, 0x34, 0xbd, 0x14, 0x9d, \ - 0x2c, 0x16, 0xe2, 0xa4, 0x79, 0xd6, 0xa2, 0xec, 0x81, 0x43, 0x87, 0xbf, \ - 0x03, 0x5c, 0x88, 0x25, 0xd9, 0x41, 0xb6, 0xa5, 0xf1, 0x27, 0x52, 0x84, \ - 0xfe, 0x2b, 0x6e, 0x1d, 0x16, 0xcd, 0x73, 0x88, 0xf8, 0x90, 0xbf, 0x19, \ - 0xfe, 0xbe, 0xa9, 0xbf, 0x09, 0xd3, 0x23, 0x43, 0xd2, 0xc7, 0x61, 0x2a, \ - 0xb3, 0x4e, 0x3c, 0x61, 0xd4, 0xbd, 0xd8, 0xb4, 0xfa, 0xa8, 0x0b, 0xf8, \ - 0x7e, 0x56, 0xcd, 0x0f, 0x13, 0x27, 0xda, 0xe6, 0x3b, 0xb3, 0x8c, 0x9c, \ - 0x4b, 0x84, 0x3c, 0xc3, 0x52, 0x57, 0x9c, 0x27, 0x9a, 0x02, 0x76, 0x26, \ - 0x59, 0x82, 0x39, 0xc3, 0x13, 0xbe, 0x6e, 0xf4, 0x44, 0x2d, 0x1d, 0x8c, \ - 0x73, 0x3e, 0x43, 0x99, 0x59, 0xcb, 0xf2, 0x34, 0x72, 0x9a, 0x5e, 0xa5, \ - 0xeb, 0x9f, 0x36, 0x6d, 0x2b, 0xf9, 0xa2, 0xe7, 0xd1, 0x78, 0x52, 0x1b, \ - 0xc8, 0xf6, 0x5b, 0x41, 0x69, 0x57, 0x81, 0x89, 0xe9, 0xbb, 0xa1, 0xde, \ - 0x19, 0x37, 0x3b, 0x13, 0x5c, 0xca, 0x61, 0x01, 0x86, 0xff, 0xdf, 0x83, \ - 0x41, 0x49, 0x7f, 0xd6, 0xf4, 0x2e, 0x08, 0xfa, 0x90, 0xc2, 0x7c, 0xb4, \ - 0xb5, 0x0a, 0x17, 0xdb, 0x0e, 0x6d, 0x75, 0x8a, 0x5d, 0x31, 0xd5, 0x66, \ - 0xfb, 0x39, 0x0b, 0xb5, 0xb6, 0xa3, 0xcd, 0xd4, 0xef, 0x88, 0x92, 0x5a, \ - 0x4d, 0x6c, 0xcb, 0xea, 0x5b, 0x79, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xdf, 0x3a, \ - 0xf9, 0x25, 0x5e, 0x24, 0x37, 0x26, 0x40, 0x97, 0x2f, 0xe0, 0x4a, 0xba, \ - 0x52, 0x1b, 0x51, 0xaf, 0x84, 0x06, 0x32, 0x24, 0x0c, 0xcf, 0x44, 0xa8, \ - 0x77, 0xa7, 0xad, 0xb5, 0x8c, 0x58, 0xcc, 0xc8, 0x31, 0xb7, 0x0d, 0xbc, \ - 0x08, 0x8a, 0xe0, 0xa6, 0x8c, 0xc2, 0x73, 0xe5, 0x1a, 0x64, 0x92, 0xe8, \ - 0xed, 0x4c, 0x6f, 0x0b, 0xa6, 0xa7, 0xf3, 0x9a, 0xf5, 0x6f, 0x69, 0xca, \ - 0x3c, 0x22, 0xd0, 0x15, 0xa8, 0x20, 0x27, 0x41, 0xf8, 0x43, 0x42, 0x7f, \ - 0xb1, 0x93, 0xa1, 0x04, 0x85, 0xda, 0xa0, 0x1c, 0xd6, 0xc6, 0xf7, 0x8a, \ - 0x9e, 0xea, 0x5c, 0x78, 0xa7, 0x55, 0xc4, 0x6b, 0x05, 0x8b, 0xc0, 0x83, \ - 0xcb, 0xce, 0x83, 0x05, 0xf8, 0xb2, 0x16, 0x2b, 0xdf, 0x06, 0x3f, 0xb8, \ - 0xec, 0x16, 0xda, 0x43, 0x33, 0xc1, 0x8f, 0xb0, 0xb8, 0xac, 0xae, 0xd4, \ - 0x94, 0xb8, 0xda, 0x6f, 0x6a, 0xc3, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xdd, 0xae, \ - 0x00, 0xcd, 0xa0, 0x72, 0x1a, 0x05, 0x8a, 0xee, 0x2f, 0xd4, 0x71, 0x4b, \ - 0xf0, 0x3e, 0xe5, 0xc1, 0xe1, 0x29, 0x8b, 0xa6, 0x67, 0x30, 0x98, 0xe7, \ - 0x12, 0xef, 0xdd, 0x12, 0x01, 0x90, 0x24, 0x58, 0xf0, 0x76, 0x92, 0xe7, \ - 0x3d, 0xbb, 0x23, 0xe1, 0xce, 0xf9, 0xa1, 0xd4, 0x38, 0x1b, 0x3f, 0x20, \ - 0xb3, 0x0f, 0x65, 0x6a, 0x8f, 0x55, 0x57, 0x36, 0xee, 0xb2, 0x84, 0x44, \ - 0xfc, 0x91, 0x88, 0xe1, 0xa4, 0xdd, 0x3b, 0x4a, 0x40, 0x4d, 0x7c, 0x86, \ - 0xed, 0xe1, 0xb5, 0x42, 0xef, 0xb9, 0x61, 0xcd, 0x58, 0x19, 0x77, 0x02, \ - 0xae, 0x58, 0x80, 0xdb, 0x13, 0x3d, 0xc7, 0x1f, 0x9d, 0xed, 0xff, 0xac, \ - 0x98, 0xfc, 0xcd, 0xf9, 0x62, 0x04, 0x83, 0x91, 0x89, 0x0d, 0x86, 0x43, \ - 0x8c, 0x0c, 0xc7, 0x1b, 0x90, 0x4d, 0xbe, 0x2f, 0xc5, 0x7c, 0xcd, 0x42, \ - 0xf5, 0xd3, 0xad, 0x8e, 0xfd, 0x9d, 0x02, 0x81, 0x80, 0x17, 0x4b, 0x79, \ - 0x2a, 0x6c, 0x1b, 0x8d, 0x61, 0xc1, 0x85, 0xc5, 0x6a, 0x3b, 0x82, 0x1c, \ - 0x05, 0x5b, 0xcd, 0xdc, 0x12, 0x25, 0x73, 0x5b, 0x9e, 0xd9, 0x84, 0x57, \ - 0x10, 0x39, 0x71, 0x63, 0x96, 0xf4, 0xaf, 0xc3, 0x78, 0x5d, 0xc7, 0x8c, \ - 0x80, 0xa9, 0x96, 0xd7, 0xc3, 0x87, 0x02, 0x96, 0x71, 0x7e, 0x5f, 0x2e, \ - 0x3c, 0x36, 0xae, 0x59, 0x92, 0xd7, 0x3a, 0x09, 0x78, 0xb9, 0xea, 0x6f, \ - 0xc2, 0x16, 0x42, 0xdc, 0x4b, 0x96, 0xad, 0x2c, 0xb2, 0x20, 0x23, 0x61, \ - 0x2d, 0x8d, 0xb5, 0x02, 0x1e, 0xe1, 0x6c, 0x81, 0x01, 0x3c, 0x5d, 0xcb, \ - 0xdd, 0x9b, 0x0e, 0xc0, 0x2f, 0x94, 0x12, 0xb2, 0xfe, 0x75, 0x75, 0x8b, \ - 0x74, 0x1e, 0x7a, 0x26, 0x0c, 0xb7, 0x81, 0x96, 0x81, 0x79, 0x6e, 0xdb, \ - 0xbc, 0x3a, 0xc4, 0x9e, 0x87, 0x09, 0x6e, 0xa0, 0xa6, 0xec, 0x8b, 0xa4, \ - 0x85, 0x71, 0xce, 0x04, 0xaf, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0xc2, 0xa7, 0x47, \ - 0x07, 0x48, 0x6a, 0xc8, 0xd4, 0xb3, 0x20, 0xe1, 0x98, 0xee, 0xff, 0x5a, \ - 0x6f, 0x30, 0x7a, 0xa5, 0x47, 0x40, 0xdc, 0x16, 0x62, 0x42, 0xf1, 0x2c, \ - 0xdc, 0xb8, 0xc7, 0x55, 0xde, 0x07, 0x3c, 0x9d, 0xb1, 0xd0, 0xdf, 0x02, \ - 0x82, 0xb0, 0x48, 0x58, 0xe1, 0x34, 0xab, 0xcf, 0xb4, 0x85, 0x23, 0x26, \ - 0x78, 0x4f, 0x7a, 0x59, 0x6f, 0xfb, 0x8c, 0x3d, 0xdf, 0x3d, 0x6c, 0x02, \ - 0x47, 0x9c, 0xe5, 0x5e, 0x49, 0xf1, 0x05, 0x0b, 0x1f, 0xbf, 0x48, 0x0f, \ - 0xdc, 0x10, 0xb9, 0x3d, 0x1d, 0x10, 0x77, 0x2a, 0x73, 0xf9, 0xdf, 0xbd, \ - 0xcd, 0xf3, 0x1f, 0xeb, 0x6e, 0x64, 0xca, 0x2b, 0x78, 0x4f, 0xf8, 0x73, \ - 0xc2, 0x10, 0xef, 0x79, 0x95, 0x33, 0x1e, 0x79, 0x35, 0x09, 0xff, 0x88, \ - 0x1b, 0xb4, 0x3e, 0x4c, 0xe1, 0x27, 0x2e, 0x75, 0x80, 0x58, 0x11, 0x03, \ - 0x21, 0x23, 0x96, 0x9a, 0xb5, 0x02, 0x81, 0x80, 0x05, 0x12, 0x64, 0x71, \ - 0x83, 0x00, 0x1c, 0xfe, 0xef, 0x83, 0xea, 0xdd, 0x2c, 0xc8, 0x2c, 0x00, \ - 0x62, 0x1e, 0x8f, 0x3a, 0xdb, 0x1c, 0xab, 0xd6, 0x34, 0x8b, 0xd1, 0xb2, \ - 0x5a, 0x4f, 0x3d, 0x37, 0x38, 0x02, 0xe0, 0xd7, 0x70, 0xc1, 0xb0, 0x47, \ - 0xe0, 0x08, 0x1a, 0x84, 0xec, 0x48, 0xc5, 0x7c, 0x76, 0x83, 0x12, 0x67, \ - 0xab, 0x7c, 0x9f, 0x90, 0x97, 0xc8, 0x8f, 0x07, 0xf4, 0xb3, 0x60, 0xf2, \ - 0x3f, 0x49, 0x18, 0xdb, 0x2e, 0x94, 0x6b, 0x53, 0x9e, 0xa2, 0x63, 0xde, \ - 0x63, 0xd9, 0xab, 0x21, 0x2e, 0x2d, 0x0a, 0xe0, 0xd0, 0xe8, 0xba, 0xc4, \ - 0x4c, 0x1e, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0x51, 0xa8, 0xc4, 0x92, 0xf8, 0x7f, 0x21, 0xe7, \ - 0x65, 0xbf, 0x0b, 0xe6, 0x01, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0x1d, 0x5b, 0x6c, 0x3f, 0x1c, \ - 0x2f, 0xa6, 0x0f, 0x68, 0x38, 0x8e, 0x85, 0xc4, 0x6c, 0x78, 0x2f, 0x6f, \ - 0x06, 0x21, 0x2e, 0x56 \ -} -/* END FILE */ - -/* - * Test client Certificates - * - * Test client certificates are defined for each choice - * of the following parameters: - * - PEM or DER encoding - * - RSA or EC key - * - * Things to add: - * - hash type - * - multiple EC curve types - */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/cli2.crt. */ -/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_PEM tests/data_files/cli2.crt */ -#define TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_PEM \ - "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ - "MIIB3zCCAWOgAwIBAgIBDTAMBggqhkjOPQQDAgUAMD4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAk5MMREw\r\n" \ - "DwYDVQQKDAhQb2xhclNTTDEcMBoGA1UEAwwTUG9sYXJTU0wgVGVzdCBFQyBDQTAe\r\n" \ - "Fw0xOTAyMTAxNDQ0MDBaFw0yOTAyMTAxNDQ0MDBaMEExCzAJBgNVBAYTAk5MMREw\r\n" \ - "DwYDVQQKDAhQb2xhclNTTDEfMB0GA1UEAwwWUG9sYXJTU0wgVGVzdCBDbGllbnQg\r\n" \ - "MjBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABFflrrFz39Osu5O4gf8Sru7mU6zO\r\n" \ - "VVP2NA7MLuNjJQvfmOLzXGA2lsDVGBRw5X+f1UtFGOWwbNVc+JaPh3Cj5MejTTBL\r\n" \ - "MAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwHQYDVR0OBBYEFHoAX4Zk/OBd5REQO7LmO8QmP8/iMB8GA1Ud\r\n" \ - "IwQYMBaAFJ1tICRJAT8ry3i1Gbx+JMnb+zZ8MAwGCCqGSM49BAMCBQADaAAwZQIx\r\n" \ - "AMqme4DKMldUlplDET9Q6Eptre7uUWKhsLOF+zPkKDlfzpIkJYEFgcloDHGYw80u\r\n" \ - "IgIwNftyPXsabTqMM7iEHgVpX/GRozKklY9yQI/5eoA6gGW7Y+imuGR/oao5ySOb\r\n" \ - "a9Vk\r\n" \ - "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is generated from tests/data_files/cli2.crt.der using `xxd -i`. */ -/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_DER tests/data_files/cli2.crt.der */ -#define TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0xdf, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x63, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ - 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x0d, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, \ - 0x3d, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3e, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, \ - 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, \ - 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, \ - 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x1c, 0x30, 0x1a, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, \ - 0x03, 0x0c, 0x13, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x20, \ - 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x45, 0x43, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, \ - 0x17, 0x0d, 0x31, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, \ - 0x30, 0x30, 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, \ - 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x30, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x41, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, \ - 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, \ - 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, \ - 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x1f, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, \ - 0x03, 0x0c, 0x16, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x20, \ - 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, \ - 0x32, 0x30, 0x59, 0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, \ - 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, \ - 0x03, 0x42, 0x00, 0x04, 0x57, 0xe5, 0xae, 0xb1, 0x73, 0xdf, 0xd3, 0xac, \ - 0xbb, 0x93, 0xb8, 0x81, 0xff, 0x12, 0xae, 0xee, 0xe6, 0x53, 0xac, 0xce, \ - 0x55, 0x53, 0xf6, 0x34, 0x0e, 0xcc, 0x2e, 0xe3, 0x63, 0x25, 0x0b, 0xdf, \ - 0x98, 0xe2, 0xf3, 0x5c, 0x60, 0x36, 0x96, 0xc0, 0xd5, 0x18, 0x14, 0x70, \ - 0xe5, 0x7f, 0x9f, 0xd5, 0x4b, 0x45, 0x18, 0xe5, 0xb0, 0x6c, 0xd5, 0x5c, \ - 0xf8, 0x96, 0x8f, 0x87, 0x70, 0xa3, 0xe4, 0xc7, 0xa3, 0x4d, 0x30, 0x4b, \ - 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00, 0x30, \ - 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, 0x04, 0x14, 0x7a, 0x00, \ - 0x5f, 0x86, 0x64, 0xfc, 0xe0, 0x5d, 0xe5, 0x11, 0x10, 0x3b, 0xb2, 0xe6, \ - 0x3b, 0xc4, 0x26, 0x3f, 0xcf, 0xe2, 0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, \ - 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x80, 0x14, 0x9d, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x24, 0x49, \ - 0x01, 0x3f, 0x2b, 0xcb, 0x78, 0xb5, 0x19, 0xbc, 0x7e, 0x24, 0xc9, 0xdb, \ - 0xfb, 0x36, 0x7c, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, \ - 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x68, 0x00, 0x30, 0x65, 0x02, 0x31, \ - 0x00, 0xca, 0xa6, 0x7b, 0x80, 0xca, 0x32, 0x57, 0x54, 0x96, 0x99, 0x43, \ - 0x11, 0x3f, 0x50, 0xe8, 0x4a, 0x6d, 0xad, 0xee, 0xee, 0x51, 0x62, 0xa1, \ - 0xb0, 0xb3, 0x85, 0xfb, 0x33, 0xe4, 0x28, 0x39, 0x5f, 0xce, 0x92, 0x24, \ - 0x25, 0x81, 0x05, 0x81, 0xc9, 0x68, 0x0c, 0x71, 0x98, 0xc3, 0xcd, 0x2e, \ - 0x22, 0x02, 0x30, 0x35, 0xfb, 0x72, 0x3d, 0x7b, 0x1a, 0x6d, 0x3a, 0x8c, \ - 0x33, 0xb8, 0x84, 0x1e, 0x05, 0x69, 0x5f, 0xf1, 0x91, 0xa3, 0x32, 0xa4, \ - 0x95, 0x8f, 0x72, 0x40, 0x8f, 0xf9, 0x7a, 0x80, 0x3a, 0x80, 0x65, 0xbb, \ - 0x63, 0xe8, 0xa6, 0xb8, 0x64, 0x7f, 0xa1, 0xaa, 0x39, 0xc9, 0x23, 0x9b, \ - 0x6b, 0xd5, 0x64 \ -} -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/cli2.key. */ -/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_PEM tests/data_files/cli2.key */ -#define TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_PEM \ - "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" \ - "MHcCAQEEIPb3hmTxZ3/mZI3vyk7p3U3wBf+WIop6hDhkFzJhmLcqoAoGCCqGSM49\r\n" \ - "AwEHoUQDQgAEV+WusXPf06y7k7iB/xKu7uZTrM5VU/Y0Dswu42MlC9+Y4vNcYDaW\r\n" \ - "wNUYFHDlf5/VS0UY5bBs1Vz4lo+HcKPkxw==\r\n" \ - "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is generated from tests/data_files/cli2.key.der using `xxd -i`. */ -/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_DER tests/data_files/cli2.key.der */ -#define TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x77, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x20, 0xf6, 0xf7, 0x86, 0x64, 0xf1, \ - 0x67, 0x7f, 0xe6, 0x64, 0x8d, 0xef, 0xca, 0x4e, 0xe9, 0xdd, 0x4d, 0xf0, \ - 0x05, 0xff, 0x96, 0x22, 0x8a, 0x7a, 0x84, 0x38, 0x64, 0x17, 0x32, 0x61, \ - 0x98, 0xb7, 0x2a, 0xa0, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, \ - 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0xa1, 0x44, 0x03, 0x42, 0x00, 0x04, 0x57, 0xe5, 0xae, \ - 0xb1, 0x73, 0xdf, 0xd3, 0xac, 0xbb, 0x93, 0xb8, 0x81, 0xff, 0x12, 0xae, \ - 0xee, 0xe6, 0x53, 0xac, 0xce, 0x55, 0x53, 0xf6, 0x34, 0x0e, 0xcc, 0x2e, \ - 0xe3, 0x63, 0x25, 0x0b, 0xdf, 0x98, 0xe2, 0xf3, 0x5c, 0x60, 0x36, 0x96, \ - 0xc0, 0xd5, 0x18, 0x14, 0x70, 0xe5, 0x7f, 0x9f, 0xd5, 0x4b, 0x45, 0x18, \ - 0xe5, 0xb0, 0x6c, 0xd5, 0x5c, 0xf8, 0x96, 0x8f, 0x87, 0x70, 0xa3, 0xe4, \ - 0xc7 \ -} -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/cli-rsa-sha256.crt. */ -/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_PEM tests/data_files/cli-rsa-sha256.crt */ -#define TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_PEM \ - "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" \ - "MIIDPzCCAiegAwIBAgIBBDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n" \ - "MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n" \ - "MTkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjkwMjEwMTQ0NDA2WjA8MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n" \ - "A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGjAYBgNVBAMMEVBvbGFyU1NMIENsaWVudCAyMIIBIjAN\r\n" \ - "BgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAyHTEzLn5tXnpRdkUYLB9u5Pyax6f\r\n" \ - "M60Nj4o8VmXl3ETZzGaFB9X4J7BKNdBjngpuG7fa8H6r7gwQk4ZJGDTzqCrSV/Uu\r\n" \ - "1C93KYRhTYJQj6eVSHD1bk2y1RPD0hrt5kPqQhTrdOrA7R/UV06p86jt0uDBMHEw\r\n" \ - "MjDV0/YI0FZPRo7yX/k9Z5GIMC5Cst99++UMd//sMcB4j7/Cf8qtbCHWjdmLao5v\r\n" \ - "4Jv4EFbMs44TFeY0BGbH7vk2DmqV9gmaBmf0ZXH4yqSxJeD+PIs1BGe64E92hfx/\r\n" \ - "/DZrtenNLQNiTrM9AM+vdqBpVoNq0qjU51Bx5rU2BXcFbXvI5MT9TNUhXwIDAQAB\r\n" \ - "o00wSzAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRxoQBzckAvVHZeM/xSj7zx3WtGITAf\r\n" \ - "BgNVHSMEGDAWgBS0WuSls97SUva51aaVD+s+vMf9/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOC\r\n" \ - "AQEAXidv1d4pLlBiKWED95rMycBdgDcgyNqJxakFkRfRyA2y1mlyTn7uBXRkNLY5\r\n" \ - "ZFzK82GCjk2Q2OD4RZSCPAJJqLpHHU34t71ciffvy2KK81YvrxczRhMAE64i+qna\r\n" \ - "yP3Td2XuWJR05PVPoSemsNELs9gWttdnYy3ce+EY2Y0n7Rsi7982EeLIAA7H6ca4\r\n" \ - "2Es/NUH//JZJT32OP0doMxeDRA+vplkKqTLLWf7dX26LIriBkBaRCgR5Yv9LBPFc\r\n" \ - "NOtpzu/LbrY7QFXKJMI+JXDudCsOn8KCmiA4d6Emisqfh3V3485l7HEQNcvLTxlD\r\n" \ - "6zDQyi0/ykYUYZkwQTK1N2Nvlw==\r\n" \ - "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n" -/* END FILE */ - -/* This was generated from tests/data_files/cli-rsa-sha256.crt.der - using `xxd -i.` */ -/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_DER tests/data_files/cli-rsa-sha256.crt.der */ -#define TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0x3f, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x27, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, \ - 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x04, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, \ - 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, \ - 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, \ - 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, \ - 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x19, 0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, \ - 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x10, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, \ - 0x20, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x30, 0x1e, 0x17, 0x0d, \ - 0x31, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, 0x34, 0x30, 0x36, \ - 0x5a, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x32, 0x39, 0x30, 0x32, 0x31, 0x30, 0x31, 0x34, 0x34, \ - 0x34, 0x30, 0x36, 0x5a, 0x30, 0x3c, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, \ - 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, \ - 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x08, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, \ - 0x53, 0x4c, 0x31, 0x1a, 0x30, 0x18, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, \ - 0x11, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x53, 0x53, 0x4c, 0x20, 0x43, 0x6c, \ - 0x69, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x32, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x0d, \ - 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, \ - 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0f, 0x00, 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x0a, 0x02, 0x82, \ - 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0xc8, 0x74, 0xc4, 0xcc, 0xb9, 0xf9, 0xb5, 0x79, 0xe9, \ - 0x45, 0xd9, 0x14, 0x60, 0xb0, 0x7d, 0xbb, 0x93, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x1e, 0x9f, \ - 0x33, 0xad, 0x0d, 0x8f, 0x8a, 0x3c, 0x56, 0x65, 0xe5, 0xdc, 0x44, 0xd9, \ - 0xcc, 0x66, 0x85, 0x07, 0xd5, 0xf8, 0x27, 0xb0, 0x4a, 0x35, 0xd0, 0x63, \ - 0x9e, 0x0a, 0x6e, 0x1b, 0xb7, 0xda, 0xf0, 0x7e, 0xab, 0xee, 0x0c, 0x10, \ - 0x93, 0x86, 0x49, 0x18, 0x34, 0xf3, 0xa8, 0x2a, 0xd2, 0x57, 0xf5, 0x2e, \ - 0xd4, 0x2f, 0x77, 0x29, 0x84, 0x61, 0x4d, 0x82, 0x50, 0x8f, 0xa7, 0x95, \ - 0x48, 0x70, 0xf5, 0x6e, 0x4d, 0xb2, 0xd5, 0x13, 0xc3, 0xd2, 0x1a, 0xed, \ - 0xe6, 0x43, 0xea, 0x42, 0x14, 0xeb, 0x74, 0xea, 0xc0, 0xed, 0x1f, 0xd4, \ - 0x57, 0x4e, 0xa9, 0xf3, 0xa8, 0xed, 0xd2, 0xe0, 0xc1, 0x30, 0x71, 0x30, \ - 0x32, 0x30, 0xd5, 0xd3, 0xf6, 0x08, 0xd0, 0x56, 0x4f, 0x46, 0x8e, 0xf2, \ - 0x5f, 0xf9, 0x3d, 0x67, 0x91, 0x88, 0x30, 0x2e, 0x42, 0xb2, 0xdf, 0x7d, \ - 0xfb, 0xe5, 0x0c, 0x77, 0xff, 0xec, 0x31, 0xc0, 0x78, 0x8f, 0xbf, 0xc2, \ - 0x7f, 0xca, 0xad, 0x6c, 0x21, 0xd6, 0x8d, 0xd9, 0x8b, 0x6a, 0x8e, 0x6f, \ - 0xe0, 0x9b, 0xf8, 0x10, 0x56, 0xcc, 0xb3, 0x8e, 0x13, 0x15, 0xe6, 0x34, \ - 0x04, 0x66, 0xc7, 0xee, 0xf9, 0x36, 0x0e, 0x6a, 0x95, 0xf6, 0x09, 0x9a, \ - 0x06, 0x67, 0xf4, 0x65, 0x71, 0xf8, 0xca, 0xa4, 0xb1, 0x25, 0xe0, 0xfe, \ - 0x3c, 0x8b, 0x35, 0x04, 0x67, 0xba, 0xe0, 0x4f, 0x76, 0x85, 0xfc, 0x7f, \ - 0xfc, 0x36, 0x6b, 0xb5, 0xe9, 0xcd, 0x2d, 0x03, 0x62, 0x4e, 0xb3, 0x3d, \ - 0x00, 0xcf, 0xaf, 0x76, 0xa0, 0x69, 0x56, 0x83, 0x6a, 0xd2, 0xa8, 0xd4, \ - 0xe7, 0x50, 0x71, 0xe6, 0xb5, 0x36, 0x05, 0x77, 0x05, 0x6d, 0x7b, 0xc8, \ - 0xe4, 0xc4, 0xfd, 0x4c, 0xd5, 0x21, 0x5f, 0x02, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, \ - 0xa3, 0x4d, 0x30, 0x4b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x04, \ - 0x02, 0x30, 0x00, 0x30, 0x1d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x0e, 0x04, 0x16, \ - 0x04, 0x14, 0x71, 0xa1, 0x00, 0x73, 0x72, 0x40, 0x2f, 0x54, 0x76, 0x5e, \ - 0x33, 0xfc, 0x52, 0x8f, 0xbc, 0xf1, 0xdd, 0x6b, 0x46, 0x21, 0x30, 0x1f, \ - 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x23, 0x04, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, 0x80, 0x14, 0xb4, \ - 0x5a, 0xe4, 0xa5, 0xb3, 0xde, 0xd2, 0x52, 0xf6, 0xb9, 0xd5, 0xa6, 0x95, \ - 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x3e, 0xbc, 0xc7, 0xfd, 0xff, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, \ - 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82, \ - 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x5e, 0x27, 0x6f, 0xd5, 0xde, 0x29, 0x2e, 0x50, 0x62, \ - 0x29, 0x61, 0x03, 0xf7, 0x9a, 0xcc, 0xc9, 0xc0, 0x5d, 0x80, 0x37, 0x20, \ - 0xc8, 0xda, 0x89, 0xc5, 0xa9, 0x05, 0x91, 0x17, 0xd1, 0xc8, 0x0d, 0xb2, \ - 0xd6, 0x69, 0x72, 0x4e, 0x7e, 0xee, 0x05, 0x74, 0x64, 0x34, 0xb6, 0x39, \ - 0x64, 0x5c, 0xca, 0xf3, 0x61, 0x82, 0x8e, 0x4d, 0x90, 0xd8, 0xe0, 0xf8, \ - 0x45, 0x94, 0x82, 0x3c, 0x02, 0x49, 0xa8, 0xba, 0x47, 0x1d, 0x4d, 0xf8, \ - 0xb7, 0xbd, 0x5c, 0x89, 0xf7, 0xef, 0xcb, 0x62, 0x8a, 0xf3, 0x56, 0x2f, \ - 0xaf, 0x17, 0x33, 0x46, 0x13, 0x00, 0x13, 0xae, 0x22, 0xfa, 0xa9, 0xda, \ - 0xc8, 0xfd, 0xd3, 0x77, 0x65, 0xee, 0x58, 0x94, 0x74, 0xe4, 0xf5, 0x4f, \ - 0xa1, 0x27, 0xa6, 0xb0, 0xd1, 0x0b, 0xb3, 0xd8, 0x16, 0xb6, 0xd7, 0x67, \ - 0x63, 0x2d, 0xdc, 0x7b, 0xe1, 0x18, 0xd9, 0x8d, 0x27, 0xed, 0x1b, 0x22, \ - 0xef, 0xdf, 0x36, 0x11, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0x00, 0x0e, 0xc7, 0xe9, 0xc6, 0xb8, \ - 0xd8, 0x4b, 0x3f, 0x35, 0x41, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x96, 0x49, 0x4f, 0x7d, 0x8e, \ - 0x3f, 0x47, 0x68, 0x33, 0x17, 0x83, 0x44, 0x0f, 0xaf, 0xa6, 0x59, 0x0a, \ - 0xa9, 0x32, 0xcb, 0x59, 0xfe, 0xdd, 0x5f, 0x6e, 0x8b, 0x22, 0xb8, 0x81, \ - 0x90, 0x16, 0x91, 0x0a, 0x04, 0x79, 0x62, 0xff, 0x4b, 0x04, 0xf1, 0x5c, \ - 0x34, 0xeb, 0x69, 0xce, 0xef, 0xcb, 0x6e, 0xb6, 0x3b, 0x40, 0x55, 0xca, \ - 0x24, 0xc2, 0x3e, 0x25, 0x70, 0xee, 0x74, 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x9f, 0xc2, 0x82, \ - 0x9a, 0x20, 0x38, 0x77, 0xa1, 0x26, 0x8a, 0xca, 0x9f, 0x87, 0x75, 0x77, \ - 0xe3, 0xce, 0x65, 0xec, 0x71, 0x10, 0x35, 0xcb, 0xcb, 0x4f, 0x19, 0x43, \ - 0xeb, 0x30, 0xd0, 0xca, 0x2d, 0x3f, 0xca, 0x46, 0x14, 0x61, 0x99, 0x30, \ - 0x41, 0x32, 0xb5, 0x37, 0x63, 0x6f, 0x97 \ -} -/* END FILE */ - -/* This is taken from tests/data_files/cli-rsa.key. */ -/* BEGIN FILE string macro TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_PEM tests/data_files/cli-rsa.key */ -#define TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_PEM \ - "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n" \ - "MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAyHTEzLn5tXnpRdkUYLB9u5Pyax6fM60Nj4o8VmXl3ETZzGaF\r\n" \ - "B9X4J7BKNdBjngpuG7fa8H6r7gwQk4ZJGDTzqCrSV/Uu1C93KYRhTYJQj6eVSHD1\r\n" \ - "bk2y1RPD0hrt5kPqQhTrdOrA7R/UV06p86jt0uDBMHEwMjDV0/YI0FZPRo7yX/k9\r\n" \ - "Z5GIMC5Cst99++UMd//sMcB4j7/Cf8qtbCHWjdmLao5v4Jv4EFbMs44TFeY0BGbH\r\n" \ - "7vk2DmqV9gmaBmf0ZXH4yqSxJeD+PIs1BGe64E92hfx//DZrtenNLQNiTrM9AM+v\r\n" \ - "dqBpVoNq0qjU51Bx5rU2BXcFbXvI5MT9TNUhXwIDAQABAoIBAGdNtfYDiap6bzst\r\n" \ - "yhCiI8m9TtrhZw4MisaEaN/ll3XSjaOG2dvV6xMZCMV+5TeXDHOAZnY18Yi18vzz\r\n" \ - "4Ut2TnNFzizCECYNaA2fST3WgInnxUkV3YXAyP6CNxJaCmv2aA0yFr2kFVSeaKGt\r\n" \ - "ymvljNp2NVkvm7Th8fBQBO7I7AXhz43k0mR7XmPgewe8ApZOG3hstkOaMvbWAvWA\r\n" \ - "zCZupdDjZYjOJqlA4eEA4H8/w7F83r5CugeBE8LgEREjLPiyejrU5H1fubEY+h0d\r\n" \ - "l5HZBJ68ybTXfQ5U9o/QKA3dd0toBEhhdRUDGzWtjvwkEQfqF1reGWj/tod/gCpf\r\n" \ - "DFi6X0ECgYEA4wOv/pjSC3ty6TuOvKX2rOUiBrLXXv2JSxZnMoMiWI5ipLQt+RYT\r\n" \ - "VPafL/m7Dn6MbwjayOkcZhBwk5CNz5A6Q4lJ64Mq/lqHznRCQQ2Mc1G8eyDF/fYL\r\n" \ - "Ze2pLvwP9VD5jTc2miDfw+MnvJhywRRLcemDFP8k4hQVtm8PMp3ZmNECgYEA4gz7\r\n" \ - "wzObR4gn8ibe617uQPZjWzUj9dUHYd+in1gwBCIrtNnaRn9I9U/Q6tegRYpii4ys\r\n" \ - "c176NmU+umy6XmuSKV5qD9bSpZWG2nLFnslrN15Lm3fhZxoeMNhBaEDTnLT26yoi\r\n" \ - "33gp0mSSWy94ZEqipms+ULF6sY1ZtFW6tpGFoy8CgYAQHhnnvJflIs2ky4q10B60\r\n" \ - "ZcxFp3rtDpkp0JxhFLhiizFrujMtZSjYNm5U7KkgPVHhLELEUvCmOnKTt4ap/vZ0\r\n" \ - "BxJNe1GZH3pW6SAvGDQpl9sG7uu/vTFP+lCxukmzxB0DrrDcvorEkKMom7ZCCRvW\r\n" \ - "KZsZ6YeH2Z81BauRj218kQKBgQCUV/DgKP2985xDTT79N08jUo3hTP5MVYCCuj/+\r\n" \ - "UeEw1TvZcx3LJby7P6Xad6a1/BqveaGyFKIfEFIaBUBItk801sDDpDaYc4gL00Xc\r\n" \ - "7lFuBHOZkxJYlss5QrGpuOEl9ZwUt5IrFLBdYaKqNHzNVC1pCPfb/JyH6Dr2HUxq\r\n" \ - "gxUwAQKBgQCcU6G2L8AG9d9c0UpOyL1tMvFe5Ttw0KjlQVdsh1MP6yigYo9DYuwu\r\n" \ - "bHFVW2r0dBTqegP2/KTOxKzaHfC1qf0RGDsUoJCNJrd1cwoCLG8P2EF4w3OBrKqv\r\n" \ - "8u4ytY0F+Vlanj5lm3TaoHSVF1+NWPyOTiwevIECGKwSxvlki4fDAA==\r\n" \ - "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n"/* END FILE */ - -/* This was generated from tests/data_files/cli-rsa.key.der using `xxd -i`. */ -/* BEGIN FILE binary macro TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_DER tests/data_files/cli-rsa.key.der */ -#define TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_DER { \ - 0x30, 0x82, 0x04, 0xa4, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x82, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, \ - 0xc8, 0x74, 0xc4, 0xcc, 0xb9, 0xf9, 0xb5, 0x79, 0xe9, 0x45, 0xd9, 0x14, \ - 0x60, 0xb0, 0x7d, 0xbb, 0x93, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x1e, 0x9f, 0x33, 0xad, 0x0d, \ - 0x8f, 0x8a, 0x3c, 0x56, 0x65, 0xe5, 0xdc, 0x44, 0xd9, 0xcc, 0x66, 0x85, \ - 0x07, 0xd5, 0xf8, 0x27, 0xb0, 0x4a, 0x35, 0xd0, 0x63, 0x9e, 0x0a, 0x6e, \ - 0x1b, 0xb7, 0xda, 0xf0, 0x7e, 0xab, 0xee, 0x0c, 0x10, 0x93, 0x86, 0x49, \ - 0x18, 0x34, 0xf3, 0xa8, 0x2a, 0xd2, 0x57, 0xf5, 0x2e, 0xd4, 0x2f, 0x77, \ - 0x29, 0x84, 0x61, 0x4d, 0x82, 0x50, 0x8f, 0xa7, 0x95, 0x48, 0x70, 0xf5, \ - 0x6e, 0x4d, 0xb2, 0xd5, 0x13, 0xc3, 0xd2, 0x1a, 0xed, 0xe6, 0x43, 0xea, \ - 0x42, 0x14, 0xeb, 0x74, 0xea, 0xc0, 0xed, 0x1f, 0xd4, 0x57, 0x4e, 0xa9, \ - 0xf3, 0xa8, 0xed, 0xd2, 0xe0, 0xc1, 0x30, 0x71, 0x30, 0x32, 0x30, 0xd5, \ - 0xd3, 0xf6, 0x08, 0xd0, 0x56, 0x4f, 0x46, 0x8e, 0xf2, 0x5f, 0xf9, 0x3d, \ - 0x67, 0x91, 0x88, 0x30, 0x2e, 0x42, 0xb2, 0xdf, 0x7d, 0xfb, 0xe5, 0x0c, \ - 0x77, 0xff, 0xec, 0x31, 0xc0, 0x78, 0x8f, 0xbf, 0xc2, 0x7f, 0xca, 0xad, \ - 0x6c, 0x21, 0xd6, 0x8d, 0xd9, 0x8b, 0x6a, 0x8e, 0x6f, 0xe0, 0x9b, 0xf8, \ - 0x10, 0x56, 0xcc, 0xb3, 0x8e, 0x13, 0x15, 0xe6, 0x34, 0x04, 0x66, 0xc7, \ - 0xee, 0xf9, 0x36, 0x0e, 0x6a, 0x95, 0xf6, 0x09, 0x9a, 0x06, 0x67, 0xf4, \ - 0x65, 0x71, 0xf8, 0xca, 0xa4, 0xb1, 0x25, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0x3c, 0x8b, 0x35, \ - 0x04, 0x67, 0xba, 0xe0, 0x4f, 0x76, 0x85, 0xfc, 0x7f, 0xfc, 0x36, 0x6b, \ - 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0x2f, 0xc0, 0x06, 0xf5, 0xdf, 0x5c, 0xd1, 0x4a, 0x4e, 0xc8, 0xbd, 0x6d, \ - 0x32, 0xf1, 0x5e, 0xe5, 0x3b, 0x70, 0xd0, 0xa8, 0xe5, 0x41, 0x57, 0x6c, \ - 0x87, 0x53, 0x0f, 0xeb, 0x28, 0xa0, 0x62, 0x8f, 0x43, 0x62, 0xec, 0x2e, \ - 0x6c, 0x71, 0x55, 0x5b, 0x6a, 0xf4, 0x74, 0x14, 0xea, 0x7a, 0x03, 0xf6, \ - 0xfc, 0xa4, 0xce, 0xc4, 0xac, 0xda, 0x1d, 0xf0, 0xb5, 0xa9, 0xfd, 0x11, \ - 0x18, 0x3b, 0x14, 0xa0, 0x90, 0x8d, 0x26, 0xb7, 0x75, 0x73, 0x0a, 0x02, \ - 0x2c, 0x6f, 0x0f, 0xd8, 0x41, 0x78, 0xc3, 0x73, 0x81, 0xac, 0xaa, 0xaf, \ - 0xf2, 0xee, 0x32, 0xb5, 0x8d, 0x05, 0xf9, 0x59, 0x5a, 0x9e, 0x3e, 0x65, \ - 0x9b, 0x74, 0xda, 0xa0, 0x74, 0x95, 0x17, 0x5f, 0x8d, 0x58, 0xfc, 0x8e, \ - 0x4e, 0x2c, 0x1e, 0xbc, 0x81, 0x02, 0x18, 0xac, 0x12, 0xc6, 0xf9, 0x64, \ - 0x8b, 0x87, 0xc3, 0x00 \ -} -/* END FILE */ - -/* - * - * Test certificates and keys as C variables - * - */ - -/* - * CA - */ - -const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_pem[] = TEST_CA_CRT_EC_PEM; -const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_pem[] = TEST_CA_KEY_EC_PEM; -const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_pem[] = TEST_CA_PWD_EC_PEM; -const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_pem[] = TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_PEM; -const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_pem[] = TEST_CA_PWD_RSA_PEM; -const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_pem[] = TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM; -const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_pem[] = TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM; - -const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der[] = TEST_CA_CRT_EC_DER; -const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_der[] = TEST_CA_KEY_EC_DER; -const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_der[] = TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_DER; -const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der[] = - TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER; -const unsigned char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der[] = - TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER; - -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_pem); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_pem); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_pem) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_pem); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_pem) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_pem); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_pem); - -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_der_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_der); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_der_len = 0; -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_der_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_der); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_der_len = 0; -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der); - -/* - * Server - */ - -const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_pem[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_PEM; -const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_pem[] = TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_PEM; -const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_pem[] = ""; -const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_pem[] = TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_PEM; -const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_pem[] = ""; -const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_pem[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM; -const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_pem[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM; - -const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_der[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_DER; -const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_der[] = TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_DER; -const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_der[] = TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_DER; -const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_der[] = - TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER; -const unsigned char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_der[] = - TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER; - -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_pem); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_pem); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_pem) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_pem); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_pem) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_pem); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_pem); - -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_der_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_der); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_der_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_der); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_der_len = 0; -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_der_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_der); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_der_len = 0; -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_der_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_der); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_der_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_der); - -/* - * Client - */ - -const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_pem[] = TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_PEM; -const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_pem[] = TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_PEM; -const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_pem[] = ""; -const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_pem[] = TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_PEM; -const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_pem[] = ""; -const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_pem[] = TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_PEM; - -const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_der[] = TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_DER; -const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_der[] = TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_DER; -const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_der[] = TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_DER; -const unsigned char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_der[] = TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_DER; - -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_pem); -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_pem); -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_pem) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_pem); -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_pem) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_pem_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_pem); - -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_der_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_der); -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_der_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_der); -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_der_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_der); -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_der_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_der); - -/* - * - * Definitions of test CRTs without specification of all parameters, choosing - * them automatically according to the config. For example, mbedtls_test_ca_crt - * is one of mbedtls_test_ca_crt_{rsa|ec}_{sha1|sha256}_{pem|der}. - * - */ - -/* - * Dispatch between PEM and DER according to config - */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) - -/* PEM encoded test CA certificates and keys */ - -#define TEST_CA_KEY_RSA TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_PEM -#define TEST_CA_PWD_RSA TEST_CA_PWD_RSA_PEM -#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256 TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM -#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1 TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM -#define TEST_CA_KEY_EC TEST_CA_KEY_EC_PEM -#define TEST_CA_PWD_EC TEST_CA_PWD_EC_PEM -#define TEST_CA_CRT_EC TEST_CA_CRT_EC_PEM - -/* PEM encoded test server certificates and keys */ - -#define TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_PEM -#define TEST_SRV_PWD_RSA "" -#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256 TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM -#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1 TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM -#define TEST_SRV_KEY_EC TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_PEM -#define TEST_SRV_PWD_EC "" -#define TEST_SRV_CRT_EC TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_PEM - -/* PEM encoded test client certificates and keys */ - -#define TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_PEM -#define TEST_CLI_PWD_RSA "" -#define TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_PEM -#define TEST_CLI_KEY_EC TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_PEM -#define TEST_CLI_PWD_EC "" -#define TEST_CLI_CRT_EC TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_PEM - -#else /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ - -/* DER encoded test CA certificates and keys */ - -#define TEST_CA_KEY_RSA TEST_CA_KEY_RSA_DER -#define TEST_CA_PWD_RSA "" -#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256 TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER -#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1 TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER -#define TEST_CA_KEY_EC TEST_CA_KEY_EC_DER -#define TEST_CA_PWD_EC "" -#define TEST_CA_CRT_EC TEST_CA_CRT_EC_DER - -/* DER encoded test server certificates and keys */ - -#define TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA_DER -#define TEST_SRV_PWD_RSA "" -#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256 TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256_DER -#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1 TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1_DER -#define TEST_SRV_KEY_EC TEST_SRV_KEY_EC_DER -#define TEST_SRV_PWD_EC "" -#define TEST_SRV_CRT_EC TEST_SRV_CRT_EC_DER - -/* DER encoded test client certificates and keys */ - -#define TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA_DER -#define TEST_CLI_PWD_RSA "" -#define TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA_DER -#define TEST_CLI_KEY_EC TEST_CLI_KEY_EC_DER -#define TEST_CLI_PWD_EC "" -#define TEST_CLI_CRT_EC TEST_CLI_CRT_EC_DER - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ - -const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa[] = TEST_CA_KEY_RSA; -const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa[] = TEST_CA_PWD_RSA; -const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256[] = TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256; -const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1[] = TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1; -const char mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec[] = TEST_CA_KEY_EC; -const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec[] = TEST_CA_PWD_EC; -const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec[] = TEST_CA_CRT_EC; - -const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa[] = TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA; -const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa[] = TEST_SRV_PWD_RSA; -const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256; -const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1; -const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec[] = TEST_SRV_KEY_EC; -const char mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec[] = TEST_SRV_PWD_EC; -const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_EC; - -const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa[] = TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA; -const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa[] = TEST_CLI_PWD_RSA; -const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa[] = TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA; -const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec[] = TEST_CLI_KEY_EC; -const char mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec[] = TEST_CLI_PWD_EC; -const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec[] = TEST_CLI_CRT_EC; - -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_key_ec); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_ec) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec); - -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_rsa) -1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha256); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_sha1); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_key_ec); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_ec) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_crt_ec); - -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa); -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_rsa) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa); -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_key_ec); -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_ec) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_cli_crt_ec); - -/* - * Dispatch between SHA-1 and SHA-256 - */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256 -#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA256 -#else -#define TEST_CA_CRT_RSA TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1 -#define TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA_SHA1 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ - -const char mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa[] = TEST_CA_CRT_RSA; -const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa[] = TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA; - -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_len = - sizeof(mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa); - -/* - * Dispatch between RSA and EC - */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - -#define TEST_CA_KEY TEST_CA_KEY_RSA -#define TEST_CA_PWD TEST_CA_PWD_RSA -#define TEST_CA_CRT TEST_CA_CRT_RSA - -#define TEST_SRV_KEY TEST_SRV_KEY_RSA -#define TEST_SRV_PWD TEST_SRV_PWD_RSA -#define TEST_SRV_CRT TEST_SRV_CRT_RSA - -#define TEST_CLI_KEY TEST_CLI_KEY_RSA -#define TEST_CLI_PWD TEST_CLI_PWD_RSA -#define TEST_CLI_CRT TEST_CLI_CRT_RSA - -#else /* no RSA, so assume ECDSA */ - -#define TEST_CA_KEY TEST_CA_KEY_EC -#define TEST_CA_PWD TEST_CA_PWD_EC -#define TEST_CA_CRT TEST_CA_CRT_EC - -#define TEST_SRV_KEY TEST_SRV_KEY_EC -#define TEST_SRV_PWD TEST_SRV_PWD_EC -#define TEST_SRV_CRT TEST_SRV_CRT_EC - -#define TEST_CLI_KEY TEST_CLI_KEY_EC -#define TEST_CLI_PWD TEST_CLI_PWD_EC -#define TEST_CLI_CRT TEST_CLI_CRT_EC -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ - -/* API stability forces us to declare - * mbedtls_test_{ca|srv|cli}_{key|pwd|crt} - * as pointers. */ -static const char test_ca_key[] = TEST_CA_KEY; -static const char test_ca_pwd[] = TEST_CA_PWD; -static const char test_ca_crt[] = TEST_CA_CRT; - -static const char test_srv_key[] = TEST_SRV_KEY; -static const char test_srv_pwd[] = TEST_SRV_PWD; -static const char test_srv_crt[] = TEST_SRV_CRT; - -static const char test_cli_key[] = TEST_CLI_KEY; -static const char test_cli_pwd[] = TEST_CLI_PWD; -static const char test_cli_crt[] = TEST_CLI_CRT; - -const char *mbedtls_test_ca_key = test_ca_key; -const char *mbedtls_test_ca_pwd = test_ca_pwd; -const char *mbedtls_test_ca_crt = test_ca_crt; - -const char *mbedtls_test_srv_key = test_srv_key; -const char *mbedtls_test_srv_pwd = test_srv_pwd; -const char *mbedtls_test_srv_crt = test_srv_crt; - -const char *mbedtls_test_cli_key = test_cli_key; -const char *mbedtls_test_cli_pwd = test_cli_pwd; -const char *mbedtls_test_cli_crt = test_cli_crt; - -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_len = - sizeof(test_ca_key); -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_len = - sizeof(test_ca_pwd) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_crt_len = - sizeof(test_ca_crt); - -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_len = - sizeof(test_srv_key); -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_pwd_len = - sizeof(test_srv_pwd) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_len = - sizeof(test_srv_crt); - -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_key_len = - sizeof(test_cli_key); -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_pwd_len = - sizeof(test_cli_pwd) - 1; -const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_len = - sizeof(test_cli_crt); - -/* - * - * Lists of certificates - * - */ - -/* List of CAs in PEM or DER, depending on config */ -const char *mbedtls_test_cas[] = { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec, -#endif - NULL -}; -const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_len[] = { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1), -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256), -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec), -#endif - 0 -}; - -/* List of all available CA certificates in DER format */ -const unsigned char *mbedtls_test_cas_der[] = { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ - NULL -}; - -const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_der_len[] = { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha256_der), -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_rsa_sha1_der), -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - sizeof(mbedtls_test_ca_crt_ec_der), -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ - 0 -}; - -/* Concatenation of all available CA certificates in PEM format */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) -const char mbedtls_test_cas_pem[] = -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA256_PEM -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - TEST_CA_CRT_RSA_SHA1_PEM -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - TEST_CA_CRT_EC_PEM -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ - ""; -const size_t mbedtls_test_cas_pem_len = sizeof(mbedtls_test_cas_pem); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CERTS_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/chacha20.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/chacha20.c index 53f1d3916c..acaae5b2e9 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/chacha20.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/chacha20.c @@ -6,19 +6,7 @@ * \author Daniel King * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" @@ -36,12 +24,6 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT) -/* Parameter validation macros */ -#define CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define CHACHA20_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - #define ROTL32(value, amount) \ ((uint32_t) ((value) << (amount)) | ((value) >> (32 - (amount)))) @@ -160,8 +142,6 @@ static void chacha20_block(const uint32_t initial_state[16], void mbedtls_chacha20_init(mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx) { - CHACHA20_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx->state, sizeof(ctx->state)); mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx->keystream8, sizeof(ctx->keystream8)); @@ -179,9 +159,6 @@ void mbedtls_chacha20_free(mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx) int mbedtls_chacha20_setkey(mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[32]) { - CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - /* ChaCha20 constants - the string "expand 32-byte k" */ ctx->state[0] = 0x61707865; ctx->state[1] = 0x3320646e; @@ -205,9 +182,6 @@ int mbedtls_chacha20_starts(mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx, const unsigned char nonce[12], uint32_t counter) { - CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET(nonce != NULL); - /* Counter */ ctx->state[12] = counter; @@ -230,11 +204,6 @@ int mbedtls_chacha20_update(mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx, unsigned char *output) { size_t offset = 0U; - size_t i; - - CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET(size == 0 || input != NULL); - CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET(size == 0 || output != NULL); /* Use leftover keystream bytes, if available */ while (size > 0U && ctx->keystream_bytes_used < CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES) { @@ -252,16 +221,7 @@ int mbedtls_chacha20_update(mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx, chacha20_block(ctx->state, ctx->keystream8); ctx->state[CHACHA20_CTR_INDEX]++; - for (i = 0U; i < 64U; i += 8U) { - output[offset + i] = input[offset + i] ^ ctx->keystream8[i]; - output[offset + i+1] = input[offset + i+1] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+1]; - output[offset + i+2] = input[offset + i+2] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+2]; - output[offset + i+3] = input[offset + i+3] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+3]; - output[offset + i+4] = input[offset + i+4] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+4]; - output[offset + i+5] = input[offset + i+5] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+5]; - output[offset + i+6] = input[offset + i+6] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+6]; - output[offset + i+7] = input[offset + i+7] ^ ctx->keystream8[i+7]; - } + mbedtls_xor(output + offset, input + offset, ctx->keystream8, 64U); offset += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES; size -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES; @@ -273,9 +233,7 @@ int mbedtls_chacha20_update(mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx, chacha20_block(ctx->state, ctx->keystream8); ctx->state[CHACHA20_CTR_INDEX]++; - for (i = 0U; i < size; i++) { - output[offset + i] = input[offset + i] ^ ctx->keystream8[i]; - } + mbedtls_xor(output + offset, input + offset, ctx->keystream8, size); ctx->keystream_bytes_used = size; @@ -294,11 +252,6 @@ int mbedtls_chacha20_crypt(const unsigned char key[32], mbedtls_chacha20_context ctx; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET(nonce != NULL); - CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET(data_len == 0 || input != NULL); - CHACHA20_VALIDATE_RET(data_len == 0 || output != NULL); - mbedtls_chacha20_init(&ctx); ret = mbedtls_chacha20_setkey(&ctx, key); diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/chachapoly.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/chachapoly.c index 547ffb2ed2..a1314eab6d 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/chachapoly.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/chachapoly.c @@ -4,19 +4,7 @@ * \brief ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD construction based on RFC 7539. * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" @@ -33,12 +21,6 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT) -/* Parameter validation macros */ -#define CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - #define CHACHAPOLY_STATE_INIT (0) #define CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD (1) #define CHACHAPOLY_STATE_CIPHERTEXT (2) /* Encrypting or decrypting */ @@ -87,8 +69,6 @@ static int chachapoly_pad_ciphertext(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx) void mbedtls_chachapoly_init(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx) { - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - mbedtls_chacha20_init(&ctx->chacha20_ctx); mbedtls_poly1305_init(&ctx->poly1305_ctx); ctx->aad_len = 0U; @@ -115,8 +95,6 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[32]) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); ret = mbedtls_chacha20_setkey(&ctx->chacha20_ctx, key); @@ -129,8 +107,6 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_starts(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char poly1305_key[64]; - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(nonce != NULL); /* Set counter = 0, will be update to 1 when generating Poly1305 key */ ret = mbedtls_chacha20_starts(&ctx->chacha20_ctx, nonce, 0U); @@ -168,9 +144,6 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, const unsigned char *aad, size_t aad_len) { - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(aad_len == 0 || aad != NULL); - if (ctx->state != CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE; } @@ -186,9 +159,6 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_update(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, unsigned char *output) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(len == 0 || input != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(len == 0 || output != NULL); if ((ctx->state != CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD) && (ctx->state != CHACHAPOLY_STATE_CIPHERTEXT)) { @@ -236,8 +206,6 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_finish(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char len_block[16]; - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(mac != NULL); if (ctx->state == CHACHAPOLY_STATE_INIT) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE; @@ -315,13 +283,6 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, unsigned char *output, unsigned char tag[16]) { - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(nonce != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(tag != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(aad_len == 0 || aad != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); - return chachapoly_crypt_and_tag(ctx, MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT, length, nonce, aad, aad_len, input, output, tag); @@ -339,12 +300,6 @@ int mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char check_tag[16]; int diff; - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(nonce != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(tag != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(aad_len == 0 || aad != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - CHACHAPOLY_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); if ((ret = chachapoly_crypt_and_tag(ctx, MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_DECRYPT, length, nonce, diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/check_crypto_config.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/check_crypto_config.h index b72de80d0a..6469e9f439 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/check_crypto_config.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/check_crypto_config.h @@ -5,19 +5,7 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* @@ -42,13 +30,13 @@ #endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && \ - !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)) #error "PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) && \ - !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ + !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)) #error "PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -60,32 +48,94 @@ #endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) && \ - !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)) #error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) && \ - !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)) #error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP) && \ - !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)) #error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS) && \ - !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)) #error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) && \ +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE)) && \ !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) -#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR defined, but not all prerequisites" +#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_xxx defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)) && \ + !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) +#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_xxx defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)) && \ + !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) +#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_xxx defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR is deprecated and will be removed in a \ + future version of Mbed TLS. Please switch to new PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_xxx \ + symbols, where xxx can be: USE, IMPORT, EXPORT, GENERATE, DERIVE" +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#warning "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR is deprecated and will be removed in a \ + future version of Mbed TLS. Please switch to new PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_xxx \ + symbols, where xxx can be: USE, IMPORT, EXPORT, GENERATE, DERIVE" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR is deprecated and will be removed in a \ + future version of Mbed TLS. Please switch to new PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_xxx \ + symbols, where xxx can be: USE, IMPORT, EXPORT, GENERATE, DERIVE" +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#warning "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR is deprecated and will be removed in a \ + future version of Mbed TLS. Please switch to new PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_xxx \ + symbols, where xxx can be: USE, IMPORT, EXPORT, GENERATE, DERIVE" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE defined, but feature is not supported" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE defined, but feature is not supported" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + !(defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512)) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) && \ + !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/cipher.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/cipher.c index 09ca686d82..0683677eda 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/cipher.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/cipher.c @@ -6,19 +6,7 @@ * \author Adriaan de Jong * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" @@ -26,7 +14,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" -#include "mbedtls/cipher_internal.h" +#include "cipher_wrap.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" @@ -55,10 +43,9 @@ #include "mbedtls/cmac.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #include "psa/crypto.h" -#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) #include "mbedtls/nist_kw.h" @@ -66,13 +53,14 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#define CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define CIPHER_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - static int supported_init = 0; +static inline const mbedtls_cipher_base_t *mbedtls_cipher_get_base( + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info) +{ + return mbedtls_cipher_base_lookup_table[info->base_idx]; +} + const int *mbedtls_cipher_list(void) { const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def; @@ -134,8 +122,8 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def; for (def = mbedtls_cipher_definitions; def->info != NULL; def++) { - if (def->info->base->cipher == cipher_id && - def->info->key_bitlen == (unsigned) key_bitlen && + if (mbedtls_cipher_get_base(def->info)->cipher == cipher_id && + mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(def->info) == (unsigned) key_bitlen && def->info->mode == mode) { return def->info; } @@ -144,9 +132,74 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( return NULL; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +static inline psa_key_type_t mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type( + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher) +{ + switch (cipher) { + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB: + return PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + + /* ARIA not yet supported in PSA. */ + /* case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC: + return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA ); */ + + default: + return 0; + } +} + +static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_mode( + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode, size_t taglen) +{ + switch (mode) { + case MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB: + return PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING; + case MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM: + return PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, taglen); + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM: + return PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen); + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG: + return PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG; + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC: + if (taglen == 0) { + return PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING; + } else { + return 0; + } + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + void mbedtls_cipher_init(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) { - CIPHER_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_t)); } @@ -156,7 +209,7 @@ void mbedtls_cipher_free(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) return; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { if (ctx->cipher_ctx != NULL) { mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa = @@ -167,25 +220,23 @@ void mbedtls_cipher_free(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) (void) psa_destroy_key(cipher_psa->slot); } - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(cipher_psa, sizeof(*cipher_psa)); - mbedtls_free(cipher_psa); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(cipher_psa, sizeof(*cipher_psa)); } mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_t)); return; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) if (ctx->cmac_ctx) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx->cmac_ctx, + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ctx->cmac_ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_cmac_context_t)); - mbedtls_free(ctx->cmac_ctx); } #endif if (ctx->cipher_ctx) { - ctx->cipher_info->base->ctx_free_func(ctx->cipher_ctx); + mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->ctx_free_func(ctx->cipher_ctx); } mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_t)); @@ -194,34 +245,25 @@ void mbedtls_cipher_free(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) int mbedtls_cipher_setup(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info) { - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); if (cipher_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_t)); - if (NULL == (ctx->cipher_ctx = cipher_info->base->ctx_alloc_func())) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED; + if (mbedtls_cipher_get_base(cipher_info)->ctx_alloc_func != NULL) { + ctx->cipher_ctx = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(cipher_info)->ctx_alloc_func(); + if (ctx->cipher_ctx == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED; + } } ctx->cipher_info = cipher_info; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) - /* - * Ignore possible errors caused by a cipher mode that doesn't use padding - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) - (void) mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(ctx, MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7); -#else - (void) mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(ctx, MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE); -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */ - return 0; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) int mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info, size_t taglen) @@ -235,11 +277,11 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, /* Check that the underlying cipher mode and cipher type are * supported by the underlying PSA Crypto implementation. */ - alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_mode(cipher_info->mode, taglen); + alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_mode(((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) cipher_info->mode), taglen); if (alg == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } - if (mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type(cipher_info->type) == 0) { + if (mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type(((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) cipher_info->type)) == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } @@ -255,22 +297,27 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, ctx->psa_enabled = 1; return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ int mbedtls_cipher_setkey(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *key, int key_bitlen, const mbedtls_operation_t operation) { - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT || - operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT); + if (operation != MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT && operation != MBEDTLS_DECRYPT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) && + MBEDTLS_DECRYPT == operation) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } +#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa = (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx; @@ -292,7 +339,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_setkey(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } key_type = mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type( - ctx->cipher_info->type); + ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type)); if (key_type == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } @@ -303,7 +350,6 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_setkey(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, * and use it for AEAD decryption. Until tests relying on this * are changed, allow any usage in PSA. */ psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, - /* mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_operation( operation ); */ PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT); psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, cipher_psa->alg); @@ -317,7 +363,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_setkey(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; default: - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } /* Indicate that we own the key slot and need to * destroy it in mbedtls_cipher_free(). */ @@ -327,31 +373,38 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_setkey(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, ctx->operation = operation; return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ if ((ctx->cipher_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN) == 0 && - (int) ctx->cipher_info->key_bitlen != key_bitlen) { + (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(ctx->cipher_info) != key_bitlen) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } ctx->key_bitlen = key_bitlen; ctx->operation = operation; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) /* * For OFB, CFB and CTR mode always use the encryption key schedule */ if (MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT == operation || - MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB == ctx->cipher_info->mode || - MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB == ctx->cipher_info->mode || - MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR == ctx->cipher_info->mode) { - return ctx->cipher_info->base->setkey_enc_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, key, - ctx->key_bitlen); + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) || + MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) || + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { + return mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->setkey_enc_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, key, + ctx->key_bitlen); } if (MBEDTLS_DECRYPT == operation) { - return ctx->cipher_info->base->setkey_dec_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, key, - ctx->key_bitlen); + return mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->setkey_dec_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, key, + ctx->key_bitlen); } +#else + if (operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT || operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT) { + return mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->setkey_enc_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, key, + ctx->key_bitlen); + } +#endif return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -362,19 +415,17 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, { size_t actual_iv_size; - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL); if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart * operations, we currently don't make it * accessible through the cipher layer. */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ /* avoid buffer overflow in ctx->iv */ if (iv_len > MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH) { @@ -384,7 +435,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, if ((ctx->cipher_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN) != 0) { actual_iv_size = iv_len; } else { - actual_iv_size = ctx->cipher_info->iv_size; + actual_iv_size = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size(ctx->cipher_info); /* avoid reading past the end of input buffer */ if (actual_iv_size > iv_len) { @@ -393,7 +444,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) - if (ctx->cipher_info->type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20) { + if (((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type) == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20) { /* Even though the actual_iv_size is overwritten with a correct value * of 12 from the cipher info, return an error to indicate that * the input iv_len is wrong. */ @@ -408,13 +459,47 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } } #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) - if (ctx->cipher_info->type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 && + if (((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type) == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 && iv_len != 12) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } #endif #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { + return mbedtls_gcm_starts((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, + iv, iv_len); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { + int set_lengths_result; + int ccm_star_mode; + + set_lengths_result = mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( + (mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + 0, 0, 0); + if (set_lengths_result != 0) { + return set_lengths_result; + } + + if (ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT) { + ccm_star_mode = MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT; + } else if (ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT) { + ccm_star_mode = MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT; + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return mbedtls_ccm_starts((mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + ccm_star_mode, + iv, iv_len); + } +#endif + if (actual_iv_size != 0) { memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, actual_iv_size); ctx->iv_size = actual_iv_size; @@ -425,18 +510,17 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, int mbedtls_cipher_reset(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) { - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { /* We don't support resetting PSA-based * cipher contexts, yet. */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ ctx->unprocessed_len = 0; @@ -447,30 +531,28 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_reset(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) int mbedtls_cipher_update_ad(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len) { - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL); if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart * operations, we currently don't make it * accessible through the cipher layer. */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) - if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode) { - return mbedtls_gcm_starts((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->operation, - ctx->iv, ctx->iv_size, ad, ad_len); + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { + return mbedtls_gcm_update_ad((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + ad, ad_len); } #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) - if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ctx->cipher_info->type) { + if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type)) { int result; mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t mode; @@ -490,7 +572,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update_ad(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } #endif - return 0; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ @@ -500,22 +582,18 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *in int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t block_size; - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart * operations, we currently don't make it * accessible through the cipher layer. */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ *olen = 0; block_size = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size(ctx); @@ -523,15 +601,16 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *in return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT; } - if (ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB) { + if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB) { if (ilen != block_size) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED; } *olen = ilen; - if (0 != (ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->ecb_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, - ctx->operation, input, output))) { + if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->ecb_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, input, + output))) { return ret; } @@ -539,15 +618,23 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *in } #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) - if (ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM) { - *olen = ilen; - return mbedtls_gcm_update((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen, input, - output); + if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM) { + return mbedtls_gcm_update((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + input, ilen, + output, ilen, olen); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG) { + return mbedtls_ccm_update((mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + input, ilen, + output, ilen, olen); } #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) - if (ctx->cipher_info->type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305) { + if (((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type) == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305) { *olen = ilen; return mbedtls_chachapoly_update((mbedtls_chachapoly_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen, input, output); @@ -560,7 +647,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *in } #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) - if (ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC) { + if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC) { size_t copy_len = 0; /* @@ -588,9 +675,12 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *in memcpy(&(ctx->unprocessed_data[ctx->unprocessed_len]), input, copy_len); - if (0 != (ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->cbc_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, - ctx->operation, block_size, ctx->iv, - ctx->unprocessed_data, output))) { + if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->cbc_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, + block_size, ctx->iv, + ctx-> + unprocessed_data, + output))) { return ret; } @@ -628,9 +718,11 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *in * Process remaining full blocks */ if (ilen) { - if (0 != (ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->cbc_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, - ctx->operation, ilen, ctx->iv, input, - output))) { + if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->cbc_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, + ilen, ctx->iv, + input, + output))) { return ret; } @@ -642,11 +734,12 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *in #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) - if (ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB) { - if (0 != (ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->cfb_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, - ctx->operation, ilen, - &ctx->unprocessed_len, ctx->iv, - input, output))) { + if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB) { + if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->cfb_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, ilen, + &ctx->unprocessed_len, + ctx->iv, + input, output))) { return ret; } @@ -657,10 +750,12 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *in #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) - if (ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB) { - if (0 != (ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->ofb_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, - ilen, &ctx->unprocessed_len, ctx->iv, - input, output))) { + if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB) { + if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->ofb_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, + ilen, + &ctx->unprocessed_len, + ctx->iv, + input, output))) { return ret; } @@ -671,10 +766,13 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *in #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) - if (ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR) { - if (0 != (ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->ctr_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, - ilen, &ctx->unprocessed_len, ctx->iv, - ctx->unprocessed_data, input, output))) { + if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR) { + if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->ctr_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, + ilen, + &ctx->unprocessed_len, + ctx->iv, + ctx->unprocessed_data, + input, output))) { return ret; } @@ -685,14 +783,18 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *in #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) - if (ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS) { + if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS) { if (ctx->unprocessed_len > 0) { /* We can only process an entire data unit at a time. */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } - ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->xts_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, - ctx->operation, ilen, ctx->iv, input, output); + ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->xts_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, + ilen, + ctx->iv, + input, + output); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } @@ -704,9 +806,10 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *in #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) - if (ctx->cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM) { - if (0 != (ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->stream_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, - ilen, input, output))) { + if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM) { + if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->stream_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, + ilen, input, + output))) { return ret; } @@ -739,7 +842,7 @@ static int get_pkcs_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, size_t *data_len) { size_t i, pad_idx; - unsigned char padding_len, bad = 0; + unsigned char padding_len; if (NULL == input || NULL == data_len) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -748,18 +851,19 @@ static int get_pkcs_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, padding_len = input[input_len - 1]; *data_len = input_len - padding_len; - /* Avoid logical || since it results in a branch */ - bad |= ~mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge(input_len, padding_len); - bad |= mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq(padding_len, 0); + mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad = mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(padding_len, input_len); + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(padding_len, 0)); /* The number of bytes checked must be independent of padding_len, * so pick input_len, which is usually 8 or 16 (one block) */ pad_idx = input_len - padding_len; for (i = 0; i < input_len; i++) { - size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge(i, pad_idx); - bad |= (input[i] ^ padding_len) & mask; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t in_padding = mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(i, pad_idx); + mbedtls_ct_condition_t different = mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(input[i], padding_len); + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_bool_and(in_padding, different)); } - return -(int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(bad, -MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING, 0); + + return mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(bad, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 */ @@ -782,29 +886,28 @@ static void add_one_and_zeros_padding(unsigned char *output, static int get_one_and_zeros_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, size_t *data_len) { - unsigned int bad = 1; - if (NULL == input || NULL == data_len) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } + mbedtls_ct_condition_t in_padding = MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad = MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE; + *data_len = 0; - size_t in_padding = ~0; for (ptrdiff_t i = (ptrdiff_t) (input_len) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { - size_t is_nonzero = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask(input[i]); + mbedtls_ct_condition_t is_nonzero = mbedtls_ct_bool(input[i]); - size_t hit_first_nonzero = is_nonzero & in_padding; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t hit_first_nonzero = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(is_nonzero, in_padding); - *data_len = (*data_len & ~hit_first_nonzero) | ((size_t) i & hit_first_nonzero); + *data_len = mbedtls_ct_size_if(hit_first_nonzero, i, *data_len); - bad = mbedtls_ct_uint_if((unsigned int) hit_first_nonzero, - !mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq(input[i], 0x80), bad); + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_if(hit_first_nonzero, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(input[i], 0x80), bad); - in_padding = in_padding & ~is_nonzero; + in_padding = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(in_padding, mbedtls_ct_bool_not(is_nonzero)); } - return -(int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(bad, -MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING, 0); + return mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(bad, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS */ @@ -828,7 +931,8 @@ static int get_zeros_and_len_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, size_t *data_len) { size_t i, pad_idx; - unsigned char padding_len, bad = 0; + unsigned char padding_len; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad; if (NULL == input || NULL == data_len) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -838,17 +942,19 @@ static int get_zeros_and_len_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, *data_len = input_len - padding_len; /* Avoid logical || since it results in a branch */ - bad |= mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge(padding_len, input_len + 1); - bad |= mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq(padding_len, 0); + bad = mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(padding_len, input_len); + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(padding_len, 0)); /* The number of bytes checked must be independent of padding_len */ pad_idx = input_len - padding_len; for (i = 0; i < input_len - 1; i++) { - size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge(i, pad_idx); - bad |= input[i] & mask; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t is_padding = mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(i, pad_idx); + mbedtls_ct_condition_t nonzero_pad_byte; + nonzero_pad_byte = mbedtls_ct_bool_if_else_0(is_padding, mbedtls_ct_bool(input[i])); + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, nonzero_pad_byte); } - return -(int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(bad, -MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING, 0); + return mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(bad, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN */ @@ -859,18 +965,14 @@ static int get_zeros_and_len_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, static void add_zeros_padding(unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, size_t data_len) { - size_t i; - - for (i = data_len; i < output_len; i++) { - output[i] = 0x00; - } + memset(output + data_len, 0, output_len - data_len); } static int get_zeros_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, size_t *data_len) { size_t i; - unsigned char done = 0, prev_done; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t done = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE, prev_done; if (NULL == input || NULL == data_len) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -879,9 +981,8 @@ static int get_zeros_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, *data_len = 0; for (i = input_len; i > 0; i--) { prev_done = done; - done |= !mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq(input[i-1], 0); - size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask(done ^ prev_done); - *data_len |= i & mask; + done = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(done, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(input[i-1], 0)); + *data_len = mbedtls_ct_size_if(mbedtls_ct_bool_ne(done, prev_done), i, *data_len); } return 0; @@ -910,39 +1011,47 @@ static int get_no_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, int mbedtls_cipher_finish(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen) { - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart * operations, we currently don't make it * accessible through the cipher layer. */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ *olen = 0; - if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB == ctx->cipher_info->mode || - MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB == ctx->cipher_info->mode || - MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR == ctx->cipher_info->mode || - MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode || - MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS == ctx->cipher_info->mode || - MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM == ctx->cipher_info->mode) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) + /* CBC mode requires padding so we make sure a call to + * mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode has been done successfully. */ + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { + if (ctx->get_padding == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } +#endif + + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) || + MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) || + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) || + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) || + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) || + MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) || + MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { return 0; } - if ((MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20 == ctx->cipher_info->type) || - (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ctx->cipher_info->type)) { + if ((MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20 == ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type)) || + (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type))) { return 0; } - if (MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB == ctx->cipher_info->mode) { + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { if (ctx->unprocessed_len != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED; } @@ -951,7 +1060,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_finish(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) - if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC == ctx->cipher_info->mode) { + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { int ret = 0; if (MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT == ctx->operation) { @@ -979,11 +1088,13 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_finish(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } /* cipher block */ - if (0 != (ret = ctx->cipher_info->base->cbc_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, - ctx->operation, - mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size(ctx), - ctx->iv, - ctx->unprocessed_data, output))) { + if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->cbc_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, + mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( + ctx), + ctx->iv, + ctx->unprocessed_data, + output))) { return ret; } @@ -1008,13 +1119,12 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_finish(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, mbedtls_cipher_padding_t mode) { - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - - if (NULL == ctx->cipher_info || MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC != ctx->cipher_info->mode) { + if (NULL == ctx->cipher_info || + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC != ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { /* While PSA Crypto knows about CBC padding * schemes, we currently don't make them @@ -1025,7 +1135,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ switch (mode) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) @@ -1069,8 +1179,6 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, int mbedtls_cipher_write_tag(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) { - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL); if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -1079,24 +1187,28 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_write_tag(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart * operations, we currently don't make it * accessible through the cipher layer. */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) - if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode) { + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { + size_t output_length; + /* The code here doesn't yet support alternative implementations + * that can delay up to a block of output. */ return mbedtls_gcm_finish((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + NULL, 0, &output_length, tag, tag_len); } #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) - if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ctx->cipher_info->type) { + if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type)) { /* Don't allow truncated MAC for Poly1305 */ if (tag_len != 16U) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -1107,7 +1219,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_write_tag(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } #endif - return 0; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } int mbedtls_cipher_check_tag(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, @@ -1116,8 +1228,6 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_check_tag(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, unsigned char check_tag[16]; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL); if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -1126,29 +1236,31 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_check_tag(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart * operations, we currently don't make it * accessible through the cipher layer. */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /* Status to return on a non-authenticated algorithm. It would make sense - * to return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT or perhaps - * MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA, but at the time I write this our - * unit tests assume 0. */ - ret = 0; + /* Status to return on a non-authenticated algorithm. */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) - if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode) { + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { + size_t output_length; + /* The code here doesn't yet support alternative implementations + * that can delay up to a block of output. */ + if (tag_len > sizeof(check_tag)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + NULL, 0, &output_length, check_tag, tag_len))) { return ret; } @@ -1162,7 +1274,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_check_tag(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) - if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ctx->cipher_info->type) { + if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type)) { /* Don't allow truncated MAC for Poly1305 */ if (tag_len != sizeof(check_tag)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -1199,13 +1311,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_crypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t finish_olen; - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { /* As in the non-PSA case, we don't check that * a key has been set. If not, the key slot will @@ -1236,13 +1342,13 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_crypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, * are terminated by unsuccessful calls to psa_cipher_update(), * and by any call to psa_cipher_finish(). */ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } - if (ctx->cipher_info->mode != MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB) { + if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) != MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB) { status = psa_cipher_set_iv(&cipher_op, iv, iv_len); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } } @@ -1250,20 +1356,20 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_crypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, input, ilen, output, ilen, olen); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } status = psa_cipher_finish(&cipher_op, output + *olen, ilen - *olen, &part_len); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } *olen += part_len; return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_iv(ctx, iv, iv_len)) != 0) { return ret; @@ -1290,8 +1396,8 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_crypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) /* - * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function shared by - * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). + * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function used by + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). */ static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, @@ -1300,7 +1406,7 @@ static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { /* As in the non-PSA case, we don't check that * a key has been set. If not, the key slot will @@ -1325,16 +1431,16 @@ static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, input, ilen, output, ilen + tag_len, olen); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } *olen -= tag_len; return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) - if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode) { + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { *olen = ilen; return mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag(ctx->cipher_ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, ilen, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, @@ -1342,7 +1448,7 @@ static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) - if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode) { + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { *olen = ilen; return mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag(ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, input, output, @@ -1350,9 +1456,9 @@ static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) - if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ctx->cipher_info->type) { + if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type)) { /* ChachaPoly has fixed length nonce and MAC (tag) */ - if ((iv_len != ctx->cipher_info->iv_size) || + if ((iv_len != mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size(ctx->cipher_info)) || (tag_len != 16U)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -1367,8 +1473,8 @@ static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } /* - * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function shared by - * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). + * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function used by + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). */ static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, @@ -1377,7 +1483,7 @@ static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { /* As in the non-PSA case, we don't check that * a key has been set. If not, the key slot will @@ -1404,15 +1510,15 @@ static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, if (status == PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; } else if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) - if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode) { + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; *olen = ilen; @@ -1428,7 +1534,7 @@ static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) - if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM == ctx->cipher_info->mode) { + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; *olen = ilen; @@ -1444,11 +1550,11 @@ static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) - if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ctx->cipher_info->type) { + if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type)) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; /* ChachaPoly has fixed length nonce and MAC (tag) */ - if ((iv_len != ctx->cipher_info->iv_size) || + if ((iv_len != mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size(ctx->cipher_info)) || (tag_len != 16U)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -1467,54 +1573,6 @@ static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -/* - * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: public legacy function. - */ -int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, - const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, - const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, - const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, - unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) -{ - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || output != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL); - - return mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt(ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, - input, ilen, output, olen, - tag, tag_len); -} - -/* - * Packet-oriented decryption for AEAD modes: public legacy function. - */ -int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, - const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, - const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, - const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, - const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) -{ - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || output != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL); - - return mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt(ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, - input, ilen, output, olen, - tag, tag_len); -} -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) @@ -1528,22 +1586,16 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, size_t *olen, size_t tag_len) { - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) if ( -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) ctx->psa_enabled == 0 && #endif - (MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode || - MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP == ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { - mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode = (MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode) ? - MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW : MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP; + (MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) || + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode))) { + mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode = + (MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) ? + MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW : MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP; /* There is no iv, tag or ad associated with KW and KWP, * so these length should be 0 as documented. */ @@ -1585,22 +1637,16 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, size_t *olen, size_t tag_len) { - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(output_len == 0 || output != NULL); - CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) if ( -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) ctx->psa_enabled == 0 && #endif - (MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode || - MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP == ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { - mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode = (MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ctx->cipher_info->mode) ? - MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW : MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP; + (MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) || + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode))) { + mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode = + (MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) ? + MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW : MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP; /* There is no iv, tag or ad associated with KW and KWP, * so these length should be 0 as documented. */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.c index f92d000380..d2fee22e2b 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.c @@ -6,26 +6,14 @@ * \author Adriaan de Jong * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) -#include "mbedtls/cipher_internal.h" +#include "cipher_wrap.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) @@ -36,10 +24,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/aes.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#include "mbedtls/arc4.h" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) #include "mbedtls/camellia.h" #endif @@ -52,10 +36,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/des.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) -#include "mbedtls/blowfish.h" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) #include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" #endif @@ -78,7 +58,65 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +enum mbedtls_cipher_base_index { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CHACHA20_BASE, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CHACHAPOLY_BASE, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE3, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_AES, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_ARIA, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_CAMELLIA, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_NULL_BASE, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_XTS_AES, +#endif + /* Prevent compile failure due to empty enum */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_PREVENT_EMPTY_ENUM +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)) /* shared by all GCM ciphers */ static void *gcm_ctx_alloc(void) { @@ -98,7 +136,9 @@ static void gcm_ctx_free(void *ctx) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)) /* shared by all CCM ciphers */ static void *ccm_ctx_alloc(void) { @@ -190,11 +230,13 @@ static int aes_crypt_xts_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) static int aes_setkey_dec_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_bitlen) { return mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec((mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen); } +#endif static int aes_setkey_enc_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_bitlen) @@ -243,182 +285,194 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t aes_info = { NULL, #endif aes_setkey_enc_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) aes_setkey_dec_wrap, +#endif aes_ctx_alloc, aes_ctx_free }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ecb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, - 128, "AES-128-ECB", - 0, - 0, 16, - &aes_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES }; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ecb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, - 192, "AES-192-ECB", - 0, - 0, 16, - &aes_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ecb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, - 256, "AES-256-ECB", - 0, - 0, 16, - &aes_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES }; +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_cbc_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, - 128, "AES-128-CBC", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, 0, - 16, - &aes_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES }; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_cbc_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, - 192, "AES-192-CBC", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC, 0, - 16, - &aes_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_cbc_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, - 256, "AES-256-CBC", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, 0, - 16, - &aes_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES }; +#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_cfb128_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, - 128, "AES-128-CFB128", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128, 0, - 16, - &aes_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES }; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_cfb128_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, - 192, "AES-192-CFB128", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128, 0, - 16, - &aes_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_cfb128_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, - 256, "AES-256-CFB128", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128, 0, - 16, - &aes_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES }; +#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ofb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, - 128, "AES-128-OFB", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB, 0, - 16, - &aes_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES }; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ofb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, - 192, "AES-192-OFB", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB, 0, - 16, - &aes_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ofb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, - 256, "AES-256-OFB", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB, 0, - 16, - &aes_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES }; +#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ctr_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, - 128, "AES-128-CTR", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR, 0, - 16, - &aes_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES }; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ctr_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, - 192, "AES-192-CTR", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR, 0, - 16, - &aes_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ctr_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, - 256, "AES-256-CTR", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR, 0, - 16, - &aes_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES }; +#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) @@ -487,36 +541,41 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t xts_aes_info = { }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_xts_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_XTS, - MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS, - 256, "AES-128-XTS", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_XTS, 0, - 16, - &xts_aes_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_XTS_AES }; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_xts_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_XTS, - MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS, - 512, "AES-256-XTS", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 512 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_XTS, 0, - 16, - &xts_aes_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_XTS_AES }; +#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES) static int gcm_aes_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_bitlen) { return mbedtls_gcm_setkey((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, key, key_bitlen); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C && MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t gcm_aes_info = { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, NULL, @@ -538,54 +597,69 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t gcm_aes_info = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) NULL, #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) gcm_aes_setkey_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) gcm_aes_setkey_wrap, +#endif gcm_ctx_alloc, gcm_ctx_free, +#else + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_gcm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, - 128, "AES-128-GCM", - 12, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, 16, - &gcm_aes_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_AES }; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_gcm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, - 192, "AES-192-GCM", - 12, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, 16, - &gcm_aes_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_AES }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_gcm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, - 256, "AES-256-GCM", - 12, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, 16, - &gcm_aes_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_AES }; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES) static int ccm_aes_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_bitlen) { return mbedtls_ccm_setkey((mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, key, key_bitlen); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C && MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t ccm_aes_info = { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, NULL, @@ -607,47 +681,96 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t ccm_aes_info = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) NULL, #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) ccm_aes_setkey_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) ccm_aes_setkey_wrap, +#endif ccm_ctx_alloc, ccm_ctx_free, +#else + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, +#endif }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ccm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, - 128, "AES-128-CCM", - 12, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, 16, - &ccm_aes_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES }; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ccm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, - 192, "AES-192-CCM", - 12, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, 16, - &ccm_aes_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ccm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, - 256, "AES-256-CCM", - 12, + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES +}; +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ccm_star_no_tag_info = { + "AES-128-CCM*-NO-TAG", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES +}; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ccm_star_no_tag_info = { + "AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG", 16, - &ccm_aes_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES }; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ccm_star_no_tag_info = { + "AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES +}; +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) @@ -688,11 +811,13 @@ static int camellia_crypt_ctr_wrap(void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *nc_off, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) static int camellia_setkey_dec_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_bitlen) { return mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec((mbedtls_camellia_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen); } +#endif static int camellia_setkey_enc_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_bitlen) @@ -742,146 +867,148 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t camellia_info = { NULL, #endif camellia_setkey_enc_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) camellia_setkey_dec_wrap, +#endif camellia_ctx_alloc, camellia_ctx_free }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_ecb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, - 128, "CAMELLIA-128-ECB", - 0, - 0, 16, - &camellia_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_ecb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, - 192, "CAMELLIA-192-ECB", - 0, - 0, 16, - &camellia_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_ecb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, - 256, "CAMELLIA-256-ECB", - 0, - 0, 16, - &camellia_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA }; #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_cbc_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, - 128, "CAMELLIA-128-CBC", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, 0, - 16, - &camellia_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_cbc_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, - 192, "CAMELLIA-192-CBC", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC, 0, - 16, - &camellia_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_cbc_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, - 256, "CAMELLIA-256-CBC", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, 0, - 16, - &camellia_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_cfb128_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, - 128, "CAMELLIA-128-CFB128", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128, 0, - 16, - &camellia_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_cfb128_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CFB128, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, - 192, "CAMELLIA-192-CFB128", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CFB128, 0, - 16, - &camellia_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_cfb128_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CFB128, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, - 256, "CAMELLIA-256-CFB128", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CFB128, 0, - 16, - &camellia_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_ctr_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, - 128, "CAMELLIA-128-CTR", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR, 0, - 16, - &camellia_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_ctr_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CTR, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, - 192, "CAMELLIA-192-CTR", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CTR, 0, - 16, - &camellia_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_ctr_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CTR, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, - 256, "CAMELLIA-256-CTR", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CTR, 0, - 16, - &camellia_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ @@ -915,42 +1042,44 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t gcm_camellia_info = { NULL, #endif gcm_camellia_setkey_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) gcm_camellia_setkey_wrap, +#endif gcm_ctx_alloc, gcm_ctx_free, }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_gcm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, - 128, "CAMELLIA-128-GCM", - 12, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, 16, - &gcm_camellia_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_CAMELLIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_gcm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, - 192, "CAMELLIA-192-GCM", - 12, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, 16, - &gcm_camellia_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_CAMELLIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_gcm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, - 256, "CAMELLIA-256-GCM", - 12, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, 16, - &gcm_camellia_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_CAMELLIA }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ @@ -984,42 +1113,77 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t ccm_camellia_info = { NULL, #endif ccm_camellia_setkey_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) ccm_camellia_setkey_wrap, +#endif ccm_ctx_alloc, ccm_ctx_free, }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_ccm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, - 128, "CAMELLIA-128-CCM", - 12, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, 16, - &ccm_camellia_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_ccm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, - 192, "CAMELLIA-192-CCM", - 12, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, 16, - &ccm_camellia_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_ccm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, - 256, "CAMELLIA-256-CCM", - 12, + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_ccm_star_no_tag_info = { + "CAMELLIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_ccm_star_no_tag_info = { + "CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_ccm_star_no_tag_info = { + "CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG", 16, - &ccm_camellia_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ @@ -1065,11 +1229,13 @@ static int aria_crypt_ctr_wrap(void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *nc_off, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) static int aria_setkey_dec_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_bitlen) { return mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec((mbedtls_aria_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen); } +#endif static int aria_setkey_enc_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_bitlen) @@ -1119,146 +1285,148 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t aria_info = { NULL, #endif aria_setkey_enc_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) aria_setkey_dec_wrap, +#endif aria_ctx_alloc, aria_ctx_free }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_ecb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_ECB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, - 128, "ARIA-128-ECB", - 0, - 0, 16, - &aria_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_ecb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_ECB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, - 192, "ARIA-192-ECB", - 0, - 0, 16, - &aria_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_ecb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_ECB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, - 256, "ARIA-256-ECB", - 0, - 0, 16, - &aria_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA }; #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_cbc_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, - 128, "ARIA-128-CBC", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, 0, - 16, - &aria_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_cbc_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, - 192, "ARIA-192-CBC", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC, 0, - 16, - &aria_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_cbc_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, - 256, "ARIA-256-CBC", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, 0, - 16, - &aria_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_cfb128_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CFB128, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, - 128, "ARIA-128-CFB128", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CFB128, 0, - 16, - &aria_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_cfb128_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CFB128, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, - 192, "ARIA-192-CFB128", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CFB128, 0, - 16, - &aria_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_cfb128_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CFB128, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, - 256, "ARIA-256-CFB128", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CFB128, 0, - 16, - &aria_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_ctr_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CTR, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, - 128, "ARIA-128-CTR", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CTR, 0, - 16, - &aria_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_ctr_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CTR, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, - 192, "ARIA-192-CTR", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CTR, 0, - 16, - &aria_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_ctr_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CTR, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, - 256, "ARIA-256-CTR", 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CTR, 0, - 16, - &aria_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ @@ -1292,42 +1460,44 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t gcm_aria_info = { NULL, #endif gcm_aria_setkey_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) gcm_aria_setkey_wrap, +#endif gcm_ctx_alloc, gcm_ctx_free, }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_gcm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, - 128, "ARIA-128-GCM", - 12, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, 16, - &gcm_aria_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_ARIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_gcm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, - 192, "ARIA-192-GCM", - 12, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, 16, - &gcm_aria_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_ARIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_gcm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, - 256, "ARIA-256-GCM", - 12, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, 16, - &gcm_aria_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_ARIA }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ @@ -1361,42 +1531,77 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t ccm_aria_info = { NULL, #endif ccm_aria_setkey_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) ccm_aria_setkey_wrap, +#endif ccm_ctx_alloc, ccm_ctx_free, }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_ccm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, - 128, "ARIA-128-CCM", - 12, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, 16, - &ccm_aria_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_ccm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, - 192, "ARIA-192-CCM", - 12, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, 16, - &ccm_aria_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_ccm_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, - 256, "ARIA-256-CCM", - 12, + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_ccm_star_no_tag_info = { + "ARIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG", 16, - &ccm_aria_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_ccm_star_no_tag_info = { + "ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_ccm_star_no_tag_info = { + "ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ @@ -1551,26 +1756,26 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t des_info = { }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ecb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, - MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES, "DES-ECB", - 0, - 0, 8, - &des_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES }; #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_cbc_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, - MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES, "DES-CBC", 8, + 8 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, 0, - 8, - &des_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ @@ -1602,26 +1807,26 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t des_ede_info = { }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ede_ecb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, - MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE, "DES-EDE-ECB", - 0, - 0, 8, - &des_ede_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE }; #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ede_cbc_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, - MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE, "DES-EDE-CBC", 8, + 8 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC, 0, - 8, - &des_ede_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ @@ -1653,251 +1858,29 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t des_ede3_info = { }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ede3_ecb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, - MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3, "DES-EDE3-ECB", - 0, - 0, 8, - &des_ede3_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE3 }; #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ede3_cbc_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, - MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3, "DES-EDE3-CBC", 8, + 8 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, 0, - 8, - &des_ede3_info + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE3 }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) - -static int blowfish_crypt_ecb_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, - const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) -{ - return mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ecb((mbedtls_blowfish_context *) ctx, operation, input, - output); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -static int blowfish_crypt_cbc_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, - size_t length, unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output) -{ - return mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cbc((mbedtls_blowfish_context *) ctx, operation, length, iv, - input, output); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) -static int blowfish_crypt_cfb64_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, - size_t length, size_t *iv_off, unsigned char *iv, - const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) -{ - return mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_cfb64((mbedtls_blowfish_context *) ctx, operation, length, - iv_off, iv, input, output); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) -static int blowfish_crypt_ctr_wrap(void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *nc_off, - unsigned char *nonce_counter, unsigned char *stream_block, - const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) -{ - return mbedtls_blowfish_crypt_ctr((mbedtls_blowfish_context *) ctx, length, nc_off, - nonce_counter, stream_block, input, output); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ - -static int blowfish_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int key_bitlen) -{ - return mbedtls_blowfish_setkey((mbedtls_blowfish_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen); -} - -static void *blowfish_ctx_alloc(void) -{ - mbedtls_blowfish_context *ctx; - ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_blowfish_context)); - - if (ctx == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - mbedtls_blowfish_init(ctx); - - return ctx; -} - -static void blowfish_ctx_free(void *ctx) -{ - mbedtls_blowfish_free((mbedtls_blowfish_context *) ctx); - mbedtls_free(ctx); -} - -static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t blowfish_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_BLOWFISH, - blowfish_crypt_ecb_wrap, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) - blowfish_crypt_cbc_wrap, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) - blowfish_crypt_cfb64_wrap, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) - NULL, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) - blowfish_crypt_ctr_wrap, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) - NULL, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) - NULL, -#endif - blowfish_setkey_wrap, - blowfish_setkey_wrap, - blowfish_ctx_alloc, - blowfish_ctx_free -}; - -static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t blowfish_ecb_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB, - MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, - 128, - "BLOWFISH-ECB", - 0, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN, - 8, - &blowfish_info -}; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t blowfish_cbc_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, - 128, - "BLOWFISH-CBC", - 8, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN, - 8, - &blowfish_info -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) -static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t blowfish_cfb64_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, - 128, - "BLOWFISH-CFB64", - 8, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN, - 8, - &blowfish_info -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) -static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t blowfish_ctr_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, - 128, - "BLOWFISH-CTR", - 8, - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN, - 8, - &blowfish_info -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -static int arc4_crypt_stream_wrap(void *ctx, size_t length, - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output) -{ - return mbedtls_arc4_crypt((mbedtls_arc4_context *) ctx, length, input, output); -} - -static int arc4_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - unsigned int key_bitlen) -{ - /* we get key_bitlen in bits, arc4 expects it in bytes */ - if (key_bitlen % 8 != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - mbedtls_arc4_setup((mbedtls_arc4_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen / 8); - return 0; -} - -static void *arc4_ctx_alloc(void) -{ - mbedtls_arc4_context *ctx; - ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_arc4_context)); - - if (ctx == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - mbedtls_arc4_init(ctx); - - return ctx; -} - -static void arc4_ctx_free(void *ctx) -{ - mbedtls_arc4_free((mbedtls_arc4_context *) ctx); - mbedtls_free(ctx); -} - -static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t arc4_base_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARC4, - NULL, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) - NULL, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) - NULL, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) - NULL, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) - NULL, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) - NULL, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) - arc4_crypt_stream_wrap, -#endif - arc4_setkey_wrap, - arc4_setkey_wrap, - arc4_ctx_alloc, - arc4_ctx_free -}; - -static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t arc4_128_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, - MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, - 128, - "ARC4-128", - 0, - 0, - 1, - &arc4_base_info -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) static int chacha20_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, @@ -1970,19 +1953,21 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t chacha20_base_info = { chacha20_stream_wrap, #endif chacha20_setkey_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) chacha20_setkey_wrap, +#endif chacha20_ctx_alloc, chacha20_ctx_free }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t chacha20_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20, - MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, - 256, "CHACHA20", - 12, - 0, 1, - &chacha20_base_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CHACHA20_BASE }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C */ @@ -2045,19 +2030,21 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t chachapoly_base_info = { NULL, #endif chachapoly_setkey_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) chachapoly_setkey_wrap, +#endif chachapoly_ctx_alloc, chachapoly_ctx_free }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t chachapoly_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, - MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY, - 256, "CHACHA20-POLY1305", - 12, - 0, 1, - &chachapoly_base_info + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CHACHAPOLY_BASE }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ @@ -2113,20 +2100,22 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t null_base_info = { null_crypt_stream, #endif null_setkey, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) null_setkey, +#endif null_ctx_alloc, null_ctx_free }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t null_cipher_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, - MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, - 0, "NULL", - 0, - 0, 1, - &null_base_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 0 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_NULL_BASE }; #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) */ @@ -2190,130 +2179,140 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t kw_aes_info = { }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_nist_kw_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW, - MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, - 128, "AES-128-KW", - 0, - 0, 16, - &kw_aes_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES }; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_nist_kw_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW, - MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, - 192, "AES-192-KW", - 0, - 0, 16, - &kw_aes_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_nist_kw_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW, - MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, - 256, "AES-256-KW", - 0, - 0, 16, - &kw_aes_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES }; +#endif static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_nist_kwp_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP, - MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, - 128, "AES-128-KWP", - 0, - 0, 16, - &kw_aes_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES }; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_nist_kwp_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KWP, - MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, - 192, "AES-192-KWP", - 0, - 0, 16, - &kw_aes_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KWP, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES }; static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_nist_kwp_info = { - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KWP, - MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, - 256, "AES-256-KWP", - 0, - 0, 16, - &kw_aes_info + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KWP, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES }; +#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB, &aes_128_ecb_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB, &aes_192_ecb_info }, { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB, &aes_256_ecb_info }, +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, &aes_128_cbc_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC, &aes_192_cbc_info }, { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, &aes_256_cbc_info }, #endif +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128, &aes_128_cfb128_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128, &aes_192_cfb128_info }, { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128, &aes_256_cfb128_info }, #endif +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB, &aes_128_ofb_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB, &aes_192_ofb_info }, { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB, &aes_256_ofb_info }, #endif +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR, &aes_128_ctr_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR, &aes_192_ctr_info }, { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR, &aes_256_ctr_info }, #endif +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_XTS, &aes_128_xts_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_XTS, &aes_256_xts_info }, #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, &aes_128_gcm_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM, &aes_192_gcm_info }, { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, &aes_256_gcm_info }, #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, &aes_128_ccm_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM, &aes_192_ccm_info }, { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, &aes_256_ccm_info }, #endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, &arc4_128_info }, -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) - { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_ECB, &blowfish_ecb_info }, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) - { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CBC, &blowfish_cbc_info }, #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) - { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CFB64, &blowfish_cfb64_info }, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &aes_128_ccm_star_no_tag_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &aes_192_ccm_star_no_tag_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &aes_256_ccm_star_no_tag_info }, #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) - { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLOWFISH_CTR, &blowfish_ctr_info }, #endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB, &camellia_128_ecb_info }, @@ -2343,6 +2342,9 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[] = { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM, &camellia_128_ccm_info }, { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM, &camellia_192_ccm_info }, { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM, &camellia_256_ccm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &camellia_128_ccm_star_no_tag_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &camellia_192_ccm_star_no_tag_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &camellia_256_ccm_star_no_tag_info }, #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ @@ -2374,6 +2376,9 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[] = { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM, &aria_128_ccm_info }, { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM, &aria_192_ccm_info }, { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM, &aria_256_ccm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &aria_128_ccm_star_no_tag_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &aria_192_ccm_star_no_tag_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &aria_256_ccm_star_no_tag_info }, #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */ @@ -2398,12 +2403,16 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW, &aes_128_nist_kw_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW, &aes_192_nist_kw_info }, { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW, &aes_256_nist_kw_info }, +#endif { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP, &aes_128_nist_kwp_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KWP, &aes_192_nist_kwp_info }, { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KWP, &aes_256_nist_kwp_info }, #endif +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, &null_cipher_info }, @@ -2416,4 +2425,58 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[] = sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_definitions[0])) int mbedtls_cipher_supported[NUM_CIPHERS]; +const mbedtls_cipher_base_t *mbedtls_cipher_base_lookup_table[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES] = &aes_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA] = &aria_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA] = &camellia_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES] = &ccm_aes_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA] = &ccm_aria_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA] = &ccm_camellia_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CHACHA20_BASE] = &chacha20_base_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CHACHAPOLY_BASE] = &chachapoly_base_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE3] = &des_ede3_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE] = &des_ede_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES] = &des_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_AES] = &gcm_aes_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_ARIA] = &gcm_aria_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_CAMELLIA] = &gcm_camellia_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES] = &kw_aes_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_NULL_BASE] = &null_base_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_XTS_AES] = &xts_aes_info +#endif +}; + #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cipher_internal.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.h similarity index 66% rename from vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cipher_internal.h rename to vendor/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.h index c77bb8cc9f..f22915120d 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cipher_internal.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.h @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /** - * \file cipher_internal.h + * \file cipher_wrap.h * * \brief Cipher wrappers. * @@ -7,28 +7,12 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CIPHER_WRAP_H #define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_WRAP_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" @@ -40,6 +24,50 @@ extern "C" { #endif +/* Support for GCM either through Mbed TLS SW implementation or PSA */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM)) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA +#endif + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES)) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM)) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA +#endif + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES)) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG)) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA +#endif + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG) && \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES)) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305)) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_SOME_AEAD_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA +#endif + /** * Base cipher information. The non-mode specific functions and values. */ @@ -97,9 +125,11 @@ struct mbedtls_cipher_base_t { int (*setkey_enc_func)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_bitlen); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) /** Set key for decryption purposes */ int (*setkey_dec_func)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_bitlen); +#endif /** Allocate a new context */ void * (*ctx_alloc_func)(void); @@ -130,7 +160,7 @@ typedef enum { typedef struct { psa_algorithm_t alg; - psa_key_id_t slot; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t slot; mbedtls_cipher_psa_key_ownership slot_state; } mbedtls_cipher_context_psa; #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ @@ -139,6 +169,8 @@ extern const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[]; extern int mbedtls_cipher_supported[]; +extern const mbedtls_cipher_base_t *mbedtls_cipher_base_lookup_table[]; + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/cmac.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/cmac.c index 0c07de6f2f..eda10d0b3d 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/cmac.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/cmac.c @@ -4,19 +4,7 @@ * \brief NIST SP800-38B compliant CMAC implementation for AES and 3DES * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* @@ -46,6 +34,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" #include @@ -68,39 +57,33 @@ static int cmac_multiply_by_u(unsigned char *output, size_t blocksize) { const unsigned char R_128 = 0x87; - const unsigned char R_64 = 0x1B; - unsigned char R_n, mask; - unsigned char overflow = 0x00; + unsigned char R_n; + uint32_t overflow = 0x00; int i; if (blocksize == MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { R_n = R_128; - } else if (blocksize == MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE) { + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + else if (blocksize == MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE) { + const unsigned char R_64 = 0x1B; R_n = R_64; - } else { + } +#endif + else { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - for (i = (int) blocksize - 1; i >= 0; i--) { - output[i] = input[i] << 1 | overflow; - overflow = input[i] >> 7; + for (i = (int) blocksize - 4; i >= 0; i -= 4) { + uint32_t i32 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(&input[i], 0); + uint32_t new_overflow = i32 >> 31; + i32 = (i32 << 1) | overflow; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(i32, &output[i], 0); + overflow = new_overflow; } - /* mask = ( input[0] >> 7 ) ? 0xff : 0x00 - * using bit operations to avoid branches */ - - /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is - * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */ -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( push ) -#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) -#endif - mask = -(input[0] >> 7); -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( pop ) -#endif - - output[blocksize - 1] ^= R_n & mask; + R_n = (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_bool(input[0] >> 7), R_n); + output[blocksize - 1] ^= R_n; return 0; } @@ -114,12 +97,12 @@ static int cmac_generate_subkeys(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *K1, unsigned char *K2) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char L[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + unsigned char L[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; size_t olen, block_size; mbedtls_platform_zeroize(L, sizeof(L)); - block_size = ctx->cipher_info->block_size; + block_size = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(ctx->cipher_info); /* Calculate Ek(0) */ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(ctx, L, block_size, L, &olen)) != 0) { @@ -145,16 +128,6 @@ static int cmac_generate_subkeys(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, #endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) || defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) -static void cmac_xor_block(unsigned char *output, const unsigned char *input1, - const unsigned char *input2, - const size_t block_size) -{ - size_t idx; - - for (idx = 0; idx < block_size; idx++) { - output[idx] = input1[idx] ^ input2[idx]; - } -} /* * Create padded last block from (partial) last block. @@ -162,7 +135,7 @@ static void cmac_xor_block(unsigned char *output, const unsigned char *input1, * We can't use the padding option from the cipher layer, as it only works for * CBC and we use ECB mode, and anyway we need to XOR K1 or K2 in addition. */ -static void cmac_pad(unsigned char padded_block[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX], +static void cmac_pad(unsigned char padded_block[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE], size_t padded_block_len, const unsigned char *last_block, size_t last_block_len) @@ -196,7 +169,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, return retval; } - type = ctx->cipher_info->type; + type = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_type(ctx->cipher_info); switch (type) { case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB: @@ -236,9 +209,13 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } cmac_ctx = ctx->cmac_ctx; - block_size = ctx->cipher_info->block_size; + block_size = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(ctx->cipher_info); state = ctx->cmac_ctx->state; + /* Without the MBEDTLS_ASSUME below, gcc -O3 will generate a warning of the form + * error: writing 16 bytes into a region of size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overflow=] */ + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(block_size <= MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE); + /* Is there data still to process from the last call, that's greater in * size than a block? */ if (cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len > 0 && @@ -247,7 +224,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, input, block_size - cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len); - cmac_xor_block(state, cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block, state, block_size); + mbedtls_xor_no_simd(state, cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block, state, block_size); if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(ctx, state, block_size, state, &olen)) != 0) { @@ -265,7 +242,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, /* Iterate across the input data in block sized chunks, excluding any * final partial or complete block */ for (j = 1; j < n; j++) { - cmac_xor_block(state, input, state, block_size); + mbedtls_xor_no_simd(state, input, state, block_size); if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(ctx, state, block_size, state, &olen)) != 0) { @@ -293,9 +270,9 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, { mbedtls_cmac_context_t *cmac_ctx; unsigned char *state, *last_block; - unsigned char K1[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; - unsigned char K2[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; - unsigned char M_last[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + unsigned char K1[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; + unsigned char K2[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; + unsigned char M_last[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t olen, block_size; @@ -305,7 +282,8 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, } cmac_ctx = ctx->cmac_ctx; - block_size = ctx->cipher_info->block_size; + block_size = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(ctx->cipher_info); + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(block_size <= MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE); // silence GCC warning state = cmac_ctx->state; mbedtls_platform_zeroize(K1, sizeof(K1)); @@ -317,14 +295,14 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, /* Calculate last block */ if (cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len < block_size) { cmac_pad(M_last, block_size, last_block, cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len); - cmac_xor_block(M_last, M_last, K2, block_size); + mbedtls_xor(M_last, M_last, K2, block_size); } else { /* Last block is complete block */ - cmac_xor_block(M_last, last_block, K1, block_size); + mbedtls_xor(M_last, last_block, K1, block_size); } - cmac_xor_block(state, M_last, state, block_size); + mbedtls_xor(state, M_last, state, block_size); if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(ctx, state, block_size, state, &olen)) != 0) { goto exit; @@ -342,7 +320,7 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, mbedtls_platform_zeroize(cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block, sizeof(cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block)); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(state, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(state, MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE); return ret; } @@ -531,6 +509,7 @@ static const unsigned char aes_128_expected_result[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY][MBEDTL }; /* CMAC-AES192 Test Data */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static const unsigned char aes_192_key[24] = { 0x8e, 0x73, 0xb0, 0xf7, 0xda, 0x0e, 0x64, 0x52, 0xc8, 0x10, 0xf3, 0x2b, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xe5, @@ -571,8 +550,10 @@ static const unsigned char aes_192_expected_result[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY][MBEDTL 0x4d, 0x77, 0x58, 0x96, 0x59, 0xf3, 0x9a, 0x11 } }; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ /* CMAC-AES256 Test Data */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) static const unsigned char aes_256_key[32] = { 0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe, 0x2b, 0x73, 0xae, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x81, @@ -614,6 +595,7 @@ static const unsigned char aes_256_expected_result[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY][MBEDTL 0x69, 0x6a, 0x2c, 0x05, 0x6c, 0x31, 0x54, 0x10 } }; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) @@ -756,8 +738,8 @@ static int cmac_test_subkeys(int verbose, int i, ret = 0; mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx; const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; - unsigned char K1[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; - unsigned char K2[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + unsigned char K1[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; + unsigned char K2[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(cipher_type); if (cipher_info == NULL) { @@ -851,7 +833,7 @@ static int cmac_test_wth_cipher(int verbose, { const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; int i, ret = 0; - unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX]; + unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(cipher_type); if (cipher_info == NULL) { @@ -961,6 +943,7 @@ int mbedtls_cmac_self_test(int verbose) } /* AES-192 */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) if ((ret = cmac_test_subkeys(verbose, "AES 192", aes_192_key, @@ -984,8 +967,10 @@ int mbedtls_cmac_self_test(int verbose) NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY)) != 0) { return ret; } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ /* AES-256 */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) if ((ret = cmac_test_subkeys(verbose, "AES 256", aes_256_key, @@ -1009,6 +994,7 @@ int mbedtls_cmac_self_test(int verbose) NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY)) != 0) { return ret; } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/common.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/common.h index e162aa3cff..3936ffdfe1 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/common.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/common.h @@ -5,38 +5,26 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_COMMON_H #define MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_COMMON_H -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#else -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" +#include "alignment.h" #include #include #include +#include -/* Define `inline` on some non-C99-compliant compilers. */ -#if (defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER)) && \ - !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) -#define inline __inline +#if defined(__ARM_NEON) +#include +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64) +#include +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS #endif /** Helper to define a function as static except when building invasive tests. @@ -60,6 +48,78 @@ #define MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE static #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +extern void (*mbedtls_test_hook_test_fail)(const char *test, int line, const char *file); +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(TEST) \ + do { \ + if ((!(TEST)) && ((*mbedtls_test_hook_test_fail) != NULL)) \ + { \ + (*mbedtls_test_hook_test_fail)( #TEST, __LINE__, __FILE__); \ + } \ + } while (0) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(TEST) +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) */ + +/** \def ARRAY_LENGTH + * Return the number of elements of a static or stack array. + * + * \param array A value of array (not pointer) type. + * + * \return The number of elements of the array. + */ +/* A correct implementation of ARRAY_LENGTH, but which silently gives + * a nonsensical result if called with a pointer rather than an array. */ +#define ARRAY_LENGTH_UNSAFE(array) \ + (sizeof(array) / sizeof(*(array))) + +#if defined(__GNUC__) +/* Test if arg and &(arg)[0] have the same type. This is true if arg is + * an array but not if it's a pointer. */ +#define IS_ARRAY_NOT_POINTER(arg) \ + (!__builtin_types_compatible_p(__typeof__(arg), \ + __typeof__(&(arg)[0]))) +/* A compile-time constant with the value 0. If `const_expr` is not a + * compile-time constant with a nonzero value, cause a compile-time error. */ +#define STATIC_ASSERT_EXPR(const_expr) \ + (0 && sizeof(struct { unsigned int STATIC_ASSERT : 1 - 2 * !(const_expr); })) + +/* Return the scalar value `value` (possibly promoted). This is a compile-time + * constant if `value` is. `condition` must be a compile-time constant. + * If `condition` is false, arrange to cause a compile-time error. */ +#define STATIC_ASSERT_THEN_RETURN(condition, value) \ + (STATIC_ASSERT_EXPR(condition) ? 0 : (value)) + +#define ARRAY_LENGTH(array) \ + (STATIC_ASSERT_THEN_RETURN(IS_ARRAY_NOT_POINTER(array), \ + ARRAY_LENGTH_UNSAFE(array))) + +#else +/* If we aren't sure the compiler supports our non-standard tricks, + * fall back to the unsafe implementation. */ +#define ARRAY_LENGTH(array) ARRAY_LENGTH_UNSAFE(array) +#endif +/** Allow library to access its structs' private members. + * + * Although structs defined in header files are publicly available, + * their members are private and should not be accessed by the user. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ALLOW_PRIVATE_ACCESS + +/** + * \brief Securely zeroize a buffer then free it. + * + * Similar to making consecutive calls to + * \c mbedtls_platform_zeroize() and \c mbedtls_free(), but has + * code size savings, and potential for optimisation in the future. + * + * Guaranteed to be a no-op if \p buf is \c NULL and \p len is 0. + * + * \param buf Buffer to be zeroized then freed. + * \param len Length of the buffer in bytes + */ +void mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(void *buf, size_t len); + /** Return an offset into a buffer. * * This is just the addition of an offset to a pointer, except that this @@ -98,254 +158,197 @@ static inline const unsigned char *mbedtls_buffer_offset_const( return p == NULL ? NULL : p + n; } -/** Byte Reading Macros - * - * Given a multi-byte integer \p x, MBEDTLS_BYTE_n retrieves the n-th - * byte from x, where byte 0 is the least significant byte. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(x) ((uint8_t) ((x) & 0xff)) -#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 8) & 0xff)) -#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 16) & 0xff)) -#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 24) & 0xff)) -#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_4(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 32) & 0xff)) -#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_5(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 40) & 0xff)) -#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_6(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 48) & 0xff)) -#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_7(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 56) & 0xff)) - -/** - * Get the unsigned 32 bits integer corresponding to four bytes in - * big-endian order (MSB first). - * - * \param data Base address of the memory to get the four bytes from. - * \param offset Offset from \p base of the first and most significant - * byte of the four bytes to build the 32 bits unsigned - * integer from. - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE -#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(data, offset) \ - ( \ - ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset)] << 24) \ - | ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset) + 1] << 16) \ - | ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset) + 2] << 8) \ - | ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset) + 3]) \ - ) +/* Always inline mbedtls_xor() for similar reasons as mbedtls_xor_no_simd(). */ +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) #endif - /** - * Put in memory a 32 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order. + * Perform a fast block XOR operation, such that + * r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i] where 0 <= i < n + * + * \param r Pointer to result (buffer of at least \p n bytes). \p r + * may be equal to either \p a or \p b, but behaviour when + * it overlaps in other ways is undefined. + * \param a Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes) + * \param b Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes) + * \param n Number of bytes to process. * - * \param n 32 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. - * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 32 - * bits unsigned integer in. - * \param offset Offset from \p base where to put the most significant - * byte of the 32 bits unsigned integer \p n. + * \note Depending on the situation, it may be faster to use either mbedtls_xor() or + * mbedtls_xor_no_simd() (these are functionally equivalent). + * If the result is used immediately after the xor operation in non-SIMD code (e.g, in + * AES-CBC), there may be additional latency to transfer the data from SIMD to scalar + * registers, and in this case, mbedtls_xor_no_simd() may be faster. In other cases where + * the result is not used immediately (e.g., in AES-CTR), mbedtls_xor() may be faster. + * For targets without SIMD support, they will behave the same. */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE -#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(n, data, offset) \ - { \ - (data)[(offset)] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(n); \ +static inline void mbedtls_xor(unsigned char *r, + const unsigned char *a, + const unsigned char *b, + size_t n) +{ + size_t i = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS) && \ + (!(defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION < 70300)) + /* Old GCC versions generate a warning here, so disable the NEON path for these compilers */ + for (; (i + 16) <= n; i += 16) { + uint8x16_t v1 = vld1q_u8(a + i); + uint8x16_t v2 = vld1q_u8(b + i); + uint8x16_t x = veorq_u8(v1, v2); + vst1q_u8(r + i, x); + } +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) + /* This if statement helps some compilers (e.g., IAR) optimise out the byte-by-byte tail case + * where n is a constant multiple of 16. + * For other compilers (e.g. recent gcc and clang) it makes no difference if n is a compile-time + * constant, and is a very small perf regression if n is not a compile-time constant. */ + if (n % 16 == 0) { + return; } #endif - -/** - * Get the unsigned 32 bits integer corresponding to four bytes in - * little-endian order (LSB first). - * - * \param data Base address of the memory to get the four bytes from. - * \param offset Offset from \p base of the first and least significant - * byte of the four bytes to build the 32 bits unsigned - * integer from. - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE -#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, offset) \ - ( \ - ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset)]) \ - | ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset) + 1] << 8) \ - | ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset) + 2] << 16) \ - | ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset) + 3] << 24) \ - ) +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) + /* This codepath probably only makes sense on architectures with 64-bit registers */ + for (; (i + 8) <= n; i += 8) { + uint64_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(b + i); + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(r + i, x); + } +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) + if (n % 8 == 0) { + return; + } #endif - -/** - * Put in memory a 32 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order. - * - * \param n 32 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. - * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 32 - * bits unsigned integer in. - * \param offset Offset from \p base where to put the least significant - * byte of the 32 bits unsigned integer \p n. - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE -#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(n, data, offset) \ - { \ - (data)[(offset)] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(n); \ +#else + for (; (i + 4) <= n; i += 4) { + uint32_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(b + i); + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(r + i, x); + } +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) + if (n % 4 == 0) { + return; } #endif - -/** - * Get the unsigned 16 bits integer corresponding to two bytes in - * little-endian order (LSB first). - * - * \param data Base address of the memory to get the two bytes from. - * \param offset Offset from \p base of the first and least significant - * byte of the two bytes to build the 16 bits unsigned - * integer from. - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_LE -#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_LE(data, offset) \ - ( \ - ((uint16_t) (data)[(offset)]) \ - | ((uint16_t) (data)[(offset) + 1] << 8) \ - ) #endif - -/** - * Put in memory a 16 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order. - * - * \param n 16 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. - * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 16 - * bits unsigned integer in. - * \param offset Offset from \p base where to put the least significant - * byte of the 16 bits unsigned integer \p n. - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE -#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE(n, data, offset) \ - { \ - (data)[(offset)] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(n); \ - } #endif + for (; i < n; i++) { + r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i]; + } +} -/** - * Get the unsigned 16 bits integer corresponding to two bytes in - * big-endian order (MSB first). - * - * \param data Base address of the memory to get the two bytes from. - * \param offset Offset from \p base of the first and most significant - * byte of the two bytes to build the 16 bits unsigned - * integer from. - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE -#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(data, offset) \ - ( \ - ((uint16_t) (data)[(offset)] << 8) \ - | ((uint16_t) (data)[(offset) + 1]) \ - ) +/* Always inline mbedtls_xor_no_simd() as we see significant perf regressions when it does not get + * inlined (e.g., observed about 3x perf difference in gcm_mult_largetable with gcc 7 - 12) */ +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) #endif - /** - * Put in memory a 16 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order. + * Perform a fast block XOR operation, such that + * r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i] where 0 <= i < n + * + * In some situations, this can perform better than mbedtls_xor() (e.g., it's about 5% + * better in AES-CBC). + * + * \param r Pointer to result (buffer of at least \p n bytes). \p r + * may be equal to either \p a or \p b, but behaviour when + * it overlaps in other ways is undefined. + * \param a Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes) + * \param b Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes) + * \param n Number of bytes to process. * - * \param n 16 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. - * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 16 - * bits unsigned integer in. - * \param offset Offset from \p base where to put the most significant - * byte of the 16 bits unsigned integer \p n. + * \note Depending on the situation, it may be faster to use either mbedtls_xor() or + * mbedtls_xor_no_simd() (these are functionally equivalent). + * If the result is used immediately after the xor operation in non-SIMD code (e.g, in + * AES-CBC), there may be additional latency to transfer the data from SIMD to scalar + * registers, and in this case, mbedtls_xor_no_simd() may be faster. In other cases where + * the result is not used immediately (e.g., in AES-CTR), mbedtls_xor() may be faster. + * For targets without SIMD support, they will behave the same. */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE -#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(n, data, offset) \ - { \ - (data)[(offset)] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(n); \ +static inline void mbedtls_xor_no_simd(unsigned char *r, + const unsigned char *a, + const unsigned char *b, + size_t n) +{ + size_t i = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) + /* This codepath probably only makes sense on architectures with 64-bit registers */ + for (; (i + 8) <= n; i += 8) { + uint64_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(b + i); + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(r + i, x); + } +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) + /* This if statement helps some compilers (e.g., IAR) optimise out the byte-by-byte tail case + * where n is a constant multiple of 8. + * For other compilers (e.g. recent gcc and clang) it makes no difference if n is a compile-time + * constant, and is a very small perf regression if n is not a compile-time constant. */ + if (n % 8 == 0) { + return; } #endif - -/** - * Get the unsigned 64 bits integer corresponding to eight bytes in - * big-endian order (MSB first). - * - * \param data Base address of the memory to get the eight bytes from. - * \param offset Offset from \p base of the first and most significant - * byte of the eight bytes to build the 64 bits unsigned - * integer from. - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE -#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(data, offset) \ - ( \ - ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset)] << 56) \ - | ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset) + 1] << 48) \ - | ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset) + 2] << 40) \ - | ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset) + 3] << 32) \ - | ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset) + 4] << 24) \ - | ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset) + 5] << 16) \ - | ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset) + 6] << 8) \ - | ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset) + 7]) \ - ) +#else + for (; (i + 4) <= n; i += 4) { + uint32_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(b + i); + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(r + i, x); + } +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) + if (n % 4 == 0) { + return; + } +#endif +#endif #endif + for (; i < n; i++) { + r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i]; + } +} -/** - * Put in memory a 64 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order. - * - * \param n 64 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. - * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 64 - * bits unsigned integer in. - * \param offset Offset from \p base where to put the most significant - * byte of the 64 bits unsigned integer \p n. +/* Fix MSVC C99 compatible issue + * MSVC support __func__ from visual studio 2015( 1900 ) + * Use MSVC predefine macro to avoid name check fail. */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE -#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(n, data, offset) \ - { \ - (data)[(offset)] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_7(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_6(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_5(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_4(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 4] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 5] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 7] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(n); \ - } +#if (defined(_MSC_VER) && (_MSC_VER <= 1900)) +#define /*no-check-names*/ __func__ __FUNCTION__ #endif -/** - * Get the unsigned 64 bits integer corresponding to eight bytes in - * little-endian order (LSB first). - * - * \param data Base address of the memory to get the eight bytes from. - * \param offset Offset from \p base of the first and least significant - * byte of the eight bytes to build the 64 bits unsigned - * integer from. - */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE -#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE(data, offset) \ - ( \ - ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset) + 7] << 56) \ - | ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset) + 6] << 48) \ - | ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset) + 5] << 40) \ - | ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset) + 4] << 32) \ - | ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset) + 3] << 24) \ - | ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset) + 2] << 16) \ - | ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset) + 1] << 8) \ - | ((uint64_t) (data)[(offset)]) \ - ) +/* Define `asm` for compilers which don't define it. */ +/* *INDENT-OFF* */ +#ifndef asm +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#define asm __asm +#else +#define asm __asm__ +#endif #endif +/* *INDENT-ON* */ -/** - * Put in memory a 64 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order. +/* + * Define the constraint used for read-only pointer operands to aarch64 asm. + * + * This is normally the usual "r", but for aarch64_32 (aka ILP32, + * as found in watchos), "p" is required to avoid warnings from clang. + * + * Note that clang does not recognise '+p' or '=p', and armclang + * does not recognise 'p' at all. Therefore, to update a pointer from + * aarch64 assembly, it is necessary to use something like: * - * \param n 64 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. - * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 64 - * bits unsigned integer in. - * \param offset Offset from \p base where to put the least significant - * byte of the 64 bits unsigned integer \p n. + * uintptr_t uptr = (uintptr_t) ptr; + * asm( "ldr x4, [%x0], #8" ... : "+r" (uptr) : : ) + * ptr = (void*) uptr; + * + * Note that the "x" in "%x0" is neccessary; writing "%0" will cause warnings. */ -#ifndef MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE -#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE(n, data, offset) \ - { \ - (data)[(offset)] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 4] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_4(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 5] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_5(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_6(n); \ - (data)[(offset) + 7] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_7(n); \ - } +#if defined(__aarch64__) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) +#if UINTPTR_MAX == 0xfffffffful +/* ILP32: Specify the pointer operand slightly differently, as per #7787. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASM_AARCH64_PTR_CONSTRAINT "p" +#elif UINTPTR_MAX == 0xfffffffffffffffful +/* Normal case (64-bit pointers): use "r" as the constraint for pointer operands to asm */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASM_AARCH64_PTR_CONSTRAINT "r" +#else +#error "Unrecognised pointer size for aarch64" +#endif #endif /* Always provide a static assert macro, so it can be used unconditionally. @@ -362,4 +365,71 @@ static inline const unsigned char *mbedtls_buffer_offset_const( #define MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(expr, msg) #endif +#if defined(__has_builtin) +#define MBEDTLS_HAS_BUILTIN(x) __has_builtin(x) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_HAS_BUILTIN(x) 0 +#endif + +/* Define compiler branch hints */ +#if MBEDTLS_HAS_BUILTIN(__builtin_expect) +#define MBEDTLS_LIKELY(x) __builtin_expect(!!(x), 1) +#define MBEDTLS_UNLIKELY(x) __builtin_expect(!!(x), 0) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_LIKELY(x) x +#define MBEDTLS_UNLIKELY(x) x +#endif + +/* MBEDTLS_ASSUME may be used to provide additional information to the compiler + * which can result in smaller code-size. */ +#if MBEDTLS_HAS_BUILTIN(__builtin_assume) +/* clang provides __builtin_assume */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASSUME(x) __builtin_assume(x) +#elif MBEDTLS_HAS_BUILTIN(__builtin_unreachable) +/* gcc and IAR can use __builtin_unreachable */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASSUME(x) do { if (!(x)) __builtin_unreachable(); } while (0) +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +/* Supported by MSVC since VS 2005 */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASSUME(x) __assume(x) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_ASSUME(x) do { } while (0) +#endif + +/* For gcc -Os, override with -O2 for a given function. + * + * This will not affect behaviour for other optimisation settings, e.g. -O0. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && defined(__OPTIMIZE_SIZE__) +#define MBEDTLS_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE __attribute__((optimize("-O2"))) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE +#endif + +/* Suppress compiler warnings for unused functions and variables. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED) && defined(__has_attribute) +# if __has_attribute(unused) +# define MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED __attribute__((unused)) +# endif +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED) && defined(__GNUC__) +# define MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED __attribute__((unused)) +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED) && defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) && defined(__VER__) +/* IAR does support __attribute__((unused)), but only if the -e flag (extended language support) + * is given; the pragma always works. + * Unfortunately the pragma affects the rest of the file where it is used, but this is harmless. + * Check for version 5.2 or later - this pragma may be supported by earlier versions, but I wasn't + * able to find documentation). + */ +# if (__VER__ >= 5020000) +# define MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED _Pragma("diag_suppress=Pe177") +# endif +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED) && defined(_MSC_VER) +# define MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED __pragma(warning(suppress:4189)) +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED) +# define MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED +#endif + #endif /* MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_COMMON_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/constant_time.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/constant_time.c index 2307ed53b5..d212ddfd81 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/constant_time.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/constant_time.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * Constant-time functions * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* @@ -22,40 +10,85 @@ * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms. */ +#include +#include + #include "common.h" #include "constant_time_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) -#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" -#endif +#include -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) -#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ASM) +/* + * Define an object with the value zero, such that the compiler cannot prove that it + * has the value zero (because it is volatile, it "may be modified in ways unknown to + * the implementation"). + */ +volatile mbedtls_ct_uint_t mbedtls_ct_zero = 0; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" -#endif +/* + * Define MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_VOLATILE_ACCESS where assembly is present to + * perform fast unaligned access to volatile data. + * + * This is needed because mbedtls_get_unaligned_uintXX etc don't support volatile + * memory accesses. + * + * Some of these definitions could be moved into alignment.h but for now they are + * only used here. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) && \ + ((defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ARM_ASM) && (UINTPTR_MAX == 0xfffffffful)) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CT_AARCH64_ASM)) +/* We check pointer sizes to avoid issues with them not matching register size requirements */ +#define MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_VOLATILE_ACCESS -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) -#include "constant_time_invasive.h" +static inline uint32_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_volatile_uint32(volatile const unsigned char *p) +{ + /* This is UB, even where it's safe: + * return *((volatile uint32_t*)p); + * so instead the same thing is expressed in assembly below. + */ + uint32_t r; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ARM_ASM) + asm volatile ("ldr %0, [%1]" : "=r" (r) : "r" (p) :); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_AARCH64_ASM) + asm volatile ("ldr %w0, [%1]" : "=r" (r) : MBEDTLS_ASM_AARCH64_PTR_CONSTRAINT(p) :); +#else +#error "No assembly defined for mbedtls_get_unaligned_volatile_uint32" #endif - -#include + return r; +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) && + (defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ARM_ASM) || defined(MBEDTLS_CT_AARCH64_ASM)) */ int mbedtls_ct_memcmp(const void *a, const void *b, size_t n) { - size_t i; + size_t i = 0; + /* + * `A` and `B` are cast to volatile to ensure that the compiler + * generates code that always fully reads both buffers. + * Otherwise it could generate a test to exit early if `diff` has all + * bits set early in the loop. + */ volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a; volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b; - volatile unsigned char diff = 0; + uint32_t diff = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_VOLATILE_ACCESS) + for (; (i + 4) <= n; i += 4) { + uint32_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_volatile_uint32(A + i); + uint32_t y = mbedtls_get_unaligned_volatile_uint32(B + i); + diff |= x ^ y; + } +#endif - for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { + for (; i < n; i++) { /* Read volatile data in order before computing diff. * This avoids IAR compiler warning: * 'the order of volatile accesses is undefined ..' */ @@ -63,330 +96,119 @@ int mbedtls_ct_memcmp(const void *a, diff |= x ^ y; } - return (int) diff; -} - -unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_mask(unsigned value) -{ - /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is - * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */ -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( push ) -#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) -#endif - return -((value | -value) >> (sizeof(value) * 8 - 1)); -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( pop ) -#endif -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) - -size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask(size_t value) -{ - /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, - * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( push ) -#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) -#endif - return -((value | -value) >> (sizeof(value) * 8 - 1)); -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( pop ) -#endif -} - -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) || - defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) - -mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask(mbedtls_mpi_uint value) -{ - /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is - * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */ -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( push ) -#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) -#endif - return -((value | -value) >> (sizeof(value) * 8 - 1)); -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( pop ) -#endif -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) - -/** Constant-flow mask generation for "less than" comparison: - * - if \p x < \p y, return all-bits 1, that is (size_t) -1 - * - otherwise, return all bits 0, that is 0 - * - * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches - * with bit operations using masks. - * - * \param x The first value to analyze. - * \param y The second value to analyze. - * - * \return All-bits-one if \p x is less than \p y, otherwise zero. - */ -static size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask_lt(size_t x, - size_t y) -{ - /* This has the most significant bit set if and only if x < y */ - const size_t sub = x - y; - - /* sub1 = (x < y) ? 1 : 0 */ - const size_t sub1 = sub >> (sizeof(sub) * 8 - 1); - - /* mask = (x < y) ? 0xff... : 0x00... */ - const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask(sub1); - - return mask; -} - -size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge(size_t x, - size_t y) -{ - return ~mbedtls_ct_size_mask_lt(x, y); -} - -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) || - defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) - -/* Return 0xff if low <= c <= high, 0 otherwise. - * - * Constant flow with respect to c. - */ -MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE -unsigned char mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range(unsigned char low, - unsigned char high, - unsigned char c) -{ - /* low_mask is: 0 if low <= c, 0x...ff if low > c */ - unsigned low_mask = ((unsigned) c - low) >> 8; - /* high_mask is: 0 if c <= high, 0x...ff if c > high */ - unsigned high_mask = ((unsigned) high - c) >> 8; - return ~(low_mask | high_mask) & 0xff; -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ - -unsigned mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq(size_t x, - size_t y) -{ - /* diff = 0 if x == y, non-zero otherwise */ - const size_t diff = x ^ y; - - /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, - * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( push ) -#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) -#endif - - /* diff_msb's most significant bit is equal to x != y */ - const size_t diff_msb = (diff | (size_t) -diff); - -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( pop ) -#endif - - /* diff1 = (x != y) ? 1 : 0 */ - const unsigned diff1 = diff_msb >> (sizeof(diff_msb) * 8 - 1); - - return 1 ^ diff1; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) - -/** Constant-flow "greater than" comparison: - * return x > y - * - * This is equivalent to \p x > \p y, but is likely to be compiled - * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. - * - * \param x The first value to analyze. - * \param y The second value to analyze. - * - * \return 1 if \p x greater than \p y, otherwise 0. - */ -static unsigned mbedtls_ct_size_gt(size_t x, - size_t y) -{ - /* Return the sign bit (1 for negative) of (y - x). */ - return (y - x) >> (sizeof(size_t) * 8 - 1); -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) - -unsigned mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt(const mbedtls_mpi_uint x, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint y) -{ - mbedtls_mpi_uint ret; - mbedtls_mpi_uint cond; - /* - * Check if the most significant bits (MSB) of the operands are different. - */ - cond = (x ^ y); - /* - * If the MSB are the same then the difference x-y will be negative (and - * have its MSB set to 1 during conversion to unsigned) if and only if x> (sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * 8 - 1); - - return (unsigned) ret; -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ - -unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if(unsigned condition, - unsigned if1, - unsigned if0) -{ - unsigned mask = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask(condition); - return (mask & if1) | (~mask & if0); + return (int) ((diff & 0xffff) | (diff >> 16)); +#endif } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) -void mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign(size_t n, - mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint *src, - unsigned char condition) +int mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial(const void *a, + const void *b, + size_t n, + size_t skip_head, + size_t skip_tail) { - size_t i; + unsigned int diff = 0; - /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types, - * but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */ -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( push ) -#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) -#endif - - /* all-bits 1 if condition is 1, all-bits 0 if condition is 0 */ - const mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = -condition; + volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a; + volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b; -#if defined(_MSC_VER) -#pragma warning( pop ) -#endif + size_t valid_end = n - skip_tail; - for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { - dest[i] = (src[i] & mask) | (dest[i] & ~mask); + for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) { + unsigned char x = A[i], y = B[i]; + unsigned int d = x ^ y; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t valid = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(i, skip_head), + mbedtls_ct_uint_lt(i, valid_end)); + diff |= mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(valid, d); } -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) - -unsigned char mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char(unsigned char value) -{ - unsigned char digit = 0; - /* For each range of values, if value is in that range, mask digit with - * the corresponding value. Since value can only be in a single range, - * only at most one masking will change digit. */ - digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range(0, 25, value) & ('A' + value); - digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range(26, 51, value) & ('a' + value - 26); - digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range(52, 61, value) & ('0' + value - 52); - digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range(62, 62, value) & '+'; - digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range(63, 63, value) & '/'; - return digit; -} - -signed char mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value(unsigned char c) -{ - unsigned char val = 0; - /* For each range of digits, if c is in that range, mask val with - * the corresponding value. Since c can only be in a single range, - * only at most one masking will change val. Set val to one plus - * the desired value so that it stays 0 if c is in none of the ranges. */ - val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range('A', 'Z', c) & (c - 'A' + 0 + 1); - val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range('a', 'z', c) & (c - 'a' + 26 + 1); - val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range('0', '9', c) & (c - '0' + 52 + 1); - val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range('+', '+', c) & (c - '+' + 62 + 1); - val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range('/', '/', c) & (c - '/' + 63 + 1); - /* At this point, val is 0 if c is an invalid digit and v+1 if c is - * a digit with the value v. */ - return val - 1; + /* Since we go byte-by-byte, the only bits set will be in the bottom 8 bits, so the + * cast from uint to int is safe. */ + return (int) diff; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) -/** Shift some data towards the left inside a buffer. - * - * `mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left(start, total, offset)` is functionally - * equivalent to - * ``` - * memmove(start, start + offset, total - offset); - * memset(start + offset, 0, total - offset); - * ``` - * but it strives to use a memory access pattern (and thus total timing) - * that does not depend on \p offset. This timing independence comes at - * the expense of performance. - * - * \param start Pointer to the start of the buffer. - * \param total Total size of the buffer. - * \param offset Offset from which to copy \p total - \p offset bytes. - */ -static void mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left(void *start, - size_t total, - size_t offset) +void mbedtls_ct_memmove_left(void *start, size_t total, size_t offset) { volatile unsigned char *buf = start; - size_t i, n; - if (total == 0) { - return; - } - for (i = 0; i < total; i++) { - unsigned no_op = mbedtls_ct_size_gt(total - offset, i); + for (size_t i = 0; i < total; i++) { + mbedtls_ct_condition_t no_op = mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(total - offset, i); /* The first `total - offset` passes are a no-op. The last * `offset` passes shift the data one byte to the left and * zero out the last byte. */ - for (n = 0; n < total - 1; n++) { + for (size_t n = 0; n < total - 1; n++) { unsigned char current = buf[n]; - unsigned char next = buf[n+1]; + unsigned char next = buf[n+1]; buf[n] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(no_op, current, next); } - buf[total-1] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(no_op, buf[total-1], 0); + buf[total-1] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(no_op, buf[total-1]); } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) -void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq(unsigned char *dest, - const unsigned char *src, - size_t len, - size_t c1, - size_t c2) -{ - /* mask = c1 == c2 ? 0xff : 0x00 */ - const size_t equal = mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq(c1, c2); - const unsigned char mask = (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_size_mask(equal); +void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + unsigned char *dest, + const unsigned char *src1, + const unsigned char *src2, + size_t len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64) + const uint64_t mask = (uint64_t) condition; + const uint64_t not_mask = (uint64_t) ~mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(condition); +#else + const uint32_t mask = (uint32_t) condition; + const uint32_t not_mask = (uint32_t) ~mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(condition); +#endif + + /* If src2 is NULL, setup src2 so that we read from the destination address. + * + * This means that if src2 == NULL && condition is false, the result will be a + * no-op because we read from dest and write the same data back into dest. + */ + if (src2 == NULL) { + src2 = dest; + } /* dest[i] = c1 == c2 ? src[i] : dest[i] */ - for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) { - dest[i] = (src[i] & mask) | (dest[i] & ~mask); + size_t i = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64) + for (; (i + 8) <= len; i += 8) { + uint64_t a = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(src1 + i) & mask; + uint64_t b = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(src2 + i) & not_mask; + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(dest + i, a | b); + } +#else + for (; (i + 4) <= len; i += 4) { + uint32_t a = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(src1 + i) & mask; + uint32_t b = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(src2 + i) & not_mask; + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(dest + i, a | b); + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS */ + for (; i < len; i++) { + dest[i] = (src1[i] & mask) | (src2[i] & not_mask); } } @@ -400,399 +222,27 @@ void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset(unsigned char *dest, size_t offsetval; for (offsetval = offset_min; offsetval <= offset_max; offsetval++) { - mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq(dest, src + offsetval, len, - offsetval, offset); - } -} - -int mbedtls_ct_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, - const unsigned char *add_data, - size_t add_data_len, - const unsigned char *data, - size_t data_len_secret, - size_t min_data_len, - size_t max_data_len, - unsigned char *output) -{ - /* - * This function breaks the HMAC abstraction and uses the md_clone() - * extension to the MD API in order to get constant-flow behaviour. - * - * HMAC(msg) is defined as HASH(okey + HASH(ikey + msg)) where + means - * concatenation, and okey/ikey are the XOR of the key with some fixed bit - * patterns (see RFC 2104, sec. 2), which are stored in ctx->hmac_ctx. - * - * We'll first compute inner_hash = HASH(ikey + msg) by hashing up to - * minlen, then cloning the context, and for each byte up to maxlen - * finishing up the hash computation, keeping only the correct result. - * - * Then we only need to compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) and we're done. - */ - const mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type(ctx->md_info); - /* TLS 1.0-1.2 only support SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1, MD-5, - * all of which have the same block size except SHA-384. */ - const size_t block_size = md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ? 128 : 64; - const unsigned char * const ikey = ctx->hmac_ctx; - const unsigned char * const okey = ikey + block_size; - const size_t hash_size = mbedtls_md_get_size(ctx->md_info); - - unsigned char aux_out[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - mbedtls_md_context_t aux; - size_t offset; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - mbedtls_md_init(&aux); - -#define MD_CHK(func_call) \ - do { \ - ret = (func_call); \ - if (ret != 0) \ - goto cleanup; \ - } while (0) - - MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_setup(&aux, ctx->md_info, 0)); - - /* After hmac_start() of hmac_reset(), ikey has already been hashed, - * so we can start directly with the message */ - MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, add_data, add_data_len)); - MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, data, min_data_len)); - - /* Fill the hash buffer in advance with something that is - * not a valid hash (barring an attack on the hash and - * deliberately-crafted input), in case the caller doesn't - * check the return status properly. */ - memset(output, '!', hash_size); - - /* For each possible length, compute the hash up to that point */ - for (offset = min_data_len; offset <= max_data_len; offset++) { - MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_clone(&aux, ctx)); - MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_finish(&aux, aux_out)); - /* Keep only the correct inner_hash in the output buffer */ - mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq(output, aux_out, hash_size, - offset, data_len_secret); - - if (offset < max_data_len) { - MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, data + offset, 1)); - } + mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(offsetval, offset), dest, src + offsetval, NULL, + len); } - - /* The context needs to finish() before it starts() again */ - MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_finish(ctx, aux_out)); - - /* Now compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) */ - MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_starts(ctx)); - MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, okey, block_size)); - MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, output, hash_size)); - MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_finish(ctx, output)); - - /* Done, get ready for next time */ - MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(ctx)); - -#undef MD_CHK - -cleanup: - mbedtls_md_free(&aux); - return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) - -#define MPI_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA) - -/* - * Conditionally assign X = Y, without leaking information - * about whether the assignment was made or not. - * (Leaking information about the respective sizes of X and Y is ok however.) - */ -#if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_ARM64) && (_MSC_FULL_VER < 193131103) -/* - * MSVC miscompiles this function if it's inlined prior to Visual Studio 2022 version 17.1. See: - * https://developercommunity.visualstudio.com/t/c-compiler-miscompiles-part-of-mbedtls-library-on/1646989 - */ -__declspec(noinline) -#endif -int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign(mbedtls_mpi *X, - const mbedtls_mpi *Y, - unsigned char assign) -{ - int ret = 0; - size_t i; - mbedtls_mpi_uint limb_mask; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(Y != NULL); - - /* all-bits 1 if assign is 1, all-bits 0 if assign is 0 */ - limb_mask = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask(assign);; - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, Y->n)); - - X->s = (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(assign, Y->s, X->s); - - mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign(Y->n, X->p, Y->p, assign); - - for (i = Y->n; i < X->n; i++) { - X->p[i] &= ~limb_mask; - } - -cleanup: - return ret; -} - -/* - * Conditionally swap X and Y, without leaking information - * about whether the swap was made or not. - * Here it is not ok to simply swap the pointers, which would lead to - * different memory access patterns when X and Y are used afterwards. - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap(mbedtls_mpi *X, - mbedtls_mpi *Y, - unsigned char swap) -{ - int ret, s; - size_t i; - mbedtls_mpi_uint limb_mask; - mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(Y != NULL); - - if (X == Y) { - return 0; - } - - /* all-bits 1 if swap is 1, all-bits 0 if swap is 0 */ - limb_mask = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask(swap); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, Y->n)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(Y, X->n)); - - s = X->s; - X->s = (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(swap, Y->s, X->s); - Y->s = (int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(swap, s, Y->s); - - - for (i = 0; i < X->n; i++) { - tmp = X->p[i]; - X->p[i] = (X->p[i] & ~limb_mask) | (Y->p[i] & limb_mask); - Y->p[i] = (Y->p[i] & ~limb_mask) | (tmp & limb_mask); - } - -cleanup: - return ret; -} - -/* - * Compare signed values in constant time - */ -int mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct(const mbedtls_mpi *X, - const mbedtls_mpi *Y, - unsigned *ret) -{ - size_t i; - /* The value of any of these variables is either 0 or 1 at all times. */ - unsigned cond, done, X_is_negative, Y_is_negative; - - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(Y != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(ret != NULL); - - if (X->n != Y->n) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - /* - * Set sign_N to 1 if N >= 0, 0 if N < 0. - * We know that N->s == 1 if N >= 0 and N->s == -1 if N < 0. - */ - X_is_negative = (X->s & 2) >> 1; - Y_is_negative = (Y->s & 2) >> 1; - - /* - * If the signs are different, then the positive operand is the bigger. - * That is if X is negative (X_is_negative == 1), then X < Y is true and it - * is false if X is positive (X_is_negative == 0). - */ - cond = (X_is_negative ^ Y_is_negative); - *ret = cond & X_is_negative; - - /* - * This is a constant-time function. We might have the result, but we still - * need to go through the loop. Record if we have the result already. - */ - done = cond; - - for (i = X->n; i > 0; i--) { - /* - * If Y->p[i - 1] < X->p[i - 1] then X < Y is true if and only if both - * X and Y are negative. - * - * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and - * the fact that we are done and continue looping. - */ - cond = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt(Y->p[i - 1], X->p[i - 1]); - *ret |= cond & (1 - done) & X_is_negative; - done |= cond; - - /* - * If X->p[i - 1] < Y->p[i - 1] then X < Y is true if and only if both - * X and Y are positive. - * - * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and - * the fact that we are done and continue looping. - */ - cond = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt(X->p[i - 1], Y->p[i - 1]); - *ret |= cond & (1 - done) & (1 - X_is_negative); - done |= cond; - } - - return 0; -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) -int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding(int mode, - unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output, - size_t output_max_len, - size_t *olen) +void mbedtls_ct_zeroize_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, void *buf, size_t len) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t i, plaintext_max_size; - - /* The following variables take sensitive values: their value must - * not leak into the observable behavior of the function other than - * the designated outputs (output, olen, return value). Otherwise - * this would open the execution of the function to - * side-channel-based variants of the Bleichenbacher padding oracle - * attack. Potential side channels include overall timing, memory - * access patterns (especially visible to an adversary who has access - * to a shared memory cache), and branches (especially visible to - * an adversary who has access to a shared code cache or to a shared - * branch predictor). */ - size_t pad_count = 0; - unsigned bad = 0; - unsigned char pad_done = 0; - size_t plaintext_size = 0; - unsigned output_too_large; - - plaintext_max_size = (output_max_len > ilen - 11) ? ilen - 11 - : output_max_len; - - /* Check and get padding length in constant time and constant - * memory trace. The first byte must be 0. */ - bad |= input[0]; - - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE) { - /* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00 - * where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */ - bad |= input[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT; - - /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find - * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */ - for (i = 2; i < ilen; i++) { - pad_done |= ((input[i] | (unsigned char) -input[i]) >> 7) ^ 1; - pad_count += ((pad_done | (unsigned char) -pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1; - } - } else { - /* Decode EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 - * where PS must be at least 8 bytes with the value 0xFF. */ - bad |= input[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN; - - /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find - * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. - * If there's a non-0xff byte in the padding, the padding is bad. */ - for (i = 2; i < ilen; i++) { - pad_done |= mbedtls_ct_uint_if(input[i], 0, 1); - pad_count += mbedtls_ct_uint_if(pad_done, 0, 1); - bad |= mbedtls_ct_uint_if(pad_done, 0, input[i] ^ 0xFF); - } + uint32_t mask = (uint32_t) ~condition; + uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *) buf; + size_t i = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) + for (; (i + 4) <= len; i += 4) { + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32((void *) (p + i), + mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32((void *) (p + i)) & mask); } - - /* If pad_done is still zero, there's no data, only unfinished padding. */ - bad |= mbedtls_ct_uint_if(pad_done, 0, 1); - - /* There must be at least 8 bytes of padding. */ - bad |= mbedtls_ct_size_gt(8, pad_count); - - /* If the padding is valid, set plaintext_size to the number of - * remaining bytes after stripping the padding. If the padding - * is invalid, avoid leaking this fact through the size of the - * output: use the maximum message size that fits in the output - * buffer. Do it without branches to avoid leaking the padding - * validity through timing. RSA keys are small enough that all the - * size_t values involved fit in unsigned int. */ - plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if( - bad, (unsigned) plaintext_max_size, - (unsigned) (ilen - pad_count - 3)); - - /* Set output_too_large to 0 if the plaintext fits in the output - * buffer and to 1 otherwise. */ - output_too_large = mbedtls_ct_size_gt(plaintext_size, - plaintext_max_size); - - /* Set ret without branches to avoid timing attacks. Return: - * - INVALID_PADDING if the padding is bad (bad != 0). - * - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted - * plaintext does not fit in the output buffer. - * - 0 if the padding is correct. */ - ret = -(int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if( - bad, -MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING, - mbedtls_ct_uint_if(output_too_large, - -MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE, - 0)); - - /* If the padding is bad or the plaintext is too large, zero the - * data that we're about to copy to the output buffer. - * We need to copy the same amount of data - * from the same buffer whether the padding is good or not to - * avoid leaking the padding validity through overall timing or - * through memory or cache access patterns. */ - bad = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask(bad | output_too_large); - for (i = 11; i < ilen; i++) { - input[i] &= ~bad; - } - - /* If the plaintext is too large, truncate it to the buffer size. - * Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because - * revealing the length is as bad as revealing the padding validity - * for a Bleichenbacher attack. */ - plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(output_too_large, - (unsigned) plaintext_max_size, - (unsigned) plaintext_size); - - /* Move the plaintext to the leftmost position where it can start in - * the working buffer, i.e. make it start plaintext_max_size from - * the end of the buffer. Do this with a memory access trace that - * does not depend on the plaintext size. After this move, the - * starting location of the plaintext is no longer sensitive - * information. */ - mbedtls_ct_mem_move_to_left(input + ilen - plaintext_max_size, - plaintext_max_size, - plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size); - - /* Finally copy the decrypted plaintext plus trailing zeros into the output - * buffer. If output_max_len is 0, then output may be an invalid pointer - * and the result of memcpy() would be undefined; prevent undefined - * behavior making sure to depend only on output_max_len (the size of the - * user-provided output buffer), which is independent from plaintext - * length, validity of padding, success of the decryption, and other - * secrets. */ - if (output_max_len != 0) { - memcpy(output, input + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size); +#endif + for (; i < len; i++) { + p[i] = p[i] & mask; } - - /* Report the amount of data we copied to the output buffer. In case - * of errors (bad padding or output too large), the value of *olen - * when this function returns is not specified. Making it equivalent - * to the good case limits the risks of leaking the padding validity. */ - *olen = plaintext_size; - - return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/constant_time_impl.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/constant_time_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2a4574ba68 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/constant_time_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,556 @@ +/** + * Constant-time functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_IMPL_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_IMPL_H + +#include + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#endif + +/* + * To improve readability of constant_time_internal.h, the static inline + * definitions are here, and constant_time_internal.h has only the declarations. + * + * This results in duplicate declarations of the form: + * static inline void f(); // from constant_time_internal.h + * static inline void f() { ... } // from constant_time_impl.h + * when constant_time_internal.h is included. + * + * This appears to behave as if the declaration-without-definition was not present + * (except for warnings if gcc -Wredundant-decls or similar is used). + * + * Disable -Wredundant-decls so that gcc does not warn about this. This is re-enabled + * at the bottom of this file. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && (__GNUC__ > 4) + #pragma GCC diagnostic push + #pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wredundant-decls" +#endif + +/* Disable asm under Memsan because it confuses Memsan and generates false errors. + * + * We also disable under Valgrind by default, because it's more useful + * for Valgrind to test the plain C implementation. MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_ASM //no-check-names + * may be set to permit building asm under Valgrind. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND) && !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_ASM)) //no-check-names +#define MBEDTLS_CT_NO_ASM +#elif defined(__has_feature) +#if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) +#define MBEDTLS_CT_NO_ASM +#endif +#endif + +/* armcc5 --gnu defines __GNUC__ but doesn't support GNU's extended asm */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && defined(__GNUC__) && (!defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || \ + __ARMCC_VERSION >= 6000000) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CT_NO_ASM) +#define MBEDTLS_CT_ASM +#if (defined(__arm__) || defined(__thumb__) || defined(__thumb2__)) +#define MBEDTLS_CT_ARM_ASM +#elif defined(__aarch64__) +#define MBEDTLS_CT_AARCH64_ASM +#elif defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) +#define MBEDTLS_CT_X86_64_ASM +#elif defined(__i386__) +#define MBEDTLS_CT_X86_ASM +#endif +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE (sizeof(mbedtls_ct_uint_t) * 8) + + +/* ============================================================================ + * Core const-time primitives + */ + +/* Ensure that the compiler cannot know the value of x (i.e., cannot optimise + * based on its value) after this function is called. + * + * If we are not using assembly, this will be fairly inefficient, so its use + * should be minimised. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ASM) +extern volatile mbedtls_ct_uint_t mbedtls_ct_zero; +#endif + +/** + * \brief Ensure that a value cannot be known at compile time. + * + * \param x The value to hide from the compiler. + * \return The same value that was passed in, such that the compiler + * cannot prove its value (even for calls of the form + * x = mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(1), x will be unknown). + * + * \note This is mainly used in constructing mbedtls_ct_condition_t + * values and performing operations over them, to ensure that + * there is no way for the compiler to ever know anything about + * the value of an mbedtls_ct_condition_t. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_uint_t mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ASM) + asm volatile ("" : [x] "+r" (x) :); + return x; +#else + return x ^ mbedtls_ct_zero; +#endif +} + +/* + * Selecting unified syntax is needed for gcc, and harmless on clang. + * + * This is needed because on Thumb 1, condition flags are always set, so + * e.g. "negs" is supported but "neg" is not (on Thumb 2, both exist). + * + * Under Thumb 1 unified syntax, only the "negs" form is accepted, and + * under divided syntax, only the "neg" form is accepted. clang only + * supports unified syntax. + * + * On Thumb 2 and Arm, both compilers are happy with the "s" suffix, + * although we don't actually care about setting the flags. + * + * For old versions of gcc (see #8516 for details), restore divided + * syntax afterwards - otherwise old versions of gcc seem to apply + * unified syntax globally, which breaks other asm code. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && defined(__thumb__) && !defined(__thumb2__) && \ + (__GNUC__ < 11) && !defined(__ARM_ARCH_2__) +#define RESTORE_ASM_SYNTAX ".syntax divided \n\t" +#else +#define RESTORE_ASM_SYNTAX +#endif + +/* Convert a number into a condition in constant time. */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x) +{ + /* + * Define mask-generation code that, as far as possible, will not use branches or conditional instructions. + * + * For some platforms / type sizes, we define assembly to assure this. + * + * Otherwise, we define a plain C fallback which (in May 2023) does not get optimised into + * conditional instructions or branches by trunk clang, gcc, or MSVC v19. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CT_AARCH64_ASM) && (defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) || defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64)) + mbedtls_ct_uint_t s; + asm volatile ("neg %x[s], %x[x] \n\t" + "orr %x[x], %x[s], %x[x] \n\t" + "asr %x[x], %x[x], 63 \n\t" + : + [s] "=&r" (s), + [x] "+&r" (x) + : + : + ); + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) x; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ARM_ASM) && defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) + uint32_t s; + asm volatile (".syntax unified \n\t" + "negs %[s], %[x] \n\t" + "orrs %[x], %[x], %[s] \n\t" + "asrs %[x], %[x], #31 \n\t" + RESTORE_ASM_SYNTAX + : + [s] "=&l" (s), + [x] "+&l" (x) + : + : + "cc" /* clobbers flag bits */ + ); + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) x; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_X86_64_ASM) && (defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) || defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64)) + uint64_t s; + asm volatile ("mov %[x], %[s] \n\t" + "neg %[s] \n\t" + "or %[x], %[s] \n\t" + "sar $63, %[s] \n\t" + : + [s] "=&a" (s) + : + [x] "D" (x) + : + ); + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) s; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_X86_ASM) && defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) + uint32_t s; + asm volatile ("mov %[x], %[s] \n\t" + "neg %[s] \n\t" + "or %[s], %[x] \n\t" + "sar $31, %[x] \n\t" + : + [s] "=&c" (s), + [x] "+&a" (x) + : + : + ); + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) x; +#else + const mbedtls_ct_uint_t xo = mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(x); +#if defined(_MSC_VER) + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is + * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */ +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + // y is negative (i.e., top bit set) iff x is non-zero + mbedtls_ct_int_t y = (-xo) | -(xo >> 1); + + // extract only the sign bit of y so that y == 1 (if x is non-zero) or 0 (if x is zero) + y = (((mbedtls_ct_uint_t) y) >> (MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE - 1)); + + // -y has all bits set (if x is non-zero), or all bits clear (if x is zero) + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (-y); +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif +#endif +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_uint_t mbedtls_ct_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + mbedtls_ct_uint_t if1, + mbedtls_ct_uint_t if0) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CT_AARCH64_ASM) && (defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) || defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64)) + asm volatile ("and %x[if1], %x[if1], %x[condition] \n\t" + "mvn %x[condition], %x[condition] \n\t" + "and %x[condition], %x[condition], %x[if0] \n\t" + "orr %x[condition], %x[if1], %x[condition]" + : + [condition] "+&r" (condition), + [if1] "+&r" (if1) + : + [if0] "r" (if0) + : + ); + return (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) condition; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ARM_ASM) && defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) + asm volatile (".syntax unified \n\t" + "ands %[if1], %[if1], %[condition] \n\t" + "mvns %[condition], %[condition] \n\t" + "ands %[condition], %[condition], %[if0] \n\t" + "orrs %[condition], %[if1], %[condition] \n\t" + RESTORE_ASM_SYNTAX + : + [condition] "+&l" (condition), + [if1] "+&l" (if1) + : + [if0] "l" (if0) + : + "cc" + ); + return (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) condition; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_X86_64_ASM) && (defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) || defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64)) + asm volatile ("and %[condition], %[if1] \n\t" + "not %[condition] \n\t" + "and %[condition], %[if0] \n\t" + "or %[if1], %[if0] \n\t" + : + [condition] "+&D" (condition), + [if1] "+&S" (if1), + [if0] "+&a" (if0) + : + : + ); + return if0; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_X86_ASM) && defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) + asm volatile ("and %[condition], %[if1] \n\t" + "not %[condition] \n\t" + "and %[if0], %[condition] \n\t" + "or %[condition], %[if1] \n\t" + : + [condition] "+&c" (condition), + [if1] "+&a" (if1) + : + [if0] "b" (if0) + : + ); + return if1; +#else + mbedtls_ct_condition_t not_cond = + (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (~mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(condition)); + return (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) ((condition & if1) | (not_cond & if0)); +#endif +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_lt(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, mbedtls_ct_uint_t y) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CT_AARCH64_ASM) && (defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) || defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64)) + uint64_t s1; + asm volatile ("eor %x[s1], %x[y], %x[x] \n\t" + "sub %x[x], %x[x], %x[y] \n\t" + "bic %x[x], %x[x], %x[s1] \n\t" + "and %x[s1], %x[s1], %x[y] \n\t" + "orr %x[s1], %x[x], %x[s1] \n\t" + "asr %x[x], %x[s1], 63" + : + [s1] "=&r" (s1), + [x] "+&r" (x) + : + [y] "r" (y) + : + ); + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) x; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ARM_ASM) && defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) + uint32_t s1; + asm volatile ( + ".syntax unified \n\t" +#if defined(__thumb__) && !defined(__thumb2__) + "movs %[s1], %[x] \n\t" + "eors %[s1], %[s1], %[y] \n\t" +#else + "eors %[s1], %[x], %[y] \n\t" +#endif + "subs %[x], %[x], %[y] \n\t" + "bics %[x], %[x], %[s1] \n\t" + "ands %[y], %[s1], %[y] \n\t" + "orrs %[x], %[x], %[y] \n\t" + "asrs %[x], %[x], #31 \n\t" + RESTORE_ASM_SYNTAX + : + [s1] "=&l" (s1), + [x] "+&l" (x), + [y] "+&l" (y) + : + : + "cc" + ); + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) x; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_X86_64_ASM) && (defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) || defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64)) + uint64_t s; + asm volatile ("mov %[x], %[s] \n\t" + "xor %[y], %[s] \n\t" + "sub %[y], %[x] \n\t" + "and %[s], %[y] \n\t" + "not %[s] \n\t" + "and %[s], %[x] \n\t" + "or %[y], %[x] \n\t" + "sar $63, %[x] \n\t" + : + [s] "=&a" (s), + [x] "+&D" (x), + [y] "+&S" (y) + : + : + ); + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) x; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_X86_ASM) && defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) + uint32_t s; + asm volatile ("mov %[x], %[s] \n\t" + "xor %[y], %[s] \n\t" + "sub %[y], %[x] \n\t" + "and %[s], %[y] \n\t" + "not %[s] \n\t" + "and %[s], %[x] \n\t" + "or %[y], %[x] \n\t" + "sar $31, %[x] \n\t" + : + [s] "=&b" (s), + [x] "+&a" (x), + [y] "+&c" (y) + : + : + ); + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) x; +#else + /* Ensure that the compiler cannot optimise the following operations over x and y, + * even if it knows the value of x and y. + */ + const mbedtls_ct_uint_t xo = mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(x); + const mbedtls_ct_uint_t yo = mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(y); + /* + * Check if the most significant bits (MSB) of the operands are different. + * cond is true iff the MSBs differ. + */ + mbedtls_ct_condition_t cond = mbedtls_ct_bool((xo ^ yo) >> (MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE - 1)); + + /* + * If the MSB are the same then the difference x-y will be negative (and + * have its MSB set to 1 during conversion to unsigned) if and only if x> (MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE - 1); + + // Convert to a condition (i.e., all bits set iff non-zero) + return mbedtls_ct_bool(ret); +#endif +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, mbedtls_ct_uint_t y) +{ + /* diff = 0 if x == y, non-zero otherwise */ + const mbedtls_ct_uint_t diff = mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(x) ^ mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(y); + + /* all ones if x != y, 0 otherwise */ + return mbedtls_ct_bool(diff); +} + +static inline unsigned char mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if(unsigned char low, + unsigned char high, + unsigned char c, + unsigned char t) +{ + const unsigned char co = (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(c); + const unsigned char to = (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(t); + + /* low_mask is: 0 if low <= c, 0x...ff if low > c */ + unsigned low_mask = ((unsigned) co - low) >> 8; + /* high_mask is: 0 if c <= high, 0x...ff if c > high */ + unsigned high_mask = ((unsigned) high - co) >> 8; + + return (unsigned char) (~(low_mask | high_mask)) & to; +} + +/* ============================================================================ + * Everything below here is trivial wrapper functions + */ + +static inline size_t mbedtls_ct_size_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + size_t if1, + size_t if0) +{ + return (size_t) mbedtls_ct_if(condition, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if1, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if0); +} + +static inline unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + unsigned if1, + unsigned if0) +{ + return (unsigned) mbedtls_ct_if(condition, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if1, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if0); +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t if1, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t if0) +{ + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) mbedtls_ct_if(condition, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if1, + (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if0); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + mbedtls_mpi_uint if1, + mbedtls_mpi_uint if0) +{ + return (mbedtls_mpi_uint) mbedtls_ct_if(condition, + (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if1, + (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if0); +} + +#endif + +static inline size_t mbedtls_ct_size_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, size_t if1) +{ + return (size_t) (condition & if1); +} + +static inline unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, unsigned if1) +{ + return (unsigned) (condition & if1); +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t if1) +{ + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (condition & if1); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + mbedtls_mpi_uint if1) +{ + return (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (condition & if1); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +static inline int mbedtls_ct_error_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, int if1, int if0) +{ + /* Coverting int -> uint -> int here is safe, because we require if1 and if0 to be + * in the range -32767..0, and we require 32-bit int and uint types. + * + * This means that (0 <= -if0 < INT_MAX), so negating if0 is safe, and similarly for + * converting back to int. + */ + return -((int) mbedtls_ct_if(condition, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) (-if1), + (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) (-if0))); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, int if1) +{ + return -((int) (condition & (-if1))); +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, + mbedtls_ct_uint_t y) +{ + return ~mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(x, y); +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, + mbedtls_ct_uint_t y) +{ + return mbedtls_ct_uint_lt(y, x); +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, + mbedtls_ct_uint_t y) +{ + return ~mbedtls_ct_uint_lt(x, y); +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_le(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, + mbedtls_ct_uint_t y) +{ + return ~mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(x, y); +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_ne(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t y) +{ + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (x ^ y); +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_and(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t y) +{ + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (x & y); +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_or(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t y) +{ + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (x | y); +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_not(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x) +{ + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (~x); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && (__GNUC__ > 4) +/* Restore warnings for -Wredundant-decls on gcc */ + #pragma GCC diagnostic pop +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/constant_time_internal.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/constant_time_internal.h index 0ba8a7a0b5..61a5c6d4e9 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/constant_time_internal.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/constant_time_internal.h @@ -2,227 +2,512 @@ * Constant-time functions * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INTERNAL_H #define MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INTERNAL_H +#include +#include + #include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) -#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +/* The constant-time interface provides various operations that are likely + * to result in constant-time code that does not branch or use conditional + * instructions for secret data (for secret pointers, this also applies to + * the data pointed to). + * + * It has three main parts: + * + * - boolean operations + * These are all named mbedtls_ct__. + * They operate over and return mbedtls_ct_condition_t. + * All arguments are considered secret. + * example: bool x = y | z => x = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(y, z) + * example: bool x = y == z => x = mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(y, z) + * + * - conditional data selection + * These are all named mbedtls_ct__if and mbedtls_ct__if_else_0 + * All arguments are considered secret. + * example: size_t a = x ? b : c => a = mbedtls_ct_size_if(x, b, c) + * example: unsigned a = x ? b : 0 => a = mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(x, b) + * + * - block memory operations + * Only some arguments are considered secret, as documented for each + * function. + * example: if (x) memcpy(...) => mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(x, ...) + * + * mbedtls_ct_condition_t must be treated as opaque and only created and + * manipulated via the functions in this header. The compiler should never + * be able to prove anything about its value at compile-time. + * + * mbedtls_ct_uint_t is an unsigned integer type over which constant time + * operations may be performed via the functions in this header. It is as big + * as the larger of size_t and mbedtls_mpi_uint, i.e. it is safe to cast + * to/from "unsigned int", "size_t", and "mbedtls_mpi_uint" (and any other + * not-larger integer types). + * + * For Arm (32-bit, 64-bit and Thumb), x86 and x86-64, assembly implementations + * are used to ensure that the generated code is constant time. For other + * architectures, it uses a plain C fallback designed to yield constant-time code + * (this has been observed to be constant-time on latest gcc, clang and MSVC + * as of May 2023). + * + * For readability, the static inline definitions are separated out into + * constant_time_impl.h. + */ + +#if (SIZE_MAX > 0xffffffffffffffffULL) +/* Pointer size > 64-bit */ +typedef size_t mbedtls_ct_condition_t; +typedef size_t mbedtls_ct_uint_t; +typedef ptrdiff_t mbedtls_ct_int_t; +#define MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE ((mbedtls_ct_condition_t) mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(SIZE_MAX)) +#elif (SIZE_MAX > 0xffffffff) || defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) +/* 32-bit < pointer size <= 64-bit, or 64-bit MPI */ +typedef uint64_t mbedtls_ct_condition_t; +typedef uint64_t mbedtls_ct_uint_t; +typedef int64_t mbedtls_ct_int_t; +#define MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64 +#define MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE ((mbedtls_ct_condition_t) mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(UINT64_MAX)) +#else +/* Pointer size <= 32-bit, and no 64-bit MPIs */ +typedef uint32_t mbedtls_ct_condition_t; +typedef uint32_t mbedtls_ct_uint_t; +typedef int32_t mbedtls_ct_int_t; +#define MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32 +#define MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE ((mbedtls_ct_condition_t) mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(UINT32_MAX)) #endif +#define MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE ((mbedtls_ct_condition_t) mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(0)) -#include +/* ============================================================================ + * Boolean operations + */ -/** Turn a value into a mask: - * - if \p value == 0, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0 - * - otherwise, return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (unsigned) -1 +/** Convert a number into a mbedtls_ct_condition_t. * - * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches - * with bit operations using masks. + * \param x Number to convert. * - * \param value The value to analyze. + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x != 0, or MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE if \p x == 0 * - * \return Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one. */ -unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_mask(unsigned value); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x); -/** Turn a value into a mask: - * - if \p value == 0, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0 - * - otherwise, return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (size_t) -1 +/** Boolean "not equal" operation. * - * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches - * with bit operations using masks. + * Functionally equivalent to: * - * \param value The value to analyze. + * \p x != \p y * - * \return Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one. + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x != \p y, otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. */ -size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask(size_t value); +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, mbedtls_ct_uint_t y); -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) || - defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) */ +/** Boolean "equals" operation. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * \p x == \p y + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x == \p y, otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, + mbedtls_ct_uint_t y); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +/** Boolean "less than" operation. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * \p x < \p y + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x < \p y, otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_lt(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, mbedtls_ct_uint_t y); -/** Turn a value into a mask: - * - if \p value == 0, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0 - * - otherwise, return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (mbedtls_mpi_uint) -1 +/** Boolean "greater than" operation. * - * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches - * with bit operations using masks. + * Functionally equivalent to: * - * \param value The value to analyze. + * \p x > \p y * - * \return Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one. + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x > \p y, otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. */ -mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask(mbedtls_mpi_uint value); +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, + mbedtls_ct_uint_t y); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ +/** Boolean "greater or equal" operation. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * \p x >= \p y + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x >= \p y, + * otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, + mbedtls_ct_uint_t y); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/** Boolean "less than or equal" operation. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * \p x <= \p y + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x <= \p y, + * otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_le(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, + mbedtls_ct_uint_t y); -/** Constant-flow mask generation for "greater or equal" comparison: - * - if \p x >= \p y, return all-bits 1, that is (size_t) -1 - * - otherwise, return all bits 0, that is 0 +/** Boolean not-equals operation. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: * - * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches - * with bit operations using masks. + * \p x != \p y * * \param x The first value to analyze. * \param y The second value to analyze. * - * \return All-bits-one if \p x is greater or equal than \p y, - * otherwise zero. + * \note This is more efficient than mbedtls_ct_uint_ne if both arguments are + * mbedtls_ct_condition_t. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x != \p y, + * otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. */ -size_t mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge(size_t x, - size_t y); +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_ne(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t y); -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) || - defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) */ +/** Boolean "and" operation. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * \p x && \p y + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x && \p y, + * otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_and(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t y); -/** Constant-flow boolean "equal" comparison: - * return x == y +/** Boolean "or" operation. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: * - * This is equivalent to \p x == \p y, but is likely to be compiled - * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * \p x || \p y * * \param x The first value to analyze. * \param y The second value to analyze. * - * \return 1 if \p x equals to \p y, otherwise 0. + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x || \p y, + * otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. */ -unsigned mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq(size_t x, - size_t y); +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_or(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t y); + +/** Boolean "not" operation. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * ! \p x + * + * \param x The value to invert + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE if \p x, otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_not(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x); + + +/* ============================================================================ + * Data selection operations + */ + +/** Choose between two size_t values. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * condition ? if1 : if0. + * + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. + * \param if0 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise \c if0. + */ +static inline size_t mbedtls_ct_size_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + size_t if1, + size_t if0); + +/** Choose between two unsigned values. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * condition ? if1 : if0. + * + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. + * \param if0 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise \c if0. + */ +static inline unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + unsigned if1, + unsigned if0); + +/** Choose between two mbedtls_ct_condition_t values. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * condition ? if1 : if0. + * + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. + * \param if0 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise \c if0. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t if1, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t if0); #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) -/** Decide if an integer is less than the other, without branches. +/** Choose between two mbedtls_mpi_uint values. * - * This is equivalent to \p x < \p y, but is likely to be compiled - * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * Functionally equivalent to: * - * \param x The first value to analyze. - * \param y The second value to analyze. + * condition ? if1 : if0. + * + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. + * \param if0 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise \c if0. + */ +static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, \ + mbedtls_mpi_uint if1, \ + mbedtls_mpi_uint if0); + +#endif + +/** Choose between an unsigned value and 0. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * condition ? if1 : 0. * - * \return 1 if \p x is less than \p y, otherwise 0. + * Functionally equivalent to mbedtls_ct_uint_if(condition, if1, 0) but + * results in smaller code size. + * + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise 0. */ -unsigned mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt(const mbedtls_mpi_uint x, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint y); +static inline unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, unsigned if1); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ +/** Choose between an mbedtls_ct_condition_t and 0. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * condition ? if1 : 0. + * + * Functionally equivalent to mbedtls_ct_bool_if(condition, if1, 0) but + * results in smaller code size. + * + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise 0. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t if1); -/** Choose between two integer values without branches. +/** Choose between a size_t value and 0. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: * - * This is equivalent to `condition ? if1 : if0`, but is likely to be compiled - * to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * condition ? if1 : 0. + * + * Functionally equivalent to mbedtls_ct_size_if(condition, if1, 0) but + * results in smaller code size. * * \param condition Condition to test. - * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition is nonzero. - * \param if0 Value to use if \p condition is zero. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. * - * \return \c if1 if \p condition is nonzero, otherwise \c if0. + * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise 0. */ -unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if(unsigned condition, - unsigned if1, - unsigned if0); +static inline size_t mbedtls_ct_size_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, size_t if1); #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) -/** Conditionally assign a value without branches. +/** Choose between an mbedtls_mpi_uint value and 0. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: * - * This is equivalent to `if ( condition ) dest = src`, but is likely - * to be compiled to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * condition ? if1 : 0. * - * \param n \p dest and \p src must be arrays of limbs of size n. - * \param dest The MPI to conditionally assign to. This must point - * to an initialized MPI. - * \param src The MPI to be assigned from. This must point to an - * initialized MPI. - * \param condition Condition to test, must be 0 or 1. + * Functionally equivalent to mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if(condition, if1, 0) but + * results in smaller code size. + * + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise 0. */ -void mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_cond_assign(size_t n, - mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint *src, - unsigned char condition); +static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + mbedtls_mpi_uint if1); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ +#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) +/** Constant-flow char selection + * + * \param low Secret. Bottom of range + * \param high Secret. Top of range + * \param c Secret. Value to compare to range + * \param t Secret. Value to return, if in range + * + * \return \p t if \p low <= \p c <= \p high, 0 otherwise. + */ +static inline unsigned char mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if(unsigned char low, + unsigned char high, + unsigned char c, + unsigned char t); -/** Given a value in the range 0..63, return the corresponding Base64 digit. +/** Choose between two error values. The values must be in the range [-32767..0]. * - * The implementation assumes that letters are consecutive (e.g. ASCII - * but not EBCDIC). + * Functionally equivalent to: * - * \param value A value in the range 0..63. + * condition ? if1 : if0. + * + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. + * \param if0 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. * - * \return A base64 digit converted from \p value. + * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise \c if0. */ -unsigned char mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char(unsigned char value); +static inline int mbedtls_ct_error_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, int if1, int if0); -/** Given a Base64 digit, return its value. +/** Choose between an error value and 0. The error value must be in the range [-32767..0]. * - * If c is not a Base64 digit ('A'..'Z', 'a'..'z', '0'..'9', '+' or '/'), - * return -1. + * Functionally equivalent to: * - * The implementation assumes that letters are consecutive (e.g. ASCII - * but not EBCDIC). + * condition ? if1 : 0. * - * \param c A base64 digit. + * Functionally equivalent to mbedtls_ct_error_if(condition, if1, 0) but + * results in smaller code size. * - * \return The value of the base64 digit \p c. + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise 0. */ -signed char mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value(unsigned char c); +static inline int mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, int if1); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ +/* ============================================================================ + * Block memory operations + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) +/** Conditionally set a block of memory to zero. + * + * Regardless of the condition, every byte will be read once and written to + * once. + * + * \param condition Secret. Condition to test. + * \param buf Secret. Pointer to the start of the buffer. + * \param len Number of bytes to set to zero. + * + * \warning Unlike mbedtls_platform_zeroize, this does not have the same guarantees + * about not being optimised away if the memory is never read again. + */ +void mbedtls_ct_zeroize_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, void *buf, size_t len); -/** Conditional memcpy without branches. +/** Shift some data towards the left inside a buffer. * - * This is equivalent to `if ( c1 == c2 ) memcpy(dest, src, len)`, but is likely - * to be compiled to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch. + * Functionally equivalent to: * - * \param dest The pointer to conditionally copy to. - * \param src The pointer to copy from. Shouldn't overlap with \p dest. - * \param len The number of bytes to copy. - * \param c1 The first value to analyze in the condition. - * \param c2 The second value to analyze in the condition. + * memmove(start, start + offset, total - offset); + * memset(start + (total - offset), 0, offset); + * + * Timing independence comes at the expense of performance. + * + * \param start Secret. Pointer to the start of the buffer. + * \param total Total size of the buffer. + * \param offset Secret. Offset from which to copy \p total - \p offset bytes. + */ +void mbedtls_ct_memmove_left(void *start, + size_t total, + size_t offset); + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) */ + +/** Conditional memcpy. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * if (condition) { + * memcpy(dest, src1, len); + * } else { + * if (src2 != NULL) + * memcpy(dest, src2, len); + * } + * + * It will always read len bytes from src1. + * If src2 != NULL, it will always read len bytes from src2. + * If src2 == NULL, it will instead read len bytes from dest (as if src2 == dest). + * + * \param condition The condition + * \param dest Secret. Destination pointer. + * \param src1 Secret. Pointer to copy from (if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE). + * This may be equal to \p dest, but may not overlap in other ways. + * \param src2 Secret (contents only - may branch to determine if this parameter is NULL). + * Pointer to copy from (if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE and \p src2 is not NULL). May be NULL. + * This may be equal to \p dest, but may not overlap it in other ways. It may overlap with \p src1. + * \param len Number of bytes to copy. */ -void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq(unsigned char *dest, - const unsigned char *src, - size_t len, - size_t c1, size_t c2); +void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + unsigned char *dest, + const unsigned char *src1, + const unsigned char *src2, + size_t len + ); -/** Copy data from a secret position with constant flow. +/** Copy data from a secret position. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * memcpy(dst, src + offset, len) * - * This function copies \p len bytes from \p src_base + \p offset_secret to \p - * dst, with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not depend on \p - * offset_secret, but only on \p offset_min, \p offset_max and \p len. - * Functionally equivalent to `memcpy(dst, src + offset_secret, len)`. + * This function copies \p len bytes from \p src + \p offset to + * \p dst, with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not depend on + * \p offset, but only on \p offset_min, \p offset_max and \p len. * * \note This function reads from \p dest, but the value that * is read does not influence the result and this @@ -231,12 +516,12 @@ void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if_eq(unsigned char *dest, * positives from static or dynamic analyzers, especially * if \p dest is not initialized. * - * \param dest The destination buffer. This must point to a writable + * \param dest Secret. The destination buffer. This must point to a writable * buffer of at least \p len bytes. - * \param src The base of the source buffer. This must point to a + * \param src Secret. The base of the source buffer. This must point to a * readable buffer of at least \p offset_max + \p len - * bytes. Shouldn't overlap with \p dest. - * \param offset The offset in the source buffer from which to copy. + * bytes. Shouldn't overlap with \p dest + * \param offset Secret. The offset in the source buffer from which to copy. * This must be no less than \p offset_min and no greater * than \p offset_max. * \param offset_min The minimal value of \p offset. @@ -250,90 +535,45 @@ void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset(unsigned char *dest, size_t offset_max, size_t len); -/** Compute the HMAC of variable-length data with constant flow. - * - * This function computes the HMAC of the concatenation of \p add_data and \p - * data, and does with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not - * depend on \p data_len_secret, but only on \p min_data_len and \p - * max_data_len. In particular, this function always reads exactly \p - * max_data_len bytes from \p data. - * - * \param ctx The HMAC context. It must have keys configured - * with mbedtls_md_hmac_starts() and use one of the - * following hashes: SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1 or MD-5. - * It is reset using mbedtls_md_hmac_reset() after - * the computation is complete to prepare for the - * next computation. - * \param add_data The first part of the message whose HMAC is being - * calculated. This must point to a readable buffer - * of \p add_data_len bytes. - * \param add_data_len The length of \p add_data in bytes. - * \param data The buffer containing the second part of the - * message. This must point to a readable buffer - * of \p max_data_len bytes. - * \param data_len_secret The length of the data to process in \p data. - * This must be no less than \p min_data_len and no - * greater than \p max_data_len. - * \param min_data_len The minimal length of the second part of the - * message, read from \p data. - * \param max_data_len The maximal length of the second part of the - * message, read from \p data. - * \param output The HMAC will be written here. This must point to - * a writable buffer of sufficient size to hold the - * HMAC value. - * - * \retval 0 on success. - * \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED - * The hardware accelerator failed. - */ -int mbedtls_ct_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, - const unsigned char *add_data, - size_t add_data_len, - const unsigned char *data, - size_t data_len_secret, - size_t min_data_len, - size_t max_data_len, - unsigned char *output); - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ +/* Documented in include/mbedtls/constant_time.h. a and b are secret. -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + int mbedtls_ct_memcmp(const void *a, + const void *b, + size_t n); + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + +/** Constant-time buffer comparison without branches. + * + * Similar to mbedtls_ct_memcmp, except that the result only depends on part of + * the input data - differences in the head or tail are ignored. Functionally equivalent to: + * + * memcmp(a + skip_head, b + skip_head, size - skip_head - skip_tail) + * + * Time taken depends on \p n, but not on \p skip_head or \p skip_tail . + * + * Behaviour is undefined if ( \p skip_head + \p skip_tail) > \p n. + * + * \param a Secret. Pointer to the first buffer, containing at least \p n bytes. May not be NULL. + * \param b Secret. Pointer to the second buffer, containing at least \p n bytes. May not be NULL. + * \param n The number of bytes to examine (total size of the buffers). + * \param skip_head Secret. The number of bytes to treat as non-significant at the start of the buffer. + * These bytes will still be read. + * \param skip_tail Secret. The number of bytes to treat as non-significant at the end of the buffer. + * These bytes will still be read. + * + * \return Zero if the contents of the two buffers are the same, otherwise non-zero. + */ +int mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial(const void *a, + const void *b, + size_t n, + size_t skip_head, + size_t skip_tail); + +#endif -/** This function performs the unpadding part of a PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption - * operation (EME-PKCS1-v1_5 decoding). - * - * \note The return value from this function is a sensitive value - * (this is unusual). #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE shouldn't happen - * in a well-written application, but 0 vs #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING - * is often a situation that an attacker can provoke and leaking which - * one is the result is precisely the information the attacker wants. - * - * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either - * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC (deprecated). - * \param input The input buffer which is the payload inside PKCS#1v1.5 - * encryption padding, called the "encoded message EM" - * by the terminology. - * \param ilen The length of the payload in the \p input buffer. - * \param output The buffer for the payload, called "message M" by the - * PKCS#1 terminology. This must be a writable buffer of - * length \p output_max_len bytes. - * \param olen The address at which to store the length of - * the payload. This must not be \c NULL. - * \param output_max_len The length in bytes of the output buffer \p output. - * - * \return \c 0 on success. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE - * The output buffer is too small for the unpadded payload. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING - * The input doesn't contain properly formatted padding. - */ -int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding(int mode, - unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char *output, - size_t output_max_len, - size_t *olen); - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ +/* Include the implementation of static inline functions above. */ +#include "constant_time_impl.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/constant_time_invasive.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/constant_time_invasive.h deleted file mode 100644 index c176b28ffd..0000000000 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/constant_time_invasive.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,51 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file constant_time_invasive.h - * - * \brief Constant-time module: interfaces for invasive testing only. - * - * The interfaces in this file are intended for testing purposes only. - * They SHOULD NOT be made available in library integrations except when - * building the library for testing. - */ -/* - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ - -#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INVASIVE_H -#define MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INVASIVE_H - -#include "common.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) - -/** Turn a value into a mask: - * - if \p low <= \p c <= \p high, - * return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (unsigned) -1 - * - otherwise, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0 - * - * \param low The value to analyze. - * \param high The value to analyze. - * \param c The value to analyze. - * - * \return All-bits-one if \p low <= \p c <= \p high, otherwise zero. - */ -unsigned char mbedtls_ct_uchar_mask_of_range(unsigned char low, - unsigned char high, - unsigned char c); - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INVASIVE_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ctr.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ctr.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..aa48fb9e70 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ctr.h @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +/** + * \file ctr.h + * + * \brief This file contains common functionality for counter algorithms. + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CTR_H +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_H + +#include "common.h" + +/** + * \brief Increment a big-endian 16-byte value. + * This is quite performance-sensitive for AES-CTR and CTR-DRBG. + * + * \param n A 16-byte value to be incremented. + */ +static inline void mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(uint8_t n[16]) +{ + // The 32-bit version seems to perform about the same as a 64-bit version + // on 64-bit architectures, so no need to define a 64-bit version. + for (int i = 3;; i--) { + uint32_t x = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(n, i << 2); + x += 1; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(x, n, i << 2); + if (x != 0 || i == 0) { + break; + } + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ctr_drbg.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ctr_drbg.c index 6f553dca66..66d9d28c58 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ctr_drbg.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ctr_drbg.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * CTR_DRBG implementation based on AES-256 (NIST SP 800-90) * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * The NIST SP 800-90 DRBGs are described in the following publication. @@ -26,25 +14,71 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#include "ctr.h" #include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" -#include #include #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) #include #endif +/* Using error translation functions from PSA to MbedTLS */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#endif + #include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +static psa_status_t ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context *psa_ctx, + unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) +{ + psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attr, PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING); + psa_set_key_type(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES); + status = psa_import_key(&key_attr, key, key_len, &psa_ctx->key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(&psa_ctx->operation, psa_ctx->key_id, PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attr); + return status; +} + +static void ctr_drbg_destroy_psa_contex(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context *psa_ctx) +{ + psa_cipher_abort(&psa_ctx->operation); + psa_destroy_key(psa_ctx->key_id); + + psa_ctx->operation = psa_cipher_operation_init(); + psa_ctx->key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +} +#endif + /* * CTR_DRBG context initialization */ void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx) { memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context)); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx->aes_ctx); +#else + ctx->psa_ctx.key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + ctx->psa_ctx.operation = psa_cipher_operation_init(); +#endif /* Indicate that the entropy nonce length is not set explicitly. * See mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(). */ ctx->reseed_counter = -1; @@ -68,7 +102,11 @@ void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx) mbedtls_mutex_free(&ctx->mutex); } #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx->aes_ctx); +#else + ctr_drbg_destroy_psa_contex(&ctx->psa_ctx); +#endif mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context)); ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; ctx->reseed_counter = -1; @@ -98,14 +136,13 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, if (len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; } -#if SIZE_MAX > INT_MAX + /* This shouldn't be an issue because * MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT < INT_MAX in any sensible * configuration, but make sure anyway. */ if (len > INT_MAX) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; } -#endif /* For backward compatibility with Mbed TLS <= 2.19, store the * entropy nonce length in a field that already exists, but isn't @@ -130,8 +167,17 @@ static int block_cipher_df(unsigned char *output, unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE]; unsigned char chain[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE]; unsigned char *p, *iv; - mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx; int ret = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx; +#else + psa_status_t status; + size_t tmp_len; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context psa_ctx; + + psa_ctx.key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_ctx.operation = psa_cipher_operation_init(); +#endif int i, j; size_t buf_len, use_len; @@ -142,7 +188,6 @@ static int block_cipher_df(unsigned char *output, memset(buf, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 16); - mbedtls_aes_init(&aes_ctx); /* * Construct IV (16 bytes) and S in buffer @@ -164,10 +209,20 @@ static int block_cipher_df(unsigned char *output, key[i] = i; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + mbedtls_aes_init(&aes_ctx); + if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&aes_ctx, key, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS)) != 0) { goto exit; } +#else + status = ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(&psa_ctx, key, sizeof(key)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status); + goto exit; + } +#endif /* * Reduce data to MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN bytes of data @@ -178,17 +233,24 @@ static int block_cipher_df(unsigned char *output, use_len = buf_len; while (use_len > 0) { - for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i++) { - chain[i] ^= p[i]; - } + mbedtls_xor(chain, chain, p, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE); p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; use_len -= (use_len >= MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE) ? MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE : use_len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, chain, chain)) != 0) { goto exit; } +#else + status = psa_cipher_update(&psa_ctx.operation, chain, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, + chain, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, &tmp_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status); + goto exit; + } +#endif } memcpy(tmp + j, chain, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE); @@ -202,23 +264,46 @@ static int block_cipher_df(unsigned char *output, /* * Do final encryption with reduced data */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&aes_ctx, tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS)) != 0) { goto exit; } +#else + ctr_drbg_destroy_psa_contex(&psa_ctx); + + status = ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(&psa_ctx, tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status); + goto exit; + } +#endif iv = tmp + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE; p = output; for (j = 0; j < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; j += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv)) != 0) { goto exit; } +#else + status = psa_cipher_update(&psa_ctx.operation, iv, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, + iv, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, &tmp_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status); + goto exit; + } +#endif memcpy(p, iv, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE); p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; } exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) mbedtls_aes_free(&aes_ctx); +#else + ctr_drbg_destroy_psa_contex(&psa_ctx); +#endif /* * tidy up the stack */ @@ -249,8 +334,12 @@ static int ctr_drbg_update_internal(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, { unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; unsigned char *p = tmp; - int i, j; + int j; int ret = 0; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + psa_status_t status; + size_t tmp_len; +#endif memset(tmp, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN); @@ -258,34 +347,47 @@ static int ctr_drbg_update_internal(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, /* * Increase counter */ - for (i = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i--) { - if (++ctx->counter[i - 1] != 0) { - break; - } - } + mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(ctx->counter); /* * Crypt counter block */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, ctx->counter, p)) != 0) { goto exit; } +#else + status = psa_cipher_update(&ctx->psa_ctx.operation, ctx->counter, sizeof(ctx->counter), + p, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, &tmp_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status); + goto exit; + } +#endif p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; } - for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; i++) { - tmp[i] ^= data[i]; - } + mbedtls_xor(tmp, tmp, data, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN); /* * Update key and counter */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx->aes_ctx, tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS)) != 0) { goto exit; } +#else + ctr_drbg_destroy_psa_contex(&ctx->psa_ctx); + + status = ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(&ctx->psa_ctx, tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status); + goto exit; + } +#endif memcpy(ctx->counter, tmp + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE); @@ -306,9 +408,9 @@ static int ctr_drbg_update_internal(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, * and with outputs * ctx = initial_working_state */ -int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *additional, - size_t add_len) +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, + size_t add_len) { unsigned char add_input[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; @@ -329,20 +431,6 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, return ret; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *additional, - size_t add_len) -{ - /* MAX_INPUT would be more logical here, but we have to match - * block_cipher_df()'s limits since we can't propagate errors */ - if (add_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT) { - add_len = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT; - } - (void) mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret(ctx, additional, add_len); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /* CTR_DRBG_Reseed with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.4.2) * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed(ctx, additional, len, nonce_len) * implements @@ -461,8 +549,6 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, mbedtls_mutex_init(&ctx->mutex); #endif - mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx->aes_ctx); - ctx->f_entropy = f_entropy; ctx->p_entropy = p_entropy; @@ -478,10 +564,20 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, good_nonce_len(ctx->entropy_len)); /* Initialize with an empty key. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx->aes_ctx, key, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS)) != 0) { return ret; } +#else + psa_status_t status; + + status = ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(&ctx->psa_ctx, key, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status); + return status; + } +#endif /* Do the initial seeding. */ if ((ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed_internal(ctx, custom, len, @@ -516,10 +612,11 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng, { int ret = 0; mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *) p_rng; - unsigned char add_input[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; unsigned char *p = output; - unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE]; - int i; + struct { + unsigned char add_input[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; + unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE]; + } locals; size_t use_len; if (output_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST) { @@ -530,7 +627,7 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng, return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; } - memset(add_input, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN); + memset(locals.add_input, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN); if (ctx->reseed_counter > ctx->reseed_interval || ctx->prediction_resistance) { @@ -541,51 +638,58 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng, } if (add_len > 0) { - if ((ret = block_cipher_df(add_input, additional, add_len)) != 0) { + if ((ret = block_cipher_df(locals.add_input, additional, add_len)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, add_input)) != 0) { + if ((ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, locals.add_input)) != 0) { goto exit; } } while (output_len > 0) { /* - * Increase counter + * Increase counter (treat it as a 128-bit big-endian integer). */ - for (i = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i--) { - if (++ctx->counter[i - 1] != 0) { - break; - } - } + mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(ctx->counter); /* * Crypt counter block */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, - ctx->counter, tmp)) != 0) { + ctx->counter, locals.tmp)) != 0) { goto exit; } +#else + psa_status_t status; + size_t tmp_len; + + status = psa_cipher_update(&ctx->psa_ctx.operation, ctx->counter, sizeof(ctx->counter), + locals.tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, &tmp_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status); + goto exit; + } +#endif use_len = (output_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE) ? MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE : output_len; /* * Copy random block to destination */ - memcpy(p, tmp, use_len); + memcpy(p, locals.tmp, use_len); p += use_len; output_len -= use_len; } - if ((ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, add_input)) != 0) { + if ((ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, locals.add_input)) != 0) { goto exit; } ctx->reseed_counter++; exit: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(add_input, sizeof(add_input)); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&locals, sizeof(locals)); return ret; } @@ -624,6 +728,9 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; } + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL); + if ((ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(ctx, buf, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT)) != 0) { goto exit; @@ -656,6 +763,9 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; } + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL); + n = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), f); if (fread(&c, 1, 1, f) != 0) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; @@ -668,7 +778,7 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, fclose(f); f = NULL; - ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret(ctx, buf, n); + ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update(ctx, buf, n); exit: mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/debug.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/debug.c index 3e794b5565..c36ed3c5c2 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/debug.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/debug.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * Debugging routines * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" @@ -23,7 +11,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "debug_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include @@ -112,7 +100,7 @@ void mbedtls_debug_print_ret(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, /* * With non-blocking I/O and examples that just retry immediately, * the logs would be quickly flooded with WANT_READ, so ignore that. - * Don't ignore WANT_WRITE however, since is is usually rare. + * Don't ignore WANT_WRITE however, since it is usually rare. */ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ) { return; @@ -144,7 +132,6 @@ void mbedtls_debug_print_buf(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str); - idx = 0; memset(txt, 0, sizeof(txt)); for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { if (i >= 4096) { @@ -180,7 +167,7 @@ void mbedtls_debug_print_buf(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, } } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) void mbedtls_debug_print_ecp(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, const char *file, int line, const char *text, const mbedtls_ecp_point *X) @@ -200,7 +187,79 @@ void mbedtls_debug_print_ecp(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, mbedtls_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "%s(Y)", text); mbedtls_debug_print_mpi(ssl, level, file, line, str, &X->Y); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +static void mbedtls_debug_print_ec_coord(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, const char *text, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; + size_t i, idx = 0; + + mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, "value of '%s' (%u bits) is:\n", + text, (unsigned int) len * 8); + + debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str); + + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + if (i >= 4096) { + break; + } + + if (i % 16 == 0) { + if (i > 0) { + mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, "\n"); + debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str); + + idx = 0; + } + } + + idx += mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, " %02x", + (unsigned int) buf[i]); + } + + if (len > 0) { + for (/* i = i */; i % 16 != 0; i++) { + idx += mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, " "); + } + + mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, "\n"); + debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str); + } +} + +void mbedtls_debug_print_psa_ec(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; + const uint8_t *coord_start; + size_t coord_len; + + if (NULL == ssl || + NULL == ssl->conf || + NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg || + level > debug_threshold) { + return; + } + + /* For the description of pk->pk_raw content please refer to the description + * psa_export_public_key() function. */ + coord_len = (pk->pub_raw_len - 1)/2; + + /* X coordinate */ + coord_start = pk->pub_raw + 1; + mbedtls_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "%s(X)", text); + mbedtls_debug_print_ec_coord(ssl, level, file, line, str, coord_start, coord_len); + + /* Y coordinate */ + coord_start = coord_start + coord_len; + mbedtls_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "%s(Y)", text); + mbedtls_debug_print_ec_coord(ssl, level, file, line, str, coord_start, coord_len); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) void mbedtls_debug_print_mpi(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, @@ -253,7 +312,7 @@ void mbedtls_debug_print_mpi(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) static void debug_print_pk(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, const char *file, int line, const char *text, const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) @@ -278,14 +337,21 @@ static void debug_print_pk(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, mbedtls_snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%s%s", text, items[i].name); name[sizeof(name) - 1] = '\0'; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) if (items[i].type == MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI) { mbedtls_debug_print_mpi(ssl, level, file, line, name, items[i].value); } else -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) if (items[i].type == MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_ECP) { mbedtls_debug_print_ecp(ssl, level, file, line, name, items[i].value); } else -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + if (items[i].type == MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_PSA_EC) { + mbedtls_debug_print_psa_ec(ssl, level, file, line, name, items[i].value); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ { debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, "should not happen\n"); } } @@ -300,7 +366,7 @@ static void debug_print_line_by_line(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, start = text; for (cur = text; *cur != '\0'; cur++) { if (*cur == '\n') { - size_t len = cur - start + 1; + size_t len = (size_t) (cur - start) + 1; if (len > DEBUG_BUF_SIZE - 1) { len = DEBUG_BUF_SIZE - 1; } @@ -344,9 +410,10 @@ void mbedtls_debug_print_crt(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, crt = crt->next; } } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) static void mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh_internal(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, const char *file, int line, @@ -392,6 +459,7 @@ void mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, } #endif } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED && + MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/debug_internal.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/debug_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4523b4633a --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/debug_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +/** + * \file debug_internal.h + * + * \brief Internal part of the public "debug.h". + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_DEBUG_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_INTERNAL_H + +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" + +/** + * \brief Print a message to the debug output. This function is always used + * through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG() macro, which supplies the ssl + * context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the message has occurred in + * \param line line number the message has occurred at + * \param format format specifier, in printf format + * \param ... variables used by the format specifier + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_msg(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *format, ...) MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(5, 6); + +/** + * \brief Print the return value of a function to the debug output. This + * function is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET() macro, + * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param text the name of the function that returned the error + * \param ret the return code value + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_ret(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, int ret); + +/** + * \brief Output a buffer of size len bytes to the debug output. This function + * is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF() macro, + * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param text a name or label for the buffer being dumped. Normally the + * variable or buffer name + * \param buf the buffer to be outputted + * \param len length of the buffer + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_buf(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, const char *text, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +/** + * \brief Print a MPI variable to the debug output. This function is always + * used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI() macro, which supplies the + * ssl context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param text a name or label for the MPI being output. Normally the + * variable name + * \param X the MPI variable + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_mpi(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_mpi *X); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) +/** + * \brief Print an ECP point to the debug output. This function is always + * used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP() macro, which supplies the + * ssl context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param text a name or label for the ECP point being output. Normally the + * variable name + * \param X the ECP point + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_ecp(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_ecp_point *X); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) +/** + * \brief Print a X.509 certificate structure to the debug output. This + * function is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT() macro, + * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param text a name or label for the certificate being output + * \param crt X.509 certificate structure + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_crt(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt); +#endif + +/* Note: the MBEDTLS_ECDH_C guard here is mandatory because this debug function + only works for the built-in implementation. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z, +} mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr; + +/** + * \brief Print a field of the ECDH structure in the SSL context to the debug + * output. This function is always used through the + * MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH() macro, which supplies the ssl context, file + * and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param ecdh the ECDH context + * \param attr the identifier of the attribute being output + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ecdh, + mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr attr); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED && + MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/des.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/des.c index 8cf346f81b..f0032b3b56 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/des.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/des.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * FIPS-46-3 compliant Triple-DES implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * DES, on which TDES is based, was originally designed by Horst Feistel @@ -642,7 +630,6 @@ int mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_des_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) { - int i; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char temp[8]; @@ -652,9 +639,7 @@ int mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_des_context *ctx, if (mode == MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT) { while (length > 0) { - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - output[i] = (unsigned char) (input[i] ^ iv[i]); - } + mbedtls_xor(output, input, iv, 8); ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb(ctx, output, output); if (ret != 0) { @@ -674,9 +659,7 @@ int mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_des_context *ctx, goto exit; } - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - output[i] = (unsigned char) (output[i] ^ iv[i]); - } + mbedtls_xor(output, output, iv, 8); memcpy(iv, temp, 8); @@ -745,7 +728,6 @@ int mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) { - int i; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char temp[8]; @@ -755,9 +737,7 @@ int mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, if (mode == MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT) { while (length > 0) { - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - output[i] = (unsigned char) (input[i] ^ iv[i]); - } + mbedtls_xor(output, input, iv, 8); ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb(ctx, output, output); if (ret != 0) { @@ -777,9 +757,7 @@ int mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, goto exit; } - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - output[i] = (unsigned char) (output[i] ^ iv[i]); - } + mbedtls_xor(output, output, iv, 8); memcpy(iv, temp, 8); diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/dhm.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/dhm.c index c6f955ee42..bcc07f5441 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/dhm.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/dhm.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * The following sources were referenced in the design of this implementation @@ -47,11 +35,6 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT) -#define DHM_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define DHM_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - /* * helper to validate the mbedtls_mpi size and import it */ @@ -65,10 +48,10 @@ static int dhm_read_bignum(mbedtls_mpi *X, return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - n = ((*p)[0] << 8) | (*p)[1]; + n = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(*p, 0); (*p) += 2; - if ((int) (end - *p) < n) { + if ((size_t) (end - *p) < (size_t) n) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -114,10 +97,49 @@ static int dhm_check_range(const mbedtls_mpi *param, const mbedtls_mpi *P) void mbedtls_dhm_init(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx) { - DHM_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_dhm_context)); } +size_t mbedtls_dhm_get_bitlen(const mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx) +{ + return mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->P); +} + +size_t mbedtls_dhm_get_len(const mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx) +{ + return mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->P); +} + +int mbedtls_dhm_get_value(const mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + mbedtls_dhm_parameter param, + mbedtls_mpi *dest) +{ + const mbedtls_mpi *src = NULL; + switch (param) { + case MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_P: + src = &ctx->P; + break; + case MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_G: + src = &ctx->G; + break; + case MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_X: + src = &ctx->X; + break; + case MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_GX: + src = &ctx->GX; + break; + case MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_GY: + src = &ctx->GY; + break; + case MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_K: + src = &ctx->K; + break; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + return mbedtls_mpi_copy(dest, src); +} + /* * Parse the ServerKeyExchange parameters */ @@ -126,9 +148,6 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_read_params(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, const unsigned char *end) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(p != NULL && *p != NULL); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(end != NULL); if ((ret = dhm_read_bignum(&ctx->P, p, end)) != 0 || (ret = dhm_read_bignum(&ctx->G, p, end)) != 0 || @@ -140,8 +159,6 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_read_params(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, return ret; } - ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->P); - return 0; } @@ -211,10 +228,6 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_make_params(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, int ret; size_t n1, n2, n3; unsigned char *p; - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); ret = dhm_make_common(ctx, x_size, f_rng, p_rng); if (ret != 0) { @@ -244,9 +257,7 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_make_params(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, DHM_MPI_EXPORT(&ctx->G, n2); DHM_MPI_EXPORT(&ctx->GX, n3); - *olen = p - output; - - ctx->len = n1; + *olen = (size_t) (p - output); cleanup: if (ret != 0 && ret > -128) { @@ -263,16 +274,12 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_set_group(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *G) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(P != NULL); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(G != NULL); if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->P, P)) != 0 || (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->G, G)) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED, ret); } - ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->P); return 0; } @@ -283,10 +290,8 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_read_public(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - if (ilen < 1 || ilen > ctx->len) { + if (ilen < 1 || ilen > mbedtls_dhm_get_len(ctx)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -306,11 +311,8 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_make_public(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, void *p_rng) { int ret; - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - if (olen < 1 || olen > ctx->len) { + if (olen < 1 || olen > mbedtls_dhm_get_len(ctx)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -407,11 +409,12 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi GYb; - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - if (output_size < ctx->len) { + if (f_rng == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (output_size < mbedtls_dhm_get_len(ctx)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -422,23 +425,17 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, mbedtls_mpi_init(&GYb); /* Blind peer's value */ - if (f_rng != NULL) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(dhm_update_blinding(ctx, f_rng, p_rng)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&GYb, &ctx->GY, &ctx->Vi)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&GYb, &GYb, &ctx->P)); - } else { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&GYb, &ctx->GY)); - } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(dhm_update_blinding(ctx, f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&GYb, &ctx->GY, &ctx->Vi)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&GYb, &GYb, &ctx->P)); /* Do modular exponentiation */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&ctx->K, &GYb, &ctx->X, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP)); /* Unblind secret value */ - if (f_rng != NULL) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->Vf)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->P)); - } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->Vf)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->P)); /* Output the secret without any leading zero byte. This is mandatory * for TLS per RFC 5246 §8.1.2. */ @@ -492,9 +489,6 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm(mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const unsigned char *dhmin, mbedtls_pem_context pem; #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(dhm != NULL); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(dhmin != NULL); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) mbedtls_pem_init(&pem); @@ -564,8 +558,6 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm(mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const unsigned char *dhmin, ret = 0; - dhm->len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&dhm->P); - exit: #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) mbedtls_pem_free(&pem); @@ -593,6 +585,7 @@ static int load_file(const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n) if ((f = fopen(path, "rb")) == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR; } + /* The data loaded here is public, so don't bother disabling buffering. */ fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END); if ((size = ftell(f)) == -1) { @@ -612,8 +605,7 @@ static int load_file(const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n) if (fread(*buf, 1, *n, f) != *n) { fclose(f); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(*buf, *n + 1); - mbedtls_free(*buf); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(*buf, *n + 1); return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR; } @@ -637,8 +629,6 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile(mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const char *path) int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n; unsigned char *buf; - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(dhm != NULL); - DHM_VALIDATE_RET(path != NULL); if ((ret = load_file(path, &buf, &n)) != 0) { return ret; @@ -646,8 +636,7 @@ int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile(mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const char *path) ret = mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm(dhm, buf, n); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, n); - mbedtls_free(buf); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, n); return ret; } diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ecdh.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ecdh.c index 9f002d9682..b276c6adad 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ecdh.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ecdh.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* @@ -34,12 +22,6 @@ #include -/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ -#define ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define ECDH_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) typedef mbedtls_ecdh_context mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed; #endif @@ -100,10 +82,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(d != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(Q != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); return ecdh_gen_public_restartable(grp, d, Q, f_rng, p_rng, NULL); } #endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT */ @@ -148,10 +126,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *z, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(Q != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(d != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(z != NULL); return ecdh_compute_shared_restartable(grp, z, Q, d, f_rng, p_rng, NULL); } @@ -170,13 +144,20 @@ static void ecdh_init_internal(mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx) #endif } +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecdh_get_grp_id(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp).id; +#else + return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp_id); +#endif +} + /* * Initialize context */ void mbedtls_ecdh_init(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx) { - ECDH_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) ecdh_init_internal(ctx); mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&ctx->Vi); @@ -211,8 +192,6 @@ static int ecdh_setup_internal(mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, */ int mbedtls_ecdh_setup(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id) { - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) return ecdh_setup_internal(ctx, grp_id); #else @@ -253,8 +232,6 @@ static void ecdh_free_internal(mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx) */ void mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx) { - ECDH_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - ctx->restart_enabled = 1; } #endif @@ -363,11 +340,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_make_params(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, void *p_rng) { int restart_enabled = 0; - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) restart_enabled = ctx->restart_enabled; #else @@ -400,7 +372,7 @@ static int ecdh_read_params_internal(mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, const unsigned char *end) { return mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Qp, buf, - end - *buf); + (size_t) (end - *buf)); } /* @@ -416,12 +388,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_read_params(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(*buf != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(end != NULL); - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id(&grp_id, buf, end - *buf)) + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id(&grp_id, buf, (size_t) (end - *buf))) != 0) { return ret; } @@ -480,10 +447,9 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_get_params(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecdh_side side) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(side == MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS || - side == MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS); + if (side != MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS && side != MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } if (mbedtls_ecdh_grp_id(ctx) == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { /* This is the first call to get_params(). Set up the context @@ -574,11 +540,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_make_public(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, void *p_rng) { int restart_enabled = 0; - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) restart_enabled = ctx->restart_enabled; #endif @@ -628,9 +589,6 @@ static int ecdh_read_public_internal(mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, int mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen) { - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) return ecdh_read_public_internal(ctx, buf, blen); #else @@ -710,10 +668,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, void *p_rng) { int restart_enabled = 0; - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - ECDH_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) restart_enabled = ctx->restart_enabled; #endif @@ -737,5 +691,4 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, } #endif } - #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c index 2fcb2fbc01..2f7a996a7e 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * Elliptic curve DSA * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* @@ -41,12 +29,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" -/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ -#define ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define ECDSA_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) /* @@ -258,13 +240,13 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do(mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid) * Compute ECDSA signature of a hashed message (SEC1 4.1.3) * Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 4 (hash message) */ -static int ecdsa_sign_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, - mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, - const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng_blind, - mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, + const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng_blind, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) { int ret, key_tries, sign_tries; int *p_sign_tries = &sign_tries, *p_key_tries = &key_tries; @@ -399,30 +381,26 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(r != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(s != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(d != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL || blen == 0); - /* Use the same RNG for both blinding and ephemeral key generation */ - return ecdsa_sign_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, - f_rng, p_rng, f_rng, p_rng, NULL); + return mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, + f_rng, p_rng, f_rng, p_rng, NULL); } #endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) /* * Deterministic signature wrapper + * + * note: The f_rng_blind parameter must not be NULL. + * */ -static int ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, - mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, - const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng_blind, - mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, + const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng_blind, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx; @@ -472,67 +450,9 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng); #else - if (f_rng_blind != NULL) { - ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng, - f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, rs_ctx); - } else { - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *p_rng_blind_det; - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - /* - * To avoid reusing rng_ctx and risking incorrect behavior we seed a - * second HMAC-DRBG with the same seed. We also apply a label to avoid - * reusing the bits of the ephemeral key for blinding and eliminate the - * risk that they leak this way. - */ - const char *blind_label = "BLINDING CONTEXT"; - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx_blind; - - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(&rng_ctx_blind); - p_rng_blind_det = &rng_ctx_blind; - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf(p_rng_blind_det, md_info, - data, 2 * grp_len); - ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret(p_rng_blind_det, - (const unsigned char *) blind_label, - strlen(blind_label)); - if (ret != 0) { - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(&rng_ctx_blind); - goto cleanup; - } -#else - /* - * In the case of restartable computations we would either need to store - * the second RNG in the restart context too or set it up at every - * restart. The first option would penalize the correct application of - * the function and the second would defeat the purpose of the - * restartable feature. - * - * Therefore in this case we reuse the original RNG. This comes with the - * price that the resulting signature might not be a valid deterministic - * ECDSA signature with a very low probability (same magnitude as - * successfully guessing the private key). However even then it is still - * a valid ECDSA signature. - */ - p_rng_blind_det = p_rng; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ - - /* - * Since the output of the RNGs is always the same for the same key and - * message, this limits the efficiency of blinding and leaks information - * through side channels. After mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() is removed NULL - * won't be a valid value for f_rng_blind anymore. Therefore it should - * be checked by the caller and this branch and check can be removed. - */ - ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng, - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng_blind_det, - rs_ctx); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(&rng_ctx_blind); -#endif - } + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng, + f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, rs_ctx); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ cleanup: @@ -545,26 +465,8 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, } /* - * Deterministic signature wrappers + * Deterministic signature wrapper */ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, - mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg) -{ - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(r != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(s != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(d != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL || blen == 0); - - return ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg, - NULL, NULL, NULL); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, @@ -573,15 +475,8 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, size_t), void *p_rng_blind) { - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(r != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(s != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(d != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL || blen == 0); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng_blind != NULL); - - return ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg, - f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, NULL); + return mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg, + f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, NULL); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ @@ -590,11 +485,12 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, * Verify ECDSA signature of hashed message (SEC1 4.1.4) * Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 2 (hash message) */ -static int ecdsa_verify_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, - const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, - const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s, - mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *r, + const mbedtls_mpi *s, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi e, s_inv, u1, u2; @@ -703,13 +599,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s) { - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(Q != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(r != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(s != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL || blen == 0); - - return ecdsa_verify_restartable(grp, buf, blen, Q, r, s, NULL); + return mbedtls_ecdsa_verify_restartable(grp, buf, blen, Q, r, s, NULL); } #endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */ @@ -717,7 +607,8 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, * Convert a signature (given by context) to ASN.1 */ static int ecdsa_signature_to_asn1(const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen) + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, + size_t *slen) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN] = { 0 }; @@ -732,6 +623,10 @@ static int ecdsa_signature_to_asn1(const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + if (len > sig_size) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + memcpy(sig, p, len); *slen = len; @@ -744,25 +639,24 @@ static int ecdsa_signature_to_asn1(const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s, int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *slen, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi r, s; - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(hash != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(slen != NULL); + if (f_rng == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } mbedtls_mpi_init(&r); mbedtls_mpi_init(&s); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(&ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d, - hash, hlen, md_alg, f_rng, - p_rng, rs_ctx)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(&ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d, + hash, hlen, md_alg, f_rng, + p_rng, rs_ctx)); #else (void) md_alg; @@ -773,13 +667,13 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng)); #else /* Use the same RNG for both blinding and ephemeral key generation */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecdsa_sign_restartable(&ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d, - hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng, f_rng, - p_rng, rs_ctx)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_restartable(&ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d, + hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng, f_rng, + p_rng, rs_ctx)); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecdsa_signature_to_asn1(&r, &s, sig, slen)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecdsa_signature_to_asn1(&r, &s, sig, sig_size, slen)); cleanup: mbedtls_mpi_free(&r); @@ -794,34 +688,15 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *slen, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(hash != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(slen != NULL); return mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( - ctx, md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, slen, f_rng, p_rng, NULL); + ctx, md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, sig_size, slen, + f_rng, p_rng, NULL); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) -int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg) -{ - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(hash != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(slen != NULL); - return mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature(ctx, md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, slen, - NULL, NULL); -} -#endif - /* * Read and check signature */ @@ -829,9 +704,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen) { - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(hash != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); return mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( ctx, hash, hlen, sig, slen, NULL); } @@ -849,10 +721,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, const unsigned char *end = sig + slen; size_t len; mbedtls_mpi r, s; - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(hash != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&r); mbedtls_mpi_init(&s); @@ -881,8 +749,8 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, goto cleanup; } #else - if ((ret = ecdsa_verify_restartable(&ctx->grp, hash, hlen, - &ctx->Q, &r, &s, rs_ctx)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_verify_restartable(&ctx->grp, hash, hlen, + &ctx->Q, &r, &s, rs_ctx)) != 0) { goto cleanup; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */ @@ -909,9 +777,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { int ret = 0; - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ctx->grp, gid); if (ret != 0) { return ret; @@ -928,9 +793,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid, int mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_copy(&ctx->grp, &key->grp)) != 0 || (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->d, &key->d)) != 0 || (ret = mbedtls_ecp_copy(&ctx->Q, &key->Q)) != 0) { @@ -945,8 +807,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, const mbedtls_ecp_key */ void mbedtls_ecdsa_init(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx) { - ECDSA_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(ctx); } @@ -968,8 +828,6 @@ void mbedtls_ecdsa_free(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx) */ void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx) { - ECDSA_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - mbedtls_ecp_restart_init(&ctx->ecp); ctx->ver = NULL; diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ecjpake.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ecjpake.c index 17fa6983d8..cdf5d7ea46 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ecjpake.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ecjpake.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * Elliptic curve J-PAKE * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* @@ -34,12 +22,6 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT) -/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ -#define ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define ECJPAKE_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - /* * Convert a mbedtls_ecjpake_role to identifier string */ @@ -51,14 +33,23 @@ static const char * const ecjpake_id[] = { #define ID_MINE (ecjpake_id[ctx->role]) #define ID_PEER (ecjpake_id[1 - ctx->role]) +/** + * Helper to Compute a hash from md_type + */ +static int mbedtls_ecjpake_compute_hash(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output) +{ + return mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_type), + input, ilen, output); +} + /* * Initialize context */ void mbedtls_ecjpake_init(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx) { - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - - ctx->md_info = NULL; + ctx->md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&ctx->grp); ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; @@ -82,7 +73,7 @@ void mbedtls_ecjpake_free(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx) return; } - ctx->md_info = NULL; + ctx->md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&ctx->grp); mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&ctx->Xm1); @@ -108,17 +99,18 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_setup(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT || - role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER); - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(secret != NULL || len == 0); + if (role != MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT && role != MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } ctx->role = role; - if ((ctx->md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(hash)) == NULL) { + if ((mbedtls_md_info_from_type(hash)) == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } + ctx->md_type = hash; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ctx->grp, curve)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->s, secret, len)); @@ -131,14 +123,25 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_setup(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, return ret; } +int mbedtls_ecjpake_set_point_format(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + int point_format) +{ + switch (point_format) { + case MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED: + case MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED: + ctx->point_format = point_format; + return 0; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +} + /* * Check if context is ready for use */ int mbedtls_ecjpake_check(const mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx) { - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - - if (ctx->md_info == NULL || + if (ctx->md_type == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || ctx->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE || ctx->s.p == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -165,7 +168,7 @@ static int ecjpake_write_len_point(unsigned char **p, } ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(grp, P, pf, - &len, *p + 4, end - (*p + 4)); + &len, *p + 4, (size_t) (end - (*p + 4))); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } @@ -186,7 +189,7 @@ static int ecjpake_write_len_point(unsigned char **p, /* * Compute hash for ZKP (7.4.2.2.2.1) */ -static int ecjpake_hash(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, +static int ecjpake_hash(const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const int pf, const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, @@ -222,11 +225,12 @@ static int ecjpake_hash(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, p += id_len; /* Compute hash */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_md(md_info, buf, p - buf, hash)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecjpake_compute_hash(md_type, + buf, (size_t) (p - buf), hash)); /* Turn it into an integer mod n */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(h, hash, - mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info))); + mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_type))); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(h, h, &grp->N)); cleanup: @@ -236,7 +240,7 @@ static int ecjpake_hash(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, /* * Parse a ECShnorrZKP (7.4.2.2.2) and verify it (7.4.2.3.3) */ -static int ecjpake_zkp_read(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, +static int ecjpake_zkp_read(const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const int pf, const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, @@ -265,7 +269,7 @@ static int ecjpake_zkp_read(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point(grp, &V, p, end - *p)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point(grp, &V, p, (size_t) (end - *p))); if (end < *p || (size_t) (end - *p) < 1) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -285,7 +289,7 @@ static int ecjpake_zkp_read(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, /* * Verification */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_hash(md_info, grp, pf, G, &V, X, id, &h)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_hash(md_type, grp, pf, G, &V, X, id, &h)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_muladd((mbedtls_ecp_group *) grp, &VV, &h, X, &r, G)); @@ -306,7 +310,7 @@ static int ecjpake_zkp_read(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, /* * Generate ZKP (7.4.2.3.2) and write it as ECSchnorrZKP (7.4.2.2.2) */ -static int ecjpake_zkp_write(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, +static int ecjpake_zkp_write(const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const int pf, const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, @@ -335,14 +339,14 @@ static int ecjpake_zkp_write(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, /* Compute signature */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base((mbedtls_ecp_group *) grp, G, &v, &V, f_rng, p_rng)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_hash(md_info, grp, pf, G, &V, X, id, &h)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_hash(md_type, grp, pf, G, &V, X, id, &h)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&h, &h, x)); /* x*h */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&h, &v, &h)); /* v - x*h */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&h, &h, &grp->N)); /* r */ /* Write it out */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point(grp, &V, - pf, &len, *p, end - *p)); + pf, &len, *p, (size_t) (end - *p))); *p += len; len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&h); /* actually r */ @@ -367,7 +371,7 @@ static int ecjpake_zkp_write(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, * Parse a ECJPAKEKeyKP (7.4.2.2.1) and check proof * Output: verified public key X */ -static int ecjpake_kkp_read(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, +static int ecjpake_kkp_read(const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const int pf, const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, @@ -388,13 +392,13 @@ static int ecjpake_kkp_read(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, * ECSchnorrZKP zkp; * } ECJPAKEKeyKP; */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point(grp, X, p, end - *p)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point(grp, X, p, (size_t) (end - *p))); if (mbedtls_ecp_is_zero(X)) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; goto cleanup; } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_zkp_read(md_info, grp, pf, G, X, id, p, end)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_zkp_read(md_type, grp, pf, G, X, id, p, end)); cleanup: return ret; @@ -404,7 +408,7 @@ static int ecjpake_kkp_read(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, * Generate an ECJPAKEKeyKP * Output: the serialized structure, plus private/public key pair */ -static int ecjpake_kkp_write(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, +static int ecjpake_kkp_write(const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const int pf, const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, @@ -427,11 +431,11 @@ static int ecjpake_kkp_write(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base((mbedtls_ecp_group *) grp, G, x, X, f_rng, p_rng)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point(grp, X, - pf, &len, *p, end - *p)); + pf, &len, *p, (size_t) (end - *p))); *p += len; /* Generate and write proof */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_zkp_write(md_info, grp, pf, G, x, X, id, + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_zkp_write(md_type, grp, pf, G, x, X, id, p, end, f_rng, p_rng)); cleanup: @@ -442,7 +446,7 @@ static int ecjpake_kkp_write(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, * Read a ECJPAKEKeyKPPairList (7.4.2.3) and check proofs * Outputs: verified peer public keys Xa, Xb */ -static int ecjpake_kkpp_read(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, +static int ecjpake_kkpp_read(const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const int pf, const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, @@ -461,8 +465,8 @@ static int ecjpake_kkpp_read(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, * ECJPAKEKeyKP ecjpake_key_kp_pair_list[2]; * } ECJPAKEKeyKPPairList; */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_kkp_read(md_info, grp, pf, G, Xa, id, &p, end)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_kkp_read(md_info, grp, pf, G, Xb, id, &p, end)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_kkp_read(md_type, grp, pf, G, Xa, id, &p, end)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_kkp_read(md_type, grp, pf, G, Xb, id, &p, end)); if (p != end) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -476,7 +480,7 @@ static int ecjpake_kkpp_read(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, * Generate a ECJPAKEKeyKPPairList * Outputs: the serialized structure, plus two private/public key pairs */ -static int ecjpake_kkpp_write(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, +static int ecjpake_kkpp_write(const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const int pf, const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, @@ -495,12 +499,12 @@ static int ecjpake_kkpp_write(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, unsigned char *p = buf; const unsigned char *end = buf + len; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_kkp_write(md_info, grp, pf, G, xm1, Xa, id, + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_kkp_write(md_type, grp, pf, G, xm1, Xa, id, &p, end, f_rng, p_rng)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_kkp_write(md_info, grp, pf, G, xm2, Xb, id, + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_kkp_write(md_type, grp, pf, G, xm2, Xb, id, &p, end, f_rng, p_rng)); - *olen = p - buf; + *olen = (size_t) (p - buf); cleanup: return ret; @@ -513,10 +517,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) { - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - - return ecjpake_kkpp_read(ctx->md_info, &ctx->grp, ctx->point_format, + return ecjpake_kkpp_read(ctx->md_type, &ctx->grp, ctx->point_format, &ctx->grp.G, &ctx->Xp1, &ctx->Xp2, ID_PEER, buf, len); @@ -530,12 +531,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - - return ecjpake_kkpp_write(ctx->md_info, &ctx->grp, ctx->point_format, + return ecjpake_kkpp_write(ctx->md_type, &ctx->grp, ctx->point_format, &ctx->grp.G, &ctx->xm1, &ctx->Xm1, &ctx->xm2, &ctx->Xm2, ID_MINE, buf, len, olen, f_rng, p_rng); @@ -577,9 +573,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group grp; mbedtls_ecp_point G; /* C: GB, S: GA */ - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&grp); mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&G); @@ -606,7 +599,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, } } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_kkp_read(ctx->md_info, &ctx->grp, + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_kkp_read(ctx->md_type, &ctx->grp, ctx->point_format, &G, &ctx->Xp, ID_PEER, &p, end)); @@ -669,11 +662,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, const unsigned char *end = buf + len; size_t ec_len; - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&G); mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&Xm); mbedtls_mpi_init(&xm); @@ -705,7 +693,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, goto cleanup; } MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group(&ctx->grp, &ec_len, - p, end - p)); + p, (size_t) (end - p))); p += ec_len; } @@ -714,15 +702,15 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, goto cleanup; } MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point(&ctx->grp, &Xm, - ctx->point_format, &ec_len, p, end - p)); + ctx->point_format, &ec_len, p, (size_t) (end - p))); p += ec_len; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_zkp_write(ctx->md_info, &ctx->grp, + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_zkp_write(ctx->md_type, &ctx->grp, ctx->point_format, &G, &xm, &Xm, ID_MINE, &p, end, f_rng, p_rng)); - *olen = p - buf; + *olen = (size_t) (p - buf); cleanup: mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&G); @@ -735,28 +723,14 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, /* * Derive PMS (7.4.2.7 / 7.4.2.8) */ -int mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, - unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng) +static int mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_k(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + mbedtls_ecp_point *K, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_ecp_point K; mbedtls_mpi m_xm2_s, one; - unsigned char kx[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; - size_t x_bytes; - - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - ECJPAKE_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - *olen = mbedtls_md_get_size(ctx->md_info); - if (len < *olen) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; - } - - mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&K); mbedtls_mpi_init(&m_xm2_s); mbedtls_mpi_init(&one); @@ -769,21 +743,76 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_mul_secret(&m_xm2_s, -1, &ctx->xm2, &ctx->s, &ctx->grp.N, f_rng, p_rng)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_muladd(&ctx->grp, &K, + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_muladd(&ctx->grp, K, &one, &ctx->Xp, &m_xm2_s, &ctx->Xp2)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ctx->grp, &K, &ctx->xm2, &K, + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ctx->grp, K, &ctx->xm2, K, f_rng, p_rng)); +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&m_xm2_s); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&one); + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point K; + unsigned char kx[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + size_t x_bytes; + + *olen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(ctx->md_type); + if (len < *olen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&K); + + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_k(ctx, &K, f_rng, p_rng); + if (ret) { + goto cleanup; + } + /* PMS = SHA-256( K.X ) */ x_bytes = (ctx->grp.pbits + 7) / 8; MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&K.X, kx, x_bytes)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_md(ctx->md_info, kx, x_bytes, buf)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecjpake_compute_hash(ctx->md_type, + kx, x_bytes, buf)); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&K); + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_shared_key(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point K; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&K); + + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_k(ctx, &K, f_rng, p_rng); + if (ret) { + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ctx->grp, &K, ctx->point_format, + olen, buf, len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } cleanup: mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&K); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&m_xm2_s); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&one); return ret; } @@ -798,7 +827,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) int mbedtls_ecjpake_self_test(int verbose) { (void) verbose; @@ -933,12 +962,42 @@ static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_cli_two[] = { 0xcc, 0x38, 0xdb, 0xdc, 0xae, 0x60, 0xd9, 0xc5, 0x4c }; +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_shared_key[] = { + 0x04, 0x01, 0xab, 0xe9, 0xf2, 0xc7, 0x3a, 0x99, 0x14, 0xcb, 0x1f, 0x80, + 0xfb, 0x9d, 0xdb, 0x7e, 0x00, 0x12, 0xa8, 0x9c, 0x2f, 0x39, 0x27, 0x79, + 0xf9, 0x64, 0x40, 0x14, 0x75, 0xea, 0xc1, 0x31, 0x28, 0x43, 0x8f, 0xe1, + 0x12, 0x41, 0xd6, 0xc1, 0xe5, 0x5f, 0x7b, 0x80, 0x88, 0x94, 0xc9, 0xc0, + 0x27, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x41, 0xf5, 0xcb, 0xa1, 0xfe, 0x6c, 0xc7, 0xe6, 0x12, + 0x17, 0xc3, 0xde, 0x27, 0xb4, +}; + static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_pms[] = { 0xf3, 0xd4, 0x7f, 0x59, 0x98, 0x44, 0xdb, 0x92, 0xa5, 0x69, 0xbb, 0xe7, 0x98, 0x1e, 0x39, 0xd9, 0x31, 0xfd, 0x74, 0x3b, 0xf2, 0x2e, 0x98, 0xf9, 0xb4, 0x38, 0xf7, 0x19, 0xd3, 0xc4, 0xf3, 0x51 }; +/* + * PRNG for test - !!!INSECURE NEVER USE IN PRODUCTION!!! + * + * This is the linear congruential generator from numerical recipes, + * except we only use the low byte as the output. See + * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_congruential_generator#Parameters_in_common_use + */ +static int self_test_rng(void *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t len) +{ + static uint32_t state = 42; + + (void) ctx; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) { + state = state * 1664525u + 1013904223u; + out[i] = (unsigned char) state; + } + + return 0; +} + /* Load my private keys and generate the corresponding public keys */ static int ecjpake_test_load(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, const unsigned char *xm1, size_t len1, @@ -949,9 +1008,9 @@ static int ecjpake_test_load(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->xm1, xm1, len1)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->xm2, xm2, len2)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Xm1, &ctx->xm1, - &ctx->grp.G, NULL, NULL)); + &ctx->grp.G, self_test_rng, NULL)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Xm2, &ctx->xm2, - &ctx->grp.G, NULL, NULL)); + &ctx->grp.G, self_test_rng, NULL)); cleanup: return ret; @@ -1101,6 +1160,13 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_self_test(int verbose) TEST_ASSERT(len == sizeof(ecjpake_test_pms)); TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(buf, ecjpake_test_pms, len) == 0); + /* Server derives K as unsigned binary data */ + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_write_shared_key(&srv, + buf, sizeof(buf), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL) == 0); + + TEST_ASSERT(len == sizeof(ecjpake_test_shared_key)); + TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(buf, ecjpake_test_shared_key, len) == 0); + memset(buf, 0, len); /* Avoid interferences with next step */ /* Client derives PMS */ @@ -1110,6 +1176,13 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_self_test(int verbose) TEST_ASSERT(len == sizeof(ecjpake_test_pms)); TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(buf, ecjpake_test_pms, len) == 0); + /* Client derives K as unsigned binary data */ + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_write_shared_key(&cli, + buf, sizeof(buf), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL) == 0); + + TEST_ASSERT(len == sizeof(ecjpake_test_shared_key)); + TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(buf, ecjpake_test_shared_key, len) == 0); + if (verbose != 0) { mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); } @@ -1136,7 +1209,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecjpake_self_test(int verbose) #undef TEST_ASSERT -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED && MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED && MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ecp.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ecp.c index dc8e27991e..427059bb53 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ecp.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ecp.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * Elliptic curves over GF(p): generic functions * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* @@ -72,187 +60,35 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" #include "mbedtls/threading.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" -#include "mbedtls/bn_mul.h" +#include "bn_mul.h" #include "ecp_invasive.h" #include #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) -/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ -#define ECP_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define ECP_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#include "mbedtls/ecp_internal.h" - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) -#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) -#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" -#else -#error \ - "Invalid configuration detected. Include check_config.h to ensure that the configuration is valid." -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ +#include "ecp_internal_alt.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /* * Counts of point addition and doubling, and field multiplications. * Used to test resistance of point multiplication to simple timing attacks. */ -static unsigned long add_count, dbl_count, mul_count; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +static unsigned long add_count, dbl_count; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +static unsigned long mul_count; #endif -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) -/* - * Currently ecp_mul() takes a RNG function as an argument, used for - * side-channel protection, but it can be NULL. The initial reasoning was - * that people will pass non-NULL RNG when they care about side-channels, but - * unfortunately we have some APIs that call ecp_mul() with a NULL RNG, with - * no opportunity for the user to do anything about it. - * - * The obvious strategies for addressing that include: - * - change those APIs so that they take RNG arguments; - * - require a global RNG to be available to all crypto modules. - * - * Unfortunately those would break compatibility. So what we do instead is - * have our own internal DRBG instance, seeded from the secret scalar. - * - * The following is a light-weight abstraction layer for doing that with - * HMAC_DRBG (first choice) or CTR_DRBG. - */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) - -/* DRBG context type */ -typedef mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ecp_drbg_context; - -/* DRBG context init */ -static inline void ecp_drbg_init(ecp_drbg_context *ctx) -{ - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(ctx); -} - -/* DRBG context free */ -static inline void ecp_drbg_free(ecp_drbg_context *ctx) -{ - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(ctx); -} - -/* DRBG function */ -static inline int ecp_drbg_random(void *p_rng, - unsigned char *output, size_t output_len) -{ - return mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(p_rng, output, output_len); -} - -/* DRBG context seeding */ -static int ecp_drbg_seed(ecp_drbg_context *ctx, - const mbedtls_mpi *secret, size_t secret_len) -{ - int ret; - unsigned char secret_bytes[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; - /* The list starts with strong hashes */ - const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = - (mbedtls_md_type_t) (mbedtls_md_list()[0]); - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_type); - - if (secret_len > MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(secret, - secret_bytes, secret_len)); - - ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf(ctx, md_info, secret_bytes, secret_len); - -cleanup: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(secret_bytes, secret_len); - - return ret; -} - -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) - -/* DRBG context type */ -typedef mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ecp_drbg_context; - -/* DRBG context init */ -static inline void ecp_drbg_init(ecp_drbg_context *ctx) -{ - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(ctx); -} - -/* DRBG context free */ -static inline void ecp_drbg_free(ecp_drbg_context *ctx) -{ - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(ctx); -} - -/* DRBG function */ -static inline int ecp_drbg_random(void *p_rng, - unsigned char *output, size_t output_len) -{ - return mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(p_rng, output, output_len); -} - -/* - * Since CTR_DRBG doesn't have a seed_buf() function the way HMAC_DRBG does, - * we need to pass an entropy function when seeding. So we use a dummy - * function for that, and pass the actual entropy as customisation string. - * (During seeding of CTR_DRBG the entropy input and customisation string are - * concatenated before being used to update the secret state.) - */ -static int ecp_ctr_drbg_null_entropy(void *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t len) -{ - (void) ctx; - memset(out, 0, len); - return 0; -} - -/* DRBG context seeding */ -static int ecp_drbg_seed(ecp_drbg_context *ctx, - const mbedtls_mpi *secret, size_t secret_len) -{ - int ret; - unsigned char secret_bytes[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; - - if (secret_len > MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(secret, - secret_bytes, secret_len)); - - ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(ctx, ecp_ctr_drbg_null_entropy, NULL, - secret_bytes, secret_len); - -cleanup: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(secret_bytes, secret_len); - - return ret; -} - -#else -#error \ - "Invalid configuration detected. Include check_config.h to ensure that the configuration is valid." -#endif /* DRBG modules */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) /* * Maximum number of "basic operations" to be done in a row. @@ -299,10 +135,6 @@ struct mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul { ecp_rsm_comb_core, /* ecp_mul_comb_core() */ ecp_rsm_final_norm, /* do the final normalization */ } state; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) - ecp_drbg_context drbg_ctx; - unsigned char drbg_seeded; -#endif }; /* @@ -315,10 +147,6 @@ static void ecp_restart_rsm_init(mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx *ctx) ctx->T = NULL; ctx->T_size = 0; ctx->state = ecp_rsm_init; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) - ecp_drbg_init(&ctx->drbg_ctx); - ctx->drbg_seeded = 0; -#endif } /* @@ -341,10 +169,6 @@ static void ecp_restart_rsm_free(mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx *ctx) mbedtls_free(ctx->T); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) - ecp_drbg_free(&ctx->drbg_ctx); -#endif - ecp_restart_rsm_init(ctx); } @@ -392,7 +216,6 @@ static void ecp_restart_ma_free(mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx *ctx) */ void mbedtls_ecp_restart_init(mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *ctx) { - ECP_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); ctx->ops_done = 0; ctx->depth = 0; ctx->rsm = NULL; @@ -424,8 +247,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_check_budget(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx, unsigned ops) { - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - if (rs_ctx != NULL && ecp_max_ops != 0) { /* scale depending on curve size: the chosen reference is 256-bit, * and multiplication is quadratic. Round to the closest integer. */ @@ -492,6 +313,22 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_check_budget(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +static void mpi_init_many(mbedtls_mpi *arr, size_t size) +{ + while (size--) { + mbedtls_mpi_init(arr++); + } +} + +static void mpi_free_many(mbedtls_mpi *arr, size_t size) +{ + while (size--) { + mbedtls_mpi_free(arr++); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + /* * List of supported curves: * - internal ID @@ -500,9 +337,9 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_check_budget(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, * - readable name * * Curves are listed in order: largest curves first, and for a given size, - * fastest curves first. This provides the default order for the SSL module. + * fastest curves first. * - * Reminder: update profiles in x509_crt.c when adding a new curves! + * Reminder: update profiles in x509_crt.c and ssl_tls.c when adding a new curve! */ static const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info ecp_supported_curves[] = { @@ -664,8 +501,6 @@ mbedtls_ecp_curve_type mbedtls_ecp_get_type(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp) */ void mbedtls_ecp_point_init(mbedtls_ecp_point *pt) { - ECP_VALIDATE(pt != NULL); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&pt->X); mbedtls_mpi_init(&pt->Y); mbedtls_mpi_init(&pt->Z); @@ -676,8 +511,6 @@ void mbedtls_ecp_point_init(mbedtls_ecp_point *pt) */ void mbedtls_ecp_group_init(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp) { - ECP_VALIDATE(grp != NULL); - grp->id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; mbedtls_mpi_init(&grp->P); mbedtls_mpi_init(&grp->A); @@ -700,8 +533,6 @@ void mbedtls_ecp_group_init(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp) */ void mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key) { - ECP_VALIDATE(key != NULL); - mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&key->grp); mbedtls_mpi_init(&key->d); mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&key->Q); @@ -721,6 +552,19 @@ void mbedtls_ecp_point_free(mbedtls_ecp_point *pt) mbedtls_mpi_free(&(pt->Z)); } +/* + * Check that the comb table (grp->T) is static initialized. + */ +static int ecp_group_is_static_comb_table(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp) +{ +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 + return grp->T != NULL && grp->T_size == 0; +#else + (void) grp; + return 0; +#endif +} + /* * Unallocate (the components of) a group */ @@ -733,14 +577,17 @@ void mbedtls_ecp_group_free(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp) } if (grp->h != 1) { - mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp->P); mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp->A); mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp->B); mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&grp->G); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT) mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp->N); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp->P); +#endif } - if (grp->T != NULL) { + if (!ecp_group_is_static_comb_table(grp) && grp->T != NULL) { for (i = 0; i < grp->T_size; i++) { mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&grp->T[i]); } @@ -770,9 +617,6 @@ void mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key) int mbedtls_ecp_copy(mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(P != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(Q != NULL); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&P->X, &Q->X)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&P->Y, &Q->Y)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&P->Z, &Q->Z)); @@ -786,9 +630,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_copy(mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q) */ int mbedtls_ecp_group_copy(mbedtls_ecp_group *dst, const mbedtls_ecp_group *src) { - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(dst != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(src != NULL); - return mbedtls_ecp_group_load(dst, src->id); } @@ -798,8 +639,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_group_copy(mbedtls_ecp_group *dst, const mbedtls_ecp_group *src) int mbedtls_ecp_set_zero(mbedtls_ecp_point *pt) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(pt != NULL); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&pt->X, 1)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&pt->Y, 1)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&pt->Z, 0)); @@ -813,8 +652,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_set_zero(mbedtls_ecp_point *pt) */ int mbedtls_ecp_is_zero(mbedtls_ecp_point *pt) { - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(pt != NULL); - return mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&pt->Z, 0) == 0; } @@ -824,9 +661,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_is_zero(mbedtls_ecp_point *pt) int mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp(const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q) { - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(P != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(Q != NULL); - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&P->X, &Q->X) == 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&P->Y, &Q->Y) == 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&P->Z, &Q->Z) == 0) { @@ -843,10 +677,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_string(mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int radix, const char *x, const char *y) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(P != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(x != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(y != NULL); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&P->X, radix, x)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&P->Y, radix, y)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&P->Z, 1)); @@ -865,12 +695,10 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; size_t plen; - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(P != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED || - format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED); + if (format != MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED && + format != MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } plen = mbedtls_mpi_size(&grp->P); @@ -928,6 +756,13 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, return ret; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) +static int mbedtls_ecp_sw_derive_y(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_mpi *X, + mbedtls_mpi *Y, + int parity_bit); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + /* * Import a point from unsigned binary data (SEC1 2.3.4 and RFC7748) */ @@ -937,10 +772,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; size_t plen; - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(pt != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - if (ilen < 1) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -974,18 +805,29 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, } } - if (buf[0] != 0x04) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - } - - if (ilen != 2 * plen + 1) { + if (ilen < 1 + plen) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&pt->X, buf + 1, plen)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&pt->Y, - buf + 1 + plen, plen)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&pt->Z, 1)); + + if (buf[0] == 0x04) { + /* format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED */ + if (ilen != 1 + plen * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + return mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&pt->Y, buf + 1 + plen, plen); + } else if (buf[0] == 0x02 || buf[0] == 0x03) { + /* format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED */ + if (ilen != 1 + plen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + return mbedtls_ecp_sw_derive_y(grp, &pt->X, &pt->Y, + (buf[0] & 1)); + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } } #endif @@ -1005,11 +847,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, { unsigned char data_len; const unsigned char *buf_start; - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(pt != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(*buf != NULL); - /* * We must have at least two bytes (1 for length, at least one for data) */ @@ -1042,12 +879,10 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_ unsigned char *buf, size_t blen) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(pt != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED || - format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED); + if (format != MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED && + format != MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } /* * buffer length must be at least one, for our length byte @@ -1078,10 +913,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(*buf != NULL); - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id(&grp_id, buf, len)) != 0) { return ret; } @@ -1098,10 +929,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id(mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp, { uint16_t tls_id; const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(*buf != NULL); - /* * We expect at least three bytes (see below) */ @@ -1119,9 +946,8 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id(mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp, /* * Next two bytes are the namedcurve value */ - tls_id = *(*buf)++; - tls_id <<= 8; - tls_id |= *(*buf)++; + tls_id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(*buf, 0); + *buf += 2; if ((curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id(tls_id)) == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; @@ -1139,10 +965,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, size_t *olen, unsigned char *buf, size_t blen) { const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - if ((curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(grp->id)) == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -1246,17 +1068,13 @@ static inline int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, * Reduce a mbedtls_mpi mod p in-place, to use after mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi * N->s < 0 is a very fast test, which fails only if N is 0 */ -#define MOD_SUB(N) \ - while ((N).s < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&(N), 0) != 0) \ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&(N), &(N), &grp->P)) - -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) && \ - !(defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT))) || \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) && \ - !(defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT))) +#define MOD_SUB(N) \ + do { \ + while ((N)->s < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int((N), 0) != 0) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi((N), (N), &grp->P)); \ + } while (0) + +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static inline int mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, @@ -1264,20 +1082,19 @@ static inline int mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(X, A, B)); - MOD_SUB(*X); + MOD_SUB(X); cleanup: return ret; } -#endif /* All functions referencing mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod() are alt-implemented without fallback */ /* * Reduce a mbedtls_mpi mod p in-place, to use after mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi and mbedtls_mpi_mul_int. * We known P, N and the result are positive, so sub_abs is correct, and * a bit faster. */ -#define MOD_ADD(N) \ - while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&(N), &grp->P) >= 0) \ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs(&(N), &(N), &grp->P)) +#define MOD_ADD(N) \ + while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi((N), &grp->P) >= 0) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs((N), (N), &grp->P)) static inline int mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *X, @@ -1286,29 +1103,202 @@ static inline int mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(X, A, B)); - MOD_ADD(*X); + MOD_ADD(X); +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED +static inline int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, + mbedtls_mpi_uint c) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_int(X, A, c)); + MOD_ADD(X); +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED +static inline int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, + mbedtls_mpi_uint c) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(X, A, c)); + MOD_SUB(X); cleanup: return ret; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) && \ - !(defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT)) +#define MPI_ECP_SUB_INT(X, A, c) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int_mod(grp, X, A, c)) + +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static inline int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(X, count)); - MOD_ADD(*X); + MOD_ADD(X); cleanup: return ret; } -#endif \ - /* All functions referencing mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod() are alt-implemented without fallback */ + +/* + * Macro wrappers around ECP modular arithmetic + * + * Currently, these wrappers are defined via the bignum module. + */ + +#define MPI_ECP_ADD(X, A, B) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(grp, X, A, B)) + +#define MPI_ECP_SUB(X, A, B) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, X, A, B)) + +#define MPI_ECP_MUL(X, A, B) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, X, A, B)) + +#define MPI_ECP_SQR(X, A) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, X, A, A)) + +#define MPI_ECP_MUL_INT(X, A, c) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_int_mod(grp, X, A, c)) + +#define MPI_ECP_INV(dst, src) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod((dst), (src), &grp->P)) + +#define MPI_ECP_MOV(X, A) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(X, A)) + +#define MPI_ECP_SHIFT_L(X, count) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod(grp, X, count)) + +#define MPI_ECP_LSET(X, c) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(X, c)) + +#define MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(X, c) \ + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(X, c) + +#define MPI_ECP_CMP(X, Y) \ + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(X, Y) + +/* Needs f_rng, p_rng to be defined. */ +#define MPI_ECP_RAND(X) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_random((X), 2, &grp->P, f_rng, p_rng)) + +/* Conditional negation + * Needs grp and a temporary MPI tmp to be defined. */ +#define MPI_ECP_COND_NEG(X, cond) \ + do \ + { \ + unsigned char nonzero = mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int((X), 0) != 0; \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&tmp, &grp->P, (X))); \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign((X), &tmp, \ + nonzero & cond)); \ + } while (0) + +#define MPI_ECP_NEG(X) MPI_ECP_COND_NEG((X), 1) + +#define MPI_ECP_VALID(X) \ + ((X)->p != NULL) + +#define MPI_ECP_COND_ASSIGN(X, Y, cond) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign((X), (Y), (cond))) + +#define MPI_ECP_COND_SWAP(X, Y, cond) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap((X), (Y), (cond))) #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + +/* + * Computes the right-hand side of the Short Weierstrass equation + * RHS = X^3 + A X + B + */ +static int ecp_sw_rhs(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *rhs, + const mbedtls_mpi *X) +{ + int ret; + + /* Compute X^3 + A X + B as X (X^2 + A) + B */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(rhs, X); + + /* Special case for A = -3 */ + if (mbedtls_ecp_group_a_is_minus_3(grp)) { + MPI_ECP_SUB_INT(rhs, rhs, 3); + } else { + MPI_ECP_ADD(rhs, rhs, &grp->A); + } + + MPI_ECP_MUL(rhs, rhs, X); + MPI_ECP_ADD(rhs, rhs, &grp->B); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Derive Y from X and a parity bit + */ +static int mbedtls_ecp_sw_derive_y(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_mpi *X, + mbedtls_mpi *Y, + int parity_bit) +{ + /* w = y^2 = x^3 + ax + b + * y = sqrt(w) = w^((p+1)/4) mod p (for prime p where p = 3 mod 4) + * + * Note: this method for extracting square root does not validate that w + * was indeed a square so this function will return garbage in Y if X + * does not correspond to a point on the curve. + */ + + /* Check prerequisite p = 3 mod 4 */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&grp->P, 0) != 1 || + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&grp->P, 1) != 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + int ret; + mbedtls_mpi exp; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&exp); + + /* use Y to store intermediate result, actually w above */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_sw_rhs(grp, Y, X)); + + /* w = y^2 */ /* Y contains y^2 intermediate result */ + /* exp = ((p+1)/4) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(&exp, &grp->P, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&exp, 2)); + /* sqrt(w) = w^((p+1)/4) mod p (for prime p where p = 3 mod 4) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(Y, Y /*y^2*/, &exp, &grp->P, NULL)); + + /* check parity bit match or else invert Y */ + /* This quick inversion implementation is valid because Y != 0 for all + * Short Weierstrass curves supported by mbedtls, as each supported curve + * has an order that is a large prime, so each supported curve does not + * have any point of order 2, and a point with Y == 0 would be of order 2 */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(Y, 0) != parity_bit) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(Y, &grp->P, Y)); + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&exp); + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) /* * For curves in short Weierstrass form, we do all the internal operations in * Jacobian coordinates. @@ -1323,7 +1313,7 @@ static inline int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, */ static int ecp_normalize_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *pt) { - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&pt->Z, 0) == 0) { + if (MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(&pt->Z, 0) == 0) { return 0; } @@ -1337,30 +1327,20 @@ static int ecp_normalize_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *pt return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; #else int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_mpi Zi, ZZi; - mbedtls_mpi_init(&Zi); mbedtls_mpi_init(&ZZi); + mbedtls_mpi T; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); - /* - * X = X / Z^2 mod p - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(&Zi, &pt->Z, &grp->P)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &ZZi, &Zi, &Zi)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &pt->X, &pt->X, &ZZi)); + MPI_ECP_INV(&T, &pt->Z); /* T <- 1 / Z */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&pt->Y, &pt->Y, &T); /* Y' <- Y*T = Y / Z */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&T, &T); /* T <- T^2 = 1 / Z^2 */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&pt->X, &pt->X, &T); /* X <- X * T = X / Z^2 */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&pt->Y, &pt->Y, &T); /* Y'' <- Y' * T = Y / Z^3 */ - /* - * Y = Y / Z^3 mod p - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &pt->Y, &pt->Y, &ZZi)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &pt->Y, &pt->Y, &Zi)); - - /* - * Z = 1 - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&pt->Z, 1)); + MPI_ECP_LSET(&pt->Z, 1); cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free(&Zi); mbedtls_mpi_free(&ZZi); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); return ret; #endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) */ @@ -1395,50 +1375,54 @@ static int ecp_normalize_jac_many(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, #else int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t i; - mbedtls_mpi *c, u, Zi, ZZi; + mbedtls_mpi *c, t; if ((c = mbedtls_calloc(T_size, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi))) == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; } - for (i = 0; i < T_size; i++) { - mbedtls_mpi_init(&c[i]); - } - - mbedtls_mpi_init(&u); mbedtls_mpi_init(&Zi); mbedtls_mpi_init(&ZZi); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&t); + mpi_init_many(c, T_size); /* - * c[i] = Z_0 * ... * Z_i + * c[i] = Z_0 * ... * Z_i, i = 0,..,n := T_size-1 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&c[0], &T[0]->Z)); + MPI_ECP_MOV(&c[0], &T[0]->Z); for (i = 1; i < T_size; i++) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &c[i], &c[i-1], &T[i]->Z)); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&c[i], &c[i-1], &T[i]->Z); } /* - * u = 1 / (Z_0 * ... * Z_n) mod P + * c[n] = 1 / (Z_0 * ... * Z_n) mod P */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(&u, &c[T_size-1], &grp->P)); + MPI_ECP_INV(&c[T_size-1], &c[T_size-1]); for (i = T_size - 1;; i--) { - /* - * Zi = 1 / Z_i mod p - * u = 1 / (Z_0 * ... * Z_i) mod P + /* At the start of iteration i (note that i decrements), we have + * - c[j] = Z_0 * .... * Z_j for j < i, + * - c[j] = 1 / (Z_0 * .... * Z_j) for j == i, + * + * This is maintained via + * - c[i-1] <- c[i] * Z_i + * + * We also derive 1/Z_i = c[i] * c[i-1] for i>0 and use that + * to do the actual normalization. For i==0, we already have + * c[0] = 1 / Z_0. */ - if (i == 0) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&Zi, &u)); + + if (i > 0) { + /* Compute 1/Z_i and establish invariant for the next iteration. */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&t, &c[i], &c[i-1]); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&c[i-1], &c[i], &T[i]->Z); } else { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &Zi, &u, &c[i-1])); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &u, &u, &T[i]->Z)); + MPI_ECP_MOV(&t, &c[0]); } - /* - * proceed as in normalize() - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &ZZi, &Zi, &Zi)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &T[i]->X, &T[i]->X, &ZZi)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &T[i]->Y, &T[i]->Y, &ZZi)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &T[i]->Y, &T[i]->Y, &Zi)); + /* Now t holds 1 / Z_i; normalize as in ecp_normalize_jac() */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&T[i]->Y, &T[i]->Y, &t); + MPI_ECP_SQR(&t, &t); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&T[i]->X, &T[i]->X, &t); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&T[i]->Y, &T[i]->Y, &t); /* * Post-precessing: reclaim some memory by shrinking coordinates @@ -1448,7 +1432,8 @@ static int ecp_normalize_jac_many(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shrink(&T[i]->X, grp->P.n)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shrink(&T[i]->Y, grp->P.n)); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&T[i]->Z); + + MPI_ECP_LSET(&T[i]->Z, 1); if (i == 0) { break; @@ -1457,10 +1442,8 @@ static int ecp_normalize_jac_many(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free(&u); mbedtls_mpi_free(&Zi); mbedtls_mpi_free(&ZZi); - for (i = 0; i < T_size; i++) { - mbedtls_mpi_free(&c[i]); - } + mbedtls_mpi_free(&t); + mpi_free_many(c, T_size); mbedtls_free(c); return ret; @@ -1476,19 +1459,13 @@ static int ecp_safe_invert_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, unsigned char inv) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char nonzero; - mbedtls_mpi mQY; - - mbedtls_mpi_init(&mQY); + mbedtls_mpi tmp; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&tmp); - /* Use the fact that -Q.Y mod P = P - Q.Y unless Q.Y == 0 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&mQY, &grp->P, &Q->Y)); - nonzero = mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&Q->Y, 0) != 0; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign(&Q->Y, &mQY, inv & nonzero)); + MPI_ECP_COND_NEG(&Q->Y, inv); cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free(&mQY); - + mbedtls_mpi_free(&tmp); return ret; } @@ -1507,7 +1484,8 @@ static int ecp_safe_invert_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, * 3M + 6S + 1a otherwise */ static int ecp_double_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, - const mbedtls_ecp_point *P) + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + mbedtls_mpi tmp[4]) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) dbl_count++; @@ -1523,63 +1501,60 @@ static int ecp_double_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; #else int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_mpi M, S, T, U; - - mbedtls_mpi_init(&M); mbedtls_mpi_init(&S); mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); mbedtls_mpi_init(&U); /* Special case for A = -3 */ - if (grp->A.p == NULL) { - /* M = 3(X + Z^2)(X - Z^2) */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &S, &P->Z, &P->Z)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(grp, &T, &P->X, &S)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, &U, &P->X, &S)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &S, &T, &U)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_int(&M, &S, 3)); MOD_ADD(M); + if (mbedtls_ecp_group_a_is_minus_3(grp)) { + /* tmp[0] <- M = 3(X + Z^2)(X - Z^2) */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[1], &P->Z); + MPI_ECP_ADD(&tmp[2], &P->X, &tmp[1]); + MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[3], &P->X, &tmp[1]); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[1], &tmp[2], &tmp[3]); + MPI_ECP_MUL_INT(&tmp[0], &tmp[1], 3); } else { - /* M = 3.X^2 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &S, &P->X, &P->X)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_int(&M, &S, 3)); MOD_ADD(M); + /* tmp[0] <- M = 3.X^2 + A.Z^4 */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[1], &P->X); + MPI_ECP_MUL_INT(&tmp[0], &tmp[1], 3); /* Optimize away for "koblitz" curves with A = 0 */ - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&grp->A, 0) != 0) { + if (MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(&grp->A, 0) != 0) { /* M += A.Z^4 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &S, &P->Z, &P->Z)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &T, &S, &S)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &S, &T, &grp->A)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(grp, &M, &M, &S)); + MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[1], &P->Z); + MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[2], &tmp[1]); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[1], &tmp[2], &grp->A); + MPI_ECP_ADD(&tmp[0], &tmp[0], &tmp[1]); } } - /* S = 4.X.Y^2 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &T, &P->Y, &P->Y)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod(grp, &T, 1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &S, &P->X, &T)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod(grp, &S, 1)); + /* tmp[1] <- S = 4.X.Y^2 */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[2], &P->Y); + MPI_ECP_SHIFT_L(&tmp[2], 1); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[1], &P->X, &tmp[2]); + MPI_ECP_SHIFT_L(&tmp[1], 1); - /* U = 8.Y^4 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &U, &T, &T)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod(grp, &U, 1)); + /* tmp[3] <- U = 8.Y^4 */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[3], &tmp[2]); + MPI_ECP_SHIFT_L(&tmp[3], 1); - /* T = M^2 - 2.S */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &T, &M, &M)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, &T, &T, &S)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, &T, &T, &S)); + /* tmp[2] <- T = M^2 - 2.S */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[2], &tmp[0]); + MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[2], &tmp[2], &tmp[1]); + MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[2], &tmp[2], &tmp[1]); - /* S = M(S - T) - U */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, &S, &S, &T)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &S, &S, &M)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, &S, &S, &U)); + /* tmp[1] <- S = M(S - T) - U */ + MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[1], &tmp[1], &tmp[2]); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[1], &tmp[1], &tmp[0]); + MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[1], &tmp[1], &tmp[3]); - /* U = 2.Y.Z */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &U, &P->Y, &P->Z)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod(grp, &U, 1)); + /* tmp[3] <- U = 2.Y.Z */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[3], &P->Y, &P->Z); + MPI_ECP_SHIFT_L(&tmp[3], 1); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&R->X, &T)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&R->Y, &S)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&R->Z, &U)); + /* Store results */ + MPI_ECP_MOV(&R->X, &tmp[2]); + MPI_ECP_MOV(&R->Y, &tmp[1]); + MPI_ECP_MOV(&R->Z, &tmp[3]); cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free(&M); mbedtls_mpi_free(&S); mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); mbedtls_mpi_free(&U); return ret; #endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) */ @@ -1591,6 +1566,10 @@ static int ecp_double_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, * The coordinates of Q must be normalized (= affine), * but those of P don't need to. R is not normalized. * + * P,Q,R may alias, but only at the level of EC points: they must be either + * equal as pointers, or disjoint (including the coordinate data buffers). + * Fine-grained aliasing at the level of coordinates is not supported. + * * Special cases: (1) P or Q is zero, (2) R is zero, (3) P == Q. * None of these cases can happen as intermediate step in ecp_mul_comb(): * - at each step, P, Q and R are multiples of the base point, the factor @@ -1599,12 +1578,11 @@ static int ecp_double_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, * due to the choice of precomputed points in the modified comb method. * So branches for these cases do not leak secret information. * - * We accept Q->Z being unset (saving memory in tables) as meaning 1. - * * Cost: 1A := 8M + 3S */ static int ecp_add_mixed(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, - const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q) + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + mbedtls_mpi tmp[4]) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) add_count++; @@ -1620,40 +1598,47 @@ static int ecp_add_mixed(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; #else int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_mpi T1, T2, T3, T4, X, Y, Z; + + /* NOTE: Aliasing between input and output is allowed, so one has to make + * sure that at the point X,Y,Z are written, {P,Q}->{X,Y,Z} are no + * longer read from. */ + mbedtls_mpi * const X = &R->X; + mbedtls_mpi * const Y = &R->Y; + mbedtls_mpi * const Z = &R->Z; + + if (!MPI_ECP_VALID(&Q->Z)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } /* * Trivial cases: P == 0 or Q == 0 (case 1) */ - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&P->Z, 0) == 0) { + if (MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(&P->Z, 0) == 0) { return mbedtls_ecp_copy(R, Q); } - if (Q->Z.p != NULL && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&Q->Z, 0) == 0) { + if (MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(&Q->Z, 0) == 0) { return mbedtls_ecp_copy(R, P); } /* * Make sure Q coordinates are normalized */ - if (Q->Z.p != NULL && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&Q->Z, 1) != 0) { + if (MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(&Q->Z, 1) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - mbedtls_mpi_init(&T1); mbedtls_mpi_init(&T2); mbedtls_mpi_init(&T3); mbedtls_mpi_init(&T4); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&X); mbedtls_mpi_init(&Y); mbedtls_mpi_init(&Z); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &T1, &P->Z, &P->Z)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &T2, &T1, &P->Z)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &T1, &T1, &Q->X)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &T2, &T2, &Q->Y)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, &T1, &T1, &P->X)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, &T2, &T2, &P->Y)); + MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[0], &P->Z); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[1], &tmp[0], &P->Z); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[0], &tmp[0], &Q->X); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[1], &tmp[1], &Q->Y); + MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[0], &tmp[0], &P->X); + MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[1], &tmp[1], &P->Y); /* Special cases (2) and (3) */ - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&T1, 0) == 0) { - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&T2, 0) == 0) { - ret = ecp_double_jac(grp, R, P); + if (MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(&tmp[0], 0) == 0) { + if (MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(&tmp[1], 0) == 0) { + ret = ecp_double_jac(grp, R, P, tmp); goto cleanup; } else { ret = mbedtls_ecp_set_zero(R); @@ -1661,28 +1646,26 @@ static int ecp_add_mixed(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, } } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &Z, &P->Z, &T1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &T3, &T1, &T1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &T4, &T3, &T1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &T3, &T3, &P->X)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&T1, &T3)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod(grp, &T1, 1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &X, &T2, &T2)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, &X, &X, &T1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, &X, &X, &T4)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, &T3, &T3, &X)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &T3, &T3, &T2)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &T4, &T4, &P->Y)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, &Y, &T3, &T4)); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&R->X, &X)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&R->Y, &Y)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&R->Z, &Z)); + /* {P,Q}->Z no longer used, so OK to write to Z even if there's aliasing. */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(Z, &P->Z, &tmp[0]); + MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[2], &tmp[0]); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[3], &tmp[2], &tmp[0]); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[2], &tmp[2], &P->X); -cleanup: + MPI_ECP_MOV(&tmp[0], &tmp[2]); + MPI_ECP_SHIFT_L(&tmp[0], 1); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&T1); mbedtls_mpi_free(&T2); mbedtls_mpi_free(&T3); mbedtls_mpi_free(&T4); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&X); mbedtls_mpi_free(&Y); mbedtls_mpi_free(&Z); + /* {P,Q}->X no longer used, so OK to write to X even if there's aliasing. */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(X, &tmp[1]); + MPI_ECP_SUB(X, X, &tmp[0]); + MPI_ECP_SUB(X, X, &tmp[3]); + MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[2], &tmp[2], X); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[2], &tmp[2], &tmp[1]); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[3], &tmp[3], &P->Y); + /* {P,Q}->Y no longer used, so OK to write to Y even if there's aliasing. */ + MPI_ECP_SUB(Y, &tmp[2], &tmp[3]); + +cleanup: return ret; #endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) */ @@ -1708,26 +1691,28 @@ static int ecp_randomize_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *pt return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; #else int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_mpi l, ll; + mbedtls_mpi l; - mbedtls_mpi_init(&l); mbedtls_mpi_init(&ll); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&l); /* Generate l such that 1 < l < p */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_random(&l, 2, &grp->P, f_rng, p_rng)); + MPI_ECP_RAND(&l); - /* Z = l * Z */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &pt->Z, &pt->Z, &l)); + /* Z' = l * Z */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&pt->Z, &pt->Z, &l); - /* X = l^2 * X */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &ll, &l, &l)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &pt->X, &pt->X, &ll)); + /* Y' = l * Y */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&pt->Y, &pt->Y, &l); - /* Y = l^3 * Y */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &ll, &ll, &l)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &pt->Y, &pt->Y, &ll)); + /* X' = l^2 * X */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&l, &l); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&pt->X, &pt->X, &l); + + /* Y'' = l^2 * Y' = l^3 * Y */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&pt->Y, &pt->Y, &l); cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free(&l); mbedtls_mpi_free(&ll); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&l); if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; @@ -1870,7 +1855,11 @@ static int ecp_precompute_comb(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, unsigned char i; size_t j = 0; const unsigned char T_size = 1U << (w - 1); - mbedtls_ecp_point *cur, *TT[COMB_MAX_PRE - 1]; + mbedtls_ecp_point *cur, *TT[COMB_MAX_PRE - 1] = { NULL }; + + mbedtls_mpi tmp[4]; + + mpi_init_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL) { @@ -1924,7 +1913,7 @@ static int ecp_precompute_comb(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_copy(cur, T + (i >> 1))); } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_double_jac(grp, cur, cur)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_double_jac(grp, cur, cur, tmp)); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) @@ -1935,8 +1924,11 @@ static int ecp_precompute_comb(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, norm_dbl: #endif /* - * Normalize current elements in T. As T has holes, - * use an auxiliary array of pointers to elements in T. + * Normalize current elements in T to allow them to be used in + * ecp_add_mixed() below, which requires one normalized input. + * + * As T has holes, use an auxiliary array of pointers to elements in T. + * */ j = 0; for (i = 1; i < T_size; i <<= 1) { @@ -1963,7 +1955,7 @@ static int ecp_precompute_comb(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, for (i = 1; i < T_size; i <<= 1) { j = i; while (j--) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_add_mixed(grp, &T[i + j], &T[j], &T[i])); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_add_mixed(grp, &T[i + j], &T[j], &T[i], tmp)); } } @@ -1987,7 +1979,19 @@ static int ecp_precompute_comb(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_normalize_jac_many(grp, TT, j)); + /* Free Z coordinate (=1 after normalization) to save RAM. + * This makes T[i] invalid as mbedtls_ecp_points, but this is OK + * since from this point onwards, they are only accessed indirectly + * via the getter function ecp_select_comb() which does set the + * target's Z coordinate to 1. */ + for (i = 0; i < T_size; i++) { + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T[i].Z); + } + cleanup: + + mpi_free_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); + #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { @@ -2017,13 +2021,15 @@ static int ecp_select_comb(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, /* Read the whole table to thwart cache-based timing attacks */ for (j = 0; j < T_size; j++) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign(&R->X, &T[j].X, j == ii)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign(&R->Y, &T[j].Y, j == ii)); + MPI_ECP_COND_ASSIGN(&R->X, &T[j].X, j == ii); + MPI_ECP_COND_ASSIGN(&R->Y, &T[j].Y, j == ii); } /* Safely invert result if i is "negative" */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_safe_invert_jac(grp, R, i >> 7)); + MPI_ECP_LSET(&R->Z, 1); + cleanup: return ret; } @@ -2043,9 +2049,11 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb_core(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_point Txi; + mbedtls_mpi tmp[4]; size_t i; mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&Txi); + mpi_init_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) (void) rs_ctx; @@ -2065,19 +2073,10 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb_core(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, } else #endif { - int have_rng = 1; - /* Start with a non-zero point and randomize its coordinates */ i = d; MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_select_comb(grp, R, T, T_size, x[i])); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&R->Z, 1)); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) - if (f_rng == NULL) { - have_rng = 0; - } -#endif - if (have_rng) { + if (f_rng != 0) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_randomize_jac(grp, R, f_rng, p_rng)); } } @@ -2086,14 +2085,15 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb_core(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET(MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_DBL + MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_ADD); --i; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_double_jac(grp, R, R)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_double_jac(grp, R, R, tmp)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_select_comb(grp, &Txi, T, T_size, x[i])); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_add_mixed(grp, R, R, &Txi)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_add_mixed(grp, R, R, &Txi, tmp)); } cleanup: mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&Txi); + mpi_free_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && @@ -2176,7 +2176,6 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb_after_precomp(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, unsigned char parity_trick; unsigned char k[COMB_MAX_D + 1]; mbedtls_ecp_point *RR = R; - int have_rng = 1; #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL) { @@ -2213,12 +2212,7 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb_after_precomp(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, * * Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) - if (f_rng == NULL) { - have_rng = 0; - } -#endif - if (have_rng) { + if (f_rng != 0) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_randomize_jac(grp, RR, f_rng, p_rng)); } @@ -2259,11 +2253,16 @@ static unsigned char ecp_pick_window_size(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, } /* - * Make sure w is within bounds. + * If static comb table may not be used (!p_eq_g) or static comb table does + * not exists, make sure w is within bounds. * (The last test is useful only for very small curves in the test suite.) + * + * The user reduces MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE does not changes the size of + * static comb table, because the size of static comb table is fixed when + * it is generated. */ #if (MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE < 6) - if (w > MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE) { + if ((!p_eq_g || !ecp_group_is_static_comb_table(grp)) && w > MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE) { w = MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE; } #endif @@ -2298,46 +2297,13 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, size_t d; unsigned char T_size = 0, T_ok = 0; mbedtls_ecp_point *T = NULL; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) - ecp_drbg_context drbg_ctx; - - ecp_drbg_init(&drbg_ctx); -#endif ECP_RS_ENTER(rsm); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) - if (f_rng == NULL) { - /* Adjust pointers */ - f_rng = &ecp_drbg_random; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL) { - p_rng = &rs_ctx->rsm->drbg_ctx; - } else -#endif - p_rng = &drbg_ctx; - - /* Initialize internal DRBG if necessary */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - if (rs_ctx == NULL || rs_ctx->rsm == NULL || - rs_ctx->rsm->drbg_seeded == 0) -#endif - { - const size_t m_len = (grp->nbits + 7) / 8; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_drbg_seed(p_rng, m, m_len)); - } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL) { - rs_ctx->rsm->drbg_seeded = 1; - } -#endif - } -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ - /* Is P the base point ? */ #if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 - p_eq_g = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&P->Y, &grp->G.Y) == 0 && - mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&P->X, &grp->G.X) == 0); + p_eq_g = (MPI_ECP_CMP(&P->Y, &grp->G.Y) == 0 && + MPI_ECP_CMP(&P->X, &grp->G.X) == 0); #else p_eq_g = 0; #endif @@ -2399,10 +2365,6 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, cleanup: -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) - ecp_drbg_free(&drbg_ctx); -#endif - /* does T belong to the group? */ if (T == grp->T) { T = NULL; @@ -2470,9 +2432,9 @@ static int ecp_normalize_mxz(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *P) return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; #else int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(&P->Z, &P->Z, &grp->P)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &P->X, &P->X, &P->Z)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&P->Z, 1)); + MPI_ECP_INV(&P->Z, &P->Z); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&P->X, &P->X, &P->Z); + MPI_ECP_LSET(&P->Z, 1); cleanup: return ret; @@ -2504,10 +2466,10 @@ static int ecp_randomize_mxz(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *P, mbedtls_mpi_init(&l); /* Generate l such that 1 < l < p */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_random(&l, 2, &grp->P, f_rng, p_rng)); + MPI_ECP_RAND(&l); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &P->X, &P->X, &l)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &P->Z, &P->Z, &l)); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&P->X, &P->X, &l); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&P->Z, &P->Z, &l); cleanup: mbedtls_mpi_free(&l); @@ -2537,7 +2499,8 @@ static int ecp_randomize_mxz(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *P, static int ecp_double_add_mxz(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, mbedtls_ecp_point *S, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, - const mbedtls_mpi *d) + const mbedtls_mpi *d, + mbedtls_mpi T[4]) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) if (mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable(grp)) { @@ -2549,35 +2512,27 @@ static int ecp_double_add_mxz(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; #else int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_mpi A, AA, B, BB, E, C, D, DA, CB; - - mbedtls_mpi_init(&A); mbedtls_mpi_init(&AA); mbedtls_mpi_init(&B); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&BB); mbedtls_mpi_init(&E); mbedtls_mpi_init(&C); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&D); mbedtls_mpi_init(&DA); mbedtls_mpi_init(&CB); - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(grp, &A, &P->X, &P->Z)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &AA, &A, &A)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, &B, &P->X, &P->Z)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &BB, &B, &B)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, &E, &AA, &BB)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(grp, &C, &Q->X, &Q->Z)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, &D, &Q->X, &Q->Z)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &DA, &D, &A)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &CB, &C, &B)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(grp, &S->X, &DA, &CB)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &S->X, &S->X, &S->X)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, &S->Z, &DA, &CB)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &S->Z, &S->Z, &S->Z)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &S->Z, d, &S->Z)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &R->X, &AA, &BB)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &R->Z, &grp->A, &E)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(grp, &R->Z, &BB, &R->Z)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &R->Z, &E, &R->Z)); + + MPI_ECP_ADD(&T[0], &P->X, &P->Z); /* Pp := PX + PZ */ + MPI_ECP_SUB(&T[1], &P->X, &P->Z); /* Pm := PX - PZ */ + MPI_ECP_ADD(&T[2], &Q->X, &Q->Z); /* Qp := QX + XZ */ + MPI_ECP_SUB(&T[3], &Q->X, &Q->Z); /* Qm := QX - QZ */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&T[3], &T[3], &T[0]); /* Qm * Pp */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&T[2], &T[2], &T[1]); /* Qp * Pm */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&T[0], &T[0]); /* Pp^2 */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&T[1], &T[1]); /* Pm^2 */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&R->X, &T[0], &T[1]); /* Pp^2 * Pm^2 */ + MPI_ECP_SUB(&T[0], &T[0], &T[1]); /* Pp^2 - Pm^2 */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&R->Z, &grp->A, &T[0]); /* A * (Pp^2 - Pm^2) */ + MPI_ECP_ADD(&R->Z, &T[1], &R->Z); /* [ A * (Pp^2-Pm^2) ] + Pm^2 */ + MPI_ECP_ADD(&S->X, &T[3], &T[2]); /* Qm*Pp + Qp*Pm */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&S->X, &S->X); /* (Qm*Pp + Qp*Pm)^2 */ + MPI_ECP_SUB(&S->Z, &T[3], &T[2]); /* Qm*Pp - Qp*Pm */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&S->Z, &S->Z); /* (Qm*Pp - Qp*Pm)^2 */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&S->Z, d, &S->Z); /* d * ( Qm*Pp - Qp*Pm )^2 */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&R->Z, &T[0], &R->Z); /* [A*(Pp^2-Pm^2)+Pm^2]*(Pp^2-Pm^2) */ cleanup: - mbedtls_mpi_free(&A); mbedtls_mpi_free(&AA); mbedtls_mpi_free(&B); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&BB); mbedtls_mpi_free(&E); mbedtls_mpi_free(&C); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&D); mbedtls_mpi_free(&DA); mbedtls_mpi_free(&CB); return ret; #endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) */ @@ -2593,48 +2548,33 @@ static int ecp_mul_mxz(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, void *p_rng) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - int have_rng = 1; size_t i; unsigned char b; mbedtls_ecp_point RP; mbedtls_mpi PX; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) - ecp_drbg_context drbg_ctx; - - ecp_drbg_init(&drbg_ctx); -#endif + mbedtls_mpi tmp[4]; mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&RP); mbedtls_mpi_init(&PX); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) + mpi_init_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); + if (f_rng == NULL) { - const size_t m_len = (grp->nbits + 7) / 8; - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_drbg_seed(&drbg_ctx, m, m_len)); - f_rng = &ecp_drbg_random; - p_rng = &drbg_ctx; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ /* Save PX and read from P before writing to R, in case P == R */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&PX, &P->X)); + MPI_ECP_MOV(&PX, &P->X); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_copy(&RP, P)); /* Set R to zero in modified x/z coordinates */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&R->X, 1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&R->Z, 0)); + MPI_ECP_LSET(&R->X, 1); + MPI_ECP_LSET(&R->Z, 0); mbedtls_mpi_free(&R->Y); /* RP.X might be slightly larger than P, so reduce it */ - MOD_ADD(RP.X); + MOD_ADD(&RP.X); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) - /* Derandomize coordinates of the starting point */ - if (f_rng == NULL) { - have_rng = 0; - } -#endif - if (have_rng) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_randomize_mxz(grp, &RP, f_rng, p_rng)); - } + /* Randomize coordinates of the starting point */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_randomize_mxz(grp, &RP, f_rng, p_rng)); /* Loop invariant: R = result so far, RP = R + P */ i = grp->nbits + 1; /* one past the (zero-based) required msb for private keys */ @@ -2647,11 +2587,11 @@ static int ecp_mul_mxz(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, * else double_add( R, RP, R, RP ) * but using safe conditional swaps to avoid leaks */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap(&R->X, &RP.X, b)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap(&R->Z, &RP.Z, b)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_double_add_mxz(grp, R, &RP, R, &RP, &PX)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap(&R->X, &RP.X, b)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap(&R->Z, &RP.Z, b)); + MPI_ECP_COND_SWAP(&R->X, &RP.X, b); + MPI_ECP_COND_SWAP(&R->Z, &RP.Z, b); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_double_add_mxz(grp, R, &RP, R, &RP, &PX, tmp)); + MPI_ECP_COND_SWAP(&R->X, &RP.X, b); + MPI_ECP_COND_SWAP(&R->Z, &RP.Z, b); } /* @@ -2665,25 +2605,13 @@ static int ecp_mul_mxz(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, * * Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them. */ - have_rng = 1; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) - if (f_rng == NULL) { - have_rng = 0; - } -#endif - if (have_rng) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_randomize_mxz(grp, R, f_rng, p_rng)); - } - + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_randomize_mxz(grp, R, f_rng, p_rng)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_normalize_mxz(grp, R)); cleanup: -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) - ecp_drbg_free(&drbg_ctx); -#endif - mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&RP); mbedtls_mpi_free(&PX); + mpi_free_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); return ret; } @@ -2691,20 +2619,19 @@ static int ecp_mul_mxz(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, /* * Restartable multiplication R = m * P + * + * This internal function can be called without an RNG in case where we know + * the inputs are not sensitive. */ -int mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, - const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +static int ecp_mul_restartable_internal(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) char is_grp_capable = 0; #endif - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(R != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(m != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(P != NULL); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) /* reset ops count for this call if top-level */ @@ -2764,6 +2691,21 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, return ret; } +/* + * Restartable multiplication R = m * P + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +{ + if (f_rng == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return ecp_mul_restartable_internal(grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx); +} + /* * Multiplication R = m * P */ @@ -2771,12 +2713,9 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_mul(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(R != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(m != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(P != NULL); return mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable(grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng, NULL); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) /* @@ -2800,22 +2739,12 @@ static int ecp_check_pubkey_sw(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_p /* * YY = Y^2 - * RHS = X (X^2 + A) + B = X^3 + A X + B + * RHS = X^3 + A X + B */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &YY, &pt->Y, &pt->Y)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &RHS, &pt->X, &pt->X)); + MPI_ECP_SQR(&YY, &pt->Y); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_sw_rhs(grp, &RHS, &pt->X)); - /* Special case for A = -3 */ - if (grp->A.p == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&RHS, &RHS, 3)); MOD_SUB(RHS); - } else { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(grp, &RHS, &RHS, &grp->A)); - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, &RHS, &RHS, &pt->X)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(grp, &RHS, &RHS, &grp->B)); - - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&YY, &RHS) != 0) { + if (MPI_ECP_CMP(&YY, &RHS) != 0) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; } @@ -2827,6 +2756,7 @@ static int ecp_check_pubkey_sw(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_p } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) /* * R = m * P with shortcuts for m == 0, m == 1 and m == -1 @@ -2839,6 +2769,8 @@ static int mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi tmp; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&tmp); if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(m, 0) == 0) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(grp, P)); @@ -2849,15 +2781,15 @@ static int mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, } else if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(m, -1) == 0) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(grp, P)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_copy(R, P)); - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&R->Y, 0) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&R->Y, &grp->P, &R->Y)); - } + MPI_ECP_NEG(&R->Y); } else { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable(grp, R, m, P, - NULL, NULL, rs_ctx)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_mul_restartable_internal(grp, R, m, P, + NULL, NULL, rs_ctx)); } cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&tmp); + return ret; } @@ -2875,21 +2807,16 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_point mP; mbedtls_ecp_point *pmP = &mP; mbedtls_ecp_point *pR = R; + mbedtls_mpi tmp[4]; #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) char is_grp_capable = 0; #endif - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(R != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(m != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(P != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(n != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(Q != NULL); - if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) != MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&mP); + mpi_init_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); ECP_RS_ENTER(ma); @@ -2936,7 +2863,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( add: #endif MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET(MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_ADD); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_add_mixed(grp, pR, pmP, pR)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_add_mixed(grp, pR, pmP, pR, tmp)); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ma != NULL) { rs_ctx->ma->state = ecp_rsma_norm; @@ -2954,6 +2881,9 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( #endif cleanup: + + mpi_free_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); + #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) if (is_grp_capable) { mbedtls_internal_ecp_free(grp); @@ -2975,21 +2905,16 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_muladd(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q) { - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(R != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(m != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(P != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(n != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(Q != NULL); return mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable(grp, R, m, P, n, Q, NULL); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) -#define ECP_MPI_INIT(s, n, p) { s, (n), (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) (p) } +#define ECP_MPI_INIT(_p, _n) { .p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) (_p), .s = 1, .n = (_n) } #define ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x) \ - ECP_MPI_INIT(1, sizeof(x) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint), x) + ECP_MPI_INIT(x, sizeof(x) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) /* * Constants for the two points other than 0, 1, -1 (mod p) in * https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate @@ -3102,9 +3027,6 @@ static int ecp_check_pubkey_mx(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_p int mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt) { - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(pt != NULL); - /* Must use affine coordinates */ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&pt->Z, 1) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; @@ -3129,9 +3051,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, int mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_mpi *d) { - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(d != NULL); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) { /* see RFC 7748 sec. 5 para. 5 */ @@ -3220,10 +3139,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(d != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) { return mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_mx(grp->nbits, d, f_rng, p_rng); @@ -3239,6 +3154,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) /* * Generate a keypair with configurable base point */ @@ -3249,12 +3165,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, void *p_rng) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(d != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(G != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(Q != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(grp, d, f_rng, p_rng)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(grp, Q, d, G, f_rng, p_rng)); @@ -3270,11 +3180,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(d != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(Q != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - return mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base(grp, &grp->G, d, Q, f_rng, p_rng); } @@ -3285,17 +3190,35 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&key->grp, grp_id)) != 0) { return ret; } return mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair(&key->grp, &key->d, &key->Q, f_rng, p_rng); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +int mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (key->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { + /* Group not set yet */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&key->grp, grp_id)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } else if (key->grp.id != grp_id) { + /* Group mismatch */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + return mbedtls_ecp_copy(&key->Q, Q); +} + #define ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE 32 +#define ECP_CURVE448_KEY_SIZE 56 /* * Read a private key. */ @@ -3304,9 +3227,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_read_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, { int ret = 0; - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&key->grp, grp_id)) != 0) { return ret; } @@ -3316,7 +3236,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_read_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&key->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) { /* - * If it is Curve25519 curve then mask the key as mandated by RFC7748 + * Mask the key as mandated by RFC7748 for Curve25519 and Curve448. */ if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519) { if (buflen != ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE) { @@ -3341,20 +3261,35 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_read_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&key->d, ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE * 8 - 2, 1) ); - } else { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } else if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448) { + if (buflen != ECP_CURVE448_KEY_SIZE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le(&key->d, buf, buflen)); + + /* Set the two least significant bits to 0 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&key->d, 0, 0)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&key->d, 1, 0)); + + /* Set the most significant bit to 1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( + mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&key->d, + ECP_CURVE448_KEY_SIZE * 8 - 1, 1) + ); } } - #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&key->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&key->d, buf, buflen)); + } +#endif + if (ret == 0) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey(&key->grp, &key->d)); } -#endif cleanup: if (ret != 0) { @@ -3367,13 +3302,11 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_read_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, /* * Write a private key. */ +#if !defined MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED int mbedtls_ecp_write_key(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&key->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) { @@ -3382,12 +3315,13 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_write_key(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le(&key->d, buf, buflen)); - } else { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } else if (key->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448) { + if (buflen < ECP_CURVE448_KEY_SIZE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le(&key->d, buf, buflen)); } - #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&key->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) { @@ -3399,19 +3333,63 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_write_key(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +int mbedtls_ecp_write_key_ext(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + size_t *olen, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + size_t len = (key->grp.nbits + 7) / 8; + if (len > buflen) { + /* For robustness, ensure *olen <= buflen even on error. */ + *olen = 0; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + *olen = len; + + /* Private key not set */ + if (key->d.n == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&key->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) { + return mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le(&key->d, buf, len); + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&key->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) { + return mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&key->d, buf, len); + } +#endif + + /* Private key set but no recognized curve type? This shouldn't happen. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +} + +/* + * Write a public key. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_write_public_key(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + int format, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + return mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&key->grp, &key->Q, + format, olen, buf, buflen); +} + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) /* * Check a public-private key pair */ -int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv) +int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_point Q; mbedtls_ecp_group grp; - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(pub != NULL); - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(prv != NULL); - if (pub->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE || pub->grp.id != prv->grp.id || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&pub->Q.X, &prv->Q.X) || @@ -3427,7 +3405,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, const mbedtls_ecp mbedtls_ecp_group_copy(&grp, &prv->grp); /* Also checks d is valid */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(&grp, &Q, &prv->d, &prv->grp.G, NULL, NULL)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(&grp, &Q, &prv->d, &prv->grp.G, f_rng, p_rng)); if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&Q.X, &prv->Q.X) || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&Q.Y, &prv->Q.Y) || @@ -3443,8 +3421,68 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, const mbedtls_ecp return ret; } +int mbedtls_ecp_keypair_calc_public(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + return mbedtls_ecp_mul(&key->grp, &key->Q, &key->d, &key->grp.G, + f_rng, p_rng); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecp_keypair_get_group_id( + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key) +{ + return key->grp.id; +} + +/* + * Export generic key-pair parameters. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_export(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (grp != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_copy(grp, &key->grp)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (d != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(d, &key->d)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (Q != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_ecp_copy(Q, &key->Q)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/* + * PRNG for test - !!!INSECURE NEVER USE IN PRODUCTION!!! + * + * This is the linear congruential generator from numerical recipes, + * except we only use the low byte as the output. See + * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_congruential_generator#Parameters_in_common_use + */ +static int self_test_rng(void *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t len) +{ + static uint32_t state = 42; + + (void) ctx; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) { + state = state * 1664525u + 1013904223u; + out[i] = (unsigned char) state; + } + + return 0; +} + /* Adjust the exponent to be a valid private point for the specified curve. * This is sometimes necessary because we use a single set of exponents * for all curves but the validity of values depends on the curve. */ @@ -3499,7 +3537,7 @@ static int self_test_point(int verbose, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(m, 16, exponents[0])); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(self_test_adjust_exponent(grp, m)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(grp, R, m, P, NULL, NULL)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(grp, R, m, P, self_test_rng, NULL)); for (i = 1; i < n_exponents; i++) { add_c_prev = add_count; @@ -3511,7 +3549,7 @@ static int self_test_point(int verbose, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(m, 16, exponents[i])); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(self_test_adjust_exponent(grp, m)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(grp, R, m, P, NULL, NULL)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(grp, R, m, P, self_test_rng, NULL)); if (add_count != add_c_prev || dbl_count != dbl_c_prev || @@ -3531,12 +3569,14 @@ static int self_test_point(int verbose, } return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ /* * Checkup routine */ int mbedtls_ecp_self_test(int verbose) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_group grp; mbedtls_ecp_point R, P; @@ -3589,7 +3629,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_self_test(int verbose) } /* Do a dummy multiplication first to trigger precomputation */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&m, 2)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(&grp, &P, &m, &grp.G, NULL, NULL)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(&grp, &P, &m, &grp.G, self_test_rng, NULL)); ret = self_test_point(verbose, &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G, sw_exponents, @@ -3650,10 +3690,14 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_self_test(int verbose) } return ret; +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + (void) verbose; + return 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves.c index 6ce4f64c16..c3cd33f47a 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves.c @@ -2,46 +2,52 @@ * Elliptic curves over GF(p): curve-specific data and functions * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" -#include "mbedtls/bn_mul.h" +#include "bn_mul.h" +#include "bignum_core.h" #include "ecp_invasive.h" #include #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) -/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ -#define ECP_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define ECP_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - -#define ECP_MPI_INIT(s, n, p) { s, (n), (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) (p) } +#define ECP_MPI_INIT(_p, _n) { .p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) (_p), .s = 1, .n = (_n) } #define ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x) \ - ECP_MPI_INIT(1, sizeof(x) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint), x) + ECP_MPI_INIT(x, sizeof(x) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) + +#define ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(x, y) { \ + ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x), ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(y), ECP_MPI_INIT(NULL, 0) } +#define ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(x, y) { \ + ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x), ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(y), ECP_MPI_INIT(mpi_one, 1) } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +/* For these curves, we build the group parameters dynamically. */ +#define ECP_LOAD_GROUP +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_one[] = { 1 }; +#endif /* * Note: the constants are in little-endian order @@ -77,6 +83,188 @@ static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_n[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xF8, 0xDE, 0x99, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), }; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x10, 0xFF, 0x82, 0xFD, 0x0A, 0xFF, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x88, 0xA1, 0x43, 0xEB, 0x20, 0xBF, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x90, 0x30, 0xB0, 0x0E, 0xA8, 0x8D, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x48, 0x79, 0x1E, 0xA1, 0x77, 0xF9, 0x73), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xCD, 0x24, 0x6B, 0xED, 0x11, 0x10, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0xDA, 0xC8, 0xFF, 0x95, 0x2B, 0x19, 0x07), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x9E, 0xE3, 0x60, 0x59, 0xD1, 0xC4, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xBD, 0x22, 0xD7, 0x2D, 0x07, 0xBD, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x2A, 0xCF, 0x33, 0xF0, 0xBE, 0xD1, 0xED), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x71, 0x4B, 0xA8, 0xED, 0x7E, 0xC9, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x2A, 0xF6, 0xDF, 0x0E, 0xE8, 0x4C, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x35, 0xF7, 0x8A, 0xC3, 0xEC, 0xDE, 0x1E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x67, 0xC2, 0x1D, 0x32, 0x8F, 0x10, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x2D, 0x17, 0xF3, 0xE4, 0xFE, 0xD8, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x45, 0x10, 0x70, 0x2C, 0x3E, 0x52, 0x3E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xF1, 0x04, 0x5D, 0xEE, 0xD4, 0x56, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0xB7, 0x38, 0x27, 0x61, 0xAA, 0x81, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x37, 0xD7, 0x0E, 0x29, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x14), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x35, 0x52, 0xC6, 0x31, 0xB7, 0x27, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xD4, 0x15, 0x98, 0x0F, 0xE7, 0xF3, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x31, 0x70, 0x35, 0x09, 0xA0, 0x2B, 0xC2), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x75, 0xA7, 0x4C, 0x88, 0xCF, 0x5B, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x17, 0x48, 0x8D, 0xF2, 0xF0, 0x86, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xCF, 0xFE, 0x6B, 0xB0, 0xA5, 0x06, 0xAB), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0x9A, 0x6D, 0x7B, 0x47, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0xFC, 0x51, 0x12, 0x62, 0x66, 0x0B, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x40, 0x93, 0xA0, 0xB5, 0x5A, 0x58, 0xD7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0xCB, 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x0B, 0xA1, 0x26, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x36, 0x9D, 0xA3, 0xD7, 0x3B, 0xAD, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x3B, 0x05, 0x9A, 0xA8, 0xAA, 0x69, 0xB2), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xD9, 0xD1, 0x4D, 0x4A, 0x6E, 0x96, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x66, 0x32, 0x39, 0xC6, 0x57, 0x7D, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xA0, 0x36, 0xC2, 0x45, 0xF9, 0x00, 0x62), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xEF, 0x59, 0x46, 0xDC, 0x60, 0xD9, 0x8F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xB0, 0xE9, 0x41, 0xA4, 0x87, 0x76, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0xD4, 0x0E, 0xB2, 0xFA, 0x16, 0x56, 0xDC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x62, 0xD2, 0xB1, 0x34, 0xB2, 0xF1, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xED, 0x55, 0xC5, 0x47, 0xB5, 0x07, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xF6, 0x2F, 0x94, 0xC3, 0xDD, 0x54, 0x2F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xA6, 0xD4, 0x8C, 0xA9, 0xCE, 0x4D, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x4B, 0x46, 0xCC, 0xB2, 0x55, 0xC8, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xAE, 0x31, 0xED, 0x89, 0x65, 0x59, 0x55), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x0A, 0xD1, 0x1A, 0xC5, 0xF6, 0xEA, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xFC, 0x0C, 0x1A, 0xFB, 0xA0, 0xC8, 0x70), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xFD, 0x53, 0x6F, 0x6D, 0xBF, 0xBA, 0xAF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xB0, 0x7D, 0x83, 0x96, 0xE3, 0xCB, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x6E, 0x55, 0x2C, 0x20, 0x53, 0x2F, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0x66, 0x00, 0x17, 0x08, 0xFE, 0xAC, 0x31), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x12, 0x97, 0x3A, 0xC7, 0x57, 0x45, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x25, 0x99, 0x00, 0xF6, 0x97, 0xB4, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x74, 0xE6, 0xE6, 0xA3, 0xDF, 0x9C, 0xCC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xF4, 0x76, 0xD5, 0x5F, 0x2A, 0xFD, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x80, 0x7E, 0x3E, 0xE5, 0xE8, 0xD6, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xAD, 0x1E, 0x70, 0x79, 0x3E, 0x3D, 0x83), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x15, 0xBB, 0xB3, 0x42, 0x6A, 0xA1, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x58, 0xCB, 0x43, 0x25, 0x00, 0x14, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x4E, 0x93, 0x11, 0xE0, 0x32, 0x54, 0x98), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x52, 0xA2, 0xB4, 0x57, 0x32, 0xB9, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x43, 0xA1, 0xB1, 0xFB, 0x01, 0xE1, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x11, 0xB8, 0xC2, 0x03, 0xE5), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x2B, 0x71, 0x26, 0x4E, 0x7C, 0xC5, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xF5, 0xD3, 0xA8, 0xE4, 0x95, 0x48, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xAE, 0xD9, 0x5D, 0x9F, 0x6A, 0x22, 0xAD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0xCC, 0xA3, 0x4D, 0xA0, 0x1C, 0x34, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x3C, 0x62, 0xF8, 0x5E, 0xA6, 0x58, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x6E, 0x66, 0x8A, 0x3D, 0x17, 0xFF, 0x0F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0xCD, 0xA8, 0xDD, 0xD1, 0x20, 0x5C, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0xFE, 0x17, 0xE2, 0xCF, 0xEA, 0x63, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x51, 0xC9, 0x16, 0xDE, 0xB4, 0xB2, 0xDD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xBE, 0x12, 0xD7, 0xA3, 0x0A, 0x50, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0x87, 0xC5, 0x8A, 0x76, 0x57, 0x07, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x1F, 0xC6, 0x1B, 0x66, 0xC4, 0x3D, 0x8A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xA4, 0x85, 0x13, 0x8F, 0xA7, 0x35, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x0D, 0xFD, 0xFF, 0x1B, 0xD1, 0xD6, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x7A, 0xD0, 0xC3, 0xB4, 0xEF, 0x39, 0x66), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xFE, 0xA5, 0x9C, 0x34, 0x30, 0x49, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0xC5, 0x39, 0x26, 0x06, 0xE3, 0x01, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x2B, 0x66, 0xFC, 0x95, 0x5F, 0x35, 0xF7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xCF, 0x54, 0x63, 0x99, 0x57, 0x05, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x6F, 0x00, 0x5F, 0x65, 0x08, 0x47, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x2A, 0x90, 0x6D, 0x67, 0xC6, 0xBC, 0x45), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x4D, 0x88, 0x0A, 0x35, 0x9E, 0x33, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x17, 0x0C, 0xF8, 0xE1, 0x7A, 0x49, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x44, 0x06, 0x8F, 0x0B, 0x70, 0x2F, 0x71), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x4B, 0xCB, 0xF9, 0x8E, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x43, 0xA1, 0x3F, 0xCE, 0x17, 0xD2, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x0D, 0xD2, 0x6C, 0x82, 0x37, 0xE5, 0xFC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x3C, 0xF4, 0x92, 0xB4, 0x8A, 0x95, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x96, 0xF1, 0x0A, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x74, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xA1, 0xAA, 0xBA, 0x86, 0x77, 0x4F, 0xA2), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x7F, 0xEF, 0x60, 0x50, 0x80, 0xD7, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0xAC, 0xC9, 0xFE, 0xEC, 0x0A, 0x1A, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x2F, 0xBE, 0x91, 0xD7, 0xB7, 0x38, 0x48), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0xAE, 0x85, 0x98, 0xFE, 0x05, 0x7F, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xBE, 0xFD, 0x11, 0x31, 0x3D, 0x14, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x75, 0xE8, 0x30, 0x01, 0xCB, 0x9B, 0x1C), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp192r1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp192r1_T_0_X, secp192r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_1_X, secp192r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_2_X, secp192r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_3_X, secp192r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_4_X, secp192r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_5_X, secp192r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_6_X, secp192r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_7_X, secp192r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_8_X, secp192r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_9_X, secp192r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_10_X, secp192r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_11_X, secp192r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_12_X, secp192r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_13_X, secp192r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_14_X, secp192r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_15_X, secp192r1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp192r1_T NULL +#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ /* @@ -113,6 +301,220 @@ static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_n[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), }; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x1D, 0x5C, 0x11, 0xD6, 0x80, 0x32, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x11, 0xC2, 0x56, 0xD3, 0xC1, 0x03, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x90, 0x13, 0x32, 0x7F, 0xBF, 0xB4, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0xB7, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x85, 0x99, 0x81, 0xD5, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x47, 0x07, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0x75, 0x43, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xDF, 0x22, 0x4C, 0xFB, 0x23, 0xF7, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x63, 0x37, 0xBD, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xF9, 0xB8, 0xD0, 0x3D, 0xD2, 0xD3, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xFD, 0x99, 0x26, 0x19, 0xFE, 0x13, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x0E, 0x4C, 0x48, 0x7C, 0xA2, 0x17, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xA3, 0x13, 0x57, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x16, 0x5C, 0x8F, 0xAA, 0xED, 0x0F, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0xC5, 0x43, 0x34, 0x93, 0x05, 0x2A, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0xE3, 0x6C, 0xCA, 0xC6, 0x14, 0xC2, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x43, 0x6C, 0xD7, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x5A, 0x98, 0x1E, 0xC8, 0xA5, 0x42, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x49, 0x56, 0x78, 0xF8, 0xEF, 0xED, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0xBB, 0x64, 0xB6, 0x4C, 0x54, 0x5F, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x0C, 0x33, 0xCC, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x79, 0xCB, 0x2E, 0x08, 0xFF, 0xD8, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0x1F, 0xD4, 0xD7, 0x57, 0xE9, 0x39, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xD6, 0x3B, 0x0A, 0x1C, 0x87, 0xB7, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x30, 0xD8, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x79, 0x74, 0x9A, 0xE6, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x5B, 0xA6, 0x67, 0xC1, 0x91, 0xE7, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xDF, 0x38, 0x82, 0x19, 0x2C, 0x4C, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x2E, 0x39, 0xC5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x36, 0x78, 0x4E, 0xAE, 0x5B, 0x02, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xF6, 0x8B, 0xF8, 0xF4, 0x92, 0x6B, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x4D, 0x71, 0x35, 0xE7, 0x0C, 0x2C, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xA5, 0x1F, 0xAE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x1C, 0x4B, 0xDF, 0x5B, 0xF2, 0x51, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x74, 0xB1, 0x5A, 0xC6, 0x0F, 0x0E, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x24, 0x09, 0x62, 0xAF, 0xFC, 0xDB, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0xE1, 0x80, 0x55, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x82, 0xFE, 0xAD, 0xC3, 0xE5, 0xCF, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xA2, 0x62, 0x17, 0x76, 0xF0, 0x5A, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xB8, 0xE5, 0xAC, 0xB7, 0x66, 0x38, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0xFD, 0x86, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xD3, 0x0C, 0x3C, 0xD1, 0x66, 0xB0, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x59, 0xB4, 0x8D, 0x90, 0x10, 0xB7, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x47, 0x9B, 0xE6, 0x55, 0x8A, 0xE4, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x49, 0xDB, 0x78, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x97, 0xED, 0xDE, 0xFF, 0xB3, 0xDF, 0x48), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xB9, 0x83, 0xB7, 0xEB, 0xBE, 0x40, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xD3, 0xD3, 0xCD, 0x0E, 0x82, 0x79, 0x3D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x83, 0x1B, 0xF0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x22, 0xBB, 0x54, 0xD3, 0x31, 0x56, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x36, 0xE5, 0xE0, 0x89, 0x96, 0x8E, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0xEF, 0x0A, 0xED, 0xD0, 0x11, 0x4A, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x00, 0x57, 0x27, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0xCA, 0x3D, 0xF7, 0x64, 0x9B, 0x6E, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xE3, 0x70, 0x6B, 0x41, 0xD7, 0xED, 0x8F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x44, 0x44, 0x80, 0xCE, 0x13, 0x37, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x73, 0x80, 0x79, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x4D, 0x70, 0x7D, 0x31, 0x0F, 0x1C, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x35, 0x88, 0x47, 0xC4, 0x24, 0x78, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xF0, 0xCD, 0x91, 0x81, 0xB3, 0xDE, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0xCE, 0xC6, 0xF7, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x9C, 0x2D, 0xE8, 0xD2, 0x00, 0x8F, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x5E, 0x7C, 0x0E, 0x0C, 0x6E, 0x58, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x81, 0x21, 0xCE, 0x43, 0xF4, 0x24, 0x3D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0xBC, 0xF0, 0xF4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x10, 0xC2, 0x74, 0x4A, 0x8F, 0x8A, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0x67, 0xF4, 0x2B, 0x38, 0x2B, 0x35, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xE7, 0x0C, 0xA9, 0xFA, 0x77, 0x5C, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x33, 0x19, 0x2B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x3E, 0x96, 0x22, 0x53, 0xE1, 0xE9, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x13, 0xBC, 0xA1, 0x16, 0xEC, 0x01, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x00, 0xC9, 0x7A, 0xC3, 0x73, 0xA5, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0xF4, 0x5E, 0xC1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x95, 0xD6, 0xD9, 0x32, 0x30, 0x2B, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x42, 0x09, 0x05, 0x61, 0x2A, 0x7E, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x84, 0xA2, 0x05, 0x88, 0x64, 0x65, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x2D, 0x90, 0xB3, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xE7, 0x2E, 0x85, 0x55, 0x80, 0x7C, 0x79), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xC1, 0xAC, 0x78, 0xB4, 0xAF, 0xFB, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0xC3, 0x28, 0x8E, 0x79, 0x18, 0x1F, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x46, 0xCF, 0x49, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x5F, 0xA8, 0x6C, 0x46, 0x83, 0x43, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xA9, 0x93, 0x11, 0xB6, 0x07, 0x57, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x2A, 0x9D, 0x03, 0x89, 0x7E, 0xD7, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x8C, 0x62, 0xCF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0x2C, 0x13, 0x59, 0xCC, 0xFA, 0x84, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xB9, 0x48, 0xBC, 0x57, 0xC7, 0xB3, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x0A, 0x38, 0x24, 0x2E, 0x3A, 0x28, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x0A, 0x43, 0xB8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x25, 0xAB, 0xC1, 0xEE, 0x70, 0x3C, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0xDB, 0x45, 0x1D, 0x4A, 0x80, 0x75, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x1F, 0x4D, 0x2D, 0x9A, 0x05, 0xF4, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x10, 0xF0, 0x5A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x95, 0xE1, 0xDC, 0x15, 0x86, 0xC3, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0xDC, 0x27, 0xD1, 0x56, 0xA1, 0x14, 0x0D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x0B, 0xD6, 0x77, 0x4E, 0x44, 0xA2, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x42, 0x71, 0x1F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x86, 0xB2, 0xB0, 0xC8, 0x2F, 0x7B, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xEF, 0xCB, 0xDB, 0xBC, 0x9E, 0x3B, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x03, 0x86, 0xDD, 0x5B, 0xF5, 0x8D, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x95, 0x79, 0xD6, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x32, 0x14, 0xDA, 0x9B, 0x4F, 0x07, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x3E, 0xFB, 0x06, 0xEE, 0xA7, 0x40, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x1F, 0xDF, 0x71, 0x61, 0xFD, 0x8B, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x8B, 0xAB, 0x8B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x34, 0xB3, 0xB4, 0xBC, 0x9F, 0xB0, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x58, 0x48, 0xA8, 0x77, 0xBB, 0x13, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xC6, 0xF7, 0x34, 0xCC, 0x89, 0x21, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x33, 0xDD, 0x1F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x81, 0xEF, 0xA4, 0xF2, 0x10, 0x0B, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xF7, 0x6E, 0x72, 0x4A, 0xDF, 0xDD, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x23, 0x0A, 0x53, 0x03, 0x16, 0x62, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x76, 0xFD, 0x3C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x14, 0xA1, 0xFA, 0xA0, 0x18, 0xBE, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x2A, 0xE1, 0xD7, 0xB0, 0x6C, 0xA0, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xC0, 0xB0, 0xC6, 0x63, 0x24, 0xCD, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x38, 0x2C, 0xB1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xCD, 0x7D, 0x20, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0xAC, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x97, 0x9F, 0xA2, 0xB6, 0x45, 0xF7, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x99, 0xF3, 0xD2, 0x20, 0x02, 0xEB, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x18, 0x5B, 0x7B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xDD, 0x77, 0x91, 0x60, 0xEA, 0xFD, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xD3, 0xB5, 0xD6, 0x90, 0x17, 0x0E, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0xF4, 0x28, 0xC1, 0xF2, 0x53, 0xF6, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0x58, 0xDC, 0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x20, 0x01, 0xFB, 0xF1, 0xBD, 0x5F, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x7F, 0x06, 0xDA, 0x11, 0xCB, 0xBA, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x41, 0x00, 0xA4, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x33, 0x79), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0xFF, 0x27, 0xCA, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp224r1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp224r1_T_0_X, secp224r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_1_X, secp224r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_2_X, secp224r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_3_X, secp224r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_4_X, secp224r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_5_X, secp224r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_6_X, secp224r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_7_X, secp224r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_8_X, secp224r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_9_X, secp224r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_10_X, secp224r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_11_X, secp224r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_12_X, secp224r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_13_X, secp224r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_14_X, secp224r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_15_X, secp224r1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp224r1_T NULL +#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ /* @@ -149,6 +551,221 @@ static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_n[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), }; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xC2, 0x98, 0xD8, 0x45, 0x39, 0xA1, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x33, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x81, 0x7D, 0x03, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x40, 0xA4, 0x63, 0xE5, 0xE6, 0xBC, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x42, 0x2C, 0xE1, 0xF2, 0xD1, 0x17, 0x6B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x51, 0xBF, 0x37, 0x68, 0x40, 0xB6, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0x5E, 0x31, 0x6B, 0x57, 0x33, 0xCE, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0x7C, 0x4A, 0xEB, 0xE7, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x7F, 0x1A, 0xFE, 0xE2, 0x42, 0xE3, 0x4F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xC8, 0xBA, 0x04, 0xB7, 0x4B, 0xD2, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0xC6, 0x23, 0x3A, 0xA0, 0x09, 0x3A, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x9D, 0x4C, 0xF9, 0x58, 0x23, 0xCC, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0xED, 0x7B, 0x29, 0x87, 0x0F, 0xFA, 0x3C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x69, 0xF2, 0x40, 0x0B, 0xA3, 0x98, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xA8, 0x48, 0x02, 0x0D, 0x1C, 0x12, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xAF, 0x09, 0x83, 0x80, 0xAA, 0x58, 0xA7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x12, 0xBE, 0x70, 0x94, 0x76, 0xE3, 0xE4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x7D, 0xEF, 0x86, 0xFF, 0xE3, 0x37, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x86, 0x8B, 0x08, 0x27, 0x7C, 0xD7, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x54, 0x4C, 0x25, 0x4F, 0x9A, 0xFE, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xFD, 0xF0, 0x6D, 0x37, 0x03, 0x69, 0xD6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xD5, 0xDA, 0xAD, 0x92, 0x49, 0xF0, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x73, 0x43, 0x9E, 0xAF, 0xA7, 0xD1, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x41, 0x07, 0xDF, 0x78, 0x95, 0x3E, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x3D, 0xD1, 0xE6, 0x3C, 0xA5, 0xE2, 0x20), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x6A, 0x5D, 0x52, 0x35, 0xD7, 0xBF, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0xA2, 0xBE, 0x96, 0xF4, 0xF8, 0x02, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x20, 0x49, 0x54, 0xEA, 0xB3, 0x82, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0xDB, 0xEA, 0x02, 0xD1, 0x75, 0x1C, 0x62), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x85, 0xF4, 0x9E, 0x4C, 0xDC, 0x39, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x6D, 0xC4, 0x57, 0xD8, 0x03, 0x5D, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x7F, 0x2D, 0x52, 0x6F, 0xC9, 0xDA, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x64, 0xFA, 0xB4, 0xFE, 0xA4, 0xC4, 0xD7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x37, 0xB9, 0xC0, 0xAA, 0x59, 0xC6, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x58, 0xD9, 0xED, 0x58, 0x99, 0x65, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x7D, 0x26, 0x8C, 0x4A, 0xF9, 0x05, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x73, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0xE7, 0x46, 0xDC, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xD0, 0x55, 0xDF, 0x00, 0x0A, 0xF5, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0xBF, 0x56, 0x81, 0x2D, 0x20, 0xEB, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xC1, 0x28, 0x52, 0xAB, 0xE3, 0xD1, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x34, 0x79, 0x45, 0x57, 0xA5, 0x12, 0x03), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xCF, 0xB8, 0x7E, 0xF7, 0x92, 0x96, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0x01, 0x8C, 0x0D, 0x23, 0xF2, 0xE3, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x2E, 0xE3, 0x84, 0x52, 0x7A, 0x34, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xA1, 0xB0, 0x15, 0x90, 0xE2, 0x53, 0x3C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x98, 0xE7, 0xFA, 0xA5, 0x7D, 0x8B, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x35, 0xD2, 0x00, 0xD1, 0x1B, 0x9F, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x69, 0x08, 0x9A, 0x72, 0xF0, 0xA9, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0xFE, 0x0E, 0x14, 0xDA, 0x7C, 0x0E, 0xD3), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xF6, 0xE8, 0xF8, 0x87, 0xF7, 0xFC, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xBE, 0x7F, 0x3F, 0x7A, 0x2B, 0xD7, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0x32, 0xF2, 0x2D, 0x94, 0x6D, 0x42, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x9A, 0xE3, 0x5F, 0x42, 0xBB, 0x84, 0xED), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x95, 0x29, 0x73, 0xA1, 0x67, 0x3E, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x30, 0x54, 0x35, 0x8E, 0x0A, 0xDD, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xD7, 0xA1, 0x97, 0x61, 0x3B, 0xF8, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x33, 0x3C, 0x58, 0x55, 0x34, 0x23, 0xA3), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x5D, 0x16, 0x5F, 0x7B, 0xBC, 0xBB, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xEE, 0x4E, 0x8A, 0xC1, 0x51, 0xCC, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x0D, 0x4D, 0x1B, 0x53, 0x23, 0x1D, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x2A, 0x38, 0x66, 0x52, 0x84, 0xE1, 0x95), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x9B, 0x83, 0x0A, 0x81, 0x4F, 0xAD, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xFF, 0x42, 0x41, 0x6E, 0xA9, 0xA2, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xA1, 0x4F, 0x1F, 0x89, 0x82, 0xAA, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0xB8, 0x0F, 0x6B, 0x8F, 0x8C, 0xD6, 0x68), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0xB3, 0xBB, 0x51, 0x69, 0xA2, 0x11, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x4F, 0x0F, 0x8D, 0xBD, 0x26, 0x0F, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xCB, 0xEC, 0x6B, 0x34, 0xC3, 0x3D, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x5D, 0x1E, 0x10, 0xD5, 0x44, 0xE2, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x9E, 0xB1, 0xF1, 0x6E, 0x4C, 0xAD, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xE3, 0xC2, 0x58, 0xC0, 0xFB, 0x34, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x9C, 0xDF, 0x35, 0x07, 0x41, 0xBD, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x6E, 0x10, 0xEC, 0x0E, 0xEC, 0xBB, 0xD6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xCF, 0xEF, 0x3F, 0x83, 0x1A, 0x88, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x29, 0xB5, 0xB9, 0xE0, 0xC9, 0xA3, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x46, 0x1E, 0x77, 0xCD, 0x7E, 0xB3, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x21, 0xD0, 0xD4, 0xA3, 0x16, 0x08, 0xEE), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0xCA, 0xA8, 0xB3, 0xBF, 0x29, 0x99, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xF2, 0x05, 0xC1, 0xCF, 0x5D, 0x91, 0x48), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x01, 0x49, 0xDB, 0x82, 0xDF, 0x5F, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x06, 0x90, 0xAD, 0xE3, 0x38, 0xA4, 0xC4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xD2, 0x3A, 0xE8, 0x03, 0xC5, 0x6D, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x35, 0xD0, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0x7A, 0x9F, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x1E, 0xD2, 0xCB, 0xAC, 0x88, 0x27, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xB9, 0x9C, 0xE0, 0x31, 0xDD, 0x99, 0x86), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xF9, 0x9B, 0x32, 0x96, 0x41, 0x58, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x5A, 0x2A, 0xB8, 0x96, 0x0E, 0xB2, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x78, 0x2C, 0xC7, 0x08, 0x99, 0x19, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x59, 0x28, 0xE9, 0x84, 0x54, 0xE6, 0x16), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x38, 0x30, 0xDB, 0x70, 0x2C, 0x0A, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x5C, 0x9D, 0xE9, 0xD5, 0x46, 0x0B, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x0B, 0x60, 0x4B, 0x37, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x24, 0xF3, 0x3D, 0x79, 0x7F, 0x6C, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7F, 0xE5, 0x1C, 0x4F, 0x60, 0x24, 0xF7, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xD8, 0xE2, 0x91, 0x7F, 0x89, 0x49, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0xA7, 0x2E, 0x8D, 0x6A, 0xB3, 0x39, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x89, 0xB5, 0x9A, 0xB8, 0x8D, 0x42, 0x9C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0x45, 0xE6, 0x4B, 0x3F, 0x4F, 0x1E, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x65, 0x5E, 0x59, 0x22, 0xCC, 0x72, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x93, 0x1A, 0x27, 0x1E, 0x34, 0xC5, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0xF2, 0xA5, 0x58, 0x5C, 0x15, 0x2E, 0xC6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x7F, 0xBA, 0x58, 0x5A, 0x84, 0x6F, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xA6, 0x36, 0x7E, 0xDC, 0xF7, 0xE1, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x4D, 0xAA, 0xEE, 0x57, 0x76, 0x3A, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x7E, 0x26, 0x18, 0x22, 0x23, 0x9F, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x4C, 0x64, 0xC7, 0x55, 0x02, 0x3F, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x02, 0x90, 0xBB, 0xC3, 0xEC, 0x30, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x6F, 0x64, 0xF4, 0x16, 0x69, 0x48, 0xA4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x44, 0x9C, 0x95, 0x0C, 0x7D, 0x67, 0x5E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0x91, 0x8B, 0xD8, 0xD0, 0xD7, 0xE7, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xF9, 0x48, 0x62, 0x6F, 0xA8, 0x93, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x3A, 0x99, 0x02, 0xD5, 0x0B, 0x3D, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xD3, 0x00, 0x31, 0xE6, 0x0C, 0x9F, 0x44), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xB2, 0xAA, 0xFD, 0x88, 0x15, 0xDF, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0x35, 0x27, 0x31, 0x44, 0xCD, 0xC0, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0xF8, 0x91, 0xA5, 0x71, 0x94, 0x84, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xCB, 0xD0, 0x93, 0xE9, 0x88, 0xDA, 0xE4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xC6, 0x39, 0x16, 0x5D, 0xA3, 0x1E, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x07, 0x37, 0x26, 0x36, 0x2A, 0xFE, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xBC, 0xF3, 0xD0, 0xDE, 0x50, 0xFC, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x2E, 0x06, 0x10, 0x15, 0x4D, 0xFA, 0xF7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x65, 0x69, 0x5B, 0x66, 0xA2, 0x75, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x16, 0x00, 0x5A, 0xB0, 0x30, 0x25, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xFB, 0x86, 0x42, 0x80, 0xC1, 0xC4, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x1D, 0x83, 0x8E, 0x94, 0x01, 0x5F, 0x82), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x37, 0x70, 0xEF, 0x1F, 0xA1, 0xF0, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x10, 0x5B, 0xCE, 0xC4, 0x9B, 0x6F, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x11, 0x11, 0x24, 0x4F, 0x4C, 0x79, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x3A, 0x72, 0xBC, 0xFE, 0x72, 0x58, 0x43), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp256r1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp256r1_T_0_X, secp256r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_1_X, secp256r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_2_X, secp256r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_3_X, secp256r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_4_X, secp256r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_5_X, secp256r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_6_X, secp256r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_7_X, secp256r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_8_X, secp256r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_9_X, secp256r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_10_X, secp256r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_11_X, secp256r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_12_X, secp256r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_13_X, secp256r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_14_X, secp256r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_15_X, secp256r1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp256r1_T NULL +#endif + #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ /* @@ -195,6 +812,557 @@ static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_n[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), }; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x0A, 0x76, 0x72, 0x38, 0x5E, 0x54, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x29, 0x55, 0xBF, 0x5D, 0xF2, 0x02, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x2A, 0x54, 0x82, 0xE0, 0x41, 0xF7, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x9B, 0xA7, 0x8B, 0x62, 0x3B, 0x1D, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xAD, 0x20, 0xF3, 0x1E, 0xC7, 0xB1, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x05, 0x8B, 0xBE, 0x22, 0xCA, 0x87, 0xAA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x0E, 0xEA, 0x90, 0x7C, 0x1D, 0x43, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x81, 0x7E, 0x1D, 0xCE, 0xB1, 0x60, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0xB5, 0x13, 0x31, 0xDA, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x14, 0x9A, 0x28, 0xBD, 0x1D, 0xF4, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xDC, 0x92, 0x92, 0xBF, 0x98, 0x9E, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x2C, 0x26, 0x96, 0x4A, 0xDE, 0x17, 0x36), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x92, 0x00, 0x2C, 0x78, 0xDB, 0x1F, 0x37), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xF3, 0xEB, 0xB7, 0x06, 0xF7, 0xB6, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xBC, 0x2C, 0xCF, 0xD8, 0xED, 0x53, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x75, 0x7B, 0xA3, 0xAB, 0xC3, 0x2C, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x9D, 0x78, 0x41, 0xF6, 0x76, 0x84, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x56, 0xE8, 0x52, 0xB3, 0xCB, 0xA8, 0xBD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xF2, 0xAE, 0xA4, 0xB6, 0x89, 0x1B, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x0F, 0xCE, 0x1C, 0x7C, 0xF6, 0x50, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0xEB, 0x90, 0xE6, 0x4D, 0xC7, 0xD4, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x49, 0x2D, 0x8A, 0x01, 0x99, 0x60, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x80, 0x9B, 0x9B, 0x6A, 0xB0, 0x07, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xA2, 0xEE, 0x59, 0xBE, 0x95, 0xBC, 0x23), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x9D, 0x56, 0xAE, 0x59, 0xFB, 0x1F, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xAC, 0x91, 0x80, 0x87, 0xA8, 0x6E, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x08, 0xA7, 0x08, 0x94, 0x32, 0xFC, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x29, 0x9E, 0x84, 0xF4, 0xE5, 0x6E, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x21, 0xB9, 0x50, 0x24, 0xF8, 0x9C, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x04, 0x01, 0xC2, 0xFB, 0x77, 0x3E, 0xDE), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x38, 0xEE, 0xE3, 0xC7, 0x9D, 0xEC, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x88, 0xCF, 0x43, 0xFA, 0x92, 0x5E, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xCA, 0x43, 0xF8, 0x3B, 0x49, 0x7E, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xE7, 0xEB, 0x17, 0x45, 0x86, 0xC2, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x69, 0x57, 0x32, 0xE0, 0x9C, 0xD1, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x10, 0xB8, 0x4D, 0xB8, 0xF4, 0x0D, 0xE3), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0xDC, 0x9A, 0xB2, 0x79, 0x39, 0x27, 0x16), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x71, 0xE4, 0x3B, 0x4D, 0x60, 0x0C, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xBD, 0x19, 0x40, 0xFA, 0x19, 0x2A, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xF8, 0x1E, 0x43, 0xA1, 0x50, 0x8D, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x18, 0x7C, 0x41, 0xFA, 0x7C, 0x1B, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x59, 0x24, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xB7, 0xD3, 0xAD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x01, 0x3D, 0x63, 0x54, 0x45, 0x6F, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xB2, 0x19, 0xA3, 0x86, 0x1D, 0x42, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x02, 0x87, 0x18, 0x92, 0x52, 0x1A, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x18, 0xB1, 0x5D, 0x18, 0x1B, 0x37, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x74, 0x61, 0xBA, 0x18, 0xAF, 0x40, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x7D, 0x3C, 0x52, 0x0F, 0x07, 0xB0, 0x6F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x39, 0x13, 0xAA, 0x60, 0x15, 0x99, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x00, 0xCB, 0xC6, 0xB1, 0xDB, 0x97, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xFA, 0x60, 0xB8, 0x24, 0xE4, 0x7D, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x75, 0xB3, 0x70, 0xB2, 0x83, 0xB1, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xE3, 0x6C, 0xCD, 0x33, 0x62, 0x7A, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x30, 0xDC, 0x0F, 0x9F, 0xBB, 0xB8, 0xAA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0xD5, 0x0A, 0x60, 0x81, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x16), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0xAA, 0x2F, 0xD6, 0xF2, 0x73, 0xDF, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x7B, 0x74, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0x5B, 0x95, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x04, 0xEB, 0x15, 0xC8, 0x5F, 0x00, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x50, 0x20, 0x28, 0xD1, 0x01, 0xAF, 0xF0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x6D, 0x4F, 0x31, 0x81, 0x2F, 0x94, 0x48), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x2F, 0xD8, 0xB6, 0x63, 0x7C, 0xE9, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x8C, 0xB9, 0x14, 0xD9, 0x37, 0x63, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x02, 0xB8, 0x46, 0xAD, 0xCE, 0x7B, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x47, 0x2D, 0x66, 0xA7, 0xE9, 0x33, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xF9, 0x93, 0x94, 0xA8, 0x48, 0xB3, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x4A, 0xAC, 0x51, 0x08, 0x72, 0x2F, 0x1A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0xAD, 0xA0, 0xF9, 0x81, 0xE1, 0x78, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x9A, 0x63, 0xD8, 0xBA, 0x79, 0x1A, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x31, 0x7B, 0x7A, 0x5A, 0x5D, 0x7D, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x96, 0x12, 0x4B, 0x19, 0x09, 0xE0, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x8A, 0x57, 0xEE, 0x4E, 0x6E, 0x7E, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x9D, 0x69, 0xDC, 0xB3, 0xDA, 0xD8, 0x08), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x49, 0x03, 0x03, 0x33, 0x6F, 0x28, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xDB, 0xA7, 0x05, 0x8C, 0xF3, 0x4D, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x92, 0xB1, 0xA8, 0xEC, 0x0D, 0x64, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0xFC, 0xFD, 0xD0, 0x4B, 0x88, 0x1B, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x9C, 0x51, 0x69, 0xCE, 0x71, 0x73, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x5A, 0x14, 0x23, 0x1A, 0x46, 0x63, 0x5F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x4C, 0x70, 0x44, 0x18, 0xCD, 0xEF, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x49, 0xDD, 0x64, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0x4D, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x32, 0x7C, 0x09, 0xD0, 0x3F, 0xD6, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xE0, 0x4F, 0x65, 0x0C, 0x7A, 0x54, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xFA, 0xFB, 0x4A, 0xB4, 0x79, 0x5A, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x5D, 0x1B, 0x2B, 0xDA, 0xBC, 0x9A, 0x74), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xAC, 0x56, 0xF7, 0x5F, 0x51, 0x68, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xE0, 0x1D, 0xBC, 0x13, 0x4E, 0xAC, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xF5, 0xC5, 0xE6, 0xD2, 0x88, 0xBA, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x0E, 0x28, 0x23, 0x58, 0x67, 0xFA, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x80, 0x4B, 0xD8, 0xC4, 0xDF, 0x15, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x0E, 0x58, 0xE6, 0x2C, 0x59, 0xC2, 0x03), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x26, 0x27, 0x99, 0x16, 0x2B, 0x22, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xF3, 0x8F, 0xC3, 0x2A, 0x9B, 0xFC, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x2E, 0x83, 0x3D, 0xFE, 0x9E, 0x3C, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x57, 0xCD, 0x2D, 0xC1, 0x49, 0x38, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x42, 0x8B, 0x33, 0x89, 0x1F, 0xEA, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x1D, 0x13, 0xD7, 0x50, 0xBB, 0x3E, 0xEB), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x9A, 0x52, 0xD2, 0x54, 0x7C, 0x97, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x33, 0x6E, 0xED, 0xD9, 0x87, 0x50, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x35, 0x7E, 0x16, 0x40, 0x15, 0x83, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x2B, 0xA4, 0xAB, 0x03, 0x91, 0xEA, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x47, 0x39, 0xEF, 0x05, 0x59, 0xD0, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x24, 0x0D, 0x76, 0x11, 0x53, 0x08, 0xAF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x2F, 0xDD, 0xBD, 0x50, 0x48, 0xB1, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x1C, 0x84, 0x55, 0x78, 0x14, 0xEB, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x5E, 0x3E, 0xA6, 0xAF, 0xF6, 0xC7, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x11, 0xE2, 0x65, 0xCA, 0x41, 0x95, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x83, 0xD8, 0xE6, 0x4D, 0x22, 0x06, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x7F, 0x25, 0x2A, 0xAA, 0x28, 0x46, 0x97), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xDB, 0x15, 0x56, 0x84, 0xCB, 0xC0, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xDB, 0x0E, 0x08, 0xC9, 0xF5, 0xD4, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x62, 0xD0, 0x1A, 0x7C, 0x13, 0xD5, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xAD, 0x53, 0xE0, 0x32, 0x21, 0xA0, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x38, 0x81, 0x21, 0x23, 0x0E, 0xD2, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x51, 0x05, 0xD0, 0x1E, 0x82, 0xA9, 0x71), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xC3, 0x27, 0xBF, 0xC6, 0xAA, 0xB7, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x65, 0x45, 0xDF, 0xB9, 0x46, 0x17, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x38, 0x3F, 0xB2, 0xB1, 0x5D, 0xCA, 0x1C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x29, 0x6C, 0x63, 0xE9, 0xD7, 0x48, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x99, 0x8C, 0xC2, 0x05, 0x99), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xE6, 0x5E, 0x82, 0x6D, 0xE5, 0x7E, 0xD5), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x61, 0xFA, 0x7D, 0x01, 0xDB, 0xB6, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xC6, 0x58, 0x39, 0xF4, 0xC6, 0x82, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x5A, 0x7A, 0x80, 0x08, 0xCD, 0xAA, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x8C, 0xC6, 0x3F, 0x3C, 0xA5, 0x68, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xF5, 0xD5, 0x17, 0xAE, 0x36, 0xD8, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xAD, 0x92, 0xC5, 0x57, 0x6C, 0xDA, 0x91), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x67, 0x17, 0xC0, 0x40, 0x78, 0x8C, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x9F, 0xF4, 0xAA, 0xDA, 0x5C, 0x7E, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xDB, 0x42, 0x3E, 0x72, 0x64, 0xA0, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xF9, 0x41, 0x17, 0x43, 0xE3, 0xE8, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xDD, 0xCC, 0x43, 0x7E, 0x16, 0x05, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x4B, 0xCF, 0x48, 0x8F, 0x41, 0x90, 0xE5), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x0C, 0x6B, 0x9D, 0x22, 0x04, 0xBC, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x63, 0x79, 0x2F, 0x6A, 0x0E, 0x8A, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x67, 0x3F, 0x02, 0xB8, 0x91, 0x7F, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x14, 0x64, 0xA0, 0x33, 0xF4, 0x6B, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x44, 0x71, 0x87, 0xB8, 0x88, 0x3F, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x2B, 0x85, 0x05, 0xC5, 0x44, 0x53, 0x15), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x2B, 0xFE, 0xD1, 0x1C, 0x73, 0xE3, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x33, 0xA1, 0xD3, 0x69, 0x1C, 0x9D, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x5A, 0xBA, 0xB6, 0xAE, 0x1B, 0x94, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x74, 0x90, 0x5C, 0x57, 0xB0, 0x3A, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x2F, 0x93, 0x20, 0x24, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x78, 0x9D, 0x71, 0x67, 0x5D, 0x49, 0x98), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0xC8, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x8D, 0xE0, 0x8F, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x7F, 0x79, 0x6C, 0x5F, 0xB7, 0xBC, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xE1, 0x83, 0x3C, 0x12, 0xBB, 0xEE, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xC2, 0xC4, 0x1B, 0x41, 0x71, 0xB9, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0xEE, 0xBB, 0x1D, 0x89, 0x50, 0x88, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x1C, 0x55, 0x74, 0xEB, 0xDE, 0x92, 0x3F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x38, 0x92, 0x06, 0x19, 0xD0, 0xB3, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x99, 0x26, 0xA3, 0x5F, 0xE2, 0xC1, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0xFC, 0xFD, 0xC3, 0xB6, 0x26, 0x24, 0x8F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x49, 0xB7, 0x64, 0x4B, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x4E, 0x95, 0xAD, 0x07, 0xFE, 0xB6, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x15, 0xE7, 0x2D, 0x19, 0xA9, 0x08, 0x10), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xBD, 0xAC, 0x0A, 0x3F, 0x6B, 0xFF, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xE4, 0x74, 0x14, 0xD9, 0x70, 0x1D, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xB0, 0x71, 0xBB, 0xD8, 0x18, 0x96, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0xB8, 0x19, 0x90, 0x80, 0xB5, 0xEE, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x21, 0x20, 0xA6, 0x17, 0x48, 0x03, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x1D, 0xBB, 0x6D, 0x94, 0x20, 0x34, 0xF1), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x82, 0x67, 0x4B, 0x8E, 0x4E, 0xBE, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xDA, 0x77, 0xF8, 0x23, 0x55, 0x2B, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x02, 0xDE, 0x25, 0x35, 0x2D, 0x74, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x0C, 0xB8, 0x0B, 0x39, 0xBA, 0xAD, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0x0E, 0x28, 0x4D, 0xE1, 0x3D, 0xE4, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xEC, 0x0A, 0xD4, 0xB8, 0xC4, 0x8D, 0xB0), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x68, 0xCE, 0xC2, 0x55, 0x4D, 0x0C, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x20, 0x93, 0x32, 0x90, 0xD6, 0xAE, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x78, 0xAB, 0x43, 0x9E, 0xEB, 0x73, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x97, 0xC3, 0x83, 0xA6, 0x3C, 0xF1, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0x25, 0x25, 0x66, 0x08, 0x26, 0xFA, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xFB, 0x44, 0x5D, 0x82, 0xEC, 0x3B, 0xAC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x90, 0xEA, 0xB5, 0x04, 0x99, 0xD0, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0xF2, 0x22, 0xA0, 0xEB, 0xFD, 0x45, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xA4, 0x81, 0x32, 0xFC, 0xFA, 0xEE, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xBB, 0xA4, 0x6A, 0x77, 0x41, 0x5C, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x1E, 0xAA, 0x4F, 0xF0, 0x10, 0xB3, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x74, 0x13, 0x14, 0x9E, 0x90, 0xD7, 0xE6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0xBD, 0x70, 0x4F, 0xA8, 0xD1, 0x06, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x4E, 0x2E, 0x68, 0xFC, 0x35, 0xFA, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x53, 0x75, 0xED, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0xC2, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x87, 0x6B, 0x9F, 0x05, 0xE2, 0x22, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x1A, 0xA8, 0xB7, 0x03, 0x9E, 0x6D, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0xD0, 0x69, 0x88, 0xA8, 0x39, 0x9E, 0x3A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xEF, 0x68, 0xFE, 0xEC, 0x24, 0x08, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x06, 0x4B, 0x92, 0x0D, 0xB7, 0x34, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xF4, 0xDD, 0x1A, 0xA0, 0x4A, 0xE4, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x63, 0x4F, 0x4F, 0xCE, 0xBB, 0xD6, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xEE, 0x8D, 0xDF, 0x3F, 0x73, 0xB7, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x06, 0xB6, 0x80, 0x4D, 0x81, 0xD9, 0x53), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_16_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0xF5, 0x13, 0xDF, 0x13, 0x19, 0x97, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xF9, 0xB3, 0x33, 0x66, 0x82, 0x21, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xFC, 0x39, 0x16, 0x23, 0x43, 0x76, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x48, 0x25, 0xA1, 0x64, 0x95, 0x1C, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0xAC, 0x15, 0x57, 0xD9, 0xDE, 0xA0, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x5F, 0xB8, 0x3D, 0x48, 0x91, 0x24, 0xCC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_16_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xF2, 0xC8, 0x54, 0xD1, 0x32, 0xBD, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x3B, 0xF0, 0xAA, 0x9D, 0xD8, 0xF4, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0xC3, 0xBB, 0x6C, 0x66, 0xAC, 0x25, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x25, 0x10, 0xB2, 0xE1, 0x41, 0xDE, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xE8, 0x30, 0xB8, 0x37, 0xBC, 0x2A, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x57, 0x01, 0x4A, 0x1E, 0x78, 0x9F, 0x85), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_17_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x19, 0xCD, 0x12, 0x0B, 0x51, 0x4F, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x4B, 0x3D, 0x24, 0xA4, 0x16, 0x59, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xEB, 0xD3, 0x59, 0x2E, 0x75, 0x7C, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xB9, 0xB4, 0xA5, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0x29, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x16, 0x05, 0x75, 0x02, 0xB3, 0x06, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x7C, 0x9F, 0x79, 0x91, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0x23), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_17_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x98, 0x7C, 0x84, 0xE1, 0xFF, 0x30, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0xE2, 0xC2, 0x5F, 0x55, 0x40, 0xBD, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0x65, 0x87, 0x3F, 0xC4, 0xC2, 0x24, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0x30, 0x0A, 0x60, 0x15, 0xD1, 0x24, 0x48), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x99, 0xD9, 0xB6, 0xAE, 0xB1, 0xAF, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x80, 0xEE, 0xA2, 0x0F, 0x74, 0xB9, 0xF3), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_18_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xE6, 0x0F, 0x37, 0xC1, 0x10, 0x99, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xAD, 0x9D, 0x5D, 0x80, 0x01, 0xA6, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x2A, 0x9D, 0x20, 0x38, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x60, 0xCB, 0xCE, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0xA7, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xCF, 0x14, 0xDF, 0xBF, 0xE5, 0x74, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x12, 0x1A, 0xDD, 0x59, 0x02, 0x5D, 0xC6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_18_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xC9, 0xF8, 0xF5, 0xB6, 0x13, 0x4D, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x45, 0xB1, 0x93, 0xB3, 0xA2, 0x79, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xF6, 0xCF, 0xF7, 0xE6, 0x29, 0x9C, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x50, 0x65, 0x80, 0xBC, 0x59, 0x0A, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xF0, 0x24, 0x35, 0xA2, 0x46, 0xF0, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x26, 0xC0, 0x9D, 0x61, 0x56, 0x62, 0x67), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_19_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0x24, 0x43, 0x2E, 0x37, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xF7, 0xCE, 0x35, 0xFC, 0x77, 0xF3, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x34, 0x96, 0xD5, 0x4A, 0x76, 0x9D, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x3B, 0x0F, 0xEA, 0xA8, 0x12, 0x0B, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x3F, 0x5D, 0x2D, 0x1C, 0xD4, 0x9E, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x2E, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0x6E, 0xAB, 0xAF, 0xDC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_19_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xB2, 0x7B, 0x0C, 0x9A, 0x83, 0x8E, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x51, 0x90, 0x92, 0x79, 0x32, 0x19, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x89, 0xF9, 0xD0, 0xCF, 0x2C, 0xA5, 0x8F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x50, 0x21, 0xDE, 0x50, 0x41, 0x9D, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x7D, 0x2B, 0x9E, 0x9D, 0x95, 0xA8, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA5, 0x20, 0x87, 0x88, 0x97, 0x5F, 0xAA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_20_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x59, 0xB4, 0x66, 0x7E, 0xE8, 0x5A, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x5C, 0x7E, 0xB2, 0xAD, 0xD9, 0xC9, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x97, 0x49, 0xA3, 0x13, 0x83, 0x07, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x26, 0xC7, 0x13, 0x35, 0x0D, 0xB0, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x60, 0xAB, 0xFA, 0x4B, 0x93, 0x18, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x2D, 0x1C, 0x31, 0x4C, 0xE4, 0x61, 0xAE), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_20_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0x4D, 0x1E, 0x51, 0x59, 0x6E, 0x91, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x54, 0x4D, 0x51, 0xED, 0x36, 0xCC, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xA8, 0x56, 0xC7, 0x78, 0x27, 0x33, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xB7, 0x95, 0xC9, 0x8B, 0xC8, 0x6A, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xE9, 0x13, 0x96, 0xB3, 0xE1, 0xF9, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x46, 0xB0, 0x5E, 0xC3, 0x94, 0x03, 0x05), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_21_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x5B, 0x29, 0x30, 0x41, 0x1A, 0x9E, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xCA, 0x83, 0x31, 0x5B, 0xA7, 0xCB, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x41, 0x50, 0x44, 0x4D, 0x64, 0x31, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0x84, 0xC2, 0x5D, 0x97, 0xA5, 0x3C, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x0F, 0xA5, 0xFD, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x47, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x58, 0x02, 0x2D, 0x40, 0xB1, 0x0B, 0xBA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_21_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x33, 0x8C, 0x67, 0xCE, 0x23, 0x43, 0x99), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x53, 0x47, 0x72, 0x44, 0x1F, 0x5B, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xC1, 0xD9, 0xA4, 0x50, 0x88, 0x63, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xF2, 0x75, 0x69, 0x73, 0x00, 0xC4, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0x90, 0x1D, 0xDF, 0x1A, 0x00, 0xD8, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0xB1, 0x89, 0x48, 0xA8, 0x70, 0x62, 0xEF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_22_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x8A, 0x55, 0x50, 0x7B, 0xEF, 0x8A, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x1B, 0x23, 0x48, 0x23, 0x63, 0x91, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x04, 0x54, 0x3C, 0x24, 0x9B, 0xC7, 0x9A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x38, 0xC3, 0x84, 0xFB, 0xFF, 0x9F, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x2A, 0xE0, 0x6D, 0x68, 0x8A, 0x5C, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x93, 0x53, 0x85, 0xA1, 0x0D, 0xAF, 0x63), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_22_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x88, 0x95, 0x4C, 0x0B, 0xD0, 0x06, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xAF, 0x8D, 0x49, 0xA2, 0xC8, 0xB4, 0xE0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x76, 0x53, 0x09, 0x88, 0x43, 0x87, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xA4, 0x77, 0x3F, 0x5E, 0x21, 0xB4, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x9E, 0x86, 0x64, 0xCC, 0x91, 0xC1, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x17, 0x56, 0xCB, 0xC3, 0x7D, 0x5B, 0xB1), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_23_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x74, 0x9F, 0xB5, 0x91, 0x21, 0xB1, 0x1C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xED, 0xE1, 0x11, 0xEF, 0x45, 0xAF, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x31, 0xBE, 0xB2, 0xBC, 0x72, 0x65, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x4B, 0x8C, 0x77, 0xCE, 0x1E, 0x42, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xC9, 0xAA, 0xB9, 0xD9, 0x86, 0x99, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x23, 0x80, 0xC6, 0x4E, 0x35, 0x0B, 0x6D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_23_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xD8, 0xA2, 0x0A, 0x39, 0x32, 0x1D, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xC8, 0x86, 0xF1, 0x12, 0x9A, 0x4A, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xF1, 0x7C, 0xAA, 0x70, 0x8E, 0xBC, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x01, 0x47, 0x8F, 0xDD, 0x8B, 0xA5, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x08, 0x21, 0xF4, 0xAB, 0xC7, 0xF5, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x76, 0xA5, 0x95, 0xC4, 0x0F, 0x88, 0x1D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_24_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x42, 0x2A, 0x52, 0xCD, 0x75, 0x51, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x36, 0xE5, 0x04, 0x2B, 0x44, 0xC6, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xEE, 0x16, 0x13, 0x07, 0x83, 0xB5, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x59, 0xC6, 0xA2, 0x19, 0x05, 0xD3, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x8B, 0xA8, 0x16, 0x09, 0xB7, 0xEA, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xEE, 0x14, 0xAF, 0xB5, 0xFD, 0xD0, 0xEF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_24_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x7C, 0xCA, 0x71, 0x3E, 0x6E, 0x66, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x31, 0x0E, 0x3F, 0xE5, 0x91, 0xC4, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x3D, 0xC2, 0x3E, 0x95, 0x37, 0x58, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x1F, 0x02, 0x03, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xEE, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x5B, 0x1A, 0xFC, 0x38, 0xCD, 0xE8, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x57, 0x42, 0x85, 0xC6, 0x21, 0x68, 0x71), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_25_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xA2, 0x4A, 0x66, 0xB1, 0x0A, 0xE6, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x0C, 0x94, 0x9D, 0x5E, 0x99, 0xB2, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x03, 0x40, 0xCA, 0xB2, 0xB3, 0x30, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x78, 0x48, 0x27, 0x34, 0x1E, 0xE2, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x72, 0x5B, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0x6D, 0xE3, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xAB, 0x46, 0xCB, 0xEA, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_25_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x08, 0xAD, 0x4E, 0x51, 0x9F, 0x2A, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x5C, 0x7D, 0x4C, 0xD6, 0xCF, 0xDD, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x76, 0x26, 0xE0, 0x8B, 0x10, 0xD9, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0xA7, 0x23, 0x4E, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0x42, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xE5, 0xA4, 0xEC, 0x77, 0x21, 0x34, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x14, 0x65, 0xEA, 0x4A, 0x85, 0xC3, 0x2F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_26_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0xD8, 0x40, 0x27, 0x73, 0x15, 0x7E, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xBB, 0x53, 0x7E, 0x0F, 0x40, 0xC8, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x37, 0x19, 0x73, 0xEF, 0x5A, 0x5E, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x73, 0x2B, 0x49, 0x7E, 0xAC, 0x97, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0xB2, 0xC3, 0x1E, 0x0E, 0xE7, 0xD2, 0x21), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x08, 0xD6, 0xDD, 0xAC, 0x21, 0xD6, 0x3E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_26_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0x26, 0xBE, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x38, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x6C, 0x31, 0xA7, 0x49, 0x50, 0x3A, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x99, 0xC6, 0xF5, 0xD2, 0xC2, 0x30, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xE4, 0xF6, 0x8B, 0x8B, 0x97, 0xE9, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x21, 0xB7, 0x0D, 0xFC, 0x15, 0x54, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x83, 0x1C, 0xA4, 0xCD, 0x6B, 0x9D, 0xF2), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_27_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xE8, 0x4C, 0x48, 0xE4, 0xAA, 0x69, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x7A, 0x27, 0xFC, 0x37, 0x96, 0x1A, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0xE7, 0x30, 0xA5, 0xCF, 0x13, 0x46, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xD8, 0xAF, 0x74, 0x23, 0x4D, 0x56, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x3D, 0x44, 0x14, 0x1B, 0x97, 0x83, 0xF0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x47, 0xD7, 0x5F, 0xFD, 0x98, 0x38, 0xF7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_27_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x73, 0x64, 0x36, 0xFD, 0x7B, 0xC1, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x5D, 0x32, 0xD2, 0x47, 0x94, 0x89, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xE9, 0x30, 0xAC, 0x06, 0xC8, 0x65, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x6C, 0xB9, 0x1B, 0xF7, 0x61, 0x49, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0xFF, 0x32, 0x43, 0x80, 0xDA, 0xA6, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xF8, 0x04, 0x01, 0x95, 0x35, 0xCE, 0x21), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_28_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x06, 0x46, 0x0D, 0x51, 0xE2, 0xD8, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x57, 0x1D, 0x6F, 0x79, 0xA0, 0xCD, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0xFB, 0x36, 0xCA, 0xAD, 0xF5, 0x9E, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x7A, 0x1D, 0x9E, 0x1D, 0x95, 0x48, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x26, 0xA5, 0xB7, 0x15, 0x2C, 0xC2, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x42, 0x72, 0xAA, 0x11, 0xDC, 0xC9, 0xB6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_28_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x6C, 0x64, 0xA7, 0x62, 0x3C, 0xAB, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x6A, 0x44, 0xD8, 0x60, 0xC0, 0xA8, 0x80), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x76, 0x58, 0x12, 0x57, 0x3C, 0x89, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x4F, 0x83, 0xCE, 0xCB, 0xB8, 0xD0, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x84, 0x04, 0xB0, 0xAD, 0xEB, 0xFA, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xA4, 0xC3, 0x41, 0x44, 0x4E, 0x65, 0x3E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_29_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x16, 0xA9, 0x1C, 0xE7, 0x65, 0x20, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x53, 0x32, 0xF8, 0xC0, 0xA6, 0xBD, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xF0, 0xE6, 0x57, 0x31, 0xCC, 0x26, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xE3, 0x54, 0x1C, 0x34, 0xD3, 0x17, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xAE, 0xED, 0xFB, 0xCD, 0xE7, 0x1E, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x16, 0x1C, 0x34, 0x40, 0x00, 0x1F, 0xB6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_29_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x32, 0x00, 0xC2, 0xD4, 0x3B, 0x1A, 0x09), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xE0, 0x99, 0x8F, 0x0C, 0x4A, 0x16, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x73, 0x18, 0x1B, 0xD4, 0x94, 0x29, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xA4, 0x2D, 0xB1, 0x9D, 0x74, 0x32, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0xF4, 0xB1, 0x0C, 0x37, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xFF, 0xDA, 0xE2, 0x35, 0xA3, 0xB6, 0x42), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_30_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x49, 0x99, 0x65, 0xC5, 0xED, 0x16, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x42, 0x9A, 0xF3, 0xA7, 0x4E, 0x6F, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x0A, 0x7E, 0xC0, 0xD7, 0x4E, 0x07, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x7A, 0x31, 0x69, 0xA6, 0xB9, 0x15, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0xE0, 0x72, 0xA4, 0x3F, 0xB9, 0xF8, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x75, 0x32, 0x85, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0x37, 0x12), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_30_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xC0, 0x0D, 0xCF, 0x25, 0x41, 0xA4, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xFC, 0xB2, 0x48, 0xC3, 0x85, 0x83, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xBE, 0x0B, 0x58, 0x2D, 0x7A, 0x9A, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0xF3, 0x81, 0x18, 0x1B, 0x74, 0x4F, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x43, 0xA3, 0x0A, 0x16, 0x8B, 0xA3, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x18, 0x81, 0x7B, 0x8D, 0xA2, 0x35, 0x77), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_31_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xC4, 0x3F, 0x2C, 0xE7, 0x5F, 0x99, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x2B, 0xB7, 0xB6, 0xAD, 0x5A, 0x56, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x00, 0xA4, 0x48, 0xC8, 0xE8, 0xBA, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xA1, 0xB5, 0x13, 0x5A, 0xCD, 0x99, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x95, 0xAD, 0xFC, 0xE2, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x6B, 0xD1, 0x34, 0x99, 0x53, 0x63, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_31_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x8A, 0x77, 0x5D, 0x2B, 0xAB, 0x01, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x85, 0xD0, 0xD5, 0x49, 0x83, 0x4D, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0xC6, 0x91, 0x30, 0x3B, 0x00, 0xAF, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xAE, 0x61, 0x07, 0xE1, 0xB6, 0xE2, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x43, 0x41, 0xFE, 0x9B, 0xB6, 0xF0, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x97, 0xAE, 0xAD, 0x89, 0x88, 0x9E, 0x41), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp384r1_T[32] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp384r1_T_0_X, secp384r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_1_X, secp384r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_2_X, secp384r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_3_X, secp384r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_4_X, secp384r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_5_X, secp384r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_6_X, secp384r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_7_X, secp384r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_8_X, secp384r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_9_X, secp384r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_10_X, secp384r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_11_X, secp384r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_12_X, secp384r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_13_X, secp384r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_14_X, secp384r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_15_X, secp384r1_T_15_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_16_X, secp384r1_T_16_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_17_X, secp384r1_T_17_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_18_X, secp384r1_T_18_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_19_X, secp384r1_T_19_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_20_X, secp384r1_T_20_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_21_X, secp384r1_T_21_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_22_X, secp384r1_T_22_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_23_X, secp384r1_T_23_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_24_X, secp384r1_T_24_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_25_X, secp384r1_T_25_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_26_X, secp384r1_T_26_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_27_X, secp384r1_T_27_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_28_X, secp384r1_T_28_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_29_X, secp384r1_T_29_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_30_X, secp384r1_T_30_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_31_X, secp384r1_T_31_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp384r1_T NULL +#endif + #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ /* @@ -256,6 +1424,748 @@ static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_n[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0xFF, 0x01), }; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0xC2, 0x31, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x42, 0x6A, 0x85, 0xC1, 0xB3, 0x48, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0xA8, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x27, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x59, 0xE7, 0xEF, 0x77, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x3D, 0x4D, 0x6B, 0x60, 0xAF, 0x28, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xB5, 0x3F, 0x05, 0x39, 0x81, 0x64, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xB4, 0x95, 0x23, 0x66, 0xCB, 0x3E, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xE9, 0x04, 0x04, 0xB7, 0x06, 0x8E, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x66, 0xD1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x94, 0xBE, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xC2, 0x72, 0xA2, 0x86, 0x70, 0x3C, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x07, 0xAD, 0x3F, 0x01, 0xB9, 0x50, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x26, 0xF4, 0x5E, 0x99, 0x72, 0xEE, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x66, 0x3E, 0x27, 0x17, 0xBD, 0xAF, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x44, 0x9B, 0x57, 0x49, 0x44, 0xF5, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x1B, 0x7D, 0x2C, 0xB4, 0x5F, 0x8A, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0xC0, 0x3B, 0x9A, 0x78, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xB1, 0x2D, 0xEB, 0x27, 0x2F, 0xE8, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x4B, 0x44, 0x25, 0xDB, 0x5C, 0x5F, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x85, 0x28, 0x78, 0x2E, 0x75, 0x34, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0x57, 0x0F, 0x73, 0x78, 0x7A, 0xE3, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xD8, 0xEC, 0xDC, 0xDA, 0x04, 0xAD, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x8A, 0x09, 0xF3, 0x58, 0x79, 0xD8, 0x29), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x03, 0xCB, 0x50, 0x1A, 0x7F, 0x56, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xA6, 0x78, 0x38, 0x85, 0x67, 0x0B, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xD5, 0xD2, 0x22, 0xC4, 0x00, 0x3B, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x93, 0x0E, 0x7B, 0x85, 0x51, 0xC3, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xA6, 0x5F, 0x54, 0x49, 0x02, 0x81, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0xE9, 0x6B, 0x3A, 0x92, 0xE7, 0x72, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x5F, 0x28, 0x9E, 0x91, 0x27, 0x88, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x28, 0x31, 0xB3, 0x84, 0xCA, 0x12, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xF9, 0xAC, 0x22, 0x10, 0x0A, 0x64, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xC6, 0x33, 0x1F, 0x69, 0x19, 0x18, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x48, 0xB8, 0xC7, 0x37, 0x5A, 0x00, 0x36), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xCC, 0x32, 0xE0, 0xEE, 0x03, 0xC2, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x29, 0xC2, 0xE4, 0x6E, 0x24, 0x20, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x6B, 0x7F, 0x7B, 0xF9, 0xB0, 0xB8, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x7B, 0x3C, 0xE1, 0x19, 0xA1, 0x23, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xE3, 0xC2, 0x53, 0xC0, 0x07, 0x13, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xFE, 0x36, 0x35, 0x9F, 0x5E, 0x59, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x55, 0x89, 0x84, 0xBC, 0xEF, 0xA2, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0x1A, 0x08, 0x67, 0xB4, 0xE7, 0x22, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x26, 0xDF, 0x81, 0x3C, 0x5F, 0x1C, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x4D, 0xD0, 0x0A, 0x48, 0x06, 0xF4, 0x48), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x18, 0x39, 0xF7, 0xD1, 0x20, 0x77, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0x8F, 0x44, 0x13, 0xCB, 0x78, 0x11, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xE2, 0x49, 0xEA, 0x43, 0x79, 0x08, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0xD1, 0xD8, 0x73, 0x2C, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xE5, 0xE7, 0xF4, 0x46, 0xAB, 0x20, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x0B, 0xB9, 0x71, 0x1A, 0x27, 0xB7, 0xA7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xA2, 0x2C, 0xD1, 0xDA, 0xBC, 0xC1, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xA3, 0x10, 0x1F, 0x90, 0xF2, 0xA5, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xFB, 0x20, 0xF4, 0xC0, 0x70, 0xC0, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0xA7, 0x99, 0xF0, 0xA5, 0xD3, 0x09, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0xE8, 0x14, 0x39, 0xBE, 0xCB, 0x60, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0xD6, 0x14, 0xA9, 0xC9, 0x20, 0xC3, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xA8, 0x5B, 0xFD, 0x2D, 0x96, 0xBC, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x04, 0x45, 0xBE, 0xCE, 0x75, 0x95, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0xDA, 0x58, 0x49, 0x35, 0x09, 0x8D, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xF0, 0xC0, 0x36, 0xF2, 0xA6, 0x2D, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xFC, 0x3D, 0xA8, 0xFB, 0x3C, 0xD2, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x4D, 0x71, 0x09, 0x18, 0x42, 0xF0, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xC1, 0xCE, 0x9E, 0x6A, 0x49, 0x60, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xB1, 0x00, 0xF7, 0xA1, 0x7A, 0x31, 0xB4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xC3, 0x86, 0xCD, 0x20, 0x4A, 0x17, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xAB, 0x8B, 0x47, 0x8D, 0xAA, 0xA6, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x97, 0xF0, 0xBC, 0x2D, 0xDC, 0x9D, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x86, 0xB0, 0x74, 0xB2, 0xF4, 0xF6, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xBD, 0xAC, 0xE3, 0x8F, 0x43, 0x5C, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0xC3, 0xE2, 0x6E, 0x25, 0x49, 0xCD, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x5E, 0x08, 0xB3, 0xB9, 0xAC, 0x5F, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xB7, 0xD1, 0xF4, 0xDC, 0x19, 0xE9, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xE4, 0xFA, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x3E, 0xED, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x67, 0x92, 0x84, 0x6E, 0x48, 0x03, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x95, 0xEF, 0x8F, 0xB2, 0x82, 0x6B, 0x1C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xFA, 0xB9, 0x55, 0x23, 0xFE, 0x09, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x79, 0x85, 0x4B, 0x0E, 0xD4, 0x35, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x27, 0x45, 0x81, 0xE0, 0x88, 0x52, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x63, 0xA2, 0x4B, 0xBC, 0x5D, 0xB1, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x8C, 0x83, 0xD9, 0x3E, 0xD3, 0x42, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x03, 0x3A, 0x31, 0xBA, 0xE9, 0x3A, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x10, 0xCD, 0x2D, 0x00, 0xFE, 0x32, 0xA7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x6E, 0x1F, 0xDA, 0xF8, 0x6F, 0x4D, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x79, 0x7D, 0x09, 0xE5, 0xD3, 0x03, 0x21), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xC3, 0xBE, 0xDF, 0x07, 0x65, 0x49, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x57, 0x33, 0xEF, 0xAE, 0x4F, 0x04, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0xE9, 0x9B, 0xFE, 0xBF, 0xE6, 0x85, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0xBA, 0xAA, 0x06, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0xB8, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x83, 0x01, 0xA9, 0xF6, 0x51, 0xE7, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xA6, 0x15, 0x8E, 0xAB, 0x1F, 0x10, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x08, 0x27, 0x1A, 0xA1, 0x21, 0xAD, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x09, 0x90, 0x6E, 0x50, 0x90, 0x9A, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x9A, 0xFE, 0xD7, 0xA1, 0xF5, 0xA2, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x7D, 0xE3, 0xDC, 0x21, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xBF, 0x07, 0xFF, 0x45, 0xDF, 0x51, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x5C, 0x34, 0x02, 0x62, 0x9B, 0x08, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xCE, 0x9A, 0x6A, 0xEC, 0x75, 0xF6, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x59, 0xF4, 0x78, 0x3C, 0x60, 0xB1, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x37, 0x84, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0xF2, 0x9A, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x9A, 0x9A, 0x15, 0x36, 0xE0, 0x2B, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x38, 0x9C, 0x50, 0x3D, 0x1E, 0x37, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x79, 0xF0, 0x92, 0xF2, 0x8B, 0x18, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xE0, 0x82, 0x1E, 0x80, 0x82, 0x4B, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xBB, 0x59, 0x6B, 0x8A, 0x77, 0x41, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xF9, 0xD4, 0xB8, 0x4A, 0x82, 0xCF, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x8C, 0xC8, 0x9B, 0x72, 0x9E, 0xF7, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0xCE, 0xE9, 0x77, 0x0A, 0x19, 0x59, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0xA1, 0x41, 0x6A, 0x72, 0x4B, 0xB4, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x35, 0x43, 0xE2, 0x8C, 0xBE, 0x0D, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xEB, 0xAD, 0xF3, 0xA9, 0xA6, 0x68, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x2F, 0xE2, 0x48, 0x0C, 0xDB, 0x1F, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x1E, 0x60, 0x9B, 0x2A, 0xD2, 0xC1, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x64, 0xB5, 0xD2, 0xF6, 0xF6, 0x6E, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x3D, 0x30, 0x78, 0x10, 0x18, 0x41, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x1D, 0x1C, 0xE0, 0x6D, 0x83, 0xD1, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x03, 0x0B, 0xF5, 0x2F, 0x6C, 0x04, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x3E, 0xD5, 0xFC, 0x31, 0x5B, 0x3A, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x82, 0x2F, 0xFB, 0xFE, 0xF8, 0x76, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x26, 0xDA, 0x9C, 0x36, 0xF5, 0x93, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0xE7, 0x6E, 0xD2, 0x7D, 0x81, 0x09, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x03, 0xF9, 0x58, 0x48, 0x24, 0xA2, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x79, 0x0C, 0x8E, 0x6B, 0x95, 0xF3, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x10, 0x5C, 0x87, 0x03, 0x39, 0xCF, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xF0, 0xF7, 0xC1, 0x07, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xE8, 0x02, 0x89, 0x65, 0xC4, 0x72, 0x36), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x88, 0xEA, 0x96, 0x67, 0x0B, 0x5D, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x75, 0x60, 0xA8, 0xBD, 0x74, 0xDF, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xE5, 0x71, 0x50, 0x67, 0xD0, 0xD2, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xFC, 0xE5, 0xC7, 0x77, 0xB0, 0x7F, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x86, 0x69, 0xCD, 0x0D, 0x9A, 0xBD, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x17, 0xBC, 0xBB, 0x59, 0x85, 0x7D, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xA8, 0x76, 0xAC, 0x80, 0xA9, 0x72, 0xE0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x78, 0xC1, 0xE2, 0x4D, 0xAF, 0xF9, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x97, 0x8E, 0x74, 0xC4, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xD8, 0xF6, 0xF3, 0xAF, 0x2F, 0x52, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x57, 0xF4, 0xCE, 0xEE, 0x43, 0xED, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x46, 0x38, 0xDE, 0x20, 0xFD, 0x59, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x18, 0xE8, 0x58, 0xB9, 0x76, 0x2C, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x54, 0xE4, 0xFE, 0xC7, 0xBC, 0x31, 0x37), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xF8, 0x89, 0xEE, 0x70, 0xB5, 0xB0, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x22, 0x26, 0x9A, 0x53, 0xB9, 0x38, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xA7, 0x19, 0x8C, 0x74, 0x7E, 0x88, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xDA, 0x0A, 0xE8, 0xDA, 0xA5, 0xBE, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x5C, 0xF7, 0xB1, 0x0C, 0x72, 0xFB, 0x09), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0xE2, 0x23, 0xE7, 0x46, 0xB7, 0xE0, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x36, 0xBC, 0xBD, 0x48, 0x11, 0x8E, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0xBB, 0xA1, 0xF7, 0x0B, 0x9E, 0xBF, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x28, 0xE1, 0xA2, 0x8F, 0xFC, 0xFC, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0xFE, 0x19, 0x0A, 0xE5, 0xE7, 0x69, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xCD, 0x12, 0xF5, 0xBE, 0xD3, 0x04, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xA8, 0x0D, 0x81, 0x59, 0xC4, 0x79, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xF3, 0x4B, 0x92, 0x65, 0xC3, 0x31, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0xB5, 0x4F, 0x4D, 0x91, 0xD4, 0xE2, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x09, 0x41, 0x79, 0x1D, 0x4D, 0x0D, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x31, 0x18, 0xBA, 0xA0, 0xF2, 0x6E, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x5B, 0x4D, 0x4F, 0xAF, 0xC9, 0x8C, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x99, 0x9C, 0x06, 0x68, 0xDE, 0xD8, 0x29), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x04, 0xE1, 0xB5, 0x9D, 0x00, 0xBC, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x95, 0x92, 0x8D, 0x72, 0xD3, 0x37, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x4B, 0x27, 0xA2, 0xE8, 0xA4, 0x26, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x45, 0x9C, 0xA9, 0xCB, 0x9F, 0xBA, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x7E, 0x1B, 0x64, 0xF4, 0xE8, 0xA5, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x20, 0xA9, 0xCA, 0xF3, 0x89, 0xE5, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xED, 0xFC, 0xAB, 0xD9, 0x0A, 0xB9, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x6F, 0x46, 0x7C, 0xCD, 0x78, 0xFF, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xAB, 0x71, 0x5A, 0x94, 0xAB, 0x20, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x2E, 0xEE, 0x87, 0x57, 0x1F, 0xAD, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x4C, 0x3D, 0xFB, 0x7E, 0xA1, 0x8B, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xCF, 0x07, 0x86, 0xBA, 0x53, 0x37, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x26, 0xB2, 0xB9, 0xE2, 0x91, 0xE3, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xC9, 0x54, 0x84, 0x08, 0x3D, 0x0B, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xA8, 0x77, 0x2F, 0x64, 0x45, 0x99, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x96, 0x16, 0x1F, 0xDB, 0x96, 0x28, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x2B, 0x8D, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x4F, 0x55, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0xE6, 0x48, 0xBD, 0x99, 0x3D, 0x12, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x84, 0x59, 0xDA, 0xB9, 0xB6, 0x66, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x78, 0x41, 0x92, 0xDF, 0xF4, 0x3F, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x86, 0x6F, 0x4F, 0xBF, 0x67, 0xDF, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x2B, 0x1E, 0x5F, 0x00, 0xEA, 0xF6, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xB9, 0x6A, 0x89, 0xD8, 0xC0, 0xD7, 0xA7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x9A, 0x32, 0x23, 0xA0, 0x02, 0x91, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x7F, 0x6A, 0x15, 0x64, 0x6A, 0x8B, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x57, 0x82, 0x58, 0xA9, 0x56, 0xB5, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x50, 0x92, 0x60, 0xCC, 0x81, 0x24, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x3D, 0xAD, 0xDA, 0xD9, 0x51, 0x3E, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0xFE, 0x8F, 0xB0, 0x0B, 0xDE, 0x2E, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xD2, 0xBE, 0xEF, 0xAC, 0x76, 0x71, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xE8, 0x72, 0x0B, 0xAC, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x5B, 0xC7, 0xFC, 0xE3, 0x3C, 0x7C, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x04, 0xA7, 0xB9, 0x9B, 0x93, 0xC0, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x48, 0x4B, 0x8E, 0x32, 0xC5, 0xF0, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x42, 0x07, 0xC1, 0xF2, 0xF1, 0x72, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x37, 0x54, 0x9C, 0x88, 0xD2, 0x62, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x89, 0x58, 0xA2, 0x0F, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0xCC, 0x4C, 0x97, 0x30, 0x66, 0x34, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x1F, 0xDB, 0xC9, 0x5E, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x4D, 0x49, 0xFF, 0x9B, 0x9C, 0xAC, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0xE4, 0x4B, 0xF2, 0xD4, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xDA, 0xE8, 0x61, 0x9F, 0xC8, 0x49, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xCB, 0xF2, 0x2D, 0x85, 0xF6, 0x8D, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xC5, 0xCD, 0x2C, 0x79, 0xC6, 0x0E, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x1D, 0x55, 0x0F, 0xF8, 0x22, 0x9F, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x56, 0xBA, 0xE7, 0x57, 0x32, 0xEC, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x9A, 0xC6, 0x4C, 0x09, 0xC4, 0x52, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x1E, 0x6F, 0xF4, 0x7D, 0x27, 0xDD, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x11, 0x16, 0xEC, 0x79, 0x83, 0xAD, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x4E, 0x92, 0x1F, 0x19, 0x7D, 0x65, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0xFF, 0x78, 0x15, 0x45, 0x63, 0x32, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x91, 0xD0, 0x78, 0x58, 0xDA, 0x50, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0xDE, 0x40, 0xF6, 0x41, 0xB4, 0x3B, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x8D, 0xE0, 0xE1, 0xA9, 0xF0, 0x35, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xD4, 0xBA, 0x7B, 0xCC, 0x1B, 0x3A, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x5A, 0x2E, 0x74, 0x47, 0x14, 0xC3, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xF0, 0x8B, 0x06, 0x15, 0x8E, 0x0E, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0xD2, 0xEB, 0x97, 0x50, 0x7D, 0x31, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x93, 0x4C, 0xDB, 0x97, 0x79, 0x44, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xA2, 0xA0, 0x0B, 0xC8, 0x3A, 0x8A, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x50, 0x92, 0x9E, 0x24, 0x1F, 0xCB, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x16, 0xC9, 0xC5, 0x3D, 0x5A, 0xAF, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xE3, 0x97, 0xE4, 0xA8, 0x50, 0xF6, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x57, 0x97, 0x42, 0x78, 0x92, 0x49, 0x0D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0xEB, 0x62, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0x32, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x0C, 0x36, 0x6E, 0x8F, 0xE8, 0xE8, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xD3, 0x7C, 0xC7, 0x8D, 0x3F, 0x5C, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x64, 0x6A, 0x73, 0x10, 0x79, 0xB8, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xF9, 0xEF, 0xA5, 0x20, 0x4A, 0x5C, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xF3, 0xF4, 0x49, 0x5B, 0x73, 0xAA, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xF2, 0xEA, 0x0F, 0x00, 0xAD, 0x53, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xB8, 0x66, 0xED, 0xC4, 0x2B, 0x4C, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x2F, 0xC1, 0x9A, 0x37, 0xD2, 0x7F, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xA7, 0x81, 0x38, 0x64, 0xC9, 0x37, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x3B, 0x6C, 0x9F, 0x5B, 0xD9, 0x8B, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x14, 0xD9, 0x08, 0xD8, 0xD2, 0x7E, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x71, 0xE6, 0x3D, 0xD1, 0xB0, 0xE7, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x81, 0x23, 0xEC, 0x2D, 0x42, 0x45, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x5B, 0x44, 0x6B, 0x89, 0x03, 0x67, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x27, 0xAE, 0x80, 0x5A, 0x33, 0xBE, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xB6, 0x64, 0x1A, 0xDF, 0xD3, 0x85, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x8C, 0x22, 0xBA, 0xD0, 0xBD, 0xCC, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x3C, 0x01, 0x3A, 0xFF, 0x9D, 0xC7, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xC7, 0x64, 0xB4, 0x59, 0x4E, 0x9F, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x34, 0x0A, 0x41, 0x94, 0xA8, 0xF2, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xD4, 0xE4, 0xF0, 0x97, 0x45, 0x6D, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0x1F, 0x4D, 0x6D, 0xFE, 0xA0, 0xC4, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x28, 0x5C, 0x40, 0xBB, 0x65, 0xD4, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xA8, 0x87, 0x35, 0x20, 0x3A, 0x89, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xFD, 0x4F, 0xAB, 0x2D, 0xD1, 0xD0, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xE8, 0x00, 0xFC, 0x69, 0x52, 0xF8, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x9A, 0x99, 0xE1, 0xDC, 0x9C, 0x3F, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x08, 0x98, 0xD9, 0xCA, 0x73, 0xD5, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x2C, 0xE0, 0xA7, 0x3E, 0x91, 0xD7, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x04, 0xB0, 0x54, 0x09, 0xF4, 0x72, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xEE, 0x28, 0xCC, 0xE8, 0x50, 0x78, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x91, 0x03, 0x76, 0xDB, 0x68, 0x24, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0xE0, 0x56, 0xB2, 0x5D, 0x12, 0xD3, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x42, 0x59, 0x8B, 0xDF, 0x67, 0xB5, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xCC, 0xE5, 0x31, 0x53, 0x7A, 0x46, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_16_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x8D, 0x59, 0xB5, 0x1B, 0x0F, 0xF4, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x2F, 0xD1, 0x2C, 0xE0, 0xD8, 0x04, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xF4, 0xD7, 0xBA, 0xB0, 0xA3, 0x7E, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x08, 0x51, 0x56, 0xA6, 0x76, 0x67, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x17, 0x63, 0xFE, 0x56, 0xD0, 0xD9, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0xF6, 0xC3, 0x14, 0x47, 0xC5, 0xA7, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x4C, 0x80, 0xF6, 0xA2, 0x57, 0xA7, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xB3, 0x7B, 0xF8, 0x2F, 0xE1, 0x3E, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_16_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0xF4, 0xF9, 0x6B, 0x7B, 0x90, 0xDF, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x82, 0xEF, 0x62, 0xA1, 0x4C, 0x53, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x99, 0x76, 0x01, 0xBA, 0x8D, 0x0F, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xF4, 0x58, 0x73, 0x56, 0xFE, 0xDD, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xCE, 0xF9, 0xE8, 0xA1, 0x34, 0xC3, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x5F, 0xDC, 0x6A, 0x3D, 0xD8, 0x7F, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xF4, 0x51, 0xB8, 0xB8, 0xC1, 0xD7, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x7D, 0x58, 0xD1, 0xD4, 0x1B, 0x4D, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_17_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x95, 0xDF, 0x00, 0xD8, 0x21, 0xDE, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x47, 0x3C, 0xC3, 0xB2, 0x01, 0x53, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x17, 0x43, 0x23, 0xBD, 0xCA, 0x71, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xBA, 0x0F, 0x4F, 0xDC, 0x41, 0x54, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x39, 0x26, 0x70, 0x53, 0x32, 0x18, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x46, 0x07, 0x97, 0x3A, 0x57, 0xE0, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x92, 0x4F, 0xCE, 0xDF, 0x25, 0x80, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x6F, 0x9A, 0x03, 0x05, 0x4B, 0xD1, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_17_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x01, 0x72, 0x30, 0x90, 0x17, 0x51, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xFB, 0x41, 0x65, 0x5C, 0xB4, 0x2D, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xCD, 0xCD, 0xAA, 0x41, 0xCC, 0xBB, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xCE, 0x08, 0x0A, 0x63, 0xE9, 0xA2, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xA8, 0x21, 0x7F, 0x7A, 0x5B, 0x9B, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x6B, 0x89, 0x44, 0x0A, 0x7F, 0x85, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xDE, 0x7C, 0x19, 0x5C, 0x65, 0x26, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0xAC, 0x62, 0x29, 0x4A, 0xF1, 0xD0, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_18_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x00, 0x40, 0x87, 0xEB, 0xA9, 0x58, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x51, 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x56, 0x35, 0x51, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xAC, 0x08, 0x94, 0x71, 0xDA, 0xEC, 0x99), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x4D, 0xC5, 0x7B, 0x31, 0x8B, 0x8D, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x05, 0xF1, 0x3E, 0x9E, 0x8F, 0x17, 0x8F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x9C, 0x4B, 0x62, 0x94, 0xAD, 0x49, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xC9, 0xC6, 0x8F, 0xFD, 0x33, 0x44, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x96, 0x17, 0x7F, 0x42, 0xBE, 0xF7, 0x0D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_18_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0x29, 0x39, 0x13, 0x08, 0x8D, 0x91, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x79, 0xF9, 0x2F, 0xA9, 0x0A, 0xCF, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x87, 0x7A, 0xA3, 0x19, 0xAB, 0x55, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x0B, 0x01, 0xC5, 0x56, 0x19, 0x9D, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0xDE, 0x82, 0x3B, 0xEA, 0xD3, 0x0B, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x6B, 0xC7, 0xF3, 0x0F, 0x82, 0x87, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x2E, 0x23, 0xF2, 0x39, 0x9D, 0x49, 0x70), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0xDE, 0xAF, 0x7A, 0xEE, 0xB0, 0xDA, 0x70), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_19_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x4E, 0x2A, 0x50, 0xFD, 0x8E, 0xC0, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x0F, 0x7C, 0x76, 0x63, 0xD8, 0x89, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x2D, 0xB9, 0x4E, 0xF4, 0xEE, 0x85, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x95, 0x5C, 0x96, 0x5D, 0xAA, 0x59, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xDB, 0xD2, 0x68, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x94, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x02, 0xBF, 0x77, 0x9F, 0xB9, 0x4C, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xDC, 0xC0, 0xCF, 0x81, 0x1E, 0xC4, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xCC, 0x37, 0x86, 0xDC, 0xE2, 0x64, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_19_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x30, 0xB1, 0x59, 0x20, 0x9D, 0x98, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x0C, 0x9D, 0xF8, 0x20, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0xA0, 0xF4, 0xE7, 0x3E, 0x9C, 0x9E, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x25, 0xA2, 0xB0, 0x54, 0xCD, 0x2E, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xD9, 0x42, 0xB0, 0x80, 0xB0, 0xA3, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0xFE, 0x9D, 0x8D, 0x40, 0xFF, 0x27, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x9D, 0xA6, 0x88, 0x3A, 0x8B, 0x6F, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x39, 0xEE, 0x1F, 0x3F, 0xB1, 0x4F, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_20_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xD7, 0x9E, 0xFF, 0xD2, 0x35, 0x67, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x4F, 0x15, 0x5D, 0xE3, 0xE8, 0x53, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xF7, 0x24, 0x98, 0xA2, 0xCB, 0x11, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x2E, 0x25, 0xE1, 0x94, 0xC5, 0xA3, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x82, 0x6E, 0xBA, 0xE7, 0x43, 0x25, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x65, 0xB4, 0x49, 0x73, 0x18, 0x35, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x5B, 0xBC, 0x62, 0x86, 0x4C, 0xC1, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xF2, 0x95, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0xA2, 0x35, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_20_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x59, 0x62, 0xB0, 0x4B, 0x1E, 0xB4, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x55, 0xCE, 0xB0, 0x69, 0xBA, 0x63, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0x69, 0x86, 0xDB, 0x34, 0x7D, 0x68, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x06, 0xCA, 0x55, 0x44, 0x36, 0x2B, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xD4, 0xC4, 0x3D, 0xCD, 0x9E, 0x69, 0xA4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x44, 0xE4, 0xBF, 0x31, 0xE6, 0x40, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x4F, 0xFA, 0x75, 0xE3, 0xFB, 0x97, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0x1C, 0x48, 0xB0, 0x26, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_21_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x7B, 0x32, 0xFA, 0xF2, 0x6D, 0x84, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x21, 0x03, 0x1D, 0x0D, 0x22, 0x55, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xF9, 0x42, 0x03, 0x9C, 0xC2, 0xCB, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xA1, 0x96, 0xD9, 0x9D, 0x11, 0x6F, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x40, 0x57, 0xEB, 0x40, 0x2D, 0xC0, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x96, 0xBB, 0x4F, 0x2F, 0x23, 0xA8, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x29, 0x85, 0x21, 0xA5, 0x50, 0x62, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x7D, 0x92, 0xCF, 0x87, 0x0C, 0x22, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_21_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x0E, 0xA5, 0x32, 0x5B, 0xDF, 0x9C, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x96, 0x37, 0x2C, 0x88, 0x35, 0x30, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xB4, 0x69, 0xFF, 0xEB, 0xC6, 0x94, 0x08), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x55, 0x60, 0xAD, 0xAA, 0x58, 0x14, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xFF, 0xF2, 0xB2, 0xD5, 0xA7, 0xD9, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xAE, 0x54, 0xD2, 0x60, 0x31, 0xF3, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x92, 0x83, 0xE3, 0xF1, 0x42, 0x83, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xD2, 0xC8, 0xB7, 0x76, 0x45, 0x7F, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_22_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x11, 0xA4, 0xFB, 0x7A, 0x01, 0xBC, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x27, 0x73, 0x8D, 0x02, 0x91, 0x27, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x62, 0xF6, 0xDD, 0x6B, 0xFA, 0x5B, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0xCA, 0xA2, 0x44, 0x2C, 0xF0, 0x28, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xF1, 0x7A, 0xA2, 0x42, 0x4C, 0x50, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x83, 0x3E, 0x50, 0xAB, 0x9C, 0xF7, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xED, 0x78, 0xCB, 0x76, 0x69, 0xDA, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x01, 0x1E, 0x43, 0x27, 0x47, 0x6E, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_22_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x4F, 0x54, 0xB9, 0x3E, 0xBD, 0xD5, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x35, 0x40, 0x69, 0x7F, 0x74, 0x9D, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x06, 0x6F, 0x67, 0x68, 0x2B, 0x4D, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x65, 0x41, 0xFC, 0x7C, 0x1E, 0xE8, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x79, 0x37, 0xAF, 0xFD, 0xD2, 0xDA, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xA8, 0x69, 0x56, 0x62, 0xA4, 0xE4, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x71, 0x73, 0x21, 0x8A, 0x17, 0x81, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x55, 0x8F, 0x7B, 0xB8, 0xAF, 0xF7, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_23_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xD1, 0xBD, 0xBE, 0x8C, 0xBC, 0x60, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0xA6, 0x57, 0x8C, 0xAE, 0x5C, 0x19, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0x43, 0xE4, 0xD9, 0xD8, 0x7B, 0xE7, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xB9, 0xE4, 0x85, 0x7C, 0x2E, 0xFC, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x2E, 0x01, 0x2A, 0x6D, 0x56, 0xBE, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x0C, 0x25, 0x9B, 0xAE, 0x86, 0x37, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x22, 0xB3, 0xCB, 0x99, 0x66, 0xB7, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xF7, 0x90, 0xF0, 0x1B, 0x09, 0x27, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_23_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x16, 0x08, 0xEF, 0x39, 0x64, 0x49, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xA0, 0xE3, 0x97, 0xA9, 0x07, 0x54, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xFF, 0xE2, 0x00, 0x07, 0x21, 0x88, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xFD, 0x59, 0x53, 0x05, 0x6C, 0x42, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0xF7, 0x39, 0x5C, 0x82, 0x36, 0xE8, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0x83, 0xA8, 0xE2, 0xA8, 0x43, 0x07, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xAF, 0x2B, 0x79, 0xED, 0xD8, 0x39, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x20, 0x91, 0x7A, 0xC4, 0x07, 0xEF, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_24_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x10, 0x2F, 0xAA, 0x0C, 0x94, 0x0E, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x81, 0x87, 0x41, 0x23, 0xEB, 0x55, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x53, 0xCC, 0x79, 0xB6, 0xEB, 0x6C, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x77, 0x73, 0x9D, 0xFC, 0x64, 0x6F, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x40, 0xE3, 0x6D, 0x1C, 0x16, 0x71, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0xF4, 0x1B, 0xFF, 0x1C, 0x2F, 0xA5, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x0E, 0x0B, 0x11, 0xF4, 0x8D, 0x93, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xC5, 0x64, 0x6F, 0x24, 0x19, 0xF2, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_24_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0xB3, 0xAF, 0xA5, 0x0E, 0x4F, 0x5E, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0x77, 0xCA, 0xF2, 0x6D, 0xC5, 0xF6, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x18, 0x8E, 0x33, 0x68, 0x6C, 0xE8, 0xE0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x8B, 0x80, 0x90, 0x19, 0x7F, 0x90, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x80, 0x6B, 0x68, 0xE2, 0x7D, 0xD4, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xC1, 0x67, 0xB3, 0x72, 0xCB, 0xBF, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0xD5, 0xD3, 0x1D, 0x14, 0x58, 0x0A, 0x80), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x7A, 0x65, 0x98, 0xB3, 0x07, 0x4B, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_25_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x87, 0x0F, 0x5F, 0xCF, 0xA2, 0x01, 0x08), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xC9, 0xC8, 0x6E, 0x35, 0x87, 0xA5, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x3E, 0x91, 0xA0, 0xAB, 0x24, 0x1E, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xBC, 0x02, 0x35, 0x70, 0xC1, 0x5F, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x59, 0xA0, 0x50, 0x04, 0x80, 0x52, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x56, 0x6E, 0x42, 0x8F, 0x8C, 0x91, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xA2, 0xCB, 0xA5, 0xDE, 0x14, 0x24, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0xCB, 0x74, 0x28, 0xE6, 0xA7, 0xE7, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_25_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x73, 0xA8, 0x8F, 0x9E, 0x0E, 0x63, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x1B, 0x77, 0xC7, 0xC1, 0x38, 0xF9, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x3C, 0xCF, 0xA8, 0x7A, 0xD7, 0xF3, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x5F, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0xAD, 0xE9, 0x1A, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0xCF, 0x2B, 0x5E, 0xD5, 0x81, 0x95, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x88, 0x75, 0x29, 0x1F, 0xC7, 0xC7, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA9, 0x5A, 0x4D, 0x63, 0x95, 0xF9, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0xCD, 0x04, 0x8F, 0xCD, 0x91, 0xDE, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_26_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xD4, 0xFD, 0x25, 0x11, 0x99, 0x6E, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x83, 0x01, 0x3D, 0xFB, 0x56, 0xA5, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x3A, 0xDC, 0x74, 0xC2, 0xD7, 0xCF, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0xBD, 0xF1, 0xDD, 0xA3, 0x07, 0x03, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xBE, 0xE9, 0x2E, 0x58, 0x84, 0x66, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x20, 0x78, 0x37, 0x79, 0x0B, 0xA6, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xF2, 0xAC, 0x65, 0xC8, 0xC9, 0x2F, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x93, 0xE5, 0x0D, 0x0C, 0xC6, 0xB8, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_26_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xAD, 0x5C, 0x19, 0x12, 0x61, 0x0E, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x4F, 0x0B, 0x1F, 0x49, 0x7E, 0xCD, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x2E, 0x30, 0x61, 0xDB, 0x08, 0x68, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x78, 0xAF, 0xB3, 0x08, 0xC1, 0x69, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x5F, 0x5D, 0xC1, 0x57, 0x6F, 0xD8, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0xD3, 0x6A, 0xF7, 0xFD, 0x86, 0xE5, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x63, 0xBD, 0x70, 0x7B, 0x47, 0xE8, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x62, 0xC8, 0x7E, 0x9D, 0x11, 0x2B, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_27_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x84, 0xFD, 0xD5, 0x9A, 0x56, 0x7F, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xBB, 0xA4, 0x6F, 0x12, 0x6E, 0x4D, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x08, 0xA1, 0x82, 0x9C, 0x62, 0x74, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x58, 0x22, 0x05, 0x1D, 0x15, 0x35, 0x79), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x88, 0xCF, 0x5C, 0x05, 0x78, 0xFB, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x6B, 0x2F, 0x79, 0x09, 0x73, 0x67, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA0, 0x80, 0xD8, 0xE8, 0xEC, 0xFB, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xE7, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x48, 0x7B, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_27_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x53, 0xA9, 0xED, 0x61, 0x92, 0xD7, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x49, 0xD9, 0x5D, 0x9B, 0x4E, 0x89, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x12, 0xEB, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0xCB, 0xC1, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xDC, 0x95, 0x16, 0xFE, 0x29, 0x70, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x33, 0xB1, 0xD6, 0x78, 0xB9, 0xE2, 0x36), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xCE, 0x88, 0xC3, 0xFD, 0x7A, 0x6B, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x1E, 0x50, 0x1E, 0xAF, 0xB1, 0x25, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xE7, 0xD7, 0xD5, 0xBD, 0x7A, 0x12, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_28_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0xAA, 0xA2, 0x80, 0x5D, 0x8F, 0xCD, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x39, 0x79, 0x64, 0xA1, 0x67, 0x3C, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xC7, 0x49, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xAC, 0xAB, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x54, 0x3E, 0x83, 0xF0, 0x3D, 0xBC, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x92, 0x4A, 0x38, 0x42, 0x8A, 0xAB, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x0B, 0x4F, 0xEE, 0x9E, 0x92, 0xA5, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xDD, 0x19, 0x96, 0xF2, 0xF0, 0x6B, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xFC, 0xDD, 0xB2, 0x8A, 0xE5, 0x4C, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_28_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x06, 0x49, 0xAC, 0x99, 0x7E, 0xF8, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xC8, 0x01, 0x51, 0xEA, 0xF6, 0x52, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x89, 0x66, 0x2B, 0x1F, 0x9B, 0x2A, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x0F, 0x95, 0x07, 0x2B, 0x6C, 0x6E, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xC3, 0xB4, 0xBB, 0x91, 0x1F, 0xA3, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x6E, 0x54, 0x28, 0x7B, 0x9C, 0x79, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x45, 0xFF, 0xA6, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x83, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0xDE, 0x8F, 0x17, 0x37, 0x82, 0xCB, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_29_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x94, 0x3F, 0x26, 0xC9, 0x1D, 0xD9, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x97, 0x28, 0x20, 0xCD, 0xC1, 0xF3, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x60, 0x9B, 0x1E, 0xDC, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0xB9, 0x5B, 0x7D, 0xA0, 0xB2, 0x8C, 0xF0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xD1, 0x42, 0xE6, 0x39, 0x33, 0x6D, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xC0, 0xFC, 0xD2, 0x14, 0x5D, 0x3E, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0x4A, 0x3E, 0x40, 0x16, 0x93, 0x15, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x24, 0xC1, 0x27, 0x27, 0xE5, 0x4B, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_29_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x50, 0xD8, 0xBC, 0xC1, 0x46, 0x22, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x0E, 0x60, 0xA1, 0xB3, 0x50, 0xD4, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0xB1, 0x26, 0xB6, 0x6D, 0x47, 0x5A, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0xAC, 0x11, 0x35, 0x3E, 0xB9, 0xF4, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x97, 0xFA, 0xBB, 0x6B, 0x39, 0x13, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x7B, 0x34, 0x12, 0x75, 0x8E, 0x9B, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x9E, 0xCD, 0x29, 0xB6, 0xEF, 0x8D, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xAC, 0xE9, 0x25, 0x27, 0xBB, 0x78, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_30_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x7A, 0xA8, 0xD3, 0xE3, 0x66, 0xE5, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x4C, 0xC4, 0x2C, 0x76, 0x81, 0x50, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x71, 0x08, 0xB8, 0x52, 0x7C, 0xAF, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x59, 0x24, 0xDD, 0xFB, 0x2F, 0xD0, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xCD, 0x56, 0xE9, 0xAC, 0x91, 0xE6, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x64, 0x20, 0xC6, 0x9F, 0xE4, 0xEF, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x2C, 0x8F, 0x8C, 0x97, 0xF6, 0x22, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xF4, 0x88, 0xAA, 0xA8, 0xD7, 0xA5, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_30_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x6C, 0xAE, 0x83, 0xB1, 0x55, 0x55, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x67, 0x84, 0x47, 0x7C, 0x83, 0x5C, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x10, 0x4D, 0xDD, 0x30, 0x60, 0xB0, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xA7, 0x36, 0x76, 0x24, 0x32, 0x9F, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x42, 0x81, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x2E, 0x13, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x94, 0x91, 0xFF, 0x99, 0xA0, 0x09, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x83, 0xA1, 0x76, 0xAF, 0x37, 0x5C, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xA8, 0x04, 0x86, 0xC4, 0xA9, 0x79, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_31_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x8C, 0xC2, 0x34, 0xFB, 0x83, 0x28, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x03, 0x7D, 0x5E, 0x9E, 0x0E, 0xB0, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x02, 0x46, 0x7F, 0xB9, 0xAC, 0xBB, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xED, 0x48, 0xC2, 0x96, 0x4D, 0x56, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0xB5, 0xC5, 0xD1, 0xE6, 0x1C, 0x7E, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x2E, 0x18, 0x71, 0x2D, 0x7B, 0xD7, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x46, 0x9D, 0xDE, 0xAA, 0x78, 0x8E, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xD7, 0x69, 0x2E, 0xE1, 0xD9, 0x48, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_31_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xFF, 0x9E, 0x09, 0x22, 0x22, 0xE6, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x14, 0x28, 0x13, 0x1B, 0x62, 0x12, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x7F, 0x67, 0x03, 0xB0, 0xC0, 0xF3, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0xC3, 0x0F, 0xFB, 0x25, 0x48, 0x3E, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x6E, 0x53, 0x98, 0x36, 0xB3, 0xD3, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x81, 0x54, 0x22, 0xA4, 0xCC, 0xC1, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xBA, 0xFC, 0xA9, 0xDF, 0x68, 0x86, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x92, 0x0E, 0xC3, 0xF2, 0x58, 0xE8, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp521r1_T[32] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp521r1_T_0_X, secp521r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_1_X, secp521r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_2_X, secp521r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_3_X, secp521r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_4_X, secp521r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_5_X, secp521r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_6_X, secp521r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_7_X, secp521r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_8_X, secp521r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_9_X, secp521r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_10_X, secp521r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_11_X, secp521r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_12_X, secp521r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_13_X, secp521r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_14_X, secp521r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_15_X, secp521r1_T_15_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_16_X, secp521r1_T_16_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_17_X, secp521r1_T_17_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_18_X, secp521r1_T_18_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_19_X, secp521r1_T_19_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_20_X, secp521r1_T_20_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_21_X, secp521r1_T_21_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_22_X, secp521r1_T_22_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_23_X, secp521r1_T_23_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_24_X, secp521r1_T_24_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_25_X, secp521r1_T_25_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_26_X, secp521r1_T_26_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_27_X, secp521r1_T_27_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_28_X, secp521r1_T_28_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_29_X, secp521r1_T_29_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_30_X, secp521r1_T_30_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_31_X, secp521r1_T_31_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp521r1_T NULL +#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) @@ -285,6 +2195,190 @@ static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_n[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xFC, 0xF2, 0x26, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), }; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x6C, 0xE0, 0xEA, 0xB1, 0xD1, 0xA5, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xF4, 0xB7, 0x80, 0x02, 0x7D, 0xB0, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xE9, 0x57, 0xC0, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0xDB), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x2F, 0x5E, 0xD9, 0x88, 0xAA, 0x82, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x86, 0xBE, 0x15, 0xD0, 0x63, 0x41, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x28, 0x56, 0x9C, 0x6D, 0x2F, 0x2F, 0x9B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x77, 0x3D, 0x0D, 0x85, 0x48, 0xA8, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x07, 0xDF, 0x1D, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x01, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x86, 0xF6, 0xAF, 0x19, 0x2A, 0x88, 0x2E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x90, 0xB6, 0x2F, 0x48, 0x36, 0x4C, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x11, 0x14, 0xA6, 0xCB, 0xBA, 0x15, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0xB0, 0xF2, 0xD4, 0xC9, 0xDA, 0xBA, 0xD7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0xC1, 0x9C, 0xE6, 0xBB, 0xFB, 0xCF, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x19, 0xAC, 0x5A, 0xC9, 0x8A, 0x1C, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xF6, 0x76, 0x86, 0x89, 0x27, 0x8D, 0x28), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xE0, 0x6F, 0x34, 0xBA, 0x5E, 0xD3, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0xDC, 0xA6, 0x87, 0xC9, 0x9D, 0xC0, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x11, 0x7E, 0xD6, 0xF7, 0x33, 0xFC, 0xE4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x37, 0x3E, 0xC0, 0x7F, 0x62, 0xE7, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x3B, 0x69, 0x9D, 0x44, 0xBC, 0x82, 0x99), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x84, 0xB3, 0x5F, 0x2B, 0xA5, 0x9E, 0x2C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x95, 0xEB, 0x4C, 0x04, 0xB4, 0xF4, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xAD, 0x4B, 0xD5, 0x9A, 0xEB, 0xC4, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xB1, 0xC5, 0x59, 0xE3, 0xD5, 0x16, 0x2A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x2A, 0xCC, 0xAC, 0xD0, 0xEE, 0x50, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x83, 0xE0, 0x5B, 0x14, 0x44, 0x52, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x15, 0x2D, 0x78, 0xF6, 0x51, 0x32, 0xCF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x36, 0x9B, 0xDD, 0xF8, 0xDD, 0xEF, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xB1, 0x6A, 0x2B, 0xAF, 0xEB, 0x2B, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x87, 0x7A, 0x66, 0x5D, 0x5B, 0xDF, 0x8F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x45, 0xE5, 0x81, 0x9B, 0xEB, 0x37, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x29, 0xE2, 0x20, 0x64, 0x23, 0x6B, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x1D, 0x41, 0xE1, 0x9B, 0x61, 0x7B, 0xD9), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x57, 0xA3, 0x0A, 0x13, 0xE4, 0x59, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x6E, 0x4A, 0x48, 0x84, 0x90, 0xAC, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xB8, 0xF5, 0xF3, 0xDE, 0xA0, 0xA1, 0x1D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x32, 0x81, 0xA9, 0x91, 0x5A, 0x4E, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0xA8, 0x90, 0xBE, 0x0F, 0xEC, 0xC0, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x30, 0xD7, 0x08, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x3A, 0xA5), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x55, 0xE3, 0x76, 0xB3, 0x64, 0x74, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x75, 0xD4, 0xDB, 0x98, 0xD7, 0x39, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xEB, 0x8A, 0xAB, 0x16, 0xD9, 0xD4, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xBE, 0xF9, 0xC7, 0xC7, 0xBA, 0xF3, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x85, 0x59, 0xF3, 0x60, 0x41, 0x02, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x1C, 0x4A, 0xA4, 0xC7, 0xED, 0x66, 0xBC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x9C, 0x2E, 0x46, 0x52, 0x18, 0x87, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x35, 0x5A, 0x75, 0xAC, 0x4D, 0x75, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0x2F, 0xAC, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0x93, 0x5E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x4D, 0xC9, 0x18, 0xE9, 0x00, 0xEB, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x69, 0x72, 0x07, 0x5A, 0x59, 0xA8, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x65, 0x83, 0x20, 0x10, 0xF9, 0x69, 0x82), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x56, 0x7F, 0x9F, 0xBF, 0x46, 0x0C, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0xCF, 0xF0, 0xDC, 0xDF, 0x2D, 0xE6, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0xF0, 0x72, 0x3A, 0x7A, 0x03, 0xE5, 0x22), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xAA, 0x57, 0x13, 0x37, 0xA7, 0x2C, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xAC, 0xA2, 0x23, 0xF9, 0x84, 0x60, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xEB, 0x51, 0x70, 0x64, 0x78, 0xCA, 0x05), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xCC, 0x30, 0x62, 0x93, 0x46, 0x13, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x26, 0xCC, 0x6C, 0x3D, 0x5C, 0xDA, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xAA, 0xB8, 0x03, 0xA4, 0x1A, 0x00, 0x96), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x9D, 0xE6, 0xCC, 0x4E, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xC3, 0x8A, 0xAE, 0x6F, 0x40, 0x05, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x8F, 0x4A, 0x4D, 0x35, 0xD3, 0x50, 0x9D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xFD, 0x98, 0xAB, 0xC7, 0x03, 0xB4, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x40, 0xD2, 0x9F, 0xCA, 0xD0, 0x53, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x84, 0x00, 0x6F, 0xC8, 0xAD, 0xED, 0x8D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xD3, 0x57, 0xD7, 0xC3, 0x07, 0xBD, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0xBA, 0x47, 0x1D, 0x3D, 0xEF, 0x98, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xC0, 0x6C, 0x7F, 0x12, 0xEE, 0x9F, 0x67), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x02, 0xDA, 0x79, 0xAA, 0xC9, 0x27, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x79, 0xC7, 0x71, 0x84, 0xCB, 0xE5, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x37, 0x06, 0xBA, 0xB5, 0xD5, 0x18, 0x4C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x65, 0x72, 0x6C, 0xF2, 0x63, 0x27, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xBC, 0x71, 0xDF, 0x75, 0xF8, 0x98, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x70, 0x9B, 0xDC, 0xE7, 0x18, 0x71, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x5B, 0x9F, 0x00, 0x5A, 0xB6, 0x80, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xE0, 0xBB, 0xFC, 0x5E, 0x78, 0x9C, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x03, 0x68, 0x83, 0x3D, 0x2E, 0x4C, 0xDD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x49, 0x23, 0xA8, 0xCB, 0x3B, 0x1A, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x3D, 0xA7, 0x46, 0xCF, 0x75, 0xB6, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xFD, 0x30, 0x01, 0xB6, 0xEF, 0xF9, 0xE8), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xFA, 0xDA, 0xB8, 0x29, 0x42, 0xC9, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xD7, 0xA0, 0xE6, 0x6B, 0x86, 0x61, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0xE9, 0xD3, 0x37, 0xD8, 0xE7, 0x35, 0xA9), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xC8, 0x8E, 0xB1, 0xCB, 0xB1, 0xB5, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xD7, 0x46, 0x7D, 0xAF, 0xE2, 0xDC, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x46, 0xE7, 0xD8, 0x76, 0x31, 0x90, 0x76), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0xD3, 0xF4, 0x74, 0xE1, 0x67, 0xD8, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x70, 0x3C, 0xC8, 0xAF, 0x5F, 0xF4, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x4E, 0xED, 0x5C, 0x43, 0xB3, 0x16, 0x35), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xAE, 0xD1, 0xDD, 0x31, 0x14, 0xD3, 0xF0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x14, 0x06, 0x13, 0x12, 0x1C, 0x81, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0xF9, 0x0C, 0x91, 0xF7, 0x67, 0x59, 0x63), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x91, 0xE2, 0xF4, 0x9D, 0xEB, 0x88, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x82, 0x30, 0x9C, 0xAE, 0x18, 0x4D, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x79, 0xCF, 0x17, 0xA5, 0x1E, 0xE8, 0xC8), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp192k1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp192k1_T_0_X, secp192k1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_1_X, secp192k1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_2_X, secp192k1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_3_X, secp192k1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_4_X, secp192k1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_5_X, secp192k1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_6_X, secp192k1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_7_X, secp192k1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_8_X, secp192k1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_9_X, secp192k1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_10_X, secp192k1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_11_X, secp192k1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_12_X, secp192k1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_13_X, secp192k1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_14_X, secp192k1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_15_X, secp192k1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp192k1_T NULL +#endif + #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) @@ -318,6 +2412,221 @@ static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_n[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), }; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xA4, 0xB7, 0xB6, 0x0E, 0x65, 0x7E, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0x75, 0x70, 0xE4, 0xE9, 0x67, 0xA4, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x28, 0xFC, 0x30, 0xDF, 0x99, 0xF0, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x5B, 0x45, 0xA1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x61, 0x6D, 0x55, 0xDB, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xBD, 0xB0, 0xC0, 0xF7, 0x19, 0xE3, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xFB, 0xCA, 0x82, 0x42, 0x34, 0xBA, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x9F, 0x08, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x6C, 0x22, 0x22, 0x40, 0x89, 0xAE, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x92, 0xE1, 0x87, 0x56, 0x35, 0xAF, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xAF, 0x08, 0x35, 0x27, 0xEA, 0x04, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x53, 0xFD, 0xCF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xD0, 0x9F, 0x8D, 0xF3, 0x63, 0x54, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0xDB, 0x0F, 0x61, 0x54, 0x26, 0xD1, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x21, 0xF7, 0x1B, 0xB5, 0x1D, 0xF6, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x05, 0xDA, 0x8F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x26, 0x73, 0xBC, 0xE4, 0x29, 0x62, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x95, 0x17, 0x8B, 0xC3, 0x9B, 0xAC, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0xDB, 0x77, 0xDF, 0xDD, 0x13, 0x04, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0xFC, 0x22, 0x93, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x65, 0xF1, 0x5A, 0x37, 0xEF, 0x79, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x01, 0x37, 0xAC, 0x9A, 0x5B, 0x51, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x75, 0x13, 0xA9, 0x4A, 0xAD, 0xFE, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x82, 0x6F, 0x66, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x5E, 0xF0, 0x40, 0xC3, 0xA6, 0xE2, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x9A, 0x6F, 0xCF, 0x11, 0x26, 0x66, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x73, 0xA8, 0xCF, 0x2B, 0x12, 0x36, 0x37), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xB3, 0x0A, 0x58, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x79, 0x00, 0x55, 0x04, 0x34, 0x90, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x54, 0x1C, 0xC2, 0x45, 0x0C, 0x1B, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x19, 0xAB, 0xA8, 0xFC, 0x73, 0xDC, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0xFB, 0x93, 0xCE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x75, 0xD0, 0x66, 0x95, 0x86, 0xCA, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xEA, 0x29, 0x16, 0x6A, 0x38, 0xDF, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA2, 0x36, 0x2F, 0xDC, 0xBB, 0x5E, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x89, 0x59, 0x49, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xA3, 0x99, 0x9D, 0xB8, 0x77, 0x9D, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x93, 0x43, 0x47, 0xC6, 0x5C, 0xF9, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x00, 0x79, 0x42, 0x64, 0xB8, 0x25, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x54, 0xB4, 0x33, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x0C, 0x42, 0x90, 0x83, 0x0B, 0x31, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x2E, 0xAE, 0xC8, 0xC7, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0x70), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xBC, 0xAD, 0x41, 0xE7, 0x32, 0x3A, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x97, 0x52, 0x83, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x13, 0x7A, 0xBD, 0xAE, 0x94, 0x60, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x9B, 0x95, 0xB4, 0x6E, 0x68, 0xB2, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x49, 0xBE, 0x51, 0xFE, 0x66, 0x15, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x37, 0xE4, 0xFE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x9B, 0xEE, 0x64, 0xC9, 0x1B, 0xBD, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x5F, 0x34, 0xA9, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x25, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x13, 0xB1, 0x38, 0xFB, 0x9D, 0x78, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0xE7, 0x1B, 0xFA, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xB3, 0xB7, 0x44, 0x92, 0x6B, 0x00, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x82, 0x44, 0x3E, 0x18, 0x1A, 0x58, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0xF8, 0xC0, 0xE4, 0xEE, 0xC1, 0xBF, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x32, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x9A, 0x42, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x26, 0x54, 0x21), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x85, 0x74, 0xA0, 0x79, 0xA8, 0xEE, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x36, 0x60, 0xB3, 0x28, 0x4D, 0x55, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x27, 0x82, 0x29, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0xFC, 0x73, 0x77, 0xAF, 0x5C, 0xAC, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0xED, 0xE5, 0xF6, 0x1D, 0xA8, 0x67, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xDE, 0x33, 0x1C, 0xF1, 0x80, 0x73, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xE2, 0xDE, 0x3C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x3E, 0x6B, 0xFE, 0xF0, 0x04, 0x28, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xB2, 0x14, 0x9D, 0x18, 0x11, 0x7D, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xC4, 0xD6, 0x2E, 0x6E, 0x57, 0x4D, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x55, 0x1B, 0xDE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xF7, 0x17, 0xBC, 0x45, 0xAB, 0x16, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xB0, 0xEF, 0x61, 0xE3, 0x20, 0x7C, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x85, 0x41, 0x4D, 0xF1, 0x7E, 0x4D, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xC2, 0x9B, 0x5E, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x2E, 0x49, 0x3D, 0x3E, 0x4B, 0xD3, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x2B, 0x9D, 0xD5, 0x27, 0xFA, 0xCA, 0xE0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0xB3, 0x6A, 0xE0, 0x79, 0x14, 0x28, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x1E, 0xDC, 0xF5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x44, 0x56, 0xCD, 0xFC, 0x9F, 0x09, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x8C, 0x59, 0xA4, 0x64, 0x2A, 0x3A, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xA0, 0xB5, 0x86, 0x4E, 0x69, 0xDA, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x8B, 0x11, 0x38, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x17, 0x16, 0x12, 0x17, 0xDC, 0x00, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x76, 0x24, 0x6C, 0x97, 0x2C, 0xB5, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x71, 0xE3, 0xB0, 0xBB, 0x4E, 0x50, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0x48, 0x26, 0xD5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x5F, 0x28, 0xF6, 0x01, 0x5A, 0x60, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x95, 0xFE, 0xD0, 0xAD, 0x15, 0xD4, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x5B, 0x7A, 0xFD, 0x80, 0xF7, 0x9F, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xBC, 0x1B, 0xDF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xE6, 0xDF, 0x14, 0x29, 0xF4, 0xD4, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x12, 0xDD, 0xEC, 0x5B, 0x8A, 0x59, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x92, 0x3E, 0x35, 0x08, 0xE9, 0xCF, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x35, 0x29, 0x97, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xDB, 0xD6, 0x6A, 0xC5, 0x43, 0xA4, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x33, 0x50, 0x61, 0x70, 0xA1, 0xE9, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x15, 0x6E, 0x5F, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x8C, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0xA1, 0x9A, 0x9D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xC6, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0x4A, 0xCD, 0x9B, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x4D, 0x5A, 0xB8, 0xE2, 0x6D, 0xA6, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x3F, 0xB6, 0x17, 0xE3, 0x2C, 0x6F, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xA4, 0x59, 0x51, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x4F, 0x7C, 0x49, 0xCD, 0x6E, 0xEB, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0xC9, 0x1F, 0xB7, 0x4D, 0x98, 0xC7, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0xFD, 0x98, 0x20, 0x95, 0xBB, 0x20, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xF2, 0x73, 0x92, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xEF, 0xFB, 0x30, 0xFA, 0x12, 0x1A, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0x4C, 0x24, 0xB4, 0x5B, 0xC9, 0x4C, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0xDD, 0x5E, 0x84, 0x95, 0x4D, 0x26, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xFA, 0xF9, 0x3A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0xA3, 0x2E, 0x7A, 0xDC, 0xA7, 0x53, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x9F, 0x81, 0x84, 0xB2, 0x0D, 0xFE, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x89, 0x1B, 0x77, 0x0C, 0x89, 0x71, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xB2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xE9, 0x2C, 0x79, 0xA6, 0x3C, 0xAD, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xE0, 0x23, 0x02, 0x86, 0x0F, 0x77, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x93, 0x6D, 0xE9, 0xF9, 0x3C, 0xBE, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0xE7, 0x24, 0x92, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x3C, 0x5B, 0x4B, 0x1B, 0x25, 0x37, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xE8, 0x38, 0x1B, 0xA1, 0x5A, 0x2E, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x19, 0xFD, 0xF4, 0x78, 0x01, 0x6B, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0x69, 0x37, 0x4F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0xE2, 0xBF, 0xD3, 0xEC, 0x95, 0x9C, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x7B, 0xFC, 0xD5, 0xD3, 0x25, 0x5E, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x55, 0x09, 0xA2, 0x58, 0x6A, 0xC9, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0xCC, 0x3B, 0xD9, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0x08, 0x65, 0x5E, 0xCB, 0xAB, 0x48, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x79, 0x8B, 0xC0, 0x11, 0xC0, 0x69, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xE8, 0x8C, 0x4C, 0xC5, 0x28, 0xE4, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x1F, 0x34, 0x5C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp224k1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp224k1_T_0_X, secp224k1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_1_X, secp224k1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_2_X, secp224k1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_3_X, secp224k1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_4_X, secp224k1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_5_X, secp224k1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_6_X, secp224k1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_7_X, secp224k1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_8_X, secp224k1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_9_X, secp224k1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_10_X, secp224k1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_11_X, secp224k1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_12_X, secp224k1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_13_X, secp224k1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_14_X, secp224k1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_15_X, secp224k1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp224k1_T NULL +#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) @@ -345,12 +2654,227 @@ static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_gy[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x08, 0x11, 0x0E, 0xFC, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x5D), MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0xC4, 0xA3, 0x26, 0x77, 0xDA, 0x3A, 0x48), }; -static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_n[] = { - MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x41, 0x36, 0xD0, 0x8C, 0x5E, 0xD2, 0xBF), - MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0xA0, 0x48, 0xAF, 0xE6, 0xDC, 0xAE, 0xBA), - MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), - MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x41, 0x36, 0xD0, 0x8C, 0x5E, 0xD2, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0xA0, 0x48, 0xAF, 0xE6, 0xDC, 0xAE, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x17, 0xF8, 0x16, 0x5B, 0x81, 0xF2, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0xDB, 0xFC, 0x9B, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x0B, 0x87, 0xCE, 0x95, 0x62, 0xA0, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xBB, 0xDC, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0x66, 0xBE, 0x79), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0xD4, 0x10, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0xD0, 0x47, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x54, 0x85, 0xA6, 0x48, 0xB4, 0x17, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x08, 0x11, 0x0E, 0xFC, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0xC4, 0xA3, 0x26, 0x77, 0xDA, 0x3A, 0x48), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xEE, 0xD7, 0x1E, 0x67, 0x86, 0x32, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x73, 0xB1, 0xA9, 0xD5, 0xCC, 0x27, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x01, 0x71, 0xFE, 0x92, 0x73), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x28, 0x63, 0x6D, 0x72, 0x09, 0xA6, 0xC0), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xE1, 0x69, 0xDC, 0x3E, 0x2C, 0x75, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xB7, 0x3F, 0x30, 0x26, 0x3C, 0xDF, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xBE, 0xB9, 0x5D, 0x0E, 0xE8, 0x5E, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0xC3, 0x05, 0xD6, 0xB7, 0xD5, 0x24, 0xFC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0xCF, 0x7B, 0xDC, 0xCD, 0xC3, 0x39, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xDA, 0xB9, 0xE5, 0x64, 0xA7, 0x47, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x46, 0xA8, 0x61, 0xF6, 0x23, 0xEB, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xC1, 0xFF, 0xE4, 0x55, 0xD5, 0xC2, 0xBF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xBE, 0xB9, 0x59, 0x24, 0x13, 0x4A, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x45, 0x12, 0xDE, 0xBA, 0x4F, 0xEF, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x08, 0xBF, 0xC1, 0x66, 0xAA, 0x0A, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xFE, 0x30, 0x55, 0x31, 0x86, 0xA7, 0xB4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xBF, 0x18, 0x81, 0x67, 0x27, 0x42, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x05, 0x83, 0xA4, 0xDD, 0x57, 0xD3, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x63, 0xAB, 0xE4, 0x90, 0x70, 0xD0, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x5D, 0xFD, 0xA0, 0xEF, 0xCF, 0x1C, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x80, 0xE4, 0xF6, 0x09, 0xBC, 0x57, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x9F, 0x6E, 0x88, 0x54, 0x6E, 0x51, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x5F, 0x85, 0xFB, 0x84, 0x3E, 0x4A, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x19, 0xF5, 0x55, 0xC9, 0x07, 0xD8, 0xCE), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0xB4, 0xC3, 0xD9, 0x5C, 0xA0, 0xD4, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x30, 0xAF, 0x59, 0x9B, 0xF8, 0x04, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xA6, 0xFD, 0x66, 0x7B, 0xC3, 0x39, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xBF, 0xF0, 0xC2, 0xE9, 0x71, 0xA4, 0x9E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x2D, 0xB9, 0x88, 0x28, 0xF1, 0xBE, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xF3, 0x1A, 0x0E, 0xB9, 0x01, 0x66, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0xA7, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0x05, 0xD0, 0xAA, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x39, 0x1E, 0x47, 0xE5, 0x68, 0xC8, 0xC0), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0xB9, 0xFC, 0xE0, 0x33, 0x8A, 0x7D, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x93, 0xA5, 0x53, 0x55, 0x16, 0xB4, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x5F, 0xEA, 0x9B, 0x29, 0x52, 0x71, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xF0, 0x24, 0xB8, 0x7D, 0xB7, 0xA0, 0x9B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x00, 0x27, 0xB2, 0xDF, 0x73, 0xA2, 0xE0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x2E, 0x4D, 0x7C, 0xDE, 0x7A, 0x23, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x65, 0x60, 0xC7, 0x97, 0x1E, 0xA4, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x13, 0x5B, 0x77, 0x59, 0xCB, 0x36, 0xE1), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xBC, 0x9F, 0x9E, 0x2D, 0x53, 0x2A, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x5F, 0x64, 0x9F, 0x1A, 0x19, 0xE6, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x7B, 0x39, 0xD2, 0xDB, 0x85, 0x84, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xC7, 0x0D, 0x58, 0x6E, 0x3F, 0x52, 0x15), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x68, 0x19, 0x0B, 0x68, 0xC9, 0x1E, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x4E, 0x21, 0x49, 0x3D, 0x55, 0xCC, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xF9, 0x25, 0x45, 0x54, 0x45, 0xB1, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xB3, 0xF7, 0xCD, 0x80, 0xA4, 0x04, 0x05), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x1E, 0x88, 0xC4, 0xAA, 0x18, 0x7E, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xAC, 0xD9, 0xB2, 0xA1, 0xC0, 0x71, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xA2, 0xF1, 0x15, 0xA6, 0x5F, 0x6C, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x5B, 0x05, 0xBC, 0xB7, 0xC6, 0x4E, 0x72), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x80, 0xF8, 0x5C, 0x20, 0x2A, 0xE1, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x48, 0x2E, 0x68, 0x82, 0x7F, 0xEB, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x3B, 0x25, 0xDB, 0x32, 0x4D, 0x88, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x6E, 0xA6, 0xB6, 0x6D, 0x62, 0x78, 0x22), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x4D, 0x3E, 0x86, 0x58, 0xC3, 0xEB, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x89, 0x33, 0x18, 0x21, 0x1D, 0x9B, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x9D, 0xFF, 0xC3, 0x79, 0xC1, 0x88, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xD4, 0x48, 0x53, 0xE8, 0xAD, 0x21, 0x16), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x7B, 0xDE, 0xCB, 0xD8, 0x39, 0x17, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0xF3, 0x03, 0xF2, 0x5C, 0xBC, 0xC8, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xAE, 0x4C, 0xB0, 0x16, 0xA4, 0x93, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x8B, 0x6B, 0xDC, 0xD7, 0x9A, 0x3E, 0x7E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x2D, 0x7A, 0xD2, 0x59, 0x05, 0xA2, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x56, 0x09, 0x32, 0xF1, 0xE8, 0xE3, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xCA, 0xE5, 0x2E, 0xF0, 0xFB, 0x18, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x85, 0xA9, 0x23, 0x15, 0x31, 0x1F, 0x0E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xE5, 0xB1, 0x86, 0xB9, 0x6E, 0x8D, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x77, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0xA3, 0x3F, 0x89, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0x25, 0xB0, 0xC7, 0x41, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x11, 0x6B, 0xA6, 0x11, 0x62, 0xD4, 0x2D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x7D, 0x34, 0xB3, 0x20, 0x7F, 0x37, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0xD4, 0x45, 0xE8, 0xC2, 0xE9, 0xC5, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x32, 0x3B, 0x25, 0x7E, 0x79, 0xAF, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0xE4, 0x54, 0x71, 0xBE, 0x35, 0x4E, 0xD0), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x94, 0xDD, 0x8F, 0xB5, 0xC2, 0xDD, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x49, 0xE9, 0x1C, 0x2F, 0x08, 0x49, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0xB6, 0x03, 0x88, 0x6F, 0xB8, 0x15, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xD3, 0x1C, 0xF3, 0xA5, 0xEB, 0x79, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0xF9, 0x43, 0x88, 0x89, 0x0D, 0x06, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x2D, 0xF5, 0x98, 0x32, 0xF6, 0xB1, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x73, 0x8F, 0x2B, 0x50, 0x27, 0x0A, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xE3, 0xBD, 0x16, 0x05, 0xC8, 0x93, 0x12), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x6A, 0xF7, 0xE3, 0x3D, 0xDE, 0x5F, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xA3, 0x9C, 0x22, 0x3C, 0x33, 0x36, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x24, 0x4C, 0x69, 0x45, 0x78, 0x14, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xF8, 0xD4, 0xBF, 0xB8, 0xC0, 0xA1, 0x25), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x88, 0xE1, 0x91, 0x03, 0xEB, 0xB3, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x11, 0xA1, 0xEF, 0x14, 0x0D, 0xC4, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0xD4, 0x0D, 0x1D, 0x96, 0x33, 0x5C, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x45, 0x2A, 0x1A, 0xE6, 0x57, 0x04, 0x9B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xB5, 0xA7, 0x80, 0xE9, 0x93, 0x97, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xB9, 0x7C, 0xA0, 0xC9, 0x57, 0x26, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0xEF, 0x56, 0xDA, 0x66, 0xF6, 0x1B, 0x9A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x89, 0x6B, 0x91, 0xE0, 0xA9, 0x65, 0x2B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x98, 0x96, 0x9B, 0x06, 0x7D, 0x5E, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xFA, 0xC1, 0x5F, 0x19, 0x37, 0x94, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xBE, 0x6B, 0x1A, 0x05, 0xE4, 0xBF, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0xCD, 0x5D, 0x35, 0xB4, 0x51, 0xF7, 0x64), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xEF, 0x96, 0xDB, 0xF2, 0x61, 0x63, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x04, 0x88, 0xC9, 0x9F, 0x1B, 0x94, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x30, 0x79, 0x7E, 0x24, 0xE7, 0x5F, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0xB8, 0x90, 0xB7, 0x94, 0x25, 0xBB, 0x0F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x79, 0xEA, 0xAD, 0xC0, 0x6D, 0x18, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xA4, 0x58, 0x2A, 0x8D, 0x95, 0xB3, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xC4, 0xC2, 0x12, 0x0D, 0x79, 0xE2, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x6F, 0xBE, 0x97, 0x4D, 0xA4, 0x20, 0x07), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x31, 0x71, 0xC6, 0xA6, 0x91, 0xEB, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x9B, 0xA8, 0x4A, 0xE7, 0x77, 0xE1, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0x06, 0xD3, 0x3D, 0x94, 0x30, 0xEF, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xDF, 0xCA, 0xFA, 0xF5, 0x28, 0xF8, 0xC9), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0xE1, 0x32, 0xFD, 0x3E, 0x81, 0xF8, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xF2, 0x4B, 0x1D, 0x19, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xB1, 0x8A, 0x22, 0x8B, 0x05, 0x6B, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x21, 0xEF, 0x30, 0xEC, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x89), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x84, 0x4A, 0x46, 0x07, 0x6C, 0x3C, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x18, 0x3A, 0xF4, 0xCC, 0xF5, 0xB2, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x8F, 0xCD, 0x0A, 0x9C, 0xF4, 0xBD, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x89, 0x7F, 0x8A, 0xB1, 0x52, 0x3A, 0xAB), }; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp256k1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp256k1_T_0_X, secp256k1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_1_X, secp256k1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_2_X, secp256k1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_3_X, secp256k1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_4_X, secp256k1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_5_X, secp256k1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_6_X, secp256k1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_7_X, secp256k1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_8_X, secp256k1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_9_X, secp256k1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_10_X, secp256k1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_11_X, secp256k1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_12_X, secp256k1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_13_X, secp256k1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_14_X, secp256k1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_15_X, secp256k1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp256k1_T NULL +#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ /* @@ -393,6 +2917,222 @@ static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_n[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x8D, 0x83, 0x9D, 0x90, 0x0A, 0x66, 0x3E), MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xA9, 0xEE, 0xA1, 0xDB, 0x57, 0xFB, 0xA9), }; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x32, 0xCE, 0x9A, 0xBD, 0x53, 0x44, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x23, 0xBD, 0xE3, 0xE1, 0x27, 0xDE, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xB7, 0x81, 0xFC, 0x2F, 0x48, 0x4B, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x57, 0x7E, 0xCB, 0xB9, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0x8B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x69, 0x04, 0x2F, 0xC7, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x8E, 0xED, 0x2D, 0x13, 0x45, 0x77, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x1D, 0x61, 0x14, 0x1A, 0x46, 0xF8, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xC4, 0xDA, 0xC3, 0x35, 0xF8, 0x7E, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xA2, 0xED, 0x52, 0xC9, 0x8C, 0xE3, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0xC9, 0xC4, 0x87, 0x3F, 0x93, 0x7A, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x12, 0x53, 0x61, 0x3E, 0x76, 0x08, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x8C, 0x74, 0xF4, 0x08, 0xC3, 0x76, 0x80), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0xDD, 0x09, 0xA6, 0xED, 0xEE, 0xC4, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xD9, 0xBE, 0x4B, 0xA5, 0xB7, 0x2B, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x20, 0x12, 0xCA, 0x0A, 0x38, 0x24, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x72, 0x71, 0x90, 0x7A, 0x2E, 0xB7, 0x23), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x66, 0xA1, 0x93, 0x10, 0x2A, 0x51, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0xBC, 0xB0, 0xB6, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x58, 0xD7, 0x0A, 0x84, 0x05, 0xA3, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x8E, 0x95, 0x61, 0xD3, 0x0B, 0xDF, 0x36), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x92, 0x12, 0x0F, 0x5E, 0x87, 0x70, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0xE9, 0x9B, 0xEB, 0x3A, 0xFB, 0xCF, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0x92, 0xB9, 0xF7, 0x45, 0xD3, 0x06, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x28, 0x65, 0xE1, 0xC5, 0x6C, 0x57, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x0E, 0x77, 0x01, 0x81, 0x9E, 0x38, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0xF0, 0xD5, 0xA5, 0x91, 0x2B, 0xDF, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xEE, 0xB6, 0x25, 0xD6, 0x98, 0xDE, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xA1, 0x55, 0x63, 0x39, 0xEB, 0xB5, 0x47), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0xD6, 0xB8, 0xE3, 0x13, 0xED, 0x7F, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xE8, 0xAE, 0x36, 0xB8, 0xCD, 0x19, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x82, 0x83, 0x7A, 0x7B, 0x46, 0x56, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x60, 0x46, 0x15, 0x5A, 0xAC, 0x99, 0x30), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x61, 0x50, 0xC6, 0xFF, 0x10, 0x7D, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x51, 0xDF, 0xA9, 0x7D, 0x78, 0x26, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0x15, 0x9A, 0xF7, 0x01, 0xC1, 0xBB, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x0F, 0xE6, 0x2A, 0xBD, 0x4A, 0x9E, 0x87), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xF8, 0xD1, 0x77, 0xD2, 0x49, 0xB3, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x86, 0xFB, 0x9E, 0x1F, 0x5A, 0x60, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xC4, 0x8D, 0xCD, 0x86, 0x61, 0x2F, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xF6, 0xB9, 0xAC, 0x37, 0x9D, 0xE9, 0x28), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x77, 0xAA, 0x97, 0x9C, 0x0B, 0x04, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0xA6, 0x60, 0x81, 0xCE, 0x25, 0x13, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x00, 0xF3, 0xBB, 0x82, 0x99, 0x95, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x5A, 0xCE, 0x90, 0x71, 0x38, 0x2F, 0x10), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x1A, 0xC0, 0x84, 0x27, 0xD6, 0x9D, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x37, 0x52, 0x16, 0x13, 0x0E, 0xCE, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xBF, 0x5A, 0xDB, 0xDB, 0x6E, 0x1E, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xB7, 0x5E, 0xF9, 0x86, 0xDD, 0x8A, 0x5C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xAB, 0x5C, 0x8D, 0x1D, 0xF2, 0x2D, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0xC5, 0xF8, 0xF7, 0x1D, 0x96, 0x0B, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x4C, 0xA7, 0x45, 0x20, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x5D, 0xEF, 0xDE, 0xEE, 0x39, 0x44, 0x19), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0x2F, 0x6D, 0x52, 0xC9, 0x58, 0x60, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0xC9, 0x62, 0xCB, 0x38, 0x3C, 0x55, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xA5, 0x09, 0x10, 0x88, 0xDB, 0xE3, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0xE0, 0x3C, 0xCE, 0x06, 0x0B, 0x4B, 0x5D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x1D, 0xB4, 0x10, 0x76, 0x8F, 0xBA, 0x09), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x70, 0x5A, 0x07, 0xF5, 0x1A, 0x74, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xE9, 0x94, 0xA8, 0xC0, 0xD5, 0x4A, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x6D, 0xD4, 0xE8, 0x9B, 0xE9, 0x6D, 0x0E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x00, 0x32, 0x41, 0x57, 0x84, 0x89, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xC7, 0x14, 0xEC, 0xE9, 0x27, 0xFF, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x67, 0x9E, 0xFB, 0xB6, 0xB8, 0x96, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x4A, 0xE3, 0x97, 0x4B, 0x58, 0xDE, 0x30), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0x1E, 0x5C, 0xF5, 0x7F, 0xD5, 0xD4, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x08, 0x7A, 0xF1, 0xBD, 0x89, 0xC7, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xF9, 0x11, 0x1B, 0xF5, 0x3C, 0x6D, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x50, 0xE5, 0x69, 0x1D, 0x59, 0xFC, 0x0C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x2F, 0xF8, 0x3F, 0xEC, 0x55, 0x99, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xA7, 0x29, 0x90, 0x43, 0x81, 0x31, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x18, 0x44, 0x50, 0x5D, 0x76, 0xCB, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xC5, 0x5B, 0x9A, 0x03, 0xE6, 0x17, 0x39), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x89, 0xFC, 0x55, 0x94, 0x91, 0x6A, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x46, 0x35, 0xF2, 0x3A, 0x42, 0x08, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0xD2, 0x76, 0x49, 0x42, 0x87, 0xD3, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xEA, 0xA0, 0x52, 0xF1, 0x6A, 0x30, 0x57), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0xB2, 0x57, 0xA3, 0x8A, 0x4D, 0x1B, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0xA3, 0x99, 0x94, 0xB5, 0x3D, 0x64, 0x09), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xC3, 0xD7, 0x53, 0xF6, 0x49, 0x1C, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x23, 0x41, 0x4D, 0xFB, 0x7A, 0x5C, 0x53), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xB8, 0x15, 0x65, 0x5C, 0x85, 0x94, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x37, 0xC7, 0xF8, 0x7E, 0xAE, 0x6C, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0xD8, 0x11, 0x54, 0x98, 0x44, 0xE3, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x4D, 0xA6, 0x4B, 0x28, 0xF2, 0x57, 0x9E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xD0, 0xEB, 0x1E, 0xAA, 0x30, 0xD3, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x9B, 0x4D, 0xA7, 0x73, 0x6E, 0xB6, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x47, 0xF6, 0xED, 0x37, 0xEF, 0x71, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0xB5, 0x49, 0x61, 0x5E, 0x45, 0xF6, 0x4A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x0E, 0xB3, 0x84, 0x3A, 0x63, 0x72, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x53, 0x5C, 0xA7, 0xC6, 0x2E, 0xAB, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x0F, 0x8F, 0x87, 0x50, 0x28, 0xB4, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x98, 0x4A, 0x98, 0x31, 0x86, 0xCA, 0x51), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xC9, 0xE2, 0xFD, 0x5D, 0x1F, 0xE8, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x90, 0x91, 0xC4, 0x84, 0xF0, 0xBA, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x5A, 0xB3, 0x4E, 0xFB, 0xE0, 0x57, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x0B, 0x90, 0xA6, 0xFD, 0x9D, 0x8E, 0x02), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x41, 0x8F, 0x31, 0xFA, 0x5A, 0xF6, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xE9, 0xE3, 0xF6, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0xE7, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x4E, 0xCD, 0xA2, 0x22, 0x14, 0xD4, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xED, 0x21, 0xB7, 0x0F, 0x53, 0x10, 0x17), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x06, 0x24, 0x2C, 0x4E, 0xD1, 0x1E, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x3F, 0xC1, 0x9F, 0xAB, 0xF0, 0x37, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x5E, 0x12, 0xCE, 0x83, 0x1B, 0x2A, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x65, 0xCF, 0xE8, 0x5C, 0xA5, 0xA2, 0x70), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x86, 0x76, 0x3A, 0x94, 0xF6, 0x1D, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xDA, 0xC9, 0xA6, 0x29, 0x93, 0x15, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x61, 0x6A, 0x7D, 0xC7, 0xA9, 0xF3, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x03, 0x71, 0xA2, 0x15, 0xCE, 0x50, 0x72), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0xD0, 0xA8, 0x1E, 0x91, 0xC4, 0x4F, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x4B, 0x7E, 0xD7, 0x71, 0x58, 0x7E, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x45, 0xAF, 0x2A, 0x18, 0x93, 0x95, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x8F, 0xC7, 0xFA, 0x4C, 0x7A, 0x86, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0xAF, 0x68, 0x3A, 0x23, 0xC1, 0x2E, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0x50, 0x11, 0x67, 0x39, 0xB9, 0xAF, 0x48), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x86, 0xAA, 0x1E, 0x88, 0x21, 0x29, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x28, 0xA4, 0x9D, 0x89, 0xA9, 0x9A, 0x10), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xBA, 0x04, 0x67, 0xB7, 0x01, 0x40, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xE9, 0x09, 0xA3, 0xCA, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x97, 0xA8, 0xB6, 0x3C, 0xEE, 0x90, 0x3D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xED, 0xC4, 0xF7, 0xC3, 0x95, 0xEC, 0x85), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x84, 0xBD, 0xEB, 0xD5, 0x64, 0xBB, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x9B, 0xE2, 0x28, 0x50, 0xC2, 0x72, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0xF2, 0x74, 0xD1, 0x26, 0xBF, 0x32, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xCB, 0xAF, 0x72, 0xDB, 0x6D, 0x30, 0x98), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x50, 0x85, 0xF4, 0x2B, 0x48, 0xC1, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x28, 0xBB, 0x11, 0xBA, 0x5B, 0x22, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xA1, 0xE5, 0x5C, 0xC9, 0x1D, 0x44, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xE8, 0xE6, 0x6F, 0xBB, 0xC1, 0x81, 0x7F), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point brainpoolP256r1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(brainpoolP256r1_T_0_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_1_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_2_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_3_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_4_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_5_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_6_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_7_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_8_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_9_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_10_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_11_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_12_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_13_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_14_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_15_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define brainpoolP256r1_T NULL +#endif + #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ /* @@ -447,6 +3187,558 @@ static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_n[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x41, 0xE6, 0x50, 0x7E, 0x6F, 0x5D, 0x0F), MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x6D, 0x38, 0xA3, 0x82, 0x1E, 0xB9, 0x8C), }; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xAF, 0xD4, 0x47, 0xE2, 0xB2, 0x87, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x46, 0xD6, 0x36, 0x34, 0xE0, 0x26, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x10, 0xBD, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x7F, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x4F, 0xF1, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0xA3, 0x47, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x3F, 0xC1, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x3A, 0xA6, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x45, 0xCF, 0x68, 0xF0, 0x64, 0x1C, 0x1D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x53, 0x3C, 0x26, 0x41, 0x03, 0x82, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x81, 0x91, 0x77, 0x21, 0x46, 0x46, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x29, 0x91, 0xF9, 0x4F, 0x05, 0x9C, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x58, 0xEC, 0xFE, 0x29, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0xD5, 0xCF, 0x95, 0x8E, 0xEB, 0xB1, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xC2, 0xF9, 0x20, 0x75, 0x1D, 0xBE, 0x8A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0xD8, 0x8A, 0x54, 0x41, 0xD6, 0x6B, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x3B, 0xF1, 0x22, 0xFD, 0x2D, 0x4B, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x55, 0xE3, 0x33, 0xF0, 0x73, 0x52, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x3F, 0x30, 0x26, 0xCA, 0x7F, 0x52, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x6E, 0x17, 0x9B, 0xD5, 0x2A, 0x4A, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xDA, 0x6B, 0xE5, 0x03, 0x07, 0x1D, 0x2E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x7A, 0xAF, 0x98, 0xE3, 0xA4, 0xF6, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x7D, 0xFE, 0x51, 0x40, 0x3B, 0x47, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x88, 0xEC, 0xC4, 0xE2, 0x8F, 0xCB, 0xA4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0xE2, 0x88, 0x2D, 0x4E, 0x50, 0xEB, 0x9A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x54, 0x94, 0x5E, 0xF4, 0x7F, 0x3A, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x07, 0x1C, 0xE1, 0xBD, 0x0F, 0xF8, 0x63), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x92, 0x28, 0x2E, 0x32, 0x04, 0xB1, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x82, 0x44, 0x43, 0x76, 0x0D, 0x55, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0xE3, 0xFF, 0x89, 0x46, 0xDE, 0x4E, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x22, 0xBB, 0x67, 0x1A, 0x81, 0xEE, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x54, 0xE2, 0x7A, 0xAE, 0xDA, 0x2C, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x9A, 0x90, 0xAA, 0x6E, 0x8B, 0xCC, 0x5F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x40, 0xAC, 0xED, 0x7D, 0x37, 0x87, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xF8, 0xB1, 0x80, 0x4C, 0x8C, 0x04, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x98, 0x2C, 0xAD, 0x30, 0x69, 0x35, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x2E, 0x00, 0x2F, 0x44, 0x8C, 0xF0, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x58, 0x07, 0xD7, 0xCD, 0x60, 0xA1, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xFB, 0x7B, 0x03, 0x05, 0x5E, 0x79, 0x73), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x17, 0xCE, 0x38, 0x4B, 0x5E, 0x5B, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x0E, 0x0A, 0x61, 0x9D, 0x7C, 0x62, 0x08), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0xF0, 0x98, 0x71, 0x7F, 0x17, 0x26, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xD3, 0xFA, 0x3C, 0xF0, 0x70, 0x07, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x47, 0x5C, 0x09, 0x43, 0xB7, 0x65, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xA9, 0xA7, 0x3E, 0xFA, 0xF3, 0xEC, 0x22), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x78, 0x22, 0x2B, 0x58, 0x71, 0xFA, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x30, 0xCE, 0x6A, 0xB3, 0xB0, 0x4F, 0x83), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0x95, 0x20, 0xA9, 0x23, 0xC2, 0x65, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xCF, 0x03, 0x5B, 0x8A, 0x80, 0x44, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xF8, 0x91, 0xF7, 0xD5, 0xED, 0xEA, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x5B, 0x16, 0x10, 0x25, 0xAC, 0x2A, 0x17), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xEC, 0xDC, 0xC4, 0x7B, 0x8C, 0x6B, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xBB, 0x1C, 0xD3, 0x5A, 0xEE, 0xD9, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x5D, 0x30, 0x5E, 0xF7, 0xB2, 0x41, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xCE, 0x0F, 0x1A, 0xC6, 0x41, 0x64, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x18, 0xE1, 0xE3, 0x82, 0x15, 0x66, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xE2, 0x24, 0x04, 0x72, 0x39, 0xA0, 0x7C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x51, 0xA2, 0x58, 0x88, 0x62, 0xE1, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xD2, 0x65, 0x14, 0xE9, 0x4C, 0x82, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xE1, 0xAC, 0x87, 0xAE, 0x31, 0x1A, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x4F, 0x96, 0x1E, 0x85, 0x7A, 0xC3, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x86, 0xBB, 0xF0, 0xC0, 0x9D, 0x08, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x53, 0x03, 0x09, 0x80, 0x91, 0xEF, 0x68), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xD7, 0xAF, 0x6F, 0x69, 0x7B, 0x88, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x13, 0xE4, 0x30, 0xA2, 0x47, 0xB5, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xD2, 0xC0, 0xDD, 0x8A, 0x1C, 0x3C, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x8C, 0xB3, 0x4C, 0xBA, 0x8B, 0x6D, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0xC7, 0xA1, 0xA8, 0x6E, 0x3C, 0x4F, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x4A, 0x97, 0xC8, 0x03, 0x6F, 0x01, 0x82), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x18, 0x12, 0xA9, 0x39, 0xD5, 0x22, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xA7, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0x9D, 0x8D, 0x78, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xB3, 0xD0, 0x7F, 0xDF, 0xD0, 0x30, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x25, 0x73, 0x96, 0xEC, 0xA8, 0x1D, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xD1, 0x65, 0x66, 0xDC, 0xD9, 0xCF, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0xED, 0x7B, 0x37, 0xAD, 0xE2, 0xBE, 0x2D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x79, 0x42, 0x6A, 0x07, 0x66, 0xB1, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x53, 0x62, 0x65, 0x92, 0x09, 0x4C, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xAF, 0xC3, 0x03, 0xF6, 0xF4, 0x2D, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xCA, 0x41, 0xD9, 0xA2, 0x69, 0x9B, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xB2, 0xA6, 0x8D, 0xE1, 0xAA, 0x61, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xBA, 0x4D, 0x12, 0xB6, 0xBE, 0xF3, 0x7E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xD9, 0x92, 0x22, 0x07, 0xCE, 0xC9, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0xA1, 0x7C, 0x91, 0xDB, 0x32, 0xF7, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x49, 0x4B, 0x6D, 0xFB, 0xD9, 0x70, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xFB, 0x4E, 0x4C, 0x5E, 0x66, 0x81, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0xB3, 0xE1, 0x00, 0xB7, 0xD9, 0xCC, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x36, 0x8B, 0xC4, 0x39, 0x20, 0xFD, 0x30), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x1F, 0x60, 0x03, 0xBB, 0xD7, 0x60, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x3C, 0x62, 0xDD, 0x71, 0x95, 0xE9, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x5B, 0x7A, 0x5F, 0x68, 0x81, 0xC5, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xAF, 0xB5, 0xB9, 0x98, 0x42, 0x28, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x29, 0x8E, 0x11, 0x49, 0xB4, 0xD7, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x3E, 0xD2, 0x30, 0xA1, 0xBA, 0xCA, 0x03), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x37, 0x64, 0x44, 0x2F, 0x03, 0xE5, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x42, 0xBC, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x1A, 0x5F, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x04, 0xAB, 0x04, 0xE0, 0x24, 0xAD, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0x45, 0x17, 0x67, 0x1F, 0x3E, 0x53, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x0F, 0xB3, 0x1B, 0x57, 0x54, 0xC2, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xD3, 0xF8, 0xC4, 0x1B, 0x9B, 0xFA, 0x30), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x90, 0xFD, 0xFB, 0xCA, 0x49, 0x38, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0xCF, 0xC6, 0xDD, 0xF0, 0xFF, 0x8C, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x69, 0x9D, 0xBD, 0x5F, 0x33, 0xE9, 0xB4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x19, 0x82, 0x3D, 0xAC, 0x1C, 0x40, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xC7, 0x02, 0x46, 0x14, 0x77, 0x00, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x05, 0xF2, 0x77, 0x3A, 0x66, 0x5C, 0x39), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xE6, 0x17, 0xDE, 0xB2, 0xA1, 0xE5, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x71, 0xEC, 0x9D, 0xD8, 0xF5, 0xD4, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0xC6, 0x42, 0x5E, 0xE7, 0x18, 0xBA, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x21, 0x68, 0x5A, 0x26, 0xFB, 0xD7, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x00, 0x5C, 0xBA, 0x8A, 0x34, 0xEC, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x9C, 0x3C, 0xAF, 0x53, 0xE8, 0x65, 0x35), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xEF, 0x28, 0xDC, 0x67, 0x05, 0xC8, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x78, 0xC3, 0x85, 0x49, 0xA0, 0xBC, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x3E, 0x2D, 0xA0, 0xCF, 0xD4, 0x7A, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x93, 0xFE, 0x60, 0xB3, 0x6E, 0x99, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0xAD, 0x04, 0xE7, 0x49, 0xAF, 0x5E, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x7A, 0xED, 0xA6, 0x9E, 0x18, 0x09, 0x31), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x05, 0x94, 0x44, 0xDC, 0xB8, 0x85, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xB7, 0x37, 0xC2, 0x50, 0x75, 0x15, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xC6, 0x0F, 0xB2, 0xA9, 0x91, 0x3E, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x81, 0xAD, 0x25, 0xA1, 0x26, 0x73, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xF1, 0xD1, 0x61, 0x7C, 0x76, 0x8F, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xDB, 0x4A, 0xFF, 0x14, 0xA7, 0x48, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x73, 0xC6, 0xC2, 0xCC, 0xF1, 0x57, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0xED, 0x73, 0x27, 0x70, 0x82, 0xB6, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xBA, 0xAC, 0x3A, 0xCF, 0xF4, 0xEA, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xD6, 0xB1, 0x8F, 0x0E, 0x08, 0x2C, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xE3, 0x8F, 0x2F, 0x0E, 0xA1, 0xF3, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0xF5, 0x7C, 0x9B, 0x29, 0x0A, 0xF6, 0x28), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0xEE, 0x17, 0x47, 0x34, 0x15, 0xA3, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xBE, 0x88, 0x48, 0xE7, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0xAD, 0xDC, 0x65, 0x61, 0x37, 0x0F, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x67, 0xAD, 0xA2, 0x3A, 0x1C, 0x91, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x07, 0x0C, 0x3A, 0x41, 0x6E, 0x13, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0xBD, 0x7E, 0xED, 0xAA, 0x14, 0xDD, 0x61), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0xDC, 0x20, 0x01, 0x72, 0x11, 0x48, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xC4, 0x7B, 0xF8, 0x62, 0x3D, 0xF0, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xC2, 0x3D, 0x2E, 0x52, 0xA3, 0x4A, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xE2, 0x53, 0x46, 0x5E, 0x21, 0xF8, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xC7, 0x8F, 0xA9, 0x26, 0x42, 0x32, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xA6, 0xA0, 0x8D, 0x4B, 0x9A, 0x19, 0x03), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xAB, 0x6D, 0x1E, 0xFB, 0xEE, 0x60, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x56, 0x3C, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0x10, 0x79, 0x1C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0xBC, 0x41, 0x9F, 0x71, 0xEF, 0x02, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x36, 0xC4, 0xD0, 0x88, 0x9B, 0x32, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xD4, 0x5D, 0x17, 0x39, 0xE6, 0x22, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x26, 0x01, 0xCE, 0xBE, 0x4A, 0x9C, 0x27), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x6D, 0x11, 0xCA, 0x6C, 0x5A, 0x93, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x96, 0x26, 0xAF, 0x2F, 0xE4, 0x30, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xC1, 0x4C, 0xC6, 0x30, 0x1F, 0x5C, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xB3, 0xE8, 0xFC, 0x35, 0xEB, 0x63, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x1D, 0xCA, 0xFC, 0x50, 0x36, 0x4B, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x0E, 0x23, 0x5B, 0xAF, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x31), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x88, 0xB6, 0xD7, 0x74, 0x4A, 0x23, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x66, 0xE2, 0xBB, 0x29, 0xA6, 0x4F, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x6F, 0x7E, 0x68, 0x6E, 0xA0, 0x14, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x73, 0xD4, 0xE8, 0xAB, 0x5B, 0xF6, 0x0D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xE0, 0x3C, 0x24, 0x00, 0x95, 0xE9, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x0D, 0x4F, 0x81, 0xD0, 0xF2, 0x3F, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x1D, 0xCD, 0x78, 0x39, 0xC4, 0x6B, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x45, 0xC7, 0xB8, 0x2F, 0xAA, 0x5D, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x8C, 0x6E, 0xA3, 0x24, 0xB2, 0xDB, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0x2D, 0xD9, 0xF1, 0xC7, 0x9B, 0x8A, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0xE1, 0x2C, 0xB9, 0x40, 0x37, 0x91, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x2C, 0xB5, 0x23, 0x03, 0x2B, 0xAF, 0x2F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x9D, 0x5A, 0x20, 0x10, 0xA9, 0x84, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x30, 0x89, 0x20, 0x13, 0xE9, 0xB2, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x6E, 0x52, 0xEB, 0x03, 0x18, 0x1F, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x9E, 0x1C, 0x35, 0x87, 0x92, 0x69, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0xC9, 0x88, 0xAF, 0xC6, 0x6C, 0x83, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0xD5, 0x7A, 0x54, 0x34, 0x99, 0xB6, 0x6F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0xAD, 0x45, 0x9B, 0x4B, 0x41, 0x4D, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x5D, 0xAB, 0x7F, 0x35, 0x34, 0xE9, 0x29), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0xBE, 0x78, 0x34, 0x44, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xDE, 0xE3, 0xC4, 0xEE, 0x0B, 0xF9, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x86, 0x16, 0x48, 0x32, 0xB8, 0x74, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xEE, 0x7C, 0xBA, 0xBD, 0x81, 0xE3, 0x55), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x6A, 0xFA, 0x84, 0xDA, 0xB8, 0xD5, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0x9F, 0x8A, 0xD5, 0x1B, 0x2E, 0x1A, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x0C, 0x61, 0xE2, 0xFF, 0x5B, 0xE6, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0x62, 0xC1, 0x87, 0x53, 0x1B, 0x92, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x90, 0x00, 0xD1, 0x6A, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x2E, 0xB5, 0x3B, 0x44, 0xB5, 0xA0, 0x78), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x5D, 0x02, 0x58, 0xB5, 0xBE, 0x45, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xEF, 0x8E, 0x90, 0x4D, 0x2A, 0x32, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x99, 0x75, 0x5C, 0x0A, 0x33, 0x8F, 0x36), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x6C, 0x95, 0xD4, 0x1F, 0xF3, 0xEB, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xE4, 0x4C, 0x91, 0x20, 0xF3, 0x25, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x95, 0xEB, 0x29, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x34, 0x81), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x15, 0xE5, 0x13, 0x7E, 0x64, 0x8B, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xBC, 0x0D, 0x18, 0x7E, 0x37, 0x9E, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x82, 0x20, 0xF7, 0x2D, 0x7A, 0x77, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x29, 0xA2, 0xDB, 0x7A, 0xE6, 0x6F, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xC6, 0x50, 0x5C, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0x4F, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x9F, 0xD5, 0xE8, 0xC5, 0x3D, 0xB7, 0x30), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_16_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x03, 0x55, 0x10, 0xDB, 0xA6, 0x8B, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x17, 0xAE, 0x78, 0xC9, 0x1D, 0x43, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x35, 0x49, 0xD4, 0x47, 0x84, 0x8D, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x95, 0x2F, 0xEA, 0xBC, 0xB4, 0x18, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x48, 0xAE, 0x89, 0xF5, 0x65, 0x3D, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xF2, 0x2B, 0x20, 0xD1, 0x75, 0x50, 0x63), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_16_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xE6, 0x5C, 0x2C, 0xE0, 0x7D, 0xDF, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x07, 0x3E, 0xCE, 0x9F, 0x18, 0xB6, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0xF8, 0xF0, 0xD5, 0xFA, 0x42, 0x1D, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x6C, 0x1D, 0x03, 0xC9, 0x0E, 0x2B, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x18, 0x52, 0xA5, 0xB4, 0x63, 0xE1, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x0A, 0xD9, 0xC4, 0xFD, 0x16, 0x60, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_17_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x7D, 0xDE, 0xDF, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xB0, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x4E, 0x8C, 0x94, 0xC1, 0xE2, 0x85, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0xF0, 0xEA, 0xB5, 0x9B, 0x70, 0xEF, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xC2, 0x39, 0x5D, 0xF3, 0x2C, 0xD9, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x1C, 0x2E, 0xCC, 0x2F, 0x54, 0x87, 0x80), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x72, 0xC7, 0xB5, 0x50, 0xA3, 0x84, 0x77), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_17_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xD1, 0xAF, 0xA9, 0xB4, 0x8B, 0x5D, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xF6, 0x52, 0x8A, 0xC3, 0x56, 0xA5, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x52, 0xFF, 0xEA, 0x05, 0x42, 0x77, 0x83), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x08, 0x90, 0x72, 0x86, 0xC4, 0xC3, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x15, 0xF8, 0xF1, 0x16, 0x67, 0xC6, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x87, 0xAC, 0x8F, 0x71, 0xEC, 0x83, 0x81), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_18_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xE1, 0xE6, 0x2D, 0x0E, 0x11, 0xA1, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xE2, 0xA8, 0x32, 0xE6, 0xE3, 0x83, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x56, 0xE5, 0xCD, 0xB7, 0x2B, 0x67, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xED, 0xC9, 0x65, 0x6D, 0x87, 0xE1, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x8E, 0xFD, 0x9A, 0x53, 0x0E, 0xFA, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0x4C, 0x4A, 0xE2, 0x23, 0x84, 0xFA, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_18_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xFE, 0x49, 0x81, 0xD1, 0x3E, 0xF4, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x72, 0xE0, 0xEF, 0x0D, 0xB8, 0x3E, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x5F, 0xCE, 0x60, 0x72, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xCC, 0xD8, 0x03, 0x07, 0x6E, 0x5A, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x3A, 0x35, 0x50, 0x4E, 0x1F, 0xCA, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xEA, 0x88, 0x55, 0xBD, 0x6E, 0x05, 0x7F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_19_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x6D, 0xF1, 0x97, 0xA6, 0x69, 0x39, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x41, 0x99, 0xFF, 0x3B, 0xA1, 0x26, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x2F, 0x95, 0x80, 0x12, 0x4A, 0x1B, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xBF, 0x51, 0xAA, 0xAE, 0x2D, 0xDA, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x1C, 0xB3, 0x52, 0x36, 0x49, 0xD4, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xC1, 0x1F, 0x3A, 0xD3, 0x3E, 0x5C, 0x1A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_19_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x51, 0xF7, 0x2B, 0xC8, 0xA9, 0xA7, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x4E, 0x7F, 0x98, 0x41, 0x66, 0xB0, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x1D, 0xC0, 0x42, 0xCD, 0xF8, 0xC3, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x41, 0x91, 0x7D, 0xCC, 0x8B, 0xCC, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xAE, 0x76, 0xED, 0x56, 0x18, 0xC5, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x6A, 0x06, 0xA3, 0x7F, 0x65, 0x10, 0x1F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_20_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xEC, 0x3C, 0x05, 0x05, 0xCA, 0xF6, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0xCD, 0x02, 0x51, 0x12, 0x16, 0x3C, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0xEB, 0xB3, 0x43, 0x7B, 0xDD, 0xB2, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x59, 0x90, 0x41, 0xDB, 0xE4, 0xF5, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x0E, 0x18, 0x2A, 0x5A, 0x83, 0x7C, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x37, 0xA1, 0x0D, 0xF1, 0x2F, 0x63, 0x79), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_20_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xC0, 0xFA, 0x6F, 0x1F, 0x67, 0xCF, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x34, 0x45, 0xBB, 0xF4, 0xF9, 0x9B, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x69, 0xFE, 0x67, 0x1D, 0x64, 0x8F, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x39, 0xBF, 0xD8, 0xB3, 0xC7, 0xAD, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x93, 0xFF, 0xF3, 0x28, 0xFA, 0x39, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xF9, 0xC3, 0x85, 0x26, 0x7A, 0x88, 0x89), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_21_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xD5, 0x79, 0xD8, 0x11, 0xDE, 0xEB, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x46, 0xA4, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0x74, 0x34, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xBD, 0xD3, 0xF5, 0x14, 0xEE, 0xFE, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x4C, 0xA3, 0x71, 0x43, 0x65, 0xF8, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x6C, 0x35, 0xFA, 0x90, 0x25, 0xD8, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x34, 0x84, 0x96, 0xA1, 0x43, 0x03, 0x4D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_21_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x3B, 0x3B, 0x2F, 0xCA, 0x59, 0xF2, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x48, 0x24, 0x74, 0xD8, 0x72, 0x90, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x42, 0x74, 0x8C, 0x6F, 0x52, 0x19, 0x3D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x9E, 0x41, 0x63, 0x68, 0x78, 0x4C, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0x94, 0xB6, 0x6B, 0x38, 0x52, 0xA8, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x30, 0x25, 0x93, 0xA1, 0x6F, 0x6E, 0x68), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_22_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x2F, 0x4B, 0x64, 0x79, 0x50, 0xFF, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x36, 0xED, 0x57, 0x39, 0x3B, 0xE7, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x85, 0xEA, 0x35, 0xD6, 0xC0, 0xA0, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x89, 0x3A, 0xCC, 0x22, 0x1C, 0x46, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x7A, 0xB0, 0xA1, 0x1B, 0x69, 0x62, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xB8, 0x8A, 0x6C, 0x18, 0x85, 0x0D, 0x88), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_22_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xB6, 0x50, 0xE9, 0x4E, 0x7F, 0xE8, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x5B, 0x5C, 0xD1, 0x4B, 0x11, 0x9A, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x25, 0x56, 0x74, 0x51, 0x9C, 0xEC, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x7F, 0xB6, 0x8A, 0xCB, 0x3A, 0x10, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x33, 0x07, 0x01, 0xE9, 0x49, 0x59, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xA5, 0x2E, 0xF2, 0xBA, 0x32, 0x63, 0x44), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_23_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x06, 0x0B, 0xA5, 0x44, 0x27, 0x7F, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x74, 0xAC, 0x0F, 0xCC, 0x4F, 0x13, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xB1, 0xBF, 0x97, 0x49, 0xA5, 0x1C, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x64, 0x68, 0x7B, 0x0F, 0xCC, 0x77, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x39, 0xF9, 0x4E, 0x84, 0x9C, 0xF6, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xCF, 0x6D, 0xE2, 0xA1, 0x2D, 0xF9, 0x2B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_23_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0xC4, 0x90, 0x57, 0x31, 0x01, 0x05, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x1E, 0xBB, 0xBF, 0x98, 0xA4, 0x7C, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0xE3, 0xA0, 0xB2, 0xCD, 0x39, 0x9A, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x34, 0x60, 0x7A, 0x89, 0x98, 0xB5, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0x20, 0x3D, 0x3A, 0x04, 0x8F, 0x5A, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x26, 0xB6, 0x49, 0x09, 0x9C, 0x0F, 0x59), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_24_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x66, 0xD2, 0x38, 0x2A, 0x62, 0x81, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0xC8, 0x20, 0x5E, 0x28, 0xA3, 0x81, 0xA7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x31, 0xA4, 0xF1, 0xEA, 0x7D, 0x87, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0x2C, 0x99, 0x09, 0x6F, 0x63, 0xEB, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x76, 0xDA, 0x1A, 0x06, 0xBE, 0xDE, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x09, 0x2E, 0x75, 0x39, 0x30, 0x2D, 0x42), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_24_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x9B, 0xC1, 0x5A, 0x17, 0xC3, 0x8C, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x8D, 0x94, 0x4D, 0x3D, 0xAB, 0x60, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFD, 0x1E, 0x0F, 0x43, 0xAE, 0x9D, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0xF2, 0xF3, 0x20, 0x1B, 0xAA, 0xB7, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x5B, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0x90, 0x3B, 0xE3, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x78, 0x72, 0xBD, 0x65, 0x09, 0x0B, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_25_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x37, 0x2A, 0x6C, 0x16, 0x4F, 0x64, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0xCE, 0xA3, 0x90, 0xB4, 0x9A, 0xBC, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x38, 0x55, 0x63, 0x1D, 0x3A, 0x6E, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0xB4, 0xAA, 0x99, 0x22, 0x45, 0x89, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x7C, 0x8C, 0xA6, 0x3D, 0xA7, 0x3E, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x06, 0x42, 0xDC, 0xA6, 0xE3, 0xC6, 0x12), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_25_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x8C, 0x3D, 0x5D, 0x47, 0x31, 0x7C, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x85, 0xEE, 0x46, 0x7E, 0x13, 0x04, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x3C, 0x8B, 0x43, 0x2E, 0x74, 0xF5, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x88, 0x8E, 0x07, 0x29, 0x08, 0x03, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x9B, 0x89, 0xEB, 0x08, 0xE8, 0x43, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x07, 0x67, 0xFD, 0xD9, 0x73, 0x6F, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_26_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xEB, 0x21, 0x8D, 0x98, 0x43, 0x74, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xCC, 0x14, 0xD8, 0x08, 0xBB, 0xA6, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x98, 0xF2, 0x6A, 0x18, 0xC3, 0xDD, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x38, 0x91, 0xA0, 0x03, 0xF2, 0x04, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0xAF, 0xE8, 0xFD, 0xFB, 0x13, 0x70, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x93, 0x87, 0x98, 0x4A, 0xE0, 0x00, 0x12), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_26_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x2E, 0x69, 0x9C, 0xA2, 0x2D, 0x03, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xFE, 0xF3, 0xB9, 0xC1, 0x85, 0x2A, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xFD, 0x86, 0xB1, 0xCD, 0xBF, 0x41, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xD8, 0x9A, 0x21, 0xF3, 0xFE, 0xCB, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x78, 0x04, 0x60, 0xB7, 0xA9, 0xA2, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x1E, 0x66, 0x2A, 0x54, 0x51, 0xBD, 0x8B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_27_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x16, 0x36, 0xEF, 0x61, 0x2D, 0xEE, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x5F, 0x88, 0xA0, 0x13, 0x12, 0xF7, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xC6, 0xAD, 0x4A, 0x4A, 0x07, 0x01, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x74, 0xB1, 0x4F, 0xEB, 0xBD, 0xD5, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xF9, 0x71, 0xA2, 0x06, 0x4F, 0xD7, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x8B, 0x4D, 0x48, 0xE0, 0x98, 0xFB, 0x6A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_27_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0xBA, 0x10, 0xA3, 0x0D, 0x52, 0xAC, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xD0, 0xE0, 0x36, 0xE6, 0x07, 0x3A, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x80, 0xF0, 0xAA, 0x49, 0x22, 0x4B, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xC7, 0xAB, 0x1C, 0x89, 0xCD, 0x24, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x2A, 0xFC, 0xB3, 0x6D, 0x45, 0x96, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0xE4, 0xDB, 0x52, 0x3F, 0xC4, 0xB4, 0x19), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_28_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0xCC, 0xC8, 0x7F, 0xBB, 0x6B, 0x87, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x21, 0x3C, 0x69, 0x7D, 0x38, 0x57, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x4C, 0x18, 0x3C, 0x53, 0xA5, 0x48, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xC3, 0x64, 0x45, 0xDB, 0xC4, 0x6D, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xCC, 0xD1, 0xBB, 0x17, 0xB8, 0x34, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x69, 0x71, 0xFA, 0xA0, 0x28, 0x4A, 0x3D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_28_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xE8, 0x9E, 0x39, 0xEA, 0x8D, 0x38, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x9C, 0xBB, 0xCD, 0x80, 0x1A, 0xEE, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xA0, 0x45, 0xBF, 0xD9, 0x22, 0x11, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x7C, 0x5C, 0xD9, 0xC0, 0x9F, 0x69, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x8A, 0xA6, 0x79, 0x4E, 0x35, 0xB9, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x8B, 0x9A, 0x3E, 0xA1, 0xB8, 0x28, 0x10), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_29_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x2F, 0xEF, 0xBB, 0xA9, 0x72, 0x7F, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x34, 0xB7, 0x12, 0xB9, 0xE7, 0xC3, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x1D, 0xD9, 0x42, 0x77, 0x0C, 0x71, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x01, 0x59, 0xA7, 0x56, 0x03, 0x91, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x91, 0x99, 0x33, 0x30, 0x3E, 0xEF, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0xC9, 0x5A, 0x9A, 0x54, 0x66, 0xF1, 0x70), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_29_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x2C, 0xB7, 0x6E, 0x71, 0x7D, 0x35, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x0D, 0xEF, 0xD1, 0x2D, 0x99, 0x63, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x31, 0xAF, 0x2D, 0xC9, 0xC6, 0xC2, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0xC0, 0xDF, 0x80, 0x54, 0xC4, 0xAC, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x6B, 0xA0, 0x84, 0x96, 0xF7, 0x31, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0xE2, 0x7C, 0x7A, 0x41, 0x45, 0x75, 0x6A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_30_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xEE, 0x58, 0x31, 0xE8, 0x68, 0xD6, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x2E, 0x48, 0xB7, 0x09, 0x9F, 0xD4, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xA9, 0x5C, 0xE7, 0x64, 0x43, 0x5D, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x58, 0x9F, 0x50, 0xAB, 0x68, 0xFF, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x88, 0x2D, 0xBA, 0x12, 0xBF, 0x8D, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xDF, 0x6F, 0xB3, 0x75, 0xA4, 0x55, 0x73), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_30_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x17, 0x92, 0x39, 0xB7, 0x13, 0x37, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x43, 0x71, 0xA7, 0xCA, 0x17, 0x1B, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xB9, 0xB0, 0x78, 0xEF, 0xA0, 0xDA, 0x83), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x84, 0xF2, 0x0F, 0x85, 0xA2, 0xB6, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x65, 0x2E, 0x6E, 0x45, 0xB9, 0x4C, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x6A, 0x8C, 0x2B, 0x77, 0x96, 0x36, 0x22), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_31_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x7A, 0x13, 0x4A, 0x97, 0x63, 0x02, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x1E, 0x06, 0x03, 0x8F, 0xB9, 0xEE, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0xEE, 0x8B, 0x89, 0xA9, 0x70, 0xDB, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x7B, 0x81, 0xC9, 0x70, 0x8D, 0x62, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0xDA, 0x46, 0xF8, 0xF9, 0x3A, 0xBE, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x9C, 0x7A, 0x97, 0x62, 0xEB, 0xFA, 0x0F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_31_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0x03, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0x46, 0x27, 0x9E, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x08, 0x1C, 0xD5, 0x25, 0xAF, 0xE9, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x69, 0xDC, 0x59, 0xF4, 0x8A, 0x7C, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x9A, 0x7A, 0x99, 0x21, 0x0C, 0x4E, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xCE, 0x85, 0x5F, 0xAC, 0xAA, 0x82, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x57, 0x69, 0x90, 0x76, 0xF3, 0x53, 0x3F), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point brainpoolP384r1_T[32] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(brainpoolP384r1_T_0_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_1_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_2_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_3_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_4_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_5_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_6_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_7_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_8_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_9_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_10_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_11_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_12_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_13_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_14_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_15_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_15_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_16_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_16_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_17_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_17_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_18_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_18_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_19_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_19_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_20_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_20_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_21_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_21_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_22_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_22_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_23_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_23_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_24_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_24_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_25_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_25_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_26_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_26_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_27_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_27_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_28_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_28_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_29_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_29_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_30_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_30_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_31_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_31_Y), +}; +#else +#define brainpoolP384r1_T NULL +#endif + #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ /* @@ -513,22 +3805,686 @@ static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_n[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0x33, 0xAE, 0xE6, 0xD4, 0x3F), MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xDB, 0xB8, 0x9D, 0xDD, 0xAA), }; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) -/* For these curves, we build the group parameters dynamically. */ -#define ECP_LOAD_GROUP +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0xF8, 0xB9, 0xBC, 0x09, 0x22, 0x35, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x5E, 0x6A, 0x40, 0x47, 0x50, 0x6D, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0x93, 0x7B, 0x68, 0xD1, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xD4, 0xD0, 0xE2, 0x78, 0x1F, 0x3B, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x09, 0xD0, 0xF4, 0xEE, 0x62, 0x3B, 0xB4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x16, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x70, 0x9F, 0xED, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x6A, 0x4C, 0x9C, 0x2E, 0x32, 0x21, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xD8, 0xBD, 0xE4, 0xAE, 0x81), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x08, 0xD8, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x1E, 0xCD, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x54, 0xF0, 0xA8, 0x2F, 0x2B, 0xCA, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x63, 0x27, 0x8A, 0xD8, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x48, 0x5F, 0x4A, 0x49, 0xDE, 0xDC, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x81, 0x1F, 0x88, 0x5B, 0xC5, 0x00, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x7B, 0xA5, 0x24, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x09, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0x22, 0x78, 0xCF, 0xA9, 0xBF, 0xEA, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x32, 0x63, 0x56, 0x5D, 0x38, 0xDE, 0x7D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xE9, 0x6B, 0x8C, 0x6F, 0x9D, 0x88, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x4F, 0x86, 0x96, 0xA7, 0x56, 0xD1, 0x37), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0xAB, 0xFA, 0xEE, 0xA7, 0xF5, 0x0E, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x40, 0xEF, 0x9E, 0x6D, 0xD6, 0x32, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xED, 0x56, 0x14, 0x57, 0x1A, 0x8D, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xED, 0x4D, 0x3A, 0xFA, 0x71, 0x75, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xC5, 0x76, 0x1C, 0x14, 0xBE, 0xB5, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x5A, 0xCB, 0xE7, 0x36, 0x1D, 0x52, 0x1C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x8D, 0x7A, 0xEB, 0xA3, 0x8B, 0xD5, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xA3, 0x41, 0xF8, 0xAC, 0x9E, 0xAB, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0xE3, 0x65, 0x0D, 0x1C, 0xFE, 0x09, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0xCA, 0x13, 0x3F, 0xC5, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x5D, 0x63, 0x28, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xD3, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x95, 0x3F, 0x7A, 0x82, 0xD4, 0x77, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xBB, 0x92, 0x32, 0x00, 0xF4, 0x66, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x58, 0x31, 0xD1, 0x17, 0x9F, 0x2A, 0x22), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x36, 0xA9, 0xCD, 0x80, 0xA5, 0x2D, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x44, 0xAB, 0xCE, 0x71, 0xFF, 0x0C, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x24, 0x58, 0x35, 0x5A, 0x21, 0x32, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0xA6, 0x28, 0xF8, 0x7A, 0x97, 0xAE, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0xE7, 0x08, 0xFA, 0x47, 0xC9, 0x55, 0x09), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xAC, 0x2E, 0x84, 0xA4, 0xF5, 0x52, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x58, 0x05, 0x9D, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0x71, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x92, 0xB4, 0x92, 0xC1, 0x92, 0xEC, 0x6B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x48, 0x2D, 0x79, 0x5E, 0x58, 0xE5, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x85, 0x26, 0xEC, 0xE9, 0x6E, 0xD4, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x68, 0x26, 0x87, 0x38, 0xA2, 0xD2, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x17, 0x60, 0xCE, 0x75, 0xF8, 0xA5, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x51, 0xDB, 0xA9, 0xAE, 0x87, 0xF1, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x49, 0x92, 0x3B, 0x19, 0x96, 0xF5, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0xD5, 0x52, 0x52, 0x8C, 0xCE, 0xFD, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x18, 0x0A, 0xE6, 0xF6, 0xAE, 0x08, 0x41), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x2B, 0xD8, 0x54, 0xCE, 0xB0, 0x57, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xB0, 0xF8, 0x9E, 0x03, 0x03, 0x3C, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x0E, 0x29, 0x29, 0x00, 0xF3, 0x70, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x33, 0x99, 0x0E, 0x00, 0x5D, 0xFE, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x2D, 0xF2, 0x59, 0x32, 0xCF, 0x03, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0xC9, 0x72, 0xAE, 0x0C, 0xEF, 0xD1, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x5A, 0x27, 0xBF, 0x2F, 0x45, 0xF9, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xBE, 0xE5, 0x2C, 0xFF, 0x5B, 0x1E, 0x88), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0xAC, 0xBB, 0xD8, 0x83, 0xC2, 0x46, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xDC, 0xCE, 0x15, 0xB4, 0xEF, 0xCF, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xDB, 0x5E, 0x94, 0x31, 0x0B, 0xB2, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xB9, 0xE3, 0xE3, 0x11, 0x71, 0x41, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xE3, 0x01, 0xB7, 0x7D, 0xBC, 0x65, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x07, 0x65, 0x87, 0xA7, 0xE8, 0x48, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x48, 0x8F, 0xD4, 0x30, 0x8E, 0xB4, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xE0, 0x73, 0xBE, 0x1E, 0xBF, 0x56, 0x36), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x0E, 0x5E, 0x87, 0xC5, 0xAB, 0x0E, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xF9, 0x5F, 0x80, 0x24, 0x4C, 0x2A, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0x15, 0x21, 0x54, 0x92, 0x84, 0x8D, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x8A, 0x47, 0x74, 0xDC, 0x42, 0xB1, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0xF7, 0x30, 0xFD, 0xC1, 0x9B, 0x0C, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x6C, 0xCC, 0xDF, 0xC5, 0xE3, 0xA9, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x67, 0x59, 0x10, 0x5C, 0x51, 0x54, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x37, 0xFB, 0x6E, 0xB0, 0x78, 0x63, 0x8E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0xEF, 0xC4, 0x39, 0x20, 0xF1, 0x46, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x62, 0xAE, 0xFF, 0x10, 0xE4, 0xE2, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x5C, 0xF5, 0x2E, 0x22, 0x89, 0xE5, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0x0C, 0x29, 0xA8, 0x62, 0xAE, 0xDB, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0xCA, 0x87, 0x2A, 0x6F, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xDC, 0x9B, 0x9F, 0x65, 0xD4, 0xAD, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xC3, 0x08, 0x0F, 0xCF, 0x67, 0xE9, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x5C, 0xD7, 0xFF, 0x41, 0x9C, 0xCB, 0x26), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x25, 0x05, 0x12, 0xAD, 0x73, 0x63, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x99, 0x07, 0x86, 0x57, 0xE7, 0x94, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x4B, 0xA5, 0xBF, 0x18, 0xA9, 0xEF, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x4C, 0xC4, 0x09, 0xF2, 0x2F, 0x0C, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x3A, 0x04, 0xEA, 0x89, 0x6C, 0x91, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x6C, 0x3A, 0xE7, 0xA3, 0xEC, 0x24, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xA1, 0x26, 0x21, 0x04, 0xE3, 0xB9, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0x71, 0x4B, 0x7B, 0xC2, 0x89, 0xCD, 0xA2), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xB9, 0xA8, 0x9D, 0xFD, 0x00, 0x3A, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x41, 0x6C, 0xBB, 0x5A, 0xCA, 0x1F, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xD7, 0xE2, 0x6C, 0x6B, 0xA7, 0x48, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x19, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0xC1, 0x7E, 0x4F, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xF7, 0x19, 0x3C, 0x06, 0x74, 0x2C, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x23, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x09, 0xB0, 0x80, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x74, 0x34, 0x08, 0x44, 0x7E, 0xA3, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xCC, 0x8D, 0x12, 0x6E, 0xE1, 0x3D, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x18, 0xB1, 0x71, 0x02, 0x93, 0xC2, 0xA4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x89, 0x40, 0xE2, 0x1F, 0xE7, 0x5E, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x8E, 0xAE, 0x89, 0x01, 0xD4, 0x0C, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xDA, 0x58, 0x70, 0x24, 0xF2, 0xE4, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0xC7, 0x1D, 0xD6, 0x4A, 0x6F, 0x66, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x1D, 0x7E, 0x4A, 0x2C, 0xCA, 0xEC, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x06, 0x7F, 0xA8, 0x99, 0xE4, 0xD3, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x1D, 0x5A, 0xDF, 0x5E, 0x58, 0x36, 0x49), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xB9, 0x32, 0x69, 0x1F, 0x72, 0x2A, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x73, 0xE2, 0x03, 0x39, 0x35, 0xAA, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x5E, 0x5D, 0x48, 0xEF, 0xAE, 0x30, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x7F, 0x60, 0x19, 0xAF, 0xEC, 0x9D, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xD9, 0x19, 0xE4, 0x1B, 0x56, 0x15, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xD7, 0x33, 0x59, 0x1F, 0x43, 0x59, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xCE, 0xEE, 0xCA, 0xA4, 0x7F, 0x63, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x40, 0xC0, 0xF6, 0x19, 0x89, 0x43, 0x20), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x92, 0xEA, 0x07, 0x65, 0x79, 0x86, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xB7, 0x13, 0x75, 0xD3, 0xC5, 0x0A, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x9E, 0xFA, 0xE1, 0x1F, 0x0C, 0xF9, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x8C, 0xED, 0x5C, 0x21, 0xE9, 0x09, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x4D, 0xD8, 0x18, 0xC4, 0xF6, 0x36, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xC9, 0xAC, 0x5C, 0xFA, 0x69, 0xA4, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x8C, 0x94, 0x1C, 0x7B, 0x71, 0x36, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xBD, 0x46, 0xCE, 0xB7, 0x1D, 0x9C, 0x5E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xD6, 0x96, 0x4B, 0xA6, 0x47, 0xEB, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0xF1, 0x5F, 0x15, 0xDE, 0x99, 0x6F, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0x04, 0xB8, 0xE6, 0xC0, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xD3, 0xF0, 0x04, 0x00, 0xE4, 0x05, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xF3, 0x06, 0xA3, 0x1A, 0xFF, 0xEA, 0x73), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x32, 0xAA, 0x99, 0x33, 0x09, 0xB6, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xEF, 0xFC, 0x61, 0x10, 0x42, 0x31, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xF1, 0xF4, 0x33, 0xCF, 0x28, 0x90, 0x9C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0x88, 0x87, 0x7B, 0xEB, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xB8, 0xDA, 0xFA, 0xDA, 0x3D, 0xA6, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xF0, 0x62, 0x82, 0x53, 0x32, 0x55, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xA5, 0x32, 0x4A, 0x19, 0x11, 0x9C, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xB3, 0x27, 0xE9, 0x75, 0x90, 0x05, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x1C, 0x90, 0x48, 0x77, 0x01, 0x85, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xD6, 0x9B, 0x84, 0xA8, 0xD7, 0xC5, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x7A, 0xCB, 0xB3, 0x11, 0x46, 0xD7, 0x99), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x23, 0xBF, 0x75, 0x75, 0xA1, 0x95, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0x66, 0x5D, 0x34, 0x13, 0xA9, 0x03, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x80, 0x9D, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0x44, 0xE1, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x5D, 0xBD, 0xA8, 0xBF, 0xB4, 0x25, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x99, 0x1F, 0x53, 0xF1, 0x57, 0xDB, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x7C, 0xE5, 0xC5, 0x51, 0x0B, 0x4C, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0xB0, 0x1A, 0x9C, 0x16, 0xB0, 0x32, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0xE3, 0xCF, 0xDD, 0x48, 0xB4, 0x7B, 0x33), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0xDD, 0x9E, 0x3C, 0x98, 0x0E, 0x77, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xAB, 0x01, 0xD3, 0x87, 0x74, 0x25, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0xA3, 0xE3, 0x76, 0x43, 0x87, 0x12, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0xB1, 0x3B, 0x60, 0x66, 0xEB, 0x98, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x78, 0xC8, 0xD7, 0x4E, 0x75, 0xCA, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xDF, 0x71, 0x19, 0xE7, 0x07, 0x36, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xC9, 0xA8, 0x5F, 0x91, 0xBF, 0x47, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x96, 0x58, 0x96, 0x18, 0xB6, 0xFA, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x2D, 0xA9, 0x9B, 0x86, 0xDB, 0x0C, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x0B, 0x2D, 0x56, 0x4A, 0xD3, 0x93, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x15, 0xE2, 0x65, 0x12, 0x86, 0x0E, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x41, 0x4D, 0xC1, 0xCB, 0xE4, 0xC3, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x53, 0x10, 0xCA, 0xA3, 0xAC, 0x83, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x01, 0x22, 0x96, 0x10, 0xAD, 0x69, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x46, 0x4E, 0xD8, 0xEA, 0xD6, 0x9D, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x2F, 0x7F, 0x62, 0x62, 0x80, 0xD0, 0x14), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xDA, 0x00, 0x63, 0x09, 0xBD, 0x6A, 0x83), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xD4, 0x6E, 0x48, 0x05, 0xB7, 0xF7, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x4D, 0xD7, 0x00, 0x4A, 0x15, 0x27, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x15, 0xAA, 0x37, 0x27, 0x34, 0x18, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x20, 0x2C, 0x84, 0x1B, 0x88, 0xBA, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x09, 0xD6, 0x04, 0xA2, 0x60, 0x84, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x04, 0x94, 0x08, 0xD4, 0xED, 0x47, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xF3, 0xE4, 0x3E, 0xB9, 0x5B, 0x35, 0x42), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0xD8, 0xB6, 0x80, 0xD6, 0xF1, 0x30, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x14, 0xA6, 0x85, 0xEE, 0xA7, 0xD8, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x49, 0x2A, 0x1E, 0x7C, 0xE9, 0x2D, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x87, 0x56, 0x91, 0x03, 0x77, 0x4D, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0x52, 0xD4, 0xAA, 0xF7, 0xFA, 0xB0, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x5D, 0x11, 0x39, 0xB1, 0xE7, 0x76, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x13, 0xBC, 0x37, 0x5D, 0x74, 0xCD, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x48, 0x14, 0x23, 0x30, 0xF8, 0x46, 0x37), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x27, 0xB0, 0xD9, 0xB2, 0x74, 0xB4, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xA6, 0xB9, 0x6F, 0x9F, 0x64, 0x36, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0x2B, 0x78, 0x40, 0x05, 0x2B, 0x7B, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x68, 0x3A, 0xB6, 0x4A, 0xE2, 0xDB, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x33, 0xD7, 0x34, 0x8B, 0x25, 0x45, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0xCE, 0xA8, 0xC9, 0x01, 0xFB, 0x0E, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xF9, 0x51, 0x4C, 0x12, 0x9F, 0x60, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x85, 0xBD, 0x30, 0x37, 0x84, 0x39, 0x44), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x33, 0xAF, 0x2E, 0xB8, 0x2E, 0xCC, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xB1, 0x73, 0x59, 0x4E, 0x0C, 0x09, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x24, 0x89, 0x81, 0x12, 0xFF, 0xBB, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x37, 0x1A, 0x66, 0xEE, 0xED, 0xB6, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xBD, 0x04, 0x20, 0x5D, 0xFB, 0xBF, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xF8, 0x34, 0xA3, 0xFF, 0x45, 0xDE, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x18, 0x73, 0xF1, 0x32, 0x25, 0x58, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0xC1, 0x14, 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x40, 0x0F, 0x12), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x07, 0x9D, 0x9C, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x56, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xBA, 0x87, 0xF9, 0x15, 0x0C, 0x66, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x1F, 0xC1, 0x28, 0xB0, 0x47, 0x0D, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xCA, 0x27, 0xEE, 0x4B, 0x23, 0x2B, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0xB5, 0x68, 0xC8, 0x17, 0x5D, 0xC3, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x02, 0x08, 0xEE, 0x20, 0x9D, 0xEA, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x14, 0x50, 0xD4, 0x7D, 0x5F, 0xCF, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xFA, 0xF8, 0xA7, 0xC6, 0xDC, 0x14, 0x8C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xBD, 0x0A, 0x1A, 0x18, 0x98, 0xDC, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x63, 0x02, 0xB7, 0xD5, 0x5B, 0x5A, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xB1, 0xD7, 0x4B, 0x15, 0x39, 0x61, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x32, 0xE1, 0x9E, 0x70, 0x1B, 0xCE, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0xD8, 0x18, 0x83, 0x52, 0x9B, 0x6D, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x55, 0x56, 0x19, 0x34, 0xA4, 0xEA, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0xA9, 0x55, 0x80, 0xE3, 0x15, 0x36, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x06, 0xC8, 0x1D, 0x17, 0x0D, 0xAD, 0x16), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0xD6, 0xF0, 0xCC, 0xF3, 0x63, 0x53, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x5A, 0xDC, 0x46, 0xBD, 0x0D, 0xAD, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x2F, 0x11, 0x60, 0x15, 0x51, 0x4A, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xE3, 0x93, 0x38, 0xD5, 0x83, 0xAA, 0x0D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xA6, 0xCC, 0xB1, 0xFD, 0xBB, 0x1A, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x54, 0xC8, 0x54, 0x6F, 0x79, 0x1A, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x4A, 0xDA, 0x28, 0x92, 0x97, 0x9D, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x4B, 0xDB, 0xC7, 0x52, 0xC5, 0x66, 0x34), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x7E, 0x92, 0x53, 0x30, 0x93, 0xFD, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x16, 0x6A, 0xB1, 0x91, 0x0A, 0xB4, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x9D, 0x40, 0x3F, 0xE3, 0xF1, 0x01, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x0E, 0xD8, 0xED, 0x11, 0x8E, 0x4C, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x4A, 0x1B, 0x88, 0xDF, 0x8D, 0x29, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x23, 0x21, 0x11, 0xAB, 0x77, 0x81, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xAF, 0x11, 0xFA, 0xBA, 0x40, 0x63, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x6F, 0x8D, 0x80, 0xDF, 0x67, 0xF5, 0x44), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0x8B, 0xB7, 0x08, 0xF4, 0xD7, 0x2D, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x2B, 0x30, 0x02, 0x45, 0x71, 0x08, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x3A, 0xCA, 0x50, 0xF6, 0xC2, 0x19, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xB9, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0x73, 0x95, 0x1D, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x60, 0x59, 0x48, 0xCB, 0xD8, 0xD6, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xB9, 0x6C, 0x89, 0xAB, 0x99, 0xA8, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0xA1, 0x8B, 0x4E, 0x06, 0x19, 0xEC, 0x99), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x95, 0x04, 0xCF, 0xD5, 0x94, 0xB3, 0x02), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x35, 0x93, 0x7C, 0xB3, 0xB8, 0x9E, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x45, 0x5C, 0x7E, 0xBF, 0x75, 0x81, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xE8, 0x24, 0xDF, 0xEC, 0x2F, 0x7D, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x8B, 0xD5, 0x6A, 0x9B, 0xA0, 0xE0, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xE3, 0x27, 0x82, 0xDE, 0xDD, 0xCA, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x57, 0x56, 0x46, 0x05, 0x06, 0x01, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x35, 0xA7, 0x47, 0xE2, 0x6B, 0x2C, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x9D, 0x4C, 0xEC, 0x1F, 0x11, 0x75, 0x2B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xAA, 0x41, 0xC1, 0xE9, 0x0E, 0xE9, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xCF, 0x9C, 0x4B, 0xE8, 0xED, 0x0A, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0x73, 0xCA, 0x0C, 0x46, 0x0A, 0x9C, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xE1, 0x9E, 0xBC, 0xFE, 0x44, 0x63, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0x43, 0x71, 0xEE, 0xF8, 0xC1, 0x8C, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x4B, 0xF0, 0x69, 0x25, 0xBD, 0x71, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0x9A, 0xFE, 0x82, 0xE7, 0xC1, 0xC1, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x5A, 0x6E, 0x5E, 0x97, 0x6A, 0x35, 0x8D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x18, 0x6C, 0x7E, 0xB8, 0x9E, 0x57, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xB9, 0xC1, 0xD0, 0xFE, 0x78, 0xFB, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x08, 0xAE, 0x46, 0x34, 0xEA, 0x7A, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x1C, 0x56, 0xA9, 0x18, 0x37, 0xD4, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x63, 0xE9, 0x0A, 0xB6, 0x38, 0x3C, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x4F, 0xA4, 0x6E, 0x85, 0x31, 0x23, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0xAD, 0xC4, 0xC3, 0xB1, 0x4B, 0x1C, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x56, 0x4A, 0x38, 0xB3, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0x2C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_16_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0xC7, 0x19, 0xDE, 0x21, 0xED, 0x89, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0xAE, 0xEB, 0x9D, 0xA7, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x0E, 0x13, 0x1E, 0x86, 0x57, 0xC3, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x4B, 0x30, 0x46, 0x52, 0xC1, 0xEC, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xD5, 0x44, 0x31, 0x96, 0x3B, 0x26, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x68, 0xA8, 0x67, 0x78, 0x39, 0xE8, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x78, 0xB7, 0xDD, 0xF2, 0x58, 0xB6, 0x3D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x3C, 0xB3, 0x26, 0xC4, 0x2C, 0x8C, 0xA5), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_16_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x24, 0xE5, 0x73, 0xEE, 0x9A, 0x02, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x6A, 0x65, 0x60, 0xF3, 0x62, 0xE3, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0x07, 0x84, 0xE6, 0x3B, 0x46, 0x65, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x8F, 0x0C, 0xB0, 0xE1, 0x04, 0x82, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x13, 0xBF, 0x3D, 0xA0, 0x48, 0xA2, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x26, 0x76, 0x74, 0xAB, 0x0B, 0x29, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x6E, 0x5F, 0x03, 0x34, 0x7C, 0x38, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x72, 0xF9, 0x3B, 0x3C, 0xA4, 0xBC, 0x7C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_17_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xCE, 0x18, 0x80, 0xB8, 0x24, 0x45, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x09, 0x03, 0xB8, 0x06, 0x64, 0xF7, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x26, 0xB1, 0x10, 0x6D, 0x71, 0x12, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x12, 0xC6, 0x6E, 0x1E, 0x6A, 0xC3, 0x80), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xD3, 0x0A, 0xDE, 0xD8, 0x6B, 0x04, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x87, 0x5B, 0xAE, 0xDB, 0x3C, 0xC0, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0xF5, 0xF9, 0xC1, 0x9A, 0x89, 0xBB, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x69, 0x72, 0x8B, 0xAE, 0x32, 0x13, 0x11), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_17_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x16, 0x07, 0x50, 0xFA, 0x4C, 0xCF, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x50, 0x21, 0xE9, 0xDE, 0xEC, 0x7E, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x2F, 0xE8, 0x83, 0x30, 0x0B, 0x65, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x0B, 0x99, 0xAC, 0xC9, 0xBA, 0x6C, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x59, 0x5A, 0x0D, 0x7B, 0x9E, 0x08, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x91, 0xB2, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xCE, 0x67, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x93, 0x60, 0x0C, 0xD7, 0x1F, 0x2F, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x7F, 0x9D, 0x40, 0xF8, 0x78, 0x7A, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_18_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x22, 0x95, 0xE8, 0xEF, 0x31, 0x57, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x88, 0x53, 0xFE, 0xAF, 0x7C, 0x47, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xCE, 0xCC, 0x79, 0xE8, 0x9F, 0x8C, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x16, 0xDD, 0x77, 0x6E, 0x8A, 0x73, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x07, 0x97, 0x21, 0x3B, 0xF8, 0x5F, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xB5, 0xD2, 0x81, 0x84, 0xF0, 0xE7, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x8F, 0x75, 0x09, 0x6A, 0x0E, 0x53, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x4F, 0x70, 0x97, 0xC7, 0xAC, 0x7D, 0x3F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_18_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x3C, 0x6A, 0xB4, 0x10, 0xA9, 0xC8, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xC5, 0xD6, 0x69, 0x16, 0xB8, 0xAC, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x44, 0xDC, 0xEB, 0x48, 0x54, 0x5D, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x48, 0x9B, 0xD7, 0x72, 0x69, 0xA4, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x0D, 0x36, 0x9A, 0x66, 0x0B, 0xEC, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xC6, 0xD4, 0xB6, 0x60, 0xE5, 0xC3, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x29, 0x42, 0xE0, 0x9D, 0xFD, 0x7C, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x10, 0xBA, 0x55, 0xBC, 0x3B, 0x38, 0x5D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_19_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x66, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x73, 0x03, 0x1B, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xA4, 0x66, 0x12, 0x96, 0x7B, 0x02, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0xB5, 0xDE, 0x6D, 0x98, 0xD1, 0xD5, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xF5, 0x44, 0xB8, 0x8E, 0xF6, 0x8C, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x15, 0x2B, 0x72, 0xBC, 0x49, 0xE5, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x44, 0xD7, 0xDF, 0x8F, 0xEB, 0x8D, 0x80), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x64, 0x88, 0xAA, 0xB7, 0xE4, 0x70, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x14, 0xBB, 0xE9, 0x9B, 0xB9, 0x65, 0x5D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_19_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x8E, 0x88, 0xF5, 0xF1, 0xC1, 0x89, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x30, 0x53, 0xE6, 0xFB, 0x2D, 0x82, 0xB4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xE4, 0xFF, 0xBA, 0x31, 0x79, 0xAB, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x09, 0xF7, 0xB7, 0x09, 0x78, 0x4C, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xAE, 0xC2, 0x44, 0xDC, 0x17, 0x78, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xD4, 0x17, 0x43, 0x19, 0x74, 0x9E, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x64, 0x3B, 0x73, 0xA2, 0x99, 0x27, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x74, 0x36, 0x5F, 0xD3, 0x14, 0xB1, 0x31), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_20_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x07, 0xAB, 0xFD, 0x9B, 0x03, 0xC5, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xBE, 0xB0, 0x1D, 0xF2, 0x0C, 0x73, 0x73), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xE7, 0x7B, 0x87, 0xD3, 0x34, 0xFD, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x25, 0x3D, 0xC7, 0x36, 0x83, 0x53, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x7C, 0xCF, 0x63, 0x55, 0x12, 0x11, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x34, 0x4D, 0x27, 0x92, 0xAC, 0x18, 0x16), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x42, 0x61, 0x9D, 0x2E, 0xFF, 0x13, 0x16), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0xDE, 0x92, 0x65, 0x57, 0x0D, 0xBC, 0x0A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_20_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x7B, 0x6E, 0xC6, 0x2A, 0x21, 0x74, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0xA7, 0x53, 0x4D, 0x29, 0x36, 0xEF, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0xD6, 0x41, 0xC7, 0x99, 0xAD, 0x50, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xAC, 0x41, 0x9F, 0xFB, 0x4C, 0x86, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xBB, 0xE6, 0x25, 0x28, 0xAA, 0xEB, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x04, 0xA2, 0xC3, 0xAA, 0x08, 0x8A, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x2B, 0x5B, 0xE2, 0x8D, 0x76, 0xEA, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x33, 0xD2, 0x21, 0x4D, 0x62, 0xE3, 0x8E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_21_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x06, 0x8B, 0x2B, 0xC2, 0xC4, 0xB1, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xF5, 0xA1, 0xC0, 0x03, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xA9, 0xEF, 0x55, 0xB6, 0x1A, 0x9F, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x54, 0x32, 0xBE, 0x06, 0x43, 0xB5, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0xD6, 0xD9, 0x20, 0x89, 0xBE, 0xD4, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x26, 0x95, 0x10, 0xCE, 0xB4, 0x88, 0x79), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xA6, 0x27, 0xAC, 0x32, 0xBA, 0xBD, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xA6, 0xAE, 0x9C, 0x7B, 0xBE, 0xA1, 0x63), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_21_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xCD, 0x4D, 0x3D, 0xDF, 0x96, 0xBB, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0xA7, 0x11, 0x06, 0xCC, 0x0E, 0x31, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0xE4, 0xF4, 0xAD, 0x7B, 0x5F, 0xF1, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x54, 0xBE, 0xF4, 0x8A, 0x03, 0x47, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x53, 0x00, 0x7F, 0xB0, 0x8A, 0x68, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x16, 0xB1, 0x73, 0x6F, 0x5B, 0x0E, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x32, 0xE3, 0x43, 0x64, 0x75, 0xFB, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x18, 0x55, 0x8A, 0x4E, 0x6E, 0x35, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_22_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x97, 0x15, 0x1E, 0xCB, 0xF2, 0x9C, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xD1, 0xBB, 0xF3, 0x70, 0xAD, 0x13, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x96, 0xA4, 0xC5, 0x5E, 0xDA, 0xD5, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x81, 0xE9, 0x65, 0x66, 0x76, 0x47, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x35, 0x87, 0x06, 0x73, 0xCF, 0x34, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x81, 0x15, 0x42, 0xA2, 0x79, 0x5B, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xA2, 0x7D, 0x09, 0x14, 0x64, 0xC6, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x6D, 0xC4, 0xED, 0xF1, 0xD6, 0xE9, 0x24), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_22_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xD5, 0xBB, 0x25, 0xA3, 0xDD, 0xA3, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xF2, 0x68, 0x67, 0x39, 0x8F, 0x73, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x76, 0x28, 0x89, 0xAD, 0x32, 0xE0, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x90, 0xCC, 0x57, 0x58, 0xAA, 0xC9, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xD7, 0x43, 0xD2, 0xCE, 0x5E, 0xA0, 0x08), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xB0, 0xB8, 0xA4, 0x9E, 0x96, 0x26, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x61, 0x1D, 0xF3, 0x65, 0x5E, 0x60, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x1E, 0x65, 0xED, 0xCF, 0x07, 0x60, 0x20), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_23_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x30, 0x17, 0x8A, 0x91, 0x88, 0x0A, 0xA4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x7D, 0x18, 0xA4, 0xAC, 0x59, 0xFC, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x31, 0x8B, 0x25, 0x65, 0x39, 0x9A, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x16, 0x4B, 0x68, 0xBA, 0x59, 0x13, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xFD, 0xD3, 0xC5, 0x56, 0xC9, 0x8C, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xC6, 0x9F, 0xF4, 0xE6, 0xF7, 0xB4, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x7C, 0x03, 0x00, 0x26, 0x9F, 0xD8, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x1D, 0x6E, 0x00, 0xB9, 0x00, 0x6E, 0x93), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_23_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x63, 0xDA, 0x03, 0x2B, 0xD5, 0x0B, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xFC, 0xE2, 0xC8, 0x47, 0xF0, 0xAE, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x4C, 0xF7, 0x50, 0x0C, 0x48, 0x06, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x2B, 0x32, 0x98, 0x0E, 0x7E, 0x61, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x02, 0x27, 0xFE, 0x75, 0x86, 0xDF, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x30, 0xB1, 0x22, 0x32, 0x1B, 0xFE, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x27, 0xF7, 0x78, 0x6F, 0xD7, 0xFD, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x78, 0xCC, 0xEA, 0xC0, 0x50, 0x24, 0x44), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_24_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x2B, 0x4F, 0x7F, 0x58, 0xE6, 0xC2, 0x70), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x43, 0xD5, 0xA7, 0x35, 0x3C, 0x80, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x6D, 0x4B, 0x12, 0x00, 0x7B, 0xE6, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x15, 0xBD, 0xD0, 0x9B, 0xCA, 0xAA, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xCE, 0x9C, 0xE3, 0x8B, 0x60, 0x7A, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xDA, 0x4B, 0x03, 0xA7, 0x8D, 0x43, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xAF, 0x00, 0x2B, 0x32, 0xF0, 0x22, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xD9, 0x99, 0x99, 0xBE, 0x43, 0x99, 0x3E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_24_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x71, 0x41, 0xF4, 0xB5, 0xFD, 0xDD, 0x36), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0xE2, 0x20, 0x4C, 0xD1, 0x2E, 0x1F, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x43, 0x48, 0x76, 0x8A, 0x49, 0xAC, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x1A, 0x55, 0xA8, 0xA3, 0xD4, 0x57, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xA6, 0x84, 0x39, 0xC9, 0x13, 0xBB, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0xFA, 0xA9, 0x70, 0xDE, 0x83, 0xDD, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0xC9, 0xD9, 0x3E, 0x44, 0x91, 0x68, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x9F, 0x85, 0x6D, 0xF7, 0x54, 0x36, 0x82), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_25_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x6B, 0xA6, 0xA3, 0xE5, 0xD4, 0x46, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x3E, 0xDC, 0x84, 0x7C, 0x7B, 0x24, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xED, 0x7F, 0x86, 0x07, 0x6C, 0x57, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x06, 0xFE, 0x52, 0x12, 0x79, 0x69, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0xD1, 0x44, 0x5F, 0x21, 0x3A, 0xC3, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xD9, 0x4A, 0xC0, 0x75, 0xAB, 0x17, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x81, 0x94, 0xB6, 0x80, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xBE, 0x8E, 0xA5, 0xAA, 0xBC, 0x1E, 0x3E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_25_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0xC7, 0x85, 0xA6, 0x59, 0x9B, 0xB1, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xCE, 0x40, 0xD1, 0xFB, 0xDF, 0x94, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xB8, 0x5E, 0xBF, 0x45, 0xA8, 0x2D, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x9C, 0x06, 0x1B, 0xA9, 0x57, 0xB9, 0x79), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0xE9, 0xCE, 0xA2, 0xD3, 0x74, 0xA1, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x5F, 0x34, 0x78, 0xDB, 0xAE, 0x3A, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x32, 0x84, 0x3E, 0x68, 0x6A, 0x43, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xBC, 0x39, 0x36, 0xA4, 0xC5, 0xBB, 0x11), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_26_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x07, 0xA2, 0xB5, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0x4D, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x1D, 0x67, 0xE6, 0xF1, 0x46, 0xEB, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x41, 0x23, 0x95, 0xE7, 0xE0, 0x10, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x69, 0xFE, 0x68, 0x8C, 0xC6, 0x5F, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xB9, 0x2B, 0x3D, 0xD2, 0x4F, 0xD8, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x09, 0xF5, 0x5F, 0xCF, 0xF6, 0x91, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x15, 0x42, 0x6B, 0x6D, 0xB5, 0xF3, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x56, 0x9D, 0xC5, 0xFF, 0xCA, 0x13, 0x9B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_26_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x38, 0xE6, 0x23, 0x63, 0x48, 0x3C, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x68, 0x3C, 0xD1, 0x3B, 0xE9, 0x3B, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x08, 0x54, 0x49, 0xD1, 0x46, 0x45, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x70, 0x52, 0x6E, 0x79, 0xC4, 0x5E, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xDF, 0xE8, 0x5A, 0x32, 0x81, 0xDA, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x2D, 0x94, 0x5B, 0xB5, 0x35, 0x9F, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x12, 0x8D, 0xC3, 0x36, 0x36, 0xB2, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x2F, 0x22, 0x38, 0x5B, 0x18, 0x4C, 0x35), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_27_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xC1, 0x22, 0x0E, 0xF0, 0x73, 0x11, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xAE, 0xA4, 0x56, 0x18, 0x61, 0x66, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xFB, 0x72, 0x08, 0x84, 0x38, 0x51, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x86, 0xA8, 0xB9, 0x31, 0x99, 0x29, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xFB, 0xC3, 0x42, 0xB3, 0xC7, 0x6F, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xF8, 0xE1, 0x09, 0xBE, 0x75, 0xB0, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x7D, 0xFF, 0xF4, 0x99, 0xFC, 0x13, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x1B, 0x84, 0x81, 0x42, 0x22, 0xC6, 0x3D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_27_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xE0, 0x37, 0xA4, 0xA0, 0x2F, 0x38, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x3D, 0xB7, 0x40, 0x2F, 0x39, 0x3C, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0x3B, 0x8A, 0x51, 0xAE, 0x40, 0x49, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x20, 0x9F, 0xDD, 0xA9, 0xD0, 0x77, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0x1D, 0x64, 0xDA, 0xA0, 0x53, 0xC7, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x7B, 0x66, 0x55, 0x94, 0xD1, 0x51, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xA9, 0xB5, 0x5B, 0x38, 0x35, 0x40, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xF0, 0x73, 0x79, 0x43, 0x61), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_28_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x47, 0x45, 0x69, 0x80, 0x72, 0x72, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x11, 0x99, 0x59, 0xDB, 0x48, 0x80, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x6E, 0x3D, 0xFC, 0x37, 0x15, 0xF4, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xBB, 0x5B, 0xA6, 0x35, 0x8D, 0x28, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x1A, 0x3B, 0x2C, 0x8F, 0xD3, 0xAA, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x1C, 0x1A, 0xF8, 0x02, 0xD9, 0x7B, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x69, 0xAC, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x31, 0x14, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x8A, 0xE6, 0xDE, 0x58, 0xB9, 0xC4, 0x7A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_28_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x83, 0x52, 0xFE, 0xF9, 0x7B, 0xE9, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xA2, 0x55, 0x46, 0x15, 0x49, 0xC1, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xBC, 0x5C, 0x91, 0xBD, 0xB9, 0x9C, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xFD, 0xB1, 0x4E, 0x5F, 0x74, 0xEE, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x8B, 0xD8, 0x8B, 0x17, 0x73, 0x1B, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x92, 0xD7, 0x67, 0x06, 0xAD, 0x25, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x0F, 0x80, 0x24, 0xE2, 0x27, 0x5F, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x1C, 0xCE, 0xD0, 0x67, 0xCA, 0xD4, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_29_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0xF1, 0xDD, 0x33, 0x66, 0xF9, 0x05, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xE5, 0x6B, 0x79, 0xBD, 0x48, 0x42, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x14, 0x52, 0xE3, 0x53, 0xB4, 0x50, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x84, 0x6C, 0xCF, 0xDA, 0xB2, 0x20, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xD6, 0x1A, 0xE5, 0xE2, 0x29, 0x70, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x61, 0xFE, 0xBB, 0x21, 0x82, 0xD1, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0xF0, 0x9C, 0x8B, 0x1A, 0x42, 0x30, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0xD6, 0x49, 0x81, 0x92, 0xF1, 0xD0, 0x90), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_29_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x91, 0x93, 0x6A, 0xA6, 0x22, 0xE9, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0xDC, 0xC3, 0x69, 0x11, 0x95, 0x7D, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xA3, 0x9D, 0x87, 0x5E, 0x64, 0x41, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x87, 0x5A, 0x15, 0xBD, 0x6E, 0x3C, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x8D, 0x50, 0xCC, 0xCF, 0xB7, 0x8F, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x65, 0xCD, 0x31, 0x30, 0xF1, 0x68, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x5C, 0x66, 0x67, 0x92, 0x30, 0x57, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x9B, 0x01, 0x3D, 0x20, 0x8B, 0xD1, 0x0D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_30_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0xC0, 0xE6, 0x4F, 0xDE, 0x62, 0xAB, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x48, 0xB3, 0x1C, 0x0F, 0x16, 0x93, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x63, 0xBD, 0x1F, 0x16, 0x50, 0x56, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x06, 0xBC, 0xE9, 0x27, 0x1C, 0x9A, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xFE, 0x21, 0xC5, 0x39, 0x55, 0xE1, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xA8, 0xD0, 0x96, 0x0E, 0xB5, 0xB2, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xE7, 0x4B, 0xF3, 0x11, 0x0C, 0xC9, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x3A, 0xC4, 0x87, 0x71, 0xEE, 0xFA, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_30_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x77, 0xEE, 0x81, 0x5E, 0x96, 0xEA, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xDF, 0xA9, 0xF4, 0x4F, 0x7C, 0xB2, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0xD4, 0xDF, 0x35, 0x63, 0x47, 0x25, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x3D, 0xFF, 0xA4, 0x02, 0xC3, 0x95, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x10, 0x78, 0xD1, 0x2B, 0xB7, 0xBE, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xE9, 0x57, 0xF9, 0xE0, 0xD8, 0xFC, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0xC4, 0x01, 0xD6, 0xB4, 0xE7, 0x78, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x6C, 0xB9, 0x13, 0xA4, 0xE8, 0x6D, 0x6F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_31_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xB0, 0xC9, 0xCD, 0xBF, 0xA2, 0x1E, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x4F, 0x86, 0x22, 0x9B, 0xEA, 0xE8, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x46, 0xDF, 0x43, 0xB9, 0x82, 0x2D, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x32, 0xF1, 0x4E, 0x95, 0x41, 0xAE, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x93, 0x26, 0xFC, 0xD3, 0x90, 0xDC, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x05, 0x45, 0xCA, 0xF9, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x82, 0x63, 0x4E, 0x55, 0x1D, 0x3A, 0x08), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x69, 0x52, 0x49, 0xE9, 0xED, 0x57, 0x34), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_31_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x64, 0xE9, 0xAC, 0x4C, 0x4A, 0xEA, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xE9, 0x0B, 0x99, 0xE7, 0xF9, 0xA9, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x0C, 0xC1, 0xF4, 0x8D, 0x07, 0xB6, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x68, 0xFA, 0x35, 0xE4, 0x9E, 0xAE, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x2D, 0x1A, 0x13, 0x8E, 0x02, 0xE2, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x38, 0x28, 0x86, 0x46, 0x7B, 0x3A, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x4C, 0x64, 0x59, 0x0A, 0xF9, 0x02, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x4F, 0x23, 0xA2, 0xC3, 0xD5, 0xEF, 0x42), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point brainpoolP512r1_T[32] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(brainpoolP512r1_T_0_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_1_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_2_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_3_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_4_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_5_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_6_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_7_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_8_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_9_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_10_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_11_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_12_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_13_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_14_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_15_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_15_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_16_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_16_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_17_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_17_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_18_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_18_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_19_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_19_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_20_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_20_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_21_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_21_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_22_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_22_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_23_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_23_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_24_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_24_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_25_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_25_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_26_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_26_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_27_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_27_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_28_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_28_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_29_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_29_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_30_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_30_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_31_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_31_Y), +}; +#else +#define brainpoolP512r1_T NULL #endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(ECP_LOAD_GROUP) /* @@ -538,7 +4494,7 @@ static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_n[] = { static inline void ecp_mpi_load(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, size_t len) { X->s = 1; - X->n = len / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint); + X->n = (unsigned short) (len / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); X->p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) p; } @@ -547,10 +4503,9 @@ static inline void ecp_mpi_load(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, size_ */ static inline void ecp_mpi_set1(mbedtls_mpi *X) { - static mbedtls_mpi_uint one[] = { 1 }; X->s = 1; X->n = 1; - X->p = one; + X->p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) mpi_one; /* X->p will not be modified so the cast is safe */ } /* @@ -562,7 +4517,8 @@ static int ecp_group_load(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *b, size_t blen, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *gx, size_t gxlen, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *gy, size_t gylen, - const mbedtls_mpi_uint *n, size_t nlen) + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *n, size_t nlen, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *T) { ecp_mpi_load(&grp->P, p, plen); if (a != NULL) { @@ -580,6 +4536,12 @@ static int ecp_group_load(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, grp->h = 1; + grp->T = (mbedtls_ecp_point *) T; + /* + * Set T_size to 0 to prevent T free by mbedtls_ecp_group_free. + */ + grp->T_size = 0; + return 0; } #endif /* ECP_LOAD_GROUP */ @@ -631,7 +4593,9 @@ static int ecp_mod_p256k1(mbedtls_mpi *); G ## _b, sizeof(G ## _b), \ G ## _gx, sizeof(G ## _gx), \ G ## _gy, sizeof(G ## _gy), \ - G ## _n, sizeof(G ## _n)) + G ## _n, sizeof(G ## _n), \ + G ## _T \ + ) #define LOAD_GROUP(G) ecp_group_load(grp, \ G ## _p, sizeof(G ## _p), \ @@ -639,7 +4603,9 @@ static int ecp_mod_p256k1(mbedtls_mpi *); G ## _b, sizeof(G ## _b), \ G ## _gx, sizeof(G ## _gx), \ G ## _gy, sizeof(G ## _gy), \ - G ## _n, sizeof(G ## _n)) + G ## _n, sizeof(G ## _n), \ + G ## _T \ + ) #endif /* ECP_LOAD_GROUP */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) @@ -750,7 +4716,6 @@ static int ecp_use_curve448(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp) */ int mbedtls_ecp_group_load(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id id) { - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); mbedtls_ecp_group_free(grp); mbedtls_ecp_group_init(grp); @@ -982,9 +4947,6 @@ static inline void sub32(uint32_t *dst, uint32_t src, signed char *carry) #define ADD(j) add32(&cur, A(j), &c); #define SUB(j) sub32(&cur, A(j), &c); -#define ciL (sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) /* chars in limb */ -#define biL (ciL << 3) /* bits in limb */ - /* * Helpers for the main 'loop' */ @@ -1016,8 +4978,7 @@ static inline void sub32(uint32_t *dst, uint32_t src, signed char *carry) * If the result is negative, we get it in the form * c * 2^bits + N, with c negative and N positive shorter than 'bits' */ -MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE -void mbedtls_ecp_fix_negative(mbedtls_mpi *N, signed char c, size_t bits) +static void mbedtls_ecp_fix_negative(mbedtls_mpi *N, signed char c, size_t bits) { size_t i; @@ -1232,43 +5193,32 @@ static int ecp_mod_p521(mbedtls_mpi *N) /* * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p255 = 2^255 - 19 - * Write N as A0 + 2^255 A1, return A0 + 19 * A1 + * Write N as A0 + 2^256 A1, return A0 + 38 * A1 */ static int ecp_mod_p255(mbedtls_mpi *N) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t i; - mbedtls_mpi M; - mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P255_WIDTH + 2]; + mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P255_WIDTH]; - if (N->n < P255_WIDTH) { + /* Helper references for top part of N */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint * const NT_p = N->p + P255_WIDTH; + const size_t NT_n = N->n - P255_WIDTH; + if (N->n <= P255_WIDTH) { return 0; } - - /* M = A1 */ - M.s = 1; - M.n = N->n - (P255_WIDTH - 1); - if (M.n > P255_WIDTH + 1) { + if (NT_n > P255_WIDTH) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - M.p = Mp; - memset(Mp, 0, sizeof(Mp)); - memcpy(Mp, N->p + P255_WIDTH - 1, M.n * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&M, 255 % (8 * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)))); - M.n++; /* Make room for multiplication by 19 */ - /* N = A0 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(N, 255, 0)); - for (i = P255_WIDTH; i < N->n; i++) { - N->p[i] = 0; - } + /* Split N as N + 2^256 M */ + memcpy(Mp, NT_p, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * NT_n); + memset(NT_p, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * NT_n); - /* N = A0 + 19 * A1 */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_int(&M, &M, 19)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_abs(N, N, &M)); + /* N = A0 + 38 * A1 */ + mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(N->p, P255_WIDTH + 1, + Mp, NT_n, + 38); -cleanup: - return ret; + return 0; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ @@ -1279,8 +5229,9 @@ static int ecp_mod_p255(mbedtls_mpi *N) /* Number of limbs fully occupied by 2^224 (max), and limbs used by it (min) */ #define DIV_ROUND_UP(X, Y) (((X) + (Y) -1) / (Y)) -#define P224_WIDTH_MIN (28 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) -#define P224_WIDTH_MAX DIV_ROUND_UP(28, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) +#define P224_SIZE (224 / 8) +#define P224_WIDTH_MIN (P224_SIZE / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) +#define P224_WIDTH_MAX DIV_ROUND_UP(P224_SIZE, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) #define P224_UNUSED_BITS ((P224_WIDTH_MAX * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * 8) - 224) /* @@ -1360,7 +5311,7 @@ static int ecp_mod_p448(mbedtls_mpi *N) */ #define P_KOBLITZ_MAX (256 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) // Max limbs in P #define P_KOBLITZ_R (8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) // Limbs in R -static inline int ecp_mod_koblitz(mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint *Rp, size_t p_limbs, +static inline int ecp_mod_koblitz(mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *Rp, size_t p_limbs, size_t adjust, size_t shift, mbedtls_mpi_uint mask) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; @@ -1374,7 +5325,7 @@ static inline int ecp_mod_koblitz(mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint *Rp, size_t p /* Init R */ R.s = 1; - R.p = Rp; + R.p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) Rp; /* R.p will not be modified so the cast is safe */ R.n = P_KOBLITZ_R; /* Common setup for M */ @@ -1382,9 +5333,9 @@ static inline int ecp_mod_koblitz(mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint *Rp, size_t p M.p = Mp; /* M = A1 */ - M.n = N->n - (p_limbs - adjust); + M.n = (unsigned short) (N->n - (p_limbs - adjust)); if (M.n > p_limbs + adjust) { - M.n = p_limbs + adjust; + M.n = (unsigned short) (p_limbs + adjust); } memset(Mp, 0, sizeof(Mp)); memcpy(Mp, N->p + p_limbs - adjust, M.n * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); @@ -1408,9 +5359,9 @@ static inline int ecp_mod_koblitz(mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint *Rp, size_t p /* Second pass */ /* M = A1 */ - M.n = N->n - (p_limbs - adjust); + M.n = (unsigned short) (N->n - (p_limbs - adjust)); if (M.n > p_limbs + adjust) { - M.n = p_limbs + adjust; + M.n = (unsigned short) (p_limbs + adjust); } memset(Mp, 0, sizeof(Mp)); memcpy(Mp, N->p + p_limbs - adjust, M.n * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); @@ -1441,11 +5392,11 @@ static inline int ecp_mod_koblitz(mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint *Rp, size_t p #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) /* * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192k1 = 2^192 - R, - * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^3 + 1 = 0x0100001119 + * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^3 + 1 = 0x01000011C9 */ static int ecp_mod_p192k1(mbedtls_mpi *N) { - static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + static const mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x11, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00) }; @@ -1462,7 +5413,7 @@ static int ecp_mod_p192k1(mbedtls_mpi *N) */ static int ecp_mod_p224k1(mbedtls_mpi *N) { - static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + static const mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x1A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00) }; @@ -1484,7 +5435,7 @@ static int ecp_mod_p224k1(mbedtls_mpi *N) */ static int ecp_mod_p256k1(mbedtls_mpi *N) { - static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + static const mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00) }; @@ -1493,6 +5444,17 @@ static int ecp_mod_p256k1(mbedtls_mpi *N) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +mbedtls_ecp_variant mbedtls_ecp_get_variant(void) +{ + return MBEDTLS_ECP_VARIANT_WITH_MPI_STRUCT; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + #endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves_new.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves_new.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..035b23a1b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves_new.c @@ -0,0 +1,6036 @@ +/* + * Elliptic curves over GF(p): curve-specific data and functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) + +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "constant_time_internal.h" + +#include "bn_mul.h" +#include "bignum_core.h" +#include "ecp_invasive.h" + +#include + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) + +#define ECP_MPI_INIT(_p, _n) { .p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) (_p), .s = 1, .n = (_n) } + +#define ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x) \ + ECP_MPI_INIT(x, sizeof(x) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) + +#define ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(x, y) { \ + ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x), ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(y), ECP_MPI_INIT(NULL, 0) } +#define ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(x, y) { \ + ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x), ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(y), ECP_MPI_INIT(mpi_one, 1) } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +/* For these curves, we build the group parameters dynamically. */ +#define ECP_LOAD_GROUP +static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_one[] = { 1 }; +#endif + +/* + * Note: the constants are in little-endian order + * to be directly usable in MPIs + */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp192r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0xB9, 0x46, 0xC1, 0xEC, 0xDE, 0xB8, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0x30, 0x24, 0x72, 0xAB, 0xE9, 0xA7, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x80, 0x9C, 0xE5, 0x19, 0x05, 0x21, 0x64), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x10, 0xFF, 0x82, 0xFD, 0x0A, 0xFF, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x88, 0xA1, 0x43, 0xEB, 0x20, 0xBF, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x90, 0x30, 0xB0, 0x0E, 0xA8, 0x8D, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x48, 0x79, 0x1E, 0xA1, 0x77, 0xF9, 0x73), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xCD, 0x24, 0x6B, 0xED, 0x11, 0x10, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0xDA, 0xC8, 0xFF, 0x95, 0x2B, 0x19, 0x07), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0x28, 0xD2, 0xB4, 0xB1, 0xC9, 0x6B, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xF8, 0xDE, 0x99, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x10, 0xFF, 0x82, 0xFD, 0x0A, 0xFF, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x88, 0xA1, 0x43, 0xEB, 0x20, 0xBF, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x90, 0x30, 0xB0, 0x0E, 0xA8, 0x8D, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x48, 0x79, 0x1E, 0xA1, 0x77, 0xF9, 0x73), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xCD, 0x24, 0x6B, 0xED, 0x11, 0x10, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0xDA, 0xC8, 0xFF, 0x95, 0x2B, 0x19, 0x07), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x9E, 0xE3, 0x60, 0x59, 0xD1, 0xC4, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xBD, 0x22, 0xD7, 0x2D, 0x07, 0xBD, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x2A, 0xCF, 0x33, 0xF0, 0xBE, 0xD1, 0xED), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x71, 0x4B, 0xA8, 0xED, 0x7E, 0xC9, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x2A, 0xF6, 0xDF, 0x0E, 0xE8, 0x4C, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x35, 0xF7, 0x8A, 0xC3, 0xEC, 0xDE, 0x1E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x67, 0xC2, 0x1D, 0x32, 0x8F, 0x10, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x2D, 0x17, 0xF3, 0xE4, 0xFE, 0xD8, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x45, 0x10, 0x70, 0x2C, 0x3E, 0x52, 0x3E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xF1, 0x04, 0x5D, 0xEE, 0xD4, 0x56, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0xB7, 0x38, 0x27, 0x61, 0xAA, 0x81, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x37, 0xD7, 0x0E, 0x29, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x14), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x35, 0x52, 0xC6, 0x31, 0xB7, 0x27, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xD4, 0x15, 0x98, 0x0F, 0xE7, 0xF3, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x31, 0x70, 0x35, 0x09, 0xA0, 0x2B, 0xC2), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x75, 0xA7, 0x4C, 0x88, 0xCF, 0x5B, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x17, 0x48, 0x8D, 0xF2, 0xF0, 0x86, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xCF, 0xFE, 0x6B, 0xB0, 0xA5, 0x06, 0xAB), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0x9A, 0x6D, 0x7B, 0x47, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0xFC, 0x51, 0x12, 0x62, 0x66, 0x0B, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x40, 0x93, 0xA0, 0xB5, 0x5A, 0x58, 0xD7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0xCB, 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x0B, 0xA1, 0x26, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x36, 0x9D, 0xA3, 0xD7, 0x3B, 0xAD, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x3B, 0x05, 0x9A, 0xA8, 0xAA, 0x69, 0xB2), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xD9, 0xD1, 0x4D, 0x4A, 0x6E, 0x96, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x66, 0x32, 0x39, 0xC6, 0x57, 0x7D, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xA0, 0x36, 0xC2, 0x45, 0xF9, 0x00, 0x62), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xEF, 0x59, 0x46, 0xDC, 0x60, 0xD9, 0x8F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xB0, 0xE9, 0x41, 0xA4, 0x87, 0x76, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0xD4, 0x0E, 0xB2, 0xFA, 0x16, 0x56, 0xDC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x62, 0xD2, 0xB1, 0x34, 0xB2, 0xF1, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xED, 0x55, 0xC5, 0x47, 0xB5, 0x07, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xF6, 0x2F, 0x94, 0xC3, 0xDD, 0x54, 0x2F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xA6, 0xD4, 0x8C, 0xA9, 0xCE, 0x4D, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x4B, 0x46, 0xCC, 0xB2, 0x55, 0xC8, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xAE, 0x31, 0xED, 0x89, 0x65, 0x59, 0x55), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x0A, 0xD1, 0x1A, 0xC5, 0xF6, 0xEA, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xFC, 0x0C, 0x1A, 0xFB, 0xA0, 0xC8, 0x70), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xFD, 0x53, 0x6F, 0x6D, 0xBF, 0xBA, 0xAF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xB0, 0x7D, 0x83, 0x96, 0xE3, 0xCB, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x6E, 0x55, 0x2C, 0x20, 0x53, 0x2F, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0x66, 0x00, 0x17, 0x08, 0xFE, 0xAC, 0x31), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x12, 0x97, 0x3A, 0xC7, 0x57, 0x45, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x25, 0x99, 0x00, 0xF6, 0x97, 0xB4, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x74, 0xE6, 0xE6, 0xA3, 0xDF, 0x9C, 0xCC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xF4, 0x76, 0xD5, 0x5F, 0x2A, 0xFD, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x80, 0x7E, 0x3E, 0xE5, 0xE8, 0xD6, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xAD, 0x1E, 0x70, 0x79, 0x3E, 0x3D, 0x83), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x15, 0xBB, 0xB3, 0x42, 0x6A, 0xA1, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x58, 0xCB, 0x43, 0x25, 0x00, 0x14, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x4E, 0x93, 0x11, 0xE0, 0x32, 0x54, 0x98), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x52, 0xA2, 0xB4, 0x57, 0x32, 0xB9, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x43, 0xA1, 0xB1, 0xFB, 0x01, 0xE1, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x11, 0xB8, 0xC2, 0x03, 0xE5), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x2B, 0x71, 0x26, 0x4E, 0x7C, 0xC5, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xF5, 0xD3, 0xA8, 0xE4, 0x95, 0x48, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xAE, 0xD9, 0x5D, 0x9F, 0x6A, 0x22, 0xAD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0xCC, 0xA3, 0x4D, 0xA0, 0x1C, 0x34, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x3C, 0x62, 0xF8, 0x5E, 0xA6, 0x58, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x6E, 0x66, 0x8A, 0x3D, 0x17, 0xFF, 0x0F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0xCD, 0xA8, 0xDD, 0xD1, 0x20, 0x5C, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0xFE, 0x17, 0xE2, 0xCF, 0xEA, 0x63, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x51, 0xC9, 0x16, 0xDE, 0xB4, 0xB2, 0xDD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xBE, 0x12, 0xD7, 0xA3, 0x0A, 0x50, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0x87, 0xC5, 0x8A, 0x76, 0x57, 0x07, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x1F, 0xC6, 0x1B, 0x66, 0xC4, 0x3D, 0x8A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xA4, 0x85, 0x13, 0x8F, 0xA7, 0x35, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x0D, 0xFD, 0xFF, 0x1B, 0xD1, 0xD6, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x7A, 0xD0, 0xC3, 0xB4, 0xEF, 0x39, 0x66), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xFE, 0xA5, 0x9C, 0x34, 0x30, 0x49, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0xC5, 0x39, 0x26, 0x06, 0xE3, 0x01, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x2B, 0x66, 0xFC, 0x95, 0x5F, 0x35, 0xF7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xCF, 0x54, 0x63, 0x99, 0x57, 0x05, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x6F, 0x00, 0x5F, 0x65, 0x08, 0x47, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x2A, 0x90, 0x6D, 0x67, 0xC6, 0xBC, 0x45), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x4D, 0x88, 0x0A, 0x35, 0x9E, 0x33, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x17, 0x0C, 0xF8, 0xE1, 0x7A, 0x49, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x44, 0x06, 0x8F, 0x0B, 0x70, 0x2F, 0x71), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x4B, 0xCB, 0xF9, 0x8E, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x43, 0xA1, 0x3F, 0xCE, 0x17, 0xD2, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x0D, 0xD2, 0x6C, 0x82, 0x37, 0xE5, 0xFC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x3C, 0xF4, 0x92, 0xB4, 0x8A, 0x95, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x96, 0xF1, 0x0A, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x74, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xA1, 0xAA, 0xBA, 0x86, 0x77, 0x4F, 0xA2), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x7F, 0xEF, 0x60, 0x50, 0x80, 0xD7, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0xAC, 0xC9, 0xFE, 0xEC, 0x0A, 0x1A, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x2F, 0xBE, 0x91, 0xD7, 0xB7, 0x38, 0x48), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0xAE, 0x85, 0x98, 0xFE, 0x05, 0x7F, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xBE, 0xFD, 0x11, 0x31, 0x3D, 0x14, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x75, 0xE8, 0x30, 0x01, 0xCB, 0x9B, 0x1C), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp192r1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp192r1_T_0_X, secp192r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_1_X, secp192r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_2_X, secp192r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_3_X, secp192r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_4_X, secp192r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_5_X, secp192r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_6_X, secp192r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_7_X, secp192r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_8_X, secp192r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_9_X, secp192r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_10_X, secp192r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_11_X, secp192r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_12_X, secp192r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_13_X, secp192r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_14_X, secp192r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_15_X, secp192r1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp192r1_T NULL +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp224r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xFF, 0x55, 0x23, 0x43, 0x39, 0x0B, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xD8, 0xBF, 0xD7, 0xB7, 0xB0, 0x44, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0x32, 0x41, 0xF5, 0xAB, 0xB3, 0x04, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0x85, 0x0A, 0x05, 0xB4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x1D, 0x5C, 0x11, 0xD6, 0x80, 0x32, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x11, 0xC2, 0x56, 0xD3, 0xC1, 0x03, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x90, 0x13, 0x32, 0x7F, 0xBF, 0xB4, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0xBD, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0xB7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x85, 0x99, 0x81, 0xD5, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x47, 0x07, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0x75, 0x43, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xDF, 0x22, 0x4C, 0xFB, 0x23, 0xF7, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0x88, 0x63, 0x37, 0xBD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0x2A, 0x5C, 0x5C, 0x45, 0x29, 0xDD, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xF0, 0xB8, 0xE0, 0xA2, 0x16, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x1D, 0x5C, 0x11, 0xD6, 0x80, 0x32, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x11, 0xC2, 0x56, 0xD3, 0xC1, 0x03, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x90, 0x13, 0x32, 0x7F, 0xBF, 0xB4, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0xB7, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x85, 0x99, 0x81, 0xD5, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x47, 0x07, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0x75, 0x43, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xDF, 0x22, 0x4C, 0xFB, 0x23, 0xF7, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x63, 0x37, 0xBD, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xF9, 0xB8, 0xD0, 0x3D, 0xD2, 0xD3, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xFD, 0x99, 0x26, 0x19, 0xFE, 0x13, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x0E, 0x4C, 0x48, 0x7C, 0xA2, 0x17, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xA3, 0x13, 0x57, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x16, 0x5C, 0x8F, 0xAA, 0xED, 0x0F, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0xC5, 0x43, 0x34, 0x93, 0x05, 0x2A, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0xE3, 0x6C, 0xCA, 0xC6, 0x14, 0xC2, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x43, 0x6C, 0xD7, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x5A, 0x98, 0x1E, 0xC8, 0xA5, 0x42, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x49, 0x56, 0x78, 0xF8, 0xEF, 0xED, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0xBB, 0x64, 0xB6, 0x4C, 0x54, 0x5F, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x0C, 0x33, 0xCC, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x79, 0xCB, 0x2E, 0x08, 0xFF, 0xD8, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0x1F, 0xD4, 0xD7, 0x57, 0xE9, 0x39, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xD6, 0x3B, 0x0A, 0x1C, 0x87, 0xB7, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x30, 0xD8, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x79, 0x74, 0x9A, 0xE6, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x5B, 0xA6, 0x67, 0xC1, 0x91, 0xE7, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xDF, 0x38, 0x82, 0x19, 0x2C, 0x4C, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x2E, 0x39, 0xC5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x36, 0x78, 0x4E, 0xAE, 0x5B, 0x02, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xF6, 0x8B, 0xF8, 0xF4, 0x92, 0x6B, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x4D, 0x71, 0x35, 0xE7, 0x0C, 0x2C, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xA5, 0x1F, 0xAE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x1C, 0x4B, 0xDF, 0x5B, 0xF2, 0x51, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x74, 0xB1, 0x5A, 0xC6, 0x0F, 0x0E, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x24, 0x09, 0x62, 0xAF, 0xFC, 0xDB, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0xE1, 0x80, 0x55, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x82, 0xFE, 0xAD, 0xC3, 0xE5, 0xCF, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xA2, 0x62, 0x17, 0x76, 0xF0, 0x5A, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xB8, 0xE5, 0xAC, 0xB7, 0x66, 0x38, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0xFD, 0x86, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xD3, 0x0C, 0x3C, 0xD1, 0x66, 0xB0, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x59, 0xB4, 0x8D, 0x90, 0x10, 0xB7, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x47, 0x9B, 0xE6, 0x55, 0x8A, 0xE4, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x49, 0xDB, 0x78, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x97, 0xED, 0xDE, 0xFF, 0xB3, 0xDF, 0x48), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xB9, 0x83, 0xB7, 0xEB, 0xBE, 0x40, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xD3, 0xD3, 0xCD, 0x0E, 0x82, 0x79, 0x3D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x83, 0x1B, 0xF0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x22, 0xBB, 0x54, 0xD3, 0x31, 0x56, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x36, 0xE5, 0xE0, 0x89, 0x96, 0x8E, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0xEF, 0x0A, 0xED, 0xD0, 0x11, 0x4A, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x00, 0x57, 0x27, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0xCA, 0x3D, 0xF7, 0x64, 0x9B, 0x6E, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xE3, 0x70, 0x6B, 0x41, 0xD7, 0xED, 0x8F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x44, 0x44, 0x80, 0xCE, 0x13, 0x37, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x73, 0x80, 0x79, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x4D, 0x70, 0x7D, 0x31, 0x0F, 0x1C, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x35, 0x88, 0x47, 0xC4, 0x24, 0x78, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xF0, 0xCD, 0x91, 0x81, 0xB3, 0xDE, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0xCE, 0xC6, 0xF7, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x9C, 0x2D, 0xE8, 0xD2, 0x00, 0x8F, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x5E, 0x7C, 0x0E, 0x0C, 0x6E, 0x58, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x81, 0x21, 0xCE, 0x43, 0xF4, 0x24, 0x3D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0xBC, 0xF0, 0xF4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x10, 0xC2, 0x74, 0x4A, 0x8F, 0x8A, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0x67, 0xF4, 0x2B, 0x38, 0x2B, 0x35, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xE7, 0x0C, 0xA9, 0xFA, 0x77, 0x5C, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x33, 0x19, 0x2B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x3E, 0x96, 0x22, 0x53, 0xE1, 0xE9, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x13, 0xBC, 0xA1, 0x16, 0xEC, 0x01, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x00, 0xC9, 0x7A, 0xC3, 0x73, 0xA5, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0xF4, 0x5E, 0xC1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x95, 0xD6, 0xD9, 0x32, 0x30, 0x2B, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x42, 0x09, 0x05, 0x61, 0x2A, 0x7E, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x84, 0xA2, 0x05, 0x88, 0x64, 0x65, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x2D, 0x90, 0xB3, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xE7, 0x2E, 0x85, 0x55, 0x80, 0x7C, 0x79), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xC1, 0xAC, 0x78, 0xB4, 0xAF, 0xFB, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0xC3, 0x28, 0x8E, 0x79, 0x18, 0x1F, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x46, 0xCF, 0x49, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x5F, 0xA8, 0x6C, 0x46, 0x83, 0x43, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xA9, 0x93, 0x11, 0xB6, 0x07, 0x57, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x2A, 0x9D, 0x03, 0x89, 0x7E, 0xD7, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x8C, 0x62, 0xCF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0x2C, 0x13, 0x59, 0xCC, 0xFA, 0x84, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xB9, 0x48, 0xBC, 0x57, 0xC7, 0xB3, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x0A, 0x38, 0x24, 0x2E, 0x3A, 0x28, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x0A, 0x43, 0xB8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x25, 0xAB, 0xC1, 0xEE, 0x70, 0x3C, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0xDB, 0x45, 0x1D, 0x4A, 0x80, 0x75, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x1F, 0x4D, 0x2D, 0x9A, 0x05, 0xF4, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x10, 0xF0, 0x5A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x95, 0xE1, 0xDC, 0x15, 0x86, 0xC3, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0xDC, 0x27, 0xD1, 0x56, 0xA1, 0x14, 0x0D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x0B, 0xD6, 0x77, 0x4E, 0x44, 0xA2, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x42, 0x71, 0x1F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x86, 0xB2, 0xB0, 0xC8, 0x2F, 0x7B, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xEF, 0xCB, 0xDB, 0xBC, 0x9E, 0x3B, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x03, 0x86, 0xDD, 0x5B, 0xF5, 0x8D, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x95, 0x79, 0xD6, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x32, 0x14, 0xDA, 0x9B, 0x4F, 0x07, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x3E, 0xFB, 0x06, 0xEE, 0xA7, 0x40, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x1F, 0xDF, 0x71, 0x61, 0xFD, 0x8B, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x8B, 0xAB, 0x8B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x34, 0xB3, 0xB4, 0xBC, 0x9F, 0xB0, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x58, 0x48, 0xA8, 0x77, 0xBB, 0x13, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xC6, 0xF7, 0x34, 0xCC, 0x89, 0x21, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x33, 0xDD, 0x1F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x81, 0xEF, 0xA4, 0xF2, 0x10, 0x0B, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xF7, 0x6E, 0x72, 0x4A, 0xDF, 0xDD, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x23, 0x0A, 0x53, 0x03, 0x16, 0x62, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x76, 0xFD, 0x3C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x14, 0xA1, 0xFA, 0xA0, 0x18, 0xBE, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x2A, 0xE1, 0xD7, 0xB0, 0x6C, 0xA0, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xC0, 0xB0, 0xC6, 0x63, 0x24, 0xCD, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x38, 0x2C, 0xB1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xCD, 0x7D, 0x20, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0xAC, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x97, 0x9F, 0xA2, 0xB6, 0x45, 0xF7, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x99, 0xF3, 0xD2, 0x20, 0x02, 0xEB, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x18, 0x5B, 0x7B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xDD, 0x77, 0x91, 0x60, 0xEA, 0xFD, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xD3, 0xB5, 0xD6, 0x90, 0x17, 0x0E, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0xF4, 0x28, 0xC1, 0xF2, 0x53, 0xF6, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0x58, 0xDC, 0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x20, 0x01, 0xFB, 0xF1, 0xBD, 0x5F, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x7F, 0x06, 0xDA, 0x11, 0xCB, 0xBA, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x41, 0x00, 0xA4, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x33, 0x79), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0xFF, 0x27, 0xCA, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp224r1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp224r1_T_0_X, secp224r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_1_X, secp224r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_2_X, secp224r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_3_X, secp224r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_4_X, secp224r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_5_X, secp224r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_6_X, secp224r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_7_X, secp224r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_8_X, secp224r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_9_X, secp224r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_10_X, secp224r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_11_X, secp224r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_12_X, secp224r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_13_X, secp224r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_14_X, secp224r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_15_X, secp224r1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp224r1_T NULL +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp256r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0x60, 0xD2, 0x27, 0x3E, 0x3C, 0xCE, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xB0, 0x53, 0xCC, 0xB0, 0x06, 0x1D, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x86, 0x98, 0x76, 0x55, 0xBD, 0xEB, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x93, 0x3A, 0xAA, 0xD8, 0x35, 0xC6, 0x5A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xC2, 0x98, 0xD8, 0x45, 0x39, 0xA1, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x33, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x81, 0x7D, 0x03, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x40, 0xA4, 0x63, 0xE5, 0xE6, 0xBC, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x42, 0x2C, 0xE1, 0xF2, 0xD1, 0x17, 0x6B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x51, 0xBF, 0x37, 0x68, 0x40, 0xB6, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0x5E, 0x31, 0x6B, 0x57, 0x33, 0xCE, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0x7C, 0x4A, 0xEB, 0xE7, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x7F, 0x1A, 0xFE, 0xE2, 0x42, 0xE3, 0x4F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x25, 0x63, 0xFC, 0xC2, 0xCA, 0xB9, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x9E, 0x17, 0xA7, 0xAD, 0xFA, 0xE6, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xC2, 0x98, 0xD8, 0x45, 0x39, 0xA1, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x33, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x81, 0x7D, 0x03, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x40, 0xA4, 0x63, 0xE5, 0xE6, 0xBC, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x42, 0x2C, 0xE1, 0xF2, 0xD1, 0x17, 0x6B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x51, 0xBF, 0x37, 0x68, 0x40, 0xB6, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0x5E, 0x31, 0x6B, 0x57, 0x33, 0xCE, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0x7C, 0x4A, 0xEB, 0xE7, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x7F, 0x1A, 0xFE, 0xE2, 0x42, 0xE3, 0x4F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xC8, 0xBA, 0x04, 0xB7, 0x4B, 0xD2, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0xC6, 0x23, 0x3A, 0xA0, 0x09, 0x3A, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x9D, 0x4C, 0xF9, 0x58, 0x23, 0xCC, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0xED, 0x7B, 0x29, 0x87, 0x0F, 0xFA, 0x3C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x69, 0xF2, 0x40, 0x0B, 0xA3, 0x98, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xA8, 0x48, 0x02, 0x0D, 0x1C, 0x12, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xAF, 0x09, 0x83, 0x80, 0xAA, 0x58, 0xA7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x12, 0xBE, 0x70, 0x94, 0x76, 0xE3, 0xE4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x7D, 0xEF, 0x86, 0xFF, 0xE3, 0x37, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x86, 0x8B, 0x08, 0x27, 0x7C, 0xD7, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x54, 0x4C, 0x25, 0x4F, 0x9A, 0xFE, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xFD, 0xF0, 0x6D, 0x37, 0x03, 0x69, 0xD6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xD5, 0xDA, 0xAD, 0x92, 0x49, 0xF0, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x73, 0x43, 0x9E, 0xAF, 0xA7, 0xD1, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x41, 0x07, 0xDF, 0x78, 0x95, 0x3E, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x3D, 0xD1, 0xE6, 0x3C, 0xA5, 0xE2, 0x20), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x6A, 0x5D, 0x52, 0x35, 0xD7, 0xBF, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0xA2, 0xBE, 0x96, 0xF4, 0xF8, 0x02, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x20, 0x49, 0x54, 0xEA, 0xB3, 0x82, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0xDB, 0xEA, 0x02, 0xD1, 0x75, 0x1C, 0x62), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x85, 0xF4, 0x9E, 0x4C, 0xDC, 0x39, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x6D, 0xC4, 0x57, 0xD8, 0x03, 0x5D, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x7F, 0x2D, 0x52, 0x6F, 0xC9, 0xDA, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x64, 0xFA, 0xB4, 0xFE, 0xA4, 0xC4, 0xD7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x37, 0xB9, 0xC0, 0xAA, 0x59, 0xC6, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x58, 0xD9, 0xED, 0x58, 0x99, 0x65, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x7D, 0x26, 0x8C, 0x4A, 0xF9, 0x05, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x73, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0xE7, 0x46, 0xDC, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xD0, 0x55, 0xDF, 0x00, 0x0A, 0xF5, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0xBF, 0x56, 0x81, 0x2D, 0x20, 0xEB, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xC1, 0x28, 0x52, 0xAB, 0xE3, 0xD1, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x34, 0x79, 0x45, 0x57, 0xA5, 0x12, 0x03), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xCF, 0xB8, 0x7E, 0xF7, 0x92, 0x96, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0x01, 0x8C, 0x0D, 0x23, 0xF2, 0xE3, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x2E, 0xE3, 0x84, 0x52, 0x7A, 0x34, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xA1, 0xB0, 0x15, 0x90, 0xE2, 0x53, 0x3C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x98, 0xE7, 0xFA, 0xA5, 0x7D, 0x8B, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x35, 0xD2, 0x00, 0xD1, 0x1B, 0x9F, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x69, 0x08, 0x9A, 0x72, 0xF0, 0xA9, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0xFE, 0x0E, 0x14, 0xDA, 0x7C, 0x0E, 0xD3), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xF6, 0xE8, 0xF8, 0x87, 0xF7, 0xFC, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xBE, 0x7F, 0x3F, 0x7A, 0x2B, 0xD7, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0x32, 0xF2, 0x2D, 0x94, 0x6D, 0x42, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x9A, 0xE3, 0x5F, 0x42, 0xBB, 0x84, 0xED), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x95, 0x29, 0x73, 0xA1, 0x67, 0x3E, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x30, 0x54, 0x35, 0x8E, 0x0A, 0xDD, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xD7, 0xA1, 0x97, 0x61, 0x3B, 0xF8, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x33, 0x3C, 0x58, 0x55, 0x34, 0x23, 0xA3), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x5D, 0x16, 0x5F, 0x7B, 0xBC, 0xBB, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xEE, 0x4E, 0x8A, 0xC1, 0x51, 0xCC, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x0D, 0x4D, 0x1B, 0x53, 0x23, 0x1D, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x2A, 0x38, 0x66, 0x52, 0x84, 0xE1, 0x95), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x9B, 0x83, 0x0A, 0x81, 0x4F, 0xAD, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xFF, 0x42, 0x41, 0x6E, 0xA9, 0xA2, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xA1, 0x4F, 0x1F, 0x89, 0x82, 0xAA, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0xB8, 0x0F, 0x6B, 0x8F, 0x8C, 0xD6, 0x68), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0xB3, 0xBB, 0x51, 0x69, 0xA2, 0x11, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x4F, 0x0F, 0x8D, 0xBD, 0x26, 0x0F, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xCB, 0xEC, 0x6B, 0x34, 0xC3, 0x3D, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x5D, 0x1E, 0x10, 0xD5, 0x44, 0xE2, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x9E, 0xB1, 0xF1, 0x6E, 0x4C, 0xAD, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xE3, 0xC2, 0x58, 0xC0, 0xFB, 0x34, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x9C, 0xDF, 0x35, 0x07, 0x41, 0xBD, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x6E, 0x10, 0xEC, 0x0E, 0xEC, 0xBB, 0xD6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xCF, 0xEF, 0x3F, 0x83, 0x1A, 0x88, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x29, 0xB5, 0xB9, 0xE0, 0xC9, 0xA3, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x46, 0x1E, 0x77, 0xCD, 0x7E, 0xB3, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x21, 0xD0, 0xD4, 0xA3, 0x16, 0x08, 0xEE), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0xCA, 0xA8, 0xB3, 0xBF, 0x29, 0x99, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xF2, 0x05, 0xC1, 0xCF, 0x5D, 0x91, 0x48), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x01, 0x49, 0xDB, 0x82, 0xDF, 0x5F, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x06, 0x90, 0xAD, 0xE3, 0x38, 0xA4, 0xC4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xD2, 0x3A, 0xE8, 0x03, 0xC5, 0x6D, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x35, 0xD0, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0x7A, 0x9F, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x1E, 0xD2, 0xCB, 0xAC, 0x88, 0x27, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xB9, 0x9C, 0xE0, 0x31, 0xDD, 0x99, 0x86), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xF9, 0x9B, 0x32, 0x96, 0x41, 0x58, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x5A, 0x2A, 0xB8, 0x96, 0x0E, 0xB2, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x78, 0x2C, 0xC7, 0x08, 0x99, 0x19, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x59, 0x28, 0xE9, 0x84, 0x54, 0xE6, 0x16), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x38, 0x30, 0xDB, 0x70, 0x2C, 0x0A, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x5C, 0x9D, 0xE9, 0xD5, 0x46, 0x0B, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x0B, 0x60, 0x4B, 0x37, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x24, 0xF3, 0x3D, 0x79, 0x7F, 0x6C, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7F, 0xE5, 0x1C, 0x4F, 0x60, 0x24, 0xF7, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xD8, 0xE2, 0x91, 0x7F, 0x89, 0x49, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0xA7, 0x2E, 0x8D, 0x6A, 0xB3, 0x39, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x89, 0xB5, 0x9A, 0xB8, 0x8D, 0x42, 0x9C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0x45, 0xE6, 0x4B, 0x3F, 0x4F, 0x1E, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x65, 0x5E, 0x59, 0x22, 0xCC, 0x72, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x93, 0x1A, 0x27, 0x1E, 0x34, 0xC5, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0xF2, 0xA5, 0x58, 0x5C, 0x15, 0x2E, 0xC6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x7F, 0xBA, 0x58, 0x5A, 0x84, 0x6F, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xA6, 0x36, 0x7E, 0xDC, 0xF7, 0xE1, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x4D, 0xAA, 0xEE, 0x57, 0x76, 0x3A, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x7E, 0x26, 0x18, 0x22, 0x23, 0x9F, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x4C, 0x64, 0xC7, 0x55, 0x02, 0x3F, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x02, 0x90, 0xBB, 0xC3, 0xEC, 0x30, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x6F, 0x64, 0xF4, 0x16, 0x69, 0x48, 0xA4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x44, 0x9C, 0x95, 0x0C, 0x7D, 0x67, 0x5E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0x91, 0x8B, 0xD8, 0xD0, 0xD7, 0xE7, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xF9, 0x48, 0x62, 0x6F, 0xA8, 0x93, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x3A, 0x99, 0x02, 0xD5, 0x0B, 0x3D, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xD3, 0x00, 0x31, 0xE6, 0x0C, 0x9F, 0x44), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xB2, 0xAA, 0xFD, 0x88, 0x15, 0xDF, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0x35, 0x27, 0x31, 0x44, 0xCD, 0xC0, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0xF8, 0x91, 0xA5, 0x71, 0x94, 0x84, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xCB, 0xD0, 0x93, 0xE9, 0x88, 0xDA, 0xE4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xC6, 0x39, 0x16, 0x5D, 0xA3, 0x1E, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x07, 0x37, 0x26, 0x36, 0x2A, 0xFE, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xBC, 0xF3, 0xD0, 0xDE, 0x50, 0xFC, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x2E, 0x06, 0x10, 0x15, 0x4D, 0xFA, 0xF7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x65, 0x69, 0x5B, 0x66, 0xA2, 0x75, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x16, 0x00, 0x5A, 0xB0, 0x30, 0x25, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xFB, 0x86, 0x42, 0x80, 0xC1, 0xC4, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x1D, 0x83, 0x8E, 0x94, 0x01, 0x5F, 0x82), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x37, 0x70, 0xEF, 0x1F, 0xA1, 0xF0, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x10, 0x5B, 0xCE, 0xC4, 0x9B, 0x6F, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x11, 0x11, 0x24, 0x4F, 0x4C, 0x79, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x3A, 0x72, 0xBC, 0xFE, 0x72, 0x58, 0x43), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp256r1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp256r1_T_0_X, secp256r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_1_X, secp256r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_2_X, secp256r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_3_X, secp256r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_4_X, secp256r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_5_X, secp256r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_6_X, secp256r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_7_X, secp256r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_8_X, secp256r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_9_X, secp256r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_10_X, secp256r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_11_X, secp256r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_12_X, secp256r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_13_X, secp256r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_14_X, secp256r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_15_X, secp256r1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp256r1_T NULL +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp384r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x2A, 0xEC, 0xD3, 0xED, 0xC8, 0x85, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0xD1, 0x2E, 0x8A, 0x8D, 0x39, 0x56, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x87, 0x13, 0x50, 0x8F, 0x08, 0x14, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x41, 0x81, 0xFE, 0x6E, 0x9C, 0x1D, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x2D, 0xF8, 0xE3, 0x6B, 0x05, 0x8E, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0xE7, 0x3E, 0xE2, 0xA7, 0x2F, 0x31, 0xB3), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x0A, 0x76, 0x72, 0x38, 0x5E, 0x54, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x29, 0x55, 0xBF, 0x5D, 0xF2, 0x02, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x2A, 0x54, 0x82, 0xE0, 0x41, 0xF7, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x9B, 0xA7, 0x8B, 0x62, 0x3B, 0x1D, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xAD, 0x20, 0xF3, 0x1E, 0xC7, 0xB1, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x05, 0x8B, 0xBE, 0x22, 0xCA, 0x87, 0xAA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x0E, 0xEA, 0x90, 0x7C, 0x1D, 0x43, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x81, 0x7E, 0x1D, 0xCE, 0xB1, 0x60, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0xB5, 0x13, 0x31, 0xDA, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x14, 0x9A, 0x28, 0xBD, 0x1D, 0xF4, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xDC, 0x92, 0x92, 0xBF, 0x98, 0x9E, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x2C, 0x26, 0x96, 0x4A, 0xDE, 0x17, 0x36), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x29, 0xC5, 0xCC, 0x6A, 0x19, 0xEC, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0xA7, 0xB0, 0x48, 0xB2, 0x0D, 0x1A, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x2D, 0x37, 0xF4, 0x81, 0x4D, 0x63, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x0A, 0x76, 0x72, 0x38, 0x5E, 0x54, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x29, 0x55, 0xBF, 0x5D, 0xF2, 0x02, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x2A, 0x54, 0x82, 0xE0, 0x41, 0xF7, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x9B, 0xA7, 0x8B, 0x62, 0x3B, 0x1D, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xAD, 0x20, 0xF3, 0x1E, 0xC7, 0xB1, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x05, 0x8B, 0xBE, 0x22, 0xCA, 0x87, 0xAA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x0E, 0xEA, 0x90, 0x7C, 0x1D, 0x43, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x81, 0x7E, 0x1D, 0xCE, 0xB1, 0x60, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0xB5, 0x13, 0x31, 0xDA, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x14, 0x9A, 0x28, 0xBD, 0x1D, 0xF4, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xDC, 0x92, 0x92, 0xBF, 0x98, 0x9E, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x2C, 0x26, 0x96, 0x4A, 0xDE, 0x17, 0x36), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x92, 0x00, 0x2C, 0x78, 0xDB, 0x1F, 0x37), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xF3, 0xEB, 0xB7, 0x06, 0xF7, 0xB6, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xBC, 0x2C, 0xCF, 0xD8, 0xED, 0x53, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x75, 0x7B, 0xA3, 0xAB, 0xC3, 0x2C, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x9D, 0x78, 0x41, 0xF6, 0x76, 0x84, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x56, 0xE8, 0x52, 0xB3, 0xCB, 0xA8, 0xBD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xF2, 0xAE, 0xA4, 0xB6, 0x89, 0x1B, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x0F, 0xCE, 0x1C, 0x7C, 0xF6, 0x50, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0xEB, 0x90, 0xE6, 0x4D, 0xC7, 0xD4, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x49, 0x2D, 0x8A, 0x01, 0x99, 0x60, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x80, 0x9B, 0x9B, 0x6A, 0xB0, 0x07, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xA2, 0xEE, 0x59, 0xBE, 0x95, 0xBC, 0x23), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x9D, 0x56, 0xAE, 0x59, 0xFB, 0x1F, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xAC, 0x91, 0x80, 0x87, 0xA8, 0x6E, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x08, 0xA7, 0x08, 0x94, 0x32, 0xFC, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x29, 0x9E, 0x84, 0xF4, 0xE5, 0x6E, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x21, 0xB9, 0x50, 0x24, 0xF8, 0x9C, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x04, 0x01, 0xC2, 0xFB, 0x77, 0x3E, 0xDE), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x38, 0xEE, 0xE3, 0xC7, 0x9D, 0xEC, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x88, 0xCF, 0x43, 0xFA, 0x92, 0x5E, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xCA, 0x43, 0xF8, 0x3B, 0x49, 0x7E, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xE7, 0xEB, 0x17, 0x45, 0x86, 0xC2, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x69, 0x57, 0x32, 0xE0, 0x9C, 0xD1, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x10, 0xB8, 0x4D, 0xB8, 0xF4, 0x0D, 0xE3), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0xDC, 0x9A, 0xB2, 0x79, 0x39, 0x27, 0x16), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x71, 0xE4, 0x3B, 0x4D, 0x60, 0x0C, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xBD, 0x19, 0x40, 0xFA, 0x19, 0x2A, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xF8, 0x1E, 0x43, 0xA1, 0x50, 0x8D, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x18, 0x7C, 0x41, 0xFA, 0x7C, 0x1B, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x59, 0x24, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xB7, 0xD3, 0xAD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x01, 0x3D, 0x63, 0x54, 0x45, 0x6F, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xB2, 0x19, 0xA3, 0x86, 0x1D, 0x42, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x02, 0x87, 0x18, 0x92, 0x52, 0x1A, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x18, 0xB1, 0x5D, 0x18, 0x1B, 0x37, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x74, 0x61, 0xBA, 0x18, 0xAF, 0x40, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x7D, 0x3C, 0x52, 0x0F, 0x07, 0xB0, 0x6F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x39, 0x13, 0xAA, 0x60, 0x15, 0x99, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x00, 0xCB, 0xC6, 0xB1, 0xDB, 0x97, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xFA, 0x60, 0xB8, 0x24, 0xE4, 0x7D, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x75, 0xB3, 0x70, 0xB2, 0x83, 0xB1, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xE3, 0x6C, 0xCD, 0x33, 0x62, 0x7A, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x30, 0xDC, 0x0F, 0x9F, 0xBB, 0xB8, 0xAA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0xD5, 0x0A, 0x60, 0x81, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x16), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0xAA, 0x2F, 0xD6, 0xF2, 0x73, 0xDF, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x7B, 0x74, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0x5B, 0x95, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x04, 0xEB, 0x15, 0xC8, 0x5F, 0x00, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x50, 0x20, 0x28, 0xD1, 0x01, 0xAF, 0xF0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x6D, 0x4F, 0x31, 0x81, 0x2F, 0x94, 0x48), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x2F, 0xD8, 0xB6, 0x63, 0x7C, 0xE9, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x8C, 0xB9, 0x14, 0xD9, 0x37, 0x63, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x02, 0xB8, 0x46, 0xAD, 0xCE, 0x7B, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x47, 0x2D, 0x66, 0xA7, 0xE9, 0x33, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xF9, 0x93, 0x94, 0xA8, 0x48, 0xB3, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x4A, 0xAC, 0x51, 0x08, 0x72, 0x2F, 0x1A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0xAD, 0xA0, 0xF9, 0x81, 0xE1, 0x78, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x9A, 0x63, 0xD8, 0xBA, 0x79, 0x1A, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x31, 0x7B, 0x7A, 0x5A, 0x5D, 0x7D, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x96, 0x12, 0x4B, 0x19, 0x09, 0xE0, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x8A, 0x57, 0xEE, 0x4E, 0x6E, 0x7E, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x9D, 0x69, 0xDC, 0xB3, 0xDA, 0xD8, 0x08), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x49, 0x03, 0x03, 0x33, 0x6F, 0x28, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xDB, 0xA7, 0x05, 0x8C, 0xF3, 0x4D, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x92, 0xB1, 0xA8, 0xEC, 0x0D, 0x64, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0xFC, 0xFD, 0xD0, 0x4B, 0x88, 0x1B, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x9C, 0x51, 0x69, 0xCE, 0x71, 0x73, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x5A, 0x14, 0x23, 0x1A, 0x46, 0x63, 0x5F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x4C, 0x70, 0x44, 0x18, 0xCD, 0xEF, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x49, 0xDD, 0x64, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0x4D, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x32, 0x7C, 0x09, 0xD0, 0x3F, 0xD6, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xE0, 0x4F, 0x65, 0x0C, 0x7A, 0x54, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xFA, 0xFB, 0x4A, 0xB4, 0x79, 0x5A, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x5D, 0x1B, 0x2B, 0xDA, 0xBC, 0x9A, 0x74), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xAC, 0x56, 0xF7, 0x5F, 0x51, 0x68, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xE0, 0x1D, 0xBC, 0x13, 0x4E, 0xAC, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xF5, 0xC5, 0xE6, 0xD2, 0x88, 0xBA, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x0E, 0x28, 0x23, 0x58, 0x67, 0xFA, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x80, 0x4B, 0xD8, 0xC4, 0xDF, 0x15, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x0E, 0x58, 0xE6, 0x2C, 0x59, 0xC2, 0x03), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x26, 0x27, 0x99, 0x16, 0x2B, 0x22, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xF3, 0x8F, 0xC3, 0x2A, 0x9B, 0xFC, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x2E, 0x83, 0x3D, 0xFE, 0x9E, 0x3C, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x57, 0xCD, 0x2D, 0xC1, 0x49, 0x38, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x42, 0x8B, 0x33, 0x89, 0x1F, 0xEA, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x1D, 0x13, 0xD7, 0x50, 0xBB, 0x3E, 0xEB), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x9A, 0x52, 0xD2, 0x54, 0x7C, 0x97, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x33, 0x6E, 0xED, 0xD9, 0x87, 0x50, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x35, 0x7E, 0x16, 0x40, 0x15, 0x83, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x2B, 0xA4, 0xAB, 0x03, 0x91, 0xEA, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x47, 0x39, 0xEF, 0x05, 0x59, 0xD0, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x24, 0x0D, 0x76, 0x11, 0x53, 0x08, 0xAF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x2F, 0xDD, 0xBD, 0x50, 0x48, 0xB1, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x1C, 0x84, 0x55, 0x78, 0x14, 0xEB, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x5E, 0x3E, 0xA6, 0xAF, 0xF6, 0xC7, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x11, 0xE2, 0x65, 0xCA, 0x41, 0x95, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x83, 0xD8, 0xE6, 0x4D, 0x22, 0x06, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x7F, 0x25, 0x2A, 0xAA, 0x28, 0x46, 0x97), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xDB, 0x15, 0x56, 0x84, 0xCB, 0xC0, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xDB, 0x0E, 0x08, 0xC9, 0xF5, 0xD4, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x62, 0xD0, 0x1A, 0x7C, 0x13, 0xD5, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xAD, 0x53, 0xE0, 0x32, 0x21, 0xA0, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x38, 0x81, 0x21, 0x23, 0x0E, 0xD2, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x51, 0x05, 0xD0, 0x1E, 0x82, 0xA9, 0x71), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xC3, 0x27, 0xBF, 0xC6, 0xAA, 0xB7, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x65, 0x45, 0xDF, 0xB9, 0x46, 0x17, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x38, 0x3F, 0xB2, 0xB1, 0x5D, 0xCA, 0x1C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x29, 0x6C, 0x63, 0xE9, 0xD7, 0x48, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x99, 0x8C, 0xC2, 0x05, 0x99), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xE6, 0x5E, 0x82, 0x6D, 0xE5, 0x7E, 0xD5), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x61, 0xFA, 0x7D, 0x01, 0xDB, 0xB6, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xC6, 0x58, 0x39, 0xF4, 0xC6, 0x82, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x5A, 0x7A, 0x80, 0x08, 0xCD, 0xAA, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x8C, 0xC6, 0x3F, 0x3C, 0xA5, 0x68, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xF5, 0xD5, 0x17, 0xAE, 0x36, 0xD8, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xAD, 0x92, 0xC5, 0x57, 0x6C, 0xDA, 0x91), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x67, 0x17, 0xC0, 0x40, 0x78, 0x8C, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x9F, 0xF4, 0xAA, 0xDA, 0x5C, 0x7E, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xDB, 0x42, 0x3E, 0x72, 0x64, 0xA0, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xF9, 0x41, 0x17, 0x43, 0xE3, 0xE8, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xDD, 0xCC, 0x43, 0x7E, 0x16, 0x05, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x4B, 0xCF, 0x48, 0x8F, 0x41, 0x90, 0xE5), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x0C, 0x6B, 0x9D, 0x22, 0x04, 0xBC, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x63, 0x79, 0x2F, 0x6A, 0x0E, 0x8A, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x67, 0x3F, 0x02, 0xB8, 0x91, 0x7F, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x14, 0x64, 0xA0, 0x33, 0xF4, 0x6B, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x44, 0x71, 0x87, 0xB8, 0x88, 0x3F, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x2B, 0x85, 0x05, 0xC5, 0x44, 0x53, 0x15), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x2B, 0xFE, 0xD1, 0x1C, 0x73, 0xE3, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x33, 0xA1, 0xD3, 0x69, 0x1C, 0x9D, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x5A, 0xBA, 0xB6, 0xAE, 0x1B, 0x94, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x74, 0x90, 0x5C, 0x57, 0xB0, 0x3A, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x2F, 0x93, 0x20, 0x24, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x78, 0x9D, 0x71, 0x67, 0x5D, 0x49, 0x98), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0xC8, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x8D, 0xE0, 0x8F, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x7F, 0x79, 0x6C, 0x5F, 0xB7, 0xBC, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xE1, 0x83, 0x3C, 0x12, 0xBB, 0xEE, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xC2, 0xC4, 0x1B, 0x41, 0x71, 0xB9, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0xEE, 0xBB, 0x1D, 0x89, 0x50, 0x88, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x1C, 0x55, 0x74, 0xEB, 0xDE, 0x92, 0x3F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x38, 0x92, 0x06, 0x19, 0xD0, 0xB3, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x99, 0x26, 0xA3, 0x5F, 0xE2, 0xC1, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0xFC, 0xFD, 0xC3, 0xB6, 0x26, 0x24, 0x8F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x49, 0xB7, 0x64, 0x4B, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x4E, 0x95, 0xAD, 0x07, 0xFE, 0xB6, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x15, 0xE7, 0x2D, 0x19, 0xA9, 0x08, 0x10), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xBD, 0xAC, 0x0A, 0x3F, 0x6B, 0xFF, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xE4, 0x74, 0x14, 0xD9, 0x70, 0x1D, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xB0, 0x71, 0xBB, 0xD8, 0x18, 0x96, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0xB8, 0x19, 0x90, 0x80, 0xB5, 0xEE, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x21, 0x20, 0xA6, 0x17, 0x48, 0x03, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x1D, 0xBB, 0x6D, 0x94, 0x20, 0x34, 0xF1), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x82, 0x67, 0x4B, 0x8E, 0x4E, 0xBE, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xDA, 0x77, 0xF8, 0x23, 0x55, 0x2B, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x02, 0xDE, 0x25, 0x35, 0x2D, 0x74, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x0C, 0xB8, 0x0B, 0x39, 0xBA, 0xAD, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0x0E, 0x28, 0x4D, 0xE1, 0x3D, 0xE4, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xEC, 0x0A, 0xD4, 0xB8, 0xC4, 0x8D, 0xB0), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x68, 0xCE, 0xC2, 0x55, 0x4D, 0x0C, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x20, 0x93, 0x32, 0x90, 0xD6, 0xAE, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x78, 0xAB, 0x43, 0x9E, 0xEB, 0x73, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x97, 0xC3, 0x83, 0xA6, 0x3C, 0xF1, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0x25, 0x25, 0x66, 0x08, 0x26, 0xFA, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xFB, 0x44, 0x5D, 0x82, 0xEC, 0x3B, 0xAC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x90, 0xEA, 0xB5, 0x04, 0x99, 0xD0, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0xF2, 0x22, 0xA0, 0xEB, 0xFD, 0x45, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xA4, 0x81, 0x32, 0xFC, 0xFA, 0xEE, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xBB, 0xA4, 0x6A, 0x77, 0x41, 0x5C, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x1E, 0xAA, 0x4F, 0xF0, 0x10, 0xB3, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x74, 0x13, 0x14, 0x9E, 0x90, 0xD7, 0xE6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0xBD, 0x70, 0x4F, 0xA8, 0xD1, 0x06, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x4E, 0x2E, 0x68, 0xFC, 0x35, 0xFA, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x53, 0x75, 0xED, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0xC2, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x87, 0x6B, 0x9F, 0x05, 0xE2, 0x22, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x1A, 0xA8, 0xB7, 0x03, 0x9E, 0x6D, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0xD0, 0x69, 0x88, 0xA8, 0x39, 0x9E, 0x3A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xEF, 0x68, 0xFE, 0xEC, 0x24, 0x08, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x06, 0x4B, 0x92, 0x0D, 0xB7, 0x34, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xF4, 0xDD, 0x1A, 0xA0, 0x4A, 0xE4, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x63, 0x4F, 0x4F, 0xCE, 0xBB, 0xD6, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xEE, 0x8D, 0xDF, 0x3F, 0x73, 0xB7, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x06, 0xB6, 0x80, 0x4D, 0x81, 0xD9, 0x53), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_16_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0xF5, 0x13, 0xDF, 0x13, 0x19, 0x97, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xF9, 0xB3, 0x33, 0x66, 0x82, 0x21, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xFC, 0x39, 0x16, 0x23, 0x43, 0x76, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x48, 0x25, 0xA1, 0x64, 0x95, 0x1C, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0xAC, 0x15, 0x57, 0xD9, 0xDE, 0xA0, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x5F, 0xB8, 0x3D, 0x48, 0x91, 0x24, 0xCC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_16_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xF2, 0xC8, 0x54, 0xD1, 0x32, 0xBD, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x3B, 0xF0, 0xAA, 0x9D, 0xD8, 0xF4, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0xC3, 0xBB, 0x6C, 0x66, 0xAC, 0x25, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x25, 0x10, 0xB2, 0xE1, 0x41, 0xDE, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xE8, 0x30, 0xB8, 0x37, 0xBC, 0x2A, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x57, 0x01, 0x4A, 0x1E, 0x78, 0x9F, 0x85), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_17_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x19, 0xCD, 0x12, 0x0B, 0x51, 0x4F, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x4B, 0x3D, 0x24, 0xA4, 0x16, 0x59, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xEB, 0xD3, 0x59, 0x2E, 0x75, 0x7C, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xB9, 0xB4, 0xA5, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0x29, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x16, 0x05, 0x75, 0x02, 0xB3, 0x06, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x7C, 0x9F, 0x79, 0x91, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0x23), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_17_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x98, 0x7C, 0x84, 0xE1, 0xFF, 0x30, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0xE2, 0xC2, 0x5F, 0x55, 0x40, 0xBD, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0x65, 0x87, 0x3F, 0xC4, 0xC2, 0x24, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0x30, 0x0A, 0x60, 0x15, 0xD1, 0x24, 0x48), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x99, 0xD9, 0xB6, 0xAE, 0xB1, 0xAF, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x80, 0xEE, 0xA2, 0x0F, 0x74, 0xB9, 0xF3), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_18_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xE6, 0x0F, 0x37, 0xC1, 0x10, 0x99, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xAD, 0x9D, 0x5D, 0x80, 0x01, 0xA6, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x2A, 0x9D, 0x20, 0x38, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x60, 0xCB, 0xCE, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0xA7, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xCF, 0x14, 0xDF, 0xBF, 0xE5, 0x74, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x12, 0x1A, 0xDD, 0x59, 0x02, 0x5D, 0xC6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_18_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xC9, 0xF8, 0xF5, 0xB6, 0x13, 0x4D, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x45, 0xB1, 0x93, 0xB3, 0xA2, 0x79, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xF6, 0xCF, 0xF7, 0xE6, 0x29, 0x9C, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x50, 0x65, 0x80, 0xBC, 0x59, 0x0A, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xF0, 0x24, 0x35, 0xA2, 0x46, 0xF0, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x26, 0xC0, 0x9D, 0x61, 0x56, 0x62, 0x67), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_19_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0x24, 0x43, 0x2E, 0x37, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xF7, 0xCE, 0x35, 0xFC, 0x77, 0xF3, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x34, 0x96, 0xD5, 0x4A, 0x76, 0x9D, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x3B, 0x0F, 0xEA, 0xA8, 0x12, 0x0B, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x3F, 0x5D, 0x2D, 0x1C, 0xD4, 0x9E, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x2E, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0x6E, 0xAB, 0xAF, 0xDC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_19_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xB2, 0x7B, 0x0C, 0x9A, 0x83, 0x8E, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x51, 0x90, 0x92, 0x79, 0x32, 0x19, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x89, 0xF9, 0xD0, 0xCF, 0x2C, 0xA5, 0x8F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x50, 0x21, 0xDE, 0x50, 0x41, 0x9D, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x7D, 0x2B, 0x9E, 0x9D, 0x95, 0xA8, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA5, 0x20, 0x87, 0x88, 0x97, 0x5F, 0xAA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_20_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x59, 0xB4, 0x66, 0x7E, 0xE8, 0x5A, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x5C, 0x7E, 0xB2, 0xAD, 0xD9, 0xC9, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x97, 0x49, 0xA3, 0x13, 0x83, 0x07, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x26, 0xC7, 0x13, 0x35, 0x0D, 0xB0, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x60, 0xAB, 0xFA, 0x4B, 0x93, 0x18, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x2D, 0x1C, 0x31, 0x4C, 0xE4, 0x61, 0xAE), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_20_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0x4D, 0x1E, 0x51, 0x59, 0x6E, 0x91, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x54, 0x4D, 0x51, 0xED, 0x36, 0xCC, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xA8, 0x56, 0xC7, 0x78, 0x27, 0x33, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xB7, 0x95, 0xC9, 0x8B, 0xC8, 0x6A, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xE9, 0x13, 0x96, 0xB3, 0xE1, 0xF9, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x46, 0xB0, 0x5E, 0xC3, 0x94, 0x03, 0x05), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_21_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x5B, 0x29, 0x30, 0x41, 0x1A, 0x9E, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xCA, 0x83, 0x31, 0x5B, 0xA7, 0xCB, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x41, 0x50, 0x44, 0x4D, 0x64, 0x31, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0x84, 0xC2, 0x5D, 0x97, 0xA5, 0x3C, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x0F, 0xA5, 0xFD, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x47, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x58, 0x02, 0x2D, 0x40, 0xB1, 0x0B, 0xBA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_21_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x33, 0x8C, 0x67, 0xCE, 0x23, 0x43, 0x99), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x53, 0x47, 0x72, 0x44, 0x1F, 0x5B, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xC1, 0xD9, 0xA4, 0x50, 0x88, 0x63, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xF2, 0x75, 0x69, 0x73, 0x00, 0xC4, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0x90, 0x1D, 0xDF, 0x1A, 0x00, 0xD8, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0xB1, 0x89, 0x48, 0xA8, 0x70, 0x62, 0xEF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_22_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x8A, 0x55, 0x50, 0x7B, 0xEF, 0x8A, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x1B, 0x23, 0x48, 0x23, 0x63, 0x91, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x04, 0x54, 0x3C, 0x24, 0x9B, 0xC7, 0x9A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x38, 0xC3, 0x84, 0xFB, 0xFF, 0x9F, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x2A, 0xE0, 0x6D, 0x68, 0x8A, 0x5C, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x93, 0x53, 0x85, 0xA1, 0x0D, 0xAF, 0x63), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_22_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x88, 0x95, 0x4C, 0x0B, 0xD0, 0x06, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xAF, 0x8D, 0x49, 0xA2, 0xC8, 0xB4, 0xE0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x76, 0x53, 0x09, 0x88, 0x43, 0x87, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xA4, 0x77, 0x3F, 0x5E, 0x21, 0xB4, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x9E, 0x86, 0x64, 0xCC, 0x91, 0xC1, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x17, 0x56, 0xCB, 0xC3, 0x7D, 0x5B, 0xB1), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_23_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x74, 0x9F, 0xB5, 0x91, 0x21, 0xB1, 0x1C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xED, 0xE1, 0x11, 0xEF, 0x45, 0xAF, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x31, 0xBE, 0xB2, 0xBC, 0x72, 0x65, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x4B, 0x8C, 0x77, 0xCE, 0x1E, 0x42, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xC9, 0xAA, 0xB9, 0xD9, 0x86, 0x99, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x23, 0x80, 0xC6, 0x4E, 0x35, 0x0B, 0x6D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_23_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xD8, 0xA2, 0x0A, 0x39, 0x32, 0x1D, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xC8, 0x86, 0xF1, 0x12, 0x9A, 0x4A, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xF1, 0x7C, 0xAA, 0x70, 0x8E, 0xBC, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x01, 0x47, 0x8F, 0xDD, 0x8B, 0xA5, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x08, 0x21, 0xF4, 0xAB, 0xC7, 0xF5, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x76, 0xA5, 0x95, 0xC4, 0x0F, 0x88, 0x1D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_24_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x42, 0x2A, 0x52, 0xCD, 0x75, 0x51, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x36, 0xE5, 0x04, 0x2B, 0x44, 0xC6, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xEE, 0x16, 0x13, 0x07, 0x83, 0xB5, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x59, 0xC6, 0xA2, 0x19, 0x05, 0xD3, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x8B, 0xA8, 0x16, 0x09, 0xB7, 0xEA, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xEE, 0x14, 0xAF, 0xB5, 0xFD, 0xD0, 0xEF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_24_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x7C, 0xCA, 0x71, 0x3E, 0x6E, 0x66, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x31, 0x0E, 0x3F, 0xE5, 0x91, 0xC4, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x3D, 0xC2, 0x3E, 0x95, 0x37, 0x58, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x1F, 0x02, 0x03, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xEE, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x5B, 0x1A, 0xFC, 0x38, 0xCD, 0xE8, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x57, 0x42, 0x85, 0xC6, 0x21, 0x68, 0x71), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_25_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xA2, 0x4A, 0x66, 0xB1, 0x0A, 0xE6, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x0C, 0x94, 0x9D, 0x5E, 0x99, 0xB2, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x03, 0x40, 0xCA, 0xB2, 0xB3, 0x30, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x78, 0x48, 0x27, 0x34, 0x1E, 0xE2, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x72, 0x5B, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0x6D, 0xE3, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xAB, 0x46, 0xCB, 0xEA, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_25_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x08, 0xAD, 0x4E, 0x51, 0x9F, 0x2A, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x5C, 0x7D, 0x4C, 0xD6, 0xCF, 0xDD, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x76, 0x26, 0xE0, 0x8B, 0x10, 0xD9, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0xA7, 0x23, 0x4E, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0x42, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xE5, 0xA4, 0xEC, 0x77, 0x21, 0x34, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x14, 0x65, 0xEA, 0x4A, 0x85, 0xC3, 0x2F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_26_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0xD8, 0x40, 0x27, 0x73, 0x15, 0x7E, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xBB, 0x53, 0x7E, 0x0F, 0x40, 0xC8, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x37, 0x19, 0x73, 0xEF, 0x5A, 0x5E, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x73, 0x2B, 0x49, 0x7E, 0xAC, 0x97, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0xB2, 0xC3, 0x1E, 0x0E, 0xE7, 0xD2, 0x21), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x08, 0xD6, 0xDD, 0xAC, 0x21, 0xD6, 0x3E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_26_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0x26, 0xBE, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x38, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x6C, 0x31, 0xA7, 0x49, 0x50, 0x3A, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x99, 0xC6, 0xF5, 0xD2, 0xC2, 0x30, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xE4, 0xF6, 0x8B, 0x8B, 0x97, 0xE9, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x21, 0xB7, 0x0D, 0xFC, 0x15, 0x54, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x83, 0x1C, 0xA4, 0xCD, 0x6B, 0x9D, 0xF2), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_27_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xE8, 0x4C, 0x48, 0xE4, 0xAA, 0x69, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x7A, 0x27, 0xFC, 0x37, 0x96, 0x1A, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0xE7, 0x30, 0xA5, 0xCF, 0x13, 0x46, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xD8, 0xAF, 0x74, 0x23, 0x4D, 0x56, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x3D, 0x44, 0x14, 0x1B, 0x97, 0x83, 0xF0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x47, 0xD7, 0x5F, 0xFD, 0x98, 0x38, 0xF7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_27_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x73, 0x64, 0x36, 0xFD, 0x7B, 0xC1, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x5D, 0x32, 0xD2, 0x47, 0x94, 0x89, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xE9, 0x30, 0xAC, 0x06, 0xC8, 0x65, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x6C, 0xB9, 0x1B, 0xF7, 0x61, 0x49, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0xFF, 0x32, 0x43, 0x80, 0xDA, 0xA6, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xF8, 0x04, 0x01, 0x95, 0x35, 0xCE, 0x21), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_28_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x06, 0x46, 0x0D, 0x51, 0xE2, 0xD8, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x57, 0x1D, 0x6F, 0x79, 0xA0, 0xCD, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0xFB, 0x36, 0xCA, 0xAD, 0xF5, 0x9E, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x7A, 0x1D, 0x9E, 0x1D, 0x95, 0x48, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x26, 0xA5, 0xB7, 0x15, 0x2C, 0xC2, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x42, 0x72, 0xAA, 0x11, 0xDC, 0xC9, 0xB6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_28_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x6C, 0x64, 0xA7, 0x62, 0x3C, 0xAB, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x6A, 0x44, 0xD8, 0x60, 0xC0, 0xA8, 0x80), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x76, 0x58, 0x12, 0x57, 0x3C, 0x89, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x4F, 0x83, 0xCE, 0xCB, 0xB8, 0xD0, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x84, 0x04, 0xB0, 0xAD, 0xEB, 0xFA, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xA4, 0xC3, 0x41, 0x44, 0x4E, 0x65, 0x3E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_29_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x16, 0xA9, 0x1C, 0xE7, 0x65, 0x20, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x53, 0x32, 0xF8, 0xC0, 0xA6, 0xBD, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xF0, 0xE6, 0x57, 0x31, 0xCC, 0x26, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xE3, 0x54, 0x1C, 0x34, 0xD3, 0x17, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xAE, 0xED, 0xFB, 0xCD, 0xE7, 0x1E, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x16, 0x1C, 0x34, 0x40, 0x00, 0x1F, 0xB6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_29_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x32, 0x00, 0xC2, 0xD4, 0x3B, 0x1A, 0x09), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xE0, 0x99, 0x8F, 0x0C, 0x4A, 0x16, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x73, 0x18, 0x1B, 0xD4, 0x94, 0x29, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xA4, 0x2D, 0xB1, 0x9D, 0x74, 0x32, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0xF4, 0xB1, 0x0C, 0x37, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xFF, 0xDA, 0xE2, 0x35, 0xA3, 0xB6, 0x42), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_30_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x49, 0x99, 0x65, 0xC5, 0xED, 0x16, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x42, 0x9A, 0xF3, 0xA7, 0x4E, 0x6F, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x0A, 0x7E, 0xC0, 0xD7, 0x4E, 0x07, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x7A, 0x31, 0x69, 0xA6, 0xB9, 0x15, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0xE0, 0x72, 0xA4, 0x3F, 0xB9, 0xF8, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x75, 0x32, 0x85, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0x37, 0x12), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_30_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xC0, 0x0D, 0xCF, 0x25, 0x41, 0xA4, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xFC, 0xB2, 0x48, 0xC3, 0x85, 0x83, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xBE, 0x0B, 0x58, 0x2D, 0x7A, 0x9A, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0xF3, 0x81, 0x18, 0x1B, 0x74, 0x4F, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x43, 0xA3, 0x0A, 0x16, 0x8B, 0xA3, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x18, 0x81, 0x7B, 0x8D, 0xA2, 0x35, 0x77), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_31_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xC4, 0x3F, 0x2C, 0xE7, 0x5F, 0x99, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x2B, 0xB7, 0xB6, 0xAD, 0x5A, 0x56, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x00, 0xA4, 0x48, 0xC8, 0xE8, 0xBA, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xA1, 0xB5, 0x13, 0x5A, 0xCD, 0x99, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x95, 0xAD, 0xFC, 0xE2, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x6B, 0xD1, 0x34, 0x99, 0x53, 0x63, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_31_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x8A, 0x77, 0x5D, 0x2B, 0xAB, 0x01, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x85, 0xD0, 0xD5, 0x49, 0x83, 0x4D, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0xC6, 0x91, 0x30, 0x3B, 0x00, 0xAF, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xAE, 0x61, 0x07, 0xE1, 0xB6, 0xE2, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x43, 0x41, 0xFE, 0x9B, 0xB6, 0xF0, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x97, 0xAE, 0xAD, 0x89, 0x88, 0x9E, 0x41), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp384r1_T[32] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp384r1_T_0_X, secp384r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_1_X, secp384r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_2_X, secp384r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_3_X, secp384r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_4_X, secp384r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_5_X, secp384r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_6_X, secp384r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_7_X, secp384r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_8_X, secp384r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_9_X, secp384r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_10_X, secp384r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_11_X, secp384r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_12_X, secp384r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_13_X, secp384r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_14_X, secp384r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_15_X, secp384r1_T_15_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_16_X, secp384r1_T_16_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_17_X, secp384r1_T_17_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_18_X, secp384r1_T_18_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_19_X, secp384r1_T_19_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_20_X, secp384r1_T_20_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_21_X, secp384r1_T_21_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_22_X, secp384r1_T_22_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_23_X, secp384r1_T_23_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_24_X, secp384r1_T_24_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_25_X, secp384r1_T_25_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_26_X, secp384r1_T_26_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_27_X, secp384r1_T_27_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_28_X, secp384r1_T_28_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_29_X, secp384r1_T_29_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_30_X, secp384r1_T_30_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_31_X, secp384r1_T_31_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp384r1_T NULL +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp521r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0xFF, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x3F, 0x50, 0x6B, 0xD4, 0x1F, 0x45, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x34, 0x2C, 0x3D, 0x88, 0xDF, 0x73, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xBF, 0xB1, 0x3B, 0xBD, 0xC0, 0x52, 0x16), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x93, 0x7E, 0xEC, 0x51, 0x39, 0x19, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x09, 0xF1, 0x8E, 0x91, 0x89, 0xB4, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x15, 0xB3, 0x99, 0x5B, 0x72, 0xDA, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x40, 0x85, 0xB6, 0xA0, 0x21, 0x9A, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x9A, 0x1C, 0x8E, 0x61, 0xB9, 0x3E, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x51, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0xC2, 0x31, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x42, 0x6A, 0x85, 0xC1, 0xB3, 0x48, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0xA8, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x27, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x59, 0xE7, 0xEF, 0x77, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x3D, 0x4D, 0x6B, 0x60, 0xAF, 0x28, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xB5, 0x3F, 0x05, 0x39, 0x81, 0x64, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xB4, 0x95, 0x23, 0x66, 0xCB, 0x3E, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xE9, 0x04, 0x04, 0xB7, 0x06, 0x8E, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0xC6, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x66, 0xD1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x94, 0xBE, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xC2, 0x72, 0xA2, 0x86, 0x70, 0x3C, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x07, 0xAD, 0x3F, 0x01, 0xB9, 0x50, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x26, 0xF4, 0x5E, 0x99, 0x72, 0xEE, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x66, 0x3E, 0x27, 0x17, 0xBD, 0xAF, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x44, 0x9B, 0x57, 0x49, 0x44, 0xF5, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x1B, 0x7D, 0x2C, 0xB4, 0x5F, 0x8A, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0xC0, 0x3B, 0x9A, 0x78, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x18, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x64, 0x38, 0x91, 0x1E, 0xB7, 0x6F, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x47, 0x9C, 0x89, 0xB8, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0xA5, 0x09, 0xF7, 0x48, 0x01, 0xCC, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x96, 0x2F, 0xBF, 0x83, 0x87, 0x86, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0xFF, 0x01), +}; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0xC2, 0x31, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x42, 0x6A, 0x85, 0xC1, 0xB3, 0x48, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0xA8, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x27, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x59, 0xE7, 0xEF, 0x77, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x3D, 0x4D, 0x6B, 0x60, 0xAF, 0x28, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xB5, 0x3F, 0x05, 0x39, 0x81, 0x64, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xB4, 0x95, 0x23, 0x66, 0xCB, 0x3E, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xE9, 0x04, 0x04, 0xB7, 0x06, 0x8E, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x66, 0xD1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x94, 0xBE, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xC2, 0x72, 0xA2, 0x86, 0x70, 0x3C, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x07, 0xAD, 0x3F, 0x01, 0xB9, 0x50, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x26, 0xF4, 0x5E, 0x99, 0x72, 0xEE, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x66, 0x3E, 0x27, 0x17, 0xBD, 0xAF, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x44, 0x9B, 0x57, 0x49, 0x44, 0xF5, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x1B, 0x7D, 0x2C, 0xB4, 0x5F, 0x8A, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0xC0, 0x3B, 0x9A, 0x78, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xB1, 0x2D, 0xEB, 0x27, 0x2F, 0xE8, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x4B, 0x44, 0x25, 0xDB, 0x5C, 0x5F, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x85, 0x28, 0x78, 0x2E, 0x75, 0x34, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0x57, 0x0F, 0x73, 0x78, 0x7A, 0xE3, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xD8, 0xEC, 0xDC, 0xDA, 0x04, 0xAD, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x8A, 0x09, 0xF3, 0x58, 0x79, 0xD8, 0x29), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x03, 0xCB, 0x50, 0x1A, 0x7F, 0x56, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xA6, 0x78, 0x38, 0x85, 0x67, 0x0B, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xD5, 0xD2, 0x22, 0xC4, 0x00, 0x3B, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x93, 0x0E, 0x7B, 0x85, 0x51, 0xC3, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xA6, 0x5F, 0x54, 0x49, 0x02, 0x81, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0xE9, 0x6B, 0x3A, 0x92, 0xE7, 0x72, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x5F, 0x28, 0x9E, 0x91, 0x27, 0x88, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x28, 0x31, 0xB3, 0x84, 0xCA, 0x12, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xF9, 0xAC, 0x22, 0x10, 0x0A, 0x64, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xC6, 0x33, 0x1F, 0x69, 0x19, 0x18, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x48, 0xB8, 0xC7, 0x37, 0x5A, 0x00, 0x36), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xCC, 0x32, 0xE0, 0xEE, 0x03, 0xC2, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x29, 0xC2, 0xE4, 0x6E, 0x24, 0x20, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x6B, 0x7F, 0x7B, 0xF9, 0xB0, 0xB8, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x7B, 0x3C, 0xE1, 0x19, 0xA1, 0x23, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xE3, 0xC2, 0x53, 0xC0, 0x07, 0x13, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xFE, 0x36, 0x35, 0x9F, 0x5E, 0x59, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x55, 0x89, 0x84, 0xBC, 0xEF, 0xA2, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0x1A, 0x08, 0x67, 0xB4, 0xE7, 0x22, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x26, 0xDF, 0x81, 0x3C, 0x5F, 0x1C, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x4D, 0xD0, 0x0A, 0x48, 0x06, 0xF4, 0x48), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x18, 0x39, 0xF7, 0xD1, 0x20, 0x77, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0x8F, 0x44, 0x13, 0xCB, 0x78, 0x11, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xE2, 0x49, 0xEA, 0x43, 0x79, 0x08, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0xD1, 0xD8, 0x73, 0x2C, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xE5, 0xE7, 0xF4, 0x46, 0xAB, 0x20, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x0B, 0xB9, 0x71, 0x1A, 0x27, 0xB7, 0xA7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xA2, 0x2C, 0xD1, 0xDA, 0xBC, 0xC1, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xA3, 0x10, 0x1F, 0x90, 0xF2, 0xA5, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xFB, 0x20, 0xF4, 0xC0, 0x70, 0xC0, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0xA7, 0x99, 0xF0, 0xA5, 0xD3, 0x09, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0xE8, 0x14, 0x39, 0xBE, 0xCB, 0x60, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0xD6, 0x14, 0xA9, 0xC9, 0x20, 0xC3, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xA8, 0x5B, 0xFD, 0x2D, 0x96, 0xBC, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x04, 0x45, 0xBE, 0xCE, 0x75, 0x95, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0xDA, 0x58, 0x49, 0x35, 0x09, 0x8D, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xF0, 0xC0, 0x36, 0xF2, 0xA6, 0x2D, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xFC, 0x3D, 0xA8, 0xFB, 0x3C, 0xD2, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x4D, 0x71, 0x09, 0x18, 0x42, 0xF0, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xC1, 0xCE, 0x9E, 0x6A, 0x49, 0x60, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xB1, 0x00, 0xF7, 0xA1, 0x7A, 0x31, 0xB4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xC3, 0x86, 0xCD, 0x20, 0x4A, 0x17, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xAB, 0x8B, 0x47, 0x8D, 0xAA, 0xA6, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x97, 0xF0, 0xBC, 0x2D, 0xDC, 0x9D, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x86, 0xB0, 0x74, 0xB2, 0xF4, 0xF6, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xBD, 0xAC, 0xE3, 0x8F, 0x43, 0x5C, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0xC3, 0xE2, 0x6E, 0x25, 0x49, 0xCD, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x5E, 0x08, 0xB3, 0xB9, 0xAC, 0x5F, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xB7, 0xD1, 0xF4, 0xDC, 0x19, 0xE9, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xE4, 0xFA, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x3E, 0xED, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x67, 0x92, 0x84, 0x6E, 0x48, 0x03, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x95, 0xEF, 0x8F, 0xB2, 0x82, 0x6B, 0x1C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xFA, 0xB9, 0x55, 0x23, 0xFE, 0x09, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x79, 0x85, 0x4B, 0x0E, 0xD4, 0x35, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x27, 0x45, 0x81, 0xE0, 0x88, 0x52, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x63, 0xA2, 0x4B, 0xBC, 0x5D, 0xB1, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x8C, 0x83, 0xD9, 0x3E, 0xD3, 0x42, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x03, 0x3A, 0x31, 0xBA, 0xE9, 0x3A, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x10, 0xCD, 0x2D, 0x00, 0xFE, 0x32, 0xA7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x6E, 0x1F, 0xDA, 0xF8, 0x6F, 0x4D, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x79, 0x7D, 0x09, 0xE5, 0xD3, 0x03, 0x21), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xC3, 0xBE, 0xDF, 0x07, 0x65, 0x49, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x57, 0x33, 0xEF, 0xAE, 0x4F, 0x04, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0xE9, 0x9B, 0xFE, 0xBF, 0xE6, 0x85, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0xBA, 0xAA, 0x06, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0xB8, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x83, 0x01, 0xA9, 0xF6, 0x51, 0xE7, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xA6, 0x15, 0x8E, 0xAB, 0x1F, 0x10, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x08, 0x27, 0x1A, 0xA1, 0x21, 0xAD, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x09, 0x90, 0x6E, 0x50, 0x90, 0x9A, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x9A, 0xFE, 0xD7, 0xA1, 0xF5, 0xA2, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x7D, 0xE3, 0xDC, 0x21, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xBF, 0x07, 0xFF, 0x45, 0xDF, 0x51, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x5C, 0x34, 0x02, 0x62, 0x9B, 0x08, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xCE, 0x9A, 0x6A, 0xEC, 0x75, 0xF6, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x59, 0xF4, 0x78, 0x3C, 0x60, 0xB1, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x37, 0x84, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0xF2, 0x9A, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x9A, 0x9A, 0x15, 0x36, 0xE0, 0x2B, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x38, 0x9C, 0x50, 0x3D, 0x1E, 0x37, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x79, 0xF0, 0x92, 0xF2, 0x8B, 0x18, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xE0, 0x82, 0x1E, 0x80, 0x82, 0x4B, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xBB, 0x59, 0x6B, 0x8A, 0x77, 0x41, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xF9, 0xD4, 0xB8, 0x4A, 0x82, 0xCF, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x8C, 0xC8, 0x9B, 0x72, 0x9E, 0xF7, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0xCE, 0xE9, 0x77, 0x0A, 0x19, 0x59, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0xA1, 0x41, 0x6A, 0x72, 0x4B, 0xB4, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x35, 0x43, 0xE2, 0x8C, 0xBE, 0x0D, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xEB, 0xAD, 0xF3, 0xA9, 0xA6, 0x68, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x2F, 0xE2, 0x48, 0x0C, 0xDB, 0x1F, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x1E, 0x60, 0x9B, 0x2A, 0xD2, 0xC1, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x64, 0xB5, 0xD2, 0xF6, 0xF6, 0x6E, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x3D, 0x30, 0x78, 0x10, 0x18, 0x41, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x1D, 0x1C, 0xE0, 0x6D, 0x83, 0xD1, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x03, 0x0B, 0xF5, 0x2F, 0x6C, 0x04, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x3E, 0xD5, 0xFC, 0x31, 0x5B, 0x3A, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x82, 0x2F, 0xFB, 0xFE, 0xF8, 0x76, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x26, 0xDA, 0x9C, 0x36, 0xF5, 0x93, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0xE7, 0x6E, 0xD2, 0x7D, 0x81, 0x09, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x03, 0xF9, 0x58, 0x48, 0x24, 0xA2, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x79, 0x0C, 0x8E, 0x6B, 0x95, 0xF3, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x10, 0x5C, 0x87, 0x03, 0x39, 0xCF, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xF0, 0xF7, 0xC1, 0x07, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xE8, 0x02, 0x89, 0x65, 0xC4, 0x72, 0x36), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x88, 0xEA, 0x96, 0x67, 0x0B, 0x5D, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x75, 0x60, 0xA8, 0xBD, 0x74, 0xDF, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xE5, 0x71, 0x50, 0x67, 0xD0, 0xD2, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xFC, 0xE5, 0xC7, 0x77, 0xB0, 0x7F, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x86, 0x69, 0xCD, 0x0D, 0x9A, 0xBD, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x17, 0xBC, 0xBB, 0x59, 0x85, 0x7D, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xA8, 0x76, 0xAC, 0x80, 0xA9, 0x72, 0xE0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x78, 0xC1, 0xE2, 0x4D, 0xAF, 0xF9, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x97, 0x8E, 0x74, 0xC4, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xD8, 0xF6, 0xF3, 0xAF, 0x2F, 0x52, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x57, 0xF4, 0xCE, 0xEE, 0x43, 0xED, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x46, 0x38, 0xDE, 0x20, 0xFD, 0x59, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x18, 0xE8, 0x58, 0xB9, 0x76, 0x2C, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x54, 0xE4, 0xFE, 0xC7, 0xBC, 0x31, 0x37), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xF8, 0x89, 0xEE, 0x70, 0xB5, 0xB0, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x22, 0x26, 0x9A, 0x53, 0xB9, 0x38, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xA7, 0x19, 0x8C, 0x74, 0x7E, 0x88, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xDA, 0x0A, 0xE8, 0xDA, 0xA5, 0xBE, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x5C, 0xF7, 0xB1, 0x0C, 0x72, 0xFB, 0x09), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0xE2, 0x23, 0xE7, 0x46, 0xB7, 0xE0, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x36, 0xBC, 0xBD, 0x48, 0x11, 0x8E, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0xBB, 0xA1, 0xF7, 0x0B, 0x9E, 0xBF, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x28, 0xE1, 0xA2, 0x8F, 0xFC, 0xFC, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0xFE, 0x19, 0x0A, 0xE5, 0xE7, 0x69, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xCD, 0x12, 0xF5, 0xBE, 0xD3, 0x04, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xA8, 0x0D, 0x81, 0x59, 0xC4, 0x79, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xF3, 0x4B, 0x92, 0x65, 0xC3, 0x31, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0xB5, 0x4F, 0x4D, 0x91, 0xD4, 0xE2, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x09, 0x41, 0x79, 0x1D, 0x4D, 0x0D, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x31, 0x18, 0xBA, 0xA0, 0xF2, 0x6E, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x5B, 0x4D, 0x4F, 0xAF, 0xC9, 0x8C, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x99, 0x9C, 0x06, 0x68, 0xDE, 0xD8, 0x29), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x04, 0xE1, 0xB5, 0x9D, 0x00, 0xBC, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x95, 0x92, 0x8D, 0x72, 0xD3, 0x37, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x4B, 0x27, 0xA2, 0xE8, 0xA4, 0x26, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x45, 0x9C, 0xA9, 0xCB, 0x9F, 0xBA, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x7E, 0x1B, 0x64, 0xF4, 0xE8, 0xA5, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x20, 0xA9, 0xCA, 0xF3, 0x89, 0xE5, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xED, 0xFC, 0xAB, 0xD9, 0x0A, 0xB9, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x6F, 0x46, 0x7C, 0xCD, 0x78, 0xFF, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xAB, 0x71, 0x5A, 0x94, 0xAB, 0x20, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x2E, 0xEE, 0x87, 0x57, 0x1F, 0xAD, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x4C, 0x3D, 0xFB, 0x7E, 0xA1, 0x8B, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xCF, 0x07, 0x86, 0xBA, 0x53, 0x37, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x26, 0xB2, 0xB9, 0xE2, 0x91, 0xE3, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xC9, 0x54, 0x84, 0x08, 0x3D, 0x0B, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xA8, 0x77, 0x2F, 0x64, 0x45, 0x99, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x96, 0x16, 0x1F, 0xDB, 0x96, 0x28, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x2B, 0x8D, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x4F, 0x55, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0xE6, 0x48, 0xBD, 0x99, 0x3D, 0x12, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x84, 0x59, 0xDA, 0xB9, 0xB6, 0x66, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x78, 0x41, 0x92, 0xDF, 0xF4, 0x3F, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x86, 0x6F, 0x4F, 0xBF, 0x67, 0xDF, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x2B, 0x1E, 0x5F, 0x00, 0xEA, 0xF6, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xB9, 0x6A, 0x89, 0xD8, 0xC0, 0xD7, 0xA7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x9A, 0x32, 0x23, 0xA0, 0x02, 0x91, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x7F, 0x6A, 0x15, 0x64, 0x6A, 0x8B, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x57, 0x82, 0x58, 0xA9, 0x56, 0xB5, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x50, 0x92, 0x60, 0xCC, 0x81, 0x24, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x3D, 0xAD, 0xDA, 0xD9, 0x51, 0x3E, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0xFE, 0x8F, 0xB0, 0x0B, 0xDE, 0x2E, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xD2, 0xBE, 0xEF, 0xAC, 0x76, 0x71, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xE8, 0x72, 0x0B, 0xAC, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x5B, 0xC7, 0xFC, 0xE3, 0x3C, 0x7C, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x04, 0xA7, 0xB9, 0x9B, 0x93, 0xC0, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x48, 0x4B, 0x8E, 0x32, 0xC5, 0xF0, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x42, 0x07, 0xC1, 0xF2, 0xF1, 0x72, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x37, 0x54, 0x9C, 0x88, 0xD2, 0x62, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x89, 0x58, 0xA2, 0x0F, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0xCC, 0x4C, 0x97, 0x30, 0x66, 0x34, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x1F, 0xDB, 0xC9, 0x5E, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x4D, 0x49, 0xFF, 0x9B, 0x9C, 0xAC, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0xE4, 0x4B, 0xF2, 0xD4, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xDA, 0xE8, 0x61, 0x9F, 0xC8, 0x49, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xCB, 0xF2, 0x2D, 0x85, 0xF6, 0x8D, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xC5, 0xCD, 0x2C, 0x79, 0xC6, 0x0E, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x1D, 0x55, 0x0F, 0xF8, 0x22, 0x9F, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x56, 0xBA, 0xE7, 0x57, 0x32, 0xEC, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x9A, 0xC6, 0x4C, 0x09, 0xC4, 0x52, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x1E, 0x6F, 0xF4, 0x7D, 0x27, 0xDD, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x11, 0x16, 0xEC, 0x79, 0x83, 0xAD, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x4E, 0x92, 0x1F, 0x19, 0x7D, 0x65, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0xFF, 0x78, 0x15, 0x45, 0x63, 0x32, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x91, 0xD0, 0x78, 0x58, 0xDA, 0x50, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0xDE, 0x40, 0xF6, 0x41, 0xB4, 0x3B, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x8D, 0xE0, 0xE1, 0xA9, 0xF0, 0x35, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xD4, 0xBA, 0x7B, 0xCC, 0x1B, 0x3A, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x5A, 0x2E, 0x74, 0x47, 0x14, 0xC3, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xF0, 0x8B, 0x06, 0x15, 0x8E, 0x0E, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0xD2, 0xEB, 0x97, 0x50, 0x7D, 0x31, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x93, 0x4C, 0xDB, 0x97, 0x79, 0x44, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xA2, 0xA0, 0x0B, 0xC8, 0x3A, 0x8A, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x50, 0x92, 0x9E, 0x24, 0x1F, 0xCB, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x16, 0xC9, 0xC5, 0x3D, 0x5A, 0xAF, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xE3, 0x97, 0xE4, 0xA8, 0x50, 0xF6, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x57, 0x97, 0x42, 0x78, 0x92, 0x49, 0x0D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0xEB, 0x62, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0x32, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x0C, 0x36, 0x6E, 0x8F, 0xE8, 0xE8, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xD3, 0x7C, 0xC7, 0x8D, 0x3F, 0x5C, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x64, 0x6A, 0x73, 0x10, 0x79, 0xB8, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xF9, 0xEF, 0xA5, 0x20, 0x4A, 0x5C, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xF3, 0xF4, 0x49, 0x5B, 0x73, 0xAA, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xF2, 0xEA, 0x0F, 0x00, 0xAD, 0x53, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xB8, 0x66, 0xED, 0xC4, 0x2B, 0x4C, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x2F, 0xC1, 0x9A, 0x37, 0xD2, 0x7F, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xA7, 0x81, 0x38, 0x64, 0xC9, 0x37, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x3B, 0x6C, 0x9F, 0x5B, 0xD9, 0x8B, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x14, 0xD9, 0x08, 0xD8, 0xD2, 0x7E, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x71, 0xE6, 0x3D, 0xD1, 0xB0, 0xE7, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x81, 0x23, 0xEC, 0x2D, 0x42, 0x45, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x5B, 0x44, 0x6B, 0x89, 0x03, 0x67, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x27, 0xAE, 0x80, 0x5A, 0x33, 0xBE, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xB6, 0x64, 0x1A, 0xDF, 0xD3, 0x85, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x8C, 0x22, 0xBA, 0xD0, 0xBD, 0xCC, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x3C, 0x01, 0x3A, 0xFF, 0x9D, 0xC7, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xC7, 0x64, 0xB4, 0x59, 0x4E, 0x9F, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x34, 0x0A, 0x41, 0x94, 0xA8, 0xF2, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xD4, 0xE4, 0xF0, 0x97, 0x45, 0x6D, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0x1F, 0x4D, 0x6D, 0xFE, 0xA0, 0xC4, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x28, 0x5C, 0x40, 0xBB, 0x65, 0xD4, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xA8, 0x87, 0x35, 0x20, 0x3A, 0x89, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xFD, 0x4F, 0xAB, 0x2D, 0xD1, 0xD0, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xE8, 0x00, 0xFC, 0x69, 0x52, 0xF8, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x9A, 0x99, 0xE1, 0xDC, 0x9C, 0x3F, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x08, 0x98, 0xD9, 0xCA, 0x73, 0xD5, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x2C, 0xE0, 0xA7, 0x3E, 0x91, 0xD7, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x04, 0xB0, 0x54, 0x09, 0xF4, 0x72, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xEE, 0x28, 0xCC, 0xE8, 0x50, 0x78, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x91, 0x03, 0x76, 0xDB, 0x68, 0x24, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0xE0, 0x56, 0xB2, 0x5D, 0x12, 0xD3, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x42, 0x59, 0x8B, 0xDF, 0x67, 0xB5, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xCC, 0xE5, 0x31, 0x53, 0x7A, 0x46, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_16_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x8D, 0x59, 0xB5, 0x1B, 0x0F, 0xF4, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x2F, 0xD1, 0x2C, 0xE0, 0xD8, 0x04, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xF4, 0xD7, 0xBA, 0xB0, 0xA3, 0x7E, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x08, 0x51, 0x56, 0xA6, 0x76, 0x67, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x17, 0x63, 0xFE, 0x56, 0xD0, 0xD9, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0xF6, 0xC3, 0x14, 0x47, 0xC5, 0xA7, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x4C, 0x80, 0xF6, 0xA2, 0x57, 0xA7, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xB3, 0x7B, 0xF8, 0x2F, 0xE1, 0x3E, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_16_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0xF4, 0xF9, 0x6B, 0x7B, 0x90, 0xDF, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x82, 0xEF, 0x62, 0xA1, 0x4C, 0x53, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x99, 0x76, 0x01, 0xBA, 0x8D, 0x0F, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xF4, 0x58, 0x73, 0x56, 0xFE, 0xDD, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xCE, 0xF9, 0xE8, 0xA1, 0x34, 0xC3, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x5F, 0xDC, 0x6A, 0x3D, 0xD8, 0x7F, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xF4, 0x51, 0xB8, 0xB8, 0xC1, 0xD7, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x7D, 0x58, 0xD1, 0xD4, 0x1B, 0x4D, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_17_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x95, 0xDF, 0x00, 0xD8, 0x21, 0xDE, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x47, 0x3C, 0xC3, 0xB2, 0x01, 0x53, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x17, 0x43, 0x23, 0xBD, 0xCA, 0x71, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xBA, 0x0F, 0x4F, 0xDC, 0x41, 0x54, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x39, 0x26, 0x70, 0x53, 0x32, 0x18, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x46, 0x07, 0x97, 0x3A, 0x57, 0xE0, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x92, 0x4F, 0xCE, 0xDF, 0x25, 0x80, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x6F, 0x9A, 0x03, 0x05, 0x4B, 0xD1, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_17_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x01, 0x72, 0x30, 0x90, 0x17, 0x51, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xFB, 0x41, 0x65, 0x5C, 0xB4, 0x2D, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xCD, 0xCD, 0xAA, 0x41, 0xCC, 0xBB, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xCE, 0x08, 0x0A, 0x63, 0xE9, 0xA2, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xA8, 0x21, 0x7F, 0x7A, 0x5B, 0x9B, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x6B, 0x89, 0x44, 0x0A, 0x7F, 0x85, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xDE, 0x7C, 0x19, 0x5C, 0x65, 0x26, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0xAC, 0x62, 0x29, 0x4A, 0xF1, 0xD0, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_18_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x00, 0x40, 0x87, 0xEB, 0xA9, 0x58, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x51, 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x56, 0x35, 0x51, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xAC, 0x08, 0x94, 0x71, 0xDA, 0xEC, 0x99), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x4D, 0xC5, 0x7B, 0x31, 0x8B, 0x8D, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x05, 0xF1, 0x3E, 0x9E, 0x8F, 0x17, 0x8F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x9C, 0x4B, 0x62, 0x94, 0xAD, 0x49, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xC9, 0xC6, 0x8F, 0xFD, 0x33, 0x44, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x96, 0x17, 0x7F, 0x42, 0xBE, 0xF7, 0x0D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_18_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0x29, 0x39, 0x13, 0x08, 0x8D, 0x91, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x79, 0xF9, 0x2F, 0xA9, 0x0A, 0xCF, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x87, 0x7A, 0xA3, 0x19, 0xAB, 0x55, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x0B, 0x01, 0xC5, 0x56, 0x19, 0x9D, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0xDE, 0x82, 0x3B, 0xEA, 0xD3, 0x0B, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x6B, 0xC7, 0xF3, 0x0F, 0x82, 0x87, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x2E, 0x23, 0xF2, 0x39, 0x9D, 0x49, 0x70), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0xDE, 0xAF, 0x7A, 0xEE, 0xB0, 0xDA, 0x70), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_19_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x4E, 0x2A, 0x50, 0xFD, 0x8E, 0xC0, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x0F, 0x7C, 0x76, 0x63, 0xD8, 0x89, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x2D, 0xB9, 0x4E, 0xF4, 0xEE, 0x85, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x95, 0x5C, 0x96, 0x5D, 0xAA, 0x59, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xDB, 0xD2, 0x68, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x94, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x02, 0xBF, 0x77, 0x9F, 0xB9, 0x4C, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xDC, 0xC0, 0xCF, 0x81, 0x1E, 0xC4, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xCC, 0x37, 0x86, 0xDC, 0xE2, 0x64, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_19_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x30, 0xB1, 0x59, 0x20, 0x9D, 0x98, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x0C, 0x9D, 0xF8, 0x20, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0xA0, 0xF4, 0xE7, 0x3E, 0x9C, 0x9E, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x25, 0xA2, 0xB0, 0x54, 0xCD, 0x2E, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xD9, 0x42, 0xB0, 0x80, 0xB0, 0xA3, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0xFE, 0x9D, 0x8D, 0x40, 0xFF, 0x27, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x9D, 0xA6, 0x88, 0x3A, 0x8B, 0x6F, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x39, 0xEE, 0x1F, 0x3F, 0xB1, 0x4F, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_20_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xD7, 0x9E, 0xFF, 0xD2, 0x35, 0x67, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x4F, 0x15, 0x5D, 0xE3, 0xE8, 0x53, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xF7, 0x24, 0x98, 0xA2, 0xCB, 0x11, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x2E, 0x25, 0xE1, 0x94, 0xC5, 0xA3, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x82, 0x6E, 0xBA, 0xE7, 0x43, 0x25, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x65, 0xB4, 0x49, 0x73, 0x18, 0x35, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x5B, 0xBC, 0x62, 0x86, 0x4C, 0xC1, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xF2, 0x95, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0xA2, 0x35, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_20_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x59, 0x62, 0xB0, 0x4B, 0x1E, 0xB4, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x55, 0xCE, 0xB0, 0x69, 0xBA, 0x63, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0x69, 0x86, 0xDB, 0x34, 0x7D, 0x68, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x06, 0xCA, 0x55, 0x44, 0x36, 0x2B, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xD4, 0xC4, 0x3D, 0xCD, 0x9E, 0x69, 0xA4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x44, 0xE4, 0xBF, 0x31, 0xE6, 0x40, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x4F, 0xFA, 0x75, 0xE3, 0xFB, 0x97, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0x1C, 0x48, 0xB0, 0x26, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_21_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x7B, 0x32, 0xFA, 0xF2, 0x6D, 0x84, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x21, 0x03, 0x1D, 0x0D, 0x22, 0x55, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xF9, 0x42, 0x03, 0x9C, 0xC2, 0xCB, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xA1, 0x96, 0xD9, 0x9D, 0x11, 0x6F, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x40, 0x57, 0xEB, 0x40, 0x2D, 0xC0, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x96, 0xBB, 0x4F, 0x2F, 0x23, 0xA8, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x29, 0x85, 0x21, 0xA5, 0x50, 0x62, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x7D, 0x92, 0xCF, 0x87, 0x0C, 0x22, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_21_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x0E, 0xA5, 0x32, 0x5B, 0xDF, 0x9C, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x96, 0x37, 0x2C, 0x88, 0x35, 0x30, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xB4, 0x69, 0xFF, 0xEB, 0xC6, 0x94, 0x08), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x55, 0x60, 0xAD, 0xAA, 0x58, 0x14, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xFF, 0xF2, 0xB2, 0xD5, 0xA7, 0xD9, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xAE, 0x54, 0xD2, 0x60, 0x31, 0xF3, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x92, 0x83, 0xE3, 0xF1, 0x42, 0x83, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xD2, 0xC8, 0xB7, 0x76, 0x45, 0x7F, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_22_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x11, 0xA4, 0xFB, 0x7A, 0x01, 0xBC, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x27, 0x73, 0x8D, 0x02, 0x91, 0x27, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x62, 0xF6, 0xDD, 0x6B, 0xFA, 0x5B, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0xCA, 0xA2, 0x44, 0x2C, 0xF0, 0x28, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xF1, 0x7A, 0xA2, 0x42, 0x4C, 0x50, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x83, 0x3E, 0x50, 0xAB, 0x9C, 0xF7, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xED, 0x78, 0xCB, 0x76, 0x69, 0xDA, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x01, 0x1E, 0x43, 0x27, 0x47, 0x6E, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_22_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x4F, 0x54, 0xB9, 0x3E, 0xBD, 0xD5, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x35, 0x40, 0x69, 0x7F, 0x74, 0x9D, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x06, 0x6F, 0x67, 0x68, 0x2B, 0x4D, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x65, 0x41, 0xFC, 0x7C, 0x1E, 0xE8, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x79, 0x37, 0xAF, 0xFD, 0xD2, 0xDA, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xA8, 0x69, 0x56, 0x62, 0xA4, 0xE4, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x71, 0x73, 0x21, 0x8A, 0x17, 0x81, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x55, 0x8F, 0x7B, 0xB8, 0xAF, 0xF7, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_23_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xD1, 0xBD, 0xBE, 0x8C, 0xBC, 0x60, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0xA6, 0x57, 0x8C, 0xAE, 0x5C, 0x19, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0x43, 0xE4, 0xD9, 0xD8, 0x7B, 0xE7, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xB9, 0xE4, 0x85, 0x7C, 0x2E, 0xFC, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x2E, 0x01, 0x2A, 0x6D, 0x56, 0xBE, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x0C, 0x25, 0x9B, 0xAE, 0x86, 0x37, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x22, 0xB3, 0xCB, 0x99, 0x66, 0xB7, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xF7, 0x90, 0xF0, 0x1B, 0x09, 0x27, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_23_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x16, 0x08, 0xEF, 0x39, 0x64, 0x49, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xA0, 0xE3, 0x97, 0xA9, 0x07, 0x54, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xFF, 0xE2, 0x00, 0x07, 0x21, 0x88, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xFD, 0x59, 0x53, 0x05, 0x6C, 0x42, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0xF7, 0x39, 0x5C, 0x82, 0x36, 0xE8, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0x83, 0xA8, 0xE2, 0xA8, 0x43, 0x07, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xAF, 0x2B, 0x79, 0xED, 0xD8, 0x39, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x20, 0x91, 0x7A, 0xC4, 0x07, 0xEF, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_24_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x10, 0x2F, 0xAA, 0x0C, 0x94, 0x0E, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x81, 0x87, 0x41, 0x23, 0xEB, 0x55, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x53, 0xCC, 0x79, 0xB6, 0xEB, 0x6C, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x77, 0x73, 0x9D, 0xFC, 0x64, 0x6F, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x40, 0xE3, 0x6D, 0x1C, 0x16, 0x71, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0xF4, 0x1B, 0xFF, 0x1C, 0x2F, 0xA5, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x0E, 0x0B, 0x11, 0xF4, 0x8D, 0x93, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xC5, 0x64, 0x6F, 0x24, 0x19, 0xF2, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_24_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0xB3, 0xAF, 0xA5, 0x0E, 0x4F, 0x5E, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0x77, 0xCA, 0xF2, 0x6D, 0xC5, 0xF6, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x18, 0x8E, 0x33, 0x68, 0x6C, 0xE8, 0xE0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x8B, 0x80, 0x90, 0x19, 0x7F, 0x90, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x80, 0x6B, 0x68, 0xE2, 0x7D, 0xD4, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xC1, 0x67, 0xB3, 0x72, 0xCB, 0xBF, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0xD5, 0xD3, 0x1D, 0x14, 0x58, 0x0A, 0x80), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x7A, 0x65, 0x98, 0xB3, 0x07, 0x4B, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_25_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x87, 0x0F, 0x5F, 0xCF, 0xA2, 0x01, 0x08), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xC9, 0xC8, 0x6E, 0x35, 0x87, 0xA5, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x3E, 0x91, 0xA0, 0xAB, 0x24, 0x1E, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xBC, 0x02, 0x35, 0x70, 0xC1, 0x5F, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x59, 0xA0, 0x50, 0x04, 0x80, 0x52, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x56, 0x6E, 0x42, 0x8F, 0x8C, 0x91, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xA2, 0xCB, 0xA5, 0xDE, 0x14, 0x24, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0xCB, 0x74, 0x28, 0xE6, 0xA7, 0xE7, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_25_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x73, 0xA8, 0x8F, 0x9E, 0x0E, 0x63, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x1B, 0x77, 0xC7, 0xC1, 0x38, 0xF9, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x3C, 0xCF, 0xA8, 0x7A, 0xD7, 0xF3, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x5F, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0xAD, 0xE9, 0x1A, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0xCF, 0x2B, 0x5E, 0xD5, 0x81, 0x95, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x88, 0x75, 0x29, 0x1F, 0xC7, 0xC7, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA9, 0x5A, 0x4D, 0x63, 0x95, 0xF9, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0xCD, 0x04, 0x8F, 0xCD, 0x91, 0xDE, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_26_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xD4, 0xFD, 0x25, 0x11, 0x99, 0x6E, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x83, 0x01, 0x3D, 0xFB, 0x56, 0xA5, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x3A, 0xDC, 0x74, 0xC2, 0xD7, 0xCF, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0xBD, 0xF1, 0xDD, 0xA3, 0x07, 0x03, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xBE, 0xE9, 0x2E, 0x58, 0x84, 0x66, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x20, 0x78, 0x37, 0x79, 0x0B, 0xA6, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xF2, 0xAC, 0x65, 0xC8, 0xC9, 0x2F, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x93, 0xE5, 0x0D, 0x0C, 0xC6, 0xB8, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_26_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xAD, 0x5C, 0x19, 0x12, 0x61, 0x0E, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x4F, 0x0B, 0x1F, 0x49, 0x7E, 0xCD, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x2E, 0x30, 0x61, 0xDB, 0x08, 0x68, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x78, 0xAF, 0xB3, 0x08, 0xC1, 0x69, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x5F, 0x5D, 0xC1, 0x57, 0x6F, 0xD8, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0xD3, 0x6A, 0xF7, 0xFD, 0x86, 0xE5, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x63, 0xBD, 0x70, 0x7B, 0x47, 0xE8, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x62, 0xC8, 0x7E, 0x9D, 0x11, 0x2B, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_27_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x84, 0xFD, 0xD5, 0x9A, 0x56, 0x7F, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xBB, 0xA4, 0x6F, 0x12, 0x6E, 0x4D, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x08, 0xA1, 0x82, 0x9C, 0x62, 0x74, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x58, 0x22, 0x05, 0x1D, 0x15, 0x35, 0x79), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x88, 0xCF, 0x5C, 0x05, 0x78, 0xFB, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x6B, 0x2F, 0x79, 0x09, 0x73, 0x67, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA0, 0x80, 0xD8, 0xE8, 0xEC, 0xFB, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xE7, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x48, 0x7B, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_27_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x53, 0xA9, 0xED, 0x61, 0x92, 0xD7, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x49, 0xD9, 0x5D, 0x9B, 0x4E, 0x89, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x12, 0xEB, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0xCB, 0xC1, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xDC, 0x95, 0x16, 0xFE, 0x29, 0x70, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x33, 0xB1, 0xD6, 0x78, 0xB9, 0xE2, 0x36), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xCE, 0x88, 0xC3, 0xFD, 0x7A, 0x6B, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x1E, 0x50, 0x1E, 0xAF, 0xB1, 0x25, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xE7, 0xD7, 0xD5, 0xBD, 0x7A, 0x12, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_28_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0xAA, 0xA2, 0x80, 0x5D, 0x8F, 0xCD, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x39, 0x79, 0x64, 0xA1, 0x67, 0x3C, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xC7, 0x49, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xAC, 0xAB, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x54, 0x3E, 0x83, 0xF0, 0x3D, 0xBC, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x92, 0x4A, 0x38, 0x42, 0x8A, 0xAB, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x0B, 0x4F, 0xEE, 0x9E, 0x92, 0xA5, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xDD, 0x19, 0x96, 0xF2, 0xF0, 0x6B, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xFC, 0xDD, 0xB2, 0x8A, 0xE5, 0x4C, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_28_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x06, 0x49, 0xAC, 0x99, 0x7E, 0xF8, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xC8, 0x01, 0x51, 0xEA, 0xF6, 0x52, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x89, 0x66, 0x2B, 0x1F, 0x9B, 0x2A, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x0F, 0x95, 0x07, 0x2B, 0x6C, 0x6E, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xC3, 0xB4, 0xBB, 0x91, 0x1F, 0xA3, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x6E, 0x54, 0x28, 0x7B, 0x9C, 0x79, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x45, 0xFF, 0xA6, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x83, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0xDE, 0x8F, 0x17, 0x37, 0x82, 0xCB, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_29_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x94, 0x3F, 0x26, 0xC9, 0x1D, 0xD9, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x97, 0x28, 0x20, 0xCD, 0xC1, 0xF3, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x60, 0x9B, 0x1E, 0xDC, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0xB9, 0x5B, 0x7D, 0xA0, 0xB2, 0x8C, 0xF0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xD1, 0x42, 0xE6, 0x39, 0x33, 0x6D, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xC0, 0xFC, 0xD2, 0x14, 0x5D, 0x3E, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0x4A, 0x3E, 0x40, 0x16, 0x93, 0x15, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x24, 0xC1, 0x27, 0x27, 0xE5, 0x4B, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_29_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x50, 0xD8, 0xBC, 0xC1, 0x46, 0x22, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x0E, 0x60, 0xA1, 0xB3, 0x50, 0xD4, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0xB1, 0x26, 0xB6, 0x6D, 0x47, 0x5A, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0xAC, 0x11, 0x35, 0x3E, 0xB9, 0xF4, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x97, 0xFA, 0xBB, 0x6B, 0x39, 0x13, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x7B, 0x34, 0x12, 0x75, 0x8E, 0x9B, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x9E, 0xCD, 0x29, 0xB6, 0xEF, 0x8D, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xAC, 0xE9, 0x25, 0x27, 0xBB, 0x78, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_30_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x7A, 0xA8, 0xD3, 0xE3, 0x66, 0xE5, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x4C, 0xC4, 0x2C, 0x76, 0x81, 0x50, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x71, 0x08, 0xB8, 0x52, 0x7C, 0xAF, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x59, 0x24, 0xDD, 0xFB, 0x2F, 0xD0, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xCD, 0x56, 0xE9, 0xAC, 0x91, 0xE6, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x64, 0x20, 0xC6, 0x9F, 0xE4, 0xEF, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x2C, 0x8F, 0x8C, 0x97, 0xF6, 0x22, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xF4, 0x88, 0xAA, 0xA8, 0xD7, 0xA5, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_30_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x6C, 0xAE, 0x83, 0xB1, 0x55, 0x55, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x67, 0x84, 0x47, 0x7C, 0x83, 0x5C, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x10, 0x4D, 0xDD, 0x30, 0x60, 0xB0, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xA7, 0x36, 0x76, 0x24, 0x32, 0x9F, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x42, 0x81, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x2E, 0x13, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x94, 0x91, 0xFF, 0x99, 0xA0, 0x09, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x83, 0xA1, 0x76, 0xAF, 0x37, 0x5C, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xA8, 0x04, 0x86, 0xC4, 0xA9, 0x79, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_31_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x8C, 0xC2, 0x34, 0xFB, 0x83, 0x28, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x03, 0x7D, 0x5E, 0x9E, 0x0E, 0xB0, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x02, 0x46, 0x7F, 0xB9, 0xAC, 0xBB, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xED, 0x48, 0xC2, 0x96, 0x4D, 0x56, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0xB5, 0xC5, 0xD1, 0xE6, 0x1C, 0x7E, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x2E, 0x18, 0x71, 0x2D, 0x7B, 0xD7, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x46, 0x9D, 0xDE, 0xAA, 0x78, 0x8E, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xD7, 0x69, 0x2E, 0xE1, 0xD9, 0x48, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_31_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xFF, 0x9E, 0x09, 0x22, 0x22, 0xE6, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x14, 0x28, 0x13, 0x1B, 0x62, 0x12, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x7F, 0x67, 0x03, 0xB0, 0xC0, 0xF3, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0xC3, 0x0F, 0xFB, 0x25, 0x48, 0x3E, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x6E, 0x53, 0x98, 0x36, 0xB3, 0xD3, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x81, 0x54, 0x22, 0xA4, 0xCC, 0xC1, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xBA, 0xFC, 0xA9, 0xDF, 0x68, 0x86, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x92, 0x0E, 0xC3, 0xF2, 0x58, 0xE8, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp521r1_T[32] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp521r1_T_0_X, secp521r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_1_X, secp521r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_2_X, secp521r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_3_X, secp521r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_4_X, secp521r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_5_X, secp521r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_6_X, secp521r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_7_X, secp521r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_8_X, secp521r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_9_X, secp521r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_10_X, secp521r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_11_X, secp521r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_12_X, secp521r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_13_X, secp521r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_14_X, secp521r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_15_X, secp521r1_T_15_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_16_X, secp521r1_T_16_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_17_X, secp521r1_T_17_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_18_X, secp521r1_T_18_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_19_X, secp521r1_T_19_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_20_X, secp521r1_T_20_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_21_X, secp521r1_T_21_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_22_X, secp521r1_T_22_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_23_X, secp521r1_T_23_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_24_X, secp521r1_T_24_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_25_X, secp521r1_T_25_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_26_X, secp521r1_T_26_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_27_X, secp521r1_T_27_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_28_X, secp521r1_T_28_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_29_X, secp521r1_T_29_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_30_X, secp521r1_T_30_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_31_X, secp521r1_T_31_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp521r1_T NULL +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0xEE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x03, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x6C, 0xE0, 0xEA, 0xB1, 0xD1, 0xA5, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xF4, 0xB7, 0x80, 0x02, 0x7D, 0xB0, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xE9, 0x57, 0xC0, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0xDB), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x2F, 0x5E, 0xD9, 0x88, 0xAA, 0x82, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x86, 0xBE, 0x15, 0xD0, 0x63, 0x41, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x28, 0x56, 0x9C, 0x6D, 0x2F, 0x2F, 0x9B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xFD, 0xDE, 0x74, 0x6A, 0x46, 0x69, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xFC, 0xF2, 0x26, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x6C, 0xE0, 0xEA, 0xB1, 0xD1, 0xA5, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xF4, 0xB7, 0x80, 0x02, 0x7D, 0xB0, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xE9, 0x57, 0xC0, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0xDB), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x2F, 0x5E, 0xD9, 0x88, 0xAA, 0x82, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x86, 0xBE, 0x15, 0xD0, 0x63, 0x41, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x28, 0x56, 0x9C, 0x6D, 0x2F, 0x2F, 0x9B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x77, 0x3D, 0x0D, 0x85, 0x48, 0xA8, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x07, 0xDF, 0x1D, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x01, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x86, 0xF6, 0xAF, 0x19, 0x2A, 0x88, 0x2E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x90, 0xB6, 0x2F, 0x48, 0x36, 0x4C, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x11, 0x14, 0xA6, 0xCB, 0xBA, 0x15, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0xB0, 0xF2, 0xD4, 0xC9, 0xDA, 0xBA, 0xD7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0xC1, 0x9C, 0xE6, 0xBB, 0xFB, 0xCF, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x19, 0xAC, 0x5A, 0xC9, 0x8A, 0x1C, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xF6, 0x76, 0x86, 0x89, 0x27, 0x8D, 0x28), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xE0, 0x6F, 0x34, 0xBA, 0x5E, 0xD3, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0xDC, 0xA6, 0x87, 0xC9, 0x9D, 0xC0, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x11, 0x7E, 0xD6, 0xF7, 0x33, 0xFC, 0xE4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x37, 0x3E, 0xC0, 0x7F, 0x62, 0xE7, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x3B, 0x69, 0x9D, 0x44, 0xBC, 0x82, 0x99), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x84, 0xB3, 0x5F, 0x2B, 0xA5, 0x9E, 0x2C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x95, 0xEB, 0x4C, 0x04, 0xB4, 0xF4, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xAD, 0x4B, 0xD5, 0x9A, 0xEB, 0xC4, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xB1, 0xC5, 0x59, 0xE3, 0xD5, 0x16, 0x2A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x2A, 0xCC, 0xAC, 0xD0, 0xEE, 0x50, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x83, 0xE0, 0x5B, 0x14, 0x44, 0x52, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x15, 0x2D, 0x78, 0xF6, 0x51, 0x32, 0xCF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x36, 0x9B, 0xDD, 0xF8, 0xDD, 0xEF, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xB1, 0x6A, 0x2B, 0xAF, 0xEB, 0x2B, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x87, 0x7A, 0x66, 0x5D, 0x5B, 0xDF, 0x8F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x45, 0xE5, 0x81, 0x9B, 0xEB, 0x37, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x29, 0xE2, 0x20, 0x64, 0x23, 0x6B, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x1D, 0x41, 0xE1, 0x9B, 0x61, 0x7B, 0xD9), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x57, 0xA3, 0x0A, 0x13, 0xE4, 0x59, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x6E, 0x4A, 0x48, 0x84, 0x90, 0xAC, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xB8, 0xF5, 0xF3, 0xDE, 0xA0, 0xA1, 0x1D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x32, 0x81, 0xA9, 0x91, 0x5A, 0x4E, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0xA8, 0x90, 0xBE, 0x0F, 0xEC, 0xC0, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x30, 0xD7, 0x08, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x3A, 0xA5), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x55, 0xE3, 0x76, 0xB3, 0x64, 0x74, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x75, 0xD4, 0xDB, 0x98, 0xD7, 0x39, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xEB, 0x8A, 0xAB, 0x16, 0xD9, 0xD4, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xBE, 0xF9, 0xC7, 0xC7, 0xBA, 0xF3, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x85, 0x59, 0xF3, 0x60, 0x41, 0x02, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x1C, 0x4A, 0xA4, 0xC7, 0xED, 0x66, 0xBC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x9C, 0x2E, 0x46, 0x52, 0x18, 0x87, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x35, 0x5A, 0x75, 0xAC, 0x4D, 0x75, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0x2F, 0xAC, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0x93, 0x5E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x4D, 0xC9, 0x18, 0xE9, 0x00, 0xEB, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x69, 0x72, 0x07, 0x5A, 0x59, 0xA8, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x65, 0x83, 0x20, 0x10, 0xF9, 0x69, 0x82), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x56, 0x7F, 0x9F, 0xBF, 0x46, 0x0C, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0xCF, 0xF0, 0xDC, 0xDF, 0x2D, 0xE6, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0xF0, 0x72, 0x3A, 0x7A, 0x03, 0xE5, 0x22), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xAA, 0x57, 0x13, 0x37, 0xA7, 0x2C, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xAC, 0xA2, 0x23, 0xF9, 0x84, 0x60, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xEB, 0x51, 0x70, 0x64, 0x78, 0xCA, 0x05), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xCC, 0x30, 0x62, 0x93, 0x46, 0x13, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x26, 0xCC, 0x6C, 0x3D, 0x5C, 0xDA, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xAA, 0xB8, 0x03, 0xA4, 0x1A, 0x00, 0x96), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x9D, 0xE6, 0xCC, 0x4E, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xC3, 0x8A, 0xAE, 0x6F, 0x40, 0x05, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x8F, 0x4A, 0x4D, 0x35, 0xD3, 0x50, 0x9D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xFD, 0x98, 0xAB, 0xC7, 0x03, 0xB4, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x40, 0xD2, 0x9F, 0xCA, 0xD0, 0x53, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x84, 0x00, 0x6F, 0xC8, 0xAD, 0xED, 0x8D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xD3, 0x57, 0xD7, 0xC3, 0x07, 0xBD, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0xBA, 0x47, 0x1D, 0x3D, 0xEF, 0x98, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xC0, 0x6C, 0x7F, 0x12, 0xEE, 0x9F, 0x67), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x02, 0xDA, 0x79, 0xAA, 0xC9, 0x27, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x79, 0xC7, 0x71, 0x84, 0xCB, 0xE5, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x37, 0x06, 0xBA, 0xB5, 0xD5, 0x18, 0x4C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x65, 0x72, 0x6C, 0xF2, 0x63, 0x27, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xBC, 0x71, 0xDF, 0x75, 0xF8, 0x98, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x70, 0x9B, 0xDC, 0xE7, 0x18, 0x71, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x5B, 0x9F, 0x00, 0x5A, 0xB6, 0x80, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xE0, 0xBB, 0xFC, 0x5E, 0x78, 0x9C, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x03, 0x68, 0x83, 0x3D, 0x2E, 0x4C, 0xDD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x49, 0x23, 0xA8, 0xCB, 0x3B, 0x1A, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x3D, 0xA7, 0x46, 0xCF, 0x75, 0xB6, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xFD, 0x30, 0x01, 0xB6, 0xEF, 0xF9, 0xE8), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xFA, 0xDA, 0xB8, 0x29, 0x42, 0xC9, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xD7, 0xA0, 0xE6, 0x6B, 0x86, 0x61, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0xE9, 0xD3, 0x37, 0xD8, 0xE7, 0x35, 0xA9), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xC8, 0x8E, 0xB1, 0xCB, 0xB1, 0xB5, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xD7, 0x46, 0x7D, 0xAF, 0xE2, 0xDC, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x46, 0xE7, 0xD8, 0x76, 0x31, 0x90, 0x76), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0xD3, 0xF4, 0x74, 0xE1, 0x67, 0xD8, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x70, 0x3C, 0xC8, 0xAF, 0x5F, 0xF4, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x4E, 0xED, 0x5C, 0x43, 0xB3, 0x16, 0x35), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xAE, 0xD1, 0xDD, 0x31, 0x14, 0xD3, 0xF0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x14, 0x06, 0x13, 0x12, 0x1C, 0x81, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0xF9, 0x0C, 0x91, 0xF7, 0x67, 0x59, 0x63), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x91, 0xE2, 0xF4, 0x9D, 0xEB, 0x88, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x82, 0x30, 0x9C, 0xAE, 0x18, 0x4D, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x79, 0xCF, 0x17, 0xA5, 0x1E, 0xE8, 0xC8), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp192k1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp192k1_T_0_X, secp192k1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_1_X, secp192k1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_2_X, secp192k1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_3_X, secp192k1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_4_X, secp192k1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_5_X, secp192k1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_6_X, secp192k1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_7_X, secp192k1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_8_X, secp192k1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_9_X, secp192k1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_10_X, secp192k1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_11_X, secp192k1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_12_X, secp192k1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_13_X, secp192k1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_14_X, secp192k1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_15_X, secp192k1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp192k1_T NULL +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xE5, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x05, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xA4, 0xB7, 0xB6, 0x0E, 0x65, 0x7E, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0x75, 0x70, 0xE4, 0xE9, 0x67, 0xA4, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x28, 0xFC, 0x30, 0xDF, 0x99, 0xF0, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0x33, 0x5B, 0x45, 0xA1), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x61, 0x6D, 0x55, 0xDB, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xBD, 0xB0, 0xC0, 0xF7, 0x19, 0xE3, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xFB, 0xCA, 0x82, 0x42, 0x34, 0xBA, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0xED, 0x9F, 0x08, 0x7E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0xB1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x71, 0xA9, 0xF0, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x61, 0xEC, 0xD2, 0xE8, 0xDC, 0x01, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xA4, 0xB7, 0xB6, 0x0E, 0x65, 0x7E, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0x75, 0x70, 0xE4, 0xE9, 0x67, 0xA4, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x28, 0xFC, 0x30, 0xDF, 0x99, 0xF0, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x5B, 0x45, 0xA1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x61, 0x6D, 0x55, 0xDB, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xBD, 0xB0, 0xC0, 0xF7, 0x19, 0xE3, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xFB, 0xCA, 0x82, 0x42, 0x34, 0xBA, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x9F, 0x08, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x6C, 0x22, 0x22, 0x40, 0x89, 0xAE, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x92, 0xE1, 0x87, 0x56, 0x35, 0xAF, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xAF, 0x08, 0x35, 0x27, 0xEA, 0x04, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x53, 0xFD, 0xCF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xD0, 0x9F, 0x8D, 0xF3, 0x63, 0x54, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0xDB, 0x0F, 0x61, 0x54, 0x26, 0xD1, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x21, 0xF7, 0x1B, 0xB5, 0x1D, 0xF6, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x05, 0xDA, 0x8F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x26, 0x73, 0xBC, 0xE4, 0x29, 0x62, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x95, 0x17, 0x8B, 0xC3, 0x9B, 0xAC, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0xDB, 0x77, 0xDF, 0xDD, 0x13, 0x04, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0xFC, 0x22, 0x93, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x65, 0xF1, 0x5A, 0x37, 0xEF, 0x79, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x01, 0x37, 0xAC, 0x9A, 0x5B, 0x51, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x75, 0x13, 0xA9, 0x4A, 0xAD, 0xFE, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x82, 0x6F, 0x66, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x5E, 0xF0, 0x40, 0xC3, 0xA6, 0xE2, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x9A, 0x6F, 0xCF, 0x11, 0x26, 0x66, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x73, 0xA8, 0xCF, 0x2B, 0x12, 0x36, 0x37), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xB3, 0x0A, 0x58, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x79, 0x00, 0x55, 0x04, 0x34, 0x90, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x54, 0x1C, 0xC2, 0x45, 0x0C, 0x1B, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x19, 0xAB, 0xA8, 0xFC, 0x73, 0xDC, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0xFB, 0x93, 0xCE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x75, 0xD0, 0x66, 0x95, 0x86, 0xCA, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xEA, 0x29, 0x16, 0x6A, 0x38, 0xDF, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA2, 0x36, 0x2F, 0xDC, 0xBB, 0x5E, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x89, 0x59, 0x49, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xA3, 0x99, 0x9D, 0xB8, 0x77, 0x9D, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x93, 0x43, 0x47, 0xC6, 0x5C, 0xF9, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x00, 0x79, 0x42, 0x64, 0xB8, 0x25, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x54, 0xB4, 0x33, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x0C, 0x42, 0x90, 0x83, 0x0B, 0x31, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x2E, 0xAE, 0xC8, 0xC7, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0x70), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xBC, 0xAD, 0x41, 0xE7, 0x32, 0x3A, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x97, 0x52, 0x83, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x13, 0x7A, 0xBD, 0xAE, 0x94, 0x60, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x9B, 0x95, 0xB4, 0x6E, 0x68, 0xB2, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x49, 0xBE, 0x51, 0xFE, 0x66, 0x15, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x37, 0xE4, 0xFE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x9B, 0xEE, 0x64, 0xC9, 0x1B, 0xBD, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x5F, 0x34, 0xA9, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x25, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x13, 0xB1, 0x38, 0xFB, 0x9D, 0x78, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0xE7, 0x1B, 0xFA, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xB3, 0xB7, 0x44, 0x92, 0x6B, 0x00, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x82, 0x44, 0x3E, 0x18, 0x1A, 0x58, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0xF8, 0xC0, 0xE4, 0xEE, 0xC1, 0xBF, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x32, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x9A, 0x42, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x26, 0x54, 0x21), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x85, 0x74, 0xA0, 0x79, 0xA8, 0xEE, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x36, 0x60, 0xB3, 0x28, 0x4D, 0x55, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x27, 0x82, 0x29, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0xFC, 0x73, 0x77, 0xAF, 0x5C, 0xAC, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0xED, 0xE5, 0xF6, 0x1D, 0xA8, 0x67, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xDE, 0x33, 0x1C, 0xF1, 0x80, 0x73, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xE2, 0xDE, 0x3C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x3E, 0x6B, 0xFE, 0xF0, 0x04, 0x28, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xB2, 0x14, 0x9D, 0x18, 0x11, 0x7D, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xC4, 0xD6, 0x2E, 0x6E, 0x57, 0x4D, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x55, 0x1B, 0xDE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xF7, 0x17, 0xBC, 0x45, 0xAB, 0x16, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xB0, 0xEF, 0x61, 0xE3, 0x20, 0x7C, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x85, 0x41, 0x4D, 0xF1, 0x7E, 0x4D, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xC2, 0x9B, 0x5E, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x2E, 0x49, 0x3D, 0x3E, 0x4B, 0xD3, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x2B, 0x9D, 0xD5, 0x27, 0xFA, 0xCA, 0xE0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0xB3, 0x6A, 0xE0, 0x79, 0x14, 0x28, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x1E, 0xDC, 0xF5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x44, 0x56, 0xCD, 0xFC, 0x9F, 0x09, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x8C, 0x59, 0xA4, 0x64, 0x2A, 0x3A, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xA0, 0xB5, 0x86, 0x4E, 0x69, 0xDA, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x8B, 0x11, 0x38, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x17, 0x16, 0x12, 0x17, 0xDC, 0x00, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x76, 0x24, 0x6C, 0x97, 0x2C, 0xB5, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x71, 0xE3, 0xB0, 0xBB, 0x4E, 0x50, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0x48, 0x26, 0xD5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x5F, 0x28, 0xF6, 0x01, 0x5A, 0x60, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x95, 0xFE, 0xD0, 0xAD, 0x15, 0xD4, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x5B, 0x7A, 0xFD, 0x80, 0xF7, 0x9F, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xBC, 0x1B, 0xDF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xE6, 0xDF, 0x14, 0x29, 0xF4, 0xD4, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x12, 0xDD, 0xEC, 0x5B, 0x8A, 0x59, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x92, 0x3E, 0x35, 0x08, 0xE9, 0xCF, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x35, 0x29, 0x97, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xDB, 0xD6, 0x6A, 0xC5, 0x43, 0xA4, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x33, 0x50, 0x61, 0x70, 0xA1, 0xE9, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x15, 0x6E, 0x5F, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x8C, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0xA1, 0x9A, 0x9D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xC6, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0x4A, 0xCD, 0x9B, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x4D, 0x5A, 0xB8, 0xE2, 0x6D, 0xA6, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x3F, 0xB6, 0x17, 0xE3, 0x2C, 0x6F, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xA4, 0x59, 0x51, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x4F, 0x7C, 0x49, 0xCD, 0x6E, 0xEB, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0xC9, 0x1F, 0xB7, 0x4D, 0x98, 0xC7, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0xFD, 0x98, 0x20, 0x95, 0xBB, 0x20, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xF2, 0x73, 0x92, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xEF, 0xFB, 0x30, 0xFA, 0x12, 0x1A, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0x4C, 0x24, 0xB4, 0x5B, 0xC9, 0x4C, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0xDD, 0x5E, 0x84, 0x95, 0x4D, 0x26, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xFA, 0xF9, 0x3A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0xA3, 0x2E, 0x7A, 0xDC, 0xA7, 0x53, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x9F, 0x81, 0x84, 0xB2, 0x0D, 0xFE, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x89, 0x1B, 0x77, 0x0C, 0x89, 0x71, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xB2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xE9, 0x2C, 0x79, 0xA6, 0x3C, 0xAD, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xE0, 0x23, 0x02, 0x86, 0x0F, 0x77, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x93, 0x6D, 0xE9, 0xF9, 0x3C, 0xBE, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0xE7, 0x24, 0x92, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x3C, 0x5B, 0x4B, 0x1B, 0x25, 0x37, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xE8, 0x38, 0x1B, 0xA1, 0x5A, 0x2E, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x19, 0xFD, 0xF4, 0x78, 0x01, 0x6B, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0x69, 0x37, 0x4F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0xE2, 0xBF, 0xD3, 0xEC, 0x95, 0x9C, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x7B, 0xFC, 0xD5, 0xD3, 0x25, 0x5E, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x55, 0x09, 0xA2, 0x58, 0x6A, 0xC9, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0xCC, 0x3B, 0xD9, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0x08, 0x65, 0x5E, 0xCB, 0xAB, 0x48, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x79, 0x8B, 0xC0, 0x11, 0xC0, 0x69, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xE8, 0x8C, 0x4C, 0xC5, 0x28, 0xE4, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x1F, 0x34, 0x5C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp224k1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp224k1_T_0_X, secp224k1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_1_X, secp224k1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_2_X, secp224k1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_3_X, secp224k1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_4_X, secp224k1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_5_X, secp224k1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_6_X, secp224k1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_7_X, secp224k1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_8_X, secp224k1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_9_X, secp224k1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_10_X, secp224k1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_11_X, secp224k1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_12_X, secp224k1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_13_X, secp224k1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_14_X, secp224k1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_15_X, secp224k1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp224k1_T NULL +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xFC, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x07, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x17, 0xF8, 0x16, 0x5B, 0x81, 0xF2, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0xDB, 0xFC, 0x9B, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x0B, 0x87, 0xCE, 0x95, 0x62, 0xA0, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xBB, 0xDC, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0x66, 0xBE, 0x79), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0xD4, 0x10, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0xD0, 0x47, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x54, 0x85, 0xA6, 0x48, 0xB4, 0x17, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x08, 0x11, 0x0E, 0xFC, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0xC4, 0xA3, 0x26, 0x77, 0xDA, 0x3A, 0x48), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x41, 0x36, 0xD0, 0x8C, 0x5E, 0xD2, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0xA0, 0x48, 0xAF, 0xE6, 0xDC, 0xAE, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x17, 0xF8, 0x16, 0x5B, 0x81, 0xF2, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0xDB, 0xFC, 0x9B, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x0B, 0x87, 0xCE, 0x95, 0x62, 0xA0, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xBB, 0xDC, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0x66, 0xBE, 0x79), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0xD4, 0x10, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0xD0, 0x47, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x54, 0x85, 0xA6, 0x48, 0xB4, 0x17, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x08, 0x11, 0x0E, 0xFC, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0xC4, 0xA3, 0x26, 0x77, 0xDA, 0x3A, 0x48), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xEE, 0xD7, 0x1E, 0x67, 0x86, 0x32, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x73, 0xB1, 0xA9, 0xD5, 0xCC, 0x27, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x01, 0x71, 0xFE, 0x92, 0x73), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x28, 0x63, 0x6D, 0x72, 0x09, 0xA6, 0xC0), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xE1, 0x69, 0xDC, 0x3E, 0x2C, 0x75, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xB7, 0x3F, 0x30, 0x26, 0x3C, 0xDF, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xBE, 0xB9, 0x5D, 0x0E, 0xE8, 0x5E, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0xC3, 0x05, 0xD6, 0xB7, 0xD5, 0x24, 0xFC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0xCF, 0x7B, 0xDC, 0xCD, 0xC3, 0x39, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xDA, 0xB9, 0xE5, 0x64, 0xA7, 0x47, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x46, 0xA8, 0x61, 0xF6, 0x23, 0xEB, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xC1, 0xFF, 0xE4, 0x55, 0xD5, 0xC2, 0xBF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xBE, 0xB9, 0x59, 0x24, 0x13, 0x4A, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x45, 0x12, 0xDE, 0xBA, 0x4F, 0xEF, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x08, 0xBF, 0xC1, 0x66, 0xAA, 0x0A, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xFE, 0x30, 0x55, 0x31, 0x86, 0xA7, 0xB4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xBF, 0x18, 0x81, 0x67, 0x27, 0x42, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x05, 0x83, 0xA4, 0xDD, 0x57, 0xD3, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x63, 0xAB, 0xE4, 0x90, 0x70, 0xD0, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x5D, 0xFD, 0xA0, 0xEF, 0xCF, 0x1C, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x80, 0xE4, 0xF6, 0x09, 0xBC, 0x57, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x9F, 0x6E, 0x88, 0x54, 0x6E, 0x51, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x5F, 0x85, 0xFB, 0x84, 0x3E, 0x4A, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x19, 0xF5, 0x55, 0xC9, 0x07, 0xD8, 0xCE), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0xB4, 0xC3, 0xD9, 0x5C, 0xA0, 0xD4, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x30, 0xAF, 0x59, 0x9B, 0xF8, 0x04, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xA6, 0xFD, 0x66, 0x7B, 0xC3, 0x39, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xBF, 0xF0, 0xC2, 0xE9, 0x71, 0xA4, 0x9E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x2D, 0xB9, 0x88, 0x28, 0xF1, 0xBE, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xF3, 0x1A, 0x0E, 0xB9, 0x01, 0x66, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0xA7, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0x05, 0xD0, 0xAA, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x39, 0x1E, 0x47, 0xE5, 0x68, 0xC8, 0xC0), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0xB9, 0xFC, 0xE0, 0x33, 0x8A, 0x7D, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x93, 0xA5, 0x53, 0x55, 0x16, 0xB4, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x5F, 0xEA, 0x9B, 0x29, 0x52, 0x71, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xF0, 0x24, 0xB8, 0x7D, 0xB7, 0xA0, 0x9B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x00, 0x27, 0xB2, 0xDF, 0x73, 0xA2, 0xE0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x2E, 0x4D, 0x7C, 0xDE, 0x7A, 0x23, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x65, 0x60, 0xC7, 0x97, 0x1E, 0xA4, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x13, 0x5B, 0x77, 0x59, 0xCB, 0x36, 0xE1), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xBC, 0x9F, 0x9E, 0x2D, 0x53, 0x2A, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x5F, 0x64, 0x9F, 0x1A, 0x19, 0xE6, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x7B, 0x39, 0xD2, 0xDB, 0x85, 0x84, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xC7, 0x0D, 0x58, 0x6E, 0x3F, 0x52, 0x15), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x68, 0x19, 0x0B, 0x68, 0xC9, 0x1E, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x4E, 0x21, 0x49, 0x3D, 0x55, 0xCC, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xF9, 0x25, 0x45, 0x54, 0x45, 0xB1, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xB3, 0xF7, 0xCD, 0x80, 0xA4, 0x04, 0x05), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x1E, 0x88, 0xC4, 0xAA, 0x18, 0x7E, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xAC, 0xD9, 0xB2, 0xA1, 0xC0, 0x71, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xA2, 0xF1, 0x15, 0xA6, 0x5F, 0x6C, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x5B, 0x05, 0xBC, 0xB7, 0xC6, 0x4E, 0x72), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x80, 0xF8, 0x5C, 0x20, 0x2A, 0xE1, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x48, 0x2E, 0x68, 0x82, 0x7F, 0xEB, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x3B, 0x25, 0xDB, 0x32, 0x4D, 0x88, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x6E, 0xA6, 0xB6, 0x6D, 0x62, 0x78, 0x22), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x4D, 0x3E, 0x86, 0x58, 0xC3, 0xEB, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x89, 0x33, 0x18, 0x21, 0x1D, 0x9B, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x9D, 0xFF, 0xC3, 0x79, 0xC1, 0x88, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xD4, 0x48, 0x53, 0xE8, 0xAD, 0x21, 0x16), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x7B, 0xDE, 0xCB, 0xD8, 0x39, 0x17, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0xF3, 0x03, 0xF2, 0x5C, 0xBC, 0xC8, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xAE, 0x4C, 0xB0, 0x16, 0xA4, 0x93, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x8B, 0x6B, 0xDC, 0xD7, 0x9A, 0x3E, 0x7E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x2D, 0x7A, 0xD2, 0x59, 0x05, 0xA2, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x56, 0x09, 0x32, 0xF1, 0xE8, 0xE3, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xCA, 0xE5, 0x2E, 0xF0, 0xFB, 0x18, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x85, 0xA9, 0x23, 0x15, 0x31, 0x1F, 0x0E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xE5, 0xB1, 0x86, 0xB9, 0x6E, 0x8D, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x77, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0xA3, 0x3F, 0x89, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0x25, 0xB0, 0xC7, 0x41, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x11, 0x6B, 0xA6, 0x11, 0x62, 0xD4, 0x2D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x7D, 0x34, 0xB3, 0x20, 0x7F, 0x37, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0xD4, 0x45, 0xE8, 0xC2, 0xE9, 0xC5, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x32, 0x3B, 0x25, 0x7E, 0x79, 0xAF, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0xE4, 0x54, 0x71, 0xBE, 0x35, 0x4E, 0xD0), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x94, 0xDD, 0x8F, 0xB5, 0xC2, 0xDD, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x49, 0xE9, 0x1C, 0x2F, 0x08, 0x49, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0xB6, 0x03, 0x88, 0x6F, 0xB8, 0x15, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xD3, 0x1C, 0xF3, 0xA5, 0xEB, 0x79, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0xF9, 0x43, 0x88, 0x89, 0x0D, 0x06, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x2D, 0xF5, 0x98, 0x32, 0xF6, 0xB1, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x73, 0x8F, 0x2B, 0x50, 0x27, 0x0A, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xE3, 0xBD, 0x16, 0x05, 0xC8, 0x93, 0x12), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x6A, 0xF7, 0xE3, 0x3D, 0xDE, 0x5F, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xA3, 0x9C, 0x22, 0x3C, 0x33, 0x36, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x24, 0x4C, 0x69, 0x45, 0x78, 0x14, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xF8, 0xD4, 0xBF, 0xB8, 0xC0, 0xA1, 0x25), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x88, 0xE1, 0x91, 0x03, 0xEB, 0xB3, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x11, 0xA1, 0xEF, 0x14, 0x0D, 0xC4, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0xD4, 0x0D, 0x1D, 0x96, 0x33, 0x5C, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x45, 0x2A, 0x1A, 0xE6, 0x57, 0x04, 0x9B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xB5, 0xA7, 0x80, 0xE9, 0x93, 0x97, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xB9, 0x7C, 0xA0, 0xC9, 0x57, 0x26, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0xEF, 0x56, 0xDA, 0x66, 0xF6, 0x1B, 0x9A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x89, 0x6B, 0x91, 0xE0, 0xA9, 0x65, 0x2B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x98, 0x96, 0x9B, 0x06, 0x7D, 0x5E, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xFA, 0xC1, 0x5F, 0x19, 0x37, 0x94, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xBE, 0x6B, 0x1A, 0x05, 0xE4, 0xBF, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0xCD, 0x5D, 0x35, 0xB4, 0x51, 0xF7, 0x64), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xEF, 0x96, 0xDB, 0xF2, 0x61, 0x63, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x04, 0x88, 0xC9, 0x9F, 0x1B, 0x94, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x30, 0x79, 0x7E, 0x24, 0xE7, 0x5F, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0xB8, 0x90, 0xB7, 0x94, 0x25, 0xBB, 0x0F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x79, 0xEA, 0xAD, 0xC0, 0x6D, 0x18, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xA4, 0x58, 0x2A, 0x8D, 0x95, 0xB3, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xC4, 0xC2, 0x12, 0x0D, 0x79, 0xE2, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x6F, 0xBE, 0x97, 0x4D, 0xA4, 0x20, 0x07), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x31, 0x71, 0xC6, 0xA6, 0x91, 0xEB, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x9B, 0xA8, 0x4A, 0xE7, 0x77, 0xE1, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0x06, 0xD3, 0x3D, 0x94, 0x30, 0xEF, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xDF, 0xCA, 0xFA, 0xF5, 0x28, 0xF8, 0xC9), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0xE1, 0x32, 0xFD, 0x3E, 0x81, 0xF8, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xF2, 0x4B, 0x1D, 0x19, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xB1, 0x8A, 0x22, 0x8B, 0x05, 0x6B, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x21, 0xEF, 0x30, 0xEC, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x89), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x84, 0x4A, 0x46, 0x07, 0x6C, 0x3C, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x18, 0x3A, 0xF4, 0xCC, 0xF5, 0xB2, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x8F, 0xCD, 0x0A, 0x9C, 0xF4, 0xBD, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x89, 0x7F, 0x8A, 0xB1, 0x52, 0x3A, 0xAB), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp256k1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp256k1_T_0_X, secp256k1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_1_X, secp256k1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_2_X, secp256k1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_3_X, secp256k1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_4_X, secp256k1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_5_X, secp256k1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_6_X, secp256k1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_7_X, secp256k1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_8_X, secp256k1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_9_X, secp256k1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_10_X, secp256k1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_11_X, secp256k1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_12_X, secp256k1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_13_X, secp256k1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_14_X, secp256k1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_15_X, secp256k1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp256k1_T NULL +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for brainpoolP256r1 (RFC 5639 3.4) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x53, 0x6E, 0x1F, 0x1D, 0x48, 0x13, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x20, 0x26, 0xD5, 0x23, 0xF6, 0x3B, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x8D, 0x83, 0x9D, 0x90, 0x0A, 0x66, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xA9, 0xEE, 0xA1, 0xDB, 0x57, 0xFB, 0xA9), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0xB5, 0x30, 0xF3, 0x44, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x5C, 0xDC, 0x26, 0xC1, 0x55, 0x80, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xFF, 0x7A, 0x41, 0x30, 0x75, 0xF6, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x30, 0x2C, 0xFC, 0x75, 0x09, 0x5A, 0x7D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x07, 0x8C, 0xFF, 0x18, 0xDC, 0xCC, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xE1, 0xF7, 0x5C, 0x29, 0x16, 0x84, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x7C, 0xD7, 0xBB, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x30, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xE9, 0x6C, 0x5C, 0xDC, 0x26), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x32, 0xCE, 0x9A, 0xBD, 0x53, 0x44, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x23, 0xBD, 0xE3, 0xE1, 0x27, 0xDE, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xB7, 0x81, 0xFC, 0x2F, 0x48, 0x4B, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x57, 0x7E, 0xCB, 0xB9, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0x8B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x69, 0x04, 0x2F, 0xC7, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x8E, 0xED, 0x2D, 0x13, 0x45, 0x77, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x1D, 0x61, 0x14, 0x1A, 0x46, 0xF8, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xC4, 0xDA, 0xC3, 0x35, 0xF8, 0x7E, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x56, 0x48, 0x97, 0x82, 0x0E, 0x1E, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0xA6, 0x61, 0xB5, 0xA3, 0x7A, 0x39, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x8D, 0x83, 0x9D, 0x90, 0x0A, 0x66, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xA9, 0xEE, 0xA1, 0xDB, 0x57, 0xFB, 0xA9), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x32, 0xCE, 0x9A, 0xBD, 0x53, 0x44, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x23, 0xBD, 0xE3, 0xE1, 0x27, 0xDE, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xB7, 0x81, 0xFC, 0x2F, 0x48, 0x4B, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x57, 0x7E, 0xCB, 0xB9, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0x8B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x69, 0x04, 0x2F, 0xC7, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x8E, 0xED, 0x2D, 0x13, 0x45, 0x77, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x1D, 0x61, 0x14, 0x1A, 0x46, 0xF8, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xC4, 0xDA, 0xC3, 0x35, 0xF8, 0x7E, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xA2, 0xED, 0x52, 0xC9, 0x8C, 0xE3, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0xC9, 0xC4, 0x87, 0x3F, 0x93, 0x7A, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x12, 0x53, 0x61, 0x3E, 0x76, 0x08, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x8C, 0x74, 0xF4, 0x08, 0xC3, 0x76, 0x80), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0xDD, 0x09, 0xA6, 0xED, 0xEE, 0xC4, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xD9, 0xBE, 0x4B, 0xA5, 0xB7, 0x2B, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x20, 0x12, 0xCA, 0x0A, 0x38, 0x24, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x72, 0x71, 0x90, 0x7A, 0x2E, 0xB7, 0x23), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x66, 0xA1, 0x93, 0x10, 0x2A, 0x51, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0xBC, 0xB0, 0xB6, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x58, 0xD7, 0x0A, 0x84, 0x05, 0xA3, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x8E, 0x95, 0x61, 0xD3, 0x0B, 0xDF, 0x36), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x92, 0x12, 0x0F, 0x5E, 0x87, 0x70, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0xE9, 0x9B, 0xEB, 0x3A, 0xFB, 0xCF, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0x92, 0xB9, 0xF7, 0x45, 0xD3, 0x06, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x28, 0x65, 0xE1, 0xC5, 0x6C, 0x57, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x0E, 0x77, 0x01, 0x81, 0x9E, 0x38, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0xF0, 0xD5, 0xA5, 0x91, 0x2B, 0xDF, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xEE, 0xB6, 0x25, 0xD6, 0x98, 0xDE, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xA1, 0x55, 0x63, 0x39, 0xEB, 0xB5, 0x47), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0xD6, 0xB8, 0xE3, 0x13, 0xED, 0x7F, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xE8, 0xAE, 0x36, 0xB8, 0xCD, 0x19, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x82, 0x83, 0x7A, 0x7B, 0x46, 0x56, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x60, 0x46, 0x15, 0x5A, 0xAC, 0x99, 0x30), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x61, 0x50, 0xC6, 0xFF, 0x10, 0x7D, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x51, 0xDF, 0xA9, 0x7D, 0x78, 0x26, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0x15, 0x9A, 0xF7, 0x01, 0xC1, 0xBB, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x0F, 0xE6, 0x2A, 0xBD, 0x4A, 0x9E, 0x87), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xF8, 0xD1, 0x77, 0xD2, 0x49, 0xB3, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x86, 0xFB, 0x9E, 0x1F, 0x5A, 0x60, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xC4, 0x8D, 0xCD, 0x86, 0x61, 0x2F, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xF6, 0xB9, 0xAC, 0x37, 0x9D, 0xE9, 0x28), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x77, 0xAA, 0x97, 0x9C, 0x0B, 0x04, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0xA6, 0x60, 0x81, 0xCE, 0x25, 0x13, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x00, 0xF3, 0xBB, 0x82, 0x99, 0x95, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x5A, 0xCE, 0x90, 0x71, 0x38, 0x2F, 0x10), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x1A, 0xC0, 0x84, 0x27, 0xD6, 0x9D, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x37, 0x52, 0x16, 0x13, 0x0E, 0xCE, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xBF, 0x5A, 0xDB, 0xDB, 0x6E, 0x1E, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xB7, 0x5E, 0xF9, 0x86, 0xDD, 0x8A, 0x5C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xAB, 0x5C, 0x8D, 0x1D, 0xF2, 0x2D, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0xC5, 0xF8, 0xF7, 0x1D, 0x96, 0x0B, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x4C, 0xA7, 0x45, 0x20, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x5D, 0xEF, 0xDE, 0xEE, 0x39, 0x44, 0x19), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0x2F, 0x6D, 0x52, 0xC9, 0x58, 0x60, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0xC9, 0x62, 0xCB, 0x38, 0x3C, 0x55, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xA5, 0x09, 0x10, 0x88, 0xDB, 0xE3, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0xE0, 0x3C, 0xCE, 0x06, 0x0B, 0x4B, 0x5D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x1D, 0xB4, 0x10, 0x76, 0x8F, 0xBA, 0x09), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x70, 0x5A, 0x07, 0xF5, 0x1A, 0x74, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xE9, 0x94, 0xA8, 0xC0, 0xD5, 0x4A, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x6D, 0xD4, 0xE8, 0x9B, 0xE9, 0x6D, 0x0E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x00, 0x32, 0x41, 0x57, 0x84, 0x89, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xC7, 0x14, 0xEC, 0xE9, 0x27, 0xFF, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x67, 0x9E, 0xFB, 0xB6, 0xB8, 0x96, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x4A, 0xE3, 0x97, 0x4B, 0x58, 0xDE, 0x30), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0x1E, 0x5C, 0xF5, 0x7F, 0xD5, 0xD4, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x08, 0x7A, 0xF1, 0xBD, 0x89, 0xC7, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xF9, 0x11, 0x1B, 0xF5, 0x3C, 0x6D, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x50, 0xE5, 0x69, 0x1D, 0x59, 0xFC, 0x0C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x2F, 0xF8, 0x3F, 0xEC, 0x55, 0x99, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xA7, 0x29, 0x90, 0x43, 0x81, 0x31, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x18, 0x44, 0x50, 0x5D, 0x76, 0xCB, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xC5, 0x5B, 0x9A, 0x03, 0xE6, 0x17, 0x39), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x89, 0xFC, 0x55, 0x94, 0x91, 0x6A, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x46, 0x35, 0xF2, 0x3A, 0x42, 0x08, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0xD2, 0x76, 0x49, 0x42, 0x87, 0xD3, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xEA, 0xA0, 0x52, 0xF1, 0x6A, 0x30, 0x57), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0xB2, 0x57, 0xA3, 0x8A, 0x4D, 0x1B, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0xA3, 0x99, 0x94, 0xB5, 0x3D, 0x64, 0x09), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xC3, 0xD7, 0x53, 0xF6, 0x49, 0x1C, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x23, 0x41, 0x4D, 0xFB, 0x7A, 0x5C, 0x53), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xB8, 0x15, 0x65, 0x5C, 0x85, 0x94, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x37, 0xC7, 0xF8, 0x7E, 0xAE, 0x6C, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0xD8, 0x11, 0x54, 0x98, 0x44, 0xE3, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x4D, 0xA6, 0x4B, 0x28, 0xF2, 0x57, 0x9E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xD0, 0xEB, 0x1E, 0xAA, 0x30, 0xD3, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x9B, 0x4D, 0xA7, 0x73, 0x6E, 0xB6, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x47, 0xF6, 0xED, 0x37, 0xEF, 0x71, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0xB5, 0x49, 0x61, 0x5E, 0x45, 0xF6, 0x4A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x0E, 0xB3, 0x84, 0x3A, 0x63, 0x72, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x53, 0x5C, 0xA7, 0xC6, 0x2E, 0xAB, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x0F, 0x8F, 0x87, 0x50, 0x28, 0xB4, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x98, 0x4A, 0x98, 0x31, 0x86, 0xCA, 0x51), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xC9, 0xE2, 0xFD, 0x5D, 0x1F, 0xE8, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x90, 0x91, 0xC4, 0x84, 0xF0, 0xBA, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x5A, 0xB3, 0x4E, 0xFB, 0xE0, 0x57, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x0B, 0x90, 0xA6, 0xFD, 0x9D, 0x8E, 0x02), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x41, 0x8F, 0x31, 0xFA, 0x5A, 0xF6, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xE9, 0xE3, 0xF6, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0xE7, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x4E, 0xCD, 0xA2, 0x22, 0x14, 0xD4, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xED, 0x21, 0xB7, 0x0F, 0x53, 0x10, 0x17), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x06, 0x24, 0x2C, 0x4E, 0xD1, 0x1E, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x3F, 0xC1, 0x9F, 0xAB, 0xF0, 0x37, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x5E, 0x12, 0xCE, 0x83, 0x1B, 0x2A, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x65, 0xCF, 0xE8, 0x5C, 0xA5, 0xA2, 0x70), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x86, 0x76, 0x3A, 0x94, 0xF6, 0x1D, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xDA, 0xC9, 0xA6, 0x29, 0x93, 0x15, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x61, 0x6A, 0x7D, 0xC7, 0xA9, 0xF3, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x03, 0x71, 0xA2, 0x15, 0xCE, 0x50, 0x72), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0xD0, 0xA8, 0x1E, 0x91, 0xC4, 0x4F, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x4B, 0x7E, 0xD7, 0x71, 0x58, 0x7E, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x45, 0xAF, 0x2A, 0x18, 0x93, 0x95, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x8F, 0xC7, 0xFA, 0x4C, 0x7A, 0x86, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0xAF, 0x68, 0x3A, 0x23, 0xC1, 0x2E, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0x50, 0x11, 0x67, 0x39, 0xB9, 0xAF, 0x48), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x86, 0xAA, 0x1E, 0x88, 0x21, 0x29, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x28, 0xA4, 0x9D, 0x89, 0xA9, 0x9A, 0x10), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xBA, 0x04, 0x67, 0xB7, 0x01, 0x40, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xE9, 0x09, 0xA3, 0xCA, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x97, 0xA8, 0xB6, 0x3C, 0xEE, 0x90, 0x3D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xED, 0xC4, 0xF7, 0xC3, 0x95, 0xEC, 0x85), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x84, 0xBD, 0xEB, 0xD5, 0x64, 0xBB, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x9B, 0xE2, 0x28, 0x50, 0xC2, 0x72, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0xF2, 0x74, 0xD1, 0x26, 0xBF, 0x32, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xCB, 0xAF, 0x72, 0xDB, 0x6D, 0x30, 0x98), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x50, 0x85, 0xF4, 0x2B, 0x48, 0xC1, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x28, 0xBB, 0x11, 0xBA, 0x5B, 0x22, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xA1, 0xE5, 0x5C, 0xC9, 0x1D, 0x44, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xE8, 0xE6, 0x6F, 0xBB, 0xC1, 0x81, 0x7F), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point brainpoolP256r1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(brainpoolP256r1_T_0_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_1_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_2_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_3_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_4_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_5_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_6_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_7_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_8_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_9_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_10_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_11_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_12_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_13_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_14_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_15_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define brainpoolP256r1_T NULL +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for brainpoolP384r1 (RFC 5639 3.6) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0xEC, 0x07, 0x31, 0x13, 0x00, 0x47, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x1A, 0x1D, 0x90, 0x29, 0xA7, 0xD3, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x11, 0xB7, 0x7F, 0x19, 0xDA, 0xB1, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x56, 0x54, 0xED, 0x09, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x41, 0xE6, 0x50, 0x7E, 0x6F, 0x5D, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x6D, 0x38, 0xA3, 0x82, 0x1E, 0xB9, 0x8C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x22, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0xA8, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0xD4, 0x3A, 0x50, 0x4A, 0x81, 0xA5, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xF9, 0x91, 0xBA, 0xEF, 0x65, 0x91, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x4F, 0x8E, 0xA2, 0xBE, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xAF, 0x05, 0xCE, 0x0A, 0x08, 0x72, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x15, 0x8C, 0x3D, 0xC6, 0x82, 0xC3, 0x7B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x4C, 0x50, 0xFA, 0x96, 0x86, 0xB7, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0xC9, 0xDB, 0x95, 0x02, 0x39, 0xB4, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x62, 0xEB, 0x3E, 0xA5, 0x0E, 0x88, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0xD2, 0xDC, 0x07, 0xE1, 0x7D, 0xB7, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x44, 0xF0, 0x16, 0x54, 0xB5, 0x39, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x22, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0xA8, 0x04), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xAF, 0xD4, 0x47, 0xE2, 0xB2, 0x87, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x46, 0xD6, 0x36, 0x34, 0xE0, 0x26, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x10, 0xBD, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x7F, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x4F, 0xF1, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0xA3, 0x47, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x3F, 0xC1, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x3A, 0xA6, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x45, 0xCF, 0x68, 0xF0, 0x64, 0x1C, 0x1D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x53, 0x3C, 0x26, 0x41, 0x03, 0x82, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x81, 0x91, 0x77, 0x21, 0x46, 0x46, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x29, 0x91, 0xF9, 0x4F, 0x05, 0x9C, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x58, 0xEC, 0xFE, 0x29, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0xD5, 0xCF, 0x95, 0x8E, 0xEB, 0xB1, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xC2, 0xF9, 0x20, 0x75, 0x1D, 0xBE, 0x8A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x65, 0x04, 0xE9, 0x02, 0x32, 0x88, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xC3, 0x7F, 0x6B, 0xAF, 0xB6, 0x3A, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x25, 0x04, 0xAC, 0x6C, 0x6E, 0x16, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x56, 0x54, 0xED, 0x09, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x41, 0xE6, 0x50, 0x7E, 0x6F, 0x5D, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x6D, 0x38, 0xA3, 0x82, 0x1E, 0xB9, 0x8C), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xAF, 0xD4, 0x47, 0xE2, 0xB2, 0x87, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x46, 0xD6, 0x36, 0x34, 0xE0, 0x26, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x10, 0xBD, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x7F, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x4F, 0xF1, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0xA3, 0x47, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x3F, 0xC1, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x3A, 0xA6, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x45, 0xCF, 0x68, 0xF0, 0x64, 0x1C, 0x1D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x53, 0x3C, 0x26, 0x41, 0x03, 0x82, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x81, 0x91, 0x77, 0x21, 0x46, 0x46, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x29, 0x91, 0xF9, 0x4F, 0x05, 0x9C, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x58, 0xEC, 0xFE, 0x29, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0xD5, 0xCF, 0x95, 0x8E, 0xEB, 0xB1, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xC2, 0xF9, 0x20, 0x75, 0x1D, 0xBE, 0x8A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0xD8, 0x8A, 0x54, 0x41, 0xD6, 0x6B, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x3B, 0xF1, 0x22, 0xFD, 0x2D, 0x4B, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x55, 0xE3, 0x33, 0xF0, 0x73, 0x52, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x3F, 0x30, 0x26, 0xCA, 0x7F, 0x52, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x6E, 0x17, 0x9B, 0xD5, 0x2A, 0x4A, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xDA, 0x6B, 0xE5, 0x03, 0x07, 0x1D, 0x2E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x7A, 0xAF, 0x98, 0xE3, 0xA4, 0xF6, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x7D, 0xFE, 0x51, 0x40, 0x3B, 0x47, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x88, 0xEC, 0xC4, 0xE2, 0x8F, 0xCB, 0xA4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0xE2, 0x88, 0x2D, 0x4E, 0x50, 0xEB, 0x9A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x54, 0x94, 0x5E, 0xF4, 0x7F, 0x3A, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x07, 0x1C, 0xE1, 0xBD, 0x0F, 0xF8, 0x63), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x92, 0x28, 0x2E, 0x32, 0x04, 0xB1, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x82, 0x44, 0x43, 0x76, 0x0D, 0x55, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0xE3, 0xFF, 0x89, 0x46, 0xDE, 0x4E, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x22, 0xBB, 0x67, 0x1A, 0x81, 0xEE, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x54, 0xE2, 0x7A, 0xAE, 0xDA, 0x2C, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x9A, 0x90, 0xAA, 0x6E, 0x8B, 0xCC, 0x5F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x40, 0xAC, 0xED, 0x7D, 0x37, 0x87, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xF8, 0xB1, 0x80, 0x4C, 0x8C, 0x04, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x98, 0x2C, 0xAD, 0x30, 0x69, 0x35, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x2E, 0x00, 0x2F, 0x44, 0x8C, 0xF0, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x58, 0x07, 0xD7, 0xCD, 0x60, 0xA1, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xFB, 0x7B, 0x03, 0x05, 0x5E, 0x79, 0x73), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x17, 0xCE, 0x38, 0x4B, 0x5E, 0x5B, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x0E, 0x0A, 0x61, 0x9D, 0x7C, 0x62, 0x08), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0xF0, 0x98, 0x71, 0x7F, 0x17, 0x26, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xD3, 0xFA, 0x3C, 0xF0, 0x70, 0x07, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x47, 0x5C, 0x09, 0x43, 0xB7, 0x65, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xA9, 0xA7, 0x3E, 0xFA, 0xF3, 0xEC, 0x22), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x78, 0x22, 0x2B, 0x58, 0x71, 0xFA, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x30, 0xCE, 0x6A, 0xB3, 0xB0, 0x4F, 0x83), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0x95, 0x20, 0xA9, 0x23, 0xC2, 0x65, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xCF, 0x03, 0x5B, 0x8A, 0x80, 0x44, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xF8, 0x91, 0xF7, 0xD5, 0xED, 0xEA, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x5B, 0x16, 0x10, 0x25, 0xAC, 0x2A, 0x17), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xEC, 0xDC, 0xC4, 0x7B, 0x8C, 0x6B, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xBB, 0x1C, 0xD3, 0x5A, 0xEE, 0xD9, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x5D, 0x30, 0x5E, 0xF7, 0xB2, 0x41, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xCE, 0x0F, 0x1A, 0xC6, 0x41, 0x64, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x18, 0xE1, 0xE3, 0x82, 0x15, 0x66, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xE2, 0x24, 0x04, 0x72, 0x39, 0xA0, 0x7C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x51, 0xA2, 0x58, 0x88, 0x62, 0xE1, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xD2, 0x65, 0x14, 0xE9, 0x4C, 0x82, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xE1, 0xAC, 0x87, 0xAE, 0x31, 0x1A, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x4F, 0x96, 0x1E, 0x85, 0x7A, 0xC3, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x86, 0xBB, 0xF0, 0xC0, 0x9D, 0x08, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x53, 0x03, 0x09, 0x80, 0x91, 0xEF, 0x68), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xD7, 0xAF, 0x6F, 0x69, 0x7B, 0x88, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x13, 0xE4, 0x30, 0xA2, 0x47, 0xB5, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xD2, 0xC0, 0xDD, 0x8A, 0x1C, 0x3C, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x8C, 0xB3, 0x4C, 0xBA, 0x8B, 0x6D, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0xC7, 0xA1, 0xA8, 0x6E, 0x3C, 0x4F, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x4A, 0x97, 0xC8, 0x03, 0x6F, 0x01, 0x82), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x18, 0x12, 0xA9, 0x39, 0xD5, 0x22, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xA7, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0x9D, 0x8D, 0x78, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xB3, 0xD0, 0x7F, 0xDF, 0xD0, 0x30, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x25, 0x73, 0x96, 0xEC, 0xA8, 0x1D, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xD1, 0x65, 0x66, 0xDC, 0xD9, 0xCF, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0xED, 0x7B, 0x37, 0xAD, 0xE2, 0xBE, 0x2D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x79, 0x42, 0x6A, 0x07, 0x66, 0xB1, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x53, 0x62, 0x65, 0x92, 0x09, 0x4C, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xAF, 0xC3, 0x03, 0xF6, 0xF4, 0x2D, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xCA, 0x41, 0xD9, 0xA2, 0x69, 0x9B, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xB2, 0xA6, 0x8D, 0xE1, 0xAA, 0x61, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xBA, 0x4D, 0x12, 0xB6, 0xBE, 0xF3, 0x7E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xD9, 0x92, 0x22, 0x07, 0xCE, 0xC9, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0xA1, 0x7C, 0x91, 0xDB, 0x32, 0xF7, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x49, 0x4B, 0x6D, 0xFB, 0xD9, 0x70, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xFB, 0x4E, 0x4C, 0x5E, 0x66, 0x81, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0xB3, 0xE1, 0x00, 0xB7, 0xD9, 0xCC, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x36, 0x8B, 0xC4, 0x39, 0x20, 0xFD, 0x30), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x1F, 0x60, 0x03, 0xBB, 0xD7, 0x60, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x3C, 0x62, 0xDD, 0x71, 0x95, 0xE9, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x5B, 0x7A, 0x5F, 0x68, 0x81, 0xC5, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xAF, 0xB5, 0xB9, 0x98, 0x42, 0x28, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x29, 0x8E, 0x11, 0x49, 0xB4, 0xD7, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x3E, 0xD2, 0x30, 0xA1, 0xBA, 0xCA, 0x03), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x37, 0x64, 0x44, 0x2F, 0x03, 0xE5, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x42, 0xBC, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x1A, 0x5F, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x04, 0xAB, 0x04, 0xE0, 0x24, 0xAD, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0x45, 0x17, 0x67, 0x1F, 0x3E, 0x53, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x0F, 0xB3, 0x1B, 0x57, 0x54, 0xC2, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xD3, 0xF8, 0xC4, 0x1B, 0x9B, 0xFA, 0x30), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x90, 0xFD, 0xFB, 0xCA, 0x49, 0x38, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0xCF, 0xC6, 0xDD, 0xF0, 0xFF, 0x8C, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x69, 0x9D, 0xBD, 0x5F, 0x33, 0xE9, 0xB4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x19, 0x82, 0x3D, 0xAC, 0x1C, 0x40, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xC7, 0x02, 0x46, 0x14, 0x77, 0x00, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x05, 0xF2, 0x77, 0x3A, 0x66, 0x5C, 0x39), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xE6, 0x17, 0xDE, 0xB2, 0xA1, 0xE5, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x71, 0xEC, 0x9D, 0xD8, 0xF5, 0xD4, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0xC6, 0x42, 0x5E, 0xE7, 0x18, 0xBA, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x21, 0x68, 0x5A, 0x26, 0xFB, 0xD7, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x00, 0x5C, 0xBA, 0x8A, 0x34, 0xEC, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x9C, 0x3C, 0xAF, 0x53, 0xE8, 0x65, 0x35), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xEF, 0x28, 0xDC, 0x67, 0x05, 0xC8, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x78, 0xC3, 0x85, 0x49, 0xA0, 0xBC, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x3E, 0x2D, 0xA0, 0xCF, 0xD4, 0x7A, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x93, 0xFE, 0x60, 0xB3, 0x6E, 0x99, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0xAD, 0x04, 0xE7, 0x49, 0xAF, 0x5E, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x7A, 0xED, 0xA6, 0x9E, 0x18, 0x09, 0x31), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x05, 0x94, 0x44, 0xDC, 0xB8, 0x85, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xB7, 0x37, 0xC2, 0x50, 0x75, 0x15, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xC6, 0x0F, 0xB2, 0xA9, 0x91, 0x3E, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x81, 0xAD, 0x25, 0xA1, 0x26, 0x73, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xF1, 0xD1, 0x61, 0x7C, 0x76, 0x8F, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xDB, 0x4A, 0xFF, 0x14, 0xA7, 0x48, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x73, 0xC6, 0xC2, 0xCC, 0xF1, 0x57, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0xED, 0x73, 0x27, 0x70, 0x82, 0xB6, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xBA, 0xAC, 0x3A, 0xCF, 0xF4, 0xEA, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xD6, 0xB1, 0x8F, 0x0E, 0x08, 0x2C, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xE3, 0x8F, 0x2F, 0x0E, 0xA1, 0xF3, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0xF5, 0x7C, 0x9B, 0x29, 0x0A, 0xF6, 0x28), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0xEE, 0x17, 0x47, 0x34, 0x15, 0xA3, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xBE, 0x88, 0x48, 0xE7, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0xAD, 0xDC, 0x65, 0x61, 0x37, 0x0F, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x67, 0xAD, 0xA2, 0x3A, 0x1C, 0x91, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x07, 0x0C, 0x3A, 0x41, 0x6E, 0x13, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0xBD, 0x7E, 0xED, 0xAA, 0x14, 0xDD, 0x61), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0xDC, 0x20, 0x01, 0x72, 0x11, 0x48, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xC4, 0x7B, 0xF8, 0x62, 0x3D, 0xF0, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xC2, 0x3D, 0x2E, 0x52, 0xA3, 0x4A, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xE2, 0x53, 0x46, 0x5E, 0x21, 0xF8, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xC7, 0x8F, 0xA9, 0x26, 0x42, 0x32, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xA6, 0xA0, 0x8D, 0x4B, 0x9A, 0x19, 0x03), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xAB, 0x6D, 0x1E, 0xFB, 0xEE, 0x60, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x56, 0x3C, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0x10, 0x79, 0x1C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0xBC, 0x41, 0x9F, 0x71, 0xEF, 0x02, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x36, 0xC4, 0xD0, 0x88, 0x9B, 0x32, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xD4, 0x5D, 0x17, 0x39, 0xE6, 0x22, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x26, 0x01, 0xCE, 0xBE, 0x4A, 0x9C, 0x27), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x6D, 0x11, 0xCA, 0x6C, 0x5A, 0x93, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x96, 0x26, 0xAF, 0x2F, 0xE4, 0x30, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xC1, 0x4C, 0xC6, 0x30, 0x1F, 0x5C, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xB3, 0xE8, 0xFC, 0x35, 0xEB, 0x63, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x1D, 0xCA, 0xFC, 0x50, 0x36, 0x4B, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x0E, 0x23, 0x5B, 0xAF, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x31), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x88, 0xB6, 0xD7, 0x74, 0x4A, 0x23, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x66, 0xE2, 0xBB, 0x29, 0xA6, 0x4F, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x6F, 0x7E, 0x68, 0x6E, 0xA0, 0x14, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x73, 0xD4, 0xE8, 0xAB, 0x5B, 0xF6, 0x0D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xE0, 0x3C, 0x24, 0x00, 0x95, 0xE9, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x0D, 0x4F, 0x81, 0xD0, 0xF2, 0x3F, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x1D, 0xCD, 0x78, 0x39, 0xC4, 0x6B, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x45, 0xC7, 0xB8, 0x2F, 0xAA, 0x5D, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x8C, 0x6E, 0xA3, 0x24, 0xB2, 0xDB, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0x2D, 0xD9, 0xF1, 0xC7, 0x9B, 0x8A, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0xE1, 0x2C, 0xB9, 0x40, 0x37, 0x91, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x2C, 0xB5, 0x23, 0x03, 0x2B, 0xAF, 0x2F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x9D, 0x5A, 0x20, 0x10, 0xA9, 0x84, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x30, 0x89, 0x20, 0x13, 0xE9, 0xB2, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x6E, 0x52, 0xEB, 0x03, 0x18, 0x1F, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x9E, 0x1C, 0x35, 0x87, 0x92, 0x69, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0xC9, 0x88, 0xAF, 0xC6, 0x6C, 0x83, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0xD5, 0x7A, 0x54, 0x34, 0x99, 0xB6, 0x6F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0xAD, 0x45, 0x9B, 0x4B, 0x41, 0x4D, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x5D, 0xAB, 0x7F, 0x35, 0x34, 0xE9, 0x29), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0xBE, 0x78, 0x34, 0x44, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xDE, 0xE3, 0xC4, 0xEE, 0x0B, 0xF9, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x86, 0x16, 0x48, 0x32, 0xB8, 0x74, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xEE, 0x7C, 0xBA, 0xBD, 0x81, 0xE3, 0x55), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x6A, 0xFA, 0x84, 0xDA, 0xB8, 0xD5, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0x9F, 0x8A, 0xD5, 0x1B, 0x2E, 0x1A, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x0C, 0x61, 0xE2, 0xFF, 0x5B, 0xE6, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0x62, 0xC1, 0x87, 0x53, 0x1B, 0x92, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x90, 0x00, 0xD1, 0x6A, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x2E, 0xB5, 0x3B, 0x44, 0xB5, 0xA0, 0x78), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x5D, 0x02, 0x58, 0xB5, 0xBE, 0x45, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xEF, 0x8E, 0x90, 0x4D, 0x2A, 0x32, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x99, 0x75, 0x5C, 0x0A, 0x33, 0x8F, 0x36), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x6C, 0x95, 0xD4, 0x1F, 0xF3, 0xEB, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xE4, 0x4C, 0x91, 0x20, 0xF3, 0x25, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x95, 0xEB, 0x29, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x34, 0x81), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x15, 0xE5, 0x13, 0x7E, 0x64, 0x8B, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xBC, 0x0D, 0x18, 0x7E, 0x37, 0x9E, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x82, 0x20, 0xF7, 0x2D, 0x7A, 0x77, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x29, 0xA2, 0xDB, 0x7A, 0xE6, 0x6F, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xC6, 0x50, 0x5C, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0x4F, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x9F, 0xD5, 0xE8, 0xC5, 0x3D, 0xB7, 0x30), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_16_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x03, 0x55, 0x10, 0xDB, 0xA6, 0x8B, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x17, 0xAE, 0x78, 0xC9, 0x1D, 0x43, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x35, 0x49, 0xD4, 0x47, 0x84, 0x8D, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x95, 0x2F, 0xEA, 0xBC, 0xB4, 0x18, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x48, 0xAE, 0x89, 0xF5, 0x65, 0x3D, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xF2, 0x2B, 0x20, 0xD1, 0x75, 0x50, 0x63), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_16_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xE6, 0x5C, 0x2C, 0xE0, 0x7D, 0xDF, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x07, 0x3E, 0xCE, 0x9F, 0x18, 0xB6, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0xF8, 0xF0, 0xD5, 0xFA, 0x42, 0x1D, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x6C, 0x1D, 0x03, 0xC9, 0x0E, 0x2B, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x18, 0x52, 0xA5, 0xB4, 0x63, 0xE1, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x0A, 0xD9, 0xC4, 0xFD, 0x16, 0x60, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_17_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x7D, 0xDE, 0xDF, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xB0, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x4E, 0x8C, 0x94, 0xC1, 0xE2, 0x85, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0xF0, 0xEA, 0xB5, 0x9B, 0x70, 0xEF, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xC2, 0x39, 0x5D, 0xF3, 0x2C, 0xD9, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x1C, 0x2E, 0xCC, 0x2F, 0x54, 0x87, 0x80), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x72, 0xC7, 0xB5, 0x50, 0xA3, 0x84, 0x77), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_17_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xD1, 0xAF, 0xA9, 0xB4, 0x8B, 0x5D, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xF6, 0x52, 0x8A, 0xC3, 0x56, 0xA5, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x52, 0xFF, 0xEA, 0x05, 0x42, 0x77, 0x83), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x08, 0x90, 0x72, 0x86, 0xC4, 0xC3, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x15, 0xF8, 0xF1, 0x16, 0x67, 0xC6, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x87, 0xAC, 0x8F, 0x71, 0xEC, 0x83, 0x81), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_18_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xE1, 0xE6, 0x2D, 0x0E, 0x11, 0xA1, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xE2, 0xA8, 0x32, 0xE6, 0xE3, 0x83, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x56, 0xE5, 0xCD, 0xB7, 0x2B, 0x67, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xED, 0xC9, 0x65, 0x6D, 0x87, 0xE1, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x8E, 0xFD, 0x9A, 0x53, 0x0E, 0xFA, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0x4C, 0x4A, 0xE2, 0x23, 0x84, 0xFA, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_18_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xFE, 0x49, 0x81, 0xD1, 0x3E, 0xF4, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x72, 0xE0, 0xEF, 0x0D, 0xB8, 0x3E, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x5F, 0xCE, 0x60, 0x72, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xCC, 0xD8, 0x03, 0x07, 0x6E, 0x5A, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x3A, 0x35, 0x50, 0x4E, 0x1F, 0xCA, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xEA, 0x88, 0x55, 0xBD, 0x6E, 0x05, 0x7F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_19_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x6D, 0xF1, 0x97, 0xA6, 0x69, 0x39, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x41, 0x99, 0xFF, 0x3B, 0xA1, 0x26, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x2F, 0x95, 0x80, 0x12, 0x4A, 0x1B, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xBF, 0x51, 0xAA, 0xAE, 0x2D, 0xDA, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x1C, 0xB3, 0x52, 0x36, 0x49, 0xD4, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xC1, 0x1F, 0x3A, 0xD3, 0x3E, 0x5C, 0x1A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_19_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x51, 0xF7, 0x2B, 0xC8, 0xA9, 0xA7, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x4E, 0x7F, 0x98, 0x41, 0x66, 0xB0, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x1D, 0xC0, 0x42, 0xCD, 0xF8, 0xC3, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x41, 0x91, 0x7D, 0xCC, 0x8B, 0xCC, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xAE, 0x76, 0xED, 0x56, 0x18, 0xC5, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x6A, 0x06, 0xA3, 0x7F, 0x65, 0x10, 0x1F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_20_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xEC, 0x3C, 0x05, 0x05, 0xCA, 0xF6, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0xCD, 0x02, 0x51, 0x12, 0x16, 0x3C, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0xEB, 0xB3, 0x43, 0x7B, 0xDD, 0xB2, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x59, 0x90, 0x41, 0xDB, 0xE4, 0xF5, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x0E, 0x18, 0x2A, 0x5A, 0x83, 0x7C, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x37, 0xA1, 0x0D, 0xF1, 0x2F, 0x63, 0x79), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_20_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xC0, 0xFA, 0x6F, 0x1F, 0x67, 0xCF, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x34, 0x45, 0xBB, 0xF4, 0xF9, 0x9B, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x69, 0xFE, 0x67, 0x1D, 0x64, 0x8F, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x39, 0xBF, 0xD8, 0xB3, 0xC7, 0xAD, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x93, 0xFF, 0xF3, 0x28, 0xFA, 0x39, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xF9, 0xC3, 0x85, 0x26, 0x7A, 0x88, 0x89), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_21_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xD5, 0x79, 0xD8, 0x11, 0xDE, 0xEB, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x46, 0xA4, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0x74, 0x34, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xBD, 0xD3, 0xF5, 0x14, 0xEE, 0xFE, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x4C, 0xA3, 0x71, 0x43, 0x65, 0xF8, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x6C, 0x35, 0xFA, 0x90, 0x25, 0xD8, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x34, 0x84, 0x96, 0xA1, 0x43, 0x03, 0x4D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_21_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x3B, 0x3B, 0x2F, 0xCA, 0x59, 0xF2, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x48, 0x24, 0x74, 0xD8, 0x72, 0x90, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x42, 0x74, 0x8C, 0x6F, 0x52, 0x19, 0x3D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x9E, 0x41, 0x63, 0x68, 0x78, 0x4C, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0x94, 0xB6, 0x6B, 0x38, 0x52, 0xA8, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x30, 0x25, 0x93, 0xA1, 0x6F, 0x6E, 0x68), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_22_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x2F, 0x4B, 0x64, 0x79, 0x50, 0xFF, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x36, 0xED, 0x57, 0x39, 0x3B, 0xE7, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x85, 0xEA, 0x35, 0xD6, 0xC0, 0xA0, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x89, 0x3A, 0xCC, 0x22, 0x1C, 0x46, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x7A, 0xB0, 0xA1, 0x1B, 0x69, 0x62, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xB8, 0x8A, 0x6C, 0x18, 0x85, 0x0D, 0x88), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_22_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xB6, 0x50, 0xE9, 0x4E, 0x7F, 0xE8, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x5B, 0x5C, 0xD1, 0x4B, 0x11, 0x9A, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x25, 0x56, 0x74, 0x51, 0x9C, 0xEC, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x7F, 0xB6, 0x8A, 0xCB, 0x3A, 0x10, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x33, 0x07, 0x01, 0xE9, 0x49, 0x59, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xA5, 0x2E, 0xF2, 0xBA, 0x32, 0x63, 0x44), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_23_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x06, 0x0B, 0xA5, 0x44, 0x27, 0x7F, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x74, 0xAC, 0x0F, 0xCC, 0x4F, 0x13, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xB1, 0xBF, 0x97, 0x49, 0xA5, 0x1C, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x64, 0x68, 0x7B, 0x0F, 0xCC, 0x77, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x39, 0xF9, 0x4E, 0x84, 0x9C, 0xF6, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xCF, 0x6D, 0xE2, 0xA1, 0x2D, 0xF9, 0x2B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_23_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0xC4, 0x90, 0x57, 0x31, 0x01, 0x05, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x1E, 0xBB, 0xBF, 0x98, 0xA4, 0x7C, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0xE3, 0xA0, 0xB2, 0xCD, 0x39, 0x9A, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x34, 0x60, 0x7A, 0x89, 0x98, 0xB5, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0x20, 0x3D, 0x3A, 0x04, 0x8F, 0x5A, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x26, 0xB6, 0x49, 0x09, 0x9C, 0x0F, 0x59), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_24_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x66, 0xD2, 0x38, 0x2A, 0x62, 0x81, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0xC8, 0x20, 0x5E, 0x28, 0xA3, 0x81, 0xA7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x31, 0xA4, 0xF1, 0xEA, 0x7D, 0x87, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0x2C, 0x99, 0x09, 0x6F, 0x63, 0xEB, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x76, 0xDA, 0x1A, 0x06, 0xBE, 0xDE, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x09, 0x2E, 0x75, 0x39, 0x30, 0x2D, 0x42), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_24_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x9B, 0xC1, 0x5A, 0x17, 0xC3, 0x8C, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x8D, 0x94, 0x4D, 0x3D, 0xAB, 0x60, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFD, 0x1E, 0x0F, 0x43, 0xAE, 0x9D, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0xF2, 0xF3, 0x20, 0x1B, 0xAA, 0xB7, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x5B, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0x90, 0x3B, 0xE3, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x78, 0x72, 0xBD, 0x65, 0x09, 0x0B, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_25_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x37, 0x2A, 0x6C, 0x16, 0x4F, 0x64, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0xCE, 0xA3, 0x90, 0xB4, 0x9A, 0xBC, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x38, 0x55, 0x63, 0x1D, 0x3A, 0x6E, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0xB4, 0xAA, 0x99, 0x22, 0x45, 0x89, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x7C, 0x8C, 0xA6, 0x3D, 0xA7, 0x3E, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x06, 0x42, 0xDC, 0xA6, 0xE3, 0xC6, 0x12), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_25_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x8C, 0x3D, 0x5D, 0x47, 0x31, 0x7C, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x85, 0xEE, 0x46, 0x7E, 0x13, 0x04, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x3C, 0x8B, 0x43, 0x2E, 0x74, 0xF5, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x88, 0x8E, 0x07, 0x29, 0x08, 0x03, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x9B, 0x89, 0xEB, 0x08, 0xE8, 0x43, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x07, 0x67, 0xFD, 0xD9, 0x73, 0x6F, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_26_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xEB, 0x21, 0x8D, 0x98, 0x43, 0x74, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xCC, 0x14, 0xD8, 0x08, 0xBB, 0xA6, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x98, 0xF2, 0x6A, 0x18, 0xC3, 0xDD, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x38, 0x91, 0xA0, 0x03, 0xF2, 0x04, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0xAF, 0xE8, 0xFD, 0xFB, 0x13, 0x70, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x93, 0x87, 0x98, 0x4A, 0xE0, 0x00, 0x12), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_26_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x2E, 0x69, 0x9C, 0xA2, 0x2D, 0x03, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xFE, 0xF3, 0xB9, 0xC1, 0x85, 0x2A, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xFD, 0x86, 0xB1, 0xCD, 0xBF, 0x41, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xD8, 0x9A, 0x21, 0xF3, 0xFE, 0xCB, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x78, 0x04, 0x60, 0xB7, 0xA9, 0xA2, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x1E, 0x66, 0x2A, 0x54, 0x51, 0xBD, 0x8B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_27_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x16, 0x36, 0xEF, 0x61, 0x2D, 0xEE, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x5F, 0x88, 0xA0, 0x13, 0x12, 0xF7, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xC6, 0xAD, 0x4A, 0x4A, 0x07, 0x01, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x74, 0xB1, 0x4F, 0xEB, 0xBD, 0xD5, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xF9, 0x71, 0xA2, 0x06, 0x4F, 0xD7, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x8B, 0x4D, 0x48, 0xE0, 0x98, 0xFB, 0x6A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_27_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0xBA, 0x10, 0xA3, 0x0D, 0x52, 0xAC, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xD0, 0xE0, 0x36, 0xE6, 0x07, 0x3A, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x80, 0xF0, 0xAA, 0x49, 0x22, 0x4B, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xC7, 0xAB, 0x1C, 0x89, 0xCD, 0x24, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x2A, 0xFC, 0xB3, 0x6D, 0x45, 0x96, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0xE4, 0xDB, 0x52, 0x3F, 0xC4, 0xB4, 0x19), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_28_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0xCC, 0xC8, 0x7F, 0xBB, 0x6B, 0x87, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x21, 0x3C, 0x69, 0x7D, 0x38, 0x57, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x4C, 0x18, 0x3C, 0x53, 0xA5, 0x48, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xC3, 0x64, 0x45, 0xDB, 0xC4, 0x6D, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xCC, 0xD1, 0xBB, 0x17, 0xB8, 0x34, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x69, 0x71, 0xFA, 0xA0, 0x28, 0x4A, 0x3D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_28_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xE8, 0x9E, 0x39, 0xEA, 0x8D, 0x38, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x9C, 0xBB, 0xCD, 0x80, 0x1A, 0xEE, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xA0, 0x45, 0xBF, 0xD9, 0x22, 0x11, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x7C, 0x5C, 0xD9, 0xC0, 0x9F, 0x69, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x8A, 0xA6, 0x79, 0x4E, 0x35, 0xB9, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x8B, 0x9A, 0x3E, 0xA1, 0xB8, 0x28, 0x10), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_29_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x2F, 0xEF, 0xBB, 0xA9, 0x72, 0x7F, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x34, 0xB7, 0x12, 0xB9, 0xE7, 0xC3, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x1D, 0xD9, 0x42, 0x77, 0x0C, 0x71, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x01, 0x59, 0xA7, 0x56, 0x03, 0x91, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x91, 0x99, 0x33, 0x30, 0x3E, 0xEF, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0xC9, 0x5A, 0x9A, 0x54, 0x66, 0xF1, 0x70), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_29_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x2C, 0xB7, 0x6E, 0x71, 0x7D, 0x35, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x0D, 0xEF, 0xD1, 0x2D, 0x99, 0x63, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x31, 0xAF, 0x2D, 0xC9, 0xC6, 0xC2, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0xC0, 0xDF, 0x80, 0x54, 0xC4, 0xAC, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x6B, 0xA0, 0x84, 0x96, 0xF7, 0x31, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0xE2, 0x7C, 0x7A, 0x41, 0x45, 0x75, 0x6A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_30_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xEE, 0x58, 0x31, 0xE8, 0x68, 0xD6, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x2E, 0x48, 0xB7, 0x09, 0x9F, 0xD4, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xA9, 0x5C, 0xE7, 0x64, 0x43, 0x5D, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x58, 0x9F, 0x50, 0xAB, 0x68, 0xFF, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x88, 0x2D, 0xBA, 0x12, 0xBF, 0x8D, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xDF, 0x6F, 0xB3, 0x75, 0xA4, 0x55, 0x73), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_30_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x17, 0x92, 0x39, 0xB7, 0x13, 0x37, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x43, 0x71, 0xA7, 0xCA, 0x17, 0x1B, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xB9, 0xB0, 0x78, 0xEF, 0xA0, 0xDA, 0x83), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x84, 0xF2, 0x0F, 0x85, 0xA2, 0xB6, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x65, 0x2E, 0x6E, 0x45, 0xB9, 0x4C, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x6A, 0x8C, 0x2B, 0x77, 0x96, 0x36, 0x22), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_31_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x7A, 0x13, 0x4A, 0x97, 0x63, 0x02, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x1E, 0x06, 0x03, 0x8F, 0xB9, 0xEE, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0xEE, 0x8B, 0x89, 0xA9, 0x70, 0xDB, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x7B, 0x81, 0xC9, 0x70, 0x8D, 0x62, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0xDA, 0x46, 0xF8, 0xF9, 0x3A, 0xBE, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x9C, 0x7A, 0x97, 0x62, 0xEB, 0xFA, 0x0F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_31_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0x03, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0x46, 0x27, 0x9E, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x08, 0x1C, 0xD5, 0x25, 0xAF, 0xE9, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x69, 0xDC, 0x59, 0xF4, 0x8A, 0x7C, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x9A, 0x7A, 0x99, 0x21, 0x0C, 0x4E, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xCE, 0x85, 0x5F, 0xAC, 0xAA, 0x82, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x57, 0x69, 0x90, 0x76, 0xF3, 0x53, 0x3F), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point brainpoolP384r1_T[32] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(brainpoolP384r1_T_0_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_1_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_2_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_3_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_4_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_5_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_6_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_7_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_8_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_9_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_10_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_11_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_12_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_13_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_14_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_15_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_15_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_16_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_16_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_17_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_17_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_18_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_18_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_19_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_19_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_20_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_20_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_21_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_21_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_22_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_22_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_23_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_23_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_24_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_24_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_25_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_25_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_26_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_26_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_27_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_27_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_28_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_28_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_29_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_29_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_30_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_30_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_31_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_31_Y), +}; +#else +#define brainpoolP384r1_T NULL +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for brainpoolP512r1 (RFC 5639 3.7) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x58, 0x56, 0x60, 0xAA, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0xC6, 0x82, 0x2D, 0x2F, 0xFF, 0x81, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x80, 0xA3, 0xE6, 0x2A, 0xA1, 0xCD, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x68, 0xC6, 0x9B, 0x00, 0x9B, 0x4D, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x08, 0x33, 0x70, 0xCA, 0x9C, 0x63, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xD2, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x8D, 0x30, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0x33, 0xAE, 0xE6, 0xD4, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xDB, 0xB8, 0x9D, 0xDD, 0xAA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x94, 0xFC, 0x77, 0x4D, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xC7, 0xF2, 0x2B, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x11, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0xC8, 0x9A, 0x8B, 0xC9, 0xF1, 0x2E, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x3A, 0x25, 0xA8, 0x5A, 0x5D, 0xED, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x63, 0x98, 0xEA, 0xCA, 0x41, 0x34, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x16, 0xF9, 0x3D, 0x8D, 0xDD, 0xCB, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x4C, 0x23, 0xAC, 0x45, 0x71, 0x32, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0x3B, 0x60, 0x8B, 0x31, 0xA3, 0x30, 0x78), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0xF7, 0x16, 0x80, 0x63, 0xBD, 0x09, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0xE5, 0xBA, 0x5E, 0xB7, 0x50, 0x40, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x3E, 0x08, 0xDC, 0xCA, 0x94, 0xFC, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0xE7, 0xB9, 0xC7, 0xF2, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x17, 0x11, 0x7F, 0xB5, 0xC8, 0x9A, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xF1, 0x2E, 0x0A, 0xA1, 0x3A, 0x25, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x5D, 0xED, 0x2D, 0xBC, 0x63, 0x98, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x41, 0x34, 0xA8, 0x10, 0x16, 0xF9, 0x3D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0xF8, 0xB9, 0xBC, 0x09, 0x22, 0x35, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x5E, 0x6A, 0x40, 0x47, 0x50, 0x6D, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0x93, 0x7B, 0x68, 0xD1, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xD4, 0xD0, 0xE2, 0x78, 0x1F, 0x3B, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x09, 0xD0, 0xF4, 0xEE, 0x62, 0x3B, 0xB4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x16, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x70, 0x9F, 0xED, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x6A, 0x4C, 0x9C, 0x2E, 0x32, 0x21, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xD8, 0xBD, 0xE4, 0xAE, 0x81), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x08, 0xD8, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x1E, 0xCD, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x54, 0xF0, 0xA8, 0x2F, 0x2B, 0xCA, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x63, 0x27, 0x8A, 0xD8, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x48, 0x5F, 0x4A, 0x49, 0xDE, 0xDC, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x81, 0x1F, 0x88, 0x5B, 0xC5, 0x00, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x7B, 0xA5, 0x24, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x09, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0x22, 0x78, 0xCF, 0xA9, 0xBF, 0xEA, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x32, 0x63, 0x56, 0x5D, 0x38, 0xDE, 0x7D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0x00, 0xA9, 0x9C, 0x82, 0x96, 0x87, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0xDA, 0x5D, 0x08, 0x81, 0xD3, 0xB1, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x10, 0xAC, 0x7F, 0x19, 0x61, 0x86, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x26, 0xA9, 0x4C, 0x41, 0x5C, 0x3E, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x08, 0x33, 0x70, 0xCA, 0x9C, 0x63, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xD2, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x8D, 0x30, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0x33, 0xAE, 0xE6, 0xD4, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xDB, 0xB8, 0x9D, 0xDD, 0xAA), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0xF8, 0xB9, 0xBC, 0x09, 0x22, 0x35, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x5E, 0x6A, 0x40, 0x47, 0x50, 0x6D, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0x93, 0x7B, 0x68, 0xD1, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xD4, 0xD0, 0xE2, 0x78, 0x1F, 0x3B, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x09, 0xD0, 0xF4, 0xEE, 0x62, 0x3B, 0xB4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x16, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x70, 0x9F, 0xED, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x6A, 0x4C, 0x9C, 0x2E, 0x32, 0x21, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xD8, 0xBD, 0xE4, 0xAE, 0x81), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x08, 0xD8, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x1E, 0xCD, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x54, 0xF0, 0xA8, 0x2F, 0x2B, 0xCA, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x63, 0x27, 0x8A, 0xD8, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x48, 0x5F, 0x4A, 0x49, 0xDE, 0xDC, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x81, 0x1F, 0x88, 0x5B, 0xC5, 0x00, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x7B, 0xA5, 0x24, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x09, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0x22, 0x78, 0xCF, 0xA9, 0xBF, 0xEA, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x32, 0x63, 0x56, 0x5D, 0x38, 0xDE, 0x7D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xE9, 0x6B, 0x8C, 0x6F, 0x9D, 0x88, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x4F, 0x86, 0x96, 0xA7, 0x56, 0xD1, 0x37), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0xAB, 0xFA, 0xEE, 0xA7, 0xF5, 0x0E, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x40, 0xEF, 0x9E, 0x6D, 0xD6, 0x32, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xED, 0x56, 0x14, 0x57, 0x1A, 0x8D, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xED, 0x4D, 0x3A, 0xFA, 0x71, 0x75, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xC5, 0x76, 0x1C, 0x14, 0xBE, 0xB5, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x5A, 0xCB, 0xE7, 0x36, 0x1D, 0x52, 0x1C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x8D, 0x7A, 0xEB, 0xA3, 0x8B, 0xD5, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xA3, 0x41, 0xF8, 0xAC, 0x9E, 0xAB, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0xE3, 0x65, 0x0D, 0x1C, 0xFE, 0x09, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0xCA, 0x13, 0x3F, 0xC5, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x5D, 0x63, 0x28, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xD3, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x95, 0x3F, 0x7A, 0x82, 0xD4, 0x77, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xBB, 0x92, 0x32, 0x00, 0xF4, 0x66, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x58, 0x31, 0xD1, 0x17, 0x9F, 0x2A, 0x22), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x36, 0xA9, 0xCD, 0x80, 0xA5, 0x2D, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x44, 0xAB, 0xCE, 0x71, 0xFF, 0x0C, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x24, 0x58, 0x35, 0x5A, 0x21, 0x32, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0xA6, 0x28, 0xF8, 0x7A, 0x97, 0xAE, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0xE7, 0x08, 0xFA, 0x47, 0xC9, 0x55, 0x09), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xAC, 0x2E, 0x84, 0xA4, 0xF5, 0x52, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x58, 0x05, 0x9D, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0x71, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x92, 0xB4, 0x92, 0xC1, 0x92, 0xEC, 0x6B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x48, 0x2D, 0x79, 0x5E, 0x58, 0xE5, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x85, 0x26, 0xEC, 0xE9, 0x6E, 0xD4, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x68, 0x26, 0x87, 0x38, 0xA2, 0xD2, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x17, 0x60, 0xCE, 0x75, 0xF8, 0xA5, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x51, 0xDB, 0xA9, 0xAE, 0x87, 0xF1, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x49, 0x92, 0x3B, 0x19, 0x96, 0xF5, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0xD5, 0x52, 0x52, 0x8C, 0xCE, 0xFD, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x18, 0x0A, 0xE6, 0xF6, 0xAE, 0x08, 0x41), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x2B, 0xD8, 0x54, 0xCE, 0xB0, 0x57, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xB0, 0xF8, 0x9E, 0x03, 0x03, 0x3C, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x0E, 0x29, 0x29, 0x00, 0xF3, 0x70, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x33, 0x99, 0x0E, 0x00, 0x5D, 0xFE, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x2D, 0xF2, 0x59, 0x32, 0xCF, 0x03, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0xC9, 0x72, 0xAE, 0x0C, 0xEF, 0xD1, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x5A, 0x27, 0xBF, 0x2F, 0x45, 0xF9, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xBE, 0xE5, 0x2C, 0xFF, 0x5B, 0x1E, 0x88), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0xAC, 0xBB, 0xD8, 0x83, 0xC2, 0x46, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xDC, 0xCE, 0x15, 0xB4, 0xEF, 0xCF, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xDB, 0x5E, 0x94, 0x31, 0x0B, 0xB2, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xB9, 0xE3, 0xE3, 0x11, 0x71, 0x41, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xE3, 0x01, 0xB7, 0x7D, 0xBC, 0x65, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x07, 0x65, 0x87, 0xA7, 0xE8, 0x48, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x48, 0x8F, 0xD4, 0x30, 0x8E, 0xB4, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xE0, 0x73, 0xBE, 0x1E, 0xBF, 0x56, 0x36), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x0E, 0x5E, 0x87, 0xC5, 0xAB, 0x0E, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xF9, 0x5F, 0x80, 0x24, 0x4C, 0x2A, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0x15, 0x21, 0x54, 0x92, 0x84, 0x8D, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x8A, 0x47, 0x74, 0xDC, 0x42, 0xB1, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0xF7, 0x30, 0xFD, 0xC1, 0x9B, 0x0C, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x6C, 0xCC, 0xDF, 0xC5, 0xE3, 0xA9, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x67, 0x59, 0x10, 0x5C, 0x51, 0x54, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x37, 0xFB, 0x6E, 0xB0, 0x78, 0x63, 0x8E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0xEF, 0xC4, 0x39, 0x20, 0xF1, 0x46, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x62, 0xAE, 0xFF, 0x10, 0xE4, 0xE2, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x5C, 0xF5, 0x2E, 0x22, 0x89, 0xE5, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0x0C, 0x29, 0xA8, 0x62, 0xAE, 0xDB, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0xCA, 0x87, 0x2A, 0x6F, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xDC, 0x9B, 0x9F, 0x65, 0xD4, 0xAD, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xC3, 0x08, 0x0F, 0xCF, 0x67, 0xE9, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x5C, 0xD7, 0xFF, 0x41, 0x9C, 0xCB, 0x26), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x25, 0x05, 0x12, 0xAD, 0x73, 0x63, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x99, 0x07, 0x86, 0x57, 0xE7, 0x94, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x4B, 0xA5, 0xBF, 0x18, 0xA9, 0xEF, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x4C, 0xC4, 0x09, 0xF2, 0x2F, 0x0C, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x3A, 0x04, 0xEA, 0x89, 0x6C, 0x91, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x6C, 0x3A, 0xE7, 0xA3, 0xEC, 0x24, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xA1, 0x26, 0x21, 0x04, 0xE3, 0xB9, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0x71, 0x4B, 0x7B, 0xC2, 0x89, 0xCD, 0xA2), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xB9, 0xA8, 0x9D, 0xFD, 0x00, 0x3A, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x41, 0x6C, 0xBB, 0x5A, 0xCA, 0x1F, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xD7, 0xE2, 0x6C, 0x6B, 0xA7, 0x48, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x19, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0xC1, 0x7E, 0x4F, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xF7, 0x19, 0x3C, 0x06, 0x74, 0x2C, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x23, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x09, 0xB0, 0x80, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x74, 0x34, 0x08, 0x44, 0x7E, 0xA3, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xCC, 0x8D, 0x12, 0x6E, 0xE1, 0x3D, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x18, 0xB1, 0x71, 0x02, 0x93, 0xC2, 0xA4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x89, 0x40, 0xE2, 0x1F, 0xE7, 0x5E, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x8E, 0xAE, 0x89, 0x01, 0xD4, 0x0C, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xDA, 0x58, 0x70, 0x24, 0xF2, 0xE4, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0xC7, 0x1D, 0xD6, 0x4A, 0x6F, 0x66, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x1D, 0x7E, 0x4A, 0x2C, 0xCA, 0xEC, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x06, 0x7F, 0xA8, 0x99, 0xE4, 0xD3, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x1D, 0x5A, 0xDF, 0x5E, 0x58, 0x36, 0x49), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xB9, 0x32, 0x69, 0x1F, 0x72, 0x2A, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x73, 0xE2, 0x03, 0x39, 0x35, 0xAA, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x5E, 0x5D, 0x48, 0xEF, 0xAE, 0x30, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x7F, 0x60, 0x19, 0xAF, 0xEC, 0x9D, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xD9, 0x19, 0xE4, 0x1B, 0x56, 0x15, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xD7, 0x33, 0x59, 0x1F, 0x43, 0x59, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xCE, 0xEE, 0xCA, 0xA4, 0x7F, 0x63, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x40, 0xC0, 0xF6, 0x19, 0x89, 0x43, 0x20), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x92, 0xEA, 0x07, 0x65, 0x79, 0x86, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xB7, 0x13, 0x75, 0xD3, 0xC5, 0x0A, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x9E, 0xFA, 0xE1, 0x1F, 0x0C, 0xF9, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x8C, 0xED, 0x5C, 0x21, 0xE9, 0x09, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x4D, 0xD8, 0x18, 0xC4, 0xF6, 0x36, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xC9, 0xAC, 0x5C, 0xFA, 0x69, 0xA4, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x8C, 0x94, 0x1C, 0x7B, 0x71, 0x36, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xBD, 0x46, 0xCE, 0xB7, 0x1D, 0x9C, 0x5E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xD6, 0x96, 0x4B, 0xA6, 0x47, 0xEB, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0xF1, 0x5F, 0x15, 0xDE, 0x99, 0x6F, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0x04, 0xB8, 0xE6, 0xC0, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xD3, 0xF0, 0x04, 0x00, 0xE4, 0x05, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xF3, 0x06, 0xA3, 0x1A, 0xFF, 0xEA, 0x73), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x32, 0xAA, 0x99, 0x33, 0x09, 0xB6, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xEF, 0xFC, 0x61, 0x10, 0x42, 0x31, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xF1, 0xF4, 0x33, 0xCF, 0x28, 0x90, 0x9C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0x88, 0x87, 0x7B, 0xEB, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xB8, 0xDA, 0xFA, 0xDA, 0x3D, 0xA6, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xF0, 0x62, 0x82, 0x53, 0x32, 0x55, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xA5, 0x32, 0x4A, 0x19, 0x11, 0x9C, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xB3, 0x27, 0xE9, 0x75, 0x90, 0x05, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x1C, 0x90, 0x48, 0x77, 0x01, 0x85, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xD6, 0x9B, 0x84, 0xA8, 0xD7, 0xC5, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x7A, 0xCB, 0xB3, 0x11, 0x46, 0xD7, 0x99), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x23, 0xBF, 0x75, 0x75, 0xA1, 0x95, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0x66, 0x5D, 0x34, 0x13, 0xA9, 0x03, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x80, 0x9D, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0x44, 0xE1, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x5D, 0xBD, 0xA8, 0xBF, 0xB4, 0x25, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x99, 0x1F, 0x53, 0xF1, 0x57, 0xDB, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x7C, 0xE5, 0xC5, 0x51, 0x0B, 0x4C, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0xB0, 0x1A, 0x9C, 0x16, 0xB0, 0x32, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0xE3, 0xCF, 0xDD, 0x48, 0xB4, 0x7B, 0x33), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0xDD, 0x9E, 0x3C, 0x98, 0x0E, 0x77, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xAB, 0x01, 0xD3, 0x87, 0x74, 0x25, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0xA3, 0xE3, 0x76, 0x43, 0x87, 0x12, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0xB1, 0x3B, 0x60, 0x66, 0xEB, 0x98, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x78, 0xC8, 0xD7, 0x4E, 0x75, 0xCA, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xDF, 0x71, 0x19, 0xE7, 0x07, 0x36, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xC9, 0xA8, 0x5F, 0x91, 0xBF, 0x47, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x96, 0x58, 0x96, 0x18, 0xB6, 0xFA, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x2D, 0xA9, 0x9B, 0x86, 0xDB, 0x0C, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x0B, 0x2D, 0x56, 0x4A, 0xD3, 0x93, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x15, 0xE2, 0x65, 0x12, 0x86, 0x0E, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x41, 0x4D, 0xC1, 0xCB, 0xE4, 0xC3, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x53, 0x10, 0xCA, 0xA3, 0xAC, 0x83, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x01, 0x22, 0x96, 0x10, 0xAD, 0x69, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x46, 0x4E, 0xD8, 0xEA, 0xD6, 0x9D, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x2F, 0x7F, 0x62, 0x62, 0x80, 0xD0, 0x14), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xDA, 0x00, 0x63, 0x09, 0xBD, 0x6A, 0x83), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xD4, 0x6E, 0x48, 0x05, 0xB7, 0xF7, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x4D, 0xD7, 0x00, 0x4A, 0x15, 0x27, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x15, 0xAA, 0x37, 0x27, 0x34, 0x18, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x20, 0x2C, 0x84, 0x1B, 0x88, 0xBA, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x09, 0xD6, 0x04, 0xA2, 0x60, 0x84, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x04, 0x94, 0x08, 0xD4, 0xED, 0x47, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xF3, 0xE4, 0x3E, 0xB9, 0x5B, 0x35, 0x42), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0xD8, 0xB6, 0x80, 0xD6, 0xF1, 0x30, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x14, 0xA6, 0x85, 0xEE, 0xA7, 0xD8, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x49, 0x2A, 0x1E, 0x7C, 0xE9, 0x2D, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x87, 0x56, 0x91, 0x03, 0x77, 0x4D, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0x52, 0xD4, 0xAA, 0xF7, 0xFA, 0xB0, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x5D, 0x11, 0x39, 0xB1, 0xE7, 0x76, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x13, 0xBC, 0x37, 0x5D, 0x74, 0xCD, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x48, 0x14, 0x23, 0x30, 0xF8, 0x46, 0x37), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x27, 0xB0, 0xD9, 0xB2, 0x74, 0xB4, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xA6, 0xB9, 0x6F, 0x9F, 0x64, 0x36, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0x2B, 0x78, 0x40, 0x05, 0x2B, 0x7B, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x68, 0x3A, 0xB6, 0x4A, 0xE2, 0xDB, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x33, 0xD7, 0x34, 0x8B, 0x25, 0x45, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0xCE, 0xA8, 0xC9, 0x01, 0xFB, 0x0E, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xF9, 0x51, 0x4C, 0x12, 0x9F, 0x60, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x85, 0xBD, 0x30, 0x37, 0x84, 0x39, 0x44), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x33, 0xAF, 0x2E, 0xB8, 0x2E, 0xCC, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xB1, 0x73, 0x59, 0x4E, 0x0C, 0x09, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x24, 0x89, 0x81, 0x12, 0xFF, 0xBB, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x37, 0x1A, 0x66, 0xEE, 0xED, 0xB6, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xBD, 0x04, 0x20, 0x5D, 0xFB, 0xBF, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xF8, 0x34, 0xA3, 0xFF, 0x45, 0xDE, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x18, 0x73, 0xF1, 0x32, 0x25, 0x58, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0xC1, 0x14, 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x40, 0x0F, 0x12), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x07, 0x9D, 0x9C, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x56, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xBA, 0x87, 0xF9, 0x15, 0x0C, 0x66, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x1F, 0xC1, 0x28, 0xB0, 0x47, 0x0D, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xCA, 0x27, 0xEE, 0x4B, 0x23, 0x2B, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0xB5, 0x68, 0xC8, 0x17, 0x5D, 0xC3, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x02, 0x08, 0xEE, 0x20, 0x9D, 0xEA, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x14, 0x50, 0xD4, 0x7D, 0x5F, 0xCF, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xFA, 0xF8, 0xA7, 0xC6, 0xDC, 0x14, 0x8C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xBD, 0x0A, 0x1A, 0x18, 0x98, 0xDC, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x63, 0x02, 0xB7, 0xD5, 0x5B, 0x5A, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xB1, 0xD7, 0x4B, 0x15, 0x39, 0x61, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x32, 0xE1, 0x9E, 0x70, 0x1B, 0xCE, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0xD8, 0x18, 0x83, 0x52, 0x9B, 0x6D, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x55, 0x56, 0x19, 0x34, 0xA4, 0xEA, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0xA9, 0x55, 0x80, 0xE3, 0x15, 0x36, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x06, 0xC8, 0x1D, 0x17, 0x0D, 0xAD, 0x16), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0xD6, 0xF0, 0xCC, 0xF3, 0x63, 0x53, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x5A, 0xDC, 0x46, 0xBD, 0x0D, 0xAD, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x2F, 0x11, 0x60, 0x15, 0x51, 0x4A, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xE3, 0x93, 0x38, 0xD5, 0x83, 0xAA, 0x0D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xA6, 0xCC, 0xB1, 0xFD, 0xBB, 0x1A, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x54, 0xC8, 0x54, 0x6F, 0x79, 0x1A, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x4A, 0xDA, 0x28, 0x92, 0x97, 0x9D, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x4B, 0xDB, 0xC7, 0x52, 0xC5, 0x66, 0x34), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x7E, 0x92, 0x53, 0x30, 0x93, 0xFD, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x16, 0x6A, 0xB1, 0x91, 0x0A, 0xB4, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x9D, 0x40, 0x3F, 0xE3, 0xF1, 0x01, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x0E, 0xD8, 0xED, 0x11, 0x8E, 0x4C, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x4A, 0x1B, 0x88, 0xDF, 0x8D, 0x29, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x23, 0x21, 0x11, 0xAB, 0x77, 0x81, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xAF, 0x11, 0xFA, 0xBA, 0x40, 0x63, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x6F, 0x8D, 0x80, 0xDF, 0x67, 0xF5, 0x44), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0x8B, 0xB7, 0x08, 0xF4, 0xD7, 0x2D, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x2B, 0x30, 0x02, 0x45, 0x71, 0x08, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x3A, 0xCA, 0x50, 0xF6, 0xC2, 0x19, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xB9, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0x73, 0x95, 0x1D, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x60, 0x59, 0x48, 0xCB, 0xD8, 0xD6, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xB9, 0x6C, 0x89, 0xAB, 0x99, 0xA8, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0xA1, 0x8B, 0x4E, 0x06, 0x19, 0xEC, 0x99), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x95, 0x04, 0xCF, 0xD5, 0x94, 0xB3, 0x02), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x35, 0x93, 0x7C, 0xB3, 0xB8, 0x9E, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x45, 0x5C, 0x7E, 0xBF, 0x75, 0x81, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xE8, 0x24, 0xDF, 0xEC, 0x2F, 0x7D, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x8B, 0xD5, 0x6A, 0x9B, 0xA0, 0xE0, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xE3, 0x27, 0x82, 0xDE, 0xDD, 0xCA, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x57, 0x56, 0x46, 0x05, 0x06, 0x01, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x35, 0xA7, 0x47, 0xE2, 0x6B, 0x2C, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x9D, 0x4C, 0xEC, 0x1F, 0x11, 0x75, 0x2B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xAA, 0x41, 0xC1, 0xE9, 0x0E, 0xE9, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xCF, 0x9C, 0x4B, 0xE8, 0xED, 0x0A, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0x73, 0xCA, 0x0C, 0x46, 0x0A, 0x9C, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xE1, 0x9E, 0xBC, 0xFE, 0x44, 0x63, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0x43, 0x71, 0xEE, 0xF8, 0xC1, 0x8C, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x4B, 0xF0, 0x69, 0x25, 0xBD, 0x71, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0x9A, 0xFE, 0x82, 0xE7, 0xC1, 0xC1, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x5A, 0x6E, 0x5E, 0x97, 0x6A, 0x35, 0x8D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x18, 0x6C, 0x7E, 0xB8, 0x9E, 0x57, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xB9, 0xC1, 0xD0, 0xFE, 0x78, 0xFB, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x08, 0xAE, 0x46, 0x34, 0xEA, 0x7A, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x1C, 0x56, 0xA9, 0x18, 0x37, 0xD4, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x63, 0xE9, 0x0A, 0xB6, 0x38, 0x3C, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x4F, 0xA4, 0x6E, 0x85, 0x31, 0x23, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0xAD, 0xC4, 0xC3, 0xB1, 0x4B, 0x1C, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x56, 0x4A, 0x38, 0xB3, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0x2C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_16_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0xC7, 0x19, 0xDE, 0x21, 0xED, 0x89, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0xAE, 0xEB, 0x9D, 0xA7, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x0E, 0x13, 0x1E, 0x86, 0x57, 0xC3, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x4B, 0x30, 0x46, 0x52, 0xC1, 0xEC, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xD5, 0x44, 0x31, 0x96, 0x3B, 0x26, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x68, 0xA8, 0x67, 0x78, 0x39, 0xE8, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x78, 0xB7, 0xDD, 0xF2, 0x58, 0xB6, 0x3D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x3C, 0xB3, 0x26, 0xC4, 0x2C, 0x8C, 0xA5), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_16_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x24, 0xE5, 0x73, 0xEE, 0x9A, 0x02, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x6A, 0x65, 0x60, 0xF3, 0x62, 0xE3, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0x07, 0x84, 0xE6, 0x3B, 0x46, 0x65, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x8F, 0x0C, 0xB0, 0xE1, 0x04, 0x82, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x13, 0xBF, 0x3D, 0xA0, 0x48, 0xA2, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x26, 0x76, 0x74, 0xAB, 0x0B, 0x29, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x6E, 0x5F, 0x03, 0x34, 0x7C, 0x38, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x72, 0xF9, 0x3B, 0x3C, 0xA4, 0xBC, 0x7C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_17_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xCE, 0x18, 0x80, 0xB8, 0x24, 0x45, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x09, 0x03, 0xB8, 0x06, 0x64, 0xF7, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x26, 0xB1, 0x10, 0x6D, 0x71, 0x12, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x12, 0xC6, 0x6E, 0x1E, 0x6A, 0xC3, 0x80), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xD3, 0x0A, 0xDE, 0xD8, 0x6B, 0x04, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x87, 0x5B, 0xAE, 0xDB, 0x3C, 0xC0, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0xF5, 0xF9, 0xC1, 0x9A, 0x89, 0xBB, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x69, 0x72, 0x8B, 0xAE, 0x32, 0x13, 0x11), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_17_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x16, 0x07, 0x50, 0xFA, 0x4C, 0xCF, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x50, 0x21, 0xE9, 0xDE, 0xEC, 0x7E, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x2F, 0xE8, 0x83, 0x30, 0x0B, 0x65, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x0B, 0x99, 0xAC, 0xC9, 0xBA, 0x6C, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x59, 0x5A, 0x0D, 0x7B, 0x9E, 0x08, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x91, 0xB2, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xCE, 0x67, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x93, 0x60, 0x0C, 0xD7, 0x1F, 0x2F, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x7F, 0x9D, 0x40, 0xF8, 0x78, 0x7A, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_18_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x22, 0x95, 0xE8, 0xEF, 0x31, 0x57, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x88, 0x53, 0xFE, 0xAF, 0x7C, 0x47, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xCE, 0xCC, 0x79, 0xE8, 0x9F, 0x8C, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x16, 0xDD, 0x77, 0x6E, 0x8A, 0x73, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x07, 0x97, 0x21, 0x3B, 0xF8, 0x5F, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xB5, 0xD2, 0x81, 0x84, 0xF0, 0xE7, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x8F, 0x75, 0x09, 0x6A, 0x0E, 0x53, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x4F, 0x70, 0x97, 0xC7, 0xAC, 0x7D, 0x3F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_18_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x3C, 0x6A, 0xB4, 0x10, 0xA9, 0xC8, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xC5, 0xD6, 0x69, 0x16, 0xB8, 0xAC, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x44, 0xDC, 0xEB, 0x48, 0x54, 0x5D, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x48, 0x9B, 0xD7, 0x72, 0x69, 0xA4, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x0D, 0x36, 0x9A, 0x66, 0x0B, 0xEC, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xC6, 0xD4, 0xB6, 0x60, 0xE5, 0xC3, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x29, 0x42, 0xE0, 0x9D, 0xFD, 0x7C, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x10, 0xBA, 0x55, 0xBC, 0x3B, 0x38, 0x5D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_19_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x66, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x73, 0x03, 0x1B, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xA4, 0x66, 0x12, 0x96, 0x7B, 0x02, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0xB5, 0xDE, 0x6D, 0x98, 0xD1, 0xD5, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xF5, 0x44, 0xB8, 0x8E, 0xF6, 0x8C, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x15, 0x2B, 0x72, 0xBC, 0x49, 0xE5, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x44, 0xD7, 0xDF, 0x8F, 0xEB, 0x8D, 0x80), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x64, 0x88, 0xAA, 0xB7, 0xE4, 0x70, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x14, 0xBB, 0xE9, 0x9B, 0xB9, 0x65, 0x5D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_19_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x8E, 0x88, 0xF5, 0xF1, 0xC1, 0x89, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x30, 0x53, 0xE6, 0xFB, 0x2D, 0x82, 0xB4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xE4, 0xFF, 0xBA, 0x31, 0x79, 0xAB, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x09, 0xF7, 0xB7, 0x09, 0x78, 0x4C, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xAE, 0xC2, 0x44, 0xDC, 0x17, 0x78, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xD4, 0x17, 0x43, 0x19, 0x74, 0x9E, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x64, 0x3B, 0x73, 0xA2, 0x99, 0x27, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x74, 0x36, 0x5F, 0xD3, 0x14, 0xB1, 0x31), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_20_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x07, 0xAB, 0xFD, 0x9B, 0x03, 0xC5, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xBE, 0xB0, 0x1D, 0xF2, 0x0C, 0x73, 0x73), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xE7, 0x7B, 0x87, 0xD3, 0x34, 0xFD, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x25, 0x3D, 0xC7, 0x36, 0x83, 0x53, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x7C, 0xCF, 0x63, 0x55, 0x12, 0x11, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x34, 0x4D, 0x27, 0x92, 0xAC, 0x18, 0x16), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x42, 0x61, 0x9D, 0x2E, 0xFF, 0x13, 0x16), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0xDE, 0x92, 0x65, 0x57, 0x0D, 0xBC, 0x0A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_20_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x7B, 0x6E, 0xC6, 0x2A, 0x21, 0x74, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0xA7, 0x53, 0x4D, 0x29, 0x36, 0xEF, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0xD6, 0x41, 0xC7, 0x99, 0xAD, 0x50, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xAC, 0x41, 0x9F, 0xFB, 0x4C, 0x86, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xBB, 0xE6, 0x25, 0x28, 0xAA, 0xEB, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x04, 0xA2, 0xC3, 0xAA, 0x08, 0x8A, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x2B, 0x5B, 0xE2, 0x8D, 0x76, 0xEA, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x33, 0xD2, 0x21, 0x4D, 0x62, 0xE3, 0x8E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_21_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x06, 0x8B, 0x2B, 0xC2, 0xC4, 0xB1, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xF5, 0xA1, 0xC0, 0x03, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xA9, 0xEF, 0x55, 0xB6, 0x1A, 0x9F, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x54, 0x32, 0xBE, 0x06, 0x43, 0xB5, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0xD6, 0xD9, 0x20, 0x89, 0xBE, 0xD4, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x26, 0x95, 0x10, 0xCE, 0xB4, 0x88, 0x79), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xA6, 0x27, 0xAC, 0x32, 0xBA, 0xBD, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xA6, 0xAE, 0x9C, 0x7B, 0xBE, 0xA1, 0x63), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_21_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xCD, 0x4D, 0x3D, 0xDF, 0x96, 0xBB, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0xA7, 0x11, 0x06, 0xCC, 0x0E, 0x31, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0xE4, 0xF4, 0xAD, 0x7B, 0x5F, 0xF1, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x54, 0xBE, 0xF4, 0x8A, 0x03, 0x47, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x53, 0x00, 0x7F, 0xB0, 0x8A, 0x68, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x16, 0xB1, 0x73, 0x6F, 0x5B, 0x0E, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x32, 0xE3, 0x43, 0x64, 0x75, 0xFB, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x18, 0x55, 0x8A, 0x4E, 0x6E, 0x35, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_22_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x97, 0x15, 0x1E, 0xCB, 0xF2, 0x9C, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xD1, 0xBB, 0xF3, 0x70, 0xAD, 0x13, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x96, 0xA4, 0xC5, 0x5E, 0xDA, 0xD5, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x81, 0xE9, 0x65, 0x66, 0x76, 0x47, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x35, 0x87, 0x06, 0x73, 0xCF, 0x34, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x81, 0x15, 0x42, 0xA2, 0x79, 0x5B, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xA2, 0x7D, 0x09, 0x14, 0x64, 0xC6, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x6D, 0xC4, 0xED, 0xF1, 0xD6, 0xE9, 0x24), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_22_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xD5, 0xBB, 0x25, 0xA3, 0xDD, 0xA3, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xF2, 0x68, 0x67, 0x39, 0x8F, 0x73, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x76, 0x28, 0x89, 0xAD, 0x32, 0xE0, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x90, 0xCC, 0x57, 0x58, 0xAA, 0xC9, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xD7, 0x43, 0xD2, 0xCE, 0x5E, 0xA0, 0x08), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xB0, 0xB8, 0xA4, 0x9E, 0x96, 0x26, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x61, 0x1D, 0xF3, 0x65, 0x5E, 0x60, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x1E, 0x65, 0xED, 0xCF, 0x07, 0x60, 0x20), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_23_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x30, 0x17, 0x8A, 0x91, 0x88, 0x0A, 0xA4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x7D, 0x18, 0xA4, 0xAC, 0x59, 0xFC, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x31, 0x8B, 0x25, 0x65, 0x39, 0x9A, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x16, 0x4B, 0x68, 0xBA, 0x59, 0x13, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xFD, 0xD3, 0xC5, 0x56, 0xC9, 0x8C, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xC6, 0x9F, 0xF4, 0xE6, 0xF7, 0xB4, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x7C, 0x03, 0x00, 0x26, 0x9F, 0xD8, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x1D, 0x6E, 0x00, 0xB9, 0x00, 0x6E, 0x93), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_23_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x63, 0xDA, 0x03, 0x2B, 0xD5, 0x0B, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xFC, 0xE2, 0xC8, 0x47, 0xF0, 0xAE, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x4C, 0xF7, 0x50, 0x0C, 0x48, 0x06, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x2B, 0x32, 0x98, 0x0E, 0x7E, 0x61, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x02, 0x27, 0xFE, 0x75, 0x86, 0xDF, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x30, 0xB1, 0x22, 0x32, 0x1B, 0xFE, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x27, 0xF7, 0x78, 0x6F, 0xD7, 0xFD, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x78, 0xCC, 0xEA, 0xC0, 0x50, 0x24, 0x44), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_24_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x2B, 0x4F, 0x7F, 0x58, 0xE6, 0xC2, 0x70), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x43, 0xD5, 0xA7, 0x35, 0x3C, 0x80, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x6D, 0x4B, 0x12, 0x00, 0x7B, 0xE6, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x15, 0xBD, 0xD0, 0x9B, 0xCA, 0xAA, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xCE, 0x9C, 0xE3, 0x8B, 0x60, 0x7A, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xDA, 0x4B, 0x03, 0xA7, 0x8D, 0x43, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xAF, 0x00, 0x2B, 0x32, 0xF0, 0x22, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xD9, 0x99, 0x99, 0xBE, 0x43, 0x99, 0x3E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_24_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x71, 0x41, 0xF4, 0xB5, 0xFD, 0xDD, 0x36), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0xE2, 0x20, 0x4C, 0xD1, 0x2E, 0x1F, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x43, 0x48, 0x76, 0x8A, 0x49, 0xAC, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x1A, 0x55, 0xA8, 0xA3, 0xD4, 0x57, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xA6, 0x84, 0x39, 0xC9, 0x13, 0xBB, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0xFA, 0xA9, 0x70, 0xDE, 0x83, 0xDD, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0xC9, 0xD9, 0x3E, 0x44, 0x91, 0x68, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x9F, 0x85, 0x6D, 0xF7, 0x54, 0x36, 0x82), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_25_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x6B, 0xA6, 0xA3, 0xE5, 0xD4, 0x46, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x3E, 0xDC, 0x84, 0x7C, 0x7B, 0x24, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xED, 0x7F, 0x86, 0x07, 0x6C, 0x57, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x06, 0xFE, 0x52, 0x12, 0x79, 0x69, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0xD1, 0x44, 0x5F, 0x21, 0x3A, 0xC3, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xD9, 0x4A, 0xC0, 0x75, 0xAB, 0x17, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x81, 0x94, 0xB6, 0x80, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xBE, 0x8E, 0xA5, 0xAA, 0xBC, 0x1E, 0x3E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_25_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0xC7, 0x85, 0xA6, 0x59, 0x9B, 0xB1, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xCE, 0x40, 0xD1, 0xFB, 0xDF, 0x94, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xB8, 0x5E, 0xBF, 0x45, 0xA8, 0x2D, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x9C, 0x06, 0x1B, 0xA9, 0x57, 0xB9, 0x79), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0xE9, 0xCE, 0xA2, 0xD3, 0x74, 0xA1, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x5F, 0x34, 0x78, 0xDB, 0xAE, 0x3A, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x32, 0x84, 0x3E, 0x68, 0x6A, 0x43, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xBC, 0x39, 0x36, 0xA4, 0xC5, 0xBB, 0x11), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_26_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x07, 0xA2, 0xB5, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0x4D, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x1D, 0x67, 0xE6, 0xF1, 0x46, 0xEB, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x41, 0x23, 0x95, 0xE7, 0xE0, 0x10, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x69, 0xFE, 0x68, 0x8C, 0xC6, 0x5F, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xB9, 0x2B, 0x3D, 0xD2, 0x4F, 0xD8, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x09, 0xF5, 0x5F, 0xCF, 0xF6, 0x91, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x15, 0x42, 0x6B, 0x6D, 0xB5, 0xF3, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x56, 0x9D, 0xC5, 0xFF, 0xCA, 0x13, 0x9B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_26_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x38, 0xE6, 0x23, 0x63, 0x48, 0x3C, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x68, 0x3C, 0xD1, 0x3B, 0xE9, 0x3B, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x08, 0x54, 0x49, 0xD1, 0x46, 0x45, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x70, 0x52, 0x6E, 0x79, 0xC4, 0x5E, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xDF, 0xE8, 0x5A, 0x32, 0x81, 0xDA, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x2D, 0x94, 0x5B, 0xB5, 0x35, 0x9F, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x12, 0x8D, 0xC3, 0x36, 0x36, 0xB2, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x2F, 0x22, 0x38, 0x5B, 0x18, 0x4C, 0x35), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_27_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xC1, 0x22, 0x0E, 0xF0, 0x73, 0x11, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xAE, 0xA4, 0x56, 0x18, 0x61, 0x66, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xFB, 0x72, 0x08, 0x84, 0x38, 0x51, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x86, 0xA8, 0xB9, 0x31, 0x99, 0x29, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xFB, 0xC3, 0x42, 0xB3, 0xC7, 0x6F, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xF8, 0xE1, 0x09, 0xBE, 0x75, 0xB0, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x7D, 0xFF, 0xF4, 0x99, 0xFC, 0x13, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x1B, 0x84, 0x81, 0x42, 0x22, 0xC6, 0x3D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_27_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xE0, 0x37, 0xA4, 0xA0, 0x2F, 0x38, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x3D, 0xB7, 0x40, 0x2F, 0x39, 0x3C, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0x3B, 0x8A, 0x51, 0xAE, 0x40, 0x49, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x20, 0x9F, 0xDD, 0xA9, 0xD0, 0x77, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0x1D, 0x64, 0xDA, 0xA0, 0x53, 0xC7, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x7B, 0x66, 0x55, 0x94, 0xD1, 0x51, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xA9, 0xB5, 0x5B, 0x38, 0x35, 0x40, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xF0, 0x73, 0x79, 0x43, 0x61), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_28_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x47, 0x45, 0x69, 0x80, 0x72, 0x72, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x11, 0x99, 0x59, 0xDB, 0x48, 0x80, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x6E, 0x3D, 0xFC, 0x37, 0x15, 0xF4, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xBB, 0x5B, 0xA6, 0x35, 0x8D, 0x28, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x1A, 0x3B, 0x2C, 0x8F, 0xD3, 0xAA, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x1C, 0x1A, 0xF8, 0x02, 0xD9, 0x7B, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x69, 0xAC, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x31, 0x14, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x8A, 0xE6, 0xDE, 0x58, 0xB9, 0xC4, 0x7A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_28_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x83, 0x52, 0xFE, 0xF9, 0x7B, 0xE9, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xA2, 0x55, 0x46, 0x15, 0x49, 0xC1, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xBC, 0x5C, 0x91, 0xBD, 0xB9, 0x9C, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xFD, 0xB1, 0x4E, 0x5F, 0x74, 0xEE, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x8B, 0xD8, 0x8B, 0x17, 0x73, 0x1B, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x92, 0xD7, 0x67, 0x06, 0xAD, 0x25, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x0F, 0x80, 0x24, 0xE2, 0x27, 0x5F, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x1C, 0xCE, 0xD0, 0x67, 0xCA, 0xD4, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_29_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0xF1, 0xDD, 0x33, 0x66, 0xF9, 0x05, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xE5, 0x6B, 0x79, 0xBD, 0x48, 0x42, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x14, 0x52, 0xE3, 0x53, 0xB4, 0x50, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x84, 0x6C, 0xCF, 0xDA, 0xB2, 0x20, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xD6, 0x1A, 0xE5, 0xE2, 0x29, 0x70, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x61, 0xFE, 0xBB, 0x21, 0x82, 0xD1, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0xF0, 0x9C, 0x8B, 0x1A, 0x42, 0x30, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0xD6, 0x49, 0x81, 0x92, 0xF1, 0xD0, 0x90), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_29_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x91, 0x93, 0x6A, 0xA6, 0x22, 0xE9, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0xDC, 0xC3, 0x69, 0x11, 0x95, 0x7D, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xA3, 0x9D, 0x87, 0x5E, 0x64, 0x41, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x87, 0x5A, 0x15, 0xBD, 0x6E, 0x3C, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x8D, 0x50, 0xCC, 0xCF, 0xB7, 0x8F, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x65, 0xCD, 0x31, 0x30, 0xF1, 0x68, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x5C, 0x66, 0x67, 0x92, 0x30, 0x57, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x9B, 0x01, 0x3D, 0x20, 0x8B, 0xD1, 0x0D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_30_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0xC0, 0xE6, 0x4F, 0xDE, 0x62, 0xAB, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x48, 0xB3, 0x1C, 0x0F, 0x16, 0x93, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x63, 0xBD, 0x1F, 0x16, 0x50, 0x56, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x06, 0xBC, 0xE9, 0x27, 0x1C, 0x9A, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xFE, 0x21, 0xC5, 0x39, 0x55, 0xE1, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xA8, 0xD0, 0x96, 0x0E, 0xB5, 0xB2, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xE7, 0x4B, 0xF3, 0x11, 0x0C, 0xC9, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x3A, 0xC4, 0x87, 0x71, 0xEE, 0xFA, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_30_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x77, 0xEE, 0x81, 0x5E, 0x96, 0xEA, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xDF, 0xA9, 0xF4, 0x4F, 0x7C, 0xB2, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0xD4, 0xDF, 0x35, 0x63, 0x47, 0x25, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x3D, 0xFF, 0xA4, 0x02, 0xC3, 0x95, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x10, 0x78, 0xD1, 0x2B, 0xB7, 0xBE, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xE9, 0x57, 0xF9, 0xE0, 0xD8, 0xFC, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0xC4, 0x01, 0xD6, 0xB4, 0xE7, 0x78, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x6C, 0xB9, 0x13, 0xA4, 0xE8, 0x6D, 0x6F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_31_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xB0, 0xC9, 0xCD, 0xBF, 0xA2, 0x1E, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x4F, 0x86, 0x22, 0x9B, 0xEA, 0xE8, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x46, 0xDF, 0x43, 0xB9, 0x82, 0x2D, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x32, 0xF1, 0x4E, 0x95, 0x41, 0xAE, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x93, 0x26, 0xFC, 0xD3, 0x90, 0xDC, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x05, 0x45, 0xCA, 0xF9, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x82, 0x63, 0x4E, 0x55, 0x1D, 0x3A, 0x08), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x69, 0x52, 0x49, 0xE9, 0xED, 0x57, 0x34), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_31_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x64, 0xE9, 0xAC, 0x4C, 0x4A, 0xEA, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xE9, 0x0B, 0x99, 0xE7, 0xF9, 0xA9, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x0C, 0xC1, 0xF4, 0x8D, 0x07, 0xB6, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x68, 0xFA, 0x35, 0xE4, 0x9E, 0xAE, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x2D, 0x1A, 0x13, 0x8E, 0x02, 0xE2, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x38, 0x28, 0x86, 0x46, 0x7B, 0x3A, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x4C, 0x64, 0x59, 0x0A, 0xF9, 0x02, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x4F, 0x23, 0xA2, 0xC3, 0xD5, 0xEF, 0x42), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point brainpoolP512r1_T[32] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(brainpoolP512r1_T_0_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_1_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_2_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_3_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_4_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_5_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_6_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_7_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_8_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_9_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_10_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_11_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_12_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_13_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_14_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_15_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_15_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_16_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_16_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_17_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_17_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_18_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_18_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_19_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_19_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_20_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_20_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_21_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_21_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_22_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_22_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_23_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_23_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_24_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_24_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_25_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_25_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_26_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_26_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_27_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_27_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_28_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_28_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_29_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_29_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_30_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_30_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_31_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_31_Y), +}; +#else +#define brainpoolP512r1_T NULL +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ + + +#if defined(ECP_LOAD_GROUP) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +/* + * Create an MPI from embedded constants + * (assumes len is an exact multiple of sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) and + * len < 1048576) + */ +static inline void ecp_mpi_load(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, size_t len) +{ + X->s = 1; + X->n = (unsigned short) (len / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); + X->p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) p; +} +#endif + +#if defined(ECP_LOAD_GROUP) +/* + * Set an MPI to static value 1 + */ +static inline void ecp_mpi_set1(mbedtls_mpi *X) +{ + X->s = 1; + X->n = 1; + X->p = mpi_one; +} + +/* + * Make group available from embedded constants + */ +static int ecp_group_load(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, size_t plen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *a, size_t alen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *b, size_t blen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *gx, size_t gxlen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *gy, size_t gylen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *n, size_t nlen, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *T) +{ + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->P, p, plen); + if (a != NULL) { + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->A, a, alen); + } + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->B, b, blen); + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->N, n, nlen); + + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->G.X, gx, gxlen); + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->G.Y, gy, gylen); + ecp_mpi_set1(&grp->G.Z); + + grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&grp->P); + grp->nbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&grp->N); + + grp->h = 1; + + grp->T = (mbedtls_ecp_point *) T; + /* + * Set T_size to 0 to prevent T free by mbedtls_ecp_group_free. + */ + grp->T_size = 0; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* ECP_LOAD_GROUP */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) +/* Forward declarations */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p192(mbedtls_mpi *); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *Np, size_t Nn); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p224(mbedtls_mpi *); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p256(mbedtls_mpi *); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p384(mbedtls_mpi *); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p384_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p521(mbedtls_mpi *); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p521_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *N_p, size_t N_n); +#endif + +#define NIST_MODP(P) grp->modp = ecp_mod_ ## P; +#else +#define NIST_MODP(P) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */ + +/* Additional forward declarations */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p255(mbedtls_mpi *); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p255_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p448(mbedtls_mpi *); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p448_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *, size_t); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p192k1(mbedtls_mpi *); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p224k1(mbedtls_mpi *); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p256k1(mbedtls_mpi *); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); +#endif + +#if defined(ECP_LOAD_GROUP) +#define LOAD_GROUP_A(G) ecp_group_load(grp, \ + G ## _p, sizeof(G ## _p), \ + G ## _a, sizeof(G ## _a), \ + G ## _b, sizeof(G ## _b), \ + G ## _gx, sizeof(G ## _gx), \ + G ## _gy, sizeof(G ## _gy), \ + G ## _n, sizeof(G ## _n), \ + G ## _T \ + ) + +#define LOAD_GROUP(G) ecp_group_load(grp, \ + G ## _p, sizeof(G ## _p), \ + NULL, 0, \ + G ## _b, sizeof(G ## _b), \ + G ## _gx, sizeof(G ## _gx), \ + G ## _gy, sizeof(G ## _gy), \ + G ## _n, sizeof(G ## _n), \ + G ## _T \ + ) +#endif /* ECP_LOAD_GROUP */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +/* Constants used by ecp_use_curve25519() */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_sint curve25519_a24 = 0x01DB42; + +/* P = 2^255 - 19 */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint curve25519_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0X7F) +}; + +/* N = 2^252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493 */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint curve25519_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XED, 0XD3, 0XF5, 0X5C, 0X1A, 0X63, 0X12, 0X58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XD6, 0X9C, 0XF7, 0XA2, 0XDE, 0XF9, 0XDE, 0X14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10) +}; + +/* + * Specialized function for creating the Curve25519 group + */ +static int ecp_use_curve25519(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Actually ( A + 2 ) / 4 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->A, curve25519_a24)); + + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->P, curve25519_p, sizeof(curve25519_p)); + + grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&grp->P); + + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->N, curve25519_n, sizeof(curve25519_n)); + + /* Y intentionally not set, since we use x/z coordinates. + * This is used as a marker to identify Montgomery curves! */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->G.X, 9)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->G.Z, 1)); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp->G.Y); + + /* Actually, the required msb for private keys */ + grp->nbits = 254; + +cleanup: + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_ecp_group_free(grp); + } + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +/* Constants used by ecp_use_curve448() */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_sint curve448_a24 = 0x98AA; + +/* P = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1 */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint curve448_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFE, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00) +}; + +/* N = 2^446 - 13818066809895115352007386748515426880336692474882178609894547503885 */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint curve448_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XF3, 0X44, 0X58, 0XAB, 0X92, 0XC2, 0X78, 0X23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0X55, 0X8F, 0XC5, 0X8D, 0X72, 0XC2, 0X6C, 0X21), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0X90, 0X36, 0XD6, 0XAE, 0X49, 0XDB, 0X4E, 0XC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XE9, 0X23, 0XCA, 0X7C, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0X3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00) +}; + +/* + * Specialized function for creating the Curve448 group + */ +static int ecp_use_curve448(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Actually ( A + 2 ) / 4 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->A, curve448_a24)); + + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->P, curve448_p, sizeof(curve448_p)); + grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&grp->P); + + /* Y intentionally not set, since we use x/z coordinates. + * This is used as a marker to identify Montgomery curves! */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->G.X, 5)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->G.Z, 1)); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp->G.Y); + + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->N, curve448_n, sizeof(curve448_n)); + + /* Actually, the required msb for private keys */ + grp->nbits = 447; + +cleanup: + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_ecp_group_free(grp); + } + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Set a group using well-known domain parameters + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_group_load(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id id) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_free(grp); + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init(grp); + + grp->id = id; + + switch (id) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1: + NIST_MODP(p192); + return LOAD_GROUP(secp192r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1: + NIST_MODP(p224); + return LOAD_GROUP(secp224r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1: + NIST_MODP(p256); + return LOAD_GROUP(secp256r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1: + NIST_MODP(p384); + return LOAD_GROUP(secp384r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1: + NIST_MODP(p521); + return LOAD_GROUP(secp521r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p192k1; + return LOAD_GROUP_A(secp192k1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p224k1; + return LOAD_GROUP_A(secp224k1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p256k1; + return LOAD_GROUP_A(secp256k1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1: + return LOAD_GROUP_A(brainpoolP256r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1: + return LOAD_GROUP_A(brainpoolP384r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1: + return LOAD_GROUP_A(brainpoolP512r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p255; + return ecp_use_curve25519(grp); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p448; + return ecp_use_curve448(grp); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + + default: + grp->id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) +/* + * Fast reduction modulo the primes used by the NIST curves. + * + * These functions are critical for speed, but not needed for correct + * operations. So, we make the choice to heavily rely on the internals of our + * bignum library, which creates a tight coupling between these functions and + * our MPI implementation. However, the coupling between the ECP module and + * MPI remains loose, since these functions can be deactivated at will. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Compared to the way things are presented in FIPS 186-3 D.2, + * we proceed in columns, from right (least significant chunk) to left, + * adding chunks to N in place, and keeping a carry for the next chunk. + * This avoids moving things around in memory, and uselessly adding zeros, + * compared to the more straightforward, line-oriented approach. + * + * For this prime we need to handle data in chunks of 64 bits. + * Since this is always a multiple of our basic mbedtls_mpi_uint, we can + * use a mbedtls_mpi_uint * to designate such a chunk, and small loops to handle it. + */ + +/* Add 64-bit chunks (dst += src) and update carry */ +static inline void add64(mbedtls_mpi_uint *dst, mbedtls_mpi_uint *src, mbedtls_mpi_uint *carry) +{ + unsigned char i; + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0; + for (i = 0; i < 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint); i++, dst++, src++) { + *dst += c; c = (*dst < c); + *dst += *src; c += (*dst < *src); + } + *carry += c; +} + +/* Add carry to a 64-bit chunk and update carry */ +static inline void carry64(mbedtls_mpi_uint *dst, mbedtls_mpi_uint *carry) +{ + unsigned char i; + for (i = 0; i < 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint); i++, dst++) { + *dst += *carry; + *carry = (*dst < *carry); + } +} + +#define WIDTH 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) +#define A(i) Np + (i) * WIDTH +#define ADD(i) add64(p, A(i), &c) +#define NEXT p += WIDTH; carry64(p, &c) +#define LAST p += WIDTH; do *p = 0; while (++p < end) +#define RESET last_carry[0] = c; c = 0; p = Np +#define ADD_LAST add64(p, last_carry, &c) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.1) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p192(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(192) * 2; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width)); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192_raw(N->p, expected_width); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *Np, size_t Nn) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0, last_carry[WIDTH] = { 0 }; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, *end; + + if (Nn != BITS_TO_LIMBS(192) * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + p = Np; + end = p + Nn; + + ADD(3); ADD(5); NEXT; // A0 += A3 + A5 + ADD(3); ADD(4); ADD(5); NEXT; // A1 += A3 + A4 + A5 + ADD(4); ADD(5); // A2 += A4 + A5 + + RESET; + + /* Use the reduction for the carry as well: + * 2^192 * last_carry = 2^64 * last_carry + last_carry mod P192 + * It can generate a carry. */ + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A0 += last_carry + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A1 += last_carry + // A2 += carry + + RESET; + + /* Use the reduction for the carry as well: + * 2^192 * last_carry = 2^64 * last_carry + last_carry mod P192 + */ + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A0 += last_carry + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A1 += last_carry + // A2 += carry + + LAST; + + return 0; +} + +#undef WIDTH +#undef A +#undef ADD +#undef NEXT +#undef LAST +#undef RESET +#undef ADD_LAST +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + +/* + * The reader is advised to first understand ecp_mod_p192() since the same + * general structure is used here, but with additional complications: + * (1) chunks of 32 bits, and (2) subtractions. + */ + +/* + * For these primes, we need to handle data in chunks of 32 bits. + * This makes it more complicated if we use 64 bits limbs in MPI, + * which prevents us from using a uniform access method as for p192. + * + * So, we define a mini abstraction layer to access 32 bit chunks, + * load them in 'cur' for work, and store them back from 'cur' when done. + * + * While at it, also define the size of N in terms of 32-bit chunks. + */ +#define LOAD32 cur = A(i); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) /* 32 bit */ + +#define MAX32 X_limbs +#define A(j) X[j] +#define STORE32 X[i] = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) cur; +#define STORE0 X[i] = 0; + +#else /* 64 bit */ + +#define MAX32 X_limbs * 2 +#define A(j) \ + (j) % 2 ? \ + (uint32_t) (X[(j) / 2] >> 32) : \ + (uint32_t) (X[(j) / 2]) +#define STORE32 \ + if (i % 2) { \ + X[i/2] &= 0x00000000FFFFFFFF; \ + X[i/2] |= (uint64_t) (cur) << 32; \ + } else { \ + X[i/2] &= 0xFFFFFFFF00000000; \ + X[i/2] |= (uint32_t) cur; \ + } + +#define STORE0 \ + if (i % 2) { \ + X[i/2] &= 0x00000000FFFFFFFF; \ + } else { \ + X[i/2] &= 0xFFFFFFFF00000000; \ + } + +#endif + +static inline int8_t extract_carry(int64_t cur) +{ + return (int8_t) (cur >> 32); +} + +#define ADD(j) cur += A(j) +#define SUB(j) cur -= A(j) + +#define ADD_CARRY(cc) cur += (cc) +#define SUB_CARRY(cc) cur -= (cc) + +#define ADD_LAST ADD_CARRY(last_c) +#define SUB_LAST SUB_CARRY(last_c) + +/* + * Helpers for the main 'loop' + */ +#define INIT(b) \ + int8_t c = 0, last_c; \ + int64_t cur; \ + size_t i = 0; \ + LOAD32; + +#define NEXT \ + c = extract_carry(cur); \ + STORE32; i++; LOAD32; \ + ADD_CARRY(c); + +#define RESET \ + c = extract_carry(cur); \ + last_c = c; \ + STORE32; i = 0; LOAD32; \ + c = 0; \ + +#define LAST \ + c = extract_carry(cur); \ + STORE32; i++; \ + if (c != 0) \ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; \ + while (i < MAX32) { STORE0; i++; } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p224 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.2) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p224(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(224) * 2; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width)); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224_raw(N->p, expected_width); +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs) +{ + if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(224) * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + INIT(224); + + SUB(7); SUB(11); NEXT; // A0 += -A7 - A11 + SUB(8); SUB(12); NEXT; // A1 += -A8 - A12 + SUB(9); SUB(13); NEXT; // A2 += -A9 - A13 + SUB(10); ADD(7); ADD(11); NEXT; // A3 += -A10 + A7 + A11 + SUB(11); ADD(8); ADD(12); NEXT; // A4 += -A11 + A8 + A12 + SUB(12); ADD(9); ADD(13); NEXT; // A5 += -A12 + A9 + A13 + SUB(13); ADD(10); // A6 += -A13 + A10 + + RESET; + + /* Use 2^224 = P + 2^96 - 1 to modulo reduce the final carry */ + SUB_LAST; NEXT; // A0 -= last_c + ; NEXT; // A1 + ; NEXT; // A2 + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A3 += last_c + ; NEXT; // A4 + ; NEXT; // A5 + // A6 + + /* The carry reduction cannot generate a carry + * (see commit 73e8553 for details)*/ + + LAST; + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p256 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.3) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p256(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(256) * 2; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width)); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256_raw(N->p, expected_width); +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs) +{ + if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(256) * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + INIT(256); + + ADD(8); ADD(9); + SUB(11); SUB(12); SUB(13); SUB(14); NEXT; // A0 + + ADD(9); ADD(10); + SUB(12); SUB(13); SUB(14); SUB(15); NEXT; // A1 + + ADD(10); ADD(11); + SUB(13); SUB(14); SUB(15); NEXT; // A2 + + ADD(11); ADD(11); ADD(12); ADD(12); ADD(13); + SUB(15); SUB(8); SUB(9); NEXT; // A3 + + ADD(12); ADD(12); ADD(13); ADD(13); ADD(14); + SUB(9); SUB(10); NEXT; // A4 + + ADD(13); ADD(13); ADD(14); ADD(14); ADD(15); + SUB(10); SUB(11); NEXT; // A5 + + ADD(14); ADD(14); ADD(15); ADD(15); ADD(14); ADD(13); + SUB(8); SUB(9); NEXT; // A6 + + ADD(15); ADD(15); ADD(15); ADD(8); + SUB(10); SUB(11); SUB(12); SUB(13); // A7 + + RESET; + + /* Use 2^224 * (2^32 - 1) + 2^192 + 2^96 - 1 + * to modulo reduce the final carry. */ + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A0 + ; NEXT; // A1 + ; NEXT; // A2 + SUB_LAST; NEXT; // A3 + ; NEXT; // A4 + ; NEXT; // A5 + SUB_LAST; NEXT; // A6 + ADD_LAST; // A7 + + RESET; + + /* Use 2^224 * (2^32 - 1) + 2^192 + 2^96 - 1 + * to modulo reduce the carry generated by the previous reduction. */ + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A0 + ; NEXT; // A1 + ; NEXT; // A2 + SUB_LAST; NEXT; // A3 + ; NEXT; // A4 + ; NEXT; // A5 + SUB_LAST; NEXT; // A6 + ADD_LAST; // A7 + + LAST; + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p384 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.4) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p384(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(384) * 2; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width)); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p384_raw(N->p, expected_width); +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p384_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs) +{ + if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(384) * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + INIT(384); + + ADD(12); ADD(21); ADD(20); + SUB(23); NEXT; // A0 + + ADD(13); ADD(22); ADD(23); + SUB(12); SUB(20); NEXT; // A1 + + ADD(14); ADD(23); + SUB(13); SUB(21); NEXT; // A2 + + ADD(15); ADD(12); ADD(20); ADD(21); + SUB(14); SUB(22); SUB(23); NEXT; // A3 + + ADD(21); ADD(21); ADD(16); ADD(13); ADD(12); ADD(20); ADD(22); + SUB(15); SUB(23); SUB(23); NEXT; // A4 + + ADD(22); ADD(22); ADD(17); ADD(14); ADD(13); ADD(21); ADD(23); + SUB(16); NEXT; // A5 + + ADD(23); ADD(23); ADD(18); ADD(15); ADD(14); ADD(22); + SUB(17); NEXT; // A6 + + ADD(19); ADD(16); ADD(15); ADD(23); + SUB(18); NEXT; // A7 + + ADD(20); ADD(17); ADD(16); + SUB(19); NEXT; // A8 + + ADD(21); ADD(18); ADD(17); + SUB(20); NEXT; // A9 + + ADD(22); ADD(19); ADD(18); + SUB(21); NEXT; // A10 + + ADD(23); ADD(20); ADD(19); + SUB(22); // A11 + + RESET; + + /* Use 2^384 = P + 2^128 + 2^96 - 2^32 + 1 to modulo reduce the final carry */ + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A0 + SUB_LAST; NEXT; // A1 + ; NEXT; // A2 + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A3 + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A4 + ; NEXT; // A5 + ; NEXT; // A6 + ; NEXT; // A7 + ; NEXT; // A8 + ; NEXT; // A9 + ; NEXT; // A10 + // A11 + + RESET; + + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A0 + SUB_LAST; NEXT; // A1 + ; NEXT; // A2 + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A3 + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A4 + ; NEXT; // A5 + ; NEXT; // A6 + ; NEXT; // A7 + ; NEXT; // A8 + ; NEXT; // A9 + ; NEXT; // A10 + // A11 + + LAST; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#undef LOAD32 +#undef MAX32 +#undef A +#undef STORE32 +#undef STORE0 +#undef ADD +#undef SUB +#undef ADD_CARRY +#undef SUB_CARRY +#undef ADD_LAST +#undef SUB_LAST +#undef INIT +#undef NEXT +#undef RESET +#undef LAST + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +/* Size of p521 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P521_WIDTH (521 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) + 1) + +/* Bits to keep in the most significant mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P521_MASK 0x01FF + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p521 = 2^521 - 1 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.5) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p521(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(521) * 2; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width)); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p521_raw(N->p, expected_width); +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p521_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint carry = 0; + + if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(521) * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Step 1: Reduction to P521_WIDTH limbs */ + /* Helper references for bottom part of X */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *X0 = X; + size_t X0_limbs = P521_WIDTH; + /* Helper references for top part of X */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *X1 = X + X0_limbs; + size_t X1_limbs = X_limbs - X0_limbs; + /* Split X as X0 + 2^P521_WIDTH X1 and compute X0 + 2^(biL - 9) X1. + * (We are using that 2^P521_WIDTH = 2^(512 + biL) and that + * 2^(512 + biL) X1 = 2^(biL - 9) X1 mod P521.) + * The high order limb of the result will be held in carry and the rest + * in X0 (that is the result will be represented as + * 2^P521_WIDTH carry + X0). + * + * Also, note that the resulting carry is either 0 or 1: + * X0 < 2^P521_WIDTH = 2^(512 + biL) and X1 < 2^(P521_WIDTH-biL) = 2^512 + * therefore + * X0 + 2^(biL - 9) X1 < 2^(512 + biL) + 2^(512 + biL - 9) + * which in turn is less than 2 * 2^(512 + biL). + */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint shift = ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1u) << (biL - 9); + carry = mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(X0, X0_limbs, X1, X1_limbs, shift); + /* Set X to X0 (by clearing the top part). */ + memset(X1, 0, X1_limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); + + /* Step 2: Reduction modulo P521 + * + * At this point X is reduced to P521_WIDTH limbs. What remains is to add + * the carry (that is 2^P521_WIDTH carry) and to reduce mod P521. */ + + /* 2^P521_WIDTH carry = 2^(512 + biL) carry = 2^(biL - 9) carry mod P521. + * Also, recall that carry is either 0 or 1. */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint addend = carry << (biL - 9); + /* Keep the top 9 bits and reduce the rest, using 2^521 = 1 mod P521. */ + addend += (X[P521_WIDTH - 1] >> 9); + X[P521_WIDTH - 1] &= P521_MASK; + + /* Reuse the top part of X (already zeroed) as a helper array for + * carrying out the addition. */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *addend_arr = X + P521_WIDTH; + addend_arr[0] = addend; + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, X, addend_arr, P521_WIDTH); + /* Both addends were less than P521 therefore X < 2 * P521. (This also means + * that the result fit in P521_WIDTH limbs and there won't be any carry.) */ + + /* Clear the reused part of X. */ + addend_arr[0] = 0; + + return 0; +} + +#undef P521_WIDTH +#undef P521_MASK + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + +/* Size of p255 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P255_WIDTH (255 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) + 1) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p255 = 2^255 - 19 + * Write N as A0 + 2^256 A1, return A0 + 38 * A1 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p255(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(255) * 2; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width)); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p255_raw(N->p, expected_width); +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p255_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_Limbs) +{ + + if (X_Limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(255) * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_uint *carry = mbedtls_calloc(P255_WIDTH, ciL); + if (carry == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + /* Step 1: Reduction to P255_WIDTH limbs */ + if (X_Limbs > P255_WIDTH) { + /* Helper references for top part of X */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint * const A1 = X + P255_WIDTH; + const size_t A1_limbs = X_Limbs - P255_WIDTH; + + /* X = A0 + 38 * A1, capture carry out */ + *carry = mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(X, P255_WIDTH, A1, A1_limbs, 38); + /* Clear top part */ + memset(A1, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * A1_limbs); + } + + /* Step 2: Reduce to <2p + * Split as A0 + 2^255*c, with c a scalar, and compute A0 + 19*c */ + *carry <<= 1; + *carry += (X[P255_WIDTH - 1] >> (biL - 1)); + *carry *= 19; + + /* Clear top bit */ + X[P255_WIDTH - 1] <<= 1; X[P255_WIDTH - 1] >>= 1; + /* Since the top bit for X has been cleared 0 + 0 + Carry + * will not overflow. + * + * Furthermore for 2p = 2^256-38. When a carry propagation on the highest + * limb occurs, X > 2^255 and all the remaining bits on the limb are zero. + * - If X < 2^255 ==> X < 2p + * - If X > 2^255 ==> X < 2^256 - 2^255 < 2p */ + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, X, carry, P255_WIDTH); + + mbedtls_free(carry); + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + +/* Size of p448 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P448_WIDTH (448 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) + +/* Number of limbs fully occupied by 2^224 (max), and limbs used by it (min) */ +#define DIV_ROUND_UP(X, Y) (((X) + (Y) -1) / (Y)) +#define P224_SIZE (224 / 8) +#define P224_WIDTH_MIN (P224_SIZE / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) +#define P224_WIDTH_MAX DIV_ROUND_UP(P224_SIZE, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) +#define P224_UNUSED_BITS ((P224_WIDTH_MAX * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * 8) - 224) + +static int ecp_mod_p448(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(448) * 2; + + /* This is required as some tests and use cases do not pass in a Bignum of + * the correct size, and expect the growth to be done automatically, which + * will no longer happen. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width)); + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p448_raw(N->p, N->n); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p448 = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1 + * Write X as A0 + 2^448 A1 and A1 as B0 + 2^224 B1, and return A0 + A1 + B1 + + * (B0 + B1) * 2^224. This is different to the reference implementation of + * Curve448, which uses its own special 56-bit limbs rather than a generic + * bignum library. We could squeeze some extra speed out on 32-bit machines by + * splitting N up into 32-bit limbs and doing the arithmetic using the limbs + * directly as we do for the NIST primes above, but for 64-bit targets it should + * use half the number of operations if we do the reduction with 224-bit limbs, + * since mpi_core_add will then use 64-bit adds. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p448_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs) +{ + size_t round; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(448) * 2) { + return 0; + } + + size_t M_limbs = X_limbs - (P448_WIDTH); + + if (M_limbs > P448_WIDTH) { + /* Shouldn't be called with X larger than 2^896! */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Both M and Q require an extra limb to catch carries. */ + M_limbs++; + + const size_t Q_limbs = M_limbs; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *M = NULL; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *Q = NULL; + + M = mbedtls_calloc(M_limbs, ciL); + + if (M == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + Q = mbedtls_calloc(Q_limbs, ciL); + + if (Q == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* M = A1 */ + memset(M, 0, (M_limbs * ciL)); + /* Do not copy into the overflow limb, as this would read past the end of + * X. */ + memcpy(M, X + P448_WIDTH, ((M_limbs - 1) * ciL)); + + /* X = A0 */ + memset(X + P448_WIDTH, 0, ((M_limbs - 1) * ciL)); + + /* X = X + M = A0 + A1 */ + /* Carry here fits in oversize X. Oversize M means it will get + * added in, not returned as carry. */ + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, X, M, M_limbs); + + /* Q = B1 = M >> 224 */ + memcpy(Q, (char *) M + P224_SIZE, P224_SIZE); + memset((char *) Q + P224_SIZE, 0, P224_SIZE); + + /* X = X + Q = (A0 + A1) + B1 + * Oversize Q catches potential carry here when X is already max 448 bits. + */ + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, X, Q, Q_limbs); + + /* M = B0 */ +#ifdef MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 + M[P224_WIDTH_MIN] &= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint)-1) >> (P224_UNUSED_BITS); + #endif + memset(M + P224_WIDTH_MAX, 0, ((M_limbs - P224_WIDTH_MAX) * ciL)); + + /* M = M + Q = B0 + B1 */ + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(M, M, Q, Q_limbs); + + /* M = (B0 + B1) * 2^224 */ + /* Shifted carry bit from the addition fits in oversize M. */ + memmove((char *) M + P224_SIZE, M, P224_SIZE + ciL); + memset(M, 0, P224_SIZE); + + /* X = X + M = (A0 + A1 + B1) + (B0 + B1) * 2^224 */ + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, X, M, M_limbs); + + /* In the second and third rounds A1 and B0 have at most 1 non-zero limb and + * B1=0. + * Using this we need to calculate: + * A0 + A1 + B1 + (B0 + B1) * 2^224 = A0 + A1 + B0 * 2^224. */ + for (round = 0; round < 2; ++round) { + + /* M = A1 */ + memset(M, 0, (M_limbs * ciL)); + memcpy(M, X + P448_WIDTH, ((M_limbs - 1) * ciL)); + + /* X = A0 */ + memset(X + P448_WIDTH, 0, ((M_limbs - 1) * ciL)); + + /* M = A1 + B0 * 2^224 + * We know that only one limb of A1 will be non-zero and that it will be + * limb 0. We also know that B0 is the bottom 224 bits of A1 (which is + * then shifted up 224 bits), so, given M is currently A1 this turns + * into: + * M = M + (M << 224) + * As the single non-zero limb in B0 will be A1 limb 0 shifted up by 224 + * bits, we can just move that into the right place, shifted up + * accordingly.*/ + M[P224_WIDTH_MIN] = M[0] << (224 & (biL - 1)); + + /* X = A0 + (A1 + B0 * 2^224) */ + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, X, M, M_limbs); + } + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_free(M); + mbedtls_free(Q); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo P = 2^s - R, + * with R about 33 bits, used by the Koblitz curves. + * + * Write X as A0 + 2^224 A1, return A0 + R * A1. + */ +#define P_KOBLITZ_R (8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) // Limbs in R + +static inline int ecp_mod_koblitz(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + size_t X_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *R, + size_t bits) +{ + int ret = 0; + + /* Determine if A1 is aligned to limb bitsize. If not then the used limbs + * of P, A0 and A1 must be set accordingly and there is a middle limb + * which is shared by A0 and A1 and need to handle accordingly. + */ + size_t shift = bits % biL; + size_t adjust = (shift + biL - 1) / biL; + size_t P_limbs = bits / biL + adjust; + + mbedtls_mpi_uint *A1 = mbedtls_calloc(P_limbs, ciL); + if (A1 == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + /* Create a buffer to store the value of `R * A1` */ + size_t R_limbs = P_KOBLITZ_R; + size_t M_limbs = P_limbs + R_limbs; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *M = mbedtls_calloc(M_limbs, ciL); + if (M == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = 0; + if (adjust != 0) { + mask = ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << shift) - 1; + } + + /* Two passes are needed to reduce the value of `A0 + R * A1` and then + * we need an additional one to reduce the possible overflow during + * the addition. + */ + for (size_t pass = 0; pass < 3; pass++) { + /* Copy A1 */ + memcpy(A1, X + P_limbs - adjust, P_limbs * ciL); + + /* Shift A1 to be aligned */ + if (shift != 0) { + mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_r(A1, P_limbs, shift); + } + + /* Zeroize the A1 part of the shared limb */ + if (mask != 0) { + X[P_limbs - 1] &= mask; + } + + /* X = A0 + * Zeroize the A1 part of X to keep only the A0 part. + */ + for (size_t i = P_limbs; i < X_limbs; i++) { + X[i] = 0; + } + + /* X = A0 + R * A1 */ + mbedtls_mpi_core_mul(M, A1, P_limbs, R, R_limbs); + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, X, M, P_limbs + R_limbs); + + /* Carry can not be generated since R is a 33-bit value and stored in + * 64 bits. The result value of the multiplication is at most + * P length + 33 bits in length and the result value of the addition + * is at most P length + 34 bits in length. So the result of the + * addition always fits in P length + 64 bits. + */ + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_free(M); + mbedtls_free(A1); + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192k1 = 2^192 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^3 + 1 = 0x01000011C9 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p192k1(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(192) * 2; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width)); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192k1_raw(N->p, expected_width); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs) +{ + static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x11, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00) + }; + + if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(192) * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return ecp_mod_koblitz(X, X_limbs, Rp, 192); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p224k1 = 2^224 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^11 + 2^9 + 2^7 + 2^4 + 2 + 1 = 0x0100001A93 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p224k1(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(224) * 2; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width)); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224k1_raw(N->p, expected_width); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs) +{ + static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x1A, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00) + }; + + if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(224) * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return ecp_mod_koblitz(X, X_limbs, Rp, 224); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p256k1 = 2^256 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^9 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^4 + 1 = 0x01000003D1 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p256k1(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(256) * 2; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width)); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256k1_raw(N->p, expected_width); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs) +{ + static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00) + }; + + if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(256) * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return ecp_mod_koblitz(X, X_limbs, Rp, 256); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_modulus_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id id, + const mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type ctype) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_modp_fn modp = NULL; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p = NULL; + size_t p_limbs; + + if (!(ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE || \ + ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + switch (id) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) + modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192_raw; +#endif + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp192r1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp192r1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp192r1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp192r1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) + modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224_raw; +#endif + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp224r1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp224r1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp224r1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp224r1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) + modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256_raw; +#endif + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp256r1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp256r1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp256r1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp256r1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) + modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p384_raw; +#endif + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp384r1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp384r1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp384r1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp384r1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) + modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p521_raw; +#endif + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp521r1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp521r1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp521r1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp521r1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) brainpoolP256r1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(brainpoolP256r1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) brainpoolP256r1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(brainpoolP256r1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) brainpoolP384r1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(brainpoolP384r1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) brainpoolP384r1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(brainpoolP384r1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) brainpoolP512r1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(brainpoolP512r1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) brainpoolP512r1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(brainpoolP512r1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { + modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p255_raw; + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) curve25519_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(curve25519_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) curve25519_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(curve25519_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { + modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192k1_raw; + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp192k1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp192k1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp192k1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp192k1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { + modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224k1_raw; + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp224k1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp224k1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp224k1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp224k1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { + modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256k1_raw; + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp256k1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp256k1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp256k1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp256k1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { + modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p448_raw; + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) curve448_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(curve448_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) curve448_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(curve448_n)); + } + break; +#endif + + default: + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (modp != NULL) { + if (mbedtls_mpi_mod_optred_modulus_setup(N, p, p_limbs, modp)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + } else { + if (mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup(N, p, p_limbs)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + } + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +mbedtls_ecp_variant mbedtls_ecp_get_variant(void) +{ + return MBEDTLS_ECP_VARIANT_WITH_MPI_UINT; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecp_internal.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ecp_internal_alt.h similarity index 93% rename from vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecp_internal.h rename to vendor/mbedtls/library/ecp_internal_alt.h index acaaa087d6..668edc74c9 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecp_internal.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ecp_internal_alt.h @@ -1,24 +1,12 @@ /** - * \file ecp_internal.h + * \file ecp_internal_alt.h * * \brief Function declarations for alternative implementation of elliptic curve * point arithmetic. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* @@ -59,11 +47,7 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_H #define MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) @@ -300,4 +284,4 @@ int mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_mxz(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ -#endif /* ecp_internal.h */ +#endif /* ecp_internal_alt.h */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ecp_invasive.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ecp_invasive.h index d6f6f9565e..ff9f9ecf1d 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ecp_invasive.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ecp_invasive.h @@ -9,43 +9,39 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_ECP_INVASIVE_H #define MBEDTLS_ECP_INVASIVE_H #include "common.h" #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "bignum_mod.h" #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/* + * Curve modulus types + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_NONE = 0, + MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE, + MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR +} mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type; + +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_ECP_VARIANT_NONE = 0, + MBEDTLS_ECP_VARIANT_WITH_MPI_STRUCT, + MBEDTLS_ECP_VARIANT_WITH_MPI_UINT +} mbedtls_ecp_variant; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) -/* Preconditions: - * - bits is a multiple of 64 or is 224 - * - c is -1 or -2 - * - 0 <= N < 2^bits - * - N has room for bits plus one limb +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) + +/** Queries the ecp variant. * - * Behavior: - * Set N to c * 2^bits + old_value_of_N. + * \return The id of the ecp variant. */ -void mbedtls_ecp_fix_negative(mbedtls_mpi *N, signed char c, size_t bits); -#endif +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +mbedtls_ecp_variant mbedtls_ecp_get_variant(void); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) /** Generate a private key on a Montgomery curve (Curve25519 or Curve448). @@ -76,6 +72,254 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_mx(size_t high_bit, #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + +/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.1) + * + * This operation expects a 384 bit MPI and the result of the reduction + * is a 192 bit MPI. + * + * \param[in,out] Np The address of the MPI to be converted. + * Must have twice as many limbs as the modulus. + * Upon return this holds the reduced value. The bitlength + * of the reduced value is the same as that of the modulus + * (192 bits). + * \param[in] Nn The length of \p Np in limbs. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *Np, size_t Nn); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + +/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p224 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.2) + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. + * Must have exact limb size that stores a 448-bit MPI + * (double the bitlength of the modulus). + * Upon return holds the reduced value which is + * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus). + * The bitlength of the reduced value is the same as + * that of the modulus (224 bits). + * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X_limbs is not the + * limb size that sores a 448-bit MPI. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + +/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p256 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.3) + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. + * Must have exact limb size that stores a 512-bit MPI + * (double the bitlength of the modulus). + * Upon return holds the reduced value which is + * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus). + * The bitlength of the reduced value is the same as + * that of the modulus (256 bits). + * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X_limbs is not the + * limb size that sores a 512-bit MPI. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); + +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) + +/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p521 = 2^521 - 1 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.5) + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. + * Must have twice as many limbs as the modulus + * (the modulus is 521 bits long). Upon return this + * holds the reduced value. The reduced value is + * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus). + * and its the bitlength is one plus the bitlength + * of the modulus. + * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X_limbs does not have + * twice as many limbs as the modulus. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p521_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + +/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p384 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.4) + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. + * Must have exact limb size that stores a 768-bit MPI + * (double the bitlength of the modulus). + * Upon return holds the reduced value which is + * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus). + * The bitlength of the reduced value is the same as + * that of the modulus (384 bits). + * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p N in limbs. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p N_n does not have + * twice as many limbs as the modulus. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p384_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + +/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192k1 = 2^192 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^3 + 1 = 0x01000011C9 + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. + * Must have exact limb size that stores a 384-bit MPI + * (double the bitlength of the modulus). + * Upon return holds the reduced value which is + * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus). + * The bitlength of the reduced value is the same as + * that of the modulus (192 bits). + * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X does not have + * twice as many limbs as the modulus. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + +/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p224k1 = 2^224 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^11 + 2^9 + 2^7 + 2^4 + 2 + 1 = 0x0100001A93 + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. + * Must have exact limb size that stores a 448-bit MPI + * (double the bitlength of the modulus). + * Upon return holds the reduced value which is + * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus). + * The bitlength of the reduced value is the same as + * that of the modulus (224 bits). + * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X does not have + * twice as many limbs as the modulus. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + +/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p256k1 = 2^256 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^9 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^4 + 1 = 0x01000003D1 + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. + * Must have exact limb size that stores a 512-bit MPI + * (double the bitlength of the modulus). + * Upon return holds the reduced value which is + * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus). + * The bitlength of the reduced value is the same as + * that of the modulus (256 bits). + * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X does not have + * twice as many limbs as the modulus. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + +/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p255 = 2^255 - 19 + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. + * Must have exact limb size that stores a 510-bit MPI + * (double the bitlength of the modulus). + * Upon return holds the reduced value which is + * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus). + * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X does not have + * twice as many limbs as the modulus. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p255_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + +/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p448 = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1 + * Write X as A0 + 2^448 A1 and A1 as B0 + 2^224 B1, and return A0 + A1 + B1 + + * (B0 + B1) * 2^224. + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. + * Must have exact limb size that stores a 896-bit MPI + * (double the bitlength of the modulus). Upon return + * holds the reduced value which is in range `0 <= X < + * N` (where N is the modulus). The bitlength of the + * reduced value is the same as that of the modulus + * (448 bits). + * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs. + * + * \return \c 0 on Success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X does not have + * twice as many limbs as the modulus. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation + * failed. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p448_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + +/** Initialise a modulus with hard-coded const curve data. + * + * \note The caller is responsible for the \p N modulus' memory. + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free(&N) should be invoked at the + * end of its lifecycle. + * + * \param[in,out] N The address of the modulus structure to populate. + * Must be initialized. + * \param[in] id The mbedtls_ecp_group_id for which to initialise the modulus. + * \param[in] ctype The mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type identifier for a coordinate modulus (P) + * or a scalar modulus (N). + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the given MPIs do not + * have the correct number of limbs. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_modulus_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id id, + const mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type ctype); + #endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INVASIVE_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/entropy.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/entropy.c index e9a7ae63d3..e3bc8516e2 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/entropy.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/entropy.c @@ -2,37 +2,17 @@ * Entropy accumulator implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) -#warning "**** WARNING! MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined! " -#warning "**** THIS BUILD HAS NO DEFINED ENTROPY SOURCES " -#warning "**** THIS BUILD IS *NOT* SUITABLE FOR PRODUCTION USE " -#endif - #include "mbedtls/entropy.h" -#include "mbedtls/entropy_poll.h" +#include "entropy_poll.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" -#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" -#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" #include @@ -42,12 +22,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) -#include "mbedtls/havege.h" -#endif - #define ENTROPY_MAX_LOOP 256 /**< Maximum amount to loop before error */ void mbedtls_entropy_init(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx) @@ -60,39 +34,17 @@ void mbedtls_entropy_init(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx) #endif ctx->accumulator_started = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) - mbedtls_sha512_init(&ctx->accumulator); -#else - mbedtls_sha256_init(&ctx->accumulator); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) - mbedtls_havege_init(&ctx->havege_data); -#endif + mbedtls_md_init(&ctx->accumulator); /* Reminder: Update ENTROPY_HAVE_STRONG in the test files * when adding more strong entropy sources here. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) - mbedtls_entropy_add_source(ctx, mbedtls_null_entropy_poll, NULL, - 1, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG); -#endif - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) mbedtls_entropy_add_source(ctx, mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll, NULL, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) - mbedtls_entropy_add_source(ctx, mbedtls_hardclock_poll, NULL, - MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDCLOCK, - MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) - mbedtls_entropy_add_source(ctx, mbedtls_havege_poll, &ctx->havege_data, - MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HAVEGE, - MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG); -#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) mbedtls_entropy_add_source(ctx, mbedtls_hardware_poll, NULL, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE, @@ -115,17 +67,10 @@ void mbedtls_entropy_free(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx) return; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) - mbedtls_havege_free(&ctx->havege_data); -#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) mbedtls_mutex_free(&ctx->mutex); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) - mbedtls_sha512_free(&ctx->accumulator); -#else - mbedtls_sha256_free(&ctx->accumulator); -#endif + mbedtls_md_free(&ctx->accumulator); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) ctx->initial_entropy_run = 0; #endif @@ -182,15 +127,10 @@ static int entropy_update(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, unsigned char source_id, int ret = 0; if (use_len > MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_ret(data, len, tmp, 0)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MD), + data, len, tmp)) != 0) { goto cleanup; } -#else - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_ret(data, len, tmp, 0)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } -#endif p = tmp; use_len = MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE; } @@ -203,29 +143,22 @@ static int entropy_update(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, unsigned char source_id, * it is sufficient to start the accumulator here only because all calls to * gather entropy eventually execute this code. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) - if (ctx->accumulator_started == 0 && - (ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(&ctx->accumulator, 0)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } else { - ctx->accumulator_started = 1; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(&ctx->accumulator, header, 2)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(&ctx->accumulator, p, use_len); -#else - if (ctx->accumulator_started == 0 && - (ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(&ctx->accumulator, 0)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } else { + if (ctx->accumulator_started == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&ctx->accumulator, + mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MD), 0); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&ctx->accumulator); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } ctx->accumulator_started = 1; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(&ctx->accumulator, header, 2)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&ctx->accumulator, header, 2)) != 0) { goto cleanup; } - ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(&ctx->accumulator, p, use_len); -#endif + ret = mbedtls_md_update(&ctx->accumulator, p, use_len); cleanup: mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); @@ -386,62 +319,41 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_func(void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len) memset(buf, 0, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) /* * Note that at this stage it is assumed that the accumulator was started * in a previous call to entropy_update(). If this is not guaranteed, the * code below will fail. */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret(&ctx->accumulator, buf)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&ctx->accumulator, buf)) != 0) { goto exit; } /* * Reset accumulator and counters and recycle existing entropy */ - mbedtls_sha512_free(&ctx->accumulator); - mbedtls_sha512_init(&ctx->accumulator); - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(&ctx->accumulator, 0)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(&ctx->accumulator, buf, - MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - - /* - * Perform second SHA-512 on entropy - */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_ret(buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, - buf, 0)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } -#else /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret(&ctx->accumulator, buf)) != 0) { + mbedtls_md_free(&ctx->accumulator); + mbedtls_md_init(&ctx->accumulator); + ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&ctx->accumulator, + mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MD), 0); + if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } - - /* - * Reset accumulator and counters and recycle existing entropy - */ - mbedtls_sha256_free(&ctx->accumulator); - mbedtls_sha256_init(&ctx->accumulator); - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(&ctx->accumulator, 0)) != 0) { + ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&ctx->accumulator); + if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(&ctx->accumulator, buf, - MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&ctx->accumulator, buf, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE)) != 0) { goto exit; } /* - * Perform second SHA-256 on entropy + * Perform second hashing on entropy */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_ret(buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, - buf, 0)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MD), + buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, buf)) != 0) { goto exit; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR */ for (i = 0; i < ctx->source_count; i++) { ctx->source[i].size = 0; @@ -503,6 +415,9 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const char *pa goto exit; } + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL); + if (fwrite(buf, 1, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, f) != MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR; goto exit; @@ -531,6 +446,9 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_update_seed_file(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const char *p return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR; } + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL); + fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END); n = (size_t) ftell(f); fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET); @@ -558,7 +476,6 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_update_seed_file(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const char *p #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) /* * Dummy source function */ @@ -572,7 +489,6 @@ static int entropy_dummy_source(void *data, unsigned char *output, return 0; } -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) @@ -683,18 +599,15 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test(int verbose) int mbedtls_entropy_self_test(int verbose) { int ret = 1; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) mbedtls_entropy_context ctx; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE] = { 0 }; unsigned char acc[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE] = { 0 }; size_t i, j; -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY */ if (verbose != 0) { mbedtls_printf(" ENTROPY test: "); } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) mbedtls_entropy_init(&ctx); /* First do a gather to make sure we have default sources */ @@ -745,7 +658,6 @@ int mbedtls_entropy_self_test(int verbose) cleanup: mbedtls_entropy_free(&ctx); -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY */ if (verbose != 0) { if (ret != 0) { diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c index 3420616a06..794ee03a83 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c @@ -2,22 +2,10 @@ * Platform-specific and custom entropy polling functions * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ -#if defined(__linux__) && !defined(_GNU_SOURCE) +#if defined(__linux__) || defined(__midipix__) && !defined(_GNU_SOURCE) /* Ensure that syscall() is available even when compiling with -std=c99 */ #define _GNU_SOURCE #endif @@ -29,54 +17,53 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) #include "mbedtls/entropy.h" -#include "mbedtls/entropy_poll.h" +#include "entropy_poll.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) #include "mbedtls/timing.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) -#include "mbedtls/havege.h" -#endif #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) #if !defined(unix) && !defined(__unix__) && !defined(__unix) && \ !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__QNXNTO__) && \ - !defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__) + !defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__) && !defined(__MVS__) #error \ - "Platform entropy sources only work on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY in config.h" + "Platform entropy sources only work on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY in mbedtls_config.h" #endif #if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) -#if !defined(_WIN32_WINNT) -#define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0400 -#endif #include -#include +#include +#include int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll(void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen) { - HCRYPTPROV provider; ((void) data); *olen = 0; - if (CryptAcquireContext(&provider, NULL, NULL, - PROV_RSA_FULL, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT) == FALSE) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; - } + /* + * BCryptGenRandom takes ULONG for size, which is smaller than size_t on + * 64-bit Windows platforms. Extract entropy in chunks of len (dependent + * on ULONG_MAX) size. + */ + while (len != 0) { + unsigned long ulong_bytes = + (len > ULONG_MAX) ? ULONG_MAX : (unsigned long) len; + + if (!BCRYPT_SUCCESS(BCryptGenRandom(NULL, output, ulong_bytes, + BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG))) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; + } - if (CryptGenRandom(provider, (DWORD) len, output) == FALSE) { - CryptReleaseContext(provider, 0); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; + *olen += ulong_bytes; + len -= ulong_bytes; } - CryptReleaseContext(provider, 0); - *olen = len; - return 0; } #else /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ @@ -101,7 +88,7 @@ static int getrandom_wrapper(void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags) memset(buf, 0, buflen); #endif #endif - return syscall(SYS_getrandom, buf, buflen, flags); + return (int) syscall(SYS_getrandom, buf, buflen, flags); } #endif /* SYS_getrandom */ #endif /* __linux__ || __midipix__ */ @@ -115,7 +102,7 @@ static int getrandom_wrapper(void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags) #define HAVE_GETRANDOM static int getrandom_wrapper(void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags) { - return getrandom(buf, buflen, flags); + return (int) getrandom(buf, buflen, flags); } #endif /* (__FreeBSD__ && __FreeBSD_version >= 1200000) || (__DragonFly__ && __DragonFly_version >= 500700) */ @@ -169,7 +156,7 @@ int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll(void *data, #if defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM) ret = getrandom_wrapper(output, len, 0); if (ret >= 0) { - *olen = ret; + *olen = (size_t) ret; return 0; } else if (errno != ENOSYS) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; @@ -196,6 +183,9 @@ int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll(void *data, return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; } + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(file, NULL); + read_len = fread(output, 1, len, file); if (read_len != len) { fclose(file); @@ -211,60 +201,6 @@ int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll(void *data, #endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ #endif /* !MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) -int mbedtls_null_entropy_poll(void *data, - unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen) -{ - ((void) data); - ((void) output); - - *olen = 0; - if (len < sizeof(unsigned char)) { - return 0; - } - - output[0] = 0; - *olen = sizeof(unsigned char); - return 0; -} -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) -int mbedtls_hardclock_poll(void *data, - unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen) -{ - unsigned long timer = mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); - ((void) data); - *olen = 0; - - if (len < sizeof(unsigned long)) { - return 0; - } - - memcpy(output, &timer, sizeof(unsigned long)); - *olen = sizeof(unsigned long); - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) -int mbedtls_havege_poll(void *data, - unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen) -{ - mbedtls_havege_state *hs = (mbedtls_havege_state *) data; - *olen = 0; - - if (mbedtls_havege_random(hs, output, len) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; - } - - *olen = len; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) int mbedtls_nv_seed_poll(void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen) diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6b4aec03e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.h @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +/** + * \file entropy_poll.h + * + * \brief Platform-specific and custom entropy polling functions + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_POLL_H +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_POLL_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * Default thresholds for built-in sources, in bytes + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM 32 /**< Minimum for platform source */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE) +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE 32 /**< Minimum for the hardware source */ +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) +/** + * \brief Platform-specific entropy poll callback + */ +int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll(void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) +/** + * \brief Entropy poll callback for a hardware source + * + * \warning This is not provided by Mbed TLS! + * See \c MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT in mbedtls_config.h. + * + * \note This must accept NULL as its first argument. + */ +int mbedtls_hardware_poll(void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) +/** + * \brief Entropy poll callback for a non-volatile seed file + * + * \note This must accept NULL as its first argument. + */ +int mbedtls_nv_seed_poll(void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen); +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* entropy_poll.h */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/error.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/error.c index 6aa4b92198..84b637aeb2 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/error.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/error.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * Error message information * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" @@ -34,10 +22,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/aes.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#include "mbedtls/arc4.h" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) #include "mbedtls/aria.h" #endif @@ -54,10 +38,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) -#include "mbedtls/blowfish.h" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) #include "mbedtls/camellia.h" #endif @@ -78,10 +58,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) -#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) #include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" #endif @@ -106,6 +82,10 @@ #include "mbedtls/error.h" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) #include "mbedtls/gcm.h" #endif @@ -118,20 +98,12 @@ #include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) -#include "mbedtls/md.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) -#include "mbedtls/md2.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) -#include "mbedtls/md4.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) +#include "mbedtls/lms.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) -#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +#include "mbedtls/md.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) @@ -142,10 +114,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) -#include "mbedtls/padlock.h" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) #include "mbedtls/pem.h" #endif @@ -162,18 +130,14 @@ #include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C) +#include "mbedtls/pkcs7.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) #include "mbedtls/poly1305.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) -#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" #endif @@ -186,6 +150,10 @@ #include "mbedtls/sha256.h" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) +#include "mbedtls/sha3.h" +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) #include "mbedtls/sha512.h" #endif @@ -202,10 +170,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/x509.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_C) -#include "mbedtls/xtea.h" -#endif - const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code) { @@ -235,8 +199,6 @@ const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "CIPHER - Authentication failed (for AEAD modes)" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT): return( "CIPHER - The context is invalid. For example, because it was freed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "CIPHER - Cipher hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) @@ -258,8 +220,6 @@ const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "DHM - Allocation of memory failed" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR): return( "DHM - Read or write of file failed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "DHM - DHM hardware accelerator failed" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED): return( "DHM - Setting the modulus and generator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */ @@ -281,8 +241,6 @@ const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "ECP - Invalid private or public key" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH): return( "ECP - The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "ECP - The ECP hardware accelerator failed" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS): return( "ECP - Operation in progress, call again with the same parameters to continue" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ @@ -296,8 +254,6 @@ const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "MD - Failed to allocate memory" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR): return( "MD - Opening or reading of file failed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "MD - MD hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) @@ -350,8 +306,8 @@ const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "PK - Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA disabled for RSA key" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH): return( "PK - The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "PK - PK hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "PK - The output buffer is too small" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) @@ -376,6 +332,33 @@ const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "PKCS5 - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT): + return( "PKCS7 - The format is invalid, e.g. different type expected" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "PKCS7 - Unavailable feature, e.g. anything other than signed data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_VERSION): + return( "PKCS7 - The PKCS #7 version element is invalid or cannot be parsed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO): + return( "PKCS7 - The PKCS #7 content info is invalid or cannot be parsed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_ALG): + return( "PKCS7 - The algorithm tag or value is invalid or cannot be parsed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CERT): + return( "PKCS7 - The certificate tag or value is invalid or cannot be parsed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNATURE): + return( "PKCS7 - Error parsing the signature" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO): + return( "PKCS7 - Error parsing the signer's info" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "PKCS7 - Input invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "PKCS7 - Allocation of memory failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL): + return( "PKCS7 - Verification Failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_CERT_DATE_INVALID): + return( "PKCS7 - The PKCS #7 date issued/expired dates are invalid" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA): return( "RSA - Bad input parameters to function" ); @@ -395,13 +378,11 @@ const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "RSA - The output buffer for decryption is not large enough" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED): return( "RSA - The random generator failed to generate non-zeros" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION): - return( "RSA - The implementation does not offer the requested operation, for example, because of security violations or lack of functionality" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "RSA - RSA hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS): + return( "SSL - A cryptographic operation is in progress. Try again later" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): return( "SSL - The requested feature is not available" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA): @@ -412,18 +393,16 @@ const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "SSL - An invalid SSL record was received" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF): return( "SSL - The connection indicated an EOF" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_CIPHER): - return( "SSL - An unknown cipher was received" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN): - return( "SSL - The server has no ciphersuites in common with the client" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR): + return( "SSL - A message could not be parsed due to a syntactic error" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG): return( "SSL - No RNG was provided to the SSL module" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE): return( "SSL - No client certification received from the client, but required by the authentication mode" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE): - return( "SSL - Our own certificate(s) is/are too large to send in an SSL message" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED): - return( "SSL - The own certificate is not set, but needed by the server" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION): + return( "SSL - Client received an extended server hello containing an unsupported extension" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL): + return( "SSL - No ALPN protocols supported that the client advertises" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED): return( "SSL - The own private key or pre-shared key is not set, but needed" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED): @@ -432,46 +411,32 @@ const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "SSL - An unexpected message was received from our peer" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE): return( "SSL - A fatal alert message was received from our peer" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_VERIFY_FAILED): - return( "SSL - Verification of our peer failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME): + return( "SSL - No server could be identified matching the client's SNI" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY): return( "SSL - The peer notified us that the connection is going to be closed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO): - return( "SSL - Processing of the ClientHello handshake message failed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO): - return( "SSL - Processing of the ServerHello handshake message failed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE): + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE): return( "SSL - Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST): - return( "SSL - Processing of the CertificateRequest handshake message failed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE): - return( "SSL - Processing of the ServerKeyExchange handshake message failed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE): - return( "SSL - Processing of the ServerHelloDone handshake message failed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE): - return( "SSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP): - return( "SSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Read Public" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS): - return( "SSL - Processing of the ClientKeyExchange handshake message failed in DHM / ECDH Calculate Secret" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY): - return( "SSL - Processing of the CertificateVerify handshake message failed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC): - return( "SSL - Processing of the ChangeCipherSpec handshake message failed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED): - return( "SSL - Processing of the Finished handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET): + return( "SSL - * Received NewSessionTicket Post Handshake Message. This error code is experimental and may be changed or removed without notice" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA): + return( "SSL - Not possible to read early data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA): + return( "SSL - * Early data has been received as part of an on-going handshake. This error code can be returned only on server side if and only if early data has been enabled by means of the mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data() API. This error code can then be returned by mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), mbedtls_ssl_read() or mbedtls_ssl_write() if early data has been received as part of the handshake sequence they triggered. To read the early data, call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data()" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA): + return( "SSL - Not possible to write early data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CACHE_ENTRY_NOT_FOUND): + return( "SSL - Cache entry not found" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED): return( "SSL - Memory allocation failed" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): return( "SSL - Hardware acceleration function returned with error" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH): return( "SSL - Hardware acceleration function skipped / left alone data" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED): - return( "SSL - Processing of the compression / decompression failed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION): + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION): return( "SSL - Handshake protocol not within min/max boundaries" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET): - return( "SSL - Processing of the NewSessionTicket handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE): + return( "SSL - The handshake negotiation failed" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED): return( "SSL - Session ticket has expired" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH): @@ -488,8 +453,6 @@ const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "SSL - DTLS client must retry for hello verification" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): return( "SSL - A buffer is too small to receive or write a message" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE): - return( "SSL - None of the common ciphersuites is usable (eg, no suitable certificate, see debug messages)" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ): return( "SSL - No data of requested type currently available on underlying transport" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE): @@ -502,8 +465,8 @@ const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "SSL - Record header looks valid but is not expected" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL): return( "SSL - The alert message received indicates a non-fatal error" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH): - return( "SSL - Couldn't set the hash for verifying CertificateVerify" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER): + return( "SSL - A field in a message was incorrect or inconsistent with other fields" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING): return( "SSL - Internal-only message signaling that further message-processing should be done" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS): @@ -514,12 +477,8 @@ const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "SSL - An encrypted DTLS-frame with an unexpected CID was received" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH): return( "SSL - An operation failed due to an unexpected version or configuration" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS): - return( "SSL - A cryptographic operation is in progress. Try again later" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG): return( "SSL - Invalid value in SSL config" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CACHE_ENTRY_NOT_FOUND): - return( "SSL - Cache entry not found" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) @@ -593,26 +552,13 @@ const char *mbedtls_low_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "AES - Invalid data input length" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA): return( "AES - Invalid input data" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): - return( "AES - Feature not available. For example, an unsupported AES key size" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "AES - AES hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARC4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "ARC4 - ARC4 hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA): return( "ARIA - Bad input data" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): return( "ARIA - Invalid data input length" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): - return( "ARIA - Feature not available. For example, an unsupported ARIA key size" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "ARIA - ARIA hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) @@ -658,22 +604,11 @@ const char *mbedtls_low_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "BIGNUM - Memory allocation failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA): - return( "BLOWFISH - Bad input data" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): - return( "BLOWFISH - Invalid data input length" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "BLOWFISH - Blowfish hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA): return( "CAMELLIA - Bad input data" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): return( "CAMELLIA - Invalid data input length" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "CAMELLIA - Camellia hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) @@ -681,17 +616,11 @@ const char *mbedtls_low_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "CCM - Bad input parameters to the function" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED): return( "CCM - Authenticated decryption failed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "CCM - CCM hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA): return( "CHACHA20 - Invalid input parameter(s)" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): - return( "CHACHA20 - Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implemented" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "CHACHA20 - Chacha20 hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) @@ -701,11 +630,6 @@ const char *mbedtls_low_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "CHACHAPOLY - Authenticated decryption failed: data was not authentic" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CMAC_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "CMAC - CMAC hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED): return( "CTR_DRBG - The entropy source failed" ); @@ -720,8 +644,6 @@ const char *mbedtls_low_level_strerr(int error_code) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): return( "DES - The data input has an invalid length" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "DES - DES hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) @@ -744,13 +666,20 @@ const char *mbedtls_low_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "ERROR - This is a bug in the library" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "PLATFORM - Hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED): + return( "PLATFORM - The requested feature is not supported by the platform" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED): return( "GCM - Authenticated decryption failed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "GCM - GCM hardware accelerator failed" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT): return( "GCM - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "GCM - An output buffer is too small" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) @@ -769,20 +698,18 @@ const char *mbedtls_low_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "HMAC_DRBG - The entropy source failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD2_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "MD2 - MD2 hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "MD4 - MD4 hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD5_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "MD5 - MD5 hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "LMS - Bad data has been input to an LMS function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_OUT_OF_PRIVATE_KEYS): + return( "LMS - Specified LMS key has utilised all of its private keys" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED): + return( "LMS - LMS signature verification failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "LMS - LMS failed to allocate space for a private key" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "LMS - Input/output buffer is too small to contain requited data" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_LMS_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED): @@ -820,68 +747,37 @@ const char *mbedtls_low_level_strerr(int error_code) return( "OID - output buffer is too small" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_OID_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED): - return( "PADLOCK - Input data should be aligned" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "PLATFORM - Hardware accelerator failed" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED): - return( "PLATFORM - The requested feature is not supported by the platform" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA): return( "POLY1305 - Invalid input parameter(s)" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): - return( "POLY1305 - Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implemented" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "POLY1305 - Poly1305 hardware accelerator failed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RIPEMD160_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "RIPEMD160 - RIPEMD160 hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "SHA1 - SHA-1 hardware accelerator failed" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA): return( "SHA1 - SHA-1 input data was malformed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "SHA256 - SHA-256 hardware accelerator failed" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA): return( "SHA256 - SHA-256 input data was malformed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA3_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "SHA3 - SHA-3 input data was malformed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA3_C */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "SHA512 - SHA-512 hardware accelerator failed" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA): return( "SHA512 - SHA-512 input data was malformed" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): - return( "THREADING - The selected feature is not available" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA): return( "THREADING - Bad input parameters to function" ); case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR): return( "THREADING - Locking / unlocking / free failed with error code" ); #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_C) - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): - return( "XTEA - The data input has an invalid length" ); - case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): - return( "XTEA - XTEA hardware accelerator failed" ); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_C */ /* End Auto-Generated Code. */ default: diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/gcm.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/gcm.c index 71e7b2e9bc..5dfac2349c 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/gcm.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/gcm.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * NIST SP800-38D compliant GCM implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* @@ -37,29 +25,69 @@ #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) +#include "block_cipher_internal.h" +#endif + #include #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) -#include "mbedtls/aesni.h" +#include "aesni.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) +#include "aesce.h" #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) -/* Parameter validation macros */ -#define GCM_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT) -#define GCM_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) +/* Used to select the acceleration mechanism */ +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_SMALLTABLE 0 +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_LARGETABLE 1 +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESNI 2 +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESCE 3 /* * Initialize a context */ void mbedtls_gcm_init(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx) { - GCM_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_gcm_context)); } +static inline void gcm_set_acceleration(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE) + ctx->acceleration = MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_LARGETABLE; +#else + ctx->acceleration = MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_SMALLTABLE; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) + /* With CLMUL support, we need only h, not the rest of the table */ + if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL)) { + ctx->acceleration = MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESNI; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE) + if (MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT()) { + ctx->acceleration = MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESCE; + } +#endif +} + +static inline void gcm_gen_table_rightshift(uint64_t dst[2], const uint64_t src[2]) +{ + uint8_t *u8Dst = (uint8_t *) dst; + uint8_t *u8Src = (uint8_t *) src; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(&src[1], 0) >> 1, &dst[1], 0); + u8Dst[8] |= (u8Src[7] & 0x01) << 7; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(&src[0], 0) >> 1, &dst[0], 0); + u8Dst[0] ^= (u8Src[15] & 0x01) ? 0xE1 : 0; +} + /* * Precompute small multiples of H, that is set * HH[i] || HL[i] = H times i, @@ -71,57 +99,61 @@ void mbedtls_gcm_init(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx) static int gcm_gen_table(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx) { int ret, i, j; - uint64_t hi, lo; - uint64_t vl, vh; - unsigned char h[16]; - size_t olen = 0; + uint64_t u64h[2] = { 0 }; + uint8_t *h = (uint8_t *) u64h; - memset(h, 0, 16); - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, h, 16, h, &olen)) != 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, h, h); +#else + size_t olen = 0; + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, h, 16, h, &olen); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { return ret; } - /* pack h as two 64-bits ints, big-endian */ - hi = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(h, 0); - lo = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(h, 4); - vh = (uint64_t) hi << 32 | lo; - - hi = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(h, 8); - lo = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(h, 12); - vl = (uint64_t) hi << 32 | lo; + gcm_set_acceleration(ctx); - /* 8 = 1000 corresponds to 1 in GF(2^128) */ - ctx->HL[8] = vl; - ctx->HH[8] = vh; + /* MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE/2 = 1000 corresponds to 1 in GF(2^128) */ + ctx->H[MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE/2][0] = u64h[0]; + ctx->H[MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE/2][1] = u64h[1]; + switch (ctx->acceleration) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) - /* With CLMUL support, we need only h, not the rest of the table */ - if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL)) { - return 0; - } + case MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESNI: + return 0; #endif - /* 0 corresponds to 0 in GF(2^128) */ - ctx->HH[0] = 0; - ctx->HL[0] = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE) + case MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESCE: + return 0; +#endif - for (i = 4; i > 0; i >>= 1) { - uint32_t T = (vl & 1) * 0xe1000000U; - vl = (vh << 63) | (vl >> 1); - vh = (vh >> 1) ^ ((uint64_t) T << 32); + default: + /* 0 corresponds to 0 in GF(2^128) */ + ctx->H[0][0] = 0; + ctx->H[0][1] = 0; - ctx->HL[i] = vl; - ctx->HH[i] = vh; - } + for (i = MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE/4; i > 0; i >>= 1) { + gcm_gen_table_rightshift(ctx->H[i], ctx->H[i*2]); + } - for (i = 2; i <= 8; i *= 2) { - uint64_t *HiL = ctx->HL + i, *HiH = ctx->HH + i; - vh = *HiH; - vl = *HiL; - for (j = 1; j < i; j++) { - HiH[j] = vh ^ ctx->HH[j]; - HiL[j] = vl ^ ctx->HL[j]; - } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE) + /* pack elements of H as 64-bits ints, big-endian */ + for (i = MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE/2; i > 0; i >>= 1) { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(ctx->H[i][0], &ctx->H[i][0], 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(ctx->H[i][1], &ctx->H[i][1], 0); + } +#endif + + for (i = 2; i < MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE; i <<= 1) { + for (j = 1; j < i; j++) { + mbedtls_xor_no_simd((unsigned char *) ctx->H[i+j], + (unsigned char *) ctx->H[i], + (unsigned char *) ctx->H[j], + 16); + } + } } return 0; @@ -133,11 +165,23 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_setkey(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, unsigned int keybits) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(keybits == 128 || keybits == 192 || keybits == 256); + if (keybits != 128 && keybits != 192 && keybits != 256) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + mbedtls_block_cipher_free(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setup(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, cipher)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setkey(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, key, keybits)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#else + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values(cipher, keybits, MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB); @@ -145,7 +189,7 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_setkey(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT; } - if (cipher_info->block_size != 16) { + if (mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(cipher_info) != 16) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT; } @@ -159,6 +203,7 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_setkey(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT)) != 0) { return ret; } +#endif if ((ret = gcm_gen_table(ctx)) != 0) { return ret; @@ -167,12 +212,86 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_setkey(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, return 0; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE) +static const uint16_t last8[256] = { + 0x0000, 0xc201, 0x8403, 0x4602, 0x0807, 0xca06, 0x8c04, 0x4e05, + 0x100e, 0xd20f, 0x940d, 0x560c, 0x1809, 0xda08, 0x9c0a, 0x5e0b, + 0x201c, 0xe21d, 0xa41f, 0x661e, 0x281b, 0xea1a, 0xac18, 0x6e19, + 0x3012, 0xf213, 0xb411, 0x7610, 0x3815, 0xfa14, 0xbc16, 0x7e17, + 0x4038, 0x8239, 0xc43b, 0x063a, 0x483f, 0x8a3e, 0xcc3c, 0x0e3d, + 0x5036, 0x9237, 0xd435, 0x1634, 0x5831, 0x9a30, 0xdc32, 0x1e33, + 0x6024, 0xa225, 0xe427, 0x2626, 0x6823, 0xaa22, 0xec20, 0x2e21, + 0x702a, 0xb22b, 0xf429, 0x3628, 0x782d, 0xba2c, 0xfc2e, 0x3e2f, + 0x8070, 0x4271, 0x0473, 0xc672, 0x8877, 0x4a76, 0x0c74, 0xce75, + 0x907e, 0x527f, 0x147d, 0xd67c, 0x9879, 0x5a78, 0x1c7a, 0xde7b, + 0xa06c, 0x626d, 0x246f, 0xe66e, 0xa86b, 0x6a6a, 0x2c68, 0xee69, + 0xb062, 0x7263, 0x3461, 0xf660, 0xb865, 0x7a64, 0x3c66, 0xfe67, + 0xc048, 0x0249, 0x444b, 0x864a, 0xc84f, 0x0a4e, 0x4c4c, 0x8e4d, + 0xd046, 0x1247, 0x5445, 0x9644, 0xd841, 0x1a40, 0x5c42, 0x9e43, + 0xe054, 0x2255, 0x6457, 0xa656, 0xe853, 0x2a52, 0x6c50, 0xae51, + 0xf05a, 0x325b, 0x7459, 0xb658, 0xf85d, 0x3a5c, 0x7c5e, 0xbe5f, + 0x00e1, 0xc2e0, 0x84e2, 0x46e3, 0x08e6, 0xcae7, 0x8ce5, 0x4ee4, + 0x10ef, 0xd2ee, 0x94ec, 0x56ed, 0x18e8, 0xdae9, 0x9ceb, 0x5eea, + 0x20fd, 0xe2fc, 0xa4fe, 0x66ff, 0x28fa, 0xeafb, 0xacf9, 0x6ef8, + 0x30f3, 0xf2f2, 0xb4f0, 0x76f1, 0x38f4, 0xfaf5, 0xbcf7, 0x7ef6, + 0x40d9, 0x82d8, 0xc4da, 0x06db, 0x48de, 0x8adf, 0xccdd, 0x0edc, + 0x50d7, 0x92d6, 0xd4d4, 0x16d5, 0x58d0, 0x9ad1, 0xdcd3, 0x1ed2, + 0x60c5, 0xa2c4, 0xe4c6, 0x26c7, 0x68c2, 0xaac3, 0xecc1, 0x2ec0, + 0x70cb, 0xb2ca, 0xf4c8, 0x36c9, 0x78cc, 0xbacd, 0xfccf, 0x3ece, + 0x8091, 0x4290, 0x0492, 0xc693, 0x8896, 0x4a97, 0x0c95, 0xce94, + 0x909f, 0x529e, 0x149c, 0xd69d, 0x9898, 0x5a99, 0x1c9b, 0xde9a, + 0xa08d, 0x628c, 0x248e, 0xe68f, 0xa88a, 0x6a8b, 0x2c89, 0xee88, + 0xb083, 0x7282, 0x3480, 0xf681, 0xb884, 0x7a85, 0x3c87, 0xfe86, + 0xc0a9, 0x02a8, 0x44aa, 0x86ab, 0xc8ae, 0x0aaf, 0x4cad, 0x8eac, + 0xd0a7, 0x12a6, 0x54a4, 0x96a5, 0xd8a0, 0x1aa1, 0x5ca3, 0x9ea2, + 0xe0b5, 0x22b4, 0x64b6, 0xa6b7, 0xe8b2, 0x2ab3, 0x6cb1, 0xaeb0, + 0xf0bb, 0x32ba, 0x74b8, 0xb6b9, 0xf8bc, 0x3abd, 0x7cbf, 0xbebe +}; + +static void gcm_mult_largetable(uint8_t *output, const uint8_t *x, uint64_t H[256][2]) +{ + int i; + uint64_t u64z[2]; + uint16_t *u16z = (uint16_t *) u64z; + uint8_t *u8z = (uint8_t *) u64z; + uint8_t rem; + + u64z[0] = 0; + u64z[1] = 0; + + if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) { + for (i = 15; i > 0; i--) { + mbedtls_xor_no_simd(u8z, u8z, (uint8_t *) H[x[i]], 16); + rem = u8z[15]; + + u64z[1] >>= 8; + u8z[8] = u8z[7]; + u64z[0] >>= 8; + + u16z[0] ^= MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_LE(&last8[rem], 0); + } + } else { + for (i = 15; i > 0; i--) { + mbedtls_xor_no_simd(u8z, u8z, (uint8_t *) H[x[i]], 16); + rem = u8z[15]; + + u64z[1] <<= 8; + u8z[8] = u8z[7]; + u64z[0] <<= 8; + + u16z[0] ^= last8[rem]; + } + } + + mbedtls_xor_no_simd(output, u8z, (uint8_t *) H[x[0]], 16); +} +#else /* * Shoup's method for multiplication use this table with * last4[x] = x times P^128 * where x and last4[x] are seen as elements of GF(2^128) as in [MGV] */ -static const uint64_t last4[16] = +static const uint16_t last4[16] = { 0x0000, 0x1c20, 0x3840, 0x2460, 0x7080, 0x6ca0, 0x48c0, 0x54e0, @@ -180,87 +299,97 @@ static const uint64_t last4[16] = 0x9180, 0x8da0, 0xa9c0, 0xb5e0 }; -/* - * Sets output to x times H using the precomputed tables. - * x and output are seen as elements of GF(2^128) as in [MGV]. - */ -static void gcm_mult(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, const unsigned char x[16], - unsigned char output[16]) +static void gcm_mult_smalltable(uint8_t *output, const uint8_t *x, uint64_t H[16][2]) { int i = 0; unsigned char lo, hi, rem; - uint64_t zh, zl; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) - if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL)) { - unsigned char h[16]; - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->HH[8] >> 32, h, 0); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->HH[8], h, 4); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->HL[8] >> 32, h, 8); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->HL[8], h, 12); - - mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult(output, x, h); - return; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE */ + uint64_t u64z[2]; + const uint64_t *pu64z = NULL; + uint8_t *u8z = (uint8_t *) u64z; lo = x[15] & 0xf; + hi = (x[15] >> 4) & 0xf; + + pu64z = H[lo]; - zh = ctx->HH[lo]; - zl = ctx->HL[lo]; + rem = (unsigned char) pu64z[1] & 0xf; + u64z[1] = (pu64z[0] << 60) | (pu64z[1] >> 4); + u64z[0] = (pu64z[0] >> 4); + u64z[0] ^= (uint64_t) last4[rem] << 48; + mbedtls_xor_no_simd(u8z, u8z, (uint8_t *) H[hi], 16); - for (i = 15; i >= 0; i--) { + for (i = 14; i >= 0; i--) { lo = x[i] & 0xf; hi = (x[i] >> 4) & 0xf; - if (i != 15) { - rem = (unsigned char) zl & 0xf; - zl = (zh << 60) | (zl >> 4); - zh = (zh >> 4); - zh ^= (uint64_t) last4[rem] << 48; - zh ^= ctx->HH[lo]; - zl ^= ctx->HL[lo]; + rem = (unsigned char) u64z[1] & 0xf; + u64z[1] = (u64z[0] << 60) | (u64z[1] >> 4); + u64z[0] = (u64z[0] >> 4); + u64z[0] ^= (uint64_t) last4[rem] << 48; + mbedtls_xor_no_simd(u8z, u8z, (uint8_t *) H[lo], 16); + + rem = (unsigned char) u64z[1] & 0xf; + u64z[1] = (u64z[0] << 60) | (u64z[1] >> 4); + u64z[0] = (u64z[0] >> 4); + u64z[0] ^= (uint64_t) last4[rem] << 48; + mbedtls_xor_no_simd(u8z, u8z, (uint8_t *) H[hi], 16); + } - } + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(u64z[0], output, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(u64z[1], output, 8); +} +#endif + +/* + * Sets output to x times H using the precomputed tables. + * x and output are seen as elements of GF(2^128) as in [MGV]. + */ +static void gcm_mult(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, const unsigned char x[16], + unsigned char output[16]) +{ + switch (ctx->acceleration) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) + case MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESNI: + mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult(output, x, (uint8_t *) ctx->H[MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE/2]); + break; +#endif - rem = (unsigned char) zl & 0xf; - zl = (zh << 60) | (zl >> 4); - zh = (zh >> 4); - zh ^= (uint64_t) last4[rem] << 48; - zh ^= ctx->HH[hi]; - zl ^= ctx->HL[hi]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE) + case MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESCE: + mbedtls_aesce_gcm_mult(output, x, (uint8_t *) ctx->H[MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE/2]); + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE) + case MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_LARGETABLE: + gcm_mult_largetable(output, x, ctx->H); + break; +#else + case MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_SMALLTABLE: + gcm_mult_smalltable(output, x, ctx->H); + break; +#endif } - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(zh >> 32, output, 0); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(zh, output, 4); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(zl >> 32, output, 8); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(zl, output, 12); + return; } int mbedtls_gcm_starts(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, int mode, - const unsigned char *iv, - size_t iv_len, - const unsigned char *add, - size_t add_len) + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char work_buf[16]; - size_t i; const unsigned char *p; - size_t use_len, olen = 0; + size_t use_len; uint64_t iv_bits; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + size_t olen = 0; +#endif - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(add_len == 0 || add != NULL); - - /* IV and AD are limited to 2^64 bits, so 2^61 bytes */ + /* IV is limited to 2^64 bits, so 2^61 bytes */ /* IV is not allowed to be zero length */ - if (iv_len == 0 || - ((uint64_t) iv_len) >> 61 != 0 || - ((uint64_t) add_len) >> 61 != 0) { + if (iv_len == 0 || (uint64_t) iv_len >> 61 != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT; } @@ -283,9 +412,16 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_starts(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, while (iv_len > 0) { use_len = (iv_len < 16) ? iv_len : 16; - for (i = 0; i < use_len; i++) { - ctx->y[i] ^= p[i]; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && (MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION >= 70110) +#pragma GCC diagnostic push +#pragma GCC diagnostic warning "-Wstringop-overflow=0" +#endif + + mbedtls_xor(ctx->y, ctx->y, p, use_len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && (MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION >= 70110) +#pragma GCC diagnostic pop +#endif gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y); @@ -293,119 +429,257 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_starts(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, p += use_len; } - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { - ctx->y[i] ^= work_buf[i]; - } + mbedtls_xor(ctx->y, ctx->y, work_buf, 16); gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y); } - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, - ctx->base_ectr, &olen)) != 0) { + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->base_ectr); +#else + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->base_ectr, &olen); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { return ret; } - ctx->add_len = add_len; + return 0; +} + +/** + * mbedtls_gcm_context::buf contains the partial state of the computation of + * the authentication tag. + * mbedtls_gcm_context::add_len and mbedtls_gcm_context::len indicate + * different stages of the computation: + * * len == 0 && add_len == 0: initial state + * * len == 0 && add_len % 16 != 0: the first `add_len % 16` bytes have + * a partial block of AD that has been + * xored in but not yet multiplied in. + * * len == 0 && add_len % 16 == 0: the authentication tag is correct if + * the data ends now. + * * len % 16 != 0: the first `len % 16` bytes have + * a partial block of ciphertext that has + * been xored in but not yet multiplied in. + * * len > 0 && len % 16 == 0: the authentication tag is correct if + * the data ends now. + */ +int mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len) +{ + const unsigned char *p; + size_t use_len, offset; + uint64_t new_add_len; + + /* AD is limited to 2^64 bits, ie 2^61 bytes + * Also check for possible overflow */ +#if SIZE_MAX > 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL + if (add_len > 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT; + } +#endif + new_add_len = ctx->add_len + (uint64_t) add_len; + if (new_add_len < ctx->add_len || new_add_len >> 61 != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + offset = ctx->add_len % 16; p = add; - while (add_len > 0) { - use_len = (add_len < 16) ? add_len : 16; - for (i = 0; i < use_len; i++) { - ctx->buf[i] ^= p[i]; + if (offset != 0) { + use_len = 16 - offset; + if (use_len > add_len) { + use_len = add_len; } - gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf); + mbedtls_xor(ctx->buf + offset, ctx->buf + offset, p, use_len); + if (offset + use_len == 16) { + gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf); + } + + ctx->add_len += use_len; add_len -= use_len; p += use_len; } + ctx->add_len += add_len; + + while (add_len >= 16) { + mbedtls_xor(ctx->buf, ctx->buf, p, 16); + + gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf); + + add_len -= 16; + p += 16; + } + + if (add_len > 0) { + mbedtls_xor(ctx->buf, ctx->buf, p, add_len); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Increment the counter. */ +static void gcm_incr(unsigned char y[16]) +{ + uint32_t x = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(y, 12); + x++; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(x, y, 12); +} + +/* Calculate and apply the encryption mask. Process use_len bytes of data, + * starting at position offset in the mask block. */ +static int gcm_mask(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + unsigned char ectr[16], + size_t offset, size_t use_len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ectr); +#else + size_t olen = 0; + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ectr, &olen); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ectr, 16); + return ret; + } + + if (ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT) { + mbedtls_xor(ctx->buf + offset, ctx->buf + offset, input, use_len); + } + mbedtls_xor(output, ectr + offset, input, use_len); + if (ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT) { + mbedtls_xor(ctx->buf + offset, ctx->buf + offset, output, use_len); + } + return 0; } int mbedtls_gcm_update(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, - size_t length, - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output) + const unsigned char *input, size_t input_length, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char ectr[16]; - size_t i; - const unsigned char *p; + const unsigned char *p = input; unsigned char *out_p = output; - size_t use_len, olen = 0; + size_t offset; + unsigned char ectr[16] = { 0 }; - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); + if (output_size < input_length) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + *output_length = input_length; + + /* Exit early if input_length==0 so that we don't do any pointer arithmetic + * on a potentially null pointer. + * Returning early also means that the last partial block of AD remains + * untouched for mbedtls_gcm_finish */ + if (input_length == 0) { + return 0; + } - if (output > input && (size_t) (output - input) < length) { + if (output > input && (size_t) (output - input) < input_length) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT; } /* Total length is restricted to 2^39 - 256 bits, ie 2^36 - 2^5 bytes * Also check for possible overflow */ - if (ctx->len + length < ctx->len || - (uint64_t) ctx->len + length > 0xFFFFFFFE0ull) { + if (ctx->len + input_length < ctx->len || + (uint64_t) ctx->len + input_length > 0xFFFFFFFE0ull) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT; } - ctx->len += length; - - p = input; - while (length > 0) { - use_len = (length < 16) ? length : 16; + if (ctx->len == 0 && ctx->add_len % 16 != 0) { + gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf); + } - for (i = 16; i > 12; i--) { - if (++ctx->y[i - 1] != 0) { - break; - } + offset = ctx->len % 16; + if (offset != 0) { + size_t use_len = 16 - offset; + if (use_len > input_length) { + use_len = input_length; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ectr, - &olen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = gcm_mask(ctx, ectr, offset, use_len, p, out_p)) != 0) { return ret; } - for (i = 0; i < use_len; i++) { - if (ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT) { - ctx->buf[i] ^= p[i]; - } - out_p[i] = ectr[i] ^ p[i]; - if (ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT) { - ctx->buf[i] ^= out_p[i]; - } + if (offset + use_len == 16) { + gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf); } - gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf); - - length -= use_len; + ctx->len += use_len; + input_length -= use_len; p += use_len; out_p += use_len; } + ctx->len += input_length; + + while (input_length >= 16) { + gcm_incr(ctx->y); + if ((ret = gcm_mask(ctx, ectr, 0, 16, p, out_p)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf); + + input_length -= 16; + p += 16; + out_p += 16; + } + + if (input_length > 0) { + gcm_incr(ctx->y); + if ((ret = gcm_mask(ctx, ectr, 0, input_length, p, out_p)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ectr, sizeof(ectr)); return 0; } int mbedtls_gcm_finish(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, - unsigned char *tag, - size_t tag_len) + unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) { unsigned char work_buf[16]; - size_t i; uint64_t orig_len; uint64_t orig_add_len; - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(tag != NULL); + /* We never pass any output in finish(). The output parameter exists only + * for the sake of alternative implementations. */ + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + *output_length = 0; + /* Total length is restricted to 2^39 - 256 bits, ie 2^36 - 2^5 bytes + * and AD length is restricted to 2^64 bits, ie 2^61 bytes so neither of + * the two multiplications would overflow. */ orig_len = ctx->len * 8; orig_add_len = ctx->add_len * 8; + if (ctx->len == 0 && ctx->add_len % 16 != 0) { + gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf); + } + if (tag_len > 16 || tag_len < 4) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT; } + if (ctx->len % 16 != 0) { + gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf); + } + memcpy(tag, ctx->base_ectr, tag_len); if (orig_len || orig_add_len) { @@ -416,15 +690,11 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_finish(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE((orig_len >> 32), work_buf, 8); MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE((orig_len), work_buf, 12); - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { - ctx->buf[i] ^= work_buf[i]; - } + mbedtls_xor(ctx->buf, ctx->buf, work_buf, 16); gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf); - for (i = 0; i < tag_len; i++) { - tag[i] ^= ctx->buf[i]; - } + mbedtls_xor(tag, tag, ctx->buf, tag_len); } return 0; @@ -443,23 +713,22 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, unsigned char *tag) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen; - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(add_len == 0 || add != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(tag != NULL); + if ((ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts(ctx, mode, iv, iv_len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } - if ((ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts(ctx, mode, iv, iv_len, add, add_len)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(ctx, add, add_len)) != 0) { return ret; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(ctx, length, input, output)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(ctx, input, length, + output, length, &olen)) != 0) { return ret; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish(ctx, tag, tag_len)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish(ctx, NULL, 0, &olen, tag, tag_len)) != 0) { return ret; } @@ -481,13 +750,6 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, unsigned char check_tag[16]; int diff; - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(add_len == 0 || add != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(tag != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - GCM_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); - if ((ret = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag(ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, length, iv, iv_len, add, add_len, input, output, tag_len, check_tag)) != 0) { @@ -510,13 +772,17 @@ void mbedtls_gcm_free(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx) if (ctx == NULL) { return; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + mbedtls_block_cipher_free(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx); +#else mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx->cipher_ctx); +#endif mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_gcm_context)); } #endif /* !MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES) /* * AES-GCM test vectors from: * @@ -527,7 +793,7 @@ void mbedtls_gcm_free(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx) static const int key_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1 }; -static const unsigned char key_test_data[MAX_TESTS][32] = +static const unsigned char key_test_data[][32] = { { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, @@ -545,7 +811,7 @@ static const size_t iv_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = static const int iv_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 2 }; -static const unsigned char iv_test_data[MAX_TESTS][64] = +static const unsigned char iv_test_data[][64] = { { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, @@ -567,7 +833,7 @@ static const size_t add_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = static const int add_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1 }; -static const unsigned char additional_test_data[MAX_TESTS][64] = +static const unsigned char additional_test_data[][64] = { { 0x00 }, { 0xfe, 0xed, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef, @@ -581,7 +847,7 @@ static const size_t pt_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = static const int pt_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = { 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1 }; -static const unsigned char pt_test_data[MAX_TESTS][64] = +static const unsigned char pt_test_data[][64] = { { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, @@ -595,7 +861,7 @@ static const unsigned char pt_test_data[MAX_TESTS][64] = 0xba, 0x63, 0x7b, 0x39, 0x1a, 0xaf, 0xd2, 0x55 }, }; -static const unsigned char ct_test_data[MAX_TESTS * 3][64] = +static const unsigned char ct_test_data[][64] = { { 0x00 }, { 0x03, 0x88, 0xda, 0xce, 0x60, 0xb6, 0xa3, 0x92, @@ -632,6 +898,7 @@ static const unsigned char ct_test_data[MAX_TESTS * 3][64] = 0xcc, 0xdc, 0xb2, 0x81, 0xd4, 0x8c, 0x7c, 0x6f, 0xd6, 0x28, 0x75, 0xd2, 0xac, 0xa4, 0x17, 0x03, 0x4c, 0x34, 0xae, 0xe5 }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0x00 }, { 0x98, 0xe7, 0x24, 0x7c, 0x07, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0x41, 0x1c, 0x26, 0x7e, 0x43, 0x84, 0xb0, 0xf6, 0x00 }, @@ -702,9 +969,10 @@ static const unsigned char ct_test_data[MAX_TESTS * 3][64] = 0x2d, 0xa3, 0xeb, 0xf1, 0xc5, 0xd8, 0x2c, 0xde, 0xa2, 0x41, 0x89, 0x97, 0x20, 0x0e, 0xf8, 0x2e, 0x44, 0xae, 0x7e, 0x3f }, +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ }; -static const unsigned char tag_test_data[MAX_TESTS * 3][16] = +static const unsigned char tag_test_data[][16] = { { 0x58, 0xe2, 0xfc, 0xce, 0xfa, 0x7e, 0x30, 0x61, 0x36, 0x7f, 0x1d, 0x57, 0xa4, 0xe7, 0x45, 0x5a }, @@ -718,6 +986,7 @@ static const unsigned char tag_test_data[MAX_TESTS * 3][16] = 0x56, 0x1b, 0xe1, 0x4a, 0xac, 0xa2, 0xfc, 0xcb }, { 0x61, 0x9c, 0xc5, 0xae, 0xff, 0xfe, 0x0b, 0xfa, 0x46, 0x2a, 0xf4, 0x3c, 0x16, 0x99, 0xd0, 0x50 }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0xcd, 0x33, 0xb2, 0x8a, 0xc7, 0x73, 0xf7, 0x4b, 0xa0, 0x0e, 0xd1, 0xf3, 0x12, 0x57, 0x24, 0x35 }, { 0x2f, 0xf5, 0x8d, 0x80, 0x03, 0x39, 0x27, 0xab, @@ -742,6 +1011,7 @@ static const unsigned char tag_test_data[MAX_TESTS * 3][16] = 0x5e, 0x45, 0x49, 0x13, 0xfe, 0x2e, 0xa8, 0xf2 }, { 0xa4, 0x4a, 0x82, 0x66, 0xee, 0x1c, 0x8e, 0xb0, 0xc8, 0xb5, 0xd4, 0xcf, 0x5a, 0xe9, 0xf1, 0x9a }, +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ }; int mbedtls_gcm_self_test(int verbose) @@ -751,6 +1021,7 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_self_test(int verbose) unsigned char tag_buf[16]; int i, j, ret; mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES; + size_t olen; if (verbose != 0) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) @@ -758,32 +1029,34 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_self_test(int verbose) #else /* MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL)) { - mbedtls_printf(" GCM note: using AESNI via "); -#if MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 1 - mbedtls_printf("assembly"); -#elif MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2 - mbedtls_printf("intrinsics"); -#else - mbedtls_printf("(unknown)"); + mbedtls_printf(" GCM note: using AESNI.\n"); + } else #endif - mbedtls_printf(".\n"); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE) + if (MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT()) { + mbedtls_printf(" GCM note: using AESCE.\n"); } else #endif + mbedtls_printf(" GCM note: built-in implementation.\n"); #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */ } - for (j = 0; j < 3; j++) { + static const int loop_limit = + (sizeof(ct_test_data) / sizeof(*ct_test_data)) / MAX_TESTS; + + for (j = 0; j < loop_limit; j++) { int key_len = 128 + 64 * j; for (i = 0; i < MAX_TESTS; i++) { - mbedtls_gcm_init(&ctx); - if (verbose != 0) { mbedtls_printf(" AES-GCM-%3d #%d (%s): ", key_len, i, "enc"); } + mbedtls_gcm_init(&ctx); + ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey(&ctx, cipher, key_test_data[key_index_test_data[i]], key_len); @@ -887,38 +1160,55 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_self_test(int verbose) ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts(&ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]], - iv_len_test_data[i], - additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], - add_len_test_data[i]); + iv_len_test_data[i]); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(&ctx, + additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], + add_len_test_data[i]); if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } if (pt_len_test_data[i] > 32) { size_t rest_len = pt_len_test_data[i] - 32; - ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, 32, + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], - buf); + 32, + buf, sizeof(buf), &olen); if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } + if (olen != 32) { + goto exit; + } - ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, rest_len, + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]] + 32, - buf + 32); + rest_len, + buf + 32, sizeof(buf) - 32, &olen); if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } + if (olen != rest_len) { + goto exit; + } } else { - ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, pt_len_test_data[i], + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], - buf); + pt_len_test_data[i], + buf, sizeof(buf), &olen); if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } + if (olen != pt_len_test_data[i]) { + goto exit; + } } - ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish(&ctx, tag_buf, 16); + ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish(&ctx, NULL, 0, &olen, tag_buf, 16); if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } @@ -952,37 +1242,53 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_self_test(int verbose) ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts(&ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]], - iv_len_test_data[i], - additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], - add_len_test_data[i]); + iv_len_test_data[i]); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(&ctx, + additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], + add_len_test_data[i]); if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } if (pt_len_test_data[i] > 32) { size_t rest_len = pt_len_test_data[i] - 32; - ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, 32, ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], - buf); + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, + ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], 32, + buf, sizeof(buf), &olen); if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } + if (olen != 32) { + goto exit; + } - ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, rest_len, + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, ct_test_data[j * 6 + i] + 32, - buf + 32); + rest_len, + buf + 32, sizeof(buf) - 32, &olen); if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } + if (olen != rest_len) { + goto exit; + } } else { - ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, pt_len_test_data[i], + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], - buf); + pt_len_test_data[i], + buf, sizeof(buf), &olen); if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } + if (olen != pt_len_test_data[i]) { + goto exit; + } } - ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish(&ctx, tag_buf, 16); + ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish(&ctx, NULL, 0, &olen, tag_buf, 16); if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/havege.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/havege.c deleted file mode 100644 index c23cdad9a5..0000000000 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/havege.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,238 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \brief HAVEGE: HArdware Volatile Entropy Gathering and Expansion - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ -/* - * The HAVEGE RNG was designed by Andre Seznec in 2002. - * - * http://www.irisa.fr/caps/projects/hipsor/publi.php - * - * Contact: seznec(at)irisa_dot_fr - orocheco(at)irisa_dot_fr - */ - -#include "common.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) - -#include "mbedtls/havege.h" -#include "mbedtls/timing.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" - -#include -#include - -/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ - * On average, one iteration accesses two 8-word blocks in the havege WALK - * table, and generates 16 words in the RES array. - * - * The data read in the WALK table is updated and permuted after each use. - * The result of the hardware clock counter read is used for this update. - * - * 25 conditional tests are present. The conditional tests are grouped in - * two nested groups of 12 conditional tests and 1 test that controls the - * permutation; on average, there should be 6 tests executed and 3 of them - * should be mispredicted. - * ------------------------------------------------------------------------ - */ - -#define SWAP(X, Y) { uint32_t *T = (X); (X) = (Y); (Y) = T; } - -#define TST1_ENTER if (PTEST & 1) { PTEST ^= 3; PTEST >>= 1; -#define TST2_ENTER if (PTEST & 1) { PTEST ^= 3; PTEST >>= 1; - -#define TST1_LEAVE U1++; } -#define TST2_LEAVE U2++; } - -#define ONE_ITERATION \ - \ - PTEST = PT1 >> 20; \ - \ - TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER \ - TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER \ - TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER TST1_ENTER \ - \ - TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE \ - TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE \ - TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE TST1_LEAVE \ - \ - PTX = (PT1 >> 18) & 7; \ - PT1 &= 0x1FFF; \ - PT2 &= 0x1FFF; \ - CLK = (uint32_t) mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); \ - \ - i = 0; \ - A = &WALK[PT1]; RES[i++] ^= *A; \ - B = &WALK[PT2]; RES[i++] ^= *B; \ - C = &WALK[PT1 ^ 1]; RES[i++] ^= *C; \ - D = &WALK[PT2 ^ 4]; RES[i++] ^= *D; \ - \ - IN = (*A >> (1)) ^ (*A << (31)) ^ CLK; \ - *A = (*B >> (2)) ^ (*B << (30)) ^ CLK; \ - *B = IN ^ U1; \ - *C = (*C >> (3)) ^ (*C << (29)) ^ CLK; \ - *D = (*D >> (4)) ^ (*D << (28)) ^ CLK; \ - \ - A = &WALK[PT1 ^ 2]; RES[i++] ^= *A; \ - B = &WALK[PT2 ^ 2]; RES[i++] ^= *B; \ - C = &WALK[PT1 ^ 3]; RES[i++] ^= *C; \ - D = &WALK[PT2 ^ 6]; RES[i++] ^= *D; \ - \ - if (PTEST & 1) SWAP(A, C); \ - \ - IN = (*A >> (5)) ^ (*A << (27)) ^ CLK; \ - *A = (*B >> (6)) ^ (*B << (26)) ^ CLK; \ - *B = IN; CLK = (uint32_t) mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); \ - *C = (*C >> (7)) ^ (*C << (25)) ^ CLK; \ - *D = (*D >> (8)) ^ (*D << (24)) ^ CLK; \ - \ - A = &WALK[PT1 ^ 4]; \ - B = &WALK[PT2 ^ 1]; \ - \ - PTEST = PT2 >> 1; \ - \ - PT2 = (RES[(i - 8) ^ PTY] ^ WALK[PT2 ^ PTY ^ 7]); \ - PT2 = ((PT2 & 0x1FFF) & (~8)) ^ ((PT1 ^ 8) & 0x8); \ - PTY = (PT2 >> 10) & 7; \ - \ - TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER \ - TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER \ - TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER TST2_ENTER \ - \ - TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE \ - TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE \ - TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE TST2_LEAVE \ - \ - C = &WALK[PT1 ^ 5]; \ - D = &WALK[PT2 ^ 5]; \ - \ - RES[i++] ^= *A; \ - RES[i++] ^= *B; \ - RES[i++] ^= *C; \ - RES[i++] ^= *D; \ - \ - IN = (*A >> (9)) ^ (*A << (23)) ^ CLK; \ - *A = (*B >> (10)) ^ (*B << (22)) ^ CLK; \ - *B = IN ^ U2; \ - *C = (*C >> (11)) ^ (*C << (21)) ^ CLK; \ - *D = (*D >> (12)) ^ (*D << (20)) ^ CLK; \ - \ - A = &WALK[PT1 ^ 6]; RES[i++] ^= *A; \ - B = &WALK[PT2 ^ 3]; RES[i++] ^= *B; \ - C = &WALK[PT1 ^ 7]; RES[i++] ^= *C; \ - D = &WALK[PT2 ^ 7]; RES[i++] ^= *D; \ - \ - IN = (*A >> (13)) ^ (*A << (19)) ^ CLK; \ - *A = (*B >> (14)) ^ (*B << (18)) ^ CLK; \ - *B = IN; \ - *C = (*C >> (15)) ^ (*C << (17)) ^ CLK; \ - *D = (*D >> (16)) ^ (*D << (16)) ^ CLK; \ - \ - PT1 = (RES[(i - 8) ^ PTX] ^ \ - WALK[PT1 ^ PTX ^ 7]) & (~1); \ - PT1 ^= (PT2 ^ 0x10) & 0x10; \ - \ - for (n++, i = 0; i < 16; i++) \ - hs->pool[n % MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE] ^= RES[i]; - -/* - * Entropy gathering function - */ -static void havege_fill(mbedtls_havege_state *hs) -{ - size_t n = 0; - size_t i; - uint32_t U1, U2, *A, *B, *C, *D; - uint32_t PT1, PT2, *WALK, RES[16]; - uint32_t PTX, PTY, CLK, PTEST, IN; - - WALK = hs->WALK; - PT1 = hs->PT1; - PT2 = hs->PT2; - - PTX = U1 = 0; - PTY = U2 = 0; - - (void) PTX; - - memset(RES, 0, sizeof(RES)); - - while (n < MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE * 4) { - ONE_ITERATION - ONE_ITERATION - ONE_ITERATION - ONE_ITERATION - } - - hs->PT1 = PT1; - hs->PT2 = PT2; - - hs->offset[0] = 0; - hs->offset[1] = MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE / 2; -} - -/* - * HAVEGE initialization - */ -void mbedtls_havege_init(mbedtls_havege_state *hs) -{ - memset(hs, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_havege_state)); - - havege_fill(hs); -} - -void mbedtls_havege_free(mbedtls_havege_state *hs) -{ - if (hs == NULL) { - return; - } - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(hs, sizeof(mbedtls_havege_state)); -} - -/* - * HAVEGE rand function - */ -int mbedtls_havege_random(void *p_rng, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) -{ - uint32_t val; - size_t use_len; - mbedtls_havege_state *hs = (mbedtls_havege_state *) p_rng; - unsigned char *p = buf; - - while (len > 0) { - use_len = len; - if (use_len > sizeof(val)) { - use_len = sizeof(val); - } - - if (hs->offset[1] >= MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE) { - havege_fill(hs); - } - - val = hs->pool[hs->offset[0]++]; - val ^= hs->pool[hs->offset[1]++]; - - memcpy(p, &val, use_len); - - len -= use_len; - p += use_len; - } - - return 0; -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/hkdf.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/hkdf.c index a3f071ecef..631ac24e53 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/hkdf.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/hkdf.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * HKDF implementation -- RFC 5869 * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/hmac_drbg.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/hmac_drbg.c index fabe00252a..90174d5d17 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/hmac_drbg.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/hmac_drbg.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * HMAC_DRBG implementation (NIST SP 800-90) * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* @@ -52,9 +40,9 @@ void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx) /* * HMAC_DRBG update, using optional additional data (10.1.2.2) */ -int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *additional, - size_t add_len) +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, + size_t add_len) { size_t md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(ctx->md_ctx.md_info); unsigned char rounds = (additional != NULL && add_len != 0) ? 2 : 1; @@ -103,15 +91,6 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, return ret; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *additional, - size_t add_len) -{ - (void) mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret(ctx, additional, add_len); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ - /* * Simplified HMAC_DRBG initialisation (for use with deterministic ECDSA) */ @@ -140,7 +119,7 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, } memset(ctx->V, 0x01, mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info)); - if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret(ctx, data, data_len)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(ctx, data, data_len)) != 0) { return ret; } @@ -212,7 +191,7 @@ static int hmac_drbg_reseed_core(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, } /* 2. Update state */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret(ctx, seed, seedlen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(ctx, seed, seedlen)) != 0) { goto exit; } @@ -357,8 +336,8 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng, /* 2. Use additional data if any */ if (additional != NULL && add_len != 0) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret(ctx, - additional, add_len)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(ctx, + additional, add_len)) != 0) { goto exit; } } @@ -384,8 +363,8 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng, } /* 6. Update */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret(ctx, - additional, add_len)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(ctx, + additional, add_len)) != 0) { goto exit; } @@ -454,6 +433,9 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char return MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; } + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL); + if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(ctx, buf, sizeof(buf))) != 0) { goto exit; } @@ -484,6 +466,9 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const cha return MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; } + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL); + n = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), f); if (fread(&c, 1, 1, f) != 0) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; @@ -496,7 +481,7 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const cha fclose(f); f = NULL; - ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret(ctx, buf, n); + ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(ctx, buf, n); exit: mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); @@ -513,7 +498,7 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const cha #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) /* Dummy checkup routine */ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test(int verbose) { @@ -642,7 +627,7 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test(int verbose) return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/lmots.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/lmots.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c7091b49e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/lmots.c @@ -0,0 +1,778 @@ +/* + * The LM-OTS one-time public-key signature scheme + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/* + * The following sources were referenced in the design of this implementation + * of the LM-OTS algorithm: + * + * [1] IETF RFC8554 + * D. McGrew, M. Curcio, S.Fluhrer + * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8554 + * + * [2] NIST Special Publication 800-208 + * David A. Cooper et. al. + * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-208.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) + +#include + +#include "lmots.h" + +#include "mbedtls/lms.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" + +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_lms_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_lms_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) + +#define PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE_OFFSET (0) +#define PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET (PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE_OFFSET + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN) +#define PUBLIC_KEY_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET (PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN) +#define PUBLIC_KEY_KEY_HASH_OFFSET (PUBLIC_KEY_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN) + +/* We only support parameter sets that use 8-bit digits, as it does not require + * translation logic between digits and bytes */ +#define W_WINTERNITZ_PARAMETER (8u) +#define CHECKSUM_LEN (2) +#define I_DIGIT_IDX_LEN (2) +#define J_HASH_IDX_LEN (1) +#define D_CONST_LEN (2) + +#define DIGIT_MAX_VALUE ((1u << W_WINTERNITZ_PARAMETER) - 1u) + +#define D_CONST_LEN (2) +static const unsigned char D_PUBLIC_CONSTANT_BYTES[D_CONST_LEN] = { 0x80, 0x80 }; +static const unsigned char D_MESSAGE_CONSTANT_BYTES[D_CONST_LEN] = { 0x81, 0x81 }; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +int (*mbedtls_lmots_sign_private_key_invalidated_hook)(unsigned char *) = NULL; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) */ + +/* Calculate the checksum digits that are appended to the end of the LMOTS digit + * string. See NIST SP800-208 section 3.1 or RFC8554 Algorithm 2 for details of + * the checksum algorithm. + * + * params The LMOTS parameter set, I and q values which + * describe the key being used. + * + * digest The digit string to create the digest from. As + * this does not contain a checksum, it is the same + * size as a hash output. + */ +static unsigned short lmots_checksum_calculate(const mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t *params, + const unsigned char *digest) +{ + size_t idx; + unsigned sum = 0; + + for (idx = 0; idx < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type); idx++) { + sum += DIGIT_MAX_VALUE - digest[idx]; + } + + return sum; +} + +/* Create the string of digest digits (in the base determined by the Winternitz + * parameter with the checksum appended to the end (Q || cksm(Q)). See NIST + * SP800-208 section 3.1 or RFC8554 Algorithm 3 step 5 (also used in Algorithm + * 4b step 3) for details. + * + * params The LMOTS parameter set, I and q values which + * describe the key being used. + * + * msg The message that will be hashed to create the + * digest. + * + * msg_size The size of the message. + * + * C_random_value The random value that will be combined with the + * message digest. This is always the same size as a + * hash output for whichever hash algorithm is + * determined by the parameter set. + * + * output An output containing the digit string (+ + * checksum) of length P digits (in the case of + * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8, this means it is of + * size P bytes). + */ +static int create_digit_array_with_checksum(const mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t *params, + const unsigned char *msg, + size_t msg_len, + const unsigned char *C_random_value, + unsigned char *out) +{ + psa_hash_operation_t op = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t output_hash_len; + unsigned short checksum; + + status = psa_hash_setup(&op, PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, params->I_key_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, params->q_leaf_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, D_MESSAGE_CONSTANT_BYTES, D_CONST_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, C_random_value, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_C_RANDOM_VALUE_LEN(params->type)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, msg, msg_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish(&op, out, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type), + &output_hash_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + checksum = lmots_checksum_calculate(params, out); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(checksum, out, MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type)); + +exit: + psa_hash_abort(&op); + + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); +} + +/* Hash each element of the string of digits (+ checksum), producing a hash + * output for each element. This is used in several places (by varying the + * hash_idx_min/max_values) in order to calculate a public key from a private + * key (RFC8554 Algorithm 1 step 4), in order to sign a message (RFC8554 + * Algorithm 3 step 5), and to calculate a public key candidate from a + * signature and message (RFC8554 Algorithm 4b step 3). + * + * params The LMOTS parameter set, I and q values which + * describe the key being used. + * + * x_digit_array The array of digits (of size P, 34 in the case of + * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8). + * + * hash_idx_min_values An array of the starting values of the j iterator + * for each of the members of the digit array. If + * this value in NULL, then all iterators will start + * at 0. + * + * hash_idx_max_values An array of the upper bound values of the j + * iterator for each of the members of the digit + * array. If this value in NULL, then iterator is + * bounded to be less than 2^w - 1 (255 in the case + * of MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) + * + * output An array containing a hash output for each member + * of the digit string P. In the case of + * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8, this is of size 32 * + * 34. + */ +static int hash_digit_array(const mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t *params, + const unsigned char *x_digit_array, + const unsigned char *hash_idx_min_values, + const unsigned char *hash_idx_max_values, + unsigned char *output) +{ + unsigned int i_digit_idx; + unsigned char i_digit_idx_bytes[I_DIGIT_IDX_LEN]; + unsigned int j_hash_idx; + unsigned char j_hash_idx_bytes[J_HASH_IDX_LEN]; + unsigned int j_hash_idx_min; + unsigned int j_hash_idx_max; + psa_hash_operation_t op = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t output_hash_len; + unsigned char tmp_hash[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX]; + + for (i_digit_idx = 0; + i_digit_idx < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT(params->type); + i_digit_idx++) { + + memcpy(tmp_hash, + &x_digit_array[i_digit_idx * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type)], + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type)); + + j_hash_idx_min = hash_idx_min_values != NULL ? + hash_idx_min_values[i_digit_idx] : 0; + j_hash_idx_max = hash_idx_max_values != NULL ? + hash_idx_max_values[i_digit_idx] : DIGIT_MAX_VALUE; + + for (j_hash_idx = j_hash_idx_min; + j_hash_idx < j_hash_idx_max; + j_hash_idx++) { + status = psa_hash_setup(&op, PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, + params->I_key_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, + params->q_leaf_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(i_digit_idx, i_digit_idx_bytes, 0); + status = psa_hash_update(&op, i_digit_idx_bytes, I_DIGIT_IDX_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + j_hash_idx_bytes[0] = (uint8_t) j_hash_idx; + status = psa_hash_update(&op, j_hash_idx_bytes, J_HASH_IDX_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, tmp_hash, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish(&op, tmp_hash, sizeof(tmp_hash), + &output_hash_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + psa_hash_abort(&op); + } + + memcpy(&output[i_digit_idx * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type)], + tmp_hash, MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type)); + } + +exit: + psa_hash_abort(&op); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_hash, sizeof(tmp_hash)); + + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); +} + +/* Combine the hashes of the digit array into a public key. This is used in + * in order to calculate a public key from a private key (RFC8554 Algorithm 1 + * step 4), and to calculate a public key candidate from a signature and message + * (RFC8554 Algorithm 4b step 3). + * + * params The LMOTS parameter set, I and q values which describe + * the key being used. + * y_hashed_digits The array of hashes, one hash for each digit of the + * symbol array (which is of size P, 34 in the case of + * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) + * + * pub_key The output public key (or candidate public key in + * case this is being run as part of signature + * verification), in the form of a hash output. + */ +static int public_key_from_hashed_digit_array(const mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t *params, + const unsigned char *y_hashed_digits, + unsigned char *pub_key) +{ + psa_hash_operation_t op = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t output_hash_len; + + status = psa_hash_setup(&op, PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, + params->I_key_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, params->q_leaf_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, D_PUBLIC_CONSTANT_BYTES, D_CONST_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, y_hashed_digits, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT(params->type) * + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish(&op, pub_key, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type), + &output_hash_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + +exit: + psa_hash_abort(&op); + } + + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +int mbedtls_lms_error_from_psa(psa_status_t status) +{ + switch (status) { + case PSA_SUCCESS: + return 0; + case PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED; + case PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + } +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +void mbedtls_lmots_public_init(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); +} + +void mbedtls_lmots_public_free(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); +} + +int mbedtls_lmots_import_public_key(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) +{ + if (key_len < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ctx->params.type = (mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t) + MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(key, MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET); + + if (key_len != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(ctx->params.type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + memcpy(ctx->params.I_key_identifier, + key + PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + + memcpy(ctx->params.q_leaf_identifier, + key + PUBLIC_KEY_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN); + + memcpy(ctx->public_key, + key + PUBLIC_KEY_KEY_HASH_OFFSET, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(ctx->params.type)); + + ctx->have_public_key = 1; + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_lmots_export_public_key(const mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx, + unsigned char *key, size_t key_size, + size_t *key_len) +{ + if (key_size < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(ctx->params.type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + if (!ctx->have_public_key) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->params.type, key, MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET); + + memcpy(key + PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET, + ctx->params.I_key_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + + memcpy(key + PUBLIC_KEY_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET, + ctx->params.q_leaf_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN); + + memcpy(key + PUBLIC_KEY_KEY_HASH_OFFSET, ctx->public_key, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(ctx->params.type)); + + if (key_len != NULL) { + *key_len = MBEDTLS_LMOTS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(ctx->params.type); + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_lmots_calculate_public_key_candidate(const mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t *params, + const unsigned char *msg, + size_t msg_size, + const unsigned char *sig, + size_t sig_size, + unsigned char *out, + size_t out_size, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char tmp_digit_array[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT_MAX]; + unsigned char y_hashed_digits[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT_MAX][MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (msg == NULL && msg_size != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (sig_size != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN(params->type) || + out_size < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ret = create_digit_array_with_checksum(params, msg, msg_size, + sig + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_C_RANDOM_OFFSET, + tmp_digit_array); + if (ret) { + return ret; + } + + ret = hash_digit_array(params, + sig + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_SIGNATURE_OFFSET(params->type), + tmp_digit_array, NULL, (unsigned char *) y_hashed_digits); + if (ret) { + return ret; + } + + ret = public_key_from_hashed_digit_array(params, + (unsigned char *) y_hashed_digits, + out); + if (ret) { + return ret; + } + + if (out_len != NULL) { + *out_len = MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type); + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_lmots_verify(const mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *msg, size_t msg_size, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size) +{ + unsigned char Kc_public_key_candidate[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (msg == NULL && msg_size != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (!ctx->have_public_key) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ctx->params.type != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (sig_size < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(sig, MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET) != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + ret = mbedtls_lmots_calculate_public_key_candidate(&ctx->params, + msg, msg_size, sig, sig_size, + Kc_public_key_candidate, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(ctx->params.type), + NULL); + if (ret) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + if (memcmp(&Kc_public_key_candidate, ctx->public_key, + sizeof(ctx->public_key))) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) + +void mbedtls_lmots_private_init(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); +} + +void mbedtls_lmots_private_free(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, + sizeof(*ctx)); +} + +int mbedtls_lmots_generate_private_key(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx, + mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t type, + const unsigned char I_key_identifier[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN], + uint32_t q_leaf_identifier, + const unsigned char *seed, + size_t seed_size) +{ + psa_hash_operation_t op = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t output_hash_len; + unsigned int i_digit_idx; + unsigned char i_digit_idx_bytes[2]; + unsigned char const_bytes[1] = { 0xFF }; + + if (ctx->have_private_key) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (type != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ctx->params.type = type; + + memcpy(ctx->params.I_key_identifier, + I_key_identifier, + sizeof(ctx->params.I_key_identifier)); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(q_leaf_identifier, ctx->params.q_leaf_identifier, 0); + + for (i_digit_idx = 0; + i_digit_idx < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT(ctx->params.type); + i_digit_idx++) { + status = psa_hash_setup(&op, PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, + ctx->params.I_key_identifier, + sizeof(ctx->params.I_key_identifier)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, + ctx->params.q_leaf_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(i_digit_idx, i_digit_idx_bytes, 0); + status = psa_hash_update(&op, i_digit_idx_bytes, I_DIGIT_IDX_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, const_bytes, sizeof(const_bytes)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, seed, seed_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish(&op, + ctx->private_key[i_digit_idx], + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(ctx->params.type), + &output_hash_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + psa_hash_abort(&op); + } + + ctx->have_private_key = 1; + +exit: + psa_hash_abort(&op); + + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); +} + +int mbedtls_lmots_calculate_public_key(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx, + const mbedtls_lmots_private_t *priv_ctx) +{ + unsigned char y_hashed_digits[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT_MAX][MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Check that a private key is loaded */ + if (!priv_ctx->have_private_key) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ret = hash_digit_array(&priv_ctx->params, + (unsigned char *) priv_ctx->private_key, NULL, + NULL, (unsigned char *) y_hashed_digits); + if (ret) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = public_key_from_hashed_digit_array(&priv_ctx->params, + (unsigned char *) y_hashed_digits, + ctx->public_key); + if (ret) { + goto exit; + } + + memcpy(&ctx->params, &priv_ctx->params, + sizeof(ctx->params)); + + ctx->have_public_key = 1; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(y_hashed_digits, sizeof(y_hashed_digits)); + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_lmots_sign(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msg_size, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len) +{ + unsigned char tmp_digit_array[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT_MAX]; + /* Create a temporary buffer to prepare the signature in. This allows us to + * finish creating a signature (ensuring the process doesn't fail), and then + * erase the private key **before** writing any data into the sig parameter + * buffer. If data were directly written into the sig buffer, it might leak + * a partial signature on failure, which effectively compromises the private + * key. + */ + unsigned char tmp_sig[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT_MAX][MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX]; + unsigned char tmp_c_random[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (msg == NULL && msg_size != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (sig_size < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + /* Check that a private key is loaded */ + if (!ctx->have_private_key) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ret = f_rng(p_rng, tmp_c_random, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(ctx->params.type)); + if (ret) { + return ret; + } + + ret = create_digit_array_with_checksum(&ctx->params, + msg, msg_size, + tmp_c_random, + tmp_digit_array); + if (ret) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = hash_digit_array(&ctx->params, (unsigned char *) ctx->private_key, + NULL, tmp_digit_array, (unsigned char *) tmp_sig); + if (ret) { + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->params.type, sig, MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET); + + /* Test hook to check if sig is being written to before we invalidate the + * private key. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + if (mbedtls_lmots_sign_private_key_invalidated_hook != NULL) { + ret = (*mbedtls_lmots_sign_private_key_invalidated_hook)(sig); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) */ + + /* We've got a valid signature now, so it's time to make sure the private + * key can't be reused. + */ + ctx->have_private_key = 0; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx->private_key, + sizeof(ctx->private_key)); + + memcpy(sig + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_C_RANDOM_OFFSET, tmp_c_random, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_C_RANDOM_VALUE_LEN(ctx->params.type)); + + memcpy(sig + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_SIGNATURE_OFFSET(ctx->params.type), tmp_sig, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT(ctx->params.type) + * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(ctx->params.type)); + + if (sig_len != NULL) { + *sig_len = MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.type); + } + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_digit_array, sizeof(tmp_digit_array)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_sig, sizeof(tmp_sig)); + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) */ +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/lmots.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/lmots.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cf92d326c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/lmots.h @@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ +/** + * \file lmots.h + * + * \brief This file provides an API for the LM-OTS post-quantum-safe one-time + * public-key signature scheme as defined in RFC8554 and NIST.SP.200-208. + * This implementation currently only supports a single parameter set + * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8 in order to reduce complexity. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_LMOTS_H +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +#include "mbedtls/lms.h" + +#include +#include + + +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(type) (MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(type)) + +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET (0) +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_C_RANDOM_OFFSET (MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN) +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_SIGNATURE_OFFSET(type) (MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_C_RANDOM_OFFSET + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_C_RANDOM_VALUE_LEN(type)) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +extern int (*mbedtls_lmots_sign_private_key_invalidated_hook)(unsigned char *); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +/** + * \brief This function converts a \ref psa_status_t to a + * low-level LMS error code. + * + * \param status The psa_status_t to convert + * + * \return The corresponding LMS error code. + */ +int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_lms_error_from_psa(psa_status_t status); +#endif + +/** + * \brief This function initializes a public LMOTS context + * + * \param ctx The uninitialized LMOTS context that will then be + * initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_lmots_public_init(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function uninitializes a public LMOTS context + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context that will then be + * uninitialized. + */ +void mbedtls_lmots_public_free(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function imports an LMOTS public key into a + * LMOTS context. + * + * \note Before this function is called, the context must + * have been initialized. + * + * \note See IETF RFC8554 for details of the encoding of + * this public key. + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context store the key in. + * \param key The buffer from which the key will be read. + * #MBEDTLS_LMOTS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN bytes will be read + * from this. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lmots_import_public_key(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, size_t key_size); + +/** + * \brief This function exports an LMOTS public key from a + * LMOTS context that already contains a public key. + * + * \note Before this function is called, the context must + * have been initialized and the context must contain + * a public key. + * + * \note See IETF RFC8554 for details of the encoding of + * this public key. + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context that contains the + * public key. + * \param key The buffer into which the key will be output. Must + * be at least #MBEDTLS_LMOTS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN in size. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lmots_export_public_key(const mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx, + unsigned char *key, size_t key_size, + size_t *key_len); + +/** + * \brief This function creates a candidate public key from + * an LMOTS signature. This can then be compared to + * the real public key to determine the validity of + * the signature. + * + * \note This function is exposed publicly to be used in LMS + * signature verification, it is expected that + * mbedtls_lmots_verify will be used for LMOTS + * signature verification. + * + * \param params The LMOTS parameter set, q and I values as an + * mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t struct. + * \param msg The buffer from which the message will be read. + * \param msg_size The size of the message that will be read. + * \param sig The buffer from which the signature will be read. + * #MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN bytes will be read from + * this. + * \param out The buffer where the candidate public key will be + * stored. Must be at least #MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN + * bytes in size. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lmots_calculate_public_key_candidate(const mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t *params, + const unsigned char *msg, + size_t msg_size, + const unsigned char *sig, + size_t sig_size, + unsigned char *out, + size_t out_size, + size_t *out_len); + +/** + * \brief This function verifies a LMOTS signature, using a + * LMOTS context that contains a public key. + * + * \warning This function is **not intended for use in + * production**, due to as-yet unsolved problems with + * handling stateful keys. The API for this function + * may change considerably in future versions. + * + * \note Before this function is called, the context must + * have been initialized and must contain a public key + * (either by import or calculation from a private + * key). + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context from which the public + * key will be read. + * \param msg The buffer from which the message will be read. + * \param msg_size The size of the message that will be read. + * \param sig The buf from which the signature will be read. + * #MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN bytes will be read from + * this. + * + * \return \c 0 on successful verification. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lmots_verify(const mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *msg, + size_t msg_size, const unsigned char *sig, + size_t sig_size); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) + +/** + * \brief This function initializes a private LMOTS context + * + * \param ctx The uninitialized LMOTS context that will then be + * initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_lmots_private_init(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function uninitializes a private LMOTS context + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context that will then be + * uninitialized. + */ +void mbedtls_lmots_private_free(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function calculates an LMOTS private key, and + * stores in into an LMOTS context. + * + * \warning This function is **not intended for use in + * production**, due to as-yet unsolved problems with + * handling stateful keys. The API for this function + * may change considerably in future versions. + * + * \note The seed must have at least 256 bits of entropy. + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context to generate the key + * into. + * \param I_key_identifier The key identifier of the key, as a 16-byte string. + * \param q_leaf_identifier The leaf identifier of key. If this LMOTS key is + * not being used as part of an LMS key, this should + * be set to 0. + * \param seed The seed used to deterministically generate the + * key. + * \param seed_size The length of the seed. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lmots_generate_private_key(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx, + mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t type, + const unsigned char I_key_identifier[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN], + uint32_t q_leaf_identifier, + const unsigned char *seed, + size_t seed_size); + +/** + * \brief This function generates an LMOTS public key from a + * LMOTS context that already contains a private key. + * + * \note Before this function is called, the context must + * have been initialized and the context must contain + * a private key. + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context to generate the key + * from and store it into. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lmots_calculate_public_key(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx, + const mbedtls_lmots_private_t *priv_ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function creates a LMOTS signature, using a + * LMOTS context that contains a private key. + * + * \note Before this function is called, the context must + * have been initialized and must contain a private + * key. + * + * \note LMOTS private keys can only be used once, otherwise + * attackers may be able to create forged signatures. + * If the signing operation is successful, the private + * key in the context will be erased, and no further + * signing will be possible until another private key + * is loaded + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context from which the + * private key will be read. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to be used for signature + * generation. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to f_rng + * \param msg The buffer from which the message will be read. + * \param msg_size The size of the message that will be read. + * \param sig The buf into which the signature will be stored. + * Must be at least #MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN in size. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lmots_sign(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msg_size, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len); + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_LMOTS_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/lms.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/lms.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8d3cae0524 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/lms.c @@ -0,0 +1,761 @@ +/* + * The LMS stateful-hash public-key signature scheme + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/* + * The following sources were referenced in the design of this implementation + * of the LMS algorithm: + * + * [1] IETF RFC8554 + * D. McGrew, M. Curcio, S.Fluhrer + * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8554 + * + * [2] NIST Special Publication 800-208 + * David A. Cooper et. al. + * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-208.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) + +#include + +#include "lmots.h" + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/lms.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_lms_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_lms_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) + +#define SIG_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET (0) +#define SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET (SIG_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN) +#define SIG_TYPE_OFFSET(otstype) (SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN(otstype)) +#define SIG_PATH_OFFSET(otstype) (SIG_TYPE_OFFSET(otstype) + \ + MBEDTLS_LMS_TYPE_LEN) + +#define PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE_OFFSET (0) +#define PUBLIC_KEY_OTSTYPE_OFFSET (PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE_OFFSET + \ + MBEDTLS_LMS_TYPE_LEN) +#define PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET (PUBLIC_KEY_OTSTYPE_OFFSET + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN) +#define PUBLIC_KEY_ROOT_NODE_OFFSET (PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN) + + +/* Currently only support H=10 */ +#define H_TREE_HEIGHT_MAX 10 +#define MERKLE_TREE_NODE_AM(type) ((size_t) 1 << (MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(type) + 1u)) +#define MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(type) ((size_t) 1 << MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(type)) +#define MERKLE_TREE_INTERNAL_NODE_AM(type) ((unsigned int) \ + (1u << MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(type))) + +#define D_CONST_LEN (2) +static const unsigned char D_LEAF_CONSTANT_BYTES[D_CONST_LEN] = { 0x82, 0x82 }; +static const unsigned char D_INTR_CONSTANT_BYTES[D_CONST_LEN] = { 0x83, 0x83 }; + + +/* Calculate the value of a leaf node of the Merkle tree (which is a hash of a + * public key and some other parameters like the leaf index). This function + * implements RFC8554 section 5.3, in the case where r >= 2^h. + * + * params The LMS parameter set, the underlying LMOTS + * parameter set, and I value which describe the key + * being used. + * + * pub_key The public key of the private whose index + * corresponds to the index of this leaf node. This + * is a hash output. + * + * r_node_idx The index of this node in the Merkle tree. Note + * that the root node of the Merkle tree is + * 1-indexed. + * + * out The output node value, which is a hash output. + */ +static int create_merkle_leaf_value(const mbedtls_lms_parameters_t *params, + unsigned char *pub_key, + unsigned int r_node_idx, + unsigned char *out) +{ + psa_hash_operation_t op; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t output_hash_len; + unsigned char r_node_idx_bytes[4]; + + op = psa_hash_operation_init(); + status = psa_hash_setup(&op, PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, params->I_key_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(r_node_idx, r_node_idx_bytes, 0); + status = psa_hash_update(&op, r_node_idx_bytes, 4); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, D_LEAF_CONSTANT_BYTES, D_CONST_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, pub_key, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->otstype)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish(&op, out, MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(params->type), + &output_hash_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: + psa_hash_abort(&op); + + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); +} + +/* Calculate the value of an internal node of the Merkle tree (which is a hash + * of a public key and some other parameters like the node index). This function + * implements RFC8554 section 5.3, in the case where r < 2^h. + * + * params The LMS parameter set, the underlying LMOTS + * parameter set, and I value which describe the key + * being used. + * + * left_node The value of the child of this node which is on + * the left-hand side. As with all nodes on the + * Merkle tree, this is a hash output. + * + * right_node The value of the child of this node which is on + * the right-hand side. As with all nodes on the + * Merkle tree, this is a hash output. + * + * r_node_idx The index of this node in the Merkle tree. Note + * that the root node of the Merkle tree is + * 1-indexed. + * + * out The output node value, which is a hash output. + */ +static int create_merkle_internal_value(const mbedtls_lms_parameters_t *params, + const unsigned char *left_node, + const unsigned char *right_node, + unsigned int r_node_idx, + unsigned char *out) +{ + psa_hash_operation_t op; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t output_hash_len; + unsigned char r_node_idx_bytes[4]; + + op = psa_hash_operation_init(); + status = psa_hash_setup(&op, PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, params->I_key_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(r_node_idx, r_node_idx_bytes, 0); + status = psa_hash_update(&op, r_node_idx_bytes, 4); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, D_INTR_CONSTANT_BYTES, D_CONST_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, left_node, + MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(params->type)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, right_node, + MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(params->type)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish(&op, out, MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(params->type), + &output_hash_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: + psa_hash_abort(&op); + + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); +} + +void mbedtls_lms_public_init(mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); +} + +void mbedtls_lms_public_free(mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); +} + +int mbedtls_lms_import_public_key(mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, size_t key_size) +{ + mbedtls_lms_algorithm_type_t type; + mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t otstype; + + type = (mbedtls_lms_algorithm_type_t) MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(key, PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE_OFFSET); + if (type != MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + ctx->params.type = type; + + if (key_size != MBEDTLS_LMS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(ctx->params.type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + otstype = (mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t) + MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(key, PUBLIC_KEY_OTSTYPE_OFFSET); + if (otstype != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + ctx->params.otstype = otstype; + + memcpy(ctx->params.I_key_identifier, + key + PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + memcpy(ctx->T_1_pub_key, key + PUBLIC_KEY_ROOT_NODE_OFFSET, + MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type)); + + ctx->have_public_key = 1; + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_lms_export_public_key(const mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx, + unsigned char *key, + size_t key_size, size_t *key_len) +{ + if (key_size < MBEDTLS_LMS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(ctx->params.type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + if (!ctx->have_public_key) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->params.type, key, PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE_OFFSET); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->params.otstype, key, PUBLIC_KEY_OTSTYPE_OFFSET); + memcpy(key + PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET, + ctx->params.I_key_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + memcpy(key +PUBLIC_KEY_ROOT_NODE_OFFSET, + ctx->T_1_pub_key, + MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type)); + + if (key_len != NULL) { + *key_len = MBEDTLS_LMS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(ctx->params.type); + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_lms_verify(const mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *msg, size_t msg_size, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size) +{ + unsigned int q_leaf_identifier; + unsigned char Kc_candidate_ots_pub_key[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX]; + unsigned char Tc_candidate_root_node[MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES_MAX]; + unsigned int height; + unsigned int curr_node_id; + unsigned int parent_node_id; + const unsigned char *left_node; + const unsigned char *right_node; + mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t ots_params; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (!ctx->have_public_key) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ctx->params.type + != MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ctx->params.otstype + != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (sig_size != MBEDTLS_LMS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.type, ctx->params.otstype)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + if (sig_size < SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(sig, SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET) + != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + if (sig_size < SIG_TYPE_OFFSET(ctx->params.otstype) + MBEDTLS_LMS_TYPE_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(sig, SIG_TYPE_OFFSET(ctx->params.otstype)) + != MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + + q_leaf_identifier = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(sig, SIG_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET); + + if (q_leaf_identifier >= MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + memcpy(ots_params.I_key_identifier, + ctx->params.I_key_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(q_leaf_identifier, ots_params.q_leaf_identifier, 0); + ots_params.type = ctx->params.otstype; + + ret = mbedtls_lmots_calculate_public_key_candidate(&ots_params, + msg, + msg_size, + sig + SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.otstype), + Kc_candidate_ots_pub_key, + sizeof(Kc_candidate_ots_pub_key), + NULL); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + create_merkle_leaf_value( + &ctx->params, + Kc_candidate_ots_pub_key, + MERKLE_TREE_INTERNAL_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type) + q_leaf_identifier, + Tc_candidate_root_node); + + curr_node_id = MERKLE_TREE_INTERNAL_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type) + + q_leaf_identifier; + + for (height = 0; height < MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(ctx->params.type); + height++) { + parent_node_id = curr_node_id / 2; + + /* Left/right node ordering matters for the hash */ + if (curr_node_id & 1) { + left_node = sig + SIG_PATH_OFFSET(ctx->params.otstype) + + height * MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type); + right_node = Tc_candidate_root_node; + } else { + left_node = Tc_candidate_root_node; + right_node = sig + SIG_PATH_OFFSET(ctx->params.otstype) + + height * MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type); + } + + create_merkle_internal_value(&ctx->params, left_node, right_node, + parent_node_id, Tc_candidate_root_node); + + curr_node_id /= 2; + } + + if (memcmp(Tc_candidate_root_node, ctx->T_1_pub_key, + MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type))) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) + +/* Calculate a full Merkle tree based on a private key. This function + * implements RFC8554 section 5.3, and is used to generate a public key (as the + * public key is the root node of the Merkle tree). + * + * ctx The LMS private context, containing a parameter + * set and private key material consisting of both + * public and private OTS. + * + * tree The output tree, which is 2^(H + 1) hash outputs. + * In the case of H=10 we have 2048 tree nodes (of + * which 1024 of them are leaf nodes). Note that + * because the Merkle tree root is 1-indexed, the 0 + * index tree node is never used. + */ +static int calculate_merkle_tree(const mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx, + unsigned char *tree) +{ + unsigned int priv_key_idx; + unsigned int r_node_idx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* First create the leaf nodes, in ascending order */ + for (priv_key_idx = 0; + priv_key_idx < MERKLE_TREE_INTERNAL_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type); + priv_key_idx++) { + r_node_idx = MERKLE_TREE_INTERNAL_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type) + priv_key_idx; + + ret = create_merkle_leaf_value(&ctx->params, + ctx->ots_public_keys[priv_key_idx].public_key, + r_node_idx, + &tree[r_node_idx * MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES( + ctx->params.type)]); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + /* Then the internal nodes, in reverse order so that we can guarantee the + * parent has been created */ + for (r_node_idx = MERKLE_TREE_INTERNAL_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type) - 1; + r_node_idx > 0; + r_node_idx--) { + ret = create_merkle_internal_value(&ctx->params, + &tree[(r_node_idx * 2) * + MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type)], + &tree[(r_node_idx * 2 + 1) * + MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type)], + r_node_idx, + &tree[r_node_idx * + MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type)]); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Calculate a path from a leaf node of the Merkle tree to the root of the tree, + * and return the full path. This function implements RFC8554 section 5.4.1, as + * the Merkle path is the main component of an LMS signature. + * + * ctx The LMS private context, containing a parameter + * set and private key material consisting of both + * public and private OTS. + * + * leaf_node_id Which leaf node to calculate the path from. + * + * path The output path, which is H hash outputs. + */ +static int get_merkle_path(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx, + unsigned int leaf_node_id, + unsigned char *path) +{ + const size_t node_bytes = MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type); + unsigned int curr_node_id = leaf_node_id; + unsigned int adjacent_node_id; + unsigned char *tree = NULL; + unsigned int height; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + tree = mbedtls_calloc((size_t) MERKLE_TREE_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type), + node_bytes); + if (tree == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + ret = calculate_merkle_tree(ctx, tree); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + for (height = 0; height < MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(ctx->params.type); + height++) { + adjacent_node_id = curr_node_id ^ 1; + + memcpy(&path[height * node_bytes], + &tree[adjacent_node_id * node_bytes], node_bytes); + + curr_node_id >>= 1; + } + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(tree, node_bytes * + (size_t) MERKLE_TREE_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type)); + + return ret; +} + +void mbedtls_lms_private_init(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); +} + +void mbedtls_lms_private_free(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx) +{ + unsigned int idx; + + if (ctx->have_private_key) { + if (ctx->ots_private_keys != NULL) { + for (idx = 0; idx < MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type); idx++) { + mbedtls_lmots_private_free(&ctx->ots_private_keys[idx]); + } + } + + if (ctx->ots_public_keys != NULL) { + for (idx = 0; idx < MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type); idx++) { + mbedtls_lmots_public_free(&ctx->ots_public_keys[idx]); + } + } + + mbedtls_free(ctx->ots_private_keys); + mbedtls_free(ctx->ots_public_keys); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); +} + + +int mbedtls_lms_generate_private_key(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx, + mbedtls_lms_algorithm_type_t type, + mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t otstype, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, const unsigned char *seed, + size_t seed_size) +{ + unsigned int idx = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (type != MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (otstype != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ctx->have_private_key) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ctx->params.type = type; + ctx->params.otstype = otstype; + ctx->have_private_key = 1; + + ret = f_rng(p_rng, + ctx->params.I_key_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + /* Requires a cast to size_t to avoid an implicit cast warning on certain + * platforms (particularly Windows) */ + ctx->ots_private_keys = mbedtls_calloc((size_t) MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type), + sizeof(*ctx->ots_private_keys)); + if (ctx->ots_private_keys == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + + /* Requires a cast to size_t to avoid an implicit cast warning on certain + * platforms (particularly Windows) */ + ctx->ots_public_keys = mbedtls_calloc((size_t) MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type), + sizeof(*ctx->ots_public_keys)); + if (ctx->ots_public_keys == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + + for (idx = 0; idx < MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type); idx++) { + mbedtls_lmots_private_init(&ctx->ots_private_keys[idx]); + mbedtls_lmots_public_init(&ctx->ots_public_keys[idx]); + } + + + for (idx = 0; idx < MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type); idx++) { + ret = mbedtls_lmots_generate_private_key(&ctx->ots_private_keys[idx], + otstype, + ctx->params.I_key_identifier, + idx, seed, seed_size); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_lmots_calculate_public_key(&ctx->ots_public_keys[idx], + &ctx->ots_private_keys[idx]); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } + + ctx->q_next_usable_key = 0; + +exit: + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_lms_private_free(ctx); + } + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_lms_calculate_public_key(mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx, + const mbedtls_lms_private_t *priv_ctx) +{ + const size_t node_bytes = MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(priv_ctx->params.type); + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *tree = NULL; + + if (!priv_ctx->have_private_key) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (priv_ctx->params.type + != MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (priv_ctx->params.otstype + != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + tree = mbedtls_calloc((size_t) MERKLE_TREE_NODE_AM(priv_ctx->params.type), + node_bytes); + if (tree == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + memcpy(&ctx->params, &priv_ctx->params, + sizeof(mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t)); + + ret = calculate_merkle_tree(priv_ctx, tree); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + /* Root node is always at position 1, due to 1-based indexing */ + memcpy(ctx->T_1_pub_key, &tree[node_bytes], node_bytes); + + ctx->have_public_key = 1; + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(tree, node_bytes * + (size_t) MERKLE_TREE_NODE_AM(priv_ctx->params.type)); + + return ret; +} + + +int mbedtls_lms_sign(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, const unsigned char *msg, + unsigned int msg_size, unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, + size_t *sig_len) +{ + uint32_t q_leaf_identifier; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (!ctx->have_private_key) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (sig_size < MBEDTLS_LMS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.type, ctx->params.otstype)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + if (ctx->params.type != MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ctx->params.otstype + != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ctx->q_next_usable_key >= MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_OUT_OF_PRIVATE_KEYS; + } + + + q_leaf_identifier = ctx->q_next_usable_key; + /* This new value must _always_ be written back to the disk before the + * signature is returned. + */ + ctx->q_next_usable_key += 1; + + if (MBEDTLS_LMS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.type, ctx->params.otstype) + < SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ret = mbedtls_lmots_sign(&ctx->ots_private_keys[q_leaf_identifier], + f_rng, + p_rng, + msg, + msg_size, + sig + SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET, + MBEDTLS_LMS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.type, + ctx->params.otstype) - SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET, + NULL); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->params.type, sig, SIG_TYPE_OFFSET(ctx->params.otstype)); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(q_leaf_identifier, sig, SIG_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET); + + ret = get_merkle_path(ctx, + MERKLE_TREE_INTERNAL_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type) + q_leaf_identifier, + sig + SIG_PATH_OFFSET(ctx->params.otstype)); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (sig_len != NULL) { + *sig_len = MBEDTLS_LMS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.type, ctx->params.otstype); + } + + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) */ +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/md.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/md.c index 45563781d5..12a3ea2374 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/md.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/md.c @@ -6,37 +6,50 @@ * \author Adriaan de Jong * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +/* + * Availability of functions in this module is controlled by two + * feature macros: + * - MBEDTLS_MD_C enables the whole module; + * - MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT enables only functions for hashing and accessing + * most hash metadata (everything except string names); is it + * automatically set whenever MBEDTLS_MD_C is defined. + * + * In this file, functions from MD_LIGHT are at the top, MD_C at the end. + * + * In the future we may want to change the contract of some functions + * (behaviour with NULL arguments) depending on whether MD_C is defined or + * only MD_LIGHT. Also, the exact scope of MD_LIGHT might vary. + * + * For these reasons, we're keeping MD_LIGHT internal for now. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT) #include "mbedtls/md.h" -#include "mbedtls/md_internal.h" +#include "md_wrap.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" -#include "mbedtls/md2.h" -#include "mbedtls/md4.h" #include "mbedtls/md5.h" #include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" #include "mbedtls/sha1.h" #include "mbedtls/sha256.h" #include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha3.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#include +#include "md_psa.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA) +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#endif #include "mbedtls/platform.h" @@ -46,227 +59,202 @@ #include #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md2_info = { - "MD2", - MBEDTLS_MD_MD2, - 16, - 16, -}; +/* See comment above MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE in md.h */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE < PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE +#error "Internal error: MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE < PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md4_info = { - "MD4", - MBEDTLS_MD_MD4, - 16, - 64, -}; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +#define MD_INFO(type, out_size, block_size) type, out_size, block_size, +#else +#define MD_INFO(type, out_size, block_size) type, out_size, #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md5_info = { - "MD5", - MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, - 16, - 64, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md5_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, 16, 64) }; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_ripemd160_info = { - "RIPEMD160", - MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, - 20, - 64, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_ripemd160_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, 20, 64) }; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha1_info = { - "SHA1", - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, - 20, - 64, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha1_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 20, 64) }; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha224_info = { - "SHA224", - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, - 28, - 64, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha224_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, 28, 64) }; +#endif -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha256_info = { - "SHA256", - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, - 32, - 64, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha256_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, 32, 64) }; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha384_info = { - "SHA384", - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, - 48, - 128, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha384_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, 48, 128) }; #endif -const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha512_info = { - "SHA512", - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, - 64, - 128, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha512_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, 64, 128) }; #endif -/* - * Reminder: update profiles in x509_crt.c when adding a new hash! - */ -static const int supported_digests[] = { - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, -#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha3_224_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224, 28, 144) +}; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha3_256_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256, 32, 136) +}; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha3_384_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384, 48, 104) +}; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha3_512_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512, 64, 72) +}; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, +const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type) +{ + switch (md_type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return &mbedtls_md5_info; #endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_MD4, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return &mbedtls_ripemd160_info; #endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_MD2, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return &mbedtls_sha1_info; #endif - - MBEDTLS_MD_NONE -}; - -const int *mbedtls_md_list(void) -{ - return supported_digests; -} - -const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_string(const char *md_name) -{ - if (NULL == md_name) { - return NULL; - } - - /* Get the appropriate digest information */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - if (!strcmp("MD2", md_name)) { - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_MD2); - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return &mbedtls_sha224_info; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - if (!strcmp("MD4", md_name)) { - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_MD4); - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return &mbedtls_sha256_info; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - if (!strcmp("MD5", md_name)) { - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_MD5); - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return &mbedtls_sha384_info; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - if (!strcmp("RIPEMD160", md_name)) { - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160); - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return &mbedtls_sha512_info; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - if (!strcmp("SHA1", md_name) || !strcmp("SHA", md_name)) { - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1); - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224: + return &mbedtls_sha3_224_info; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - if (!strcmp("SHA224", md_name)) { - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224); - } - if (!strcmp("SHA256", md_name)) { - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256); - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256: + return &mbedtls_sha3_256_info; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - if (!strcmp("SHA384", md_name)) { - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384); - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384: + return &mbedtls_sha3_384_info; #endif - if (!strcmp("SHA512", md_name)) { - return mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512); - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512: + return &mbedtls_sha3_512_info; #endif - return NULL; + default: + return NULL; + } } -const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA) +static psa_algorithm_t psa_alg_of_md(const mbedtls_md_info_t *info) { - switch (md_type) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: - return &mbedtls_md2_info; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: - return &mbedtls_md4_info; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + switch (info->type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_MD5_VIA_PSA) case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: - return &mbedtls_md5_info; + return PSA_ALG_MD5; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160_VIA_PSA) case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: - return &mbedtls_ripemd160_info; + return PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1_VIA_PSA) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: - return &mbedtls_sha1_info; + return PSA_ALG_SHA_1; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224_VIA_PSA) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: - return &mbedtls_sha224_info; + return PSA_ALG_SHA_224; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256_VIA_PSA) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: - return &mbedtls_sha256_info; + return PSA_ALG_SHA_256; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384_VIA_PSA) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: - return &mbedtls_sha384_info; + return PSA_ALG_SHA_384; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512_VIA_PSA) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: - return &mbedtls_sha512_info; + return PSA_ALG_SHA_512; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224_VIA_PSA) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224: + return PSA_ALG_SHA3_224; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256_VIA_PSA) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256: + return PSA_ALG_SHA3_256; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384_VIA_PSA) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384: + return PSA_ALG_SHA3_384; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512_VIA_PSA) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512: + return PSA_ALG_SHA3_512; #endif default: - return NULL; + return PSA_ALG_NONE; } } +static int md_can_use_psa(const mbedtls_md_info_t *info) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = psa_alg_of_md(info); + if (alg == PSA_ALG_NONE) { + return 0; + } + + return psa_can_do_hash(alg); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA */ + void mbedtls_md_init(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx) { + /* Note: this sets engine (if present) to MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_LEGACY */ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_md_context_t)); } @@ -277,17 +265,12 @@ void mbedtls_md_free(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx) } if (ctx->md_ctx != NULL) { - switch (ctx->md_info->type) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: - mbedtls_md2_free(ctx->md_ctx); - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: - mbedtls_md4_free(ctx->md_ctx); - break; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA) + if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_PSA) { + psa_hash_abort(ctx->md_ctx); + } else #endif + switch (ctx->md_info->type) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: mbedtls_md5_free(ctx->md_ctx); @@ -303,19 +286,33 @@ void mbedtls_md_free(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx) mbedtls_sha1_free(ctx->md_ctx); break; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + mbedtls_sha256_free(ctx->md_ctx); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: mbedtls_sha256_free(ctx->md_ctx); break; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + mbedtls_sha512_free(ctx->md_ctx); + break; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: mbedtls_sha512_free(ctx->md_ctx); break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512: + mbedtls_sha3_free(ctx->md_ctx); + break; #endif default: /* Shouldn't happen */ @@ -324,11 +321,12 @@ void mbedtls_md_free(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx) mbedtls_free(ctx->md_ctx); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) if (ctx->hmac_ctx != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx->hmac_ctx, + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ctx->hmac_ctx, 2 * ctx->md_info->block_size); - mbedtls_free(ctx->hmac_ctx); } +#endif mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_md_context_t)); } @@ -342,17 +340,22 @@ int mbedtls_md_clone(mbedtls_md_context_t *dst, return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - switch (src->md_info->type) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: - mbedtls_md2_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx); - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: - mbedtls_md4_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx); - break; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA) + if (src->engine != dst->engine) { + /* This can happen with src set to legacy because PSA wasn't ready + * yet, and dst to PSA because it became ready in the meantime. + * We currently don't support that case (we'd need to re-allocate + * md_ctx to the size of the appropriate MD context). */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + if (src->engine == MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_PSA) { + psa_status_t status = psa_hash_clone(src->md_ctx, dst->md_ctx); + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); + } #endif + + switch (src->md_info->type) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: mbedtls_md5_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx); @@ -368,19 +371,33 @@ int mbedtls_md_clone(mbedtls_md_context_t *dst, mbedtls_sha1_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx); break; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + mbedtls_sha256_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: mbedtls_sha256_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx); break; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + mbedtls_sha512_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx); + break; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: mbedtls_sha512_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx); break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512: + mbedtls_sha3_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx); + break; #endif default: return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -389,13 +406,6 @@ int mbedtls_md_clone(mbedtls_md_context_t *dst, return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -int mbedtls_md_init_ctx(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info) -{ - return mbedtls_md_setup(ctx, md_info, 1); -} -#endif - #define ALLOC(type) \ do { \ ctx->md_ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_##type##_context)); \ @@ -407,25 +417,35 @@ int mbedtls_md_init_ctx(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_i int mbedtls_md_setup(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, int hmac) { - if (md_info == NULL || ctx == NULL) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) + if (ctx == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif + if (md_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } ctx->md_info = md_info; ctx->md_ctx = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) ctx->hmac_ctx = NULL; - - switch (md_info->type) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: - ALLOC(md2); - break; +#else + if (hmac != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: - ALLOC(md4); - break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA) + if (md_can_use_psa(ctx->md_info)) { + ctx->md_ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(psa_hash_operation_t)); + if (ctx->md_ctx == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + ctx->engine = MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_PSA; + } else #endif + switch (md_info->type) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: ALLOC(md5); @@ -441,24 +461,39 @@ int mbedtls_md_setup(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info ALLOC(sha1); break; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + ALLOC(sha256); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: ALLOC(sha256); break; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + ALLOC(sha512); + break; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: ALLOC(sha512); break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512: + ALLOC(sha3); + break; #endif default: return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) if (hmac != 0) { ctx->hmac_ctx = mbedtls_calloc(2, md_info->block_size); if (ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL) { @@ -466,6 +501,7 @@ int mbedtls_md_setup(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED; } } +#endif return 0; } @@ -473,44 +509,59 @@ int mbedtls_md_setup(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info int mbedtls_md_starts(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) if (ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - - switch (ctx->md_info->type) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: - return mbedtls_md2_starts_ret(ctx->md_ctx); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: - return mbedtls_md4_starts_ret(ctx->md_ctx); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA) + if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_PSA) { + psa_algorithm_t alg = psa_alg_of_md(ctx->md_info); + psa_hash_abort(ctx->md_ctx); + psa_status_t status = psa_hash_setup(ctx->md_ctx, alg); + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); + } #endif + + switch (ctx->md_info->type) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: - return mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(ctx->md_ctx); + return mbedtls_md5_starts(ctx->md_ctx); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: - return mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret(ctx->md_ctx); + return mbedtls_ripemd160_starts(ctx->md_ctx); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: - return mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret(ctx->md_ctx); + return mbedtls_sha1_starts(ctx->md_ctx); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: - return mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(ctx->md_ctx, 1); + return mbedtls_sha256_starts(ctx->md_ctx, 1); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: - return mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(ctx->md_ctx, 0); + return mbedtls_sha256_starts(ctx->md_ctx, 0); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: - return mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(ctx->md_ctx, 1); + return mbedtls_sha512_starts(ctx->md_ctx, 1); #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: - return mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(ctx->md_ctx, 0); + return mbedtls_sha512_starts(ctx->md_ctx, 0); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224: + return mbedtls_sha3_starts(ctx->md_ctx, MBEDTLS_SHA3_224); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256: + return mbedtls_sha3_starts(ctx->md_ctx, MBEDTLS_SHA3_256); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384: + return mbedtls_sha3_starts(ctx->md_ctx, MBEDTLS_SHA3_384); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512: + return mbedtls_sha3_starts(ctx->md_ctx, MBEDTLS_SHA3_512); #endif default: return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -519,42 +570,54 @@ int mbedtls_md_starts(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx) int mbedtls_md_update(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) if (ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - - switch (ctx->md_info->type) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: - return mbedtls_md2_update_ret(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: - return mbedtls_md4_update_ret(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA) + if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_PSA) { + psa_status_t status = psa_hash_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); + } #endif + + switch (ctx->md_info->type) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: - return mbedtls_md5_update_ret(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); + return mbedtls_md5_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: - return mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); + return mbedtls_ripemd160_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: - return mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); + return mbedtls_sha1_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return mbedtls_sha256_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: - return mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); + return mbedtls_sha256_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return mbedtls_sha512_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: - return mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); + return mbedtls_sha512_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512: + return mbedtls_sha3_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); #endif default: return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -563,42 +626,56 @@ int mbedtls_md_update(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, siz int mbedtls_md_finish(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) if (ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - - switch (ctx->md_info->type) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: - return mbedtls_md2_finish_ret(ctx->md_ctx, output); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: - return mbedtls_md4_finish_ret(ctx->md_ctx, output); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA) + if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_PSA) { + size_t size = ctx->md_info->size; + psa_status_t status = psa_hash_finish(ctx->md_ctx, + output, size, &size); + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); + } #endif + + switch (ctx->md_info->type) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: - return mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(ctx->md_ctx, output); + return mbedtls_md5_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: - return mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret(ctx->md_ctx, output); + return mbedtls_ripemd160_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: - return mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(ctx->md_ctx, output); + return mbedtls_sha1_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return mbedtls_sha256_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: - return mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret(ctx->md_ctx, output); + return mbedtls_sha256_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return mbedtls_sha512_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output); #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: - return mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret(ctx->md_ctx, output); + return mbedtls_sha512_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512: + return mbedtls_sha3_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output, ctx->md_info->size); #endif default: return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -612,46 +689,232 @@ int mbedtls_md(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const unsigned char *input, siz return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - switch (md_info->type) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: - return mbedtls_md2_ret(input, ilen, output); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: - return mbedtls_md4_ret(input, ilen, output); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA) + if (md_can_use_psa(md_info)) { + size_t size = md_info->size; + psa_status_t status = psa_hash_compute(psa_alg_of_md(md_info), + input, ilen, + output, size, &size); + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); + } #endif + + switch (md_info->type) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: - return mbedtls_md5_ret(input, ilen, output); + return mbedtls_md5(input, ilen, output); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: - return mbedtls_ripemd160_ret(input, ilen, output); + return mbedtls_ripemd160(input, ilen, output); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: - return mbedtls_sha1_ret(input, ilen, output); + return mbedtls_sha1(input, ilen, output); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: - return mbedtls_sha256_ret(input, ilen, output, 1); + return mbedtls_sha256(input, ilen, output, 1); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: - return mbedtls_sha256_ret(input, ilen, output, 0); + return mbedtls_sha256(input, ilen, output, 0); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: - return mbedtls_sha512_ret(input, ilen, output, 1); + return mbedtls_sha512(input, ilen, output, 1); #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: - return mbedtls_sha512_ret(input, ilen, output, 0); + return mbedtls_sha512(input, ilen, output, 0); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224: + return mbedtls_sha3(MBEDTLS_SHA3_224, input, ilen, output, md_info->size); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256: + return mbedtls_sha3(MBEDTLS_SHA3_256, input, ilen, output, md_info->size); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384: + return mbedtls_sha3(MBEDTLS_SHA3_384, input, ilen, output, md_info->size); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512: + return mbedtls_sha3(MBEDTLS_SHA3_512, input, ilen, output, md_info->size); #endif default: return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } } +unsigned char mbedtls_md_get_size(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info) +{ + if (md_info == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + return md_info->size; +} + +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_get_type(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info) +{ + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + } + + return md_info->type; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +int mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(psa_status_t status) +{ + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR_LIST(status, psa_to_md_errors, + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + + +/************************************************************************ + * Functions above this separator are part of MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT, * + * functions below are only available when MBEDTLS_MD_C is set. * + ************************************************************************/ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) + +/* + * Reminder: update profiles in x509_crt.c when adding a new hash! + */ +static const int supported_digests[] = { + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160) + MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) + MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512, +#endif + + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE +}; + +const int *mbedtls_md_list(void) +{ + return supported_digests; +} + +typedef struct { + const char *md_name; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type; +} md_name_entry; + +static const md_name_entry md_names[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) + { "MD5", MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160) + { "RIPEMD160", MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + { "SHA1", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 }, + { "SHA", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 }, // compatibility fallback +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) + { "SHA224", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { "SHA256", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { "SHA384", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + { "SHA512", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224) + { "SHA3-224", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256) + { "SHA3-256", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384) + { "SHA3-384", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512) + { "SHA3-512", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512 }, +#endif + { NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE }, +}; + +const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_string(const char *md_name) +{ + if (NULL == md_name) { + return NULL; + } + + const md_name_entry *entry = md_names; + while (entry->md_name != NULL && + strcmp(entry->md_name, md_name) != 0) { + ++entry; + } + + return mbedtls_md_info_from_type(entry->md_type); +} + +const char *mbedtls_md_get_name(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info) +{ + if (md_info == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + const md_name_entry *entry = md_names; + while (entry->md_type != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && + entry->md_type != md_info->type) { + ++entry; + } + + return entry->md_name; +} + +const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_ctx( + const mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_info); +} + #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) int mbedtls_md_file(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const char *path, unsigned char *output) { @@ -669,6 +932,9 @@ int mbedtls_md_file(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const char *path, unsigned return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR; } + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL); + mbedtls_md_init(&ctx); if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) { @@ -705,7 +971,6 @@ int mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *key, int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char sum[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char *ipad, *opad; - size_t i; if (ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -732,10 +997,8 @@ int mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *key, memset(ipad, 0x36, ctx->md_info->block_size); memset(opad, 0x5C, ctx->md_info->block_size); - for (i = 0; i < keylen; i++) { - ipad[i] = (unsigned char) (ipad[i] ^ key[i]); - opad[i] = (unsigned char) (opad[i] ^ key[i]); - } + mbedtls_xor(ipad, ipad, key, keylen); + mbedtls_xor(opad, opad, key, keylen); if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(ctx)) != 0) { goto cleanup; @@ -840,75 +1103,6 @@ int mbedtls_md_hmac(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, return ret; } -int mbedtls_md_process(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *data) -{ - if (ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - switch (ctx->md_info->type) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD2: - return mbedtls_internal_md2_process(ctx->md_ctx); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD4: - return mbedtls_internal_md4_process(ctx->md_ctx, data); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: - return mbedtls_internal_md5_process(ctx->md_ctx, data); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: - return mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process(ctx->md_ctx, data); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: - return mbedtls_internal_sha1_process(ctx->md_ctx, data); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: - return mbedtls_internal_sha256_process(ctx->md_ctx, data); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: -#endif - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: - return mbedtls_internal_sha512_process(ctx->md_ctx, data); -#endif - default: - return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } -} - -unsigned char mbedtls_md_get_size(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info) -{ - if (md_info == NULL) { - return 0; - } - - return md_info->size; -} - -mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_get_type(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info) -{ - if (md_info == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; - } - - return md_info->type; -} - -const char *mbedtls_md_get_name(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info) -{ - if (md_info == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - - return md_info->name; -} - #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/md2.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/md2.c deleted file mode 100644 index f009498c48..0000000000 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/md2.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,359 +0,0 @@ -/* - * RFC 1115/1319 compliant MD2 implementation - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ -/* - * The MD2 algorithm was designed by Ron Rivest in 1989. - * - * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1115.txt - * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1319.txt - */ - -#include "common.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - -#include "mbedtls/md2.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" -#include "mbedtls/error.h" - -#include - -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT) - -static const unsigned char PI_SUBST[256] = -{ - 0x29, 0x2E, 0x43, 0xC9, 0xA2, 0xD8, 0x7C, 0x01, 0x3D, 0x36, - 0x54, 0xA1, 0xEC, 0xF0, 0x06, 0x13, 0x62, 0xA7, 0x05, 0xF3, - 0xC0, 0xC7, 0x73, 0x8C, 0x98, 0x93, 0x2B, 0xD9, 0xBC, 0x4C, - 0x82, 0xCA, 0x1E, 0x9B, 0x57, 0x3C, 0xFD, 0xD4, 0xE0, 0x16, - 0x67, 0x42, 0x6F, 0x18, 0x8A, 0x17, 0xE5, 0x12, 0xBE, 0x4E, - 0xC4, 0xD6, 0xDA, 0x9E, 0xDE, 0x49, 0xA0, 0xFB, 0xF5, 0x8E, - 0xBB, 0x2F, 0xEE, 0x7A, 0xA9, 0x68, 0x79, 0x91, 0x15, 0xB2, - 0x07, 0x3F, 0x94, 0xC2, 0x10, 0x89, 0x0B, 0x22, 0x5F, 0x21, - 0x80, 0x7F, 0x5D, 0x9A, 0x5A, 0x90, 0x32, 0x27, 0x35, 0x3E, - 0xCC, 0xE7, 0xBF, 0xF7, 0x97, 0x03, 0xFF, 0x19, 0x30, 0xB3, - 0x48, 0xA5, 0xB5, 0xD1, 0xD7, 0x5E, 0x92, 0x2A, 0xAC, 0x56, - 0xAA, 0xC6, 0x4F, 0xB8, 0x38, 0xD2, 0x96, 0xA4, 0x7D, 0xB6, - 0x76, 0xFC, 0x6B, 0xE2, 0x9C, 0x74, 0x04, 0xF1, 0x45, 0x9D, - 0x70, 0x59, 0x64, 0x71, 0x87, 0x20, 0x86, 0x5B, 0xCF, 0x65, - 0xE6, 0x2D, 0xA8, 0x02, 0x1B, 0x60, 0x25, 0xAD, 0xAE, 0xB0, - 0xB9, 0xF6, 0x1C, 0x46, 0x61, 0x69, 0x34, 0x40, 0x7E, 0x0F, - 0x55, 0x47, 0xA3, 0x23, 0xDD, 0x51, 0xAF, 0x3A, 0xC3, 0x5C, - 0xF9, 0xCE, 0xBA, 0xC5, 0xEA, 0x26, 0x2C, 0x53, 0x0D, 0x6E, - 0x85, 0x28, 0x84, 0x09, 0xD3, 0xDF, 0xCD, 0xF4, 0x41, 0x81, - 0x4D, 0x52, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0x37, 0xC8, 0x6C, 0xC1, 0xAB, 0xFA, - 0x24, 0xE1, 0x7B, 0x08, 0x0C, 0xBD, 0xB1, 0x4A, 0x78, 0x88, - 0x95, 0x8B, 0xE3, 0x63, 0xE8, 0x6D, 0xE9, 0xCB, 0xD5, 0xFE, - 0x3B, 0x00, 0x1D, 0x39, 0xF2, 0xEF, 0xB7, 0x0E, 0x66, 0x58, - 0xD0, 0xE4, 0xA6, 0x77, 0x72, 0xF8, 0xEB, 0x75, 0x4B, 0x0A, - 0x31, 0x44, 0x50, 0xB4, 0x8F, 0xED, 0x1F, 0x1A, 0xDB, 0x99, - 0x8D, 0x33, 0x9F, 0x11, 0x83, 0x14 -}; - -void mbedtls_md2_init(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx) -{ - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_md2_context)); -} - -void mbedtls_md2_free(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx) -{ - if (ctx == NULL) { - return; - } - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_md2_context)); -} - -void mbedtls_md2_clone(mbedtls_md2_context *dst, - const mbedtls_md2_context *src) -{ - *dst = *src; -} - -/* - * MD2 context setup - */ -int mbedtls_md2_starts_ret(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx) -{ - memset(ctx->cksum, 0, 16); - memset(ctx->state, 0, 46); - memset(ctx->buffer, 0, 16); - ctx->left = 0; - - return 0; -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md2_starts(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx) -{ - mbedtls_md2_starts_ret(ctx); -} -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT) -int mbedtls_internal_md2_process(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx) -{ - int i, j; - unsigned char t = 0; - - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { - ctx->state[i + 16] = ctx->buffer[i]; - ctx->state[i + 32] = - (unsigned char) (ctx->buffer[i] ^ ctx->state[i]); - } - - for (i = 0; i < 18; i++) { - for (j = 0; j < 48; j++) { - ctx->state[j] = (unsigned char) - (ctx->state[j] ^ PI_SUBST[t]); - t = ctx->state[j]; - } - - t = (unsigned char) (t + i); - } - - t = ctx->cksum[15]; - - for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { - ctx->cksum[i] = (unsigned char) - (ctx->cksum[i] ^ PI_SUBST[ctx->buffer[i] ^ t]); - t = ctx->cksum[i]; - } - - /* Zeroise variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&t, sizeof(t)); - - return 0; -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md2_process(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx) -{ - mbedtls_internal_md2_process(ctx); -} -#endif -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT */ - -/* - * MD2 process buffer - */ -int mbedtls_md2_update_ret(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t fill; - - while (ilen > 0) { - if (ilen > 16 - ctx->left) { - fill = 16 - ctx->left; - } else { - fill = ilen; - } - - memcpy(ctx->buffer + ctx->left, input, fill); - - ctx->left += fill; - input += fill; - ilen -= fill; - - if (ctx->left == 16) { - ctx->left = 0; - if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_md2_process(ctx)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - } - } - - return 0; -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md2_update(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen) -{ - mbedtls_md2_update_ret(ctx, input, ilen); -} -#endif - -/* - * MD2 final digest - */ -int mbedtls_md2_finish_ret(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16]) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t i; - unsigned char x; - - x = (unsigned char) (16 - ctx->left); - - for (i = ctx->left; i < 16; i++) { - ctx->buffer[i] = x; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_md2_process(ctx)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - memcpy(ctx->buffer, ctx->cksum, 16); - if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_md2_process(ctx)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - memcpy(output, ctx->state, 16); - - return 0; -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md2_finish(mbedtls_md2_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16]) -{ - mbedtls_md2_finish_ret(ctx, output); -} -#endif - -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT */ - -/* - * output = MD2( input buffer ) - */ -int mbedtls_md2_ret(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16]) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_md2_context ctx; - - mbedtls_md2_init(&ctx); - - if ((ret = mbedtls_md2_starts_ret(&ctx)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_md2_update_ret(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_md2_finish_ret(&ctx, output)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - -exit: - mbedtls_md2_free(&ctx); - - return ret; -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md2(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16]) -{ - mbedtls_md2_ret(input, ilen, output); -} -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - -/* - * RFC 1319 test vectors - */ -static const unsigned char md2_test_str[7][81] = -{ - { "" }, - { "a" }, - { "abc" }, - { "message digest" }, - { "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" }, - { "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" }, - { "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890" } -}; - -static const size_t md2_test_strlen[7] = -{ - 0, 1, 3, 14, 26, 62, 80 -}; - -static const unsigned char md2_test_sum[7][16] = -{ - { 0x83, 0x50, 0xE5, 0xA3, 0xE2, 0x4C, 0x15, 0x3D, - 0xF2, 0x27, 0x5C, 0x9F, 0x80, 0x69, 0x27, 0x73 }, - { 0x32, 0xEC, 0x01, 0xEC, 0x4A, 0x6D, 0xAC, 0x72, - 0xC0, 0xAB, 0x96, 0xFB, 0x34, 0xC0, 0xB5, 0xD1 }, - { 0xDA, 0x85, 0x3B, 0x0D, 0x3F, 0x88, 0xD9, 0x9B, - 0x30, 0x28, 0x3A, 0x69, 0xE6, 0xDE, 0xD6, 0xBB }, - { 0xAB, 0x4F, 0x49, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x2A, 0x53, 0x0B, - 0x21, 0x9F, 0xF3, 0x30, 0x31, 0xFE, 0x06, 0xB0 }, - { 0x4E, 0x8D, 0xDF, 0xF3, 0x65, 0x02, 0x92, 0xAB, - 0x5A, 0x41, 0x08, 0xC3, 0xAA, 0x47, 0x94, 0x0B }, - { 0xDA, 0x33, 0xDE, 0xF2, 0xA4, 0x2D, 0xF1, 0x39, - 0x75, 0x35, 0x28, 0x46, 0xC3, 0x03, 0x38, 0xCD }, - { 0xD5, 0x97, 0x6F, 0x79, 0xD8, 0x3D, 0x3A, 0x0D, - 0xC9, 0x80, 0x6C, 0x3C, 0x66, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xD8 } -}; - -/* - * Checkup routine - */ -int mbedtls_md2_self_test(int verbose) -{ - int i, ret = 0; - unsigned char md2sum[16]; - - for (i = 0; i < 7; i++) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" MD2 test #%d: ", i + 1); - } - - ret = mbedtls_md2_ret(md2_test_str[i], md2_test_strlen[i], md2sum); - if (ret != 0) { - goto fail; - } - - if (memcmp(md2sum, md2_test_sum[i], 16) != 0) { - ret = 1; - goto fail; - } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); - } - } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("\n"); - } - - return 0; - -fail: - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); - } - - return ret; -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/md4.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/md4.c deleted file mode 100644 index 163afb1ddb..0000000000 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/md4.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,463 +0,0 @@ -/* - * RFC 1186/1320 compliant MD4 implementation - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ -/* - * The MD4 algorithm was designed by Ron Rivest in 1990. - * - * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1186.txt - * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1320.txt - */ - -#include "common.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - -#include "mbedtls/md4.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" -#include "mbedtls/error.h" - -#include - -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT) - -void mbedtls_md4_init(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx) -{ - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_md4_context)); -} - -void mbedtls_md4_free(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx) -{ - if (ctx == NULL) { - return; - } - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_md4_context)); -} - -void mbedtls_md4_clone(mbedtls_md4_context *dst, - const mbedtls_md4_context *src) -{ - *dst = *src; -} - -/* - * MD4 context setup - */ -int mbedtls_md4_starts_ret(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx) -{ - ctx->total[0] = 0; - ctx->total[1] = 0; - - ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301; - ctx->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89; - ctx->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE; - ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476; - - return 0; -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md4_starts(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx) -{ - mbedtls_md4_starts_ret(ctx); -} -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT) -int mbedtls_internal_md4_process(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64]) -{ - struct { - uint32_t X[16], A, B, C, D; - } local; - - local.X[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 0); - local.X[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 4); - local.X[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 8); - local.X[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 12); - local.X[4] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 16); - local.X[5] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 20); - local.X[6] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 24); - local.X[7] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 28); - local.X[8] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 32); - local.X[9] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 36); - local.X[10] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 40); - local.X[11] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 44); - local.X[12] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 48); - local.X[13] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 52); - local.X[14] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 56); - local.X[15] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 60); - -#define S(x, n) (((x) << (n)) | (((x) & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (32 - (n)))) - - local.A = ctx->state[0]; - local.B = ctx->state[1]; - local.C = ctx->state[2]; - local.D = ctx->state[3]; - -#define F(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) | ((~(x)) & (z))) -#define P(a, b, c, d, x, s) \ - do \ - { \ - (a) += F((b), (c), (d)) + (x); \ - (a) = S((a), (s)); \ - } while (0) - - - P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[0], 3); - P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[1], 7); - P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[2], 11); - P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[3], 19); - P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[4], 3); - P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[5], 7); - P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[6], 11); - P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[7], 19); - P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[8], 3); - P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[9], 7); - P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[10], 11); - P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[11], 19); - P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[12], 3); - P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[13], 7); - P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[14], 11); - P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[15], 19); - -#undef P -#undef F - -#define F(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) | ((x) & (z)) | ((y) & (z))) -#define P(a, b, c, d, x, s) \ - do \ - { \ - (a) += F((b), (c), (d)) + (x) + 0x5A827999; \ - (a) = S((a), (s)); \ - } while (0) - - P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[0], 3); - P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[4], 5); - P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[8], 9); - P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[12], 13); - P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[1], 3); - P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[5], 5); - P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[9], 9); - P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[13], 13); - P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[2], 3); - P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[6], 5); - P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[10], 9); - P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[14], 13); - P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[3], 3); - P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[7], 5); - P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[11], 9); - P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[15], 13); - -#undef P -#undef F - -#define F(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z)) -#define P(a, b, c, d, x, s) \ - do \ - { \ - (a) += F((b), (c), (d)) + (x) + 0x6ED9EBA1; \ - (a) = S((a), (s)); \ - } while (0) - - P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[0], 3); - P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[8], 9); - P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[4], 11); - P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[12], 15); - P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[2], 3); - P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[10], 9); - P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[6], 11); - P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[14], 15); - P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[1], 3); - P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[9], 9); - P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[5], 11); - P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[13], 15); - P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.X[3], 3); - P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.X[11], 9); - P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, local.X[7], 11); - P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, local.X[15], 15); - -#undef F -#undef P - - ctx->state[0] += local.A; - ctx->state[1] += local.B; - ctx->state[2] += local.C; - ctx->state[3] += local.D; - - /* Zeroise variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&local, sizeof(local)); - - return 0; -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md4_process(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64]) -{ - mbedtls_internal_md4_process(ctx, data); -} -#endif -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT */ - -/* - * MD4 process buffer - */ -int mbedtls_md4_update_ret(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t fill; - uint32_t left; - - if (ilen == 0) { - return 0; - } - - left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; - fill = 64 - left; - - ctx->total[0] += (uint32_t) ilen; - ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF; - - if (ctx->total[0] < (uint32_t) ilen) { - ctx->total[1]++; - } - - if (left && ilen >= fill) { - memcpy((void *) (ctx->buffer + left), - (void *) input, fill); - - if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_md4_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - input += fill; - ilen -= fill; - left = 0; - } - - while (ilen >= 64) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_md4_process(ctx, input)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - input += 64; - ilen -= 64; - } - - if (ilen > 0) { - memcpy((void *) (ctx->buffer + left), - (void *) input, ilen); - } - - return 0; -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md4_update(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen) -{ - mbedtls_md4_update_ret(ctx, input, ilen); -} -#endif - -static const unsigned char md4_padding[64] = -{ - 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 -}; - -/* - * MD4 final digest - */ -int mbedtls_md4_finish_ret(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16]) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - uint32_t last, padn; - uint32_t high, low; - unsigned char msglen[8]; - - high = (ctx->total[0] >> 29) - | (ctx->total[1] << 3); - low = (ctx->total[0] << 3); - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(low, msglen, 0); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(high, msglen, 4); - - last = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; - padn = (last < 56) ? (56 - last) : (120 - last); - - ret = mbedtls_md4_update_ret(ctx, (unsigned char *) md4_padding, padn); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_md4_update_ret(ctx, msglen, 8)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[0], output, 0); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[1], output, 4); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[2], output, 8); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[3], output, 12); - - return 0; -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md4_finish(mbedtls_md4_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16]) -{ - mbedtls_md4_finish_ret(ctx, output); -} -#endif - -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT */ - -/* - * output = MD4( input buffer ) - */ -int mbedtls_md4_ret(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16]) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_md4_context ctx; - - mbedtls_md4_init(&ctx); - - if ((ret = mbedtls_md4_starts_ret(&ctx)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_md4_update_ret(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_md4_finish_ret(&ctx, output)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - -exit: - mbedtls_md4_free(&ctx); - - return ret; -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md4(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16]) -{ - mbedtls_md4_ret(input, ilen, output); -} -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - -/* - * RFC 1320 test vectors - */ -static const unsigned char md4_test_str[7][81] = -{ - { "" }, - { "a" }, - { "abc" }, - { "message digest" }, - { "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" }, - { "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" }, - { "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890" } -}; - -static const size_t md4_test_strlen[7] = -{ - 0, 1, 3, 14, 26, 62, 80 -}; - -static const unsigned char md4_test_sum[7][16] = -{ - { 0x31, 0xD6, 0xCF, 0xE0, 0xD1, 0x6A, 0xE9, 0x31, - 0xB7, 0x3C, 0x59, 0xD7, 0xE0, 0xC0, 0x89, 0xC0 }, - { 0xBD, 0xE5, 0x2C, 0xB3, 0x1D, 0xE3, 0x3E, 0x46, - 0x24, 0x5E, 0x05, 0xFB, 0xDB, 0xD6, 0xFB, 0x24 }, - { 0xA4, 0x48, 0x01, 0x7A, 0xAF, 0x21, 0xD8, 0x52, - 0x5F, 0xC1, 0x0A, 0xE8, 0x7A, 0xA6, 0x72, 0x9D }, - { 0xD9, 0x13, 0x0A, 0x81, 0x64, 0x54, 0x9F, 0xE8, - 0x18, 0x87, 0x48, 0x06, 0xE1, 0xC7, 0x01, 0x4B }, - { 0xD7, 0x9E, 0x1C, 0x30, 0x8A, 0xA5, 0xBB, 0xCD, - 0xEE, 0xA8, 0xED, 0x63, 0xDF, 0x41, 0x2D, 0xA9 }, - { 0x04, 0x3F, 0x85, 0x82, 0xF2, 0x41, 0xDB, 0x35, - 0x1C, 0xE6, 0x27, 0xE1, 0x53, 0xE7, 0xF0, 0xE4 }, - { 0xE3, 0x3B, 0x4D, 0xDC, 0x9C, 0x38, 0xF2, 0x19, - 0x9C, 0x3E, 0x7B, 0x16, 0x4F, 0xCC, 0x05, 0x36 } -}; - -/* - * Checkup routine - */ -int mbedtls_md4_self_test(int verbose) -{ - int i, ret = 0; - unsigned char md4sum[16]; - - for (i = 0; i < 7; i++) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" MD4 test #%d: ", i + 1); - } - - ret = mbedtls_md4_ret(md4_test_str[i], md4_test_strlen[i], md4sum); - if (ret != 0) { - goto fail; - } - - if (memcmp(md4sum, md4_test_sum[i], 16) != 0) { - ret = 1; - goto fail; - } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); - } - } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("\n"); - } - - return 0; - -fail: - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); - } - - return ret; -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/md5.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/md5.c index fb47486fe1..e4a87a2e09 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/md5.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/md5.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * RFC 1321 compliant MD5 implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * The MD5 algorithm was designed by Ron Rivest in 1991. @@ -59,7 +47,7 @@ void mbedtls_md5_clone(mbedtls_md5_context *dst, /* * MD5 context setup */ -int mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx) +int mbedtls_md5_starts(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx) { ctx->total[0] = 0; ctx->total[1] = 0; @@ -72,13 +60,6 @@ int mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx) return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md5_starts(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx) -{ - mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(ctx); -} -#endif - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT) int mbedtls_internal_md5_process(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64]) @@ -214,21 +195,14 @@ int mbedtls_internal_md5_process(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md5_process(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64]) -{ - mbedtls_internal_md5_process(ctx, data); -} -#endif #endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT */ /* * MD5 process buffer */ -int mbedtls_md5_update_ret(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen) +int mbedtls_md5_update(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t fill; @@ -275,20 +249,11 @@ int mbedtls_md5_update_ret(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md5_update(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen) -{ - mbedtls_md5_update_ret(ctx, input, ilen); -} -#endif - /* * MD5 final digest */ -int mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16]) +int mbedtls_md5_finish(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[16]) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; uint32_t used; @@ -309,7 +274,7 @@ int mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, memset(ctx->buffer + used, 0, 64 - used); if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_md5_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { - return ret; + goto exit; } memset(ctx->buffer, 0, 56); @@ -326,7 +291,7 @@ int mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(high, ctx->buffer, 60); if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_md5_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { - return ret; + goto exit; } /* @@ -337,40 +302,36 @@ int mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[2], output, 8); MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[3], output, 12); - return 0; -} + ret = 0; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md5_finish(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[16]) -{ - mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(ctx, output); +exit: + mbedtls_md5_free(ctx); + return ret; } -#endif #endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT */ /* * output = MD5( input buffer ) */ -int mbedtls_md5_ret(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16]) +int mbedtls_md5(const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[16]) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_md5_context ctx; mbedtls_md5_init(&ctx); - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(&ctx)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_starts(&ctx)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_update(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(&ctx, output)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_finish(&ctx, output)) != 0) { goto exit; } @@ -380,15 +341,6 @@ int mbedtls_md5_ret(const unsigned char *input, return ret; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_md5(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[16]) -{ - mbedtls_md5_ret(input, ilen, output); -} -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /* * RFC 1321 test vectors @@ -440,7 +392,7 @@ int mbedtls_md5_self_test(int verbose) mbedtls_printf(" MD5 test #%d: ", i + 1); } - ret = mbedtls_md5_ret(md5_test_buf[i], md5_test_buflen[i], md5sum); + ret = mbedtls_md5(md5_test_buf[i], md5_test_buflen[i], md5sum); if (ret != 0) { goto fail; } diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/md_psa.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/md_psa.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..028ba2409c --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/md_psa.h @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +/** + * Translation between MD and PSA identifiers (algorithms, errors). + * + * Note: this internal module will go away when everything becomes based on + * PSA Crypto; it is a helper for the transition period. + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MD_PSA_H +#define MBEDTLS_MD_PSA_H + +#include "common.h" + +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +/** Convert PSA status to MD error code. + * + * \param status PSA status. + * + * \return The corresponding MD error code, + */ +int mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(psa_status_t status); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_PSA_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/md_wrap.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/md_wrap.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dad123540a --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/md_wrap.h @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/** + * \file md_wrap.h + * + * \brief Message digest wrappers. + * + * \warning This in an internal header. Do not include directly. + * + * \author Adriaan de Jong + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H +#define MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/md.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * Message digest information. + * Allows message digest functions to be called in a generic way. + */ +struct mbedtls_md_info_t { + /** Digest identifier */ + mbedtls_md_type_t type; + + /** Output length of the digest function in bytes */ + unsigned char size; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) + /** Block length of the digest function in bytes */ + unsigned char block_size; +#endif +}; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c index bdde4e0ba4..79b0a8b8fa 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * Buffer-based memory allocator * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" @@ -520,6 +508,12 @@ void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status(void) } } +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_count_get(size_t *alloc_count, size_t *free_count) +{ + *alloc_count = heap.alloc_count; + *free_count = heap.free_count; +} + void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_get(size_t *max_used, size_t *max_blocks) { *max_used = heap.maximum_used; diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/mps_common.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/mps_common.h index 80e3133a59..f9fe099880 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/mps_common.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/mps_common.h @@ -1,20 +1,6 @@ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /** @@ -169,7 +155,7 @@ * */ typedef size_t mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t; -#define MBEDTLS_MPS_STORED_SIZE_MAX ((mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t) -1) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_STORED_SIZE_MAX (SIZE_MAX) /** \brief The type of buffer sizes and offsets used in the MPS API * and implementation. @@ -183,7 +169,7 @@ typedef size_t mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t; * so almost 10%. */ typedef size_t mbedtls_mps_size_t; -#define MBEDTLS_MPS_SIZE_MAX ((mbedtls_mps_size_t) -1) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_SIZE_MAX (SIZE_MAX) #if MBEDTLS_MPS_STORED_SIZE_MAX > MBEDTLS_MPS_SIZE_MAX #error "Misconfiguration of mbedtls_mps_size_t and mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t." diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/mps_error.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/mps_error.h index 5113959beb..016a84ce49 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/mps_error.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/mps_error.h @@ -1,20 +1,6 @@ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /** diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.c index 75c563add2..27d0c04c10 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.c @@ -2,26 +2,12 @@ * Message Processing Stack, Reader implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) #include "mps_reader.h" #include "mps_common.h" @@ -549,4 +535,4 @@ int mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim(mbedtls_mps_reader *rd, MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(0); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.h index bb912ec17f..3193a5e334 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.h @@ -1,20 +1,6 @@ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /** diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.c index ccd944f533..69f6e5a0f9 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.c @@ -2,26 +2,12 @@ * Message Processing Stack, Trace module * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) #include "mps_common.h" @@ -123,4 +109,4 @@ void mbedtls_mps_trace_indent(int level, mbedtls_mps_trace_type ty) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.h index f8e0a5d807..b456b2ffdd 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.h @@ -1,20 +1,6 @@ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * - * This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /** diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/net_sockets.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/net_sockets.c index 2c2a876b02..edec5876ad 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/net_sockets.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/net_sockets.c @@ -2,23 +2,11 @@ * TCP/IP or UDP/IP networking functions * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* Enable definition of getaddrinfo() even when compiling with -std=c99. Must - * be set before config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h indirectly. + * be set before mbedtls_config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h indirectly. * Harmless on other platforms. */ #ifndef _POSIX_C_SOURCE #define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L @@ -34,7 +22,7 @@ #if !defined(unix) && !defined(__unix__) && !defined(__unix) && \ !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__QNXNTO__) && \ !defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__) -#error "This module only works on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_NET_C in config.h" +#error "This module only works on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_NET_C in mbedtls_config.h" #endif #include "mbedtls/platform.h" @@ -49,11 +37,6 @@ #define IS_EINTR(ret) ((ret) == WSAEINTR) -#if !defined(_WIN32_WINNT) -/* Enables getaddrinfo() & Co */ -#define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0501 -#endif - #include #include @@ -333,7 +316,7 @@ static int net_would_block(const mbedtls_net_context *ctx) */ int mbedtls_net_accept(mbedtls_net_context *bind_ctx, mbedtls_net_context *client_ctx, - void *client_ip, size_t buf_size, size_t *ip_len) + void *client_ip, size_t buf_size, size_t *cip_len) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; int type; @@ -416,22 +399,22 @@ int mbedtls_net_accept(mbedtls_net_context *bind_ctx, if (client_ip != NULL) { if (client_addr.ss_family == AF_INET) { struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *) &client_addr; - *ip_len = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr); + *cip_len = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr); - if (buf_size < *ip_len) { + if (buf_size < *cip_len) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; } - memcpy(client_ip, &addr4->sin_addr.s_addr, *ip_len); + memcpy(client_ip, &addr4->sin_addr.s_addr, *cip_len); } else { struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) &client_addr; - *ip_len = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr); + *cip_len = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr); - if (buf_size < *ip_len) { + if (buf_size < *cip_len) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; } - memcpy(client_ip, &addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, *ip_len); + memcpy(client_ip, &addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, *cip_len); } } diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/nist_kw.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/nist_kw.c index 4ff5e41b46..f15425b8bd 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/nist_kw.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/nist_kw.c @@ -3,19 +3,7 @@ * only * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * Definition of Key Wrapping: @@ -76,7 +64,7 @@ int mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey(mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - if (cipher_info->block_size != 16) { + if (mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(cipher_info) != 16) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -334,9 +322,9 @@ int mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap(mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, unsigned char *output, size_t *out_len, size_t out_size) { int ret = 0; - size_t i, olen; + size_t olen; unsigned char A[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH]; - unsigned char diff; + int diff; *out_len = 0; if (out_size < in_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH) { @@ -421,14 +409,15 @@ int mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap(mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, * larger than 8, because of the type wrap around. */ padlen = in_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH - Plen; - ret = -(int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(padlen & ~7, -MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED, -ret); + ret = mbedtls_ct_error_if(mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(padlen, 7), + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED, ret); padlen &= 7; /* Check padding in "constant-time" */ - for (diff = 0, i = 0; i < KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; i++) { - size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge(i, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH - padlen); - diff |= (unsigned char) (mask & output[*out_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH + i]); - } + const uint8_t zero[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH] = { 0 }; + diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial( + &output[*out_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH], zero, + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH - padlen, 0); if (diff != 0) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; @@ -460,17 +449,22 @@ int mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap(mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) -#define KW_TESTS 3 - /* * Test vectors taken from NIST * https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Cryptographic-Algorithm-Validation-Program/CAVP-TESTING-BLOCK-CIPHER-MODES#KW */ -static const unsigned int key_len[KW_TESTS] = { 16, 24, 32 }; +static const unsigned int key_len[] = { + 16, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + 24, + 32 +#endif +}; -static const unsigned char kw_key[KW_TESTS][32] = { +static const unsigned char kw_key[][32] = { { 0x75, 0x75, 0xda, 0x3a, 0x93, 0x60, 0x7c, 0xc2, 0xbf, 0xd8, 0xce, 0xc7, 0xaa, 0xdf, 0xd9, 0xa6 }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0x2d, 0x85, 0x26, 0x08, 0x1d, 0x02, 0xfb, 0x5b, 0x85, 0xf6, 0x9a, 0xc2, 0x86, 0xec, 0xd5, 0x7d, 0x40, 0xdf, 0x5d, 0xf3, 0x49, 0x47, 0x44, 0xd3 }, @@ -478,11 +472,13 @@ static const unsigned char kw_key[KW_TESTS][32] = { 0x4a, 0x98, 0x48, 0xd3, 0x0f, 0xdd, 0x78, 0x33, 0x5b, 0x03, 0x9a, 0x48, 0xa8, 0x96, 0x2c, 0x4d, 0x1c, 0xb7, 0x8e, 0xab, 0xd5, 0xda, 0xd7, 0x88 } +#endif }; -static const unsigned char kw_msg[KW_TESTS][40] = { +static const unsigned char kw_msg[][40] = { { 0x42, 0x13, 0x6d, 0x3c, 0x38, 0x4a, 0x3e, 0xea, 0xc9, 0x5a, 0x06, 0x6f, 0xd2, 0x8f, 0xed, 0x3f }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0x95, 0xc1, 0x1b, 0xf5, 0x35, 0x3a, 0xfe, 0xdb, 0x98, 0xfd, 0xd6, 0xc8, 0xca, 0x6f, 0xdb, 0x6d, 0xa5, 0x4b, 0x74, 0xb4, 0x99, 0x0f, 0xdc, 0x45, @@ -491,14 +487,28 @@ static const unsigned char kw_msg[KW_TESTS][40] = { { 0x1b, 0x20, 0xbf, 0x19, 0x90, 0xb0, 0x65, 0xd7, 0x98, 0xe1, 0xb3, 0x22, 0x64, 0xad, 0x50, 0xa8, 0x74, 0x74, 0x92, 0xba, 0x09, 0xa0, 0x4d, 0xd1 } +#endif }; -static const size_t kw_msg_len[KW_TESTS] = { 16, 40, 24 }; -static const size_t kw_out_len[KW_TESTS] = { 24, 48, 32 }; -static const unsigned char kw_res[KW_TESTS][48] = { +static const size_t kw_msg_len[] = { + 16, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + 40, + 24 +#endif +}; +static const size_t kw_out_len[] = { + 24, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + 48, + 32 +#endif +}; +static const unsigned char kw_res[][48] = { { 0x03, 0x1f, 0x6b, 0xd7, 0xe6, 0x1e, 0x64, 0x3d, 0xf6, 0x85, 0x94, 0x81, 0x6f, 0x64, 0xca, 0xa3, 0xf5, 0x6f, 0xab, 0xea, 0x25, 0x48, 0xf5, 0xfb }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0x44, 0x3c, 0x6f, 0x15, 0x09, 0x83, 0x71, 0x91, 0x3e, 0x5c, 0x81, 0x4c, 0xa1, 0xa0, 0x42, 0xec, 0x68, 0x2f, 0x7b, 0x13, 0x6d, 0x24, 0x3a, 0x4d, @@ -509,11 +519,13 @@ static const unsigned char kw_res[KW_TESTS][48] = { 0xd5, 0xd5, 0x40, 0xec, 0x25, 0xd4, 0x3d, 0x87, 0x20, 0x0f, 0xda, 0xdc, 0x6d, 0x1f, 0x05, 0xd9, 0x16, 0x58, 0x4f, 0xa9, 0xf6, 0xcb, 0xf5, 0x12 } +#endif }; -static const unsigned char kwp_key[KW_TESTS][32] = { +static const unsigned char kwp_key[][32] = { { 0x78, 0x65, 0xe2, 0x0f, 0x3c, 0x21, 0x65, 0x9a, 0xb4, 0x69, 0x0b, 0x62, 0x9c, 0xdf, 0x3c, 0xc4 }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0xf5, 0xf8, 0x96, 0xa3, 0xbd, 0x2f, 0x4a, 0x98, 0x23, 0xef, 0x16, 0x2b, 0x00, 0xb8, 0x05, 0xd7, 0xde, 0x1e, 0xa4, 0x66, 0x26, 0x96, 0xa2, 0x58 }, @@ -521,23 +533,33 @@ static const unsigned char kwp_key[KW_TESTS][32] = { 0x25, 0x54, 0xee, 0x2a, 0x8d, 0xf1, 0x38, 0x6f, 0x5b, 0x94, 0xa1, 0xa6, 0x0e, 0xd8, 0xa4, 0xae, 0xf6, 0x0a, 0x8d, 0x61, 0xab, 0x5f, 0x22, 0x5a } +#endif }; -static const unsigned char kwp_msg[KW_TESTS][31] = { +static const unsigned char kwp_msg[][31] = { { 0xbd, 0x68, 0x43, 0xd4, 0x20, 0x37, 0x8d, 0xc8, 0x96 }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0x6c, 0xcd, 0xd5, 0x85, 0x18, 0x40, 0x97, 0xeb, 0xd5, 0xc3, 0xaf, 0x3e, 0x47, 0xd0, 0x2c, 0x19, 0x14, 0x7b, 0x4d, 0x99, 0x5f, 0x96, 0x43, 0x66, 0x91, 0x56, 0x75, 0x8c, 0x13, 0x16, 0x8f }, { 0xd1 } +#endif +}; +static const size_t kwp_msg_len[] = { + 9, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + 31, + 1 +#endif }; -static const size_t kwp_msg_len[KW_TESTS] = { 9, 31, 1 }; -static const unsigned char kwp_res[KW_TESTS][48] = { +static const unsigned char kwp_res[][48] = { { 0x41, 0xec, 0xa9, 0x56, 0xd4, 0xaa, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xb5, 0xcf, 0x4e, 0xfe, 0x65, 0x96, 0x61, 0xe7, 0x4d, 0xb6, 0xf8, 0xc5, 0x64, 0xe2, 0x35, 0x00 }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) { 0x4e, 0x9b, 0xc2, 0xbc, 0xbc, 0x6c, 0x1e, 0x13, 0xd3, 0x35, 0xbc, 0xc0, 0xf7, 0x73, 0x6a, 0x88, 0xfa, 0x87, 0x53, 0x66, 0x15, 0xbb, 0x8e, 0x63, @@ -545,8 +567,15 @@ static const unsigned char kwp_res[KW_TESTS][48] = { 0x67, 0xcf, 0xa9, 0x8a, 0x9d, 0x0e, 0x33, 0x26 }, { 0x06, 0xba, 0x7a, 0xe6, 0xf3, 0x24, 0x8c, 0xfd, 0xcf, 0x26, 0x75, 0x07, 0xfa, 0x00, 0x1b, 0xc4 } +#endif +}; +static const size_t kwp_out_len[] = { + 24, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + 40, + 16 +#endif }; -static const size_t kwp_out_len[KW_TESTS] = { 24, 40, 16 }; int mbedtls_nist_kw_self_test(int verbose) { @@ -557,114 +586,128 @@ int mbedtls_nist_kw_self_test(int verbose) int ret = 0; mbedtls_nist_kw_init(&ctx); - for (i = 0; i < KW_TESTS; i++) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" KW-AES-%u ", (unsigned int) key_len[i] * 8); - } + /* + * KW mode + */ + { + static const int num_tests = sizeof(kw_key) / sizeof(*kw_key); - ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, - kw_key[i], key_len[i] * 8, 1); - if (ret != 0) { + for (i = 0; i < num_tests; i++) { if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" KW: setup failed "); + mbedtls_printf(" KW-AES-%u ", (unsigned int) key_len[i] * 8); } - goto end; - } + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + kw_key[i], key_len[i] * 8, 1); + if (ret != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" KW: setup failed "); + } - ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap(&ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW, kw_msg[i], - kw_msg_len[i], out, &olen, sizeof(out)); - if (ret != 0 || kw_out_len[i] != olen || - memcmp(out, kw_res[i], kw_out_len[i]) != 0) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("failed. "); + goto end; } - ret = 1; - goto end; - } + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap(&ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW, kw_msg[i], + kw_msg_len[i], out, &olen, sizeof(out)); + if (ret != 0 || kw_out_len[i] != olen || + memcmp(out, kw_res[i], kw_out_len[i]) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed. "); + } - if ((ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, - kw_key[i], key_len[i] * 8, 0)) - != 0) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" KW: setup failed "); + ret = 1; + goto end; } - goto end; - } + if ((ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + kw_key[i], key_len[i] * 8, 0)) + != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" KW: setup failed "); + } - ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap(&ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW, - out, olen, out, &olen, sizeof(out)); - - if (ret != 0 || olen != kw_msg_len[i] || - memcmp(out, kw_msg[i], kw_msg_len[i]) != 0) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + goto end; } - ret = 1; - goto end; - } + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap(&ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW, + out, olen, out, &olen, sizeof(out)); - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" passed\n"); - } - } + if (ret != 0 || olen != kw_msg_len[i] || + memcmp(out, kw_msg[i], kw_msg_len[i]) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } - for (i = 0; i < KW_TESTS; i++) { - olen = sizeof(out); - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" KWP-AES-%u ", (unsigned int) key_len[i] * 8); - } + ret = 1; + goto end; + } - ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, kwp_key[i], - key_len[i] * 8, 1); - if (ret != 0) { if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" KWP: setup failed "); + mbedtls_printf(" passed\n"); } - - goto end; } - ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap(&ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP, kwp_msg[i], - kwp_msg_len[i], out, &olen, sizeof(out)); + } + + /* + * KWP mode + */ + { + static const int num_tests = sizeof(kwp_key) / sizeof(*kwp_key); - if (ret != 0 || kwp_out_len[i] != olen || - memcmp(out, kwp_res[i], kwp_out_len[i]) != 0) { + for (i = 0; i < num_tests; i++) { + olen = sizeof(out); if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("failed. "); + mbedtls_printf(" KWP-AES-%u ", (unsigned int) key_len[i] * 8); } - ret = 1; - goto end; - } + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, kwp_key[i], + key_len[i] * 8, 1); + if (ret != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" KWP: setup failed "); + } - if ((ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, - kwp_key[i], key_len[i] * 8, 0)) - != 0) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" KWP: setup failed "); + goto end; } + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap(&ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP, kwp_msg[i], + kwp_msg_len[i], out, &olen, sizeof(out)); - goto end; - } + if (ret != 0 || kwp_out_len[i] != olen || + memcmp(out, kwp_res[i], kwp_out_len[i]) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed. "); + } - ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap(&ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP, out, - olen, out, &olen, sizeof(out)); + ret = 1; + goto end; + } - if (ret != 0 || olen != kwp_msg_len[i] || - memcmp(out, kwp_msg[i], kwp_msg_len[i]) != 0) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("failed. "); + if ((ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + kwp_key[i], key_len[i] * 8, 0)) + != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" KWP: setup failed "); + } + + goto end; } - ret = 1; - goto end; - } + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap(&ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP, out, + olen, out, &olen, sizeof(out)); - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" passed\n"); + if (ret != 0 || olen != kwp_msg_len[i] || + memcmp(out, kwp_msg[i], kwp_msg_len[i]) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed. "); + } + + ret = 1; + goto end; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" passed\n"); + } } } end: diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/oid.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/oid.c index 12a96503bd..1d6b1eb866 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/oid.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/oid.c @@ -4,19 +4,7 @@ * \brief Object Identifier (OID) database * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" @@ -26,6 +14,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" #include #include @@ -37,6 +26,17 @@ */ #define ADD_LEN(s) s, MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(s) +/* + * Macro to generate mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) +#define OID_DESCRIPTOR(s, name, description) { ADD_LEN(s), name, description } +#define NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL } +#else +#define OID_DESCRIPTOR(s, name, description) { ADD_LEN(s) } +#define NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR { NULL, 0 } +#endif + /* * Macro to generate an internal function for oid_XXX_from_asn1() (used by * the other functions) @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ return NULL; \ } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) /* * Macro to generate a function for retrieving a single attribute from the * descriptor of an mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t wrapper. @@ -72,6 +73,7 @@ *ATTR1 = data->descriptor.ATTR1; \ return 0; \ } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ /* * Macro to generate a function for retrieving a single attribute from an @@ -153,88 +155,102 @@ typedef struct { static const oid_x520_attr_t oid_x520_attr_type[] = { { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN), "id-at-commonName", "Common Name" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, "id-at-commonName", "Common Name"), "CN", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY), "id-at-countryName", "Country" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY, "id-at-countryName", "Country"), "C", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY), "id-at-locality", "Locality" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY, "id-at-locality", "Locality"), "L", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE), "id-at-state", "State" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE, "id-at-state", "State"), "ST", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION), "id-at-organizationName", "Organization" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION, "id-at-organizationName", + "Organization"), "O", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT), "id-at-organizationalUnitName", "Org Unit" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT, "id-at-organizationalUnitName", "Org Unit"), "OU", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL), "emailAddress", "E-mail address" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL, + "emailAddress", + "E-mail address"), "emailAddress", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER), "id-at-serialNumber", "Serial number" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER, + "id-at-serialNumber", + "Serial number"), "serialNumber", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS), "id-at-postalAddress", - "Postal address" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS, + "id-at-postalAddress", + "Postal address"), "postalAddress", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE), "id-at-postalCode", "Postal code" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE, "id-at-postalCode", "Postal code"), "postalCode", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME), "id-at-surName", "Surname" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME, "id-at-surName", "Surname"), "SN", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME), "id-at-givenName", "Given name" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME, "id-at-givenName", "Given name"), "GN", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS), "id-at-initials", "Initials" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS, "id-at-initials", "Initials"), "initials", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER), "id-at-generationQualifier", - "Generation qualifier" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER, + "id-at-generationQualifier", + "Generation qualifier"), "generationQualifier", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE), "id-at-title", "Title" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE, "id-at-title", "Title"), "title", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER), "id-at-dnQualifier", - "Distinguished Name qualifier" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER, + "id-at-dnQualifier", + "Distinguished Name qualifier"), "dnQualifier", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM), "id-at-pseudonym", "Pseudonym" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM, "id-at-pseudonym", "Pseudonym"), "pseudonym", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT), "id-domainComponent", - "Domain component" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_UID, "id-uid", "User Id"), + "uid", + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT, + "id-domainComponent", + "Domain component"), "DC", }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER), "id-at-uniqueIdentifier", - "Unique Identifier" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER, + "id-at-uniqueIdentifier", + "Unique Identifier"), "uniqueIdentifier", }, { - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, NULL, } }; @@ -257,36 +273,53 @@ typedef struct { static const oid_x509_ext_t oid_x509_ext[] = { { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS), "id-ce-basicConstraints", - "Basic Constraints" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, + "id-ce-basicConstraints", + "Basic Constraints"), MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE), "id-ce-keyUsage", "Key Usage" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE, "id-ce-keyUsage", "Key Usage"), MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE, }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE), "id-ce-extKeyUsage", - "Extended Key Usage" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, + "id-ce-extKeyUsage", + "Extended Key Usage"), MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME), "id-ce-subjectAltName", - "Subject Alt Name" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME, + "id-ce-subjectAltName", + "Subject Alt Name"), MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME, }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE), "id-netscape-certtype", - "Netscape Certificate Type" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE, + "id-netscape-certtype", + "Netscape Certificate Type"), MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE, }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES), "id-ce-certificatePolicies", - "Certificate Policies" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES, + "id-ce-certificatePolicies", + "Certificate Policies"), MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES, }, { - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER, + "id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier", + "Subject Key Identifier"), + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER, + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER, + "id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier", + "Authority Key Identifier"), + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER, + }, + { + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, 0, }, }; @@ -294,19 +327,23 @@ static const oid_x509_ext_t oid_x509_ext[] = FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_x509_ext_t, x509_ext, oid_x509_ext) FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type, oid_x509_ext_t, x509_ext, int, ext_type) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) static const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t oid_ext_key_usage[] = { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH), "id-kp-serverAuth", - "TLS Web Server Authentication" }, - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH), "id-kp-clientAuth", - "TLS Web Client Authentication" }, - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_CODE_SIGNING), "id-kp-codeSigning", "Code Signing" }, - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION), "id-kp-emailProtection", "E-mail Protection" }, - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_TIME_STAMPING), "id-kp-timeStamping", "Time Stamping" }, - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_OCSP_SIGNING), "id-kp-OCSPSigning", "OCSP Signing" }, - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_WISUN_FAN), "id-kp-wisun-fan-device", - "Wi-SUN Alliance Field Area Network (FAN)" }, - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH, + "id-kp-serverAuth", + "TLS Web Server Authentication"), + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH, + "id-kp-clientAuth", + "TLS Web Client Authentication"), + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_CODE_SIGNING, "id-kp-codeSigning", "Code Signing"), + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION, "id-kp-emailProtection", "E-mail Protection"), + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_TIME_STAMPING, "id-kp-timeStamping", "Time Stamping"), + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_OCSP_SIGNING, "id-kp-OCSPSigning", "OCSP Signing"), + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_WISUN_FAN, + "id-kp-wisun-fan-device", + "Wi-SUN Alliance Field Area Network (FAN)"), + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, }; FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t, ext_key_usage, oid_ext_key_usage) @@ -318,8 +355,8 @@ FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage, static const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t oid_certificate_policies[] = { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_POLICY), "anyPolicy", "Any Policy" }, - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_POLICY, "anyPolicy", "Any Policy"), + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, }; FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t, certificate_policies, oid_certificate_policies) @@ -328,8 +365,8 @@ FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_certificate_policies, certificate_policies, const char *, description) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) /* * For SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier */ @@ -342,103 +379,107 @@ typedef struct { static const oid_sig_alg_t oid_sig_alg[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD2), "md2WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with MD2" }, - MBEDTLS_MD_MD2, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD4), "md4WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with MD4" }, - MBEDTLS_MD_MD4, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD5), "md5WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with MD5" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD5, "md5WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with MD5"), MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA1), "sha-1WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA1, "sha-1WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA1"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA224), "sha224WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-224" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA224, "sha224WithRSAEncryption", + "RSA with SHA-224"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA256), "sha256WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-256" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA256, "sha256WithRSAEncryption", + "RSA with SHA-256"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA384), "sha384WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-384" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA384, "sha384WithRSAEncryption", + "RSA with SHA-384"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA512), "sha512WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA-512" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA512, "sha512WithRSAEncryption", + "RSA with SHA-512"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_SHA_OBS), "sha-1WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_SHA_OBS, "sha-1WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA1"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA1), "ecdsa-with-SHA1", "ECDSA with SHA1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA1, "ecdsa-with-SHA1", "ECDSA with SHA1"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA224), "ecdsa-with-SHA224", "ECDSA with SHA224" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA224, "ecdsa-with-SHA224", "ECDSA with SHA224"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA256), "ecdsa-with-SHA256", "ECDSA with SHA256" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA256, "ecdsa-with-SHA256", "ECDSA with SHA256"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA384), "ecdsa-with-SHA384", "ECDSA with SHA384" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA384, "ecdsa-with-SHA384", "ECDSA with SHA384"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA512), "ecdsa-with-SHA512", "ECDSA with SHA512" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA512, "ecdsa-with-SHA512", "ECDSA with SHA512"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_RSASSA_PSS), "RSASSA-PSS", "RSASSA-PSS" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_RSASSA_PSS, "RSASSA-PSS", "RSASSA-PSS"), MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS, }, #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ { - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, MBEDTLS_PK_NONE, }, }; FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_sig_alg_t, sig_alg, oid_sig_alg) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) FN_OID_GET_DESCRIPTOR_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg_desc, oid_sig_alg_t, sig_alg, const char *, description) +#endif + FN_OID_GET_ATTR2(mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg, oid_sig_alg_t, sig_alg, @@ -453,7 +494,6 @@ FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR2(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg, pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t, md_alg) -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ /* * For PublicKeyInfo (PKCS1, RFC 5480) @@ -466,19 +506,19 @@ typedef struct { static const oid_pk_alg_t oid_pk_alg[] = { { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_RSA), "rsaEncryption", "RSA" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_RSA, "rsaEncryption", "RSA"), MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_UNRESTRICTED), "id-ecPublicKey", "Generic EC key" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_UNRESTRICTED, "id-ecPublicKey", "Generic EC key"), MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY, }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_ECDH), "id-ecDH", "EC key for ECDH" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_ECDH, "id-ecDH", "EC key for ECDH"), MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH, }, { - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, MBEDTLS_PK_NONE, }, }; @@ -491,9 +531,9 @@ FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t, pk_alg) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) /* - * For namedCurve (RFC 5480) + * For elliptic curves that use namedCurve inside ECParams (RFC 5480) */ typedef struct { mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; @@ -502,74 +542,74 @@ typedef struct { static const oid_ecp_grp_t oid_ecp_grp[] = { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192R1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1), "secp192r1", "secp192r1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1, "secp192r1", "secp192r1"), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192R1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224R1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1), "secp224r1", "secp224r1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1, "secp224r1", "secp224r1"), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224R1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1), "secp256r1", "secp256r1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1, "secp256r1", "secp256r1"), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1), "secp384r1", "secp384r1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1, "secp384r1", "secp384r1"), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP521R1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1), "secp521r1", "secp521r1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1, "secp521r1", "secp521r1"), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP521R1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192K1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1), "secp192k1", "secp192k1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1, "secp192k1", "secp192k1"), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192K1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224K1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1), "secp224k1", "secp224k1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1, "secp224k1", "secp224k1"), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224K1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256K1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1), "secp256k1", "secp256k1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1, "secp256k1", "secp256k1"), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256K1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP256R1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1), "brainpoolP256r1", "brainpool256r1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1, "brainpoolP256r1", "brainpool256r1"), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP256R1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP384R1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1), "brainpoolP384r1", "brainpool384r1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1, "brainpoolP384r1", "brainpool384r1"), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP384R1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP512R1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1), "brainpoolP512r1", "brainpool512r1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1, "brainpoolP512r1", "brainpool512r1"), MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP512R1 */ { - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, }, }; @@ -581,7 +621,48 @@ FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp, oid_ecp_grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id, grp_id) -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +/* + * For Elliptic Curve algorithms that are directly + * encoded in the AlgorithmIdentifier (RFC 8410) + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; +} oid_ecp_grp_algid_t; + +static const oid_ecp_grp_algid_t oid_ecp_grp_algid[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_X25519, "X25519", "X25519"), + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE448) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_X448, "X448", "X448"), + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE448 */ + { + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, + }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_ecp_grp_algid_t, grp_id_algid, oid_ecp_grp_algid) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp_algid, + oid_ecp_grp_algid_t, + grp_id_algid, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id, + grp_id) +FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp_algid, + oid_ecp_grp_algid_t, + oid_ecp_grp_algid, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id, + grp_id) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) /* @@ -595,15 +676,27 @@ typedef struct { static const oid_cipher_alg_t oid_cipher_alg[] = { { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_DES_CBC), "desCBC", "DES-CBC" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DES_CBC, "desCBC", "DES-CBC"), MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC), "des-ede3-cbc", "DES-EDE3-CBC" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC, "des-ede3-cbc", "DES-EDE3-CBC"), MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, }, { - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AES_128_CBC, "aes128-cbc", "AES128-CBC"), + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AES_192_CBC, "aes192-cbc", "AES192-CBC"), + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC, + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AES_256_CBC, "aes256-cbc", "AES256-CBC"), + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, + }, + { + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE, }, }; @@ -616,7 +709,6 @@ FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_cipher_alg, cipher_alg) #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) /* * For digestAlgorithm */ @@ -627,58 +719,74 @@ typedef struct { static const oid_md_alg_t oid_md_alg[] = { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD2), "id-md2", "MD2" }, - MBEDTLS_MD_MD2, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD4), "id-md4", "MD4" }, - MBEDTLS_MD_MD4, - }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5), "id-md5", "MD5" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5, "id-md5", "MD5"), MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1), "id-sha1", "SHA-1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1, "id-sha1", "SHA-1"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224), "id-sha224", "SHA-224" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224, "id-sha224", "SHA-224"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256), "id-sha256", "SHA-256" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256, "id-sha256", "SHA-256"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384), "id-sha384", "SHA-384" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384, "id-sha384", "SHA-384"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512), "id-sha512", "SHA-512" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512, "id-sha512", "SHA-512"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_RIPEMD160), "id-ripemd160", "RIPEMD-160" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_RIPEMD160, "id-ripemd160", "RIPEMD-160"), MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA3_224, "id-sha3-224", "SHA-3-224"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224, + }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA3_256, "id-sha3-256", "SHA-3-256"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256, + }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA3_384, "id-sha3-384", "SHA-3-384"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384, + }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512) { - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA3_512, "id-sha3-512", "SHA-3-512"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512, + }, +#endif + { + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, }, }; @@ -701,43 +809,76 @@ typedef struct { static const oid_md_hmac_t oid_md_hmac[] = { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA1), "hmacSHA1", "HMAC-SHA-1" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA1, "hmacSHA1", "HMAC-SHA-1"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA224), "hmacSHA224", "HMAC-SHA-224" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA224, "hmacSHA224", "HMAC-SHA-224"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA256), "hmacSHA256", "HMAC-SHA-256" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA256, "hmacSHA256", "HMAC-SHA-256"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA384), "hmacSHA384", "HMAC-SHA-384" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA384, "hmacSHA384", "HMAC-SHA-384"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA512), "hmacSHA512", "HMAC-SHA-512" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA512, "hmacSHA512", "HMAC-SHA-512"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA3_224, "hmacSHA3-224", "HMAC-SHA3-224"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA3_256, "hmacSHA3-256", "HMAC-SHA3-256"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA3_384, "hmacSHA3-384", "HMAC-SHA3-384"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA3_512, "hmacSHA3-512", "HMAC-SHA3-512"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_RIPEMD160, "hmacRIPEMD160", "HMAC-RIPEMD160"), + MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160 */ { - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, }, }; FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_md_hmac_t, md_hmac, oid_md_hmac) FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_md_hmac, oid_md_hmac_t, md_hmac, mbedtls_md_type_t, md_hmac) -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) /* * For PKCS#12 PBEs */ @@ -750,17 +891,19 @@ typedef struct { static const oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg_t oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg[] = { { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC), "pbeWithSHAAnd3-KeyTripleDES-CBC", - "PBE with SHA1 and 3-Key 3DES" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC, + "pbeWithSHAAnd3-KeyTripleDES-CBC", + "PBE with SHA1 and 3-Key 3DES"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, }, { - { ADD_LEN(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC), "pbeWithSHAAnd2-KeyTripleDES-CBC", - "PBE with SHA1 and 2-Key 3DES" }, + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC, + "pbeWithSHAAnd2-KeyTripleDES-CBC", + "PBE with SHA1 and 2-Key 3DES"), MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC, }, { - { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }, + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE, }, }; @@ -773,7 +916,7 @@ FN_OID_GET_ATTR2(mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg, md_alg, mbedtls_cipher_type_t, cipher_alg) -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ /* Return the x.y.z.... style numeric string for the given OID */ int mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string(char *buf, size_t size, @@ -844,4 +987,180 @@ int mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string(char *buf, size_t size, return (int) (size - n); } +static int oid_parse_number(unsigned int *num, const char **p, const char *bound) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + + *num = 0; + + while (*p < bound && **p >= '0' && **p <= '9') { + ret = 0; + if (*num > (UINT_MAX / 10)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } + *num *= 10; + *num += **p - '0'; + (*p)++; + } + return ret; +} + +static size_t oid_subidentifier_num_bytes(unsigned int value) +{ + size_t num_bytes = 0; + + do { + value >>= 7; + num_bytes++; + } while (value != 0); + + return num_bytes; +} + +static int oid_subidentifier_encode_into(unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *bound, + unsigned int value) +{ + size_t num_bytes = oid_subidentifier_num_bytes(value); + + if ((size_t) (bound - *p) < num_bytes) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + (*p)[num_bytes - 1] = (unsigned char) (value & 0x7f); + value >>= 7; + + for (size_t i = 2; i <= num_bytes; i++) { + (*p)[num_bytes - i] = 0x80 | (unsigned char) (value & 0x7f); + value >>= 7; + } + *p += num_bytes; + + return 0; +} + +/* Return the OID for the given x.y.z.... style numeric string */ +int mbedtls_oid_from_numeric_string(mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, + const char *oid_str, size_t size) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + const char *str_ptr = oid_str; + const char *str_bound = oid_str + size; + unsigned int val = 0; + unsigned int component1, component2; + size_t encoded_len; + unsigned char *resized_mem; + + /* Count the number of dots to get a worst-case allocation size. */ + size_t num_dots = 0; + for (size_t i = 0; i < size; i++) { + if (oid_str[i] == '.') { + num_dots++; + } + } + /* Allocate maximum possible required memory: + * There are (num_dots + 1) integer components, but the first 2 share the + * same subidentifier, so we only need num_dots subidentifiers maximum. */ + if (num_dots == 0 || (num_dots > MBEDTLS_OID_MAX_COMPONENTS - 1)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } + /* Each byte can store 7 bits, calculate number of bytes for a + * subidentifier: + * + * bytes = ceil(subidentifer_size * 8 / 7) + */ + size_t bytes_per_subidentifier = (((sizeof(unsigned int) * 8) - 1) / 7) + + 1; + size_t max_possible_bytes = num_dots * bytes_per_subidentifier; + oid->p = mbedtls_calloc(max_possible_bytes, 1); + if (oid->p == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + unsigned char *out_ptr = oid->p; + unsigned char *out_bound = oid->p + max_possible_bytes; + + ret = oid_parse_number(&component1, &str_ptr, str_bound); + if (ret != 0) { + goto error; + } + if (component1 > 2) { + /* First component can't be > 2 */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + goto error; + } + if (str_ptr >= str_bound || *str_ptr != '.') { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + goto error; + } + str_ptr++; + + ret = oid_parse_number(&component2, &str_ptr, str_bound); + if (ret != 0) { + goto error; + } + if ((component1 < 2) && (component2 > 39)) { + /* Root nodes 0 and 1 may have up to 40 children, numbered 0-39 */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + goto error; + } + if (str_ptr < str_bound) { + if (*str_ptr == '.') { + str_ptr++; + } else { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + goto error; + } + } + + if (component2 > (UINT_MAX - (component1 * 40))) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + goto error; + } + ret = oid_subidentifier_encode_into(&out_ptr, out_bound, + (component1 * 40) + component2); + if (ret != 0) { + goto error; + } + + while (str_ptr < str_bound) { + ret = oid_parse_number(&val, &str_ptr, str_bound); + if (ret != 0) { + goto error; + } + if (str_ptr < str_bound) { + if (*str_ptr == '.') { + str_ptr++; + } else { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + goto error; + } + } + + ret = oid_subidentifier_encode_into(&out_ptr, out_bound, val); + if (ret != 0) { + goto error; + } + } + + encoded_len = (size_t) (out_ptr - oid->p); + resized_mem = mbedtls_calloc(encoded_len, 1); + if (resized_mem == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto error; + } + memcpy(resized_mem, oid->p, encoded_len); + mbedtls_free(oid->p); + oid->p = resized_mem; + oid->len = encoded_len; + + oid->tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + + return 0; + +error: + mbedtls_free(oid->p); + oid->p = NULL; + oid->len = 0; + return ret; +} + #endif /* MBEDTLS_OID_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/padlock.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/padlock.c index c09d31f1ca..1f006910c2 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/padlock.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/padlock.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * VIA PadLock support functions * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * This implementation is based on the VIA PadLock Programming Guide: @@ -27,16 +15,10 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) -#include "mbedtls/padlock.h" +#include "padlock.h" #include -/* *INDENT-OFF* */ -#ifndef asm -#define asm __asm -#endif -/* *INDENT-ON* */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE) /* @@ -83,7 +65,12 @@ int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, uint32_t *ctrl; unsigned char buf[256]; - rk = ctx->rk; + rk = ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset; + + if (((long) rk & 15) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED; + } + blk = MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16(buf); memcpy(blk, input, 16); @@ -109,6 +96,7 @@ int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, return 0; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) /* * PadLock AES-CBC buffer en(de)cryption */ @@ -126,12 +114,14 @@ int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, uint32_t *ctrl; unsigned char buf[256]; + rk = ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset; + if (((long) input & 15) != 0 || - ((long) output & 15) != 0) { + ((long) output & 15) != 0 || + ((long) rk & 15) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED; } - rk = ctx->rk; iw = MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16(buf); memcpy(iw, iv, 16); @@ -160,6 +150,7 @@ int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, return 0; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/padlock.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/padlock.h similarity index 72% rename from vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/padlock.h rename to vendor/mbedtls/library/padlock.h index 076fd6069f..92d72af516 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/padlock.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/padlock.h @@ -9,33 +9,16 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_H #define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/aes.h" -/** Input data should be aligned. */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED -0x0030 +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED -0x0030 /**< Input data should be aligned. */ #if defined(__has_feature) #if __has_feature(address_sanitizer) @@ -43,17 +26,17 @@ #endif #endif -/* Some versions of ASan result in errors about not enough registers */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ - defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__i386__) && \ +/* + * - `padlock` is implements with GNUC assembly for x86 target. + * - Some versions of ASan result in errors about not enough registers. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && \ + defined(__GNUC__) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASAN) #define MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE -#ifndef MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86 -#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_X86 -#endif - #include #define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_RNG 0x000C @@ -123,7 +106,6 @@ int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, } #endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && - __GNUC__ && __i386__ && !MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASAN */ +#endif /* HAVE_X86 */ #endif /* padlock.h */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/pem.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/pem.c index 3b9a3e91f2..0fee5df43a 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/pem.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/pem.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) decoding * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" @@ -25,7 +13,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/base64.h" #include "mbedtls/des.h" #include "mbedtls/aes.h" -#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" @@ -34,14 +22,25 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) +#define PEM_RFC1421 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5 && + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC && + ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_DES_C ) */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) void mbedtls_pem_init(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx) { memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_pem_context)); } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) +#if defined(PEM_RFC1421) /* * Read a 16-byte hex string and convert it to binary */ @@ -77,26 +76,33 @@ static int pem_pbkdf1(unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen) { - mbedtls_md5_context md5_ctx; + mbedtls_md_context_t md5_ctx; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md5_info; unsigned char md5sum[16]; size_t use_len; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_md5_init(&md5_ctx); + mbedtls_md_init(&md5_ctx); + + /* Prepare the context. (setup() errors gracefully on NULL info.) */ + md5_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_MD5); + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md5_ctx, md5_info, 0)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } /* * key[ 0..15] = MD5(pwd || IV) */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(&md5_ctx)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md5_ctx)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5_ctx, pwd, pwdlen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md5_ctx, pwd, pwdlen)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5_ctx, iv, 8)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md5_ctx, iv, 8)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(&md5_ctx, md5sum)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md5_ctx, md5sum)) != 0) { goto exit; } @@ -110,19 +116,19 @@ static int pem_pbkdf1(unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, /* * key[16..23] = MD5(key[ 0..15] || pwd || IV]) */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(&md5_ctx)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md5_ctx)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5_ctx, md5sum, 16)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md5_ctx, md5sum, 16)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5_ctx, pwd, pwdlen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md5_ctx, pwd, pwdlen)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5_ctx, iv, 8)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md5_ctx, iv, 8)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(&md5_ctx, md5sum)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md5_ctx, md5sum)) != 0) { goto exit; } @@ -134,7 +140,7 @@ static int pem_pbkdf1(unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, memcpy(key + 16, md5sum, use_len); exit: - mbedtls_md5_free(&md5_ctx); + mbedtls_md_free(&md5_ctx); mbedtls_platform_zeroize(md5sum, 16); return ret; @@ -234,8 +240,30 @@ static int pem_aes_decrypt(unsigned char aes_iv[16], unsigned int keylen, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC && - ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_DES_C ) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +static int pem_check_pkcs_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, size_t *data_len) +{ + /* input_len > 0 is guaranteed by mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(). */ + size_t pad_len = input[input_len - 1]; + size_t i; + + if (pad_len > input_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH; + } + + *data_len = input_len - pad_len; + + for (i = *data_len; i < input_len; i++) { + if (input[i] != pad_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH; + } + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C || MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#endif /* PEM_RFC1421 */ int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const char *footer, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *pwd, @@ -245,15 +273,13 @@ int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const size_t len; unsigned char *buf; const unsigned char *s1, *s2, *end; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) +#if defined(PEM_RFC1421) unsigned char pem_iv[16]; mbedtls_cipher_type_t enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE; #else ((void) pwd); ((void) pwdlen); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC && - ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_DES_C ) */ +#endif /* PEM_RFC1421 */ if (ctx == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -295,13 +321,12 @@ int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const if (*end == '\n') { end++; } - *use_len = end - data; + *use_len = (size_t) (end - data); enc = 0; if (s2 - s1 >= 22 && memcmp(s1, "Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED", 22) == 0) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) +#if defined(PEM_RFC1421) enc++; s1 += 22; @@ -374,36 +399,36 @@ int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const } #else return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC && - ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_DES_C ) */ +#endif /* PEM_RFC1421 */ } if (s1 >= s2) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA; } - ret = mbedtls_base64_decode(NULL, 0, &len, s1, s2 - s1); + ret = mbedtls_base64_decode(NULL, 0, &len, s1, (size_t) (s2 - s1)); if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER) { return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA, ret); } + if (len == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if ((buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, len)) == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_base64_decode(buf, len, &len, s1, s2 - s1)) != 0) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, len); - mbedtls_free(buf); + if ((ret = mbedtls_base64_decode(buf, len, &len, s1, (size_t) (s2 - s1))) != 0) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, len); return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA, ret); } if (enc != 0) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) +#if defined(PEM_RFC1421) if (pwd == NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, len); - mbedtls_free(buf); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, len); return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED; } @@ -428,27 +453,24 @@ int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ if (ret != 0) { - mbedtls_free(buf); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, len); return ret; } - /* - * The result will be ASN.1 starting with a SEQUENCE tag, with 1 to 3 - * length bytes (allow 4 to be sure) in all known use cases. - * - * Use that as a heuristic to try to detect password mismatches. - */ - if (len <= 2 || buf[0] != 0x30 || buf[1] > 0x83) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, len); - mbedtls_free(buf); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH; + /* Check PKCS padding and update data length based on padding info. + * This can be used to detect invalid padding data and password + * mismatches. */ + size_t unpadded_len; + ret = pem_check_pkcs_padding(buf, len, &unpadded_len); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, len); + return ret; } + len = unpadded_len; #else - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, len); - mbedtls_free(buf); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, len); return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC && - ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_DES_C ) */ +#endif /* PEM_RFC1421 */ } ctx->buf = buf; @@ -460,8 +482,7 @@ int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const void mbedtls_pem_free(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx) { if (ctx->buf != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx->buf, ctx->buflen); - mbedtls_free(ctx->buf); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ctx->buf, ctx->buflen); } mbedtls_free(ctx->info); @@ -479,7 +500,7 @@ int mbedtls_pem_write_buffer(const char *header, const char *footer, size_t len = 0, use_len, add_len = 0; mbedtls_base64_encode(NULL, 0, &use_len, der_data, der_len); - add_len = strlen(header) + strlen(footer) + (use_len / 64) + 1; + add_len = strlen(header) + strlen(footer) + (((use_len > 2) ? (use_len - 2) : 0) / 64) + 1; if (use_len + add_len > buf_len) { *olen = use_len + add_len; @@ -514,7 +535,7 @@ int mbedtls_pem_write_buffer(const char *header, const char *footer, p += strlen(footer); *p++ = '\0'; - *olen = p - buf; + *olen = (size_t) (p - buf); /* Clean any remaining data previously written to the buffer */ memset(buf + *olen, 0, buf_len - *olen); diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/pk.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/pk.c index 12f4120225..097777f2c0 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/pk.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/pk.c @@ -2,62 +2,59 @@ * Public Key abstraction layer * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) #include "mbedtls/pk.h" -#include "mbedtls/pk_internal.h" +#include "pk_wrap.h" +#include "pkwrite.h" +#include "pk_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "rsa_internal.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) #include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) +#include "psa_util_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" #endif #include #include -/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ -#define PK_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define PK_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) +#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_OR_PUBLIC_MAX_SIZE \ + (PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE > PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE) ? \ + PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE : PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE /* * Initialise a mbedtls_pk_context */ void mbedtls_pk_init(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx) { - PK_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - ctx->pk_info = NULL; ctx->pk_ctx = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ctx->priv_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + memset(ctx->pub_raw, 0, sizeof(ctx->pub_raw)); + ctx->pub_raw_len = 0; + ctx->ec_family = 0; + ctx->ec_bits = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ } /* @@ -69,10 +66,18 @@ void mbedtls_pk_free(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx) return; } - if (ctx->pk_info != NULL) { + if ((ctx->pk_info != NULL) && (ctx->pk_info->ctx_free_func != NULL)) { ctx->pk_info->ctx_free_func(ctx->pk_ctx); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + /* The ownership of the priv_id key for opaque keys is external of the PK + * module. It's the user responsibility to clear it after use. */ + if ((ctx->pk_info != NULL) && (ctx->pk_info->type != MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE)) { + psa_destroy_key(ctx->priv_id); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_pk_context)); } @@ -82,7 +87,6 @@ void mbedtls_pk_free(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx) */ void mbedtls_pk_restart_init(mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx) { - PK_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); ctx->pk_info = NULL; ctx->rs_ctx = NULL; } @@ -113,17 +117,17 @@ const mbedtls_pk_info_t *mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type) #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: return &mbedtls_rsa_info; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: return &mbedtls_eckey_info; case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: return &mbedtls_eckeydh_info; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME) case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: return &mbedtls_ecdsa_info; -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME */ /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT omitted on purpose */ default: return NULL; @@ -135,12 +139,12 @@ const mbedtls_pk_info_t *mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type) */ int mbedtls_pk_setup(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info) { - PK_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); if (info == NULL || ctx->pk_info != NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - if ((ctx->pk_ctx = info->ctx_alloc_func()) == NULL) { + if ((info->ctx_alloc_func != NULL) && + ((ctx->pk_ctx = info->ctx_alloc_func()) == NULL)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED; } @@ -154,11 +158,10 @@ int mbedtls_pk_setup(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info) * Initialise a PSA-wrapping context */ int mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, - const psa_key_id_t key) + const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) { - const mbedtls_pk_info_t * const info = &mbedtls_pk_opaque_info; + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info = NULL; psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; - psa_key_id_t *pk_ctx; psa_key_type_t type; if (ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info != NULL) { @@ -171,19 +174,19 @@ int mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes); psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); - /* Current implementation of can_do() relies on this. */ - if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(type)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(type)) { + info = &mbedtls_ecdsa_opaque_info; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + if (type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) { + info = &mbedtls_rsa_opaque_info; + } else { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } - if ((ctx->pk_ctx = info->ctx_alloc_func()) == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED; - } - ctx->pk_info = info; - - pk_ctx = (psa_key_id_t *) ctx->pk_ctx; - *pk_ctx = key; + ctx->priv_id = key; return 0; } @@ -201,7 +204,6 @@ int mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, void *key, mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt; const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info = &mbedtls_rsa_alt_info; - PK_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); if (ctx->pk_info != NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -238,26 +240,772 @@ int mbedtls_pk_can_do(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_type_t type) return ctx->pk_info->can_do(type); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) /* - * Helper for mbedtls_pk_sign and mbedtls_pk_verify + * Tell if a PK can do the operations of the given PSA algorithm */ -static inline int pk_hashlen_helper(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, size_t *hash_len) +int mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, psa_algorithm_t alg, + psa_key_usage_t usage) { - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + psa_key_usage_t key_usage; - if (*hash_len != 0 && md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { + /* A context with null pk_info is not set up yet and can't do anything. + * For backward compatibility, also accept NULL instead of a context + * pointer. */ + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL) { return 0; } - if ((md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg)) == NULL) { - return -1; + /* Filter out non allowed algorithms */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) == 0 && + PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) == 0 && + PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) == 0 && + alg != PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT && + PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg) == 0) { + return 0; + } + + /* Filter out non allowed usage flags */ + if (usage == 0 || + (usage & ~(PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE)) != 0) { + return 0; + } + + /* Wildcard hash is not allowed */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) && + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) { + return 0; + } + + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(ctx) != MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + mbedtls_pk_type_t type; + + if (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg)) { + type = MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY; + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) || + alg == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) { + type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA; + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg)) { + type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS; + } else { + return 0; + } + + if (ctx->pk_info->can_do(type) == 0) { + return 0; + } + + switch (type) { + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + key_usage = PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE; + break; + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS: + key_usage = PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT; + break; + default: + /* Should never happen */ + return 0; + } + + return (key_usage & usage) == usage; } - if (*hash_len != 0 && *hash_len != mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info)) { + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + + status = psa_get_key_attributes(ctx->priv_id, &attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return 0; + } + + psa_algorithm_t key_alg = psa_get_key_algorithm(&attributes); + /* Key's enrollment is available only when an Mbed TLS implementation of PSA + * Crypto is being used, i.e. when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is defined. + * Even though we don't officially support using other implementations of PSA + * Crypto with TLS and X.509 (yet), we try to keep vendor's customizations + * separated. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + psa_algorithm_t key_alg2 = psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm(&attributes); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + key_usage = psa_get_key_usage_flags(&attributes); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + + if ((key_usage & usage) != usage) { + return 0; + } + + /* + * Common case: the key alg [or alg2] only allows alg. + * This will match PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT & PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH + * directly. + * This would also match ECDSA/RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN/RSA_PSS with + * a fixed hash on key_alg [or key_alg2]. + */ + if (alg == key_alg) { + return 1; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + if (alg == key_alg2) { + return 1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + + /* + * If key_alg [or key_alg2] is a hash-and-sign with a wildcard for the hash, + * and alg is the same hash-and-sign family with any hash, + * then alg is compliant with this key alg + */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg)) { + if (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(key_alg) && + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(key_alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH && + (alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == (key_alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) { + return 1; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(key_alg2) && + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(key_alg2) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH && + (alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == (key_alg2 & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) { + return 1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +static psa_algorithm_t psa_algorithm_for_rsa(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, + int want_crypt) +{ + if (mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(rsa) == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { + if (want_crypt) { + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) mbedtls_rsa_get_md_alg(rsa); + return PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_type)); + } else { + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH); + } + } else { + if (want_crypt) { + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT; + } else { + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH); + } + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk); + + psa_key_usage_t more_usage = usage; + if (usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE) { + more_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE; + } else if (usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH) { + more_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH; + } else if (usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT) { + more_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT; + } + more_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY; + + int want_private = !(usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE || + usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH || + usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT); + + switch (pk_type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + { + int want_crypt = 0; /* 0: sign/verify; 1: encrypt/decrypt */ + switch (usage) { + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH: + /* Nothing to do. */ + break; + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT: + want_crypt = 1; + break; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + /* Detect the presence of a private key in a way that works both + * in CRT and non-CRT configurations. */ + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk); + int has_private = (mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(rsa) == 0); + if (want_private && !has_private) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + psa_set_key_type(attributes, (want_private ? + PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR : + PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)); + psa_set_key_bits(attributes, mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(pk)); + psa_set_key_algorithm(attributes, + psa_algorithm_for_rsa(rsa, want_crypt)); + break; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + { + int sign_ok = (pk_type != MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH); + int derive_ok = (pk_type != MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + psa_ecc_family_t family = pk->ec_family; + size_t bits = pk->ec_bits; + int has_private = 0; + if (pk->priv_id != MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT) { + has_private = 1; + } +#else + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk); + int has_private = (ec->d.n != 0); + size_t bits = 0; + psa_ecc_family_t family = + mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ec->grp.id, &bits); +#endif + psa_algorithm_t alg = 0; + switch (usage) { + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH: + if (!sign_ok) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) + alg = PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH); +#else + alg = PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH); +#endif + break; + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE: + alg = PSA_ALG_ECDH; + if (!derive_ok) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + break; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + if (want_private && !has_private) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + psa_set_key_type(attributes, (want_private ? + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(family) : + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(family))); + psa_set_key_bits(attributes, bits); + psa_set_key_algorithm(attributes, alg); + break; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + case MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE: + { + psa_key_attributes_t old_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + status = psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &old_attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + psa_key_type_t old_type = psa_get_key_type(&old_attributes); + switch (usage) { + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH: + if (!(PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(old_type) || + old_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + break; + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT: + if (old_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + break; + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE: + if (!(PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(old_type))) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + break; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + psa_key_type_t new_type = old_type; + /* Opaque keys are always key pairs, so we don't need a check + * on the input if the required usage is private. We just need + * to adjust the type correctly if the required usage is public. */ + if (!want_private) { + new_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(new_type); + } + more_usage = psa_get_key_usage_flags(&old_attributes); + if ((usage & more_usage) == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + psa_set_key_type(attributes, new_type); + psa_set_key_bits(attributes, psa_get_key_bits(&old_attributes)); + psa_set_key_algorithm(attributes, psa_get_key_algorithm(&old_attributes)); + break; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + psa_set_key_usage_flags(attributes, more_usage); + /* Key's enrollment is available only when an Mbed TLS implementation of PSA + * Crypto is being used, i.e. when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is defined. + * Even though we don't officially support using other implementations of PSA + * Crypto with TLS and X.509 (yet), we try to keep vendor's customizations + * separated. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm(attributes, PSA_ALG_NONE); +#endif + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) || defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static psa_status_t export_import_into_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t old_key_id, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *new_key_id) +{ + unsigned char key_buffer[PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t key_length = 0; + psa_status_t status = psa_export_key(old_key_id, + key_buffer, sizeof(key_buffer), + &key_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + status = psa_import_key(attributes, key_buffer, key_length, new_key_id); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(key_buffer, key_length); + return status; +} + +static int copy_into_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t old_key_id, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *new_key_id) +{ + /* Normally, we prefer copying: it's more efficient and works even + * for non-exportable keys. */ + psa_status_t status = psa_copy_key(old_key_id, attributes, new_key_id); + if (status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED /*missing COPY usage*/ || + status == PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT /*incompatible policy*/) { + /* There are edge cases where copying won't work, but export+import + * might: + * - If the old key does not allow PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY. + * - If the old key's usage does not allow what attributes wants. + * Because the key was intended for use in the pk module, and may + * have had a policy chosen solely for what pk needs rather than + * based on a detailed understanding of PSA policies, we are a bit + * more liberal than psa_copy_key() here. + */ + /* Here we need to check that the types match, otherwise we risk + * importing nonsensical data. */ + psa_key_attributes_t old_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + status = psa_get_key_attributes(old_key_id, &old_attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + psa_key_type_t old_type = psa_get_key_type(&old_attributes); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&old_attributes); + if (old_type != psa_get_key_type(attributes)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + status = export_import_into_psa(old_key_id, attributes, new_key_id); + } + return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA || MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +static int import_pair_into_psa(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key_id) +{ + switch (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + { + if (psa_get_key_type(attributes) != PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + unsigned char key_buffer[ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS)]; + unsigned char *const key_end = key_buffer + sizeof(key_buffer); + unsigned char *key_data = key_end; + int ret = mbedtls_rsa_write_key(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), + key_buffer, &key_data); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + size_t key_length = key_end - key_data; + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(psa_import_key(attributes, + key_data, key_length, + key_id)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(key_data, key_length); + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + { + /* We need to check the curve family, otherwise the import could + * succeed with nonsensical data. + * We don't check the bit-size: it's optional in attributes, + * and if it's specified, psa_import_key() will know from the key + * data length and will check that the bit-size matches. */ + psa_key_type_t to_type = psa_get_key_type(attributes); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + psa_ecc_family_t from_family = pk->ec_family; +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk); + size_t from_bits = 0; + psa_ecc_family_t from_family = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ec->grp.id, + &from_bits); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + if (to_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(from_family)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + if (mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(pk->priv_id)) { + /* We have a public key and want a key pair. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + return copy_into_psa(pk->priv_id, attributes, key_id); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + if (ec->d.n == 0) { + /* Private key not set. Assume the input is a public key only. + * (The other possibility is that it's an incomplete object + * where the group is set but neither the public key nor + * the private key. This is not possible through ecp.h + * functions, so we don't bother reporting a more suitable + * error in that case.) */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + unsigned char key_buffer[PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)]; + size_t key_length = 0; + int ret = mbedtls_ecp_write_key_ext(ec, &key_length, + key_buffer, sizeof(key_buffer)); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(psa_import_key(attributes, + key_buffer, key_length, + key_id)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(key_buffer, key_length); + return ret; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + case MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE: + return copy_into_psa(pk->priv_id, attributes, key_id); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +} + +static int import_public_into_psa(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key_id) +{ + psa_key_type_t psa_type = psa_get_key_type(attributes); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + unsigned char key_buffer[PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE]; +#endif + unsigned char *key_data = NULL; + size_t key_length = 0; + + switch (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + { + if (psa_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + unsigned char *const key_end = key_buffer + sizeof(key_buffer); + key_data = key_end; + int ret = mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), + key_buffer, &key_data); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + key_length = (size_t) ret; + break; + } +#endif /*MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + { + /* We need to check the curve family, otherwise the import could + * succeed with nonsensical data. + * We don't check the bit-size: it's optional in attributes, + * and if it's specified, psa_import_key() will know from the key + * data length and will check that the bit-size matches. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + if (psa_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(pk->ec_family)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + key_data = (unsigned char *) pk->pub_raw; + key_length = pk->pub_raw_len; +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk); + size_t from_bits = 0; + psa_ecc_family_t from_family = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ec->grp.id, + &from_bits); + if (psa_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(from_family)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + int ret = mbedtls_ecp_write_public_key( + ec, MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + &key_length, key_buffer, sizeof(key_buffer)); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + key_data = key_buffer; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + break; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + case MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE: + { + psa_key_attributes_t old_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status = + psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &old_attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + psa_key_type_t old_type = psa_get_key_type(&old_attributes); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&old_attributes); + if (psa_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(old_type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + status = psa_export_public_key(pk->priv_id, + key_buffer, sizeof(key_buffer), + &key_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + key_data = key_buffer; + break; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(psa_import_key(attributes, + key_data, key_length, + key_id)); +} + +int mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key_id) +{ + /* Set the output immediately so that it won't contain garbage even + * if we error out before calling psa_import_key(). */ + *key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ + + int want_public = PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(psa_get_key_type(attributes)); + if (want_public) { + return import_public_into_psa(pk, attributes, key_id); + } else { + return import_pair_into_psa(pk, attributes, key_id); + } +} + +static int copy_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + int public_only) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type; + psa_algorithm_t alg_type; + size_t key_bits; + /* Use a buffer size large enough to contain either a key pair or public key. */ + unsigned char exp_key[PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_OR_PUBLIC_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t exp_key_len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + + if (pk == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + status = psa_get_key_attributes(key_id, &key_attr); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (public_only) { + status = psa_export_public_key(key_id, exp_key, sizeof(exp_key), &exp_key_len); + } else { + status = psa_export_key(key_id, exp_key, sizeof(exp_key), &exp_key_len); + } + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + key_type = psa_get_key_type(&key_attr); + if (public_only) { + key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(key_type); + } + key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&key_attr); + alg_type = psa_get_key_algorithm(&key_attr); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if ((key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || + (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)) { + + ret = mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA)); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), exp_key, exp_key_len); + } else { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), exp_key, exp_key_len); + } + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + if (PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(alg_type) != PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) { + md_type = mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(alg_type); + } + + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg_type) || PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg_type)) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_type); + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg_type) || + alg_type == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, md_type); + } + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(key_type) || + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(key_type)) { + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; + + ret = mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + grp_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(key_type), key_bits); + ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(pk, grp_id); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(key_type)) { + ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_key(pk, exp_key, exp_key_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey_from_prv(pk, exp_key, exp_key_len, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE); + } else { + ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey(pk, exp_key, exp_key_len); + } + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attr); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(exp_key, sizeof(exp_key)); + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + return copy_from_psa(key_id, pk, 0); +} + +int mbedtls_pk_copy_public_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + return copy_from_psa(key_id, pk, 1); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ + +/* + * Helper for mbedtls_pk_sign and mbedtls_pk_verify + */ +static inline int pk_hashlen_helper(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, size_t *hash_len) +{ + if (*hash_len != 0) { + return 0; + } + + *hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_alg); + + if (*hash_len == 0) { return -1; } - *hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); return 0; } @@ -297,10 +1045,9 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) { - PK_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && hash_len == 0) || - hash != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hash_len != 0) && hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } if (ctx->pk_info == NULL || pk_hashlen_helper(md_alg, &hash_len) != 0) { @@ -318,7 +1065,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, return ret; } - ret = ctx->pk_info->verify_rs_func(ctx->pk_ctx, + ret = ctx->pk_info->verify_rs_func(ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, rs_ctx->rs_ctx); if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { @@ -335,7 +1082,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; } - return ctx->pk_info->verify_func(ctx->pk_ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, + return ctx->pk_info->verify_func(ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len); } @@ -358,10 +1105,9 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) { - PK_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && hash_len == 0) || - hash != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hash_len != 0) && hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } if (ctx->pk_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -371,29 +1117,97 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options, return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; } - if (type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS) { + if (type != MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS) { + /* General case: no options */ + if (options != NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return mbedtls_pk_verify(ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len); + } + + /* Ensure the PK context is of the right type otherwise mbedtls_pk_rsa() + * below would return a NULL pointer. */ + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(ctx) != MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *pss_opts; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *pss_opts; #if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX - if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif + + if (options == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + pss_opts = (const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *) options; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (pss_opts->mgf1_hash_id == md_alg) { + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES]; + unsigned char *p; + int key_len; + size_t signature_length; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT; + psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT; + + psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(psa_md_alg); + p = buf + sizeof(buf); + key_len = mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx), buf, &p); + + if (key_len < 0) { + return key_len; } -#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */ - if (options == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, psa_sig_alg); + + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + buf + sizeof(buf) - key_len, key_len, + &key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_destroy_key(key_id); + return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); } - pss_opts = (const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *) options; + /* This function requires returning MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH + * on a valid signature with trailing data in a buffer, but + * mbedtls_psa_rsa_verify_hash requires the sig_len to be exact, + * so for this reason the passed sig_len is overwritten. Smaller + * signature lengths should not be accepted for verification. */ + signature_length = sig_len > mbedtls_pk_get_len(ctx) ? + mbedtls_pk_get_len(ctx) : sig_len; + status = psa_verify_hash(key_id, psa_sig_alg, hash, + hash_len, sig, signature_length); + destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(key_id); + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS && sig_len > mbedtls_pk_get_len(ctx)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH; + } + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = destruction_status; + } + return PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + { if (sig_len < mbedtls_pk_get_len(ctx)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; } ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx), - NULL, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, pss_opts->mgf1_hash_id, pss_opts->expected_salt_len, @@ -407,17 +1221,10 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options, } return 0; + } #else - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ - } - - /* General case: no options */ - if (options != NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - return mbedtls_pk_verify(ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len); } /* @@ -426,17 +1233,15 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options, int mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) { - PK_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && hash_len == 0) || - hash != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hash_len != 0) && hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - if (ctx->pk_info == NULL || - pk_hashlen_helper(md_alg, &hash_len) != 0) { + if (ctx->pk_info == NULL || pk_hashlen_helper(md_alg, &hash_len) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -451,9 +1256,10 @@ int mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, return ret; } - ret = ctx->pk_info->sign_rs_func(ctx->pk_ctx, md_alg, - hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng, - rs_ctx->rs_ctx); + ret = ctx->pk_info->sign_rs_func(ctx, md_alg, + hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx->rs_ctx); if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { mbedtls_pk_restart_free(rs_ctx); @@ -469,8 +1275,10 @@ int mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; } - return ctx->pk_info->sign_func(ctx->pk_ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, - sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng); + return ctx->pk_info->sign_func(ctx, md_alg, + hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng); } /* @@ -478,11 +1286,114 @@ int mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, */ int mbedtls_pk_sign(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { return mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable(ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, - sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng, NULL); + sig, sig_size, sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng, NULL); +} + +/* + * Make a signature given a signature type. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_sign_ext(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type, + mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + if (ctx->pk_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(ctx, pk_type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + + if (pk_type != MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS) { + return mbedtls_pk_sign(ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + const psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg); + if (psa_md_alg == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(ctx) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t psa_alg, sign_alg; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + psa_algorithm_t psa_enrollment_alg; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + psa_status_t status; + + status = psa_get_key_attributes(ctx->priv_id, &key_attr); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + psa_alg = psa_get_key_algorithm(&key_attr); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + psa_enrollment_alg = psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm(&key_attr); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attr); + + /* Since we're PK type is MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS at least one between + * alg and enrollment alg should be of type RSA_PSS. */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(psa_alg)) { + sign_alg = psa_alg; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + else if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(psa_enrollment_alg)) { + sign_alg = psa_enrollment_alg; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + else { + /* The opaque key has no RSA PSS algorithm associated. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + /* Adjust the hashing algorithm. */ + sign_alg = (sign_alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(psa_md_alg); + + status = psa_sign_hash(ctx->priv_id, sign_alg, + hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len); + return PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + return mbedtls_pk_psa_rsa_sign_ext(PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(psa_md_alg), + ctx->pk_ctx, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len); +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if (sig_size < mbedtls_pk_get_len(ctx)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + if (pk_hashlen_helper(md_alg, &hash_len) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_rsa_context *const rsa_ctx = mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx); + + const int ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_no_mode_check(rsa_ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, + (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig); + if (ret == 0) { + *sig_len = rsa_ctx->len; + } + return ret; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#else + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ } /* @@ -493,11 +1404,6 @@ int mbedtls_pk_decrypt(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - PK_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL || ilen == 0); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL || osize == 0); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - if (ctx->pk_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -506,7 +1412,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_decrypt(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; } - return ctx->pk_info->decrypt_func(ctx->pk_ctx, input, ilen, + return ctx->pk_info->decrypt_func(ctx, input, ilen, output, olen, osize, f_rng, p_rng); } @@ -518,11 +1424,6 @@ int mbedtls_pk_encrypt(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - PK_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL || ilen == 0); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL || osize == 0); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - if (ctx->pk_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -531,23 +1432,27 @@ int mbedtls_pk_encrypt(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; } - return ctx->pk_info->encrypt_func(ctx->pk_ctx, input, ilen, + return ctx->pk_info->encrypt_func(ctx, input, ilen, output, olen, osize, f_rng, p_rng); } /* * Check public-private key pair */ -int mbedtls_pk_check_pair(const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, const mbedtls_pk_context *prv) +int mbedtls_pk_check_pair(const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, + const mbedtls_pk_context *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) { - PK_VALIDATE_RET(pub != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(prv != NULL); - if (pub->pk_info == NULL || prv->pk_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } + if (f_rng == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if (prv->pk_info->check_pair_func == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } @@ -557,12 +1462,15 @@ int mbedtls_pk_check_pair(const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, const mbedtls_pk_contex return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; } } else { - if (pub->pk_info != prv->pk_info) { + if ((prv->pk_info->type != MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) && + (pub->pk_info != prv->pk_info)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; } } - return prv->pk_info->check_pair_func(pub->pk_ctx, prv->pk_ctx); + return prv->pk_info->check_pair_func((mbedtls_pk_context *) pub, + (mbedtls_pk_context *) prv, + f_rng, p_rng); } /* @@ -576,7 +1484,7 @@ size_t mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx) return 0; } - return ctx->pk_info->get_bitlen(ctx->pk_ctx); + return ctx->pk_info->get_bitlen((mbedtls_pk_context *) ctx); } /* @@ -584,7 +1492,6 @@ size_t mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx) */ int mbedtls_pk_debug(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items) { - PK_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); if (ctx->pk_info == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -593,7 +1500,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_debug(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; } - ctx->pk_info->debug_func(ctx->pk_ctx, items); + ctx->pk_info->debug_func((mbedtls_pk_context *) ctx, items); return 0; } @@ -621,66 +1528,4 @@ mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_pk_get_type(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx) return ctx->pk_info->type; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -/* - * Load the key to a PSA key slot, - * then turn the PK context into a wrapper for that key slot. - * - * Currently only works for EC private keys. - */ -int mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, - psa_key_id_t *key, - psa_algorithm_t hash_alg) -{ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - ((void) pk); - ((void) key); - ((void) hash_alg); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; -#else - const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec; - unsigned char d[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; - size_t d_len; - psa_ecc_family_t curve_id; - psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; - psa_key_type_t key_type; - size_t bits; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_status_t status; - - /* export the private key material in the format PSA wants */ - if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk) != MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; - } - - ec = mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk); - d_len = (ec->grp.nbits + 7) / 8; - if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ec->d, d, d_len)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - curve_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ec->grp.id, &bits); - key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve_id); - - /* prepare the key attributes */ - psa_set_key_type(&attributes, key_type); - psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, bits); - psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH); - psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDSA(hash_alg)); - - /* import private key into PSA */ - status = psa_import_key(&attributes, d, d_len, key); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(d, sizeof(d)); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } - - /* make PK context wrap the key slot */ - mbedtls_pk_free(pk); - mbedtls_pk_init(pk); - - return mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque(pk, *key); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/pk_ecc.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/pk_ecc.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..86218fffc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/pk_ecc.c @@ -0,0 +1,255 @@ +/* + * ECC setters for PK. + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "pk_internal.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + +int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + size_t ec_bits; + psa_ecc_family_t ec_family = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(grp_id, &ec_bits); + + /* group may already be initialized; if so, make sure IDs match */ + if ((pk->ec_family != 0 && pk->ec_family != ec_family) || + (pk->ec_bits != 0 && pk->ec_bits != ec_bits)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + + /* set group */ + pk->ec_family = ec_family; + pk->ec_bits = ec_bits; + + return 0; +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pk); + + /* grp may already be initialized; if so, make sure IDs match */ + if (mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk)->grp.id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE && + mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk)->grp.id != grp_id) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + + /* set group */ + return mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&(ecp->grp), grp_id); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +} + +int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_usage_t flags; + psa_status_t status; + + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(pk->ec_family)); + if (pk->ec_family == PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY) { + /* Do not set algorithm here because Montgomery keys cannot do ECDSA and + * the PK module cannot do ECDH. When the key will be used in TLS for + * ECDH, it will be exported and then re-imported with proper flags + * and algorithm. */ + flags = PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT; + } else { + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, + MBEDTLS_PK_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_MAYBE_DET(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)); + flags = PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT; + } + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, flags); + + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, key, key_len, &pk->priv_id); + return psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status); + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck = mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pk); + int ret = mbedtls_ecp_read_key(eck->grp.id, eck, key, key_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + return 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +} + +int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey_from_prv(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char *prv, size_t prv_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; + (void) prv; + (void) prv_len; + psa_status_t status; + + status = psa_export_public_key(pk->priv_id, pk->pub_raw, sizeof(pk->pub_raw), + &pk->pub_raw_len); + return psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status); + +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) /* && !MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; + psa_status_t status; + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck = (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pk->pk_ctx; + size_t curve_bits; + psa_ecc_family_t curve = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(eck->grp.id, &curve_bits); + + /* Import private key into PSA, from serialized input */ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_set_key_type(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve)); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT); + status = psa_import_key(&key_attr, prv, prv_len, &key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status); + } + + /* Export public key from PSA */ + unsigned char pub[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; + size_t pub_len; + status = psa_export_public_key(key_id, pub, sizeof(pub), &pub_len); + psa_status_t destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status); + } else if (destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(destruction_status); + } + + /* Load serialized public key into ecp_keypair structure */ + return mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&eck->grp, &eck->Q, pub, pub_len); + +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + (void) prv; + (void) prv_len; + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck = (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pk->pk_ctx; + return mbedtls_ecp_mul(&eck->grp, &eck->Q, &eck->d, &eck->grp.G, f_rng, p_rng); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +/* + * Set the public key: fallback using ECP_LIGHT in the USE_PSA_EC_DATA case. + * + * Normally, when MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA is enabled, we only use PSA + * functions to handle keys. However, currently psa_import_key() does not + * support compressed points. In case that support was explicitly requested, + * this fallback uses ECP functions to get the job done. This is the reason + * why MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED auto-enables MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT. + * + * [in/out] pk: in: must have the group set, see mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(). + * out: will have the public key set. + * [in] pub, pub_len: the public key as an ECPoint, + * in any format supported by ECP. + * + * Return: + * - 0 on success; + * - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the format is potentially valid + * but not supported; + * - another error code otherwise. + */ +static int pk_ecc_set_pubkey_psa_ecp_fallback(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char *pub, + size_t pub_len) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED) + (void) pk; + (void) pub; + (void) pub_len; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED */ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair ecp_key; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id ecp_group_id; + int ret; + + ecp_group_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(pk->ec_family, pk->ec_bits); + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ecp_key); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&(ecp_key.grp), ecp_group_id); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&(ecp_key.grp), &ecp_key.Q, + pub, pub_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&(ecp_key.grp), &ecp_key.Q, + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + &pk->pub_raw_len, pk->pub_raw, + sizeof(pk->pub_raw)); + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ecp_key); + return ret; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + +int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, const unsigned char *pub, size_t pub_len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + + /* Load the key */ + if (!PSA_ECC_FAMILY_IS_WEIERSTRASS(pk->ec_family) || *pub == 0x04) { + /* Format directly supported by PSA: + * - non-Weierstrass curves that only have one format; + * - uncompressed format for Weierstrass curves. */ + if (pub_len > sizeof(pk->pub_raw)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + memcpy(pk->pub_raw, pub, pub_len); + pk->pub_raw_len = pub_len; + } else { + /* Other format, try the fallback */ + int ret = pk_ecc_set_pubkey_psa_ecp_fallback(pk, pub, pub_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + /* Validate the key by trying to import it */ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attrs = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attrs, 0); + psa_set_key_type(&key_attrs, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(pk->ec_family)); + psa_set_key_bits(&key_attrs, pk->ec_bits); + + if ((psa_import_key(&key_attrs, pk->pub_raw, pk->pub_raw_len, + &key_id) != PSA_SUCCESS) || + (psa_destroy_key(key_id) != PSA_SUCCESS)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY; + } + + return 0; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + + int ret; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec_key = (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pk->pk_ctx; + ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&ec_key->grp, &ec_key->Q, pub, pub_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + return mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(&ec_key->grp, &ec_key->Q); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C && MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/pk_internal.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/pk_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e86a3a09d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/pk_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,207 @@ +/** + * \file pk_internal.h + * + * \brief Public Key abstraction layer: internal (i.e. library only) functions + * and definitions. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PK_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_PK_INTERNAL_H + +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#define PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status) +#define PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR_LIST(status, \ + psa_to_pk_rsa_errors, \ + psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls) +#define PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR_LIST(status, \ + psa_to_pk_ecdsa_errors, \ + psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ + +/* Headers/footers for PEM files */ +#define PEM_BEGIN_PUBLIC_KEY "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----" +#define PEM_END_PUBLIC_KEY "-----END PUBLIC KEY-----" +#define PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----" +#define PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----" +#define PEM_BEGIN_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----" +#define PEM_END_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----" +#define PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_EC "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----" +#define PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_EC "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----" +#define PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8 "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----" +#define PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8 "-----END PRIVATE KEY-----" +#define PEM_BEGIN_ENCRYPTED_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8 "-----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----" +#define PEM_END_ENCRYPTED_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8 "-----END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +/** + * Public function mbedtls_pk_ec() can be used to get direct access to the + * wrapped ecp_keypair structure pointed to the pk_ctx. However this is not + * ideal because it bypasses the PK module on the control of its internal + * structure (pk_context) fields. + * For backward compatibility we keep mbedtls_pk_ec() when ECP_C is defined, but + * we provide 2 very similar functions when only ECP_LIGHT is enabled and not + * ECP_C. + * These variants embed the "ro" or "rw" keywords in their name to make the + * usage of the returned pointer explicit. Of course the returned value is + * const or non-const accordingly. + */ +static inline const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(const mbedtls_pk_context pk) +{ + switch (mbedtls_pk_get_type(&pk)) { + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + return (const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) (pk).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_ctx); + default: + return NULL; + } +} + +static inline mbedtls_ecp_keypair *mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(const mbedtls_pk_context pk) +{ + switch (mbedtls_pk_get_type(&pk)) { + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + return (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) (pk).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_ctx); + default: + return NULL; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS && !MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +static inline mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_id id; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + psa_key_attributes_t opaque_attrs = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t opaque_key_type; + psa_ecc_family_t curve; + + if (psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &opaque_attrs) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + } + opaque_key_type = psa_get_key_type(&opaque_attrs); + curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(opaque_key_type); + id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(curve, psa_get_key_bits(&opaque_attrs)); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&opaque_attrs); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(pk->ec_family, pk->ec_bits); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + id = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk)->grp.id; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + } + + return id; +} + +/* Helper for Montgomery curves */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE448) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519 || MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_PK_IS_RFC8410_GROUP_ID(id) \ + ((id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519) || (id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448)) + +static inline int mbedtls_pk_is_rfc8410(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_id id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk); + + return MBEDTLS_PK_IS_RFC8410_GROUP_ID(id); +} + +/* + * Set the group used by this key. + * + * [in/out] pk: in: must have been pk_setup() to an ECC type + * out: will have group (curve) information set + * [in] grp_in: a supported group ID (not NONE) + */ +int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id); + +/* + * Set the private key material + * + * [in/out] pk: in: must have the group set already, see mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(). + * out: will have the private key set. + * [in] key, key_len: the raw private key (no ASN.1 wrapping). + */ +int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, unsigned char *key, size_t key_len); + +/* + * Set the public key. + * + * [in/out] pk: in: must have its group set, see mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(). + * out: will have the public key set. + * [in] pub, pub_len: the raw public key (an ECPoint). + * + * Return: + * - 0 on success; + * - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the format is potentially valid + * but not supported; + * - another error code otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, const unsigned char *pub, size_t pub_len); + +/* + * Derive a public key from its private counterpart. + * Computationally intensive, only use when public key is not available. + * + * [in/out] pk: in: must have the private key set, see mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_key(). + * out: will have the public key set. + * [in] prv, prv_len: the raw private key (see note below). + * [in] f_rng, p_rng: RNG function and context. + * + * Note: the private key information is always available from pk, + * however for convenience the serialized version is also passed, + * as it's available at each calling site, and useful in some configs + * (as otherwise we would have to re-serialize it from the pk context). + * + * There are three implementations of this function: + * 1. MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA, + * 2. MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO but not MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA, + * 3. not MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey_from_prv(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char *prv, size_t prv_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +/* Helper for (deterministic) ECDSA */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_MAYBE_DET PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_MAYBE_DET PSA_ALG_ECDSA +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( + mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int mbedtls_pk_load_file(const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n); +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.c index f577fccdbb..19196b559a 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.c @@ -2,32 +2,22 @@ * Public Key abstraction layer: wrapper functions * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) -#include "mbedtls/pk_internal.h" +#include "pk_wrap.h" +#include "pk_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" /* Even if RSA not activated, for the sake of RSA-alt */ #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" -#include - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" #endif @@ -37,23 +27,26 @@ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" -#endif +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "pkwrite.h" +#include "rsa_internal.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -#include "psa/crypto.h" -#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME) +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include #include +#include #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) static int rsa_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) @@ -62,33 +55,99 @@ static int rsa_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS; } -static size_t rsa_get_bitlen(const void *ctx) +static size_t rsa_get_bitlen(mbedtls_pk_context *pk) { - const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; - return 8 * mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa); + const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx; + return mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen(rsa); } -static int rsa_verify_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static int rsa_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + int key_len; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES]; + unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof(buf); + psa_algorithm_t psa_alg_md; + size_t rsa_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa); + +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX + if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif + + if (mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(rsa) == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { + psa_alg_md = PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg)); + } else { + psa_alg_md = PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg)); + } + + if (sig_len < rsa_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + key_len = mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(rsa, buf, &p); + if (key_len <= 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, psa_alg_md); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY); + + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + buf + sizeof(buf) - key_len, key_len, + &key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_verify_hash(key_id, psa_alg_md, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + status = psa_destroy_key(key_id); + if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + return ret; +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +static int rsa_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx; size_t rsa_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa); #if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */ +#endif if (sig_len < rsa_len) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(rsa, NULL, NULL, - MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, md_alg, - (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(rsa, md_alg, + (unsigned int) hash_len, + hash, sig)) != 0) { return ret; } @@ -103,61 +162,293 @@ static int rsa_verify_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, return 0; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -static int rsa_sign_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +int mbedtls_pk_psa_rsa_sign_ext(psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa_ctx, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, + size_t *sig_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + int key_len; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + unsigned char *p; + + buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES); + if (buf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + p = buf + MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES; + + *sig_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa_ctx); + if (sig_size < *sig_len) { + mbedtls_free(buf); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + key_len = mbedtls_rsa_write_key(rsa_ctx, buf, &p); + if (key_len <= 0) { + mbedtls_free(buf); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, alg); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR); + + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + buf + MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES - key_len, key_len, + &key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + status = psa_sign_hash(key_id, alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_free(buf); + status = psa_destroy_key(key_id); + if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static int rsa_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); + + psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg; + psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg); + if (psa_md_alg == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + psa_algorithm_t psa_alg; + if (mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk)) == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { + psa_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(psa_md_alg); + } else { + psa_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(psa_md_alg); + } + + return mbedtls_pk_psa_rsa_sign_ext(psa_alg, pk->pk_ctx, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len); +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +static int rsa_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx; #if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */ +#endif *sig_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa); + if (sig_size < *sig_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } - return mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(rsa, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, - md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig); + return mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(rsa, f_rng, p_rng, + md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, + hash, sig); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -static int rsa_decrypt_wrap(void *ctx, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static int rsa_decrypt_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg, decrypt_alg; + psa_status_t status; + int key_len; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES]; + unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof(buf); + + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); + + if (ilen != mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + key_len = mbedtls_rsa_write_key(rsa, buf, &p); + if (key_len <= 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT); + if (mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(rsa) == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { + psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) mbedtls_rsa_get_md_alg(rsa)); + decrypt_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(psa_md_alg); + } else { + decrypt_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT; + } + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, decrypt_alg); + + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + buf + sizeof(buf) - key_len, key_len, + &key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_asymmetric_decrypt(key_id, decrypt_alg, + input, ilen, + NULL, 0, + output, osize, olen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); + status = psa_destroy_key(key_id); + if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + return ret; +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +static int rsa_decrypt_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx; if (ilen != mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } return mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(rsa, f_rng, p_rng, - MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, olen, input, output, osize); + olen, input, output, osize); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static int rsa_encrypt_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg, psa_encrypt_alg; + psa_status_t status; + int key_len; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES]; + unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof(buf); + + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); + + if (mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa) > osize) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE; + } + + key_len = mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(rsa, buf, &p); + if (key_len <= 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT); + if (mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(rsa) == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { + psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) mbedtls_rsa_get_md_alg(rsa)); + psa_encrypt_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(psa_md_alg); + } else { + psa_encrypt_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT; + } + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, psa_encrypt_alg); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY); + + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + buf + sizeof(buf) - key_len, key_len, + &key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_asymmetric_encrypt(key_id, psa_encrypt_alg, + input, ilen, + NULL, 0, + output, osize, olen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = 0; -static int rsa_encrypt_wrap(void *ctx, +cleanup: + status = psa_destroy_key(key_id); + if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + return ret; +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +static int rsa_encrypt_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx; *olen = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa); if (*olen > osize) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE; } - return mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(rsa, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, + return mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(rsa, f_rng, p_rng, ilen, input, output); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -static int rsa_check_pair_wrap(const void *pub, const void *prv) +static int rsa_check_pair_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, mbedtls_pk_context *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) { - return mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv((const mbedtls_rsa_context *) pub, - (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) prv); + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; + return mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv((const mbedtls_rsa_context *) pub->pk_ctx, + (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) prv->pk_ctx); } static void *rsa_alloc_wrap(void) @@ -165,7 +456,7 @@ static void *rsa_alloc_wrap(void) void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_context)); if (ctx != NULL) { - mbedtls_rsa_init((mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx, 0, 0); + mbedtls_rsa_init((mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx); } return ctx; @@ -177,44 +468,50 @@ static void rsa_free_wrap(void *ctx) mbedtls_free(ctx); } -static void rsa_debug(const void *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items) +static void rsa_debug(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + /* Not supported */ + (void) pk; + (void) items; +#else + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx; + items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI; items->name = "rsa.N"; - items->value = &(((mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx)->N); + items->value = &(rsa->N); items++; items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI; items->name = "rsa.E"; - items->value = &(((mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx)->E); + items->value = &(rsa->E); +#endif } const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_info = { - MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, - "RSA", - rsa_get_bitlen, - rsa_can_do, - rsa_verify_wrap, - rsa_sign_wrap, + .type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + .name = "RSA", + .get_bitlen = rsa_get_bitlen, + .can_do = rsa_can_do, + .verify_func = rsa_verify_wrap, + .sign_func = rsa_sign_wrap, #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - NULL, - NULL, -#endif - rsa_decrypt_wrap, - rsa_encrypt_wrap, - rsa_check_pair_wrap, - rsa_alloc_wrap, - rsa_free_wrap, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - NULL, - NULL, -#endif - rsa_debug, + .verify_rs_func = NULL, + .sign_rs_func = NULL, + .rs_alloc_func = NULL, + .rs_free_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + .decrypt_func = rsa_decrypt_wrap, + .encrypt_func = rsa_encrypt_wrap, + .check_pair_func = rsa_check_pair_wrap, + .ctx_alloc_func = rsa_alloc_wrap, + .ctx_free_func = rsa_free_wrap, + .debug_func = rsa_debug, }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) /* * Generic EC key */ @@ -225,70 +522,313 @@ static int eckey_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; } -static size_t eckey_get_bitlen(const void *ctx) +static size_t eckey_get_bitlen(mbedtls_pk_context *pk) { - return ((mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) ctx)->grp.pbits; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + return pk->ec_bits; +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pk->pk_ctx; + return ecp->grp.pbits; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) -/* Forward declarations */ -static int ecdsa_verify_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* Common helper for ECDSA verify using PSA functions. */ +static int ecdsa_verify_psa(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len, + psa_ecc_family_t curve, size_t curve_bits, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md = PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY; + size_t signature_len = PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(curve_bits); + size_t converted_sig_len; + unsigned char extracted_sig[PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char *p; + psa_status_t status; + + if (curve == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve)); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, psa_sig_md); + + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, key, key_len, &key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + + if (signature_len > sizeof(extracted_sig)) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + p = (unsigned char *) sig; + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(curve_bits, p, sig_len, extracted_sig, + sizeof(extracted_sig), &converted_sig_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if (converted_sig_len != signature_len) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_verify_hash(key_id, psa_sig_md, hash, hash_len, + extracted_sig, signature_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + status = psa_destroy_key(key_id); + if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + return ret; +} + +static int ecdsa_opaque_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) +{ + (void) md_alg; + unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_PK_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_RAW_LEN]; + size_t key_len; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_ecc_family_t curve; + size_t curve_bits; + psa_status_t status; + + status = psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &key_attr); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(psa_get_key_type(&key_attr)); + curve_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&key_attr); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attr); + + status = psa_export_public_key(pk->priv_id, key, sizeof(key), &key_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + return ecdsa_verify_psa(key, key_len, curve, curve_bits, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +static int ecdsa_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len); + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) +{ + (void) md_alg; + psa_ecc_family_t curve = pk->ec_family; + size_t curve_bits = pk->ec_bits; -static int ecdsa_sign_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); + return ecdsa_verify_psa(pk->pub_raw, pk->pub_raw_len, curve, curve_bits, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len); +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +static int ecdsa_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) +{ + (void) md_alg; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx = pk->pk_ctx; + unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; + size_t key_len; + size_t curve_bits; + psa_ecc_family_t curve = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ctx->grp.id, &curve_bits); + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Q, + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + &key_len, key, sizeof(key)); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } -static int eckey_verify_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + return ecdsa_verify_psa(key, key_len, curve, curve_bits, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +static int ecdsa_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa; + ((void) md_alg); - mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ecdsa); + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature((mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len); - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(&ecdsa, ctx)) == 0) { - ret = ecdsa_verify_wrap(&ecdsa, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len); + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH; } - mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa); + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* Common helper for ECDSA sign using PSA functions. + * Instead of extracting key's properties in order to check which kind of ECDSA + * signature it supports, we try both deterministic and non-deterministic. + */ +static int ecdsa_sign_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + size_t key_bits = 0; + + status = psa_get_key_attributes(key_id, &key_attr); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&key_attr); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attr); + + status = psa_sign_hash(key_id, + PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg)), + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto done; + } else if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED) { + return PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + status = psa_sign_hash(key_id, + PSA_ALG_ECDSA(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg)), + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + +done: + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(key_bits, sig, *sig_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len); return ret; } -static int eckey_sign_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, +static int ecdsa_opaque_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, + size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); + + return ecdsa_sign_psa(pk->priv_id, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, + sig_len); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +/* When PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA is defined opaque and non-opaque keys end up + * using the same function. */ +#define ecdsa_sign_wrap ecdsa_opaque_sign_wrap +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +static int ecdsa_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx = pk->pk_ctx; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_KEY_PAIR_LENGTH]; + size_t curve_bits; + psa_ecc_family_t curve = + mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ctx->grp.id, &curve_bits); + size_t key_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(curve_bits); + psa_algorithm_t psa_hash = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg); + psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md = MBEDTLS_PK_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_MAYBE_DET(psa_hash); + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); - mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ecdsa); + if (curve == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (key_len > sizeof(buf)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->d, buf, key_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(&ecdsa, ctx)) == 0) { - ret = ecdsa_sign_wrap(&ecdsa, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, - f_rng, p_rng); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve)); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, psa_sig_md); + + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, buf, key_len, &key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; } - mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa); + ret = ecdsa_sign_psa(key_id, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); + status = psa_destroy_key(key_id); + if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +static int ecdsa_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + return mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature((mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx, + md_alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) /* Forward declarations */ -static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, +static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, void *rs_ctx); -static int ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, +static int ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, void *rs_ctx); @@ -333,7 +873,7 @@ static void eckey_rs_free(void *ctx) mbedtls_free(ctx); } -static int eckey_verify_rs_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, +static int eckey_verify_rs_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, void *rs_ctx) @@ -348,52 +888,196 @@ static int eckey_verify_rs_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, /* set up our own sub-context if needed (that is, on first run) */ if (rs->ecdsa_ctx.grp.pbits == 0) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(&rs->ecdsa_ctx, ctx)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(&rs->ecdsa_ctx, pk->pk_ctx)); } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap(&rs->ecdsa_ctx, + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap(pk, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, &rs->ecdsa_rs)); -cleanup: - return ret; -} +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +static int eckey_sign_rs_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + void *rs_ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + eckey_restart_ctx *rs = rs_ctx; + + /* Should never happen */ + if (rs == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* set up our own sub-context if needed (that is, on first run) */ + if (rs->ecdsa_ctx.grp.pbits == 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(&rs->ecdsa_ctx, pk->pk_ctx)); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap(pk, md_alg, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng, &rs->ecdsa_rs)); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +static int eckey_check_pair_psa(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, mbedtls_pk_context *prv) +{ + psa_status_t status; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint8_t prv_key_buf[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; + size_t prv_key_len; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = prv->priv_id; + + status = psa_export_public_key(key_id, prv_key_buf, sizeof(prv_key_buf), + &prv_key_len); + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (memcmp(prv_key_buf, pub->pub_raw, pub->pub_raw_len) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return 0; +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +static int eckey_check_pair_psa(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, mbedtls_pk_context *prv) +{ + psa_status_t status; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint8_t prv_key_buf[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; + size_t prv_key_len; + psa_status_t destruction_status; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + uint8_t pub_key_buf[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; + size_t pub_key_len; + size_t curve_bits; + const psa_ecc_family_t curve = + mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*prv)->grp.id, &curve_bits); + const size_t curve_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(curve_bits); + + if (curve == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + psa_set_key_type(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve)); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT); + + ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*prv)->d, + prv_key_buf, curve_bytes); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(prv_key_buf, sizeof(prv_key_buf)); + return ret; + } + + status = psa_import_key(&key_attr, prv_key_buf, curve_bytes, &key_id); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(prv_key_buf, sizeof(prv_key_buf)); + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } -static int eckey_sign_rs_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - void *rs_ctx) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - eckey_restart_ctx *rs = rs_ctx; + // From now on prv_key_buf is used to store the public key of prv. + status = psa_export_public_key(key_id, prv_key_buf, sizeof(prv_key_buf), + &prv_key_len); + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(key_id); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } else if (destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(destruction_status); + } - /* Should never happen */ - if (rs == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pub)->grp, + &mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pub)->Q, + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + &pub_key_len, pub_key_buf, + sizeof(pub_key_buf)); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; } - /* set up our own sub-context if needed (that is, on first run) */ - if (rs->ecdsa_ctx.grp.pbits == 0) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(&rs->ecdsa_ctx, ctx)); + if (memcmp(prv_key_buf, pub_key_buf, curve_bytes) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap(&rs->ecdsa_ctx, md_alg, - hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, - f_rng, p_rng, &rs->ecdsa_rs)); + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ -cleanup: - return ret; +static int eckey_check_pair_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, mbedtls_pk_context *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; + return eckey_check_pair_psa(pub, prv); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +static int eckey_check_pair_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, mbedtls_pk_context *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + return mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv((const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pub->pk_ctx, + (const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) prv->pk_ctx, + f_rng, p_rng); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -static int eckey_check_pair(const void *pub, const void *prv) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +/* When PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA is defined opaque and non-opaque keys end up + * using the same function. */ +#define ecdsa_opaque_check_pair_wrap eckey_check_pair_wrap +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +static int ecdsa_opaque_check_pair_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, + mbedtls_pk_context *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) { - return mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv((const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pub, - (const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) prv); + psa_status_t status; + uint8_t exp_pub_key[MBEDTLS_PK_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_RAW_LEN]; + size_t exp_pub_key_len = 0; + uint8_t pub_key[MBEDTLS_PK_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_RAW_LEN]; + size_t pub_key_len = 0; + int ret; + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; + + status = psa_export_public_key(prv->priv_id, exp_pub_key, sizeof(exp_pub_key), + &exp_pub_key_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status); + return ret; + } + ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&(mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pub)->grp), + &(mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pub)->Q), + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + &pub_key_len, pub_key, sizeof(pub_key)); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + if ((exp_pub_key_len != pub_key_len) || + memcmp(exp_pub_key, pub_key, exp_pub_key_len)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + return 0; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) static void *eckey_alloc_wrap(void) { void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ecp_keypair)); @@ -410,40 +1094,54 @@ static void eckey_free_wrap(void *ctx) mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free((mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) ctx); mbedtls_free(ctx); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ -static void eckey_debug(const void *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items) +static void eckey_debug(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_PSA_EC; + items->name = "eckey.Q"; + items->value = pk; +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pk->pk_ctx; items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_ECP; items->name = "eckey.Q"; - items->value = &(((mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) ctx)->Q); + items->value = &(ecp->Q); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ } const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckey_info = { - MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY, - "EC", - eckey_get_bitlen, - eckey_can_do, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - eckey_verify_wrap, - eckey_sign_wrap, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - eckey_verify_rs_wrap, - eckey_sign_rs_wrap, -#endif -#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ - NULL, - NULL, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ - NULL, - NULL, - eckey_check_pair, - eckey_alloc_wrap, - eckey_free_wrap, + .type = MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY, + .name = "EC", + .get_bitlen = eckey_get_bitlen, + .can_do = eckey_can_do, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY) + .verify_func = ecdsa_verify_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */ + .verify_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) + .sign_func = ecdsa_sign_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */ + .sign_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - eckey_rs_alloc, - eckey_rs_free, -#endif - eckey_debug, + .verify_rs_func = eckey_verify_rs_wrap, + .sign_rs_func = eckey_sign_rs_wrap, + .rs_alloc_func = eckey_rs_alloc, + .rs_free_func = eckey_rs_free, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + .decrypt_func = NULL, + .encrypt_func = NULL, + .check_pair_func = eckey_check_pair_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + .ctx_alloc_func = NULL, + .ctx_free_func = NULL, +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + .ctx_alloc_func = eckey_alloc_wrap, + .ctx_free_func = eckey_free_wrap, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + .debug_func = eckey_debug, }; /* @@ -456,205 +1154,37 @@ static int eckeydh_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) } const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckeydh_info = { - MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH, - "EC_DH", - eckey_get_bitlen, /* Same underlying key structure */ - eckeydh_can_do, - NULL, - NULL, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - NULL, - NULL, -#endif - NULL, - NULL, - eckey_check_pair, - eckey_alloc_wrap, /* Same underlying key structure */ - eckey_free_wrap, /* Same underlying key structure */ + .type = MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH, + .name = "EC_DH", + .get_bitlen = eckey_get_bitlen, /* Same underlying key structure */ + .can_do = eckeydh_can_do, + .verify_func = NULL, + .sign_func = NULL, #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - NULL, - NULL, -#endif - eckey_debug, /* Same underlying key structure */ + .verify_rs_func = NULL, + .sign_rs_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + .decrypt_func = NULL, + .encrypt_func = NULL, + .check_pair_func = eckey_check_pair_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + .ctx_alloc_func = NULL, + .ctx_free_func = NULL, +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + .ctx_alloc_func = eckey_alloc_wrap, /* Same underlying key structure */ + .ctx_free_func = eckey_free_wrap, /* Same underlying key structure */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + .debug_func = eckey_debug, /* Same underlying key structure */ }; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME) static int ecdsa_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) { return type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -/* - * An ASN.1 encoded signature is a sequence of two ASN.1 integers. Parse one of - * those integers and convert it to the fixed-length encoding expected by PSA. - */ -static int extract_ecdsa_sig_int(unsigned char **from, const unsigned char *end, - unsigned char *to, size_t to_len) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t unpadded_len, padding_len; - - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(from, end, &unpadded_len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - while (unpadded_len > 0 && **from == 0x00) { - (*from)++; - unpadded_len--; - } - - if (unpadded_len > to_len || unpadded_len == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; - } - - padding_len = to_len - unpadded_len; - memset(to, 0x00, padding_len); - memcpy(to + padding_len, *from, unpadded_len); - (*from) += unpadded_len; - - return 0; -} - -/* - * Convert a signature from an ASN.1 sequence of two integers - * to a raw {r,s} buffer. Note: the provided sig buffer must be at least - * twice as big as int_size. - */ -static int extract_ecdsa_sig(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - unsigned char *sig, size_t int_size) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t tmp_size; - - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &tmp_size, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - /* Extract r */ - if ((ret = extract_ecdsa_sig_int(p, end, sig, int_size)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - /* Extract s */ - if ((ret = extract_ecdsa_sig_int(p, end, sig + int_size, int_size)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - return 0; -} - -static int ecdsa_verify_wrap(void *ctx_arg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) -{ - mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx = ctx_arg; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; - psa_key_id_t key_id = 0; - psa_status_t status; - mbedtls_pk_context key; - int key_len; - /* see ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES in pkwrite.c */ - unsigned char buf[30 + 2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; - unsigned char *p; - mbedtls_pk_info_t pk_info = mbedtls_eckey_info; - psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md = PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY; - size_t curve_bits; - psa_ecc_family_t curve = - mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ctx->grp.id, &curve_bits); - const size_t signature_part_size = (ctx->grp.nbits + 7) / 8; - ((void) md_alg); - - if (curve == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - /* mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey() expects a full PK context; - * re-construct one to make it happy */ - key.pk_info = &pk_info; - key.pk_ctx = ctx; - p = buf + sizeof(buf); - key_len = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(&p, buf, &key); - if (key_len <= 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve)); - psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH); - psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, psa_sig_md); - - status = psa_import_key(&attributes, - buf + sizeof(buf) - key_len, key_len, - &key_id); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - ret = mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk(status); - goto cleanup; - } - - /* We don't need the exported key anymore and can - * reuse its buffer for signature extraction. */ - if (2 * signature_part_size > sizeof(buf)) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - goto cleanup; - } - - p = (unsigned char *) sig; - if ((ret = extract_ecdsa_sig(&p, sig + sig_len, buf, - signature_part_size)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - - if (psa_verify_hash(key_id, psa_sig_md, - hash, hash_len, - buf, 2 * signature_part_size) - != PSA_SUCCESS) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } - - if (p != sig + sig_len) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH; - goto cleanup; - } - ret = 0; - -cleanup: - psa_destroy_key(key_id); - return ret; -} -#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -static int ecdsa_verify_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - ((void) md_alg); - - ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature((mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx, - hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len); - - if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH; - } - - return ret; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - -static int ecdsa_sign_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) -{ - return mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature((mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx, - md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) -static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, void *rs_ctx) @@ -663,7 +1193,7 @@ static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, ((void) md_alg); ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( - (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx, + (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, (mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *) rs_ctx); @@ -674,38 +1204,19 @@ static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, return ret; } -static int ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, +static int ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, void *rs_ctx) { return mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( - (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx, - md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng, + (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx, + md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng, (mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *) rs_ctx); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ - -static void *ecdsa_alloc_wrap(void) -{ - void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ecdsa_context)); - - if (ctx != NULL) { - mbedtls_ecdsa_init((mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx); - } - - return ctx; -} - -static void ecdsa_free_wrap(void *ctx) -{ - mbedtls_ecdsa_free((mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx); - mbedtls_free(ctx); -} -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) static void *ecdsa_rs_alloc(void) { void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx)); @@ -722,31 +1233,43 @@ static void ecdsa_rs_free(void *ctx) mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free(ctx); mbedtls_free(ctx); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_info = { - MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, - "ECDSA", - eckey_get_bitlen, /* Compatible key structures */ - ecdsa_can_do, - ecdsa_verify_wrap, - ecdsa_sign_wrap, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap, - ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap, -#endif - NULL, - NULL, - eckey_check_pair, /* Compatible key structures */ - ecdsa_alloc_wrap, - ecdsa_free_wrap, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - ecdsa_rs_alloc, - ecdsa_rs_free, -#endif - eckey_debug, /* Compatible key structures */ + .type = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, + .name = "ECDSA", + .get_bitlen = eckey_get_bitlen, /* Compatible key structures */ + .can_do = ecdsa_can_do, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY) + .verify_func = ecdsa_verify_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */ + .verify_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) + .sign_func = ecdsa_sign_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN */ + .sign_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + .verify_rs_func = ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap, + .sign_rs_func = ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap, + .rs_alloc_func = ecdsa_rs_alloc, + .rs_free_func = ecdsa_rs_free, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + .decrypt_func = NULL, + .encrypt_func = NULL, + .check_pair_func = eckey_check_pair_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + .ctx_alloc_func = NULL, + .ctx_free_func = NULL, +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + .ctx_alloc_func = eckey_alloc_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */ + .ctx_free_func = eckey_free_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + .debug_func = eckey_debug, /* Compatible key structures */ }; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) /* @@ -758,41 +1281,44 @@ static int rsa_alt_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) return type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA; } -static size_t rsa_alt_get_bitlen(const void *ctx) +static size_t rsa_alt_get_bitlen(mbedtls_pk_context *pk) { - const mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = (const mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *) ctx; + const mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = pk->pk_ctx; return 8 * rsa_alt->key_len_func(rsa_alt->key); } -static int rsa_alt_sign_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, +static int rsa_alt_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = (mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *) ctx; + mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = pk->pk_ctx; #if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX if (UINT_MAX < hash_len) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */ +#endif *sig_len = rsa_alt->key_len_func(rsa_alt->key); if (*sig_len > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } + if (*sig_len > sig_size) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } - return rsa_alt->sign_func(rsa_alt->key, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + return rsa_alt->sign_func(rsa_alt->key, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig); } -static int rsa_alt_decrypt_wrap(void *ctx, +static int rsa_alt_decrypt_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = (mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *) ctx; + mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = pk->pk_ctx; ((void) f_rng); ((void) p_rng); @@ -802,11 +1328,13 @@ static int rsa_alt_decrypt_wrap(void *ctx, } return rsa_alt->decrypt_func(rsa_alt->key, - MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, olen, input, output, osize); + olen, input, output, osize); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -static int rsa_alt_check_pair(const void *pub, const void *prv) +static int rsa_alt_check_pair(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, mbedtls_pk_context *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) { unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char hash[32]; @@ -819,13 +1347,14 @@ static int rsa_alt_check_pair(const void *pub, const void *prv) memset(hash, 0x2a, sizeof(hash)); - if ((ret = rsa_alt_sign_wrap((void *) prv, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + if ((ret = rsa_alt_sign_wrap(prv, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, hash, sizeof(hash), - sig, &sig_len, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { + sig, sizeof(sig), &sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { return ret; } - if (rsa_verify_wrap((void *) pub, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + if (rsa_verify_wrap(pub, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, hash, sizeof(hash), sig, sig_len) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; } @@ -847,63 +1376,42 @@ static void *rsa_alt_alloc_wrap(void) static void rsa_alt_free_wrap(void *ctx) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_alt_context)); - mbedtls_free(ctx); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_alt_context)); } const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_alt_info = { - MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT, - "RSA-alt", - rsa_alt_get_bitlen, - rsa_alt_can_do, - NULL, - rsa_alt_sign_wrap, + .type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT, + .name = "RSA-alt", + .get_bitlen = rsa_alt_get_bitlen, + .can_do = rsa_alt_can_do, + .verify_func = NULL, + .sign_func = rsa_alt_sign_wrap, #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - NULL, - NULL, -#endif - rsa_alt_decrypt_wrap, - NULL, + .verify_rs_func = NULL, + .sign_rs_func = NULL, + .rs_alloc_func = NULL, + .rs_free_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + .decrypt_func = rsa_alt_decrypt_wrap, + .encrypt_func = NULL, #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - rsa_alt_check_pair, + .check_pair_func = rsa_alt_check_pair, #else - NULL, + .check_pair_func = NULL, #endif - rsa_alt_alloc_wrap, - rsa_alt_free_wrap, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - NULL, - NULL, -#endif - NULL, + .ctx_alloc_func = rsa_alt_alloc_wrap, + .ctx_free_func = rsa_alt_free_wrap, + .debug_func = NULL, }; - #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - -static void *pk_opaque_alloc_wrap(void) -{ - void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(psa_key_id_t)); - - /* no _init() function to call, as calloc() already zeroized */ - - return ctx; -} - -static void pk_opaque_free_wrap(void *ctx) -{ - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(psa_key_id_t)); - mbedtls_free(ctx); -} - -static size_t pk_opaque_get_bitlen(const void *ctx) +static size_t opaque_get_bitlen(mbedtls_pk_context *pk) { - const psa_key_id_t *key = (const psa_key_id_t *) ctx; size_t bits; psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; - if (PSA_SUCCESS != psa_get_key_attributes(*key, &attributes)) { + if (PSA_SUCCESS != psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &attributes)) { return 0; } @@ -912,176 +1420,163 @@ static size_t pk_opaque_get_bitlen(const void *ctx) return bits; } -static int pk_opaque_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +static int ecdsa_opaque_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) { - /* For now opaque PSA keys can only wrap ECC keypairs, - * as checked by setup_psa(). - * Also, ECKEY_DH does not really make sense with the current API. */ return type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_opaque_info = { + .type = MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE, + .name = "Opaque", + .get_bitlen = opaque_get_bitlen, + .can_do = ecdsa_opaque_can_do, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY) + .verify_func = ecdsa_opaque_verify_wrap, +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */ + .verify_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) + .sign_func = ecdsa_opaque_sign_wrap, +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN */ + .sign_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + .verify_rs_func = NULL, + .sign_rs_func = NULL, + .rs_alloc_func = NULL, + .rs_free_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + .decrypt_func = NULL, + .encrypt_func = NULL, + .check_pair_func = ecdsa_opaque_check_pair_wrap, + .ctx_alloc_func = NULL, + .ctx_free_func = NULL, + .debug_func = NULL, +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ -/* - * Simultaneously convert and move raw MPI from the beginning of a buffer - * to an ASN.1 MPI at the end of the buffer. - * See also mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(). - * - * p: pointer to the end of the output buffer - * start: start of the output buffer, and also of the mpi to write at the end - * n_len: length of the mpi to read from start - */ -static int asn1_write_mpibuf(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - size_t n_len) +static int rsa_opaque_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t len = 0; - - if ((size_t) (*p - start) < n_len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; - } + return type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA || + type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS; +} - len = n_len; - *p -= len; - memmove(*p, start, len); +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +static int rsa_opaque_decrypt(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_key_type_t type; + psa_status_t status; - /* ASN.1 DER encoding requires minimal length, so skip leading 0s. - * Neither r nor s should be 0, but as a failsafe measure, still detect - * that rather than overflowing the buffer in case of a PSA error. */ - while (len > 0 && **p == 0x00) { - ++(*p); - --len; - } + /* PSA has its own RNG */ + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; - /* this is only reached if the signature was invalid */ - if (len == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + status = psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); } - /* if the msb is 1, ASN.1 requires that we prepend a 0. - * Neither r nor s can be 0, so we can assume len > 0 at all times. */ - if (**p & 0x80) { - if (*p - start < 1) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; - } + type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes); + alg = psa_get_key_algorithm(&attributes); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); - *--(*p) = 0x00; - len += 1; + if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)); - - return (int) len; -} - -/* Transcode signature from PSA format to ASN.1 sequence. - * See ecdsa_signature_to_asn1 in ecdsa.c, but with byte buffers instead of - * MPIs, and in-place. - * - * [in/out] sig: the signature pre- and post-transcoding - * [in/out] sig_len: signature length pre- and post-transcoding - * [int] buf_len: the available size the in/out buffer - */ -static int pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa(unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, - size_t buf_len) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t len = 0; - const size_t rs_len = *sig_len / 2; - unsigned char *p = sig + buf_len; - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, asn1_write_mpibuf(&p, sig + rs_len, rs_len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, asn1_write_mpibuf(&p, sig, rs_len)); - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&p, sig, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&p, sig, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); - - memmove(sig, p, len); - *sig_len = len; + status = psa_asymmetric_decrypt(pk->priv_id, alg, input, ilen, NULL, 0, output, osize, olen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } return 0; } +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ - -static int pk_opaque_sign_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +static int rsa_opaque_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - ((void) ctx); - ((void) md_alg); - ((void) hash); - ((void) hash_len); - ((void) sig); - ((void) sig_len); - ((void) f_rng); - ((void) p_rng); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; -#else /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ - const psa_key_id_t *key = (const psa_key_id_t *) ctx; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; - psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_ECDSA(mbedtls_psa_translate_md(md_alg)); - size_t buf_len; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_key_type_t type; psa_status_t status; /* PSA has its own RNG */ (void) f_rng; (void) p_rng; - /* PSA needs an output buffer of known size, but our API doesn't provide - * that information. Assume that the buffer is large enough for a - * maximal-length signature with that key (otherwise the application is - * buggy anyway). */ - status = psa_get_key_attributes(*key, &attributes); + status = psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &attributes); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk(status); + return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); } - buf_len = MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN(psa_get_key_bits(&attributes)); + + type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes); + alg = psa_get_key_algorithm(&attributes); psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); - if (buf_len > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type)) { + alg = (alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg); + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } - /* make the signature */ - status = psa_sign_hash(*key, alg, hash, hash_len, - sig, buf_len, sig_len); + status = psa_sign_hash(pk->priv_id, alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return mbedtls_psa_err_translate_pk(status); + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type)) { + return PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } else { + return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } } - /* transcode it to ASN.1 sequence */ - return pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa(sig, sig_len, buf_len); -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ + return 0; +#else /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + ((void) pk); + ((void) md_alg); + ((void) hash); + ((void) hash_len); + ((void) sig); + ((void) sig_size); + ((void) sig_len); + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ } -const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_opaque_info = { - MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE, - "Opaque", - pk_opaque_get_bitlen, - pk_opaque_can_do, - NULL, /* verify - will be done later */ - pk_opaque_sign_wrap, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - NULL, /* restartable verify - not relevant */ - NULL, /* restartable sign - not relevant */ -#endif - NULL, /* decrypt - will be done later */ - NULL, /* encrypt - will be done later */ - NULL, /* check_pair - could be done later or left NULL */ - pk_opaque_alloc_wrap, - pk_opaque_free_wrap, +const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_opaque_info = { + .type = MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE, + .name = "Opaque", + .get_bitlen = opaque_get_bitlen, + .can_do = rsa_opaque_can_do, + .verify_func = NULL, + .sign_func = rsa_opaque_sign_wrap, #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - NULL, /* restart alloc - not relevant */ - NULL, /* restart free - not relevant */ -#endif - NULL, /* debug - could be done later, or even left NULL */ + .verify_rs_func = NULL, + .sign_rs_func = NULL, + .rs_alloc_func = NULL, + .rs_free_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) + .decrypt_func = rsa_opaque_decrypt, +#else /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */ + .decrypt_func = NULL, +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */ + .encrypt_func = NULL, + .check_pair_func = NULL, + .ctx_alloc_func = NULL, + .ctx_free_func = NULL, + .debug_func = NULL, }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pk_internal.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.h similarity index 63% rename from vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pk_internal.h rename to vendor/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.h index 8a0c30f5ff..be096da53a 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pk_internal.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.h @@ -1,36 +1,24 @@ /** - * \file pk_internal.h + * \file pk_wrap.h * * \brief Public Key abstraction layer: wrapper functions */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H #define MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif + struct mbedtls_pk_info_t { /** Public key type */ mbedtls_pk_type_t type; @@ -39,52 +27,54 @@ struct mbedtls_pk_info_t { const char *name; /** Get key size in bits */ - size_t (*get_bitlen)(const void *); + size_t (*get_bitlen)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk); /** Tell if the context implements this type (e.g. ECKEY can do ECDSA) */ int (*can_do)(mbedtls_pk_type_t type); /** Verify signature */ - int (*verify_func)(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + int (*verify_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len); /** Make signature */ - int (*sign_func)(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + int (*sign_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) /** Verify signature (restartable) */ - int (*verify_rs_func)(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + int (*verify_rs_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, void *rs_ctx); /** Make signature (restartable) */ - int (*sign_rs_func)(void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + int (*sign_rs_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, void *rs_ctx); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ /** Decrypt message */ - int (*decrypt_func)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + int (*decrypt_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); /** Encrypt message */ - int (*encrypt_func)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + int (*encrypt_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); /** Check public-private key pair */ - int (*check_pair_func)(const void *pub, const void *prv); + int (*check_pair_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, mbedtls_pk_context *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng); /** Allocate a new context */ void * (*ctx_alloc_func)(void); @@ -101,7 +91,7 @@ struct mbedtls_pk_info_t { #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ /** Interface with the debug module */ - void (*debug_func)(const void *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items); + void (*debug_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items); }; #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) @@ -118,12 +108,12 @@ typedef struct { extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_info; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckey_info; extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckeydh_info; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME) extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_info; #endif @@ -132,7 +122,17 @@ extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_alt_info; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_opaque_info; -#endif +extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_opaque_info; +extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_opaque_info; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +int mbedtls_pk_psa_rsa_sign_ext(psa_algorithm_t psa_alg_md, + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa_ctx, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, + size_t *sig_len); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/pkcs11.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/pkcs11.c deleted file mode 100644 index 8ba40caf91..0000000000 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/pkcs11.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,233 +0,0 @@ -/** - * \file pkcs11.c - * - * \brief Wrapper for PKCS#11 library libpkcs11-helper - * - * \author Adriaan de Jong - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ - -#include "mbedtls/pkcs11.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) - -#include "mbedtls/md.h" -#include "mbedtls/oid.h" -#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" - -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" - -#include - -void mbedtls_pkcs11_init(mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx) -{ - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_pkcs11_context)); -} - -int mbedtls_pkcs11_x509_cert_bind(mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, pkcs11h_certificate_t pkcs11_cert) -{ - int ret = 1; - unsigned char *cert_blob = NULL; - size_t cert_blob_size = 0; - - if (cert == NULL) { - ret = 2; - goto cleanup; - } - - if (pkcs11h_certificate_getCertificateBlob(pkcs11_cert, NULL, - &cert_blob_size) != CKR_OK) { - ret = 3; - goto cleanup; - } - - cert_blob = mbedtls_calloc(1, cert_blob_size); - if (NULL == cert_blob) { - ret = 4; - goto cleanup; - } - - if (pkcs11h_certificate_getCertificateBlob(pkcs11_cert, cert_blob, - &cert_blob_size) != CKR_OK) { - ret = 5; - goto cleanup; - } - - if (0 != mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(cert, cert_blob, cert_blob_size)) { - ret = 6; - goto cleanup; - } - - ret = 0; - -cleanup: - if (NULL != cert_blob) { - mbedtls_free(cert_blob); - } - - return ret; -} - - -int mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_bind(mbedtls_pkcs11_context *priv_key, - pkcs11h_certificate_t pkcs11_cert) -{ - int ret = 1; - mbedtls_x509_crt cert; - - mbedtls_x509_crt_init(&cert); - - if (priv_key == NULL) { - goto cleanup; - } - - if (0 != mbedtls_pkcs11_x509_cert_bind(&cert, pkcs11_cert)) { - goto cleanup; - } - - priv_key->len = mbedtls_pk_get_len(&cert.pk); - priv_key->pkcs11h_cert = pkcs11_cert; - - ret = 0; - -cleanup: - mbedtls_x509_crt_free(&cert); - - return ret; -} - -void mbedtls_pkcs11_priv_key_free(mbedtls_pkcs11_context *priv_key) -{ - if (NULL != priv_key) { - pkcs11h_certificate_freeCertificate(priv_key->pkcs11h_cert); - } -} - -int mbedtls_pkcs11_decrypt(mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx, - int mode, size_t *olen, - const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output, - size_t output_max_len) -{ - size_t input_len, output_len; - - if (NULL == ctx) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - if (MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE != mode) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - output_len = input_len = ctx->len; - - if (input_len < 16 || input_len > output_max_len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - /* Determine size of output buffer */ - if (pkcs11h_certificate_decryptAny(ctx->pkcs11h_cert, CKM_RSA_PKCS, input, - input_len, NULL, &output_len) != CKR_OK) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - if (output_len > output_max_len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE; - } - - if (pkcs11h_certificate_decryptAny(ctx->pkcs11h_cert, CKM_RSA_PKCS, input, - input_len, output, &output_len) != CKR_OK) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - *olen = output_len; - return 0; -} - -int mbedtls_pkcs11_sign(mbedtls_pkcs11_context *ctx, - int mode, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - unsigned int hashlen, - const unsigned char *hash, - unsigned char *sig) -{ - size_t sig_len = 0, asn_len = 0, oid_size = 0; - unsigned char *p = sig; - const char *oid; - - if (NULL == ctx) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - if (MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE != mode) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); - if (md_info == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - if (mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md(md_alg, &oid, &oid_size) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); - asn_len = 10 + oid_size; - } - - sig_len = ctx->len; - if (hashlen > sig_len || asn_len > sig_len || - hashlen + asn_len > sig_len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { - /* - * DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE { - * digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, - * digest Digest } - * - * DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier - * - * Digest ::= OCTET STRING - */ - *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; - *p++ = (unsigned char) (0x08 + oid_size + hashlen); - *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; - *p++ = (unsigned char) (0x04 + oid_size); - *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; - *p++ = oid_size & 0xFF; - memcpy(p, oid, oid_size); - p += oid_size; - *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL; - *p++ = 0x00; - *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; - *p++ = hashlen; - } - - memcpy(p, hash, hashlen); - - if (pkcs11h_certificate_signAny(ctx->pkcs11h_cert, CKM_RSA_PKCS, sig, - asn_len + hashlen, sig, &sig_len) != CKR_OK) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - return 0; -} - -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/pkcs12.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/pkcs12.c index 89fda10a9c..a3467b9820 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/pkcs12.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/pkcs12.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * PKCS#12 Personal Information Exchange Syntax * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * The PKCS #12 Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard v1.1 @@ -29,21 +17,21 @@ #include "mbedtls/pkcs12.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#include "mbedtls/arc4.h" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) #include "mbedtls/des.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +#include "psa_util_internal.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) static int pkcs12_parse_pbe_params(mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_asn1_buf *salt, int *iterations) @@ -131,47 +119,6 @@ static int pkcs12_pbe_derive_key_iv(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, mbedtls_md_typ #undef PKCS12_MAX_PWDLEN -int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, - const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, - const unsigned char *data, size_t len, - unsigned char *output) -{ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - ((void) pbe_params); - ((void) mode); - ((void) pwd); - ((void) pwdlen); - ((void) data); - ((void) len); - ((void) output); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; -#else - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char key[16]; - mbedtls_arc4_context ctx; - ((void) mode); - - mbedtls_arc4_init(&ctx); - - if ((ret = pkcs12_pbe_derive_key_iv(pbe_params, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, - pwd, pwdlen, - key, 16, NULL, 0)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - mbedtls_arc4_setup(&ctx, key, 16); - if ((ret = mbedtls_arc4_crypt(&ctx, len, data, output)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - -exit: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(key, sizeof(key)); - mbedtls_arc4_free(&ctx); - - return ret; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ -} - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, @@ -181,6 +128,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, size_t *output_len); #endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, @@ -197,6 +145,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, pwd, pwdlen, data, len, output, SIZE_MAX, &output_len); } +#endif int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, @@ -210,6 +159,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, unsigned char iv[16]; const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; + size_t iv_len = 0; size_t finish_olen = 0; unsigned int padlen = 0; @@ -222,7 +172,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } - keylen = cipher_info->key_bitlen / 8; + keylen = (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info) / 8; if (mode == MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT) { if (output_size < len) { @@ -237,9 +187,10 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, } } + iv_len = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size(cipher_info); if ((ret = pkcs12_pbe_derive_key_iv(pbe_params, md_type, pwd, pwdlen, key, keylen, - iv, cipher_info->iv_size)) != 0) { + iv, iv_len)) != 0) { return ret; } @@ -249,45 +200,33 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, goto exit; } - if ((ret = - mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&cipher_ctx, key, 8 * keylen, - (mbedtls_operation_t) mode)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&cipher_ctx, key, 8 * keylen, + (mbedtls_operation_t) mode)) != 0) { goto exit; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) - /* PKCS12 uses CBC with PKCS7 padding */ - - mbedtls_cipher_padding_t padding = MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7; + { + /* PKCS12 uses CBC with PKCS7 padding */ + mbedtls_cipher_padding_t padding = MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7; #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) - /* For historical reasons, when decrypting, this function works when - * decrypting even when support for PKCS7 padding is disabled. In this - * case, it ignores the padding, and so will never report a - * password mismatch. - */ - if (mode == MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT) { - padding = MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE; - } + /* For historical reasons, when decrypting, this function works when + * decrypting even when support for PKCS7 padding is disabled. In this + * case, it ignores the padding, and so will never report a + * password mismatch. + */ + if (mode == MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT) { + padding = MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE; + } #endif - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&cipher_ctx, padding)) != 0) { - goto exit; + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&cipher_ctx, padding)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_iv(&cipher_ctx, iv, cipher_info->iv_size)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_reset(&cipher_ctx)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&cipher_ctx, data, len, - output, output_len)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_finish(&cipher_ctx, output + (*output_len), &finish_olen)) != 0) { + ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt(&cipher_ctx, iv, iv_len, data, len, output, &finish_olen); + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH; } @@ -301,7 +240,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ static void pkcs12_fill_buffer(unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, const unsigned char *filler, size_t fill_len) @@ -325,6 +264,65 @@ static void pkcs12_fill_buffer(unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, } } + +static int calculate_hashes(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, int iterations, + unsigned char *diversifier, unsigned char *salt_block, + unsigned char *pwd_block, unsigned char *hash_output, int use_salt, + int use_password, size_t hlen, size_t v) +{ + int ret = -1; + size_t i; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_type); + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + // Calculate hash( diversifier || salt_block || pwd_block ) + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, diversifier, v)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (use_salt != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, salt_block, v)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } + + if (use_password != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, pwd_block, v)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, hash_output)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + // Perform remaining ( iterations - 1 ) recursive hash calculations + for (i = 1; i < (size_t) iterations; i++) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md(md_info, hash_output, hlen, hash_output)) + != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); + return ret; +} + + int mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation(unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen, @@ -334,7 +332,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation(unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, unsigned int j; unsigned char diversifier[128]; - unsigned char salt_block[128], pwd_block[128], hash_block[128]; + unsigned char salt_block[128], pwd_block[128], hash_block[128] = { 0 }; unsigned char hash_output[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char *p; unsigned char c; @@ -343,9 +341,6 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation(unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, size_t hlen, use_len, v, i; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; - // This version only allows max of 64 bytes of password or salt if (datalen > 128 || pwdlen > 64 || saltlen > 64) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -362,17 +357,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation(unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, use_password = (pwd && pwdlen != 0); use_salt = (salt && saltlen != 0); - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_type); - if (md_info == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - } - - mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); - - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_type); if (hlen <= 32) { v = 64; @@ -392,38 +377,12 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation(unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, p = data; while (datalen > 0) { - // Calculate hash( diversifier || salt_block || pwd_block ) - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx)) != 0) { + if (calculate_hashes(md_type, iterations, diversifier, salt_block, + pwd_block, hash_output, use_salt, use_password, hlen, + v) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, diversifier, v)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - - if (use_salt != 0) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, salt_block, v)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - } - - if (use_password != 0) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, pwd_block, v)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, hash_output)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - - // Perform remaining ( iterations - 1 ) recursive hash calculations - for (i = 1; i < (size_t) iterations; i++) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_md(md_info, hash_output, hlen, hash_output)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - } - use_len = (datalen > hlen) ? hlen : datalen; memcpy(p, hash_output, use_len); datalen -= use_len; @@ -472,8 +431,6 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation(unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, mbedtls_platform_zeroize(hash_block, sizeof(hash_block)); mbedtls_platform_zeroize(hash_output, sizeof(hash_output)); - mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); - return ret; } diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/pkcs5.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/pkcs5.c index ebf391ad83..c6c53054b6 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/pkcs5.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/pkcs5.c @@ -6,19 +6,7 @@ * \author Mathias Olsson * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * PKCS#5 includes PBKDF2 and more @@ -36,7 +24,9 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ @@ -44,8 +34,9 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) static int pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_asn1_buf *salt, int *iterations, int *keylen, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_type) @@ -118,6 +109,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, size_t *output_len); #endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, @@ -132,6 +124,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, return mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(pbe_params, mode, pwd, pwdlen, data, datalen, output, SIZE_MAX, &output_len); } +#endif int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, @@ -145,9 +138,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, mbedtls_asn1_buf salt; mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; unsigned char key[32], iv[32]; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_alg; mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; unsigned int padlen = 0; @@ -183,11 +174,6 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, return ret; } - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_type); - if (md_info == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg(&p, end, &enc_scheme_oid, &enc_scheme_params)) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); @@ -206,10 +192,10 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, * The value of keylen from pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params() is ignored * since it is optional and we don't know if it was set or not */ - keylen = cipher_info->key_bitlen / 8; + keylen = (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info) / 8; if (enc_scheme_params.tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING || - enc_scheme_params.len != cipher_info->iv_size) { + enc_scheme_params.len != mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size(cipher_info)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT; } @@ -226,18 +212,13 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, } } - mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); - mbedtls_cipher_init(&cipher_ctx); memcpy(iv, enc_scheme_params.p, enc_scheme_params.len); - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 1)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(&md_ctx, pwd, pwdlen, salt.p, salt.len, - iterations, keylen, key)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac_ext(md_type, pwd, pwdlen, salt.p, + salt.len, iterations, keylen, + key)) != 0) { goto exit; } @@ -251,23 +232,25 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, } #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) - /* PKCS5 uses CBC with PKCS7 padding (which is the same as - * "PKCS5 padding" except that it's typically only called PKCS5 - * with 64-bit-block ciphers). - */ - mbedtls_cipher_padding_t padding = MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7; + { + /* PKCS5 uses CBC with PKCS7 padding (which is the same as + * "PKCS5 padding" except that it's typically only called PKCS5 + * with 64-bit-block ciphers). + */ + mbedtls_cipher_padding_t padding = MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7; #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) - /* For historical reasons, when decrypting, this function works when - * decrypting even when support for PKCS7 padding is disabled. In this - * case, it ignores the padding, and so will never report a - * password mismatch. - */ - if (mode == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT) { - padding = MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE; - } + /* For historical reasons, when decrypting, this function works when + * decrypting even when support for PKCS7 padding is disabled. In this + * case, it ignores the padding, and so will never report a + * password mismatch. + */ + if (mode == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT) { + padding = MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE; + } #endif - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&cipher_ctx, padding)) != 0) { - goto exit; + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&cipher_ctx, padding)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt(&cipher_ctx, iv, enc_scheme_params.len, @@ -276,21 +259,19 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, } exit: - mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); mbedtls_cipher_free(&cipher_ctx); return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ -int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, - const unsigned char *password, - size_t plen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen, - unsigned int iteration_count, - uint32_t key_length, unsigned char *output) +static int pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *password, + size_t plen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen, + unsigned int iteration_count, + uint32_t key_length, unsigned char *output) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - int j; unsigned int i; unsigned char md1[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char work[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; @@ -349,9 +330,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, // U1 xor U2 // - for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++) { - work[j] ^= md1[j]; - } + mbedtls_xor(work, work, md1, md_size); } use_len = (key_length < md_size) ? key_length : md_size; @@ -375,9 +354,48 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, return ret; } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *password, + size_t plen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen, + unsigned int iteration_count, + uint32_t key_length, unsigned char *output) +{ + return pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(ctx, password, plen, salt, slen, iteration_count, + key_length, output); +} +#endif + +int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac_ext(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *password, + size_t plen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen, + unsigned int iteration_count, + uint32_t key_length, unsigned char *output) +{ + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = NULL; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 1)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(&md_ctx, password, plen, salt, slen, + iteration_count, key_length, output); +exit: + mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); + return ret; +} + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) int mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test(int verbose) { if (verbose != 0) { @@ -441,33 +459,18 @@ static const unsigned char result_key_test_data[MAX_TESTS][32] = int mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test(int verbose) { - mbedtls_md_context_t sha1_ctx; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *info_sha1; int ret, i; unsigned char key[64]; - mbedtls_md_init(&sha1_ctx); - - info_sha1 = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1); - if (info_sha1 == NULL) { - ret = 1; - goto exit; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&sha1_ctx, info_sha1, 1)) != 0) { - ret = 1; - goto exit; - } - for (i = 0; i < MAX_TESTS; i++) { if (verbose != 0) { mbedtls_printf(" PBKDF2 (SHA1) #%d: ", i); } - ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(&sha1_ctx, password_test_data[i], - plen_test_data[i], salt_test_data[i], - slen_test_data[i], it_cnt_test_data[i], - key_len_test_data[i], key); + ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac_ext(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, password_test_data[i], + plen_test_data[i], salt_test_data[i], + slen_test_data[i], it_cnt_test_data[i], + key_len_test_data[i], key); if (ret != 0 || memcmp(result_key_test_data[i], key, key_len_test_data[i]) != 0) { if (verbose != 0) { @@ -488,11 +491,9 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test(int verbose) } exit: - mbedtls_md_free(&sha1_ctx); - return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/pkcs7.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/pkcs7.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3aac662ba6 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/pkcs7.c @@ -0,0 +1,773 @@ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#include "common.h" + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C) +#include "mbedtls/pkcs7.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include +#include +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) +#include +#endif + +/** + * Initializes the mbedtls_pkcs7 structure. + */ +void mbedtls_pkcs7_init(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7) +{ + memset(pkcs7, 0, sizeof(*pkcs7)); +} + +static int pkcs7_get_next_content_len(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + size_t *len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED + | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC); + if (ret != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO, ret); + } else if ((size_t) (end - *p) != *len) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return ret; +} + +/** + * version Version + * Version ::= INTEGER + **/ +static int pkcs7_get_version(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, int *ver) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(p, end, ver); + if (ret != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_VERSION, ret); + } + + /* If version != 1, return invalid version */ + if (*ver != MBEDTLS_PKCS7_SUPPORTED_VERSION) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_VERSION; + } + + return ret; +} + +/** + * ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * contentType ContentType, + * content + * [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType OPTIONAL } + **/ +static int pkcs7_get_content_info_type(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + unsigned char **seq_end, + mbedtls_pkcs7_buf *pkcs7) +{ + size_t len = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *start = *p; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED + | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + if (ret != 0) { + *p = start; + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO, ret); + } + *seq_end = *p + len; + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, *seq_end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID); + if (ret != 0) { + *p = start; + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO, ret); + } + + pkcs7->tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + pkcs7->len = len; + pkcs7->p = *p; + *p += len; + + return ret; +} + +/** + * DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier + * + * This is from x509.h + **/ +static int pkcs7_get_digest_algorithm(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *alg) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null(p, end, alg)) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_ALG, ret); + } + + return ret; +} + +/** + * DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers :: SET of DigestAlgorithmIdentifier + **/ +static int pkcs7_get_digest_algorithm_set(unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *alg) +{ + size_t len = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED + | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_ALG, ret); + } + + end = *p + len; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null(p, end, alg); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_ALG, ret); + } + + /** For now, it assumes there is only one digest algorithm specified **/ + if (*p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * certificates :: SET OF ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate, + * ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate ::= CHOICE { + * certificate Certificate -- x509, + * extendedCertificate[0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificate } + * Return number of certificates added to the signed data, + * 0 or higher is valid. + * Return negative error code for failure. + **/ +static int pkcs7_get_certificates(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_crt *certs) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len1 = 0; + size_t len2 = 0; + unsigned char *end_set, *end_cert, *start; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len1, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED + | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC); + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { + return 0; + } + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + start = *p; + end_set = *p + len1; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_set, &len2, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED + | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CERT, ret); + } + + end_cert = *p + len2; + + /* + * This is to verify that there is only one signer certificate. It seems it is + * not easy to differentiate between the chain vs different signer's certificate. + * So, we support only the root certificate and the single signer. + * The behaviour would be improved with addition of multiple signer support. + */ + if (end_cert != end_set) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(certs, start, len1)) < 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CERT; + } + + *p = end_cert; + + /* + * Since in this version we strictly support single certificate, and reaching + * here implies we have parsed successfully, we return 1. + */ + return 1; +} + +/** + * EncryptedDigest ::= OCTET STRING + **/ +static int pkcs7_get_signature(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_pkcs7_buf *signature) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + signature->tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; + signature->len = len; + signature->p = *p; + + *p = *p + len; + + return 0; +} + +static void pkcs7_free_signer_info(mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer) +{ + mbedtls_x509_name *name_cur; + mbedtls_x509_name *name_prv; + + if (signer == NULL) { + return; + } + + name_cur = signer->issuer.next; + while (name_cur != NULL) { + name_prv = name_cur; + name_cur = name_cur->next; + mbedtls_free(name_prv); + } + signer->issuer.next = NULL; +} + +/** + * SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version; + * issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber, + * digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, + * authenticatedAttributes + * [0] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL, + * digestEncryptionAlgorithm DigestEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier, + * encryptedDigest EncryptedDigest, + * unauthenticatedAttributes + * [1] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL, + * Returns 0 if the signerInfo is valid. + * Return negative error code for failure. + * Structure must not contain vales for authenticatedAttributes + * and unauthenticatedAttributes. + **/ +static int pkcs7_get_signer_info(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer, + mbedtls_x509_buf *alg) +{ + unsigned char *end_signer, *end_issuer_and_sn; + int asn1_ret = 0, ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + asn1_ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED + | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + if (asn1_ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + end_signer = *p + len; + + ret = pkcs7_get_version(p, end_signer, &signer->version); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + asn1_ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_signer, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + if (asn1_ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + end_issuer_and_sn = *p + len; + /* Parsing IssuerAndSerialNumber */ + signer->issuer_raw.p = *p; + + asn1_ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_issuer_and_sn, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + if (asn1_ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name(p, *p + len, &signer->issuer); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + signer->issuer_raw.len = (size_t) (*p - signer->issuer_raw.p); + + ret = mbedtls_x509_get_serial(p, end_issuer_and_sn, &signer->serial); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + /* ensure no extra or missing bytes */ + if (*p != end_issuer_and_sn) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO; + goto out; + } + + ret = pkcs7_get_digest_algorithm(p, end_signer, &signer->alg_identifier); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + /* Check that the digest algorithm used matches the one provided earlier */ + if (signer->alg_identifier.tag != alg->tag || + signer->alg_identifier.len != alg->len || + memcmp(signer->alg_identifier.p, alg->p, alg->len) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO; + goto out; + } + + /* Assume authenticatedAttributes is nonexistent */ + ret = pkcs7_get_digest_algorithm(p, end_signer, &signer->sig_alg_identifier); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + ret = pkcs7_get_signature(p, end_signer, &signer->sig); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + /* Do not permit any unauthenticated attributes */ + if (*p != end_signer) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO; + } + +out: + if (asn1_ret != 0 || ret != 0) { + pkcs7_free_signer_info(signer); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO, + asn1_ret); + } + + return ret; +} + +/** + * SignerInfos ::= SET of SignerInfo + * Return number of signers added to the signed data, + * 0 or higher is valid. + * Return negative error code for failure. + **/ +static int pkcs7_get_signers_info_set(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signers_set, + mbedtls_x509_buf *digest_alg) +{ + unsigned char *end_set; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int count = 0; + size_t len = 0; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED + | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO, ret); + } + + /* Detect zero signers */ + if (len == 0) { + return 0; + } + + end_set = *p + len; + + ret = pkcs7_get_signer_info(p, end_set, signers_set, digest_alg); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + count++; + + mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *prev = signers_set; + while (*p != end_set) { + mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer = + mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info)); + if (!signer) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = pkcs7_get_signer_info(p, end_set, signer, digest_alg); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_free(signer); + goto cleanup; + } + prev->next = signer; + prev = signer; + count++; + } + + return count; + +cleanup: + pkcs7_free_signer_info(signers_set); + mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer = signers_set->next; + while (signer != NULL) { + prev = signer; + signer = signer->next; + pkcs7_free_signer_info(prev); + mbedtls_free(prev); + } + signers_set->next = NULL; + return ret; +} + +/** + * SignedData ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version, + * digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers, + * contentInfo ContentInfo, + * certificates + * [0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificatesAndCertificates + * OPTIONAL, + * crls + * [0] IMPLICIT CertificateRevocationLists OPTIONAL, + * signerInfos SignerInfos } + */ +static int pkcs7_get_signed_data(unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, + mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data *signed_data) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + unsigned char *end = buf + buflen; + unsigned char *end_content_info = NULL; + size_t len = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED + | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + if (p + len != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + /* Get version of signed data */ + ret = pkcs7_get_version(&p, end, &signed_data->version); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Get digest algorithm */ + ret = pkcs7_get_digest_algorithm_set(&p, end, + &signed_data->digest_alg_identifiers); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg(&signed_data->digest_alg_identifiers, &md_alg); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_ALG; + } + + mbedtls_pkcs7_buf content_type; + memset(&content_type, 0, sizeof(content_type)); + ret = pkcs7_get_content_info_type(&p, end, &end_content_info, &content_type); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_DATA, &content_type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO; + } + + if (p != end_content_info) { + /* Determine if valid content is present */ + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, + end_content_info, + &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO, ret); + } + p += len; + if (p != end_content_info) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO, ret); + } + /* Valid content is present - this is not supported */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + /* Look for certificates, there may or may not be any */ + mbedtls_x509_crt_init(&signed_data->certs); + ret = pkcs7_get_certificates(&p, end, &signed_data->certs); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + + signed_data->no_of_certs = ret; + + /* + * Currently CRLs are not supported. If CRL exist, the parsing will fail + * at next step of getting signers info and return error as invalid + * signer info. + */ + + signed_data->no_of_crls = 0; + + /* Get signers info */ + ret = pkcs7_get_signers_info_set(&p, + end, + &signed_data->signers, + &signed_data->digest_alg_identifiers); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + + signed_data->no_of_signers = ret; + + /* Don't permit trailing data */ + if (p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_pkcs7_parse_der(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7, const unsigned char *buf, + const size_t buflen) +{ + unsigned char *p; + unsigned char *end; + size_t len = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (pkcs7 == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* make an internal copy of the buffer for parsing */ + pkcs7->raw.p = p = mbedtls_calloc(1, buflen); + if (pkcs7->raw.p == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto out; + } + memcpy(p, buf, buflen); + pkcs7->raw.len = buflen; + end = p + buflen; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED + | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + if (ret != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + goto out; + } + + if ((size_t) (end - p) != len) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto out; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { + goto out; + } + p = pkcs7->raw.p; + len = buflen; + goto try_data; + } + + if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA, p, len)) { + /* OID is not MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA, which is the only supported feature */ + if (!MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_DATA, p, len) + || !MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA, p, len) + || !MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA, p, len) + || !MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_AND_ENVELOPED_DATA, p, len) + || !MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA, p, len)) { + /* OID is valid according to the spec, but unsupported */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } else { + /* OID is invalid according to the spec */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + goto out; + } + + p += len; + + ret = pkcs7_get_next_content_len(&p, end, &len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + /* ensure no extra/missing data */ + if (p + len != end) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto out; + } + +try_data: + ret = pkcs7_get_signed_data(p, len, &pkcs7->signed_data); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + ret = MBEDTLS_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA; + +out: + if (ret < 0) { + mbedtls_pkcs7_free(pkcs7); + } + + return ret; +} + +static int mbedtls_pkcs7_data_or_hash_verify(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7, + const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + const unsigned char *data, + size_t datalen, + const int is_data_hash) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *hash; + mbedtls_pk_context pk_cxt = cert->pk; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer; + + if (pkcs7->signed_data.no_of_signers == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CERT; + } + + if (mbedtls_x509_time_is_past(&cert->valid_to) || + mbedtls_x509_time_is_future(&cert->valid_from)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_CERT_DATE_INVALID; + } + + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg(&pkcs7->signed_data.digest_alg_identifiers, &md_alg); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL; + } + + hash = mbedtls_calloc(mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info), 1); + if (hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + /* BEGIN must free hash before jumping out */ + if (is_data_hash) { + if (datalen != mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info)) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL; + } else { + memcpy(hash, data, datalen); + } + } else { + ret = mbedtls_md(md_info, data, datalen, hash); + } + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_free(hash); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL; + } + + /* assume failure */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL; + + /* + * Potential TODOs + * Currently we iterate over all signers and return success if any of them + * verify. + * + * However, we could make this better by checking against the certificate's + * identification and SignerIdentifier fields first. That would also allow + * us to distinguish between 'no signature for key' and 'signature for key + * failed to validate'. + */ + for (signer = &pkcs7->signed_data.signers; signer; signer = signer->next) { + ret = mbedtls_pk_verify(&pk_cxt, md_alg, hash, + mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info), + signer->sig.p, signer->sig.len); + + if (ret == 0) { + break; + } + } + + mbedtls_free(hash); + /* END must free hash before jumping out */ + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data_verify(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7, + const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + const unsigned char *data, + size_t datalen) +{ + if (data == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + return mbedtls_pkcs7_data_or_hash_verify(pkcs7, cert, data, datalen, 0); +} + +int mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_hash_verify(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7, + const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + const unsigned char *hash, + size_t hashlen) +{ + if (hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + return mbedtls_pkcs7_data_or_hash_verify(pkcs7, cert, hash, hashlen, 1); +} + +/* + * Unallocate all pkcs7 data + */ +void mbedtls_pkcs7_free(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7) +{ + mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer_cur; + mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer_prev; + + if (pkcs7 == NULL || pkcs7->raw.p == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_free(pkcs7->raw.p); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(&pkcs7->signed_data.certs); + mbedtls_x509_crl_free(&pkcs7->signed_data.crl); + + signer_cur = pkcs7->signed_data.signers.next; + pkcs7_free_signer_info(&pkcs7->signed_data.signers); + while (signer_cur != NULL) { + signer_prev = signer_cur; + signer_cur = signer_prev->next; + pkcs7_free_signer_info(signer_prev); + mbedtls_free(signer_prev); + } + + pkcs7->raw.p = NULL; +} + +#endif diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c index 76fe0c81e4..4f6ee13986 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * Public Key layer for parsing key files and structures * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" @@ -25,19 +13,25 @@ #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "pk_internal.h" #include +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif + +/* Key types */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "rsa_internal.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) -#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" -#endif + +/* Extended formats */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) #include "mbedtls/pem.h" #endif @@ -48,175 +42,55 @@ #include "mbedtls/pkcs12.h" #endif -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" - -/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ -#define PK_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define PK_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) -/* - * Load all data from a file into a given buffer. +/*********************************************************************** * - * The file is expected to contain either PEM or DER encoded data. - * A terminating null byte is always appended. It is included in the announced - * length only if the data looks like it is PEM encoded. - */ -int mbedtls_pk_load_file(const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n) -{ - FILE *f; - long size; - - PK_VALIDATE_RET(path != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(n != NULL); - - if ((f = fopen(path, "rb")) == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR; - } - - fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END); - if ((size = ftell(f)) == -1) { - fclose(f); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR; - } - fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET); - - *n = (size_t) size; - - if (*n + 1 == 0 || - (*buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, *n + 1)) == NULL) { - fclose(f); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED; - } - - if (fread(*buf, 1, *n, f) != *n) { - fclose(f); - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(*buf, *n); - mbedtls_free(*buf); - - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR; - } - - fclose(f); - - (*buf)[*n] = '\0'; - - if (strstr((const char *) *buf, "-----BEGIN ") != NULL) { - ++*n; - } + * Low-level ECC parsing: optional support for SpecifiedECDomain + * + * There are two functions here that are used by the rest of the code: + * - pk_ecc_tag_is_speficied_ec_domain() + * - pk_ecc_group_id_from_specified() + * + * All the other functions are internal to this section. + * + * The two "public" functions have a dummy variant provided + * in configs without MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED. This acts as an + * abstraction layer for this macro, which should not appear outside + * this section. + * + **********************************************************************/ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED) +/* See the "real" version for documentation */ +static int pk_ecc_tag_is_specified_ec_domain(int tag) +{ + (void) tag; return 0; } -/* - * Load and parse a private key - */ -int mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, - const char *path, const char *pwd) +/* See the "real" version for documentation */ +static int pk_ecc_group_id_from_specified(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t n; - unsigned char *buf; - - PK_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(path != NULL); - - if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file(path, &buf, &n)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - if (pwd == NULL) { - ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key(ctx, buf, n, NULL, 0); - } else { - ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key(ctx, buf, n, - (const unsigned char *) pwd, strlen(pwd)); - } - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, n); - mbedtls_free(buf); - - return ret; + (void) params; + (void) grp_id; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } - +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED */ /* - * Load and parse a public key - */ -int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const char *path) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t n; - unsigned char *buf; - - PK_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(path != NULL); - - if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file(path, &buf, &n)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(ctx, buf, n); - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, n); - mbedtls_free(buf); - - return ret; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -/* Minimally parse an ECParameters buffer to and mbedtls_asn1_buf - * - * ECParameters ::= CHOICE { - * namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER - * specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain -- = SEQUENCE { ... } - * -- implicitCurve NULL - * } + * Tell if the passed tag might be the start of SpecifiedECDomain + * (that is, a sequence). */ -static int pk_get_ecparams(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_asn1_buf *params) +static int pk_ecc_tag_is_specified_ec_domain(int tag) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - if (end - *p < 1) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA); - } - - /* Tag may be either OID or SEQUENCE */ - params->tag = **p; - if (params->tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED) - && params->tag != (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) -#endif - ) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG); - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, ¶ms->len, params->tag)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); - } - - params->p = *p; - *p += params->len; - - if (*p != end) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - } - - return 0; + return tag == (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED) /* * Parse a SpecifiedECDomain (SEC 1 C.2) and (mostly) fill the group with it. * WARNING: the resulting group should only be used with - * pk_group_id_from_specified(), since its base point may not be set correctly + * pk_ecc_group_id_from_specified(), since its base point may not be set correctly * if it was encoded compressed. * * SpecifiedECDomain ::= SEQUENCE { @@ -236,7 +110,7 @@ static int pk_group_from_specified(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_g { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p = params->p; - const unsigned char * const end = params->p + params->len; + const unsigned char *const end = params->p + params->len; const unsigned char *end_field, *end_curve; size_t len; int ver; @@ -408,7 +282,6 @@ static int pk_group_id_from_group(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_grou mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&grp->G.Y, 0) == mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&ref.G.Y, 0)) { break; } - } cleanup: @@ -426,8 +299,8 @@ static int pk_group_id_from_group(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_grou /* * Parse a SpecifiedECDomain (SEC 1 C.2) and find the associated group ID */ -static int pk_group_id_from_specified(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, - mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id) +static int pk_ecc_group_id_from_specified(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_group grp; @@ -441,12 +314,70 @@ static int pk_group_id_from_specified(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, ret = pk_group_id_from_group(&grp, grp_id); cleanup: - mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp); + /* The API respecting lifecycle for mbedtls_ecp_group struct is + * _init(), _load() and _free(). In pk_ecc_group_id_from_specified() the + * temporary grp breaks that flow and it's members are populated + * by pk_group_id_from_group(). As such mbedtls_ecp_group_free() + * which is assuming a group populated by _setup() may not clean-up + * properly -> Manually free it's members. + */ + mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp.N); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp.P); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp.A); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp.B); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&grp.G); return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED */ +/*********************************************************************** + * + * Unsorted (yet!) from this point on until the next section header + * + **********************************************************************/ + +/* Minimally parse an ECParameters buffer to and mbedtls_asn1_buf + * + * ECParameters ::= CHOICE { + * namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER + * specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain -- = SEQUENCE { ... } + * -- implicitCurve NULL + * } + */ +static int pk_get_ecparams(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_asn1_buf *params) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (end - *p < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA); + } + + /* Acceptable tags: OID for namedCurve, or specifiedECDomain */ + params->tag = **p; + if (params->tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID && + !pk_ecc_tag_is_specified_ec_domain(params->tag)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, ¶ms->len, params->tag)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + params->p = *p; + *p += params->len; + + if (*p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return 0; +} + /* * Use EC parameters to initialise an EC group * @@ -455,7 +386,7 @@ static int pk_group_id_from_specified(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, * specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain -- = SEQUENCE { ... } * -- implicitCurve NULL */ -static int pk_use_ecparams(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_group *grp) +static int pk_use_ecparams(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_pk_context *pk) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; @@ -465,116 +396,71 @@ static int pk_use_ecparams(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_group *gr return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE; } } else { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED) - if ((ret = pk_group_id_from_specified(params, &grp_id)) != 0) { + ret = pk_ecc_group_id_from_specified(params, &grp_id); + if (ret != 0) { return ret; } -#else - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; -#endif } - /* - * grp may already be initialized; if so, make sure IDs match - */ - if (grp->id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE && grp->id != grp_id) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(grp, grp_id)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - return 0; + return mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(pk, grp_id); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES) + /* - * EC public key is an EC point - * - * The caller is responsible for clearing the structure upon failure if - * desired. Take care to pass along the possible ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE - * return code of mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary() and leave p in a usable state. + * Load an RFC8410 EC key, which doesn't have any parameters */ -static int pk_get_ecpubkey(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key) +static int pk_use_ecparams_rfc8410(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&key->grp, &key->Q, - (const unsigned char *) *p, end - *p)) == 0) { - ret = mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(&key->grp, &key->Q); + if (params->tag != 0 || params->len != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; } - /* - * We know mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary consumed all bytes or failed - */ - *p = (unsigned char *) end; - - return ret; + return mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(pk, grp_id); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) /* - * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { - * modulus INTEGER, -- n - * publicExponent INTEGER -- e - * } + * Parse an RFC 8410 encoded private EC key + * + * CurvePrivateKey ::= OCTET STRING */ -static int pk_get_rsapubkey(unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa) +static int pk_parse_key_rfc8410_der(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, const unsigned char *end, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret); - } - - if (*p + len != end) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - } - - /* Import N */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret); - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(rsa, *p, len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, - NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY; - } - - *p += len; - - /* Import E */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret); + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&key, (key + keylen), &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); } - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, - NULL, 0, *p, len)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY; + if (key + len != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; } - *p += len; - - if (mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa) != 0 || - mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(rsa) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY; + /* + * Load the private key + */ + ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_key(pk, key, len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; } - if (*p != end) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + /* pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der() only supports version 1 PKCS8 keys, + * which never contain a public key. As such, derive the public key + * unconditionally. */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey_from_prv(pk, key, len, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { + return ret; } return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ /* Get a PK algorithm identifier * @@ -584,7 +470,8 @@ static int pk_get_rsapubkey(unsigned char **p, */ static int pk_get_pk_alg(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg, mbedtls_asn1_buf *params) + mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg, mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id *ec_grp_id) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_asn1_buf alg_oid; @@ -595,7 +482,18 @@ static int pk_get_pk_alg(unsigned char **p, return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG, ret); } - if (mbedtls_oid_get_pk_alg(&alg_oid, pk_alg) != 0) { + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_pk_alg(&alg_oid, pk_alg); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND) { + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp_algid(&alg_oid, ec_grp_id); + if (ret == 0) { + *pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY; + } + } +#else + (void) ec_grp_id; +#endif + if (ret != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG; } @@ -623,13 +521,9 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, size_t len; mbedtls_asn1_buf alg_params; mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_grp_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; - PK_VALIDATE_RET(p != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(*p != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(end != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(pk != NULL); - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); @@ -637,7 +531,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, end = *p + len; - if ((ret = pk_get_pk_alg(p, end, &pk_alg, &alg_params)) != 0) { + if ((ret = pk_get_pk_alg(p, end, &pk_alg, &alg_params, &ec_grp_id)) != 0) { return ret; } @@ -660,17 +554,35 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { - ret = pk_get_rsapubkey(p, end, mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk)); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), *p, (size_t) (end - *p)); + if (ret == 0) { + /* On success all the input has been consumed by the parsing function. */ + *p += end - *p; + } else if ((ret <= MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA) && + (ret >= MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL)) { + /* In case of ASN1 error codes add MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY. */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret); + } else { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY; + } } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH || pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) { - ret = pk_use_ecparams(&alg_params, &mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk)->grp); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES) + if (MBEDTLS_PK_IS_RFC8410_GROUP_ID(ec_grp_id)) { + ret = pk_use_ecparams_rfc8410(&alg_params, ec_grp_id, pk); + } else +#endif + { + ret = pk_use_ecparams(&alg_params, pk); + } if (ret == 0) { - ret = pk_get_ecpubkey(p, end, mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk)); + ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey(pk, *p, (size_t) (end - *p)); + *p += end - *p; } } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG; if (ret == 0 && *p != end) { @@ -685,208 +597,20 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, return ret; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -/* - * Wrapper around mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi() that rejects zero. - * - * The value zero is: - * - never a valid value for an RSA parameter - * - interpreted as "omitted, please reconstruct" by mbedtls_rsa_complete(). - * - * Since values can't be omitted in PKCS#1, passing a zero value to - * rsa_complete() would be incorrect, so reject zero values early. - */ -static int asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_mpi *X) -{ - int ret; - - ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(p, end, X); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(X, 0) == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; - } - - return 0; -} - -/* - * Parse a PKCS#1 encoded private RSA key - */ -static int pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, - const unsigned char *key, - size_t keylen) -{ - int ret, version; - size_t len; - unsigned char *p, *end; - - mbedtls_mpi T; - mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); - - p = (unsigned char *) key; - end = p + keylen; - - /* - * This function parses the RSAPrivateKey (PKCS#1) - * - * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { - * version Version, - * modulus INTEGER, -- n - * publicExponent INTEGER, -- e - * privateExponent INTEGER, -- d - * prime1 INTEGER, -- p - * prime2 INTEGER, -- q - * exponent1 INTEGER, -- d mod (p-1) - * exponent2 INTEGER, -- d mod (q-1) - * coefficient INTEGER, -- (inverse of q) mod p - * otherPrimeInfos OtherPrimeInfos OPTIONAL - * } - */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); - } - - end = p + len; - - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, &version)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); - } - - if (version != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION; - } - - /* Import N */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, - NULL, NULL)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - - /* Import E */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, - NULL, &T)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - - /* Import D */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, - &T, NULL)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - - /* Import P */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL, - NULL, NULL)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - - /* Import Q */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T, - NULL, NULL)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) - /* - * The RSA CRT parameters DP, DQ and QP are nominally redundant, in - * that they can be easily recomputed from D, P and Q. However by - * parsing them from the PKCS1 structure it is possible to avoid - * recalculating them which both reduces the overhead of loading - * RSA private keys into memory and also avoids side channels which - * can arise when computing those values, since all of D, P, and Q - * are secret. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 for a - * description of one such attack. - */ - - /* Import DP */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->DP, &T)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - - /* Import DQ */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->DQ, &T)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - - /* Import QP */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->QP, &T)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - -#else - /* Verify existence of the CRT params */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } -#endif - - /* rsa_complete() doesn't complete anything with the default - * implementation but is still called: - * - for the benefit of alternative implementation that may want to - * pre-compute stuff beyond what's provided (eg Montgomery factors) - * - as is also sanity-checks the key - * - * Furthermore, we also check the public part for consistency with - * mbedtls_pk_parse_pubkey(), as it includes size minima for example. - */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(rsa)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - - if (p != end) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - } - -cleanup: - - mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); - - if (ret != 0) { - /* Wrap error code if it's coming from a lower level */ - if ((ret & 0xff80) == 0) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); - } else { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; - } - - mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa); - } - - return ret; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) /* * Parse a SEC1 encoded private EC key */ -static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck, - const unsigned char *key, - size_t keylen) +static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; int version, pubkey_done; - size_t len; - mbedtls_asn1_buf params; + size_t len, d_len; + mbedtls_asn1_buf params = { 0, 0, NULL }; unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) key; + unsigned char *d; unsigned char *end = p + keylen; unsigned char *end2; @@ -919,10 +643,10 @@ static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck, return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); } - if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&eck->d, p, len)) != 0) { - mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(eck); - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); - } + /* Keep a reference to the position fo the private key. It will be used + * later in this function. */ + d = p; + d_len = len; p += len; @@ -935,16 +659,22 @@ static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0)) == 0) { if ((ret = pk_get_ecparams(&p, p + len, ¶ms)) != 0 || - (ret = pk_use_ecparams(¶ms, &eck->grp)) != 0) { - mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(eck); + (ret = pk_use_ecparams(¶ms, pk)) != 0) { return ret; } } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { - mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(eck); return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); } } + /* + * Load the private key + */ + ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_key(pk, d, d_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + if (p != end) { /* * Is 'publickey' present? If not, or if we can't read it (eg because it @@ -964,11 +694,11 @@ static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck, MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); } - if ((ret = pk_get_ecpubkey(&p, end2, eck)) == 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey(pk, p, (size_t) (end2 - p))) == 0) { pubkey_done = 1; } else { /* - * The only acceptable failure mode of pk_get_ecpubkey() above + * The only acceptable failure mode of mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey() above * is if the point format is not recognized. */ if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) { @@ -976,26 +706,25 @@ static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck, } } } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { - mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(eck); return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); } } - if (!pubkey_done && - (ret = mbedtls_ecp_mul(&eck->grp, &eck->Q, &eck->d, &eck->grp.G, - NULL, NULL)) != 0) { - mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(eck); - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey(&eck->grp, &eck->d)) != 0) { - mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(eck); - return ret; + if (!pubkey_done) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey_from_prv(pk, d, d_len, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { + return ret; + } } return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +/*********************************************************************** + * + * PKCS#8 parsing functions + * + **********************************************************************/ /* * Parse an unencrypted PKCS#8 encoded private key @@ -1012,8 +741,8 @@ static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck, */ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, - const unsigned char *key, - size_t keylen) + const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { int ret, version; size_t len; @@ -1021,8 +750,14 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) key; unsigned char *end = p + keylen; mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_grp_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; +#endif + /* * This function parses the PrivateKeyInfo object (PKCS#8 v1.2 = RFC 5208) * @@ -1054,7 +789,7 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION, ret); } - if ((ret = pk_get_pk_alg(&p, end, &pk_alg, ¶ms)) != 0) { + if ((ret = pk_get_pk_alg(&p, end, &pk_alg, ¶ms, &ec_grp_id)) != 0) { return ret; } @@ -1077,23 +812,43 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { - if ((ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), p, len)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), p, len)) != 0) { mbedtls_pk_free(pk); return ret; } } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH) { - if ((ret = pk_use_ecparams(¶ms, &mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk)->grp)) != 0 || - (ret = pk_parse_key_sec1_der(mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk), p, len)) != 0) { - mbedtls_pk_free(pk); - return ret; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES) + if (MBEDTLS_PK_IS_RFC8410_GROUP_ID(ec_grp_id)) { + if ((ret = + pk_use_ecparams_rfc8410(¶ms, ec_grp_id, pk)) != 0 || + (ret = + pk_parse_key_rfc8410_der(pk, p, len, end, f_rng, + p_rng)) != 0) { + mbedtls_pk_free(pk); + return ret; + } + } else +#endif + { + if ((ret = pk_use_ecparams(¶ms, pk)) != 0 || + (ret = pk_parse_key_sec1_der(pk, p, len, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { + mbedtls_pk_free(pk); + return ret; + } } } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG; + end = p + len; + if (end != (key + keylen)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + return 0; } @@ -1107,20 +862,22 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( * */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) -static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, - const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen) + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { int ret, decrypted = 0; size_t len; unsigned char *buf; unsigned char *p, *end; mbedtls_asn1_buf pbe_alg_oid, pbe_params; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_alg; mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; #endif + size_t outlen = 0; p = key; end = p + keylen; @@ -1164,11 +921,11 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( /* * Decrypt EncryptedData with appropriate PBE */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) if (mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg(&pbe_alg_oid, &md_alg, &cipher_alg) == 0) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe(&pbe_params, MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT, - cipher_alg, md_alg, - pwd, pwdlen, p, len, buf)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(&pbe_params, MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT, + cipher_alg, md_alg, + pwd, pwdlen, p, len, buf, len, &outlen)) != 0) { if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH; } @@ -1176,29 +933,13 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( return ret; } - decrypted = 1; - } else if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128, &pbe_alg_oid) == 0) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_sha1_rc4_128(&pbe_params, - MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT, - pwd, pwdlen, - p, len, buf)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - // Best guess for password mismatch when using RC4. If first tag is - // not MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE - // - if (*buf != (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH; - } - decrypted = 1; } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBES2, &pbe_alg_oid) == 0) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2(&pbe_params, MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT, pwd, pwdlen, - p, len, buf)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(&pbe_params, MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT, pwd, pwdlen, + p, len, buf, len, &outlen)) != 0) { if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH; } @@ -1208,7 +949,7 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( decrypted = 1; } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ { ((void) pwd); } @@ -1216,17 +957,23 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( if (decrypted == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } - - return pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der(pk, buf, len); + return pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der(pk, buf, outlen, f_rng, p_rng); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C || MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ +/*********************************************************************** + * + * Top-level functions, with format auto-discovery + * + **********************************************************************/ + /* * Parse a private key */ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, - const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen) + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; @@ -1235,13 +982,9 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_pem_context pem; #endif - (void) pk_info; - - PK_VALIDATE_RET(pk != NULL); if (keylen == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; } - PK_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) mbedtls_pem_init(&pem); @@ -1252,16 +995,15 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; } else { ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem, - "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----", - "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----", + PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA, PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA, key, pwd, pwdlen, &len); } if (ret == 0) { pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA); if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, pk_info)) != 0 || - (ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), - pem.buf, pem.buflen)) != 0) { + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), + pem.buf, pem.buflen)) != 0) { mbedtls_pk_free(pk); } @@ -1276,22 +1018,23 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ if (key[keylen - 1] != '\0') { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; } else { ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem, - "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----", - "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----", + PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_EC, + PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_EC, key, pwd, pwdlen, &len); } if (ret == 0) { pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY); if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, pk_info)) != 0 || - (ret = pk_parse_key_sec1_der(mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk), - pem.buf, pem.buflen)) != 0) { + (ret = pk_parse_key_sec1_der(pk, + pem.buf, pem.buflen, + f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { mbedtls_pk_free(pk); } @@ -1304,20 +1047,19 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT) { return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ if (key[keylen - 1] != '\0') { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; } else { ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem, - "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----", - "-----END PRIVATE KEY-----", + PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8, PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8, key, NULL, 0, &len); } if (ret == 0) { if ((ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der(pk, - pem.buf, pem.buflen)) != 0) { + pem.buf, pem.buflen, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { mbedtls_pk_free(pk); } @@ -1333,14 +1075,13 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; } else { ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem, - "-----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----", - "-----END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----", + PEM_BEGIN_ENCRYPTED_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8, + PEM_END_ENCRYPTED_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8, key, NULL, 0, &len); } if (ret == 0) { - if ((ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der(pk, - pem.buf, pem.buflen, - pwd, pwdlen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der(pk, pem.buf, pem.buflen, + pwd, pwdlen, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { mbedtls_pk_free(pk); } @@ -1363,7 +1104,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, * error */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) - { + if (pwdlen != 0) { unsigned char *key_copy; if ((key_copy = mbedtls_calloc(1, keylen)) == NULL) { @@ -1372,11 +1113,10 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, memcpy(key_copy, key, keylen); - ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der(pk, key_copy, keylen, - pwd, pwdlen); + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der(pk, key_copy, keylen, + pwd, pwdlen, f_rng, p_rng); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(key_copy, keylen); - mbedtls_free(key_copy); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(key_copy, keylen); } if (ret == 0) { @@ -1391,7 +1131,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C || MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ - ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der(pk, key, keylen); + ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der(pk, key, keylen, f_rng, p_rng); if (ret == 0) { return 0; } @@ -1403,7 +1143,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA); if (mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, pk_info) == 0 && - pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), key, keylen) == 0) { + mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), key, keylen) == 0) { return 0; } @@ -1411,21 +1151,21 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_pk_init(pk); #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY); if (mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, pk_info) == 0 && - pk_parse_key_sec1_der(mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk), - key, keylen) == 0) { + pk_parse_key_sec1_der(pk, + key, keylen, f_rng, p_rng) == 0) { return 0; } mbedtls_pk_free(pk); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ - /* If MBEDTLS_RSA_C is defined but MBEDTLS_ECP_C isn't, + /* If MBEDTLS_RSA_C is defined but MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS isn't, * it is ok to leave the PK context initialized but not * freed: It is the caller's responsibility to call pk_init() * before calling this function, and to call pk_free() - * when it fails. If MBEDTLS_ECP_C is defined but MBEDTLS_RSA_C + * when it fails. If MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS is defined but MBEDTLS_RSA_C * isn't, this leads to mbedtls_pk_free() being called * twice, once here and once by the caller, but this is * also ok and in line with the mbedtls_pk_free() calls @@ -1450,11 +1190,9 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pem_context pem; #endif - PK_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); if (keylen == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; } - PK_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL || keylen == 0); #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) mbedtls_pem_init(&pem); @@ -1464,8 +1202,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; } else { ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem, - "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----", - "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----", + PEM_BEGIN_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA, PEM_END_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA, key, NULL, 0, &len); } @@ -1481,7 +1218,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, return ret; } - if ((ret = pk_get_rsapubkey(&p, p + pem.buflen, mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx))) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx), p, pem.buflen)) != 0) { mbedtls_pk_free(ctx); } @@ -1498,8 +1235,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; } else { ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem, - "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----", - "-----END PUBLIC KEY-----", + PEM_BEGIN_PUBLIC_KEY, PEM_END_PUBLIC_KEY, key, NULL, 0, &len); } @@ -1509,7 +1245,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, */ p = pem.buf; - ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(&p, p + pem.buflen, ctx); + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(&p, p + pem.buflen, ctx); mbedtls_pem_free(&pem); return ret; } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT) { @@ -1529,13 +1265,12 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, } p = (unsigned char *) key; - ret = pk_get_rsapubkey(&p, p + keylen, mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx)); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx), p, keylen); if (ret == 0) { return ret; } mbedtls_pk_free(ctx); - if (ret != (MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG))) { + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ @@ -1546,4 +1281,112 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, return ret; } +/*********************************************************************** + * + * Top-level functions, with filesystem support + * + **********************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/* + * Load all data from a file into a given buffer. + * + * The file is expected to contain either PEM or DER encoded data. + * A terminating null byte is always appended. It is included in the announced + * length only if the data looks like it is PEM encoded. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_load_file(const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n) +{ + FILE *f; + long size; + + if ((f = fopen(path, "rb")) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } + + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL); + + fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END); + if ((size = ftell(f)) == -1) { + fclose(f); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } + fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET); + + *n = (size_t) size; + + if (*n + 1 == 0 || + (*buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, *n + 1)) == NULL) { + fclose(f); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + if (fread(*buf, 1, *n, f) != *n) { + fclose(f); + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(*buf, *n); + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } + + fclose(f); + + (*buf)[*n] = '\0'; + + if (strstr((const char *) *buf, "-----BEGIN ") != NULL) { + ++*n; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Load and parse a private key + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const char *path, const char *pwd, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + unsigned char *buf; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file(path, &buf, &n)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (pwd == NULL) { + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key(ctx, buf, n, NULL, 0, f_rng, p_rng); + } else { + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key(ctx, buf, n, + (const unsigned char *) pwd, strlen(pwd), f_rng, p_rng); + } + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, n); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Load and parse a public key + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const char *path) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + unsigned char *buf; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file(path, &buf, &n)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(ctx, buf, n); + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, n); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.c index 88e685503b..5e009c565e 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * Public Key layer for writing key files and structures * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" @@ -26,96 +14,128 @@ #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "pk_internal.h" #include -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" -#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) -#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +#include "pk_internal.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +#include "pkwrite.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) #include "mbedtls/pem.h" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "rsa_internal.h" +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #include "psa/crypto.h" -#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" #endif #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ -#define PK_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define PK_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) +/* Helpers for properly sizing buffers aimed at holding public keys or + * key-pairs based on build symbols. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +#define PK_MAX_EC_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE +#define PK_MAX_EC_KEY_PAIR_SIZE MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_KEY_PAIR_LENGTH +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#define PK_MAX_EC_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE +#define PK_MAX_EC_KEY_PAIR_SIZE MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_KEY_PAIR_LENGTH +#else +#define PK_MAX_EC_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN +#define PK_MAX_EC_KEY_PAIR_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES +#endif +/****************************************************************************** + * Internal functions for RSA keys. + ******************************************************************************/ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -/* - * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { - * modulus INTEGER, -- n - * publicExponent INTEGER -- e - * } - */ -static int pk_write_rsa_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa) +static int pk_write_rsa_der(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *buf, + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t len = 0; - mbedtls_mpi T; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + uint8_t tmp[PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t len = 0, tmp_len = 0; - mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); + if (psa_export_key(pk->priv_id, tmp, sizeof(tmp), &tmp_len) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + *p -= tmp_len; + memcpy(*p, tmp, tmp_len); + len += tmp_len; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); - /* Export E */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; + return (int) len; } - len += ret; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + return mbedtls_rsa_write_key(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), buf, p); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ - /* Export N */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; +/****************************************************************************** + * Internal functions for EC keys. + ******************************************************************************/ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +static int pk_write_ec_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + size_t len = 0; + uint8_t buf[PK_MAX_EC_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]; -end_of_export: + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + if (psa_export_public_key(pk->priv_id, buf, sizeof(buf), &len) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } else { + len = pk->pub_raw_len; + memcpy(buf, pk->pub_raw, len); + } - mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); - if (ret < 0) { - return ret; + if (*p < start || (size_t) (*p - start) < len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; } - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + *p -= len; + memcpy(*p, buf, len); return (int) len; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -/* - * EC public key is an EC point - */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ static int pk_write_ec_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec) + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; - unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN]; + unsigned char buf[PK_MAX_EC_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk); + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ec->grp, &ec->Q, - MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, - &len, buf, sizeof(buf))) != 0) { - return ret; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + if (psa_export_public_key(pk->priv_id, buf, sizeof(buf), &len) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + *p -= len; + memcpy(*p, buf, len); + return (int) len; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ec->grp, &ec->Q, + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + &len, buf, sizeof(buf))) != 0) { + return ret; + } } if (*p < start || (size_t) (*p - start) < len) { @@ -127,6 +147,72 @@ static int pk_write_ec_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, return (int) len; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + +/* + * privateKey OCTET STRING -- always of length ceil(log2(n)/8) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +static int pk_write_ec_private(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + size_t byte_length; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char tmp[PK_MAX_EC_KEY_PAIR_SIZE]; + psa_status_t status; + + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + status = psa_export_key(pk->priv_id, tmp, sizeof(tmp), &byte_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + return ret; + } + } else { + status = psa_export_key(pk->priv_id, tmp, sizeof(tmp), &byte_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + } + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string(p, start, tmp, byte_length); +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + return ret; +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +static int pk_write_ec_private(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + size_t byte_length; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char tmp[PK_MAX_EC_KEY_PAIR_SIZE]; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status; + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + status = psa_export_key(pk->priv_id, tmp, sizeof(tmp), &byte_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + return ret; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pk); + byte_length = (ec->grp.pbits + 7) / 8; + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_write_key_ext(ec, &byte_length, tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string(p, start, tmp, byte_length); +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ /* * ECParameters ::= CHOICE { @@ -134,14 +220,14 @@ static int pk_write_ec_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, * } */ static int pk_write_ec_param(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec) + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; const char *oid; size_t oid_len; - if ((ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp(ec->grp.id, &oid, &oid_len)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp(grp_id, &oid, &oid_len)) != 0) { return ret; } @@ -150,71 +236,197 @@ static int pk_write_ec_param(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, return (int) len; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES) /* - * privateKey OCTET STRING -- always of length ceil(log2(n)/8) + * RFC8410 section 7 + * + * OneAsymmetricKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version, + * privateKeyAlgorithm PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier, + * privateKey PrivateKey, + * attributes [0] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL, + * ..., + * [[2: publicKey [1] IMPLICIT PublicKey OPTIONAL ]], + * ... + * } + * ... + * CurvePrivateKey ::= OCTET STRING */ -static int pk_write_ec_private(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec) +static int pk_write_ec_rfc8410_der(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *buf, + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t byte_length = (ec->grp.pbits + 7) / 8; - unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + size_t len = 0; + size_t oid_len = 0; + const char *oid; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; - ret = mbedtls_ecp_write_key(ec, tmp, byte_length); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; + /* privateKey */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, pk_write_ec_private(p, buf, pk)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)); + + grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk); + /* privateKeyAlgorithm */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp_algid(grp_id, &oid, &oid_len)) != 0) { + return ret; } - ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string(p, start, tmp, byte_length); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier_ext(p, buf, oid, oid_len, 0, 0)); -exit: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, byte_length); - return ret; + /* version */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int(p, buf, 0)); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + return (int) len; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES */ + +/* + * RFC 5915, or SEC1 Appendix C.4 + * + * ECPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version INTEGER { ecPrivkeyVer1(1) } (ecPrivkeyVer1), + * privateKey OCTET STRING, + * parameters [0] ECParameters {{ NamedCurve }} OPTIONAL, + * publicKey [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL + * } + */ +static int pk_write_ec_der(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *buf, + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + size_t len = 0; + int ret; + size_t pub_len = 0, par_len = 0; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; + + /* publicKey */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, pk_write_ec_pubkey(p, buf, pk)); + + if (*p - buf < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + (*p)--; + **p = 0; + pub_len += 1; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, buf, pub_len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING)); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, buf, pub_len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 1)); + len += pub_len; + + /* parameters */ + grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(par_len, pk_write_ec_param(p, buf, grp_id)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(par_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, buf, par_len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(par_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0)); + len += par_len; + + /* privateKey */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, pk_write_ec_private(p, buf, pk)); + + /* version */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int(p, buf, 1)); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + return (int) len; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +/****************************************************************************** + * Internal functions for Opaque keys. + ******************************************************************************/ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static int pk_write_opaque_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + size_t buffer_size; + size_t len = 0; + + if (*p < start) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + buffer_size = (size_t) (*p - start); + if (psa_export_public_key(pk->priv_id, start, buffer_size, + &len) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + *p -= len; + memmove(*p, start, len); + + return (int) len; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +/****************************************************************************** + * Generic helpers + ******************************************************************************/ + +/* Extend the public mbedtls_pk_get_type() by getting key type also in case of + * opaque keys. */ +static mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_get_type_ext(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (pk_type == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + psa_key_attributes_t opaque_attrs = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t opaque_key_type; + + if (psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &opaque_attrs) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + } + opaque_key_type = psa_get_key_type(&opaque_attrs); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&opaque_attrs); + + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(opaque_key_type)) { + return MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY; + } else if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(opaque_key_type)) { + return MBEDTLS_PK_RSA; + } else { + return MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + } + } else +#endif + return pk_type; +} + +/****************************************************************************** + * Public functions for writing private/public DER keys. + ******************************************************************************/ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const mbedtls_pk_context *key) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; - (void) p; - (void) start; - (void) key; - (void) ret; - - PK_VALIDATE_RET(p != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(*p != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(start != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, pk_write_rsa_pubkey(p, start, mbedtls_pk_rsa(*key))); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*key), start, p)); } else #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) { - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, pk_write_ec_pubkey(p, start, mbedtls_pk_ec(*key))); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, pk_write_ec_pubkey(p, start, key)); } else #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { - size_t buffer_size; - psa_key_id_t *key_id = (psa_key_id_t *) key->pk_ctx; - - if (*p < start) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - buffer_size = (size_t) (*p - start); - if (psa_export_public_key(*key_id, start, buffer_size, &len) - != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } else { - *p -= len; - memmove(*p, start, len); - } + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, pk_write_opaque_pubkey(p, start, key)); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; @@ -222,19 +434,18 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, return (int) len; } -int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size) +int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(const mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *c; - size_t len = 0, par_len = 0, oid_len; + int has_par = 1; + size_t len = 0, par_len = 0, oid_len = 0; mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type; - const char *oid; + const char *oid = NULL; - PK_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); if (size == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; } - PK_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); c = buf + size; @@ -255,55 +466,33 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, siz MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING)); - pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type(key); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - if (pk_type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) { - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(par_len, pk_write_ec_param(&c, buf, mbedtls_pk_ec(*key))); - } -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - if (pk_type == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { - psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; - psa_key_type_t key_type; - psa_key_id_t key_id; - psa_ecc_family_t curve; - size_t bits; - - key_id = *((psa_key_id_t *) key->pk_ctx); - if (PSA_SUCCESS != psa_get_key_attributes(key_id, &attributes)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } - key_type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes); - bits = psa_get_key_bits(&attributes); - psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); - - curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(key_type); - if (curve == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + pk_type = pk_get_type_ext(key); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + if (pk_get_type_ext(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) { + mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(key); + if (MBEDTLS_PK_IS_RFC8410_GROUP_ID(ec_grp_id)) { + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp_algid(ec_grp_id, &oid, &oid_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + has_par = 0; + } else { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(par_len, pk_write_ec_param(&c, buf, ec_grp_id)); } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ - ret = mbedtls_psa_get_ecc_oid_from_id(curve, bits, &oid, &oid_len); + /* At this point oid_len is not null only for EC Montgomery keys. */ + if (oid_len == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg(pk_type, &oid, &oid_len); if (ret != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + return ret; } - - /* Write EC algorithm parameters; that's akin - * to pk_write_ec_param() above. */ - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(par_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_oid(&c, buf, - oid, oid_len)); - - /* The rest of the function works as for legacy EC contexts. */ - pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - - if ((ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg(pk_type, &oid, - &oid_len)) != 0) { - return ret; } - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier(&c, buf, oid, oid_len, - par_len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier_ext(&c, buf, oid, oid_len, + par_len, has_par)); MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | @@ -312,320 +501,120 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, siz return (int) len; } -int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size) +int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(const mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *c; - size_t len = 0; - (void) ret; - (void) c; - (void) key; - - PK_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); if (size == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; } - PK_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL); c = buf + size; #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { - mbedtls_mpi T; /* Temporary holding the exported parameters */ - mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa(*key); - - /* - * Export the parameters one after another to avoid simultaneous copies. - */ - - mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); - - /* Export QP */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(&c, buf, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export DQ */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(&c, buf, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export DP */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(&c, buf, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export Q */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, - &T, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(&c, buf, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export P */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, &T, - NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(&c, buf, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export D */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, - NULL, &T, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(&c, buf, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export E */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, - NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(&c, buf, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export N */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, &T, NULL, - NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(&c, buf, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - -end_of_export: - - mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); - if (ret < 0) { - return ret; - } - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int(&c, buf, 0)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, - buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + if (pk_get_type_ext(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { + return pk_write_rsa_der(&c, buf, key); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) { - mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec(*key); - size_t pub_len = 0, par_len = 0; - - /* - * RFC 5915, or SEC1 Appendix C.4 - * - * ECPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { - * version INTEGER { ecPrivkeyVer1(1) } (ecPrivkeyVer1), - * privateKey OCTET STRING, - * parameters [0] ECParameters {{ NamedCurve }} OPTIONAL, - * publicKey [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL - * } - */ - - /* publicKey */ - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, pk_write_ec_pubkey(&c, buf, ec)); - - if (c - buf < 1) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + if (pk_get_type_ext(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES) + if (mbedtls_pk_is_rfc8410(key)) { + return pk_write_ec_rfc8410_der(&c, buf, key); } - *--c = 0; - pub_len += 1; - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, pub_len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING)); - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, pub_len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 1)); - len += pub_len; - - /* parameters */ - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(par_len, pk_write_ec_param(&c, buf, ec)); - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(par_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, par_len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(par_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0)); - len += par_len; - - /* privateKey */ - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, pk_write_ec_private(&c, buf, ec)); - - /* version */ - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int(&c, buf, 1)); - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES */ + return pk_write_ec_der(&c, buf, key); } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - - return (int) len; } +/****************************************************************************** + * Public functions for wrinting private/public PEM keys. + ******************************************************************************/ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) -#define PEM_BEGIN_PUBLIC_KEY "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\n" -#define PEM_END_PUBLIC_KEY "-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n" - -#define PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n" -#define PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n" -#define PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_EC "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\n" -#define PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_EC "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----\n" - -/* - * Max sizes of key per types. Shown as tag + len (+ content). - */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -/* - * RSA public keys: - * SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 3 - * algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, 1 + 1 (sequence) - * + 1 + 1 + 9 (rsa oid) - * + 1 + 1 (params null) - * subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } 1 + 3 + (1 + below) - * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 3 - * modulus INTEGER, -- n 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 - * publicExponent INTEGER -- e 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 - * } - */ -#define RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES (38 + 2 * MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE) - -/* - * RSA private keys: - * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 3 - * version Version, 1 + 1 + 1 - * modulus INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 - * publicExponent INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 - * privateExponent INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 - * prime1 INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 - * prime2 INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 - * exponent1 INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 - * exponent2 INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 - * coefficient INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 - * otherPrimeInfos OtherPrimeInfos OPTIONAL 0 (not supported) - * } - */ -#define MPI_MAX_SIZE_2 (MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE / 2 + \ - MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE % 2) -#define RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES (47 + 3 * MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE \ - + 5 * MPI_MAX_SIZE_2) - -#else /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ - -#define RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES 0 -#define RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES 0 - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -/* - * EC public keys: - * SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 2 - * algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, 1 + 1 (sequence) - * + 1 + 1 + 7 (ec oid) - * + 1 + 1 + 9 (namedCurve oid) - * subjectPublicKey BIT STRING 1 + 2 + 1 [1] - * + 1 (point format) [1] - * + 2 * ECP_MAX (coords) [1] - * } - */ -#define ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES (30 + 2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES) - -/* - * EC private keys: - * ECPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 2 - * version INTEGER , 1 + 1 + 1 - * privateKey OCTET STRING, 1 + 1 + ECP_MAX - * parameters [0] ECParameters OPTIONAL, 1 + 1 + (1 + 1 + 9) - * publicKey [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL 1 + 2 + [1] above - * } - */ -#define ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES (29 + 3 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES) - -#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ - -#define ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES 0 -#define ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES 0 - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +#define PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES \ + (MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES > MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES ? \ + MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES : MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES) +#define PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES \ + (MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES > MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES ? \ + MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES : MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES) -#define PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES (RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES > ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES ? \ - RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES : ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES) -#define PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES (RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES > ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES ? \ - RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES : ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES) - -int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem(mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size) +int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem(const mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char output_buf[PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES]; + unsigned char *output_buf = NULL; + output_buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES); + if (output_buf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED; + } size_t olen = 0; - PK_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL || size == 0); - if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(key, output_buf, - sizeof(output_buf))) < 0) { - return ret; + PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES)) < 0) { + goto cleanup; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_pem_write_buffer(PEM_BEGIN_PUBLIC_KEY, PEM_END_PUBLIC_KEY, - output_buf + sizeof(output_buf) - ret, + if ((ret = mbedtls_pem_write_buffer(PEM_BEGIN_PUBLIC_KEY "\n", PEM_END_PUBLIC_KEY "\n", + output_buf + PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES - ret, ret, buf, size, &olen)) != 0) { - return ret; + goto cleanup; } - return 0; + ret = 0; +cleanup: + mbedtls_free(output_buf); + return ret; } -int mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem(mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size) +int mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem(const mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char output_buf[PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES]; + unsigned char *output_buf = NULL; + output_buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES); + if (output_buf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED; + } const char *begin, *end; size_t olen = 0; - PK_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - PK_VALIDATE_RET(buf != NULL || size == 0); - - if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(key, output_buf, sizeof(output_buf))) < 0) { - return ret; + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(key, output_buf, PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES)) < 0) { + goto cleanup; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { - begin = PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA; - end = PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA; + if (pk_get_type_ext(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { + begin = PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA "\n"; + end = PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA "\n"; } else #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) { - begin = PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_EC; - end = PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_EC; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + if (pk_get_type_ext(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) { + if (mbedtls_pk_is_rfc8410(key)) { + begin = PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8 "\n"; + end = PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8 "\n"; + } else { + begin = PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_EC "\n"; + end = PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_EC "\n"; + } } else -#endif - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + goto cleanup; + } if ((ret = mbedtls_pem_write_buffer(begin, end, - output_buf + sizeof(output_buf) - ret, + output_buf + PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES - ret, ret, buf, size, &olen)) != 0) { - return ret; + goto cleanup; } - return 0; + ret = 0; +cleanup: + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(output_buf, PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES); + return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..01dc3d2f0f --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/pkwrite.h @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +/** + * \file pkwrite.h + * + * \brief Internal defines shared by the PK write module + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_H +#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +/* + * Max sizes of key per types. Shown as tag + len (+ content). + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +/* + * RSA public keys: + * SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 3 + * algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, 1 + 1 (sequence) + * + 1 + 1 + 9 (rsa oid) + * + 1 + 1 (params null) + * subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } 1 + 3 + (1 + below) + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 3 + * modulus INTEGER, -- n 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 + * publicExponent INTEGER -- e 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 + * } + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES (38 + 2 * MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE) + +/* + * RSA private keys: + * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 3 + * version Version, 1 + 1 + 1 + * modulus INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 + * publicExponent INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 + * privateExponent INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 + * prime1 INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 + * prime2 INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 + * exponent1 INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 + * exponent2 INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 + * coefficient INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 + * otherPrimeInfos OtherPrimeInfos OPTIONAL 0 (not supported) + * } + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE_2 (MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE / 2 + \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE % 2) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES (47 + 3 * MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE \ + + 5 * MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE_2) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#define MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES 0 +#define MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES 0 + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + +/* Find the maximum number of bytes necessary to store an EC point. When USE_PSA + * is defined this means looking for the maximum between PSA and built-in + * supported curves. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_MAX_ECC_BYTES (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) > \ + MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ? \ + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) : \ + MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES) +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_MAX_ECC_BYTES MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +/* + * EC public keys: + * SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 2 + * algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, 1 + 1 (sequence) + * + 1 + 1 + 7 (ec oid) + * + 1 + 1 + 9 (namedCurve oid) + * subjectPublicKey BIT STRING 1 + 2 + 1 [1] + * + 1 (point format) [1] + * + 2 * ECP_MAX (coords) [1] + * } + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES (30 + 2 * MBEDTLS_PK_MAX_ECC_BYTES) + +/* + * EC private keys: + * ECPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 2 + * version INTEGER , 1 + 1 + 1 + * privateKey OCTET STRING, 1 + 1 + ECP_MAX + * parameters [0] ECParameters OPTIONAL, 1 + 1 + (1 + 1 + 9) + * publicKey [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL 1 + 2 + [1] above + * } + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES (29 + 3 * MBEDTLS_PK_MAX_ECC_BYTES) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +#define MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES 0 +#define MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES 0 + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +/* Define the maximum available public key DER length based on the supported + * key types (EC and/or RSA). */ +#if (MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES > MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_PUBKEY_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_PUBKEY_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/platform.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/platform.c index c8b0328d1d..890c4cbaba 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/platform.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/platform.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * Platform abstraction layer * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" @@ -226,6 +214,28 @@ int mbedtls_platform_set_fprintf(int (*fprintf_func)(FILE *, const char *, ...)) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SETBUF) +/* + * Make dummy function to prevent NULL pointer dereferences + */ +static void platform_setbuf_uninit(FILE *stream, char *buf) +{ + ((void) stream); + ((void) buf); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SETBUF platform_setbuf_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SETBUF */ +void (*mbedtls_setbuf)(FILE *stream, char *buf) = MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SETBUF; + +int mbedtls_platform_set_setbuf(void (*setbuf_func)(FILE *stream, char *buf)) +{ + mbedtls_setbuf = setbuf_func; + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT) /* @@ -289,6 +299,9 @@ int mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read(unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len) return -1; } + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(file, NULL); + if ((n = fread(buf, 1, buf_len, file)) != buf_len) { fclose(file); mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, buf_len); @@ -308,6 +321,9 @@ int mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write(unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len) return -1; } + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(file, NULL); + if ((n = fwrite(buf, 1, buf_len, file)) != buf_len) { fclose(file); return -1; diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/platform_util.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/platform_util.c index 3783f0eb84..0741bf575e 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/platform_util.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/platform_util.c @@ -3,29 +3,23 @@ * library. * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * Ensure gmtime_r is available even with -std=c99; must be defined before - * config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h. Harmless on other platforms. + * mbedtls_config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h. Harmless on other platforms + * except OpenBSD, where it stops us accessing explicit_bzero. */ -#if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) +#if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && !defined(__OpenBSD__) #define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L #endif +#if !defined(_GNU_SOURCE) +/* Clang requires this to get support for explicit_bzero */ +#define _GNU_SOURCE +#endif + #include "common.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" @@ -33,11 +27,40 @@ #include "mbedtls/threading.h" #include + +#ifndef __STDC_WANT_LIB_EXT1__ +#define __STDC_WANT_LIB_EXT1__ 1 /* Ask for the C11 gmtime_s() and memset_s() if available */ +#endif #include +#if defined(_WIN32) +#include +#endif + +// Detect platforms known to support explicit_bzero() +#if defined(__GLIBC__) && (__GLIBC__ >= 2) && (__GLIBC_MINOR__ >= 25) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_EXPLICIT_BZERO 1 +#elif (defined(__FreeBSD__) && (__FreeBSD_version >= 1100037)) || defined(__OpenBSD__) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_EXPLICIT_BZERO 1 +#endif + #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT) + +#undef HAVE_MEMORY_SANITIZER +#if defined(__has_feature) +#if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) +#include +#define HAVE_MEMORY_SANITIZER +#endif +#endif + /* - * This implementation should never be optimized out by the compiler + * Where possible, we try to detect the presence of a platform-provided + * secure memset, such as explicit_bzero(), that is safe against being optimized + * out, and use that. + * + * For other platforms, we provide an implementation that aims not to be + * optimized out by the compiler. * * This implementation for mbedtls_platform_zeroize() was inspired from Colin * Percival's blog article at: @@ -52,36 +75,84 @@ * (refer to http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2014-09-05-erratum.html for * details), optimizations of the following form are still possible: * - * if( memset_func != memset ) - * memset_func( buf, 0, len ); + * if (memset_func != memset) + * memset_func(buf, 0, len); * * Note that it is extremely difficult to guarantee that - * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() will not be optimized out by aggressive compilers + * the memset() call will not be optimized out by aggressive compilers * in a portable way. For this reason, Mbed TLS also provides the configuration * option MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT, which allows users to configure * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() to use a suitable implementation for their * platform and needs. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_EXPLICIT_BZERO) && !(defined(__STDC_LIB_EXT1__) && \ + !defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)) \ + && !defined(_WIN32) static void *(*const volatile memset_func)(void *, int, size_t) = memset; +#endif void mbedtls_platform_zeroize(void *buf, size_t len) { - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(len == 0 || buf != NULL); - if (len > 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_EXPLICIT_BZERO) + explicit_bzero(buf, len); +#if defined(HAVE_MEMORY_SANITIZER) + /* You'd think that Msan would recognize explicit_bzero() as + * equivalent to bzero(), but it actually doesn't on several + * platforms, including Linux (Ubuntu 20.04). + * https://github.com/google/sanitizers/issues/1507 + * https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/74433a19bb6f4cef607680fa4d1d7d81ca3826aa + */ + __msan_unpoison(buf, len); +#endif +#elif defined(__STDC_LIB_EXT1__) && !defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) + memset_s(buf, len, 0, len); +#elif defined(_WIN32) + SecureZeroMemory(buf, len); +#else memset_func(buf, 0, len); +#endif + +#if defined(__GNUC__) + /* For clang and recent gcc, pretend that we have some assembly that reads the + * zero'd memory as an additional protection against being optimised away. */ +#if defined(__clang__) || (__GNUC__ >= 10) +#if defined(__clang__) +#pragma clang diagnostic push +#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wvla" +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) +#pragma GCC diagnostic push +#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wvla" +#endif + asm volatile ("" : : "m" (*(char (*)[len]) buf) :); +#if defined(__clang__) +#pragma clang diagnostic pop +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) +#pragma GCC diagnostic pop +#endif +#endif +#endif } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT */ +void mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(void *buf, size_t len) +{ + if (buf != NULL) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, len); + } + + mbedtls_free(buf); +} + #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT) #include #if !defined(_WIN32) && (defined(unix) || \ defined(__unix) || defined(__unix__) || (defined(__APPLE__) && \ - defined(__MACH__))) + defined(__MACH__)) || defined__midipix__) #include #endif /* !_WIN32 && (unix || __unix || __unix__ || - * (__APPLE__ && __MACH__)) */ + * (__APPLE__ && __MACH__) || __midipix__) */ #if !((defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L) || \ (defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS) && \ @@ -93,9 +164,10 @@ void mbedtls_platform_zeroize(void *buf, size_t len) * threading.h. However, this macro is not part of the Mbed TLS public API, so * we keep it private by only defining it in this file */ -#if !(defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)) +#if !(defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)) || \ + (defined(__MINGW32__) && !defined(__MINGW64_VERSION_MAJOR)) #define PLATFORM_UTIL_USE_GMTIME -#endif /* ! ( defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) ) */ +#endif #endif /* !( ( defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L ) || \ ( defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS ) && \ @@ -104,8 +176,13 @@ void mbedtls_platform_zeroize(void *buf, size_t len) struct tm *mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r(const mbedtls_time_t *tt, struct tm *tm_buf) { -#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) +#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(PLATFORM_UTIL_USE_GMTIME) +#if defined(__STDC_LIB_EXT1__) + return (gmtime_s(tt, tm_buf) == 0) ? NULL : tm_buf; +#else + /* MSVC and mingw64 argument order and return value are inconsistent with the C11 standard */ return (gmtime_s(tm_buf, tt) == 0) ? tm_buf : NULL; +#endif #elif !defined(PLATFORM_UTIL_USE_GMTIME) return gmtime_r(tt, tm_buf); #else @@ -133,3 +210,54 @@ struct tm *mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r(const mbedtls_time_t *tt, #endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ } #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE && MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +void (*mbedtls_test_hook_test_fail)(const char *, int, const char *); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT) + +#include +#if !defined(_WIN32) && \ + (defined(unix) || defined(__unix) || defined(__unix__) || \ + (defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__)) || defined(__HAIKU__) || defined(__midipix__)) +#include +#endif \ + /* !_WIN32 && (unix || __unix || __unix__ || (__APPLE__ && __MACH__) || __HAIKU__ || __midipix__) */ +#if (defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 199309L) || defined(__HAIKU__) +mbedtls_ms_time_t mbedtls_ms_time(void) +{ + int ret; + struct timespec tv; + mbedtls_ms_time_t current_ms; + +#if defined(__linux__) && defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME) || defined(__midipix__) + ret = clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &tv); +#else + ret = clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &tv); +#endif + if (ret) { + return time(NULL) * 1000; + } + + current_ms = tv.tv_sec; + + return current_ms*1000 + tv.tv_nsec / 1000000; +} +#elif defined(_WIN32) || defined(WIN32) || defined(__CYGWIN__) || \ + defined(__MINGW32__) || defined(_WIN64) +#include +mbedtls_ms_time_t mbedtls_ms_time(void) +{ + FILETIME ct; + mbedtls_ms_time_t current_ms; + + GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&ct); + current_ms = ((mbedtls_ms_time_t) ct.dwLowDateTime + + ((mbedtls_ms_time_t) (ct.dwHighDateTime) << 32LL))/10000; + return current_ms; +} +#else +#error "No mbedtls_ms_time available" +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME && !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/poly1305.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/poly1305.c index 510a45a698..c9ebe9e1da 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/poly1305.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/poly1305.c @@ -4,19 +4,7 @@ * \brief Poly1305 authentication algorithm. * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" @@ -32,12 +20,6 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT) -/* Parameter validation macros */ -#define POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define POLY1305_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - #define POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES (16U) /* @@ -245,8 +227,6 @@ static void poly1305_compute_mac(const mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, void mbedtls_poly1305_init(mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx) { - POLY1305_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_poly1305_context)); } @@ -262,9 +242,6 @@ void mbedtls_poly1305_free(mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx) int mbedtls_poly1305_starts(mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[32]) { - POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - /* r &= 0x0ffffffc0ffffffc0ffffffc0fffffff */ ctx->r[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 0) & 0x0FFFFFFFU; ctx->r[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 4) & 0x0FFFFFFCU; @@ -298,8 +275,6 @@ int mbedtls_poly1305_update(mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, size_t remaining = ilen; size_t queue_free_len; size_t nblocks; - POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); if ((remaining > 0U) && (ctx->queue_len > 0U)) { queue_free_len = (POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES - ctx->queue_len); @@ -351,9 +326,6 @@ int mbedtls_poly1305_update(mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, int mbedtls_poly1305_finish(mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, unsigned char mac[16]) { - POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET(mac != NULL); - /* Process any leftover data */ if (ctx->queue_len > 0U) { /* Add padding bit */ @@ -381,9 +353,6 @@ int mbedtls_poly1305_mac(const unsigned char key[32], { mbedtls_poly1305_context ctx; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); - POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET(mac != NULL); - POLY1305_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); mbedtls_poly1305_init(&ctx); diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto.c index e4b865ec97..969c695ac0 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -3,22 +3,11 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core_common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) @@ -27,12 +16,15 @@ #endif #include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa/crypto_values.h" #include "psa_crypto_cipher.h" #include "psa_crypto_core.h" #include "psa_crypto_invasive.h" #include "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h" +#include "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.h" #include "psa_crypto_ecp.h" +#include "psa_crypto_ffdh.h" #include "psa_crypto_hash.h" #include "psa_crypto_mac.h" #include "psa_crypto_rsa.h" @@ -52,30 +44,25 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include "mbedtls/aes.h" -#include "mbedtls/arc4.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" -#include "mbedtls/blowfish.h" #include "mbedtls/camellia.h" #include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" #include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #include "mbedtls/ccm.h" #include "mbedtls/cmac.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" #include "mbedtls/des.h" #include "mbedtls/ecdh.h" #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" #include "mbedtls/entropy.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/gcm.h" -#include "mbedtls/md2.h" -#include "mbedtls/md4.h" #include "mbedtls/md5.h" -#include "mbedtls/md.h" -#include "mbedtls/md_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/pk.h" -#include "mbedtls/pk_internal.h" +#include "pk_wrap.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" @@ -83,9 +70,14 @@ #include "mbedtls/sha1.h" #include "mbedtls/sha256.h" #include "mbedtls/sha512.h" -#include "mbedtls/xtea.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" -#define ARRAY_LENGTH(array) (sizeof(array) / sizeof(*(array))) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) +#define BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF 1 +#endif /****************************************************************/ /* Global data, support functions and library management */ @@ -101,23 +93,242 @@ static int key_type_is_raw_bytes(psa_key_type_t type) #define RNG_INITIALIZED 1 #define RNG_SEEDED 2 +/* IDs for PSA crypto subsystems. Starts at 1 to catch potential uninitialized + * variables as arguments. */ +typedef enum { + PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS = 1, + PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_KEY_SLOTS, + PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_RNG, + PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION, +} mbedtls_psa_crypto_subsystem; + +/* Initialization flags for global_data::initialized */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_INITIALIZED 0x01 +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_KEY_SLOTS_INITIALIZED 0x02 +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION_INITIALIZED 0x04 + +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_ALL_INITIALISED ( \ + PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_INITIALIZED | \ + PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_KEY_SLOTS_INITIALIZED | \ + PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION_INITIALIZED) + typedef struct { - unsigned initialized : 1; - unsigned rng_state : 2; + uint8_t initialized; + uint8_t rng_state; mbedtls_psa_random_context_t rng; } psa_global_data_t; static psa_global_data_t global_data; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) -mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *const mbedtls_psa_random_state = - &global_data.rng.drbg; -#endif +static uint8_t psa_get_initialized(void) +{ + uint8_t initialized; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + initialized = global_data.rng_state == RNG_SEEDED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + initialized = + (initialized && (global_data.initialized == PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_ALL_INITIALISED)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + return initialized; +} + +static uint8_t psa_get_drivers_initialized(void) +{ + uint8_t initialized; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + initialized = (global_data.initialized & PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_INITIALIZED) != 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + return initialized; +} #define GUARD_MODULE_INITIALIZED \ - if (global_data.initialized == 0) \ + if (psa_get_initialized() == 0) \ return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) + +/* Declare a local copy of an input buffer and a variable that will be used + * to store a pointer to the start of the buffer. + * + * Note: This macro must be called before any operations which may jump to + * the exit label, so that the local input copy object is safe to be freed. + * + * Assumptions: + * - input is the name of a pointer to the buffer to be copied + * - The name LOCAL_INPUT_COPY_OF_input is unused in the current scope + * - input_copy_name is a name that is unused in the current scope + */ +#define LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input, input_copy_name) \ + psa_crypto_local_input_t LOCAL_INPUT_COPY_OF_##input = PSA_CRYPTO_LOCAL_INPUT_INIT; \ + const uint8_t *input_copy_name = NULL; + +/* Allocate a copy of the buffer input and set the pointer input_copy to + * point to the start of the copy. + * + * Assumptions: + * - psa_status_t status exists + * - An exit label is declared + * - input is the name of a pointer to the buffer to be copied + * - LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input, input_copy) has previously been called + */ +#define LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input, length, input_copy) \ + status = psa_crypto_local_input_alloc(input, length, \ + &LOCAL_INPUT_COPY_OF_##input); \ + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { \ + goto exit; \ + } \ + input_copy = LOCAL_INPUT_COPY_OF_##input.buffer; + +/* Free the local input copy allocated previously by LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC() + * + * Assumptions: + * - input_copy is the name of the input copy pointer set by LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC() + * - input is the name of the original buffer that was copied + */ +#define LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input, input_copy) \ + input_copy = NULL; \ + psa_crypto_local_input_free(&LOCAL_INPUT_COPY_OF_##input); + +/* Declare a local copy of an output buffer and a variable that will be used + * to store a pointer to the start of the buffer. + * + * Note: This macro must be called before any operations which may jump to + * the exit label, so that the local output copy object is safe to be freed. + * + * Assumptions: + * - output is the name of a pointer to the buffer to be copied + * - The name LOCAL_OUTPUT_COPY_OF_output is unused in the current scope + * - output_copy_name is a name that is unused in the current scope + */ +#define LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output, output_copy_name) \ + psa_crypto_local_output_t LOCAL_OUTPUT_COPY_OF_##output = PSA_CRYPTO_LOCAL_OUTPUT_INIT; \ + uint8_t *output_copy_name = NULL; + +/* Allocate a copy of the buffer output and set the pointer output_copy to + * point to the start of the copy. + * + * Assumptions: + * - psa_status_t status exists + * - An exit label is declared + * - output is the name of a pointer to the buffer to be copied + * - LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output, output_copy) has previously been called + */ +#define LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output, length, output_copy) \ + status = psa_crypto_local_output_alloc(output, length, \ + &LOCAL_OUTPUT_COPY_OF_##output); \ + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { \ + goto exit; \ + } \ + output_copy = LOCAL_OUTPUT_COPY_OF_##output.buffer; + +/* Free the local output copy allocated previously by LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC() + * after first copying back its contents to the original buffer. + * + * Assumptions: + * - psa_status_t status exists + * - output_copy is the name of the output copy pointer set by LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC() + * - output is the name of the original buffer that was copied + */ +#define LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output, output_copy) \ + output_copy = NULL; \ + do { \ + psa_status_t local_output_status; \ + local_output_status = psa_crypto_local_output_free(&LOCAL_OUTPUT_COPY_OF_##output); \ + if (local_output_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { \ + /* Since this error case is an internal error, it's more serious than \ + * any existing error code and so it's fine to overwrite the existing \ + * status. */ \ + status = local_output_status; \ + } \ + } while (0) +#else /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS */ +#define LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input, input_copy_name) \ + const uint8_t *input_copy_name = NULL; +#define LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input, length, input_copy) \ + input_copy = input; +#define LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input, input_copy) \ + input_copy = NULL; +#define LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output, output_copy_name) \ + uint8_t *output_copy_name = NULL; +#define LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output, length, output_copy) \ + output_copy = output; +#define LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output, output_copy) \ + output_copy = NULL; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS */ + + +int psa_can_do_hash(psa_algorithm_t hash_alg) +{ + (void) hash_alg; + return psa_get_drivers_initialized(); +} + +int psa_can_do_cipher(psa_key_type_t key_type, psa_algorithm_t cipher_alg) +{ + (void) key_type; + (void) cipher_alg; + return psa_get_drivers_initialized(); +} + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +static int psa_is_dh_key_size_valid(size_t bits) +{ + switch (bits) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048) + case 2048: + return 1; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072) + case 3072: + return 1; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096) + case 4096: + return 1; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144) + case 6144: + return 1; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192) + case 8192: + return 1; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 */ + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT || + MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY || + PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */ + psa_status_t mbedtls_to_psa_error(int ret) { /* Mbed TLS error codes can combine a high-level error code and a @@ -128,16 +339,15 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_to_psa_error(int ret) case 0: return PSA_SUCCESS; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) case MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH: case MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH: - case MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - case MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: - return PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE; - - case MBEDTLS_ERR_ARC4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: - return PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA: case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG: case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH: @@ -148,42 +358,34 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_to_psa_error(int ret) return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL: return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA) - case MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_BAD_INPUT_DATA: -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH) - case MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH: #endif - case MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH: - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - case MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: - return PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) case MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA: -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH) - case MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH: -#endif case MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH: return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - case MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: - return PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) case MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT: return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; case MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED: return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; - case MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: - return PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) case MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA: return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) case MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE: return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; case MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED: return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA: @@ -198,11 +400,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_to_psa_error(int ret) return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT: return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: - return PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE; - - case MBEDTLS_ERR_CMAC_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: - return PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE; +#endif #if !(defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE)) @@ -217,22 +415,24 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_to_psa_error(int ret) return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) case MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH: return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - case MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: - return PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE; +#endif case MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED: case MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_STRONG_SOURCE: case MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED: return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) case MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED: return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; case MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT: return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - case MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: - return PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE; +#endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE) @@ -247,24 +447,24 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_to_psa_error(int ret) return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY; #endif - case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD2_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: - case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: - case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD5_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: - return PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE; - +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT) case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA: return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED: return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR: return PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; - case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: - return PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE; +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR: return PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; +#endif case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA: return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER: @@ -279,14 +479,19 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_to_psa_error(int ret) return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED: return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED: return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH: case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA: return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR: return PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; +#endif case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION: case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT: return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; @@ -303,17 +508,16 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_to_psa_error(int ret) return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH: return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; - case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: - return PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; +#endif case MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: return PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE; case MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED: return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - case MBEDTLS_ERR_RIPEMD160_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: - return PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE; - +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA: return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING: @@ -331,21 +535,9 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_to_psa_error(int ret) return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED: return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY; - case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION: - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: - return PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE; - - case MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: - case MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: - case MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: - return PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE; - - case MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH: - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - case MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: - return PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA: case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY: return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; @@ -360,8 +552,12 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_to_psa_error(int ret) return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED: return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY; - case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: - return PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS: + return PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE; +#endif +#endif case MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED: return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; @@ -371,123 +567,55 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_to_psa_error(int ret) } } +/** + * \brief For output buffers which contain "tags" + * (outputs that may be checked for validity like + * hashes, MACs and signatures), fill the unused + * part of the output buffer (the whole buffer on + * error, the trailing part on success) with + * something that isn't a valid tag (barring an + * attack on the tag and deliberately-crafted + * input), in case the caller doesn't check the + * return status properly. + * + * \param output_buffer Pointer to buffer to wipe. May not be NULL + * unless \p output_buffer_size is zero. + * \param status Status of function called to generate + * output_buffer originally + * \param output_buffer_size Size of output buffer. If zero, \p output_buffer + * could be NULL. + * \param output_buffer_length Length of data written to output_buffer, must be + * less than \p output_buffer_size + */ +static void psa_wipe_tag_output_buffer(uint8_t *output_buffer, psa_status_t status, + size_t output_buffer_size, size_t output_buffer_length) +{ + size_t offset = 0; + if (output_buffer_size == 0) { + /* If output_buffer_size is 0 then we have nothing to do. We must not + call memset because output_buffer may be NULL in this case */ + return; + } - -/****************************************************************/ -/* Key management */ -/****************************************************************/ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) -mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve, - size_t bits, - int bits_is_sloppy) -{ - switch (curve) { - case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1: - switch (bits) { -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) - case 192: - return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1; -#endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224) - case 224: - return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1; -#endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) - case 256: - return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1; -#endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) - case 384: - return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1; -#endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) - case 521: - return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1; - case 528: - if (bits_is_sloppy) { - return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1; - } - break; -#endif - } - break; - - case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1: - switch (bits) { -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) - case 256: - return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1; -#endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) - case 384: - return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1; -#endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) - case 512: - return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1; -#endif - } - break; - - case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY: - switch (bits) { -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) - case 255: - return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519; - case 256: - if (bits_is_sloppy) { - return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519; - } - break; -#endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) - case 448: - return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448; -#endif - } - break; - - case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1: - switch (bits) { -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192) - case 192: - return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1; -#endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) - case 224: - return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1; -#endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) - case 256: - return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1; -#endif - } - break; + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + offset = output_buffer_length; } - (void) bits_is_sloppy; - return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + memset(output_buffer + offset, '!', output_buffer_size - offset); } -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) || - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) */ -static psa_status_t validate_unstructured_key_bit_size(psa_key_type_t type, - size_t bits) + +psa_status_t psa_validate_unstructured_key_bit_size(psa_key_type_t type, + size_t bits) { /* Check that the bit size is acceptable for the key type */ switch (type) { case PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA: case PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC: case PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE: + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD: + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH: break; #if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) case PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES: @@ -517,13 +645,6 @@ static psa_status_t validate_unstructured_key_bit_size(psa_key_type_t type, } break; #endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARC4) - case PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4: - if (bits < 8 || bits > 2048) { - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } - break; -#endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20: if (bits != 256) { @@ -618,7 +739,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_import_key_into_slot( size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits) { psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_type_t type = attributes->core.type; + psa_key_type_t type = attributes->type; /* zero-length keys are never supported. */ if (data_length == 0) { @@ -628,18 +749,8 @@ psa_status_t psa_import_key_into_slot( if (key_type_is_raw_bytes(type)) { *bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(data_length); - /* Ensure that the bytes-to-bits conversion hasn't overflown. */ - if (data_length > SIZE_MAX / 8) { - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - } - - /* Enforce a size limit, and in particular ensure that the bit - * size fits in its representation type. */ - if ((*bits) > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) { - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - } - - status = validate_unstructured_key_bit_size(type, *bits); + status = psa_validate_unstructured_key_bit_size(attributes->type, + *bits); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { return status; } @@ -651,7 +762,21 @@ psa_status_t psa_import_key_into_slot( return PSA_SUCCESS; } else if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC(type)) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type)) { + if (psa_is_dh_key_size_valid(PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(data_length)) == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + return mbedtls_psa_ffdh_import_key(attributes, + data, data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, + bits); + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type)) { return mbedtls_psa_ecp_import_key(attributes, @@ -660,9 +785,10 @@ psa_status_t psa_import_key_into_slot( key_buffer_length, bits); } -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type)) { return mbedtls_psa_rsa_import_key(attributes, @@ -671,7 +797,8 @@ psa_status_t psa_import_key_into_slot( key_buffer_length, bits); } -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || +#endif /* (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) && + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)) || * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ } @@ -952,8 +1079,14 @@ static psa_status_t psa_restrict_key_policy( * In case of a persistent key, the function loads the description of the key * into a key slot if not already done. * - * On success, the returned key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of - * the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. + * On success, the returned key slot has been registered for reading. + * It is the responsibility of the caller to then unregister + * once they have finished reading the contents of the slot. + * The caller unregisters by calling psa_unregister_read() or + * psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(). psa_unregister_read() must be called + * if and only if the caller already holds the global key slot mutex + * (when mutexes are enabled). psa_unregister_read_under_mutex() encapsulates + * the unregister with mutex lock and unlock operations. */ static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, @@ -962,7 +1095,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( psa_algorithm_t alg) { psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_slot_t *slot; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(key, p_slot); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { @@ -997,7 +1130,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( error: *p_slot = NULL; - psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); return status; } @@ -1012,8 +1145,14 @@ static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( * psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy() when there is no opaque key support * for a cryptographic operation. * - * On success, the returned key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of the - * caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. + * On success, the returned key slot has been registered for reading. + * It is the responsibility of the caller to then unregister + * once they have finished reading the contents of the slot. + * The caller unregisters by calling psa_unregister_read() or + * psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(). psa_unregister_read() must be called + * if and only if the caller already holds the global key slot mutex + * (when mutexes are enabled). psa_unregister_read_under_mutex() encapsulates + * psa_unregister_read() with mutex lock and unlock operations. */ static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, @@ -1028,7 +1167,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( } if (psa_key_lifetime_is_external((*p_slot)->attr.lifetime)) { - psa_unlock_key_slot(*p_slot); + psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(*p_slot); *p_slot = NULL; return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } @@ -1038,13 +1177,10 @@ static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( psa_status_t psa_remove_key_data_from_memory(psa_key_slot_t *slot) { - /* Data pointer will always be either a valid pointer or NULL in an - * initialized slot, so we can just free it. */ if (slot->key.data != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes); } - mbedtls_free(slot->key.data); slot->key.data = NULL; slot->key.bytes = 0; @@ -1059,16 +1195,41 @@ psa_status_t psa_wipe_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot) /* * As the return error code may not be handled in case of multiple errors, - * do our best to report an unexpected lock counter: if available - * call MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED that may terminate execution (if called as - * part of the execution of a test suite this will stop the test suite - * execution). + * do our best to report an unexpected amount of registered readers or + * an unexpected state. + * Assert with MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT that the slot is valid for + * wiping. + * if the MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS configuration option is enabled and the + * function is called as part of the execution of a test suite, the + * execution of the test suite is stopped in error if the assertion fails. */ - if (slot->lock_count != 1) { -#ifdef MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS - MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(slot->lock_count == 1); -#endif - status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + switch (slot->state) { + case PSA_SLOT_FULL: + /* In this state psa_wipe_key_slot() must only be called if the + * caller is the last reader. */ + case PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION: + /* In this state psa_wipe_key_slot() must only be called if the + * caller is the last reader. */ + if (slot->registered_readers != 1) { + MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(slot->registered_readers == 1); + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + break; + case PSA_SLOT_FILLING: + /* In this state registered_readers must be 0. */ + if (slot->registered_readers != 0) { + MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(slot->registered_readers == 0); + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + break; + case PSA_SLOT_EMPTY: + /* The slot is already empty, it cannot be wiped. */ + MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(slot->state != PSA_SLOT_EMPTY); + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + break; + default: + /* The slot's state is invalid. */ + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; } /* Multipart operations may still be using the key. This is safe @@ -1078,7 +1239,8 @@ psa_status_t psa_wipe_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot) * key material can linger until all operations are completed. */ /* At this point, key material and other type-specific content has * been wiped. Clear remaining metadata. We can call memset and not - * zeroize because the metadata is not particularly sensitive. */ + * zeroize because the metadata is not particularly sensitive. + * This memset also sets the slot's state to PSA_SLOT_EMPTY. */ memset(slot, 0, sizeof(*slot)); return status; } @@ -1097,27 +1259,49 @@ psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) } /* - * Get the description of the key in a key slot. In case of a persistent - * key, this will load the key description from persistent memory if not - * done yet. We cannot avoid this loading as without it we don't know if + * Get the description of the key in a key slot, and register to read it. + * In the case of a persistent key, this will load the key description + * from persistent memory if not done yet. + * We cannot avoid this loading as without it we don't know if * the key is operated by an SE or not and this information is needed by - * the current implementation. - */ + * the current implementation. */ status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(key, &slot); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { return status; } - /* - * If the key slot containing the key description is under access by the - * library (apart from the present access), the key cannot be destroyed - * yet. For the time being, just return in error. Eventually (to be - * implemented), the key should be destroyed when all accesses have - * stopped. - */ - if (slot->lock_count > 1) { - psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); - return PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* We cannot unlock between setting the state to PENDING_DELETION + * and destroying the key in storage, as otherwise another thread + * could load the key into a new slot and the key will not be + * fully destroyed. */ + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_lock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); + + if (slot->state == PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION) { + /* Another thread has destroyed the key between us locking the slot + * and us gaining the mutex. Unregister from the slot, + * and report that the key does not exist. */ + status = psa_unregister_read(slot); + + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE : status; + } +#endif + /* Set the key slot containing the key description's state to + * PENDING_DELETION. This stops new operations from registering + * to read the slot. Current readers can safely continue to access + * the key within the slot; the last registered reader will + * automatically wipe the slot when they call psa_unregister_read(). + * If the key is persistent, we can now delete the copy of the key + * from memory. If the key is opaque, we require the driver to + * deal with the deletion. */ + overall_status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(slot, PSA_SLOT_FULL, + PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION); + + if (overall_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; } if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY(slot->attr.lifetime)) { @@ -1166,15 +1350,13 @@ psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) if (!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime)) { + /* Destroy the copy of the persistent key from storage. + * The slot will still hold a copy of the key until the last reader + * unregisters. */ status = psa_destroy_persistent_key(slot->attr.id); if (overall_status == PSA_SUCCESS) { overall_status = status; } - - /* TODO: other slots may have a copy of the same key. We should - * invalidate them. - * https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/214 - */ } #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) */ @@ -1192,58 +1374,24 @@ psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ exit: - status = psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); - /* Prioritize CORRUPTION_DETECTED from wiping over a storage error */ + /* Unregister from reading the slot. If we are the last active reader + * then this will wipe the slot. */ + status = psa_unregister_read(slot); + /* Prioritize CORRUPTION_DETECTED from unregistering over + * a storage error. */ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { overall_status = status; } - return overall_status; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) -static psa_status_t psa_get_rsa_public_exponent( - const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, - psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) -{ - mbedtls_mpi mpi; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - uint8_t *buffer = NULL; - size_t buflen; - mbedtls_mpi_init(&mpi); - - ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &mpi); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&mpi, 65537) == 0) { - /* It's the default value, which is reported as an empty string, - * so there's nothing to do. */ - goto exit; - } - buflen = mbedtls_mpi_size(&mpi); - buffer = mbedtls_calloc(1, buflen); - if (buffer == NULL) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&mpi, buffer, buflen); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - attributes->domain_parameters = buffer; - attributes->domain_parameters_size = buflen; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* Don't overwrite existing errors if the unlock fails. */ + status = overall_status; + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif -exit: - mbedtls_mpi_free(&mpi); - if (ret != 0) { - mbedtls_free(buffer); - } - return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + return overall_status; } -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || - * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ /** Retrieve all the publicly-accessible attributes of a key. */ @@ -1251,7 +1399,6 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_key_attributes(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) { psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; psa_key_slot_t *slot; psa_reset_key_attributes(attributes); @@ -1261,9 +1408,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_key_attributes(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, return status; } - attributes->core = slot->attr; - attributes->core.flags &= (MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY | - MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_DUAL_USE); + *attributes = slot->attr; #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) if (psa_get_se_driver_entry(slot->attr.lifetime) != NULL) { @@ -1272,47 +1417,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_key_attributes(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ - switch (slot->attr.type) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) - case PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR: - case PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY: - /* TODO: reporting the public exponent for opaque keys - * is not yet implemented. - * https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/216 - */ - if (!psa_key_lifetime_is_external(slot->attr.lifetime)) { - mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; - - status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( - slot->attr.type, - slot->key.data, - slot->key.bytes, - &rsa); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - break; - } - - status = psa_get_rsa_public_exponent(rsa, - attributes); - mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa); - mbedtls_free(rsa); - } - break; -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || - * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ - default: - /* Nothing else to do. */ - break; - } - - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - psa_reset_key_attributes(attributes); - } - - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); - - return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; + return psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) @@ -1320,7 +1425,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_key_slot_number( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, psa_key_slot_number_t *slot_number) { - if (attributes->core.flags & MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_FLAG_HAS_SLOT_NUMBER) { + if (attributes->has_slot_number) { *slot_number = attributes->slot_number; return PSA_SUCCESS; } else { @@ -1350,11 +1455,12 @@ psa_status_t psa_export_key_internal( const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length) { - psa_key_type_t type = attributes->core.type; + psa_key_type_t type = attributes->type; if (key_type_is_raw_bytes(type) || PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type) || - PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type)) { + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) || + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type)) { return psa_export_key_buffer_internal( key_buffer, key_buffer_size, data, data_size, data_length); @@ -1367,13 +1473,14 @@ psa_status_t psa_export_key_internal( } psa_status_t psa_export_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, - uint8_t *data, + uint8_t *data_external, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length) { psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; psa_key_slot_t *slot; + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(data_external, data); /* Reject a zero-length output buffer now, since this can never be a * valid key representation. This way we know that data must be a valid @@ -1398,15 +1505,18 @@ psa_status_t psa_export_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, return status; } - psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { - .core = slot->attr - }; - status = psa_driver_wrapper_export_key(&attributes, + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(data_external, data_size, data); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_export_key(&slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, data, data_size, data_length); - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(data_external, data); return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; } @@ -1418,63 +1528,76 @@ psa_status_t psa_export_public_key_internal( size_t data_size, size_t *data_length) { - psa_key_type_t type = attributes->core.type; - - if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type) || PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type)) { - if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type)) { - /* Exporting public -> public */ - return psa_export_key_buffer_internal( - key_buffer, key_buffer_size, - data, data_size, data_length); - } + psa_key_type_t type = attributes->type; - if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type)) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) - return mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_public_key(attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - data, - data_size, - data_length); + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type) && + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type) || PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) || + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type))) { + /* Exporting public -> public */ + return psa_export_key_buffer_internal( + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + data, data_size, data_length); + } else if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + return mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_public_key(attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length); #else - /* We don't know how to convert a private RSA key to public. */ - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || + /* We don't know how to convert a private RSA key to public. */ + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ - } else { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) - return mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_public_key(attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - data, - data_size, - data_length); + } else if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) + return mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_public_key(attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length); #else - /* We don't know how to convert a private ECC key to public */ - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || + /* We don't know how to convert a private ECC key to public */ + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) */ - } + } else if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) + return mbedtls_psa_ffdh_export_public_key(attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, data_size, + data_length); +#else + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) */ } else { - /* This shouldn't happen in the reference implementation, but - it is valid for a special-purpose implementation to omit - support for exporting certain key types. */ + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) data; + (void) data_size; + (void) data_length; return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } } psa_status_t psa_export_public_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, - uint8_t *data, + uint8_t *data_external, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length) { psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_attributes_t attributes; psa_key_slot_t *slot; + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(data_external, data); + /* Reject a zero-length output buffer now, since this can never be a * valid key representation. This way we know that data must be a valid * pointer and we can do things like memset(data, ..., data_size). */ @@ -1494,31 +1617,24 @@ psa_status_t psa_export_public_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, return status; } + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(data_external, data_size, data); + if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC(slot->attr.type)) { status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto exit; } - attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) { - .core = slot->attr - }; status = psa_driver_wrapper_export_public_key( - &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, data, data_size, data_length); exit: - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(data_external, data); return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; } -MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT((MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY & MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_DUAL_USE) == 0, - "One or more key attribute flag is listed as both external-only and dual-use") -MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT((PSA_KA_MASK_INTERNAL_ONLY & MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_DUAL_USE) == 0, - "One or more key attribute flag is listed as both internal-only and dual-use") -MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT((PSA_KA_MASK_INTERNAL_ONLY & MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY) == 0, - "One or more key attribute flag is listed as both internal-only and external-only") - /** Validate that a key policy is internally well-formed. * * This function only rejects invalid policies. It does not validate the @@ -1535,6 +1651,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_validate_key_policy(const psa_key_policy_t *policy) PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE)) != 0) { return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } @@ -1583,7 +1700,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_validate_key_attributes( } } - status = psa_validate_key_policy(&attributes->core.policy); + status = psa_validate_key_policy(&attributes->policy); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { return status; } @@ -1596,12 +1713,6 @@ static psa_status_t psa_validate_key_attributes( return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } - /* Reject invalid flags. These should not be reachable through the API. */ - if (attributes->core.flags & ~(MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY | - MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_DUAL_USE)) { - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } - return PSA_SUCCESS; } @@ -1620,8 +1731,9 @@ static psa_status_t psa_validate_key_attributes( * In case of failure at any step, stop the sequence and call * psa_fail_key_creation(). * - * On success, the key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of the caller - * to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. + * On success, the key slot's state is PSA_SLOT_FILLING. + * It is the responsibility of the caller to change the slot's state to + * PSA_SLOT_EMPTY/FULL once key creation has finished. * * \param method An identification of the calling function. * \param[in] attributes Key attributes for the new key. @@ -1652,7 +1764,15 @@ static psa_status_t psa_start_key_creation( return status; } - status = psa_get_empty_key_slot(&volatile_key_id, p_slot); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_lock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + status = psa_reserve_free_key_slot(&volatile_key_id, p_slot); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { return status; } @@ -1666,7 +1786,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_start_key_creation( * volatile key identifier associated to the slot returned to contain its * definition. */ - slot->attr = attributes->core; + slot->attr = *attributes; if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime)) { #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) slot->attr.id = volatile_key_id; @@ -1675,13 +1795,6 @@ static psa_status_t psa_start_key_creation( #endif } - /* Erase external-only flags from the internal copy. To access - * external-only flags, query `attributes`. Thanks to the check - * in psa_validate_key_attributes(), this leaves the dual-use - * flags and any internal flag that psa_get_empty_key_slot() - * may have set. */ - slot->attr.flags &= ~MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY; - #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) /* For a key in a secure element, we need to do three things * when creating or registering a persistent key: @@ -1708,7 +1821,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_start_key_creation( return status; } - if (!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(attributes->core.lifetime)) { + if (!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(attributes->lifetime)) { psa_crypto_prepare_transaction(PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_CREATE_KEY); psa_crypto_transaction.key.lifetime = slot->attr.lifetime; psa_crypto_transaction.key.slot = slot_number; @@ -1741,9 +1854,9 @@ static psa_status_t psa_start_key_creation( * See the documentation of psa_start_key_creation() for the intended use * of this function. * - * If the finalization succeeds, the function unlocks the key slot (it was - * locked by psa_start_key_creation()) and the key slot cannot be accessed - * anymore as part of the key creation process. + * If the finalization succeeds, the function sets the key slot's state to + * PSA_SLOT_FULL, and the key slot can no longer be accessed as part of the + * key creation process. * * \param[in,out] slot Pointer to the slot with key material. * \param[in] driver The secure element driver for the key, @@ -1772,6 +1885,11 @@ static psa_status_t psa_finish_key_creation( (void) slot; (void) driver; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_lock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) if (!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime)) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) @@ -1811,6 +1929,11 @@ static psa_status_t psa_finish_key_creation( status = psa_save_se_persistent_data(driver); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { psa_destroy_persistent_key(slot->attr.id); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif return status; } status = psa_crypto_stop_transaction(); @@ -1819,12 +1942,17 @@ static psa_status_t psa_finish_key_creation( if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { *key = slot->attr.id; - status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(slot, PSA_SLOT_FILLING, + PSA_SLOT_FULL); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; } } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif return status; } @@ -1834,7 +1962,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_finish_key_creation( * or after psa_finish_key_creation() fails. In other circumstances, this * function may not clean up persistent storage. * See the documentation of psa_start_key_creation() for the intended use - * of this function. + * of this function. Sets the slot's state to PSA_SLOT_EMPTY. * * \param[in,out] slot Pointer to the slot with key material. * \param[in] driver The secure element driver for the key, @@ -1849,6 +1977,13 @@ static void psa_fail_key_creation(psa_key_slot_t *slot, return; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* If the lock operation fails we still wipe the slot. + * Operations will no longer work after a failed lock, + * but we still need to wipe the slot of confidential data. */ + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex); +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) /* TODO: If the key has already been created in the secure * element, and the failure happened later (when saving metadata @@ -1867,6 +2002,10 @@ static void psa_fail_key_creation(psa_key_slot_t *slot, #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex); +#endif } /** Validate optional attributes during key creation. @@ -1882,63 +2021,14 @@ static psa_status_t psa_validate_optional_attributes( const psa_key_slot_t *slot, const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) { - if (attributes->core.type != 0) { - if (attributes->core.type != slot->attr.type) { - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } - } - - if (attributes->domain_parameters_size != 0) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) - if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(slot->attr.type)) { - mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; - mbedtls_mpi actual, required; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - psa_status_t status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( - slot->attr.type, - slot->key.data, - slot->key.bytes, - &rsa); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } - - mbedtls_mpi_init(&actual); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&required); - ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, - NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &actual); - mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa); - mbedtls_free(rsa); - if (ret != 0) { - goto rsa_exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&required, - attributes->domain_parameters, - attributes->domain_parameters_size); - if (ret != 0) { - goto rsa_exit; - } - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&actual, &required) != 0) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } -rsa_exit: - mbedtls_mpi_free(&actual); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&required); - if (ret != 0) { - return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); - } - } else -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || - * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ - { + if (attributes->type != 0) { + if (attributes->type != slot->attr.type) { return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } } - if (attributes->core.bits != 0) { - if (attributes->core.bits != slot->attr.bits) { + if (attributes->bits != 0) { + if (attributes->bits != slot->attr.bits) { return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } } @@ -1947,14 +2037,16 @@ static psa_status_t psa_validate_optional_attributes( } psa_status_t psa_import_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - const uint8_t *data, + const uint8_t *data_external, size_t data_length, mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key) { psa_status_t status; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(data_external, data); psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; size_t bits; + size_t storage_size = data_length; *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; @@ -1965,6 +2057,13 @@ psa_status_t psa_import_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } + /* Ensure that the bytes-to-bits conversion cannot overflow. */ + if (data_length > SIZE_MAX / 8) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(data_external, data_length, data); + status = psa_start_key_creation(PSA_KEY_CREATION_IMPORT, attributes, &slot, &driver); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { @@ -1972,11 +2071,18 @@ psa_status_t psa_import_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, } /* In the case of a transparent key or an opaque key stored in local - * storage (thus not in the case of generating a key in a secure element - * or cryptoprocessor with storage), we have to allocate a buffer to - * hold the generated key material. */ + * storage ( thus not in the case of importing a key in a secure element + * with storage ( MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C ) ),we have to allocate a + * buffer to hold the imported key material. */ if (slot->key.data == NULL) { - status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot(slot, data_length); + if (psa_key_lifetime_is_external(attributes->lifetime)) { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size_from_key_data( + attributes, data, data_length, &storage_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot(slot, storage_size); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { goto exit; } @@ -1999,6 +2105,12 @@ psa_status_t psa_import_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, goto exit; } + /* Enforce a size limit, and in particular ensure that the bit + * size fits in its representation type.*/ + if (bits > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } status = psa_validate_optional_attributes(slot, attributes); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { goto exit; @@ -2006,6 +2118,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_import_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, status = psa_finish_key_creation(slot, driver, key); exit: + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(data_external, data); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { psa_fail_key_creation(slot, driver); } @@ -2052,22 +2165,6 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_register_se_key( } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ -static psa_status_t psa_copy_key_material(const psa_key_slot_t *source, - psa_key_slot_t *target) -{ - psa_status_t status = psa_copy_key_material_into_slot(target, - source->key.data, - source->key.bytes); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } - - target->attr.type = source->attr.type; - target->attr.bits = source->attr.bits; - - return PSA_SUCCESS; -} - psa_status_t psa_copy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t source_key, const psa_key_attributes_t *specified_attributes, mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *target_key) @@ -2078,10 +2175,11 @@ psa_status_t psa_copy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t source_key, psa_key_slot_t *target_slot = NULL; psa_key_attributes_t actual_attributes = *specified_attributes; psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; + size_t storage_size = 0; *target_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; - status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( source_key, &source_slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY, 0); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { goto exit; @@ -2093,8 +2191,17 @@ psa_status_t psa_copy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t source_key, goto exit; } + /* The target key type and number of bits have been validated by + * psa_validate_optional_attributes() to be either equal to zero or + * equal to the ones of the source key. So it is safe to inherit + * them from the source key now." + * */ + actual_attributes.bits = source_slot->attr.bits; + actual_attributes.type = source_slot->attr.type; + + status = psa_restrict_key_policy(source_slot->attr.type, - &actual_attributes.core.policy, + &actual_attributes.policy, &source_slot->attr.policy); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { goto exit; @@ -2105,37 +2212,60 @@ psa_status_t psa_copy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t source_key, if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { goto exit; } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) - if (driver != NULL) { - /* Copying to a secure element is not implemented yet. */ + if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(target_slot->attr.lifetime) != + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(source_slot->attr.lifetime)) { + /* + * If the source and target keys are stored in different locations, + * the source key would need to be exported as plaintext and re-imported + * in the other location. This has security implications which have not + * been fully mapped. For now, this can be achieved through + * appropriate API invocations from the application, if needed. + * */ status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; goto exit; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + /* + * When the source and target keys are within the same location, + * - For transparent keys it is a blind copy without any driver invocation, + * - For opaque keys this translates to an invocation of the drivers' + * copy_key entry point through the dispatch layer. + * */ + if (psa_key_lifetime_is_external(actual_attributes.lifetime)) { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size(&actual_attributes, + &storage_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } - if (psa_key_lifetime_is_external(actual_attributes.core.lifetime)) { - /* - * Copying through an opaque driver is not implemented yet, consider - * a lifetime with an external location as an invalid parameter for - * now. - */ - status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - goto exit; - } + status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot(target_slot, storage_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } - status = psa_copy_key_material(source_slot, target_slot); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - goto exit; + status = psa_driver_wrapper_copy_key(&actual_attributes, + source_slot->key.data, + source_slot->key.bytes, + target_slot->key.data, + target_slot->key.bytes, + &target_slot->key.bytes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } else { + status = psa_copy_key_material_into_slot(target_slot, + source_slot->key.data, + source_slot->key.bytes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } } - status = psa_finish_key_creation(target_slot, driver, target_key); exit: if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { psa_fail_key_creation(target_slot, driver); } - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(source_slot); + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(source_slot); return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; } @@ -2190,10 +2320,11 @@ psa_status_t psa_hash_setup(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, } psa_status_t psa_hash_update(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, - const uint8_t *input, + const uint8_t *input_external, size_t input_length) { psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); if (operation->id == 0) { status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; @@ -2206,6 +2337,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_hash_update(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, return PSA_SUCCESS; } + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_update(operation, input, input_length); exit: @@ -2213,32 +2345,57 @@ psa_status_t psa_hash_update(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, psa_hash_abort(operation); } + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); return status; } -psa_status_t psa_hash_finish(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, - uint8_t *hash, - size_t hash_size, - size_t *hash_length) +static psa_status_t psa_hash_finish_internal(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length) { + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + *hash_length = 0; if (operation->id == 0) { return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; } - psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_finish( + status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_finish( operation, hash, hash_size, hash_length); psa_hash_abort(operation); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_finish(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash_external, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(hash_external, hash); + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(hash_external, hash_size, hash); + status = psa_hash_finish_internal(operation, hash, hash_size, hash_length); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(hash_external, hash); return status; } psa_status_t psa_hash_verify(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, - const uint8_t *hash, + const uint8_t *hash_external, size_t hash_length) { uint8_t actual_hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; size_t actual_hash_length; - psa_status_t status = psa_hash_finish( + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(hash_external, hash); + + status = psa_hash_finish_internal( operation, actual_hash, sizeof(actual_hash), &actual_hash_length); @@ -2252,7 +2409,8 @@ psa_status_t psa_hash_verify(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, goto exit; } - if (mbedtls_psa_safer_memcmp(hash, actual_hash, actual_hash_length) != 0) { + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(hash_external, hash_length, hash); + if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(hash, actual_hash, actual_hash_length) != 0) { status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; } @@ -2261,36 +2419,55 @@ psa_status_t psa_hash_verify(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { psa_hash_abort(operation); } - + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(hash_external, hash); return status; } psa_status_t psa_hash_compute(psa_algorithm_t alg, - const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, - uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_size, + const uint8_t *input_external, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash_external, size_t hash_size, size_t *hash_length) { + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(hash_external, hash); + *hash_length = 0; if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg)) { return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } - return psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute(alg, input, input_length, - hash, hash_size, hash_length); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(hash_external, hash_size, hash); + status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute(alg, input, input_length, + hash, hash_size, hash_length); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(hash_external, hash); + return status; } psa_status_t psa_hash_compare(psa_algorithm_t alg, - const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, - const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length) + const uint8_t *input_external, size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *hash_external, size_t hash_length) { uint8_t actual_hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; size_t actual_hash_length; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(hash_external, hash); if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg)) { - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + return status; } - psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( alg, input, input_length, actual_hash, sizeof(actual_hash), &actual_hash_length); @@ -2301,12 +2478,18 @@ psa_status_t psa_hash_compare(psa_algorithm_t alg, status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; goto exit; } - if (mbedtls_psa_safer_memcmp(hash, actual_hash, actual_hash_length) != 0) { + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(hash_external, hash_length, hash); + if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(hash, actual_hash, actual_hash_length) != 0) { status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; } exit: mbedtls_platform_zeroize(actual_hash, sizeof(actual_hash)); + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(hash_external, hash); + return status; } @@ -2407,7 +2590,6 @@ static psa_status_t psa_mac_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, { psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_attributes_t attributes; psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ @@ -2425,11 +2607,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_mac_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, goto exit; } - attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) { - .core = slot->attr - }; - - status = psa_mac_finalize_alg_and_key_validation(alg, &attributes, + status = psa_mac_finalize_alg_and_key_validation(alg, &slot->attr, &operation->mac_size); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { goto exit; @@ -2439,13 +2617,13 @@ static psa_status_t psa_mac_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, /* Dispatch the MAC setup call with validated input */ if (is_sign) { status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup(operation, - &attributes, + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, alg); } else { status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_setup(operation, - &attributes, + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, alg); @@ -2456,7 +2634,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_mac_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, psa_mac_abort(operation); } - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; } @@ -2476,35 +2654,48 @@ psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, } psa_status_t psa_mac_update(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, - const uint8_t *input, + const uint8_t *input_external, size_t input_length) { + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + if (operation->id == 0) { - return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + return status; } /* Don't require hash implementations to behave correctly on a * zero-length input, which may have an invalid pointer. */ if (input_length == 0) { - return PSA_SUCCESS; + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + return status; } - psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_update(operation, - input, input_length); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_update(operation, input, input_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { psa_mac_abort(operation); } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + return status; } psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, - uint8_t *mac, + uint8_t *mac_external, size_t mac_size, size_t *mac_length) { psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(mac_external, mac); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(mac_external, mac_size, mac); if (operation->id == 0) { status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; @@ -2528,6 +2719,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, goto exit; } + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_finish(operation, mac, operation->mac_size, mac_length); @@ -2544,22 +2736,23 @@ psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, operation->mac_size = 0; } - if (mac_size > operation->mac_size) { - memset(&mac[operation->mac_size], '!', - mac_size - operation->mac_size); + if (mac != NULL) { + psa_wipe_tag_output_buffer(mac, status, mac_size, *mac_length); } abort_status = psa_mac_abort(operation); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(mac_external, mac); return status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status; } psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, - const uint8_t *mac, + const uint8_t *mac_external, size_t mac_length) { psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(mac_external, mac); if (operation->id == 0) { status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; @@ -2576,11 +2769,13 @@ psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, goto exit; } + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(mac_external, mac_length, mac); status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_finish(operation, mac, mac_length); exit: abort_status = psa_mac_abort(operation); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(mac_external, mac); return status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status; } @@ -2596,7 +2791,6 @@ static psa_status_t psa_mac_compute_internal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, { psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_attributes_t attributes; psa_key_slot_t *slot; uint8_t operation_mac_size = 0; @@ -2609,11 +2803,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_mac_compute_internal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, goto exit; } - attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) { - .core = slot->attr - }; - - status = psa_mac_finalize_alg_and_key_validation(alg, &attributes, + status = psa_mac_finalize_alg_and_key_validation(alg, &slot->attr, &operation_mac_size); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { goto exit; @@ -2625,7 +2815,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_mac_compute_internal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, } status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_compute( - &attributes, + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, alg, input, input_length, @@ -2642,39 +2832,55 @@ static psa_status_t psa_mac_compute_internal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, *mac_length = mac_size; operation_mac_size = 0; } - if (mac_size > operation_mac_size) { - memset(&mac[operation_mac_size], '!', mac_size - operation_mac_size); - } - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + psa_wipe_tag_output_buffer(mac, status, mac_size, *mac_length); + + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; } psa_status_t psa_mac_compute(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg, - const uint8_t *input, + const uint8_t *input_external, size_t input_length, - uint8_t *mac, + uint8_t *mac_external, size_t mac_size, size_t *mac_length) { - return psa_mac_compute_internal(key, alg, - input, input_length, - mac, mac_size, mac_length, 1); + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(mac_external, mac); + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(mac_external, mac_size, mac); + status = psa_mac_compute_internal(key, alg, + input, input_length, + mac, mac_size, mac_length, 1); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(mac_external, mac); + + return status; } psa_status_t psa_mac_verify(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg, - const uint8_t *input, + const uint8_t *input_external, size_t input_length, - const uint8_t *mac, + const uint8_t *mac_external, size_t mac_length) { psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; uint8_t actual_mac[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE]; size_t actual_mac_length; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(mac_external, mac); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); status = psa_mac_compute_internal(key, alg, input, input_length, actual_mac, sizeof(actual_mac), @@ -2687,13 +2893,17 @@ psa_status_t psa_mac_verify(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; goto exit; } - if (mbedtls_psa_safer_memcmp(mac, actual_mac, actual_mac_length) != 0) { + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(mac_external, mac_length, mac); + if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(mac, actual_mac, actual_mac_length) != 0) { status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; goto exit; } exit: mbedtls_platform_zeroize(actual_mac, sizeof(actual_mac)); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(mac_external, mac); return status; } @@ -2735,7 +2945,6 @@ static psa_status_t psa_sign_internal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, { psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_attributes_t attributes; psa_key_slot_t *slot; *signature_length = 0; @@ -2768,39 +2977,25 @@ static psa_status_t psa_sign_internal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, goto exit; } - attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) { - .core = slot->attr - }; - if (input_is_message) { status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_message( - &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, alg, input, input_length, signature, signature_size, signature_length); } else { status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash( - &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, alg, input, input_length, signature, signature_size, signature_length); } exit: - /* Fill the unused part of the output buffer (the whole buffer on error, - * the trailing part on success) with something that isn't a valid signature - * (barring an attack on the signature and deliberately-crafted input), - * in case the caller doesn't check the return status properly. */ - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - memset(signature + *signature_length, '!', - signature_size - *signature_length); - } else { - memset(signature, '!', signature_size); - } - /* If signature_size is 0 then we have nothing to do. We must not call - * memset because signature may be NULL in this case. */ + psa_wipe_tag_output_buffer(signature, status, signature_size, + *signature_length); - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; } @@ -2832,23 +3027,19 @@ static psa_status_t psa_verify_internal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, return status; } - psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { - .core = slot->attr - }; - if (input_is_message) { status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_message( - &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, alg, input, input_length, signature, signature_length); } else { status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash( - &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, alg, input, input_length, signature, signature_length); } - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; @@ -2891,15 +3082,27 @@ psa_status_t psa_sign_message_builtin( psa_status_t psa_sign_message(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg, - const uint8_t *input, + const uint8_t *input_external, size_t input_length, - uint8_t *signature, + uint8_t *signature_external, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length) { - return psa_sign_internal( - key, 1, alg, input, input_length, - signature, signature_size, signature_length); + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(signature_external, signature); + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(signature_external, signature_size, signature); + status = psa_sign_internal(key, 1, alg, input, input_length, signature, + signature_size, signature_length); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(signature_external, signature); + return status; } psa_status_t psa_verify_message_builtin( @@ -2938,14 +3141,27 @@ psa_status_t psa_verify_message_builtin( psa_status_t psa_verify_message(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg, - const uint8_t *input, + const uint8_t *input_external, size_t input_length, - const uint8_t *signature, + const uint8_t *signature_external, size_t signature_length) { - return psa_verify_internal( - key, 1, alg, input, input_length, - signature, signature_length); + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(signature_external, signature); + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(signature_external, signature_length, signature); + status = psa_verify_internal(key, 1, alg, input, input_length, signature, + signature_length); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(signature_external, signature); + + return status; } psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_builtin( @@ -2954,7 +3170,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_builtin( psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length) { - if (attributes->core.type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) { + if (attributes->type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) { if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg)) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ @@ -2969,7 +3185,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_builtin( } else { return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } - } else if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(attributes->core.type)) { + } else if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(attributes->type)) { if (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg)) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) @@ -2998,15 +3214,28 @@ psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_builtin( psa_status_t psa_sign_hash(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg, - const uint8_t *hash, + const uint8_t *hash_external, size_t hash_length, - uint8_t *signature, + uint8_t *signature_external, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length) { - return psa_sign_internal( - key, 0, alg, hash, hash_length, - signature, signature_size, signature_length); + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(hash_external, hash); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(signature_external, signature); + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(hash_external, hash_length, hash); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(signature_external, signature_size, signature); + status = psa_sign_internal(key, 0, alg, hash, hash_length, signature, + signature_size, signature_length); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(hash_external, hash); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(signature_external, signature); + + return status; } psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_builtin( @@ -3015,7 +3244,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_builtin( psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length) { - if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(attributes->core.type)) { + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(attributes->type)) { if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg)) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ @@ -3030,7 +3259,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_builtin( } else { return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } - } else if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(attributes->core.type)) { + } else if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(attributes->type)) { if (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg)) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) @@ -3058,34 +3287,36 @@ psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_builtin( psa_status_t psa_verify_hash(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg, - const uint8_t *hash, + const uint8_t *hash_external, size_t hash_length, - const uint8_t *signature, + const uint8_t *signature_external, size_t signature_length) { - return psa_verify_internal( - key, 0, alg, hash, hash_length, - signature, signature_length); -} + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(hash_external, hash); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(signature_external, signature); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) -static void psa_rsa_oaep_set_padding_mode(psa_algorithm_t alg, - mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa) -{ - psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH(alg); - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_psa(hash_alg); - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type(md_info); - mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_alg); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(hash_external, hash_length, hash); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(signature_external, signature_length, signature); + status = psa_verify_internal(key, 0, alg, hash, hash_length, signature, + signature_length); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(hash_external, hash); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(signature_external, signature); + + return status; } -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg, - const uint8_t *input, + const uint8_t *input_external, size_t input_length, - const uint8_t *salt, + const uint8_t *salt_external, size_t salt_length, - uint8_t *output, + uint8_t *output_external, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length) { @@ -3093,6 +3324,10 @@ psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; psa_key_slot_t *slot; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(salt_external, salt); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + (void) input; (void) input_length; (void) salt; @@ -3105,7 +3340,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } - status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT, alg); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { return status; @@ -3116,84 +3351,31 @@ psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, goto exit; } - if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(slot->attr.type)) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) - mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; - status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation(slot->attr.type, - slot->key.data, - slot->key.bytes, - &rsa); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - goto rsa_exit; - } - - if (output_size < mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa)) { - status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; - goto rsa_exit; - } -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || - * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ - if (alg == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) - status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( - mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(rsa, - mbedtls_psa_get_random, - MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, - MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, - input_length, - input, - output)); -#else - status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT */ - } else - if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg)) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) - psa_rsa_oaep_set_padding_mode(alg, rsa); - status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( - mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(rsa, - mbedtls_psa_get_random, - MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, - MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, - salt, salt_length, - input_length, - input, - output)); -#else - status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP */ - } else { - status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) -rsa_exit: - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - *output_length = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa); - } - - mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa); - mbedtls_free(rsa); -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || - * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ - } else { - status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - } + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(salt_external, salt_length, salt); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_size, output); + status = psa_driver_wrapper_asymmetric_encrypt( + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, salt, salt_length, + output, output_size, output_length); exit: - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(salt_external, salt); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; } psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg, - const uint8_t *input, + const uint8_t *input_external, size_t input_length, - const uint8_t *salt, + const uint8_t *salt_external, size_t salt_length, - uint8_t *output, + uint8_t *output_external, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length) { @@ -3201,6 +3383,10 @@ psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; psa_key_slot_t *slot; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(salt_external, salt); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + (void) input; (void) input_length; (void) salt; @@ -3213,7 +3399,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } - status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT, alg); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { return status; @@ -3223,322 +3409,213 @@ psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, goto exit; } - if (slot->attr.type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) - mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; - status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation(slot->attr.type, - slot->key.data, - slot->key.bytes, - &rsa); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - goto exit; - } - - if (input_length != mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa)) { - status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - goto rsa_exit; - } -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || - * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ - - if (alg == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) - status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( - mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(rsa, - mbedtls_psa_get_random, - MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, - MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, - output_length, - input, - output, - output_size)); -#else - status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT */ - } else - if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg)) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) - psa_rsa_oaep_set_padding_mode(alg, rsa); - status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( - mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(rsa, - mbedtls_psa_get_random, - MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, - MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, - salt, salt_length, - output_length, - input, - output, - output_size)); -#else - status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP */ - } else { - status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(salt_external, salt_length, salt); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_size, output); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) -rsa_exit: - mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa); - mbedtls_free(rsa); -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || - * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ - } else { - status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - } + status = psa_driver_wrapper_asymmetric_decrypt( + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, salt, salt_length, + output, output_size, output_length); exit: - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(salt_external, salt); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; } - - /****************************************************************/ -/* Symmetric cryptography */ +/* Asymmetric interruptible cryptography */ /****************************************************************/ -static psa_status_t psa_cipher_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, - mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, - psa_algorithm_t alg, - mbedtls_operation_t cipher_operation) -{ - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_attributes_t attributes; - psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; - psa_key_usage_t usage = (cipher_operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ? - PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT : - PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT); +static uint32_t psa_interruptible_max_ops = PSA_INTERRUPTIBLE_MAX_OPS_UNLIMITED; - /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ - if (operation->id != 0) { - status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; - goto exit; - } +void psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(uint32_t max_ops) +{ + psa_interruptible_max_ops = max_ops; +} - if (!PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg)) { - status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - goto exit; - } +uint32_t psa_interruptible_get_max_ops(void) +{ + return psa_interruptible_max_ops; +} - status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(key, &slot, usage, alg); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - goto exit; - } +uint32_t psa_sign_hash_get_num_ops( + const psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) +{ + return operation->num_ops; +} - /* Initialize the operation struct members, except for id. The id member - * is used to indicate to psa_cipher_abort that there are resources to free, - * so we only set it (in the driver wrapper) after resources have been - * allocated/initialized. */ - operation->iv_set = 0; - if (alg == PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) { - operation->iv_required = 0; - } else if (slot->attr.type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4) { - operation->iv_required = 0; - } else { - operation->iv_required = 1; - } - operation->default_iv_length = PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(slot->attr.type, alg); - - attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) { - .core = slot->attr - }; +uint32_t psa_verify_hash_get_num_ops( + const psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) +{ + return operation->num_ops; +} - /* Try doing the operation through a driver before using software fallback. */ - if (cipher_operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT) { - status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt_setup(operation, - &attributes, - slot->key.data, - slot->key.bytes, - alg); - } else { - status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt_setup(operation, - &attributes, - slot->key.data, - slot->key.bytes, - alg); +static psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_abort_internal( + psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) +{ + if (operation->id == 0) { + /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not (yet) + * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's + * nothing to do. */ + return PSA_SUCCESS; } -exit: - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - psa_cipher_abort(operation); - } + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash_abort(operation); - return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; -} + operation->id = 0; -psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, - mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, - psa_algorithm_t alg) -{ - return psa_cipher_setup(operation, key, alg, MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT); -} + /* Do not clear either the error_occurred or num_ops elements here as they + * only want to be cleared by the application calling abort, not by abort + * being called at completion of an operation. */ -psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, - mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, - psa_algorithm_t alg) -{ - return psa_cipher_setup(operation, key, alg, MBEDTLS_DECRYPT); + return status; } -psa_status_t psa_cipher_generate_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, - uint8_t *iv, - size_t iv_size, - size_t *iv_length) +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_start( + psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash_external, size_t hash_length) { psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - uint8_t local_iv[PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE]; - size_t default_iv_length = 0; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; - if (operation->id == 0) { - status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; - goto exit; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(hash_external, hash); + + /* Check that start has not been previously called, or operation has not + * previously errored. */ + if (operation->id != 0 || operation->error_occurred) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; } - if (operation->iv_set || !operation->iv_required) { - status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; - goto exit; + status = psa_sign_verify_check_alg(0, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->error_occurred = 1; + return status; } - default_iv_length = operation->default_iv_length; - if (iv_size < default_iv_length) { - status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(key, &slot, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH, + alg); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { goto exit; } - if (default_iv_length > PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE) { - status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(slot->attr.type)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto exit; } - status = psa_generate_random(local_iv, default_iv_length); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(hash_external, hash_length, hash); + + /* Ensure ops count gets reset, in case of operation re-use. */ + operation->num_ops = 0; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash_start(operation, &slot->attr, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, alg, + hash, hash_length); +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - goto exit; + operation->error_occurred = 1; + psa_sign_hash_abort_internal(operation); } - status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_set_iv(operation, - local_iv, default_iv_length); + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); -exit: - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - memcpy(iv, local_iv, default_iv_length); - *iv_length = default_iv_length; - operation->iv_set = 1; - } else { - *iv_length = 0; - psa_cipher_abort(operation); + if (unlock_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->error_occurred = 1; } - return status; + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(hash_external, hash); + + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; } -psa_status_t psa_cipher_set_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, - const uint8_t *iv, - size_t iv_length) + +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_complete( + psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *signature_external, size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length) { psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - if (operation->id == 0) { - status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; - goto exit; - } + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(signature_external, signature); - if (operation->iv_set || !operation->iv_required) { + *signature_length = 0; + + /* Check that start has been called first, and that operation has not + * previously errored. */ + if (operation->id == 0 || operation->error_occurred) { status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; goto exit; } - if (iv_length > PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE) { - status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + /* Immediately reject a zero-length signature buffer. This guarantees that + * signature must be a valid pointer. */ + if (signature_size == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; goto exit; } - status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_set_iv(operation, - iv, - iv_length); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(signature_external, signature_size, signature); -exit: - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - operation->iv_set = 1; - } else { - psa_cipher_abort(operation); - } - return status; -} + status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash_complete(operation, signature, + signature_size, + signature_length); -psa_status_t psa_cipher_update(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, - const uint8_t *input, - size_t input_length, - uint8_t *output, - size_t output_size, - size_t *output_length) -{ - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + /* Update ops count with work done. */ + operation->num_ops = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash_get_num_ops(operation); - if (operation->id == 0) { - status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; - goto exit; - } +exit: - if (operation->iv_required && !operation->iv_set) { - status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; - goto exit; + if (signature != NULL) { + psa_wipe_tag_output_buffer(signature, status, signature_size, + *signature_length); } - status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_update(operation, - input, - input_length, - output, - output_size, - output_length); + if (status != PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE) { + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->error_occurred = 1; + } -exit: - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - psa_cipher_abort(operation); + psa_sign_hash_abort_internal(operation); } + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(signature_external, signature); + return status; } -psa_status_t psa_cipher_finish(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, - uint8_t *output, - size_t output_size, - size_t *output_length) +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_abort( + psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) { - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; - - if (operation->id == 0) { - status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; - goto exit; - } + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - if (operation->iv_required && !operation->iv_set) { - status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; - goto exit; - } + status = psa_sign_hash_abort_internal(operation); - status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_finish(operation, - output, - output_size, - output_length); + /* We clear the number of ops done here, so that it is not cleared when + * the operation fails or succeeds, only on manual abort. */ + operation->num_ops = 0; -exit: - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - return psa_cipher_abort(operation); - } else { - *output_length = 0; - (void) psa_cipher_abort(operation); + /* Likewise, failure state. */ + operation->error_occurred = 0; - return status; - } + return status; } -psa_status_t psa_cipher_abort(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation) +static psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_abort_internal( + psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) { if (operation->id == 0) { /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not (yet) @@ -3547,771 +3624,4307 @@ psa_status_t psa_cipher_abort(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation) return PSA_SUCCESS; } - psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_abort(operation); + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash_abort(operation); operation->id = 0; - operation->iv_set = 0; - operation->iv_required = 0; - return PSA_SUCCESS; + /* Do not clear either the error_occurred or num_ops elements here as they + * only want to be cleared by the application calling abort, not by abort + * being called at completion of an operation. */ + + return status; } -psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, - psa_algorithm_t alg, - const uint8_t *input, - size_t input_length, - uint8_t *output, - size_t output_size, - size_t *output_length) +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_start( + psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash_external, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature_external, size_t signature_length) { psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_attributes_t attributes; - psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; - uint8_t local_iv[PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE]; - size_t default_iv_length = 0; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; - if (!PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg)) { - status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - goto exit; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(hash_external, hash); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(signature_external, signature); + + /* Check that start has not been previously called, or operation has not + * previously errored. */ + if (operation->id != 0 || operation->error_occurred) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + status = psa_sign_verify_check_alg(0, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->error_occurred = 1; + return status; } status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(key, &slot, - PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - goto exit; + operation->error_occurred = 1; + return status; } - attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) { - .core = slot->attr - }; + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(hash_external, hash_length, hash); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(signature_external, signature_length, signature); - default_iv_length = PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(slot->attr.type, alg); - if (default_iv_length > PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE) { - status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; - goto exit; - } + /* Ensure ops count gets reset, in case of operation re-use. */ + operation->num_ops = 0; - if (default_iv_length > 0) { - if (output_size < default_iv_length) { - status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; - goto exit; - } + status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash_start(operation, &slot->attr, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif - status = psa_generate_random(local_iv, default_iv_length); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - goto exit; - } + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->error_occurred = 1; + psa_verify_hash_abort_internal(operation); } - status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt( - &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, - alg, local_iv, default_iv_length, input, input_length, - mbedtls_buffer_offset(output, default_iv_length), - output_size - default_iv_length, output_length); + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); -exit: - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - status = unlock_status; + if (unlock_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->error_occurred = 1; } - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - if (default_iv_length > 0) { - memcpy(output, local_iv, default_iv_length); - } - *output_length += default_iv_length; - } else { - *output_length = 0; - } + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(hash_external, hash); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(signature_external, signature); - return status; + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; } -psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, - psa_algorithm_t alg, - const uint8_t *input, - size_t input_length, - uint8_t *output, - size_t output_size, - size_t *output_length) +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_complete( + psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) { psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_attributes_t attributes; - psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; - if (!PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg)) { - status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + /* Check that start has been called first, and that operation has not + * previously errored. */ + if (operation->id == 0 || operation->error_occurred) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; goto exit; } - status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(key, &slot, - PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT, - alg); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - goto exit; - } + status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash_complete(operation); - attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) { - .core = slot->attr - }; - - if (input_length < PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(slot->attr.type, alg)) { - status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - goto exit; - } - - status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt( - &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, - alg, input, input_length, - output, output_size, output_length); + /* Update ops count with work done. */ + operation->num_ops = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash_get_num_ops( + operation); exit: - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - status = unlock_status; - } - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - *output_length = 0; + if (status != PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE) { + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->error_occurred = 1; + } + + psa_verify_hash_abort_internal(operation); } return status; } +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_abort( + psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + status = psa_verify_hash_abort_internal(operation); + + /* We clear the number of ops done here, so that it is not cleared when + * the operation fails or succeeds, only on manual abort. */ + operation->num_ops = 0; + + /* Likewise, failure state. */ + operation->error_occurred = 0; + + return status; +} /****************************************************************/ -/* AEAD */ +/* Asymmetric interruptible cryptography internal */ +/* implementations */ /****************************************************************/ -psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, - psa_algorithm_t alg, - const uint8_t *nonce, - size_t nonce_length, - const uint8_t *additional_data, - size_t additional_data_length, - const uint8_t *plaintext, - size_t plaintext_length, - uint8_t *ciphertext, - size_t ciphertext_size, - size_t *ciphertext_length) +void mbedtls_psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(uint32_t max_ops) { - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_slot_t *slot; - - *ciphertext_length = 0; - if (!PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD(alg)) { - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - } +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( - key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT, alg); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; + /* Internal implementation uses zero to indicate infinite number max ops, + * therefore avoid this value, and set to minimum possible. */ + if (max_ops == 0) { + max_ops = 1; } - psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { - .core = slot->attr - }; + mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(max_ops); +#else + (void) max_ops; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ +} - status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_encrypt( - &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, - alg, - nonce, nonce_length, - additional_data, additional_data_length, - plaintext, plaintext_length, - ciphertext, ciphertext_size, ciphertext_length); +uint32_t mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_get_num_ops( + const mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) +{ +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS && ciphertext_size != 0) { - memset(ciphertext, 0, ciphertext_size); - } + return operation->num_ops; +#else + (void) operation; + return 0; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ +} - psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); +uint32_t mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_get_num_ops( + const mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) +{ + #if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - return status; + return operation->num_ops; +#else + (void) operation; + return 0; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ } -psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, - psa_algorithm_t alg, - const uint8_t *nonce, - size_t nonce_length, - const uint8_t *additional_data, - size_t additional_data_length, - const uint8_t *ciphertext, - size_t ciphertext_length, - uint8_t *plaintext, - size_t plaintext_size, - size_t *plaintext_length) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_start( + mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length) { psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_slot_t *slot; + size_t required_hash_length; - *plaintext_length = 0; + if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(attributes->type)) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } - if (!PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD(alg)) { + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg)) { return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } - status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( - key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT, alg); +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init(&operation->restart_ctx); + + /* Ensure num_ops is zero'ed in case of context re-use. */ + operation->num_ops = 0; + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(attributes->type, + attributes->bits, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &operation->ctx); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { return status; } - psa_key_attributes_t attributes = { - .core = slot->attr - }; + operation->coordinate_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( + operation->ctx->grp.nbits); - status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_decrypt( - &attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, - alg, - nonce, nonce_length, - additional_data, additional_data_length, - ciphertext, ciphertext_length, - plaintext, plaintext_size, plaintext_length); + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg); + operation->md_alg = mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(hash_alg); + operation->alg = alg; - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS && plaintext_size != 0) { - memset(plaintext, 0, plaintext_size); + /* We only need to store the same length of hash as the private key size + * here, it would be truncated by the internal implementation anyway. */ + required_hash_length = (hash_length < operation->coordinate_bytes ? + hash_length : operation->coordinate_bytes); + + if (required_hash_length > sizeof(operation->hash)) { + /* Shouldn't happen, but better safe than sorry. */ + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; } - psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + memcpy(operation->hash, hash, required_hash_length); + operation->hash_length = required_hash_length; - return status; -} + return PSA_SUCCESS; -/****************************************************************/ -/* Generators */ -/****************************************************************/ +#else + (void) operation; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + (void) hash; + (void) hash_length; + (void) status; + (void) required_hash_length; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) -#define AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF -#endif /* At least one builtin KDF */ + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ +} -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) -static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_start_hmac( - psa_mac_operation_t *operation, - psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, - const uint8_t *hmac_key, - size_t hmac_key_length) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_complete( + mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length) { +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; - psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC); - psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(hmac_key_length)); - psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH); + mbedtls_mpi r; + mbedtls_mpi s; - operation->is_sign = 1; - operation->mac_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&r); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&s); - status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup(operation, - &attributes, - hmac_key, hmac_key_length, - PSA_ALG_HMAC(hash_alg)); + /* Ensure max_ops is set to the current value (or default). */ + mbedtls_psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(psa_interruptible_get_max_ops()); - psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); - return status; -} -#endif /* KDF algorithms reliant on HMAC */ + if (signature_size < 2 * operation->coordinate_bytes) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } -#define HKDF_STATE_INIT 0 /* no input yet */ -#define HKDF_STATE_STARTED 1 /* got salt */ -#define HKDF_STATE_KEYED 2 /* got key */ -#define HKDF_STATE_OUTPUT 3 /* output started */ + if (PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(operation->alg)) { -static psa_algorithm_t psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg( - const psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation) -{ - if (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(operation->alg)) { - return PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(operation->alg); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(&operation->ctx->grp, + &r, + &s, + &operation->ctx->d, + operation->hash, + operation->hash_length, + operation->md_alg, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + &operation->restart_ctx)); +#else /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ } else { - return operation->alg; - } -} + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_restartable(&operation->ctx->grp, + &r, + &s, + &operation->ctx->d, + operation->hash, + operation->hash_length, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + &operation->restart_ctx)); + } + + /* Hide the fact that the restart context only holds a delta of number of + * ops done during the last operation, not an absolute value. */ + operation->num_ops += operation->restart_ctx.ecp.ops_done; -psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_abort(psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation) -{ - psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; - psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg(operation); - if (kdf_alg == 0) { - /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not - * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's - * nothing to do. */ - } else -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) - if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF(kdf_alg)) { - mbedtls_free(operation->ctx.hkdf.info); - status = psa_mac_abort(&operation->ctx.hkdf.hmac); - } else -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) - if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(kdf_alg) || - /* TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MS KDF uses the same core as TLS-1.2 PRF */ - PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(kdf_alg)) { - if (operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret, - operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret_length); - mbedtls_free(operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret); - } + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&r, + signature, + operation->coordinate_bytes) + ); - if (operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed, - operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed_length); - mbedtls_free(operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; } - if (operation->ctx.tls12_prf.label != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(operation->ctx.tls12_prf.label, - operation->ctx.tls12_prf.label_length); - mbedtls_free(operation->ctx.tls12_prf.label); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&s, + signature + + operation->coordinate_bytes, + operation->coordinate_bytes) + ); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; } - status = PSA_SUCCESS; + *signature_length = operation->coordinate_bytes * 2; - /* We leave the fields Ai and output_block to be erased safely by the - * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() in the end of this function. */ - } else -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || - * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) */ - { - status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + status = PSA_SUCCESS; } - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(operation, sizeof(*operation)); + +exit: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&r); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&s); return status; + + #else + + (void) operation; + (void) signature; + (void) signature_size; + (void) signature_length; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ } -psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_get_capacity(const psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, - size_t *capacity) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_abort( + mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) { - if (operation->alg == 0) { - /* This is a blank key derivation operation. */ - return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + + if (operation->ctx) { + mbedtls_ecdsa_free(operation->ctx); + mbedtls_free(operation->ctx); + operation->ctx = NULL; } - *capacity = operation->capacity; + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free(&operation->restart_ctx); + + operation->num_ops = 0; + return PSA_SUCCESS; + +#else + + (void) operation; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ } -psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_set_capacity(psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, - size_t capacity) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_start( + mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length) { - if (operation->alg == 0) { - return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t coordinate_bytes = 0; + size_t required_hash_length = 0; + + if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(attributes->type)) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } - if (capacity > operation->capacity) { - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } - operation->capacity = capacity; - return PSA_SUCCESS; -} -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) -/* Read some bytes from an HKDF-based operation. This performs a chunk - * of the expand phase of the HKDF algorithm. */ -static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_hkdf_read(psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t *hkdf, - psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, - uint8_t *output, - size_t output_length) -{ - uint8_t hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); - size_t hmac_output_length; - psa_status_t status; +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - if (hkdf->state < HKDF_STATE_KEYED || !hkdf->info_set) { - return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init(&operation->restart_ctx); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&operation->r); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&operation->s); + + /* Ensure num_ops is zero'ed in case of context re-use. */ + operation->num_ops = 0; + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(attributes->type, + attributes->bits, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &operation->ctx); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; } - hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_OUTPUT; - while (output_length != 0) { - /* Copy what remains of the current block */ - uint8_t n = hash_length - hkdf->offset_in_block; - if (n > output_length) { - n = (uint8_t) output_length; - } - memcpy(output, hkdf->output_block + hkdf->offset_in_block, n); - output += n; - output_length -= n; - hkdf->offset_in_block += n; - if (output_length == 0) { - break; - } - /* We can't be wanting more output after block 0xff, otherwise - * the capacity check in psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() would have - * prevented this call. It could happen only if the operation - * object was corrupted or if this function is called directly - * inside the library. */ - if (hkdf->block_number == 0xff) { - return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; - } - - /* We need a new block */ - ++hkdf->block_number; - hkdf->offset_in_block = 0; - - status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac(&hkdf->hmac, - hash_alg, - hkdf->prk, - hash_length); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } + coordinate_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(operation->ctx->grp.nbits); - if (hkdf->block_number != 1) { - status = psa_mac_update(&hkdf->hmac, - hkdf->output_block, - hash_length); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } - } - status = psa_mac_update(&hkdf->hmac, - hkdf->info, - hkdf->info_length); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } - status = psa_mac_update(&hkdf->hmac, - &hkdf->block_number, 1); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } - status = psa_mac_sign_finish(&hkdf->hmac, - hkdf->output_block, - sizeof(hkdf->output_block), - &hmac_output_length); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } + if (signature_length != 2 * coordinate_bytes) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; } - return PSA_SUCCESS; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) -static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_generate_next_block( - psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *tls12_prf, - psa_algorithm_t alg) -{ - psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH(alg); - uint8_t hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); - psa_mac_operation_t hmac = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; - size_t hmac_output_length; - psa_status_t status, cleanup_status; + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&operation->r, + signature, + coordinate_bytes)); - /* We can't be wanting more output after block 0xff, otherwise - * the capacity check in psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() would have - * prevented this call. It could happen only if the operation - * object was corrupted or if this function is called directly - * inside the library. */ - if (tls12_prf->block_number == 0xff) { - return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; } - /* We need a new block */ - ++tls12_prf->block_number; - tls12_prf->left_in_block = hash_length; - - /* Recall the definition of the TLS-1.2-PRF from RFC 5246: - * - * PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_(secret, label + seed) - * - * P_hash(secret, seed) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(1) + seed) + - * HMAC_hash(secret, A(2) + seed) + - * HMAC_hash(secret, A(3) + seed) + ... - * - * A(0) = seed - * A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1)) - * - * The `psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation` structure saves the block - * `HMAC_hash(secret, A(i) + seed)` from which the output - * is currently extracted as `output_block` and where i is - * `block_number`. - */ + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&operation->s, + signature + + coordinate_bytes, + coordinate_bytes)); - status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac(&hmac, - hash_alg, - tls12_prf->secret, - tls12_prf->secret_length); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - goto cleanup; + return status; } - /* Calculate A(i) where i = tls12_prf->block_number. */ - if (tls12_prf->block_number == 1) { - /* A(1) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(0)), where A(0) = seed. (The RFC overloads - * the variable seed and in this instance means it in the context of the - * P_hash function, where seed = label + seed.) */ - status = psa_mac_update(&hmac, - tls12_prf->label, - tls12_prf->label_length); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - goto cleanup; - } - status = psa_mac_update(&hmac, - tls12_prf->seed, - tls12_prf->seed_length); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - goto cleanup; - } - } else { - /* A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1)) */ - status = psa_mac_update(&hmac, tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - goto cleanup; - } - } + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_public_part(operation->ctx); - status = psa_mac_sign_finish(&hmac, - tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length, - &hmac_output_length); - if (hmac_output_length != hash_length) { - status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - } if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - goto cleanup; + return status; } - /* Calculate HMAC_hash(secret, A(i) + label + seed). */ - status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac(&hmac, - hash_alg, - tls12_prf->secret, - tls12_prf->secret_length); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - goto cleanup; - } - status = psa_mac_update(&hmac, tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - goto cleanup; - } - status = psa_mac_update(&hmac, tls12_prf->label, tls12_prf->label_length); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - goto cleanup; - } - status = psa_mac_update(&hmac, tls12_prf->seed, tls12_prf->seed_length); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - goto cleanup; - } - status = psa_mac_sign_finish(&hmac, - tls12_prf->output_block, hash_length, - &hmac_output_length); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - goto cleanup; + /* We only need to store the same length of hash as the private key size + * here, it would be truncated by the internal implementation anyway. */ + required_hash_length = (hash_length < coordinate_bytes ? hash_length : + coordinate_bytes); + + if (required_hash_length > sizeof(operation->hash)) { + /* Shouldn't happen, but better safe than sorry. */ + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; } + memcpy(operation->hash, hash, required_hash_length); + operation->hash_length = required_hash_length; -cleanup: - cleanup_status = psa_mac_abort(&hmac); - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS && cleanup_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - status = cleanup_status; - } + return PSA_SUCCESS; +#else + (void) operation; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + (void) hash; + (void) hash_length; + (void) signature; + (void) signature_length; + (void) status; + (void) coordinate_bytes; + (void) required_hash_length; - return status; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ } -static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_read( - psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *tls12_prf, - psa_algorithm_t alg, - uint8_t *output, - size_t output_length) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_complete( + mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) { - psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_GET_HASH(alg); - uint8_t hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); - psa_status_t status; - uint8_t offset, length; - switch (tls12_prf->state) { - case PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_LABEL_SET: - tls12_prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OUTPUT; - break; - case PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OUTPUT: - break; - default: - return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; - } +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - while (output_length != 0) { - /* Check if we have fully processed the current block. */ - if (tls12_prf->left_in_block == 0) { - status = psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_generate_next_block(tls12_prf, - alg); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - continue; - } + /* Ensure max_ops is set to the current value (or default). */ + mbedtls_psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(psa_interruptible_get_max_ops()); - if (tls12_prf->left_in_block > output_length) { - length = (uint8_t) output_length; - } else { - length = tls12_prf->left_in_block; - } + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecdsa_verify_restartable(&operation->ctx->grp, + operation->hash, + operation->hash_length, + &operation->ctx->Q, + &operation->r, + &operation->s, + &operation->restart_ctx)); + + /* Hide the fact that the restart context only holds a delta of number of + * ops done during the last operation, not an absolute value. */ + operation->num_ops += operation->restart_ctx.ecp.ops_done; - offset = hash_length - tls12_prf->left_in_block; - memcpy(output, tls12_prf->output_block + offset, length); - output += length; - output_length -= length; - tls12_prf->left_in_block -= length; - } + return status; +#else + (void) operation; - return PSA_SUCCESS; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF || - * MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ -psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( - psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, - uint8_t *output, - size_t output_length) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_abort( + mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) { - psa_status_t status; - psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg(operation); - if (operation->alg == 0) { - /* This is a blank operation. */ - return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; - } +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - if (output_length > operation->capacity) { - operation->capacity = 0; - /* Go through the error path to wipe all confidential data now - * that the operation object is useless. */ - status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA; - goto exit; + if (operation->ctx) { + mbedtls_ecdsa_free(operation->ctx); + mbedtls_free(operation->ctx); + operation->ctx = NULL; } - if (output_length == 0 && operation->capacity == 0) { - /* Edge case: this is a finished operation, and 0 bytes - * were requested. The right error in this case could - * be either INSUFFICIENT_CAPACITY or BAD_STATE. Return - * INSUFFICIENT_CAPACITY, which is right for a finished - * operation, for consistency with the case when - * output_length > 0. */ - return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA; + + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free(&operation->restart_ctx); + + operation->num_ops = 0; + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&operation->r); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&operation->s); + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + +#else + (void) operation; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ +} + +static psa_status_t psa_generate_random_internal(uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size) +{ + GUARD_MODULE_INITIALIZED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + + psa_status_t status; + size_t output_length = 0; + status = mbedtls_psa_external_get_random(&global_data.rng, + output, output_size, + &output_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + /* Breaking up a request into smaller chunks is currently not supported + * for the external RNG interface. */ + if (output_length != output_size) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY; + } + return PSA_SUCCESS; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + + while (output_size > 0) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED; + size_t request_size = + (output_size > MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST ? + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST : + output_size); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(&global_data.rng.drbg, output, request_size); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(&global_data.rng.drbg, output, request_size); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && !MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ + if (ret != 0) { + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + } + output_size -= request_size; + output += request_size; + } + return PSA_SUCCESS; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +} + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Symmetric cryptography */ +/****************************************************************/ + +static psa_status_t psa_cipher_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_operation_t cipher_operation) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_key_usage_t usage = (cipher_operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ? + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT : + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT); + + /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ + if (operation->id != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(key, &slot, usage, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + /* Initialize the operation struct members, except for id. The id member + * is used to indicate to psa_cipher_abort that there are resources to free, + * so we only set it (in the driver wrapper) after resources have been + * allocated/initialized. */ + operation->iv_set = 0; + if (alg == PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) { + operation->iv_required = 0; + } else { + operation->iv_required = 1; + } + operation->default_iv_length = PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(slot->attr.type, alg); + + /* Try doing the operation through a driver before using software fallback. */ + if (cipher_operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT) { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt_setup(operation, + &slot->attr, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg); + } else { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt_setup(operation, + &slot->attr, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg); + } + +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_cipher_abort(operation); + } + + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + return psa_cipher_setup(operation, key, alg, MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT); +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + return psa_cipher_setup(operation, key, alg, MBEDTLS_DECRYPT); +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_generate_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *iv_external, + size_t iv_size, + size_t *iv_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t default_iv_length = 0; + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(iv_external, iv); + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->iv_set || !operation->iv_required) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + default_iv_length = operation->default_iv_length; + if (iv_size < default_iv_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + if (default_iv_length > PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE) { + status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(iv_external, default_iv_length, iv); + + status = psa_generate_random_internal(iv, default_iv_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_set_iv(operation, + iv, default_iv_length); + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + *iv_length = default_iv_length; + operation->iv_set = 1; + } else { + *iv_length = 0; + psa_cipher_abort(operation); + if (iv != NULL) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(iv, default_iv_length); + } + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(iv_external, iv); + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_set_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv_external, + size_t iv_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(iv_external, iv); + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->iv_set || !operation->iv_required) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (iv_length > PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(iv_external, iv_length, iv); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_set_iv(operation, + iv, + iv_length); + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->iv_set = 1; + } else { + psa_cipher_abort(operation); + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(iv_external, iv); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_update(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->iv_required && !operation->iv_set) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_size, output); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_update(operation, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length); + +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_cipher_abort(operation); + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_finish(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->iv_required && !operation->iv_set) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_size, output); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_finish(operation, + output, + output_size, + output_length); + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = psa_cipher_abort(operation); + } else { + *output_length = 0; + (void) psa_cipher_abort(operation); + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_abort(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation) +{ + if (operation->id == 0) { + /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not (yet) + * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's + * nothing to do. */ + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + + psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_abort(operation); + + operation->id = 0; + operation->iv_set = 0; + operation->iv_required = 0; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + uint8_t local_iv[PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t default_iv_length = 0; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(key, &slot, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT, + alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + default_iv_length = PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(slot->attr.type, alg); + if (default_iv_length > PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE) { + status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + + if (default_iv_length > 0) { + if (output_size < default_iv_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_generate_random_internal(local_iv, default_iv_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_size, output); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt( + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, local_iv, default_iv_length, input, input_length, + psa_crypto_buffer_offset(output, default_iv_length), + output_size - default_iv_length, output_length); + +exit: + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = unlock_status; + } + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + if (default_iv_length > 0) { + memcpy(output, local_iv, default_iv_length); + } + *output_length += default_iv_length; + } else { + *output_length = 0; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(key, &slot, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT, + alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (alg == PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG && + input_length < PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(slot->attr.type)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } else if (input_length < PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(slot->attr.type, alg)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_size, output); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt( + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length); + +exit: + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = unlock_status; + } + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + *output_length = 0; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + + return status; +} + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* AEAD */ +/****************************************************************/ + +/* Helper function to get the base algorithm from its variants. */ +static psa_algorithm_t psa_aead_get_base_algorithm(psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + return PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG(alg); +} + +/* Helper function to perform common nonce length checks. */ +static psa_status_t psa_aead_check_nonce_length(psa_algorithm_t alg, + size_t nonce_length) +{ + psa_algorithm_t base_alg = psa_aead_get_base_algorithm(alg); + + switch (base_alg) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) + case PSA_ALG_GCM: + /* Not checking max nonce size here as GCM spec allows almost + * arbitrarily large nonces. Please note that we do not generally + * recommend the usage of nonces of greater length than + * PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE, as large nonces are hashed to a shorter + * size, which can then lead to collisions if you encrypt a very + * large number of messages.*/ + if (nonce_length != 0) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) + case PSA_ALG_CCM: + if (nonce_length >= 7 && nonce_length <= 13) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + case PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305: + if (nonce_length == 12) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } else if (nonce_length == 8) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + default: + (void) nonce_length; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_aead_check_algorithm(psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD(alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce_external, + size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data_external, + size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *plaintext_external, + size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *ciphertext_external, + size_t ciphertext_size, + size_t *ciphertext_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(nonce_external, nonce); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(additional_data_external, additional_data); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(plaintext_external, plaintext); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(ciphertext_external, ciphertext); + + *ciphertext_length = 0; + + status = psa_aead_check_algorithm(alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(nonce_external, nonce_length, nonce); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(additional_data_external, additional_data_length, additional_data); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(plaintext_external, plaintext_length, plaintext); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(ciphertext_external, ciphertext_size, ciphertext); + + status = psa_aead_check_nonce_length(alg, nonce_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_encrypt( + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + plaintext, plaintext_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_size, ciphertext_length); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS && ciphertext_size != 0) { + memset(ciphertext, 0, ciphertext_size); + } + +exit: + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(nonce_external, nonce); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(additional_data_external, additional_data); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(plaintext_external, plaintext); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(ciphertext_external, ciphertext); + + psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce_external, + size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data_external, + size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext_external, + size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *plaintext_external, + size_t plaintext_size, + size_t *plaintext_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(nonce_external, nonce); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(additional_data_external, additional_data); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(ciphertext_external, ciphertext); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(plaintext_external, plaintext); + + *plaintext_length = 0; + + status = psa_aead_check_algorithm(alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(nonce_external, nonce_length, nonce); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(additional_data_external, additional_data_length, + additional_data); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(ciphertext_external, ciphertext_length, ciphertext); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(plaintext_external, plaintext_size, plaintext); + + status = psa_aead_check_nonce_length(alg, nonce_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_decrypt( + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_length, + plaintext, plaintext_size, plaintext_length); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS && plaintext_size != 0) { + memset(plaintext, 0, plaintext_size); + } + +exit: + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(nonce_external, nonce); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(additional_data_external, additional_data); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(ciphertext_external, ciphertext); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(plaintext_external, plaintext); + + psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_validate_tag_length(psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + const uint8_t tag_len = PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg); + + switch (PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(alg, 0)) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 0): + /* CCM allows the following tag lengths: 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16.*/ + if (tag_len < 4 || tag_len > 16 || tag_len % 2) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 0): + /* GCM allows the following tag lengths: 4, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16. */ + if (tag_len != 4 && tag_len != 8 && (tag_len < 12 || tag_len > 16)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 0): + /* We only support the default tag length. */ + if (tag_len != 16) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + + default: + (void) tag_len; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/* Set the key for a multipart authenticated operation. */ +static psa_status_t psa_aead_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + int is_encrypt, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_key_usage_t key_usage = 0; + + status = psa_aead_check_algorithm(alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->id != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->nonce_set || operation->lengths_set || + operation->ad_started || operation->body_started) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (is_encrypt) { + key_usage = PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT; + } else { + key_usage = PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(key, &slot, key_usage, + alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((status = psa_validate_tag_length(alg)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (is_encrypt) { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_encrypt_setup(operation, + &slot->attr, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg); + } else { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_decrypt_setup(operation, + &slot->attr, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg); + } + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + operation->key_type = psa_get_key_type(&slot->attr); + +exit: + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = unlock_status; + operation->alg = psa_aead_get_base_algorithm(alg); + operation->is_encrypt = is_encrypt; + } else { + psa_aead_abort(operation); + } + + return status; +} + +/* Set the key for a multipart authenticated encryption operation. */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + return psa_aead_setup(operation, 1, key, alg); +} + +/* Set the key for a multipart authenticated decryption operation. */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + return psa_aead_setup(operation, 0, key, alg); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_aead_set_nonce_internal(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->nonce_set) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_aead_check_nonce_length(operation->alg, nonce_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_set_nonce(operation, nonce, + nonce_length); + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->nonce_set = 1; + } else { + psa_aead_abort(operation); + } + + return status; +} + +/* Generate a random nonce / IV for multipart AEAD operation */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_generate_nonce(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *nonce_external, + size_t nonce_size, + size_t *nonce_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint8_t local_nonce[PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t required_nonce_size = 0; + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(nonce_external, nonce); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(nonce_external, nonce_size, nonce); + + *nonce_length = 0; + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->nonce_set || !operation->is_encrypt) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + /* For CCM, this size may not be correct according to the PSA + * specification. The PSA Crypto 1.0.1 specification states: + * + * CCM encodes the plaintext length pLen in L octets, with L the smallest + * integer >= 2 where pLen < 2^(8L). The nonce length is then 15 - L bytes. + * + * However this restriction that L has to be the smallest integer is not + * applied in practice, and it is not implementable here since the + * plaintext length may or may not be known at this time. */ + required_nonce_size = PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(operation->key_type, + operation->alg); + if (nonce_size < required_nonce_size) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_generate_random_internal(local_nonce, required_nonce_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_aead_set_nonce_internal(operation, local_nonce, + required_nonce_size); + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + memcpy(nonce, local_nonce, required_nonce_size); + *nonce_length = required_nonce_size; + } else { + psa_aead_abort(operation); + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(nonce_external, nonce); + + return status; +} + +/* Set the nonce for a multipart authenticated encryption or decryption + operation.*/ +psa_status_t psa_aead_set_nonce(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *nonce_external, + size_t nonce_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(nonce_external, nonce); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(nonce_external, nonce_length, nonce); + + status = psa_aead_set_nonce_internal(operation, nonce, nonce_length); + +/* Exit label is only needed for buffer copying, prevent unused warnings. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(nonce_external, nonce); + + return status; +} + +/* Declare the lengths of the message and additional data for multipart AEAD. */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_set_lengths(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + size_t ad_length, + size_t plaintext_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->lengths_set || operation->ad_started || + operation->body_started) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + switch (operation->alg) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) + case PSA_ALG_GCM: + /* Lengths can only be too large for GCM if size_t is bigger than 32 + * bits. Without the guard this code will generate warnings on 32bit + * builds. */ +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT32_MAX + if (((uint64_t) ad_length) >> 61 != 0 || + ((uint64_t) plaintext_length) > 0xFFFFFFFE0ull) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } +#endif + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) + case PSA_ALG_CCM: + if (ad_length > 0xFF00) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + case PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305: + /* No length restrictions for ChaChaPoly. */ + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + default: + break; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_set_lengths(operation, ad_length, + plaintext_length); + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->ad_remaining = ad_length; + operation->body_remaining = plaintext_length; + operation->lengths_set = 1; + } else { + psa_aead_abort(operation); + } + + return status; +} + +/* Pass additional data to an active multipart AEAD operation. */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_update_ad(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (!operation->nonce_set || operation->body_started) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->lengths_set) { + if (operation->ad_remaining < input_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + operation->ad_remaining -= input_length; + } +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) + else if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CCM) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM */ + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_update_ad(operation, input, + input_length); + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->ad_started = 1; + } else { + psa_aead_abort(operation); + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + + return status; +} + +/* Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active multipart AEAD + operation.*/ +psa_status_t psa_aead_update(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_size, output); + + *output_length = 0; + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (!operation->nonce_set) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->lengths_set) { + /* Additional data length was supplied, but not all the additional + data was supplied.*/ + if (operation->ad_remaining != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + /* Too much data provided. */ + if (operation->body_remaining < input_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + operation->body_remaining -= input_length; + } +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) + else if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CCM) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM */ + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_update(operation, input, input_length, + output, output_size, + output_length); + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->body_started = 1; + } else { + psa_aead_abort(operation); + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_aead_final_checks(const psa_aead_operation_t *operation) +{ + if (operation->id == 0 || !operation->nonce_set) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (operation->lengths_set && (operation->ad_remaining != 0 || + operation->body_remaining != 0)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/* Finish encrypting a message in a multipart AEAD operation. */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_finish(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *ciphertext_external, + size_t ciphertext_size, + size_t *ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *tag_external, + size_t tag_size, + size_t *tag_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(ciphertext_external, ciphertext); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(tag_external, tag); + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(ciphertext_external, ciphertext_size, ciphertext); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(tag_external, tag_size, tag); + + *ciphertext_length = 0; + *tag_length = tag_size; + + status = psa_aead_final_checks(operation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (!operation->is_encrypt) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_finish(operation, ciphertext, + ciphertext_size, + ciphertext_length, + tag, tag_size, tag_length); + +exit: + + + /* In case the operation fails and the user fails to check for failure or + * the zero tag size, make sure the tag is set to something implausible. + * Even if the operation succeeds, make sure we clear the rest of the + * buffer to prevent potential leakage of anything previously placed in + * the same buffer.*/ + psa_wipe_tag_output_buffer(tag, status, tag_size, *tag_length); + + psa_aead_abort(operation); + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(ciphertext_external, ciphertext); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(tag_external, tag); + + return status; +} + +/* Finish authenticating and decrypting a message in a multipart AEAD + operation.*/ +psa_status_t psa_aead_verify(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *plaintext_external, + size_t plaintext_size, + size_t *plaintext_length, + const uint8_t *tag_external, + size_t tag_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(plaintext_external, plaintext); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(tag_external, tag); + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(plaintext_external, plaintext_size, plaintext); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(tag_external, tag_length, tag); + + *plaintext_length = 0; + + status = psa_aead_final_checks(operation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->is_encrypt) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_verify(operation, plaintext, + plaintext_size, + plaintext_length, + tag, tag_length); + +exit: + psa_aead_abort(operation); + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(plaintext_external, plaintext); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(tag_external, tag); + + return status; +} + +/* Abort an AEAD operation. */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_abort(psa_aead_operation_t *operation) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (operation->id == 0) { + /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not (yet) + * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's + * nothing to do. */ + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_abort(operation); + + memset(operation, 0, sizeof(*operation)); + + return status; +} + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Generators */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2) +#define AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF +#endif /* At least one builtin KDF */ + +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_start_hmac( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const uint8_t *hmac_key, + size_t hmac_key_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC); + psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(hmac_key_length)); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH); + + operation->is_sign = 1; + operation->mac_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup(operation, + &attributes, + hmac_key, hmac_key_length, + PSA_ALG_HMAC(hash_alg)); + + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + return status; +} +#endif /* KDF algorithms reliant on HMAC */ + +#define HKDF_STATE_INIT 0 /* no input yet */ +#define HKDF_STATE_STARTED 1 /* got salt */ +#define HKDF_STATE_KEYED 2 /* got key */ +#define HKDF_STATE_OUTPUT 3 /* output started */ + +static psa_algorithm_t psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg( + const psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation) +{ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(operation->alg)) { + return PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(operation->alg); + } else { + return operation->alg; + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_abort(psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg(operation); + if (kdf_alg == 0) { + /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not + * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's + * nothing to do. */ + } else +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_ANY_HKDF(kdf_alg)) { + mbedtls_free(operation->ctx.hkdf.info); + status = psa_mac_abort(&operation->ctx.hkdf.hmac); + } else +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(kdf_alg) || + /* TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MS KDF uses the same core as TLS-1.2 PRF */ + PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(kdf_alg)) { + if (operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret, + operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret_length); + } + + if (operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed, + operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed_length); + } + + if (operation->ctx.tls12_prf.label != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(operation->ctx.tls12_prf.label, + operation->ctx.tls12_prf.label_length); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if (operation->ctx.tls12_prf.other_secret != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(operation->ctx.tls12_prf.other_secret, + operation->ctx.tls12_prf.other_secret_length); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + + /* We leave the fields Ai and output_block to be erased safely by the + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() in the end of this function. */ + } else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(operation->ctx.tls12_ecjpake_to_pms.data, + sizeof(operation->ctx.tls12_ecjpake_to_pms.data)); + } else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2(kdf_alg)) { + if (operation->ctx.pbkdf2.salt != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(operation->ctx.pbkdf2.salt, + operation->ctx.pbkdf2.salt_length); + } + + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + } else +#endif /* defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2) */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(operation, sizeof(*operation)); + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_get_capacity(const psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + size_t *capacity) +{ + if (operation->alg == 0) { + /* This is a blank key derivation operation. */ + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + *capacity = operation->capacity; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_set_capacity(psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + size_t capacity) +{ + if (operation->alg == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + if (capacity > operation->capacity) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + operation->capacity = capacity; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF) +/* Read some bytes from an HKDF-based operation. */ +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_hkdf_read(psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t *hkdf, + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_length) +{ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH(kdf_alg); + uint8_t hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + size_t hmac_output_length; + psa_status_t status; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) + const uint8_t last_block = PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(kdf_alg) ? 0 : 0xff; +#else + const uint8_t last_block = 0xff; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */ + + if (hkdf->state < HKDF_STATE_KEYED || + (!hkdf->info_set +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) + && !PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(kdf_alg) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */ + )) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_OUTPUT; + + while (output_length != 0) { + /* Copy what remains of the current block */ + uint8_t n = hash_length - hkdf->offset_in_block; + if (n > output_length) { + n = (uint8_t) output_length; + } + memcpy(output, hkdf->output_block + hkdf->offset_in_block, n); + output += n; + output_length -= n; + hkdf->offset_in_block += n; + if (output_length == 0) { + break; + } + /* We can't be wanting more output after the last block, otherwise + * the capacity check in psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() would have + * prevented this call. It could happen only if the operation + * object was corrupted or if this function is called directly + * inside the library. */ + if (hkdf->block_number == last_block) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + /* We need a new block */ + ++hkdf->block_number; + hkdf->offset_in_block = 0; + + status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac(&hkdf->hmac, + hash_alg, + hkdf->prk, + hash_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + if (hkdf->block_number != 1) { + status = psa_mac_update(&hkdf->hmac, + hkdf->output_block, + hash_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + } + status = psa_mac_update(&hkdf->hmac, + hkdf->info, + hkdf->info_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + status = psa_mac_update(&hkdf->hmac, + &hkdf->block_number, 1); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + status = psa_mac_sign_finish(&hkdf->hmac, + hkdf->output_block, + sizeof(hkdf->output_block), + &hmac_output_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_generate_next_block( + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *tls12_prf, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH(alg); + uint8_t hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + psa_mac_operation_t hmac = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t hmac_output_length; + psa_status_t status, cleanup_status; + + /* We can't be wanting more output after block 0xff, otherwise + * the capacity check in psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() would have + * prevented this call. It could happen only if the operation + * object was corrupted or if this function is called directly + * inside the library. */ + if (tls12_prf->block_number == 0xff) { + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + + /* We need a new block */ + ++tls12_prf->block_number; + tls12_prf->left_in_block = hash_length; + + /* Recall the definition of the TLS-1.2-PRF from RFC 5246: + * + * PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_(secret, label + seed) + * + * P_hash(secret, seed) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(1) + seed) + + * HMAC_hash(secret, A(2) + seed) + + * HMAC_hash(secret, A(3) + seed) + ... + * + * A(0) = seed + * A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1)) + * + * The `psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation` structure saves the block + * `HMAC_hash(secret, A(i) + seed)` from which the output + * is currently extracted as `output_block` and where i is + * `block_number`. + */ + + status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac(&hmac, + hash_alg, + tls12_prf->secret, + tls12_prf->secret_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Calculate A(i) where i = tls12_prf->block_number. */ + if (tls12_prf->block_number == 1) { + /* A(1) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(0)), where A(0) = seed. (The RFC overloads + * the variable seed and in this instance means it in the context of the + * P_hash function, where seed = label + seed.) */ + status = psa_mac_update(&hmac, + tls12_prf->label, + tls12_prf->label_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + status = psa_mac_update(&hmac, + tls12_prf->seed, + tls12_prf->seed_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + } else { + /* A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1)) */ + status = psa_mac_update(&hmac, tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + } + + status = psa_mac_sign_finish(&hmac, + tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length, + &hmac_output_length); + if (hmac_output_length != hash_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Calculate HMAC_hash(secret, A(i) + label + seed). */ + status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac(&hmac, + hash_alg, + tls12_prf->secret, + tls12_prf->secret_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + status = psa_mac_update(&hmac, tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + status = psa_mac_update(&hmac, tls12_prf->label, tls12_prf->label_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + status = psa_mac_update(&hmac, tls12_prf->seed, tls12_prf->seed_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + status = psa_mac_sign_finish(&hmac, + tls12_prf->output_block, hash_length, + &hmac_output_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + +cleanup: + cleanup_status = psa_mac_abort(&hmac); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS && cleanup_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = cleanup_status; + } + + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_read( + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *tls12_prf, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_length) +{ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_GET_HASH(alg); + uint8_t hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + psa_status_t status; + uint8_t offset, length; + + switch (tls12_prf->state) { + case PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_LABEL_SET: + tls12_prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OUTPUT; + break; + case PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OUTPUT: + break; + default: + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + while (output_length != 0) { + /* Check if we have fully processed the current block. */ + if (tls12_prf->left_in_block == 0) { + status = psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_generate_next_block(tls12_prf, + alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + continue; + } + + if (tls12_prf->left_in_block > output_length) { + length = (uint8_t) output_length; + } else { + length = tls12_prf->left_in_block; + } + + offset = hash_length - tls12_prf->left_in_block; + memcpy(output, tls12_prf->output_block + offset, length); + output += length; + output_length -= length; + tls12_prf->left_in_block -= length; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF || + * MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_read( + psa_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_t *ecjpake, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t output_size = 0; + + if (output_length != 32) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + status = psa_hash_compute(PSA_ALG_SHA_256, ecjpake->data, + PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_DATA_SIZE, output, output_length, + &output_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + if (output_size != output_length) { + return PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2) +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_pbkdf2_generate_block( + psa_pbkdf2_key_derivation_t *pbkdf2, + psa_algorithm_t prf_alg, + uint8_t prf_output_length, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_mac_operation_t mac_operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t mac_output_length; + uint8_t U_i[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE]; + uint8_t *U_accumulator = pbkdf2->output_block; + uint64_t i; + uint8_t block_counter[4]; + + mac_operation.is_sign = 1; + mac_operation.mac_size = prf_output_length; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(pbkdf2->block_number, block_counter, 0); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup(&mac_operation, + attributes, + pbkdf2->password, + pbkdf2->password_length, + prf_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + status = psa_mac_update(&mac_operation, pbkdf2->salt, pbkdf2->salt_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + status = psa_mac_update(&mac_operation, block_counter, sizeof(block_counter)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + status = psa_mac_sign_finish(&mac_operation, U_i, sizeof(U_i), + &mac_output_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if (mac_output_length != prf_output_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + goto cleanup; + } + + memcpy(U_accumulator, U_i, prf_output_length); + + for (i = 1; i < pbkdf2->input_cost; i++) { + /* We are passing prf_output_length as mac_size because the driver + * function directly sets mac_output_length as mac_size upon success. + * See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/7801 */ + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_compute(attributes, + pbkdf2->password, + pbkdf2->password_length, + prf_alg, U_i, prf_output_length, + U_i, prf_output_length, + &mac_output_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + mbedtls_xor(U_accumulator, U_accumulator, U_i, prf_output_length); + } + +cleanup: + /* Zeroise buffers to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(U_i, PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE); + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_pbkdf2_read( + psa_pbkdf2_key_derivation_t *pbkdf2, + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t prf_alg; + uint8_t prf_output_length; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(pbkdf2->password_length)); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE); + + if (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(kdf_alg)) { + prf_alg = PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_GET_HASH(kdf_alg)); + prf_output_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(prf_alg); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC); + } else if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) { + prf_alg = PSA_ALG_CMAC; + prf_output_length = PSA_MAC_LENGTH(PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, 128U, PSA_ALG_CMAC); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES); + } else { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + switch (pbkdf2->state) { + case PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_PASSWORD_SET: + /* Initially we need a new block so bytes_used is equal to block size*/ + pbkdf2->bytes_used = prf_output_length; + pbkdf2->state = PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_OUTPUT; + break; + case PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_OUTPUT: + break; + default: + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + while (output_length != 0) { + uint8_t n = prf_output_length - pbkdf2->bytes_used; + if (n > output_length) { + n = (uint8_t) output_length; + } + memcpy(output, pbkdf2->output_block + pbkdf2->bytes_used, n); + output += n; + output_length -= n; + pbkdf2->bytes_used += n; + + if (output_length == 0) { + break; + } + + /* We need a new block */ + pbkdf2->bytes_used = 0; + pbkdf2->block_number++; + + status = psa_key_derivation_pbkdf2_generate_block(pbkdf2, prf_alg, + prf_output_length, + &attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2 */ + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg(operation); + + if (operation->alg == 0) { + /* This is a blank operation. */ + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (output_length == 0 && operation->capacity == 0) { + /* Edge case: this is a finished operation, and 0 bytes + * were requested. The right error in this case could + * be either INSUFFICIENT_CAPACITY or BAD_STATE. Return + * INSUFFICIENT_CAPACITY, which is right for a finished + * operation, for consistency with the case when + * output_length > 0. */ + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA; + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_length, output); + if (output_length > operation->capacity) { + operation->capacity = 0; + /* Go through the error path to wipe all confidential data now + * that the operation object is useless. */ + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA; + goto exit; + } + + operation->capacity -= output_length; + +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_ANY_HKDF(kdf_alg)) { + status = psa_key_derivation_hkdf_read(&operation->ctx.hkdf, kdf_alg, + output, output_length); + } else +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(kdf_alg) || + PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(kdf_alg)) { + status = psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_read(&operation->ctx.tls12_prf, + kdf_alg, output, + output_length); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF || + * MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) { + status = psa_key_derivation_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_read( + &operation->ctx.tls12_ecjpake_to_pms, output, output_length); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2(kdf_alg)) { + status = psa_key_derivation_pbkdf2_read(&operation->ctx.pbkdf2, kdf_alg, + output, output_length); + } else +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2 */ + + { + (void) kdf_alg; + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + + return status; + } + +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + /* Preserve the algorithm upon errors, but clear all sensitive state. + * This allows us to differentiate between exhausted operations and + * blank operations, so we can return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE on blank + * operations. */ + psa_algorithm_t alg = operation->alg; + psa_key_derivation_abort(operation); + operation->alg = alg; + if (output != NULL) { + memset(output, '!', output_length); + } + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + return status; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) +static void psa_des_set_key_parity(uint8_t *data, size_t data_size) +{ + if (data_size >= 8) { + mbedtls_des_key_set_parity(data); + } + if (data_size >= 16) { + mbedtls_des_key_set_parity(data + 8); + } + if (data_size >= 24) { + mbedtls_des_key_set_parity(data + 16); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES */ + +/* + * ECC keys on a Weierstrass elliptic curve require the generation + * of a private key which is an integer + * in the range [1, N - 1], where N is the boundary of the private key domain: + * N is the prime p for Diffie-Hellman, or the order of the + * curve’s base point for ECC. + * + * Let m be the bit size of N, such that 2^m > N >= 2^(m-1). + * This function generates the private key using the following process: + * + * 1. Draw a byte string of length ceiling(m/8) bytes. + * 2. If m is not a multiple of 8, set the most significant + * (8 * ceiling(m/8) - m) bits of the first byte in the string to zero. + * 3. Convert the string to integer k by decoding it as a big-endian byte string. + * 4. If k > N - 2, discard the result and return to step 1. + * 5. Output k + 1 as the private key. + * + * This method allows compliance to NIST standards, specifically the methods titled + * Key-Pair Generation by Testing Candidates in the following publications: + * - NIST Special Publication 800-56A: Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment + * Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography [SP800-56A] §5.6.1.1.4 for + * Diffie-Hellman keys. + * + * - [SP800-56A] §5.6.1.2.2 or FIPS Publication 186-4: Digital Signature + * Standard (DSS) [FIPS186-4] §B.4.2 for elliptic curve keys. + * + * Note: Function allocates memory for *data buffer, so given *data should be + * always NULL. + */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +static psa_status_t psa_generate_derived_ecc_key_weierstrass_helper( + psa_key_slot_t *slot, + size_t bits, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t **data + ) +{ + unsigned key_out_of_range = 1; + mbedtls_mpi k; + mbedtls_mpi diff_N_2; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t m; + size_t m_bytes; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&k); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&diff_N_2); + + psa_ecc_family_t curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( + slot->attr.type); + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = + mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(curve, bits); + + if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + mbedtls_ecp_group ecp_group; + mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&ecp_group); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ecp_group, grp_id)); + + /* N is the boundary of the private key domain (ecp_group.N). */ + /* Let m be the bit size of N. */ + m = ecp_group.nbits; + + m_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(m); + + /* Calculate N - 2 - it will be needed later. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&diff_N_2, &ecp_group.N, 2)); + + /* Note: This function is always called with *data == NULL and it + * allocates memory for the data buffer. */ + *data = mbedtls_calloc(1, m_bytes); + if (*data == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + while (key_out_of_range) { + /* 1. Draw a byte string of length ceiling(m/8) bytes. */ + if ((status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(operation, *data, m_bytes)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* 2. If m is not a multiple of 8 */ + if (m % 8 != 0) { + /* Set the most significant + * (8 * ceiling(m/8) - m) bits of the first byte in + * the string to zero. + */ + uint8_t clear_bit_mask = (1 << (m % 8)) - 1; + (*data)[0] &= clear_bit_mask; + } + + /* 3. Convert the string to integer k by decoding it as a + * big-endian byte string. + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&k, *data, m_bytes)); + + /* 4. If k > N - 2, discard the result and return to step 1. + * Result of comparison is returned. When it indicates error + * then this function is called again. + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct(&diff_N_2, &k, &key_out_of_range)); + } + + /* 5. Output k + 1 as the private key. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(&k, &k, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&k, *data, m_bytes)); +cleanup: + if (ret != 0) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + } + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + mbedtls_free(*data); + *data = NULL; + } + mbedtls_mpi_free(&k); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&diff_N_2); + return status; +} + +/* ECC keys on a Montgomery elliptic curve draws a byte string whose length + * is determined by the curve, and sets the mandatory bits accordingly. That is: + * + * - Curve25519 (PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 255 bits): + * draw a 32-byte string and process it as specified in + * Elliptic Curves for Security [RFC7748] §5. + * + * - Curve448 (PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 448 bits): + * draw a 56-byte string and process it as specified in [RFC7748] §5. + * + * Note: Function allocates memory for *data buffer, so given *data should be + * always NULL. + */ + +static psa_status_t psa_generate_derived_ecc_key_montgomery_helper( + size_t bits, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t **data + ) +{ + size_t output_length; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + switch (bits) { + case 255: + output_length = 32; + break; + case 448: + output_length = 56; + break; + default: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + break; + } + + *data = mbedtls_calloc(1, output_length); + + if (*data == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(operation, *data, output_length); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + switch (bits) { + case 255: + (*data)[0] &= 248; + (*data)[31] &= 127; + (*data)[31] |= 64; + break; + case 448: + (*data)[0] &= 252; + (*data)[55] |= 128; + break; + default: + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + break; + } + + return status; +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE */ +static psa_status_t psa_generate_derived_ecc_key_weierstrass_helper( + psa_key_slot_t *slot, size_t bits, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, uint8_t **data) +{ + (void) slot; + (void) bits; + (void) operation; + (void) data; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_generate_derived_ecc_key_montgomery_helper( + size_t bits, psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, uint8_t **data) +{ + (void) bits; + (void) operation; + (void) data; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE */ + +static psa_status_t psa_generate_derived_key_internal( + psa_key_slot_t *slot, + size_t bits, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation) +{ + uint8_t *data = NULL; + size_t bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits); + size_t storage_size = bytes; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(slot->attr.type)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(slot->attr.type)) { + psa_ecc_family_t curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(slot->attr.type); + if (PSA_ECC_FAMILY_IS_WEIERSTRASS(curve)) { + /* Weierstrass elliptic curve */ + status = psa_generate_derived_ecc_key_weierstrass_helper(slot, bits, operation, &data); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } else { + /* Montgomery elliptic curve */ + status = psa_generate_derived_ecc_key_montgomery_helper(bits, operation, &data); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + } else +#endif /* defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) || + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) */ + if (key_type_is_raw_bytes(slot->attr.type)) { + if (bits % 8 != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + data = mbedtls_calloc(1, bytes); + if (data == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(operation, data, bytes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) + if (slot->attr.type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES) { + psa_des_set_key_parity(data, bytes); + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) */ + } else { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + slot->attr.bits = (psa_key_bits_t) bits; + + if (psa_key_lifetime_is_external(slot->attr.lifetime)) { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size(&slot->attr, + &storage_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot(slot, storage_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_import_key(&slot->attr, + data, bytes, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + &slot->key.bytes, &bits); + if (bits != slot->attr.bits) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_free(data); + return status; +} + +static const psa_key_production_parameters_t default_production_parameters = + PSA_KEY_PRODUCTION_PARAMETERS_INIT; + +int psa_key_production_parameters_are_default( + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, + size_t params_data_length) +{ + if (params->flags != 0) { + return 0; + } + if (params_data_length != 0) { + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, + size_t params_data_length, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; + + *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + /* Reject any attempt to create a zero-length key so that we don't + * risk tripping up later, e.g. on a malloc(0) that returns NULL. */ + if (psa_get_key_bits(attributes) == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + if (!psa_key_production_parameters_are_default(params, params_data_length)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_NONE) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (!operation->can_output_key) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; + } + + status = psa_start_key_creation(PSA_KEY_CREATION_DERIVE, attributes, + &slot, &driver); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + if (driver != NULL) { + /* Deriving a key in a secure element is not implemented yet. */ + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = psa_generate_derived_key_internal(slot, + attributes->bits, + operation); + } + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = psa_finish_key_creation(slot, driver, key); + } + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_fail_key_creation(slot, driver); + } + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key) +{ + return psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext(attributes, operation, + &default_production_parameters, 0, + key); +} + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Key derivation */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF) +static int is_kdf_alg_supported(psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF(kdf_alg)) { + return 1; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(kdf_alg)) { + return 1; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(kdf_alg)) { + return 1; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(kdf_alg)) { + return 1; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(kdf_alg)) { + return 1; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) { + return 1; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(kdf_alg)) { + return 1; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) { + return 1; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_hash_try_support(psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + psa_hash_operation_t operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = psa_hash_setup(&operation, alg); + psa_hash_abort(&operation); + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_set_maximum_capacity( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg) +{ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) { + operation->capacity = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) { +#if (SIZE_MAX > UINT32_MAX) + operation->capacity = UINT32_MAX * (size_t) PSA_MAC_LENGTH( + PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, + 128U, + PSA_ALG_CMAC); +#else + operation->capacity = SIZE_MAX; +#endif + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 */ + + /* After this point, if kdf_alg is not valid then value of hash_alg may be + * invalid or meaningless but it does not affect this function */ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(kdf_alg); + size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + if (hash_size == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + /* Make sure that hash_alg is a supported hash algorithm. Otherwise + * we might fail later, which is somewhat unfriendly and potentially + * risk-prone. */ + psa_status_t status = psa_hash_try_support(hash_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF(kdf_alg)) { + operation->capacity = 255 * hash_size; + } else +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(kdf_alg)) { + operation->capacity = hash_size; + } else +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(kdf_alg)) { + operation->capacity = 255 * hash_size; + } else +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(kdf_alg) && + (hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 || hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_384)) { + operation->capacity = SIZE_MAX; + } else +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(kdf_alg) && + (hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 || hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_384)) { + /* Master Secret is always 48 bytes + * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5246.html#section-8.1 */ + operation->capacity = 48U; + } else +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(kdf_alg)) { +#if (SIZE_MAX > UINT32_MAX) + operation->capacity = UINT32_MAX * hash_size; +#else + operation->capacity = SIZE_MAX; +#endif + } else +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC */ + { + (void) hash_size; + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg) +{ + /* Make sure that operation->ctx is properly zero-initialised. (Macro + * initialisers for this union leave some bytes unspecified.) */ + memset(&operation->ctx, 0, sizeof(operation->ctx)); + + /* Make sure that kdf_alg is a supported key derivation algorithm. */ + if (!is_kdf_alg_supported(kdf_alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + psa_status_t status = psa_key_derivation_set_maximum_capacity(operation, + kdf_alg); + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_try_support(psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) + if (alg == PSA_ALG_ECDH) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + if (alg == PSA_ALG_FFDH) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } +#endif + (void) alg; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +} + +static int psa_key_derivation_allows_free_form_secret_input( + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg) +{ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) { + return 0; + } +#endif + (void) kdf_alg; + return 1; +} +#endif /* AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF */ + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup(psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + if (operation->alg != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)) { +#if defined(AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF) + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg); + psa_algorithm_t ka_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg); + status = psa_key_agreement_try_support(ka_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + if (!psa_key_derivation_allows_free_form_secret_input(kdf_alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + status = psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf(operation, kdf_alg); +#else + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF */ + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg)) { +#if defined(AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF) + status = psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf(operation, alg); +#else + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF */ + } else { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->alg = alg; + } + return status; +} + +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF) +static psa_status_t psa_hkdf_input(psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t *hkdf, + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH(kdf_alg); + psa_status_t status; + switch (step) { + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(kdf_alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND */ + if (hkdf->state != HKDF_STATE_INIT) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } else { + status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac(&hkdf->hmac, + hash_alg, + data, data_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_STARTED; + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(kdf_alg)) { + /* We shouldn't be in different state as HKDF_EXPAND only allows + * two inputs: SECRET (this case) and INFO which does not modify + * the state. It could happen only if the hkdf + * object was corrupted. */ + if (hkdf->state != HKDF_STATE_INIT) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + /* Allow only input that fits expected prk size */ + if (data_length != PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + memcpy(hkdf->prk, data, data_length); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND */ + { + /* HKDF: If no salt was provided, use an empty salt. + * HKDF-EXTRACT: salt is mandatory. */ + if (hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_INIT) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(kdf_alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */ + status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac(&hkdf->hmac, + hash_alg, + NULL, 0); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_STARTED; + } + if (hkdf->state != HKDF_STATE_STARTED) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + status = psa_mac_update(&hkdf->hmac, + data, data_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + status = psa_mac_sign_finish(&hkdf->hmac, + hkdf->prk, + sizeof(hkdf->prk), + &data_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + } + + hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_KEYED; + hkdf->block_number = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(kdf_alg)) { + /* The only block of output is the PRK. */ + memcpy(hkdf->output_block, hkdf->prk, PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg)); + hkdf->offset_in_block = 0; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */ + { + /* Block 0 is empty, and the next block will be + * generated by psa_key_derivation_hkdf_read(). */ + hkdf->offset_in_block = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(kdf_alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(kdf_alg) && + hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_INIT) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */ + if (hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_OUTPUT) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + if (hkdf->info_set) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + hkdf->info_length = data_length; + if (data_length != 0) { + hkdf->info = mbedtls_calloc(1, data_length); + if (hkdf->info == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + memcpy(hkdf->info, data, data_length); + } + hkdf->info_set = 1; + return PSA_SUCCESS; + default: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } +} +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_set_seed(psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + if (prf->state != PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_INIT) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (data_length != 0) { + prf->seed = mbedtls_calloc(1, data_length); + if (prf->seed == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + + memcpy(prf->seed, data, data_length); + prf->seed_length = data_length; + } + + prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_SEED_SET; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_set_key(psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + if (prf->state != PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_SEED_SET && + prf->state != PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OTHER_KEY_SET) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (data_length != 0) { + prf->secret = mbedtls_calloc(1, data_length); + if (prf->secret == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + + memcpy(prf->secret, data, data_length); + prf->secret_length = data_length; + } + + prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_KEY_SET; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_set_label(psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + if (prf->state != PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_KEY_SET) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (data_length != 0) { + prf->label = mbedtls_calloc(1, data_length); + if (prf->label == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + + memcpy(prf->label, data, data_length); + prf->label_length = data_length; + } + + prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_LABEL_SET; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_input(psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + switch (step) { + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED: + return psa_tls12_prf_set_seed(prf, data, data_length); + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET: + return psa_tls12_prf_set_key(prf, data, data_length); + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL: + return psa_tls12_prf_set_label(prf, data, data_length); + default: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || + * MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_set_key( + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + const size_t pms_len = (prf->state == PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OTHER_KEY_SET ? + 4 + data_length + prf->other_secret_length : + 4 + 2 * data_length); + + if (data_length > PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + uint8_t *pms = mbedtls_calloc(1, pms_len); + if (pms == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + uint8_t *cur = pms; + + /* pure-PSK: + * Quoting RFC 4279, Section 2: + * + * The premaster secret is formed as follows: if the PSK is N octets + * long, concatenate a uint16 with the value N, N zero octets, a second + * uint16 with the value N, and the PSK itself. + * + * mixed-PSK: + * In a DHE-PSK, RSA-PSK, ECDHE-PSK the premaster secret is formed as + * follows: concatenate a uint16 with the length of the other secret, + * the other secret itself, uint16 with the length of PSK, and the + * PSK itself. + * For details please check: + * - RFC 4279, Section 4 for the definition of RSA-PSK, + * - RFC 4279, Section 3 for the definition of DHE-PSK, + * - RFC 5489 for the definition of ECDHE-PSK. + */ + + if (prf->state == PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OTHER_KEY_SET) { + *cur++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(prf->other_secret_length); + *cur++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(prf->other_secret_length); + if (prf->other_secret_length != 0) { + memcpy(cur, prf->other_secret, prf->other_secret_length); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(prf->other_secret, prf->other_secret_length); + cur += prf->other_secret_length; + } + } else { + *cur++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(data_length); + *cur++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(data_length); + memset(cur, 0, data_length); + cur += data_length; + } + + *cur++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(data_length); + *cur++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(data_length); + memcpy(cur, data, data_length); + cur += data_length; + + status = psa_tls12_prf_set_key(prf, pms, (size_t) (cur - pms)); + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(pms, pms_len); + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_set_other_key( + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + if (prf->state != PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_SEED_SET) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (data_length != 0) { + prf->other_secret = mbedtls_calloc(1, data_length); + if (prf->other_secret == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + + memcpy(prf->other_secret, data, data_length); + prf->other_secret_length = data_length; + } else { + prf->other_secret_length = 0; + } + + prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OTHER_KEY_SET; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_input( + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + switch (step) { + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET: + return psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_set_key(prf, + data, data_length); + break; + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET: + return psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_set_other_key(prf, + data, + data_length); + break; + default: + return psa_tls12_prf_input(prf, step, data, data_length); + break; + + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_input( + psa_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_t *ecjpake, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + if (data_length != PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_INPUT_SIZE || + step != PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + /* Check if the passed point is in an uncompressed form */ + if (data[0] != 0x04) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + /* Only K.X has to be extracted - bytes 1 to 32 inclusive. */ + memcpy(ecjpake->data, data + 1, PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_DATA_SIZE); + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS */ + +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2) +static psa_status_t psa_pbkdf2_set_input_cost( + psa_pbkdf2_key_derivation_t *pbkdf2, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + uint64_t data) +{ + if (step != PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_COST) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + if (pbkdf2->state != PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_INIT) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (data > PSA_VENDOR_PBKDF2_MAX_ITERATIONS) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (data == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + pbkdf2->input_cost = data; + pbkdf2->state = PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_INPUT_COST_SET; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_pbkdf2_set_salt(psa_pbkdf2_key_derivation_t *pbkdf2, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + if (pbkdf2->state == PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_INPUT_COST_SET) { + pbkdf2->state = PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_SALT_SET; + } else if (pbkdf2->state == PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_SALT_SET) { + /* Appending to existing salt. No state change. */ + } else { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (data_length == 0) { + /* Appending an empty string, nothing to do. */ + } else { + uint8_t *next_salt; + + next_salt = mbedtls_calloc(1, data_length + pbkdf2->salt_length); + if (next_salt == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + + if (pbkdf2->salt_length != 0) { + memcpy(next_salt, pbkdf2->salt, pbkdf2->salt_length); + } + memcpy(next_salt + pbkdf2->salt_length, data, data_length); + pbkdf2->salt_length += data_length; + mbedtls_free(pbkdf2->salt); + pbkdf2->salt = next_salt; + } + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC) +static psa_status_t psa_pbkdf2_hmac_set_password(psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_len, + uint8_t *output, + size_t *output_len) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + if (input_len > PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(hash_alg)) { + return psa_hash_compute(hash_alg, input, input_len, output, + PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE, output_len); + } else if (input_len > 0) { + memcpy(output, input, input_len); + } + *output_len = PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(hash_alg); + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) +static psa_status_t psa_pbkdf2_cmac_set_password(const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_len, + uint8_t *output, + size_t *output_len) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + if (input_len != PSA_MAC_LENGTH(PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, 128U, PSA_ALG_CMAC)) { + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + uint8_t zeros[16] = { 0 }; + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES); + psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(sizeof(zeros))); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE); + /* Passing PSA_MAC_LENGTH(PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, 128U, PSA_ALG_CMAC) as + * mac_size as the driver function sets mac_output_length = mac_size + * on success. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/7801 */ + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_compute(&attributes, + zeros, sizeof(zeros), + PSA_ALG_CMAC, input, input_len, + output, + PSA_MAC_LENGTH(PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, + 128U, + PSA_ALG_CMAC), + output_len); + } else { + memcpy(output, input, input_len); + *output_len = PSA_MAC_LENGTH(PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, 128U, PSA_ALG_CMAC); + } + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 */ + +static psa_status_t psa_pbkdf2_set_password(psa_pbkdf2_key_derivation_t *pbkdf2, + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + if (pbkdf2->state != PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_SALT_SET) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(kdf_alg)) { + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_GET_HASH(kdf_alg); + status = psa_pbkdf2_hmac_set_password(hash_alg, data, data_length, + pbkdf2->password, + &pbkdf2->password_length); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) { + status = psa_pbkdf2_cmac_set_password(data, data_length, + pbkdf2->password, + &pbkdf2->password_length); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 */ + { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + pbkdf2->state = PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_PASSWORD_SET; + + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_pbkdf2_input(psa_pbkdf2_key_derivation_t *pbkdf2, + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + switch (step) { + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT: + return psa_pbkdf2_set_salt(pbkdf2, data, data_length); + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD: + return psa_pbkdf2_set_password(pbkdf2, kdf_alg, data, data_length); + default: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } +} +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2 */ + +/** Check whether the given key type is acceptable for the given + * input step of a key derivation. + * + * Secret inputs must have the type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE. + * Non-secret inputs must have the type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA. + * Both secret and non-secret inputs can alternatively have the type + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE, which is never the type of a key object, meaning + * that the input was passed as a buffer rather than via a key object. + */ +static int psa_key_derivation_check_input_type( + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + psa_key_type_t key_type) +{ + switch (step) { + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET: + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET: + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL: + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT: + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO: + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED: + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD: + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; + } + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_internal( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + psa_key_type_t key_type, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg(operation); + + status = psa_key_derivation_check_input_type(step, key_type); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_ANY_HKDF(kdf_alg)) { + status = psa_hkdf_input(&operation->ctx.hkdf, kdf_alg, + step, data, data_length); + } else +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(kdf_alg)) { + status = psa_tls12_prf_input(&operation->ctx.tls12_prf, + step, data, data_length); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(kdf_alg)) { + status = psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_input(&operation->ctx.tls12_prf, + step, data, data_length); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) { + status = psa_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_input( + &operation->ctx.tls12_ecjpake_to_pms, step, data, data_length); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2(kdf_alg)) { + status = psa_pbkdf2_input(&operation->ctx.pbkdf2, kdf_alg, + step, data, data_length); + } else +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2 */ + { + /* This can't happen unless the operation object was not initialized */ + (void) data; + (void) data_length; + (void) kdf_alg; + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(operation); + } + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_integer_internal( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + uint64_t value) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg(operation); + +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2(kdf_alg)) { + status = psa_pbkdf2_set_input_cost( + &operation->ctx.pbkdf2, step, value); + } else +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2 */ + { + (void) step; + (void) value; + (void) kdf_alg; + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(operation); + } + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data_external, + size_t data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(data_external, data); + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(data_external, data_length, data); + + status = psa_key_derivation_input_internal(operation, step, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE, + data, data_length); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(data_external, data); + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_integer( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + uint64_t value) +{ + return psa_key_derivation_input_integer_internal(operation, step, value); +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_key( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, operation->alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(operation); + return status; + } + + /* Passing a key object as a SECRET or PASSWORD input unlocks the + * permission to output to a key object. */ + if (step == PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET || + step == PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD) { + operation->can_output_key = 1; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_input_internal(operation, + step, slot->attr.type, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes); + + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Key agreement */ +/****************************************************************/ + +psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_raw_builtin(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *shared_secret, + size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length) +{ + switch (alg) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) + case PSA_ALG_ECDH: + return mbedtls_psa_key_agreement_ecdh(attributes, key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, alg, + peer_key, peer_key_length, + shared_secret, + shared_secret_size, + shared_secret_length); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH) + case PSA_ALG_FFDH: + return mbedtls_psa_ffdh_key_agreement(attributes, + peer_key, + peer_key_length, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + shared_secret, + shared_secret_size, + shared_secret_length); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH */ + + default: + (void) attributes; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) peer_key; + (void) peer_key_length; + (void) shared_secret; + (void) shared_secret_size; + (void) shared_secret_length; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } +} + +/** Internal function for raw key agreement + * Calls the driver wrapper which will hand off key agreement task + * to the driver's implementation if a driver is present. + * Fallback specified in the driver wrapper is built-in raw key agreement + * (psa_key_agreement_raw_builtin). + */ +static psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_raw_internal(psa_algorithm_t alg, + psa_key_slot_t *private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *shared_secret, + size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length) +{ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return psa_driver_wrapper_key_agreement(&private_key->attr, + private_key->key.data, + private_key->key.bytes, alg, + peer_key, peer_key_length, + shared_secret, + shared_secret_size, + shared_secret_length); +} + +/* Note that if this function fails, you must call psa_key_derivation_abort() + * to potentially free embedded data structures and wipe confidential data. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_internal(psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + psa_key_slot_t *private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + uint8_t shared_secret[PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE] = { 0 }; + size_t shared_secret_length = 0; + psa_algorithm_t ka_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(operation->alg); + + /* Step 1: run the secret agreement algorithm to generate the shared + * secret. */ + status = psa_key_agreement_raw_internal(ka_alg, + private_key, + peer_key, peer_key_length, + shared_secret, + sizeof(shared_secret), + &shared_secret_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; } - operation->capacity -= output_length; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) - if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF(kdf_alg)) { - psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH(kdf_alg); - status = psa_key_derivation_hkdf_read(&operation->ctx.hkdf, hash_alg, - output, output_length); + /* Step 2: set up the key derivation to generate key material from + * the shared secret. A shared secret is permitted wherever a key + * of type DERIVE is permitted. */ + status = psa_key_derivation_input_internal(operation, step, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE, + shared_secret, + shared_secret_length); +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(shared_secret, shared_secret_length); + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_key_agreement(psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key_external, + size_t peer_key_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(peer_key_external, peer_key); + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(operation->alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + private_key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, operation->alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(peer_key_external, peer_key_length, peer_key); + status = psa_key_agreement_internal(operation, step, + slot, + peer_key, peer_key_length); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(operation); + } else { + /* If a private key has been added as SECRET, we allow the derived + * key material to be used as a key in PSA Crypto. */ + if (step == PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET) { + operation->can_output_key = 1; + } + } + + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(peer_key_external, peer_key); + + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_raw_key_agreement(psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key_external, + size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + size_t expected_length; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(peer_key_external, peer_key); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_size, output); + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + private_key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + /* PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE() is in general an upper bound + * for the output size. The PSA specification only guarantees that this + * function works if output_size >= PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(...), + * but it might be nice to allow smaller buffers if the output fits. + * At the time of writing this comment, with only ECDH implemented, + * PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE() is exact so the point is moot. + * If FFDH is implemented, PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE() can easily + * be exact for it as well. */ + expected_length = + PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(slot->attr.type, slot->attr.bits); + if (output_size < expected_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(peer_key_external, peer_key_length, peer_key); + status = psa_key_agreement_raw_internal(alg, slot, + peer_key, peer_key_length, + output, output_size, + output_length); + +exit: + /* Check for successful allocation of output, + * with an unsuccessful status. */ + if (output != NULL && status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + /* If an error happens and is not handled properly, the output + * may be used as a key to protect sensitive data. Arrange for such + * a key to be random, which is likely to result in decryption or + * verification errors. This is better than filling the buffer with + * some constant data such as zeros, which would result in the data + * being protected with a reproducible, easily knowable key. + */ + psa_generate_random_internal(output, output_size); + *output_length = output_size; + } + + if (output == NULL) { + /* output allocation failed. */ + *output_length = 0; + } + + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(peer_key_external, peer_key); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Random generation */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) +#include "entropy_poll.h" +#endif + +/** Initialize the PSA random generator. + * + * Note: the mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex should be held when calling + * this function if mutexes are enabled. + */ +static void mbedtls_psa_random_init(mbedtls_psa_random_context_t *rng) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + memset(rng, 0, sizeof(*rng)); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + + /* Set default configuration if + * mbedtls_psa_crypto_configure_entropy_sources() hasn't been called. */ + if (rng->entropy_init == NULL) { + rng->entropy_init = mbedtls_entropy_init; + } + if (rng->entropy_free == NULL) { + rng->entropy_free = mbedtls_entropy_free; + } + + rng->entropy_init(&rng->entropy); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) + /* The PSA entropy injection feature depends on using NV seed as an entropy + * source. Add NV seed as an entropy source for PSA entropy injection. */ + mbedtls_entropy_add_source(&rng->entropy, + mbedtls_nv_seed_poll, NULL, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG); +#endif + + mbedtls_psa_drbg_init(&rng->drbg); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +} + +/** Deinitialize the PSA random generator. + * + * Note: the mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex should be held when calling + * this function if mutexes are enabled. + */ +static void mbedtls_psa_random_free(mbedtls_psa_random_context_t *rng) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + memset(rng, 0, sizeof(*rng)); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + mbedtls_psa_drbg_free(&rng->drbg); + rng->entropy_free(&rng->entropy); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +} + +/** Seed the PSA random generator. + */ +static psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_random_seed(mbedtls_psa_random_context_t *rng) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + /* Do nothing: the external RNG seeds itself. */ + (void) rng; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + const unsigned char drbg_seed[] = "PSA"; + int ret = mbedtls_psa_drbg_seed(&rng->drbg, &rng->entropy, + drbg_seed, sizeof(drbg_seed) - 1); + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +} + +psa_status_t psa_generate_random(uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_size) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_size, output); + + status = psa_generate_random_internal(output, output_size); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + return status; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(const uint8_t *seed, + size_t seed_size) +{ + if (psa_get_initialized()) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; + } + + if (((seed_size < MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM) || + (seed_size < MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE)) || + (seed_size > MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + return mbedtls_psa_storage_inject_entropy(seed, seed_size); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */ + +/** Validate the key type and size for key generation + * + * \param type The key type + * \param bits The number of bits of the key + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key type and size are valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size in bits of the key is not valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The type and/or the size in bits of the key or the combination of + * the two is not supported. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_validate_key_type_and_size_for_key_generation( + psa_key_type_t type, size_t bits) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (key_type_is_raw_bytes(type)) { + status = psa_validate_unstructured_key_bit_size(type, bits); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) - if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(kdf_alg) || - PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(kdf_alg)) { - status = psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_read(&operation->ctx.tls12_prf, - kdf_alg, output, - output_length); +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type) && PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) { + if (bits > PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + if (bits < PSA_VENDOR_RSA_GENERATE_MIN_KEY_BITS) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + /* Accept only byte-aligned keys, for the same reasons as + * in psa_import_rsa_key(). */ + if (bits % 8 != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + } else +#endif /* defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) && PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) { + /* To avoid empty block, return successfully here. */ + return PSA_SUCCESS; } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF || - * MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ +#endif /* defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type) && PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) { + if (psa_is_dh_key_size_valid(bits) == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + } else +#endif /* defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) */ { - (void) kdf_alg; - return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } -exit: - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - /* Preserve the algorithm upon errors, but clear all sensitive state. - * This allows us to differentiate between exhausted operations and - * blank operations, so we can return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE on blank - * operations. */ - psa_algorithm_t alg = operation->alg; - psa_key_derivation_abort(operation); - operation->alg = alg; - memset(output, '!', output_length); - } - return status; + return PSA_SUCCESS; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) -static void psa_des_set_key_parity(uint8_t *data, size_t data_size) +psa_status_t psa_generate_key_internal( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, size_t params_data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length) { - if (data_size >= 8) { - mbedtls_des_key_set_parity(data); - } - if (data_size >= 16) { - mbedtls_des_key_set_parity(data + 8); - } - if (data_size >= 24) { - mbedtls_des_key_set_parity(data + 16); - } -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES */ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_type_t type = attributes->type; -static psa_status_t psa_generate_derived_key_internal( - psa_key_slot_t *slot, - size_t bits, - psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation) -{ - uint8_t *data = NULL; - size_t bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits); - psa_status_t status; - psa_key_attributes_t attributes; + /* Only used for RSA */ + (void) params; + (void) params_data_length; - if (!key_type_is_raw_bytes(slot->attr.type)) { - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } - if (bits % 8 != 0) { - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } - data = mbedtls_calloc(1, bytes); - if (data == NULL) { - return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; - } + if (key_type_is_raw_bytes(type)) { + status = psa_generate_random_internal(key_buffer, key_buffer_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } - status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(operation, data, bytes); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - goto exit; - } #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) - if (slot->attr.type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES) { - psa_des_set_key_parity(data, bytes); - } + if (type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES) { + psa_des_set_key_parity(key_buffer, key_buffer_size); + } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES */ + } else - status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot(slot, bytes); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - goto exit; - } - - slot->attr.bits = (psa_key_bits_t) bits; - attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) { - .core = slot->attr - }; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) + if (type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) { + return mbedtls_psa_rsa_generate_key(attributes, + params, params_data_length, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length); + } else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) */ - status = psa_driver_wrapper_import_key(&attributes, - data, bytes, - slot->key.data, - slot->key.bytes, - &slot->key.bytes, &bits); - if (bits != slot->attr.bits) { - status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) && PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) { + return mbedtls_psa_ecp_generate_key(attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length); + } else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type) && PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) { + return mbedtls_psa_ffdh_generate_key(attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length); + } else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) */ + { + (void) key_buffer_length; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } -exit: - mbedtls_free(data); - return status; + return PSA_SUCCESS; } -psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, - mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key) +psa_status_t psa_generate_key_ext(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, + size_t params_data_length, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key) { psa_status_t status; psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; + size_t key_buffer_size; *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; @@ -4321,1206 +7934,1233 @@ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attribute return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } - if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_NONE) { - return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; - } - - if (!operation->can_output_key) { - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; - } - - status = psa_start_key_creation(PSA_KEY_CREATION_DERIVE, attributes, - &slot, &driver); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) - if (driver != NULL) { - /* Deriving a key in a secure element is not implemented yet. */ - status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - status = psa_generate_derived_key_internal(slot, - attributes->core.bits, - operation); - } - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - status = psa_finish_key_creation(slot, driver, key); - } - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - psa_fail_key_creation(slot, driver); + /* Reject any attempt to create a public key. */ + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(attributes->type)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } - return status; -} - - - -/****************************************************************/ -/* Key derivation */ -/****************************************************************/ - -#if defined(AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF) -static int is_kdf_alg_supported(psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) - if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF(kdf_alg)) { - return 1; - } -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) - if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(kdf_alg)) { - return 1; - } -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) - if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(kdf_alg)) { - return 1; - } +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) + if (attributes->type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) { + if (params->flags != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } else #endif - return 0; -} - -static psa_status_t psa_hash_try_support(psa_algorithm_t alg) -{ - psa_hash_operation_t operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; - psa_status_t status = psa_hash_setup(&operation, alg); - psa_hash_abort(&operation); - return status; -} - -static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf( - psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, - psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg) -{ - /* Make sure that operation->ctx is properly zero-initialised. (Macro - * initialisers for this union leave some bytes unspecified.) */ - memset(&operation->ctx, 0, sizeof(operation->ctx)); - - /* Make sure that kdf_alg is a supported key derivation algorithm. */ - if (!is_kdf_alg_supported(kdf_alg)) { - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - } - - /* All currently supported key derivation algorithms are based on a - * hash algorithm. */ - psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH(kdf_alg); - size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); - if (hash_size == 0) { - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + if (!psa_key_production_parameters_are_default(params, params_data_length)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } - /* Make sure that hash_alg is a supported hash algorithm. Otherwise - * we might fail later, which is somewhat unfriendly and potentially - * risk-prone. */ - psa_status_t status = psa_hash_try_support(hash_alg); + status = psa_start_key_creation(PSA_KEY_CREATION_GENERATE, attributes, + &slot, &driver); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } - - if ((PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(kdf_alg) || - PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(kdf_alg)) && - !(hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 || hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_384)) { - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - } - - operation->capacity = 255 * hash_size; - return PSA_SUCCESS; -} - -static psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_try_support(psa_algorithm_t alg) -{ -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) - if (alg == PSA_ALG_ECDH) { - return PSA_SUCCESS; + goto exit; } -#endif - (void) alg; - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; -} -#endif /* AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF */ -psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup(psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, - psa_algorithm_t alg) -{ - psa_status_t status; + /* In the case of a transparent key or an opaque key stored in local + * storage ( thus not in the case of generating a key in a secure element + * with storage ( MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C ) ),we have to allocate a + * buffer to hold the generated key material. */ + if (slot->key.data == NULL) { + if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(attributes->lifetime) == + PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE) { + status = psa_validate_key_type_and_size_for_key_generation( + attributes->type, attributes->bits); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } - if (operation->alg != 0) { - return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; - } + key_buffer_size = PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( + attributes->type, + attributes->bits); + } else { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size( + attributes, &key_buffer_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } - if (PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)) { - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)) { -#if defined(AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF) - psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg); - psa_algorithm_t ka_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg); - status = psa_key_agreement_try_support(ka_alg); + status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot(slot, key_buffer_size); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } - status = psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf(operation, kdf_alg); -#else - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; -#endif /* AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF */ - } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg)) { -#if defined(AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF) - status = psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf(operation, alg); -#else - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; -#endif /* AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF */ - } else { - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_generate_key(attributes, + params, params_data_length, + slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + &slot->key.bytes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_remove_key_data_from_memory(slot); } +exit: if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - operation->alg = alg; + status = psa_finish_key_creation(slot, driver, key); + } + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_fail_key_creation(slot, driver); } + return status; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) -static psa_status_t psa_hkdf_input(psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t *hkdf, - psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, - psa_key_derivation_step_t step, - const uint8_t *data, - size_t data_length) +psa_status_t psa_generate_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key) { - psa_status_t status; - switch (step) { - case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT: - if (hkdf->state != HKDF_STATE_INIT) { - return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; - } else { - status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac(&hkdf->hmac, - hash_alg, - data, data_length); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } - hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_STARTED; - return PSA_SUCCESS; - } - case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET: - /* If no salt was provided, use an empty salt. */ - if (hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_INIT) { - status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac(&hkdf->hmac, - hash_alg, - NULL, 0); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } - hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_STARTED; - } - if (hkdf->state != HKDF_STATE_STARTED) { - return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; - } - status = psa_mac_update(&hkdf->hmac, - data, data_length); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } - status = psa_mac_sign_finish(&hkdf->hmac, - hkdf->prk, - sizeof(hkdf->prk), - &data_length); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } - hkdf->offset_in_block = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); - hkdf->block_number = 0; - hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_KEYED; - return PSA_SUCCESS; - case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO: - if (hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_OUTPUT) { - return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; - } - if (hkdf->info_set) { - return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; - } - hkdf->info_length = data_length; - if (data_length != 0) { - hkdf->info = mbedtls_calloc(1, data_length); - if (hkdf->info == NULL) { - return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; - } - memcpy(hkdf->info, data, data_length); - } - hkdf->info_set = 1; - return PSA_SUCCESS; - default: - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } + return psa_generate_key_ext(attributes, + &default_production_parameters, 0, + key); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) -static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_set_seed(psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, - const uint8_t *data, - size_t data_length) +/****************************************************************/ +/* Module setup */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_crypto_configure_entropy_sources( + void (* entropy_init)(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx), + void (* entropy_free)(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx)) { - if (prf->state != PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_INIT) { - return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; - } + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - if (data_length != 0) { - prf->seed = mbedtls_calloc(1, data_length); - if (prf->seed == NULL) { - return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ - memcpy(prf->seed, data, data_length); - prf->seed_length = data_length; + if (global_data.rng_state != RNG_NOT_INITIALIZED) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } else { + global_data.rng.entropy_init = entropy_init; + global_data.rng.entropy_free = entropy_free; + status = PSA_SUCCESS; } - prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_SEED_SET; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ - return PSA_SUCCESS; + return status; } +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) */ -static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_set_key(psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, - const uint8_t *data, - size_t data_length) +void mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(void) { - if (prf->state != PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_SEED_SET) { - return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; - } - if (data_length != 0) { - prf->secret = mbedtls_calloc(1, data_length); - if (prf->secret == NULL) { - return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ - memcpy(prf->secret, data, data_length); - prf->secret_length = data_length; + /* Nothing to do to free transaction. */ + if (global_data.initialized & PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION_INITIALIZED) { + global_data.initialized &= ~PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION_INITIALIZED; } - prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_KEY_SET; + if (global_data.initialized & PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_KEY_SLOTS_INITIALIZED) { + psa_wipe_all_key_slots(); + global_data.initialized &= ~PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_KEY_SLOTS_INITIALIZED; + } - return PSA_SUCCESS; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ -static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_set_label(psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, - const uint8_t *data, - size_t data_length) -{ - if (prf->state != PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_KEY_SET) { - return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + if (global_data.rng_state != RNG_NOT_INITIALIZED) { + mbedtls_psa_random_free(&global_data.rng); } + global_data.rng_state = RNG_NOT_INITIALIZED; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&global_data.rng, sizeof(global_data.rng)); - if (data_length != 0) { - prf->label = mbedtls_calloc(1, data_length); - if (prf->label == NULL) { - return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ - memcpy(prf->label, data, data_length); - prf->label_length = data_length; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + /* Terminate drivers */ + if (global_data.initialized & PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_INITIALIZED) { + psa_driver_wrapper_free(); + global_data.initialized &= ~PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_INITIALIZED; } - prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_LABEL_SET; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ - return PSA_SUCCESS; } -static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_input(psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, - psa_key_derivation_step_t step, - const uint8_t *data, - size_t data_length) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS) +/** Recover a transaction that was interrupted by a power failure. + * + * This function is called during initialization, before psa_crypto_init() + * returns. If this function returns a failure status, the initialization + * fails. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_crypto_recover_transaction( + const psa_crypto_transaction_t *transaction) { - switch (step) { - case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED: - return psa_tls12_prf_set_seed(prf, data, data_length); - case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET: - return psa_tls12_prf_set_key(prf, data, data_length); - case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL: - return psa_tls12_prf_set_label(prf, data, data_length); + switch (transaction->unknown.type) { + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_CREATE_KEY: + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_DESTROY_KEY: + /* TODO - fall through to the failure case until this + * is implemented. + * https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/218 + */ default: - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + /* We found an unsupported transaction in the storage. + * We don't know what state the storage is in. Give up. */ + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; } } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || - * MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) -static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_set_key( - psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, - const uint8_t *data, - size_t data_length) +static psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_crypto_init_subsystem(mbedtls_psa_crypto_subsystem subsystem) { - psa_status_t status; - uint8_t pms[4 + 2 * PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE]; - uint8_t *cur = pms; + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + uint8_t driver_wrappers_initialized = 0; - if (data_length > PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE) { - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } + switch (subsystem) { + case PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS: - /* Quoting RFC 4279, Section 2: - * - * The premaster secret is formed as follows: if the PSK is N octets - * long, concatenate a uint16 with the value N, N zero octets, a second - * uint16 with the value N, and the PSK itself. - */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex)); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ - *cur++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(data_length); - *cur++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(data_length); - memset(cur, 0, data_length); - cur += data_length; - *cur++ = pms[0]; - *cur++ = pms[1]; - memcpy(cur, data, data_length); - cur += data_length; + if (!(global_data.initialized & PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_INITIALIZED)) { + /* Init drivers */ + status = psa_driver_wrapper_init(); - status = psa_tls12_prf_set_key(prf, pms, cur - pms); + /* Drivers need shutdown regardless of startup errors. */ + global_data.initialized |= PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_INITIALIZED; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(pms, sizeof(pms)); - return status; -} -static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_input( - psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, - psa_key_derivation_step_t step, - const uint8_t *data, - size_t data_length) -{ - if (step == PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET) { - return psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_set_key(prf, - data, data_length); - } + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex)); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ - return psa_tls12_prf_input(prf, step, data, data_length); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + break; + + case PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_KEY_SLOTS: + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex)); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + if (!(global_data.initialized & PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_KEY_SLOTS_INITIALIZED)) { + status = psa_initialize_key_slots(); + + /* Need to wipe keys even if initialization fails. */ + global_data.initialized |= PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_KEY_SLOTS_INITIALIZED; -/** Check whether the given key type is acceptable for the given - * input step of a key derivation. - * - * Secret inputs must have the type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE. - * Non-secret inputs must have the type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA. - * Both secret and non-secret inputs can alternatively have the type - * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE, which is never the type of a key object, meaning - * that the input was passed as a buffer rather than via a key object. - */ -static int psa_key_derivation_check_input_type( - psa_key_derivation_step_t step, - psa_key_type_t key_type) -{ - switch (step) { - case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET: - if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE) { - return PSA_SUCCESS; - } - if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE) { - return PSA_SUCCESS; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex)); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + break; - case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL: - case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT: - case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO: - case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED: - if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA) { - return PSA_SUCCESS; - } - if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE) { - return PSA_SUCCESS; + + case PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_RNG: + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex)); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + driver_wrappers_initialized = + (global_data.initialized & PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_INITIALIZED); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex)); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + /* Need to use separate mutex here, as initialisation can require + * testing of init flags, which requires locking the global data + * mutex. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex)); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + /* Initialize and seed the random generator. */ + if (global_data.rng_state == RNG_NOT_INITIALIZED && driver_wrappers_initialized) { + mbedtls_psa_random_init(&global_data.rng); + global_data.rng_state = RNG_INITIALIZED; + + status = mbedtls_psa_random_seed(&global_data.rng); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + global_data.rng_state = RNG_SEEDED; + } } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex)); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + break; + + case PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION: + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex)); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + if (!(global_data.initialized & PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION_INITIALIZED)) { +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS) + status = psa_crypto_load_transaction(); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = psa_crypto_recover_transaction(&psa_crypto_transaction); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + global_data.initialized |= PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION_INITIALIZED; + } + status = psa_crypto_stop_transaction(); + } else if (status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) { + /* There's no transaction to complete. It's all good. */ + global_data.initialized |= PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION_INITIALIZED; + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + } +#else /* defined(PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS) */ + global_data.initialized |= PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION_INITIALIZED; + status = PSA_SUCCESS; +#endif /* defined(PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS) */ + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex)); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + break; + + default: + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; } - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + + /* Exit label only required when using threading macros. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +exit: +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + return status; } -static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_internal( - psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, - psa_key_derivation_step_t step, - psa_key_type_t key_type, - const uint8_t *data, - size_t data_length) +psa_status_t psa_crypto_init(void) { psa_status_t status; - psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg(operation); - status = psa_key_derivation_check_input_type(step, key_type); + /* Double initialization is explicitly allowed. Early out if everything is + * done. */ + if (psa_get_initialized()) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + + status = mbedtls_psa_crypto_init_subsystem(PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { goto exit; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) - if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF(kdf_alg)) { - status = psa_hkdf_input(&operation->ctx.hkdf, - PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH(kdf_alg), - step, data, data_length); - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) - if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(kdf_alg)) { - status = psa_tls12_prf_input(&operation->ctx.tls12_prf, - step, data, data_length); - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) - if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(kdf_alg)) { - status = psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_input(&operation->ctx.tls12_prf, - step, data, data_length); - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ - { - /* This can't happen unless the operation object was not initialized */ - (void) data; - (void) data_length; - (void) kdf_alg; - return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + status = mbedtls_psa_crypto_init_subsystem(PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_KEY_SLOTS); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_psa_crypto_init_subsystem(PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_RNG); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; } + status = mbedtls_psa_crypto_init_subsystem(PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION); + exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - psa_key_derivation_abort(operation); + mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(); } + return status; } -psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( - psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, - psa_key_derivation_step_t step, - const uint8_t *data, - size_t data_length) +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SOME_PAKE) +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_password_len( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + size_t *password_len) { - return psa_key_derivation_input_internal(operation, step, - PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE, - data, data_length); + if (inputs->password_len == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + *password_len = inputs->password_len; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; } -psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_key( - psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, - psa_key_derivation_step_t step, - mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_password( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + uint8_t *buffer, size_t buffer_size, size_t *buffer_length) { - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_slot_t *slot; - - status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( - key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, operation->alg); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - psa_key_derivation_abort(operation); - return status; + if (inputs->password_len == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; } - /* Passing a key object as a SECRET input unlocks the permission - * to output to a key object. */ - if (step == PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET) { - operation->can_output_key = 1; + if (buffer_size < inputs->password_len) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; } - status = psa_key_derivation_input_internal(operation, - step, slot->attr.type, - slot->key.data, - slot->key.bytes); - - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + memcpy(buffer, inputs->password, inputs->password_len); + *buffer_length = inputs->password_len; - return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; + return PSA_SUCCESS; } +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_user_len( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + size_t *user_len) +{ + if (inputs->user_len == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + *user_len = inputs->user_len; -/****************************************************************/ -/* Key agreement */ -/****************************************************************/ + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) -static psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_ecdh(const uint8_t *peer_key, - size_t peer_key_length, - const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *our_key, - uint8_t *shared_secret, - size_t shared_secret_size, - size_t *shared_secret_length) +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_user( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + uint8_t *user_id, size_t user_id_size, size_t *user_id_len) { - mbedtls_ecp_keypair *their_key = NULL; - mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh; - psa_status_t status; - size_t bits = 0; - psa_ecc_family_t curve = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(our_key->grp.id, &bits); - mbedtls_ecdh_init(&ecdh); - - status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( - PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve), - bits, - peer_key, - peer_key_length, - &their_key); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - goto exit; + if (inputs->user_len == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; } - status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( - mbedtls_ecdh_get_params(&ecdh, their_key, MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS)); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - goto exit; - } - status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( - mbedtls_ecdh_get_params(&ecdh, our_key, MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS)); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - goto exit; + if (user_id_size < inputs->user_len) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; } - status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( - mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&ecdh, - shared_secret_length, - shared_secret, shared_secret_size, - mbedtls_psa_get_random, - MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE)); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - goto exit; + memcpy(user_id, inputs->user, inputs->user_len); + *user_id_len = inputs->user_len; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_peer_len( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + size_t *peer_len) +{ + if (inputs->peer_len == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; } - if (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits) != *shared_secret_length) { - status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + *peer_len = inputs->peer_len; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_peer( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + uint8_t *peer_id, size_t peer_id_size, size_t *peer_id_length) +{ + if (inputs->peer_len == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; } -exit: - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(shared_secret, shared_secret_size); + if (peer_id_size < inputs->peer_len) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; } - mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ecdh); - mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(their_key); - mbedtls_free(their_key); - return status; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH */ + memcpy(peer_id, inputs->peer, inputs->peer_len); + *peer_id_length = inputs->peer_len; -#define PSA_KEY_AGREEMENT_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} -static psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_raw_internal(psa_algorithm_t alg, - psa_key_slot_t *private_key, - const uint8_t *peer_key, - size_t peer_key_length, - uint8_t *shared_secret, - size_t shared_secret_size, - size_t *shared_secret_length) +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_cipher_suite( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite) { - mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; - psa_status_t status; - - switch (alg) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) - case PSA_ALG_ECDH: - if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(private_key->attr.type)) { - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } - status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( - private_key->attr.type, - private_key->attr.bits, - private_key->key.data, - private_key->key.bytes, - &ecp); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } - status = psa_key_agreement_ecdh(peer_key, peer_key_length, - ecp, - shared_secret, shared_secret_size, - shared_secret_length); - mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(ecp); - mbedtls_free(ecp); - return status; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH */ - default: - (void) ecp; - (void) status; - (void) private_key; - (void) peer_key; - (void) peer_key_length; - (void) shared_secret; - (void) shared_secret_size; - (void) shared_secret_length; - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + if (inputs->cipher_suite.algorithm == PSA_ALG_NONE) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; } + + *cipher_suite = inputs->cipher_suite; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; } -/* Note that if this function fails, you must call psa_key_derivation_abort() - * to potentially free embedded data structures and wipe confidential data. - */ -static psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_internal(psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, - psa_key_derivation_step_t step, - psa_key_slot_t *private_key, - const uint8_t *peer_key, - size_t peer_key_length) +psa_status_t psa_pake_setup( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite) { - psa_status_t status; - uint8_t shared_secret[PSA_KEY_AGREEMENT_MAX_SHARED_SECRET_SIZE]; - size_t shared_secret_length = 0; - psa_algorithm_t ka_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(operation->alg); + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - /* Step 1: run the secret agreement algorithm to generate the shared - * secret. */ - status = psa_key_agreement_raw_internal(ka_alg, - private_key, - peer_key, peer_key_length, - shared_secret, - sizeof(shared_secret), - &shared_secret_length); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + if (operation->stage != PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_SETUP) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; goto exit; } - /* Step 2: set up the key derivation to generate key material from - * the shared secret. A shared secret is permitted wherever a key - * of type DERIVE is permitted. */ - status = psa_key_derivation_input_internal(operation, step, - PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE, - shared_secret, - shared_secret_length); + if (PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(cipher_suite->algorithm) == 0 || + PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(cipher_suite->hash) == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + memset(&operation->data.inputs, 0, sizeof(operation->data.inputs)); + + operation->alg = cipher_suite->algorithm; + operation->primitive = PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(cipher_suite->type, + cipher_suite->family, cipher_suite->bits); + operation->data.inputs.cipher_suite = *cipher_suite; + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) { + psa_jpake_computation_stage_t *computation_stage = + &operation->computation_stage.jpake; + + memset(computation_stage, 0, sizeof(*computation_stage)); + computation_stage->step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE; + } else +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + + operation->stage = PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; exit: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(shared_secret, shared_secret_length); + psa_pake_abort(operation); return status; } -psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_key_agreement(psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, - psa_key_derivation_step_t step, - mbedtls_svc_key_id_t private_key, - const uint8_t *peer_key, - size_t peer_key_length) +psa_status_t psa_pake_set_password_key( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t password) { psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_slot_t *slot; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_key_type_t type; - if (!PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(operation->alg)) { - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (operation->stage != PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; } - status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( - private_key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, operation->alg); + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(password, &slot, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, + operation->alg); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; + goto exit; } - status = psa_key_agreement_internal(operation, step, - slot, - peer_key, peer_key_length); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - psa_key_derivation_abort(operation); - } else { - /* If a private key has been added as SECRET, we allow the derived - * key material to be used as a key in PSA Crypto. */ - if (step == PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET) { - operation->can_output_key = 1; - } + + type = psa_get_key_type(&slot->attr); + + if (type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD && + type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + operation->data.inputs.password = mbedtls_calloc(1, slot->key.bytes); + if (operation->data.inputs.password == NULL) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + goto exit; } - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + memcpy(operation->data.inputs.password, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes); + operation->data.inputs.password_len = slot->key.bytes; + operation->data.inputs.attributes = slot->attr; +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_pake_abort(operation); + } + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; } -psa_status_t psa_raw_key_agreement(psa_algorithm_t alg, - mbedtls_svc_key_id_t private_key, - const uint8_t *peer_key, - size_t peer_key_length, - uint8_t *output, - size_t output_size, - size_t *output_length) +psa_status_t psa_pake_set_user( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *user_id_external, + size_t user_id_len) { psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; - size_t expected_length; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(user_id_external, user_id); - if (!PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)) { + if (operation->stage != PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (user_id_len == 0) { status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto exit; } - status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( - private_key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, alg); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + + if (operation->data.inputs.user_len != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; goto exit; } - /* PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE() is in general an upper bound - * for the output size. The PSA specification only guarantees that this - * function works if output_size >= PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(...), - * but it might be nice to allow smaller buffers if the output fits. - * At the time of writing this comment, with only ECDH implemented, - * PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE() is exact so the point is moot. - * If FFDH is implemented, PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE() can easily - * be exact for it as well. */ - expected_length = - PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(slot->attr.type, slot->attr.bits); - if (output_size < expected_length) { - status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + operation->data.inputs.user = mbedtls_calloc(1, user_id_len); + if (operation->data.inputs.user == NULL) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; goto exit; } - status = psa_key_agreement_raw_internal(alg, slot, - peer_key, peer_key_length, - output, output_size, - output_length); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(user_id_external, user_id_len, user_id); + + memcpy(operation->data.inputs.user, user_id, user_id_len); + operation->data.inputs.user_len = user_id_len; + + status = PSA_SUCCESS; exit: + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(user_id_external, user_id); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - /* If an error happens and is not handled properly, the output - * may be used as a key to protect sensitive data. Arrange for such - * a key to be random, which is likely to result in decryption or - * verification errors. This is better than filling the buffer with - * some constant data such as zeros, which would result in the data - * being protected with a reproducible, easily knowable key. - */ - psa_generate_random(output, output_size); - *output_length = output_size; + psa_pake_abort(operation); } + return status; +} - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); +psa_status_t psa_pake_set_peer( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *peer_id_external, + size_t peer_id_len) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(peer_id_external, peer_id); - return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; -} + if (operation->stage != PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + if (peer_id_len == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + if (operation->data.inputs.peer_len != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } -/****************************************************************/ -/* Random generation */ -/****************************************************************/ + operation->data.inputs.peer = mbedtls_calloc(1, peer_id_len); + if (operation->data.inputs.peer == NULL) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + goto exit; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) -#include "mbedtls/entropy_poll.h" -#endif + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(peer_id_external, peer_id_len, peer_id); -/** Initialize the PSA random generator. - */ -static void mbedtls_psa_random_init(mbedtls_psa_random_context_t *rng) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) - memset(rng, 0, sizeof(*rng)); -#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + memcpy(operation->data.inputs.peer, peer_id, peer_id_len); + operation->data.inputs.peer_len = peer_id_len; - /* Set default configuration if - * mbedtls_psa_crypto_configure_entropy_sources() hasn't been called. */ - if (rng->entropy_init == NULL) { - rng->entropy_init = mbedtls_entropy_init; + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + +exit: + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(peer_id_external, peer_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_pake_abort(operation); } - if (rng->entropy_free == NULL) { - rng->entropy_free = mbedtls_entropy_free; + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_pake_set_role( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_pake_role_t role) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (operation->stage != PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; } - rng->entropy_init(&rng->entropy); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) - /* The PSA entropy injection feature depends on using NV seed as an entropy - * source. Add NV seed as an entropy source for PSA entropy injection. */ - mbedtls_entropy_add_source(&rng->entropy, - mbedtls_nv_seed_poll, NULL, - MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, - MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG); + switch (operation->alg) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) + case PSA_ALG_JPAKE: + if (role == PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + break; #endif - - mbedtls_psa_drbg_init(MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + default: + (void) role; + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } +exit: + psa_pake_abort(operation); + return status; } -/** Deinitialize the PSA random generator. - */ -static void mbedtls_psa_random_free(mbedtls_psa_random_context_t *rng) +/* Auxiliary function to convert core computation stage to single driver step. */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) +static psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t convert_jpake_computation_stage_to_driver_step( + psa_jpake_computation_stage_t *stage) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) - memset(rng, 0, sizeof(*rng)); -#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ - mbedtls_psa_drbg_free(MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE); - rng->entropy_free(&rng->entropy); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ -} + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t key_share_step; + if (stage->round == PSA_JPAKE_FIRST) { + int is_x1; -/** Seed the PSA random generator. - */ -static psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_random_seed(mbedtls_psa_random_context_t *rng) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) - /* Do nothing: the external RNG seeds itself. */ - (void) rng; - return PSA_SUCCESS; -#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ - const unsigned char drbg_seed[] = "PSA"; - int ret = mbedtls_psa_drbg_seed(&rng->entropy, - drbg_seed, sizeof(drbg_seed) - 1); - return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + if (stage->io_mode == PSA_JPAKE_OUTPUT) { + is_x1 = (stage->outputs < 1); + } else { + is_x1 = (stage->inputs < 1); + } + + key_share_step = is_x1 ? + PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE : + PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_KEY_SHARE; + } else if (stage->round == PSA_JPAKE_SECOND) { + key_share_step = (stage->io_mode == PSA_JPAKE_OUTPUT) ? + PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_KEY_SHARE : + PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_KEY_SHARE; + } else { + return PSA_JPAKE_STEP_INVALID; + } + return (psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t) (key_share_step + stage->step - PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE); } +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */ -psa_status_t psa_generate_random(uint8_t *output, - size_t output_size) +static psa_status_t psa_pake_complete_inputs( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation) { - GUARD_MODULE_INITIALIZED; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + /* Create copy of the inputs on stack as inputs share memory + with the driver context which will be setup by the driver. */ + psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t inputs = operation->data.inputs; - size_t output_length = 0; - psa_status_t status = mbedtls_psa_external_get_random(&global_data.rng, - output, output_size, - &output_length); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } - /* Breaking up a request into smaller chunks is currently not supported - * for the external RNG interface. */ - if (output_length != output_size) { - return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY; + if (inputs.password_len == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; } - return PSA_SUCCESS; -#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ - - while (output_size > 0) { - size_t request_size = - (output_size > MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST ? - MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST : - output_size); - int ret = mbedtls_psa_get_random(MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, - output, request_size); - if (ret != 0) { - return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) { + if (inputs.user_len == 0 || inputs.peer_len == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; } - output_size -= request_size; - output += request_size; } - return PSA_SUCCESS; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ -} -/* Wrapper function allowing the classic API to use the PSA RNG. - * - * `mbedtls_psa_get_random(MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, ...)` calls - * `psa_generate_random(...)`. The state parameter is ignored since the - * PSA API doesn't support passing an explicit state. - * - * In the non-external case, psa_generate_random() calls an - * `mbedtls_xxx_drbg_random` function which has exactly the same signature - * and semantics as mbedtls_psa_get_random(). As an optimization, - * instead of doing this back-and-forth between the PSA API and the - * classic API, psa_crypto_random_impl.h defines `mbedtls_psa_get_random` - * as a constant function pointer to `mbedtls_xxx_drbg_random`. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) -int mbedtls_psa_get_random(void *p_rng, - unsigned char *output, - size_t output_size) -{ - /* This function takes a pointer to the RNG state because that's what - * classic mbedtls functions using an RNG expect. The PSA RNG manages - * its own state internally and doesn't let the caller access that state. - * So we just ignore the state parameter, and in practice we'll pass - * NULL. */ - (void) p_rng; - psa_status_t status = psa_generate_random(output, output_size); + /* Clear driver context */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&operation->data, sizeof(operation->data)); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_pake_setup(operation, &inputs); + + /* Driver is responsible for creating its own copy of the password. */ + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(inputs.password, inputs.password_len); + + /* User and peer are translated to role. */ + mbedtls_free(inputs.user); + mbedtls_free(inputs.peer); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - return 0; - } else { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) { + operation->stage = PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COMPUTATION; + } else +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } } + return status; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) -psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(const uint8_t *seed, - size_t seed_size) +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) +static psa_status_t psa_jpake_prologue( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_pake_step_t step, + psa_jpake_io_mode_t io_mode) { - if (global_data.initialized) { - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; + if (step != PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE && + step != PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC && + step != PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } - if (((seed_size < MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM) || - (seed_size < MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE)) || - (seed_size > MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE)) { - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + psa_jpake_computation_stage_t *computation_stage = + &operation->computation_stage.jpake; + + if (computation_stage->round != PSA_JPAKE_FIRST && + computation_stage->round != PSA_JPAKE_SECOND) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; } - return mbedtls_psa_storage_inject_entropy(seed, seed_size); + /* Check that the step we are given is the one we were expecting */ + if (step != computation_stage->step) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE && + computation_stage->inputs == 0 && + computation_stage->outputs == 0) { + /* Start of the round, so function decides whether we are inputting + * or outputting */ + computation_stage->io_mode = io_mode; + } else if (computation_stage->io_mode != io_mode) { + /* Middle of the round so the mode we are in must match the function + * called by the user */ + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */ -/** Validate the key type and size for key generation - * - * \param type The key type - * \param bits The number of bits of the key - * - * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS - * The key type and size are valid. - * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT - * The size in bits of the key is not valid. - * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED - * The type and/or the size in bits of the key or the combination of - * the two is not supported. - */ -static psa_status_t psa_validate_key_type_and_size_for_key_generation( - psa_key_type_t type, size_t bits) +static psa_status_t psa_jpake_epilogue( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_jpake_io_mode_t io_mode) { - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - if (key_type_is_raw_bytes(type)) { - status = validate_unstructured_key_bit_size(type, bits); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; + psa_jpake_computation_stage_t *stage = + &operation->computation_stage.jpake; + + if (stage->step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF) { + /* End of an input/output */ + if (io_mode == PSA_JPAKE_INPUT) { + stage->inputs++; + if (stage->inputs == PSA_JPAKE_EXPECTED_INPUTS(stage->round)) { + stage->io_mode = PSA_JPAKE_OUTPUT; + } } - } else -#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) - if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type) && PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) { - if (bits > PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) { - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + if (io_mode == PSA_JPAKE_OUTPUT) { + stage->outputs++; + if (stage->outputs == PSA_JPAKE_EXPECTED_OUTPUTS(stage->round)) { + stage->io_mode = PSA_JPAKE_INPUT; + } } - - /* Accept only byte-aligned keys, for the same reasons as - * in psa_import_rsa_key(). */ - if (bits % 8 != 0) { - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + if (stage->inputs == PSA_JPAKE_EXPECTED_INPUTS(stage->round) && + stage->outputs == PSA_JPAKE_EXPECTED_OUTPUTS(stage->round)) { + /* End of a round, move to the next round */ + stage->inputs = 0; + stage->outputs = 0; + stage->round++; } - } else -#endif /* defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) */ + stage->step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE; + } else { + stage->step++; + } + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} -#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) - if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) && PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) { - /* To avoid empty block, return successfully here. */ - return PSA_SUCCESS; - } else -#endif /* defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) */ - { - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */ + +psa_status_t psa_pake_output( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_pake_step_t step, + uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t driver_step = PSA_JPAKE_STEP_INVALID; + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + *output_length = 0; + + if (operation->stage == PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS) { + status = psa_pake_complete_inputs(operation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } } - return PSA_SUCCESS; -} + if (operation->stage != PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COMPUTATION) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } -psa_status_t psa_generate_key_internal( - const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length) -{ - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_type_t type = attributes->core.type; + if (output_size == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } - if ((attributes->domain_parameters == NULL) && - (attributes->domain_parameters_size != 0)) { - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + switch (operation->alg) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) + case PSA_ALG_JPAKE: + status = psa_jpake_prologue(operation, step, PSA_JPAKE_OUTPUT); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + driver_step = convert_jpake_computation_stage_to_driver_step( + &operation->computation_stage.jpake); + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */ + default: + (void) step; + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; } - if (key_type_is_raw_bytes(type)) { - status = psa_generate_random(key_buffer, key_buffer_size); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_size, output); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) - if (type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES) { - psa_des_set_key_parity(key_buffer, key_buffer_size); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES */ - } else + status = psa_driver_wrapper_pake_output(operation, driver_step, + output, output_size, output_length); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) - if (type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) { - return mbedtls_psa_rsa_generate_key(attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - key_buffer_length); - } else -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) - * defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) */ + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) - if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) && PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) { - return mbedtls_psa_ecp_generate_key(attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - key_buffer_length); - } else -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) */ - { - (void) key_buffer_length; - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + switch (operation->alg) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) + case PSA_ALG_JPAKE: + status = psa_jpake_epilogue(operation, PSA_JPAKE_OUTPUT); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */ + default: + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; } - return PSA_SUCCESS; +exit: + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_pake_abort(operation); + } + return status; } -psa_status_t psa_generate_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key) +psa_status_t psa_pake_input( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_pake_step_t step, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length) { - psa_status_t status; - psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; - psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; - size_t key_buffer_size; - - *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; - - /* Reject any attempt to create a zero-length key so that we don't - * risk tripping up later, e.g. on a malloc(0) that returns NULL. */ - if (psa_get_key_bits(attributes) == 0) { - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t driver_step = PSA_JPAKE_STEP_INVALID; + const size_t max_input_length = (size_t) PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE(operation->alg, + operation->primitive, + step); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + + if (operation->stage == PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS) { + status = psa_pake_complete_inputs(operation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } } - /* Reject any attempt to create a public key. */ - if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(attributes->core.type)) { - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (operation->stage != PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COMPUTATION) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; } - status = psa_start_key_creation(PSA_KEY_CREATION_GENERATE, attributes, - &slot, &driver); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + if (input_length == 0 || input_length > max_input_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto exit; } - /* In the case of a transparent key or an opaque key stored in local - * storage (thus not in the case of generating a key in a secure element - * or cryptoprocessor with storage), we have to allocate a buffer to - * hold the generated key material. */ - if (slot->key.data == NULL) { - if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(attributes->core.lifetime) == - PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE) { - status = psa_validate_key_type_and_size_for_key_generation( - attributes->core.type, attributes->core.bits); + switch (operation->alg) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) + case PSA_ALG_JPAKE: + status = psa_jpake_prologue(operation, step, PSA_JPAKE_INPUT); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { goto exit; } + driver_step = convert_jpake_computation_stage_to_driver_step( + &operation->computation_stage.jpake); + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */ + default: + (void) step; + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } - key_buffer_size = PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( - attributes->core.type, - attributes->core.bits); - } else { - status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size( - attributes, &key_buffer_size); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + status = psa_driver_wrapper_pake_input(operation, driver_step, + input, input_length); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + switch (operation->alg) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) + case PSA_ALG_JPAKE: + status = psa_jpake_epilogue(operation, PSA_JPAKE_INPUT); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { goto exit; } - } + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */ + default: + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } - status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot(slot, key_buffer_size); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { +exit: + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_pake_abort(operation); + } + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_pake_get_implicit_key( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *output) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint8_t shared_key[MBEDTLS_PSA_JPAKE_BUFFER_SIZE]; + size_t shared_key_len = 0; + + if (operation->stage != PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COMPUTATION) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) { + psa_jpake_computation_stage_t *computation_stage = + &operation->computation_stage.jpake; + if (computation_stage->round != PSA_JPAKE_FINISHED) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; goto exit; } + } else +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; } - status = psa_driver_wrapper_generate_key(attributes, - slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, &slot->key.bytes); + status = psa_driver_wrapper_pake_get_implicit_key(operation, + shared_key, + sizeof(shared_key), + &shared_key_len); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - psa_remove_key_data_from_memory(slot); + goto exit; } + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(output, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + shared_key, + shared_key_len); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(shared_key, sizeof(shared_key)); exit: - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - status = psa_finish_key_creation(slot, driver, key); + abort_status = psa_pake_abort(operation); + return status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_pake_abort( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + + if (operation->stage == PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COMPUTATION) { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_pake_abort(operation); } - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - psa_fail_key_creation(slot, driver); + + if (operation->stage == PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS) { + if (operation->data.inputs.password != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(operation->data.inputs.password, + operation->data.inputs.password_len); + } + if (operation->data.inputs.user != NULL) { + mbedtls_free(operation->data.inputs.user); + } + if (operation->data.inputs.peer != NULL) { + mbedtls_free(operation->data.inputs.peer); + } } + memset(operation, 0, sizeof(psa_pake_operation_t)); return status; } +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SOME_PAKE */ + +/* Memory copying test hooks. These are called before input copy, after input + * copy, before output copy and after output copy, respectively. + * They are used by memory-poisoning tests to temporarily unpoison buffers + * while they are copied. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +void (*psa_input_pre_copy_hook)(const uint8_t *input, size_t input_len) = NULL; +void (*psa_input_post_copy_hook)(const uint8_t *input, size_t input_len) = NULL; +void (*psa_output_pre_copy_hook)(const uint8_t *output, size_t output_len) = NULL; +void (*psa_output_post_copy_hook)(const uint8_t *output, size_t output_len) = NULL; +#endif -/****************************************************************/ -/* Module setup */ -/****************************************************************/ - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) -psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_crypto_configure_entropy_sources( - void (* entropy_init)(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx), - void (* entropy_free)(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx)) +/** Copy from an input buffer to a local copy. + * + * \param[in] input Pointer to input buffer. + * \param[in] input_len Length of the input buffer. + * \param[out] input_copy Pointer to a local copy in which to store the input data. + * \param[out] input_copy_len Length of the local copy buffer. + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS, if the buffer was successfully + * copied. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED, if the local + * copy is too small to hold contents of the + * input buffer. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +psa_status_t psa_crypto_copy_input(const uint8_t *input, size_t input_len, + uint8_t *input_copy, size_t input_copy_len) { - if (global_data.rng_state != RNG_NOT_INITIALIZED) { - return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + if (input_len > input_copy_len) { + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; } - global_data.rng.entropy_init = entropy_init; - global_data.rng.entropy_free = entropy_free; - return PSA_SUCCESS; -} -#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) */ -void mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(void) -{ - psa_wipe_all_key_slots(); - if (global_data.rng_state != RNG_NOT_INITIALIZED) { - mbedtls_psa_random_free(&global_data.rng); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + if (psa_input_pre_copy_hook != NULL) { + psa_input_pre_copy_hook(input, input_len); } - /* Wipe all remaining data, including configuration. - * In particular, this sets all state indicator to the value - * indicating "uninitialized". */ - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&global_data, sizeof(global_data)); +#endif - /* Terminate drivers */ - psa_driver_wrapper_free(); + if (input_len > 0) { + memcpy(input_copy, input, input_len); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + if (psa_input_post_copy_hook != NULL) { + psa_input_post_copy_hook(input, input_len); + } +#endif + + return PSA_SUCCESS; } -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS) -/** Recover a transaction that was interrupted by a power failure. +/** Copy from a local output buffer into a user-supplied one. * - * This function is called during initialization, before psa_crypto_init() - * returns. If this function returns a failure status, the initialization - * fails. + * \param[in] output_copy Pointer to a local buffer containing the output. + * \param[in] output_copy_len Length of the local buffer. + * \param[out] output Pointer to user-supplied output buffer. + * \param[out] output_len Length of the user-supplied output buffer. + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS, if the buffer was successfully + * copied. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, if the + * user-supplied output buffer is too small to + * hold the contents of the local buffer. */ -static psa_status_t psa_crypto_recover_transaction( - const psa_crypto_transaction_t *transaction) +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +psa_status_t psa_crypto_copy_output(const uint8_t *output_copy, size_t output_copy_len, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_len) { - switch (transaction->unknown.type) { - case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_CREATE_KEY: - case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_DESTROY_KEY: - /* TODO - fall through to the failure case until this - * is implemented. - * https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/218 - */ - default: - /* We found an unsupported transaction in the storage. - * We don't know what state the storage is in. Give up. */ - return PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + if (output_len < output_copy_len) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + if (psa_output_pre_copy_hook != NULL) { + psa_output_pre_copy_hook(output, output_len); + } +#endif + + if (output_copy_len > 0) { + memcpy(output, output_copy, output_copy_len); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + if (psa_output_post_copy_hook != NULL) { + psa_output_post_copy_hook(output, output_len); } +#endif + + return PSA_SUCCESS; } -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS */ -psa_status_t psa_crypto_init(void) +psa_status_t psa_crypto_local_input_alloc(const uint8_t *input, size_t input_len, + psa_crypto_local_input_t *local_input) { psa_status_t status; - /* Double initialization is explicitly allowed. */ - if (global_data.initialized != 0) { + *local_input = PSA_CRYPTO_LOCAL_INPUT_INIT; + + if (input_len == 0) { return PSA_SUCCESS; } - /* Initialize and seed the random generator. */ - mbedtls_psa_random_init(&global_data.rng); - global_data.rng_state = RNG_INITIALIZED; - status = mbedtls_psa_random_seed(&global_data.rng); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - goto exit; + local_input->buffer = mbedtls_calloc(input_len, 1); + if (local_input->buffer == NULL) { + /* Since we dealt with the zero-length case above, we know that + * a NULL return value means a failure of allocation. */ + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; } - global_data.rng_state = RNG_SEEDED; + /* From now on, we must free local_input->buffer on error. */ - status = psa_initialize_key_slots(); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - goto exit; - } + local_input->length = input_len; - /* Init drivers */ - status = psa_driver_wrapper_init(); + status = psa_crypto_copy_input(input, input_len, + local_input->buffer, local_input->length); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - goto exit; + goto error; } -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS) - status = psa_crypto_load_transaction(); - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - status = psa_crypto_recover_transaction(&psa_crypto_transaction); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - goto exit; - } - status = psa_crypto_stop_transaction(); - } else if (status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) { - /* There's no transaction to complete. It's all good. */ - status = PSA_SUCCESS; + return PSA_SUCCESS; + +error: + mbedtls_free(local_input->buffer); + local_input->buffer = NULL; + local_input->length = 0; + return status; +} + +void psa_crypto_local_input_free(psa_crypto_local_input_t *local_input) +{ + mbedtls_free(local_input->buffer); + local_input->buffer = NULL; + local_input->length = 0; +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_local_output_alloc(uint8_t *output, size_t output_len, + psa_crypto_local_output_t *local_output) +{ + *local_output = PSA_CRYPTO_LOCAL_OUTPUT_INIT; + + if (output_len == 0) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; } -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS */ + local_output->buffer = mbedtls_calloc(output_len, 1); + if (local_output->buffer == NULL) { + /* Since we dealt with the zero-length case above, we know that + * a NULL return value means a failure of allocation. */ + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + local_output->length = output_len; + local_output->original = output; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} - /* All done. */ - global_data.initialized = 1; +psa_status_t psa_crypto_local_output_free(psa_crypto_local_output_t *local_output) +{ + psa_status_t status; -exit: + if (local_output->buffer == NULL) { + local_output->length = 0; + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + if (local_output->original == NULL) { + /* We have an internal copy but nothing to copy back to. */ + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + + status = psa_crypto_copy_output(local_output->buffer, local_output->length, + local_output->original, local_output->length); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(); + return status; } - return status; + + mbedtls_free(local_output->buffer); + local_output->buffer = NULL; + local_output->length = 0; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_aead.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_aead.c index 26ccc1cafc..a201985b4f 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_aead.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_aead.c @@ -3,19 +3,7 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" @@ -26,81 +14,42 @@ #include "psa_crypto_core.h" #include "psa_crypto_cipher.h" +#include +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + #include "mbedtls/ccm.h" #include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" #include "mbedtls/cipher.h" #include "mbedtls/gcm.h" - -typedef struct { - psa_algorithm_t core_alg; - uint8_t tag_length; - union { - unsigned dummy; /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) - mbedtls_ccm_context ccm; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) - mbedtls_gcm_context gcm; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) - mbedtls_chachapoly_context chachapoly; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ - } ctx; -} aead_operation_t; - -#define AEAD_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, { 0 } } - -static void psa_aead_abort_internal(aead_operation_t *operation) -{ - switch (operation->core_alg) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) - case PSA_ALG_CCM: - mbedtls_ccm_free(&operation->ctx.ccm); - break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) - case PSA_ALG_GCM: - mbedtls_gcm_free(&operation->ctx.gcm); - break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) - case PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305: - mbedtls_chachapoly_free(&operation->ctx.chachapoly); - break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ - } -} +#include "mbedtls/error.h" static psa_status_t psa_aead_setup( - aead_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, psa_algorithm_t alg) { psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t key_bits; - const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id; - size_t full_tag_length = 0; - - key_bits = attributes->core.bits; + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; + size_t key_bits = attributes->bits; + (void) key_buffer_size; - cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa(alg, - attributes->core.type, key_bits, - &cipher_id); - if (cipher_info == NULL) { - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + status = mbedtls_cipher_values_from_psa(alg, attributes->type, + &key_bits, &mode, &cipher_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; } switch (PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(alg, 0)) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 0): - operation->core_alg = PSA_ALG_CCM; - full_tag_length = 16; + operation->alg = PSA_ALG_CCM; /* CCM allows the following tag lengths: 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16. * The call to mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag or * mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt will validate the tag length. */ - if (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(attributes->core.type) != 16) { + if (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(attributes->type) != 16) { return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } @@ -116,12 +65,11 @@ static psa_status_t psa_aead_setup( #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 0): - operation->core_alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; - full_tag_length = 16; + operation->alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; /* GCM allows the following tag lengths: 4, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16. * The call to mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag or * mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt will validate the tag length. */ - if (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(attributes->core.type) != 16) { + if (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(attributes->type) != 16) { return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } @@ -137,8 +85,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_aead_setup( #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 0): - operation->core_alg = PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305; - full_tag_length = 16; + operation->alg = PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305; /* We only support the default tag length. */ if (alg != PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) { return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; @@ -160,15 +107,9 @@ static psa_status_t psa_aead_setup( return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } - if (PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(attributes->core.type, - key_bits, alg) - > full_tag_length) { - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } + operation->key_type = psa_get_key_type(attributes); - operation->tag_length = PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(attributes->core.type, - key_bits, - alg); + operation->tag_length = PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg); return PSA_SUCCESS; } @@ -183,11 +124,12 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt( uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t *ciphertext_length) { psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - aead_operation_t operation = AEAD_OPERATION_INIT; + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t operation = MBEDTLS_PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT; uint8_t *tag; - (void) key_buffer_size; - status = psa_aead_setup(&operation, attributes, key_buffer, alg); + status = psa_aead_setup(&operation, attributes, key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { goto exit; } @@ -201,7 +143,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt( tag = ciphertext + plaintext_length; #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) - if (operation.core_alg == PSA_ALG_CCM) { + if (operation.alg == PSA_ALG_CCM) { status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag(&operation.ctx.ccm, plaintext_length, @@ -213,7 +155,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt( } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) - if (operation.core_alg == PSA_ALG_GCM) { + if (operation.alg == PSA_ALG_GCM) { status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag(&operation.ctx.gcm, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, @@ -225,16 +167,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt( } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) - if (operation.core_alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) { - if (nonce_length != 12) { - if (nonce_length == 8) { - status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - } else { - status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } - goto exit; - } - + if (operation.alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) { if (operation.tag_length != 16) { status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; goto exit; @@ -265,7 +198,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt( } exit: - psa_aead_abort_internal(&operation); + mbedtls_psa_aead_abort(&operation); return status; } @@ -303,11 +236,12 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt( uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length) { psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - aead_operation_t operation = AEAD_OPERATION_INIT; + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t operation = MBEDTLS_PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT; const uint8_t *tag = NULL; - (void) key_buffer_size; - status = psa_aead_setup(&operation, attributes, key_buffer, alg); + status = psa_aead_setup(&operation, attributes, key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { goto exit; } @@ -320,7 +254,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt( } #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) - if (operation.core_alg == PSA_ALG_CCM) { + if (operation.alg == PSA_ALG_CCM) { status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt(&operation.ctx.ccm, ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length, @@ -332,7 +266,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt( } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) - if (operation.core_alg == PSA_ALG_GCM) { + if (operation.alg == PSA_ALG_GCM) { status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt(&operation.ctx.gcm, ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length, @@ -344,16 +278,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt( } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) - if (operation.core_alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) { - if (nonce_length != 12) { - if (nonce_length == 8) { - status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - } else { - status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } - goto exit; - } - + if (operation.alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) { if (operation.tag_length != 16) { status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; goto exit; @@ -383,7 +308,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt( } exit: - psa_aead_abort_internal(&operation); + mbedtls_psa_aead_abort(&operation); if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { *plaintext_length = ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length; @@ -391,4 +316,334 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt( return status; } +/* Set the key and algorithm for a multipart authenticated encryption + * operation. */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + status = psa_aead_setup(operation, attributes, key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, alg); + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->is_encrypt = 1; + } + + return status; +} + +/* Set the key and algorithm for a multipart authenticated decryption + * operation. */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + status = psa_aead_setup(operation, attributes, key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, alg); + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->is_encrypt = 0; + } + + return status; +} + +/* Set a nonce for the multipart AEAD operation*/ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_set_nonce( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_GCM) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_gcm_starts(&operation->ctx.gcm, + operation->is_encrypt ? + MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT : MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, + nonce, + nonce_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CCM) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ccm_starts(&operation->ctx.ccm, + operation->is_encrypt ? + MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT : MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT, + nonce, + nonce_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) { + /* Note - ChaChaPoly allows an 8 byte nonce, but we would have to + * allocate a buffer in the operation, copy the nonce to it and pad + * it, so for now check the nonce is 12 bytes, as + * mbedtls_chachapoly_starts() assumes it can read 12 bytes from the + * passed in buffer. */ + if (nonce_length != 12) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_chachapoly_starts(&operation->ctx.chachapoly, + nonce, + operation->is_encrypt ? + MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT : + MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_DECRYPT)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + { + (void) operation; + (void) nonce; + (void) nonce_length; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return status; +} + +/* Declare the lengths of the message and additional data for AEAD. */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_set_lengths( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + size_t ad_length, + size_t plaintext_length) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CCM) { + return mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(&operation->ctx.ccm, + ad_length, + plaintext_length, + operation->tag_length)); + + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ + (void) operation; + (void) ad_length; + (void) plaintext_length; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/* Pass additional data to an active multipart AEAD operation. */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_GCM) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(&operation->ctx.gcm, input, input_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CCM) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ccm_update_ad(&operation->ctx.ccm, input, input_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad(&operation->ctx.chachapoly, + input, + input_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + { + (void) operation; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return status; +} + +/* Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active multipart AEAD + * operation.*/ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_update( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + size_t update_output_length; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + update_output_length = input_length; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_GCM) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_gcm_update(&operation->ctx.gcm, + input, input_length, + output, output_size, + &update_output_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CCM) { + if (output_size < input_length) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ccm_update(&operation->ctx.ccm, + input, input_length, + output, output_size, + &update_output_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) { + if (output_size < input_length) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_chachapoly_update(&operation->ctx.chachapoly, + input_length, + input, + output)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + { + (void) operation; + (void) input; + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + *output_length = update_output_length; + } + + return status; +} + +/* Finish encrypting a message in a multipart AEAD operation. */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_finish( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_size, + size_t *ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *tag, + size_t tag_size, + size_t *tag_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t finish_output_size = 0; + + if (tag_size < operation->tag_length) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_GCM) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_gcm_finish(&operation->ctx.gcm, + ciphertext, ciphertext_size, ciphertext_length, + tag, operation->tag_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CCM) { + /* tag must be big enough to store a tag of size passed into set + * lengths. */ + if (tag_size < operation->tag_length) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ccm_finish(&operation->ctx.ccm, + tag, operation->tag_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) { + /* Belt and braces. Although the above tag_size check should have + * already done this, if we later start supporting smaller tag sizes + * for chachapoly, then passing a tag buffer smaller than 16 into here + * could cause a buffer overflow, so better safe than sorry. */ + if (tag_size < 16) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_chachapoly_finish(&operation->ctx.chachapoly, + tag)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + { + (void) ciphertext; + (void) ciphertext_size; + (void) ciphertext_length; + (void) tag; + (void) tag_size; + (void) tag_length; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + /* This will be zero for all supported algorithms currently, but left + * here for future support. */ + *ciphertext_length = finish_output_size; + *tag_length = operation->tag_length; + } + + return status; +} + +/* Abort an AEAD operation */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_abort( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation) +{ + switch (operation->alg) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + case PSA_ALG_CCM: + mbedtls_ccm_free(&operation->ctx.ccm); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + case PSA_ALG_GCM: + mbedtls_gcm_free(&operation->ctx.gcm); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + case PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305: + mbedtls_chachapoly_free(&operation->ctx.chachapoly); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + } + + operation->is_encrypt = 0; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_aead.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_aead.h index 8586c7bfad..a3392199f6 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_aead.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_aead.h @@ -3,19 +3,7 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_AEAD_H @@ -148,4 +136,364 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt( const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length, uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length); +/** Set the key for a multipart authenticated encryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * aead_encrypt_setup entry point. This function behaves as an + * aead_encrypt_setup entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification for transparent drivers. + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to + * mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup(), the operation is reset by the PSA core by a + * call to mbedtls_psa_aead_abort(). The PSA core may call + * mbedtls_psa_aead_abort() at any time after the operation has been + * initialized, and is required to when the operation is no longer needed. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t and not yet in + * use. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + It must be consistent with the size in bits + recorded in \p attributes. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * An invalid block length was supplied. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * Failed to allocate memory for key material + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Set the key for a multipart authenticated decryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * aead_decrypt_setup entry point. This function behaves as an + * aead_decrypt_setup entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification for transparent drivers. + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to + * mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup(), the PSA core resets the operation by a + * call to mbedtls_psa_aead_abort(). The PSA core may call + * mbedtls_psa_aead_abort() at any time after the operation has been + * initialized, and is required to when the operation is no longer needed. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t and not yet in + * use. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + It must be consistent with the size in bits + recorded in \p attributes. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * An invalid block length was supplied. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * Failed to allocate memory for key material + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Set the nonce for an authenticated encryption or decryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver aead_set_nonce + * entry point. This function behaves as an aead_set_nonce entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * This function sets the nonce for the authenticated + * encryption or decryption operation. + * + * The PSA core calls mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or + * mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup() before calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the PSA core will call + * mbedtls_psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[in] nonce Buffer containing the nonce to use. + * \param nonce_length Size of the nonce in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size of \p nonce is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Algorithm previously set is not supported in this configuration of + * the library. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_set_nonce( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_length); + +/** Declare the lengths of the message and additional data for AEAD. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver aead_set_lengths + * entry point. This function behaves as an aead_set_lengths entry point + * as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * The PSA core calls this function before calling mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad() + * or mbedtls_psa_aead_update() if the algorithm for the operation requires it. + * If the algorithm does not require it, calling this function is optional, but + * if this function is called then the implementation must enforce the lengths. + * + * The PSA core may call this function before or after setting the nonce with + * mbedtls_psa_aead_set_nonce(). + * + * - For #PSA_ALG_CCM, calling this function is required. + * - For the other AEAD algorithms defined in this specification, calling + * this function is not required. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the PSA core calls + * mbedtls_psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param ad_length Size of the non-encrypted additional + * authenticated data in bytes. + * \param plaintext_length Size of the plaintext to encrypt in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * At least one of the lengths is not acceptable for the chosen + * algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Algorithm previously set is not supported in this configuration of + * the library. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_set_lengths( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + size_t ad_length, + size_t plaintext_length); + +/** Pass additional data to an active AEAD operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * aead_update_ad entry point. This function behaves as an aead_update_ad + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * Additional data is authenticated, but not encrypted. + * + * The PSA core can call this function multiple times to pass successive + * fragments of the additional data. It will not call this function after + * passing data to encrypt or decrypt with mbedtls_psa_aead_update(). + * + * Before calling this function, the PSA core will: + * 1. Call either mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or + * mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup(). + * 2. Set the nonce with mbedtls_psa_aead_set_nonce(). + * + * If this function returns an error status, the PSA core will call + * mbedtls_psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the fragment of + * additional data. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Algorithm previously set is not supported in this configuration of + * the library. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active AEAD operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * aead_update entry point. This function behaves as an aead_update entry + * point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * Before calling this function, the PSA core will: + * 1. Call either mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or + * mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup(). The choice of setup function + * determines whether this function encrypts or decrypts its input. + * 2. Set the nonce with mbedtls_psa_aead_set_nonce(). + * 3. Call mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad() to pass all the additional data. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the PSA core will call + * mbedtls_psa_aead_abort(). + * + * This function does not require the input to be aligned to any + * particular block boundary. If the implementation can only process + * a whole block at a time, it must consume all the input provided, but + * it may delay the end of the corresponding output until a subsequent + * call to mbedtls_psa_aead_update(), mbedtls_psa_aead_finish() provides + * sufficient input. The amount of data that can be delayed in this way is + * bounded by #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to + * encrypt or decrypt. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, + * \c alg, \p input_length) where + * \c key_type is the type of key and \c alg is + * the algorithm that were used to set up the + * operation. + * - #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p + * input_length) evaluates to the maximum + * output size of any supported AEAD + * algorithm. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c alg, \p input_length) or + * #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length) can be used to + * determine the required buffer size. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_update( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Finish encrypting a message in an AEAD operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * aead_finish entry point. This function behaves as an aead_finish entry + * point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * The operation must have been set up by the PSA core with + * mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup(). + * + * This function finishes the authentication of the additional data + * formed by concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to + * mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad() with the plaintext formed by concatenating the + * inputs passed to preceding calls to mbedtls_psa_aead_update(). + * + * This function has two output buffers: + * - \p ciphertext contains trailing ciphertext that was buffered from + * preceding calls to mbedtls_psa_aead_update(). + * - \p tag contains the authentication tag. + * + * Whether or not this function returns successfully, the PSA core subsequently + * calls mbedtls_psa_aead_abort() to deactivate the operation. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[out] ciphertext Buffer where the last part of the ciphertext + * is to be written. + * \param ciphertext_size Size of the \p ciphertext buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, + * \c alg) where \c key_type is the type of key + * and \c alg is the algorithm that were used to + * set up the operation. + * - #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE evaluates to + * the maximum output size of any supported AEAD + * algorithm. + * \param[out] ciphertext_length On success, the number of bytes of + * returned ciphertext. + * \param[out] tag Buffer where the authentication tag is + * to be written. + * \param tag_size Size of the \p tag buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - The exact tag size is #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\c + * key_type, \c key_bits, \c alg) where + * \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and + * bit-size of the key, and \c alg are the + * algorithm that were used in the call to + * mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup(). + * - #PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the + * maximum tag size of any supported AEAD + * algorithm. + * \param[out] tag_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned tag. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p tag buffer is too small. + * #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\c key_type, key_bits, \c alg) or + * #PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine the required \p tag + * buffer size. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_finish( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_size, + size_t *ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *tag, + size_t tag_size, + size_t *tag_length); + +/** Abort an AEAD operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * aead_abort entry point. This function behaves as an aead_abort entry + * point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation by the PSA core by it calling + * mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup() again. + * + * The PSA core may call this function any time after the operation object has + * been initialized as described in #mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling mbedtls_psa_aead_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to mbedtls_psa_aead_abort() or + * mbedtls_psa_aead_finish() is safe and has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized AEAD operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_abort( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation); + #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_AEAD_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c index d216339e65..881d673cc0 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c @@ -3,19 +3,7 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" @@ -31,14 +19,122 @@ #include -const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( +/* mbedtls_cipher_values_from_psa() below only checks if the proper build symbols + * are enabled, but it does not provide any compatibility check between them + * (i.e. if the specified key works with the specified algorithm). This helper + * function is meant to provide this support. + * mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa() might be used for the same purpose, but it + * requires CIPHER_C to be enabled. + */ +static psa_status_t mbedtls_cipher_validate_values( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + psa_key_type_t key_type) +{ + /* Reduce code size - hinting to the compiler about what it can assume allows the compiler to + eliminate bits of the logic below. */ +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(key_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(key_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(key_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(key_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(key_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 0)); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 0)); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 0)); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_CTR); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_CFB); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_OFB); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_XTS); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_CMAC); +#endif + + if (alg == PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER || + alg == PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 0)) { + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + } + + if (alg == PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 0) || + alg == PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 0) || + alg == PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG) { + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES || + key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA || + key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + } + + if (alg == PSA_ALG_CTR || + alg == PSA_ALG_CFB || + alg == PSA_ALG_OFB || + alg == PSA_ALG_XTS || + alg == PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING || + alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING || + alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 || + alg == PSA_ALG_CMAC) { + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES || + key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA || + key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES || + key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + } + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_cipher_values_from_psa( psa_algorithm_t alg, psa_key_type_t key_type, - size_t key_bits, + size_t *key_bits, + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t *mode, mbedtls_cipher_id_t *cipher_id) { - mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id_tmp; + /* Only DES modifies key_bits */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) + (void) key_bits; +#endif if (PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg)) { alg = PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(alg, 0); @@ -48,61 +144,66 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( switch (alg) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER) case PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER: - mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM; + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM; break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR) case PSA_ALG_CTR: - mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR; + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR; break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CFB) case PSA_ALG_CFB: - mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB; + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB; break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_OFB) case PSA_ALG_OFB: - mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB; + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB; break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) case PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING: - mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB; + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB; break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) case PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING: - mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC; + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC; break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) case PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7: - mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC; + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG) + case PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG: + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG; break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 0): - mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM; + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM; break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 0): - mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM; + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM; break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 0): - mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY; + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY; break; #endif default: - return NULL; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } } else if (alg == PSA_ALG_CMAC) { - mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB; + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB; } else { - return NULL; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } switch (key_type) { @@ -120,7 +221,7 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( case PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES: /* key_bits is 64 for Single-DES, 128 for two-key Triple-DES, * and 192 for three-key Triple-DES. */ - if (key_bits == 64) { + if (*key_bits == 64) { cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_DES; } else { cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_3DES; @@ -128,8 +229,8 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( /* mbedtls doesn't recognize two-key Triple-DES as an algorithm, * but two-key Triple-DES is functionally three-key Triple-DES * with K1=K3, so that's how we present it to mbedtls. */ - if (key_bits == 128) { - key_bits = 192; + if (*key_bits == 128) { + *key_bits = 192; } break; #endif @@ -138,26 +239,43 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA; break; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ARC4) - case PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4: - cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARC4; - break; -#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20: cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CHACHA20; break; #endif default: - return NULL; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + if (cipher_id != NULL) { + *cipher_id = cipher_id_tmp; + } + + return mbedtls_cipher_validate_values(alg, key_type); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + psa_key_type_t key_type, + size_t key_bits, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t *cipher_id) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id_tmp; + + status = mbedtls_cipher_values_from_psa(alg, key_type, &key_bits, &mode, &cipher_id_tmp); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return NULL; } if (cipher_id != NULL) { *cipher_id = cipher_id_tmp; } - return mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values(cipher_id_tmp, - (int) key_bits, mode); + return mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values(cipher_id_tmp, (int) key_bits, mode); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) @@ -171,14 +289,14 @@ static psa_status_t psa_cipher_setup( int ret = 0; size_t key_bits; const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info = NULL; - psa_key_type_t key_type = attributes->core.type; + psa_key_type_t key_type = attributes->type; (void) key_buffer_size; mbedtls_cipher_init(&operation->ctx.cipher); operation->alg = alg; - key_bits = attributes->core.bits; + key_bits = attributes->bits; cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa(alg, key_type, key_bits, NULL); if (cipher_info == NULL) { @@ -306,7 +424,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_cipher_update_ecb( size_t *output_length) { psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t block_size = ctx->cipher_info->block_size; + size_t block_size = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(ctx->cipher_info); size_t internal_output_length = 0; *output_length = 0; @@ -414,7 +532,11 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_update( output_length); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING */ - { + if (input_length == 0) { + /* There is no input, nothing to be done */ + *output_length = 0; + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + } else { status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( mbedtls_cipher_update(&operation->ctx.cipher, input, input_length, output, output_length)); @@ -479,17 +601,18 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort( return PSA_SUCCESS; } -psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - const uint8_t *key_buffer, - size_t key_buffer_size, - psa_algorithm_t alg, - const uint8_t *iv, - size_t iv_length, - const uint8_t *input, - size_t input_length, - uint8_t *output, - size_t output_size, - size_t *output_length) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) { psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t operation = MBEDTLS_PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; @@ -510,7 +633,8 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, } status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_update(&operation, input, input_length, - output, output_size, &update_output_length); + output, output_size, + &update_output_length); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { goto exit; } diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_cipher.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_cipher.h index bf43ff08ab..cc565851cc 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_cipher.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_cipher.h @@ -3,19 +3,7 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_CIPHER_H @@ -24,6 +12,28 @@ #include #include +/** Get Mbed TLS cipher information given the cipher algorithm PSA identifier + * as well as the PSA type and size of the key to be used with the cipher + * algorithm. + * + * \param[in] alg PSA cipher algorithm identifier + * \param[in] key_type PSA key type + * \param[in,out] key_bits Size of the key in bits. The value provided in input + * might be updated if necessary. + * \param[out] mode Mbed TLS cipher mode + * \param[out] cipher_id Mbed TLS cipher algorithm identifier + * + * \return On success \c PSA_SUCCESS is returned and key_bits, mode and cipher_id + * are properly updated. + * \c PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED is returned if the cipher algorithm is not + * supported. + */ + +psa_status_t mbedtls_cipher_values_from_psa(psa_algorithm_t alg, psa_key_type_t key_type, + size_t *key_bits, mbedtls_cipher_mode_t *mode, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t *cipher_id); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) /** Get Mbed TLS cipher information given the cipher algorithm PSA identifier * as well as the PSA type and size of the key to be used with the cipher * algorithm. @@ -39,6 +49,7 @@ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( psa_algorithm_t alg, psa_key_type_t key_type, size_t key_bits, mbedtls_cipher_id_t *cipher_id); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ /** * \brief Set the key for a multipart symmetric encryption operation. diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_client.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_client.c index c3234275ae..72f671d63d 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_client.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_client.c @@ -3,19 +3,7 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" @@ -28,52 +16,7 @@ void psa_reset_key_attributes(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) { - mbedtls_free(attributes->domain_parameters); memset(attributes, 0, sizeof(*attributes)); } -psa_status_t psa_set_key_domain_parameters(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - psa_key_type_t type, - const uint8_t *data, - size_t data_length) -{ - uint8_t *copy = NULL; - - if (data_length != 0) { - copy = mbedtls_calloc(1, data_length); - if (copy == NULL) { - return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; - } - memcpy(copy, data, data_length); - } - /* After this point, this function is guaranteed to succeed, so it - * can start modifying `*attributes`. */ - - if (attributes->domain_parameters != NULL) { - mbedtls_free(attributes->domain_parameters); - attributes->domain_parameters = NULL; - attributes->domain_parameters_size = 0; - } - - attributes->domain_parameters = copy; - attributes->domain_parameters_size = data_length; - attributes->core.type = type; - return PSA_SUCCESS; -} - -psa_status_t psa_get_key_domain_parameters( - const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length) -{ - if (attributes->domain_parameters_size > data_size) { - return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; - } - *data_length = attributes->domain_parameters_size; - if (attributes->domain_parameters_size != 0) { - memcpy(data, attributes->domain_parameters, - attributes->domain_parameters_size); - } - return PSA_SUCCESS; -} - #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_core.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_core.h index 781c9d2f43..9462d2e8be 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_core.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_core.h @@ -3,70 +3,97 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_H #define PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +/* + * Include the build-time configuration information header. Here, we do not + * include `"mbedtls/build_info.h"` directly but `"psa/build_info.h"`, which + * is basically just an alias to it. This is to ease the maintenance of the + * TF-PSA-Crypto repository which has a different build system and + * configuration. + */ +#include "psa/build_info.h" #include "psa/crypto.h" #include "psa/crypto_se_driver.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif -/** Constant-time buffer comparison +/** + * Tell if PSA is ready for this hash. + * + * \note For now, only checks the state of the driver subsystem, + * not the algorithm. Might do more in the future. * - * \param[in] a Left-hand buffer for comparison. - * \param[in] b Right-hand buffer for comparison. - * \param n Amount of bytes to compare. + * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm (ignored for now). * - * \return 0 if the buffer contents are equal, non-zero otherwise + * \return 1 if the driver subsytem is ready, 0 otherwise. */ -static inline int mbedtls_psa_safer_memcmp( - const uint8_t *a, const uint8_t *b, size_t n) -{ - size_t i; - unsigned char diff = 0; +int psa_can_do_hash(psa_algorithm_t hash_alg); - for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { - diff |= a[i] ^ b[i]; - } +/** + * Tell if PSA is ready for this cipher. + * + * \note For now, only checks the state of the driver subsystem, + * not the algorithm. Might do more in the future. + * + * \param cipher_alg The cipher algorithm (ignored for now). + * + * \return 1 if the driver subsytem is ready, 0 otherwise. + */ +int psa_can_do_cipher(psa_key_type_t key_type, psa_algorithm_t cipher_alg); - return diff; -} +typedef enum { + PSA_SLOT_EMPTY = 0, + PSA_SLOT_FILLING, + PSA_SLOT_FULL, + PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION, +} psa_key_slot_state_t; /** The data structure representing a key slot, containing key material * and metadata for one key. */ typedef struct { - psa_core_key_attributes_t attr; + psa_key_attributes_t attr; /* - * Number of locks on the key slot held by the library. + * The current state of the key slot, as described in + * docs/architecture/psa-thread-safety/psa-thread-safety.md. + * + * Library functions can modify the state of a key slot by calling + * psa_key_slot_state_transition. * - * This counter is incremented by one each time a library function - * retrieves through one of the dedicated internal API a pointer to the - * key slot. + * The state variable is used to help determine whether library functions + * which operate on the slot succeed. For example, psa_finish_key_creation, + * which transfers the state of a slot from PSA_SLOT_FILLING to + * PSA_SLOT_FULL, must fail with error code PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * if the state of the slot is not PSA_SLOT_FILLING. + * + * Library functions which traverse the array of key slots only consider + * slots that are in a suitable state for the function. + * For example, psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory, which finds a slot + * containing a given key ID, will only check slots whose state variable is + * PSA_SLOT_FULL. */ + psa_key_slot_state_t state; + + /* + * Number of functions registered as reading the material in the key slot. * - * This counter is decremented by one each time a library function stops - * accessing the key slot and states it by calling the - * psa_unlock_key_slot() API. + * Library functions must not write directly to registered_readers + * + * A function must call psa_register_read(slot) before reading the current + * contents of the slot for an operation. + * They then must call psa_unregister_read(slot) once they have finished + * reading the current contents of the slot. If the key slot mutex is not + * held (when mutexes are enabled), this call must be done via a call to + * psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot). + * A function must call psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot) to check if + * the slot is in use for reading. * * This counter is used to prevent resetting the key slot while the library * may access it. For example, such control is needed in the following @@ -77,10 +104,9 @@ typedef struct { * the library cannot be reclaimed to free a key slot to load the * persistent key. * . In case of a multi-threaded application where one thread asks to close - * or purge or destroy a key while it is in used by the library through - * another thread. - */ - size_t lock_count; + * or purge or destroy a key while it is in use by the library through + * another thread. */ + size_t registered_readers; /* Dynamically allocated key data buffer. * Format as specified in psa_export_key(). */ @@ -90,86 +116,60 @@ typedef struct { } key; } psa_key_slot_t; -/* A mask of key attribute flags used only internally. - * Currently there aren't any. */ -#define PSA_KA_MASK_INTERNAL_ONLY ( \ - 0) - -/** Test whether a key slot is occupied. - * - * A key slot is occupied iff the key type is nonzero. This works because - * no valid key can have 0 as its key type. - * - * \param[in] slot The key slot to test. - * - * \return 1 if the slot is occupied, 0 otherwise. - */ -static inline int psa_is_key_slot_occupied(const psa_key_slot_t *slot) -{ - return slot->attr.type != 0; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) -/** Test whether a key slot is locked. - * - * A key slot is locked iff its lock counter is strictly greater than 0. +/** Perform a mutex operation and return immediately upon failure. * - * \param[in] slot The key slot to test. + * Returns PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE if the operation fails + * and status was PSA_SUCCESS. * - * \return 1 if the slot is locked, 0 otherwise. + * Assumptions: + * psa_status_t status exists. + * f is a mutex operation which returns 0 upon success. */ -static inline int psa_is_key_slot_locked(const psa_key_slot_t *slot) -{ - return slot->lock_count > 0; -} +#define PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(f) \ + do \ + { \ + if ((f) != 0) { \ + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { \ + return PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE; \ + } \ + return status; \ + } \ + } while (0); -/** Retrieve flags from psa_key_slot_t::attr::core::flags. +/** Perform a mutex operation and goto exit on failure. * - * \param[in] slot The key slot to query. - * \param mask The mask of bits to extract. + * Sets status to PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE if status was PSA_SUCCESS. * - * \return The key attribute flags in the given slot, - * bitwise-anded with \p mask. + * Assumptions: + * psa_status_t status exists. + * Label exit: exists. + * f is a mutex operation which returns 0 upon success. */ -static inline uint16_t psa_key_slot_get_flags(const psa_key_slot_t *slot, - uint16_t mask) -{ - return slot->attr.flags & mask; -} - -/** Set flags in psa_key_slot_t::attr::core::flags. - * - * \param[in,out] slot The key slot to modify. - * \param mask The mask of bits to modify. - * \param value The new value of the selected bits. - */ -static inline void psa_key_slot_set_flags(psa_key_slot_t *slot, - uint16_t mask, - uint16_t value) -{ - slot->attr.flags = ((~mask & slot->attr.flags) | - (mask & value)); -} +#define PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(f) \ + do \ + { \ + if ((f) != 0) { \ + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { \ + status = PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE; \ + } \ + goto exit; \ + } \ + } while (0); +#endif -/** Turn on flags in psa_key_slot_t::attr::core::flags. +/** Test whether a key slot has any registered readers. + * If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the + * global key slot mutex. * - * \param[in,out] slot The key slot to modify. - * \param mask The mask of bits to set. - */ -static inline void psa_key_slot_set_bits_in_flags(psa_key_slot_t *slot, - uint16_t mask) -{ - slot->attr.flags |= mask; -} - -/** Turn off flags in psa_key_slot_t::attr::core::flags. + * \param[in] slot The key slot to test. * - * \param[in,out] slot The key slot to modify. - * \param mask The mask of bits to clear. + * \return 1 if the slot has any registered readers, 0 otherwise. */ -static inline void psa_key_slot_clear_bits(psa_key_slot_t *slot, - uint16_t mask) +static inline int psa_key_slot_has_readers(const psa_key_slot_t *slot) { - slot->attr.flags &= ~mask; + return slot->registered_readers > 0; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) @@ -189,13 +189,20 @@ static inline psa_key_slot_number_t psa_key_slot_get_slot_number( /** Completely wipe a slot in memory, including its policy. * * Persistent storage is not affected. + * Sets the slot's state to PSA_SLOT_EMPTY. + * If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the + * global key slot mutex. * * \param[in,out] slot The key slot to wipe. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS - * Success. This includes the case of a key slot that was - * already fully wiped. - * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * The slot has been successfully wiped. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * The slot's state was PSA_SLOT_FULL or PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION, and + * the amount of registered readers was not equal to 1. Or, + * the slot's state was PSA_SLOT_EMPTY. Or, + * the slot's state was PSA_SLOT_FILLING, and the amount + * of registered readers was not equal to 0. */ psa_status_t psa_wipe_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot); @@ -336,6 +343,18 @@ psa_status_t psa_export_public_key_internal( const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length); +/** Whether a key production parameters structure is the default. + * + * Calls to a key generation driver with non-default production parameters + * require a driver supporting custom production parameters. + * + * \param[in] params The key production parameters to check. + * \param params_data_length Size of `params->data` in bytes. + */ +int psa_key_production_parameters_are_default( + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, + size_t params_data_length); + /** * \brief Generate a key. * @@ -343,6 +362,9 @@ psa_status_t psa_export_public_key_internal( * entry point. * * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to generate. + * \param[in] params The production parameters from + * psa_generate_key_ext(). + * \param params_data_length The size of `params->data` in bytes. * \param[out] key_buffer Buffer where the key data is to be written. * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of \p key_buffer in bytes. * \param[out] key_buffer_length On success, the number of bytes written in @@ -357,6 +379,8 @@ psa_status_t psa_export_public_key_internal( * The size of \p key_buffer is too small. */ psa_status_t psa_generate_key_internal(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, + size_t params_data_length, uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length); @@ -515,4 +539,419 @@ psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_builtin( psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length); +/** + * \brief Validate the key bit size for unstructured keys. + * + * \note Check that the bit size is acceptable for a given key type for + * unstructured keys. + * + * \param[in] type The key type + * \param[in] bits The number of bits of the key + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key type and size are valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size in bits of the key is not valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The type and/or the size in bits of the key or the combination of + * the two is not supported. + */ +psa_status_t psa_validate_unstructured_key_bit_size(psa_key_type_t type, + size_t bits); + +/** Perform a key agreement and return the raw shared secret, using + built-in raw key agreement functions. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * key_agreement entry point. This function behaves as a key_agreement + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the private key + * context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in + * bytes. + * \param[in] alg A key agreement algorithm that is + * compatible with the type of the key. + * \param[in] peer_key The buffer containing the key context + * of the peer's public key. + * \param[in] peer_key_length Size of the \p peer_key buffer in + * bytes. + * \param[out] shared_secret The buffer to which the shared secret + * is to be written. + * \param[in] shared_secret_size Size of the \p shared_secret buffer in + * bytes. + * \param[out] shared_secret_length On success, the number of bytes that make + * up the returned shared secret. + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. Shared secret successfully calculated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p alg is not a key agreement algorithm, or + * \p private_key is not compatible with \p alg, + * or \p peer_key is not valid for \p alg or not compatible with + * \p private_key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p shared_secret_size is too small + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not a supported key agreement algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_raw_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *shared_secret, + size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length); + +/** + * \brief Set the maximum number of ops allowed to be executed by an + * interruptible function in a single call. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * interruptible_set_max_ops entry point. This function behaves as an + * interruptible_set_max_ops entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] max_ops The maximum number of ops to be executed in a + * single call, this can be a number from 0 to + * #PSA_INTERRUPTIBLE_MAX_OPS_UNLIMITED, where 0 + * is obviously the least amount of work done per + * call. + */ +void mbedtls_psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(uint32_t max_ops); + +/** + * \brief Get the maximum number of ops allowed to be executed by an + * interruptible function in a single call. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * interruptible_get_max_ops entry point. This function behaves as an + * interruptible_get_max_ops entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \return Maximum number of ops allowed to be executed + * by an interruptible function in a single call. + */ +uint32_t mbedtls_psa_interruptible_get_max_ops(void); + +/** + * \brief Get the number of ops that a hash signing operation has taken for the + * previous call. If no call or work has taken place, this will return + * zero. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_hash_get_num_ops entry point. This function behaves as an + * sign_hash_get_num_ops entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param operation The \c + * mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to use. This must be initialized first. + * + * \return Number of ops that were completed + * in the last call to \c + * mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_complete(). + */ +uint32_t mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_get_num_ops( + const mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation); + +/** + * \brief Get the number of ops that a hash verification operation has taken for + * the previous call. If no call or work has taken place, this will + * return zero. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * verify_hash_get_num_ops entry point. This function behaves as an + * verify_hash_get_num_ops entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param operation The \c + * mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to use. This must be initialized first. + * + * \return Number of ops that were completed + * in the last call to \c + * mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_complete(). + */ +uint32_t mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_get_num_ops( + const mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation); + +/** + * \brief Start signing a hash or short message with a private key, in an + * interruptible manner. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_hash_start entry point. This function behaves as a + * sign_hash_start entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] operation The \c + * mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to use. This must be initialized first. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of the key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign. + * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The operation started successfully - call \c psa_sign_hash_complete() + * with the same context to complete the operation + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * An unsupported, incorrectly formatted or incorrect type of key was + * used. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED Either no internal interruptible operations + * are currently supported, or the key type is currently unsupported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * There was insufficient memory to load the key representation. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_start( + mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length); + +/** + * \brief Continue and eventually complete the action of signing a hash or + * short message with a private key, in an interruptible manner. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_hash_complete entry point. This function behaves as a + * sign_hash_complete entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] operation The \c + * mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to use. This must be initialized first. + * + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. This + * must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes that make up + * the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Operation completed successfully + * + * \retval #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE + * Operation was interrupted due to the setting of \c + * psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(), there is still work to be done, + * please call this function again with the same operation object. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of \p key. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_complete( + mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length); + +/** + * \brief Abort a sign hash operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver sign_hash_abort + * entry point. This function behaves as a sign_hash_abort entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * \param[in] operation The \c + * mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to abort. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The operation was aborted successfully. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_abort( + mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation); + +/** + * \brief Start reading and verifying a hash or short message, in an + * interruptible manner. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * verify_hash_start entry point. This function behaves as a + * verify_hash_start entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] operation The \c + * mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to use. This must be initialized first. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of the key. + * \param[in] hash The hash whose signature is to be verified. + * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The operation started successfully - call \c psa_sign_hash_complete() + * with the same context to complete the operation + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * An unsupported or incorrect type of key was used. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Either no internal interruptible operations are currently supported, + * or the key type is currently unsupported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * There was insufficient memory either to load the key representation, + * or to prepare the operation. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_start( + mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length); + +/** + * \brief Continue and eventually complete the action of signing a hash or + * short message with a private key, in an interruptible manner. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_hash_complete entry point. This function behaves as a + * sign_hash_complete entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] operation The \c + * mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to use. This must be initialized first. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Operation completed successfully, and the passed signature is valid. + * + * \retval #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE + * Operation was interrupted due to the setting of \c + * psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(), there is still work to be done, + * please call this function again with the same operation object. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed + * signature is not a valid signature. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_complete( + mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation); + +/** + * \brief Abort a verify signed hash operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * verify_hash_abort entry point. This function behaves as a + * verify_hash_abort entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] operation The \c + * mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to abort. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The operation was aborted successfully. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_abort( + mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation); + +typedef struct psa_crypto_local_input_s { + uint8_t *buffer; + size_t length; +} psa_crypto_local_input_t; + +#define PSA_CRYPTO_LOCAL_INPUT_INIT ((psa_crypto_local_input_t) { NULL, 0 }) + +/** Allocate a local copy of an input buffer and copy the contents into it. + * + * \param[in] input Pointer to input buffer. + * \param[in] input_len Length of the input buffer. + * \param[out] local_input Pointer to a psa_crypto_local_input_t struct + * containing a local input copy. + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS, if the buffer was successfully + * copied. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY, if a copy of + * the buffer cannot be allocated. + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_local_input_alloc(const uint8_t *input, size_t input_len, + psa_crypto_local_input_t *local_input); + +/** Free a local copy of an input buffer. + * + * \param[in] local_input Pointer to a psa_crypto_local_input_t struct + * populated by a previous call to + * psa_crypto_local_input_alloc(). + */ +void psa_crypto_local_input_free(psa_crypto_local_input_t *local_input); + +typedef struct psa_crypto_local_output_s { + uint8_t *original; + uint8_t *buffer; + size_t length; +} psa_crypto_local_output_t; + +#define PSA_CRYPTO_LOCAL_OUTPUT_INIT ((psa_crypto_local_output_t) { NULL, NULL, 0 }) + +/** Allocate a local copy of an output buffer. + * + * \note This does not copy any data from the original + * output buffer but only allocates a buffer + * whose contents will be copied back to the + * original in a future call to + * psa_crypto_local_output_free(). + * + * \param[in] output Pointer to output buffer. + * \param[in] output_len Length of the output buffer. + * \param[out] local_output Pointer to a psa_crypto_local_output_t struct to + * populate with the local output copy. + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS, if the buffer was successfully + * copied. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY, if a copy of + * the buffer cannot be allocated. + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_local_output_alloc(uint8_t *output, size_t output_len, + psa_crypto_local_output_t *local_output); + +/** Copy from a local copy of an output buffer back to the original, then + * free the local copy. + * + * \param[in] local_output Pointer to a psa_crypto_local_output_t struct + * populated by a previous call to + * psa_crypto_local_output_alloc(). + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS, if the local output was + * successfully copied back to the original. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED, if the output + * could not be copied back to the original. + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_local_output_free(psa_crypto_local_output_t *local_output); + #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_core_common.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_core_common.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..98fce2cca4 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_core_common.h @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/** + * \file psa_crypto_core_common.h + * + * \brief Utility macros for internal use in the PSA cryptography core. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_COMMON_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_COMMON_H + +/** Return an offset into a buffer. + * + * This is just the addition of an offset to a pointer, except that this + * function also accepts an offset of 0 into a buffer whose pointer is null. + * (`p + n` has undefined behavior when `p` is null, even when `n == 0`. + * A null pointer is a valid buffer pointer when the size is 0, for example + * as the result of `malloc(0)` on some platforms.) + * + * \param p Pointer to a buffer of at least n bytes. + * This may be \p NULL if \p n is zero. + * \param n An offset in bytes. + * \return Pointer to offset \p n in the buffer \p p. + * Note that this is only a valid pointer if the size of the + * buffer is at least \p n + 1. + */ +static inline unsigned char *psa_crypto_buffer_offset( + unsigned char *p, size_t n) +{ + return p == NULL ? NULL : p + n; +} + +/** Return an offset into a read-only buffer. + * + * Similar to mbedtls_buffer_offset(), but for const pointers. + * + * \param p Pointer to a buffer of at least n bytes. + * This may be \p NULL if \p n is zero. + * \param n An offset in bytes. + * \return Pointer to offset \p n in the buffer \p p. + * Note that this is only a valid pointer if the size of the + * buffer is at least \p n + 1. + */ +static inline const unsigned char *psa_crypto_buffer_offset_const( + const unsigned char *p, size_t n) +{ + return p == NULL ? NULL : p + n; +} + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_COMMON_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c deleted file mode 100644 index 6156385337..0000000000 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1868 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Functions to delegate cryptographic operations to an available - * and appropriate accelerator. - * Warning: This file will be auto-generated in the future. - */ -/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ - -#include "psa_crypto_aead.h" -#include "psa_crypto_cipher.h" -#include "psa_crypto_core.h" -#include "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h" -#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" -#include "psa_crypto_mac.h" - -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS) - -/* Include test driver definition when running tests */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) -#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT -#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT -#endif -#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT -#define PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT -#endif -#include "test/drivers/test_driver.h" -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ - -/* Repeat above block for each JSON-declared driver during autogeneration */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS */ - -/* Auto-generated values depending on which drivers are registered. - * ID 0 is reserved for unallocated operations. - * ID 1 is reserved for the Mbed TLS software driver. */ -#define PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID (1) - -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) -#define PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID (2) -#define PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID (3) -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ - -/* Support the 'old' SE interface when asked to */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) -/* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT is defined when either a new-style or old-style - * SE driver is present, to avoid unused argument errors at compile time. */ -#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT -#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT -#endif -#include "psa_crypto_se.h" -#endif - -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_init(void) -{ - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) - status = psa_init_all_se_drivers(); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - status = mbedtls_test_transparent_init(); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } - - status = mbedtls_test_opaque_init(); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } -#endif - - (void) status; - return PSA_SUCCESS; -} - -void psa_driver_wrapper_free(void) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) - /* Unregister all secure element drivers, so that we restart from - * a pristine state. */ - psa_unregister_all_se_drivers(); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ - -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - mbedtls_test_transparent_free(); - mbedtls_test_opaque_free(); -#endif -} - -/* Start delegation functions */ -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_message( - const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - const uint8_t *key_buffer, - size_t key_buffer_size, - psa_algorithm_t alg, - const uint8_t *input, - size_t input_length, - uint8_t *signature, - size_t signature_size, - size_t *signature_length) -{ - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_location_t location = - PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(attributes->core.lifetime); - - switch (location) { - case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: - /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so - * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_sign_message( - attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - alg, - input, - input_length, - signature, - signature_size, - signature_length); - /* Declared with fallback == true */ - if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { - return status; - } -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - break; - - /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: - status = mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_sign_message( - attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - alg, - input, - input_length, - signature, - signature_size, - signature_length); - if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { - return status; - } - break; -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - default: - /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ - (void) status; - break; - } - - return psa_sign_message_builtin(attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - alg, - input, - input_length, - signature, - signature_size, - signature_length); -} - -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_message( - const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - const uint8_t *key_buffer, - size_t key_buffer_size, - psa_algorithm_t alg, - const uint8_t *input, - size_t input_length, - const uint8_t *signature, - size_t signature_length) -{ - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_location_t location = - PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(attributes->core.lifetime); - - switch (location) { - case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: - /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so - * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_verify_message( - attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - alg, - input, - input_length, - signature, - signature_length); - /* Declared with fallback == true */ - if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { - return status; - } -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - break; - - /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: - return mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_verify_message( - attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - alg, - input, - input_length, - signature, - signature_length); - if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { - return status; - } - break; -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - default: - /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ - (void) status; - break; - } - - return psa_verify_message_builtin(attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - alg, - input, - input_length, - signature, - signature_length); -} - -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash( - const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, - psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, - uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length) -{ - /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) - const psa_drv_se_t *drv; - psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; - - if (psa_get_se_driver(attributes->core.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context)) { - if (drv->asymmetric == NULL || - drv->asymmetric->p_sign == NULL) { - /* Key is defined in SE, but we have no way to exercise it */ - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - } - return drv->asymmetric->p_sign( - drv_context, *((psa_key_slot_number_t *) key_buffer), - alg, hash, hash_length, - signature, signature_size, signature_length); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ - - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_location_t location = - PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(attributes->core.lifetime); - - switch (location) { - case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: - /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so - * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_sign_hash(attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - alg, - hash, - hash_length, - signature, - signature_size, - signature_length); - /* Declared with fallback == true */ - if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { - return status; - } -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ - return psa_sign_hash_builtin(attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - alg, - hash, - hash_length, - signature, - signature_size, - signature_length); - - /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: - return mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_sign_hash(attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - alg, - hash, - hash_length, - signature, - signature_size, - signature_length); -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - default: - /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ - (void) status; - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } -} - -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash( - const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, - psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, - const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length) -{ - /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) - const psa_drv_se_t *drv; - psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; - - if (psa_get_se_driver(attributes->core.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context)) { - if (drv->asymmetric == NULL || - drv->asymmetric->p_verify == NULL) { - /* Key is defined in SE, but we have no way to exercise it */ - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - } - return drv->asymmetric->p_verify( - drv_context, *((psa_key_slot_number_t *) key_buffer), - alg, hash, hash_length, - signature, signature_length); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ - - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_location_t location = - PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(attributes->core.lifetime); - - switch (location) { - case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: - /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so - * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_verify_hash( - attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - alg, - hash, - hash_length, - signature, - signature_length); - /* Declared with fallback == true */ - if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { - return status; - } -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - - return psa_verify_hash_builtin(attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - alg, - hash, - hash_length, - signature, - signature_length); - - /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: - return mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_verify_hash(attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - alg, - hash, - hash_length, - signature, - signature_length); -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - default: - /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ - (void) status; - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } -} - -/** Get the key buffer size required to store the key material of a key - * associated with an opaque driver without storage. - * - * \param[in] attributes The key attributes. - * \param[out] key_buffer_size Minimum buffer size to contain the key material - * - * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS - * The minimum size for a buffer to contain the key material has been - * returned successfully. - * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT - * The size in bits of the key is not valid. - * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED - * The type and/or the size in bits of the key or the combination of - * the two is not supported. - */ -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size( - const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - size_t *key_buffer_size) -{ - psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(attributes->core.lifetime); - psa_key_type_t key_type = attributes->core.type; - size_t key_bits = attributes->core.bits; - - *key_buffer_size = 0; - switch (location) { -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) - /* Emulate property 'builtin_key_size' */ - if (psa_key_id_is_builtin( - MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( - psa_get_key_id(attributes)))) { - *key_buffer_size = sizeof(psa_drv_slot_number_t); - return PSA_SUCCESS; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ - *key_buffer_size = mbedtls_test_size_function(key_type, key_bits); - return (*key_buffer_size != 0) ? - PSA_SUCCESS : PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ - - default: - (void) key_type; - (void) key_bits; - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - } -} - -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_generate_key( - const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length) -{ - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_location_t location = - PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(attributes->core.lifetime); - - /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) - const psa_drv_se_t *drv; - psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; - - if (psa_get_se_driver(attributes->core.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context)) { - size_t pubkey_length = 0; /* We don't support this feature yet */ - if (drv->key_management == NULL || - drv->key_management->p_generate == NULL) { - /* Key is defined as being in SE, but we have no way to generate it */ - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - } - return drv->key_management->p_generate( - drv_context, - *((psa_key_slot_number_t *) key_buffer), - attributes, NULL, 0, &pubkey_length); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ - - switch (location) { - case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) - /* Transparent drivers are limited to generating asymmetric keys */ - if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC(attributes->core.type)) { - /* Cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - status = mbedtls_test_transparent_generate_key( - attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, - key_buffer_length); - /* Declared with fallback == true */ - if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { - break; - } -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ - } -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - - /* Software fallback */ - status = psa_generate_key_internal( - attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, key_buffer_length); - break; - - /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: - status = mbedtls_test_opaque_generate_key( - attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, key_buffer_length); - break; -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - - default: - /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ - status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - break; - } - - return status; -} - -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_import_key( - const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - const uint8_t *data, - size_t data_length, - uint8_t *key_buffer, - size_t key_buffer_size, - size_t *key_buffer_length, - size_t *bits) -{ - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( - psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes)); - - /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) - const psa_drv_se_t *drv; - psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; - - if (psa_get_se_driver(attributes->core.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context)) { - if (drv->key_management == NULL || - drv->key_management->p_import == NULL) { - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - } - - /* The driver should set the number of key bits, however in - * case it doesn't, we initialize bits to an invalid value. */ - *bits = PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS + 1; - status = drv->key_management->p_import( - drv_context, - *((psa_key_slot_number_t *) key_buffer), - attributes, data, data_length, bits); - - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } - - if ((*bits) > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) { - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - } - - return PSA_SUCCESS; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ - - switch (location) { - case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: - /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so - * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - status = mbedtls_test_transparent_import_key( - attributes, - data, data_length, - key_buffer, key_buffer_size, - key_buffer_length, bits); - /* Declared with fallback == true */ - if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { - return status; - } -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ - return psa_import_key_into_slot(attributes, - data, data_length, - key_buffer, key_buffer_size, - key_buffer_length, bits); - - default: - /* Importing a key with external storage in not yet supported. - * Return in error indicating that the lifetime is not valid. */ - (void) status; - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } - -} - -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_export_key( - const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, - uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length) - -{ - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( - psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes)); - - /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) - const psa_drv_se_t *drv; - psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; - - if (psa_get_se_driver(attributes->core.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context)) { - if ((drv->key_management == NULL) || - (drv->key_management->p_export == NULL)) { - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - } - - return drv->key_management->p_export( - drv_context, - *((psa_key_slot_number_t *) key_buffer), - data, data_size, data_length); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ - - switch (location) { - case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: - return psa_export_key_internal(attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - data, - data_size, - data_length); - - /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: - return mbedtls_test_opaque_export_key(attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - data, - data_size, - data_length); -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - default: - /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ - return status; - } -} - -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_export_public_key( - const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, - uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length) - -{ - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( - psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes)); - - /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) - const psa_drv_se_t *drv; - psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; - - if (psa_get_se_driver(attributes->core.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context)) { - if ((drv->key_management == NULL) || - (drv->key_management->p_export_public == NULL)) { - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - } - - return drv->key_management->p_export_public( - drv_context, - *((psa_key_slot_number_t *) key_buffer), - data, data_size, data_length); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ - - switch (location) { - case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: - /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so - * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - status = mbedtls_test_transparent_export_public_key( - attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - data, - data_size, - data_length); - /* Declared with fallback == true */ - if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { - return status; - } -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ - return psa_export_public_key_internal(attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - data, - data_size, - data_length); - - /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: - return mbedtls_test_opaque_export_public_key(attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - data, - data_size, - data_length); -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - default: - /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ - return status; - } -} - -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_builtin_key( - psa_drv_slot_number_t slot_number, - psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length) -{ - psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(attributes->core.lifetime); - switch (location) { -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: - return mbedtls_test_opaque_get_builtin_key( - slot_number, - attributes, - key_buffer, key_buffer_size, key_buffer_length); -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ - default: - (void) slot_number; - (void) key_buffer; - (void) key_buffer_size; - (void) key_buffer_length; - return PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST; - } -} - -/* - * Cipher functions - */ -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt( - const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - const uint8_t *key_buffer, - size_t key_buffer_size, - psa_algorithm_t alg, - const uint8_t *iv, - size_t iv_length, - const uint8_t *input, - size_t input_length, - uint8_t *output, - size_t output_size, - size_t *output_length) -{ - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_location_t location = - PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(attributes->core.lifetime); - - switch (location) { - case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: - /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so - * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_encrypt(attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - alg, - iv, - iv_length, - input, - input_length, - output, - output_size, - output_length); - /* Declared with fallback == true */ - if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { - return status; - } -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) - return mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt(attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - alg, - iv, - iv_length, - input, - input_length, - output, - output_size, - output_length); -#else - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ - - /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: - return mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_encrypt(attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - alg, - iv, - iv_length, - input, - input_length, - output, - output_size, - output_length); -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - - default: - /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ - (void) status; - (void) key_buffer; - (void) key_buffer_size; - (void) alg; - (void) iv; - (void) iv_length; - (void) input; - (void) input_length; - (void) output; - (void) output_size; - (void) output_length; - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } -} - -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt( - const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - const uint8_t *key_buffer, - size_t key_buffer_size, - psa_algorithm_t alg, - const uint8_t *input, - size_t input_length, - uint8_t *output, - size_t output_size, - size_t *output_length) -{ - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_location_t location = - PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(attributes->core.lifetime); - - switch (location) { - case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: - /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so - * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_decrypt(attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - alg, - input, - input_length, - output, - output_size, - output_length); - /* Declared with fallback == true */ - if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { - return status; - } -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) - return mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt(attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - alg, - input, - input_length, - output, - output_size, - output_length); -#else - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ - - /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: - return mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_decrypt(attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - alg, - input, - input_length, - output, - output_size, - output_length); -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - - default: - /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ - (void) status; - (void) key_buffer; - (void) key_buffer_size; - (void) alg; - (void) input; - (void) input_length; - (void) output; - (void) output_size; - (void) output_length; - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } -} - -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt_setup( - psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, - const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, - psa_algorithm_t alg) -{ - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_location_t location = - PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(attributes->core.lifetime); - - switch (location) { - case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: - /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so - * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_encrypt_setup( - &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, - attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - alg); - /* Declared with fallback == true */ - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID; - } - - if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { - return status; - } -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) - /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ - status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(&operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, - attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - alg); - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; - } - - if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { - return status; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - - /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: - status = mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_encrypt_setup( - &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, - attributes, - key_buffer, key_buffer_size, - alg); - - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID; - } - - return status; -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - default: - /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ - (void) status; - (void) operation; - (void) key_buffer; - (void) key_buffer_size; - (void) alg; - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } -} - -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt_setup( - psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, - const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, - psa_algorithm_t alg) -{ - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - psa_key_location_t location = - PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(attributes->core.lifetime); - - switch (location) { - case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: - /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so - * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_decrypt_setup( - &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, - attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - alg); - /* Declared with fallback == true */ - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID; - } - - if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { - return status; - } -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) - /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ - status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(&operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, - attributes, - key_buffer, - key_buffer_size, - alg); - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; - } - - return status; -#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ - - /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: - status = mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_decrypt_setup( - &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, - attributes, - key_buffer, key_buffer_size, - alg); - - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID; - } - - return status; -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - default: - /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ - (void) status; - (void) operation; - (void) key_buffer; - (void) key_buffer_size; - (void) alg; - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } -} - -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_set_iv( - psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, - const uint8_t *iv, - size_t iv_length) -{ - switch (operation->id) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) - case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: - return mbedtls_psa_cipher_set_iv(&operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, - iv, - iv_length); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ - -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: - return mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_set_iv( - &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, - iv, iv_length); - - case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: - return mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_set_iv( - &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, - iv, iv_length); -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - } - - (void) iv; - (void) iv_length; - - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; -} - -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_update( - psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, - const uint8_t *input, - size_t input_length, - uint8_t *output, - size_t output_size, - size_t *output_length) -{ - switch (operation->id) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) - case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: - return mbedtls_psa_cipher_update(&operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, - input, - input_length, - output, - output_size, - output_length); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ - -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: - return mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_update( - &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, - input, input_length, - output, output_size, output_length); - - case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: - return mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_update( - &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, - input, input_length, - output, output_size, output_length); -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - } - - (void) input; - (void) input_length; - (void) output; - (void) output_size; - (void) output_length; - - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; -} - -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_finish( - psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, - uint8_t *output, - size_t output_size, - size_t *output_length) -{ - switch (operation->id) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) - case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: - return mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish(&operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, - output, - output_size, - output_length); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ - -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: - return mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_finish( - &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, - output, output_size, output_length); - - case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: - return mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_finish( - &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, - output, output_size, output_length); -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - } - - (void) output; - (void) output_size; - (void) output_length; - - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; -} - -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_abort( - psa_cipher_operation_t *operation) -{ - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - switch (operation->id) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) - case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: - return mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort(&operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ - -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: - status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_abort( - &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( - &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, - sizeof(operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx)); - return status; - - case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: - status = mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_abort( - &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize( - &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, - sizeof(operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx)); - return status; -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - } - - (void) status; - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; -} - -/* - * Hashing functions - */ -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( - psa_algorithm_t alg, - const uint8_t *input, - size_t input_length, - uint8_t *hash, - size_t hash_size, - size_t *hash_length) -{ - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - /* Try accelerators first */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - status = mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_compute( - alg, input, input_length, hash, hash_size, hash_length); - if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { - return status; - } -#endif - - /* If software fallback is compiled in, try fallback */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) - status = mbedtls_psa_hash_compute(alg, input, input_length, - hash, hash_size, hash_length); - if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { - return status; - } -#endif - (void) status; - (void) alg; - (void) input; - (void) input_length; - (void) hash; - (void) hash_size; - (void) hash_length; - - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; -} - -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_setup( - psa_hash_operation_t *operation, - psa_algorithm_t alg) -{ - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - /* Try setup on accelerators first */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - status = mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_setup( - &operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx, alg); - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID; - } - - if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { - return status; - } -#endif - - /* If software fallback is compiled in, try fallback */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) - status = mbedtls_psa_hash_setup(&operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, alg); - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; - } - - if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { - return status; - } -#endif - /* Nothing left to try if we fall through here */ - (void) status; - (void) operation; - (void) alg; - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; -} - -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_clone( - const psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, - psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation) -{ - switch (source_operation->id) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) - case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: - target_operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; - return mbedtls_psa_hash_clone(&source_operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, - &target_operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx); -#endif -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: - target_operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID; - return mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_clone( - &source_operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx, - &target_operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx); -#endif - default: - (void) target_operation; - return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; - } -} - -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_update( - psa_hash_operation_t *operation, - const uint8_t *input, - size_t input_length) -{ - switch (operation->id) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) - case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: - return mbedtls_psa_hash_update(&operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, - input, input_length); -#endif -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: - return mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_update( - &operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx, - input, input_length); -#endif - default: - (void) input; - (void) input_length; - return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; - } -} - -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_finish( - psa_hash_operation_t *operation, - uint8_t *hash, - size_t hash_size, - size_t *hash_length) -{ - switch (operation->id) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) - case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: - return mbedtls_psa_hash_finish(&operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, - hash, hash_size, hash_length); -#endif -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: - return mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_finish( - &operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx, - hash, hash_size, hash_length); -#endif - default: - (void) hash; - (void) hash_size; - (void) hash_length; - return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; - } -} - -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_abort( - psa_hash_operation_t *operation) -{ - switch (operation->id) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) - case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: - return mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(&operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx); -#endif -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: - return mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_abort( - &operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx); -#endif - default: - return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; - } -} - -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_encrypt( - const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, - psa_algorithm_t alg, - const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, - const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, - const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_length, - uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t *ciphertext_length) -{ - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_location_t location = - PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(attributes->core.lifetime); - - switch (location) { - case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: - /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so - * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ - -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - status = mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_encrypt( - attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, - alg, - nonce, nonce_length, - additional_data, additional_data_length, - plaintext, plaintext_length, - ciphertext, ciphertext_size, ciphertext_length); - /* Declared with fallback == true */ - if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { - return status; - } -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - - /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ - return mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt( - attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, - alg, - nonce, nonce_length, - additional_data, additional_data_length, - plaintext, plaintext_length, - ciphertext, ciphertext_size, ciphertext_length); - - /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ - - default: - /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ - (void) status; - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } -} - -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_decrypt( - const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, - psa_algorithm_t alg, - const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, - const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, - const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length, - uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length) -{ - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_location_t location = - PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(attributes->core.lifetime); - - switch (location) { - case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: - /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so - * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ - -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - status = mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_decrypt( - attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, - alg, - nonce, nonce_length, - additional_data, additional_data_length, - ciphertext, ciphertext_length, - plaintext, plaintext_size, plaintext_length); - /* Declared with fallback == true */ - if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { - return status; - } -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - - /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ - return mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt( - attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, - alg, - nonce, nonce_length, - additional_data, additional_data_length, - ciphertext, ciphertext_length, - plaintext, plaintext_size, plaintext_length); - - /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ - - default: - /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ - (void) status; - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } -} - - -/* - * MAC functions - */ -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_compute( - const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - const uint8_t *key_buffer, - size_t key_buffer_size, - psa_algorithm_t alg, - const uint8_t *input, - size_t input_length, - uint8_t *mac, - size_t mac_size, - size_t *mac_length) -{ - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_location_t location = - PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(attributes->core.lifetime); - - switch (location) { - case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: - /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so - * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - status = mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_compute( - attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, - input, input_length, - mac, mac_size, mac_length); - /* Declared with fallback == true */ - if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { - return status; - } -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) - /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ - status = mbedtls_psa_mac_compute( - attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, - input, input_length, - mac, mac_size, mac_length); - if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { - return status; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - - /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: - status = mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_compute( - attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, - input, input_length, - mac, mac_size, mac_length); - return status; -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - default: - /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ - (void) key_buffer; - (void) key_buffer_size; - (void) alg; - (void) input; - (void) input_length; - (void) mac; - (void) mac_size; - (void) mac_length; - (void) status; - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } -} - -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup( - psa_mac_operation_t *operation, - const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - const uint8_t *key_buffer, - size_t key_buffer_size, - psa_algorithm_t alg) -{ - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_location_t location = - PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(attributes->core.lifetime); - - switch (location) { - case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: - /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so - * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - status = mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_sign_setup( - &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, - attributes, - key_buffer, key_buffer_size, - alg); - /* Declared with fallback == true */ - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID; - } - - if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { - return status; - } -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) - /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ - status = mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup(&operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, - attributes, - key_buffer, key_buffer_size, - alg); - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; - } - - if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { - return status; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - - /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: - status = mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_sign_setup( - &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, - attributes, - key_buffer, key_buffer_size, - alg); - - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID; - } - - return status; -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - default: - /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ - (void) status; - (void) operation; - (void) key_buffer; - (void) key_buffer_size; - (void) alg; - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } -} - -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_setup( - psa_mac_operation_t *operation, - const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - const uint8_t *key_buffer, - size_t key_buffer_size, - psa_algorithm_t alg) -{ - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_location_t location = - PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(attributes->core.lifetime); - - switch (location) { - case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: - /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so - * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - status = mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_verify_setup( - &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, - attributes, - key_buffer, key_buffer_size, - alg); - /* Declared with fallback == true */ - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID; - } - - if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { - return status; - } -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) - /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ - status = mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup(&operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, - attributes, - key_buffer, key_buffer_size, - alg); - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; - } - - if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { - return status; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - - /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: - status = mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_verify_setup( - &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, - attributes, - key_buffer, key_buffer_size, - alg); - - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID; - } - - return status; -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - default: - /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ - (void) status; - (void) operation; - (void) key_buffer; - (void) key_buffer_size; - (void) alg; - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } -} - -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_update( - psa_mac_operation_t *operation, - const uint8_t *input, - size_t input_length) -{ - switch (operation->id) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) - case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: - return mbedtls_psa_mac_update(&operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, - input, input_length); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ - -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: - return mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_update( - &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, - input, input_length); - - case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: - return mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_update( - &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, - input, input_length); -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - default: - (void) input; - (void) input_length; - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } -} - -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_finish( - psa_mac_operation_t *operation, - uint8_t *mac, - size_t mac_size, - size_t *mac_length) -{ - switch (operation->id) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) - case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: - return mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_finish(&operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, - mac, mac_size, mac_length); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ - -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: - return mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_sign_finish( - &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, - mac, mac_size, mac_length); - - case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: - return mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_sign_finish( - &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, - mac, mac_size, mac_length); -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - default: - (void) mac; - (void) mac_size; - (void) mac_length; - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } -} - -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_finish( - psa_mac_operation_t *operation, - const uint8_t *mac, - size_t mac_length) -{ - switch (operation->id) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) - case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: - return mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish(&operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, - mac, mac_length); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ - -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: - return mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_verify_finish( - &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, - mac, mac_length); - - case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: - return mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_verify_finish( - &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, - mac, mac_length); -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - default: - (void) mac; - (void) mac_length; - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } -} - -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_abort( - psa_mac_operation_t *operation) -{ - switch (operation->id) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) - case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: - return mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(&operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ - -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) - case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_ID: - return mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_abort( - &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx); - case PSA_CRYPTO_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_ID: - return mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_abort( - &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx); -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ - default: - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h index 9471099de9..ea6aee32eb 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h @@ -1,40 +1,114 @@ /* - * Function signatures for functionality that can be provided by - * cryptographic accelerators. - * Warning: This file will be auto-generated in the future. + * Functions to delegate cryptographic operations to an available + * and appropriate accelerator. + * Warning: This file is now auto-generated. */ /* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ -#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_H -#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_H -#include "psa/crypto.h" -#include "psa/crypto_driver_common.h" +/* BEGIN-common headers */ +#include "common.h" +#include "psa_crypto_aead.h" +#include "psa_crypto_cipher.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.h" +#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" +#include "psa_crypto_mac.h" +#include "psa_crypto_pake.h" +#include "psa_crypto_rsa.h" -/* - * Initialization and termination functions - */ -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_init(void); -void psa_driver_wrapper_free(void); +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" +/* END-common headers */ -/* - * Signature functions - */ -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_message( +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +/* BEGIN-driver headers */ +/* Headers for mbedtls_test opaque driver */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#include "test/drivers/test_driver.h" + +#endif +/* Headers for mbedtls_test transparent driver */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#include "test/drivers/test_driver.h" + +#endif +/* Headers for p256 transparent driver */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) +#include "../3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m_driver_entrypoints.h" + +#endif + +/* END-driver headers */ + +/* Auto-generated values depending on which drivers are registered. + * ID 0 is reserved for unallocated operations. + * ID 1 is reserved for the Mbed TLS software driver. */ +/* BEGIN-driver id definition */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID (1) +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID (2) +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID (3) +#define P256_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID (4) + +/* END-driver id */ + +/* BEGIN-Common Macro definitions */ + +/* END-Common Macro definitions */ + +/* Support the 'old' SE interface when asked to */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +/* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT is defined when either a new-style or old-style + * SE driver is present, to avoid unused argument errors at compile time. */ +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT +#endif +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" +#endif + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_init( void ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + status = psa_init_all_se_drivers( ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_init( ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_init( ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); +#endif + + (void) status; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static inline void psa_driver_wrapper_free( void ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* Unregister all secure element drivers, so that we restart from + * a pristine state. */ + psa_unregister_all_se_drivers( ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + mbedtls_test_transparent_free( ); + mbedtls_test_opaque_free( ); +#endif +} + +/* Start delegation functions */ +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_message( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, @@ -43,9 +117,73 @@ psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_message( size_t input_length, uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, - size_t *signature_length); + size_t *signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_message( + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_sign_message( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + break; + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_sign_message( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); + break; +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + break; + } + + return( psa_sign_message_builtin( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ) ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_message( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, @@ -53,57 +191,882 @@ psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_message( const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, const uint8_t *signature, - size_t signature_length); + size_t signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_verify_message( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + break; + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_verify_message( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_length ) ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); + break; +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + break; + } -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash( + return( psa_verify_message_builtin( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_length ) ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, - uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length); + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ) +{ + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes), &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + if( drv->asymmetric == NULL || + drv->asymmetric->p_sign == NULL ) + { + /* Key is defined in SE, but we have no way to exercise it */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + return( drv->asymmetric->p_sign( + drv_context, *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_sign_hash( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#if defined (MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( psa_get_key_type(attributes) ) && + PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) && + !PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC( alg ) && + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(psa_get_key_type(attributes)) == PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 && + psa_get_key_bits(attributes) == 256 ) + { + status = p256_transparent_sign_hash( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + return( psa_sign_hash_builtin( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_sign_hash( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash( +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, - const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length); + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ) +{ + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; -/* - * Key handling functions + if( psa_get_se_driver( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes), &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + if( drv->asymmetric == NULL || + drv->asymmetric->p_verify == NULL ) + { + /* Key is defined in SE, but we have no way to exercise it */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + return( drv->asymmetric->p_verify( + drv_context, *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_verify_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#if defined (MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( psa_get_key_type(attributes) ) && + PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) && + !PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC( alg ) && + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(psa_get_key_type(attributes)) == PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 && + psa_get_key_bits(attributes) == 256 ) + { + status = p256_transparent_verify_hash( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + return( psa_verify_hash_builtin( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_verify_hash( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline uint32_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash_get_num_ops( + psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { + /* If uninitialised, return 0, as no work can have been done. */ + case 0: + return 0; + + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return(mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_get_num_ops(&operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx)); + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + /* Add test driver tests here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + /* Can't happen (see discussion in #8271) */ + return 0; +} + +static inline uint32_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash_get_num_ops( + psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { + /* If uninitialised, return 0, as no work can have been done. */ + case 0: + return 0; + + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return (mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_get_num_ops(&operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx)); + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + /* Add test driver tests here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + } + + /* Can't happen (see discussion in #8271) */ + return 0; +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash_start( + psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( + psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + + /* Add test driver tests here */ + + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + status = mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_start( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length ); + break; + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + break; + } + + return( status ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash_complete( + psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_complete( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + signature, signature_size, + signature_length ) ); + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + /* Add test driver tests here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + ( void ) signature; + ( void ) signature_size; + ( void ) signature_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash_abort( + psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_abort( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + /* Add test driver tests here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash_start( + psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( + psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + + /* Add test driver tests here */ + + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + status = mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_start( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ); + break; + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + break; + } + + return( status ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash_complete( + psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_complete( + &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx + ) ); + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + /* Add test driver tests here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash_abort( + psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_abort( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx + ) ); + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + /* Add test driver tests here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +/** Calculate the key buffer size required to store the key material of a key + * associated with an opaque driver from input key data. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attributes + * \param[in] data The input key data. + * \param[in] data_length The input data length. + * \param[out] key_buffer_size Minimum buffer size to contain the key material. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription */ +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size_from_key_data( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + size_t *key_buffer_size ) +{ + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type(attributes); + + *key_buffer_size = 0; + switch( location ) + { +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + *key_buffer_size = mbedtls_test_opaque_size_function( key_type, + PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( data_length ) ); + return( ( *key_buffer_size != 0 ) ? + PSA_SUCCESS : PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_import_key( + default: + (void)key_type; + (void)data; + (void)data_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_generate_key( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, - uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, - size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits); + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, size_t params_data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes)); + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) + int is_default_production = + psa_key_production_parameters_are_default(params, params_data_length); + if( location != PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE && !is_default_production ) + { + /* We don't support passing custom production parameters + * to drivers yet. */ + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } +#else + int is_default_production = 1; + (void) is_default_production; +#endif + + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes), &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + size_t pubkey_length = 0; /* We don't support this feature yet */ + if( drv->key_management == NULL || + drv->key_management->p_generate == NULL ) + { + /* Key is defined as being in SE, but we have no way to generate it */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + return( drv->key_management->p_generate( + drv_context, + *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + attributes, NULL, 0, &pubkey_length ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) + /* Transparent drivers are limited to generating asymmetric keys. */ + /* We don't support passing custom production parameters + * to drivers yet. */ + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC( psa_get_key_type(attributes) ) && + is_default_production ) + { + /* Cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_generate_key( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + break; +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( psa_get_key_type(attributes) ) && + psa_get_key_type(attributes) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1) && + psa_get_key_bits(attributes) == 256 ) + { + status = p256_transparent_generate_key( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + break; + } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED */ + } +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Software fallback */ + status = psa_generate_key_internal( + attributes, params, params_data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, key_buffer_length ); + break; -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_export_key( + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_generate_key( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, key_buffer_length ); + break; +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + break; + } + + return( status ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_import_key( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, - uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length); + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, + size_t *bits ) +{ + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( + psa_get_key_lifetime( attributes ) ); + + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes), &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + if( drv->key_management == NULL || + drv->key_management->p_import == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* The driver should set the number of key bits, however in + * case it doesn't, we initialize bits to an invalid value. */ + *bits = PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS + 1; + status = drv->key_management->p_import( + drv_context, + *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + attributes, data, data_length, bits ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( (*bits) > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) + +#if (defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) ) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_import_key + (attributes, + data, + data_length, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, + bits + ); + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) ) + status = p256_transparent_import_key + (attributes, + data, + data_length, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, + bits + ); + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + return( psa_import_key_into_slot( attributes, + data, data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, bits ) ); + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_export_public_key( +#if (defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) ) + case 0x7fffff: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_import_key + (attributes, + data, + data_length, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, + bits + )); +#endif + + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_export_key( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, - uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length); + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size( - const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - size_t *key_buffer_size); +{ -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_generate_key( - const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length); + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( + psa_get_key_lifetime( attributes ) ); + + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes), &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + if( ( drv->key_management == NULL ) || + ( drv->key_management->p_export == NULL ) ) + { + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + return( drv->key_management->p_export( + drv_context, + *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + data, data_size, data_length ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + return( psa_export_key_internal( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length ) ); -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_builtin_key( - psa_drv_slot_number_t slot_number, + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) + +#if (defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) ) + case 0x7fffff: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_export_key + (attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length + )); +#endif + + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + return( status ); + } + +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_copy_key( psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, - uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length); + const uint8_t *source_key, size_t source_key_length, + uint8_t *target_key_buffer, size_t target_key_buffer_size, + size_t *target_key_buffer_length ) +{ + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes), &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + /* Copying to a secure element is not implemented yet. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + switch( location ) + { +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) + +#if (defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) ) + case 0x7fffff: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_copy_key + (attributes, + source_key, + source_key_length, + target_key_buffer, + target_key_buffer_size, + target_key_buffer_length + )); +#endif + + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void)source_key; + (void)source_key_length; + (void)target_key_buffer; + (void)target_key_buffer_size; + (void)target_key_buffer_length; + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + return( status ); + +} /* * Cipher functions */ -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt( +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, @@ -114,9 +1077,88 @@ psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt( size_t input_length, uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, - size_t *output_length); + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_encrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + iv, + iv_length, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + iv, + iv_length, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#else + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt( + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_encrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + iv, + iv_length, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + (void)iv; + (void)iv_length; + (void)input; + (void)input_length; + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, @@ -125,101 +1167,1033 @@ psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt( size_t input_length, uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, - size_t *output_length); + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_decrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#else + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_decrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt_setup( + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + (void)input; + (void)input_length; + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt_setup( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, - psa_algorithm_t alg); + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_encrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_encrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt_setup( + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID; + + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + (void)operation; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt_setup( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, - psa_algorithm_t alg); + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_decrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_set_iv( + return( status ); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_decrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID; + + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + (void)operation; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_set_iv( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, const uint8_t *iv, - size_t iv_length); + size_t iv_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + iv, + iv_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_set_iv( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + iv, iv_length ) ); -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_update( + case MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_set_iv( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + iv, iv_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)iv; + (void)iv_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_update( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, - size_t *output_length); + size_t *output_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_update( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_update( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); + + case MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_update( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_finish( + (void)input; + (void)input_length; + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_finish( psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, - size_t *output_length); + size_t *output_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_finish( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); + + case MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_finish( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_abort( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_abort( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + sizeof( operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx ) ); + return( status ); + + case MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_abort( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + sizeof( operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx ) ); + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_abort( - psa_cipher_operation_t *operation); + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} /* * Hashing functions */ -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_size, - size_t *hash_length); + size_t *hash_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_setup( + /* Try accelerators first */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_compute( + alg, input, input_length, hash, hash_size, hash_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + + /* If software fallback is compiled in, try fallback */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + status = mbedtls_psa_hash_compute( alg, input, input_length, + hash, hash_size, hash_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + (void) status; + (void) alg; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) hash; + (void) hash_size; + (void) hash_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_setup( psa_hash_operation_t *operation, - psa_algorithm_t alg); + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Try setup on accelerators first */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_setup( + &operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx, alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_clone( + /* If software fallback is compiled in, try fallback */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + status = mbedtls_psa_hash_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + /* Nothing left to try if we fall through here */ + (void) status; + (void) operation; + (void) alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_clone( const psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, - psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation); + psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation ) +{ + switch( source_operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + target_operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + return( mbedtls_psa_hash_clone( &source_operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + &target_operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + target_operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID; + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_clone( + &source_operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx, + &target_operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx ) ); +#endif + default: + (void) target_operation; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } +} -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_update( +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_update( psa_hash_operation_t *operation, const uint8_t *input, - size_t input_length); + size_t input_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_hash_update( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_update( + &operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); +#endif + default: + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } +} -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_finish( +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_finish( psa_hash_operation_t *operation, uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_size, - size_t *hash_length); - -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_abort( - psa_hash_operation_t *operation); + size_t *hash_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_hash_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + hash, hash_size, hash_length ) ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_finish( + &operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx, + hash, hash_size, hash_length ) ); +#endif + default: + (void) hash; + (void) hash_size; + (void) hash_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } +} -/* - * AEAD functions - */ +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_abort( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_hash_abort( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_abort( + &operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx ) ); +#endif + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } +} -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_encrypt( +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_encrypt( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_length, - uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t *ciphertext_length); + uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t *ciphertext_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_decrypt( + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_encrypt( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + plaintext, plaintext_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_size, ciphertext_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + return( mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + plaintext, plaintext_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_size, ciphertext_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_decrypt( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length, - uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length); + uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_decrypt( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_length, + plaintext, plaintext_size, plaintext_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + return( mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_length, + plaintext, plaintext_size, plaintext_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_encrypt_setup( + psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID; + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_encrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + status = mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + return( status ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_decrypt_setup( + psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID; + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_decrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + status = mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + return( status ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_set_nonce( + psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + nonce, + nonce_length ) ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_set_nonce( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + nonce, nonce_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)nonce; + (void)nonce_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_set_lengths( + psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + size_t ad_length, + size_t plaintext_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_aead_set_lengths( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + ad_length, + plaintext_length ) ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_set_lengths( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + ad_length, plaintext_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)ad_length; + (void)plaintext_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_update_ad( + psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + input, + input_length ) ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_update_ad( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)input; + (void)input_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_update( + psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_aead_update( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + input, input_length, + output, output_size, + output_length ) ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_update( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length, output, output_size, + output_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)input; + (void)input_length; + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_finish( + psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_size, + size_t *ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *tag, + size_t tag_size, + size_t *tag_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_aead_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + ciphertext, + ciphertext_size, + ciphertext_length, tag, + tag_size, tag_length ) ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_finish( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + ciphertext, ciphertext_size, + ciphertext_length, tag, tag_size, tag_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)ciphertext; + (void)ciphertext_size; + (void)ciphertext_length; + (void)tag; + (void)tag_size; + (void)tag_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_verify( + psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *plaintext, + size_t plaintext_size, + size_t *plaintext_length, + const uint8_t *tag, + size_t tag_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + { + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint8_t check_tag[PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t check_tag_length; + + status = mbedtls_psa_aead_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + plaintext, + plaintext_size, + plaintext_length, + check_tag, + sizeof( check_tag ), + &check_tag_length ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + if( tag_length != check_tag_length || + mbedtls_ct_memcmp( tag, check_tag, tag_length ) + != 0 ) + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( check_tag, sizeof( check_tag ) ); + + return( status ); + } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_verify( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + plaintext, plaintext_size, + plaintext_length, tag, tag_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)plaintext; + (void)plaintext_size; + (void)plaintext_length; + (void)tag; + (void)tag_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_abort( + psa_aead_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_aead_abort( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_abort( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} /* * MAC functions */ -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_compute( +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_compute( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, @@ -228,41 +2202,696 @@ psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_compute( size_t input_length, uint8_t *mac, size_t mac_size, - size_t *mac_length); + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_compute( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, + input, input_length, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + status = mbedtls_psa_mac_compute( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, + input, input_length, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_compute( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, + input, input_length, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ); + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) mac; + (void) mac_size; + (void) mac_length; + (void) status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup( +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, - psa_algorithm_t alg); + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_setup( + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_sign_setup( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + status = mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_sign_setup( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID; + + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void) status; + (void) operation; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, - psa_algorithm_t alg); + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_verify_setup( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + status = mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_verify_setup( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_update( + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID; + + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void) status; + (void) operation; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_update( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, const uint8_t *input, - size_t input_length); + size_t input_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_mac_update( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_update( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_finish( + case MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_update( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_finish( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, uint8_t *mac, size_t mac_size, - size_t *mac_length); + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_sign_finish( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ) ); -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_finish( + case MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_sign_finish( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void) mac; + (void) mac_size; + (void) mac_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_finish( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, const uint8_t *mac, - size_t mac_length); + size_t mac_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + mac, mac_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_verify_finish( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + mac, mac_length ) ); + + case MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_verify_finish( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + mac, mac_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void) mac; + (void) mac_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_abort( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_mac_abort( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_abort( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx ) ); + case MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_abort( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +/* + * Asymmetric cryptography + */ +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_asymmetric_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_asymmetric_encrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, input, input_length, + salt, salt_length, output, output_size, + output_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + return( mbedtls_psa_asymmetric_encrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, input, input_length, + salt, salt_length, output, output_size, output_length ) + ); + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_asymmetric_encrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, input, input_length, + salt, salt_length, output, output_size, output_length ) + ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + (void)input; + (void)input_length; + (void)salt; + (void)salt_length; + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_asymmetric_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_asymmetric_decrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, input, input_length, + salt, salt_length, output, output_size, + output_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + return( mbedtls_psa_asymmetric_decrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg,input, input_length, + salt, salt_length, output, output_size, + output_length ) ); + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_asymmetric_decrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, input, input_length, + salt, salt_length, output, output_size, + output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + (void)input; + (void)input_length; + (void)salt; + (void)salt_length; + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_key_agreement( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *shared_secret, + size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length + ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = + mbedtls_test_transparent_key_agreement( attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, peer_key, + peer_key_length, shared_secret, shared_secret_size, + shared_secret_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( psa_get_key_type(attributes) ) && + PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg) && + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(psa_get_key_type(attributes)) == PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 && + psa_get_key_bits(attributes) == 256 ) + { + status = p256_transparent_key_agreement( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + peer_key, + peer_key_length, + shared_secret, + shared_secret_size, + shared_secret_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) + return( status ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Software Fallback */ + status = psa_key_agreement_raw_builtin( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + peer_key, + peer_key_length, + shared_secret, + shared_secret_size, + shared_secret_length ); + return( status ); +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_key_agreement( attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, peer_key, + peer_key_length, shared_secret, shared_secret_size, + shared_secret_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + default: + (void) attributes; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) peer_key; + (void) peer_key_length; + (void) shared_secret; + (void) shared_secret_size; + (void) shared_secret_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_pake_setup( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime( &inputs->attributes ) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_pake_setup( + &operation->data.ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + inputs ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID; + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE) + status = mbedtls_psa_pake_setup( &operation->data.ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + inputs ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; +#endif + return status; + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)operation; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_pake_output( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t step, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_pake_output( &operation->data.ctx.mbedtls_ctx, step, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_pake_output( + &operation->data.ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + step, output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void) step; + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + (void) output_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_pake_input( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t step, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_pake_input( &operation->data.ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + step, input, + input_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_pake_input( + &operation->data.ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + step, + input, input_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void) step; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_pake_get_implicit_key( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_pake_get_implicit_key( &operation->data.ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_pake_get_implicit_key( + &operation->data.ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + (void) output_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} -psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_abort( - psa_mac_operation_t *operation); +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_pake_abort( + psa_pake_operation_t * operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_pake_abort( &operation->data.ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE */ -#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_H */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_pake_abort( + &operation->data.ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} -/* End of automatically generated file. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..de8a5269b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c @@ -0,0 +1,256 @@ +/* + * Functions to delegate cryptographic operations to an available + * and appropriate accelerator. + * Warning: This file is now auto-generated. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + + +/* BEGIN-common headers */ +#include "common.h" +#include "psa_crypto_aead.h" +#include "psa_crypto_cipher.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.h" +#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" +#include "psa_crypto_mac.h" +#include "psa_crypto_pake.h" +#include "psa_crypto_rsa.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +/* END-common headers */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +/* BEGIN-driver headers */ +/* Headers for mbedtls_test opaque driver */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#include "test/drivers/test_driver.h" + +#endif +/* Headers for mbedtls_test transparent driver */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#include "test/drivers/test_driver.h" + +#endif +/* Headers for p256 transparent driver */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) +#include "../3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m_driver_entrypoints.h" + +#endif + +/* END-driver headers */ + +/* Auto-generated values depending on which drivers are registered. + * ID 0 is reserved for unallocated operations. + * ID 1 is reserved for the Mbed TLS software driver. */ +/* BEGIN-driver id definition */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID (1) +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID (2) +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID (3) +#define P256_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID (4) + +/* END-driver id */ + +/* BEGIN-Common Macro definitions */ + +/* END-Common Macro definitions */ + +/* Support the 'old' SE interface when asked to */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +/* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT is defined when either a new-style or old-style + * SE driver is present, to avoid unused argument errors at compile time. */ +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT +#endif +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" +#endif + +/** Get the key buffer size required to store the key material of a key + * associated with an opaque driver. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attributes. + * \param[out] key_buffer_size Minimum buffer size to contain the key material + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The minimum size for a buffer to contain the key material has been + * returned successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The type and/or the size in bits of the key or the combination of + * the two is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key is declared with a lifetime not known to us. + */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + size_t *key_buffer_size ) +{ + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type(attributes); + size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(attributes); + + *key_buffer_size = 0; + switch( location ) + { +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + /* Emulate property 'builtin_key_size' */ + if( psa_key_id_is_builtin( + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( + psa_get_key_id( attributes ) ) ) ) + { + *key_buffer_size = sizeof( psa_drv_slot_number_t ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + *key_buffer_size = mbedtls_test_opaque_size_function( key_type, + key_bits ); + return( ( *key_buffer_size != 0 ) ? + PSA_SUCCESS : PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + + default: + (void)key_type; + (void)key_bits; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) + +{ + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( + psa_get_key_lifetime( attributes ) ); + + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes), &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + if( ( drv->key_management == NULL ) || + ( drv->key_management->p_export_public == NULL ) ) + { + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + return( drv->key_management->p_export_public( + drv_context, + *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + data, data_size, data_length ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) + +#if (defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) ) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_export_public_key + (attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length + ); + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) ) + status = p256_transparent_export_public_key + (attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length + ); + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + return( psa_export_public_key_internal( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) + +#if (defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) ) + case 0x7fffff: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_export_public_key + (attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length + )); +#endif + + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + return( status ); + } + +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_builtin_key( + psa_drv_slot_number_t slot_number, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ) +{ + + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + switch( location ) + { +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) + +#if (defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) ) + case 0x7fffff: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_get_builtin_key + (slot_number, + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length + )); +#endif + + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void) slot_number; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) key_buffer_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + } + +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cd617f60ee --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.h @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +/* + * Function signatures for functionality that can be provided by + * cryptographic accelerators. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_NO_STATIC_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_NO_STATIC_H + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa/crypto_driver_common.h" + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + size_t *key_buffer_size); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_builtin_key( + psa_drv_slot_number_t slot_number, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_NO_STATIC_H */ + +/* End of automatically generated file. */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c index ea0eb1be38..95baff6a0f 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c @@ -3,19 +3,7 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" @@ -26,21 +14,79 @@ #include "psa_crypto_core.h" #include "psa_crypto_ecp.h" #include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h" -#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" #include #include #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include +#include #include #include -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) +/* Helper function to verify if the provided EC's family and key bit size are valid. + * + * Note: "bits" parameter is used both as input and output and it might be updated + * in case provided input value is not multiple of 8 ("sloppy" bits). + */ +static int check_ecc_parameters(psa_ecc_family_t family, size_t *bits) +{ + switch (family) { + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1: + switch (*bits) { + case 192: + case 224: + case 256: + case 384: + case 521: + return PSA_SUCCESS; + case 528: + *bits = 521; + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; + + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1: + switch (*bits) { + case 256: + case 384: + case 512: + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; + + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY: + switch (*bits) { + case 448: + case 255: + return PSA_SUCCESS; + case 256: + *bits = 255; + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; + + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1: + switch (*bits) { + case 192: + /* secp224k1 is not and will not be supported in PSA (#3541). */ + case 256: + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; + } + + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +} + psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( psa_key_type_t type, size_t curve_bits, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, @@ -91,16 +137,15 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( } mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(ecp); + status = check_ecc_parameters(PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type), &curve_bits); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + /* Load the group. */ - grp_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type), - curve_bits, !explicit_bits); + grp_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type), + curve_bits); if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { - /* We can't distinguish between a nonsensical family/size combination - * (which would warrant PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT) and a - * well-regarded curve that Mbed TLS just doesn't know about (which - * would warrant PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED). For uniformity with how - * curves that Mbed TLS knows about but for which support is disabled - * at build time, return NOT_SUPPORTED. */ status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; goto exit; } @@ -149,13 +194,16 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( return status; } -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) || * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_import_key( @@ -168,8 +216,8 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_import_key( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; /* Parse input */ - status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(attributes->core.type, - attributes->core.bits, + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(attributes->type, + attributes->bits, data, data_length, &ecp); @@ -177,7 +225,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_import_key( goto exit; } - if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(attributes->core.type) == + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(attributes->type) == PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY) { *bits = ecp->grp.nbits + 1; } else { @@ -187,7 +235,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_import_key( /* Re-export the data to PSA export format. There is currently no support * for other input formats then the export format, so this is a 1-1 * copy operation. */ - status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_key(attributes->core.type, + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_key(attributes->type, ecp, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, @@ -233,20 +281,8 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_key(psa_key_type_t type, return status; } else { - if (data_size < PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(ecp->grp.nbits)) { - return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; - } - status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( - mbedtls_ecp_write_key(ecp, - data, - PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(ecp->grp.nbits))); - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - *data_length = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(ecp->grp.nbits); - } else { - memset(data, 0, data_size); - } - + mbedtls_ecp_write_key_ext(ecp, data_length, data, data_size)); return status; } } @@ -260,7 +296,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_public_key( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( - attributes->core.type, attributes->core.bits, + attributes->type, attributes->bits, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, &ecp); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { return status; @@ -268,7 +304,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_public_key( status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_key( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( - PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(attributes->core.type)), + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(attributes->type)), ecp, data, data_size, data_length); mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(ecp); @@ -276,10 +312,11 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_public_key( return status; } -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) || +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_generate_key( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length) @@ -288,18 +325,14 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_generate_key( int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; psa_ecc_family_t curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( - attributes->core.type); + attributes->type); mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = - mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(curve, attributes->core.bits, 0); + mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(curve, attributes->bits); const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(grp_id); mbedtls_ecp_keypair ecp; - if (attributes->domain_parameters_size != 0) { - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - } - if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE || curve_info == NULL) { return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } @@ -314,17 +347,14 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_generate_key( } status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( - mbedtls_ecp_write_key(&ecp, key_buffer, key_buffer_size)); + mbedtls_ecp_write_key_ext(&ecp, key_buffer_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size)); mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ecp); - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - *key_buffer_length = key_buffer_size; - } - return status; } -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */ /****************************************************************/ /* ECDSA sign/verify */ @@ -344,8 +374,8 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_sign_hash( size_t curve_bytes; mbedtls_mpi r, s; - status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(attributes->core.type, - attributes->core.bits, + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(attributes->type, + attributes->bits, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, &ecp); @@ -365,8 +395,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_sign_hash( if (PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg); - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_psa(hash_alg); - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type(md_info); + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(hash_alg); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( &ecp->grp, &r, &s, &ecp->d, hash, @@ -404,6 +433,21 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_sign_hash( return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); } +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_public_part(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp) +{ + int ret = 0; + + /* Check whether the public part is loaded. If not, load it. */ + if (mbedtls_ecp_is_zero(&ecp->Q)) { + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ecp->grp, &ecp->Q, + &ecp->d, &ecp->grp.G, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE); + } + + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); +} + psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_verify_hash( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, @@ -412,14 +456,13 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_verify_hash( { psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t curve_bytes; mbedtls_mpi r, s; (void) alg; - status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(attributes->core.type, - attributes->core.bits, + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(attributes->type, + attributes->bits, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, &ecp); @@ -432,37 +475,122 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_verify_hash( mbedtls_mpi_init(&s); if (signature_length != 2 * curve_bytes) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; goto cleanup; } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&r, - signature, - curve_bytes)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&s, - signature + curve_bytes, - curve_bytes)); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&r, + signature, + curve_bytes)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } - /* Check whether the public part is loaded. If not, load it. */ - if (mbedtls_ecp_is_zero(&ecp->Q)) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( - mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ecp->grp, &ecp->Q, &ecp->d, &ecp->grp.G, - mbedtls_psa_get_random, MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE)); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&s, + signature + curve_bytes, + curve_bytes)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; } - ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_verify(&ecp->grp, hash, hash_length, - &ecp->Q, &r, &s); + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_public_part(ecp); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(mbedtls_ecdsa_verify(&ecp->grp, hash, + hash_length, &ecp->Q, + &r, &s)); cleanup: mbedtls_mpi_free(&r); mbedtls_mpi_free(&s); mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(ecp); mbedtls_free(ecp); - return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + return status; } #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ +/****************************************************************/ +/* ECDH Key Agreement */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_key_agreement_ecdh( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *peer_key, size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *shared_secret, size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(attributes->type) || + !PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( + attributes->type, + attributes->bits, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &ecp); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *their_key = NULL; + mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh; + size_t bits = 0; + psa_ecc_family_t curve = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ecp->grp.id, &bits); + mbedtls_ecdh_init(&ecdh); + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve), + bits, + peer_key, + peer_key_length, + &their_key); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecdh_get_params(&ecdh, their_key, MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecdh_get_params(&ecdh, ecp, MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&ecdh, + shared_secret_length, + shared_secret, shared_secret_size, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + if (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits) != *shared_secret_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(shared_secret, shared_secret_size); + } + mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ecdh); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(their_key); + mbedtls_free(their_key); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(ecp); + mbedtls_free(ecp); + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH */ + + #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h index 7541c77492..a9f5d59de4 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h @@ -3,19 +3,7 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ECP_H @@ -48,6 +36,15 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(psa_key_type_t type, size_t data_length, mbedtls_ecp_keypair **p_ecp); +/** Load the public part of an internal ECP, if required. + * + * \param ecp The ECP context to load the public part for. + * + * \return PSA_SUCCESS on success, otherwise an MPI error. + */ + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_public_part(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp); + /** Import an ECP key in binary format. * * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver @@ -219,4 +216,52 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_verify_hash( psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length); + +/** Perform a key agreement and return the raw ECDH shared secret. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * key_agreement entry point. This function behaves as a key_agreement + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the private key + * context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in + * bytes. + * \param[in] alg A key agreement algorithm that is + * compatible with the type of the key. + * \param[in] peer_key The buffer containing the key context + * of the peer's public key. + * \param[in] peer_key_length Size of the \p peer_key buffer in + * bytes. + * \param[out] shared_secret The buffer to which the shared secret + * is to be written. + * \param[in] shared_secret_size Size of the \p shared_secret buffer in + * bytes. + * \param[out] shared_secret_length On success, the number of bytes that make + * up the returned shared secret. + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. Shared secret successfully calculated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p alg is not a key agreement algorithm, or + * \p private_key is not compatible with \p alg, + * or \p peer_key is not valid for \p alg or not compatible with + * \p private_key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p shared_secret_size is too small + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not a supported key agreement algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_key_agreement_ecdh( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *peer_key, size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *shared_secret, size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length); #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ECP_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ae38f6d7c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c @@ -0,0 +1,321 @@ +/* + * PSA FFDH layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +/* This header is only needed because it defines + * MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHEXXXX_[P|G]_BIN symbols that are used in + * mbedtls_psa_ffdh_set_prime_generator(). Apart from that, this module + * only uses bignum functions for arithmetic. */ +#include + +#include +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_ffdh.h" +#include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH) +static psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_set_prime_generator(size_t key_size, + mbedtls_mpi *P, + mbedtls_mpi *G) +{ + const unsigned char *dhm_P = NULL; + const unsigned char *dhm_G = NULL; + size_t dhm_size_P = 0; + size_t dhm_size_G = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (P == NULL && G == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048) + static const unsigned char dhm_P_2048[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE2048_P_BIN; + static const unsigned char dhm_G_2048[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE2048_G_BIN; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072) + static const unsigned char dhm_P_3072[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE3072_P_BIN; + static const unsigned char dhm_G_3072[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE3072_G_BIN; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096) + static const unsigned char dhm_P_4096[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE4096_P_BIN; + static const unsigned char dhm_G_4096[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE4096_G_BIN; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144) + static const unsigned char dhm_P_6144[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE6144_P_BIN; + static const unsigned char dhm_G_6144[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE6144_G_BIN; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192) + static const unsigned char dhm_P_8192[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE8192_P_BIN; + static const unsigned char dhm_G_8192[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE8192_G_BIN; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 */ + + switch (key_size) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048) + case sizeof(dhm_P_2048): + dhm_P = dhm_P_2048; + dhm_G = dhm_G_2048; + dhm_size_P = sizeof(dhm_P_2048); + dhm_size_G = sizeof(dhm_G_2048); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072) + case sizeof(dhm_P_3072): + dhm_P = dhm_P_3072; + dhm_G = dhm_G_3072; + dhm_size_P = sizeof(dhm_P_3072); + dhm_size_G = sizeof(dhm_G_3072); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096) + case sizeof(dhm_P_4096): + dhm_P = dhm_P_4096; + dhm_G = dhm_G_4096; + dhm_size_P = sizeof(dhm_P_4096); + dhm_size_G = sizeof(dhm_G_4096); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144) + case sizeof(dhm_P_6144): + dhm_P = dhm_P_6144; + dhm_G = dhm_G_6144; + dhm_size_P = sizeof(dhm_P_6144); + dhm_size_G = sizeof(dhm_G_6144); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192) + case sizeof(dhm_P_8192): + dhm_P = dhm_P_8192; + dhm_G = dhm_G_8192; + dhm_size_P = sizeof(dhm_P_8192); + dhm_size_G = sizeof(dhm_G_8192); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 */ + default: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + if (P != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(P, dhm_P, + dhm_size_P)); + } + if (G != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(G, dhm_G, + dhm_size_G)); + } + +cleanup: + if (ret != 0) { + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT || + MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE || + MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY || + MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi GX, G, X, P; + psa_key_type_t type = attributes->type; + + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type)) { + if (key_buffer_size > data_size) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + memcpy(data, key_buffer, key_buffer_size); + memset(data + key_buffer_size, 0, + data_size - key_buffer_size); + *data_length = key_buffer_size; + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&GX); mbedtls_mpi_init(&G); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&X); mbedtls_mpi_init(&P); + + size_t key_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(attributes->bits); + + status = mbedtls_psa_ffdh_set_prime_generator(key_len, &P, &G); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&X, key_buffer, + key_buffer_size)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&GX, &G, &X, &P, NULL)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&GX, data, key_len)); + + *data_length = key_len; + + ret = 0; +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&P); mbedtls_mpi_free(&G); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&X); mbedtls_mpi_free(&GX); + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS && ret != 0) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + } + + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT || + MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X, P; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&P); mbedtls_mpi_init(&X); + (void) attributes; + + status = mbedtls_psa_ffdh_set_prime_generator(key_buffer_size, &P, NULL); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* RFC7919: Traditional finite field Diffie-Hellman has each peer choose their + secret exponent from the range [2, P-2]. + Select random value in range [3, P-1] and decrease it by 1. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_random(&X, 3, &P, mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&X, &X, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&X, key_buffer, key_buffer_size)); + *key_buffer_length = key_buffer_size; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&P); mbedtls_mpi_free(&X); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS && ret != 0) { + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + } + + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits) +{ + (void) attributes; + + if (key_buffer_size < data_length) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + memcpy(key_buffer, data, data_length); + *key_buffer_length = data_length; + *bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(data_length); + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_key_agreement( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *shared_secret, + size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi P, G, X, GY, K; + const size_t calculated_shared_secret_size = peer_key_length; + + if (peer_key_length != key_buffer_size || + calculated_shared_secret_size > shared_secret_size) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR(psa_get_key_type(attributes))) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&P); mbedtls_mpi_init(&G); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&X); mbedtls_mpi_init(&GY); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&K); + + status = mbedtls_psa_ffdh_set_prime_generator( + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(attributes->bits), &P, &G); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&X, key_buffer, + key_buffer_size)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&GY, peer_key, + peer_key_length)); + + /* Calculate shared secret public key: K = G^(XY) mod P = GY^X mod P */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&K, &GY, &X, &P, NULL)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&K, shared_secret, + calculated_shared_secret_size)); + + *shared_secret_length = calculated_shared_secret_size; + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&P); mbedtls_mpi_free(&G); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&X); mbedtls_mpi_free(&GY); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&K); + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS && ret != 0) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + } + + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..79accd15ac --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.h @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +/* + * PSA FFDH layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_FFDH_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_FFDH_H + +#include + +/** Perform a key agreement and return the FFDH shared secret. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] peer_key The buffer containing the key context + * of the peer's public key. + * \param[in] peer_key_length Size of the \p peer_key buffer in + * bytes. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the private key + * context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in + * bytes. + * \param[out] shared_secret The buffer to which the shared secret + * is to be written. + * \param[in] shared_secret_size Size of the \p shared_secret buffer in + * bytes. + * \param[out] shared_secret_length On success, the number of bytes that make + * up the returned shared secret. + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. Shared secret successfully calculated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key_buffer_size, \p peer_key_length, \p shared_secret_size + * do not match + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_key_agreement( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *shared_secret, + size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length); + +/** Export a public key or the public part of a DH key pair in binary format. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer Material or context of the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p data + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The public key was exported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of \p key_buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length); + +/** + * \brief Generate DH key. + * + * \note The signature of the function is that of a PSA driver generate_key + * entry point. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to generate. + * \param[out] key_buffer Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of \p key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p key_buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was generated successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Key size in bits is invalid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of \p key_buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length); + +/** + * \brief Import DH key. + * + * \note The signature of the function is that of a PSA driver import_key + * entry point. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to import. + * \param[in] data The buffer containing the key data in import + * format. + * \param[in] data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer The buffer containing the key data in output + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. This + * size is greater or equal to \p data_length. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length The length of the data written in \p + * key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] bits The key size in number of bits. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was generated successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of \p key_buffer is too small. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_FFDH_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_hash.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_hash.c index ef73320416..eeb7666c1c 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_hash.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_hash.c @@ -3,19 +3,7 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" @@ -29,58 +17,6 @@ #include #include -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) -const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_psa(psa_algorithm_t alg) -{ - switch (alg) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - case PSA_ALG_MD2: - return &mbedtls_md2_info; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - case PSA_ALG_MD4: - return &mbedtls_md4_info; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - case PSA_ALG_MD5: - return &mbedtls_md5_info; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: - return &mbedtls_ripemd160_info; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: - return &mbedtls_sha1_info; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: - return &mbedtls_sha224_info; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: - return &mbedtls_sha256_info; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: - return &mbedtls_sha384_info; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: - return &mbedtls_sha512_info; -#endif - default: - return NULL; - } -} -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || - * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) || - * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) || - * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_abort( mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation) @@ -91,16 +27,6 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_abort( * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's * nothing to do. */ break; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD2) - case PSA_ALG_MD2: - mbedtls_md2_free(&operation->ctx.md2); - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD4) - case PSA_ALG_MD4: - mbedtls_md4_free(&operation->ctx.md4); - break; -#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) case PSA_ALG_MD5: mbedtls_md5_free(&operation->ctx.md5); @@ -135,6 +61,25 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_abort( case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: mbedtls_sha512_free(&operation->ctx.sha512); break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_224: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_256: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_384: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_512: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) + mbedtls_sha3_free(&operation->ctx.sha3); + break; #endif default: return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; @@ -155,58 +100,70 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_setup( } switch (alg) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD2) - case PSA_ALG_MD2: - mbedtls_md2_init(&operation->ctx.md2); - ret = mbedtls_md2_starts_ret(&operation->ctx.md2); - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD4) - case PSA_ALG_MD4: - mbedtls_md4_init(&operation->ctx.md4); - ret = mbedtls_md4_starts_ret(&operation->ctx.md4); - break; -#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) case PSA_ALG_MD5: mbedtls_md5_init(&operation->ctx.md5); - ret = mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(&operation->ctx.md5); + ret = mbedtls_md5_starts(&operation->ctx.md5); break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: mbedtls_ripemd160_init(&operation->ctx.ripemd160); - ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret(&operation->ctx.ripemd160); + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_starts(&operation->ctx.ripemd160); break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: mbedtls_sha1_init(&operation->ctx.sha1); - ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret(&operation->ctx.sha1); + ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts(&operation->ctx.sha1); break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: mbedtls_sha256_init(&operation->ctx.sha256); - ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(&operation->ctx.sha256, 1); + ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts(&operation->ctx.sha256, 1); break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: mbedtls_sha256_init(&operation->ctx.sha256); - ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(&operation->ctx.sha256, 0); + ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts(&operation->ctx.sha256, 0); break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: mbedtls_sha512_init(&operation->ctx.sha512); - ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(&operation->ctx.sha512, 1); + ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts(&operation->ctx.sha512, 1); break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: mbedtls_sha512_init(&operation->ctx.sha512); - ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(&operation->ctx.sha512, 0); + ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts(&operation->ctx.sha512, 0); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_224: + mbedtls_sha3_init(&operation->ctx.sha3); + ret = mbedtls_sha3_starts(&operation->ctx.sha3, MBEDTLS_SHA3_224); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_256: + mbedtls_sha3_init(&operation->ctx.sha3); + ret = mbedtls_sha3_starts(&operation->ctx.sha3, MBEDTLS_SHA3_256); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_384: + mbedtls_sha3_init(&operation->ctx.sha3); + ret = mbedtls_sha3_starts(&operation->ctx.sha3, MBEDTLS_SHA3_384); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_512: + mbedtls_sha3_init(&operation->ctx.sha3); + ret = mbedtls_sha3_starts(&operation->ctx.sha3, MBEDTLS_SHA3_512); break; #endif default: @@ -229,18 +186,6 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_clone( switch (source_operation->alg) { case 0: return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD2) - case PSA_ALG_MD2: - mbedtls_md2_clone(&target_operation->ctx.md2, - &source_operation->ctx.md2); - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD4) - case PSA_ALG_MD4: - mbedtls_md4_clone(&target_operation->ctx.md4, - &source_operation->ctx.md4); - break; -#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) case PSA_ALG_MD5: mbedtls_md5_clone(&target_operation->ctx.md5, @@ -282,6 +227,26 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_clone( mbedtls_sha512_clone(&target_operation->ctx.sha512, &source_operation->ctx.sha512); break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_224: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_256: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_384: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_512: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) + mbedtls_sha3_clone(&target_operation->ctx.sha3, + &source_operation->ctx.sha3); + break; #endif default: (void) source_operation; @@ -301,59 +266,67 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_update( int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; switch (operation->alg) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD2) - case PSA_ALG_MD2: - ret = mbedtls_md2_update_ret(&operation->ctx.md2, - input, input_length); - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD4) - case PSA_ALG_MD4: - ret = mbedtls_md4_update_ret(&operation->ctx.md4, - input, input_length); - break; -#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) case PSA_ALG_MD5: - ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&operation->ctx.md5, - input, input_length); + ret = mbedtls_md5_update(&operation->ctx.md5, + input, input_length); break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: - ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret(&operation->ctx.ripemd160, - input, input_length); + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update(&operation->ctx.ripemd160, + input, input_length); break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: - ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&operation->ctx.sha1, - input, input_length); + ret = mbedtls_sha1_update(&operation->ctx.sha1, + input, input_length); break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: - ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(&operation->ctx.sha256, - input, input_length); + ret = mbedtls_sha256_update(&operation->ctx.sha256, + input, input_length); break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: - ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(&operation->ctx.sha256, - input, input_length); + ret = mbedtls_sha256_update(&operation->ctx.sha256, + input, input_length); break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: - ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(&operation->ctx.sha512, - input, input_length); + ret = mbedtls_sha512_update(&operation->ctx.sha512, + input, input_length); break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: - ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(&operation->ctx.sha512, - input, input_length); + ret = mbedtls_sha512_update(&operation->ctx.sha512, + input, input_length); break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_224: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_256: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_384: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_512: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) + ret = mbedtls_sha3_update(&operation->ctx.sha3, + input, input_length); + break; #endif default: (void) input; @@ -390,50 +363,59 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_finish( } switch (operation->alg) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD2) - case PSA_ALG_MD2: - ret = mbedtls_md2_finish_ret(&operation->ctx.md2, hash); - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD4) - case PSA_ALG_MD4: - ret = mbedtls_md4_finish_ret(&operation->ctx.md4, hash); - break; -#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) case PSA_ALG_MD5: - ret = mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(&operation->ctx.md5, hash); + ret = mbedtls_md5_finish(&operation->ctx.md5, hash); break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: - ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret(&operation->ctx.ripemd160, hash); + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_finish(&operation->ctx.ripemd160, hash); break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: - ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(&operation->ctx.sha1, hash); + ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish(&operation->ctx.sha1, hash); break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: - ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret(&operation->ctx.sha256, hash); + ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish(&operation->ctx.sha256, hash); break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: - ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret(&operation->ctx.sha256, hash); + ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish(&operation->ctx.sha256, hash); break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: - ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret(&operation->ctx.sha512, hash); + ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish(&operation->ctx.sha512, hash); break; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: - ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret(&operation->ctx.sha512, hash); + ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish(&operation->ctx.sha512, hash); break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_224: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_256: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_384: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_512: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) + ret = mbedtls_sha3_finish(&operation->ctx.sha3, hash, hash_size); + break; #endif default: (void) hash; diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_hash.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_hash.h index 1c1b451988..0a7be80552 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_hash.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_hash.h @@ -3,19 +3,7 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_HASH_H @@ -23,17 +11,6 @@ #include -#include - -/** Get Mbed TLS MD information of a hash algorithm given its PSA identifier - * - * \param[in] alg PSA hash algorithm identifier - * - * \return The Mbed TLS MD information of the hash algorithm. \c NULL if the - * PSA hash algorithm is not supported. - */ -const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_psa(psa_algorithm_t alg); - /** Calculate the hash (digest) of a message using Mbed TLS routines. * * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_compute diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_invasive.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_invasive.h index 58e357e379..51c90c64a4 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_invasive.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_invasive.h @@ -10,29 +10,20 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_INVASIVE_H #define PSA_CRYPTO_INVASIVE_H -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#else -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#endif +/* + * Include the build-time configuration information header. Here, we do not + * include `"mbedtls/build_info.h"` directly but `"psa/build_info.h"`, which + * is basically just an alias to it. This is to ease the maintenance of the + * TF-PSA-Crypto repository which has a different build system and + * configuration. + */ +#include "psa/build_info.h" #include "psa/crypto.h" #include "common.h" @@ -81,6 +72,21 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_crypto_configure_entropy_sources( psa_status_t psa_mac_key_can_do( psa_algorithm_t algorithm, psa_key_type_t key_type); + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_copy_input(const uint8_t *input, size_t input_len, + uint8_t *input_copy, size_t input_copy_len); + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_copy_output(const uint8_t *output_copy, size_t output_copy_len, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_len); + +/* + * Test hooks to use for memory unpoisoning/poisoning in copy functions. + */ +extern void (*psa_input_pre_copy_hook)(const uint8_t *input, size_t input_len); +extern void (*psa_input_post_copy_hook)(const uint8_t *input, size_t input_len); +extern void (*psa_output_pre_copy_hook)(const uint8_t *output, size_t output_len); +extern void (*psa_output_post_copy_hook)(const uint8_t *output, size_t output_len); + #endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_INVASIVE_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_its.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_its.h index 3ceee49bea..877063b878 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_its.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_its.h @@ -3,19 +3,7 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_H diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_mac.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_mac.c index 07f123ee05..8fe6218118 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_mac.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_mac.c @@ -3,19 +3,7 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" @@ -29,6 +17,7 @@ #include #include +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" #include #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) @@ -453,7 +442,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish( goto cleanup; } - if (mbedtls_psa_safer_memcmp(mac, actual_mac, mac_length) != 0) { + if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(mac, actual_mac, mac_length) != 0) { status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; } diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_mac.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_mac.h index 4f8024a9e3..2f614bcc6e 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_mac.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_mac.h @@ -3,19 +3,7 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_MAC_H diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_pake.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_pake.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9ac2e8c486 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_pake.c @@ -0,0 +1,571 @@ +/* + * PSA PAKE layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_pake.h" +#include "psa_crypto_slot_management.h" + +#include +#include "psa_util_internal.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +/* + * State sequence: + * + * psa_pake_setup() + * | + * |-- In any order: + * | | psa_pake_set_password_key() + * | | psa_pake_set_user() + * | | psa_pake_set_peer() + * | | psa_pake_set_role() + * | + * |--- In any order: (First round input before or after first round output) + * | | + * | |------ In Order + * | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | | + * | |------ In Order: + * | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | + * |--- In any order: (Second round input before or after second round output) + * | | + * | |------ In Order + * | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | | + * | |------ In Order: + * | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | + * psa_pake_get_implicit_key() + * psa_pake_abort() + */ + +/* + * Possible sequence of calls to implementation: + * + * |--- In any order: + * | | + * | |------ In Order + * | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | | + * | |------ In Order: + * | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | + * |--- In any order: + * | | + * | |------ In Order + * | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | | + * | |------ In Order: + * | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE) +static psa_status_t mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error(int ret) +{ + switch (ret) { + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED: + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + default: + return PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + } +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE) +static psa_status_t psa_pake_ecjpake_setup(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_ecjpake_init(&operation->ctx.jpake); + + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_setup(&operation->ctx.jpake, + operation->role, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, + operation->password, + operation->password_len); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(operation->password, operation->password_len); + + if (ret != 0) { + return mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error(ret); + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} +#endif + +/* The only two JPAKE user/peer identifiers supported in built-in implementation. */ +static const uint8_t jpake_server_id[] = { 's', 'e', 'r', 'v', 'e', 'r' }; +static const uint8_t jpake_client_id[] = { 'c', 'l', 'i', 'e', 'n', 't' }; + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_setup(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t user_len = 0, peer_len = 0, password_len = 0; + uint8_t *peer = NULL, *user = NULL; + size_t actual_user_len = 0, actual_peer_len = 0, actual_password_len = 0; + psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite = psa_pake_cipher_suite_init(); + + status = psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_password_len(inputs, &password_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_user_len(inputs, &user_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_peer_len(inputs, &peer_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_cipher_suite(inputs, &cipher_suite); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + operation->password = mbedtls_calloc(1, password_len); + if (operation->password == NULL) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + goto error; + } + + user = mbedtls_calloc(1, user_len); + if (user == NULL) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + goto error; + } + + peer = mbedtls_calloc(1, peer_len); + if (peer == NULL) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + goto error; + } + + status = psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_password(inputs, operation->password, + password_len, &actual_password_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto error; + } + + status = psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_user(inputs, user, + user_len, &actual_user_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto error; + } + + status = psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_peer(inputs, peer, + peer_len, &actual_peer_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto error; + } + + operation->password_len = actual_password_len; + operation->alg = cipher_suite.algorithm; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE) + if (cipher_suite.algorithm == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) { + if (cipher_suite.type != PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC || + cipher_suite.family != PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 || + cipher_suite.bits != 256 || + cipher_suite.hash != PSA_ALG_SHA_256) { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto error; + } + + const size_t user_peer_len = sizeof(jpake_client_id); // client and server have the same length + if (actual_user_len != user_peer_len || + actual_peer_len != user_peer_len) { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto error; + } + + if (memcmp(user, jpake_client_id, actual_user_len) == 0 && + memcmp(peer, jpake_server_id, actual_peer_len) == 0) { + operation->role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT; + } else + if (memcmp(user, jpake_server_id, actual_user_len) == 0 && + memcmp(peer, jpake_client_id, actual_peer_len) == 0) { + operation->role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER; + } else { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto error; + } + + operation->buffer_length = 0; + operation->buffer_offset = 0; + + status = psa_pake_ecjpake_setup(operation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto error; + } + + /* Role has been set, release user/peer buffers. */ + mbedtls_free(user); mbedtls_free(peer); + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } else +#else + (void) operation; + (void) inputs; +#endif + { status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } + +error: + mbedtls_free(user); mbedtls_free(peer); + /* In case of failure of the setup of a multipart operation, the PSA driver interface + * specifies that the core does not call any other driver entry point thus does not + * call mbedtls_psa_pake_abort(). Therefore call it here to do the needed clean + * up like freeing the memory that may have been allocated to store the password. + */ + mbedtls_psa_pake_abort(operation); + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_output_internal( + mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t step, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t length; + (void) step; // Unused parameter + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE) + /* + * The PSA CRYPTO PAKE and Mbed TLS JPAKE API have a different + * handling of output sequencing. + * + * The Mbed TLS JPAKE API outputs the whole X1+X2 and X2S steps data + * at once, on the other side the PSA CRYPTO PAKE api requires + * the KEY_SHARE/ZP_PUBLIC/ZK_PROOF parts of X1, X2 & X2S to be + * retrieved in sequence. + * + * In order to achieve API compatibility, the whole X1+X2 or X2S steps + * data is stored in an intermediate buffer at first step output call, + * and data is sliced down by parsing the ECPoint records in order + * to return the right parts on each step. + */ + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) { + /* Initialize & write round on KEY_SHARE sequences */ + if (step == PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE) { + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one(&operation->ctx.jpake, + operation->buffer, + sizeof(operation->buffer), + &operation->buffer_length, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE); + if (ret != 0) { + return mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error(ret); + } + + operation->buffer_offset = 0; + } else if (step == PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_KEY_SHARE) { + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(&operation->ctx.jpake, + operation->buffer, + sizeof(operation->buffer), + &operation->buffer_length, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE); + if (ret != 0) { + return mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error(ret); + } + + operation->buffer_offset = 0; + } + + /* + * mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_xxx() outputs thing in the format + * defined by draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-01 section 7. The summary is + * that the data for each step is prepended with a length byte, and + * then they're concatenated. Additionally, the server's second round + * output is prepended with a 3-bytes ECParameters structure. + * + * In PSA, we output each step separately, and don't prepend the + * output with a length byte, even less a curve identifier, as that + * information is already available. + */ + if (step == PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_KEY_SHARE && + operation->role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER) { + /* Skip ECParameters, with is 3 bytes (RFC 8422) */ + operation->buffer_offset += 3; + } + + /* Read the length byte then move past it to the data */ + length = operation->buffer[operation->buffer_offset]; + operation->buffer_offset += 1; + + if (operation->buffer_offset + length > operation->buffer_length) { + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT; + } + + if (output_size < length) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + memcpy(output, + operation->buffer + operation->buffer_offset, + length); + *output_length = length; + + operation->buffer_offset += length; + + /* Reset buffer after ZK_PROOF sequence */ + if ((step == PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PROOF) || + (step == PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_ZK_PROOF)) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(operation->buffer, sizeof(operation->buffer)); + operation->buffer_length = 0; + operation->buffer_offset = 0; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } else +#else + (void) step; + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + (void) output_length; +#endif + { return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_output(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t step, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = mbedtls_psa_pake_output_internal( + operation, step, output, output_size, output_length); + + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_input_internal( + mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t step, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + (void) step; // Unused parameter + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE) + /* + * The PSA CRYPTO PAKE and Mbed TLS JPAKE API have a different + * handling of input sequencing. + * + * The Mbed TLS JPAKE API takes the whole X1+X2 or X4S steps data + * at once as input, on the other side the PSA CRYPTO PAKE api requires + * the KEY_SHARE/ZP_PUBLIC/ZK_PROOF parts of X1, X2 & X4S to be + * given in sequence. + * + * In order to achieve API compatibility, each X1+X2 or X4S step data + * is stored sequentially in an intermediate buffer and given to the + * Mbed TLS JPAKE API on the last step. + * + * This causes any input error to be only detected on the last step. + */ + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) { + /* + * Copy input to local buffer and format it as the Mbed TLS API + * expects, i.e. as defined by draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-01 section 7. + * The summary is that the data for each step is prepended with a + * length byte, and then they're concatenated. Additionally, the + * server's second round output is prepended with a 3-bytes + * ECParameters structure - which means we have to prepend that when + * we're a client. + */ + if (step == PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_KEY_SHARE && + operation->role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT) { + /* We only support secp256r1. */ + /* This is the ECParameters structure defined by RFC 8422. */ + unsigned char ecparameters[3] = { + 3, /* named_curve */ + 0, 23 /* secp256r1 */ + }; + + if (operation->buffer_length + sizeof(ecparameters) > + sizeof(operation->buffer)) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + memcpy(operation->buffer + operation->buffer_length, + ecparameters, sizeof(ecparameters)); + operation->buffer_length += sizeof(ecparameters); + } + + /* + * The core checks that input_length is smaller than + * PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE. + * Thus no risk of integer overflow here. + */ + if (operation->buffer_length + input_length + 1 > sizeof(operation->buffer)) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + /* Write the length byte */ + operation->buffer[operation->buffer_length] = (uint8_t) input_length; + operation->buffer_length += 1; + + /* Finally copy the data */ + memcpy(operation->buffer + operation->buffer_length, + input, input_length); + operation->buffer_length += input_length; + + /* Load buffer at each last round ZK_PROOF */ + if (step == PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PROOF) { + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one(&operation->ctx.jpake, + operation->buffer, + operation->buffer_length); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(operation->buffer, sizeof(operation->buffer)); + operation->buffer_length = 0; + + if (ret != 0) { + return mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error(ret); + } + } else if (step == PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_ZK_PROOF) { + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(&operation->ctx.jpake, + operation->buffer, + operation->buffer_length); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(operation->buffer, sizeof(operation->buffer)); + operation->buffer_length = 0; + + if (ret != 0) { + return mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error(ret); + } + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } else +#else + (void) step; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; +#endif + { return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_input(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t step, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = mbedtls_psa_pake_input_internal( + operation, step, input, input_length); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_get_implicit_key( + mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) { + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_shared_key(&operation->ctx.jpake, + output, + output_size, + output_length, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE); + if (ret != 0) { + return mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error(ret); + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } else +#else + (void) output; +#endif + { return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_abort(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation) +{ + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(operation->password, operation->password_len); + operation->password = NULL; + operation->password_len = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) { + operation->role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_NONE; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(operation->buffer, sizeof(operation->buffer)); + operation->buffer_length = 0; + operation->buffer_offset = 0; + mbedtls_ecjpake_free(&operation->ctx.jpake); + } +#endif + + operation->alg = PSA_ALG_NONE; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_pake.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_pake.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3d3ee0cc9a --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_pake.h @@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +/* + * PSA PAKE layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_PAKE_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_PAKE_H + +#include + +/** Set the session information for a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * pake_setup entry point. This function behaves as a pake_setup + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized but not set up yet. + * \param[in] inputs Inputs required for PAKE operation (role, password, + * key lifetime, cipher suite) + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The algorithm in \p cipher_suite is not a supported PAKE algorithm, + * or the PAKE primitive in \p cipher_suite is not supported or not + * compatible with the PAKE algorithm, or the hash algorithm in + * \p cipher_suite is not supported or not compatible with the PAKE + * algorithm and primitive. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_setup(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs); + + +/** Get output for a step of a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * pake_output entry point. This function behaves as a pake_output + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active PAKE operation. + * \param step The step of the algorithm for which the output is + * requested. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written in the + * format appropriate for this driver \p step. Refer to + * the documentation of psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t for + * more information. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. This must + * be at least #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p alg, \p + * primitive, \p step) where \p alg and + * \p primitive are the PAKE algorithm and primitive + * in the operation's cipher suite, and \p step is + * the output step. + * + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes of the returned + * output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_output(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t step, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Provide input for a step of a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * pake_input entry point. This function behaves as a pake_input + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \note The core checks that input_length is smaller than PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active PAKE operation. + * \param step The driver step for which the input is provided. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the input in the format + * appropriate for this \p step. Refer to the + * documentation of psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t + * for more information. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The verification fails for a zero-knowledge input step. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * the \p input is not valid for the \p operation's algorithm, cipher suite + * or \p step. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * the \p input is not supported for the \p operation's algorithm, cipher + * suite or \p step. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_input(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t step, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Get implicitly confirmed shared secret from a PAKE. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * pake_get_implicit_key entry point. This function behaves as a + * pake_get_implicit_key entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active PAKE operation. + * \param[out] output Output buffer for implicit key. + * \param output_size Size of the output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes of the implicit key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Input from a PAKE is not supported by the algorithm in the \p output + * key derivation operation. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_get_implicit_key( + mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Abort a PAKE operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * pake_abort entry point. This function behaves as a pake_abort + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation to abort. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_abort(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_PAKE_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h index f1a2af11d9..533fb2e940 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h @@ -1,55 +1,25 @@ /** \file psa_crypto_random_impl.h * * \brief PSA crypto random generator implementation abstraction. - * - * The definitions here need to be consistent with the declarations - * in include/mbedtls/psa_util.h. This file contains some redundant - * declarations to increase the chance that a compiler will detect - * inconsistencies if one file is changed without updating the other, - * but not all potential inconsistencies can be enforced, so make sure - * to check the public declarations and contracts in - * include/mbedtls/psa_util.h if you modify this file. */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_RANDOM_IMPL_H #define PSA_CRYPTO_RANDOM_IMPL_H -#include +#include "psa_util_internal.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) -#include -#include // only for error codes -#include - typedef mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t mbedtls_psa_random_context_t; -/* Trivial wrapper around psa_generate_random(). */ -int mbedtls_psa_get_random(void *p_rng, - unsigned char *output, - size_t output_size); - -/* The PSA RNG API doesn't need any externally maintained state. */ -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE NULL - #else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" + /* Choose a DRBG based on configuration and availability */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE) @@ -62,7 +32,7 @@ int mbedtls_psa_get_random(void *p_rng, #elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) #include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) #include #if SIZE_MAX > 0xffffffff /* Looks like a 64-bit system, so prefer SHA-512. */ @@ -71,19 +41,45 @@ int mbedtls_psa_get_random(void *p_rng, /* Looks like a 32-bit system, so prefer SHA-256. */ #define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 #endif -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 #else #error "No hash algorithm available for HMAC_DBRG." #endif -#else +#else /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE && !MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && !MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C*/ + #error "No DRBG module available for the psa_crypto module." + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE && !MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && !MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C*/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && !MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ + +/* The maximum number of bytes that mbedtls_psa_get_random() is expected to return. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST #endif -#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +typedef mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) +typedef mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && !MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ + +typedef struct { + void (* entropy_init)(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx); + void (* entropy_free)(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx); + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t drbg; +} mbedtls_psa_random_context_t; /** Initialize the PSA DRBG. * @@ -111,63 +107,6 @@ static inline void mbedtls_psa_drbg_free(mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *p_rng) #endif } -/** The type of the PSA random generator context. - * - * The random generator context is composed of an entropy context and - * a DRBG context. - */ -typedef struct { - void (* entropy_init)(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx); - void (* entropy_free)(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx); - mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; - mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t drbg; -} mbedtls_psa_random_context_t; - -/* Defined in include/mbedtls/psa_util.h so that it's visible to - * application code. The declaration here is redundant, but included - * as a safety net to make it more likely that a future change that - * accidentally causes the implementation to diverge from the interface - * will be noticed. */ -/* Do not include the declaration under MSVC because it doesn't accept it - * ("error C2370: 'mbedtls_psa_get_random' : redefinition; different storage class"). - * Observed with Visual Studio 2013. A known bug apparently: - * https://stackoverflow.com/questions/8146541/duplicate-external-static-declarations-not-allowed-in-visual-studio - */ -#if !defined(_MSC_VER) -static mbedtls_f_rng_t *const mbedtls_psa_get_random; -#endif - -/** The maximum number of bytes that mbedtls_psa_get_random() is expected to - * return. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST -#endif - -/** A pointer to the PSA DRBG state. - * - * This variable is only intended to be used through the macro - * #MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE. - */ -/* psa_crypto.c sets this variable to a pointer to the DRBG state in the - * global PSA crypto state. */ -/* The type `mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t` is defined in - * include/mbedtls/psa_util.h so that `mbedtls_psa_random_state` can be - * declared there and be visible to application code. */ -extern mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *const mbedtls_psa_random_state; - -/** A pointer to the PSA DRBG state. - * - * This macro expands to an expression that is suitable as the \c p_rng - * parameter to pass to mbedtls_psa_get_random(). - * - * This macro exists in all configurations where the psa_crypto module is - * enabled. Its expansion depends on the configuration. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE mbedtls_psa_random_state - /** Seed the PSA DRBG. * * \param entropy An entropy context to read the seed from. @@ -179,23 +118,15 @@ extern mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *const mbedtls_psa_random_state; * \return \c 0 on success. * \return An Mbed TLS error code (\c MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx) on failure. */ -static inline int mbedtls_psa_drbg_seed( - mbedtls_entropy_context *entropy, - const unsigned char *custom, size_t len) +static inline int mbedtls_psa_drbg_seed(mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *drbg_ctx, + mbedtls_entropy_context *entropy, + const unsigned char *custom, size_t len) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) - return mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, - mbedtls_entropy_func, - entropy, - custom, len); + return mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(drbg_ctx, mbedtls_entropy_func, entropy, custom, len); #elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = - mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE); - return mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed(MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, - md_info, - mbedtls_entropy_func, - entropy, - custom, len); + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE); + return mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed(drbg_ctx, md_info, mbedtls_entropy_func, entropy, custom, len); #endif } diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c index 853a0443c8..2f613b32da 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c @@ -3,19 +3,7 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" @@ -23,10 +11,12 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) #include +#include "psa/crypto_values.h" #include "psa_crypto_core.h" #include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h" #include "psa_crypto_rsa.h" #include "psa_crypto_hash.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" #include #include @@ -34,14 +24,14 @@ #include #include -#include -#include +#include "rsa_internal.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) /* Mbed TLS doesn't support non-byte-aligned key sizes (i.e. key sizes @@ -71,61 +61,51 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( mbedtls_rsa_context **p_rsa) { psa_status_t status; - mbedtls_pk_context ctx; size_t bits; - mbedtls_pk_init(&ctx); + + *p_rsa = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_context)); + if (*p_rsa == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + mbedtls_rsa_init(*p_rsa); /* Parse the data. */ if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) { - status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( - mbedtls_pk_parse_key(&ctx, data, data_length, NULL, 0)); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(*p_rsa, data, data_length)); } else { - status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( - mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(&ctx, data, data_length)); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(*p_rsa, data, data_length)); } if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { goto exit; } - /* We have something that the pkparse module recognizes. If it is a - * valid RSA key, store it. */ - if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(&ctx) != MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { - status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - goto exit; - } - /* The size of an RSA key doesn't have to be a multiple of 8. Mbed TLS * supports non-byte-aligned key sizes, but not well. For example, * mbedtls_rsa_get_len() returns the key size in bytes, not in bits. */ - bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(mbedtls_pk_rsa(ctx))); + bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(*p_rsa)); if (bits > PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) { status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; goto exit; } - status = psa_check_rsa_key_byte_aligned(mbedtls_pk_rsa(ctx)); + status = psa_check_rsa_key_byte_aligned(*p_rsa); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { goto exit; } - /* Copy out the pointer to the RSA context, and reset the PK context - * such that pk_free doesn't free the RSA context we just grabbed. */ - *p_rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa(ctx); - ctx.pk_info = NULL; - exit: - mbedtls_pk_free(&ctx); return status; } #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) || * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) || - * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || \ +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) - psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_import_key( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, @@ -136,7 +116,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_import_key( mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; /* Parse input */ - status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation(attributes->core.type, + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation(attributes->type, data, data_length, &rsa); @@ -150,7 +130,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_import_key( * representation in the key slot. Export representation in case of RSA is * the smallest representation that's allowed as input, so a straight-up * allocation of the same size as the input buffer will be large enough. */ - status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key(attributes->core.type, + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key(attributes->type, rsa, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, @@ -162,29 +142,28 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_import_key( return status; } +#endif /* (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) && + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key(psa_key_type_t type, mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) int ret; - mbedtls_pk_context pk; - uint8_t *pos = data + data_size; - - mbedtls_pk_init(&pk); - pk.pk_info = &mbedtls_rsa_info; - pk.pk_ctx = rsa; + uint8_t *end = data + data_size; /* PSA Crypto API defines the format of an RSA key as a DER-encoded * representation of the non-encrypted PKCS#1 RSAPrivateKey for a * private key and of the RFC3279 RSAPublicKey for a public key. */ if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) { - ret = mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(&pk, data, data_size); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_write_key(rsa, data, &end); } else { - ret = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(&pos, data, &pk); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(rsa, data, &end); } if (ret < 0) { @@ -206,14 +185,6 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key(psa_key_type_t type, *data_length = ret; return PSA_SUCCESS; -#else - (void) type; - (void) rsa; - (void) data; - (void) data_size; - (void) data_length; - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ } psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_public_key( @@ -225,7 +196,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_public_key( mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( - attributes->core.type, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, &rsa); + attributes->type, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, &rsa); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { return status; } @@ -241,31 +212,25 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_public_key( return status; } -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) -static psa_status_t psa_rsa_read_exponent(const uint8_t *domain_parameters, - size_t domain_parameters_size, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +static psa_status_t psa_rsa_read_exponent(const uint8_t *e_bytes, + size_t e_length, int *exponent) { size_t i; uint32_t acc = 0; - if (domain_parameters_size == 0) { - *exponent = 65537; - return PSA_SUCCESS; - } - /* Mbed TLS encodes the public exponent as an int. For simplicity, only * support values that fit in a 32-bit integer, which is larger than * int on just about every platform anyway. */ - if (domain_parameters_size > sizeof(acc)) { + if (e_length > sizeof(acc)) { return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } - for (i = 0; i < domain_parameters_size; i++) { - acc = (acc << 8) | domain_parameters[i]; + for (i = 0; i < e_length; i++) { + acc = (acc << 8) | e_bytes[i]; } if (acc > INT_MAX) { return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; @@ -276,39 +241,40 @@ static psa_status_t psa_rsa_read_exponent(const uint8_t *domain_parameters, psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_generate_key( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, size_t params_data_length, uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length) { psa_status_t status; mbedtls_rsa_context rsa; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - int exponent; + int exponent = 65537; - status = psa_rsa_read_exponent(attributes->domain_parameters, - attributes->domain_parameters_size, - &exponent); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; + if (params_data_length != 0) { + status = psa_rsa_read_exponent(params->data, params_data_length, + &exponent); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } } - mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE); + mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa); ret = mbedtls_rsa_gen_key(&rsa, mbedtls_psa_get_random, MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, - (unsigned int) attributes->core.bits, + (unsigned int) attributes->bits, exponent); if (ret != 0) { return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); } - status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key(attributes->core.type, + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key(attributes->type, &rsa, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, key_buffer_length); mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa); return status; } -#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) - * defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) */ +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) */ /****************************************************************/ /* Sign/verify hashes */ @@ -324,8 +290,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_rsa_decode_md_type(psa_algorithm_t alg, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg) { psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg); - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_psa(hash_alg); - *md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type(md_info); + *md_alg = mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(hash_alg); /* The Mbed TLS RSA module uses an unsigned int for hash length * parameters. Validate that it fits so that we don't risk an @@ -338,10 +303,10 @@ static psa_status_t psa_rsa_decode_md_type(psa_algorithm_t alg, /* For signatures using a hash, the hash length must be correct. */ if (alg != PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW) { - if (md_info == NULL) { + if (*md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } - if (mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info) != hash_length) { + if (mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(*md_alg) != hash_length) { return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } } @@ -360,7 +325,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_sign_hash( int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; - status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation(attributes->core.type, + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation(attributes->type, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, &rsa); @@ -380,29 +345,32 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_sign_hash( #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg)) { - mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, - MBEDTLS_MD_NONE); - ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(rsa, - mbedtls_psa_get_random, - MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, - MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, - md_alg, - (unsigned int) hash_length, - hash, - signature); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE); + if (ret == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + md_alg, + (unsigned int) hash_length, + hash, + signature); + } } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg)) { - mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_alg); - ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(rsa, - mbedtls_psa_get_random, - MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, - MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, - MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, - (unsigned int) hash_length, - hash, - signature); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_alg); + + if (ret == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + (unsigned int) hash_length, + hash, + signature); + } } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS */ { @@ -456,7 +424,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_verify_hash( int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; - status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation(attributes->core.type, + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation(attributes->type, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, &rsa); @@ -476,32 +444,30 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_verify_hash( #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg)) { - mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, - MBEDTLS_MD_NONE); - ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(rsa, - mbedtls_psa_get_random, - MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, - MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, - md_alg, - (unsigned int) hash_length, - hash, - signature); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE); + if (ret == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(rsa, + md_alg, + (unsigned int) hash_length, + hash, + signature); + } } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg)) { - int slen = rsa_pss_expected_salt_len(alg, rsa, hash_length); - mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_alg); - ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(rsa, - mbedtls_psa_get_random, - MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, - MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, - md_alg, - (unsigned int) hash_length, - hash, - md_alg, - slen, - signature); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_alg); + if (ret == 0) { + int slen = rsa_pss_expected_salt_len(alg, rsa, hash_length); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(rsa, + md_alg, + (unsigned) hash_length, + hash, + md_alg, + slen, + signature); + } } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS */ { @@ -526,4 +492,215 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_verify_hash( #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) */ +/****************************************************************/ +/* Asymmetric cryptography */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) +static int psa_rsa_oaep_set_padding_mode(psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa) +{ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH(alg); + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(hash_alg); + + /* Just to get the error status right, as rsa_set_padding() doesn't + * distinguish between "bad RSA algorithm" and "unknown hash". */ + if (mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg) == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_alg); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_asymmetric_encrypt(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) salt; + (void) salt_length; + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + (void) output_length; + + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(attributes->type)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation(attributes->type, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &rsa); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto rsa_exit; + } + + if (output_size < mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto rsa_exit; + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ + if (alg == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + input_length, + input, + output)); +#else + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT */ + } else + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + psa_rsa_oaep_set_padding_mode(alg, rsa)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto rsa_exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + salt, salt_length, + input_length, + input, + output)); +#else + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP */ + } else { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) +rsa_exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + *output_length = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa); + } + + mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa); + mbedtls_free(rsa); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ + } else { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_asymmetric_decrypt(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) salt; + (void) salt_length; + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + (void) output_length; + + *output_length = 0; + + if (attributes->type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation(attributes->type, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &rsa); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto rsa_exit; + } + + if (input_length != mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto rsa_exit; + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ + + if (alg == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + output_length, + input, + output, + output_size)); +#else + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT */ + } else + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + psa_rsa_oaep_set_padding_mode(alg, rsa)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto rsa_exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + salt, salt_length, + output_length, + input, + output, + output_size)); +#else + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP */ + } else { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) +rsa_exit: + mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa); + mbedtls_free(rsa); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ + } else { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return status; +} + #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h index 82ea4746d7..ffeef26be1 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h @@ -3,19 +3,7 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_RSA_H @@ -121,6 +109,15 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_public_key( * entry point. * * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the RSA key to generate. + * \param[in] params Production parameters for the key + * generation. This function only uses + * `params->data`, + * which contains the public exponent. + * This can be a null pointer if + * \c params_data_length is 0. + * \param params_data_length Length of `params->data` in bytes. + * This can be 0, in which case the + * public exponent will be 65537. * \param[out] key_buffer Buffer where the key data is to be written. * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of \p key_buffer in bytes. * \param[out] key_buffer_length On success, the number of bytes written in @@ -135,6 +132,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_public_key( */ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_generate_key( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, size_t params_data_length, uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length); /** Sign an already-calculated hash with an RSA private key. @@ -212,4 +210,118 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_verify_hash( psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length); +/** + * \brief Encrypt a short message with a public key. + * + * \param attributes The attributes for the key to import. + * \param key_buffer Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] salt A salt or label, if supported by the + * encryption algorithm. + * If the algorithm does not support a + * salt, pass \c NULL. + * If the algorithm supports an optional + * salt and you do not want to pass a salt, + * pass \c NULL. + * + * - For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is + * supported. + * \param salt_length Size of the \p salt buffer in bytes. + * If \p salt is \c NULL, pass 0. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the encrypted message is to + * be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_asymmetric_encrypt(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** + * \brief Decrypt a short message with a private key. + * + * \param attributes The attributes for the key to import. + * \param key_buffer Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] input The message to decrypt. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] salt A salt or label, if supported by the + * encryption algorithm. + * If the algorithm does not support a + * salt, pass \c NULL. + * If the algorithm supports an optional + * salt and you do not want to pass a salt, + * pass \c NULL. + * + * - For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is + * supported. + * \param salt_length Size of the \p salt buffer in bytes. + * If \p salt is \c NULL, pass 0. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the decrypted message is to + * be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \c output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_asymmetric_decrypt(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_RSA_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_se.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_se.c index 7bea10ad64..7a36a4f3a5 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_se.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_se.c @@ -3,19 +3,7 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" @@ -124,12 +112,10 @@ static psa_status_t psa_get_se_driver_its_file_uid( return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } -#if SIZE_MAX > UINT32_MAX /* ITS file sizes are limited to 32 bits. */ if (driver->u.internal.persistent_data_size > UINT32_MAX) { return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } -#endif /* See the documentation of PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_ITS_UID_BASE. */ *uid = PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_ITS_UID_BASE + driver->location; @@ -316,6 +302,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_register_se_driver( * location because it means a transparent key. */ MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE == 0, "Secure element support requires 0 to mean a local key"); + if (location == PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE) { return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_se.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_se.h index 373852dfcc..e0bd5acfb3 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_se.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_se.h @@ -3,29 +3,20 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SE_H #define PSA_CRYPTO_SE_H -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +/* + * Include the build-time configuration information header. Here, we do not + * include `"mbedtls/build_info.h"` directly but `"psa/build_info.h"`, which + * is basically just an alias to it. This is to ease the maintenance of the + * TF-PSA-Crypto repository which has a different build system and + * configuration. + */ +#include "psa/build_info.h" #include "psa/crypto.h" #include "psa/crypto_se_driver.h" diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c index 2d27902085..b184ed08c9 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c @@ -3,19 +3,7 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" @@ -25,7 +13,7 @@ #include "psa/crypto.h" #include "psa_crypto_core.h" -#include "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h" +#include "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.h" #include "psa_crypto_slot_management.h" #include "psa_crypto_storage.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) @@ -35,16 +23,34 @@ #include #include #include "mbedtls/platform.h" - -#define ARRAY_LENGTH(array) (sizeof(array) / sizeof(*(array))) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif typedef struct { psa_key_slot_t key_slots[MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT]; - unsigned key_slots_initialized : 1; + uint8_t key_slots_initialized; } psa_global_data_t; static psa_global_data_t global_data; +static uint8_t psa_get_key_slots_initialized(void) +{ + uint8_t initialized; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + initialized = global_data.key_slots_initialized; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + return initialized; +} + int psa_is_valid_key_id(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, int vendor_ok) { psa_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(key); @@ -81,6 +87,9 @@ int psa_is_valid_key_id(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, int vendor_ok) * On success, the function locks the key slot. It is the responsibility of * the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. * + * If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the + * global key slot mutex. + * * \param key Key identifier to query. * \param[out] p_slot On success, `*p_slot` contains a pointer to the * key slot containing the description of the key @@ -105,16 +114,14 @@ static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory( if (psa_key_id_is_volatile(key_id)) { slot = &global_data.key_slots[key_id - PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN]; - /* - * Check if both the PSA key identifier key_id and the owner - * identifier of key match those of the key slot. - * - * Note that, if the key slot is not occupied, its PSA key identifier - * is equal to zero. This is an invalid value for a PSA key identifier - * and thus cannot be equal to the valid PSA key identifier key_id. - */ - status = mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(key, slot->attr.id) ? - PSA_SUCCESS : PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST; + /* Check if both the PSA key identifier key_id and the owner + * identifier of key match those of the key slot. */ + if ((slot->state == PSA_SLOT_FULL) && + (mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(key, slot->attr.id))) { + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + } else { + status = PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST; + } } else { if (!psa_is_valid_key_id(key, 1)) { return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE; @@ -122,7 +129,9 @@ static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory( for (slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++) { slot = &global_data.key_slots[slot_idx]; - if (mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(key, slot->attr.id)) { + /* Only consider slots which are in a full state. */ + if ((slot->state == PSA_SLOT_FULL) && + (mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(key, slot->attr.id))) { break; } } @@ -131,7 +140,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory( } if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - status = psa_lock_key_slot(slot); + status = psa_register_read(slot); if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { *p_slot = slot; } @@ -144,7 +153,9 @@ psa_status_t psa_initialize_key_slots(void) { /* Nothing to do: program startup and psa_wipe_all_key_slots() both * guarantee that the key slots are initialized to all-zero, which - * means that all the key slots are in a valid, empty state. */ + * means that all the key slots are in a valid, empty state. The global + * data mutex is already held when calling this function, so no need to + * lock it here, to set the flag. */ global_data.key_slots_initialized = 1; return PSA_SUCCESS; } @@ -155,36 +166,39 @@ void psa_wipe_all_key_slots(void) for (slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++) { psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[slot_idx]; - slot->lock_count = 1; + slot->registered_readers = 1; + slot->state = PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION; (void) psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); } + /* The global data mutex is already held when calling this function. */ global_data.key_slots_initialized = 0; } -psa_status_t psa_get_empty_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id, - psa_key_slot_t **p_slot) +psa_status_t psa_reserve_free_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot) { psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t slot_idx; - psa_key_slot_t *selected_slot, *unlocked_persistent_key_slot; + psa_key_slot_t *selected_slot, *unused_persistent_key_slot; - if (!global_data.key_slots_initialized) { + if (!psa_get_key_slots_initialized()) { status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; goto error; } - selected_slot = unlocked_persistent_key_slot = NULL; + selected_slot = unused_persistent_key_slot = NULL; for (slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++) { psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[slot_idx]; - if (!psa_is_key_slot_occupied(slot)) { + if (slot->state == PSA_SLOT_EMPTY) { selected_slot = slot; break; } - if ((unlocked_persistent_key_slot == NULL) && - (!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime)) && - (!psa_is_key_slot_locked(slot))) { - unlocked_persistent_key_slot = slot; + if ((unused_persistent_key_slot == NULL) && + (slot->state == PSA_SLOT_FULL) && + (!psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot)) && + (!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime))) { + unused_persistent_key_slot = slot; } } @@ -196,14 +210,18 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_empty_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id, * storage. */ if ((selected_slot == NULL) && - (unlocked_persistent_key_slot != NULL)) { - selected_slot = unlocked_persistent_key_slot; - selected_slot->lock_count = 1; - psa_wipe_key_slot(selected_slot); + (unused_persistent_key_slot != NULL)) { + selected_slot = unused_persistent_key_slot; + psa_register_read(selected_slot); + status = psa_wipe_key_slot(selected_slot); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto error; + } } if (selected_slot != NULL) { - status = psa_lock_key_slot(selected_slot); + status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(selected_slot, PSA_SLOT_EMPTY, + PSA_SLOT_FILLING); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { goto error; } @@ -256,6 +274,9 @@ static psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key_into_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot) #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ status = psa_copy_key_material_into_slot(slot, key_data, key_data_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } exit: psa_free_persistent_key_data(key_data, key_data_length); @@ -328,8 +349,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_load_builtin_key_into_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot) /* Copy actual key length and core attributes into the slot on success */ slot->key.bytes = key_buffer_length; - slot->attr = attributes.core; - + slot->attr = attributes; exit: if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { psa_remove_key_data_from_memory(slot); @@ -344,16 +364,31 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; *p_slot = NULL; - if (!global_data.key_slots_initialized) { + if (!psa_get_key_slots_initialized()) { return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* We need to set status as success, otherwise CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * would be returned if the lock fails. */ + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + /* If the key is persistent and not loaded, we cannot unlock the mutex + * between checking if the key is loaded and setting the slot as FULL, + * as otherwise another thread may load and then destroy the key + * in the meantime. */ + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_lock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif /* * On success, the pointer to the slot is passed directly to the caller * thus no need to unlock the key slot here. */ status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory(key, p_slot); if (status != PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif return status; } @@ -362,8 +397,12 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) psa_key_id_t volatile_key_id; - status = psa_get_empty_key_slot(&volatile_key_id, p_slot); + status = psa_reserve_free_key_slot(&volatile_key_id, p_slot); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif return status; } @@ -384,45 +423,82 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { psa_wipe_key_slot(*p_slot); + if (status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) { status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE; } } else { /* Add implicit usage flags. */ psa_extend_key_usage_flags(&(*p_slot)->attr.policy.usage); + + psa_key_slot_state_transition((*p_slot), PSA_SLOT_FILLING, + PSA_SLOT_FULL); + status = psa_register_read(*p_slot); } - return status; #else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE; + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE; #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + return status; } -psa_status_t psa_unlock_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot) +psa_status_t psa_unregister_read(psa_key_slot_t *slot) { if (slot == NULL) { return PSA_SUCCESS; } + if ((slot->state != PSA_SLOT_FULL) && + (slot->state != PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION)) { + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + + /* If we are the last reader and the slot is marked for deletion, + * we must wipe the slot here. */ + if ((slot->state == PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION) && + (slot->registered_readers == 1)) { + return psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); + } - if (slot->lock_count > 0) { - slot->lock_count--; + if (psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot)) { + slot->registered_readers--; return PSA_SUCCESS; } /* * As the return error code may not be handled in case of multiple errors, - * do our best to report if the lock counter is equal to zero: if - * available call MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED that may terminate execution (if - * called as part of the execution of a unit test suite this will stop the - * test suite execution). + * do our best to report if there are no registered readers. Assert with + * MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT that there are registered readers: + * if the MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS configuration option is enabled and + * the function is called as part of the execution of a test suite, the + * execution of the test suite is stopped in error if the assertion fails. */ -#ifdef MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS - MBEDTLS_PARAM_FAILED(slot->lock_count > 0); -#endif - + MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot)); return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; } +psa_status_t psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(psa_key_slot_t *slot) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* We need to set status as success, otherwise CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * would be returned if the lock fails. */ + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_lock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + status = psa_unregister_read(slot); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + return status; +} + psa_status_t psa_validate_key_location(psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime, psa_se_drv_table_entry_t **p_drv) { @@ -440,14 +516,8 @@ psa_status_t psa_validate_key_location(psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime, (void) p_drv; #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS) /* Key location for external keys gets checked by the wrapper */ return PSA_SUCCESS; -#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS */ - /* No support for external lifetimes at all, or dynamic interface - * did not find driver for requested lifetime. */ - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS */ } else { /* Local/internal keys are always valid */ return PSA_SUCCESS; @@ -492,7 +562,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_open_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_key_handle_t *handle) *handle = key; - return psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + return psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); #else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ (void) key; @@ -503,44 +573,78 @@ psa_status_t psa_open_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_key_handle_t *handle) psa_status_t psa_close_key(psa_key_handle_t handle) { - psa_status_t status; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; psa_key_slot_t *slot; if (psa_key_handle_is_null(handle)) { return PSA_SUCCESS; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* We need to set status as success, otherwise CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * would be returned if the lock fails. */ + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_lock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory(handle, &slot); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { if (status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) { status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE; } - +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif return status; } - if (slot->lock_count <= 1) { - return psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); + + if (slot->registered_readers == 1) { + status = psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); } else { - return psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + status = psa_unregister_read(slot); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + + return status; } psa_status_t psa_purge_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) { - psa_status_t status; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; psa_key_slot_t *slot; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* We need to set status as success, otherwise CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * would be returned if the lock fails. */ + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_lock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory(key, &slot); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif return status; } if ((!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime)) && - (slot->lock_count <= 1)) { - return psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); + (slot->registered_readers == 1)) { + status = psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); } else { - return psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + status = psa_unregister_read(slot); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + + return status; } void mbedtls_psa_get_stats(mbedtls_psa_stats_t *stats) @@ -551,10 +655,10 @@ void mbedtls_psa_get_stats(mbedtls_psa_stats_t *stats) for (slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++) { const psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[slot_idx]; - if (psa_is_key_slot_locked(slot)) { + if (psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot)) { ++stats->locked_slots; } - if (!psa_is_key_slot_occupied(slot)) { + if (slot->state == PSA_SLOT_EMPTY) { ++stats->empty_slots; continue; } diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h index c8366abeb8..bcfc9d8adc 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h @@ -3,19 +3,7 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SLOT_MANAGEMENT_H @@ -66,8 +54,9 @@ static inline int psa_key_id_is_volatile(psa_key_id_t key_id) * In case of a persistent key, the function loads the description of the key * into a key slot if not already done. * - * On success, the returned key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of - * the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. + * On success, the returned key slot has been registered for reading. + * It is the responsibility of the caller to call psa_unregister_read(slot) + * when they have finished reading the contents of the slot. * * \param key Key identifier to query. * \param[out] p_slot On success, `*p_slot` contains a pointer to the @@ -103,54 +92,101 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_status_t psa_initialize_key_slots(void); /** Delete all data from key slots in memory. + * This function is not thread safe, it wipes every key slot regardless of + * state and reader count. It should only be called when no slot is in use. * * This does not affect persistent storage. */ void psa_wipe_all_key_slots(void); -/** Find a free key slot. +/** Find a free key slot and reserve it to be filled with a key. + * + * This function finds a key slot that is free, + * sets its state to PSA_SLOT_FILLING and then returns the slot. * - * This function returns a key slot that is available for use and is in its - * ground state (all-bits-zero). On success, the key slot is locked. It is - * the responsibility of the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not - * access it anymore. + * On success, the key slot's state is PSA_SLOT_FILLING. + * It is the responsibility of the caller to change the slot's state to + * PSA_SLOT_EMPTY/FULL once key creation has finished. + * + * If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the + * global key slot mutex. * * \param[out] volatile_key_id On success, volatile key identifier * associated to the returned slot. * \param[out] p_slot On success, a pointer to the slot. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription - * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * There were no free key slots. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * This function attempted to operate on a key slot which was in an + * unexpected state. */ -psa_status_t psa_get_empty_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id, - psa_key_slot_t **p_slot); +psa_status_t psa_reserve_free_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot); -/** Lock a key slot. +/** Change the state of a key slot. * - * This function increments the key slot lock counter by one. + * This function changes the state of the key slot from expected_state to + * new state. If the state of the slot was not expected_state, the state is + * unchanged. * - * \param[in] slot The key slot. + * If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the + * global key slot mutex. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot. + * \param[in] expected_state The current state of the slot. + * \param[in] new_state The new state of the slot. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS - The key slot lock counter was incremented. + The key slot's state variable is new_state. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED - * The lock counter already reached its maximum value and was not - * increased. + * The slot's state was not expected_state. */ -static inline psa_status_t psa_lock_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot) +static inline psa_status_t psa_key_slot_state_transition( + psa_key_slot_t *slot, psa_key_slot_state_t expected_state, + psa_key_slot_state_t new_state) { - if (slot->lock_count >= SIZE_MAX) { + if (slot->state != expected_state) { return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; } + slot->state = new_state; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} - slot->lock_count++; +/** Register as a reader of a key slot. + * + * This function increments the key slot registered reader counter by one. + * If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the + * global key slot mutex. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + The key slot registered reader counter was incremented. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * The reader counter already reached its maximum value and was not + * increased, or the slot's state was not PSA_SLOT_FULL. + */ +static inline psa_status_t psa_register_read(psa_key_slot_t *slot) +{ + if ((slot->state != PSA_SLOT_FULL) || + (slot->registered_readers >= SIZE_MAX)) { + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + slot->registered_readers++; return PSA_SUCCESS; } -/** Unlock a key slot. +/** Unregister from reading a key slot. * - * This function decrements the key slot lock counter by one. + * This function decrements the key slot registered reader counter by one. + * If the state of the slot is PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION, + * and there is only one registered reader (the caller), + * this function will call psa_wipe_key_slot(). + * If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the + * global key slot mutex. * * \note To ease the handling of errors in retrieving a key slot * a NULL input pointer is valid, and the function returns @@ -158,13 +194,37 @@ static inline psa_status_t psa_lock_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot) * * \param[in] slot The key slot. * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS - * \p slot is NULL or the key slot lock counter has been - * decremented successfully. + * \p slot is NULL or the key slot reader counter has been + * decremented (and potentially wiped) successfully. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED - * The lock counter was equal to 0. + * The slot's state was neither PSA_SLOT_FULL nor + * PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION. + * Or a wipe was attempted and the slot's state was not + * PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION. + * Or registered_readers was equal to 0. + */ +psa_status_t psa_unregister_read(psa_key_slot_t *slot); + +/** Wrap a call to psa_unregister_read in the global key slot mutex. * + * If threading is disabled, this simply calls psa_unregister_read. + * + * \note To ease the handling of errors in retrieving a key slot + * a NULL input pointer is valid, and the function returns + * successfully without doing anything in that case. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot. + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \p slot is NULL or the key slot reader counter has been + * decremented (and potentially wiped) successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * The slot's state was neither PSA_SLOT_FULL nor + * PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION. + * Or a wipe was attempted and the slot's state was not + * PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION. + * Or registered_readers was equal to 0. */ -psa_status_t psa_unlock_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot); +psa_status_t psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(psa_key_slot_t *slot); /** Test whether a lifetime designates a key in an external cryptoprocessor. * diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_storage.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_storage.c index 688940b5f4..7d1317b45a 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_storage.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_storage.c @@ -3,19 +3,7 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" @@ -38,6 +26,8 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" + + /****************************************************************/ /* Key storage */ /****************************************************************/ @@ -245,7 +235,7 @@ typedef struct { void psa_format_key_data_for_storage(const uint8_t *data, const size_t data_length, - const psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attr, uint8_t *storage_data) { psa_persistent_key_storage_format *storage_format = @@ -277,7 +267,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_parse_key_data_from_storage(const uint8_t *storage_data, size_t storage_data_length, uint8_t **key_data, size_t *key_data_length, - psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr) + psa_key_attributes_t *attr) { psa_status_t status; const psa_persistent_key_storage_format *storage_format = @@ -324,7 +314,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_parse_key_data_from_storage(const uint8_t *storage_data, return PSA_SUCCESS; } -psa_status_t psa_save_persistent_key(const psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr, +psa_status_t psa_save_persistent_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attr, const uint8_t *data, const size_t data_length) { @@ -352,21 +342,17 @@ psa_status_t psa_save_persistent_key(const psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr, status = psa_crypto_storage_store(attr->id, storage_data, storage_data_length); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(storage_data, storage_data_length); - mbedtls_free(storage_data); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(storage_data, storage_data_length); return status; } void psa_free_persistent_key_data(uint8_t *key_data, size_t key_data_length) { - if (key_data != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(key_data, key_data_length); - } - mbedtls_free(key_data); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(key_data, key_data_length); } -psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key(psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr, +psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key(psa_key_attributes_t *attr, uint8_t **data, size_t *data_length) { @@ -401,8 +387,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key(psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr, } exit: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(loaded_data, storage_data_length); - mbedtls_free(loaded_data); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(loaded_data, storage_data_length); return status; } diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_storage.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_storage.h index 37ca46e283..d7f5b18953 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_storage.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_crypto_storage.h @@ -5,19 +5,7 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_H @@ -105,7 +93,7 @@ int psa_is_key_present_in_storage(const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key); * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription */ -psa_status_t psa_save_persistent_key(const psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr, +psa_status_t psa_save_persistent_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attr, const uint8_t *data, const size_t data_length); @@ -135,7 +123,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_save_persistent_key(const psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr, * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST \emptydescription */ -psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key(psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr, +psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key(psa_key_attributes_t *attr, uint8_t **data, size_t *data_length); @@ -175,7 +163,7 @@ void psa_free_persistent_key_data(uint8_t *key_data, size_t key_data_length); */ void psa_format_key_data_for_storage(const uint8_t *data, const size_t data_length, - const psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attr, uint8_t *storage_data); /** @@ -198,7 +186,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_parse_key_data_from_storage(const uint8_t *storage_data, size_t storage_data_length, uint8_t **key_data, size_t *key_data_length, - psa_core_key_attributes_t *attr); + psa_key_attributes_t *attr); #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) /** This symbol is defined if transaction support is required. */ @@ -243,8 +231,9 @@ typedef uint16_t psa_crypto_transaction_type_t; * This type is designed to be serialized by writing the memory representation * and reading it back on the same device. * - * \note The transaction mechanism is designed for a single active transaction - * at a time. The transaction object is #psa_crypto_transaction. + * \note The transaction mechanism is not thread-safe. There can only be one + * single active transaction at a time. + * The transaction object is #psa_crypto_transaction. * * \note If an API call starts a transaction, it must complete this transaction * before returning to the application. diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_its_file.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_its_file.c index be3c2d58a3..9567137483 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_its_file.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_its_file.c @@ -3,19 +3,7 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" @@ -98,6 +86,9 @@ static psa_status_t psa_its_read_file(psa_storage_uid_t uid, return PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST; } + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(*p_stream, NULL); + n = fread(&header, 1, sizeof(header), *p_stream); if (n != sizeof(header)) { return PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT; @@ -107,14 +98,9 @@ static psa_status_t psa_its_read_file(psa_storage_uid_t uid, return PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT; } - p_info->size = (header.size[0] | - header.size[1] << 8 | - header.size[2] << 16 | - header.size[3] << 24); - p_info->flags = (header.flags[0] | - header.flags[1] << 8 | - header.flags[2] << 16 | - header.flags[3] << 24); + p_info->size = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(header.size, 0); + p_info->flags = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(header.flags, 0); + return PSA_SUCCESS; } @@ -207,10 +193,14 @@ psa_status_t psa_its_set(psa_storage_uid_t uid, psa_its_fill_filename(uid, filename); stream = fopen(PSA_ITS_STORAGE_TEMP, "wb"); + if (stream == NULL) { goto exit; } + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(stream, NULL); + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE; n = fwrite(&header, 1, sizeof(header), stream); if (n != sizeof(header)) { diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_util.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_util.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4ccc5b05d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_util.c @@ -0,0 +1,602 @@ +/* + * PSA hashing layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +/* This is needed for MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX macros */ +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) +#include +#include +#endif + +#include "psa_util_internal.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT) +#include +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) +#include +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)) +#include +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#include +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +#include +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +#include +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) +#include +#endif +#include + +/* PSA_SUCCESS is kept at the top of each error table since + * it's the most common status when everything functions properly. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT) +const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_md_errors[] = +{ + { PSA_SUCCESS, 0 }, + { PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED, MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA }, + { PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY, MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED } +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) +const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_cipher_errors[] = +{ + { PSA_SUCCESS, 0 }, + { PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA }, + { PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED } +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) +const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_lms_errors[] = +{ + { PSA_SUCCESS, 0 }, + { PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA } +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)) +const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_ssl_errors[] = +{ + { PSA_SUCCESS, 0 }, + { PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED }, + { PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA }, + { PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR }, + { PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL } +}; +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_pk_rsa_errors[] = +{ + { PSA_SUCCESS, 0 }, + { PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA }, + { PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE }, + { PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING } +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_pk_ecdsa_errors[] = +{ + { PSA_SUCCESS, 0 }, + { PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE }, + { PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL }, + { PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED } +}; +#endif + +int psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(psa_status_t status) +{ + switch (status) { + case PSA_SUCCESS: + return 0; + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED; + case PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + case PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE: + case PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED: + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + } +} + +int psa_status_to_mbedtls(psa_status_t status, + const mbedtls_error_pair_t *local_translations, + size_t local_errors_num, + int (*fallback_f)(psa_status_t)) +{ + for (size_t i = 0; i < local_errors_num; i++) { + if (status == local_translations[i].psa_status) { + return local_translations[i].mbedtls_error; + } + } + return fallback_f(status); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +int psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(psa_status_t status) +{ + switch (status) { + case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; + case PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG; + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED; + case PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + case PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT: + case PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID: + case PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR; + default: + return psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Key management */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid, + size_t *bits) +{ + switch (grpid) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192R1) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1: + *bits = 192; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224R1) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1: + *bits = 224; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1: + *bits = 256; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1: + *bits = 384; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP521R1) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1: + *bits = 521; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP256R1) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1: + *bits = 256; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP384R1) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1: + *bits = 384; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP512R1) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1: + *bits = 512; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: + *bits = 255; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192K1) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1: + *bits = 192; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224K1) + /* secp224k1 is not and will not be supported in PSA (#3541). */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256K1) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1: + *bits = 256; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE448) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: + *bits = 448; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY; +#endif + default: + *bits = 0; + return 0; + } +} + +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t family, + size_t bits) +{ + switch (family) { + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1: + switch (bits) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) + case 192: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224) + case 224: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) + case 256: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) + case 384: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) + case 521: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1; +#endif + } + break; + + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1: + switch (bits) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) + case 256: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) + case 384: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) + case 512: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1; +#endif + } + break; + + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY: + switch (bits) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) + case 255: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) + case 448: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448; +#endif + } + break; + + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1: + switch (bits) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192) + case 192: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) + /* secp224k1 is not and will not be supported in PSA (#3541). */ +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) + case 256: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1; +#endif + } + break; + } + + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; +} +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ + +/* Wrapper function allowing the classic API to use the PSA RNG. + * + * `mbedtls_psa_get_random(MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, ...)` calls + * `psa_generate_random(...)`. The state parameter is ignored since the + * PSA API doesn't support passing an explicit state. + */ +int mbedtls_psa_get_random(void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_size) +{ + /* This function takes a pointer to the RNG state because that's what + * classic mbedtls functions using an RNG expect. The PSA RNG manages + * its own state internally and doesn't let the caller access that state. + * So we just ignore the state parameter, and in practice we'll pass + * NULL. */ + (void) p_rng; + psa_status_t status = psa_generate_random(output, output_size); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + return 0; + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA) + +/** + * \brief Convert a single raw coordinate to DER ASN.1 format. The output der + * buffer is filled backward (i.e. starting from its end). + * + * \param raw_buf Buffer containing the raw coordinate to be + * converted. + * \param raw_len Length of raw_buf in bytes. This must be > 0. + * \param der_buf_start Pointer to the beginning of the buffer which + * will be filled with the DER converted data. + * \param der_buf_end End of the buffer used to store the DER output. + * + * \return On success, the amount of data (in bytes) written to + * the DER buffer. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL if the provided der + * buffer is too small to contain all the converted data. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA if the input raw + * coordinate is null (i.e. all zeros). + * + * \warning Raw and der buffer must not be overlapping. + */ +static int convert_raw_to_der_single_int(const unsigned char *raw_buf, size_t raw_len, + unsigned char *der_buf_start, + unsigned char *der_buf_end) +{ + unsigned char *p = der_buf_end; + int len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* ASN.1 DER encoding requires minimal length, so skip leading 0s. + * Provided input MPIs should not be 0, but as a failsafe measure, still + * detect that and return error in case. */ + while (*raw_buf == 0x00) { + ++raw_buf; + --raw_len; + if (raw_len == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } + } + len = (int) raw_len; + + /* Copy the raw coordinate to the end of der_buf. */ + if ((p - der_buf_start) < len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + p -= len; + memcpy(p, raw_buf, len); + + /* If MSb is 1, ASN.1 requires that we prepend a 0. */ + if (*p & 0x80) { + if ((p - der_buf_start) < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + --p; + *p = 0x00; + ++len; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&p, der_buf_start, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&p, der_buf_start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)); + + return len; +} + +int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(size_t bits, const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len, + unsigned char *der, size_t der_size, size_t *der_len) +{ + unsigned char r[PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)]; + unsigned char s[PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)]; + const size_t coordinate_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits); + size_t len = 0; + unsigned char *p = der + der_size; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (raw_len != (2 * coordinate_len)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } + + /* Since raw and der buffers might overlap, dump r and s before starting + * the conversion. */ + memcpy(r, raw, coordinate_len); + memcpy(s, raw + coordinate_len, coordinate_len); + + /* der buffer will initially be written starting from its end so we pick s + * first and then r. */ + ret = convert_raw_to_der_single_int(s, coordinate_len, der, p); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + p -= ret; + len += ret; + + ret = convert_raw_to_der_single_int(r, coordinate_len, der, p); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + p -= ret; + len += ret; + + /* Add ASN.1 header (len + tag). */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&p, der, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&p, der, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + /* memmove the content of der buffer to its beginnig. */ + memmove(der, p, len); + *der_len = len; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * \brief Convert a single integer from ASN.1 DER format to raw. + * + * \param der Buffer containing the DER integer value to be + * converted. + * \param der_len Length of the der buffer in bytes. + * \param raw Output buffer that will be filled with the + * converted data. This should be at least + * coordinate_size bytes and it must be zeroed before + * calling this function. + * \param coordinate_size Size (in bytes) of a single coordinate in raw + * format. + * + * \return On success, the amount of DER data parsed from the + * provided der buffer. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG if the integer tag + * is missing in the der buffer. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH if the integer + * is null (i.e. all zeros) or if the output raw buffer + * is too small to contain the converted raw value. + * + * \warning Der and raw buffers must not be overlapping. + */ +static int convert_der_to_raw_single_int(unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, + unsigned char *raw, size_t coordinate_size) +{ + unsigned char *p = der; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t unpadded_len, padding_len = 0; + + /* Get the length of ASN.1 element (i.e. the integer we need to parse). */ + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, p + der_len, &unpadded_len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* It's invalid to have: + * - unpadded_len == 0. + * - MSb set without a leading 0x00 (leading 0x00 is checked below). */ + if (((unpadded_len == 0) || (*p & 0x80) != 0)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } + + /* Skip possible leading zero */ + if (*p == 0x00) { + p++; + unpadded_len--; + /* It is not allowed to have more than 1 leading zero. + * Ignore the case in which unpadded_len = 0 because that's a 0 encoded + * in ASN.1 format (i.e. 020100). */ + if ((unpadded_len > 0) && (*p == 0x00)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } + } + + if (unpadded_len > coordinate_size) { + /* Parsed number is longer than the maximum expected value. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } + padding_len = coordinate_size - unpadded_len; + /* raw buffer was already zeroed by the calling function so zero-padding + * operation is skipped here. */ + memcpy(raw + padding_len, p, unpadded_len); + p += unpadded_len; + + return (int) (p - der); +} + +int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(size_t bits, const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, + unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_size, size_t *raw_len) +{ + unsigned char raw_tmp[PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) der; + size_t data_len; + size_t coordinate_size = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits); + int ret; + + /* The output raw buffer should be at least twice the size of a raw + * coordinate in order to store r and s. */ + if (raw_size < coordinate_size * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + + /* Check that the provided input DER buffer has the right header. */ + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, der + der_len, &data_len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + memset(raw_tmp, 0, 2 * coordinate_size); + + /* Extract r */ + ret = convert_der_to_raw_single_int(p, data_len, raw_tmp, coordinate_size); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + p += ret; + data_len -= ret; + + /* Extract s */ + ret = convert_der_to_raw_single_int(p, data_len, raw_tmp + coordinate_size, + coordinate_size); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + p += ret; + data_len -= ret; + + /* Check that we consumed all the input der data. */ + if ((size_t) (p - der) != der_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + + memcpy(raw, raw_tmp, 2 * coordinate_size); + *raw_len = 2 * coordinate_size; + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_util_internal.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_util_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..70a08a02cd --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/psa_util_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +/** + * \file psa_util_internal.h + * + * \brief Internal utility functions for use of PSA Crypto. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_INTERNAL_H + +/* Include the public header so that users only need one include. */ +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" + +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) + +/************************************************************************* + * FFDH + ************************************************************************/ + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_FFDH_PUBKEY_LENGTH \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_FFDH_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS) + +/************************************************************************* + * ECC + ************************************************************************/ + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_KEY_PAIR_LENGTH \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) + +/************************************************************************* + * Error translation + ************************************************************************/ + +typedef struct { + /* Error codes used by PSA crypto are in -255..-128, fitting in 16 bits. */ + int16_t psa_status; + /* Error codes used by Mbed TLS are in one of the ranges + * -127..-1 (low-level) or -32767..-4096 (high-level with a low-level + * code optionally added), fitting in 16 bits. */ + int16_t mbedtls_error; +} mbedtls_error_pair_t; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT) +extern const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_md_errors[4]; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) +extern const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_cipher_errors[4]; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) +extern const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_lms_errors[3]; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +extern const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_ssl_errors[7]; +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +extern const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_pk_rsa_errors[8]; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +extern const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_pk_ecdsa_errors[7]; +#endif + +/* Generic fallback function for error translation, + * when the received state was not module-specific. */ +int psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(psa_status_t status); + +/* This function iterates over provided local error translations, + * and if no match was found - calls the fallback error translation function. */ +int psa_status_to_mbedtls(psa_status_t status, + const mbedtls_error_pair_t *local_translations, + size_t local_errors_num, + int (*fallback_f)(psa_status_t)); + +/* The second out of three-stage error handling functions of the pk module, + * acts as a fallback after RSA / ECDSA error translation, and if no match + * is found, it itself calls psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls. */ +int psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(psa_status_t status); + +/* Utility macro to shorten the defines of error translator in modules. */ +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR_LIST(status, error_list, fallback_f) \ + psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, error_list, \ + sizeof(error_list)/sizeof(error_list[0]), \ + fallback_f) + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ripemd160.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ripemd160.c index a2e11cdf08..b4fc3cdba1 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ripemd160.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ripemd160.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * RIPE MD-160 implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* @@ -60,7 +48,7 @@ void mbedtls_ripemd160_clone(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *dst, /* * RIPEMD-160 context setup */ -int mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx) +int mbedtls_ripemd160_starts(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx) { ctx->total[0] = 0; ctx->total[1] = 0; @@ -74,13 +62,6 @@ int mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx) return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_ripemd160_starts(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx) -{ - mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret(ctx); -} -#endif - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT) /* * Process one block @@ -277,21 +258,14 @@ int mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_ripemd160_process(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64]) -{ - mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process(ctx, data); -} -#endif #endif /* !MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT */ /* * RIPEMD-160 process buffer */ -int mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen) +int mbedtls_ripemd160_update(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t fill; @@ -339,15 +313,6 @@ int mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_ripemd160_update(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen) -{ - mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret(ctx, input, ilen); -} -#endif - static const unsigned char ripemd160_padding[64] = { 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, @@ -359,8 +324,8 @@ static const unsigned char ripemd160_padding[64] = /* * RIPEMD-160 final digest */ -int mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[20]) +int mbedtls_ripemd160_finish(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20]) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; uint32_t last, padn; @@ -377,14 +342,14 @@ int mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, last = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; padn = (last < 56) ? (56 - last) : (120 - last); - ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret(ctx, ripemd160_padding, padn); + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update(ctx, ripemd160_padding, padn); if (ret != 0) { - return ret; + goto exit; } - ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret(ctx, msglen, 8); + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update(ctx, msglen, 8); if (ret != 0) { - return ret; + goto exit; } MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[0], output, 0); @@ -393,40 +358,36 @@ int mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[3], output, 12); MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[4], output, 16); - return 0; -} + ret = 0; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_ripemd160_finish(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[20]) -{ - mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret(ctx, output); +exit: + mbedtls_ripemd160_free(ctx); + return ret; } -#endif #endif /* ! MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT */ /* * output = RIPEMD-160( input buffer ) */ -int mbedtls_ripemd160_ret(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[20]) +int mbedtls_ripemd160(const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[20]) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ripemd160_context ctx; mbedtls_ripemd160_init(&ctx); - if ((ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret(&ctx)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_starts(&ctx)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret(&ctx, output)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_finish(&ctx, output)) != 0) { goto exit; } @@ -436,15 +397,6 @@ int mbedtls_ripemd160_ret(const unsigned char *input, return ret; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_ripemd160(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[20]) -{ - mbedtls_ripemd160_ret(input, ilen, output); -} -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /* * Test vectors from the RIPEMD-160 paper and @@ -503,8 +455,8 @@ int mbedtls_ripemd160_self_test(int verbose) mbedtls_printf(" RIPEMD-160 test #%d: ", i + 1); } - ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_ret(ripemd160_test_str[i], - ripemd160_test_strlen[i], output); + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160(ripemd160_test_str[i], + ripemd160_test_strlen[i], output); if (ret != 0) { goto fail; } diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/rsa.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/rsa.c index 01d0eb09d2..7eb4a259ea 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/rsa.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/rsa.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * The RSA public-key cryptosystem * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* @@ -40,32 +28,545 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" -#include "mbedtls/rsa_internal.h" +#include "bignum_core.h" +#include "rsa_alt_helpers.h" +#include "rsa_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "constant_time_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" +#include "md_psa.h" #include -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) -#include "mbedtls/md.h" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__NetBSD__) #include #endif #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) +/* + * Wrapper around mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi() that rejects zero. + * + * The value zero is: + * - never a valid value for an RSA parameter + * - interpreted as "omitted, please reconstruct" by mbedtls_rsa_complete(). + * + * Since values can't be omitted in PKCS#1, passing a zero value to + * rsa_complete() would be incorrect, so reject zero values early. + */ +static int asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_mpi *X) +{ + int ret; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(p, end, X); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(X, 0) == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) +{ + int ret, version; + size_t len; + unsigned char *p, *end; + + mbedtls_mpi T; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); + + p = (unsigned char *) key; + end = p + keylen; + + /* + * This function parses the RSAPrivateKey (PKCS#1) + * + * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version, + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER, -- e + * privateExponent INTEGER, -- d + * prime1 INTEGER, -- p + * prime2 INTEGER, -- q + * exponent1 INTEGER, -- d mod (p-1) + * exponent2 INTEGER, -- d mod (q-1) + * coefficient INTEGER, -- (inverse of q) mod p + * otherPrimeInfos OtherPrimeInfos OPTIONAL + * } + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return ret; + } -/* Parameter validation macros */ -#define RSA_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define RSA_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) + if (end != p + len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, &version)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (version != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Import N */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import E */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL, &T)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import D */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, + &T, NULL)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import P */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL, + NULL, NULL)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import Q */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T, + NULL, NULL)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + /* + * The RSA CRT parameters DP, DQ and QP are nominally redundant, in + * that they can be easily recomputed from D, P and Q. However by + * parsing them from the PKCS1 structure it is possible to avoid + * recalculating them which both reduces the overhead of loading + * RSA private keys into memory and also avoids side channels which + * can arise when computing those values, since all of D, P, and Q + * are secret. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 for a + * description of one such attack. + */ + + /* Import DP */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->DP, &T)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import DQ */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->DQ, &T)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import QP */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->QP, &T)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + +#else + /* Verify existence of the CRT params */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } +#endif + + /* rsa_complete() doesn't complete anything with the default + * implementation but is still called: + * - for the benefit of alternative implementation that may want to + * pre-compute stuff beyond what's provided (eg Montgomery factors) + * - as is also sanity-checks the key + * + * Furthermore, we also check the public part for consistency with + * mbedtls_pk_parse_pubkey(), as it includes size minima for example. + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(rsa)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if (p != end) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); + + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa); + } + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) +{ + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) key; + unsigned char *end = (unsigned char *) (key + keylen); + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + /* + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER -- e + * } + */ + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (end != p + len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Import N */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(rsa, p, len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + p += len; + + /* Import E */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, p, len)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + p += len; + + if (mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa) != 0 || + mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(rsa) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_write_key(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, + unsigned char **p) +{ + size_t len = 0; + int ret; + + mbedtls_mpi T; /* Temporary holding the exported parameters */ + + /* + * Export the parameters one after another to avoid simultaneous copies. + */ + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); + + /* Export QP */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export DQ */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export DP */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export Q */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export P */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export D */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export E */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export N */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + +end_of_export: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int(p, start, 0)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + return (int) len; +} + +/* + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER -- e + * } + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, + unsigned char **p) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + mbedtls_mpi T; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); + + /* Export E */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export N */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + +end_of_export: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + return (int) len; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + +/** This function performs the unpadding part of a PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption + * operation (EME-PKCS1-v1_5 decoding). + * + * \note The return value from this function is a sensitive value + * (this is unusual). #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE shouldn't happen + * in a well-written application, but 0 vs #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + * is often a situation that an attacker can provoke and leaking which + * one is the result is precisely the information the attacker wants. + * + * \param input The input buffer which is the payload inside PKCS#1v1.5 + * encryption padding, called the "encoded message EM" + * by the terminology. + * \param ilen The length of the payload in the \p input buffer. + * \param output The buffer for the payload, called "message M" by the + * PKCS#1 terminology. This must be a writable buffer of + * length \p output_max_len bytes. + * \param olen The address at which to store the length of + * the payload. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param output_max_len The length in bytes of the output buffer \p output. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE + * The output buffer is too small for the unpadded payload. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + * The input doesn't contain properly formatted padding. + */ +static int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding(unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len, + size_t *olen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, plaintext_max_size; + + /* The following variables take sensitive values: their value must + * not leak into the observable behavior of the function other than + * the designated outputs (output, olen, return value). Otherwise + * this would open the execution of the function to + * side-channel-based variants of the Bleichenbacher padding oracle + * attack. Potential side channels include overall timing, memory + * access patterns (especially visible to an adversary who has access + * to a shared memory cache), and branches (especially visible to + * an adversary who has access to a shared code cache or to a shared + * branch predictor). */ + size_t pad_count = 0; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t pad_done; + size_t plaintext_size = 0; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t output_too_large; + + plaintext_max_size = (output_max_len > ilen - 11) ? ilen - 11 + : output_max_len; + + /* Check and get padding length in constant time and constant + * memory trace. The first byte must be 0. */ + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool(input[0]); + + + /* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00 + * where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */ + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(input[1], MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT)); + + /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find + * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */ + pad_done = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE; + for (i = 2; i < ilen; i++) { + mbedtls_ct_condition_t found = mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(input[i], 0); + pad_done = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(pad_done, found); + pad_count += mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_bool_not(pad_done), 1); + } + + /* If pad_done is still zero, there's no data, only unfinished padding. */ + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_bool_not(pad_done)); + + /* There must be at least 8 bytes of padding. */ + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(8, pad_count)); + + /* If the padding is valid, set plaintext_size to the number of + * remaining bytes after stripping the padding. If the padding + * is invalid, avoid leaking this fact through the size of the + * output: use the maximum message size that fits in the output + * buffer. Do it without branches to avoid leaking the padding + * validity through timing. RSA keys are small enough that all the + * size_t values involved fit in unsigned int. */ + plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if( + bad, (unsigned) plaintext_max_size, + (unsigned) (ilen - pad_count - 3)); + + /* Set output_too_large to 0 if the plaintext fits in the output + * buffer and to 1 otherwise. */ + output_too_large = mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(plaintext_size, + plaintext_max_size); + + /* Set ret without branches to avoid timing attacks. Return: + * - INVALID_PADDING if the padding is bad (bad != 0). + * - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted + * plaintext does not fit in the output buffer. + * - 0 if the padding is correct. */ + ret = mbedtls_ct_error_if( + bad, + MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING, + mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(output_too_large, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE) + ); + + /* If the padding is bad or the plaintext is too large, zero the + * data that we're about to copy to the output buffer. + * We need to copy the same amount of data + * from the same buffer whether the padding is good or not to + * avoid leaking the padding validity through overall timing or + * through memory or cache access patterns. */ + mbedtls_ct_zeroize_if(mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, output_too_large), input + 11, ilen - 11); + + /* If the plaintext is too large, truncate it to the buffer size. + * Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because + * revealing the length is as bad as revealing the padding validity + * for a Bleichenbacher attack. */ + plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(output_too_large, + (unsigned) plaintext_max_size, + (unsigned) plaintext_size); + + /* Move the plaintext to the leftmost position where it can start in + * the working buffer, i.e. make it start plaintext_max_size from + * the end of the buffer. Do this with a memory access trace that + * does not depend on the plaintext size. After this move, the + * starting location of the plaintext is no longer sensitive + * information. */ + mbedtls_ct_memmove_left(input + ilen - plaintext_max_size, + plaintext_max_size, + plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size); + + /* Finally copy the decrypted plaintext plus trailing zeros into the output + * buffer. If output_max_len is 0, then output may be an invalid pointer + * and the result of memcpy() would be undefined; prevent undefined + * behavior making sure to depend only on output_max_len (the size of the + * user-provided output buffer), which is independent from plaintext + * length, validity of padding, success of the decryption, and other + * secrets. */ + if (output_max_len != 0) { + memcpy(output, input + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size); + } + + /* Report the amount of data we copied to the output buffer. In case + * of errors (bad padding or output too large), the value of *olen + * when this function returns is not specified. Making it equivalent + * to the good case limits the risks of leaking the padding validity. */ + *olen = plaintext_size; + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) int mbedtls_rsa_import(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *N, @@ -73,7 +574,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_import(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *E) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); if ((N != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->N, N)) != 0) || (P != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->P, P)) != 0) || @@ -98,7 +598,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, unsigned char const *E, size_t E_len) { int ret = 0; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); if (N != NULL) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->N, N, N_len)); @@ -228,8 +727,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_complete(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) #endif int n_missing, pq_missing, d_missing, is_pub, is_priv; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - have_N = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->N, 0) != 0); have_P = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) != 0); have_Q = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) != 0); @@ -328,7 +825,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_export_raw(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, { int ret = 0; int is_priv; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); /* Check if key is private or public */ is_priv = @@ -378,7 +874,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_export(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; int is_priv; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); /* Check if key is private or public */ is_priv = @@ -421,7 +916,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; int is_priv; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); /* Check if key is private or public */ is_priv = @@ -455,17 +949,12 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, /* * Initialize an RSA context */ -void mbedtls_rsa_init(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int padding, - int hash_id) +void mbedtls_rsa_init(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) { - RSA_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE(padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 || - padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21); - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_context)); - mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(ctx, padding, hash_id); + ctx->padding = MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15; + ctx->hash_id = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) /* Set ctx->ver to nonzero to indicate that the mutex has been @@ -478,27 +967,71 @@ void mbedtls_rsa_init(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, /* * Set padding for an existing RSA context */ -void mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int padding, - int hash_id) +int mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int padding, + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_id) { - RSA_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE(padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 || - padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21); + switch (padding) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: + break; +#endif + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + if ((padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) && + (hash_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE)) { + /* Just make sure this hash is supported in this build. */ + if (mbedtls_md_info_from_type(hash_id) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ ctx->padding = padding; ctx->hash_id = hash_id; + + return 0; } /* - * Get length in bytes of RSA modulus + * Get padding mode of initialized RSA context + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) +{ + return ctx->padding; +} + +/* + * Get hash identifier of mbedtls_md_type_t type */ +int mbedtls_rsa_get_md_alg(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) +{ + return ctx->hash_id; +} + +/* + * Get length in bits of RSA modulus + */ +size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) +{ + return mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N); +} +/* + * Get length in bytes of RSA modulus + */ size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_len(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) { return ctx->len; } - #if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) /* @@ -515,8 +1048,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi H, G, L; int prime_quality = 0; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); /* * If the modulus is 1024 bit long or shorter, then the security strength of @@ -531,7 +1062,12 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_mpi_init(&G); mbedtls_mpi_init(&L); - if (nbits < 128 || exponent < 3 || nbits % 2 != 0) { + if (exponent < 3 || nbits % 2 != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (nbits < MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; goto cleanup; } @@ -631,8 +1167,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, */ int mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) { - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - if (rsa_check_context(ctx, 0 /* public */, 0 /* no blinding */) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; } @@ -655,8 +1189,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) */ int mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) { - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - if (mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(ctx) != 0 || rsa_check_context(ctx, 1 /* private */, 1 /* blinding */) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; @@ -683,9 +1215,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) int mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv(const mbedtls_rsa_context *pub, const mbedtls_rsa_context *prv) { - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(pub != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(prv != NULL); - if (mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(pub) != 0 || mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(prv) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; @@ -709,9 +1238,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_public(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t olen; mbedtls_mpi T; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); if (rsa_check_context(ctx, 0 /* public */, 0 /* no blinding */)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -816,6 +1342,45 @@ static int rsa_prepare_blinding(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, return ret; } +/* + * Unblind + * T = T * Vf mod N + */ +static int rsa_unblind(mbedtls_mpi *T, mbedtls_mpi *Vf, const mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_mpi_uint mm = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(N->p); + const size_t nlimbs = N->n; + const size_t tlimbs = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(nlimbs); + mbedtls_mpi RR, M_T; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&RR); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&M_T); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_core_get_mont_r2_unsafe(&RR, N)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&M_T, tlimbs)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(T, nlimbs)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(Vf, nlimbs)); + + /* T = T * Vf mod N + * Reminder: montmul(A, B, N) = A * B * R^-1 mod N + * Usually both operands are multiplied by R mod N beforehand (by calling + * `to_mont_rep()` on them), yielding a result that's also * R mod N (aka + * "in the Montgomery domain"). Here we only multiply one operand by R mod + * N, so the result is directly what we want - no need to call + * `from_mont_rep()` on it. */ + mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(T->p, T->p, N->p, nlimbs, mm, RR.p, M_T.p); + mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(T->p, T->p, Vf->p, nlimbs, N->p, nlimbs, mm, M_T.p); + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&RR); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&M_T); + + return ret; +} + /* * Exponent blinding supposed to prevent side-channel attacks using multiple * traces of measurements to recover the RSA key. The more collisions are there, @@ -863,30 +1428,21 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, /* Temporaries holding the blinded exponents for * the mod p resp. mod q computation (if used). */ mbedtls_mpi DP_blind, DQ_blind; - - /* Pointers to actual exponents to be used - either the unblinded - * or the blinded ones, depending on the presence of a PRNG. */ - mbedtls_mpi *DP = &ctx->DP; - mbedtls_mpi *DQ = &ctx->DQ; #else /* Temporary holding the blinded exponent (if used). */ mbedtls_mpi D_blind; - - /* Pointer to actual exponent to be used - either the unblinded - * or the blinded one, depending on the presence of a PRNG. */ - mbedtls_mpi *D = &ctx->D; #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ /* Temporaries holding the initial input and the double * checked result; should be the same in the end. */ - mbedtls_mpi I, C; + mbedtls_mpi input_blinded, check_result_blinded; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); + if (f_rng == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } if (rsa_check_context(ctx, 1 /* private key checks */, - f_rng != NULL /* blinding y/n */) != 0) { + 1 /* blinding on */) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -903,21 +1459,19 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_mpi_init(&Q1); mbedtls_mpi_init(&R); - if (f_rng != NULL) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - mbedtls_mpi_init(&D_blind); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&D_blind); #else - mbedtls_mpi_init(&DP_blind); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&DQ_blind); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&DP_blind); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&DQ_blind); #endif - } #if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) mbedtls_mpi_init(&TP); mbedtls_mpi_init(&TQ); #endif - mbedtls_mpi_init(&I); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&C); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&input_blinded); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&check_result_blinded); /* End of MPI initialization */ @@ -927,61 +1481,53 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, goto cleanup; } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&I, &T)); + /* + * Blinding + * T = T * Vi mod N + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(rsa_prepare_blinding(ctx, f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->Vi)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->N)); - if (f_rng != NULL) { - /* - * Blinding - * T = T * Vi mod N - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(rsa_prepare_blinding(ctx, f_rng, p_rng)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->Vi)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->N)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&input_blinded, &T)); - /* - * Exponent blinding - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&P1, &ctx->P, 1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&Q1, &ctx->Q, 1)); + /* + * Exponent blinding + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&P1, &ctx->P, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&Q1, &ctx->Q, 1)); #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - /* - * D_blind = ( P - 1 ) * ( Q - 1 ) * R + D - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, - f_rng, p_rng)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&D_blind, &P1, &Q1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&D_blind, &D_blind, &R)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&D_blind, &D_blind, &ctx->D)); - - D = &D_blind; + /* + * D_blind = ( P - 1 ) * ( Q - 1 ) * R + D + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, + f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&D_blind, &P1, &Q1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&D_blind, &D_blind, &R)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&D_blind, &D_blind, &ctx->D)); #else - /* - * DP_blind = ( P - 1 ) * R + DP - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, - f_rng, p_rng)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&DP_blind, &P1, &R)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&DP_blind, &DP_blind, - &ctx->DP)); - - DP = &DP_blind; - - /* - * DQ_blind = ( Q - 1 ) * R + DQ - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, - f_rng, p_rng)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&DQ_blind, &Q1, &R)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&DQ_blind, &DQ_blind, - &ctx->DQ)); + /* + * DP_blind = ( P - 1 ) * R + DP + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, + f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&DP_blind, &P1, &R)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&DP_blind, &DP_blind, + &ctx->DP)); - DQ = &DQ_blind; + /* + * DQ_blind = ( Q - 1 ) * R + DQ + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, + f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&DQ_blind, &Q1, &R)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&DQ_blind, &DQ_blind, + &ctx->DQ)); #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ - } #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&T, &T, D, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&T, &T, &D_blind, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN)); #else /* * Faster decryption using the CRT @@ -990,8 +1536,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * TQ = input ^ dQ mod Q */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&TP, &T, DP, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&TQ, &T, DQ, &ctx->Q, &ctx->RQ)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&TP, &T, &DP_blind, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&TQ, &T, &DQ_blind, &ctx->Q, &ctx->RQ)); /* * T = (TP - TQ) * (Q^-1 mod P) mod P @@ -1007,23 +1553,20 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&T, &TQ, &TP)); #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ - if (f_rng != NULL) { - /* - * Unblind - * T = T * Vf mod N - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->Vf)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->N)); - } - /* Verify the result to prevent glitching attacks. */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&C, &T, &ctx->E, + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&check_result_blinded, &T, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN)); - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&C, &I) != 0) { + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&check_result_blinded, &input_blinded) != 0) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; goto cleanup; } + /* + * Unblind + * T = T * Vf mod N + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(rsa_unblind(&T, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N)); + olen = ctx->len; MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&T, output, olen)); @@ -1038,14 +1581,12 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_mpi_free(&Q1); mbedtls_mpi_free(&R); - if (f_rng != NULL) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - mbedtls_mpi_free(&D_blind); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&D_blind); #else - mbedtls_mpi_free(&DP_blind); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&DQ_blind); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&DP_blind); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&DQ_blind); #endif - } mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); @@ -1053,8 +1594,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_mpi_free(&TP); mbedtls_mpi_free(&TQ); #endif - mbedtls_mpi_free(&C); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&I); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&check_result_blinded); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&input_blinded); if (ret != 0 && ret >= -0x007f) { return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED, ret); @@ -1071,22 +1612,35 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \param dlen length of destination buffer * \param src source of the mask generation * \param slen length of the source buffer - * \param md_ctx message digest context to use + * \param md_alg message digest to use */ static int mgf_mask(unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, unsigned char *src, - size_t slen, mbedtls_md_context_t *md_ctx) + size_t slen, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg) { - unsigned char mask[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char counter[4]; unsigned char *p; unsigned int hlen; size_t i, use_len; + unsigned char mask[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; int ret = 0; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; - memset(mask, 0, MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE); - memset(counter, 0, 4); + mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); - hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_ctx->md_info); + memset(mask, 0, sizeof(mask)); + memset(counter, 0, 4); /* Generate and apply dbMask */ p = dst; @@ -1097,16 +1651,16 @@ static int mgf_mask(unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, unsigned char *src, use_len = dlen; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(md_ctx)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(md_ctx, src, slen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, src, slen)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(md_ctx, counter, 4)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, counter, 4)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(md_ctx, mask)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, mask)) != 0) { goto exit; } @@ -1121,9 +1675,82 @@ static int mgf_mask(unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, unsigned char *src, exit: mbedtls_platform_zeroize(mask, sizeof(mask)); + mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); + + return ret; +} + +/** + * Generate Hash(M') as in RFC 8017 page 43 points 5 and 6. + * + * \param hash the input hash + * \param hlen length of the input hash + * \param salt the input salt + * \param slen length of the input salt + * \param out the output buffer - must be large enough for \p md_alg + * \param md_alg message digest to use + */ +static int hash_mprime(const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen, + unsigned char *out, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg) +{ + const unsigned char zeros[8] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; + + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, zeros, sizeof(zeros))) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, hash, hlen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, salt, slen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, out)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); return ret; } + +/** + * Compute a hash. + * + * \param md_alg algorithm to use + * \param input input message to hash + * \param ilen input length + * \param output the output buffer - must be large enough for \p md_alg + */ +static int compute_hash(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output) +{ + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return mbedtls_md(md_info, input, ilen, output); +} #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) @@ -1133,7 +1760,6 @@ static int mgf_mask(unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, unsigned char *src, int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, size_t ilen, const unsigned char *input, @@ -1143,31 +1769,17 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p = output; unsigned int hlen; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; - - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(label_len == 0 || label != NULL); - - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } if (f_rng == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id); - if (md_info == NULL) { + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id); + if (hlen == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } olen = ctx->len; - hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); /* first comparison checks for overflow */ if (ilen + 2 * hlen + 2 < ilen || olen < ilen + 2 * hlen + 2) { @@ -1186,7 +1798,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, p += hlen; /* Construct DB */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_md(md_info, label, label_len, p)) != 0) { + ret = compute_hash((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id, label, label_len, p); + if (ret != 0) { return ret; } p += hlen; @@ -1196,33 +1809,19 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, memcpy(p, input, ilen); } - mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - /* maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB */ if ((ret = mgf_mask(output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1, output + 1, hlen, - &md_ctx)) != 0) { - goto exit; + (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id)) != 0) { + return ret; } /* maskedSeed: Apply seedMask to seed */ if ((ret = mgf_mask(output + 1, hlen, output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1, - &md_ctx)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - -exit: - mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); - - if (ret != 0) { + (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id)) != 0) { return ret; } - return (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC) - ? mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, output, output) - : mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, output, output); + return mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, output, output); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ @@ -1232,8 +1831,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, size_t ilen, + void *p_rng, size_t ilen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) { @@ -1241,16 +1839,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p = output; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - olen = ctx->len; /* first comparison checks for overflow */ @@ -1261,33 +1849,26 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, nb_pad = olen - 3 - ilen; *p++ = 0; - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC) { - if (f_rng == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - *p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT; + if (f_rng == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - while (nb_pad-- > 0) { - int rng_dl = 100; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT; - do { - ret = f_rng(p_rng, p, 1); - } while (*p == 0 && --rng_dl && ret == 0); + while (nb_pad-- > 0) { + int rng_dl = 100; - /* Check if RNG failed to generate data */ - if (rng_dl == 0 || ret != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret); - } + do { + ret = f_rng(p_rng, p, 1); + } while (*p == 0 && --rng_dl && ret == 0); - p++; + /* Check if RNG failed to generate data */ + if (rng_dl == 0 || ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret); } - } else { - *p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN; - while (nb_pad-- > 0) { - *p++ = 0xFF; - } + p++; } *p++ = 0; @@ -1295,9 +1876,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, memcpy(p, input, ilen); } - return (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC) - ? mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, output, output) - : mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, output, output); + return mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, output, output); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ @@ -1307,26 +1886,20 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, size_t ilen, + size_t ilen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) { - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - switch (ctx->padding) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, ilen, - input, output); + return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, + ilen, input, output); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, NULL, 0, + return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, NULL, 0, ilen, input, output); #endif @@ -1342,7 +1915,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, @@ -1351,26 +1923,16 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t ilen, i, pad_len; - unsigned char *p, pad_done; - int bad; + unsigned char *p; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad, in_padding; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char lhash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned int hlen; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; - - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(label_len == 0 || label != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); /* * Parameters sanity checks */ - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { + if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -1380,13 +1942,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id); - if (md_info == NULL) { + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id); + if (hlen == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); - // checking for integer underflow if (2 * hlen + 2 > ilen) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -1395,9 +1955,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, /* * RSA operation */ - ret = (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC) - ? mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, input, buf) - : mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf); if (ret != 0) { goto cleanup; @@ -1406,26 +1964,19 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, /* * Unmask data and generate lHash */ - mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) { - mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); - goto cleanup; - } - /* seed: Apply seedMask to maskedSeed */ if ((ret = mgf_mask(buf + 1, hlen, buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1, - &md_ctx)) != 0 || + (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id)) != 0 || /* DB: Apply dbMask to maskedDB */ (ret = mgf_mask(buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1, buf + 1, hlen, - &md_ctx)) != 0) { - mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); + (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id)) != 0) { goto cleanup; } - mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); - /* Generate lHash */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_md(md_info, label, label_len, lhash)) != 0) { + ret = compute_hash((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id, + label, label_len, lhash); + if (ret != 0) { goto cleanup; } @@ -1433,27 +1984,26 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * Check contents, in "constant-time" */ p = buf; - bad = 0; - bad |= *p++; /* First byte must be 0 */ + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool(*p++); /* First byte must be 0 */ p += hlen; /* Skip seed */ /* Check lHash */ - bad |= mbedtls_ct_memcmp(lhash, p, hlen); + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_bool(mbedtls_ct_memcmp(lhash, p, hlen))); p += hlen; /* Get zero-padding len, but always read till end of buffer * (minus one, for the 01 byte) */ pad_len = 0; - pad_done = 0; + in_padding = MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE; for (i = 0; i < ilen - 2 * hlen - 2; i++) { - pad_done |= p[i]; - pad_len += ((pad_done | (unsigned char) -pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1; + in_padding = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(in_padding, mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(p[i], 0)); + pad_len += mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(in_padding, 1); } p += pad_len; - bad |= *p++ ^ 0x01; + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(*p++, 0x01)); /* * The only information "leaked" is whether the padding was correct or not @@ -1461,17 +2011,17 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * recommendations in PKCS#1 v2.2: an opponent cannot distinguish between * the different error conditions. */ - if (bad != 0) { + if (bad != MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; goto cleanup; } - if (ilen - (p - buf) > output_max_len) { + if (ilen - ((size_t) (p - buf)) > output_max_len) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE; goto cleanup; } - *olen = ilen - (p - buf); + *olen = ilen - ((size_t) (p - buf)); if (*olen != 0) { memcpy(output, p, *olen); } @@ -1492,7 +2042,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, @@ -1502,16 +2051,9 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, size_t ilen; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - ilen = ctx->len; - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15) { + if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -1519,15 +2061,13 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - ret = (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC) - ? mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, input, buf) - : mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf); if (ret != 0) { goto cleanup; } - ret = mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding(mode, buf, ilen, + ret = mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding(buf, ilen, output, output_max_len, olen); cleanup: @@ -1543,28 +2083,21 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, size_t *olen, + size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, size_t output_max_len) { - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - switch (ctx->padding) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, olen, + return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, olen, input, output, output_max_len); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, NULL, 0, + return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, NULL, 0, olen, input, output, output_max_len); #endif @@ -1575,15 +2108,14 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, } #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) -static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - unsigned int hashlen, - const unsigned char *hash, - int saltlen, - unsigned char *sig) +static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_no_mode_check(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + int saltlen, + unsigned char *sig) { size_t olen; unsigned char *p = sig; @@ -1591,17 +2123,9 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, size_t slen, min_slen, hlen, offset = 0; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t msb; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && - hashlen == 0) || - hash != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); - - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_id; + + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -1613,21 +2137,25 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { /* Gather length of hash to sign */ - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); - if (md_info == NULL) { + size_t exp_hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_alg); + if (exp_hashlen == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); + if (hashlen != exp_hashlen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } } - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id); - if (md_info == NULL) { + hash_id = (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id; + if (hash_id == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { + hash_id = md_alg; + } + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(hash_id); + if (hlen == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); - if (saltlen == MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY) { /* Calculate the largest possible salt length, up to the hash size. * Normally this is the hash length, which is the maximum salt length @@ -1665,26 +2193,10 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, p += slen; - mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - /* Generate H = Hash( M' ) */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, p, 8)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, hash, hashlen)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, salt, slen)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, p)) != 0) { - goto exit; + ret = hash_mprime(hash, hashlen, salt, slen, p, hash_id); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; } /* Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask */ @@ -1693,9 +2205,9 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, } /* maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB */ - if ((ret = mgf_mask(sig + offset, olen - hlen - 1 - offset, p, hlen, - &md_ctx)) != 0) { - goto exit; + ret = mgf_mask(sig + offset, olen - hlen - 1 - offset, p, hlen, hash_id); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; } msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N) - 1; @@ -1704,16 +2216,38 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, p += hlen; *p++ = 0xBC; -exit: - mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); + return mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig); +} - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; +static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + int saltlen, + unsigned char *sig) +{ + if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if ((ctx->hash_id == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) && (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } + return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_no_mode_check(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, hashlen, hash, saltlen, + sig); +} - return (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC) - ? mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, sig) - : mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig); +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_no_mode_check(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + unsigned char *sig) +{ + return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_no_mode_check(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, + hashlen, hash, MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, sig); } /* @@ -1729,24 +2263,22 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int saltlen, unsigned char *sig) { - return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, md_alg, + return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, hashlen, hash, saltlen, sig); } - /* * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig) { - return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, + return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, hashlen, hash, MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, sig); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ @@ -1763,14 +2295,13 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * Parameters: * - md_alg: Identifies the hash algorithm used to generate the given hash; * MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if raw data is signed. - * - hashlen: Length of hash in case hashlen is MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * - hashlen: Length of hash. Must match md_alg if that's not NONE. * - hash: Buffer containing the hashed message or the raw data. * - dst_len: Length of the encoded message. * - dst: Buffer to hold the encoded message. * * Assumptions: - * - hash has size hashlen if md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. - * - hash has size corresponding to md_alg if md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * - hash has size hashlen. * - dst points to a buffer of size at least dst_len. * */ @@ -1787,8 +2318,8 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, /* Are we signing hashed or raw data? */ if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); - if (md_info == NULL) { + unsigned char md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_alg); + if (md_size == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -1796,7 +2327,9 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); + if (hashlen != md_size) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } /* Double-check that 8 + hashlen + oid_size can be used as a * 1-byte ASN.1 length encoding and that there's no overflow. */ @@ -1893,7 +2426,6 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, @@ -1902,15 +2434,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *sig_try = NULL, *verif = NULL; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && - hashlen == 0) || - hash != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15) { + if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -1923,15 +2451,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, return ret; } - /* - * Call respective RSA primitive - */ - - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC) { - /* Skip verification on a public key operation */ - return mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, sig); - } - /* Private key operation * * In order to prevent Lenstra's attack, make the signature in a @@ -1960,10 +2479,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, memcpy(sig, sig_try, ctx->len); cleanup: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(sig_try, ctx->len); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(verif, ctx->len); - mbedtls_free(sig_try); - mbedtls_free(verif); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(sig_try, ctx->len); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(verif, ctx->len); if (ret != 0) { memset(sig, '!', ctx->len); @@ -1978,30 +2495,25 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig) { - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && - hashlen == 0) || - hash != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } switch (ctx->padding) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, - hashlen, hash, sig); + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, + md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig); #endif @@ -2015,9 +2527,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, @@ -2030,22 +2539,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, unsigned char *p; unsigned char *hash_start; unsigned char result[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - unsigned char zeros[8]; unsigned int hlen; size_t observed_salt_len, msb; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; - unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE] = { 0 }; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && - hashlen == 0) || - hash != NULL); - - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -2055,9 +2553,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - ret = (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC) - ? mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, buf) - : mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, buf); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, buf); if (ret != 0) { return ret; @@ -2071,23 +2567,21 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { /* Gather length of hash to sign */ - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); - if (md_info == NULL) { + size_t exp_hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_alg); + if (exp_hashlen == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); + if (hashlen != exp_hashlen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } } - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(mgf1_hash_id); - if (md_info == NULL) { + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(mgf1_hash_id); + if (hlen == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); - - memset(zeros, 0, 8); - /* * Note: EMSA-PSS verification is over the length of N - 1 bits */ @@ -2108,14 +2602,9 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, } hash_start = p + siglen - hlen - 1; - mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - - ret = mgf_mask(p, siglen - hlen - 1, hash_start, hlen, &md_ctx); + ret = mgf_mask(p, siglen - hlen - 1, hash_start, hlen, mgf1_hash_id); if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; + return ret; } buf[0] &= 0xFF >> (siglen * 8 - msb); @@ -2125,81 +2614,54 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, } if (*p++ != 0x01) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; - goto exit; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; } - observed_salt_len = hash_start - p; + observed_salt_len = (size_t) (hash_start - p); if (expected_salt_len != MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY && observed_salt_len != (size_t) expected_salt_len) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; - goto exit; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; } /* * Generate H = Hash( M' ) */ - ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx); + ret = hash_mprime(hash, hashlen, p, observed_salt_len, + result, mgf1_hash_id); if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, zeros, 8); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, hash, hashlen); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, p, observed_salt_len); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, result); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; + return ret; } if (memcmp(hash_start, result, hlen) != 0) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; - goto exit; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; } -exit: - mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); - - return ret; + return 0; } /* * Simplified PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, const unsigned char *sig) { mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && - hashlen == 0) || - hash != NULL); + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } mgf1_hash_id = (ctx->hash_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) ? (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id : md_alg; - return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(ctx, md_alg, hashlen, hash, - mgf1_hash_id, MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, + mgf1_hash_id, + MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, sig); } @@ -2210,9 +2672,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY function */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, @@ -2222,20 +2681,12 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, size_t sig_len; unsigned char *encoded = NULL, *encoded_expected = NULL; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && - hashlen == 0) || - hash != NULL); - - sig_len = ctx->len; - - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15) { + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } + sig_len = ctx->len; + /* * Prepare expected PKCS1 v1.5 encoding of hash. */ @@ -2255,9 +2706,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * Apply RSA primitive to get what should be PKCS1 encoded hash. */ - ret = (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC) - ? mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, encoded) - : mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, encoded); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, encoded); if (ret != 0) { goto cleanup; } @@ -2275,13 +2724,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, cleanup: if (encoded != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(encoded, sig_len); - mbedtls_free(encoded); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(encoded, sig_len); } if (encoded_expected != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(encoded_expected, sig_len); - mbedtls_free(encoded_expected); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(encoded_expected, sig_len); } return ret; @@ -2292,32 +2739,25 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * Do an RSA operation and check the message digest */ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, const unsigned char *sig) { - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && - hashlen == 0) || - hash != NULL); + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } switch (ctx->padding) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(ctx, md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(ctx, md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig); #endif @@ -2332,8 +2772,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_copy(mbedtls_rsa_context *dst, const mbedtls_rsa_context *src) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(dst != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(src != NULL); dst->len = src->len; @@ -2407,7 +2845,6 @@ void mbedtls_rsa_free(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" /* * Example RSA-1024 keypair, for test purposes @@ -2485,14 +2922,14 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test(int verbose) unsigned char rsa_plaintext[PT_LEN]; unsigned char rsa_decrypted[PT_LEN]; unsigned char rsa_ciphertext[KEY_LEN]; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) unsigned char sha1sum[20]; #endif mbedtls_mpi K; mbedtls_mpi_init(&K); - mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, 0); + mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&K, 16, RSA_N)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_import(&rsa, &K, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); @@ -2527,7 +2964,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test(int verbose) memcpy(rsa_plaintext, RSA_PT, PT_LEN); - if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(&rsa, myrand, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, + if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(&rsa, myrand, NULL, PT_LEN, rsa_plaintext, rsa_ciphertext) != 0) { if (verbose != 0) { @@ -2542,7 +2979,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test(int verbose) mbedtls_printf("passed\n PKCS#1 decryption : "); } - if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(&rsa, myrand, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(&rsa, myrand, NULL, &len, rsa_ciphertext, rsa_decrypted, sizeof(rsa_decrypted)) != 0) { if (verbose != 0) { @@ -2566,12 +3003,13 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test(int verbose) mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) if (verbose != 0) { mbedtls_printf(" PKCS#1 data sign : "); } - if (mbedtls_sha1_ret(rsa_plaintext, PT_LEN, sha1sum) != 0) { + if (mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1), + rsa_plaintext, PT_LEN, sha1sum) != 0) { if (verbose != 0) { mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); } @@ -2580,7 +3018,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test(int verbose) } if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(&rsa, myrand, NULL, - MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 0, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 20, sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext) != 0) { if (verbose != 0) { mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); @@ -2594,8 +3032,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test(int verbose) mbedtls_printf("passed\n PKCS#1 sig. verify: "); } - if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(&rsa, NULL, NULL, - MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 0, + if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(&rsa, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 20, sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext) != 0) { if (verbose != 0) { mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); @@ -2608,7 +3045,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test(int verbose) if (verbose != 0) { mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ if (verbose != 0) { mbedtls_printf("\n"); diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/rsa_internal.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/rsa_alt_helpers.c similarity index 95% rename from vendor/mbedtls/library/rsa_internal.c rename to vendor/mbedtls/library/rsa_alt_helpers.c index 41ceff06c0..5c265a9921 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/rsa_internal.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/rsa_alt_helpers.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * Helper functions for the RSA module * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later * */ @@ -24,7 +12,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" -#include "mbedtls/rsa_internal.h" +#include "rsa_alt_helpers.h" /* * Compute RSA prime factors from public and private exponents @@ -234,80 +222,33 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent(mbedtls_mpi const *P, return ret; } -/* - * Check that RSA CRT parameters are in accordance with core parameters. - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt(const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, - const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *DP, - const mbedtls_mpi *DQ, const mbedtls_mpi *QP) +int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt(const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *DP, + mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP) { int ret = 0; - - mbedtls_mpi K, L; + mbedtls_mpi K; mbedtls_mpi_init(&K); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&L); - /* Check that DP - D == 0 mod P - 1 */ + /* DP = D mod P-1 */ if (DP != NULL) { - if (P == NULL) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - goto cleanup; - } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, P, 1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&L, DP, D)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&L, &L, &K)); - - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&L, 0) != 0) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(DP, D, &K)); } - /* Check that DQ - D == 0 mod Q - 1 */ + /* DQ = D mod Q-1 */ if (DQ != NULL) { - if (Q == NULL) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - goto cleanup; - } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, Q, 1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&L, DQ, D)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&L, &L, &K)); - - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&L, 0) != 0) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(DQ, D, &K)); } - /* Check that QP * Q - 1 == 0 mod P */ + /* QP = Q^{-1} mod P */ if (QP != NULL) { - if (P == NULL || Q == NULL) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - goto cleanup; - } - - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&K, QP, Q)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, &K, 1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&K, &K, P)); - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&K, 0) != 0) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; - goto cleanup; - } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(QP, Q, P)); } cleanup: - - /* Wrap MPI error codes by RSA check failure error code */ - if (ret != 0 && - ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED && - ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA) { - ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; - } - mbedtls_mpi_free(&K); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&L); return ret; } @@ -425,33 +366,80 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_validate_params(const mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_mpi *P, return ret; } -int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt(const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, - const mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *DP, - mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP) +/* + * Check that RSA CRT parameters are in accordance with core parameters. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt(const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *DP, + const mbedtls_mpi *DQ, const mbedtls_mpi *QP) { int ret = 0; - mbedtls_mpi K; + + mbedtls_mpi K, L; mbedtls_mpi_init(&K); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&L); - /* DP = D mod P-1 */ + /* Check that DP - D == 0 mod P - 1 */ if (DP != NULL) { + if (P == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, P, 1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(DP, D, &K)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&L, DP, D)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&L, &L, &K)); + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&L, 0) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } } - /* DQ = D mod Q-1 */ + /* Check that DQ - D == 0 mod Q - 1 */ if (DQ != NULL) { + if (Q == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, Q, 1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(DQ, D, &K)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&L, DQ, D)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&L, &L, &K)); + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&L, 0) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } } - /* QP = Q^{-1} mod P */ + /* Check that QP * Q - 1 == 0 mod P */ if (QP != NULL) { - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(QP, Q, P)); + if (P == NULL || Q == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&K, QP, Q)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, &K, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&K, &K, P)); + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&K, 0) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } } cleanup: + + /* Wrap MPI error codes by RSA check failure error code */ + if (ret != 0 && + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED && + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA) { + ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + } + mbedtls_mpi_free(&K); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&L); return ret; } diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/rsa_internal.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/rsa_alt_helpers.h similarity index 90% rename from vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/rsa_internal.h rename to vendor/mbedtls/library/rsa_alt_helpers.h index 017018bca9..052b02491e 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/rsa_internal.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/rsa_alt_helpers.h @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /** - * \file rsa_internal.h + * \file rsa_alt_helpers.h * * \brief Context-independent RSA helper functions * @@ -36,30 +36,12 @@ */ /* * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT_HELPERS_H +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT_HELPERS_H -#ifndef MBEDTLS_RSA_INTERNAL_H -#define MBEDTLS_RSA_INTERNAL_H - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) -#include "mbedtls/config.h" -#else -#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" @@ -221,4 +203,4 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt(const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, } #endif -#endif /* rsa_internal.h */ +#endif /* rsa_alt_helpers.h */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/rsa_internal.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/rsa_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f79c3b7122 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/rsa_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +/** + * \file rsa_internal.h + * + * \brief Internal-only RSA public-key cryptosystem API. + * + * This file declares RSA-related functions that are to be used + * only from within the Mbed TLS library itself. + * + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_RSA_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_INTERNAL_H + +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" + +/** + * \brief Parse a PKCS#1 (ASN.1) encoded private RSA key. + * + * \param rsa The RSA context where parsed data will be stored. + * \param key The buffer that contains the key. + * \param keylen The length of the key buffer in bytes. + * + * \return 0 on success. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_xxx in case of ASN.1 parsing errors. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_xxx in case of RSA internal failures while + * parsing data. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED if validity checks on the + * provided key fail. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen); + +/** + * \brief Parse a PKCS#1 (ASN.1) encoded public RSA key. + * + * \param rsa The RSA context where parsed data will be stored. + * \param key The buffer that contains the key. + * \param keylen The length of the key buffer in bytes. + * + * \return 0 on success. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_xxx in case of ASN.1 parsing errors. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_xxx in case of RSA internal failures while + * parsing data. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED if validity checks on the + * provided key fail. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen); + +/** + * \brief Write a PKCS#1 (ASN.1) encoded private RSA key. + * + * \param rsa The RSA context which contains the data to be written. + * \param start Beginning of the buffer that will be filled with the + * private key. + * \param p End of the buffer that will be filled with the private key. + * On successful return, the referenced pointer will be + * updated in order to point to the beginning of written data. + * + * \return On success, the number of bytes written to the output buffer + * (i.e. a value > 0). + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the RSA context does not + * contain a valid key pair. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_xxx in case of failure while writing to the + * output buffer. + * + * \note The output buffer is filled backward, i.e. starting from its + * end and moving toward its start. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_write_key(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, + unsigned char **p); + +/** + * \brief Parse a PKCS#1 (ASN.1) encoded public RSA key. + * + * \param rsa The RSA context which contains the data to be written. + * \param start Beginning of the buffer that will be filled with the + * private key. + * \param p End of the buffer that will be filled with the private key. + * On successful return, the referenced pointer will be + * updated in order to point to the beginning of written data. + * + * \return On success, the number of bytes written to the output buffer + * (i.e. a value > 0). + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the RSA context does not + * contain a valid public key. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_xxx in case of failure while writing to the + * output buffer. + * + * \note The output buffer is filled backward, i.e. starting from its + * end and moving toward its start. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, + unsigned char **p); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +/** + * \brief This function is analogue to \c mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(). + * The only difference between them is that this function is more flexible + * on the parameters of \p ctx that are set with \c mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(). + * + * \note Compared to its counterpart, this function: + * - does not check the padding setting of \p ctx. + * - allows the hash_id of \p ctx to be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + * in which case it uses \p md_alg as the hash_id. + * + * \note Refer to \c mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign() for a description + * of the functioning and parameters of this function. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_no_mode_check(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + unsigned char *sig); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + +#endif /* rsa_internal.h */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/sha1.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/sha1.c index 6da641427c..dfbe481f39 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/sha1.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/sha1.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * FIPS-180-1 compliant SHA-1 implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * The SHA-1 standard was published by NIST in 1993. @@ -34,17 +22,10 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#define SHA1_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA) - -#define SHA1_VALIDATE(cond) MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT) void mbedtls_sha1_init(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx) { - SHA1_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_sha1_context)); } @@ -60,19 +41,14 @@ void mbedtls_sha1_free(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx) void mbedtls_sha1_clone(mbedtls_sha1_context *dst, const mbedtls_sha1_context *src) { - SHA1_VALIDATE(dst != NULL); - SHA1_VALIDATE(src != NULL); - *dst = *src; } /* * SHA-1 context setup */ -int mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx) +int mbedtls_sha1_starts(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx) { - SHA1_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ctx->total[0] = 0; ctx->total[1] = 0; @@ -85,13 +61,6 @@ int mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx) return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha1_starts(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx) -{ - mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret(ctx); -} -#endif - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT) int mbedtls_internal_sha1_process(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, const unsigned char data[64]) @@ -100,9 +69,6 @@ int mbedtls_internal_sha1_process(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, uint32_t temp, W[16], A, B, C, D, E; } local; - SHA1_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - SHA1_VALIDATE_RET((const unsigned char *) data != NULL); - local.W[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(data, 0); local.W[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(data, 4); local.W[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(data, 8); @@ -264,29 +230,19 @@ int mbedtls_internal_sha1_process(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha1_process(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64]) -{ - mbedtls_internal_sha1_process(ctx, data); -} -#endif #endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT */ /* * SHA-1 process buffer */ -int mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen) +int mbedtls_sha1_update(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t fill; uint32_t left; - SHA1_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - SHA1_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - if (ilen == 0) { return 0; } @@ -329,28 +285,16 @@ int mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha1_update(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen) -{ - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(ctx, input, ilen); -} -#endif - /* * SHA-1 final digest */ -int mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[20]) +int mbedtls_sha1_finish(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20]) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; uint32_t used; uint32_t high, low; - SHA1_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - SHA1_VALIDATE_RET((unsigned char *) output != NULL); - /* * Add padding: 0x80 then 0x00 until 8 bytes remain for the length */ @@ -366,7 +310,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, memset(ctx->buffer + used, 0, 64 - used); if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_sha1_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { - return ret; + goto exit; } memset(ctx->buffer, 0, 56); @@ -383,7 +327,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(low, ctx->buffer, 60); if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_sha1_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { - return ret; + goto exit; } /* @@ -395,61 +339,44 @@ int mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->state[3], output, 12); MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->state[4], output, 16); - return 0; -} + ret = 0; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha1_finish(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[20]) -{ - mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(ctx, output); +exit: + mbedtls_sha1_free(ctx); + return ret; } -#endif #endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT */ /* * output = SHA-1( input buffer ) */ -int mbedtls_sha1_ret(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[20]) +int mbedtls_sha1(const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[20]) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_sha1_context ctx; - SHA1_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - SHA1_VALIDATE_RET((unsigned char *) output != NULL); - mbedtls_sha1_init(&ctx); - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret(&ctx)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts(&ctx)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_update(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(&ctx, output)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish(&ctx, output)) != 0) { goto exit; } exit: mbedtls_sha1_free(&ctx); - return ret; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha1(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[20]) -{ - mbedtls_sha1_ret(input, ilen, output); -} -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /* * FIPS-180-1 test vectors @@ -496,7 +423,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha1_self_test(int verbose) mbedtls_printf(" SHA-1 test #%d: ", i + 1); } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret(&ctx)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts(&ctx)) != 0) { goto fail; } @@ -504,20 +431,20 @@ int mbedtls_sha1_self_test(int verbose) memset(buf, 'a', buflen = 1000); for (j = 0; j < 1000; j++) { - ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&ctx, buf, buflen); + ret = mbedtls_sha1_update(&ctx, buf, buflen); if (ret != 0) { goto fail; } } } else { - ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&ctx, sha1_test_buf[i], - sha1_test_buflen[i]); + ret = mbedtls_sha1_update(&ctx, sha1_test_buf[i], + sha1_test_buflen[i]); if (ret != 0) { goto fail; } } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(&ctx, sha1sum)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish(&ctx, sha1sum)) != 0) { goto fail; } diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/sha256.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/sha256.c index f7090396d2..87889817a4 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/sha256.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/sha256.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * FIPS-180-2 compliant SHA-256 implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * The SHA-256 Secure Hash Standard was published by NIST in 2002. @@ -22,9 +10,45 @@ * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-2.pdf */ +#if defined(__clang__) && (__clang_major__ >= 4) + +/* Ideally, we would simply use MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A in the following #if, + * but that is defined by build_info.h, and we need this block to happen first. */ +#if defined(__ARM_ARCH) && (__ARM_ARCH_PROFILE == 'A') +#if __ARM_ARCH >= 8 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A) && !defined(__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO) +/* TODO: Re-consider above after https://reviews.llvm.org/D131064 merged. + * + * The intrinsic declaration are guarded by predefined ACLE macros in clang: + * these are normally only enabled by the -march option on the command line. + * By defining the macros ourselves we gain access to those declarations without + * requiring -march on the command line. + * + * `arm_neon.h` is included by common.h, so we put these defines + * at the top of this file, before any includes. + */ +#define __ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO 1 +/* See: https://arm-software.github.io/acle/main/acle.html#cryptographic-extensions + * + * `__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO` is deprecated, but we need to continue to specify it + * for older compilers. + */ +#define __ARM_FEATURE_SHA2 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ENABLE_ARM_CRYPTO_EXTENSIONS_COMPILER_FLAG +#endif + +#endif /* defined(__clang__) && (__clang_major__ >= 4) */ + +/* Ensure that SIG_SETMASK is defined when -std=c99 is used. */ +#define _GNU_SOURCE + #include "common.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) #include "mbedtls/sha256.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" @@ -34,16 +58,168 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#define SHA256_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define SHA256_VALIDATE(cond) MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A) + +# if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY) +# if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS) +# if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +# warning "Target does not support NEON instructions" +# undef MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT +# else +# error "Target does not support NEON instructions" +# endif +# endif +# endif + +# if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY) +/* *INDENT-OFF* */ + +# if !defined(__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_ENABLE_ARM_CRYPTO_EXTENSIONS_COMPILER_FLAG) +# if defined(__ARMCOMPILER_VERSION) +# if __ARMCOMPILER_VERSION <= 6090000 +# error "Must use minimum -march=armv8-a+crypto for MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_*" +# endif +# pragma clang attribute push (__attribute__((target("sha2"))), apply_to=function) +# define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +# elif defined(__clang__) +# if __clang_major__ < 4 +# error "A more recent Clang is required for MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_*" +# endif +# pragma clang attribute push (__attribute__((target("crypto"))), apply_to=function) +# define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +# elif defined(__GNUC__) + /* FIXME: GCC 5 claims to support Armv8 Crypto Extensions, but some + * intrinsics are missing. Missing intrinsics could be worked around. + */ +# if __GNUC__ < 6 +# error "A more recent GCC is required for MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_*" +# else +# pragma GCC push_options +# pragma GCC target ("arch=armv8-a+crypto") +# define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +# endif +# else +# error "Only GCC and Clang supported for MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_*" +# endif +# endif +/* *INDENT-ON* */ + +# endif +# if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +# if defined(__unix__) +# if defined(__linux__) +/* Our preferred method of detection is getauxval() */ +# include +/* These are not always defined via sys/auxv.h */ +# if !defined(HWCAP_SHA2) +# define HWCAP_SHA2 (1 << 6) +# endif +# if !defined(HWCAP2_SHA2) +# define HWCAP2_SHA2 (1 << 3) +# endif +# endif +/* Use SIGILL on Unix, and fall back to it on Linux */ +# include +# endif +# endif +#elif !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64) +# undef MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY +# undef MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +/* + * Capability detection code comes early, so we can disable + * MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT if no detection mechanism found + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) && defined(HWCAP_SHA2) +static int mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha256_determine_support(void) +{ + return (getauxval(AT_HWCAP) & HWCAP_SHA2) ? 1 : 0; +} +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) && defined(HWCAP2_SHA2) +static int mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha256_determine_support(void) +{ + return (getauxval(AT_HWCAP2) & HWCAP2_SHA2) ? 1 : 0; +} +#elif defined(__APPLE__) +static int mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha256_determine_support(void) +{ + return 1; +} +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64) +#define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN +#include +#include + +static int mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha256_determine_support(void) +{ + return IsProcessorFeaturePresent(PF_ARM_V8_CRYPTO_INSTRUCTIONS_AVAILABLE) ? + 1 : 0; +} +#elif defined(__unix__) && defined(SIG_SETMASK) +/* Detection with SIGILL, setjmp() and longjmp() */ +#include +#include + +static jmp_buf return_from_sigill; + +/* + * Armv8-A SHA256 support detection via SIGILL + */ +static void sigill_handler(int signal) +{ + (void) signal; + longjmp(return_from_sigill, 1); +} + +static int mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha256_determine_support(void) +{ + struct sigaction old_action, new_action; + + sigset_t old_mask; + if (sigprocmask(0, NULL, &old_mask)) { + return 0; + } + + sigemptyset(&new_action.sa_mask); + new_action.sa_flags = 0; + new_action.sa_handler = sigill_handler; + + sigaction(SIGILL, &new_action, &old_action); + + static int ret = 0; + + if (setjmp(return_from_sigill) == 0) { /* First return only */ + /* If this traps, we will return a second time from setjmp() with 1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) + asm volatile ("sha256h q0, q0, v0.4s" : : : "v0"); +#else + asm volatile ("sha256h.32 q0, q0, q0" : : : "q0"); +#endif + ret = 1; + } + + sigaction(SIGILL, &old_action, NULL); + sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &old_mask, NULL); + + return ret; +} +#else +#warning "No mechanism to detect ARMV8_CRYPTO found, using C code only" +#undef MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT +#endif /* HWCAP_SHA2, __APPLE__, __unix__ && SIG_SETMASK */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT) +#define SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE 64 + void mbedtls_sha256_init(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx) { - SHA256_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_sha256_context)); } @@ -59,25 +235,33 @@ void mbedtls_sha256_free(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx) void mbedtls_sha256_clone(mbedtls_sha256_context *dst, const mbedtls_sha256_context *src) { - SHA256_VALIDATE(dst != NULL); - SHA256_VALIDATE(src != NULL); - *dst = *src; } /* * SHA-256 context setup */ -int mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224) +int mbedtls_sha256_starts(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224) { - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET(is224 == 0 || is224 == 1); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + if (is224 != 0 && is224 != 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + if (is224 != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#else /* defined MBEDTLS_SHA224_C only */ + if (is224 == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif ctx->total[0] = 0; ctx->total[1] = 0; if (is224 == 0) { - /* SHA-256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) ctx->state[0] = 0x6A09E667; ctx->state[1] = 0xBB67AE85; ctx->state[2] = 0x3C6EF372; @@ -86,8 +270,9 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224) ctx->state[5] = 0x9B05688C; ctx->state[6] = 0x1F83D9AB; ctx->state[7] = 0x5BE0CD19; +#endif } else { - /* SHA-224 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) ctx->state[0] = 0xC1059ED8; ctx->state[1] = 0x367CD507; ctx->state[2] = 0x3070DD17; @@ -96,21 +281,16 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224) ctx->state[5] = 0x68581511; ctx->state[6] = 0x64F98FA7; ctx->state[7] = 0xBEFA4FA4; +#endif } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) ctx->is224 = is224; +#endif return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha256_starts(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - int is224) -{ - mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(ctx, is224); -} -#endif - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT) static const uint32_t K[] = { @@ -132,6 +312,146 @@ static const uint32_t K[] = 0x90BEFFFA, 0xA4506CEB, 0xBEF9A3F7, 0xC67178F2, }; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY) +# define mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many_a64_crypto mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many +# define mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_a64_crypto mbedtls_internal_sha256_process +#endif + +static size_t mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many_a64_crypto( + mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, const uint8_t *msg, size_t len) +{ + uint32x4_t abcd = vld1q_u32(&ctx->state[0]); + uint32x4_t efgh = vld1q_u32(&ctx->state[4]); + + size_t processed = 0; + + for (; + len >= SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE; + processed += SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE, + msg += SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE, + len -= SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) { + uint32x4_t tmp, abcd_prev; + + uint32x4_t abcd_orig = abcd; + uint32x4_t efgh_orig = efgh; + + uint32x4_t sched0 = vreinterpretq_u32_u8(vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 0)); + uint32x4_t sched1 = vreinterpretq_u32_u8(vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 1)); + uint32x4_t sched2 = vreinterpretq_u32_u8(vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 2)); + uint32x4_t sched3 = vreinterpretq_u32_u8(vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 3)); + +#if __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__ /* Will be true if not defined */ + /* Untested on BE */ + sched0 = vreinterpretq_u32_u8(vrev32q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u32(sched0))); + sched1 = vreinterpretq_u32_u8(vrev32q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u32(sched1))); + sched2 = vreinterpretq_u32_u8(vrev32q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u32(sched2))); + sched3 = vreinterpretq_u32_u8(vrev32q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u32(sched3))); +#endif + + /* Rounds 0 to 3 */ + tmp = vaddq_u32(sched0, vld1q_u32(&K[0])); + abcd_prev = abcd; + abcd = vsha256hq_u32(abcd_prev, efgh, tmp); + efgh = vsha256h2q_u32(efgh, abcd_prev, tmp); + + /* Rounds 4 to 7 */ + tmp = vaddq_u32(sched1, vld1q_u32(&K[4])); + abcd_prev = abcd; + abcd = vsha256hq_u32(abcd_prev, efgh, tmp); + efgh = vsha256h2q_u32(efgh, abcd_prev, tmp); + + /* Rounds 8 to 11 */ + tmp = vaddq_u32(sched2, vld1q_u32(&K[8])); + abcd_prev = abcd; + abcd = vsha256hq_u32(abcd_prev, efgh, tmp); + efgh = vsha256h2q_u32(efgh, abcd_prev, tmp); + + /* Rounds 12 to 15 */ + tmp = vaddq_u32(sched3, vld1q_u32(&K[12])); + abcd_prev = abcd; + abcd = vsha256hq_u32(abcd_prev, efgh, tmp); + efgh = vsha256h2q_u32(efgh, abcd_prev, tmp); + + for (int t = 16; t < 64; t += 16) { + /* Rounds t to t + 3 */ + sched0 = vsha256su1q_u32(vsha256su0q_u32(sched0, sched1), sched2, sched3); + tmp = vaddq_u32(sched0, vld1q_u32(&K[t])); + abcd_prev = abcd; + abcd = vsha256hq_u32(abcd_prev, efgh, tmp); + efgh = vsha256h2q_u32(efgh, abcd_prev, tmp); + + /* Rounds t + 4 to t + 7 */ + sched1 = vsha256su1q_u32(vsha256su0q_u32(sched1, sched2), sched3, sched0); + tmp = vaddq_u32(sched1, vld1q_u32(&K[t + 4])); + abcd_prev = abcd; + abcd = vsha256hq_u32(abcd_prev, efgh, tmp); + efgh = vsha256h2q_u32(efgh, abcd_prev, tmp); + + /* Rounds t + 8 to t + 11 */ + sched2 = vsha256su1q_u32(vsha256su0q_u32(sched2, sched3), sched0, sched1); + tmp = vaddq_u32(sched2, vld1q_u32(&K[t + 8])); + abcd_prev = abcd; + abcd = vsha256hq_u32(abcd_prev, efgh, tmp); + efgh = vsha256h2q_u32(efgh, abcd_prev, tmp); + + /* Rounds t + 12 to t + 15 */ + sched3 = vsha256su1q_u32(vsha256su0q_u32(sched3, sched0), sched1, sched2); + tmp = vaddq_u32(sched3, vld1q_u32(&K[t + 12])); + abcd_prev = abcd; + abcd = vsha256hq_u32(abcd_prev, efgh, tmp); + efgh = vsha256h2q_u32(efgh, abcd_prev, tmp); + } + + abcd = vaddq_u32(abcd, abcd_orig); + efgh = vaddq_u32(efgh, efgh_orig); + } + + vst1q_u32(&ctx->state[0], abcd); + vst1q_u32(&ctx->state[4], efgh); + + return processed; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +/* + * This function is for internal use only if we are building both C and Armv8-A + * versions, otherwise it is renamed to be the public mbedtls_internal_sha256_process() + */ +static +#endif +int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_a64_crypto(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE]) +{ + return (mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many_a64_crypto(ctx, data, + SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) == + SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) ? 0 : -1; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT || MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA) +#if defined(__clang__) +#pragma clang attribute pop +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +#pragma GCC pop_options +#endif +#undef MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +#define mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many_c mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many +#define mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_c mbedtls_internal_sha256_process +#endif + + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY) + #define SHR(x, n) (((x) & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (n)) #define ROTR(x, n) (SHR(x, n) | ((x) << (32 - (n)))) @@ -158,8 +478,15 @@ static const uint32_t K[] = (d) += local.temp1; (h) = local.temp1 + local.temp2; \ } while (0) -int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64]) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +/* + * This function is for internal use only if we are building both C and Armv8 + * versions, otherwise it is renamed to be the public mbedtls_internal_sha256_process() + */ +static +#endif +int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_c(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE]) { struct { uint32_t temp1, temp2, W[64]; @@ -168,9 +495,6 @@ int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, unsigned int i; - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET((const unsigned char *) data != NULL); - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { local.A[i] = ctx->state[i]; } @@ -246,35 +570,88 @@ int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha256_process(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[64]) +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT && !MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY */ + + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY) + +static size_t mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many_c( + mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, const uint8_t *data, size_t len) { - mbedtls_internal_sha256_process(ctx, data); + size_t processed = 0; + + while (len >= SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) { + if (mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_c(ctx, data) != 0) { + return 0; + } + + data += SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE; + len -= SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE; + + processed += SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE; + } + + return processed; } -#endif -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT */ + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY */ + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) + +static int mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha256_has_support(void) +{ + static int done = 0; + static int supported = 0; + + if (!done) { + supported = mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha256_determine_support(); + done = 1; + } + + return supported; +} + +static size_t mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const uint8_t *msg, size_t len) +{ + if (mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha256_has_support()) { + return mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many_a64_crypto(ctx, msg, len); + } else { + return mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many_c(ctx, msg, len); + } +} + +int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE]) +{ + if (mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha256_has_support()) { + return mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_a64_crypto(ctx, data); + } else { + return mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_c(ctx, data); + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT */ + /* * SHA-256 process buffer */ -int mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen) +int mbedtls_sha256_update(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t fill; uint32_t left; - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - if (ilen == 0) { return 0; } left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; - fill = 64 - left; + fill = SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE - left; ctx->total[0] += (uint32_t) ilen; ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF; @@ -295,13 +672,15 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, left = 0; } - while (ilen >= 64) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_sha256_process(ctx, input)) != 0) { - return ret; + while (ilen >= SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) { + size_t processed = + mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many(ctx, input, ilen); + if (processed < SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; } - input += 64; - ilen -= 64; + input += processed; + ilen -= processed; } if (ilen > 0) { @@ -311,27 +690,16 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha256_update(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen) -{ - mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(ctx, input, ilen); -} -#endif - /* * SHA-256 final digest */ -int mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[32]) +int mbedtls_sha256_finish(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + unsigned char *output) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; uint32_t used; uint32_t high, low; - - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET((unsigned char *) output != NULL); + int truncated = 0; /* * Add padding: 0x80 then 0x00 until 8 bytes remain for the length @@ -345,10 +713,10 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, memset(ctx->buffer + used, 0, 56 - used); } else { /* We'll need an extra block */ - memset(ctx->buffer + used, 0, 64 - used); + memset(ctx->buffer + used, 0, SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE - used); if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_sha256_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { - return ret; + goto exit; } memset(ctx->buffer, 0, 56); @@ -365,7 +733,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(low, ctx->buffer, 60); if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_sha256_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { - return ret; + goto exit; } /* @@ -379,49 +747,58 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->state[5], output, 20); MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->state[6], output, 24); - if (ctx->is224 == 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + truncated = ctx->is224; +#endif + if (!truncated) { MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->state[7], output, 28); } - return 0; -} + ret = 0; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha256_finish(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[32]) -{ - mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret(ctx, output); +exit: + mbedtls_sha256_free(ctx); + return ret; } -#endif #endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT */ /* * output = SHA-256( input buffer ) */ -int mbedtls_sha256_ret(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[32], - int is224) +int mbedtls_sha256(const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, + int is224) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_sha256_context ctx; - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET(is224 == 0 || is224 == 1); - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - SHA256_VALIDATE_RET((unsigned char *) output != NULL); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + if (is224 != 0 && is224 != 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + if (is224 != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#else /* defined MBEDTLS_SHA224_C only */ + if (is224 == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif mbedtls_sha256_init(&ctx); - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(&ctx, is224)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts(&ctx, is224)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_update(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret(&ctx, output)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish(&ctx, output)) != 0) { goto exit; } @@ -431,37 +808,30 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_ret(const unsigned char *input, return ret; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha256(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[32], - int is224) -{ - mbedtls_sha256_ret(input, ilen, output, is224); -} -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /* * FIPS-180-2 test vectors */ -static const unsigned char sha256_test_buf[3][57] = +static const unsigned char sha_test_buf[3][57] = { { "abc" }, { "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq" }, { "" } }; -static const size_t sha256_test_buflen[3] = +static const size_t sha_test_buflen[3] = { 3, 56, 1000 }; -static const unsigned char sha256_test_sum[6][32] = +typedef const unsigned char (sha_test_sum_t)[32]; + +/* + * SHA-224 test vectors + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) +static sha_test_sum_t sha224_test_sum[] = { - /* - * SHA-224 test vectors - */ { 0x23, 0x09, 0x7D, 0x22, 0x34, 0x05, 0xD8, 0x22, 0x86, 0x42, 0xA4, 0x77, 0xBD, 0xA2, 0x55, 0xB3, 0x2A, 0xAD, 0xBC, 0xE4, 0xBD, 0xA0, 0xB3, 0xF7, @@ -473,11 +843,16 @@ static const unsigned char sha256_test_sum[6][32] = { 0x20, 0x79, 0x46, 0x55, 0x98, 0x0C, 0x91, 0xD8, 0xBB, 0xB4, 0xC1, 0xEA, 0x97, 0x61, 0x8A, 0x4B, 0xF0, 0x3F, 0x42, 0x58, 0x19, 0x48, 0xB2, 0xEE, - 0x4E, 0xE7, 0xAD, 0x67 }, + 0x4E, 0xE7, 0xAD, 0x67 } +}; +#endif - /* - * SHA-256 test vectors - */ +/* + * SHA-256 test vectors + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +static sha_test_sum_t sha256_test_sum[] = +{ { 0xBA, 0x78, 0x16, 0xBF, 0x8F, 0x01, 0xCF, 0xEA, 0x41, 0x41, 0x40, 0xDE, 0x5D, 0xAE, 0x22, 0x23, 0xB0, 0x03, 0x61, 0xA3, 0x96, 0x17, 0x7A, 0x9C, @@ -491,17 +866,26 @@ static const unsigned char sha256_test_sum[6][32] = 0xF1, 0x80, 0x9A, 0x48, 0xA4, 0x97, 0x20, 0x0E, 0x04, 0x6D, 0x39, 0xCC, 0xC7, 0x11, 0x2C, 0xD0 } }; +#endif /* * Checkup routine */ -int mbedtls_sha256_self_test(int verbose) +static int mbedtls_sha256_common_self_test(int verbose, int is224) { - int i, j, k, buflen, ret = 0; + int i, buflen, ret = 0; unsigned char *buf; unsigned char sha256sum[32]; mbedtls_sha256_context ctx; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + sha_test_sum_t *sha_test_sum = (is224) ? sha224_test_sum : sha256_test_sum; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + sha_test_sum_t *sha_test_sum = sha256_test_sum; +#else + sha_test_sum_t *sha_test_sum = sha224_test_sum; +#endif + buf = mbedtls_calloc(1024, sizeof(unsigned char)); if (NULL == buf) { if (verbose != 0) { @@ -513,42 +897,39 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_self_test(int verbose) mbedtls_sha256_init(&ctx); - for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { - j = i % 3; - k = i < 3; - + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" SHA-%d test #%d: ", 256 - k * 32, j + 1); + mbedtls_printf(" SHA-%d test #%d: ", 256 - is224 * 32, i + 1); } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(&ctx, k)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts(&ctx, is224)) != 0) { goto fail; } - if (j == 2) { + if (i == 2) { memset(buf, 'a', buflen = 1000); - for (j = 0; j < 1000; j++) { - ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(&ctx, buf, buflen); + for (int j = 0; j < 1000; j++) { + ret = mbedtls_sha256_update(&ctx, buf, buflen); if (ret != 0) { goto fail; } } } else { - ret = mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(&ctx, sha256_test_buf[j], - sha256_test_buflen[j]); + ret = mbedtls_sha256_update(&ctx, sha_test_buf[i], + sha_test_buflen[i]); if (ret != 0) { goto fail; } } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret(&ctx, sha256sum)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish(&ctx, sha256sum)) != 0) { goto fail; } - if (memcmp(sha256sum, sha256_test_sum[i], 32 - k * 4) != 0) { + if (memcmp(sha256sum, sha_test_sum[i], 32 - is224 * 4) != 0) { ret = 1; goto fail; } @@ -576,6 +957,20 @@ int mbedtls_sha256_self_test(int verbose) return ret; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +int mbedtls_sha256_self_test(int verbose) +{ + return mbedtls_sha256_common_self_test(verbose, 0); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) +int mbedtls_sha224_self_test(int verbose) +{ + return mbedtls_sha256_common_self_test(verbose, 1); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA224_C */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C || MBEDTLS_SHA224_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/sha3.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/sha3.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..57385595f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/sha3.c @@ -0,0 +1,721 @@ +/* + * FIPS-202 compliant SHA3 implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +/* + * The SHA-3 Secure Hash Standard was published by NIST in 2015. + * + * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/fips/nist.fips.202.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) + +/* + * These macros select manually unrolled implementations of parts of the main permutation function. + * + * Unrolling has a major impact on both performance and code size. gcc performance benefits a lot + * from manually unrolling at higher optimisation levels. + * + * Depending on your size/perf priorities, compiler and target, it may be beneficial to adjust + * these; the defaults here should give sensible trade-offs for gcc and clang on aarch64 and + * x86-64. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_THETA_UNROLL) + #define MBEDTLS_SHA3_THETA_UNROLL 0 //no-check-names +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_CHI_UNROLL) + #if defined(__OPTIMIZE_SIZE__) + #define MBEDTLS_SHA3_CHI_UNROLL 0 //no-check-names + #else + #define MBEDTLS_SHA3_CHI_UNROLL 1 //no-check-names + #endif +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_PI_UNROLL) + #define MBEDTLS_SHA3_PI_UNROLL 1 //no-check-names +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_RHO_UNROLL) + #define MBEDTLS_SHA3_RHO_UNROLL 1 //no-check-names +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/sha3.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#define XOR_BYTE 0x6 + +/* Precomputed masks for the iota transform. + * + * Each round uses a 64-bit mask value. In each mask values, only + * bits whose position is of the form 2^k-1 can be set, thus only + * 7 of 64 bits of the mask need to be known for each mask value. + * + * We use a compressed encoding of the mask where bits 63, 31 and 15 + * are moved to bits 4-6. This allows us to make each mask value + * 1 byte rather than 8 bytes, saving 7*24 = 168 bytes of data (with + * perhaps a little variation due to alignment). Decompressing this + * requires a little code, but much less than the savings on the table. + * + * The impact on performance depends on the platform and compiler. + * There's a bit more computation, but less memory bandwidth. A quick + * benchmark on x86_64 shows a 7% speed improvement with GCC and a + * 5% speed penalty with Clang, compared to the naive uint64_t[24] table. + * YMMV. + */ +/* Helper macro to set the values of the higher bits in unused low positions */ +#define H(b63, b31, b15) (b63 << 6 | b31 << 5 | b15 << 4) +static const uint8_t iota_r_packed[24] = { + H(0, 0, 0) | 0x01, H(0, 0, 1) | 0x82, H(1, 0, 1) | 0x8a, H(1, 1, 1) | 0x00, + H(0, 0, 1) | 0x8b, H(0, 1, 0) | 0x01, H(1, 1, 1) | 0x81, H(1, 0, 1) | 0x09, + H(0, 0, 0) | 0x8a, H(0, 0, 0) | 0x88, H(0, 1, 1) | 0x09, H(0, 1, 0) | 0x0a, + H(0, 1, 1) | 0x8b, H(1, 0, 0) | 0x8b, H(1, 0, 1) | 0x89, H(1, 0, 1) | 0x03, + H(1, 0, 1) | 0x02, H(1, 0, 0) | 0x80, H(0, 0, 1) | 0x0a, H(1, 1, 0) | 0x0a, + H(1, 1, 1) | 0x81, H(1, 0, 1) | 0x80, H(0, 1, 0) | 0x01, H(1, 1, 1) | 0x08, +}; +#undef H + +static const uint32_t rho[6] = { + 0x3f022425, 0x1c143a09, 0x2c3d3615, 0x27191713, 0x312b382e, 0x3e030832 +}; + +static const uint32_t pi[6] = { + 0x110b070a, 0x10050312, 0x04181508, 0x0d13170f, 0x0e14020c, 0x01060916 +}; + +#define ROTR64(x, y) (((x) << (64U - (y))) | ((x) >> (y))) // 64-bit rotate right +#define ABSORB(ctx, idx, v) do { ctx->state[(idx) >> 3] ^= ((uint64_t) (v)) << (((idx) & 0x7) << 3); \ +} while (0) +#define SQUEEZE(ctx, idx) ((uint8_t) (ctx->state[(idx) >> 3] >> (((idx) & 0x7) << 3))) +#define SWAP(x, y) do { uint64_t tmp = (x); (x) = (y); (y) = tmp; } while (0) + +/* The permutation function. */ +static void keccak_f1600(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx) +{ + uint64_t lane[5]; + uint64_t *s = ctx->state; + int i; + + for (int round = 0; round < 24; round++) { + uint64_t t; + + /* Theta */ +#if MBEDTLS_SHA3_THETA_UNROLL == 0 //no-check-names + for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { + lane[i] = s[i] ^ s[i + 5] ^ s[i + 10] ^ s[i + 15] ^ s[i + 20]; + } + for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { + t = lane[(i + 4) % 5] ^ ROTR64(lane[(i + 1) % 5], 63); + s[i] ^= t; s[i + 5] ^= t; s[i + 10] ^= t; s[i + 15] ^= t; s[i + 20] ^= t; + } +#else + lane[0] = s[0] ^ s[5] ^ s[10] ^ s[15] ^ s[20]; + lane[1] = s[1] ^ s[6] ^ s[11] ^ s[16] ^ s[21]; + lane[2] = s[2] ^ s[7] ^ s[12] ^ s[17] ^ s[22]; + lane[3] = s[3] ^ s[8] ^ s[13] ^ s[18] ^ s[23]; + lane[4] = s[4] ^ s[9] ^ s[14] ^ s[19] ^ s[24]; + + t = lane[4] ^ ROTR64(lane[1], 63); + s[0] ^= t; s[5] ^= t; s[10] ^= t; s[15] ^= t; s[20] ^= t; + + t = lane[0] ^ ROTR64(lane[2], 63); + s[1] ^= t; s[6] ^= t; s[11] ^= t; s[16] ^= t; s[21] ^= t; + + t = lane[1] ^ ROTR64(lane[3], 63); + s[2] ^= t; s[7] ^= t; s[12] ^= t; s[17] ^= t; s[22] ^= t; + + t = lane[2] ^ ROTR64(lane[4], 63); + s[3] ^= t; s[8] ^= t; s[13] ^= t; s[18] ^= t; s[23] ^= t; + + t = lane[3] ^ ROTR64(lane[0], 63); + s[4] ^= t; s[9] ^= t; s[14] ^= t; s[19] ^= t; s[24] ^= t; +#endif + + /* Rho */ + for (i = 1; i < 25; i += 4) { + uint32_t r = rho[(i - 1) >> 2]; +#if MBEDTLS_SHA3_RHO_UNROLL == 0 + for (int j = i; j < i + 4; j++) { + uint8_t r8 = (uint8_t) (r >> 24); + r <<= 8; + s[j] = ROTR64(s[j], r8); + } +#else + s[i + 0] = ROTR64(s[i + 0], MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(r)); + s[i + 1] = ROTR64(s[i + 1], MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(r)); + s[i + 2] = ROTR64(s[i + 2], MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(r)); + s[i + 3] = ROTR64(s[i + 3], MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(r)); +#endif + } + + /* Pi */ + t = s[1]; +#if MBEDTLS_SHA3_PI_UNROLL == 0 + for (i = 0; i < 24; i += 4) { + uint32_t p = pi[i >> 2]; + for (unsigned j = 0; j < 4; j++) { + SWAP(s[p & 0xff], t); + p >>= 8; + } + } +#else + uint32_t p = pi[0]; + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(p)], t); + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(p)], t); + p = pi[1]; + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(p)], t); + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(p)], t); + p = pi[2]; + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(p)], t); + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(p)], t); + p = pi[3]; + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(p)], t); + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(p)], t); + p = pi[4]; + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(p)], t); + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(p)], t); + p = pi[5]; + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(p)], t); + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(p)], t); +#endif + + /* Chi */ +#if MBEDTLS_SHA3_CHI_UNROLL == 0 //no-check-names + for (i = 0; i <= 20; i += 5) { + lane[0] = s[i]; lane[1] = s[i + 1]; lane[2] = s[i + 2]; + lane[3] = s[i + 3]; lane[4] = s[i + 4]; + s[i + 0] ^= (~lane[1]) & lane[2]; + s[i + 1] ^= (~lane[2]) & lane[3]; + s[i + 2] ^= (~lane[3]) & lane[4]; + s[i + 3] ^= (~lane[4]) & lane[0]; + s[i + 4] ^= (~lane[0]) & lane[1]; + } +#else + lane[0] = s[0]; lane[1] = s[1]; lane[2] = s[2]; lane[3] = s[3]; lane[4] = s[4]; + s[0] ^= (~lane[1]) & lane[2]; + s[1] ^= (~lane[2]) & lane[3]; + s[2] ^= (~lane[3]) & lane[4]; + s[3] ^= (~lane[4]) & lane[0]; + s[4] ^= (~lane[0]) & lane[1]; + + lane[0] = s[5]; lane[1] = s[6]; lane[2] = s[7]; lane[3] = s[8]; lane[4] = s[9]; + s[5] ^= (~lane[1]) & lane[2]; + s[6] ^= (~lane[2]) & lane[3]; + s[7] ^= (~lane[3]) & lane[4]; + s[8] ^= (~lane[4]) & lane[0]; + s[9] ^= (~lane[0]) & lane[1]; + + lane[0] = s[10]; lane[1] = s[11]; lane[2] = s[12]; lane[3] = s[13]; lane[4] = s[14]; + s[10] ^= (~lane[1]) & lane[2]; + s[11] ^= (~lane[2]) & lane[3]; + s[12] ^= (~lane[3]) & lane[4]; + s[13] ^= (~lane[4]) & lane[0]; + s[14] ^= (~lane[0]) & lane[1]; + + lane[0] = s[15]; lane[1] = s[16]; lane[2] = s[17]; lane[3] = s[18]; lane[4] = s[19]; + s[15] ^= (~lane[1]) & lane[2]; + s[16] ^= (~lane[2]) & lane[3]; + s[17] ^= (~lane[3]) & lane[4]; + s[18] ^= (~lane[4]) & lane[0]; + s[19] ^= (~lane[0]) & lane[1]; + + lane[0] = s[20]; lane[1] = s[21]; lane[2] = s[22]; lane[3] = s[23]; lane[4] = s[24]; + s[20] ^= (~lane[1]) & lane[2]; + s[21] ^= (~lane[2]) & lane[3]; + s[22] ^= (~lane[3]) & lane[4]; + s[23] ^= (~lane[4]) & lane[0]; + s[24] ^= (~lane[0]) & lane[1]; +#endif + + /* Iota */ + /* Decompress the round masks (see definition of rc) */ + s[0] ^= ((iota_r_packed[round] & 0x40ull) << 57 | + (iota_r_packed[round] & 0x20ull) << 26 | + (iota_r_packed[round] & 0x10ull) << 11 | + (iota_r_packed[round] & 0x8f)); + } +} + +void mbedtls_sha3_init(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_sha3_context)); +} + +void mbedtls_sha3_free(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_sha3_context)); +} + +void mbedtls_sha3_clone(mbedtls_sha3_context *dst, + const mbedtls_sha3_context *src) +{ + *dst = *src; +} + +/* + * SHA-3 context setup + */ +int mbedtls_sha3_starts(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx, mbedtls_sha3_id id) +{ + switch (id) { + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_224: + ctx->olen = 224 / 8; + ctx->max_block_size = 1152 / 8; + break; + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_256: + ctx->olen = 256 / 8; + ctx->max_block_size = 1088 / 8; + break; + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_384: + ctx->olen = 384 / 8; + ctx->max_block_size = 832 / 8; + break; + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_512: + ctx->olen = 512 / 8; + ctx->max_block_size = 576 / 8; + break; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA3_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + memset(ctx->state, 0, sizeof(ctx->state)); + ctx->index = 0; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * SHA-3 process buffer + */ +int mbedtls_sha3_update(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t ilen) +{ + if (ilen >= 8) { + // 8-byte align index + int align_bytes = 8 - (ctx->index % 8); + if (align_bytes) { + for (; align_bytes > 0; align_bytes--) { + ABSORB(ctx, ctx->index, *input++); + ilen--; + ctx->index++; + } + if ((ctx->index = ctx->index % ctx->max_block_size) == 0) { + keccak_f1600(ctx); + } + } + + // process input in 8-byte chunks + while (ilen >= 8) { + ABSORB(ctx, ctx->index, MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE(input, 0)); + input += 8; + ilen -= 8; + if ((ctx->index = (ctx->index + 8) % ctx->max_block_size) == 0) { + keccak_f1600(ctx); + } + } + } + + // handle remaining bytes + while (ilen-- > 0) { + ABSORB(ctx, ctx->index, *input++); + if ((ctx->index = (ctx->index + 1) % ctx->max_block_size) == 0) { + keccak_f1600(ctx); + } + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_sha3_finish(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx, + uint8_t *output, size_t olen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Catch SHA-3 families, with fixed output length */ + if (ctx->olen > 0) { + if (ctx->olen > olen) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA3_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto exit; + } + olen = ctx->olen; + } + + ABSORB(ctx, ctx->index, XOR_BYTE); + ABSORB(ctx, ctx->max_block_size - 1, 0x80); + keccak_f1600(ctx); + ctx->index = 0; + + while (olen-- > 0) { + *output++ = SQUEEZE(ctx, ctx->index); + + if ((ctx->index = (ctx->index + 1) % ctx->max_block_size) == 0) { + keccak_f1600(ctx); + } + } + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_sha3_free(ctx); + return ret; +} + +/* + * output = SHA-3( input buffer ) + */ +int mbedtls_sha3(mbedtls_sha3_id id, const uint8_t *input, + size_t ilen, uint8_t *output, size_t olen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_sha3_context ctx; + + mbedtls_sha3_init(&ctx); + + /* Sanity checks are performed in every mbedtls_sha3_xxx() */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha3_starts(&ctx, id)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha3_update(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha3_finish(&ctx, output, olen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_sha3_free(&ctx); + + return ret; +} + +/**************** Self-tests ****************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +static const unsigned char test_data[2][4] = +{ + "", + "abc", +}; + +static const size_t test_data_len[2] = +{ + 0, /* "" */ + 3 /* "abc" */ +}; + +static const unsigned char test_hash_sha3_224[2][28] = +{ + { /* "" */ + 0x6B, 0x4E, 0x03, 0x42, 0x36, 0x67, 0xDB, 0xB7, + 0x3B, 0x6E, 0x15, 0x45, 0x4F, 0x0E, 0xB1, 0xAB, + 0xD4, 0x59, 0x7F, 0x9A, 0x1B, 0x07, 0x8E, 0x3F, + 0x5B, 0x5A, 0x6B, 0xC7 + }, + { /* "abc" */ + 0xE6, 0x42, 0x82, 0x4C, 0x3F, 0x8C, 0xF2, 0x4A, + 0xD0, 0x92, 0x34, 0xEE, 0x7D, 0x3C, 0x76, 0x6F, + 0xC9, 0xA3, 0xA5, 0x16, 0x8D, 0x0C, 0x94, 0xAD, + 0x73, 0xB4, 0x6F, 0xDF + } +}; + +static const unsigned char test_hash_sha3_256[2][32] = +{ + { /* "" */ + 0xA7, 0xFF, 0xC6, 0xF8, 0xBF, 0x1E, 0xD7, 0x66, + 0x51, 0xC1, 0x47, 0x56, 0xA0, 0x61, 0xD6, 0x62, + 0xF5, 0x80, 0xFF, 0x4D, 0xE4, 0x3B, 0x49, 0xFA, + 0x82, 0xD8, 0x0A, 0x4B, 0x80, 0xF8, 0x43, 0x4A + }, + { /* "abc" */ + 0x3A, 0x98, 0x5D, 0xA7, 0x4F, 0xE2, 0x25, 0xB2, + 0x04, 0x5C, 0x17, 0x2D, 0x6B, 0xD3, 0x90, 0xBD, + 0x85, 0x5F, 0x08, 0x6E, 0x3E, 0x9D, 0x52, 0x5B, + 0x46, 0xBF, 0xE2, 0x45, 0x11, 0x43, 0x15, 0x32 + } +}; + +static const unsigned char test_hash_sha3_384[2][48] = +{ + { /* "" */ + 0x0C, 0x63, 0xA7, 0x5B, 0x84, 0x5E, 0x4F, 0x7D, + 0x01, 0x10, 0x7D, 0x85, 0x2E, 0x4C, 0x24, 0x85, + 0xC5, 0x1A, 0x50, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0x94, 0xFC, 0x61, + 0x99, 0x5E, 0x71, 0xBB, 0xEE, 0x98, 0x3A, 0x2A, + 0xC3, 0x71, 0x38, 0x31, 0x26, 0x4A, 0xDB, 0x47, + 0xFB, 0x6B, 0xD1, 0xE0, 0x58, 0xD5, 0xF0, 0x04 + }, + { /* "abc" */ + 0xEC, 0x01, 0x49, 0x82, 0x88, 0x51, 0x6F, 0xC9, + 0x26, 0x45, 0x9F, 0x58, 0xE2, 0xC6, 0xAD, 0x8D, + 0xF9, 0xB4, 0x73, 0xCB, 0x0F, 0xC0, 0x8C, 0x25, + 0x96, 0xDA, 0x7C, 0xF0, 0xE4, 0x9B, 0xE4, 0xB2, + 0x98, 0xD8, 0x8C, 0xEA, 0x92, 0x7A, 0xC7, 0xF5, + 0x39, 0xF1, 0xED, 0xF2, 0x28, 0x37, 0x6D, 0x25 + } +}; + +static const unsigned char test_hash_sha3_512[2][64] = +{ + { /* "" */ + 0xA6, 0x9F, 0x73, 0xCC, 0xA2, 0x3A, 0x9A, 0xC5, + 0xC8, 0xB5, 0x67, 0xDC, 0x18, 0x5A, 0x75, 0x6E, + 0x97, 0xC9, 0x82, 0x16, 0x4F, 0xE2, 0x58, 0x59, + 0xE0, 0xD1, 0xDC, 0xC1, 0x47, 0x5C, 0x80, 0xA6, + 0x15, 0xB2, 0x12, 0x3A, 0xF1, 0xF5, 0xF9, 0x4C, + 0x11, 0xE3, 0xE9, 0x40, 0x2C, 0x3A, 0xC5, 0x58, + 0xF5, 0x00, 0x19, 0x9D, 0x95, 0xB6, 0xD3, 0xE3, + 0x01, 0x75, 0x85, 0x86, 0x28, 0x1D, 0xCD, 0x26 + }, + { /* "abc" */ + 0xB7, 0x51, 0x85, 0x0B, 0x1A, 0x57, 0x16, 0x8A, + 0x56, 0x93, 0xCD, 0x92, 0x4B, 0x6B, 0x09, 0x6E, + 0x08, 0xF6, 0x21, 0x82, 0x74, 0x44, 0xF7, 0x0D, + 0x88, 0x4F, 0x5D, 0x02, 0x40, 0xD2, 0x71, 0x2E, + 0x10, 0xE1, 0x16, 0xE9, 0x19, 0x2A, 0xF3, 0xC9, + 0x1A, 0x7E, 0xC5, 0x76, 0x47, 0xE3, 0x93, 0x40, + 0x57, 0x34, 0x0B, 0x4C, 0xF4, 0x08, 0xD5, 0xA5, + 0x65, 0x92, 0xF8, 0x27, 0x4E, 0xEC, 0x53, 0xF0 + } +}; + +static const unsigned char long_kat_hash_sha3_224[28] = +{ + 0xD6, 0x93, 0x35, 0xB9, 0x33, 0x25, 0x19, 0x2E, + 0x51, 0x6A, 0x91, 0x2E, 0x6D, 0x19, 0xA1, 0x5C, + 0xB5, 0x1C, 0x6E, 0xD5, 0xC1, 0x52, 0x43, 0xE7, + 0xA7, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x3C +}; + +static const unsigned char long_kat_hash_sha3_256[32] = +{ + 0x5C, 0x88, 0x75, 0xAE, 0x47, 0x4A, 0x36, 0x34, + 0xBA, 0x4F, 0xD5, 0x5E, 0xC8, 0x5B, 0xFF, 0xD6, + 0x61, 0xF3, 0x2A, 0xCA, 0x75, 0xC6, 0xD6, 0x99, + 0xD0, 0xCD, 0xCB, 0x6C, 0x11, 0x58, 0x91, 0xC1 +}; + +static const unsigned char long_kat_hash_sha3_384[48] = +{ + 0xEE, 0xE9, 0xE2, 0x4D, 0x78, 0xC1, 0x85, 0x53, + 0x37, 0x98, 0x34, 0x51, 0xDF, 0x97, 0xC8, 0xAD, + 0x9E, 0xED, 0xF2, 0x56, 0xC6, 0x33, 0x4F, 0x8E, + 0x94, 0x8D, 0x25, 0x2D, 0x5E, 0x0E, 0x76, 0x84, + 0x7A, 0xA0, 0x77, 0x4D, 0xDB, 0x90, 0xA8, 0x42, + 0x19, 0x0D, 0x2C, 0x55, 0x8B, 0x4B, 0x83, 0x40 +}; + +static const unsigned char long_kat_hash_sha3_512[64] = +{ + 0x3C, 0x3A, 0x87, 0x6D, 0xA1, 0x40, 0x34, 0xAB, + 0x60, 0x62, 0x7C, 0x07, 0x7B, 0xB9, 0x8F, 0x7E, + 0x12, 0x0A, 0x2A, 0x53, 0x70, 0x21, 0x2D, 0xFF, + 0xB3, 0x38, 0x5A, 0x18, 0xD4, 0xF3, 0x88, 0x59, + 0xED, 0x31, 0x1D, 0x0A, 0x9D, 0x51, 0x41, 0xCE, + 0x9C, 0xC5, 0xC6, 0x6E, 0xE6, 0x89, 0xB2, 0x66, + 0xA8, 0xAA, 0x18, 0xAC, 0xE8, 0x28, 0x2A, 0x0E, + 0x0D, 0xB5, 0x96, 0xC9, 0x0B, 0x0A, 0x7B, 0x87 +}; + +static int mbedtls_sha3_kat_test(int verbose, + const char *type_name, + mbedtls_sha3_id id, + int test_num) +{ + uint8_t hash[64]; + int result; + + result = mbedtls_sha3(id, + test_data[test_num], test_data_len[test_num], + hash, sizeof(hash)); + if (result != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" %s test %d error code: %d\n", + type_name, test_num, result); + } + + return result; + } + + switch (id) { + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_224: + result = memcmp(hash, test_hash_sha3_224[test_num], 28); + break; + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_256: + result = memcmp(hash, test_hash_sha3_256[test_num], 32); + break; + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_384: + result = memcmp(hash, test_hash_sha3_384[test_num], 48); + break; + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_512: + result = memcmp(hash, test_hash_sha3_512[test_num], 64); + break; + default: + break; + } + + if (0 != result) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" %s test %d failed\n", type_name, test_num); + } + + return -1; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" %s test %d passed\n", type_name, test_num); + } + + return 0; +} + +static int mbedtls_sha3_long_kat_test(int verbose, + const char *type_name, + mbedtls_sha3_id id) +{ + mbedtls_sha3_context ctx; + unsigned char buffer[1000]; + unsigned char hash[64]; + int result = 0; + + memset(buffer, 'a', 1000); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" %s long KAT test ", type_name); + } + + mbedtls_sha3_init(&ctx); + + result = mbedtls_sha3_starts(&ctx, id); + if (result != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("setup failed\n "); + } + } + + /* Process 1,000,000 (one million) 'a' characters */ + for (int i = 0; i < 1000; i++) { + result = mbedtls_sha3_update(&ctx, buffer, 1000); + if (result != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("update error code: %i\n", result); + } + + goto cleanup; + } + } + + result = mbedtls_sha3_finish(&ctx, hash, sizeof(hash)); + if (result != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("finish error code: %d\n", result); + } + + goto cleanup; + } + + switch (id) { + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_224: + result = memcmp(hash, long_kat_hash_sha3_224, 28); + break; + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_256: + result = memcmp(hash, long_kat_hash_sha3_256, 32); + break; + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_384: + result = memcmp(hash, long_kat_hash_sha3_384, 48); + break; + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_512: + result = memcmp(hash, long_kat_hash_sha3_512, 64); + break; + default: + break; + } + + if (result != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_sha3_free(&ctx); + return result; +} + +int mbedtls_sha3_self_test(int verbose) +{ + int i; + + /* SHA-3 Known Answer Tests (KAT) */ + for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { + if (0 != mbedtls_sha3_kat_test(verbose, + "SHA3-224", MBEDTLS_SHA3_224, i)) { + return 1; + } + + if (0 != mbedtls_sha3_kat_test(verbose, + "SHA3-256", MBEDTLS_SHA3_256, i)) { + return 1; + } + + if (0 != mbedtls_sha3_kat_test(verbose, + "SHA3-384", MBEDTLS_SHA3_384, i)) { + return 1; + } + + if (0 != mbedtls_sha3_kat_test(verbose, + "SHA3-512", MBEDTLS_SHA3_512, i)) { + return 1; + } + } + + /* SHA-3 long KAT tests */ + if (0 != mbedtls_sha3_long_kat_test(verbose, + "SHA3-224", MBEDTLS_SHA3_224)) { + return 1; + } + + if (0 != mbedtls_sha3_long_kat_test(verbose, + "SHA3-256", MBEDTLS_SHA3_256)) { + return 1; + } + + if (0 != mbedtls_sha3_long_kat_test(verbose, + "SHA3-384", MBEDTLS_SHA3_384)) { + return 1; + } + + if (0 != mbedtls_sha3_long_kat_test(verbose, + "SHA3-512", MBEDTLS_SHA3_512)) { + return 1; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA3_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/sha512.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/sha512.c index f6b7c1fbf1..6dcea8da5d 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/sha512.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/sha512.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * FIPS-180-2 compliant SHA-384/512 implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * The SHA-512 Secure Hash Standard was published by NIST in 2002. @@ -22,9 +10,25 @@ * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-2.pdf */ +#if defined(__aarch64__) && !defined(__ARM_FEATURE_SHA512) && \ + defined(__clang__) && __clang_major__ >= 7 +/* TODO: Re-consider above after https://reviews.llvm.org/D131064 merged. + * + * The intrinsic declaration are guarded by predefined ACLE macros in clang: + * these are normally only enabled by the -march option on the command line. + * By defining the macros ourselves we gain access to those declarations without + * requiring -march on the command line. + * + * `arm_neon.h` is included by common.h, so we put these defines + * at the top of this file, before any includes. + */ +#define __ARM_FEATURE_SHA512 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ENABLE_ARM_SHA3_EXTENSIONS_COMPILER_FLAG +#endif + #include "common.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) #include "mbedtls/sha512.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" @@ -40,12 +44,171 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#define SHA512_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define SHA512_VALIDATE(cond) MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) +#if defined(__aarch64__) +# if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) +/* *INDENT-OFF* */ +# if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS) +# error "Target does not support NEON instructions" +# endif +/* + * Best performance comes from most recent compilers, with intrinsics and -O3. + * Must compile with -march=armv8.2-a+sha3, but we can't detect armv8.2-a, and + * can't always detect __ARM_FEATURE_SHA512 (notably clang 7-12). + * + * GCC < 8 won't work at all (lacks the sha512 instructions) + * GCC >= 8 uses intrinsics, sets __ARM_FEATURE_SHA512 + * + * Clang < 7 won't work at all (lacks the sha512 instructions) + * Clang 7-12 don't have intrinsics (but we work around that with inline + * assembler) or __ARM_FEATURE_SHA512 + * Clang == 13.0.0 same as clang 12 (only seen on macOS) + * Clang >= 13.0.1 has __ARM_FEATURE_SHA512 and intrinsics + */ +# if !defined(__ARM_FEATURE_SHA512) || defined(MBEDTLS_ENABLE_ARM_SHA3_EXTENSIONS_COMPILER_FLAG) + /* Test Clang first, as it defines __GNUC__ */ +# if defined(__ARMCOMPILER_VERSION) +# if __ARMCOMPILER_VERSION < 6090000 +# error "A more recent armclang is required for MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_*" +# elif __ARMCOMPILER_VERSION == 6090000 +# error "Must use minimum -march=armv8.2-a+sha3 for MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_*" +# else +# pragma clang attribute push (__attribute__((target("sha3"))), apply_to=function) +# define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +# endif +# elif defined(__clang__) +# if __clang_major__ < 7 +# error "A more recent Clang is required for MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_*" +# else +# pragma clang attribute push (__attribute__((target("sha3"))), apply_to=function) +# define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +# endif +# elif defined(__GNUC__) +# if __GNUC__ < 8 +# error "A more recent GCC is required for MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_*" +# else +# pragma GCC push_options +# pragma GCC target ("arch=armv8.2-a+sha3") +# define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +# endif +# else +# error "Only GCC and Clang supported for MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_*" +# endif +# endif +/* *INDENT-ON* */ +# endif +# if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +# if defined(__unix__) +# if defined(__linux__) +/* Our preferred method of detection is getauxval() */ +# include +# if !defined(HWCAP_SHA512) +/* The same header that declares getauxval() should provide the HWCAP_xxx + * constants to analyze its return value. However, the libc may be too + * old to have the constant that we need. So if it's missing, assume that + * the value is the same one used by the Linux kernel ABI. + */ +# define HWCAP_SHA512 (1 << 21) +# endif +# endif +/* Use SIGILL on Unix, and fall back to it on Linux */ +# include +# endif +# endif +#elif !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64) +# undef MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY +# undef MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +/* + * Capability detection code comes early, so we can disable + * MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT if no detection mechanism found + */ +#if defined(HWCAP_SHA512) +static int mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha512_determine_support(void) +{ + return (getauxval(AT_HWCAP) & HWCAP_SHA512) ? 1 : 0; +} +#elif defined(__APPLE__) +#include +#include + +static int mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha512_determine_support(void) +{ + int value = 0; + size_t value_len = sizeof(value); + + int ret = sysctlbyname("hw.optional.armv8_2_sha512", &value, &value_len, + NULL, 0); + return ret == 0 && value != 0; +} +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64) +/* + * As of March 2022, there don't appear to be any PF_ARM_V8_* flags + * available to pass to IsProcessorFeaturePresent() to check for + * SHA-512 support. So we fall back to the C code only. + */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma message "No mechanism to detect A64_CRYPTO found, using C code only" +#else +#warning "No mechanism to detect A64_CRYPTO found, using C code only" +#endif +#elif defined(__unix__) && defined(SIG_SETMASK) +/* Detection with SIGILL, setjmp() and longjmp() */ +#include +#include + +static jmp_buf return_from_sigill; + +/* + * A64 SHA512 support detection via SIGILL + */ +static void sigill_handler(int signal) +{ + (void) signal; + longjmp(return_from_sigill, 1); +} + +static int mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha512_determine_support(void) +{ + struct sigaction old_action, new_action; + + sigset_t old_mask; + if (sigprocmask(0, NULL, &old_mask)) { + return 0; + } + + sigemptyset(&new_action.sa_mask); + new_action.sa_flags = 0; + new_action.sa_handler = sigill_handler; + + sigaction(SIGILL, &new_action, &old_action); + + static int ret = 0; + + if (setjmp(return_from_sigill) == 0) { /* First return only */ + /* If this traps, we will return a second time from setjmp() with 1 */ + asm ("sha512h q0, q0, v0.2d" : : : "v0"); + ret = 1; + } + + sigaction(SIGILL, &old_action, NULL); + sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &old_mask, NULL); + + return ret; +} +#else +#warning "No mechanism to detect A64_CRYPTO found, using C code only" +#undef MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT +#endif /* HWCAP_SHA512, __APPLE__, __unix__ && SIG_SETMASK */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT) +#define SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE 128 + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER) static void sha512_put_uint64_be(uint64_t n, unsigned char *b, uint8_t i) { @@ -57,8 +220,6 @@ static void sha512_put_uint64_be(uint64_t n, unsigned char *b, uint8_t i) void mbedtls_sha512_init(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx) { - SHA512_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_sha512_context)); } @@ -74,29 +235,33 @@ void mbedtls_sha512_free(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx) void mbedtls_sha512_clone(mbedtls_sha512_context *dst, const mbedtls_sha512_context *src) { - SHA512_VALIDATE(dst != NULL); - SHA512_VALIDATE(src != NULL); - *dst = *src; } /* * SHA-512 context setup */ -int mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384) +int mbedtls_sha512_starts(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384) { - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET(is384 == 0 || is384 == 1); -#else - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET(is384 == 0); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + if (is384 != 0 && is384 != 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + if (is384 != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#else /* defined MBEDTLS_SHA384_C only */ + if (is384 == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } #endif ctx->total[0] = 0; ctx->total[1] = 0; if (is384 == 0) { - /* SHA-512 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) ctx->state[0] = UL64(0x6A09E667F3BCC908); ctx->state[1] = UL64(0xBB67AE8584CAA73B); ctx->state[2] = UL64(0x3C6EF372FE94F82B); @@ -105,11 +270,9 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384) ctx->state[5] = UL64(0x9B05688C2B3E6C1F); ctx->state[6] = UL64(0x1F83D9ABFB41BD6B); ctx->state[7] = UL64(0x5BE0CD19137E2179); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ } else { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA; -#else - /* SHA-384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) ctx->state[0] = UL64(0xCBBB9D5DC1059ED8); ctx->state[1] = UL64(0x629A292A367CD507); ctx->state[2] = UL64(0x9159015A3070DD17); @@ -118,24 +281,16 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384) ctx->state[5] = UL64(0x8EB44A8768581511); ctx->state[6] = UL64(0xDB0C2E0D64F98FA7); ctx->state[7] = UL64(0x47B5481DBEFA4FA4); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) ctx->is384 = is384; #endif return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha512_starts(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - int is384) -{ - mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(ctx, is384); -} -#endif - #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT) /* @@ -184,9 +339,267 @@ static const uint64_t K[80] = UL64(0x4CC5D4BECB3E42B6), UL64(0x597F299CFC657E2A), UL64(0x5FCB6FAB3AD6FAEC), UL64(0x6C44198C4A475817) }; +#endif -int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[128]) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) +# define mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many_a64_crypto mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many +# define mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_a64_crypto mbedtls_internal_sha512_process +#endif + +/* Accelerated SHA-512 implementation originally written by Simon Tatham for PuTTY, + * under the MIT licence; dual-licensed as Apache 2 with his kind permission. + */ + +#if defined(__clang__) && \ + (__clang_major__ < 13 || \ + (__clang_major__ == 13 && __clang_minor__ == 0 && __clang_patchlevel__ == 0)) +static inline uint64x2_t vsha512su0q_u64(uint64x2_t x, uint64x2_t y) +{ + asm ("sha512su0 %0.2D,%1.2D" : "+w" (x) : "w" (y)); + return x; +} +static inline uint64x2_t vsha512su1q_u64(uint64x2_t x, uint64x2_t y, uint64x2_t z) +{ + asm ("sha512su1 %0.2D,%1.2D,%2.2D" : "+w" (x) : "w" (y), "w" (z)); + return x; +} +static inline uint64x2_t vsha512hq_u64(uint64x2_t x, uint64x2_t y, uint64x2_t z) +{ + asm ("sha512h %0,%1,%2.2D" : "+w" (x) : "w" (y), "w" (z)); + return x; +} +static inline uint64x2_t vsha512h2q_u64(uint64x2_t x, uint64x2_t y, uint64x2_t z) +{ + asm ("sha512h2 %0,%1,%2.2D" : "+w" (x) : "w" (y), "w" (z)); + return x; +} +#endif /* __clang__ etc */ + +static size_t mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many_a64_crypto( + mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, const uint8_t *msg, size_t len) +{ + uint64x2_t ab = vld1q_u64(&ctx->state[0]); + uint64x2_t cd = vld1q_u64(&ctx->state[2]); + uint64x2_t ef = vld1q_u64(&ctx->state[4]); + uint64x2_t gh = vld1q_u64(&ctx->state[6]); + + size_t processed = 0; + + for (; + len >= SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE; + processed += SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE, + msg += SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE, + len -= SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE) { + uint64x2_t initial_sum, sum, intermed; + + uint64x2_t ab_orig = ab; + uint64x2_t cd_orig = cd; + uint64x2_t ef_orig = ef; + uint64x2_t gh_orig = gh; + + uint64x2_t s0 = (uint64x2_t) vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 0); + uint64x2_t s1 = (uint64x2_t) vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 1); + uint64x2_t s2 = (uint64x2_t) vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 2); + uint64x2_t s3 = (uint64x2_t) vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 3); + uint64x2_t s4 = (uint64x2_t) vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 4); + uint64x2_t s5 = (uint64x2_t) vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 5); + uint64x2_t s6 = (uint64x2_t) vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 6); + uint64x2_t s7 = (uint64x2_t) vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 7); + +#if __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__ /* assume LE if these not defined; untested on BE */ + s0 = vreinterpretq_u64_u8(vrev64q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u64(s0))); + s1 = vreinterpretq_u64_u8(vrev64q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u64(s1))); + s2 = vreinterpretq_u64_u8(vrev64q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u64(s2))); + s3 = vreinterpretq_u64_u8(vrev64q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u64(s3))); + s4 = vreinterpretq_u64_u8(vrev64q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u64(s4))); + s5 = vreinterpretq_u64_u8(vrev64q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u64(s5))); + s6 = vreinterpretq_u64_u8(vrev64q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u64(s6))); + s7 = vreinterpretq_u64_u8(vrev64q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u64(s7))); +#endif + + /* Rounds 0 and 1 */ + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s0, vld1q_u64(&K[0])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), gh); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(ef, gh, 1), vextq_u64(cd, ef, 1)); + gh = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, cd, ab); + cd = vaddq_u64(cd, intermed); + + /* Rounds 2 and 3 */ + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s1, vld1q_u64(&K[2])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), ef); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(cd, ef, 1), vextq_u64(ab, cd, 1)); + ef = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, ab, gh); + ab = vaddq_u64(ab, intermed); + + /* Rounds 4 and 5 */ + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s2, vld1q_u64(&K[4])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), cd); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(ab, cd, 1), vextq_u64(gh, ab, 1)); + cd = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, gh, ef); + gh = vaddq_u64(gh, intermed); + + /* Rounds 6 and 7 */ + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s3, vld1q_u64(&K[6])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), ab); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(gh, ab, 1), vextq_u64(ef, gh, 1)); + ab = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, ef, cd); + ef = vaddq_u64(ef, intermed); + + /* Rounds 8 and 9 */ + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s4, vld1q_u64(&K[8])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), gh); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(ef, gh, 1), vextq_u64(cd, ef, 1)); + gh = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, cd, ab); + cd = vaddq_u64(cd, intermed); + + /* Rounds 10 and 11 */ + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s5, vld1q_u64(&K[10])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), ef); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(cd, ef, 1), vextq_u64(ab, cd, 1)); + ef = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, ab, gh); + ab = vaddq_u64(ab, intermed); + + /* Rounds 12 and 13 */ + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s6, vld1q_u64(&K[12])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), cd); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(ab, cd, 1), vextq_u64(gh, ab, 1)); + cd = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, gh, ef); + gh = vaddq_u64(gh, intermed); + + /* Rounds 14 and 15 */ + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s7, vld1q_u64(&K[14])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), ab); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(gh, ab, 1), vextq_u64(ef, gh, 1)); + ab = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, ef, cd); + ef = vaddq_u64(ef, intermed); + + for (unsigned int t = 16; t < 80; t += 16) { + /* Rounds t and t + 1 */ + s0 = vsha512su1q_u64(vsha512su0q_u64(s0, s1), s7, vextq_u64(s4, s5, 1)); + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s0, vld1q_u64(&K[t])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), gh); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(ef, gh, 1), vextq_u64(cd, ef, 1)); + gh = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, cd, ab); + cd = vaddq_u64(cd, intermed); + + /* Rounds t + 2 and t + 3 */ + s1 = vsha512su1q_u64(vsha512su0q_u64(s1, s2), s0, vextq_u64(s5, s6, 1)); + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s1, vld1q_u64(&K[t + 2])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), ef); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(cd, ef, 1), vextq_u64(ab, cd, 1)); + ef = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, ab, gh); + ab = vaddq_u64(ab, intermed); + + /* Rounds t + 4 and t + 5 */ + s2 = vsha512su1q_u64(vsha512su0q_u64(s2, s3), s1, vextq_u64(s6, s7, 1)); + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s2, vld1q_u64(&K[t + 4])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), cd); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(ab, cd, 1), vextq_u64(gh, ab, 1)); + cd = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, gh, ef); + gh = vaddq_u64(gh, intermed); + + /* Rounds t + 6 and t + 7 */ + s3 = vsha512su1q_u64(vsha512su0q_u64(s3, s4), s2, vextq_u64(s7, s0, 1)); + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s3, vld1q_u64(&K[t + 6])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), ab); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(gh, ab, 1), vextq_u64(ef, gh, 1)); + ab = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, ef, cd); + ef = vaddq_u64(ef, intermed); + + /* Rounds t + 8 and t + 9 */ + s4 = vsha512su1q_u64(vsha512su0q_u64(s4, s5), s3, vextq_u64(s0, s1, 1)); + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s4, vld1q_u64(&K[t + 8])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), gh); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(ef, gh, 1), vextq_u64(cd, ef, 1)); + gh = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, cd, ab); + cd = vaddq_u64(cd, intermed); + + /* Rounds t + 10 and t + 11 */ + s5 = vsha512su1q_u64(vsha512su0q_u64(s5, s6), s4, vextq_u64(s1, s2, 1)); + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s5, vld1q_u64(&K[t + 10])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), ef); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(cd, ef, 1), vextq_u64(ab, cd, 1)); + ef = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, ab, gh); + ab = vaddq_u64(ab, intermed); + + /* Rounds t + 12 and t + 13 */ + s6 = vsha512su1q_u64(vsha512su0q_u64(s6, s7), s5, vextq_u64(s2, s3, 1)); + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s6, vld1q_u64(&K[t + 12])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), cd); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(ab, cd, 1), vextq_u64(gh, ab, 1)); + cd = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, gh, ef); + gh = vaddq_u64(gh, intermed); + + /* Rounds t + 14 and t + 15 */ + s7 = vsha512su1q_u64(vsha512su0q_u64(s7, s0), s6, vextq_u64(s3, s4, 1)); + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s7, vld1q_u64(&K[t + 14])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), ab); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(gh, ab, 1), vextq_u64(ef, gh, 1)); + ab = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, ef, cd); + ef = vaddq_u64(ef, intermed); + } + + ab = vaddq_u64(ab, ab_orig); + cd = vaddq_u64(cd, cd_orig); + ef = vaddq_u64(ef, ef_orig); + gh = vaddq_u64(gh, gh_orig); + } + + vst1q_u64(&ctx->state[0], ab); + vst1q_u64(&ctx->state[2], cd); + vst1q_u64(&ctx->state[4], ef); + vst1q_u64(&ctx->state[6], gh); + + return processed; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +/* + * This function is for internal use only if we are building both C and A64 + * versions, otherwise it is renamed to be the public mbedtls_internal_sha512_process() + */ +static +#endif +int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_a64_crypto(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE]) +{ + return (mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many_a64_crypto(ctx, data, + SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE) == + SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE) ? 0 : -1; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT || MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA) +#if defined(__clang__) +#pragma clang attribute pop +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +#pragma GCC pop_options +#endif +#undef MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +#endif + + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +#define mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many_c mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many +#define mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_c mbedtls_internal_sha512_process +#endif + + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +/* + * This function is for internal use only if we are building both C and A64 + * versions, otherwise it is renamed to be the public mbedtls_internal_sha512_process() + */ +static +#endif +int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_c(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE]) { int i; struct { @@ -194,9 +607,6 @@ int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, uint64_t A[8]; } local; - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET((const unsigned char *) data != NULL); - #define SHR(x, n) ((x) >> (n)) #define ROTR(x, n) (SHR((x), (n)) | ((x) << (64 - (n)))) @@ -280,35 +690,87 @@ int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha512_process(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - const unsigned char data[128]) +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT && !MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY */ + + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) + +static size_t mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many_c( + mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, const uint8_t *data, size_t len) { - mbedtls_internal_sha512_process(ctx, data); + size_t processed = 0; + + while (len >= SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE) { + if (mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_c(ctx, data) != 0) { + return 0; + } + + data += SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE; + len -= SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE; + + processed += SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE; + } + + return processed; } -#endif -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT */ + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY */ + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) + +static int mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha512_has_support(void) +{ + static int done = 0; + static int supported = 0; + + if (!done) { + supported = mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha512_determine_support(); + done = 1; + } + + return supported; +} + +static size_t mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const uint8_t *msg, size_t len) +{ + if (mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha512_has_support()) { + return mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many_a64_crypto(ctx, msg, len); + } else { + return mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many_c(ctx, msg, len); + } +} + +int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE]) +{ + if (mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha512_has_support()) { + return mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_a64_crypto(ctx, data); + } else { + return mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_c(ctx, data); + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT */ /* * SHA-512 process buffer */ -int mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen) +int mbedtls_sha512_update(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t fill; unsigned int left; - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - if (ilen == 0) { return 0; } left = (unsigned int) (ctx->total[0] & 0x7F); - fill = 128 - left; + fill = SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE - left; ctx->total[0] += (uint64_t) ilen; @@ -328,13 +790,15 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, left = 0; } - while (ilen >= 128) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_sha512_process(ctx, input)) != 0) { - return ret; + while (ilen >= SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE) { + size_t processed = + mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many(ctx, input, ilen); + if (processed < SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; } - input += 128; - ilen -= 128; + input += processed; + ilen -= processed; } if (ilen > 0) { @@ -344,27 +808,16 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, return 0; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha512_update(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen) -{ - mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(ctx, input, ilen); -} -#endif - /* * SHA-512 final digest */ -int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[64]) +int mbedtls_sha512_finish(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + unsigned char *output) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned used; uint64_t high, low; - - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET((unsigned char *) output != NULL); + int truncated = 0; /* * Add padding: 0x80 then 0x00 until 16 bytes remain for the length @@ -378,10 +831,10 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, memset(ctx->buffer + used, 0, 112 - used); } else { /* We'll need an extra block */ - memset(ctx->buffer + used, 0, 128 - used); + memset(ctx->buffer + used, 0, SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE - used); if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_sha512_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { - return ret; + goto exit; } memset(ctx->buffer, 0, 112); @@ -398,7 +851,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, sha512_put_uint64_be(low, ctx->buffer, 120); if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_sha512_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { - return ret; + goto exit; } /* @@ -411,8 +864,7 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, sha512_put_uint64_be(ctx->state[4], output, 32); sha512_put_uint64_be(ctx->state[5], output, 40); - int truncated = 0; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) truncated = ctx->is384; #endif if (!truncated) { @@ -420,49 +872,51 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, sha512_put_uint64_be(ctx->state[7], output, 56); } - return 0; -} + ret = 0; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha512_finish(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, - unsigned char output[64]) -{ - mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret(ctx, output); +exit: + mbedtls_sha512_free(ctx); + return ret; } -#endif #endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT */ /* * output = SHA-512( input buffer ) */ -int mbedtls_sha512_ret(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[64], - int is384) +int mbedtls_sha512(const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, + int is384) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_sha512_context ctx; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET(is384 == 0 || is384 == 1); -#else - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET(is384 == 0); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + if (is384 != 0 && is384 != 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + if (is384 != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#else /* defined MBEDTLS_SHA384_C only */ + if (is384 == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } #endif - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - SHA512_VALIDATE_RET((unsigned char *) output != NULL); mbedtls_sha512_init(&ctx); - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(&ctx, is384)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts(&ctx, is384)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_update(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret(&ctx, output)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish(&ctx, output)) != 0) { goto exit; } @@ -472,22 +926,12 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_ret(const unsigned char *input, return ret; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -void mbedtls_sha512(const unsigned char *input, - size_t ilen, - unsigned char output[64], - int is384) -{ - mbedtls_sha512_ret(input, ilen, output, is384); -} -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) /* * FIPS-180-2 test vectors */ -static const unsigned char sha512_test_buf[3][113] = +static const unsigned char sha_test_buf[3][113] = { { "abc" }, { @@ -496,17 +940,19 @@ static const unsigned char sha512_test_buf[3][113] = { "" } }; -static const size_t sha512_test_buflen[3] = +static const size_t sha_test_buflen[3] = { 3, 112, 1000 }; -static const unsigned char sha512_test_sum[][64] = +typedef const unsigned char (sha_test_sum_t)[64]; + +/* + * SHA-384 test vectors + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) +static sha_test_sum_t sha384_test_sum[] = { -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - /* - * SHA-384 test vectors - */ { 0xCB, 0x00, 0x75, 0x3F, 0x45, 0xA3, 0x5E, 0x8B, 0xB5, 0xA0, 0x3D, 0x69, 0x9A, 0xC6, 0x50, 0x07, 0x27, 0x2C, 0x32, 0xAB, 0x0E, 0xDE, 0xD1, 0x63, @@ -524,12 +970,16 @@ static const unsigned char sha512_test_sum[][64] = 0xED, 0x14, 0x9E, 0x9C, 0x00, 0xF2, 0x48, 0x52, 0x79, 0x72, 0xCE, 0xC5, 0x70, 0x4C, 0x2A, 0x5B, 0x07, 0xB8, 0xB3, 0xDC, 0x38, 0xEC, 0xC4, 0xEB, - 0xAE, 0x97, 0xDD, 0xD8, 0x7F, 0x3D, 0x89, 0x85 }, -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ + 0xAE, 0x97, 0xDD, 0xD8, 0x7F, 0x3D, 0x89, 0x85 } +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ - /* - * SHA-512 test vectors - */ +/* + * SHA-512 test vectors + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +static sha_test_sum_t sha512_test_sum[] = +{ { 0xDD, 0xAF, 0x35, 0xA1, 0x93, 0x61, 0x7A, 0xBA, 0xCC, 0x41, 0x73, 0x49, 0xAE, 0x20, 0x41, 0x31, 0x12, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0x4E, 0x89, 0xA9, 0x7E, 0xA2, @@ -555,19 +1005,23 @@ static const unsigned char sha512_test_sum[][64] = 0xEB, 0x00, 0x9C, 0x5C, 0x2C, 0x49, 0xAA, 0x2E, 0x4E, 0xAD, 0xB2, 0x17, 0xAD, 0x8C, 0xC0, 0x9B } }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ -#define ARRAY_LENGTH(a) (sizeof(a) / sizeof((a)[0])) - -/* - * Checkup routine - */ -int mbedtls_sha512_self_test(int verbose) +static int mbedtls_sha512_common_self_test(int verbose, int is384) { - int i, j, k, buflen, ret = 0; + int i, buflen, ret = 0; unsigned char *buf; unsigned char sha512sum[64]; mbedtls_sha512_context ctx; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + sha_test_sum_t *sha_test_sum = (is384) ? sha384_test_sum : sha512_test_sum; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + sha_test_sum_t *sha_test_sum = sha512_test_sum; +#else + sha_test_sum_t *sha_test_sum = sha384_test_sum; +#endif + buf = mbedtls_calloc(1024, sizeof(unsigned char)); if (NULL == buf) { if (verbose != 0) { @@ -579,44 +1033,37 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_self_test(int verbose) mbedtls_sha512_init(&ctx); - for (i = 0; i < (int) ARRAY_LENGTH(sha512_test_sum); i++) { - j = i % 3; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - k = i < 3; -#else - k = 0; -#endif - + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" SHA-%d test #%d: ", 512 - k * 128, j + 1); + mbedtls_printf(" SHA-%d test #%d: ", 512 - is384 * 128, i + 1); } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(&ctx, k)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts(&ctx, is384)) != 0) { goto fail; } - if (j == 2) { + if (i == 2) { memset(buf, 'a', buflen = 1000); - for (j = 0; j < 1000; j++) { - ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(&ctx, buf, buflen); + for (int j = 0; j < 1000; j++) { + ret = mbedtls_sha512_update(&ctx, buf, buflen); if (ret != 0) { goto fail; } } } else { - ret = mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(&ctx, sha512_test_buf[j], - sha512_test_buflen[j]); + ret = mbedtls_sha512_update(&ctx, sha_test_buf[i], + sha_test_buflen[i]); if (ret != 0) { goto fail; } } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret(&ctx, sha512sum)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish(&ctx, sha512sum)) != 0) { goto fail; } - if (memcmp(sha512sum, sha512_test_sum[i], 64 - k * 16) != 0) { + if (memcmp(sha512sum, sha_test_sum[i], 64 - is384 * 16) != 0) { ret = 1; goto fail; } @@ -644,8 +1091,22 @@ int mbedtls_sha512_self_test(int verbose) return ret; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +int mbedtls_sha512_self_test(int verbose) +{ + return mbedtls_sha512_common_self_test(verbose, 0); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) +int mbedtls_sha384_self_test(int verbose) +{ + return mbedtls_sha512_common_self_test(verbose, 1); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ + #undef ARRAY_LENGTH #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C || MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_cache.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_cache.c index 6082074b25..772cb8fdfe 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_cache.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_cache.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * SSL session cache implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * These session callbacks use a simple chained list @@ -26,10 +14,10 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl_cache.h" -#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include @@ -45,76 +33,73 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_cache_init(mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache) #endif } -int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get(void *data, mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_cache_find_entry(mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len, + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry **dst) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CACHE_ENTRY_NOT_FOUND; #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) mbedtls_time_t t = mbedtls_time(NULL); #endif - mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache = (mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *) data; - mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur, *entry; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&cache->mutex)) != 0) { - return ret; - } -#endif - - cur = cache->chain; - entry = NULL; - - while (cur != NULL) { - entry = cur; - cur = cur->next; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur; + for (cur = cache->chain; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) if (cache->timeout != 0 && - (int) (t - entry->timestamp) > cache->timeout) { + (int) (t - cur->timestamp) > cache->timeout) { continue; } #endif - if (session->id_len != entry->session.id_len || - memcmp(session->id, entry->session.id, - entry->session.id_len) != 0) { + if (session_id_len != cur->session_id_len || + memcmp(session_id, cur->session_id, + cur->session_id_len) != 0) { continue; } - ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(session, &entry->session); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - /* - * Restore peer certificate (without rest of the original chain) - */ - if (entry->peer_cert.p != NULL) { - /* `session->peer_cert` is NULL after the call to - * mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(), because cache entries - * have the `peer_cert` field set to NULL. */ - - if ((session->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc(1, - sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt))) == NULL) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - goto exit; - } - - mbedtls_x509_crt_init(session->peer_cert); - if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(session->peer_cert, entry->peer_cert.p, - entry->peer_cert.len)) != 0) { - mbedtls_free(session->peer_cert); - session->peer_cert = NULL; - goto exit; - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + break; + } + if (cur != NULL) { + *dst = cur; ret = 0; + } + + return ret; +} + + +int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get(void *data, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len, + mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache = (mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *) data; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *entry; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&cache->mutex)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif + + ret = ssl_cache_find_entry(cache, session_id, session_id_len, &entry); + if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_load(session, + entry->session, + entry->session_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = 0; + exit: #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&cache->mutex) != 0) { @@ -125,149 +110,251 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get(void *data, mbedtls_ssl_session *session) return ret; } -int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set(void *data, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +/* zeroize a cache entry */ +static void ssl_cache_entry_zeroize(mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *entry) +{ + if (entry == NULL) { + return; + } + + /* zeroize and free session structure */ + if (entry->session != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(entry->session, entry->session_len); + } + + /* zeroize the whole entry structure */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(entry, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry)); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_cache_pick_writing_slot(mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len, + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry **dst) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) mbedtls_time_t t = mbedtls_time(NULL), oldest = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *old = NULL; -#endif - mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache = (mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *) data; - mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur, *prv; int count = 0; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&cache->mutex)) != 0) { - return ret; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur, *last; + + /* Check 1: Is there already an entry with the given session ID? + * + * If yes, overwrite it. + * + * If not, `count` will hold the size of the session cache + * at the end of this loop, and `last` will point to the last + * entry, both of which will be used later. */ + + last = NULL; + for (cur = cache->chain; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { + count++; + if (session_id_len == cur->session_id_len && + memcmp(session_id, cur->session_id, cur->session_id_len) == 0) { + goto found; + } + last = cur; } -#endif - cur = cache->chain; - prv = NULL; - - while (cur != NULL) { - count++; + /* Check 2: Is there an outdated entry in the cache? + * + * If so, overwrite it. + * + * If not, remember the oldest entry in `old` for later. + */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + for (cur = cache->chain; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { if (cache->timeout != 0 && (int) (t - cur->timestamp) > cache->timeout) { - cur->timestamp = t; - break; /* expired, reuse this slot, update timestamp */ + goto found; } -#endif - if (memcmp(session->id, cur->session.id, cur->session.id_len) == 0) { - break; /* client reconnected, keep timestamp for session id */ - - } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) if (oldest == 0 || cur->timestamp < oldest) { oldest = cur->timestamp; old = cur; } -#endif + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ - prv = cur; - cur = cur->next; + /* Check 3: Is there free space in the cache? */ + + if (count < cache->max_entries) { + /* Create new entry */ + cur = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry)); + if (cur == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + /* Append to the end of the linked list. */ + if (last == NULL) { + cache->chain = cur; + } else { + last->next = cur; + } + + goto found; } - if (cur == NULL) { + /* Last resort: The cache is full and doesn't contain any outdated + * elements. In this case, we evict the oldest one, judged by timestamp + * (if present) or cache-order. */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - /* - * Reuse oldest entry if max_entries reached - */ - if (count >= cache->max_entries) { - if (old == NULL) { - /* This should only happen on an ill-configured cache - * with max_entries == 0. */ - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto exit; - } - - cur = old; - } + if (old == NULL) { + /* This should only happen on an ill-configured cache + * with max_entries == 0. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } #else /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ - /* - * Reuse first entry in chain if max_entries reached, - * but move to last place - */ - if (count >= cache->max_entries) { - if (cache->chain == NULL) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto exit; - } - - cur = cache->chain; - cache->chain = cur->next; - cur->next = NULL; - prv->next = cur; - } + /* Reuse first entry in chain, but move to last place. */ + if (cache->chain == NULL) { + /* This should never happen */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + + old = cache->chain; + cache->chain = old->next; + old->next = NULL; + last->next = old; #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ - else { - /* - * max_entries not reached, create new entry - */ - cur = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry)); - if (cur == NULL) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - goto exit; - } - - if (prv == NULL) { - cache->chain = cur; - } else { - prv->next = cur; - } - } + + /* Now `old` points to the oldest entry to be overwritten. */ + cur = old; + +found: + + /* If we're reusing an entry, free it first. */ + if (cur->session != NULL) { + /* `ssl_cache_entry_zeroize` would break the chain, + * so we reuse `old` to record `next` temporarily. */ + old = cur->next; + ssl_cache_entry_zeroize(cur); + cur->next = old; + } #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - cur->timestamp = t; + cur->timestamp = t; +#endif + + *dst = cur; + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set(void *data, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len, + const mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache = (mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *) data; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur; + + size_t session_serialized_len = 0; + unsigned char *session_serialized = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&cache->mutex)) != 0) { + return ret; + } #endif + + ret = ssl_cache_pick_writing_slot(cache, + session_id, session_id_len, + &cur); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - /* - * If we're reusing an entry, free its certificate first - */ - if (cur->peer_cert.p != NULL) { - mbedtls_free(cur->peer_cert.p); - memset(&cur->peer_cert, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_buf)); + /* Check how much space we need to serialize the session + * and allocate a sufficiently large buffer. */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_save(session, NULL, 0, &session_serialized_len); + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { + goto exit; + } + + session_serialized = mbedtls_calloc(1, session_serialized_len); + if (session_serialized == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - - /* Copy the entire session; this temporarily makes a copy of the - * X.509 CRT structure even though we only want to store the raw CRT. - * This inefficiency will go away as soon as we implement on-demand - * parsing of CRTs, in which case there's no need for the `peer_cert` - * field anymore in the first place, and we're done after this call. */ - ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(&cur->session, session); + + /* Now serialize the session into the allocated buffer. */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_save(session, + session_serialized, + session_serialized_len, + &session_serialized_len); if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - /* If present, free the X.509 structure and only store the raw CRT data. */ - if (cur->session.peer_cert != NULL) { - cur->peer_cert.p = - mbedtls_calloc(1, cur->session.peer_cert->raw.len); - if (cur->peer_cert.p == NULL) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - goto exit; - } + if (session_id_len > sizeof(cur->session_id)) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto exit; + } + cur->session_id_len = session_id_len; + memcpy(cur->session_id, session_id, session_id_len); + + cur->session = session_serialized; + cur->session_len = session_serialized_len; + session_serialized = NULL; + + ret = 0; + +exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&cache->mutex) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR; + } +#endif + + if (session_serialized != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(session_serialized, session_serialized_len); + session_serialized = NULL; + } + + return ret; +} - memcpy(cur->peer_cert.p, - cur->session.peer_cert->raw.p, - cur->session.peer_cert->raw.len); - cur->peer_cert.len = session->peer_cert->raw.len; +int mbedtls_ssl_cache_remove(void *data, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache = (mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *) data; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *entry; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *prev; - mbedtls_x509_crt_free(cur->session.peer_cert); - mbedtls_free(cur->session.peer_cert); - cur->session.peer_cert = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&cache->mutex)) != 0) { + return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif + ret = ssl_cache_find_entry(cache, session_id, session_id_len, &entry); + /* No valid entry found, exit with success */ + if (ret != 0) { + ret = 0; + goto exit; + } + + /* Now we remove the entry from the chain */ + if (entry == cache->chain) { + cache->chain = entry->next; + goto free; + } + for (prev = cache->chain; prev->next != NULL; prev = prev->next) { + if (prev->next == entry) { + prev->next = entry->next; + break; + } + } + +free: + ssl_cache_entry_zeroize(entry); + mbedtls_free(entry); ret = 0; exit: @@ -310,13 +397,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_cache_free(mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache) prv = cur; cur = cur->next; - mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&prv->session); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - mbedtls_free(prv->peer_cert.p); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - + ssl_cache_entry_zeroize(prv); mbedtls_free(prv); } diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c index f1e995633b..23619a26c8 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c @@ -4,19 +4,7 @@ * \brief SSL ciphersuites for Mbed TLS * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" @@ -27,18 +15,17 @@ #include "mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif #include -#undef HAVE_SHA384 -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) -#define HAVE_SHA384 -#endif - /* * Ordered from most preferred to least preferred in terms of security. * - * Current rule (except RC4 and 3DES, weak and null which come last): + * Current rule (except weak and null which come last): * 1. By key exchange: * Forward-secure non-PSK > forward-secure PSK > ECJPAKE > other non-PSK > other PSK * 2. By key length and cipher: @@ -52,6 +39,15 @@ static const int ciphersuite_preference[] = #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES) MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES, #else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + /* TLS 1.3 ciphersuites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_CCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + /* Chacha-Poly ephemeral suites */ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, @@ -255,34 +251,6 @@ static const int ciphersuite_preference[] = MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, - /* 3DES suites */ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, - - /* RC4 suites */ - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, - - /* Weak suites */ - MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, - MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, - /* NULL suites */ MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, @@ -311,1877 +279,1517 @@ static const int ciphersuite_preference[] = static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE, /* Key exchange not part of ciphersuite in TLS 1.3 */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE, /* Key exchange not part of ciphersuite in TLS 1.3 */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_CCM_SHA256, "TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE, /* Key exchange not part of ciphersuite in TLS 1.3 */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256, "TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-8-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE, /* Key exchange not part of ciphersuite in TLS 1.3 */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 && MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + "TLS1-3-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE, /* Key exchange not part of ciphersuite in TLS 1.3 */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY && MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C && - MBEDTLS_SHA256_C && +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY && + MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-NULL-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) && defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 && MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 && MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) && defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 && MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 && MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, "TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-MD5", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, -#endif + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-NULL-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCM", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCM", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* HAVE_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-RC4-128-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, "TLS-ECJPAKE-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES) #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, "TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-MD5", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if defined(HAVE_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-DES-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-DES-CBC-SHA", - MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK }, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA) #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(HAVE_SHA384)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif -#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)) +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, - 0 }, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA */ { 0, "", MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE, - 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 } + 0, 0, 0 } }; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES) @@ -2200,19 +1808,6 @@ static int ciphersuite_is_removed(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *cs_info) { (void) cs_info; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES) - if (cs_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128) { - return 1; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES) - if (cs_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB || - cs_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC) { - return 1; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES */ - return 0; } @@ -2305,6 +1900,31 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id(const char *ciphersuite_name) return cur->id; } +size_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_get_cipher_key_bitlen(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_type_t key_type; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + size_t key_bits; + + status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) info->cipher, + info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG ? 8 : 16, + &alg, &key_type, &key_bits); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return 0; + } + + return key_bits; +#else + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t * const cipher_info = + mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) info->cipher); + + return mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +} + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) { @@ -2327,10 +1947,54 @@ mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphe } } -mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) { switch (info->key_exchange) { case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT; + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( + mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) info->mac)); + + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return PSA_ALG_ECDSA(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) info->mac)); + + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + return PSA_ALG_ECDH; + + default: + return PSA_ALG_NONE; + } +} + +psa_key_usage_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_usage(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->key_exchange) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + return PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT; + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH; + + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + return PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE; + + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->key_exchange) { case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: return MBEDTLS_PK_RSA; @@ -2345,7 +2009,8 @@ mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersu #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) { @@ -2362,7 +2027,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) return 0; } } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED*/ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED || + * MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED || + * MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED*/ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..27ff72106e --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +/** + * \file ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h + * + * \brief Internal part of the public "ssl_ciphersuites.h". + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_INTERNAL_H + +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); +psa_key_usage_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_usage(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); +int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_has_pfs(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_no_pfs(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdh(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED */ + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_dhe(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdhe(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_client.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_client.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..345e608938 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_client.c @@ -0,0 +1,1017 @@ +/* + * TLS 1.2 and 1.3 client-side functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + +#include + +#include "debug_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "ssl_client.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "ssl_tls13_keys.h" +#include "ssl_debug_helpers.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_hostname_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t hostname_len; + + *olen = 0; + + if (ssl->hostname == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("client hello, adding server name extension: %s", + ssl->hostname)); + + hostname_len = strlen(ssl->hostname); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, hostname_len + 9); + + /* + * Sect. 3, RFC 6066 (TLS Extensions Definitions) + * + * In order to provide any of the server names, clients MAY include an + * extension of type "server_name" in the (extended) client hello. The + * "extension_data" field of this extension SHALL contain + * "ServerNameList" where: + * + * struct { + * NameType name_type; + * select (name_type) { + * case host_name: HostName; + * } name; + * } ServerName; + * + * enum { + * host_name(0), (255) + * } NameType; + * + * opaque HostName<1..2^16-1>; + * + * struct { + * ServerName server_name_list<1..2^16-1> + * } ServerNameList; + * + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME, p, 0); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(hostname_len + 5, p, 0); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(hostname_len + 3, p, 0); + p += 2; + + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(hostname_len, p, 0); + p += 2; + + memcpy(p, ssl->hostname, hostname_len); + + *olen = hostname_len + 9; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +/* + * ssl_write_alpn_ext() + * + * Structure of the application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension in + * ClientHello: + * + * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; + * + * struct { + * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> + * } ProtocolNameList; + * + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + *out_len = 0; + + if (ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, adding alpn extension")); + + + /* Check we have enough space for the extension type (2 bytes), the + * extension length (2 bytes) and the protocol_name_list length (2 bytes). + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN, p, 0); + /* Skip writing extension and list length for now */ + p += 6; + + /* + * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; + * + * struct { + * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> + * } ProtocolNameList; + */ + for (const char **cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++) { + /* + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_alpn_protocols() checked that the length of + * protocol names is less than 255. + */ + size_t protocol_name_len = strlen(*cur); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 1 + protocol_name_len); + *p++ = (unsigned char) protocol_name_len; + memcpy(p, *cur, protocol_name_len); + p += protocol_name_len; + } + + *out_len = (size_t) (p - buf); + + /* List length = *out_len - 2 (ext_type) - 2 (ext_len) - 2 (list_len) */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*out_len - 6, buf, 4); + + /* Extension length = *out_len - 2 (ext_type) - 2 (ext_len) */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*out_len - 4, buf, 2); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_2_SOME_ECC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +/* + * Function for writing a supported groups (TLS 1.3) or supported elliptic + * curves (TLS 1.2) extension. + * + * The "extension_data" field of a supported groups extension contains a + * "NamedGroupList" value (TLS 1.3 RFC8446): + * enum { + * secp256r1(0x0017), secp384r1(0x0018), secp521r1(0x0019), + * x25519(0x001D), x448(0x001E), + * ffdhe2048(0x0100), ffdhe3072(0x0101), ffdhe4096(0x0102), + * ffdhe6144(0x0103), ffdhe8192(0x0104), + * ffdhe_private_use(0x01FC..0x01FF), + * ecdhe_private_use(0xFE00..0xFEFF), + * (0xFFFF) + * } NamedGroup; + * struct { + * NamedGroup named_group_list<2..2^16-1>; + * } NamedGroupList; + * + * The "extension_data" field of a supported elliptic curves extension contains + * a "NamedCurveList" value (TLS 1.2 RFC 8422): + * enum { + * deprecated(1..22), + * secp256r1 (23), secp384r1 (24), secp521r1 (25), + * x25519(29), x448(30), + * reserved (0xFE00..0xFEFF), + * deprecated(0xFF01..0xFF02), + * (0xFFFF) + * } NamedCurve; + * struct { + * NamedCurve named_curve_list<2..2^16-1> + * } NamedCurveList; + * + * The TLS 1.3 supported groups extension was defined to be a compatible + * generalization of the TLS 1.2 supported elliptic curves extension. They both + * share the same extension identifier. + * + */ +#define SSL_WRITE_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXT_TLS1_2_FLAG 1 +#define SSL_WRITE_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXT_TLS1_3_FLAG 2 + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_supported_groups_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + int flags, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + unsigned char *named_group_list; /* Start of named_group_list */ + size_t named_group_list_len; /* Length of named_group_list */ + const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups(ssl); + + *out_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, adding supported_groups extension")); + + /* Check if we have space for header and length fields: + * - extension_type (2 bytes) + * - extension_data_length (2 bytes) + * - named_group_list_length (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6); + p += 6; + + named_group_list = p; + + if (group_list == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; + } + + for (; *group_list != 0; group_list++) { + int propose_group = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("got supported group(%04x)", *group_list)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + if (flags & SSL_WRITE_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXT_TLS1_3_FLAG) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(*group_list) && + (mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(*group_list) != + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE)) { + propose_group = 1; + } +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(*group_list)) { + propose_group = 1; + } +#endif + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_2_SOME_ECC) + if ((flags & SSL_WRITE_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXT_TLS1_2_FLAG) && + mbedtls_ssl_tls12_named_group_is_ecdhe(*group_list) && + (mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(*group_list) != + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE)) { + propose_group = 1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_2_SOME_ECC */ + + if (propose_group) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*group_list, p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("NamedGroup: %s ( %x )", + mbedtls_ssl_named_group_to_str(*group_list), + *group_list)); + } + } + + /* Length of named_group_list */ + named_group_list_len = (size_t) (p - named_group_list); + if (named_group_list_len == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("No group available.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* Write extension_type */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, buf, 0); + /* Write extension_data_length */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(named_group_list_len + 2, buf, 2); + /* Write length of named_group_list */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(named_group_list_len, buf, 4); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Supported groups extension", + buf + 4, named_group_list_len + 2); + + *out_len = (size_t) (p - buf); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask( + ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_2_SOME_ECC || + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_client_hello_cipher_suites( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + int *tls12_uses_ec, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + const int *ciphersuite_list; + unsigned char *cipher_suites; /* Start of the cipher_suites list */ + size_t cipher_suites_len; + + *tls12_uses_ec = 0; + *out_len = 0; + + /* + * Ciphersuite list + * + * This is a list of the symmetric cipher options supported by + * the client, specifically the record protection algorithm + * ( including secret key length ) and a hash to be used with + * HKDF, in descending order of client preference. + */ + ciphersuite_list = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list; + + /* Check there is space for the cipher suite list length (2 bytes). */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + p += 2; + + /* Write cipher_suites + * CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>; + */ + cipher_suites = p; + for (size_t i = 0; ciphersuite_list[i] != 0; i++) { + int cipher_suite = ciphersuite_list[i]; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(cipher_suite); + + if (mbedtls_ssl_validate_ciphersuite(ssl, ciphersuite_info, + ssl->handshake->min_tls_version, + ssl->tls_version) != 0) { + continue; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)) + *tls12_uses_ec |= mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(ciphersuite_info); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, add ciphersuite: %04x, %s", + (unsigned int) cipher_suite, + ciphersuite_info->name)); + + /* Check there is space for the cipher suite identifier (2 bytes). */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(cipher_suite, p, 0); + p += 2; + } + + /* + * Add TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV + */ + int renegotiating = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + renegotiating = (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE); +#endif + if (!renegotiating) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("adding EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, p, 0); + p += 2; + } + + /* Write the cipher_suites length in number of bytes */ + cipher_suites_len = (size_t) (p - cipher_suites); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(cipher_suites_len, buf, 0); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("client hello, got %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " cipher suites", + cipher_suites_len/2)); + + /* Output the total length of cipher_suites field. */ + *out_len = (size_t) (p - buf); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Structure of the TLS 1.3 ClientHello message: + * + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; // TLS v1.2 + * Random random; + * opaque legacy_session_id<0..32>; + * CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>; + * opaque legacy_compression_methods<1..2^8-1>; + * Extension extensions<8..2^16-1>; + * } ClientHello; + * + * Structure of the (D)TLS 1.2 ClientHello message: + * + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion client_version; + * Random random; + * SessionID session_id; + * opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; // DTLS 1.2 ONLY + * CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>; + * CompressionMethod compression_methods<1..2^8-1>; + * select (extensions_present) { + * case false: + * struct {}; + * case true: + * Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>; + * }; + * } ClientHello; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_client_hello_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len, + size_t *binders_len) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + unsigned char *p = buf; + unsigned char *p_extensions_len; /* Pointer to extensions length */ + size_t output_len; /* Length of buffer used by function */ + size_t extensions_len; /* Length of the list of extensions*/ + int tls12_uses_ec = 0; + + *out_len = 0; + *binders_len = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + unsigned char propose_tls12 = + (handshake->min_tls_version <= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) + && + (MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 <= ssl->tls_version); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + unsigned char propose_tls13 = + (handshake->min_tls_version <= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) + && + (MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 <= ssl->tls_version); +#endif + + /* + * Write client_version (TLS 1.2) or legacy_version (TLS 1.3) + * + * In all cases this is the TLS 1.2 version. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + mbedtls_ssl_write_version(p, ssl->conf->transport, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2); + p += 2; + + /* ... + * Random random; + * ... + * + * The random bytes have been prepared by ssl_prepare_client_hello() into + * the handshake->randbytes buffer and are copied here into the output + * buffer. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + memcpy(p, handshake->randbytes, MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, random bytes", + p, MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + p += MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN; + + /* TLS 1.2: + * ... + * SessionID session_id; + * ... + * with + * opaque SessionID<0..32>; + * + * TLS 1.3: + * ... + * opaque legacy_session_id<0..32>; + * ... + * + * The (legacy) session identifier bytes have been prepared by + * ssl_prepare_client_hello() into the ssl->session_negotiate->id buffer + * and are copied here into the output buffer. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len + 1); + *p++ = (unsigned char) ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; + memcpy(p, ssl->session_negotiate->id, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len); + p += ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "session id", ssl->session_negotiate->id, + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len); + + /* DTLS 1.2 ONLY + * ... + * opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; + * ... + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + uint8_t cookie_len = 0; +#else + uint16_t cookie_len = 0; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + + if (handshake->cookie != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, cookie", + handshake->cookie, + handshake->cookie_len); + cookie_len = handshake->cookie_len; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, cookie_len + 1); + *p++ = (unsigned char) cookie_len; + if (cookie_len > 0) { + memcpy(p, handshake->cookie, cookie_len); + p += cookie_len; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* Write cipher_suites */ + ret = ssl_write_client_hello_cipher_suites(ssl, p, end, + &tls12_uses_ec, + &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + + /* Write legacy_compression_methods (TLS 1.3) or + * compression_methods (TLS 1.2) + * + * For every TLS 1.3 ClientHello, this vector MUST contain exactly + * one byte set to zero, which corresponds to the 'null' compression + * method in prior versions of TLS. + * + * For TLS 1.2 ClientHello, for security reasons we do not support + * compression anymore, thus also just the 'null' compression method. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + *p++ = 1; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; + + /* Write extensions */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + /* Keeping track of the included extensions */ + handshake->sent_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE; +#endif + + /* First write extensions, then the total length */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + p_extensions_len = p; + p += 2; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + /* Write server name extension */ + ret = ssl_write_hostname_ext(ssl, p, end, &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + ret = ssl_write_alpn_ext(ssl, p, end, &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (propose_tls13) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_client_hello_exts(ssl, p, end, + &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_2_SOME_ECC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + { + int ssl_write_supported_groups_ext_flags = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + if (propose_tls13 && mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_ephemeral_enabled(ssl)) { + ssl_write_supported_groups_ext_flags |= + SSL_WRITE_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXT_TLS1_3_FLAG; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_2_SOME_ECC) + if (propose_tls12 && tls12_uses_ec) { + ssl_write_supported_groups_ext_flags |= + SSL_WRITE_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXT_TLS1_2_FLAG; + } +#endif + if (ssl_write_supported_groups_ext_flags != 0) { + ret = ssl_write_supported_groups_ext(ssl, p, end, + ssl_write_supported_groups_ext_flags, + &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_2_SOME_ECC || + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + int write_sig_alg_ext = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + write_sig_alg_ext = write_sig_alg_ext || + (propose_tls13 && mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_ephemeral_enabled(ssl)); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + write_sig_alg_ext = write_sig_alg_ext || propose_tls12; +#endif + + if (write_sig_alg_ext) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_sig_alg_ext(ssl, p, end, &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (propose_tls12) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls12_write_client_hello_exts(ssl, p, end, + tls12_uses_ec, + &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + /* The "pre_shared_key" extension (RFC 8446 Section 4.2.11) + * MUST be the last extension in the ClientHello. + */ + if (propose_tls13 && mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_psk_enabled(ssl)) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_identities_of_pre_shared_key_ext( + ssl, p, end, &output_len, binders_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + + /* Write the length of the list of extensions. */ + extensions_len = (size_t) (p - p_extensions_len) - 2; + + if (extensions_len == 0) { + p = p_extensions_len; + } else { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(extensions_len, p_extensions_len, 0); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, total extension length: %" \ + MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, extensions_len)); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello extensions", + p_extensions_len, extensions_len); + } + + *out_len = (size_t) (p - buf); + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_generate_random(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *randbytes = ssl->handshake->randbytes; + size_t gmt_unix_time_len = 0; + + /* + * Generate the random bytes + * + * TLS 1.2 case: + * struct { + * uint32 gmt_unix_time; + * opaque random_bytes[28]; + * } Random; + * + * TLS 1.3 case: + * opaque Random[32]; + */ + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + mbedtls_time_t gmt_unix_time = mbedtls_time(NULL); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(gmt_unix_time, randbytes, 0); + gmt_unix_time_len = 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("client hello, current time: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG, + (long long) gmt_unix_time)); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + } + + ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, + randbytes + gmt_unix_time_len, + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN - gmt_unix_time_len); + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_prepare_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + size_t session_id_len; + mbedtls_ssl_session *session_negotiate = ssl->session_negotiate; + + if (session_negotiate == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + + /* Check if a tls13 ticket has been configured. */ + if (ssl->handshake->resume != 0 && + session_negotiate->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 && + session_negotiate->ticket != NULL) { + mbedtls_ms_time_t now = mbedtls_ms_time(); + mbedtls_ms_time_t age = now - session_negotiate->ticket_reception_time; + if (age < 0 || + age > (mbedtls_ms_time_t) session_negotiate->ticket_lifetime * 1000) { + /* Without valid ticket, disable session resumption.*/ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("Ticket expired, disable session resumption")); + ssl->handshake->resume = 0; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && + MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && + MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + /* Bet on the highest configured version if we are not in a TLS 1.2 + * renegotiation or session resumption. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { + ssl->handshake->min_tls_version = ssl->tls_version; + } else +#endif + { + if (ssl->handshake->resume) { + ssl->tls_version = session_negotiate->tls_version; + ssl->handshake->min_tls_version = ssl->tls_version; + } else { + ssl->handshake->min_tls_version = ssl->conf->min_tls_version; + } + } + + /* + * Generate the random bytes, except when responding to a verify request + * where we MUST reuse the previously generated random bytes + * (RFC 6347 4.2.1). + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if ((ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) || + (ssl->handshake->cookie == NULL)) +#endif + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (!ssl->handshake->hello_retry_request_flag) +#endif + { + ret = ssl_generate_random(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "Random bytes generation failed", ret); + return ret; + } + } + } + + /* + * Prepare session identifier. At that point, the length of the session + * identifier in the SSL context `ssl->session_negotiate->id_len` is equal + * to zero, except in the case of a TLS 1.2 session renegotiation or + * session resumption. + */ + session_id_len = session_negotiate->id_len; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + if (session_id_len < 16 || session_id_len > 32 || +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE || +#endif + ssl->handshake->resume == 0) { + session_id_len = 0; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + /* + * RFC 5077 section 3.4: "When presenting a ticket, the client MAY + * generate and include a Session ID in the TLS ClientHello." + */ + int renegotiating = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { + renegotiating = 1; + } +#endif + if (!renegotiating) { + if ((session_negotiate->ticket != NULL) && + (session_negotiate->ticket_len != 0)) { + session_id_len = 32; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + /* + * Create a legacy session identifier for the purpose of middlebox + * compatibility only if one has not been created already, which is + * the case if we are here for the TLS 1.3 second ClientHello. + * + * Versions of TLS before TLS 1.3 supported a "session resumption" + * feature which has been merged with pre-shared keys in TLS 1.3 + * version. A client which has a cached session ID set by a pre-TLS 1.3 + * server SHOULD set this field to that value. In compatibility mode, + * this field MUST be non-empty, so a client not offering a pre-TLS 1.3 + * session MUST generate a new 32-byte value. This value need not be + * random but SHOULD be unpredictable to avoid implementations fixating + * on a specific value (also known as ossification). Otherwise, it MUST + * be set as a zero-length vector ( i.e., a zero-valued single byte + * length field ). + */ + session_id_len = 32; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ + + if (session_id_len != session_negotiate->id_len) { + session_negotiate->id_len = session_id_len; + if (session_id_len > 0) { + ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, + session_negotiate->id, + session_id_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "creating session id failed", ret); + return ret; + } + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 && + ssl->handshake->resume) { + int hostname_mismatch = ssl->hostname != NULL || + session_negotiate->hostname != NULL; + if (ssl->hostname != NULL && session_negotiate->hostname != NULL) { + hostname_mismatch = strcmp( + ssl->hostname, session_negotiate->hostname) != 0; + } + + if (hostname_mismatch) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Hostname mismatch the session ticket, " + "disable session resumption.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } else { + return mbedtls_ssl_session_set_hostname(session_negotiate, + ssl->hostname); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && + MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + + return 0; +} +/* + * Write ClientHello handshake message. + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = 0; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len, msg_len, binders_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write client hello")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_prepare_client_hello(ssl)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_write_client_hello_body(ssl, buf, + buf + buf_len, + &msg_len, + &binders_len)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + ssl->out_msglen = msg_len + 4; + mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(ssl); + + /* + * The two functions below may try to send data on the network and + * can return with the MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ error code when they + * fail to do so and the transmission has to be retried later. In that + * case as in fatal error cases, we return immediately. But we must have + * set the handshake state to the next state at that point to ensure + * that we will not write and send again a ClientHello when we + * eventually succeed in sending the pending data. + */ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret); + return ret; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + { + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO, + msg_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum", ret); + return ret; + } + ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf, msg_len - binders_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "update_checksum", ret); + return ret; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if (binders_len > 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_binders_of_pre_shared_key_ext( + ssl, buf + msg_len - binders_len, buf + msg_len)); + ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf + msg_len - binders_len, + binders_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "update_checksum", ret); + return ret; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(ssl, + buf_len, + msg_len)); + + /* + * Set next state. Note that if TLS 1.3 is proposed, this may be + * overwritten by mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello(). + */ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (ssl->handshake->min_tls_version <= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 && + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 <= ssl->tls_version) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello(ssl); + } +#endif + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS( + 3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO, ssl->handshake->sent_extensions); +#endif + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write client hello")); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_client.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_client.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..05ee7e4cc3 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_client.h @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +/** + * TLS 1.2 and 1.3 client-side functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_H + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#endif + +#include + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_cookie.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_cookie.c index 1ac9c41760..2772cac4be 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_cookie.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_cookie.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * DTLS cookie callbacks implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * These session callbacks use a simple chained list @@ -28,32 +16,40 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h" -#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" #include +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) +#endif + /* - * If DTLS is in use, then at least one of SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512 is - * available. Try SHA-256 first, 512 wastes resources since we need to stay - * with max 32 bytes of cookie for DTLS 1.0 + * If DTLS is in use, then at least one of SHA-256 or SHA-384 is + * available. Try SHA-256 first as 384 wastes resources */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#define COOKIE_MD MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#define COOKIE_MD MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 #define COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN 32 #define COOKIE_HMAC_LEN 28 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) #define COOKIE_MD MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 #define COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN 48 #define COOKIE_HMAC_LEN 28 -#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) -#define COOKIE_MD MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 -#define COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN 20 -#define COOKIE_HMAC_LEN 20 #else -#error "DTLS hello verify needs SHA-1 or SHA-2" +#error "DTLS hello verify needs SHA-256 or SHA-384" #endif /* @@ -64,15 +60,21 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_cookie_init(mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ctx->psa_hmac_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +#else mbedtls_md_init(&ctx->hmac_ctx); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) ctx->serial = 0; #endif ctx->timeout = MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) mbedtls_mutex_init(&ctx->mutex); #endif +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } void mbedtls_ssl_cookie_set_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx, unsigned long delay) @@ -82,11 +84,15 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_cookie_set_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx, unsigned long d void mbedtls_ssl_cookie_free(mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_destroy_key(ctx->psa_hmac_key); +#else mbedtls_md_free(&ctx->hmac_ctx); #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) mbedtls_mutex_free(&ctx->mutex); #endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx)); } @@ -95,6 +101,33 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup(mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; + + alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(COOKIE_MD); + if (alg == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ctx->psa_hmac_alg = PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(alg), + COOKIE_HMAC_LEN); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, ctx->psa_hmac_alg); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC); + psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN)); + + if ((status = psa_generate_key(&attributes, + &ctx->psa_hmac_key)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } +#else int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char key[COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN]; @@ -113,10 +146,12 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup(mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx, } mbedtls_platform_zeroize(key, sizeof(key)); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ return 0; } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) /* * Generate the HMAC part of a cookie */ @@ -142,6 +177,7 @@ static int ssl_cookie_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *hmac_ctx, return 0; } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /* * Generate cookie for DTLS ClientHello verification @@ -150,6 +186,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write(void *p_ctx, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t sign_mac_length = 0; +#endif int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx = (mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *) p_ctx; unsigned long t; @@ -169,6 +210,37 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write(void *p_ctx, MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(t, *p, 0); *p += 4; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_mac_sign_setup(&operation, ctx->psa_hmac_key, + ctx->psa_hmac_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_mac_update(&operation, *p - 4, 4); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_mac_update(&operation, cli_id, cli_id_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_mac_sign_finish(&operation, *p, COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN, + &sign_mac_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + *p += COOKIE_HMAC_LEN; + + ret = 0; +#else #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret); @@ -184,7 +256,15 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write(void *p_ctx, MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR); } #endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +exit: + status = psa_mac_abort(&operation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ return ret; } @@ -195,9 +275,14 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check(void *p_ctx, const unsigned char *cookie, size_t cookie_len, const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#else unsigned char ref_hmac[COOKIE_HMAC_LEN]; - int ret = 0; unsigned char *p = ref_hmac; +#endif + int ret = 0; mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx = (mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *) p_ctx; unsigned long cur_time, cookie_time; @@ -209,6 +294,36 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check(void *p_ctx, return -1; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_mac_verify_setup(&operation, ctx->psa_hmac_key, + ctx->psa_hmac_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_mac_update(&operation, cookie, 4); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_mac_update(&operation, cli_id, + cli_id_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_mac_verify_finish(&operation, cookie + 4, + COOKIE_HMAC_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + ret = 0; +#else #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret); @@ -236,6 +351,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check(void *p_ctx, ret = -1; goto exit; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) cur_time = (unsigned long) mbedtls_time(NULL); @@ -243,10 +359,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check(void *p_ctx, cur_time = ctx->serial; #endif - cookie_time = ((unsigned long) cookie[0] << 24) | - ((unsigned long) cookie[1] << 16) | - ((unsigned long) cookie[2] << 8) | - ((unsigned long) cookie[3]); + cookie_time = (unsigned long) MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(cookie, 0); if (ctx->timeout != 0 && cur_time - cookie_time > ctx->timeout) { ret = -1; @@ -254,7 +367,14 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check(void *p_ctx, } exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_mac_abort(&operation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } +#else mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ref_hmac, sizeof(ref_hmac)); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_debug_helpers.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_debug_helpers.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4889e77e04 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_debug_helpers.h @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +/** + * \file ssl_debug_helpers.h + * + * \brief Automatically generated helper functions for debugging + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_HELPERS_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_HELPERS_H + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" + + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_states_str(mbedtls_ssl_states in); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +const char *mbedtls_ssl_early_data_status_str(mbedtls_ssl_early_data_status in); +const char *mbedtls_ssl_early_data_state_str(mbedtls_ssl_early_data_state in); +#endif + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version_str(mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version in); + +const char *mbedtls_tls_prf_types_str(mbedtls_tls_prf_types in); + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_key_export_type_str(mbedtls_ssl_key_export_type in); + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str(uint16_t in); + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_named_group_to_str(uint16_t in); + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_name(unsigned int extension_type); + +void mbedtls_ssl_print_extensions(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int level, const char *file, int line, + int hs_msg_type, uint32_t extensions_mask, + const char *extra); + +void mbedtls_ssl_print_extension(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int level, const char *file, int line, + int hs_msg_type, unsigned int extension_type, + const char *extra_msg0, const char *extra_msg1); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +void mbedtls_ssl_print_ticket_flags(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int level, const char *file, int line, + unsigned int flags); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(level, hs_msg_type, extensions_mask) \ + mbedtls_ssl_print_extensions(ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, \ + hs_msg_type, extensions_mask, NULL) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT(level, hs_msg_type, extension_type, extra) \ + mbedtls_ssl_print_extension(ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, \ + hs_msg_type, extension_type, \ + extra, NULL) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_TICKET_FLAGS(level, flags) \ + mbedtls_ssl_print_ticket_flags(ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, flags) +#endif + +#else + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(level, hs_msg_type, extension_mask) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT(level, hs_msg_type, extension_type, extra) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_TICKET_FLAGS(level, flags) +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_HELPERS_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f8b4448c86 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c @@ -0,0 +1,251 @@ +/* Automatically generated by generate_ssl_debug_helpers.py. DO NOT EDIT. */ + +/** + * \file ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c + * + * \brief Automatically generated helper functions for debugging + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + * + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + +#include "ssl_debug_helpers.h" + + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_named_group_to_str( uint16_t in ) +{ + switch( in ) + { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192K1: + return "secp192k1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192R1: + return "secp192r1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224K1: + return "secp224k1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224R1: + return "secp224r1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256K1: + return "secp256k1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1: + return "secp256r1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1: + return "secp384r1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1: + return "secp521r1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP256R1: + return "bp256r1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP384R1: + return "bp384r1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP512R1: + return "bp512r1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519: + return "x25519"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448: + return "x448"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE2048: + return "ffdhe2048"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE3072: + return "ffdhe3072"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE4096: + return "ffdhe4096"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE6144: + return "ffdhe6144"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192: + return "ffdhe8192"; + }; + + return "UNKOWN"; +} +const char *mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str( uint16_t in ) +{ + switch( in ) + { + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256: + return "rsa_pkcs1_sha256"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384: + return "rsa_pkcs1_sha384"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512: + return "rsa_pkcs1_sha512"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256: + return "ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384: + return "ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512: + return "ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256: + return "rsa_pss_rsae_sha256"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384: + return "rsa_pss_rsae_sha384"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512: + return "rsa_pss_rsae_sha512"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ED25519: + return "ed25519"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ED448: + return "ed448"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA256: + return "rsa_pss_pss_sha256"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA384: + return "rsa_pss_pss_sha384"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA512: + return "rsa_pss_pss_sha512"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1: + return "rsa_pkcs1_sha1"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SHA1: + return "ecdsa_sha1"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE: + return "none"; + }; + + return "UNKNOWN"; +} +const char *mbedtls_ssl_states_str( mbedtls_ssl_states in ) +{ + switch (in) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_BEFORE_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_BEFORE_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH"; + default: + return "UNKNOWN_VALUE"; + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +const char *mbedtls_ssl_early_data_status_str( mbedtls_ssl_early_data_status in ) +{ + switch (in) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_INDICATED: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_INDICATED"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED"; + default: + return "UNKNOWN_VALUE"; + } +} + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) */ +const char *mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version_str( mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version in ) +{ + switch (in) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3"; + default: + return "UNKNOWN_VALUE"; + } +} + +const char *mbedtls_tls_prf_types_str( mbedtls_tls_prf_types in ) +{ + switch (in) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HKDF_EXPAND_SHA384: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_HKDF_EXPAND_SHA384"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HKDF_EXPAND_SHA256: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_HKDF_EXPAND_SHA256"; + default: + return "UNKNOWN_VALUE"; + } +} + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_key_export_type_str( mbedtls_ssl_key_export_type in ) +{ + switch (in) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS12_MASTER_SECRET: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS12_MASTER_SECRET"; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_EARLY_SECRET: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_EARLY_SECRET"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET"; +#endif + default: + return "UNKNOWN_VALUE"; + } +} + + + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ +/* End of automatically generated file. */ + diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_misc.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_misc.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a8807f67c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_misc.h @@ -0,0 +1,2983 @@ +/** + * \file ssl_misc.h + * + * \brief Internal functions shared by the SSL modules + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_MISC_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MISC_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" +#include "pk_internal.h" +#include "common.h" + +/* Shorthand for restartable ECC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS 1 /* In progress */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE 2 /* Done or aborted */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING 3 /* Requested (server only) */ + +/* Faked handshake message identity for HelloRetryRequest. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_HS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST (-MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO) + +/* + * Internal identity of handshake extensions + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_UNRECOGNIZED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERVERNAME 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH 2 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_STATUS_REQUEST 3 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_GROUPS 4 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES 4 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG 5 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_USE_SRTP 6 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_HEARTBEAT 7 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ALPN 8 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SCT 9 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CLI_CERT_TYPE 10 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERV_CERT_TYPE 11 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PADDING 12 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PRE_SHARED_KEY 13 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EARLY_DATA 14 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS 15 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_COOKIE 16 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES 17 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CERT_AUTH 18 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_OID_FILTERS 19 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH 20 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG_CERT 21 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_KEY_SHARE 22 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_TRUNCATED_HMAC 23 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS 24 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC 25 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET 26 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SESSION_TICKET 27 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT 28 + +/* Utility for translating IANA extension type. */ +uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_id(unsigned int extension_type); +uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_mask(unsigned int extension_type); +/* Macros used to define mask constants */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(id) (1ULL << (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_##id)) +/* Reset value of extension mask */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE 0 + +/* In messages containing extension requests, we should ignore unrecognized + * extensions. In messages containing extension responses, unrecognized + * extensions should result in handshake abortion. Messages containing + * extension requests include ClientHello, CertificateRequest and + * NewSessionTicket. Messages containing extension responses include + * ServerHello, HelloRetryRequest, EncryptedExtensions and Certificate. + * + * RFC 8446 section 4.1.3 + * + * The ServerHello MUST only include extensions which are required to establish + * the cryptographic context and negotiate the protocol version. + * + * RFC 8446 section 4.2 + * + * If an implementation receives an extension which it recognizes and which is + * not specified for the message in which it appears, it MUST abort the handshake + * with an "illegal_parameter" alert. + */ + +/* Extensions that are not recognized by TLS 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_EXT_MASK_UNRECOGNIZED \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SESSION_TICKET) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(TRUNCATED_HMAC) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(UNRECOGNIZED)) + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for ClientHello */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CH \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SERVERNAME) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(STATUS_REQUEST) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_GROUPS) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(USE_SRTP) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(HEARTBEAT) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(ALPN) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SCT) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(CLI_CERT_TYPE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SERV_CERT_TYPE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PADDING) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(COOKIE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_VERSIONS) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(CERT_AUTH) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG_CERT) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_EXT_MASK_UNRECOGNIZED) + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for EncryptedExtensions */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_EE \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SERVERNAME) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_GROUPS) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(USE_SRTP) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(HEARTBEAT) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(ALPN) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(CLI_CERT_TYPE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SERV_CERT_TYPE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT)) + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for CertificateRequest */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CR \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(STATUS_REQUEST) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SCT) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(CERT_AUTH) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(OID_FILTERS) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG_CERT) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_EXT_MASK_UNRECOGNIZED) + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for Certificate */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CT \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(STATUS_REQUEST) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SCT)) + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for ServerHello */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_SH \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_VERSIONS)) + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for HelloRetryRequest */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_HRR \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(COOKIE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_VERSIONS)) + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for NewSessionTicket */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_NST \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_EXT_MASK_UNRECOGNIZED) + +/* + * Helper macros for function call with return check. + */ +/* + * Exit when return non-zero value + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(f) \ + do { \ + ret = (f); \ + if (ret != 0) \ + { \ + goto cleanup; \ + } \ + } while (0) +/* + * Exit when return negative value + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG(f) \ + do { \ + ret = (f); \ + if (ret < 0) \ + { \ + goto cleanup; \ + } \ + } while (0) + +/* + * DTLS retransmission states, see RFC 6347 4.2.4 + * + * The SENDING state is merged in PREPARING for initial sends, + * but is distinct for resends. + * + * Note: initial state is wrong for server, but is not used anyway. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING 2 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED 3 + +/* + * Allow extra bytes for record, authentication and encryption overhead: + * counter (8) + header (5) + IV(16) + MAC (16-48) + padding (0-256). + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + +/* This macro determines whether CBC is supported. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA)) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC +#endif + +/* This macro determines whether a ciphersuite using a + * stream cipher can be used. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM +#endif + +/* This macro determines whether the CBC construct used in TLS 1.2 is supported. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC +#endif + +/* This macro determines whether a ciphersuite uses Encrypt-then-MAC with CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) +/* Ciphersuites using HMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 48 /* SHA-384 used for HMAC */ +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 32 /* SHA-256 used for HMAC */ +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 20 /* SHA-1 used for HMAC */ +#endif +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ +/* AEAD ciphersuites: GCM and CCM use a 128 bits tag */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 16 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 256 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION 0 +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD (MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH + \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD + \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD + \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION \ + ) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN (MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN)) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN (MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN)) + +/* The maximum number of buffered handshake messages. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS 4 + +/* Maximum length we can advertise as our max content length for + RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension negotiation purposes + (the lesser of both sizes, if they are unequal.) + */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ( \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) \ + ? (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) \ + : (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) \ + ) + +/* Maximum size in bytes of list in signature algorithms ext., RFC 5246/8446 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_ALG_LIST_LEN 65534 + +/* Minimum size in bytes of list in signature algorithms ext., RFC 5246/8446 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_SIG_ALG_LIST_LEN 2 + +/* Maximum size in bytes of list in supported elliptic curve ext., RFC 4492 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CURVE_LIST_LEN 65535 + +#define MBEDTLS_RECEIVED_SIG_ALGS_SIZE 20 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(sig, hash) ((hash << 8) | sig) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_ALG_FROM_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(alg) (alg & 0xFF) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_HASH_ALG_FROM_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(alg) (alg >> 8) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Check that we obey the standard's message size bounds + */ + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > 16384 +#error "Bad configuration - incoming record content too large." +#endif + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN > 16384 +#error "Bad configuration - outgoing record content too large." +#endif + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN + 2048 +#error "Bad configuration - incoming protected record payload too large." +#endif + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + 2048 +#error "Bad configuration - outgoing protected record payload too large." +#endif + +/* Calculate buffer sizes */ + +/* Note: Even though the TLS record header is only 5 bytes + long, we're internally using 8 bytes to store the + implicit sequence number. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN 13 + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ + ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ + ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN) \ + + (MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX)) +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ + ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ + ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN) \ + + (MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX)) +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN 32 +#define MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN 32 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +/** + * \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for + * the output buffer. For the client, this is the configured + * value. For the server, it is the minimum of two - the + * configured value and the negotiated one. + * + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload() + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer. + */ +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/** + * \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for + * the input buffer. This is the negotiated maximum fragment + * length, or, if there is none, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN. + * If it is not defined either, the value is 2^14. This function + * works as its predecessor, \c mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len(). + * + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_in_record_payload() + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer. + */ +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) +/** + * \brief Get the size limit in bytes for the protected outgoing records + * as defined in RFC 8449 + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return The size limit in bytes for the protected outgoing + * records as defined in RFC 8449. + */ +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_record_size_limit(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(ctx) + + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX; +#else + return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(ctx) + + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD; +#endif +} + +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + return mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len(ctx) + + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX; +#else + return mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len(ctx) + + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD; +#endif +} +#endif + +/* + * TLS extension flags (for extensions with outgoing ServerHello content + * that need it (e.g. for RENEGOTIATION_INFO the server already knows because + * of state of the renegotiation flag, so no indicator is required) + */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT (1 << 0) +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK (1 << 1) + +/** + * \brief This function checks if the remaining size in a buffer is + * greater or equal than a needed space. + * + * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer. + * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer. + * \param need Needed space in bytes. + * + * \return Zero if the needed space is available in the buffer, non-zero + * otherwise. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr(const uint8_t *cur, + const uint8_t *end, size_t need) +{ + return (cur > end) || (need > (size_t) (end - cur)); +} +#else +typedef struct { + const uint8_t *cur; + const uint8_t *end; + size_t need; +} mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr_args; + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args( + const uint8_t *cur, const uint8_t *end, size_t need); +void mbedtls_ssl_reset_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args(void); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_cmp_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args(mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr_args *args); + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr(const uint8_t *cur, + const uint8_t *end, size_t need) +{ + if ((cur > end) || (need > (size_t) (end - cur))) { + mbedtls_ssl_set_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args(cur, end, need); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +/** + * \brief This macro checks if the remaining size in a buffer is + * greater or equal than a needed space. If it is not the case, + * it returns an SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL error. + * + * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer. + * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer. + * \param need Needed space in bytes. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(cur, end, need) \ + do { \ + if (mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr((cur), (end), (need)) != 0) \ + { \ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; \ + } \ + } while (0) + +/** + * \brief This macro checks if the remaining length in an input buffer is + * greater or equal than a needed length. If it is not the case, it + * returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR error and pends a + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR alert message. + * + * This is a function-like macro. It is guaranteed to evaluate each + * argument exactly once. + * + * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer. + * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer. + * \param need Needed length in bytes. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(cur, end, need) \ + do { \ + if (mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr((cur), (end), (need)) != 0) \ + { \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, \ + ("missing input data in %s", __func__)); \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, \ + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); \ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; \ + } \ + } while (0) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen); + +/* cipher.h exports the maximum IV, key and block length from + * all ciphers enabled in the config, regardless of whether those + * ciphers are actually usable in SSL/TLS. Notably, XTS is enabled + * in the default configuration and uses 64 Byte keys, but it is + * not used for record protection in SSL/TLS. + * + * In order to prevent unnecessary inflation of key structures, + * we introduce SSL-specific variants of the max-{key,block,IV} + * macros here which are meant to only take those ciphers into + * account which can be negotiated in SSL/TLS. + * + * Since the current definitions of MBEDTLS_MAX_{KEY|BLOCK|IV}_LENGTH + * in cipher.h are rough overapproximations of the real maxima, here + * we content ourselves with replicating those overapproximations + * for the maximum block and IV length, and excluding XTS from the + * computation of the maximum key length. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH 16 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH 16 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 32 + +/** + * \brief The data structure holding the cryptographic material (key and IV) + * used for record protection in TLS 1.3. + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set { + /*! The key for client->server records. */ + unsigned char client_write_key[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; + /*! The key for server->client records. */ + unsigned char server_write_key[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; + /*! The IV for client->server records. */ + unsigned char client_write_iv[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + /*! The IV for server->client records. */ + unsigned char server_write_iv[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + + size_t key_len; /*!< The length of client_write_key and + * server_write_key, in Bytes. */ + size_t iv_len; /*!< The length of client_write_iv and + * server_write_iv, in Bytes. */ +}; +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set mbedtls_ssl_key_set; + +typedef struct { + unsigned char binder_key[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char client_early_traffic_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; +} mbedtls_ssl_tls13_early_secrets; + +typedef struct { + unsigned char client_handshake_traffic_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char server_handshake_traffic_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; +} mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets; + +/* + * This structure contains the parameters only needed during handshake. + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params { + /* Frequently-used boolean or byte fields (placed early to take + * advantage of smaller code size for indirect access on Arm Thumb) */ + uint8_t resume; /*!< session resume indicator*/ + uint8_t cli_exts; /*!< client extension presence*/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + uint8_t sni_authmode; /*!< authmode from SNI callback */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* Flag indicating if a CertificateRequest message has been sent + * to the client or not. */ + uint8_t certificate_request_sent; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + /* Flag indicating if the server has accepted early data or not. */ + uint8_t early_data_accepted; +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + uint8_t new_session_ticket; /*!< use NewSessionTicket? */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + /** Minimum TLS version to be negotiated. + * + * It is set up in the ClientHello writing preparation stage and used + * throughout the ClientHello writing. Not relevant anymore as soon as + * the protocol version has been negotiated thus as soon as the + * ServerHello is received. + * For a fresh handshake not linked to any previous handshake, it is + * equal to the configured minimum minor version to be negotiated. When + * renegotiating or resuming a session, it is equal to the previously + * negotiated minor version. + * + * There is no maximum TLS version field in this handshake context. + * From the start of the handshake, we need to define a current protocol + * version for the record layer which we define as the maximum TLS + * version to be negotiated. The `tls_version` field of the SSL context is + * used to store this maximum value until it contains the actual + * negotiated value. + */ + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version min_tls_version; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + uint8_t extended_ms; /*!< use Extended Master Secret? */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + uint8_t async_in_progress; /*!< an asynchronous operation is in progress */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + unsigned char retransmit_state; /*!< Retransmission state */ +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + unsigned char group_list_heap_allocated; + unsigned char sig_algs_heap_allocated; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + uint8_t ecrs_enabled; /*!< Handshake supports EC restart? */ + enum { /* this complements ssl->state with info on intra-state operations */ + ssl_ecrs_none = 0, /*!< nothing going on (yet) */ + ssl_ecrs_crt_verify, /*!< Certificate: crt_verify() */ + ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing, /*!< ServerKeyExchange: pk_verify() */ + ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret, /*!< ClientKeyExchange: ECDH step 2 */ + ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign, /*!< CertificateVerify: pk_sign() */ + } ecrs_state; /*!< current (or last) operation */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *ecrs_peer_cert; /*!< The peer's CRT chain. */ + size_t ecrs_n; /*!< place for saving a length */ +#endif + + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t const *ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL + int (*update_checksum)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); + MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL + int (*calc_verify)(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *); + MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL + int (*calc_finished)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int); + mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf; + + /* + * Handshake specific crypto variables + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + uint8_t key_exchange_mode; /*!< Selected key exchange mode */ + + /** + * Flag indicating if, in the course of the current handshake, an + * HelloRetryRequest message has been sent by the server or received by + * the client (<> 0) or not (0). + */ + uint8_t hello_retry_request_flag; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + /** + * Flag indicating if, in the course of the current handshake, a dummy + * change_cipher_spec (CCS) record has already been sent. Used to send only + * one CCS per handshake while not complicating the handshake state + * transitions for that purpose. + */ + uint8_t ccs_sent; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + uint8_t tls13_kex_modes; /*!< Key exchange modes supported by the client */ +#endif + /** selected_group of key_share extension in HelloRetryRequest message. */ + uint16_t hrr_selected_group; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + uint16_t new_session_tickets_count; /*!< number of session tickets */ +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + uint16_t received_sig_algs[MBEDTLS_RECEIVED_SIG_ALGS_SIZE]; +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + const uint16_t *group_list; + const uint16_t *sig_algs; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + mbedtls_dhm_context dhm_ctx; /*!< DHM key exchange */ +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh_ctx; /*!< ECDH key exchange */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_PSA_ANY_ENABLED) + psa_key_type_t xxdh_psa_type; + size_t xxdh_psa_bits; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t xxdh_psa_privkey; + uint8_t xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external; + unsigned char xxdh_psa_peerkey[PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t xxdh_psa_peerkey_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_PSA_ANY_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_pake_operation_t psa_pake_ctx; /*!< EC J-PAKE key exchange */ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_pake_password; + uint8_t psa_pake_ctx_is_ok; +#else + mbedtls_ecjpake_context ecjpake_ctx; /*!< EC J-PAKE key exchange */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + unsigned char *ecjpake_cache; /*!< Cache for ClientHello ext */ + size_t ecjpake_cache_len; /*!< Length of cached data */ +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + uint16_t *curves_tls_id; /*!< List of TLS IDs of supported elliptic curves */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psk_opaque; /*!< Opaque PSK from the callback */ + uint8_t psk_opaque_is_internal; +#else + unsigned char *psk; /*!< PSK from the callback */ + size_t psk_len; /*!< Length of PSK from callback */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + uint16_t selected_identity; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx ecrs_ctx; /*!< restart context */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; /*!< chosen key/cert pair (server) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *sni_key_cert; /*!< key/cert list from SNI */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *sni_ca_chain; /*!< trusted CAs from SNI callback */ + mbedtls_x509_crl *sni_ca_crl; /*!< trusted CAs CRLs from SNI */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + mbedtls_pk_context peer_pubkey; /*!< The public key from the peer. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + struct { + size_t total_bytes_buffered; /*!< Cumulative size of heap allocated + * buffers used for message buffering. */ + + uint8_t seen_ccs; /*!< Indicates if a CCS message has + * been seen in the current flight. */ + + struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer { + unsigned is_valid : 1; + unsigned is_fragmented : 1; + unsigned is_complete : 1; + unsigned char *data; + size_t data_len; + } hs[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS]; + + struct { + unsigned char *data; + size_t len; + unsigned epoch; + } future_record; + + } buffering; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)) + unsigned char *cookie; /*!< HelloVerifyRequest cookie for DTLS + * HelloRetryRequest cookie for TLS 1.3 */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + /* RFC 6347 page 15 + ... + opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; + ... + */ + uint8_t cookie_len; +#else + /* RFC 8446 page 39 + ... + opaque cookie<0..2^16-1>; + ... + If TLS1_3 is enabled, the max length is 2^16 - 1 + */ + uint16_t cookie_len; /*!< DTLS: HelloVerifyRequest cookie length + * TLS1_3: HelloRetryRequest cookie length */ +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS || + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 ) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + unsigned char cookie_verify_result; /*!< Srv: flag for sending a cookie */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + unsigned int out_msg_seq; /*!< Outgoing handshake sequence number */ + unsigned int in_msg_seq; /*!< Incoming handshake sequence number */ + + uint32_t retransmit_timeout; /*!< Current value of timeout */ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight; /*!< Current outgoing flight */ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur_msg; /*!< Current message in flight */ + unsigned char *cur_msg_p; /*!< Position in current message */ + unsigned int in_flight_start_seq; /*!< Minimum message sequence in the + flight being received */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *alt_transform_out; /*!< Alternative transform for + resending messages */ + unsigned char alt_out_ctr[MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN]; /*!< Alternative record epoch/counter + for resending messages */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* The state of CID configuration in this handshake. */ + + uint8_t cid_in_use; /*!< This indicates whether the use of the CID extension + * has been negotiated. Possible values are + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED and + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */ + unsigned char peer_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX]; /*! The peer's CID */ + uint8_t peer_cid_len; /*!< The length of + * \c peer_cid. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + uint16_t mtu; /*!< Handshake mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* + * Checksum contexts + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha256_psa; +#else + mbedtls_md_context_t fin_sha256; +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha384_psa; +#else + mbedtls_md_context_t fin_sha384; +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + uint16_t offered_group_id; /* The NamedGroup value for the group + * that is being used for ephemeral + * key exchange. + * + * On the client: Defaults to the first + * entry in the client's group list, + * but can be overwritten by the HRR. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + uint8_t client_auth; /*!< used to check if CertificateRequest has been + received from server side. If CertificateRequest + has been received, Certificate and CertificateVerify + should be sent to server */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + /* + * State-local variables used during the processing + * of a specific handshake state. + */ + union { + /* Outgoing Finished message */ + struct { + uint8_t preparation_done; + + /* Buffer holding digest of the handshake up to + * but excluding the outgoing finished message. */ + unsigned char digest[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t digest_len; + } finished_out; + + /* Incoming Finished message */ + struct { + uint8_t preparation_done; + + /* Buffer holding digest of the handshake up to but + * excluding the peer's incoming finished message. */ + unsigned char digest[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t digest_len; + } finished_in; + + } state_local; + + /* End of state-local variables. */ + + unsigned char randbytes[MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN]; + /*!< random bytes */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + unsigned char premaster[MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE]; + /*!< premaster secret */ + size_t pmslen; /*!< premaster length */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + uint32_t sent_extensions; /*!< extensions sent by endpoint */ + uint32_t received_extensions; /*!< extensions received by endpoint */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + unsigned char certificate_request_context_len; + unsigned char *certificate_request_context; +#endif + + /** TLS 1.3 transform for encrypted handshake messages. */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_handshake; + union { + unsigned char early[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char handshake[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char app[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + } tls13_master_secrets; + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets tls13_hs_secrets; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + /** TLS 1.3 transform for early data and handshake messages. */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_earlydata; +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + /** Asynchronous operation context. This field is meant for use by the + * asynchronous operation callbacks (mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_sign_start, + * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_decrypt_start, + * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_resume, mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_cancel). + * The library does not use it internally. */ + void *user_async_ctx; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + const unsigned char *sni_name; /*!< raw SNI */ + size_t sni_name_len; /*!< raw SNI len */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + const mbedtls_x509_crt *dn_hints; /*!< acceptable client cert issuers */ +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ +}; + +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer; + +/* + * Representation of decryption/encryption transformations on records + * + * There are the following general types of record transformations: + * - Stream transformations (TLS versions == 1.2 only) + * Transformation adding a MAC and applying a stream-cipher + * to the authenticated message. + * - CBC block cipher transformations ([D]TLS versions == 1.2 only) + * For TLS 1.2, no IV is generated at key extraction time, but every + * encrypted record is explicitly prefixed by the IV with which it was + * encrypted. + * - AEAD transformations ([D]TLS versions == 1.2 only) + * These come in two fundamentally different versions, the first one + * used in TLS 1.2, excluding ChaChaPoly ciphersuites, and the second + * one used for ChaChaPoly ciphersuites in TLS 1.2 as well as for TLS 1.3. + * In the first transformation, the IV to be used for a record is obtained + * as the concatenation of an explicit, static 4-byte IV and the 8-byte + * record sequence number, and explicitly prepending this sequence number + * to the encrypted record. In contrast, in the second transformation + * the IV is obtained by XOR'ing a static IV obtained at key extraction + * time with the 8-byte record sequence number, without prepending the + * latter to the encrypted record. + * + * Additionally, DTLS 1.2 + CID as well as TLS 1.3 use an inner plaintext + * which allows to add flexible length padding and to hide a record's true + * content type. + * + * In addition to type and version, the following parameters are relevant: + * - The symmetric cipher algorithm to be used. + * - The (static) encryption/decryption keys for the cipher. + * - For stream/CBC, the type of message digest to be used. + * - For stream/CBC, (static) encryption/decryption keys for the digest. + * - For AEAD transformations, the size (potentially 0) of an explicit, + * random initialization vector placed in encrypted records. + * - For some transformations (currently AEAD) an implicit IV. It is static + * and (if present) is combined with the explicit IV in a transformation- + * -dependent way (e.g. appending in TLS 1.2 and XOR'ing in TLS 1.3). + * - For stream/CBC, a flag determining the order of encryption and MAC. + * - The details of the transformation depend on the SSL/TLS version. + * - The length of the authentication tag. + * + * The struct below refines this abstract view as follows: + * - The cipher underlying the transformation is managed in + * cipher contexts cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}, which must have the + * same cipher type. The mode of these cipher contexts determines + * the type of the transformation in the sense above: e.g., if + * the type is MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC resp. MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM + * then the transformation has type CBC resp. AEAD. + * - The cipher keys are never stored explicitly but + * are maintained within cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}. + * - For stream/CBC transformations, the message digest contexts + * used for the MAC's are stored in md_ctx_{enc/dec}. These contexts + * are unused for AEAD transformations. + * - For stream/CBC transformations, the MAC keys are not stored explicitly + * but maintained within md_ctx_{enc/dec}. + * - The mac_enc and mac_dec fields are unused for EAD transformations. + * - For transformations using an implicit IV maintained within + * the transformation context, its contents are stored within + * iv_{enc/dec}. + * - The value of ivlen indicates the length of the IV. + * This is redundant in case of stream/CBC transformations + * which always use 0 resp. the cipher's block length as the + * IV length, but is needed for AEAD ciphers and may be + * different from the underlying cipher's block length + * in this case. + * - The field fixed_ivlen is nonzero for AEAD transformations only + * and indicates the length of the static part of the IV which is + * constant throughout the communication, and which is stored in + * the first fixed_ivlen bytes of the iv_{enc/dec} arrays. + * - tls_version denotes the 2-byte TLS version + * - For stream/CBC transformations, maclen denotes the length of the + * authentication tag, while taglen is unused and 0. + * - For AEAD transformations, taglen denotes the length of the + * authentication tag, while maclen is unused and 0. + * - For CBC transformations, encrypt_then_mac determines the + * order of encryption and authentication. This field is unused + * in other transformations. + * + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_transform { + /* + * Session specific crypto layer + */ + size_t minlen; /*!< min. ciphertext length */ + size_t ivlen; /*!< IV length */ + size_t fixed_ivlen; /*!< Fixed part of IV (AEAD) */ + size_t maclen; /*!< MAC(CBC) len */ + size_t taglen; /*!< TAG(AEAD) len */ + + unsigned char iv_enc[16]; /*!< IV (encryption) */ + unsigned char iv_dec[16]; /*!< IV (decryption) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_mac_enc; /*!< MAC (encryption) */ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_mac_dec; /*!< MAC (decryption) */ + psa_algorithm_t psa_mac_alg; /*!< psa MAC algorithm */ +#else + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_enc; /*!< MAC (encryption) */ + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_dec; /*!< MAC (decryption) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + int encrypt_then_mac; /*!< flag for EtM activation */ +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ + + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_key_enc; /*!< psa encryption key */ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_key_dec; /*!< psa decryption key */ + psa_algorithm_t psa_alg; /*!< psa algorithm */ +#else + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_enc; /*!< encryption context */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_dec; /*!< decryption context */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + uint8_t in_cid_len; + uint8_t out_cid_len; + unsigned char in_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX]; + unsigned char out_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX]; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + /* We need the Hello random bytes in order to re-derive keys from the + * Master Secret and other session info, + * see ssl_tls12_populate_transform() */ + unsigned char randbytes[MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN]; + /*!< ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ +}; + +/* + * Return 1 if the transform uses an AEAD cipher, 0 otherwise. + * Equivalently, return 0 if a separate MAC is used, 1 otherwise. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_transform_uses_aead( + const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + return transform->maclen == 0 && transform->taglen != 0; +#else + (void) transform; + return 1; +#endif +} + +/* + * Internal representation of record frames + * + * Instances come in two flavors: + * (1) Encrypted + * These always have data_offset = 0 + * (2) Unencrypted + * These have data_offset set to the amount of + * pre-expansion during record protection. Concretely, + * this is the length of the fixed part of the explicit IV + * used for encryption, or 0 if no explicit IV is used + * (e.g. for stream ciphers). + * + * The reason for the data_offset in the unencrypted case + * is to allow for in-place conversion of an unencrypted to + * an encrypted record. If the offset wasn't included, the + * encrypted content would need to be shifted afterwards to + * make space for the fixed IV. + * + */ +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX +#endif + +typedef struct { + uint8_t ctr[MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN]; /* In TLS: The implicit record sequence number. + * In DTLS: The 2-byte epoch followed by + * the 6-byte sequence number. + * This is stored as a raw big endian byte array + * as opposed to a uint64_t because we rarely + * need to perform arithmetic on this, but do + * need it as a Byte array for the purpose of + * MAC computations. */ + uint8_t type; /* The record content type. */ + uint8_t ver[2]; /* SSL/TLS version as present on the wire. + * Convert to internal presentation of versions + * using mbedtls_ssl_read_version() and + * mbedtls_ssl_write_version(). + * Keep wire-format for MAC computations. */ + + unsigned char *buf; /* Memory buffer enclosing the record content */ + size_t buf_len; /* Buffer length */ + size_t data_offset; /* Offset of record content */ + size_t data_len; /* Length of record content */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + uint8_t cid_len; /* Length of the CID (0 if not present) */ + unsigned char cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX]; /* The CID */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ +} mbedtls_record; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +/* + * List of certificate + private key pairs + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert { + mbedtls_x509_crt *cert; /*!< cert */ + mbedtls_pk_context *key; /*!< private key */ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *next; /*!< next key/cert pair */ +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +/* + * List of handshake messages kept around for resending + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item { + unsigned char *p; /*!< message, including handshake headers */ + size_t len; /*!< length of p */ + unsigned char type; /*!< type of the message: handshake or CCS */ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *next; /*!< next handshake message(s) */ +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +/** + * \brief Given an SSL context and its associated configuration, write the TLS + * 1.2 specific extensions of the ClientHello message. + * + * \param[in] ssl SSL context + * \param[in] buf Base address of the buffer where to write the extensions + * \param[in] end End address of the buffer where to write the extensions + * \param uses_ec Whether one proposed ciphersuite uses an elliptic curve + * (<> 0) or not ( 0 ). + * \param[out] out_len Length of the data written into the buffer \p buf + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_write_client_hello_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + int uses_ec, + size_t *out_len); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + +/** + * \brief Find the preferred hash for a given signature algorithm. + * + * \param[in] ssl SSL context + * \param[in] sig_alg A signature algorithm identifier as defined in the + * TLS 1.2 SignatureAlgorithm enumeration. + * + * \return The preferred hash algorithm for \p sig_alg. It is a hash algorithm + * identifier as defined in the TLS 1.2 HashAlgorithm enumeration. + */ +unsigned int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned int sig_alg); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +/** + * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL transform context and clear + * memory + * + * \param transform SSL transform context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform); + +/** + * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL handshake context and clear + * memory + * + * \param ssl SSL context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/* set inbound transform of ssl context */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform); + +/* set outbound transform of ssl context */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +static inline void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_states state) +{ + ssl->state = (int) state; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/** + * \brief Update record layer + * + * This function roughly separates the implementation + * of the logic of (D)TLS from the implementation + * of the secure transport. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to use. + * \param update_hs_digest This indicates if the handshake digest + * should be automatically updated in case + * a handshake message is found. + * + * \return 0 or non-zero error code. + * + * \note A clarification on what is called 'record layer' here + * is in order, as many sensible definitions are possible: + * + * The record layer takes as input an untrusted underlying + * transport (stream or datagram) and transforms it into + * a serially multiplexed, secure transport, which + * conceptually provides the following: + * + * (1) Three datagram based, content-agnostic transports + * for handshake, alert and CCS messages. + * (2) One stream- or datagram-based transport + * for application data. + * (3) Functionality for changing the underlying transform + * securing the contents. + * + * The interface to this functionality is given as follows: + * + * a Updating + * [Currently implemented by mbedtls_ssl_read_record] + * + * Check if and on which of the four 'ports' data is pending: + * Nothing, a controlling datagram of type (1), or application + * data (2). In any case data is present, internal buffers + * provide access to the data for the user to process it. + * Consumption of type (1) datagrams is done automatically + * on the next update, invalidating that the internal buffers + * for previous datagrams, while consumption of application + * data (2) is user-controlled. + * + * b Reading of application data + * [Currently manual adaption of ssl->in_offt pointer] + * + * As mentioned in the last paragraph, consumption of data + * is different from the automatic consumption of control + * datagrams (1) because application data is treated as a stream. + * + * c Tracking availability of application data + * [Currently manually through decreasing ssl->in_msglen] + * + * For efficiency and to retain datagram semantics for + * application data in case of DTLS, the record layer + * provides functionality for checking how much application + * data is still available in the internal buffer. + * + * d Changing the transformation securing the communication. + * + * Given an opaque implementation of the record layer in the + * above sense, it should be possible to implement the logic + * of (D)TLS on top of it without the need to know anything + * about the record layer's internals. This is done e.g. + * in all the handshake handling functions, and in the + * application data reading function mbedtls_ssl_read. + * + * \note The above tries to give a conceptual picture of the + * record layer, but the current implementation deviates + * from it in some places. For example, our implementation of + * the update functionality through mbedtls_ssl_read_record + * discards datagrams depending on the current state, which + * wouldn't fall under the record layer's responsibility + * following the above definition. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_read_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned update_hs_digest); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want); + +/* + * Write handshake message header + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char hs_type, + unsigned char **buf, size_t *buf_len); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int update_checksum, + int force_flush); +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg_ext(ssl, 1 /* update checksum */, 1 /* force flush */); +} + +/* + * Write handshake message tail + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t buf_len, size_t msg_len); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int force_flush); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +void mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info); + +/* + * Update checksum of handshake messages. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned hs_type, + unsigned char const *msg, + size_t msg_len); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned hs_type, + size_t total_hs_len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_ex); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/** + * Get the first defined opaque PSK by order of precedence: + * 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque() in the PSK + * callback + * 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque() + * Return an opaque PSK + */ +static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t mbedtls_ssl_get_opaque_psk( + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque)) { + return ssl->handshake->psk_opaque; + } + + if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->conf->psk_opaque)) { + return ssl->conf->psk_opaque; + } + + return MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +} +#else +/** + * Get the first defined PSK by order of precedence: + * 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() in the PSK callback + * 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() + * Return a code and update the pair (PSK, PSK length) passed to this function + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_get_psk(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char **psk, size_t *psk_len) +{ + if (ssl->handshake->psk != NULL && ssl->handshake->psk_len > 0) { + *psk = ssl->handshake->psk; + *psk_len = ssl->handshake->psk_len; + } else if (ssl->conf->psk != NULL && ssl->conf->psk_len > 0) { + *psk = ssl->conf->psk; + *psk_len = ssl->conf->psk_len; + } else { + *psk = NULL; + *psk_len = 0; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk(mbedtls_pk_context *pk); +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(mbedtls_pk_type_t type); +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig(unsigned char sig); +#endif + +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(unsigned char hash); +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(int md); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int md); +#endif + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t tls_id); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +/** + * \brief Return PSA EC info for the specified TLS ID. + * + * \param tls_id The TLS ID to look for + * \param type If the TLD ID is supported, then proper \c psa_key_type_t + * value is returned here. Can be NULL. + * \param bits If the TLD ID is supported, then proper bit size is returned + * here. Can be NULL. + * \return PSA_SUCCESS if the TLS ID is supported, + * PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED otherwise + * + * \note If either \c family or \c bits parameters are NULL, then + * the corresponding value is not returned. + * The function can be called with both parameters as NULL + * simply to check if a specific TLS ID is supported. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(uint16_t tls_id, + psa_key_type_t *type, + size_t *bits); + +/** + * \brief Return \c mbedtls_ecp_group_id for the specified TLS ID. + * + * \param tls_id The TLS ID to look for + * \return Proper \c mbedtls_ecp_group_id if the TLS ID is supported, + * or MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE otherwise + */ +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(uint16_t tls_id); + +/** + * \brief Return TLS ID for the specified \c mbedtls_ecp_group_id. + * + * \param grp_id The \c mbedtls_ecp_group_id ID to look for + * \return Proper TLS ID if the \c mbedtls_ecp_group_id is supported, + * or 0 otherwise + */ +uint16_t mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) +/** + * \brief Return EC's name for the specified TLS ID. + * + * \param tls_id The TLS ID to look for + * \return A pointer to a const string with the proper name. If TLS + * ID is not supported, a NULL pointer is returned instead. + */ +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_curve_name_from_tls_id(uint16_t tls_id); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +static inline mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value + (const uint16_t srtp_profile_value) +{ + switch (srtp_profile_value) { + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80: + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32: + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80: + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32: + return srtp_profile_value; + default: break; + } + return MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +static inline mbedtls_pk_context *mbedtls_ssl_own_key(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; + + if (ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL) { + key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert; + } else { + key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert; + } + + return key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->key; +} + +static inline mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; + + if (ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL) { + key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert; + } else { + key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert; + } + + return key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->cert; +} + +/* + * Check usage of a certificate wrt extensions: + * keyUsage, extendedKeyUsage (later), and nSCertType (later). + * + * Warning: cert_endpoint is the endpoint of the cert (ie, of our peer when we + * check a cert we received from them)! + * + * Return 0 if everything is OK, -1 if not. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite, + int cert_endpoint, + uint32_t *flags); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_write_version(unsigned char version[2], int transport, + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version); +uint16_t mbedtls_ssl_read_version(const unsigned char version[2], + int transport); + +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + ((void) ssl); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + return 13; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + { + return 5; + } +} + +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return (size_t) (ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_hdr); +} + +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + return 12; + } +#else + ((void) ssl); +#endif + return 4; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_resend(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif + +/* Visible for testing purposes only */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl); +void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, + const mbedtls_ssl_session *src); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +/* The hash buffer must have at least MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE bytes of length. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen, + unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +void mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + mbedtls_record *rec, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + mbedtls_record *rec); + +/* Length of the "epoch" field in the record header */ +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_ep_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + return 2; + } +#else + ((void) ssl); +#endif + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint32_t millisecs); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_check_timer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +void mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform); +void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial); +void mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_msg_layer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int partial); + +/* + * Send pending alert + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_handle_pending_alert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/* + * Set pending fatal alert flag. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char alert_type, + int alert_reason); + +/* Alias of mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(type, user_return_value) \ + mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert(ssl, type, user_return_value) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif + +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +void mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +void mbedtls_ssl_flight_free(mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +/** + * ssl utils functions for checking configuration. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls13_only(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ + return conf->min_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 && + conf->max_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_only(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ + return conf->min_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 && + conf->max_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls13_enabled(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + return conf->min_tls_version <= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 && + conf->max_tls_version >= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; +#else + ((void) conf); + return 0; +#endif +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_enabled(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + return conf->min_tls_version <= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 && + conf->max_tls_version >= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; +#else + ((void) conf); + return 0; +#endif +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_hybrid_tls12_tls13(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ + return conf->min_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 && + conf->max_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +extern const uint8_t mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic[ + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN]; +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_finished_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_finished_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/** + * \brief Given an SSL context and its associated configuration, write the TLS + * 1.3 specific extensions of the ClientHello message. + * + * \param[in] ssl SSL context + * \param[in] buf Base address of the buffer where to write the extensions + * \param[in] end End address of the buffer where to write the extensions + * \param[out] out_len Length of the data written into the buffer \p buf + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_client_hello_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len); + +/** + * \brief TLS 1.3 client side state machine entry + * + * \param ssl SSL context + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/** + * \brief TLS 1.3 server side state machine entry + * + * \param ssl SSL context + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_server_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + + +/* + * Helper functions around key exchange modes. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_kex_mode_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int kex_mode_mask) +{ + return (ssl->conf->tls13_kex_modes & kex_mode_mask) != 0; +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_psk_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_kex_mode_enabled(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_psk_ephemeral_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_kex_mode_enabled(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_ephemeral_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_kex_mode_enabled(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_ephemeral_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_kex_mode_enabled(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_psk_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_kex_mode_enabled(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +/** + * Given a list of key exchange modes, check if at least one of them is + * supported by peer. + * + * \param[in] ssl SSL context + * \param kex_modes_mask Mask of the key exchange modes to check + * + * \return Non-zero if at least one of the key exchange modes is supported by + * the peer, otherwise \c 0. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_kex_mode_supported(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int kex_modes_mask) +{ + return (ssl->handshake->tls13_kex_modes & kex_modes_mask) != 0; +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_psk_supported(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_kex_mode_supported(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_psk_ephemeral_supported( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_kex_mode_supported(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_ephemeral_supported(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_kex_mode_supported(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_some_ephemeral_supported(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_kex_mode_supported(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_some_psk_supported(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_kex_mode_supported(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Helper functions for extensions checking. + */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int hs_msg_type, + unsigned int received_extension_type, + uint32_t hs_msg_allowed_extensions_mask); + +static inline void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned int extension_type) +{ + ssl->handshake->sent_extensions |= + mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_mask(extension_type); +} + +/* + * Helper functions to check the selected key exchange mode. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_check( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int kex_mask) +{ + return (ssl->handshake->key_exchange_mode & kex_mask) != 0; +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_psk( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_check(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_ephemeral( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_check(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL); +} + +/* + * Fetch TLS 1.3 handshake message header + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned hs_type, + unsigned char **buf, + size_t *buf_len); + +/** + * \brief Detect if a list of extensions contains a supported_versions + * extension or not. + * + * \param[in] ssl SSL context + * \param[in] buf Address of the first byte of the extensions vector. + * \param[in] end End of the buffer containing the list of extensions. + * \param[out] supported_versions_data If the extension is present, address of + * its first byte of data, NULL otherwise. + * \param[out] supported_versions_data_end If the extension is present, address + * of the first byte immediately + * following the extension data, NULL + * otherwise. + * \return 0 if the list of extensions does not contain a supported_versions + * extension. + * \return 1 if the list of extensions contains a supported_versions + * extension. + * \return A negative value if an error occurred while parsing the + * extensions. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_supported_versions_ext_present_in_exts( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *end, + const unsigned char **supported_versions_data, + const unsigned char **supported_versions_data_end); + +/* + * Handler of TLS 1.3 server certificate message + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +/* + * Handler of TLS 1.3 write Certificate message + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/* + * Handler of TLS 1.3 write Certificate Verify message + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Generic handler of Certificate Verify + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/* + * Write of dummy-CCS's for middlebox compatibility + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_reset_transcript_for_hrr(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_and_write_xxdh_key_exchange( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint16_t named_group, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len); +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int in_new_session_ticket, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len); + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_early_data_len(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t early_data_len); + +typedef enum { +/* + * The client has not sent the first ClientHello yet, the negotiation of early + * data has not started yet. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IDLE, + +/* + * In its ClientHello, the client has not included an early data indication + * extension. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NO_IND_SENT, + +/* + * The client has sent an early data indication extension in its first + * ClientHello, it has not received the response (ServerHello or + * HelloRetryRequest) from the server yet. The transform to protect early data + * is not set either as for middlebox compatibility a dummy CCS may have to be + * sent in clear. Early data cannot be sent to the server yet. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IND_SENT, + +/* + * The client has sent an early data indication extension in its first + * ClientHello, it has not received the response (ServerHello or + * HelloRetryRequest) from the server yet. The transform to protect early data + * has been set and early data can be written now. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_CAN_WRITE, + +/* + * The client has indicated the use of early data and the server has accepted + * it. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTED, + +/* + * The client has indicated the use of early data but the server has rejected + * it. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED, + +/* + * The client has sent an early data indication extension in its first + * ClientHello, the server has accepted them and the client has received the + * server Finished message. It cannot send early data to the server anymore. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED, + +} mbedtls_ssl_early_data_state; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/* + * Write Signature Algorithm extension + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_sig_alg_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, size_t *out_len); +/* + * Parse TLS Signature Algorithm extension + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +/* Get handshake transcript */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_md_type_t md, + unsigned char *dst, + size_t dst_len, + size_t *olen); + +/* + * Return supported groups. + * + * In future, invocations can be changed to ssl->conf->group_list + * when mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves() is deleted. + * + * ssl->handshake->group_list is either a translation of curve_list to IANA TLS group + * identifiers when mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves() has been used, or a pointer to + * ssl->conf->group_list when mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups() has been more recently invoked. + * + */ +static inline const void *mbedtls_ssl_get_groups(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + return ssl->conf->group_list; + #else + if ((ssl->handshake != NULL) && (ssl->handshake->group_list != NULL)) { + return ssl->handshake->group_list; + } else { + return ssl->conf->group_list; + } + #endif +} + +/* + * Helper functions for NamedGroup. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_named_group_is_ecdhe(uint16_t named_group) +{ + /* + * RFC 8422 section 5.1.1 + */ + return named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP256R1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP384R1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP512R1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448 || + /* Below deprecated curves should be removed with notice to users */ + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192K1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192R1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224K1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224R1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256K1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1; +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(uint16_t named_group) +{ + return named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448; +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(uint16_t named_group) +{ + return named_group >= MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE2048 && + named_group <= MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192; +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_named_group_is_offered( + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t named_group) +{ + const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups(ssl); + + if (group_list == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + for (; *group_list != 0; group_list++) { + if (*group_list == named_group) { + return 1; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_named_group_is_supported(uint16_t named_group) +{ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(named_group)) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(named_group) != + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { + return 1; + } + } +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(named_group)) { + return 1; + } +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + (void) named_group; +#endif + return 0; +} + +/* + * Return supported signature algorithms. + * + * In future, invocations can be changed to ssl->conf->sig_algs when + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes() is deleted. + * + * ssl->handshake->sig_algs is either a translation of sig_hashes to IANA TLS + * signature algorithm identifiers when mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes() has been + * used, or a pointer to ssl->conf->sig_algs when mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_algs() has + * been more recently invoked. + * + */ +static inline const void *mbedtls_ssl_get_sig_algs( + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + if (ssl->handshake != NULL && + ssl->handshake->sig_algs_heap_allocated == 1 && + ssl->handshake->sig_algs != NULL) { + return ssl->handshake->sig_algs; + } +#endif + return ssl->conf->sig_algs; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + + ((void) ssl); + return NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_received(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint16_t own_sig_alg) +{ + const uint16_t *sig_alg = ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs; + if (sig_alg == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + for (; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++) { + if (*sig_alg == own_sig_alg) { + return 1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_for_cert_verify_is_supported( + const uint16_t sig_alg) +{ + switch (sig_alg) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME) +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) && defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256: + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 && MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) && defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384: + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 && MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) && defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512: + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 && MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256: + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384: + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512: + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + default: + return 0; + } + return 1; + +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_is_supported( + const uint16_t sig_alg) +{ + switch (sig_alg) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256: + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384: + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512: + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ + default: + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_for_cert_verify_is_supported( + sig_alg); + } + return 1; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_sig_alg_cert_key_match(uint16_t sig_alg, + mbedtls_pk_context *key); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint16_t proposed_sig_alg) +{ + const uint16_t *sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_sig_algs(ssl); + if (sig_alg == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + for (; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++) { + if (*sig_alg == proposed_sig_alg) { + return 1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_get_pk_type_and_md_alg_from_sig_alg( + uint16_t sig_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_type, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg) +{ + *pk_type = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig(sig_alg & 0xff); + *md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash((sig_alg >> 8) & 0xff); + + if (*pk_type != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE && *md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { + return 0; + } + + switch (sig_alg) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256: + *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256; + *pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384: + *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384; + *pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512: + *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512; + *pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_sig_alg_is_supported( + const uint16_t sig_alg) +{ + /* High byte is hash */ + unsigned char hash = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(sig_alg); + unsigned char sig = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(sig_alg); + + switch (hash) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5: + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1: + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224: + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256: + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384: + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512: + break; +#endif + + default: + return 0; + } + + switch (sig) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA: + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA: + break; +#endif + + default: + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported( + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const uint16_t sig_alg) +{ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + return mbedtls_ssl_tls12_sig_alg_is_supported(sig_alg); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_is_supported(sig_alg); + } +#endif + ((void) ssl); + ((void) sig_alg); + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +/* Corresponding PSA algorithm for MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL. + * Same value is used for PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER, hence it is + * guaranteed to not be a valid PSA algorithm identifier. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_NULL_CIPHER 0x04000000 + +/** + * \brief Translate mbedtls cipher type/taglen pair to psa: + * algorithm, key type and key size. + * + * \param mbedtls_cipher_type [in] given mbedtls cipher type + * \param taglen [in] given tag length + * 0 - default tag length + * \param alg [out] corresponding PSA alg + * There is no corresponding PSA + * alg for MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, so + * in this case MBEDTLS_SSL_NULL_CIPHER + * is returned via this parameter + * \param key_type [out] corresponding PSA key type + * \param key_size [out] corresponding PSA key size + * + * \return PSA_SUCCESS on success or PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED if + * conversion is not supported. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa(mbedtls_cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_type, + size_t taglen, + psa_algorithm_t *alg, + psa_key_type_t *key_type, + size_t *key_size); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +/** + * \brief Convert given PSA status to mbedtls error code. + * + * \param status [in] given PSA status + * + * \return corresponding mbedtls error code + */ +static inline MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls(psa_status_t status) +{ + switch (status) { + case PSA_SUCCESS: + return 0; + case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; + case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + case PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + case PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE, + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO +} mbedtls_ecjpake_rounds_t; + +/** + * \brief Parse the provided input buffer for getting the first round + * of key exchange. This code is common between server and client + * + * \param pake_ctx [in] the PAKE's operation/context structure + * \param buf [in] input buffer to parse + * \param len [in] length of the input buffer + * \param round [in] either MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE or + * MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO + * + * \return 0 on success or a negative error code in case of failure + */ +int mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round( + psa_pake_operation_t *pake_ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, mbedtls_ecjpake_rounds_t round); + +/** + * \brief Write the first round of key exchange into the provided output + * buffer. This code is common between server and client + * + * \param pake_ctx [in] the PAKE's operation/context structure + * \param buf [out] the output buffer in which data will be written to + * \param len [in] length of the output buffer + * \param olen [out] the length of the data really written on the buffer + * \param round [in] either MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE or + * MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO + * + * \return 0 on success or a negative error code in case of failure + */ +int mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round( + psa_pake_operation_t *pake_ctx, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, size_t *olen, + mbedtls_ecjpake_rounds_t round); + +#endif //MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED && MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + +/** + * \brief TLS record protection modes + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_STREAM = 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC_ETM, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_AEAD +} mbedtls_ssl_mode_t; + +mbedtls_ssl_mode_t mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_transform( + const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) +mbedtls_ssl_mode_t mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_ciphersuite( + int encrypt_then_mac, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite); +#else +mbedtls_ssl_mode_t mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_ciphersuite( + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_read_public_xxdhe_share(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len); + +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_cipher_suite_is_offered( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int cipher_suite) +{ + const int *ciphersuite_list = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list; + + /* Check whether we have offered this ciphersuite */ + for (size_t i = 0; ciphersuite_list[i] != 0; i++) { + if (ciphersuite_list[i] == cipher_suite) { + return 1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/** + * \brief Validate cipher suite against config in SSL context. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param suite_info Cipher suite to validate + * \param min_tls_version Minimal TLS version to accept a cipher suite + * \param max_tls_version Maximal TLS version to accept a cipher suite + * + * \return 0 if valid, negative value otherwise. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_validate_ciphersuite( + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info, + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version min_tls_version, + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version max_tls_version); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_server_name_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_EXTENSION_DATA_LENGTH (2) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_MIN (64) /* As defined in RFC 8449 */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_record_size_limit_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_record_size_limit_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end); + + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +int mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len, + const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, + unsigned char *obuf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +/** + * \brief Given an SSL context and its associated configuration, write the TLS + * 1.3 specific Pre-Shared key extension. + * + * \param[in] ssl SSL context + * \param[in] buf Base address of the buffer where to write the extension + * \param[in] end End address of the buffer where to write the extension + * \param[out] out_len Length in bytes of the Pre-Shared key extension: data + * written into the buffer \p buf by this function plus + * the length of the binders to be written. + * \param[out] binders_len Length of the binders to be written at the end of + * the extension. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_identities_of_pre_shared_key_ext( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len, size_t *binders_len); + +/** + * \brief Given an SSL context and its associated configuration, write the TLS + * 1.3 specific Pre-Shared key extension binders at the end of the + * ClientHello. + * + * \param[in] ssl SSL context + * \param[in] buf Base address of the buffer where to write the binders + * \param[in] end End address of the buffer where to write the binders + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_binders_of_pre_shared_key_ext( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *end); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_session_set_hostname(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const char *hostname); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_session_set_ticket_alpn(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const char *alpn); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_MAX_ALLOWED_TICKET_LIFETIME (604800) + +static inline unsigned int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_get_ticket_flags( + mbedtls_ssl_session *session, unsigned int flags) +{ + return session->ticket_flags & + (flags & MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK); +} + +/** + * Check if at least one of the given flags is set in + * the session ticket. See the definition of + * `MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK` to get all + * permitted flags. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_has_flags( + mbedtls_ssl_session *session, unsigned int flags) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_get_ticket_flags(session, flags) != 0; +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_allow_psk( + mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_has_flags( + session, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_PSK_RESUMPTION); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_allow_psk_ephemeral( + mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_has_flags( + session, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_PSK_EPHEMERAL_RESUMPTION); +} + +static inline unsigned int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_allow_early_data( + mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_has_flags( + session, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_EARLY_DATA); +} + +static inline void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_set_ticket_flags( + mbedtls_ssl_session *session, unsigned int flags) +{ + session->ticket_flags |= (flags & MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK); +} + +static inline void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_clear_ticket_flags( + mbedtls_ssl_session *session, unsigned int flags) +{ + session->ticket_flags &= ~(flags & MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + +/** Compute the HMAC of variable-length data with constant flow. + * + * This function computes the HMAC of the concatenation of \p add_data and \p + * data, and does with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not + * depend on \p data_len_secret, but only on \p min_data_len and \p + * max_data_len. In particular, this function always reads exactly \p + * max_data_len bytes from \p data. + * + * \param ctx The HMAC context. It must have keys configured + * with mbedtls_md_hmac_starts() and use one of the + * following hashes: SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1 or MD-5. + * It is reset using mbedtls_md_hmac_reset() after + * the computation is complete to prepare for the + * next computation. + * \param add_data The first part of the message whose HMAC is being + * calculated. This must point to a readable buffer + * of \p add_data_len bytes. + * \param add_data_len The length of \p add_data in bytes. + * \param data The buffer containing the second part of the + * message. This must point to a readable buffer + * of \p max_data_len bytes. + * \param data_len_secret The length of the data to process in \p data. + * This must be no less than \p min_data_len and no + * greater than \p max_data_len. + * \param min_data_len The minimal length of the second part of the + * message, read from \p data. + * \param max_data_len The maximal length of the second part of the + * message, read from \p data. + * \param output The HMAC will be written here. This must point to + * a writable buffer of sufficient size to hold the + * HMAC value. + * + * \retval 0 on success. + * \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED + * The hardware accelerator failed. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +int mbedtls_ct_hmac(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t mac_alg, + const unsigned char *add_data, + size_t add_data_len, + const unsigned char *data, + size_t data_len_secret, + size_t min_data_len, + size_t max_data_len, + unsigned char *output); +#else +int mbedtls_ct_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *add_data, + size_t add_data_len, + const unsigned char *data, + size_t data_len_secret, + size_t min_data_len, + size_t max_data_len, + unsigned char *output); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) */ + +#endif /* ssl_misc.h */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c index 4e9cc7ff35..b07cd96f1b 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c @@ -3,25 +3,9 @@ * (record layer + retransmission state machine) * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* - * The SSL 3.0 specification was drafted by Netscape in 1996, - * and became an IETF standard in 1999. - * - * http://wp.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/ * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4346.txt */ @@ -33,8 +17,8 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" -#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" -#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "debug_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/version.h" @@ -44,7 +28,7 @@ #include #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" #include "psa/crypto.h" #endif @@ -52,6 +36,246 @@ #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) +#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_384) +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) +#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) +#else /* See check_config.h */ +#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_1) +#endif + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ct_hmac(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t mac_alg, + const unsigned char *add_data, + size_t add_data_len, + const unsigned char *data, + size_t data_len_secret, + size_t min_data_len, + size_t max_data_len, + unsigned char *output) +{ + /* + * This function breaks the HMAC abstraction and uses psa_hash_clone() + * extension in order to get constant-flow behaviour. + * + * HMAC(msg) is defined as HASH(okey + HASH(ikey + msg)) where + means + * concatenation, and okey/ikey are the XOR of the key with some fixed bit + * patterns (see RFC 2104, sec. 2). + * + * We'll first compute ikey/okey, then inner_hash = HASH(ikey + msg) by + * hashing up to minlen, then cloning the context, and for each byte up + * to maxlen finishing up the hash computation, keeping only the + * correct result. + * + * Then we only need to compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) and we're done. + */ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(mac_alg); + const size_t block_size = PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(hash_alg); + unsigned char key_buf[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH]; + const size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + psa_hash_operation_t operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t hash_length; + + unsigned char aux_out[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + psa_hash_operation_t aux_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t offset; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + size_t mac_key_length; + size_t i; + +#define PSA_CHK(func_call) \ + do { \ + status = (func_call); \ + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) \ + goto cleanup; \ + } while (0) + + /* Export MAC key + * We assume key length is always exactly the output size + * which is never more than the block size, thus we use block_size + * as the key buffer size. + */ + PSA_CHK(psa_export_key(key, key_buf, block_size, &mac_key_length)); + + /* Calculate ikey */ + for (i = 0; i < mac_key_length; i++) { + key_buf[i] = (unsigned char) (key_buf[i] ^ 0x36); + } + for (; i < block_size; ++i) { + key_buf[i] = 0x36; + } + + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_setup(&operation, hash_alg)); + + /* Now compute inner_hash = HASH(ikey + msg) */ + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_update(&operation, key_buf, block_size)); + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_update(&operation, add_data, add_data_len)); + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_update(&operation, data, min_data_len)); + + /* Fill the hash buffer in advance with something that is + * not a valid hash (barring an attack on the hash and + * deliberately-crafted input), in case the caller doesn't + * check the return status properly. */ + memset(output, '!', hash_size); + + /* For each possible length, compute the hash up to that point */ + for (offset = min_data_len; offset <= max_data_len; offset++) { + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_clone(&operation, &aux_operation)); + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_finish(&aux_operation, aux_out, + PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE, &hash_length)); + /* Keep only the correct inner_hash in the output buffer */ + mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(offset, data_len_secret), + output, aux_out, NULL, hash_size); + + if (offset < max_data_len) { + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_update(&operation, data + offset, 1)); + } + } + + /* Abort current operation to prepare for final operation */ + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_abort(&operation)); + + /* Calculate okey */ + for (i = 0; i < mac_key_length; i++) { + key_buf[i] = (unsigned char) ((key_buf[i] ^ 0x36) ^ 0x5C); + } + for (; i < block_size; ++i) { + key_buf[i] = 0x5C; + } + + /* Now compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) */ + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_setup(&operation, hash_alg)); + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_update(&operation, key_buf, block_size)); + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_update(&operation, output, hash_size)); + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_finish(&operation, output, hash_size, &hash_length)); + +#undef PSA_CHK + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(key_buf, MAX_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(aux_out, PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE); + + psa_hash_abort(&operation); + psa_hash_abort(&aux_operation); + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); +} + +#undef MAX_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH + +#else +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ct_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *add_data, + size_t add_data_len, + const unsigned char *data, + size_t data_len_secret, + size_t min_data_len, + size_t max_data_len, + unsigned char *output) +{ + /* + * This function breaks the HMAC abstraction and uses the md_clone() + * extension to the MD API in order to get constant-flow behaviour. + * + * HMAC(msg) is defined as HASH(okey + HASH(ikey + msg)) where + means + * concatenation, and okey/ikey are the XOR of the key with some fixed bit + * patterns (see RFC 2104, sec. 2), which are stored in ctx->hmac_ctx. + * + * We'll first compute inner_hash = HASH(ikey + msg) by hashing up to + * minlen, then cloning the context, and for each byte up to maxlen + * finishing up the hash computation, keeping only the correct result. + * + * Then we only need to compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) and we're done. + */ + const mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type(ctx->md_info); + /* TLS 1.2 only supports SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1, MD-5, + * all of which have the same block size except SHA-384. */ + const size_t block_size = md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ? 128 : 64; + const unsigned char * const ikey = ctx->hmac_ctx; + const unsigned char * const okey = ikey + block_size; + const size_t hash_size = mbedtls_md_get_size(ctx->md_info); + + unsigned char aux_out[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + mbedtls_md_context_t aux; + size_t offset; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_md_init(&aux); + +#define MD_CHK(func_call) \ + do { \ + ret = (func_call); \ + if (ret != 0) \ + goto cleanup; \ + } while (0) + + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_setup(&aux, ctx->md_info, 0)); + + /* After hmac_start() of hmac_reset(), ikey has already been hashed, + * so we can start directly with the message */ + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, add_data, add_data_len)); + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, data, min_data_len)); + + /* Fill the hash buffer in advance with something that is + * not a valid hash (barring an attack on the hash and + * deliberately-crafted input), in case the caller doesn't + * check the return status properly. */ + memset(output, '!', hash_size); + + /* For each possible length, compute the hash up to that point */ + for (offset = min_data_len; offset <= max_data_len; offset++) { + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_clone(&aux, ctx)); + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_finish(&aux, aux_out)); + /* Keep only the correct inner_hash in the output buffer */ + mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(offset, data_len_secret), + output, aux_out, NULL, hash_size); + + if (offset < max_data_len) { + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, data + offset, 1)); + } + } + + /* The context needs to finish() before it starts() again */ + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_finish(ctx, aux_out)); + + /* Now compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) */ + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_starts(ctx)); + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, okey, block_size)); + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, output, hash_size)); + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_finish(ctx, output)); + + /* Done, get ready for next time */ + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(ctx)); + +#undef MD_CHK + +cleanup: + mbedtls_md_free(&aux); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ + static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl); /* @@ -85,7 +309,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_check_timer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return 0; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_record_header(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, unsigned char *buf, @@ -101,9 +324,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_check_record(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "record buffer", buf, buflen); /* We don't support record checking in TLS because - * (a) there doesn't seem to be a usecase for it, and - * (b) In SSLv3 and TLS 1.0, CBC record decryption has state - * and we'd need to backup the transform here. + * there doesn't seem to be a usecase for it. */ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; @@ -144,7 +365,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_check_record(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("<= mbedtls_ssl_check_record")); return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING */ #define SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH 0 #define SSL_FORCE_FLUSH 1 @@ -300,27 +520,11 @@ static void ssl_reset_retransmit_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) -int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init)(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *key_enc, const unsigned char *key_dec, - size_t keylen, - const unsigned char *iv_enc, const unsigned char *iv_dec, - size_t ivlen, - const unsigned char *mac_enc, const unsigned char *mac_dec, - size_t maclen) = NULL; -int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate)(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int direction) = NULL; -int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset)(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) = NULL; -int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write)(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) = NULL; -int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read)(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) = NULL; -int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish)(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) = NULL; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ - /* * Encryption/decryption functions */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) static size_t ssl_compute_padding_length(size_t len, size_t granularity) @@ -406,162 +610,248 @@ static int ssl_parse_inner_plaintext(unsigned char const *content, return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID || - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ -/* `add_data` must have size 13 Bytes if the CID extension is disabled, - * and 13 + 1 + CID-length Bytes if the CID extension is enabled. */ +/* The size of the `add_data` structure depends on various + * factors, namely + * + * 1) CID functionality disabled + * + * additional_data = + * 8: seq_num + + * 1: type + + * 2: version + + * 2: length of inner plaintext + + * + * size = 13 bytes + * + * 2) CID functionality based on RFC 9146 enabled + * + * size = 8 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 6 + 2 + CID-length + * = 23 + CID-length + * + * 3) CID functionality based on legacy CID version + according to draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * + * size = 13 + 1 + CID-length + * + * More information about the CID usage: + * + * Per Section 5.3 of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 the + * size of the additional data structure is calculated as: + * + * additional_data = + * 8: seq_num + + * 1: tls12_cid + + * 2: DTLSCipherText.version + + * n: cid + + * 1: cid_length + + * 2: length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext + * + * Per RFC 9146 the size of the add_data structure is calculated as: + * + * additional_data = + * 8: seq_num_placeholder + + * 1: tls12_cid + + * 1: cid_length + + * 1: tls12_cid + + * 2: DTLSCiphertext.version + + * 2: epoch + + * 6: sequence_number + + * n: cid + + * 2: length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext + * + */ static void ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(unsigned char *add_data, size_t *add_data_len, mbedtls_record *rec, - unsigned minor_ver) + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version + tls_version, + size_t taglen) { - /* Quoting RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2): + /* Several types of ciphers have been defined for use with TLS and DTLS, + * and the MAC calculations for those ciphers differ slightly. Further + * variants were added when the CID functionality was added with RFC 9146. + * This implementations also considers the use of a legacy version of the + * CID specification published in draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05, + * which is used in deployments. * - * additional_data = seq_num + TLSCompressed.type + - * TLSCompressed.version + TLSCompressed.length; + * We will distinguish between the non-CID and the CID cases below. * - * For the CID extension, this is extended as follows - * (quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05, - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05): + * --- Non-CID cases --- * - * additional_data = seq_num + DTLSPlaintext.type + - * DTLSPlaintext.version + - * cid + - * cid_length + - * length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext; + * Quoting RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2): + * + * additional_data = seq_num + TLSCompressed.type + + * TLSCompressed.version + TLSCompressed.length; * * For TLS 1.3, the record sequence number is dropped from the AAD * and encoded within the nonce of the AEAD operation instead. + * Moreover, the additional data involves the length of the TLS + * ciphertext, not the TLS plaintext as in earlier versions. + * Quoting RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3): + * + * additional_data = TLSCiphertext.opaque_type || + * TLSCiphertext.legacy_record_version || + * TLSCiphertext.length + * + * We pass the tag length to this function in order to compute the + * ciphertext length from the inner plaintext length rec->data_len via + * + * TLSCiphertext.length = TLSInnerPlaintext.length + taglen. + * + * --- CID cases --- + * + * RFC 9146 uses a common pattern when constructing the data + * passed into a MAC / AEAD cipher. + * + * Data concatenation for MACs used with block ciphers with + * Encrypt-then-MAC Processing (with CID): + * + * data = seq_num_placeholder + + * tls12_cid + + * cid_length + + * tls12_cid + + * DTLSCiphertext.version + + * epoch + + * sequence_number + + * cid + + * DTLSCiphertext.length + + * IV + + * ENC(content + padding + padding_length) + * + * Data concatenation for MACs used with block ciphers (with CID): + * + * data = seq_num_placeholder + + * tls12_cid + + * cid_length + + * tls12_cid + + * DTLSCiphertext.version + + * epoch + + * sequence_number + + * cid + + * length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext + + * DTLSInnerPlaintext.content + + * DTLSInnerPlaintext.real_type + + * DTLSInnerPlaintext.zeros + * + * AEAD ciphers use the following additional data calculation (with CIDs): + * + * additional_data = seq_num_placeholder + + * tls12_cid + + * cid_length + + * tls12_cid + + * DTLSCiphertext.version + + * epoch + + * sequence_number + + * cid + + * length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext + * + * Section 5.3 of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 (for legacy CID use) + * defines the additional data calculation as follows: + * + * additional_data = seq_num + + * tls12_cid + + * DTLSCipherText.version + + * cid + + * cid_length + + * length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext */ unsigned char *cur = add_data; + size_t ad_len_field = rec->data_len; - int is_tls13 = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) - if (minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4) { - is_tls13 = 1; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ - if (!is_tls13) { - ((void) minor_ver); - memcpy(cur, rec->ctr, sizeof(rec->ctr)); - cur += sizeof(rec->ctr); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT == 0 + const unsigned char seq_num_placeholder[] = { 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff }; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + /* In TLS 1.3, the AAD contains the length of the TLSCiphertext, + * which differs from the length of the TLSInnerPlaintext + * by the length of the authentication tag. */ + ad_len_field += taglen; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + { + ((void) tls_version); + ((void) taglen); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT == 0 + if (rec->cid_len != 0) { + // seq_num_placeholder + memcpy(cur, seq_num_placeholder, sizeof(seq_num_placeholder)); + cur += sizeof(seq_num_placeholder); + + // tls12_cid type + *cur = rec->type; + cur++; + + // cid_length + *cur = rec->cid_len; + cur++; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + { + // epoch + sequence number + memcpy(cur, rec->ctr, sizeof(rec->ctr)); + cur += sizeof(rec->ctr); + } } + // type *cur = rec->type; cur++; + // version memcpy(cur, rec->ver, sizeof(rec->ver)); cur += sizeof(rec->ver); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT == 1 + if (rec->cid_len != 0) { + // CID memcpy(cur, rec->cid, rec->cid_len); cur += rec->cid_len; + // cid_length *cur = rec->cid_len; cur++; - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(rec->data_len, cur, 0); + // length of inner plaintext + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ad_len_field, cur, 0); cur += 2; } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ - { - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(rec->data_len, cur, 0); - cur += 2; - } - - *add_data_len = cur - add_data; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - -#define SSL3_MAC_MAX_BYTES 20 /* MD-5 or SHA-1 */ - -/* - * SSLv3.0 MAC functions - */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_mac(mbedtls_md_context_t *md_ctx, - const unsigned char *secret, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, - const unsigned char *ctr, int type, - unsigned char out[SSL3_MAC_MAX_BYTES]) -{ - unsigned char header[11]; - unsigned char padding[48]; - int padlen; - int md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_ctx->md_info); - int md_type = mbedtls_md_get_type(md_ctx->md_info); - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - /* Only MD5 and SHA-1 supported */ - if (md_type == MBEDTLS_MD_MD5) { - padlen = 48; - } else { - padlen = 40; - } +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT == 0 - memcpy(header, ctr, 8); - header[8] = (unsigned char) type; - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(len, header, 9); + if (rec->cid_len != 0) { + // epoch + sequence number + memcpy(cur, rec->ctr, sizeof(rec->ctr)); + cur += sizeof(rec->ctr); - memset(padding, 0x36, padlen); - ret = mbedtls_md_starts(md_ctx); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_update(md_ctx, secret, md_size); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_update(md_ctx, padding, padlen); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_update(md_ctx, header, 11); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_update(md_ctx, buf, len); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_finish(md_ctx, out); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } + // CID + memcpy(cur, rec->cid, rec->cid_len); + cur += rec->cid_len; - memset(padding, 0x5C, padlen); - ret = mbedtls_md_starts(md_ctx); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_update(md_ctx, secret, md_size); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_update(md_ctx, padding, padlen); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_update(md_ctx, out, md_size); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_finish(md_ctx, out); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; + // length of inner plaintext + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ad_len_field, cur, 0); + cur += 2; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ad_len_field, cur, 0); + cur += 2; } - return 0; + *add_data_len = (size_t) (cur - add_data); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_transform_aead_dynamic_iv_is_explicit( mbedtls_ssl_transform const *transform) @@ -599,18 +889,14 @@ static void ssl_build_record_nonce(unsigned char *dst_iv, unsigned char const *dynamic_iv, size_t dynamic_iv_len) { - size_t i; - /* Start with Fixed IV || 0 */ memset(dst_iv, 0, dst_iv_len); memcpy(dst_iv, fixed_iv, fixed_iv_len); dst_iv += dst_iv_len - dynamic_iv_len; - for (i = 0; i < dynamic_iv_len; i++) { - dst_iv[i] ^= dynamic_iv[i]; - } + mbedtls_xor(dst_iv, dst_iv, dynamic_iv, dynamic_iv_len); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD */ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, @@ -618,10 +904,17 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { - mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; + mbedtls_ssl_mode_t ssl_mode; int auth_done = 0; unsigned char *data; - unsigned char add_data[13 + 1 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX]; + /* For an explanation of the additional data length see + * the description of ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(). + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + unsigned char add_data[23 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX]; +#else + unsigned char add_data[13]; +#endif size_t add_data_len; size_t post_avail; @@ -632,9 +925,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #endif /* The PRNG is used for dynamic IV generation that's used - * for CBC transformations in TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2. */ + * for CBC transformations in TLS 1.2. */ #if !(defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2))) + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)) ((void) f_rng); ((void) p_rng); #endif @@ -657,13 +950,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } + ssl_mode = mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_transform(transform); + data = rec->buf + rec->data_offset; post_avail = rec->buf_len - (rec->data_len + rec->data_offset); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "before encrypt: output payload", data, rec->data_len); - mode = mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc); - if (rec->data_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Record content %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " too large, maximum %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, @@ -684,11 +977,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * since they apply to different versions of the protocol. There * is hence no risk of double-addition of the inner plaintext. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) - if (transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (transform->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { size_t padding = ssl_compute_padding_length(rec->data_len, - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY); if (ssl_build_inner_plaintext(data, &rec->data_len, post_avail, @@ -699,7 +992,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, rec->type = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) /* @@ -712,7 +1005,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (rec->cid_len != 0) { size_t padding = ssl_compute_padding_length(rec->data_len, - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY); /* * Wrap plaintext into DTLSInnerPlaintext structure. * See ssl_build_inner_plaintext() for more information. @@ -737,76 +1030,70 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* * Add MAC before if needed */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) - if (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM || - (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - && transform->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED -#endif - )) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_STREAM || + ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC) { if (post_avail < transform->maclen) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t sign_mac_length = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if (transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { - unsigned char mac[SSL3_MAC_MAX_BYTES]; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - ret = ssl_mac(&transform->md_ctx_enc, transform->mac_enc, - data, rec->data_len, rec->ctr, rec->type, mac); - if (ret == 0) { - memcpy(data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen); - } - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(mac, transform->maclen); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_mac", ret); - return ret; - } - } else -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1) { - unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(add_data, &add_data_len, rec, + transform->tls_version, + transform->taglen); - ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(add_data, &add_data_len, rec, - transform->minor_ver); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_mac_sign_setup(&operation, transform->psa_mac_enc, + transform->psa_mac_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&transform->md_ctx_enc, - add_data, add_data_len); - if (ret != 0) { - goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&transform->md_ctx_enc, - data, rec->data_len); - if (ret != 0) { - goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&transform->md_ctx_enc, mac); - if (ret != 0) { - goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&transform->md_ctx_enc); - if (ret != 0) { - goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; - } + status = psa_mac_update(&operation, add_data, add_data_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + } - memcpy(data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen); + status = psa_mac_update(&operation, data, rec->data_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + } -hmac_failed_etm_disabled: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(mac, transform->maclen); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_md_hmac_xxx", ret); - return ret; - } - } else -#endif - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + status = psa_mac_sign_finish(&operation, mac, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD, + &sign_mac_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + } +#else + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&transform->md_ctx_enc, add_data, + add_data_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&transform->md_ctx_enc, data, rec->data_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&transform->md_ctx_enc, mac); + if (ret != 0) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&transform->md_ctx_enc); + if (ret != 0) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + memcpy(data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen); +#endif MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "computed mac", data + rec->data_len, transform->maclen); @@ -814,47 +1101,48 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, rec->data_len += transform->maclen; post_avail -= transform->maclen; auth_done++; + +hmac_failed_etm_disabled: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(mac, transform->maclen); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + status = psa_mac_abort(&operation); + if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_md_hmac_xxx", ret); + return ret; + } } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ /* * Encrypt */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) - if (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t olen; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM) + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_STREAM) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", " "including %d bytes of padding", rec->data_len, 0)); - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, - transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen, - data, rec->data_len, - data, &olen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret); - return ret; - } - - if (rec->data_len != olen) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } + /* The only supported stream cipher is "NULL", + * so there's nothing to do here.*/ } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C || MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) - if (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM || - mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM || - mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD) + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_AEAD) { unsigned char iv[12]; unsigned char *dynamic_iv; size_t dynamic_iv_len; int dynamic_iv_is_explicit = ssl_transform_aead_dynamic_iv_is_explicit(transform); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; /* Check that there's space for the authentication tag. */ if (post_avail < transform->taglen) { @@ -888,7 +1176,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * This depends on the TLS version. */ ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(add_data, &add_data_len, rec, - transform->minor_ver); + transform->tls_version, + transform->taglen); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "IV used (internal)", iv, transform->ivlen); @@ -904,17 +1193,33 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* * Encrypt and authenticate */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_aead_encrypt(transform->psa_key_enc, + transform->psa_alg, + iv, transform->ivlen, + add_data, add_data_len, + data, rec->data_len, + data, rec->buf_len - (data - rec->buf), + &rec->data_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf", ret); + return ret; + } +#else if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, iv, transform->ivlen, add_data, add_data_len, data, rec->data_len, /* src */ - data, rec->buf_len - (data - rec->buf), /* dst */ + data, rec->buf_len - (size_t) (data - rec->buf), /* dst */ &rec->data_len, transform->taglen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt", ret); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext", ret); return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "after encrypt: tag", data + rec->data_len - transform->taglen, transform->taglen); @@ -937,12 +1242,18 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, auth_done++; } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) - if (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC) { + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC || + ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC_ETM) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t padlen, i; size_t olen; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t part_len; + psa_cipher_operation_t cipher_op = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /* Currently we're always using minimal padding * (up to 255 bytes would be allowed). */ @@ -964,35 +1275,31 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, rec->data_len += padlen + 1; post_avail -= padlen + 1; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) /* - * Prepend per-record IV for block cipher in TLS v1.1 and up as per + * Prepend per-record IV for block cipher in TLS v1.2 as per * Method 1 (6.2.3.2. in RFC4346 and RFC5246) */ - if (transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2) { - if (f_rng == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("No PRNG provided to encrypt_record routine")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - - if (rec->data_offset < transform->ivlen) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; - } - - /* - * Generate IV - */ - ret = f_rng(p_rng, transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } + if (f_rng == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("No PRNG provided to encrypt_record routine")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } - memcpy(data - transform->ivlen, transform->iv_enc, - transform->ivlen); + if (rec->data_offset < transform->ivlen) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + /* + * Generate IV + */ + ret = f_rng(p_rng, transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + memcpy(data - transform->ivlen, transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", " "including %" @@ -1001,6 +1308,49 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, rec->data_len, transform->ivlen, padlen + 1)); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(&cipher_op, + transform->psa_key_enc, transform->psa_alg); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_cipher_encrypt_setup", ret); + return ret; + } + + status = psa_cipher_set_iv(&cipher_op, transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_cipher_set_iv", ret); + return ret; + + } + + status = psa_cipher_update(&cipher_op, + data, rec->data_len, + data, rec->data_len, &olen); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_cipher_update", ret); + return ret; + + } + + status = psa_cipher_finish(&cipher_op, + data + olen, rec->data_len - olen, + &part_len); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_cipher_finish", ret); + return ret; + + } + + olen += part_len; +#else if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen, @@ -1009,38 +1359,26 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret); return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ if (rec->data_len != olen) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) - if (transform->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2) { - /* - * Save IV in SSL3 and TLS1 - */ - memcpy(transform->iv_enc, transform->cipher_ctx_enc.iv, - transform->ivlen); - } else -#endif - { - data -= transform->ivlen; - rec->data_offset -= transform->ivlen; - rec->data_len += transform->ivlen; - } + data -= transform->ivlen; + rec->data_offset -= transform->ivlen; + rec->data_len += transform->ivlen; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) if (auth_done == 0) { unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t sign_mac_length = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - /* - * MAC(MAC_write_key, seq_num + - * TLSCipherText.type + - * TLSCipherText.version + - * length_of( (IV +) ENC(...) ) + - * IV + // except for TLS 1.0 - * ENC(content + padding + padding_length)); + /* MAC(MAC_write_key, add_data, IV, ENC(content + padding + padding_length)) */ if (post_avail < transform->maclen) { @@ -1049,11 +1387,35 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(add_data, &add_data_len, - rec, transform->minor_ver); + rec, transform->tls_version, + transform->taglen); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("using encrypt then mac")); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "MAC'd meta-data", add_data, add_data_len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_mac_sign_setup(&operation, transform->psa_mac_enc, + transform->psa_mac_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } + + status = psa_mac_update(&operation, add_data, add_data_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } + + status = psa_mac_update(&operation, data, rec->data_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } + + status = psa_mac_sign_finish(&operation, mac, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD, + &sign_mac_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } +#else ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&transform->md_ctx_enc, add_data, add_data_len); @@ -1073,6 +1435,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (ret != 0) { goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ memcpy(data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen); @@ -1082,6 +1445,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, hmac_failed_etm_enabled: mbedtls_platform_zeroize(mac, transform->maclen); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + status = psa_mac_abort(&operation); + if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ if (ret != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "HMAC calculation failed", ret); return ret; @@ -1110,14 +1480,26 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, mbedtls_record *rec) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD) size_t olen; - mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; - int ret, auth_done = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) - size_t padlen = 0, correct = 1; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC || MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD */ + mbedtls_ssl_mode_t ssl_mode; + int ret; + + int auth_done = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + size_t padlen = 0; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t correct = MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE; #endif unsigned char *data; - unsigned char add_data[13 + 1 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX]; + /* For an explanation of the additional data length see + * the description of ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(). + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + unsigned char add_data[23 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX]; +#else + unsigned char add_data[13]; +#endif size_t add_data_len; #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) @@ -1135,7 +1517,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, } data = rec->buf + rec->data_offset; - mode = mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec); + ssl_mode = mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_transform(transform); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) /* @@ -1147,8 +1529,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) - if (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM) + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_STREAM) { if (rec->data_len < transform->maclen) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Record too short for MAC:" @@ -1157,31 +1539,18 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; } - padlen = 0; - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, - transform->iv_dec, - transform->ivlen, - data, rec->data_len, - data, &olen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret); - return ret; - } - - if (rec->data_len != olen) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } + /* The only supported stream cipher is "NULL", + * so there's no encryption to do here.*/ } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C || MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) - if (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM || - mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM || - mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY) { +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD) + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_AEAD) { unsigned char iv[12]; unsigned char *dynamic_iv; size_t dynamic_iv_len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /* * Extract dynamic part of nonce for AEAD decryption. @@ -1233,7 +1602,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, * This depends on the TLS version. */ ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(add_data, &add_data_len, rec, - transform->minor_ver); + transform->tls_version, + transform->taglen); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "additional data used for AEAD", add_data, add_data_len); @@ -1241,7 +1611,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, * explicit_iv_len Bytes preceding data, and taglen * bytes following data + data_len. This justifies * the debug message and the invocation of - * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() below. */ + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext() below. */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "IV used", iv, transform->ivlen); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "TAG used", data + rec->data_len, @@ -1250,13 +1620,29 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, /* * Decrypt and authenticate */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, - iv, transform->ivlen, - add_data, add_data_len, - data, rec->data_len + transform->taglen, /* src */ - data, rec->buf_len - (data - rec->buf), &olen, /* dst */ - transform->taglen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt", ret); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_aead_decrypt(transform->psa_key_dec, + transform->psa_alg, + iv, transform->ivlen, + add_data, add_data_len, + data, rec->data_len + transform->taglen, + data, rec->buf_len - (data - rec->buf), + &olen); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_aead_decrypt", ret); + return ret; + } +#else + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext + (&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + iv, transform->ivlen, + add_data, add_data_len, + data, rec->data_len + transform->taglen, /* src */ + data, rec->buf_len - (size_t) (data - rec->buf), &olen, /* dst */ + transform->taglen)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext", ret); if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; @@ -1264,6 +1650,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + auth_done++; /* Double-check that AEAD decryption doesn't change content length. */ @@ -1272,19 +1660,23 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) - if (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC) { + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC || + ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC_ETM) { size_t minlen = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t part_len; + psa_cipher_operation_t cipher_op = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /* * Check immediate ciphertext sanity */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2) { - /* The ciphertext is prefixed with the CBC IV. */ - minlen += transform->ivlen; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* The ciphertext is prefixed with the CBC IV. */ + minlen += transform->ivlen; #endif /* Size considerations: @@ -1324,8 +1716,12 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, * Authenticate before decrypt if enabled */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - if (transform->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED) { + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC_ETM) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; +#else unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("using encrypt then mac")); @@ -1341,11 +1737,36 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, * Further, we still know that data_len > minlen */ rec->data_len -= transform->maclen; ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(add_data, &add_data_len, rec, - transform->minor_ver); + transform->tls_version, + transform->taglen); /* Calculate expected MAC. */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "MAC'd meta-data", add_data, add_data_len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_mac_verify_setup(&operation, transform->psa_mac_dec, + transform->psa_mac_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } + + status = psa_mac_update(&operation, add_data, add_data_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } + + status = psa_mac_update(&operation, data, rec->data_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } + + /* Compare expected MAC with MAC at the end of the record. */ + status = psa_mac_verify_finish(&operation, data + rec->data_len, + transform->maclen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } +#else ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&transform->md_ctx_dec, add_data, add_data_len); if (ret != 0) { @@ -1377,10 +1798,19 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ auth_done++; hmac_failed_etm_enabled: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + status = psa_mac_abort(&operation); + if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } +#else mbedtls_platform_zeroize(mac_expect, transform->maclen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ if (ret != 0) { if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_hmac_xxx", ret); @@ -1404,28 +1834,68 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) /* - * Initialize for prepended IV for block cipher in TLS v1.1 and up + * Initialize for prepended IV for block cipher in TLS v1.2 */ - if (transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2) { - /* Safe because data_len >= minlen + ivlen = 2 * ivlen. */ - memcpy(transform->iv_dec, data, transform->ivlen); + /* Safe because data_len >= minlen + ivlen = 2 * ivlen. */ + memcpy(transform->iv_dec, data, transform->ivlen); - data += transform->ivlen; - rec->data_offset += transform->ivlen; - rec->data_len -= transform->ivlen; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + data += transform->ivlen; + rec->data_offset += transform->ivlen; + rec->data_len -= transform->ivlen; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ /* We still have data_len % ivlen == 0 and data_len >= ivlen here. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(&cipher_op, + transform->psa_key_dec, transform->psa_alg); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_cipher_decrypt_setup", ret); + return ret; + } + + status = psa_cipher_set_iv(&cipher_op, transform->iv_dec, transform->ivlen); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_cipher_set_iv", ret); + return ret; + } + + status = psa_cipher_update(&cipher_op, + data, rec->data_len, + data, rec->data_len, &olen); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_cipher_update", ret); + return ret; + } + + status = psa_cipher_finish(&cipher_op, + data + olen, rec->data_len - olen, + &part_len); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_cipher_finish", ret); + return ret; + } + + olen += part_len; +#else + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, transform->iv_dec, transform->ivlen, data, rec->data_len, data, &olen)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret); return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /* Double-check that length hasn't changed during decryption. */ if (rec->data_len != olen) { @@ -1433,19 +1903,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) - if (transform->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2) { - /* - * Save IV in SSL3 and TLS1, where CBC decryption of consecutive - * records is equivalent to CBC decryption of the concatenation - * of the records; in other words, IVs are maintained across - * record decryptions. - */ - memcpy(transform->iv_dec, transform->cipher_ctx_dec.iv, - transform->ivlen); - } -#endif - /* Safe since data_len >= minlen + maclen + 1, so after having * subtracted at most minlen and maclen up to this point, * data_len > 0 (because of data_len % ivlen == 0, it's actually @@ -1453,11 +1910,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, padlen = data[rec->data_len - 1]; if (auth_done == 1) { - const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge( + const mbedtls_ct_condition_t ge = mbedtls_ct_uint_ge( rec->data_len, padlen + 1); - correct &= mask; - padlen &= mask; + correct = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(ge, correct); + padlen = mbedtls_ct_size_if_else_0(ge, padlen); } else { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) if (rec->data_len < transform->maclen + padlen + 1) { @@ -1469,12 +1926,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, padlen + 1)); } #endif - - const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge( + const mbedtls_ct_condition_t ge = mbedtls_ct_uint_ge( rec->data_len, transform->maclen + padlen + 1); - correct &= mask; - padlen &= mask; + correct = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(ge, correct); + padlen = mbedtls_ct_size_if_else_0(ge, padlen); } padlen++; @@ -1482,66 +1938,43 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, /* Regardless of the validity of the padding, * we have data_len >= padlen here. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if (transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { - /* This is the SSL 3.0 path, we don't have to worry about Lucky - * 13, because there's a strictly worse padding attack built in - * the protocol (known as part of POODLE), so we don't care if the - * code is not constant-time, in particular branches are OK. */ - if (padlen > transform->ivlen) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad padding length: is %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", " - "should be no more than %" - MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, - padlen, transform->ivlen)); -#endif - correct = 0; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (transform->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { - /* The padding check involves a series of up to 256 - * consecutive memory reads at the end of the record - * plaintext buffer. In order to hide the length and - * validity of the padding, always perform exactly - * `min(256,plaintext_len)` reads (but take into account - * only the last `padlen` bytes for the padding check). */ - size_t pad_count = 0; - volatile unsigned char * const check = data; - - /* Index of first padding byte; it has been ensured above - * that the subtraction is safe. */ - size_t const padding_idx = rec->data_len - padlen; - size_t const num_checks = rec->data_len <= 256 ? rec->data_len : 256; - size_t const start_idx = rec->data_len - num_checks; - size_t idx; - - for (idx = start_idx; idx < rec->data_len; idx++) { - /* pad_count += (idx >= padding_idx) && - * (check[idx] == padlen - 1); - */ - const size_t mask = mbedtls_ct_size_mask_ge(idx, padding_idx); - const size_t equal = mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq(check[idx], - padlen - 1); - pad_count += mask & equal; - } - correct &= mbedtls_ct_size_bool_eq(pad_count, padlen); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* The padding check involves a series of up to 256 + * consecutive memory reads at the end of the record + * plaintext buffer. In order to hide the length and + * validity of the padding, always perform exactly + * `min(256,plaintext_len)` reads (but take into account + * only the last `padlen` bytes for the padding check). */ + size_t pad_count = 0; + volatile unsigned char * const check = data; + + /* Index of first padding byte; it has been ensured above + * that the subtraction is safe. */ + size_t const padding_idx = rec->data_len - padlen; + size_t const num_checks = rec->data_len <= 256 ? rec->data_len : 256; + size_t const start_idx = rec->data_len - num_checks; + size_t idx; + + for (idx = start_idx; idx < rec->data_len; idx++) { + /* pad_count += (idx >= padding_idx) && + * (check[idx] == padlen - 1); + */ + const mbedtls_ct_condition_t a = mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(idx, padding_idx); + size_t increment = mbedtls_ct_size_if_else_0(a, 1); + const mbedtls_ct_condition_t b = mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(check[idx], padlen - 1); + increment = mbedtls_ct_size_if_else_0(b, increment); + pad_count += increment; + } + correct = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(pad_count, padlen), correct); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) - if (padlen > 0 && correct == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad padding byte detected")); - } -#endif - padlen &= mbedtls_ct_size_mask(correct); - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + if (padlen > 0 && correct == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad padding byte detected")); } +#endif + padlen = mbedtls_ct_size_if_else_0(correct, padlen); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ /* If the padding was found to be invalid, padlen == 0 * and the subtraction is safe. If the padding was found valid, @@ -1564,7 +1997,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, * Authenticate if not done yet. * Compute the MAC regardless of the padding result (RFC4346, CBCTIME). */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) if (auth_done == 0) { unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD] = { 0 }; unsigned char mac_peer[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD] = { 0 }; @@ -1587,59 +2020,46 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, */ rec->data_len -= transform->maclen; ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(add_data, &add_data_len, rec, - transform->minor_ver); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if (transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { - ret = ssl_mac(&transform->md_ctx_dec, - transform->mac_dec, - data, rec->data_len, - rec->ctr, rec->type, - mac_expect); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_mac", ret); - goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; - } - memcpy(mac_peer, data + rec->data_len, transform->maclen); - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (transform->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { - /* - * The next two sizes are the minimum and maximum values of - * data_len over all padlen values. - * - * They're independent of padlen, since we previously did - * data_len -= padlen. - * - * Note that max_len + maclen is never more than the buffer - * length, as we previously did in_msglen -= maclen too. - */ - const size_t max_len = rec->data_len + padlen; - const size_t min_len = (max_len > 256) ? max_len - 256 : 0; + transform->tls_version, + transform->taglen); - ret = mbedtls_ct_hmac(&transform->md_ctx_dec, - add_data, add_data_len, - data, rec->data_len, min_len, max_len, - mac_expect); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ct_hmac", ret); - goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* + * The next two sizes are the minimum and maximum values of + * data_len over all padlen values. + * + * They're independent of padlen, since we previously did + * data_len -= padlen. + * + * Note that max_len + maclen is never more than the buffer + * length, as we previously did in_msglen -= maclen too. + */ + const size_t max_len = rec->data_len + padlen; + const size_t min_len = (max_len > 256) ? max_len - 256 : 0; - mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset(mac_peer, data, - rec->data_len, - min_len, max_len, - transform->maclen); - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ret = mbedtls_ct_hmac(transform->psa_mac_dec, + transform->psa_mac_alg, + add_data, add_data_len, + data, rec->data_len, min_len, max_len, + mac_expect); +#else + ret = mbedtls_ct_hmac(&transform->md_ctx_dec, + add_data, add_data_len, + data, rec->data_len, min_len, max_len, + mac_expect); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ct_hmac", ret); + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; } + mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset(mac_peer, data, + rec->data_len, + min_len, max_len, + transform->maclen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "expected mac", mac_expect, transform->maclen); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "message mac", mac_peer, transform->maclen); @@ -1650,7 +2070,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("message mac does not match")); #endif - correct = 0; + correct = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE; } auth_done++; @@ -1665,10 +2085,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, /* * Finally check the correct flag */ - if (correct == 0) { + if (correct == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ /* Make extra sure authentication was performed, exactly once */ if (auth_done != 1) { @@ -1676,8 +2096,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) - if (transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (transform->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { /* Remove inner padding and infer true content type. */ ret = ssl_parse_inner_plaintext(data, &rec->data_len, &rec->type); @@ -1686,7 +2106,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD; } } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) if (rec->cid_len != 0) { @@ -1707,164 +2127,53 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, #undef MAC_PLAINTEXT #undef MAC_CIPHERTEXT -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) /* - * Compression/decompression functions + * Fill the input message buffer by appending data to it. + * The amount of data already fetched is in ssl->in_left. + * + * If we return 0, is it guaranteed that (at least) nb_want bytes are + * available (from this read and/or a previous one). Otherwise, an error code + * is returned (possibly EOF or WANT_READ). + * + * With stream transport (TLS) on success ssl->in_left == nb_want, but + * with datagram transport (DTLS) on success ssl->in_left >= nb_want, + * since we always read a whole datagram at once. + * + * For DTLS, it is up to the caller to set ssl->next_record_offset when + * they're done reading a record. */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_compress_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char *msg_post = ssl->out_msg; - ptrdiff_t bytes_written = ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf; - size_t len_pre = ssl->out_msglen; - unsigned char *msg_pre = ssl->compress_buf; + size_t len; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) - size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; + size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; #else - size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; #endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> compress buf")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> fetch input")); - if (len_pre == 0) { - return 0; + if (ssl->f_recv == NULL && ssl->f_recv_timeout == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Bad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() ")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - memcpy(msg_pre, ssl->out_msg, len_pre); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("before compression: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", ", - ssl->out_msglen)); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "before compression: output payload", - ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen); - - ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.next_in = msg_pre; - ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.avail_in = len_pre; - ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.next_out = msg_post; - ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.avail_out = out_buf_len - bytes_written; - - ret = deflate(&ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate, Z_SYNC_FLUSH); - if (ret != Z_OK) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("failed to perform compression (%d)", ret)); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED; + if (nb_want > in_buf_len - (size_t) (ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("requesting more data than fits")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - ssl->out_msglen = out_buf_len - - ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.avail_out - bytes_written; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("after compression: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", ", - ssl->out_msglen)); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "after compression: output payload", - ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= compress buf")); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + uint32_t timeout; - return 0; -} - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_decompress_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char *msg_post = ssl->in_msg; - ptrdiff_t header_bytes = ssl->in_msg - ssl->in_buf; - size_t len_pre = ssl->in_msglen; - unsigned char *msg_pre = ssl->compress_buf; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) - size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; -#else - size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; -#endif - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> decompress buf")); - - if (len_pre == 0) { - return 0; - } - - memcpy(msg_pre, ssl->in_msg, len_pre); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("before decompression: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", ", - ssl->in_msglen)); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "before decompression: input payload", - ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen); - - ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.next_in = msg_pre; - ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_in = len_pre; - ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.next_out = msg_post; - ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_out = in_buf_len - header_bytes; - - ret = inflate(&ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate, Z_SYNC_FLUSH); - if (ret != Z_OK) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("failed to perform decompression (%d)", ret)); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED; - } - - ssl->in_msglen = in_buf_len - - ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_out - header_bytes; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("after decompression: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", ", - ssl->in_msglen)); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "after decompression: input payload", - ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= decompress buf")); - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ - -/* - * Fill the input message buffer by appending data to it. - * The amount of data already fetched is in ssl->in_left. - * - * If we return 0, is it guaranteed that (at least) nb_want bytes are - * available (from this read and/or a previous one). Otherwise, an error code - * is returned (possibly EOF or WANT_READ). - * - * With stream transport (TLS) on success ssl->in_left == nb_want, but - * with datagram transport (DTLS) on success ssl->in_left >= nb_want, - * since we always read a whole datagram at once. - * - * For DTLS, it is up to the caller to set ssl->next_record_offset when - * they're done reading a record. - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t len; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) - size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; -#else - size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; -#endif - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> fetch input")); - - if (ssl->f_recv == NULL && ssl->f_recv_timeout == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Bad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() ")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - if (nb_want > in_buf_len - (size_t) (ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("requesting more data than fits")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - uint32_t timeout; - - /* - * The point is, we need to always read a full datagram at once, so we - * sometimes read more then requested, and handle the additional data. - * It could be the rest of the current record (while fetching the - * header) and/or some other records in the same datagram. - */ + /* + * The point is, we need to always read a full datagram at once, so we + * sometimes read more then requested, and handle the additional data. + * It could be the rest of the current record (while fetching the + * header) and/or some other records in the same datagram. + */ /* * Move to the next record in the already read datagram if applicable @@ -1920,9 +2229,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("timer has expired")); ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT; } else { - len = in_buf_len - (ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf); + len = in_buf_len - (size_t) (ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf); - if (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 0) { timeout = ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout; } else { timeout = ssl->conf->read_timeout; @@ -2016,7 +2325,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want) return ret; } - if ((size_t) ret > len || (INT_MAX > SIZE_MAX && ret > (int) SIZE_MAX)) { + if ((size_t) ret > len) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("f_recv returned %d bytes but only %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " were requested", @@ -2068,7 +2377,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return ret; } - if ((size_t) ret > ssl->out_left || (INT_MAX > SIZE_MAX && ret > (int) SIZE_MAX)) { + if ((size_t) ret > ssl->out_left) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("f_send returned %d bytes but only %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes were sent", @@ -2169,7 +2478,7 @@ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_swap_epochs(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { mbedtls_ssl_transform *tmp_transform; - unsigned char tmp_out_ctr[8]; + unsigned char tmp_out_ctr[MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN]; if (ssl->transform_out == ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("skip swap epochs")); @@ -2184,23 +2493,15 @@ static int ssl_swap_epochs(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = tmp_transform; /* Swap epoch + sequence_number */ - memcpy(tmp_out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8); - memcpy(ssl->cur_out_ctr, ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, 8); - memcpy(ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, tmp_out_ctr, 8); + memcpy(tmp_out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, sizeof(tmp_out_ctr)); + memcpy(ssl->cur_out_ctr, ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, + sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr)); + memcpy(ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, tmp_out_ctr, + sizeof(ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr)); /* Adjust to the newly activated transform */ mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(ssl, ssl->transform_out); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - if (mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate != NULL) { - int ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate", ret); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } - } -#endif - return 0; } @@ -2253,8 +2554,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) (cur->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && cur->p[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED); - uint8_t const force_flush = ssl->disable_datagram_packing == 1 ? - SSL_FORCE_FLUSH : SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH; + int const force_flush = ssl->disable_datagram_packing == 1 ? + SSL_FORCE_FLUSH : SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH; /* Swap epochs before sending Finished: we can't do it after * sending ChangeCipherSpec, in case write returns WANT_READ. @@ -2292,7 +2593,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } else { const unsigned char * const p = ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p; const size_t hs_len = cur->len - 12; - const size_t frag_off = p - (cur->p + 12); + const size_t frag_off = (size_t) (p - (cur->p + 12)); const size_t rem_len = hs_len - frag_off; size_t cur_hs_frag_len, max_hs_frag_len; @@ -2368,7 +2669,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } /* Update state and set timer */ - if (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 1) { ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED; } else { ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING; @@ -2430,6 +2731,24 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) /* * Handshake layer functions */ +int mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char hs_type, + unsigned char **buf, size_t *buf_len) +{ + /* + * Reserve 4 bytes for handshake header. ( Section 4,RFC 8446 ) + * ... + * HandshakeType msg_type; + * uint24 length; + * ... + */ + *buf = ssl->out_msg + 4; + *buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 4; + + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = hs_type; + + return 0; +} /* * Write (DTLS: or queue) current handshake (including CCS) message. @@ -2453,7 +2772,9 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * (including handshake headers but excluding record headers) * - ssl->out_msg: the record contents (handshake headers + content) */ -int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int update_checksum, + int force_flush) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const size_t hs_len = ssl->out_msglen - 4; @@ -2466,16 +2787,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) */ if (ssl->out_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && ssl->out_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { - /* In SSLv3, the client might send a NoCertificate alert. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if (!(ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 && - ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT && - ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT)) -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } /* Whenever we send anything different from a @@ -2560,8 +2873,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ /* Update running hashes of handshake messages seen */ - if (hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST) { - ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen); + if (hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST && update_checksum != 0) { + ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, ssl->out_msg, + ssl->out_msglen); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "update_checksum", ret); + return ret; + } } } @@ -2577,7 +2895,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } else #endif { - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record(ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record(ssl, force_flush)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_record", ret); return ret; } @@ -2588,6 +2906,22 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return 0; } +int mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t buf_len, size_t msg_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t msg_with_header_len; + ((void) buf_len); + + /* Add reserved 4 bytes for handshake header */ + msg_with_header_len = msg_len + 4; + ssl->out_msglen = msg_with_header_len; + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg_ext(ssl, 0, 0)); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + /* * Record layer functions */ @@ -2600,41 +2934,14 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * - ssl->out_msglen: length of the record content (excl headers) * - ssl->out_msg: record content */ -int mbedtls_ssl_write_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush) +int mbedtls_ssl_write_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int force_flush) { int ret, done = 0; size_t len = ssl->out_msglen; - uint8_t flush = force_flush; + int flush = force_flush; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write record")); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - if (ssl->transform_out != NULL && - ssl->session_out->compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE) { - if ((ret = ssl_compress_buf(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_compress_buf", ret); - return ret; - } - - len = ssl->out_msglen; - } -#endif /*MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - if (mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write != NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write()")); - - ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write(ssl); - if (ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write", ret); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } - - if (ret == 0) { - done = 1; - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ if (!done) { unsigned i; size_t protected_record_size; @@ -2645,24 +2952,30 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush) #endif /* Skip writing the record content type to after the encryption, * as it may change when using the CID extension. */ - - mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, ssl->out_hdr + 1); - - memcpy(ssl->out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8); + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_ver = ssl->tls_version; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + /* TLS 1.3 still uses the TLS 1.2 version identifier + * for backwards compatibility. */ + if (tls_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + tls_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ssl->out_hdr + 1, ssl->conf->transport, + tls_ver); + + memcpy(ssl->out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN); MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(len, ssl->out_len, 0); if (ssl->transform_out != NULL) { mbedtls_record rec; rec.buf = ssl->out_iv; - rec.buf_len = out_buf_len - (ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_buf); + rec.buf_len = out_buf_len - (size_t) (ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_buf); rec.data_len = ssl->out_msglen; - rec.data_offset = ssl->out_msg - rec.buf; + rec.data_offset = (size_t) (ssl->out_msg - rec.buf); - memcpy(&rec.ctr[0], ssl->out_ctr, 8); - mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, rec.ver); + memcpy(&rec.ctr[0], ssl->out_ctr, sizeof(rec.ctr)); + mbedtls_ssl_write_version(rec.ver, ssl->conf->transport, tls_ver); rec.type = ssl->out_msgtype; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) @@ -2729,7 +3042,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush) } } - /* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */ + /* The loop goes to its end if the counter is wrapping */ if (i == mbedtls_ssl_ep_len(ssl)) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("outgoing message counter would wrap")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING; @@ -2784,16 +3097,12 @@ static int ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_frag_len(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl) { - return (ssl->in_msg[9] << 16) | - (ssl->in_msg[10] << 8) | - ssl->in_msg[11]; + return MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(ssl->in_msg, 9); } static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_frag_off(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl) { - return (ssl->in_msg[6] << 16) | - (ssl->in_msg[7] << 8) | - ssl->in_msg[8]; + return MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(ssl->in_msg, 6); } MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL @@ -2906,9 +3215,7 @@ static size_t ssl_get_reassembly_buffer_size(size_t msg_len, static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl) { - return (ssl->in_msg[1] << 16) | - (ssl->in_msg[2] << 8) | - ssl->in_msg[3]; + return MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(ssl->in_msg, 1); } int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) @@ -2929,7 +3236,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned int recv_msg_seq = (ssl->in_msg[4] << 8) | ssl->in_msg[5]; + unsigned int recv_msg_seq = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_msg, 4); if (ssl_check_hs_header(ssl) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid handshake header")); @@ -2937,9 +3244,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } if (ssl->handshake != NULL && - ((ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && + ((mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 0 && recv_msg_seq != ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq) || - (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && + (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 1 && ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO))) { if (recv_msg_seq > ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, @@ -2994,12 +3301,17 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return 0; } -void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +int mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; - if (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && hs != NULL) { - ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_hslen); + if (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 0 && hs != NULL) { + ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_hslen); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "update_checksum", ret); + return ret; + } } /* Handshake message is complete, increment counter */ @@ -3030,6 +3342,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) memset(hs_buf, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer)); } #endif + return 0; } /* @@ -3162,7 +3475,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, unsigned char *obuf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen) { - size_t sid_len, cookie_len; + size_t sid_len, cookie_len, epoch, fragment_offset; unsigned char *p; /* @@ -3196,17 +3509,19 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "cli_id", cli_id, cli_id_len); if (in_len < 61) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("check cookie: record too short")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } - if (in[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE || - in[3] != 0 || in[4] != 0 || - in[19] != 0 || in[20] != 0 || in[21] != 0) { + + epoch = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(in, 3); + fragment_offset = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(in, 19); + + if (in[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE || epoch != 0 || + fragment_offset != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("check cookie: not a good ClientHello")); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, (" type=%u epoch=%u fragment_offset=%u", - in[0], - (unsigned) in[3] << 8 | in[4], - (unsigned) in[19] << 16 | in[20] << 8 | in[21])); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + in[0], (unsigned) epoch, + (unsigned) fragment_offset)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } sid_len = in[59]; @@ -3214,7 +3529,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("check cookie: sid_len=%u > %u", (unsigned) sid_len, (unsigned) in_len - 61)); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "sid received from network", in + 60, sid_len); @@ -3224,7 +3539,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("check cookie: cookie_len=%u > %u", (unsigned) cookie_len, (unsigned) (in_len - sid_len - 61))); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "cookie received from network", @@ -3274,7 +3589,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } - *olen = p - obuf; + *olen = (size_t) (p - obuf); /* Go back and fill length fields */ obuf[27] = (unsigned char) (*olen - 28); @@ -3312,7 +3627,7 @@ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_handle_possible_reconnect(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t len; + size_t len = 0; if (ssl->conf->f_cookie_write == NULL || ssl->conf->f_cookie_check == NULL) { @@ -3398,7 +3713,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_record_header(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, size_t len, mbedtls_record *rec) { - int major_ver, minor_ver; + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version; size_t const rec_hdr_type_offset = 0; size_t const rec_hdr_type_len = 1; @@ -3460,7 +3775,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_record_header(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, rec->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CID) { /* Shift pointers to account for record header including CID * struct { - * ContentType special_type = tls12_cid; + * ContentType outer_type = tls12_cid; * ProtocolVersion version; * uint16 epoch; * uint48 sequence_number; @@ -3504,21 +3819,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_record_header(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, */ rec->ver[0] = buf[rec_hdr_version_offset + 0]; rec->ver[1] = buf[rec_hdr_version_offset + 1]; - mbedtls_ssl_read_version(&major_ver, &minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, - &rec->ver[0]); - - if (major_ver != ssl->major_ver) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("major version mismatch: got %u, expected %u", - (unsigned) major_ver, - (unsigned) ssl->major_ver)); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD; - } + tls_version = (mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version) mbedtls_ssl_read_version( + buf + rec_hdr_version_offset, + ssl->conf->transport); + + if (tls_version > ssl->conf->max_tls_version) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("TLS version mismatch: got %u, expected max %u", + (unsigned) tls_version, + (unsigned) ssl->conf->max_tls_version)); - if (minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("minor version mismatch: got %u, expected max %u", - (unsigned) minor_ver, - (unsigned) ssl->conf->max_minor_ver)); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD; } /* @@ -3542,14 +3851,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_record_header(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, */ rec->data_offset = rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len; - rec->data_len = ((size_t) buf[rec_hdr_len_offset + 0] << 8) | - ((size_t) buf[rec_hdr_len_offset + 1] << 0); + rec->data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, rec_hdr_len_offset); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "input record header", buf, rec->data_offset); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("input record: msgtype = %u, " - "version = [%d:%d], msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, - rec->type, - major_ver, minor_ver, rec->data_len)); + "version = [0x%x], msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + rec->type, (unsigned) tls_version, rec->data_len)); rec->buf = buf; rec->buf_len = rec->data_offset + rec->data_len; @@ -3572,7 +3879,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_record_header(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - rec_epoch = (rec->ctr[0] << 8) | rec->ctr[1]; + rec_epoch = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(rec->ctr, 0); /* Check that the datagram is large enough to contain a record * of the advertised length. */ @@ -3622,7 +3929,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_record_header(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_check_client_reconnect(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { - unsigned int rec_epoch = (ssl->in_ctr[0] << 8) | ssl->in_ctr[1]; + unsigned int rec_epoch = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_ctr, 0); /* * Check for an epoch 0 ClientHello. We can't use in_msg here to @@ -3632,7 +3939,7 @@ static int ssl_check_client_reconnect(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) */ if (rec_epoch == 0 && ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && - ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && + mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 1 && ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && ssl->in_left > 13 && ssl->in_buf[13] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO) { @@ -3657,21 +3964,20 @@ static int ssl_prepare_record_content(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "input record from network", rec->buf, rec->buf_len); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - if (mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read != NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read()")); - - ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read(ssl); - if (ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read", ret); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } - - if (ret == 0) { + /* + * In TLS 1.3, always treat ChangeCipherSpec records + * as unencrypted. The only thing we do with them is + * check the length and content and ignore them. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (ssl->transform_in != NULL && + ssl->transform_in->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + if (rec->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { done = 1; } } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + if (!done && ssl->transform_in != NULL) { unsigned char const old_msg_type = rec->type; @@ -3679,6 +3985,35 @@ static int ssl_prepare_record_content(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, rec)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_decrypt_buf", ret); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* + * Although the server rejected early data, it might receive early + * data as long as it has not received the client Finished message. + * It is encrypted with early keys and should be ignored as stated + * in section 4.2.10 of RFC 8446: + * + * "Ignore the extension and return a regular 1-RTT response. The + * server then skips past early data by attempting to deprotect + * received records using the handshake traffic key, discarding + * records which fail deprotection (up to the configured + * max_early_data_size). Once a record is deprotected successfully, + * it is treated as the start of the client's second flight and the + * server proceeds as with an ordinary 1-RTT handshake." + */ + if ((old_msg_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA) && + (ssl->discard_early_data_record == + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("EarlyData: deprotect and discard app data records.")); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_early_data_len(ssl, rec->data_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID && ssl->conf->ignore_unexpected_cid @@ -3688,9 +4023,27 @@ static int ssl_prepare_record_content(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + /* + * The decryption of the record failed, no reason to ignore it, + * return in error with the decryption error code. + */ return ret; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* + * If the server were discarding protected records that it fails to + * deprotect because it has rejected early data, as we have just + * deprotected successfully a record, the server has to resume normal + * operation and fail the connection if the deprotection of a record + * fails. + */ + if (ssl->discard_early_data_record == + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD) { + ssl->discard_early_data_record = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + if (old_msg_type != rec->type) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("record type after decrypt (before %d): %d", old_msg_type, rec->type)); @@ -3715,7 +4068,7 @@ static int ssl_prepare_record_content(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (rec->data_len == 0) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 && rec->type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA) { /* TLS v1.2 explicitly disallows zero-length messages which are not application data */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid zero-length message type: %d", ssl->in_msgtype)); @@ -3748,7 +4101,8 @@ static int ssl_prepare_record_content(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #endif { unsigned i; - for (i = 8; i > mbedtls_ssl_ep_len(ssl); i--) { + for (i = MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN; + i > mbedtls_ssl_ep_len(ssl); i--) { if (++ssl->in_ctr[i - 1] != 0) { break; } @@ -3763,6 +4117,38 @@ static int ssl_prepare_record_content(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* + * Although the server rejected early data because it needed to send an + * HelloRetryRequest message, it might receive early data as long as it has + * not received the client Finished message. + * The early data is encrypted with early keys and should be ignored as + * stated in section 4.2.10 of RFC 8446 (second case): + * + * "The server then ignores early data by skipping all records with an + * external content type of "application_data" (indicating that they are + * encrypted), up to the configured max_early_data_size. Ignore application + * data message before 2nd ClientHello when early_data was received in 1st + * ClientHello." + */ + if (ssl->discard_early_data_record == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD) { + if (rec->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA) { + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_early_data_len(ssl, rec->data_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("EarlyData: Ignore application message before 2nd ClientHello")); + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + } else if (rec->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { + ssl->discard_early_data_record = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update(ssl); @@ -3861,7 +4247,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && update_hs_digest == 1) { - mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(ssl); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(ssl); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status"), ret); + return ret; + } } } else { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("reuse previously read message")); @@ -3940,9 +4330,7 @@ static int ssl_load_buffered_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[0]; if ((hs_buf->is_valid == 1) && (hs_buf->is_complete == 1)) { /* Synthesize a record containing the buffered HS message. */ - size_t msg_len = (hs_buf->data[1] << 16) | - (hs_buf->data[2] << 8) | - hs_buf->data[3]; + size_t msg_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(hs_buf->data, 1); /* Double-check that we haven't accidentally buffered * a message that doesn't fit into the input buffer. */ @@ -4039,7 +4427,7 @@ static int ssl_buffer_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) case MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE: { unsigned recv_msg_seq_offset; - unsigned recv_msg_seq = (ssl->in_msg[4] << 8) | ssl->in_msg[5]; + unsigned recv_msg_seq = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_msg, 4); mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer *hs_buf; size_t msg_len = ssl->in_hslen - 12; @@ -4579,13 +4967,11 @@ static int ssl_get_next_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return ret; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) if (ssl->conf->badmac_limit != 0 && ++ssl->badmac_seen >= ssl->conf->badmac_limit) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("too many records with bad MAC")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; } -#endif /* As above, invalid records cause * dismissal of the whole datagram. */ @@ -4635,23 +5021,6 @@ static int ssl_get_next_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ssl->in_msglen = rec.data_len; MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(rec.data_len, ssl->in_len, 0); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - if (ssl->transform_in != NULL && - ssl->session_in->compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE) { - if ((ret = ssl_decompress_buf(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_decompress_buf", ret); - return ret; - } - - /* Check actual (decompress) record content length against - * configured maximum. */ - if (ssl->in_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad message length")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD; - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ - return 0; } @@ -4694,6 +5063,20 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE; } #endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("Ignore ChangeCipherSpec in TLS 1.3 compatibility mode")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; +#else + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("ChangeCipherSpec invalid in TLS 1.3 without compatibility mode")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ } if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT) { @@ -4727,23 +5110,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED) if (ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING && ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("is a SSLv3 no renegotiation alert")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("is a no renegotiation alert")); /* Will be handled when trying to parse ServerHello */ return 0; } #endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 && - ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && - ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING && - ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("is a SSLv3 no_cert")); - /* Will be handled in mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate() */ - return 0; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - /* Silently ignore: fetch new message */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL; } @@ -4753,7 +5124,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) /* Drop unexpected ApplicationData records, * except at the beginning of renegotiations */ if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA && - ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER + mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 0 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && !(ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO) @@ -4764,7 +5135,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } if (ssl->handshake != NULL && - ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) { + mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 1) { mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform(ssl); } } @@ -4859,7 +5230,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * data. */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("switching to new transform spec for inbound data")); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) ssl->transform_in = ssl->transform_negotiate; +#endif ssl->session_in = ssl->session_negotiate; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) @@ -4877,21 +5250,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - memset(ssl->in_ctr, 0, 8); + memset(ssl->in_ctr, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN); mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(ssl); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - if (mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate != NULL) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_INBOUND)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate", ret); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } - } -#endif - ssl->state++; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse change cipher spec")); @@ -4910,10 +5272,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) static size_t ssl_transform_get_explicit_iv_len( mbedtls_ssl_transform const *transform) { - if (transform->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2) { - return 0; - } - return transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen; } @@ -4924,19 +5282,18 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { ssl->out_ctr = ssl->out_hdr + 3; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - ssl->out_cid = ssl->out_ctr + 8; + ssl->out_cid = ssl->out_ctr + MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN; ssl->out_len = ssl->out_cid; if (transform != NULL) { ssl->out_len += transform->out_cid_len; } #else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ - ssl->out_len = ssl->out_ctr + 8; + ssl->out_len = ssl->out_ctr + MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ ssl->out_iv = ssl->out_len + 2; } else #endif { - ssl->out_ctr = ssl->out_hdr - 8; ssl->out_len = ssl->out_hdr + 3; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) ssl->out_cid = ssl->out_len; @@ -4979,16 +5336,16 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * ssl_parse_record_header(). */ ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr + 3; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - ssl->in_cid = ssl->in_ctr + 8; + ssl->in_cid = ssl->in_ctr + MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN; ssl->in_len = ssl->in_cid; /* Default: no CID */ #else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ - ssl->in_len = ssl->in_ctr + 8; + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_ctr + MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_len + 2; } else #endif { - ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr - 8; + ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr - MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN; ssl->in_len = ssl->in_hdr + 3; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) ssl->in_cid = ssl->in_len; @@ -5014,6 +5371,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ { + ssl->out_ctr = ssl->out_buf; ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf + 8; ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf + 8; } @@ -5089,6 +5447,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) size_t transform_expansion = 0; const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform = ssl->transform_out; unsigned block_size; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_attributes_t attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ size_t out_hdr_len = mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len(ssl); @@ -5096,12 +5458,39 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return (int) out_hdr_len; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - if (ssl->session_out->compression != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - } -#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (transform->psa_alg == PSA_ALG_GCM || + transform->psa_alg == PSA_ALG_CCM || + transform->psa_alg == PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8) || + transform->psa_alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 || + transform->psa_alg == MBEDTLS_SSL_NULL_CIPHER) { + transform_expansion = transform->minlen; + } else if (transform->psa_alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) { + (void) psa_get_key_attributes(transform->psa_key_enc, &attr); + key_type = psa_get_key_type(&attr); + + block_size = PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type); + + /* Expansion due to the addition of the MAC. */ + transform_expansion += transform->maclen; + + /* Expansion due to the addition of CBC padding; + * Theoretically up to 256 bytes, but we never use + * more than the block size of the underlying cipher. */ + transform_expansion += block_size; + + /* For TLS 1.2 or higher, an explicit IV is added + * after the record header. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + transform_expansion += block_size; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("Unsupported psa_alg spotted in mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion()")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } +#else switch (mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc)) { case MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM: case MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM: @@ -5123,13 +5512,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * more than the block size of the underlying cipher. */ transform_expansion += block_size; - /* For TLS 1.1 or higher, an explicit IV is added + /* For TLS 1.2 or higher, an explicit IV is added * after the record header. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2) { - transform_expansion += block_size; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + transform_expansion += block_size; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ break; @@ -5137,6 +5524,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) if (transform->out_cid_len != 0) { @@ -5158,16 +5546,18 @@ static int ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) int in_ctr_cmp; int out_ctr_cmp; - if (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER || + if (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 0 || ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING || ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED) { return 0; } in_ctr_cmp = memcmp(ssl->in_ctr + ep_len, - ssl->conf->renego_period + ep_len, 8 - ep_len); - out_ctr_cmp = memcmp(ssl->cur_out_ctr + ep_len, - ssl->conf->renego_period + ep_len, 8 - ep_len); + &ssl->conf->renego_period[ep_len], + MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN - ep_len); + out_ctr_cmp = memcmp(&ssl->cur_out_ctr[ep_len], + &ssl->conf->renego_period[ep_len], + sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr) - ep_len); if (in_ctr_cmp <= 0 && out_ctr_cmp <= 0) { return 0; @@ -5178,49 +5568,248 @@ static int ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ -/* - * Receive application data decrypted from the SSL layer - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_check_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t n; - if (ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + if ((ssl->in_hslen == mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl)) || + (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET)) { + return 0; } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> read")); + ssl->keep_current_message = 1; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl)) != 0) { - return ret; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("NewSessionTicket received")); + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); - if (ssl->handshake != NULL && - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) { - return ret; - } + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_handle_hs_message_post_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("received post-handshake message")); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + int ret = ssl_tls13_check_new_session_ticket(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; } } -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ - /* - * Check if renegotiation is necessary and/or handshake is - * in process. If yes, perform/continue, and fall through - * if an unexpected packet is received while the client - * is waiting for the ServerHello. - * - * (There is no equivalent to the last condition on - * the server-side as it is not treated as within - * a handshake while waiting for the ClientHello - * after a renegotiation request.) - */ + /* Fail in all other cases. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - ret = ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate(ssl); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +/* This function is called from mbedtls_ssl_read() when a handshake message is + * received after the initial handshake. In this context, handshake messages + * may only be sent for the purpose of initiating renegotiations. + * + * This function is introduced as a separate helper since the handling + * of post-handshake handshake messages changes significantly in TLS 1.3, + * and having a helper function allows to distinguish between TLS <= 1.2 and + * TLS 1.3 in the future without bloating the logic of mbedtls_ssl_read(). + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls12_handle_hs_message_post_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* + * - For client-side, expect SERVER_HELLO_REQUEST. + * - For server-side, expect CLIENT_HELLO. + * - Fail (TLS) or silently drop record (DTLS) in other cases. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST || + ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl))) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("handshake received (not HelloRequest)")); + + /* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + return 0; + } +#endif + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && + ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("handshake received (not ClientHello)")); + + /* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + return 0; + } +#endif + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + /* Determine whether renegotiation attempt should be accepted */ + if (!(ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED || + (ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && + ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == + MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION))) { + /* + * Accept renegotiation request + */ + + /* DTLS clients need to know renego is server-initiated */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING; + } +#endif + ret = mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation(ssl); + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && + ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation", + ret); + return ret; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + { + /* + * Refuse renegotiation + */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("refusing renegotiation, sending alert")); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_handle_hs_message_post_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + /* Check protocol version and dispatch accordingly. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + return ssl_tls13_handle_hs_message_post_handshake(ssl); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (ssl->tls_version <= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + return ssl_tls12_handle_hs_message_post_handshake(ssl); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + /* Should never happen */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; +} + +/* + * brief Read at most 'len' application data bytes from the input + * buffer. + * + * param ssl SSL context: + * - First byte of application data not read yet in the input + * buffer located at address `in_offt`. + * - The number of bytes of data not read yet is `in_msglen`. + * param buf buffer that will hold the data + * param len maximum number of bytes to read + * + * note The function updates the fields `in_offt` and `in_msglen` + * according to the number of bytes read. + * + * return The number of bytes read. + */ +static int ssl_read_application_data( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + size_t n = (len < ssl->in_msglen) ? len : ssl->in_msglen; + + if (len != 0) { + memcpy(buf, ssl->in_offt, n); + ssl->in_msglen -= n; + } + + /* Zeroising the plaintext buffer to erase unused application data + from the memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->in_offt, n); + + if (ssl->in_msglen == 0) { + /* all bytes consumed */ + ssl->in_offt = NULL; + ssl->keep_current_message = 0; + } else { + /* more data available */ + ssl->in_offt += n; + } + + return (int) n; +} + +/* + * Receive application data decrypted from the SSL layer + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> read")); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (ssl->handshake != NULL && + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + } +#endif + + /* + * Check if renegotiation is necessary and/or handshake is + * in process. If yes, perform/continue, and fall through + * if an unexpected packet is received while the client + * is waiting for the ServerHello. + * + * (There is no equivalent to the last condition on + * the server-side as it is not treated as within + * a handshake while waiting for the ClientHello + * after a renegotiation request.) + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ret = ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate(ssl); if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && ret != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate", ret); @@ -5270,107 +5859,16 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) } if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("received handshake message")); - - /* - * - For client-side, expect SERVER_HELLO_REQUEST. - * - For server-side, expect CLIENT_HELLO. - * - Fail (TLS) or silently drop record (DTLS) in other cases. - */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && - (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST || - ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl))) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("handshake received (not HelloRequest)")); - - /* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - continue; - } -#endif - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && - ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("handshake received (not ClientHello)")); - - /* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - continue; - } -#endif - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - /* Determine whether renegotiation attempt should be accepted */ - if (!(ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED || - (ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && - ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == - MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION))) { - /* - * Accept renegotiation request - */ - - /* DTLS clients need to know renego is server-initiated */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { - ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING; - } -#endif - ret = mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation(ssl); - if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && - ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation", - ret); - return ret; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ - { - /* - * Refuse renegotiation - */ - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("refusing renegotiation, sending alert")); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { - /* SSLv3 does not have a "no_renegotiation" warning, so - we send a fatal alert and abort the connection. */ - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) - != 0) { - return ret; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } + ret = ssl_handle_hs_message_post_handshake(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_handle_hs_message_post_handshake", + ret); + return ret; } - /* At this point, we don't know whether the renegotiation has been - * completed or not. The cases to consider are the following: + /* At this point, we don't know whether the renegotiation triggered + * by the post-handshake message has been completed or not. The cases + * to consider are the following: * 1) The renegotiation is complete. In this case, no new record * has been read yet. * 2) The renegotiation is incomplete because the client received @@ -5378,7 +5876,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) * 3) The renegotiation is incomplete because the client received * a non-handshake, non-application data message while awaiting * the ServerHello. - * In each of these case, looping will be the proper action: + * + * In each of these cases, looping will be the proper action: * - For 1), the next iteration will read a new record and check * if it's application data. * - For 2), the loop condition isn't satisfied as application data @@ -5387,6 +5886,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) * will re-deliver the message that was held back by the client * when expecting the ServerHello. */ + continue; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) @@ -5416,7 +5916,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) /* We're going to return something now, cancel timer, * except if handshake (renegotiation) is in progress */ - if (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 1) { mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, 0); } @@ -5437,31 +5937,33 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ } - n = (len < ssl->in_msglen) - ? len : ssl->in_msglen; + ret = ssl_read_application_data(ssl, buf, len); - if (len != 0) { - memcpy(buf, ssl->in_offt, n); - ssl->in_msglen -= n; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= read")); - /* Zeroising the plaintext buffer to erase unused application data - from the memory. */ - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->in_offt, n); + return ret; +} - if (ssl->in_msglen == 0) { - /* all bytes consumed */ - ssl->in_offt = NULL; - ssl->keep_current_message = 0; - } else { - /* more data available */ - ssl->in_offt += n; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +int mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + if (ssl == NULL || (ssl->conf == NULL)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= read")); + /* + * The server may receive early data only while waiting for the End of + * Early Data handshake message. + */ + if ((ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) || + (ssl->in_offt == NULL)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA; + } - return (int) n; + return ssl_read_application_data(ssl, buf, len); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ /* * Send application data to be encrypted by the SSL layer, taking care of max @@ -5532,45 +6034,6 @@ static int ssl_write_real(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return (int) len; } -/* - * Write application data, doing 1/n-1 splitting if necessary. - * - * With non-blocking I/O, ssl_write_real() may return WANT_WRITE, - * then the caller will call us again with the same arguments, so - * remember whether we already did the split or not. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_split(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - if (ssl->conf->cbc_record_splitting == - MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED || - len <= 1 || - ssl->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 || - mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode(&ssl->transform_out->cipher_ctx_enc) - != MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC) { - return ssl_write_real(ssl, buf, len); - } - - if (ssl->split_done == 0) { - if ((ret = ssl_write_real(ssl, buf, 1)) <= 0) { - return ret; - } - ssl->split_done = 1; - } - - if ((ret = ssl_write_real(ssl, buf + 1, len - 1)) <= 0) { - return ret; - } - ssl->split_done = 0; - - return ret + 1; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */ - /* * Write application data (public-facing wrapper) */ @@ -5598,17 +6061,118 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t } } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) - ret = ssl_write_split(ssl, buf, len); -#else ret = ssl_write_real(ssl, buf, len); -#endif MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write")); return ret; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const struct mbedtls_ssl_config *conf; + uint32_t remaining; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write early_data")); + + if (ssl == NULL || (conf = ssl->conf) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if ((!mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls13_enabled(conf)) || + (conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) || + (conf->early_data_enabled != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA; + } + + if (ssl->tls_version != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA; + } + + /* + * If we are at the beginning of the handshake, the early data state being + * equal to MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IDLE or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IND_SENT advance the handshake just + * enough to be able to send early data if possible. That way, we can + * guarantee that when starting the handshake with this function we will + * send at least one record of early data. Note that when the state is + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IND_SENT and not yet + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_CAN_WRITE, we cannot send early data + * as the early data outbound transform has not been set as we may have to + * first send a dummy CCS in clear. + */ + if ((ssl->early_data_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IDLE) || + (ssl->early_data_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IND_SENT)) { + while ((ssl->early_data_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IDLE) || + (ssl->early_data_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IND_SENT)) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step", ret); + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_flush_output", ret); + return ret; + } + } + remaining = ssl->session_negotiate->max_early_data_size; + } else { + /* + * If we are past the point where we can send early data or we have + * already reached the maximum early data size, return immediatly. + * Otherwise, progress the handshake as much as possible to not delay + * it too much. If we reach a point where we can still send early data, + * then we will send some. + */ + if ((ssl->early_data_state != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_CAN_WRITE) && + (ssl->early_data_state != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTED)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA; + } + + remaining = ssl->session_negotiate->max_early_data_size - + ssl->total_early_data_size; + + if (remaining == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(ssl); + if ((ret != 0) && (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret); + return ret; + } + } + + if (((ssl->early_data_state != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_CAN_WRITE) && + (ssl->early_data_state != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTED)) + || (remaining == 0)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA; + } + + if (len > remaining) { + len = remaining; + } + + ret = ssl_write_real(ssl, buf, len); + if (ret >= 0) { + ssl->total_early_data_size += ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write early_data, ret=%d", ret)); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + /* * Notify the peer that the connection is being closed */ @@ -5622,7 +6186,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write close notify")); - if (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 1) { if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY)) != 0) { @@ -5642,22 +6206,41 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform) return; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - deflateEnd(&transform->ctx_deflate); - inflateEnd(&transform->ctx_inflate); -#endif - +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_destroy_key(transform->psa_key_enc); + psa_destroy_key(transform->psa_key_dec); +#else mbedtls_cipher_free(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc); mbedtls_cipher_free(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_destroy_key(transform->psa_mac_enc); + psa_destroy_key(transform->psa_mac_dec); +#else mbedtls_md_free(&transform->md_ctx_enc); mbedtls_md_free(&transform->md_ctx_dec); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #endif mbedtls_platform_zeroize(transform, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform)); } +void mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform) +{ + ssl->transform_in = transform; + memset(ssl->in_ctr, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform) +{ + ssl->transform_out = transform; + memset(ssl->cur_out_ctr, 0, sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr)); +} + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) void mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) @@ -5688,8 +6271,7 @@ static void ssl_buffering_free_slot(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (hs_buf->is_valid == 1) { hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered -= hs_buf->data_len; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(hs_buf->data, hs_buf->data_len); - mbedtls_free(hs_buf->data); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(hs_buf->data, hs_buf->data_len); memset(hs_buf, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer)); } } @@ -5701,50 +6283,86 @@ static void ssl_buffering_free_slot(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * and, for DTLS, to/from TLS equivalent. * * For TLS this is the identity. - * For DTLS, use 1's complement (v -> 255 - v, and then map as follows: - * 1.0 <-> 3.2 (DTLS 1.0 is based on TLS 1.1) + * For DTLS, map as follows, then use 1's complement (v -> ~v): * 1.x <-> 3.x+1 for x != 0 (DTLS 1.2 based on TLS 1.2) + * DTLS 1.0 is stored as TLS 1.1 internally */ -void mbedtls_ssl_write_version(int major, int minor, int transport, - unsigned char ver[2]) +void mbedtls_ssl_write_version(unsigned char version[2], int transport, + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version) { + uint16_t tls_version_formatted; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) if (transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - if (minor == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2) { - --minor; /* DTLS 1.0 stored as TLS 1.1 internally */ - - } - ver[0] = (unsigned char) (255 - (major - 2)); - ver[1] = (unsigned char) (255 - (minor - 1)); + tls_version_formatted = + ~(tls_version - (tls_version == 0x0302 ? 0x0202 : 0x0201)); } else #else ((void) transport); #endif { - ver[0] = (unsigned char) major; - ver[1] = (unsigned char) minor; + tls_version_formatted = (uint16_t) tls_version; } + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(tls_version_formatted, version, 0); } -void mbedtls_ssl_read_version(int *major, int *minor, int transport, - const unsigned char ver[2]) +uint16_t mbedtls_ssl_read_version(const unsigned char version[2], + int transport) { + uint16_t tls_version = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(version, 0); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) if (transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - *major = 255 - ver[0] + 2; - *minor = 255 - ver[1] + 1; - - if (*minor == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1) { - ++*minor; /* DTLS 1.0 stored as TLS 1.1 internally */ - } - } else + tls_version = + ~(tls_version - (tls_version == 0xfeff ? 0x0202 : 0x0201)); + } #else ((void) transport); #endif - { - *major = ver[0]; - *minor = ver[1]; + return tls_version; +} + +/* + * Send pending fatal alert. + * 0, No alert message. + * !0, if mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message() returned in error, the error code it + * returned, ssl->alert_reason otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_handle_pending_alert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + + /* No pending alert, return success*/ + if (ssl->send_alert == 0) { + return 0; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + ssl->alert_type); + + /* If mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message() returned with MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, + * do not clear the alert to be able to send it later. + */ + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE) { + ssl->send_alert = 0; } + + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return ssl->alert_reason; +} + +/* + * Set pending fatal alert flag. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char alert_type, + int alert_reason) +{ + ssl->send_alert = 1; + ssl->alert_type = alert_type; + ssl->alert_reason = alert_reason; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_ticket.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_ticket.c index 0789245bac..6a31b0bee6 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_ticket.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_ticket.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * TLS server tickets callbacks implementation * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" @@ -23,13 +11,25 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) +#endif + /* * Initialize context */ @@ -42,9 +42,9 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_init(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx) #endif } -#define MAX_KEY_BYTES 32 /* 256 bits */ +#define MAX_KEY_BYTES MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_MAX_KEY_BYTES -#define TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES 4 +#define TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES #define TICKET_IV_BYTES 12 #define TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES 2 #define TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES 16 @@ -65,12 +65,20 @@ static int ssl_ticket_gen_key(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, unsigned char index) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char buf[MAX_KEY_BYTES]; + unsigned char buf[MAX_KEY_BYTES] = { 0 }; mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key *key = ctx->keys + index; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - key->generation_time = (uint32_t) mbedtls_time(NULL); + key->generation_time = mbedtls_time(NULL); #endif + /* The lifetime of a key is the configured lifetime of the tickets when + * the key is created. + */ + key->lifetime = ctx->ticket_lifetime; if ((ret = ctx->f_rng(ctx->p_rng, key->name, sizeof(key->name))) != 0) { return ret; @@ -80,10 +88,23 @@ static int ssl_ticket_gen_key(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, return ret; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, key->alg); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, key->key_type); + psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, key->key_bits); + + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR( + psa_import_key(&attributes, buf, + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key->key_bits), + &key->key)); +#else /* With GCM and CCM, same context can encrypt & decrypt */ ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&key->ctx, buf, mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen(&key->ctx), MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); @@ -99,23 +120,94 @@ static int ssl_ticket_update_keys(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) ((void) ctx); #else - if (ctx->ticket_lifetime != 0) { - uint32_t current_time = (uint32_t) mbedtls_time(NULL); - uint32_t key_time = ctx->keys[ctx->active].generation_time; + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key * const key = ctx->keys + ctx->active; + if (key->lifetime != 0) { + mbedtls_time_t current_time = mbedtls_time(NULL); + mbedtls_time_t key_time = key->generation_time; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#endif if (current_time >= key_time && - current_time - key_time < ctx->ticket_lifetime) { + (uint64_t) (current_time - key_time) < key->lifetime) { return 0; } ctx->active = 1 - ctx->active; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if ((status = psa_destroy_key(ctx->keys[ctx->active].key)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + return ssl_ticket_gen_key(ctx, ctx->active); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ return 0; } +/* + * Rotate active session ticket encryption key + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_rotate(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *name, size_t nlength, + const unsigned char *k, size_t klength, + uint32_t lifetime) +{ + const unsigned char idx = 1 - ctx->active; + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key * const key = ctx->keys + idx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + const size_t bitlen = key->key_bits; +#else + const int bitlen = mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen(&key->ctx); +#endif + + if (nlength < TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES || klength * 8 < (size_t) bitlen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if ((status = psa_destroy_key(key->key)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + return ret; + } + + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, key->alg); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, key->key_type); + psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, key->key_bits); + + if ((status = psa_import_key(&attributes, k, + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key->key_bits), + &key->key)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + return ret; + } +#else + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&key->ctx, k, bitlen, MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + ctx->active = idx; + ctx->ticket_lifetime = lifetime; + memcpy(key->name, name, TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + key->generation_time = mbedtls_time(NULL); +#endif + key->lifetime = lifetime; + + return 0; +} + /* * Setup context for actual use */ @@ -125,71 +217,62 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, uint32_t lifetime) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; - - ctx->f_rng = f_rng; - ctx->p_rng = p_rng; + size_t key_bits; - ctx->ticket_lifetime = lifetime; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_key_type_t key_type; +#else + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(cipher); - if (cipher_info == NULL) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa(cipher, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES, + &alg, &key_type, &key_bits) != PSA_SUCCESS) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - if (cipher_info->mode != MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM && - cipher_info->mode != MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM) { + if (PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } +#else + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(cipher); - if (cipher_info->key_bitlen > 8 * MAX_KEY_BYTES) { + if (mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode(cipher_info) != MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM && + mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode(cipher_info) != MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM && + mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode(cipher_info) != MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - int do_mbedtls_cipher_setup = 1; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(&ctx->keys[0].ctx, - cipher_info, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES); - - switch (ret) { - case 0: - do_mbedtls_cipher_setup = 0; - break; - case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: - /* We don't yet expect to support all ciphers through PSA, - * so allow fallback to ordinary mbedtls_cipher_setup(). */ - do_mbedtls_cipher_setup = 1; - break; - default: - return ret; - } + key_bits = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info); #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - if (do_mbedtls_cipher_setup) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&ctx->keys[0].ctx, cipher_info)) - != 0) { - return ret; - } + + if (key_bits > 8 * MAX_KEY_BYTES) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - do_mbedtls_cipher_setup = 1; + ctx->f_rng = f_rng; + ctx->p_rng = p_rng; + + ctx->ticket_lifetime = lifetime; + #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - do_mbedtls_cipher_setup = 0; + ctx->keys[0].alg = alg; + ctx->keys[0].key_type = key_type; + ctx->keys[0].key_bits = key_bits; - ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(&ctx->keys[1].ctx, - cipher_info, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES); - if (ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) { + ctx->keys[1].alg = alg; + ctx->keys[1].key_type = key_type; + ctx->keys[1].key_bits = key_bits; +#else + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&ctx->keys[0].ctx, cipher_info)) != 0) { return ret; } - if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) { - do_mbedtls_cipher_setup = 1; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&ctx->keys[1].ctx, cipher_info)) != 0) { + return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - if (do_mbedtls_cipher_setup) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&ctx->keys[1].ctx, cipher_info)) - != 0) { - return ret; - } - } if ((ret = ssl_ticket_gen_key(ctx, 0)) != 0 || (ret = ssl_ticket_gen_key(ctx, 1)) != 0) { @@ -229,6 +312,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write(void *p_ticket, unsigned char *state = state_len_bytes + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES; size_t clear_len, ciph_len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#endif + *tlen = 0; if (ctx == NULL || ctx->f_rng == NULL) { @@ -251,7 +338,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write(void *p_ticket, key = &ctx->keys[ctx->active]; - *ticket_lifetime = ctx->ticket_lifetime; + *ticket_lifetime = key->lifetime; memcpy(key_name, key->name, TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES); @@ -261,7 +348,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write(void *p_ticket, /* Dump session state */ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_save(session, - state, end - state, + state, (size_t) (end - state), &clear_len)) != 0 || (unsigned long) clear_len > 65535) { goto cleanup; @@ -269,15 +356,27 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write(void *p_ticket, MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(clear_len, state_len_bytes, 0); /* Encrypt and authenticate */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if ((status = psa_aead_encrypt(key->key, key->alg, iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES, + key_name, TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN, + state, clear_len, + state, end - state, + &ciph_len)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } +#else if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(&key->ctx, iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES, /* Additional data: key name, IV and length */ key_name, TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN, state, clear_len, - state, end - state, &ciph_len, + state, (size_t) (end - state), &ciph_len, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES)) != 0) { goto cleanup; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if (ciph_len != clear_len + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto cleanup; @@ -330,6 +429,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse(void *p_ticket, unsigned char *ticket = enc_len_p + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES; size_t enc_len, clear_len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#endif + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->f_rng == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -348,7 +451,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse(void *p_ticket, goto cleanup; } - enc_len = (enc_len_p[0] << 8) | enc_len_p[1]; + enc_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(enc_len_p, 0); if (len != TICKET_MIN_LEN + enc_len) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -364,6 +467,15 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse(void *p_ticket, } /* Decrypt and authenticate */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if ((status = psa_aead_decrypt(key->key, key->alg, iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES, + key_name, TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN, + ticket, enc_len + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES, + ticket, enc_len, &clear_len)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } +#else if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext(&key->ctx, iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES, /* Additional data: key name, IV and length */ @@ -377,6 +489,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse(void *p_ticket, goto cleanup; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if (clear_len != enc_len) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto cleanup; @@ -388,15 +502,20 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse(void *p_ticket, } #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - { - /* Check for expiration */ - mbedtls_time_t current_time = mbedtls_time(NULL); + mbedtls_ms_time_t ticket_creation_time, ticket_age; + mbedtls_ms_time_t ticket_lifetime = + (mbedtls_ms_time_t) key->lifetime * 1000; - if (current_time < session->start || - (uint32_t) (current_time - session->start) > ctx->ticket_lifetime) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED; - goto cleanup; - } + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_get_ticket_creation_time(session, + &ticket_creation_time); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + ticket_age = mbedtls_ms_time() - ticket_creation_time; + if (ticket_age < 0 || ticket_age > ticket_lifetime) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED; + goto cleanup; } #endif @@ -415,8 +534,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse(void *p_ticket, */ void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_free(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_destroy_key(ctx->keys[0].key); + psa_destroy_key(ctx->keys[1].key); +#else mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx->keys[0].ctx); mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx->keys[1].ctx); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) mbedtls_mutex_free(&ctx->mutex); diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c index 494de1b93e..c5e06491c1 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls.c @@ -1,26 +1,10 @@ /* - * SSLv3/TLSv1 shared functions + * TLS shared functions * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* - * The SSL 3.0 specification was drafted by Netscape in 1996, - * and became an IETF standard in 1999. - * - * http://wp.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/ * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4346.txt */ @@ -32,8 +16,11 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" -#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" -#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "ssl_client.h" +#include "ssl_debug_helpers.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" + +#include "debug_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/version.h" @@ -43,6 +30,8 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "md_psa.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" #include "psa/crypto.h" #endif @@ -50,6 +39,42 @@ #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* Define local translating functions to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +static mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr_args chk_buf_ptr_fail_args; + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args( + const uint8_t *cur, const uint8_t *end, size_t need) +{ + chk_buf_ptr_fail_args.cur = cur; + chk_buf_ptr_fail_args.end = end; + chk_buf_ptr_fail_args.need = need; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_reset_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args(void) +{ + memset(&chk_buf_ptr_fail_args, 0, sizeof(chk_buf_ptr_fail_args)); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_cmp_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args(mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr_args *args) +{ + return (chk_buf_ptr_fail_args.cur != args->cur) || + (chk_buf_ptr_fail_args.end != args->end) || + (chk_buf_ptr_fail_args.need != args->need); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) @@ -105,6 +130,36 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_set_cid(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return 0; } +int mbedtls_ssl_get_own_cid(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int *enabled, + unsigned char own_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX], + size_t *own_cid_len) +{ + *enabled = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED; + + if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* We report MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED in case the CID length is + * zero as this is indistinguishable from not requesting to use + * the CID extension. */ + if (ssl->own_cid_len == 0 || ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED) { + return 0; + } + + if (own_cid_len != NULL) { + *own_cid_len = ssl->own_cid_len; + if (own_cid != NULL) { + memcpy(own_cid, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len); + } + } + + *enabled = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; + + return 0; +} + int mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int *enabled, unsigned char peer_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX], @@ -113,7 +168,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *enabled = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED; if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM || - ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) { + mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -175,9 +230,17 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, { mbedtls_ssl_session_free(dst); memcpy(dst, src, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) dst->ticket = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + dst->hostname = NULL; +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + dst->ticket_alpn = NULL; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) @@ -217,6 +280,16 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + { + int ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_set_ticket_alpn(dst, src->ticket_alpn); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN && MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) if (src->ticket != NULL) { dst->ticket = mbedtls_calloc(1, src->ticket_len); @@ -226,6 +299,18 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, memcpy(dst->ticket, src->ticket, src->ticket_len); } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if (src->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_set_hostname(dst, src->hostname); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ return 0; @@ -237,7 +322,7 @@ static int resize_buffer(unsigned char **buffer, size_t len_new, size_t *len_old { unsigned char *resized_buffer = mbedtls_calloc(1, len_new); if (resized_buffer == NULL) { - return -1; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; } /* We want to copy len_new bytes when downsizing the buffer, and @@ -246,8 +331,7 @@ static int resize_buffer(unsigned char **buffer, size_t len_new, size_t *len_old * lost, are done outside of this function. */ memcpy(resized_buffer, *buffer, (len_new < *len_old) ? len_new : *len_old); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(*buffer, *len_old); - mbedtls_free(*buffer); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(*buffer, *len_old); *buffer = resized_buffer; *len_old = len_new; @@ -311,7199 +395,8933 @@ static void handle_buffer_resizing(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int downsizing, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH */ -/* - * Key material generation - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl3_prf(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const char *label, - const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, - unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen) -{ - int ret = 0; - size_t i; - mbedtls_md5_context md5; - mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; - unsigned char padding[16]; - unsigned char sha1sum[20]; - ((void) label); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - mbedtls_md5_init(&md5); - mbedtls_sha1_init(&sha1); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) +typedef int (*tls_prf_fn)(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen); - /* - * SSLv3: - * block = - * MD5( secret + SHA1( 'A' + secret + random ) ) + - * MD5( secret + SHA1( 'BB' + secret + random ) ) + - * MD5( secret + SHA1( 'CCC' + secret + random ) ) + - * ... - */ - for (i = 0; i < dlen / 16; i++) { - memset(padding, (unsigned char) ('A' + i), 1 + i); +static tls_prf_fn ssl_tls12prf_from_cs(int ciphersuite_id); - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret(&sha1)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&sha1, padding, 1 + i)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&sha1, secret, slen)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&sha1, random, rlen)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(&sha1, sha1sum)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(&md5)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5, secret, slen)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5, sha1sum, 20)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(&md5, dstbuf + i * 16)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - } +/* Type for the TLS PRF */ +typedef int ssl_tls_prf_t(const unsigned char *, size_t, const char *, + const unsigned char *, size_t, + unsigned char *, size_t); -exit: - mbedtls_md5_free(&md5); - mbedtls_sha1_free(&sha1); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls12_populate_transform(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + int ciphersuite, + const unsigned char master[48], +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + int encrypt_then_mac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */ + ssl_tls_prf_t tls_prf, + const unsigned char randbytes[64], + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version, + unsigned endpoint, + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int tls_prf_sha256(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen); +static int ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *); +static int ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(padding, sizeof(padding)); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(sha1sum, sizeof(sha1sum)); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256*/ - return ret; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int tls_prf_sha384(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen); + +static int ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *); +static int ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384*/ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int tls1_prf(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const char *label, - const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, - unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen) -{ - size_t nb, hs; - size_t i, j, k; - const unsigned char *S1, *S2; - unsigned char *tmp; - size_t tmp_len = 0; - unsigned char h_i[20]; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +static int ssl_tls12_session_load(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); +static int ssl_update_checksum_start(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); - tmp_len = 20 + strlen(label) + rlen; - tmp = mbedtls_calloc(1, tmp_len); - if (tmp == NULL) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - goto exit; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +static int ssl_update_checksum_sha256(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256*/ - hs = (slen + 1) / 2; - S1 = secret; - S2 = secret + slen - hs; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +static int ssl_update_checksum_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384*/ - nb = strlen(label); - memcpy(tmp + 20, label, nb); - memcpy(tmp + 20 + nb, random, rlen); - nb += rlen; +int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf(const mbedtls_tls_prf_types prf, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf = NULL; - /* - * First compute P_md5(secret,label+random)[0..dlen] - */ - if ((md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_MD5)) == NULL) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto exit; + switch (prf) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384: + tls_prf = tls_prf_sha384; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384*/ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256: + tls_prf = tls_prf_sha256; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256*/ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 1)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } + return tls_prf(secret, slen, label, random, rlen, dstbuf, dlen); +} - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&md_ctx, S1, hs); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&md_ctx, tmp + 20, nb); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +static void ssl_clear_peer_cert(mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + if (session->peer_cert != NULL) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(session->peer_cert); + mbedtls_free(session->peer_cert); + session->peer_cert = NULL; } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&md_ctx, 4 + tmp); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if (session->peer_cert_digest != NULL) { + /* Zeroization is not necessary. */ + mbedtls_free(session->peer_cert_digest); + session->peer_cert_digest = NULL; + session->peer_cert_digest_type = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + session->peer_cert_digest_len = 0; } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - for (i = 0; i < dlen; i += 16) { - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&md_ctx); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&md_ctx, 4 + tmp, 16 + nb); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&md_ctx, h_i); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } +uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_id(unsigned int extension_type) +{ + switch (extension_type) { + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERVERNAME; - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&md_ctx); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&md_ctx, 4 + tmp, 16); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&md_ctx, 4 + tmp); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH; - k = (i + 16 > dlen) ? dlen % 16 : 16; + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_STATUS_REQUEST; - for (j = 0; j < k; j++) { - dstbuf[i + j] = h_i[j]; - } - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_GROUPS; - mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG; - /* - * XOR out with P_sha1(secret,label+random)[0..dlen] - */ - if ((md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1)) == NULL) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto exit; - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_USE_SRTP; - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 1)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_HEARTBEAT; - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&md_ctx, S2, hs); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&md_ctx, tmp + 20, nb); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&md_ctx, tmp); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ALPN; - for (i = 0; i < dlen; i += 20) { - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&md_ctx); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&md_ctx, tmp, 20 + nb); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&md_ctx, h_i); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SCT: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SCT; - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&md_ctx); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&md_ctx, tmp, 20); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&md_ctx, tmp); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CLI_CERT_TYPE: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CLI_CERT_TYPE; - k = (i + 20 > dlen) ? dlen % 20 : 20; + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERV_CERT_TYPE: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERV_CERT_TYPE; - for (j = 0; j < k; j++) { - dstbuf[i + j] = (unsigned char) (dstbuf[i + j] ^ h_i[j]); - } - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PADDING: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PADDING; -exit: - mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PRE_SHARED_KEY; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, tmp_len); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(h_i, sizeof(h_i)); + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EARLY_DATA: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EARLY_DATA; - mbedtls_free(tmp); - return ret; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_COOKIE: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_COOKIE; -static psa_status_t setup_psa_key_derivation(psa_key_derivation_operation_t *derivation, - psa_key_id_t key, - psa_algorithm_t alg, - const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_length, - const unsigned char *label, size_t label_length, - size_t capacity) -{ - psa_status_t status; - - status = psa_key_derivation_setup(derivation, alg); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } - - if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(alg)) { - status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(derivation, - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED, - seed, seed_length); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES; - if (mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(key)) { - status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( - derivation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, - NULL, 0); - } else { - status = psa_key_derivation_input_key( - derivation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, key); - } - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CERT_AUTH: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CERT_AUTH; - status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(derivation, - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL, - label, label_length); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } - } else { - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_OID_FILTERS: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_OID_FILTERS; - status = psa_key_derivation_set_capacity(derivation, capacity); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH; - return PSA_SUCCESS; -} + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG_CERT: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG_CERT; -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int tls_prf_generic(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, - const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const char *label, - const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, - unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen) -{ - psa_status_t status; - psa_algorithm_t alg; - psa_key_id_t master_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; - psa_key_derivation_operation_t derivation = - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_KEY_SHARE; - if (md_type == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { - alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); - } else { - alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_TRUNCATED_HMAC; - /* Normally a "secret" should be long enough to be impossible to - * find by brute force, and in particular should not be empty. But - * this PRF is also used to derive an IV, in particular in EAP-TLS, - * and for this use case it makes sense to have a 0-length "secret". - * Since the key API doesn't allow importing a key of length 0, - * keep master_key=0, which setup_psa_key_derivation() understands - * to mean a 0-length "secret" input. */ - if (slen != 0) { - psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); - psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); - psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, alg); - psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE); + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS; - status = psa_import_key(&key_attributes, secret, slen, &master_key); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; - status = setup_psa_key_derivation(&derivation, - master_key, alg, - random, rlen, - (unsigned char const *) label, - (size_t) strlen(label), - dlen); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); - psa_destroy_key(master_key); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET; - status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(&derivation, dstbuf, dlen); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); - psa_destroy_key(master_key); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT; - status = psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - psa_destroy_key(master_key); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SESSION_TICKET; - if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(master_key)) { - status = psa_destroy_key(master_key); - } - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } - return 0; + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_UNRECOGNIZED; } -#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int tls_prf_generic(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, - const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const char *label, - const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, - unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen) +uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_mask(unsigned int extension_type) { - size_t nb; - size_t i, j, k, md_len; - unsigned char *tmp; - size_t tmp_len = 0; - unsigned char h_i[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + return 1 << mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_id(extension_type); +} - mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) +static const char *extension_name_table[] = { + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_UNRECOGNIZED] = "unrecognized", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERVERNAME] = "server_name", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH] = "max_fragment_length", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_STATUS_REQUEST] = "status_request", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_GROUPS] = "supported_groups", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG] = "signature_algorithms", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_USE_SRTP] = "use_srtp", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_HEARTBEAT] = "heartbeat", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ALPN] = "application_layer_protocol_negotiation", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SCT] = "signed_certificate_timestamp", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CLI_CERT_TYPE] = "client_certificate_type", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERV_CERT_TYPE] = "server_certificate_type", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PADDING] = "padding", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PRE_SHARED_KEY] = "pre_shared_key", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EARLY_DATA] = "early_data", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS] = "supported_versions", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_COOKIE] = "cookie", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES] = "psk_key_exchange_modes", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CERT_AUTH] = "certificate_authorities", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_OID_FILTERS] = "oid_filters", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH] = "post_handshake_auth", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG_CERT] = "signature_algorithms_cert", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_KEY_SHARE] = "key_share", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_TRUNCATED_HMAC] = "truncated_hmac", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS] = "supported_point_formats", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC] = "encrypt_then_mac", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET] = "extended_master_secret", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SESSION_TICKET] = "session_ticket", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT] = "record_size_limit" +}; - if ((md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_type)) == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } +static const unsigned int extension_type_table[] = { + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_UNRECOGNIZED] = 0xff, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERVERNAME] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_STATUS_REQUEST] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_GROUPS] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_USE_SRTP] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_HEARTBEAT] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ALPN] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SCT] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SCT, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CLI_CERT_TYPE] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CLI_CERT_TYPE, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERV_CERT_TYPE] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERV_CERT_TYPE, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PADDING] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PADDING, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PRE_SHARED_KEY] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EARLY_DATA] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EARLY_DATA, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_COOKIE] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_COOKIE, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CERT_AUTH] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CERT_AUTH, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_OID_FILTERS] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_OID_FILTERS, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG_CERT] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG_CERT, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_KEY_SHARE] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_TRUNCATED_HMAC] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SESSION_TICKET] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT +}; - md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_name(unsigned int extension_type) +{ + return extension_name_table[ + mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_id(extension_type)]; +} + +static const char *ssl_tls13_get_hs_msg_name(int hs_msg_type) +{ + switch (hs_msg_type) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO: + return "ClientHello"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO: + return "ServerHello"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_HS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: + return "HelloRetryRequest"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET: + return "NewSessionTicket"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: + return "EncryptedExtensions"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE: + return "Certificate"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: + return "CertificateRequest"; + } + return "Unknown"; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_print_extension(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int level, const char *file, int line, + int hs_msg_type, unsigned int extension_type, + const char *extra_msg0, const char *extra_msg1) +{ + const char *extra_msg; + if (extra_msg0 && extra_msg1) { + mbedtls_debug_print_msg( + ssl, level, file, line, + "%s: %s(%u) extension %s %s.", + ssl_tls13_get_hs_msg_name(hs_msg_type), + mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_name(extension_type), + extension_type, + extra_msg0, extra_msg1); + return; + } - tmp_len = md_len + strlen(label) + rlen; - tmp = mbedtls_calloc(1, tmp_len); - if (tmp == NULL) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - goto exit; + extra_msg = extra_msg0 ? extra_msg0 : extra_msg1; + if (extra_msg) { + mbedtls_debug_print_msg( + ssl, level, file, line, + "%s: %s(%u) extension %s.", ssl_tls13_get_hs_msg_name(hs_msg_type), + mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_name(extension_type), extension_type, + extra_msg); + return; } - nb = strlen(label); - memcpy(tmp + md_len, label, nb); - memcpy(tmp + md_len + nb, random, rlen); - nb += rlen; + mbedtls_debug_print_msg( + ssl, level, file, line, + "%s: %s(%u) extension.", ssl_tls13_get_hs_msg_name(hs_msg_type), + mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_name(extension_type), extension_type); +} - /* - * Compute P_(secret, label + random)[0..dlen] - */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 1)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } +void mbedtls_ssl_print_extensions(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int level, const char *file, int line, + int hs_msg_type, uint32_t extensions_mask, + const char *extra) +{ - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&md_ctx, secret, slen); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&md_ctx, tmp + md_len, nb); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&md_ctx, tmp); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; + for (unsigned i = 0; + i < sizeof(extension_name_table) / sizeof(extension_name_table[0]); + i++) { + mbedtls_ssl_print_extension( + ssl, level, file, line, hs_msg_type, extension_type_table[i], + extensions_mask & (1 << i) ? "exists" : "does not exist", extra); } +} - for (i = 0; i < dlen; i += md_len) { - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&md_ctx); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&md_ctx, tmp, md_len + nb); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&md_ctx, h_i); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +static const char *ticket_flag_name_table[] = +{ + [0] = "ALLOW_PSK_RESUMPTION", + [2] = "ALLOW_PSK_EPHEMERAL_RESUMPTION", + [3] = "ALLOW_EARLY_DATA", +}; - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&md_ctx); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&md_ctx, tmp, md_len); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&md_ctx, tmp); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } +void mbedtls_ssl_print_ticket_flags(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int level, const char *file, int line, + unsigned int flags) +{ + size_t i; - k = (i + md_len > dlen) ? dlen % md_len : md_len; + mbedtls_debug_print_msg(ssl, level, file, line, + "print ticket_flags (0x%02x)", flags); - for (j = 0; j < k; j++) { - dstbuf[i + j] = h_i[j]; + flags = flags & MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH(ticket_flag_name_table); i++) { + if ((flags & (1 << i))) { + mbedtls_debug_print_msg(ssl, level, file, line, "- %s is set.", + ticket_flag_name_table[i]); } } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ -exit: - mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ - if (tmp != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, tmp_len); +void mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info) +{ + ((void) ciphersuite_info); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + if (ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { + ssl->handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_sha384; + } else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + if (ciphersuite_info->mac != MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { + ssl->handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_sha256; + } else +#endif + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return; } +} - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(h_i, sizeof(h_i)); +int mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned hs_type, + size_t total_hs_len) +{ + unsigned char hs_hdr[4]; - mbedtls_free(tmp); + /* Build HS header for checksum update. */ + hs_hdr[0] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(hs_type); + hs_hdr[1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(total_hs_len); + hs_hdr[2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(total_hs_len); + hs_hdr[3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(total_hs_len); - return ret; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int tls_prf_sha256(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const char *label, - const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, - unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen) -{ - return tls_prf_generic(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, secret, slen, - label, random, rlen, dstbuf, dlen); + return ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, hs_hdr, sizeof(hs_hdr)); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int tls_prf_sha384(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const char *label, - const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, - unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen) +int mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned hs_type, + unsigned char const *msg, + size_t msg_len) { - return tls_prf_generic(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, secret, slen, - label, random, rlen, dstbuf, dlen); + int ret; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(ssl, hs_type, msg_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + return ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, msg, msg_len); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - -static void ssl_update_checksum_start(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -static void ssl_update_checksum_md5sha1(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -static void ssl_calc_verify_ssl(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *); -static void ssl_calc_finished_ssl(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -static void ssl_calc_verify_tls(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *); -static void ssl_calc_finished_tls(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -static void ssl_update_checksum_sha256(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); -static void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *); -static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int); +int mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status; +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; #endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) -static void ssl_update_checksum_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); -static void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *); -static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int); +#else /* SHA-256 or SHA-384 */ + ((void) ssl); +#endif /* SHA-256 or SHA-384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_hash_abort(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); + } + status = psa_hash_setup(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); + } +#else + mbedtls_md_free(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256); + mbedtls_md_init(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256); + ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, + mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256), + 0); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } #endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_use_opaque_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl) -{ - if (ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL) { - /* If we've used a callback to select the PSK, - * the static configuration is irrelevant. */ - if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque)) { - return 1; - } - - return 0; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_hash_abort(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); } - - if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->conf->psk_opaque)) { - return 1; + status = psa_hash_setup(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); } - +#else + mbedtls_md_free(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384); + mbedtls_md_init(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384); + ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384, + mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384), 0); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif +#endif return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) -static mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_get_type(mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf) +static int ssl_update_checksum_start(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if (tls_prf == ssl3_prf) { - return MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SSL3; - } else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status; +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if (tls_prf == tls1_prf) { - return MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_TLS1; - } else +#else /* SHA-256 or SHA-384 */ + ((void) ssl); + (void) buf; + (void) len; +#endif /* SHA-256 or SHA-384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_hash_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, buf, len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); + } +#else + ret = mbedtls_md_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, buf, len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - if (tls_prf == tls_prf_sha384) { - return MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384; - } else #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - if (tls_prf == tls_prf_sha256) { - return MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256; - } else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_hash_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, buf, len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); + } +#else + ret = mbedtls_md_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384, buf, len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } #endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - return MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE; +#endif + return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ -int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf(const mbedtls_tls_prf_types prf, - const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const char *label, - const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, - unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +static int ssl_update_checksum_sha256(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) { - mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(psa_hash_update( + &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, buf, len)); +#else + return mbedtls_md_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, buf, len); +#endif +} +#endif - switch (prf) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SSL3: - tls_prf = ssl3_prf; - break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_TLS1: - tls_prf = tls1_prf; - break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +static int ssl_update_checksum_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(psa_hash_update( + &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, buf, len)); +#else + return mbedtls_md_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384, buf, len); +#endif +} +#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384: - tls_prf = tls_prf_sha384; - break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256: - tls_prf = tls_prf_sha256; - break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - default: - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - } +static void ssl_handshake_params_init(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake) +{ + memset(handshake, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params)); - return tls_prf(secret, slen, label, random, rlen, dstbuf, dlen); -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + handshake->fin_sha256_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); +#else + mbedtls_md_init(&handshake->fin_sha256); +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + handshake->fin_sha384_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); +#else + mbedtls_md_init(&handshake->fin_sha384); +#endif +#endif -/* Type for the TLS PRF */ -typedef int ssl_tls_prf_t(const unsigned char *, size_t, const char *, - const unsigned char *, size_t, - unsigned char *, size_t); + handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_start; -/* - * Populate a transform structure with session keys and all the other - * necessary information. - * - * Parameters: - * - [in/out]: transform: structure to populate - * [in] must be just initialised with mbedtls_ssl_transform_init() - * [out] fully populated, ready for use by mbedtls_ssl_{en,de}crypt_buf() - * - [in] ciphersuite - * - [in] master - * - [in] encrypt_then_mac - * - [in] trunc_hmac - * - [in] compression - * - [in] tls_prf: pointer to PRF to use for key derivation - * - [in] randbytes: buffer holding ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random - * - [in] minor_ver: SSL/TLS minor version - * - [in] endpoint: client or server - * - [in] ssl: optionally used for: - * - MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL: whole context (non-const) - * - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS: ssl->conf->{f,p}_export_keys - * - MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C: ssl->conf->{f,p}_dbg - */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_populate_transform(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, - int ciphersuite, - const unsigned char master[48], -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - int encrypt_then_mac, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - int trunc_hmac, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - int compression, -#endif - ssl_tls_prf_t tls_prf, - const unsigned char randbytes[64], - int minor_ver, - unsigned endpoint, -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - const -#endif - mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - int ret = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + mbedtls_dhm_init(&handshake->dhm_ctx); +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ecdh_init(&handshake->ecdh_ctx); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - int psa_fallthrough; + handshake->psa_pake_ctx = psa_pake_operation_init(); + handshake->psa_pake_password = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +#else + mbedtls_ecjpake_init(&handshake->ecjpake_ctx); #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - int do_mbedtls_cipher_setup; - unsigned char keyblk[256]; - unsigned char *key1; - unsigned char *key2; - unsigned char *mac_enc; - unsigned char *mac_dec; - size_t mac_key_len = 0; - size_t iv_copy_len; - unsigned keylen; - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; - const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL; + handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0; +#endif +#endif -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) - ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for those cases */ - (void) ssl; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init(&handshake->ecrs_ctx); #endif - /* - * Some data just needs copying into the structure - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) - transform->encrypt_then_mac = encrypt_then_mac; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + handshake->sni_authmode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET; #endif - transform->minor_ver = minor_ver; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) - memcpy(transform->randbytes, randbytes, sizeof(transform->randbytes)); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + mbedtls_pk_init(&handshake->peer_pubkey); #endif +} - /* - * Get various info structures - */ - ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ciphersuite); - if (ciphersuite_info == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ciphersuite info for %d not found", - ciphersuite)); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } +void mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform) +{ + memset(transform, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform)); - cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(ciphersuite_info->cipher); - if (cipher_info == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("cipher info for %u not found", - ciphersuite_info->cipher)); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + transform->psa_key_enc = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + transform->psa_key_dec = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +#else + mbedtls_cipher_init(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc); + mbedtls_cipher_init(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec); +#endif - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(ciphersuite_info->mac); - if (md_info == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("mbedtls_md info for %u not found", - (unsigned) ciphersuite_info->mac)); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + transform->psa_mac_enc = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + transform->psa_mac_dec = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +#else + mbedtls_md_init(&transform->md_ctx_enc); + mbedtls_md_init(&transform->md_ctx_dec); +#endif +#endif +} -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - /* Copy own and peer's CID if the use of the CID - * extension has been negotiated. */ - if (ssl->handshake->cid_in_use == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Copy CIDs into SSL transform")); +void mbedtls_ssl_session_init(mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + memset(session, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)); +} - transform->in_cid_len = ssl->own_cid_len; - memcpy(transform->in_cid, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Incoming CID", transform->in_cid, - transform->in_cid_len); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_handshake_init(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - transform->out_cid_len = ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len; - memcpy(transform->out_cid, ssl->handshake->peer_cid, - ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Outgoing CID", transform->out_cid, - transform->out_cid_len); + /* Clear old handshake information if present */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (ssl->transform_negotiate) { + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform_negotiate); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate) { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session_negotiate); + } + if (ssl->handshake) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(ssl); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) /* - * Compute key block using the PRF + * Either the pointers are now NULL or cleared properly and can be freed. + * Now allocate missing structures. */ - ret = tls_prf(master, 48, "key expansion", randbytes, 64, keyblk, 256); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "prf", ret); - return ret; + if (ssl->transform_negotiate == NULL) { + ssl->transform_negotiate = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform)); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite = %s", - mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name(ciphersuite))); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "master secret", master, 48); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "random bytes", randbytes, 64); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "key block", keyblk, 256); - - /* - * Determine the appropriate key, IV and MAC length. - */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate == NULL) { + ssl->session_negotiate = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)); + } - keylen = cipher_info->key_bitlen / 8; + if (ssl->handshake == NULL) { + ssl->handshake = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params)); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + /* If the buffers are too small - reallocate */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) - if (cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM || - cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM || - cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY) { - size_t explicit_ivlen; + handle_buffer_resizing(ssl, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN, + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN); +#endif - transform->maclen = 0; - mac_key_len = 0; - transform->taglen = - ciphersuite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG ? 8 : 16; + /* All pointers should exist and can be directly freed without issue */ + if (ssl->handshake == NULL || +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + ssl->transform_negotiate == NULL || +#endif + ssl->session_negotiate == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc() of ssl sub-contexts failed")); - /* All modes haves 96-bit IVs, but the length of the static parts vary - * with mode and version: - * - For GCM and CCM in TLS 1.2, there's a static IV of 4 Bytes - * (to be concatenated with a dynamically chosen IV of 8 Bytes) - * - For ChaChaPoly in TLS 1.2, and all modes in TLS 1.3, there's - * a static IV of 12 Bytes (to be XOR'ed with the 8 Byte record - * sequence number). - */ - transform->ivlen = 12; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) - if (minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4) { - transform->fixed_ivlen = 12; - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ - { - if (cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY) { - transform->fixed_ivlen = 12; - } else { - transform->fixed_ivlen = 4; - } - } + mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake); + ssl->handshake = NULL; - /* Minimum length of encrypted record */ - explicit_ivlen = transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen; - transform->minlen = explicit_ivlen + transform->taglen; - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) - if (cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM || - cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC) { - /* Initialize HMAC contexts */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&transform->md_ctx_enc, md_info, 1)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&transform->md_ctx_dec, md_info, 1)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_md_setup", ret); - goto end; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + mbedtls_free(ssl->transform_negotiate); + ssl->transform_negotiate = NULL; +#endif - /* Get MAC length */ - mac_key_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); - transform->maclen = mac_key_len; + mbedtls_free(ssl->session_negotiate); + ssl->session_negotiate = NULL; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - /* - * If HMAC is to be truncated, we shall keep the leftmost bytes, - * (rfc 6066 page 13 or rfc 2104 section 4), - * so we only need to adjust the length here. - */ - if (trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED) { - transform->maclen = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT) - /* Fall back to old, non-compliant version of the truncated - * HMAC implementation which also truncates the key - * (Mbed TLS versions from 1.3 to 2.6.0) */ - mac_key_len = transform->maclen; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + ssl->early_data_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IDLE; #endif - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + ssl->discard_early_data_record = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD; +#endif + ssl->total_early_data_size = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ - /* IV length */ - transform->ivlen = cipher_info->iv_size; + /* Initialize structures */ + mbedtls_ssl_session_init(ssl->session_negotiate); + ssl_handshake_params_init(ssl->handshake); - /* Minimum length */ - if (cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM) { - transform->minlen = transform->maclen; - } else { - /* - * GenericBlockCipher: - * 1. if EtM is in use: one block plus MAC - * otherwise: * first multiple of blocklen greater than maclen - * 2. IV except for SSL3 and TLS 1.0 - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - if (encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED) { - transform->minlen = transform->maclen - + cipher_info->block_size; - } else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(ssl->transform_negotiate); #endif - { - transform->minlen = transform->maclen - + cipher_info->block_size - - transform->maclen % cipher_info->block_size; - } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) - if (minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 || - minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1) { - ; /* No need to adjust minlen */ - } else -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 || - minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - transform->minlen += transform->ivlen; - } else -#endif - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto end; - } - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + /* Setup handshake checksums */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum", ret); + return ret; } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("keylen: %u, minlen: %u, ivlen: %u, maclen: %u", - (unsigned) keylen, - (unsigned) transform->minlen, - (unsigned) transform->ivlen, - (unsigned) transform->maclen)); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + ssl->handshake->new_session_tickets_count = + ssl->conf->new_session_tickets_count; +#endif - /* - * Finally setup the cipher contexts, IVs and MAC secrets. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { - key1 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2; - key2 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2 + keylen; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = ssl->transform_out; - mac_enc = keyblk; - mac_dec = keyblk + mac_key_len; + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING; + } else { + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING; + } - /* - * This is not used in TLS v1.1. - */ - iv_copy_len = (transform->fixed_ivlen) ? - transform->fixed_ivlen : transform->ivlen; - memcpy(transform->iv_enc, key2 + keylen, iv_copy_len); - memcpy(transform->iv_dec, key2 + keylen + iv_copy_len, - iv_copy_len); - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { - key1 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2 + keylen; - key2 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2; + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, 0); + } +#endif - mac_enc = keyblk + mac_key_len; - mac_dec = keyblk; +/* + * curve_list is translated to IANA TLS group identifiers here because + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves returns void and so can't return + * any error codes. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + /* Heap allocate and translate curve_list from internal to IANA group ids */ + if (ssl->conf->curve_list != NULL) { + size_t length; + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curve_list = ssl->conf->curve_list; - /* - * This is not used in TLS v1.1. - */ - iv_copy_len = (transform->fixed_ivlen) ? - transform->fixed_ivlen : transform->ivlen; - memcpy(transform->iv_dec, key1 + keylen, iv_copy_len); - memcpy(transform->iv_enc, key1 + keylen + iv_copy_len, - iv_copy_len); - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto end; - } + for (length = 0; (curve_list[length] != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE); length++) { + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if (minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { - if (mac_key_len > sizeof(transform->mac_enc)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto end; + /* Leave room for zero termination */ + uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_calloc(length + 1, sizeof(uint16_t)); + if (group_list == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; } - memcpy(transform->mac_enc, mac_enc, mac_key_len); - memcpy(transform->mac_dec, mac_dec, mac_key_len); - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1) { - /* For HMAC-based ciphersuites, initialize the HMAC transforms. - For AEAD-based ciphersuites, there is nothing to do here. */ - if (mac_key_len != 0) { - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&transform->md_ctx_enc, - mac_enc, mac_key_len); - if (ret != 0) { - goto end; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&transform->md_ctx_dec, - mac_dec, mac_key_len); - if (ret != 0) { - goto end; + for (size_t i = 0; i < length; i++) { + uint16_t tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id( + curve_list[i]); + if (tls_id == 0) { + mbedtls_free(group_list); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; } + group_list[i] = tls_id; } - } else -#endif - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto end; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - if (mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init != NULL) { - ret = 0; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init()")); - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init(ssl, key1, key2, keylen, - transform->iv_enc, transform->iv_dec, - iv_copy_len, - mac_enc, mac_dec, - mac_key_len)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init", ret); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - goto end; - } - } -#else - ((void) mac_dec); - ((void) mac_enc); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ + group_list[length] = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) - if (ssl->conf->f_export_keys != NULL) { - ssl->conf->f_export_keys(ssl->conf->p_export_keys, - master, keyblk, - mac_key_len, keylen, - iv_copy_len); + ssl->handshake->group_list = group_list; + ssl->handshake->group_list_heap_allocated = 1; + } else { + ssl->handshake->group_list = ssl->conf->group_list; + ssl->handshake->group_list_heap_allocated = 0; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ - if (ssl->conf->f_export_keys_ext != NULL) { - ssl->conf->f_export_keys_ext(ssl->conf->p_export_keys, - master, keyblk, - mac_key_len, keylen, - iv_copy_len, - randbytes + 32, - randbytes, - tls_prf_get_type(tls_prf)); - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* Heap allocate and translate sig_hashes from internal hash identifiers to + signature algorithms IANA identifiers. */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_only(ssl->conf) && + ssl->conf->sig_hashes != NULL) { + const int *md; + const int *sig_hashes = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; + size_t sig_algs_len = 0; + uint16_t *p; + + MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_ALG_LIST_LEN + <= (SIZE_MAX - (2 * sizeof(uint16_t))), + "MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_ALG_LIST_LEN too big"); + + for (md = sig_hashes; *md != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; md++) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(*md) == MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE) { + continue; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + sig_algs_len += sizeof(uint16_t); #endif - do_mbedtls_cipher_setup = 1; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - - /* Only use PSA-based ciphers for TLS-1.2. - * That's relevant at least for TLS-1.0, where - * we assume that mbedtls_cipher_crypt() updates - * the structure field for the IV, which the PSA-based - * implementation currently doesn't. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, - cipher_info, transform->taglen); - if (ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa", ret); - goto end; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + sig_algs_len += sizeof(uint16_t); +#endif + if (sig_algs_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_ALG_LIST_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; + } } - if (ret == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Successfully setup PSA-based encryption cipher context")); - psa_fallthrough = 0; - } else { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ( - "Failed to setup PSA-based cipher context for record encryption - fall through to default setup.")); - psa_fallthrough = 1; + if (sig_algs_len < MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_SIG_ALG_LIST_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; } - } else { - psa_fallthrough = 1; - } -#else - psa_fallthrough = 1; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - - if (psa_fallthrough == 0) { - do_mbedtls_cipher_setup = 0; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - if (do_mbedtls_cipher_setup && - (ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, - cipher_info)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret); - goto end; - } - do_mbedtls_cipher_setup = 1; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - /* Only use PSA-based ciphers for TLS-1.2. - * That's relevant at least for TLS-1.0, where - * we assume that mbedtls_cipher_crypt() updates - * the structure field for the IV, which the PSA-based - * implementation currently doesn't. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, - cipher_info, transform->taglen); - if (ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa", ret); - goto end; + ssl->handshake->sig_algs = mbedtls_calloc(1, sig_algs_len + + sizeof(uint16_t)); + if (ssl->handshake->sig_algs == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; } - if (ret == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Successfully setup PSA-based decryption cipher context")); - psa_fallthrough = 0; - } else { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ( - "Failed to setup PSA-based cipher context for record decryption - fall through to default setup.")); - psa_fallthrough = 1; + p = (uint16_t *) ssl->handshake->sig_algs; + for (md = sig_hashes; *md != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; md++) { + unsigned char hash = mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(*md); + if (hash == MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE) { + continue; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + *p = ((hash << 8) | MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA); + p++; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + *p = ((hash << 8) | MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA); + p++; +#endif } - } else { - psa_fallthrough = 1; - } -#else - psa_fallthrough = 1; + *p = MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; + ssl->handshake->sig_algs_heap_allocated = 1; + } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - - if (psa_fallthrough == 0) { - do_mbedtls_cipher_setup = 0; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - if (do_mbedtls_cipher_setup && - (ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, - cipher_info)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret); - goto end; + { + ssl->handshake->sig_algs_heap_allocated = 0; } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + return 0; +} - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, key1, - cipher_info->key_bitlen, - MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret); - goto end; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/* Dummy cookie callbacks for defaults */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_cookie_write_dummy(void *ctx, + unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len) +{ + ((void) ctx); + ((void) p); + ((void) end); + ((void) cli_id); + ((void) cli_id_len); - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, key2, - cipher_info->key_bitlen, - MBEDTLS_DECRYPT)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret); - goto end; - } + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +} -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) - if (cipher_info->mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, - MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode", ret); - goto end; - } +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_cookie_check_dummy(void *ctx, + const unsigned char *cookie, size_t cookie_len, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len) +{ + ((void) ctx); + ((void) cookie); + ((void) cookie_len); + ((void) cli_id); + ((void) cli_id_len); - if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, - MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode", ret); - goto end; - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ +/* + * Initialize an SSL context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_init(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + memset(ssl, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_context)); +} - /* Initialize Zlib contexts */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - if (compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Initializing zlib states")); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_conf_version_check(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf = ssl->conf; - memset(&transform->ctx_deflate, 0, sizeof(transform->ctx_deflate)); - memset(&transform->ctx_inflate, 0, sizeof(transform->ctx_inflate)); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls13_only(conf)) { + if (conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("DTLS 1.3 is not yet supported.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } - if (deflateInit(&transform->ctx_deflate, - Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION) != Z_OK || - inflateInit(&transform->ctx_inflate) != Z_OK) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Failed to initialize compression")); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED; - goto end; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("The SSL configuration is tls13 only.")); + return 0; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_only(conf)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("The SSL configuration is tls12 only.")); + return 0; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_hybrid_tls12_tls13(conf)) { + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("DTLS not yet supported in Hybrid TLS 1.3 + TLS 1.2")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("The SSL configuration is TLS 1.3 or TLS 1.2.")); + return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ +#endif -end: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(keyblk, sizeof(keyblk)); - return ret; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("The SSL configuration is invalid.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; } -/* - * Set appropriate PRF function and other SSL / TLS 1.0/1.1 / TLS1.2 functions - * - * Inputs: - * - SSL/TLS minor version - * - hash associated with the ciphersuite (only used by TLS 1.2) - * - * Outputs: - * - the tls_prf, calc_verify and calc_finished members of handshake structure - */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_set_handshake_prfs(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake, - int minor_ver, - mbedtls_md_type_t hash) +static int ssl_conf_check(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) || \ - !(defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)) - (void) hash; -#endif + int ret; + ret = ssl_conf_version_check(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if (minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { - handshake->tls_prf = ssl3_prf; - handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_ssl; - handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_ssl; - } else -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if (minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - handshake->tls_prf = tls1_prf; - handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls; - handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls; - } else -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - if (minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 && - hash == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { - handshake->tls_prf = tls_prf_sha384; - handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384; - handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384; - } else -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - if (minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - handshake->tls_prf = tls_prf_sha256; - handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256; - handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256; - } else -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + /* RFC 8446 section 4.4.3 + * + * If the verification fails, the receiver MUST terminate the handshake with + * a "decrypt_error" alert. + * + * If the client is configured as TLS 1.3 only with optional verify, return + * bad config. + * + */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_ephemeral_enabled( + (mbedtls_ssl_context *) ssl) && + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + ssl->conf->max_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 && + ssl->conf->min_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 && + ssl->conf->authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Optional verify auth mode " + "is not available for TLS 1.3 client")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + + if (ssl->conf->f_rng == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no RNG provided")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG; } + /* Space for further checks */ + return 0; } /* - * Compute master secret if needed - * - * Parameters: - * [in/out] handshake - * [in] resume, premaster, extended_ms, calc_verify, tls_prf - * (PSA-PSK) ciphersuite_info, psk_opaque - * [out] premaster (cleared) - * [out] master - * [in] ssl: optionally used for debugging, EMS and PSA-PSK - * debug: conf->f_dbg, conf->p_dbg - * EMS: passed to calc_verify (debug + (SSL3) session_negotiate) - * PSA-PSA: minor_ver, conf + * Setup an SSL context */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_compute_master(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake, - unsigned char *master, - const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) + +int mbedtls_ssl_setup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; - /* cf. RFC 5246, Section 8.1: - * "The master secret is always exactly 48 bytes in length." */ - size_t const master_secret_len = 48; + ssl->conf = conf; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) - unsigned char session_hash[48]; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + if ((ret = ssl_conf_check(ssl)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + ssl->tls_version = ssl->conf->max_tls_version; - /* The label for the KDF used for key expansion. - * This is either "master secret" or "extended master secret" - * depending on whether the Extended Master Secret extension - * is used. */ - char const *lbl = "master secret"; + /* + * Prepare base structures + */ - /* The salt for the KDF used for key expansion. - * - If the Extended Master Secret extension is not used, - * this is ClientHello.Random + ServerHello.Random - * (see Sect. 8.1 in RFC 5246). - * - If the Extended Master Secret extension is used, - * this is the transcript of the handshake so far. - * (see Sect. 4 in RFC 7627). */ - unsigned char const *salt = handshake->randbytes; - size_t salt_len = 64; + /* Set to NULL in case of an error condition */ + ssl->out_buf = NULL; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) && \ - !(defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)) - ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for those cases */ - (void) ssl; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + ssl->in_buf_len = in_buf_len; #endif - - if (handshake->resume != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("no premaster (session resumed)")); - return 0; + ssl->in_buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, in_buf_len); + if (ssl->in_buf == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes) failed", in_buf_len)); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto error; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) - if (handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED) { - lbl = "extended master secret"; - salt = session_hash; - handshake->calc_verify(ssl, session_hash, &salt_len); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "session hash for extended master secret", - session_hash, salt_len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + ssl->out_buf_len = out_buf_len; +#endif + ssl->out_buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, out_buf_len); + if (ssl->out_buf == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes) failed", out_buf_len)); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto error; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) - if (handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK && - ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 && - ssl_use_opaque_psk(ssl) == 1) { - /* Perform PSK-to-MS expansion in a single step. */ - psa_status_t status; - psa_algorithm_t alg; - psa_key_id_t psk; - psa_key_derivation_operation_t derivation = - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; - mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg = handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac; + mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(ssl); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("perform PSA-based PSK-to-MS expansion")); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + memset(&ssl->dtls_srtp_info, 0, sizeof(ssl->dtls_srtp_info)); +#endif - psk = mbedtls_ssl_get_opaque_psk(ssl); + if ((ret = ssl_handshake_init(ssl)) != 0) { + goto error; + } - if (hash_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { - alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); - } else { - alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); - } + return 0; - status = setup_psa_key_derivation(&derivation, psk, alg, - salt, salt_len, - (unsigned char const *) lbl, - (size_t) strlen(lbl), - master_secret_len); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } +error: + mbedtls_free(ssl->in_buf); + mbedtls_free(ssl->out_buf); - status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(&derivation, - master, - master_secret_len); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } + ssl->conf = NULL; - status = psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } - } else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + ssl->in_buf_len = 0; + ssl->out_buf_len = 0; #endif - { - ret = handshake->tls_prf(handshake->premaster, handshake->pmslen, - lbl, salt, salt_len, - master, - master_secret_len); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "prf", ret); - return ret; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "premaster secret", - handshake->premaster, - handshake->pmslen); + ssl->in_buf = NULL; + ssl->out_buf = NULL; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(handshake->premaster, - sizeof(handshake->premaster)); - } + ssl->in_hdr = NULL; + ssl->in_ctr = NULL; + ssl->in_len = NULL; + ssl->in_iv = NULL; + ssl->in_msg = NULL; - return 0; + ssl->out_hdr = NULL; + ssl->out_ctr = NULL; + ssl->out_len = NULL; + ssl->out_iv = NULL; + ssl->out_msg = NULL; + + return ret; } -int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +/* + * Reset an initialized and used SSL context for re-use while retaining + * all application-set variables, function pointers and data. + * + * If partial is non-zero, keep data in the input buffer and client ID. + * (Use when a DTLS client reconnects from the same port.) + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_msg_layer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int partial) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * const ciphersuite_info = - ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; +#else + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> derive keys")); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + partial = 0; +#endif - /* Set PRF, calc_verify and calc_finished function pointers */ - ret = ssl_set_handshake_prfs(ssl->handshake, - ssl->minor_ver, - ciphersuite_info->mac); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_set_handshake_prfs", ret); - return ret; - } + /* Cancel any possibly running timer */ + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, 0); - /* Compute master secret if needed */ - ret = ssl_compute_master(ssl->handshake, - ssl->session_negotiate->master, - ssl); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_compute_master", ret); - return ret; - } + mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(ssl); - /* Swap the client and server random values: - * - MS derivation wanted client+server (RFC 5246 8.1) - * - key derivation wants server+client (RFC 5246 6.3) */ - { - unsigned char tmp[64]; - memcpy(tmp, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64); - memcpy(ssl->handshake->randbytes, tmp + 32, 32); - memcpy(ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, tmp, 32); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); - } + /* Reset incoming message parsing */ + ssl->in_offt = NULL; + ssl->nb_zero = 0; + ssl->in_msgtype = 0; + ssl->in_msglen = 0; + ssl->in_hslen = 0; + ssl->keep_current_message = 0; + ssl->transform_in = NULL; - /* Populate transform structure */ - ret = ssl_populate_transform(ssl->transform_negotiate, - ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite, - ssl->session_negotiate->master, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - ssl->session_negotiate->compression, -#endif - ssl->handshake->tls_prf, - ssl->handshake->randbytes, - ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->endpoint, - ssl); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_populate_transform", ret); - return ret; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + ssl->in_epoch = 0; +#endif + + /* Keep current datagram if partial == 1 */ + if (partial == 0) { + ssl->in_left = 0; + memset(ssl->in_buf, 0, in_buf_len); } - /* We no longer need Server/ClientHello.random values */ - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->handshake->randbytes, - sizeof(ssl->handshake->randbytes)); + ssl->send_alert = 0; - /* Allocate compression buffer */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - if (ssl->session_negotiate->compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE && - ssl->compress_buf == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Allocating compression buffer")); - ssl->compress_buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN); - if (ssl->compress_buf == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc(%d bytes) failed", - MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN)); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - } - } + /* Reset outgoing message writing */ + ssl->out_msgtype = 0; + ssl->out_msglen = 0; + ssl->out_left = 0; + memset(ssl->out_buf, 0, out_buf_len); + memset(ssl->cur_out_ctr, 0, sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr)); + ssl->transform_out = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset(ssl); #endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= derive keys")); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (ssl->transform) { + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform); + mbedtls_free(ssl->transform); + ssl->transform = NULL; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - return 0; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform_application); + mbedtls_free(ssl->transform_application); + ssl->transform_application = NULL; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -void ssl_calc_verify_ssl(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *hash, - size_t *hlen) -{ - mbedtls_md5_context md5; - mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; - unsigned char pad_1[48]; - unsigned char pad_2[48]; + if (ssl->handshake != NULL) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->handshake->transform_earlydata); + mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake->transform_earlydata); + ssl->handshake->transform_earlydata = NULL; +#endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc verify ssl")); + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->handshake->transform_handshake); + mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake->transform_handshake); + ssl->handshake->transform_handshake = NULL; + } - mbedtls_md5_init(&md5); - mbedtls_sha1_init(&sha1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ +} - mbedtls_md5_clone(&md5, &ssl->handshake->fin_md5); - mbedtls_sha1_clone(&sha1, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1); +int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - memset(pad_1, 0x36, 48); - memset(pad_2, 0x5C, 48); + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST; + ssl->tls_version = ssl->conf->max_tls_version; - mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5, ssl->session_negotiate->master, 48); - mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5, pad_1, 48); - mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(&md5, hash); + mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_msg_layer(ssl, partial); - mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(&md5); - mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5, ssl->session_negotiate->master, 48); - mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5, pad_2, 48); - mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5, hash, 16); - mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(&md5, hash); + /* Reset renegotiation state */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->renego_records_seen = 0; - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&sha1, ssl->session_negotiate->master, 48); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&sha1, pad_1, 40); - mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(&sha1, hash + 16); + ssl->verify_data_len = 0; + memset(ssl->own_verify_data, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN); + memset(ssl->peer_verify_data, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN); +#endif + ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION; - mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret(&sha1); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&sha1, ssl->session_negotiate->master, 48); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&sha1, pad_2, 40); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&sha1, hash + 16, 20); - mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(&sha1, hash + 16); + ssl->session_in = NULL; + ssl->session_out = NULL; + if (ssl->session) { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session); + mbedtls_free(ssl->session); + ssl->session = NULL; + } - *hlen = 36; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + ssl->alpn_chosen = NULL; +#endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc verify")); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + int free_cli_id = 1; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) + free_cli_id = (partial == 0); +#endif + if (free_cli_id) { + mbedtls_free(ssl->cli_id); + ssl->cli_id = NULL; + ssl->cli_id_len = 0; + } +#endif - mbedtls_md5_free(&md5); - mbedtls_sha1_free(&sha1); + if ((ret = ssl_handshake_init(ssl)) != 0) { + return ret; + } - return; + return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -void ssl_calc_verify_tls(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *hash, - size_t *hlen) +/* + * Reset an initialized and used SSL context for re-use while retaining + * all application-set variables, function pointers and data. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { - mbedtls_md5_context md5; - mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc verify tls")); - - mbedtls_md5_init(&md5); - mbedtls_sha1_init(&sha1); + return mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int(ssl, 0); +} - mbedtls_md5_clone(&md5, &ssl->handshake->fin_md5); - mbedtls_sha1_clone(&sha1, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1); +/* + * SSL set accessors + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int endpoint) +{ + conf->endpoint = endpoint; +} - mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(&md5, hash); - mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(&sha1, hash + 16); +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int transport) +{ + conf->transport = transport; +} - *hlen = 36; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char mode) +{ + conf->anti_replay = mode; +} +#endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc verify")); +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned limit) +{ + conf->badmac_limit = limit; +} - mbedtls_md5_free(&md5); - mbedtls_sha1_free(&sha1); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - return; +void mbedtls_ssl_set_datagram_packing(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned allow_packing) +{ + ssl->disable_datagram_packing = !allow_packing; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *hash, - size_t *hlen) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + uint32_t min, uint32_t max) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - size_t hash_size; - psa_status_t status; - psa_hash_operation_t sha256_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); + conf->hs_timeout_min = min; + conf->hs_timeout_max = max; +} +#endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> PSA calc verify sha256")); - status = psa_hash_clone(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, &sha256_psa); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash clone failed")); - return; - } +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int authmode) +{ + conf->authmode = authmode; +} - status = psa_hash_finish(&sha256_psa, hash, 32, &hash_size); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash finish failed")); - return; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy) +{ + conf->f_vrfy = f_vrfy; + conf->p_vrfy = p_vrfy; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - *hlen = 32; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "PSA calculated verify result", hash, *hlen); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= PSA calc verify")); -#else - mbedtls_sha256_context sha256; +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + conf->f_rng = f_rng; + conf->p_rng = p_rng; +} - mbedtls_sha256_init(&sha256); +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + void (*f_dbg)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *), + void *p_dbg) +{ + conf->f_dbg = f_dbg; + conf->p_dbg = p_dbg; +} - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc verify sha256")); +void mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + void *p_bio, + mbedtls_ssl_send_t *f_send, + mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *f_recv, + mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t *f_recv_timeout) +{ + ssl->p_bio = p_bio; + ssl->f_send = f_send; + ssl->f_recv = f_recv; + ssl->f_recv_timeout = f_recv_timeout; +} - mbedtls_sha256_clone(&sha256, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256); - mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret(&sha256, hash); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +void mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t mtu) +{ + ssl->mtu = mtu; +} +#endif - *hlen = 32; +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_read_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t timeout) +{ + conf->read_timeout = timeout; +} - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc verify")); +void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + void *p_timer, + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t *f_set_timer, + mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t *f_get_timer) +{ + ssl->p_timer = p_timer; + ssl->f_set_timer = f_set_timer; + ssl->f_get_timer = f_get_timer; - mbedtls_sha256_free(&sha256); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - return; + /* Make sure we start with no timer running */ + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, 0); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) -void ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *hash, - size_t *hlen) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + void *p_cache, + mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_t *f_get_cache, + mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_t *f_set_cache) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - size_t hash_size; - psa_status_t status; - psa_hash_operation_t sha384_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> PSA calc verify sha384")); - status = psa_hash_clone(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, &sha384_psa); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash clone failed")); - return; - } - - status = psa_hash_finish(&sha384_psa, hash, 48, &hash_size); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash finish failed")); - return; - } - - *hlen = 48; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "PSA calculated verify result", hash, *hlen); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= PSA calc verify")); -#else - mbedtls_sha512_context sha512; - - mbedtls_sha512_init(&sha512); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc verify sha384")); - - mbedtls_sha512_clone(&sha512, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512); - mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret(&sha512, hash); - - *hlen = 48; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc verify")); - - mbedtls_sha512_free(&sha512); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - return; + conf->p_cache = p_cache; + conf->f_get_cache = f_get_cache; + conf->f_set_cache = f_set_cache; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) -int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_ex) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_set_session(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session) { - unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->premaster; - unsigned char *end = p + sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster); - const unsigned char *psk = NULL; - size_t psk_len = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - if (mbedtls_ssl_get_psk(ssl, &psk, &psk_len) - == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED) { - /* - * This should never happen because the existence of a PSK is always - * checked before calling this function - */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + if (ssl == NULL || + session == NULL || + ssl->session_negotiate == NULL || + ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - /* - * PMS = struct { - * opaque other_secret<0..2^16-1>; - * opaque psk<0..2^16-1>; - * }; - * with "other_secret" depending on the particular key exchange - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) - if (key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK) { - if (end - p < 2) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(psk_len, p, 0); - p += 2; + if (ssl->handshake->resume == 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } - if (end < p || (size_t) (end - p) < psk_len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (session->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(session->ciphersuite); - memset(p, 0, psk_len); - p += psk_len; - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) - if (key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK) { - /* - * other_secret already set by the ClientKeyExchange message, - * and is 48 bytes long - */ - if (end - p < 2) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_validate_ciphersuite( + ssl, ciphersuite_info, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("%d is not a valid TLS 1.3 ciphersuite.", + session->ciphersuite)); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - - *p++ = 0; - *p++ = 48; - p += 48; - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) - if (key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t len; - - /* Write length only when we know the actual value */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, - p + 2, end - (p + 2), &len, - ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret); - return ret; - } - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(len, p, 0); - p += 2 + len; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K); - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) - if (key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t zlen; - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &zlen, - p + 2, end - (p + 2), - ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret); - return ret; - } - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(zlen, p, 0); - p += 2 + zlen; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, - MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z); - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - - /* opaque psk<0..2^16-1>; */ - if (end - p < 2) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(psk_len, p, 0); - p += 2; - - if (end < p || (size_t) (end - p) < psk_len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(ssl->session_negotiate, + session)) != 0) { + return ret; } - memcpy(p, psk, psk_len); - p += psk_len; - - ssl->handshake->pmslen = p - ssl->handshake->premaster; + ssl->handshake->resume = 1; return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_hello_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -int mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const int *ciphersuites) { - /* If renegotiation is not enforced, retransmit until we would reach max - * timeout if we were using the usual handshake doubling scheme */ - if (ssl->conf->renego_max_records < 0) { - uint32_t ratio = ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max / ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min + 1; - unsigned char doublings = 1; - - while (ratio != 0) { - ++doublings; - ratio >>= 1; - } - - if (++ssl->renego_records_seen > doublings) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("no longer retransmitting hello request")); - return 0; - } - } - - return ssl_write_hello_request(ssl); + conf->ciphersuite_list = ciphersuites; } -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -static void ssl_clear_peer_cert(mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_key_exchange_modes(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const int kex_modes) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - if (session->peer_cert != NULL) { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free(session->peer_cert); - mbedtls_free(session->peer_cert); - session->peer_cert = NULL; - } -#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - if (session->peer_cert_digest != NULL) { - /* Zeroization is not necessary. */ - mbedtls_free(session->peer_cert_digest); - session->peer_cert_digest = NULL; - session->peer_cert_digest_type = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; - session->peer_cert_digest_len = 0; - } -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + conf->tls13_kex_modes = kex_modes & MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_ALL; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ -/* - * Handshake functions - */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) -/* No certificate support -> dummy functions */ -int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int early_data_enabled) { - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + conf->early_data_enabled = early_data_enabled; +} - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate")); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_early_data_size( + mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t max_early_data_size) +{ + conf->max_early_data_size = max_early_data_size; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert(ciphersuite_info)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate")); - ssl->state++; - return 0; - } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile) +{ + conf->cert_profile = profile; } -int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +static void ssl_key_cert_free(mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert) { - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate")); + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur = key_cert, *next; - if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert(ciphersuite_info)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate")); - ssl->state++; - return 0; + while (cur != NULL) { + next = cur->next; + mbedtls_free(cur); + cur = next; } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } -#else /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ -/* Some certificate support -> implement write and parse */ - -int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +/* Append a new keycert entry to a (possibly empty) list */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_append_key_cert(mbedtls_ssl_key_cert **head, + mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + mbedtls_pk_context *key) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - size_t i, n; - const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt; - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate")); + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *new_cert; - if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert(ciphersuite_info)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate")); - ssl->state++; + if (cert == NULL) { + /* Free list if cert is null */ + ssl_key_cert_free(*head); + *head = NULL; return 0; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { - if (ssl->client_auth == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate")); - ssl->state++; - return 0; - } + new_cert = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_key_cert)); + if (new_cert == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - /* - * If using SSLv3 and got no cert, send an Alert message - * (otherwise an empty Certificate message will be sent). - */ - if (mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl) == NULL && - ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { - ssl->out_msglen = 2; - ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT; - ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING; - ssl->out_msg[1] = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT; + new_cert->cert = cert; + new_cert->key = key; + new_cert->next = NULL; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("got no certificate to send")); - goto write_msg; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { - if (mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl) == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no certificate to send")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED; + /* Update head if the list was null, else add to the end */ + if (*head == NULL) { + *head = new_cert; + } else { + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur = *head; + while (cur->next != NULL) { + cur = cur->next; } + cur->next = new_cert; } -#endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "own certificate", mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl)); + return 0; +} - /* - * 0 . 0 handshake type - * 1 . 3 handshake length - * 4 . 6 length of all certs - * 7 . 9 length of cert. 1 - * 10 . n-1 peer certificate - * n . n+2 length of cert. 2 - * n+3 . ... upper level cert, etc. - */ - i = 7; - crt = mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl); +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key) +{ + return ssl_append_key_cert(&conf->key_cert, own_cert, pk_key); +} - while (crt != NULL) { - n = crt->raw.len; - if (n > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 3 - i) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("certificate too large, %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET - " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, - i + 3 + n, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN)); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_TOO_LARGE; - } +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl) +{ + conf->ca_chain = ca_chain; + conf->ca_crl = ca_crl; - ssl->out_msg[i] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(n); - ssl->out_msg[i + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(n); - ssl->out_msg[i + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(n); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + /* mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() and mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb() + * cannot be used together. */ + conf->f_ca_cb = NULL; + conf->p_ca_cb = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ +} - i += 3; memcpy(ssl->out_msg + i, crt->raw.p, n); - i += n; crt = crt->next; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, + void *p_ca_cb) +{ + conf->f_ca_cb = f_ca_cb; + conf->p_ca_cb = p_ca_cb; - ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(i - 7); - ssl->out_msg[5] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(i - 7); - ssl->out_msg[6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(i - 7); + /* mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() and mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb() + * cannot be used together. */ + conf->ca_chain = NULL; + conf->ca_crl = NULL; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - ssl->out_msglen = i; - ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; - ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +const unsigned char *mbedtls_ssl_get_hs_sni(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t *name_len) +{ + *name_len = ssl->handshake->sni_name_len; + return ssl->handshake->sni_name; +} -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) -write_msg: -#endif +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key) +{ + return ssl_append_key_cert(&ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert, + own_cert, pk_key); +} - ssl->state++; +void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl) +{ + ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain = ca_chain; + ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl = ca_crl; +} - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); - return ret; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) +void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_dn_hints(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt) +{ + ssl->handshake->dn_hints = crt; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write certificate")); +void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_authmode(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int authmode) +{ + ssl->handshake->sni_authmode = authmode; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ - return ret; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_set_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy) +{ + ssl->f_vrfy = f_vrfy; + ssl->p_vrfy = p_vrfy; } +#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *crt_buf, - size_t crt_buf_len) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static const uint8_t jpake_server_id[] = { 's', 'e', 'r', 'v', 'e', 'r' }; +static const uint8_t jpake_client_id[] = { 'c', 'l', 'i', 'e', 'n', 't' }; + +static psa_status_t mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password_common( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t pwd) { - mbedtls_x509_crt const * const peer_crt = ssl->session->peer_cert; + psa_status_t status; + psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite = psa_pake_cipher_suite_init(); + const uint8_t *user = NULL; + size_t user_len = 0; + const uint8_t *peer = NULL; + size_t peer_len = 0; + psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm(&cipher_suite, PSA_ALG_JPAKE); + psa_pake_cs_set_primitive(&cipher_suite, + PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, + PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, + 256)); + psa_pake_cs_set_hash(&cipher_suite, PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + + status = psa_pake_setup(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, &cipher_suite); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } - if (peer_crt == NULL) { - return -1; + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + user = jpake_server_id; + user_len = sizeof(jpake_server_id); + peer = jpake_client_id; + peer_len = sizeof(jpake_client_id); + } else { + user = jpake_client_id; + user_len = sizeof(jpake_client_id); + peer = jpake_server_id; + peer_len = sizeof(jpake_server_id); } - if (peer_crt->raw.len != crt_buf_len) { - return -1; + status = psa_pake_set_user(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, user, user_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; } - return memcmp(peer_crt->raw.p, crt_buf, peer_crt->raw.len); + status = psa_pake_set_peer(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, peer, peer_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_pake_set_password_key(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, pwd); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx_is_ok = 1; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; } -#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *crt_buf, - size_t crt_buf_len) + +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *pw, + size_t pw_len) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char const * const peer_cert_digest = - ssl->session->peer_cert_digest; - mbedtls_md_type_t const peer_cert_digest_type = - ssl->session->peer_cert_digest_type; - mbedtls_md_info_t const * const digest_info = - mbedtls_md_info_from_type(peer_cert_digest_type); - unsigned char tmp_digest[MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN]; - size_t digest_len; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status; - if (peer_cert_digest == NULL || digest_info == NULL) { - return -1; + if (ssl->handshake == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - digest_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(digest_info); - if (digest_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN) { - return -1; + /* Empty password is not valid */ + if ((pw == NULL) || (pw_len == 0)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - ret = mbedtls_md(digest_info, crt_buf, crt_buf_len, tmp_digest); - if (ret != 0) { - return -1; + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_ALG_JPAKE); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD); + + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, pw, pw_len, + &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } - return memcmp(tmp_digest, peer_cert_digest, digest_len); + status = mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password_common(ssl, + ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ -/* - * Once the certificate message is read, parse it into a cert chain and - * perform basic checks, but leave actual verification to the caller - */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_certificate_chain(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_x509_crt *chain) +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password_opaque(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t pwd) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - int crt_cnt = 0; -#endif - size_t i, n; - uint8_t alert; + psa_status_t status; - if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + if (ssl->handshake == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - if (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE || - ssl->in_hslen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 3 + 3) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE; + if (mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(pwd)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - i = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); + status = mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password_common(ssl, pwd); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } - /* - * Same message structure as in mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate() - */ - n = (ssl->in_msg[i+1] << 8) | ssl->in_msg[i+2]; + return 0; +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *pw, + size_t pw_len) +{ + mbedtls_ecjpake_role role; - if (ssl->in_msg[i] != 0 || - ssl->in_hslen != n + 3 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE; + if (ssl->handshake == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - /* Make &ssl->in_msg[i] point to the beginning of the CRT chain. */ - i += 3; + /* Empty password is not valid */ + if ((pw == NULL) || (pw_len == 0)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - /* Iterate through and parse the CRTs in the provided chain. */ - while (i < ssl->in_hslen) { - /* Check that there's room for the next CRT's length fields. */ - if (i + 3 > ssl->in_hslen) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE; - } - /* In theory, the CRT can be up to 2**24 Bytes, but we don't support - * anything beyond 2**16 ~ 64K. */ - if (ssl->in_msg[i] != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE; - } + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER; + } else { + role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT; + } - /* Read length of the next CRT in the chain. */ - n = ((unsigned int) ssl->in_msg[i + 1] << 8) - | (unsigned int) ssl->in_msg[i + 2]; - i += 3; + return mbedtls_ecjpake_setup(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + role, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, + pw, pw_len); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ - if (n < 128 || i + n > ssl->in_hslen) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf) +{ + if (conf->psk_identity == NULL || + conf->psk_identity_len == 0) { + return 0; + } - /* Check if we're handling the first CRT in the chain. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if (crt_cnt++ == 0 && - ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && - ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) { - /* During client-side renegotiation, check that the server's - * end-CRTs hasn't changed compared to the initial handshake, - * mitigating the triple handshake attack. On success, reuse - * the original end-CRT instead of parsing it again. */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Check that peer CRT hasn't changed during renegotiation")); - if (ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged(ssl, - &ssl->in_msg[i], - n) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("new server cert during renegotiation")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(conf->psk_opaque)) { + return 1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - /* Now we can safely free the original chain. */ - ssl_clear_peer_cert(ssl->session); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + if (conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0) { + return 1; + } - /* Parse the next certificate in the chain. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(chain, ssl->in_msg + i, n); -#else - /* If we don't need to store the CRT chain permanently, parse - * it in-place from the input buffer instead of making a copy. */ - ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy(chain, ssl->in_msg + i, n); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - switch (ret) { - case 0: /*ok*/ - case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND: - /* Ignore certificate with an unknown algorithm: maybe a - prior certificate was already trusted. */ - break; + return 0; +} - case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED: - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto crt_parse_der_failed; +static void ssl_conf_remove_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ + /* Remove reference to existing PSK, if any. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(conf->psk_opaque)) { + /* The maintenance of the PSK key slot is the + * user's responsibility. */ + conf->psk_opaque = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if (conf->psk != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(conf->psk, conf->psk_len); + conf->psk = NULL; + conf->psk_len = 0; + } - case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION: - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; - goto crt_parse_der_failed; + /* Remove reference to PSK identity, if any. */ + if (conf->psk_identity != NULL) { + mbedtls_free(conf->psk_identity); + conf->psk_identity = NULL; + conf->psk_identity_len = 0; + } +} - default: - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT; -crt_parse_der_failed: - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, alert); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret); - return ret; - } +/* This function assumes that PSK identity in the SSL config is unset. + * It checks that the provided identity is well-formed and attempts + * to make a copy of it in the SSL config. + * On failure, the PSK identity in the config remains unset. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_conf_set_psk_identity(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + unsigned char const *psk_identity, + size_t psk_identity_len) +{ + /* Identity len will be encoded on two bytes */ + if (psk_identity == NULL || + psk_identity_len == 0 || + (psk_identity_len >> 16) != 0 || + psk_identity_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - i += n; + conf->psk_identity = mbedtls_calloc(1, psk_identity_len); + if (conf->psk_identity == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "peer certificate", chain); + conf->psk_identity_len = psk_identity_len; + memcpy(conf->psk_identity, psk_identity, conf->psk_identity_len); + return 0; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_srv_check_client_no_crt_notification(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len, + const unsigned char *psk_identity, size_t psk_identity_len) { - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { - return -1; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* We currently only support one PSK, raw or opaque. */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(conf)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - /* - * Check if the client sent an empty certificate - */ - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { - if (ssl->in_msglen == 2 && - ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT && - ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING && - ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("SSLv3 client has no certificate")); - return 0; - } + /* Check and set raw PSK */ + if (psk == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if (psk_len == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if (psk_len > MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - return -1; + if ((conf->psk = mbedtls_calloc(1, psk_len)) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ + conf->psk_len = psk_len; + memcpy(conf->psk, psk, conf->psk_len); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (ssl->in_hslen == 3 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) && - ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && - ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE && - memcmp(ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl), "\0\0\0", 3) == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("TLSv1 client has no certificate")); - return 0; + /* Check and set PSK Identity */ + ret = ssl_conf_set_psk_identity(conf, psk_identity, psk_identity_len); + if (ret != 0) { + ssl_conf_remove_psk(conf); } - return -1; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ -/* Check if a certificate message is expected. - * Return either - * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED, or - * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP - * indicating whether a Certificate message is expected or not. - */ -#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED 0 -#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP 1 -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_certificate_coordinate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - int authmode) +static void ssl_remove_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; - - if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert(ciphersuite_info)) { - return SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK) { - return SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP; - } - - if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE) { - ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = - MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY; - return SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque)) { + /* The maintenance of the external PSK key slot is the + * user's responsibility. */ + if (ssl->handshake->psk_opaque_is_internal) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque); + ssl->handshake->psk_opaque_is_internal = 0; } + ssl->handshake->psk_opaque = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; } #else - ((void) authmode); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - - return SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED; + if (ssl->handshake->psk != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ssl->handshake->psk, + ssl->handshake->psk_len); + ssl->handshake->psk_len = 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - int authmode, - mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, - void *rs_ctx) +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len) { - int ret = 0; - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; - int have_ca_chain = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_NONE; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *); - void *p_vrfy; + if (psk == NULL || ssl->handshake == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE) { - return 0; + if (psk_len > MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - if (ssl->f_vrfy != NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Use context-specific verification callback")); - f_vrfy = ssl->f_vrfy; - p_vrfy = ssl->p_vrfy; - } else { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Use configuration-specific verification callback")); - f_vrfy = ssl->conf->f_vrfy; - p_vrfy = ssl->conf->p_vrfy; - } - - /* - * Main check: verify certificate - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) - if (ssl->conf->f_ca_cb != NULL) { - ((void) rs_ctx); - have_ca_chain = 1; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification")); - ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb( - chain, - ssl->conf->f_ca_cb, - ssl->conf->p_ca_cb, - ssl->conf->cert_profile, - ssl->hostname, - &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result, - f_vrfy, p_vrfy); - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ - { - mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain; - mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - if (ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL) { - ca_chain = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain; - ca_crl = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl; - } else -#endif - { - ca_chain = ssl->conf->ca_chain; - ca_crl = ssl->conf->ca_crl; - } + ssl_remove_psk(ssl); - if (ca_chain != NULL) { - have_ca_chain = 1; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + if (ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + } else { + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); } - - ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( - chain, - ca_chain, ca_crl, - ssl->conf->cert_profile, - ssl->hostname, - &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result, - f_vrfy, p_vrfy, rs_ctx); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "x509_verify_cert", ret); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; - } -#endif + psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, alg); + psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE); - /* - * Secondary checks: always done, but change 'ret' only if it was 0 - */ + status = psa_import_key(&key_attributes, psk, psk_len, &key); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - { - const mbedtls_pk_context *pk = &chain->pk; + /* Allow calling psa_destroy_key() on psk remove */ + ssl->handshake->psk_opaque_is_internal = 1; + return mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque(ssl, key); +#else + if ((ssl->handshake->psk = mbedtls_calloc(1, psk_len)) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } - /* If certificate uses an EC key, make sure the curve is OK. - * This is a public key, so it can't be opaque, so can_do() is a good - * enough check to ensure pk_ec() is safe to use here. */ - if (mbedtls_pk_can_do(pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) && - mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(ssl, mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk)->grp.id) != 0) { - ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; + ssl->handshake->psk_len = psk_len; + memcpy(ssl->handshake->psk, psk, ssl->handshake->psk_len); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate (EC key curve)")); - if (ret == 0) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE; - } - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + return 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +} - if (mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(chain, - ciphersuite_info, - !ssl->conf->endpoint, - &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate (usage extensions)")); - if (ret == 0) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE; - } - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psk, + const unsigned char *psk_identity, + size_t psk_identity_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - /* mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile is supposed to report a - * verification failure through MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED, - * with details encoded in the verification flags. All other kinds - * of error codes, including those from the user provided f_vrfy - * functions, are treated as fatal and lead to a failure of - * ssl_parse_certificate even if verification was optional. */ - if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL && - (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED || - ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE)) { - ret = 0; + /* We currently only support one PSK, raw or opaque. */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(conf)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } - if (have_ca_chain == 0 && authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no CA chain")); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED; + /* Check and set opaque PSK */ + if (mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(psk)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } + conf->psk_opaque = psk; + /* Check and set PSK Identity */ + ret = ssl_conf_set_psk_identity(conf, psk_identity, + psk_identity_len); if (ret != 0) { - uint8_t alert; - - /* The certificate may have been rejected for several reasons. - Pick one and send the corresponding alert. Which alert to send - may be a subject of debate in some cases. */ - if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER) { - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED; - } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH) { - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT; - } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE) { - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; - } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE) { - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; - } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE) { - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; - } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK) { - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; - } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY) { - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; - } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED) { - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED; - } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED) { - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED; - } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED) { - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA; - } else { - alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN; - } - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - alert); - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) - if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("! Certificate verification flags %08x", - (unsigned int) ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result)); - } else { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Certificate verification flags clear")); + ssl_conf_remove_psk(conf); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ return ret; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_remember_peer_crt_digest(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *start, size_t len) +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psk) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - /* Remember digest of the peer's end-CRT. */ - ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest = - mbedtls_calloc(1, MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN); - if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc(%d bytes) failed", - MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN)); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR); - - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + if ((mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(psk)) || + (ssl->handshake == NULL)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - ret = mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type( - MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE), - start, len, - ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest); + ssl_remove_psk(ssl); + ssl->handshake->psk_opaque = psk; + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest_type = - MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE; - ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest_len = - MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_psk)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, + size_t), + void *p_psk) +{ + conf->f_psk = f_psk; + conf->p_psk = p_psk; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - return ret; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static mbedtls_ssl_mode_t mbedtls_ssl_get_base_mode( + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + if (alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) { + return MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg)) { + return MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_AEAD; + } + return MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_STREAM; } -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_remember_peer_pubkey(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *start, size_t len) +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +static mbedtls_ssl_mode_t mbedtls_ssl_get_base_mode( + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode) { - unsigned char *end = start + len; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + if (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC) { + return MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ - /* Make a copy of the peer's raw public key. */ - mbedtls_pk_init(&ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey); - ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(&start, end, - &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey); - if (ret != 0) { - /* We should have parsed the public key before. */ - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM || + mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM || + mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY) { + return MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_AEAD; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ - return 0; + return MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_STREAM; } -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +static mbedtls_ssl_mode_t mbedtls_ssl_get_actual_mode( + mbedtls_ssl_mode_t base_mode, + int encrypt_then_mac) { - int ret = 0; - int crt_expected; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - const int authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET - ? ssl->handshake->sni_authmode - : ssl->conf->authmode; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + if (encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED && + base_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC) { + return MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC_ETM; + } #else - const int authmode = ssl->conf->authmode; + (void) encrypt_then_mac; #endif - void *rs_ctx = NULL; - mbedtls_x509_crt *chain = NULL; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate")); + return base_mode; +} - crt_expected = ssl_parse_certificate_coordinate(ssl, authmode); - if (crt_expected == SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate")); - goto exit; - } +mbedtls_ssl_mode_t mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_transform( + const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_mode_t base_mode = mbedtls_ssl_get_base_mode( +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + transform->psa_alg +#else + mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc) +#endif + ); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled && - ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_crt_verify) { - chain = ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert; - ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert = NULL; - goto crt_verify; - } -#endif - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) { - /* mbedtls_ssl_read_record may have sent an alert already. We - let it decide whether to alert. */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); - goto exit; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if (ssl_srv_check_client_no_crt_notification(ssl) == 0) { - ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING; - - if (authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE; - } - - goto exit; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - - /* Clear existing peer CRT structure in case we tried to - * reuse a session but it failed, and allocate a new one. */ - ssl_clear_peer_cert(ssl->session_negotiate); - - chain = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt)); - if (chain == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes) failed", - sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt))); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR); - - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - goto exit; - } - mbedtls_x509_crt_init(chain); - - ret = ssl_parse_certificate_chain(ssl, chain); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) { - ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_crt_verify; - } - -crt_verify: - if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) { - rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx; - } + int encrypt_then_mac = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + encrypt_then_mac = transform->encrypt_then_mac; #endif + return mbedtls_ssl_get_actual_mode(base_mode, encrypt_then_mac); +} - ret = ssl_parse_certificate_verify(ssl, authmode, - chain, rs_ctx); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - { - unsigned char *crt_start, *pk_start; - size_t crt_len, pk_len; - - /* We parse the CRT chain without copying, so - * these pointers point into the input buffer, - * and are hence still valid after freeing the - * CRT chain. */ - - crt_start = chain->raw.p; - crt_len = chain->raw.len; - - pk_start = chain->pk_raw.p; - pk_len = chain->pk_raw.len; - - /* Free the CRT structures before computing - * digest and copying the peer's public key. */ - mbedtls_x509_crt_free(chain); - mbedtls_free(chain); - chain = NULL; - - ret = ssl_remember_peer_crt_digest(ssl, crt_start, crt_len); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } +mbedtls_ssl_mode_t mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_ciphersuite( +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + int encrypt_then_mac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_mode_t base_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_STREAM; - ret = ssl_remember_peer_pubkey(ssl, pk_start, pk_len); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_key_type_t type; + size_t size; + status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) suite->cipher, + 0, &alg, &type, &size); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + base_mode = mbedtls_ssl_get_base_mode(alg); } -#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - /* Pass ownership to session structure. */ - ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert = chain; - chain = NULL; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse certificate")); - -exit: - - if (ret == 0) { - ssl->state++; +#else + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher = + mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) suite->cipher); + if (cipher != NULL) { + base_mode = + mbedtls_ssl_get_base_mode( + mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode(cipher)); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS) { - ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert = chain; - chain = NULL; - } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + int encrypt_then_mac = 0; #endif - - if (chain != NULL) { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free(chain); - mbedtls_free(chain); - } - - return ret; + return mbedtls_ssl_get_actual_mode(base_mode, encrypt_then_mac); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ -void mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info) -{ - ((void) ciphersuite_info); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if (ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - ssl->handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_md5sha1; - } else +psa_status_t mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa(mbedtls_cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_type, + size_t taglen, + psa_algorithm_t *alg, + psa_key_type_t *key_type, + size_t *key_size) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + (void) taglen; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - if (ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { - ssl->handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_sha384; - } else + switch (mbedtls_cipher_type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC: + *alg = PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + *key_size = 128; + break; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - if (ciphersuite_info->mac != MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { - ssl->handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_sha256; - } else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM: + *alg = taglen ? PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen) : PSA_ALG_CCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + *key_size = 128; + break; #endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return; - } -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(&ssl->handshake->fin_md5); - mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha1); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM: + *alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + *key_size = 128; + break; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_hash_abort(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa); - psa_hash_setup(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_256); -#else - mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, 0); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM: + *alg = taglen ? PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen) : PSA_ALG_CCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + *key_size = 192; + break; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM: + *alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + *key_size = 192; + break; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_hash_abort(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa); - psa_hash_setup(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_384); -#else - mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha512, 1); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC: + *alg = PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + *key_size = 256; + break; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM: + *alg = taglen ? PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen) : PSA_ALG_CCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + *key_size = 256; + break; #endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -} - -static void ssl_update_checksum_start(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&ssl->handshake->fin_md5, buf, len); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha1, buf, len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM: + *alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + *key_size = 256; + break; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_hash_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, buf, len); -#else - mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, buf, len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC: + *alg = PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; + *key_size = 128; + break; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM: + *alg = taglen ? PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen) : PSA_ALG_CCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; + *key_size = 128; + break; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_hash_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, buf, len); -#else - mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha512, buf, len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM: + *alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; + *key_size = 128; + break; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM: + *alg = taglen ? PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen) : PSA_ALG_CCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; + *key_size = 192; + break; #endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -static void ssl_update_checksum_md5sha1(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) -{ - mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&ssl->handshake->fin_md5, buf, len); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha1, buf, len); -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM: + *alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; + *key_size = 192; + break; #endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -static void ssl_update_checksum_sha256(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_hash_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, buf, len); -#else - mbedtls_sha256_update_ret(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, buf, len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC: + *alg = PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; + *key_size = 256; + break; #endif -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM: + *alg = taglen ? PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen) : PSA_ALG_CCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; + *key_size = 256; + break; #endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) -static void ssl_update_checksum_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_hash_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, buf, len); -#else - mbedtls_sha512_update_ret(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha512, buf, len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM: + *alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; + *key_size = 256; + break; #endif -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC: + *alg = PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; + *key_size = 128; + break; #endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM: + *alg = taglen ? PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen) : PSA_ALG_CCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; + *key_size = 128; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM: + *alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; + *key_size = 128; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM: + *alg = taglen ? PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen) : PSA_ALG_CCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; + *key_size = 192; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM: + *alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; + *key_size = 192; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC: + *alg = PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; + *key_size = 256; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM: + *alg = taglen ? PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen) : PSA_ALG_CCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; + *key_size = 256; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM: + *alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; + *key_size = 256; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305: + *alg = PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20; + *key_size = 256; + break; +#endif + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL: + *alg = MBEDTLS_SSL_NULL_CIPHER; + *key_type = 0; + *key_size = 0; + break; + default: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -static void ssl_calc_finished_ssl( - mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from) + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const unsigned char *dhm_P, size_t P_len, + const unsigned char *dhm_G, size_t G_len) { - const char *sender; - mbedtls_md5_context md5; - mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char padbuf[48]; - unsigned char md5sum[16]; - unsigned char sha1sum[20]; + mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_P); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_G); - mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; - if (!session) { - session = ssl->session; + if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&conf->dhm_P, dhm_P, P_len)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&conf->dhm_G, dhm_G, G_len)) != 0) { + mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_P); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_G); + return ret; } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc finished ssl")); - - mbedtls_md5_init(&md5); - mbedtls_sha1_init(&sha1); + return 0; +} - mbedtls_md5_clone(&md5, &ssl->handshake->fin_md5); - mbedtls_sha1_clone(&sha1, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1); +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_ctx(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm_ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - /* - * SSLv3: - * hash = - * MD5( master + pad2 + - * MD5( handshake + sender + master + pad1 ) ) - * + SHA1( master + pad2 + - * SHA1( handshake + sender + master + pad1 ) ) - */ + mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_P); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_G); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "finished md5 state", (unsigned char *) - md5.state, sizeof(md5.state)); -#endif + if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_get_value(dhm_ctx, MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_P, + &conf->dhm_P)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_dhm_get_value(dhm_ctx, MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_G, + &conf->dhm_G)) != 0) { + mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_P); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_G); + return ret; + } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "finished sha1 state", (unsigned char *) - sha1.state, sizeof(sha1.state)); -#endif + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - sender = (from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) ? "CLNT" - : "SRVR"; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +/* + * Set the minimum length for Diffie-Hellman parameters + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + unsigned int bitlen) +{ + conf->dhm_min_bitlen = bitlen; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ - memset(padbuf, 0x36, 48); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +/* + * Set allowed/preferred hashes for handshake signatures + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const int *hashes) +{ + conf->sig_hashes = hashes; +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5, (const unsigned char *) sender, 4); - mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5, session->master, 48); - mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5, padbuf, 48); - mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(&md5, md5sum); +/* Configure allowed signature algorithms for handshake */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_algs(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const uint16_t *sig_algs) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + conf->sig_hashes = NULL; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + conf->sig_algs = sig_algs; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&sha1, (const unsigned char *) sender, 4); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&sha1, session->master, 48); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&sha1, padbuf, 40); - mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(&sha1, sha1sum); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +/* + * Set the allowed elliptic curves + * + * mbedtls_ssl_setup() takes the provided list + * and translates it to a list of IANA TLS group identifiers, + * stored in ssl->handshake->group_list. + * + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curve_list) +{ + conf->curve_list = curve_list; + conf->group_list = NULL; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ - memset(padbuf, 0x5C, 48); +/* + * Set the allowed groups + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const uint16_t *group_list) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + conf->curve_list = NULL; +#endif + conf->group_list = group_list; +} - mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(&md5); - mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5, session->master, 48); - mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5, padbuf, 48); - mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&md5, md5sum, 16); - mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(&md5, buf); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const char *hostname) +{ + /* Initialize to suppress unnecessary compiler warning */ + size_t hostname_len = 0; - mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret(&sha1); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&sha1, session->master, 48); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&sha1, padbuf, 40); - mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&sha1, sha1sum, 20); - mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(&sha1, buf + 16); + /* Check if new hostname is valid before + * making any change to current one */ + if (hostname != NULL) { + hostname_len = strlen(hostname); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "calc finished result", buf, 36); + if (hostname_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } - mbedtls_md5_free(&md5); - mbedtls_sha1_free(&sha1); + /* Now it's clear that we will overwrite the old hostname, + * so we can free it safely */ - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(padbuf, sizeof(padbuf)); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(md5sum, sizeof(md5sum)); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(sha1sum, sizeof(sha1sum)); + if (ssl->hostname != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ssl->hostname, strlen(ssl->hostname)); + } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc finished")); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ + /* Passing NULL as hostname shall clear the old one */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -static void ssl_calc_finished_tls( - mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from) -{ - int len = 12; - const char *sender; - mbedtls_md5_context md5; - mbedtls_sha1_context sha1; - unsigned char padbuf[36]; + if (hostname == NULL) { + ssl->hostname = NULL; + } else { + ssl->hostname = mbedtls_calloc(1, hostname_len + 1); + if (ssl->hostname == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } - mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; - if (!session) { - session = ssl->session; + memcpy(ssl->hostname, hostname, hostname_len); + + ssl->hostname[hostname_len] = '\0'; } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc finished tls")); + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - mbedtls_md5_init(&md5); - mbedtls_sha1_init(&sha1); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_sni)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, + const unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_sni) +{ + conf->f_sni = f_sni; + conf->p_sni = p_sni; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ - mbedtls_md5_clone(&md5, &ssl->handshake->fin_md5); - mbedtls_sha1_clone(&sha1, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char **protos) +{ + size_t cur_len, tot_len; + const char **p; /* - * TLSv1: - * hash = PRF( master, finished_label, - * MD5( handshake ) + SHA1( handshake ) )[0..11] + * RFC 7301 3.1: "Empty strings MUST NOT be included and byte strings + * MUST NOT be truncated." + * We check lengths now rather than later. */ + tot_len = 0; + for (p = protos; *p != NULL; p++) { + cur_len = strlen(*p); + tot_len += cur_len; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "finished md5 state", (unsigned char *) - md5.state, sizeof(md5.state)); -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "finished sha1 state", (unsigned char *) - sha1.state, sizeof(sha1.state)); -#endif - - sender = (from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) - ? "client finished" - : "server finished"; - - mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(&md5, padbuf); - mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(&sha1, padbuf + 16); - - ssl->handshake->tls_prf(session->master, 48, sender, - padbuf, 36, buf, len); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "calc finished result", buf, len); + if ((cur_len == 0) || + (cur_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_NAME_LEN) || + (tot_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_LIST_LEN)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } - mbedtls_md5_free(&md5); - mbedtls_sha1_free(&sha1); + conf->alpn_list = protos; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(padbuf, sizeof(padbuf)); + return 0; +} - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc finished")); +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return ssl->alpn_chosen; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256( - mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_srtp_mki_value_supported(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int support_mki_value) { - int len = 12; - const char *sender; - unsigned char padbuf[32]; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - size_t hash_size; - psa_hash_operation_t sha256_psa = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; - psa_status_t status; -#else - mbedtls_sha256_context sha256; -#endif + conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support = support_mki_value; +} - mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; - if (!session) { - session = ssl->session; +int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_srtp_set_mki_value(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *mki_value, + uint16_t mki_len) +{ + if (mki_len > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - sender = (from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) - ? "client finished" - : "server finished"; + if (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - sha256_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); + memcpy(ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_value, mki_len); + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len = mki_len; + return 0; +} - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc PSA finished tls sha256")); +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *profiles) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *p; + size_t list_size = 0; - status = psa_hash_clone(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, &sha256_psa); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash clone failed")); - return; + /* check the profiles list: all entry must be valid, + * its size cannot be more than the total number of supported profiles, currently 4 */ + for (p = profiles; *p != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET && + list_size <= MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH; + p++) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value(*p) != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) { + list_size++; + } else { + /* unsupported value, stop parsing and set the size to an error value */ + list_size = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH + 1; + } } - status = psa_hash_finish(&sha256_psa, padbuf, sizeof(padbuf), &hash_size); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash finish failed")); - return; + if (list_size > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH) { + conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list = NULL; + conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len = 0; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "PSA calculated padbuf", padbuf, 32); -#else - mbedtls_sha256_init(&sha256); + conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list = profiles; + conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len = list_size; + + return 0; +} - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc finished tls sha256")); +void mbedtls_ssl_get_dtls_srtp_negotiation_result(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info *dtls_srtp_info) +{ + dtls_srtp_info->chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile; + /* do not copy the mki value if there is no chosen profile */ + if (dtls_srtp_info->chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) { + dtls_srtp_info->mki_len = 0; + } else { + dtls_srtp_info->mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len; + memcpy(dtls_srtp_info->mki_value, ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ - mbedtls_sha256_clone(&sha256, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor) +{ + conf->max_tls_version = (mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version) ((major << 8) | minor); +} - /* - * TLSv1.2: - * hash = PRF( master, finished_label, - * Hash( handshake ) )[0.11] - */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor) +{ + conf->min_tls_version = (mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version) ((major << 8) | minor); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "finished sha2 state", (unsigned char *) - sha256.state, sizeof(sha256.state)); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_req_ca_list(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + char cert_req_ca_list) +{ + conf->cert_req_ca_list = cert_req_ca_list; +} #endif - mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret(&sha256, padbuf); - mbedtls_sha256_free(&sha256); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char etm) +{ + conf->encrypt_then_mac = etm; +} +#endif - ssl->handshake->tls_prf(session->master, 48, sender, - padbuf, 32, buf, len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char ems) +{ + conf->extended_ms = ems; +} +#endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "calc finished result", buf, len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned char mfl_code) +{ + if (mfl_code >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID || + ssl_mfl_code_to_length(mfl_code) > MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(padbuf, sizeof(padbuf)); + conf->mfl_code = mfl_code; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc finished")); + return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int allow_legacy) +{ + conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation = allow_legacy; +} -static void ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384( - mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int renegotiation) { - int len = 12; - const char *sender; - unsigned char padbuf[48]; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - size_t hash_size; - psa_hash_operation_t sha384_psa = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; - psa_status_t status; -#else - mbedtls_sha512_context sha512; -#endif - - mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; - if (!session) { - session = ssl->session; - } - - sender = (from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) - ? "client finished" - : "server finished"; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - sha384_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc PSA finished tls sha384")); - - status = psa_hash_clone(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, &sha384_psa); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash clone failed")); - return; - } + conf->disable_renegotiation = renegotiation; +} - status = psa_hash_finish(&sha384_psa, padbuf, sizeof(padbuf), &hash_size); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("PSA hash finish failed")); - return; - } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "PSA calculated padbuf", padbuf, 48); -#else - mbedtls_sha512_init(&sha512); +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_enforced(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int max_records) +{ + conf->renego_max_records = max_records; +} - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc finished tls sha384")); +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_period(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const unsigned char period[8]) +{ + memcpy(conf->renego_period, period, 8); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ - mbedtls_sha512_clone(&sha512, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha512); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int use_tickets) +{ + conf->session_tickets = use_tickets; +} +#endif - /* - * TLSv1.2: - * hash = PRF( master, finished_label, - * Hash( handshake ) )[0.11] - */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "finished sha512 state", (unsigned char *) - sha512.state, sizeof(sha512.state)); -#endif - /* mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret's output parameter is declared as a - * 64-byte buffer, but since we're using SHA-384, we know that the - * output fits in 48 bytes. This is correct C, but GCC 11.1 warns - * about it. - */ -#if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ >= 11 -#pragma GCC diagnostic push -#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wstringop-overflow" -#endif - mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret(&sha512, padbuf); -#if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ >= 11 -#pragma GCC diagnostic pop +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_new_session_tickets(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + uint16_t num_tickets) +{ + conf->new_session_tickets_count = num_tickets; +} #endif - mbedtls_sha512_free(&sha512); +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t *f_ticket_write, + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t *f_ticket_parse, + void *p_ticket) +{ + conf->f_ticket_write = f_ticket_write; + conf->f_ticket_parse = f_ticket_parse; + conf->p_ticket = p_ticket; +} #endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ - ssl->handshake->tls_prf(session->master, 48, sender, - padbuf, 48, buf, len); +void mbedtls_ssl_set_export_keys_cb(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *f_export_keys, + void *p_export_keys) +{ + ssl->f_export_keys = f_export_keys; + ssl->p_export_keys = p_export_keys; +} - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "calc finished result", buf, len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb( + mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t *f_async_sign, + mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t *f_async_decrypt, + mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t *f_async_resume, + mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t *f_async_cancel, + void *async_config_data) +{ + conf->f_async_sign_start = f_async_sign; + conf->f_async_decrypt_start = f_async_decrypt; + conf->f_async_resume = f_async_resume; + conf->f_async_cancel = f_async_cancel; + conf->p_async_config_data = async_config_data; +} - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(padbuf, sizeof(padbuf)); +void *mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_async_config_data(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ + return conf->p_async_config_data; +} - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc finished")); +void *mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + if (ssl->handshake == NULL) { + return NULL; + } else { + return ssl->handshake->user_async_ctx; + } } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +void mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + void *ctx) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("=> handshake wrapup: final free")); + if (ssl->handshake != NULL) { + ssl->handshake->user_async_ctx = ctx; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ - /* - * Free our handshake params - */ - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(ssl); - mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake); - ssl->handshake = NULL; +/* + * SSL get accessors + */ +uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + if (ssl->session != NULL) { + return ssl->session->verify_result; + } - /* - * Free the previous transform and switch in the current one - */ - if (ssl->transform) { - mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform); - mbedtls_free(ssl->transform); + if (ssl->session_negotiate != NULL) { + return ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result; } - ssl->transform = ssl->transform_negotiate; - ssl->transform_negotiate = NULL; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("<= handshake wrapup: final free")); + return 0xFFFFFFFF; } -void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +int mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id_from_ssl(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { - int resume = ssl->handshake->resume; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("=> handshake wrapup")); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) { - ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE; - ssl->renego_records_seen = 0; + if (ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL) { + return 0; } -#endif - /* - * Free the previous session and switch in the current one - */ - if (ssl->session) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - /* RFC 7366 3.1: keep the EtM state */ - ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = - ssl->session->encrypt_then_mac; -#endif + return ssl->session->ciphersuite; +} - mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session); - mbedtls_free(ssl->session); +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + if (ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL) { + return NULL; } - ssl->session = ssl->session_negotiate; - ssl->session_negotiate = NULL; - /* - * Add cache entry - */ - if (ssl->conf->f_set_cache != NULL && - ssl->session->id_len != 0 && - resume == 0) { - if (ssl->conf->f_set_cache(ssl->conf->p_cache, ssl->session) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("cache did not store session")); - } - } + return mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name(ssl->session->ciphersuite); +} +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_version(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl->handshake->flight != NULL) { - /* Cancel handshake timer */ - mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, 0); - - /* Keep last flight around in case we need to resend it: - * we need the handshake and transform structures for that */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("skip freeing handshake and transform")); - } else + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + switch (ssl->tls_version) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2: + return "DTLSv1.2"; + default: + return "unknown (DTLS)"; + } + } #endif - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform(ssl); - - ssl->state++; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("<= handshake wrapup")); + switch (ssl->tls_version) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2: + return "TLSv1.2"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3: + return "TLSv1.3"; + default: + return "unknown"; + } } -int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_record_size_limit(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { - int ret, hash_len; + const size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + size_t record_size_limit = max_len; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write finished")); + if (ssl->session != NULL && + ssl->session->record_size_limit >= MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_MIN && + ssl->session->record_size_limit < max_len) { + record_size_limit = ssl->session->record_size_limit; + } - mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(ssl, ssl->transform_negotiate); + // TODO: this is currently untested + /* During a handshake, use the value being negotiated */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate != NULL && + ssl->session_negotiate->record_size_limit >= MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_MIN && + ssl->session_negotiate->record_size_limit < max_len) { + record_size_limit = ssl->session_negotiate->record_size_limit; + } - ssl->handshake->calc_finished(ssl, ssl->out_msg + 4, ssl->conf->endpoint); + return record_size_limit; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ - /* - * RFC 5246 7.4.9 (Page 63) says 12 is the default length and ciphersuites - * may define some other value. Currently (early 2016), no defined - * ciphersuite does this (and this is unlikely to change as activity has - * moved to TLS 1.3 now) so we can keep the hardcoded 12 here. - */ - hash_len = (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) ? 36 : 12; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN; + size_t read_mfl; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - ssl->verify_data_len = hash_len; - memcpy(ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->out_msg + 4, hash_len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* Use the configured MFL for the client if we're past SERVER_HELLO_DONE */ + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + ssl->state >= MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) { + return ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->conf->mfl_code); + } #endif - ssl->out_msglen = 4 + hash_len; - ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; - ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED; - - /* - * In case of session resuming, invert the client and server - * ChangeCipherSpec messages order. - */ - if (ssl->handshake->resume != 0) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { - ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP; + /* Check if a smaller max length was negotiated */ + if (ssl->session_out != NULL) { + read_mfl = ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->session_out->mfl_code); + if (read_mfl < max_len) { + max_len = read_mfl; } -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { - ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + } + + /* During a handshake, use the value being negotiated */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate != NULL) { + read_mfl = ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code); + if (read_mfl < max_len) { + max_len = read_mfl; } -#endif - } else { - ssl->state++; } - /* - * Switch to our negotiated transform and session parameters for outbound - * data. - */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("switching to new transform spec for outbound data")); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - unsigned char i; - - /* Remember current epoch settings for resending */ - ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = ssl->transform_out; - memcpy(ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8); - - /* Set sequence_number to zero */ - memset(ssl->cur_out_ctr + 2, 0, 6); + return max_len; +} - /* Increment epoch */ - for (i = 2; i > 0; i--) { - if (++ssl->cur_out_ctr[i - 1] != 0) { - break; - } - } +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + size_t max_len; - /* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */ - if (i == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("DTLS epoch would wrap")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - memset(ssl->cur_out_ctr, 0, 8); + /* + * Assume mfl_code is correct since it was checked when set + */ + max_len = ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->conf->mfl_code); - ssl->transform_out = ssl->transform_negotiate; - ssl->session_out = ssl->session_negotiate; + /* Check if a smaller max length was negotiated */ + if (ssl->session_out != NULL && + ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->session_out->mfl_code) < max_len) { + max_len = ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->session_out->mfl_code); + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - if (mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate != NULL) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate", ret); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } + /* During a handshake, use the value being negotiated */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate != NULL && + ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code) < max_len) { + max_len = ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code); } -#endif + + return max_len; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(ssl); +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + /* Return unlimited mtu for client hello messages to avoid fragmentation. */ + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO || + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO)) { + return 0; } -#endif - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); - return ret; + if (ssl->handshake == NULL || ssl->handshake->mtu == 0) { + return ssl->mtu; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - (ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret); - return ret; + if (ssl->mtu == 0) { + return ssl->handshake->mtu; } -#endif - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write finished")); - return 0; + return ssl->mtu < ssl->handshake->mtu ? + ssl->mtu : ssl->handshake->mtu; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -#define SSL_MAX_HASH_LEN 36 -#else -#define SSL_MAX_HASH_LEN 12 -#endif - -int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned int hash_len; - unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_HASH_LEN]; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse finished")); + size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; - /* There is currently no ciphersuite using another length with TLS 1.2 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { - hash_len = 36; - } else +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + (void) ssl; #endif - hash_len = 12; - ssl->handshake->calc_finished(ssl, buf, ssl->conf->endpoint ^ 1); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + const size_t mfl = mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(ssl); - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); - goto exit; + if (max_len > mfl) { + max_len = mfl; } +#endif - if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad finished message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - goto exit; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + const size_t record_size_limit = mbedtls_ssl_get_output_record_size_limit(ssl); - if (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED || - ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + hash_len) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad finished message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED; - goto exit; + if (max_len > record_size_limit) { + max_len = record_size_limit; } +#endif - if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl), - buf, hash_len) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad finished message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED; - goto exit; + if (ssl->transform_out != NULL && + ssl->transform_out->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + /* + * In TLS 1.3 case, when records are protected, `max_len` as computed + * above is the maximum length of the TLSInnerPlaintext structure that + * along the plaintext payload contains the inner content type (one byte) + * and some zero padding. Given the algorithm used for padding + * in mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(), compute the maximum length for + * the plaintext payload. Round down to a multiple of + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY and + * subtract 1. + */ + max_len = ((max_len / MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY) * + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY) - 1; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - ssl->verify_data_len = hash_len; - memcpy(ssl->peer_verify_data, buf, hash_len); -#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu(ssl) != 0) { + const size_t mtu = mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu(ssl); + const int ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion(ssl); + const size_t overhead = (size_t) ret; - if (ssl->handshake->resume != 0) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { - ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; } -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { - ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP; + + if (mtu <= overhead) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("MTU too low for record expansion")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } -#endif - } else { - ssl->state++; - } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(ssl); + if (max_len > mtu - overhead) { + max_len = mtu - overhead; + } } -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse finished")); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + ((void) ssl); +#endif -exit: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, hash_len); - return ret; + return (int) max_len; } -static void ssl_handshake_params_init(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake) +int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_in_record_payload(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { - memset(handshake, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params)); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - mbedtls_md5_init(&handshake->fin_md5); - mbedtls_sha1_init(&handshake->fin_sha1); - mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(&handshake->fin_md5); - mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret(&handshake->fin_sha1); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - handshake->fin_sha256_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); - psa_hash_setup(&handshake->fin_sha256_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_256); -#else - mbedtls_sha256_init(&handshake->fin_sha256); - mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret(&handshake->fin_sha256, 0); -#endif -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - handshake->fin_sha384_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); - psa_hash_setup(&handshake->fin_sha384_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_384); -#else - mbedtls_sha512_init(&handshake->fin_sha512); - mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret(&handshake->fin_sha512, 1); -#endif -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - - handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_start; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) - mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_init(&handshake->hash_algs); -#endif + size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) - mbedtls_dhm_init(&handshake->dhm_ctx); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) - mbedtls_ecdh_init(&handshake->ecdh_ctx); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - mbedtls_ecjpake_init(&handshake->ecjpake_ctx); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL; - handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0; -#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + (void) ssl; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init(&handshake->ecrs_ctx); -#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + const size_t mfl = mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len(ssl); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - handshake->sni_authmode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET; + if (max_len > mfl) { + max_len = mfl; + } #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - mbedtls_pk_init(&handshake->peer_pubkey); -#endif + return (int) max_len; } -void mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +const mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { - memset(transform, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform)); - - mbedtls_cipher_init(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc); - mbedtls_cipher_init(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec); + if (ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL) { + return NULL; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) - mbedtls_md_init(&transform->md_ctx_enc); - mbedtls_md_init(&transform->md_ctx_dec); -#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + return ssl->session->peer_cert; +#else + return NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ -void mbedtls_ssl_session_init(mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_get_session(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_session *dst) { - memset(session, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)); -} + int ret; -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_handshake_init(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - /* Clear old handshake information if present */ - if (ssl->transform_negotiate) { - mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform_negotiate); - } - if (ssl->session_negotiate) { - mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session_negotiate); - } - if (ssl->handshake) { - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(ssl); + if (ssl == NULL || + dst == NULL || + ssl->session == NULL || + ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - /* - * Either the pointers are now NULL or cleared properly and can be freed. - * Now allocate missing structures. + /* Since Mbed TLS 3.0, mbedtls_ssl_get_session() is no longer + * idempotent: Each session can only be exported once. + * + * (This is in preparation for TLS 1.3 support where we will + * need the ability to export multiple sessions (aka tickets), + * which will be achieved by calling mbedtls_ssl_get_session() + * multiple times until it fails.) + * + * Check whether we have already exported the current session, + * and fail if so. */ - if (ssl->transform_negotiate == NULL) { - ssl->transform_negotiate = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform)); + if (ssl->session->exported == 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } - if (ssl->session_negotiate == NULL) { - ssl->session_negotiate = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(dst, ssl->session); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; } - if (ssl->handshake == NULL) { - ssl->handshake = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params)); - } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) - /* If the buffers are too small - reallocate */ + /* Remember that we've exported the session. */ + ssl->session->exported = 1; + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ - handle_buffer_resizing(ssl, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN, - MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN); -#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - /* All pointers should exist and can be directly freed without issue */ - if (ssl->handshake == NULL || - ssl->transform_negotiate == NULL || - ssl->session_negotiate == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc() of ssl sub-contexts failed")); +/* Serialization of TLS 1.2 sessions + * + * For more detail, see the description of ssl_session_save(). + */ +static size_t ssl_tls12_session_save(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t used = 0; - mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake); - mbedtls_free(ssl->transform_negotiate); - mbedtls_free(ssl->session_negotiate); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + uint64_t start; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + size_t cert_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - ssl->handshake = NULL; - ssl->transform_negotiate = NULL; - ssl->session_negotiate = NULL; + /* + * Time + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + used += 8; - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + if (used <= buf_len) { + start = (uint64_t) session->start; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(start, p, 0); + p += 8; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ - /* Initialize structures */ - mbedtls_ssl_session_init(ssl->session_negotiate); - mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(ssl->transform_negotiate); - ssl_handshake_params_init(ssl->handshake); + /* + * Basic mandatory fields + */ + used += 1 /* id_len */ + + sizeof(session->id) + + sizeof(session->master) + + 4; /* verify_result */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = ssl->transform_out; + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(session->id_len); + memcpy(p, session->id, 32); + p += 32; - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING; - } else { - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING; - } + memcpy(p, session->master, 48); + p += 48; - mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(session->verify_result, p, 0); + p += 4; } -#endif - return 0; -} + /* + * Peer's end-entity certificate + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + if (session->peer_cert == NULL) { + cert_len = 0; + } else { + cert_len = session->peer_cert->raw.len; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) -/* Dummy cookie callbacks for defaults */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_cookie_write_dummy(void *ctx, - unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, - const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len) -{ - ((void) ctx); - ((void) p); - ((void) end); - ((void) cli_id); - ((void) cli_id_len); + used += 3 + cert_len; - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; -} + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(cert_len); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(cert_len); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(cert_len); -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_cookie_check_dummy(void *ctx, - const unsigned char *cookie, size_t cookie_len, - const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len) -{ - ((void) ctx); - ((void) cookie); - ((void) cookie_len); - ((void) cli_id); - ((void) cli_id_len); + if (session->peer_cert != NULL) { + memcpy(p, session->peer_cert->raw.p, cert_len); + p += cert_len; + } + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if (session->peer_cert_digest != NULL) { + used += 1 /* type */ + 1 /* length */ + session->peer_cert_digest_len; + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = (unsigned char) session->peer_cert_digest_type; + *p++ = (unsigned char) session->peer_cert_digest_len; + memcpy(p, session->peer_cert_digest, + session->peer_cert_digest_len); + p += session->peer_cert_digest_len; + } + } else { + used += 2; + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = (unsigned char) MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + *p++ = 0; + } + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + /* + * Session ticket if any, plus associated data + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (session->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + used += 3 + session->ticket_len + 4; /* len + ticket + lifetime */ -/* - * Initialize an SSL context - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_init(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - memset(ssl, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_context)); -} + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(session->ticket_len); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(session->ticket_len); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(session->ticket_len); -/* - * Setup an SSL context - */ + if (session->ticket != NULL) { + memcpy(p, session->ticket, session->ticket_len); + p += session->ticket_len; + } -int mbedtls_ssl_setup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; - size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(session->ticket_lifetime, p, 0); + p += 4; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (session->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + used += 8; - ssl->conf = conf; + if (used <= buf_len) { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE((uint64_t) session->ticket_creation_time, p, 0); + p += 8; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ /* - * Prepare base structures + * Misc extension-related info */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + used += 1; - /* Set to NULL in case of an error condition */ - ssl->out_buf = NULL; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) - ssl->in_buf_len = in_buf_len; -#endif - ssl->in_buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, in_buf_len); - if (ssl->in_buf == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes) failed", in_buf_len)); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - goto error; + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = session->mfl_code; } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) - ssl->out_buf_len = out_buf_len; #endif - ssl->out_buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, out_buf_len); - if (ssl->out_buf == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes) failed", out_buf_len)); - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - goto error; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + used += 1; + + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(session->encrypt_then_mac); } +#endif - mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(ssl); + return used; +} -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) - memset(&ssl->dtls_srtp_info, 0, sizeof(ssl->dtls_srtp_info)); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls12_session_load(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + uint64_t start; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + size_t cert_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - if ((ret = ssl_handshake_init(ssl)) != 0) { - goto error; - } + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char * const end = buf + len; - return 0; + /* + * Time + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + if (8 > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } -error: - mbedtls_free(ssl->in_buf); - mbedtls_free(ssl->out_buf); + start = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(p, 0); + p += 8; - ssl->conf = NULL; + session->start = (time_t) start; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) - ssl->in_buf_len = 0; - ssl->out_buf_len = 0; -#endif - ssl->in_buf = NULL; - ssl->out_buf = NULL; + /* + * Basic mandatory fields + */ + if (1 + 32 + 48 + 4 > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - ssl->in_hdr = NULL; - ssl->in_ctr = NULL; - ssl->in_len = NULL; - ssl->in_iv = NULL; - ssl->in_msg = NULL; + session->id_len = *p++; + memcpy(session->id, p, 32); + p += 32; - ssl->out_hdr = NULL; - ssl->out_ctr = NULL; - ssl->out_len = NULL; - ssl->out_iv = NULL; - ssl->out_msg = NULL; + memcpy(session->master, p, 48); + p += 48; - return ret; -} + session->verify_result = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0); + p += 4; -/* - * Reset an initialized and used SSL context for re-use while retaining - * all application-set variables, function pointers and data. - * - * If partial is non-zero, keep data in the input buffer and client ID. - * (Use when a DTLS client reconnects from the same port.) - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) - size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; - size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; + /* Immediately clear invalid pointer values that have been read, in case + * we exit early before we replaced them with valid ones. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + session->peer_cert = NULL; #else - size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; - size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - ((void) partial); -#endif + session->peer_cert_digest = NULL; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + session->ticket = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ - ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST; + /* + * Peer certificate + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + /* Deserialize CRT from the end of the ticket. */ + if (3 > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - /* Cancel any possibly running timer */ - mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, 0); + cert_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(p, 0); + p += 3; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE; - ssl->renego_records_seen = 0; + if (cert_len != 0) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - ssl->verify_data_len = 0; - memset(ssl->own_verify_data, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN); - memset(ssl->peer_verify_data, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN); -#endif - ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION; + if (cert_len > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - ssl->in_offt = NULL; - mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(ssl); + session->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt)); - ssl->in_msgtype = 0; - ssl->in_msglen = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - ssl->next_record_offset = 0; - ssl->in_epoch = 0; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) - mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset(ssl); -#endif + if (session->peer_cert == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } - ssl->in_hslen = 0; - ssl->nb_zero = 0; + mbedtls_x509_crt_init(session->peer_cert); - ssl->keep_current_message = 0; + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(session->peer_cert, + p, cert_len)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(session->peer_cert); + mbedtls_free(session->peer_cert); + session->peer_cert = NULL; + return ret; + } - ssl->out_msgtype = 0; - ssl->out_msglen = 0; - ssl->out_left = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) - if (ssl->split_done != MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED) { - ssl->split_done = 0; + p += cert_len; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + /* Deserialize CRT digest from the end of the ticket. */ + if (2 > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#endif - memset(ssl->cur_out_ctr, 0, sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr)); + session->peer_cert_digest_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) *p++; + session->peer_cert_digest_len = (size_t) *p++; - ssl->transform_in = NULL; - ssl->transform_out = NULL; + if (session->peer_cert_digest_len != 0) { + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = + mbedtls_md_info_from_type(session->peer_cert_digest_type); + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if (session->peer_cert_digest_len != mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - ssl->session_in = NULL; - ssl->session_out = NULL; + if (session->peer_cert_digest_len > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - memset(ssl->out_buf, 0, out_buf_len); + session->peer_cert_digest = + mbedtls_calloc(1, session->peer_cert_digest_len); + if (session->peer_cert_digest == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } - int clear_in_buf = 1; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if (partial != 0) { - clear_in_buf = 0; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - if (clear_in_buf) { - ssl->in_left = 0; - memset(ssl->in_buf, 0, in_buf_len); + memcpy(session->peer_cert_digest, p, + session->peer_cert_digest_len); + p += session->peer_cert_digest_len; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - if (mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset != NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset()")); - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset", ret); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + /* + * Session ticket and associated data + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (session->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + if (3 > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - } -#endif - if (ssl->transform) { - mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform); - mbedtls_free(ssl->transform); - ssl->transform = NULL; + session->ticket_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(p, 0); + p += 3; + + if (session->ticket_len != 0) { + if (session->ticket_len > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + session->ticket = mbedtls_calloc(1, session->ticket_len); + if (session->ticket == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + memcpy(session->ticket, p, session->ticket_len); + p += session->ticket_len; + } + + if (4 > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + session->ticket_lifetime = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0); + p += 4; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (session->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + if (8 > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + session->ticket_creation_time = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(p, 0); + p += 8; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ - if (ssl->session) { - mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session); - mbedtls_free(ssl->session); - ssl->session = NULL; + /* + * Misc extension-related info + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + if (1 > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) - ssl->alpn_chosen = NULL; + session->mfl_code = *p++; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - int free_cli_id = 1; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) - if (partial != 0) { - free_cli_id = 0; - } -#endif - if (free_cli_id) { - mbedtls_free(ssl->cli_id); - ssl->cli_id = NULL; - ssl->cli_id_len = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + if (1 > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } + + session->encrypt_then_mac = *p++; #endif - if ((ret = ssl_handshake_init(ssl)) != 0) { - return ret; + /* Done, should have consumed entire buffer */ + if (p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } return 0; } -/* - * Reset an initialized and used SSL context for re-use while retaining - * all application-set variables, function pointers and data. - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - return mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int(ssl, 0); -} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -/* - * SSL set accessors +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +/* Serialization of TLS 1.3 sessions: + * + * For more detail, see the description of ssl_session_save(). */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int endpoint) -{ - conf->endpoint = endpoint; -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int transport) -{ - conf->transport = transport; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char mode) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_session_save(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen) { - conf->anti_replay = mode; -} + unsigned char *p = buf; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + size_t hostname_len = (session->hostname == NULL) ? + 0 : strlen(session->hostname) + 1; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned limit) -{ - conf->badmac_limit = limit; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + const size_t alpn_len = (session->ticket_alpn == NULL) ? + 0 : strlen(session->ticket_alpn) + 1; #endif + size_t needed = 4 /* ticket_age_add */ + + 1 /* ticket_flags */ + + 1; /* resumption_key length */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + *olen = 0; -void mbedtls_ssl_set_datagram_packing(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned allow_packing) -{ - ssl->disable_datagram_packing = !allow_packing; -} + if (session->resumption_key_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_RESUMPTION_KEY_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + needed += session->resumption_key_len; /* resumption_key */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - uint32_t min, uint32_t max) -{ - conf->hs_timeout_min = min; - conf->hs_timeout_max = max; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + needed += 4; /* max_early_data_size */ #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + needed += 2; /* record_size_limit */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int authmode) -{ - conf->authmode = authmode; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + needed += 8; /* ticket_creation_time or ticket_reception_time */ +#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), - void *p_vrfy) -{ - conf->f_vrfy = f_vrfy; - conf->p_vrfy = p_vrfy; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (session->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + needed += 2 /* alpn_len */ + + alpn_len; /* alpn */ +#endif + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng) -{ - conf->f_rng = f_rng; - conf->p_rng = p_rng; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (session->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + needed += 2 /* hostname_len */ + + hostname_len; /* hostname */ +#endif -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - void (*f_dbg)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *), - void *p_dbg) -{ - conf->f_dbg = f_dbg; - conf->p_dbg = p_dbg; -} + needed += 4 /* ticket_lifetime */ + + 2; /* ticket_len */ -void mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - void *p_bio, - mbedtls_ssl_send_t *f_send, - mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *f_recv, - mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t *f_recv_timeout) -{ - ssl->p_bio = p_bio; - ssl->f_send = f_send; - ssl->f_recv = f_recv; - ssl->f_recv_timeout = f_recv_timeout; -} + /* Check size_t overflow */ + if (session->ticket_len > SIZE_MAX - needed) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -void mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t mtu) -{ - ssl->mtu = mtu; -} -#endif + needed += session->ticket_len; /* ticket */ + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_read_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t timeout) -{ - conf->read_timeout = timeout; -} + *olen = needed; + if (needed > buf_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } -void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - void *p_timer, - mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t *f_set_timer, - mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t *f_get_timer) -{ - ssl->p_timer = p_timer; - ssl->f_set_timer = f_set_timer; - ssl->f_get_timer = f_get_timer; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(session->ticket_age_add, p, 0); + p[4] = session->ticket_flags; - /* Make sure we start with no timer running */ - mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, 0); -} + /* save resumption_key */ + p[5] = session->resumption_key_len; + p += 6; + memcpy(p, session->resumption_key, session->resumption_key_len); + p += session->resumption_key_len; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(session->max_early_data_size, p, 0); + p += 4; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(session->record_size_limit, p, 0); + p += 2; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - void *p_cache, - int (*f_get_cache)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *), - int (*f_set_cache)(void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *)) -{ - conf->p_cache = p_cache; - conf->f_get_cache = f_get_cache; - conf->f_set_cache = f_set_cache; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + if (session->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE((uint64_t) session->ticket_creation_time, p, 0); + p += 8; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) -int mbedtls_ssl_set_session(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(alpn_len, p, 0); + p += 2; - if (ssl == NULL || - session == NULL || - ssl->session_negotiate == NULL || - ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + if (alpn_len > 0) { + /* save chosen alpn */ + memcpy(p, session->ticket_alpn, alpn_len); + p += alpn_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(ssl->session_negotiate, - session)) != 0) { - return ret; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (session->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(hostname_len, p, 0); + p += 2; + if (hostname_len > 0) { + /* save host name */ + memcpy(p, session->hostname, hostname_len); + p += hostname_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ - ssl->handshake->resume = 1; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE((uint64_t) session->ticket_reception_time, p, 0); + p += 8; +#endif + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(session->ticket_lifetime, p, 0); + p += 4; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(session->ticket_len, p, 0); + p += 2; + if (session->ticket != NULL && session->ticket_len > 0) { + memcpy(p, session->ticket, session->ticket_len); + p += session->ticket_len; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const int *ciphersuites) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_session_load(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) { - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0] = ciphersuites; - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1] = ciphersuites; - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2] = ciphersuites; - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3] = ciphersuites; -} + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *end = buf + len; -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const int *ciphersuites, - int major, int minor) -{ - if (major != MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3) { - return; + if (end - p < 6) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } + session->ticket_age_add = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0); + session->ticket_flags = p[4]; - if (minor < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 || minor > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - return; + /* load resumption_key */ + session->resumption_key_len = p[5]; + p += 6; + + if (end - p < session->resumption_key_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - conf->ciphersuite_list[minor] = ciphersuites; -} + if (sizeof(session->resumption_key) < session->resumption_key_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + memcpy(session->resumption_key, p, session->resumption_key_len); + p += session->resumption_key_len; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile) -{ - conf->cert_profile = profile; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (end - p < 4) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + session->max_early_data_size = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0); + p += 4; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + if (end - p < 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + session->record_size_limit = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ -/* Append a new keycert entry to a (possibly empty) list */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_append_key_cert(mbedtls_ssl_key_cert **head, - mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, - mbedtls_pk_context *key) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *new_cert; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (session->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + if (end - p < 8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + session->ticket_creation_time = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(p, 0); + p += 8; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ - new_cert = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_key_cert)); - if (new_cert == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + size_t alpn_len; + + if (end - p < 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + alpn_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + if (end - p < (long int) alpn_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (alpn_len > 0) { + int ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_set_ticket_alpn(session, (char *) p); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += alpn_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - new_cert->cert = cert; - new_cert->key = key; - new_cert->next = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (session->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + size_t hostname_len; + /* load host name */ + if (end - p < 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + hostname_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; - /* Update head is the list was null, else add to the end */ - if (*head == NULL) { - *head = new_cert; - } else { - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur = *head; - while (cur->next != NULL) { - cur = cur->next; + if (end - p < (long int) hostname_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if (hostname_len > 0) { + session->hostname = mbedtls_calloc(1, hostname_len); + if (session->hostname == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + memcpy(session->hostname, p, hostname_len); + p += hostname_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + if (end - p < 8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + session->ticket_reception_time = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(p, 0); + p += 8; +#endif + if (end - p < 4) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + session->ticket_lifetime = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0); + p += 4; + + if (end - p < 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + session->ticket_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + if (end - p < (long int) session->ticket_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if (session->ticket_len > 0) { + session->ticket = mbedtls_calloc(1, session->ticket_len); + if (session->ticket == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + memcpy(session->ticket, p, session->ticket_len); + p += session->ticket_len; } - cur->next = new_cert; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ return 0; -} -int mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert, - mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key) -{ - return ssl_append_key_cert(&conf->key_cert, own_cert, pk_key); } - -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain, - mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl) -{ - conf->ca_chain = ca_chain; - conf->ca_crl = ca_crl; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) - /* mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() and mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb() - * cannot be used together. */ - conf->f_ca_cb = NULL; - conf->p_ca_cb = NULL; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_session_save(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen) +{ + ((void) session); + ((void) buf); + ((void) buf_len); + *olen = 0; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, - void *p_ca_cb) +static int ssl_tls13_session_load(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len) { - conf->f_ca_cb = f_ca_cb; - conf->p_ca_cb = p_ca_cb; - - /* mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() and mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb() - * cannot be used together. */ - conf->ca_chain = NULL; - conf->ca_crl = NULL; + ((void) session); + ((void) buf); + ((void) buf_len); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) -int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert, - mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key) -{ - return ssl_append_key_cert(&ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert, - own_cert, pk_key); -} +/* + * Define ticket header determining Mbed TLS version + * and structure of the ticket. + */ -void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain, - mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl) -{ - ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain = ca_chain; - ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl = ca_crl; -} +/* + * Define bitflag determining compile-time settings influencing + * structure of serialized SSL sessions. + */ -void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_authmode(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - int authmode) -{ - ssl->handshake->sni_authmode = authmode; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -void mbedtls_ssl_set_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), - void *p_vrfy) -{ - ssl->f_vrfy = f_vrfy; - ssl->p_vrfy = p_vrfy; -} -#endif +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) -/* - * Set EC J-PAKE password for current handshake - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *pw, - size_t pw_len) -{ - mbedtls_ecjpake_role role; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_KEEP_PEER_CRT 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_KEEP_PEER_CRT 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ - if (ssl->handshake == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { - role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER; - } else { - role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ - return mbedtls_ecjpake_setup(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, - role, - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, - MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, - pw, pw_len); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ -static void ssl_conf_remove_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) -{ - /* Remove reference to existing PSK, if any. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(conf->psk_opaque)) { - /* The maintenance of the PSK key slot is the - * user's responsibility. */ - conf->psk_opaque = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; - } - /* This and the following branch should never - * be taken simultaneously as we maintain the - * invariant that raw and opaque PSKs are never - * configured simultaneously. As a safeguard, - * though, `else` is omitted here. */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - if (conf->psk != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(conf->psk, conf->psk_len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_SNI 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_SNI 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ - mbedtls_free(conf->psk); - conf->psk = NULL; - conf->psk_len = 0; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_EARLY_DATA 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_EARLY_DATA 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ - /* Remove reference to PSK identity, if any. */ - if (conf->psk_identity != NULL) { - mbedtls_free(conf->psk_identity); - conf->psk_identity = NULL; - conf->psk_identity_len = 0; - } -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_RECORD_SIZE 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_RECORD_SIZE 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ -/* This function assumes that PSK identity in the SSL config is unset. - * It checks that the provided identity is well-formed and attempts - * to make a copy of it in the SSL config. - * On failure, the PSK identity in the config remains unset. */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_conf_set_psk_identity(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - unsigned char const *psk_identity, - size_t psk_identity_len) -{ - /* Identity len will be encoded on two bytes */ - if (psk_identity == NULL || - (psk_identity_len >> 16) != 0 || - psk_identity_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ALPN 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ALPN 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ - conf->psk_identity = mbedtls_calloc(1, psk_identity_len); - if (conf->psk_identity == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - } +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME_BIT 0 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT_BIT 1 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET_BIT 2 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL_BIT 3 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM_BIT 4 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET_BIT 5 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_KEEP_PEER_CRT_BIT 6 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_SNI_BIT 7 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_EARLY_DATA_BIT 8 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_RECORD_SIZE_BIT 9 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT 10 - conf->psk_identity_len = psk_identity_len; - memcpy(conf->psk_identity, psk_identity, conf->psk_identity_len); +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG \ + ((uint16_t) ( \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET << \ + SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_KEEP_PEER_CRT << \ + SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_KEEP_PEER_CRT_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_SNI << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_SNI_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_EARLY_DATA << \ + SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_EARLY_DATA_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_RECORD_SIZE << \ + SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_RECORD_SIZE_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ALPN << \ + SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT))) + +static const unsigned char ssl_serialized_session_header[] = { + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR, + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR, + MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH, + MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG), + MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG), +}; - return 0; -} +/* + * Serialize a session in the following format: + * (in the presentation language of TLS, RFC 8446 section 3) + * + * TLS 1.2 session: + * + * struct { + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + * opaque ticket<0..2^24-1>; // length 0 means no ticket + * uint32 ticket_lifetime; + * #endif + * } ClientOnlyData; + * + * struct { + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + * uint64 start_time; + * #endif + * uint8 session_id_len; // at most 32 + * opaque session_id[32]; + * opaque master[48]; // fixed length in the standard + * uint32 verify_result; + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE + * opaque peer_cert<0..2^24-1>; // length 0 means no peer cert + * #else + * uint8 peer_cert_digest_type; + * opaque peer_cert_digest<0..2^8-1> + * #endif + * select (endpoint) { + * case client: ClientOnlyData; + * case server: uint64 ticket_creation_time; + * }; + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + * uint8 mfl_code; // up to 255 according to standard + * #endif + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + * uint8 encrypt_then_mac; // 0 or 1 + * #endif + * } serialized_session_tls12; + * + * + * TLS 1.3 Session: + * + * struct { + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + * opaque hostname<0..2^16-1>; + * #endif + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + * uint64 ticket_reception_time; + * #endif + * uint32 ticket_lifetime; + * opaque ticket<1..2^16-1>; + * } ClientOnlyData; + * + * struct { + * uint32 ticket_age_add; + * uint8 ticket_flags; + * opaque resumption_key<0..255>; + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + * uint32 max_early_data_size; + * #endif + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + * uint16 record_size_limit; + * #endif + * select ( endpoint ) { + * case client: ClientOnlyData; + * case server: + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + * uint64 ticket_creation_time; + * #endif + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + * opaque ticket_alpn<0..256>; + * #endif + * }; + * } serialized_session_tls13; + * + * + * SSL session: + * + * struct { + * + * opaque mbedtls_version[3]; // library version: major, minor, patch + * opaque session_format[2]; // library-version specific 16-bit field + * // determining the format of the remaining + * // serialized data. + * + * Note: When updating the format, remember to keep + * these version+format bytes. + * + * // In this version, `session_format` determines + * // the setting of those compile-time + * // configuration options which influence + * // the structure of mbedtls_ssl_session. + * + * uint8_t minor_ver; // Protocol minor version. Possible values: + * // - TLS 1.2 (0x0303) + * // - TLS 1.3 (0x0304) + * uint8_t endpoint; + * uint16_t ciphersuite; + * + * select (serialized_session.tls_version) { + * + * case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2: + * serialized_session_tls12 data; + * case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3: + * serialized_session_tls13 data; + * + * }; + * + * } serialized_session; + * + */ -int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len, - const unsigned char *psk_identity, size_t psk_identity_len) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_session_save(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char omit_header, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen) { + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t used = 0; + size_t remaining_len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + size_t out_len; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - /* Remove opaque/raw PSK + PSK Identity */ - ssl_conf_remove_psk(conf); - - /* Check and set raw PSK */ - if (psk == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +#endif + if (session == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } - if (psk_len == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + + if (!omit_header) { + /* + * Add Mbed TLS version identifier + */ + used += sizeof(ssl_serialized_session_header); + + if (used <= buf_len) { + memcpy(p, ssl_serialized_session_header, + sizeof(ssl_serialized_session_header)); + p += sizeof(ssl_serialized_session_header); + } } - if (psk_len > MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + + /* + * TLS version identifier, endpoint, ciphersuite + */ + used += 1 /* TLS version */ + + 1 /* endpoint */ + + 2; /* ciphersuite */ + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(session->tls_version); + *p++ = session->endpoint; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(session->ciphersuite, p, 0); + p += 2; } - if ((conf->psk = mbedtls_calloc(1, psk_len)) == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + /* Forward to version-specific serialization routine. */ + remaining_len = (buf_len >= used) ? buf_len - used : 0; + switch (session->tls_version) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2: + used += ssl_tls12_session_save(session, p, remaining_len); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3: + ret = ssl_tls13_session_save(session, p, remaining_len, &out_len); + if (ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { + return ret; + } + used += out_len; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } - conf->psk_len = psk_len; - memcpy(conf->psk, psk, conf->psk_len); - /* Check and set PSK Identity */ - ret = ssl_conf_set_psk_identity(conf, psk_identity, psk_identity_len); - if (ret != 0) { - ssl_conf_remove_psk(conf); + *olen = used; + if (used > buf_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; } - return ret; + return 0; } -static void ssl_remove_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +/* + * Public wrapper for ssl_session_save() + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_save(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque)) { - ssl->handshake->psk_opaque = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - if (ssl->handshake->psk != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->handshake->psk, - ssl->handshake->psk_len); - mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake->psk); - ssl->handshake->psk_len = 0; - } + return ssl_session_save(session, 0, buf, buf_len, olen); } -int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len) +/* + * Deserialize session, see mbedtls_ssl_session_save() for format. + * + * This internal version is wrapped by a public function that cleans up in + * case of error, and has an extra option omit_header. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_session_load(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char omit_header, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) { - if (psk == NULL || ssl->handshake == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - if (psk_len > MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char * const end = buf + len; + size_t remaining_len; - ssl_remove_psk(ssl); - if ((ssl->handshake->psk = mbedtls_calloc(1, psk_len)) == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + if (session == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } - ssl->handshake->psk_len = psk_len; - memcpy(ssl->handshake->psk, psk, ssl->handshake->psk_len); + if (!omit_header) { + /* + * Check Mbed TLS version identifier + */ - return 0; -} + if ((size_t) (end - p) < sizeof(ssl_serialized_session_header)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - psa_key_id_t psk, - const unsigned char *psk_identity, - size_t psk_identity_len) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - /* Clear opaque/raw PSK + PSK Identity, if present. */ - ssl_conf_remove_psk(conf); + if (memcmp(p, ssl_serialized_session_header, + sizeof(ssl_serialized_session_header)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH; + } + p += sizeof(ssl_serialized_session_header); + } - /* Check and set opaque PSK */ - if (mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(psk)) { + /* + * TLS version identifier, endpoint, ciphersuite + */ + if (4 > (size_t) (end - p)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - conf->psk_opaque = psk; + session->tls_version = (mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version) (0x0300 | *p++); + session->endpoint = *p++; + session->ciphersuite = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; - /* Check and set PSK Identity */ - ret = ssl_conf_set_psk_identity(conf, psk_identity, - psk_identity_len); - if (ret != 0) { - ssl_conf_remove_psk(conf); - } + /* Dispatch according to TLS version. */ + remaining_len = (size_t) (end - p); + switch (session->tls_version) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2: + return ssl_tls12_session_load(session, p, remaining_len); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - return ret; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3: + return ssl_tls13_session_load(session, p, remaining_len); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ -int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - psa_key_id_t psk) -{ - if ((mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(psk)) || - (ssl->handshake == NULL)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - - ssl_remove_psk(ssl); - ssl->handshake->psk_opaque = psk; - return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - int (*f_psk)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, - size_t), - void *p_psk) +/* + * Deserialize session: public wrapper for error cleaning + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_load(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) { - conf->f_psk = f_psk; - conf->p_psk = p_psk; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + int ret = ssl_session_load(session, 0, buf, len); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(session); + } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char *dhm_P, const char *dhm_G) + return ret; +} + +/* + * Perform a single step of the SSL handshake + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_prepare_handshake_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&conf->dhm_P, 16, dhm_P)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&conf->dhm_G, 16, dhm_G)) != 0) { - mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_P); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_G); + /* + * We may have not been able to send to the peer all the handshake data + * that were written into the output buffer by the previous handshake step, + * if the write to the network callback returned with the + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE error code. + * We proceed to the next handshake step only when all data from the + * previous one have been sent to the peer, thus we make sure that this is + * the case here by calling `mbedtls_ssl_flush_output()`. The function may + * return with the #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE error code in which case + * we have to wait before to go ahead. + * In the case of TLS 1.3, handshake step handlers do not send data to the + * peer. Data are only sent here and through + * `mbedtls_ssl_handle_pending_alert` in case an error that triggered an + * alert occurred. + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl)) != 0) { return ret; } - return 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ -int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const unsigned char *dhm_P, size_t P_len, - const unsigned char *dhm_G, size_t G_len) +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_P); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_G); + if (ssl == NULL || + ssl->conf == NULL || + ssl->handshake == NULL || + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&conf->dhm_P, dhm_P, P_len)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&conf->dhm_G, dhm_G, G_len)) != 0) { - mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_P); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_G); + ret = ssl_prepare_handshake_step(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { return ret; } - return 0; -} + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handle_pending_alert(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } -int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_ctx(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm_ctx) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + /* If ssl->conf->endpoint is not one of MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, this is the return code we give */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_P); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_G); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("client state: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_states_str((mbedtls_ssl_states) ssl->state))); - if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&conf->dhm_P, &dhm_ctx->P)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&conf->dhm_G, &dhm_ctx->G)) != 0) { - mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_P); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_G); - return ret; + switch (ssl->state) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST: + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO; + ret = 0; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_client_hello(ssl); + break; + + default: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_client_step(ssl); + } else { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step(ssl); + } +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step(ssl); +#else + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_client_step(ssl); +#endif + } } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_server_step(ssl); + } else { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step(ssl); + } +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step(ssl); +#else + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_server_step(ssl); +#endif + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) -/* - * Set the minimum length for Diffie-Hellman parameters - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - unsigned int bitlen) -{ - conf->dhm_min_bitlen = bitlen; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + if (ret != 0) { + /* handshake_step return error. And it is same + * with alert_reason. + */ + if (ssl->send_alert) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handle_pending_alert(ssl); + goto cleanup; + } + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) -/* - * Set allowed/preferred hashes for handshake signatures - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const int *hashes) -{ - conf->sig_hashes = hashes; +cleanup: + return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) /* - * Set the allowed elliptic curves + * Perform the SSL handshake */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curve_list) -{ - conf->curve_list = curve_list; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -int mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const char *hostname) +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { - /* Initialize to suppress unnecessary compiler warning */ - size_t hostname_len = 0; + int ret = 0; - /* Check if new hostname is valid before - * making any change to current one */ - if (hostname != NULL) { - hostname_len = strlen(hostname); + /* Sanity checks */ - if (hostname_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } + if (ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - /* Now it's clear that we will overwrite the old hostname, - * so we can free it safely */ - - if (ssl->hostname != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->hostname, strlen(ssl->hostname)); - mbedtls_free(ssl->hostname); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + (ssl->f_set_timer == NULL || ssl->f_get_timer == NULL)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("You must use " + "mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb() for DTLS")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - /* Passing NULL as hostname shall clear the old one */ - - if (hostname == NULL) { - ssl->hostname = NULL; - } else { - ssl->hostname = mbedtls_calloc(1, hostname_len + 1); - if (ssl->hostname == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> handshake")); - memcpy(ssl->hostname, hostname, hostname_len); + /* Main handshake loop */ + while (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(ssl); - ssl->hostname[hostname_len] = '\0'; + if (ret != 0) { + break; + } } - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= handshake")); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - int (*f_sni)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, - const unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_sni) -{ - conf->f_sni = f_sni; - conf->p_sni = p_sni; + return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) -int mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char **protos) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/* + * Write HelloRequest to request renegotiation on server + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_hello_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { - size_t cur_len, tot_len; - const char **p; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - /* - * RFC 7301 3.1: "Empty strings MUST NOT be included and byte strings - * MUST NOT be truncated." - * We check lengths now rather than later. - */ - tot_len = 0; - for (p = protos; *p != NULL; p++) { - cur_len = strlen(*p); - tot_len += cur_len; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write hello request")); - if ((cur_len == 0) || - (cur_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_NAME_LEN) || - (tot_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_LIST_LEN)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } + ssl->out_msglen = 4; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); + return ret; } - conf->alpn_list = protos; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write hello request")); return 0; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ -const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - return ssl->alpn_chosen; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_srtp_mki_value_supported(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - int support_mki_value) +/* + * Actually renegotiate current connection, triggered by either: + * - any side: calling mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate(), + * - client: receiving a HelloRequest during mbedtls_ssl_read(), + * - server: receiving any handshake message on server during mbedtls_ssl_read() after + * the initial handshake is completed. + * If the handshake doesn't complete due to waiting for I/O, it will continue + * during the next calls to mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate() or mbedtls_ssl_read() respectively. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { - conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support = support_mki_value; -} + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; -int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_srtp_set_mki_value(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *mki_value, - uint16_t mki_len) -{ - if (mki_len > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> renegotiate")); - if (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + if ((ret = ssl_handshake_init(ssl)) != 0) { + return ret; } - memcpy(ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_value, mki_len); - ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len = mki_len; - return 0; -} - -int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *profiles) -{ - const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *p; - size_t list_size = 0; - - /* check the profiles list: all entry must be valid, - * its size cannot be more than the total number of supported profiles, currently 4 */ - for (p = profiles; *p != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET && - list_size <= MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH; - p++) { - if (mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value(*p) != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) { - list_size++; + /* RFC 6347 4.2.2: "[...] the HelloRequest will have message_seq = 0 and + * the ServerHello will have message_seq = 1" */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING) { + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq = 1; } else { - /* unsupported value, stop parsing and set the size to an error value */ - list_size = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH + 1; + ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq = 1; } } +#endif - if (list_size > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH) { - conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list = NULL; - conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len = 0; - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST; + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret); + return ret; } - conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list = profiles; - conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len = list_size; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= renegotiate")); return 0; } -void mbedtls_ssl_get_dtls_srtp_negotiation_result(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info *dtls_srtp_info) +/* + * Renegotiate current connection on client, + * or request renegotiation on server + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { - dtls_srtp_info->chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile; - /* do not copy the mki value if there is no chosen profile */ - if (dtls_srtp_info->chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) { - dtls_srtp_info->mki_len = 0; - } else { - dtls_srtp_info->mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len; - memcpy(dtls_srtp_info->mki_value, ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, - ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len); + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + + if (ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor) -{ - conf->max_major_ver = major; - conf->max_minor_ver = minor; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* On server, just send the request */ + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor) -{ - conf->min_major_ver = major; - conf->min_minor_ver = minor; -} + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_fallback(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char fallback) -{ - conf->fallback = fallback; -} -#endif + /* Did we already try/start sending HelloRequest? */ + if (ssl->out_left != 0) { + return mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl); + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_req_ca_list(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - char cert_req_ca_list) -{ - conf->cert_req_ca_list = cert_req_ca_list; -} -#endif + return ssl_write_hello_request(ssl); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char etm) -{ - conf->encrypt_then_mac = etm; -} -#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + /* + * On client, either start the renegotiation process or, + * if already in progress, continue the handshake + */ + if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char ems) -{ - conf->extended_ms = ems; -} -#endif + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation", ret); + return ret; + } + } else { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret); + return ret; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_arc4_support(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char arc4) -{ - conf->arc4_disabled = arc4; + return ret; } -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) -int mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned char mfl_code) +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { - if (mfl_code >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID || - ssl_mfl_code_to_length(mfl_code) > MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + if (handshake == NULL) { + return; } - conf->mfl_code = mfl_code; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + if (ssl->handshake->group_list_heap_allocated) { + mbedtls_free((void *) handshake->group_list); + } + handshake->group_list = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + if (ssl->handshake->sig_algs_heap_allocated) { + mbedtls_free((void *) handshake->sig_algs); + } + handshake->sig_algs = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (ssl->handshake->certificate_request_context) { + mbedtls_free((void *) handshake->certificate_request_context); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_truncated_hmac(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int truncate) -{ - conf->trunc_hmac = truncate; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + if (ssl->conf->f_async_cancel != NULL && handshake->async_in_progress != 0) { + ssl->conf->f_async_cancel(ssl); + handshake->async_in_progress = 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cbc_record_splitting(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char split) -{ - conf->cbc_record_splitting = split; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_abort(&handshake->fin_sha256_psa); +#else + mbedtls_md_free(&handshake->fin_sha256); +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_abort(&handshake->fin_sha384_psa); +#else + mbedtls_md_free(&handshake->fin_sha384); +#endif #endif -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int allow_legacy) -{ - conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation = allow_legacy; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int renegotiation) -{ - conf->disable_renegotiation = renegotiation; -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_enforced(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int max_records) -{ - conf->renego_max_records = max_records; -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_period(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - const unsigned char period[8]) -{ - memcpy(conf->renego_period, period, 8); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + mbedtls_dhm_free(&handshake->dhm_ctx); +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ecdh_free(&handshake->ecdh_ctx); +#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_pake_abort(&handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + /* + * Opaque keys are not stored in the handshake's data and it's the user + * responsibility to destroy them. Clear ones, instead, are created by + * the TLS library and should be destroyed at the same level + */ + if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(handshake->psa_pake_password)) { + psa_destroy_key(handshake->psa_pake_password); + } + handshake->psa_pake_password = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +#else + mbedtls_ecjpake_free(&handshake->ecjpake_ctx); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int use_tickets) -{ - conf->session_tickets = use_tickets; -} + mbedtls_free(handshake->ecjpake_cache); + handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL; + handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0; #endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t *f_ticket_write, - mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t *f_ticket_parse, - void *p_ticket) -{ - conf->f_ticket_write = f_ticket_write; - conf->f_ticket_parse = f_ticket_parse; - conf->p_ticket = p_ticket; -} #endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *f_export_keys, - void *p_export_keys) -{ - conf->f_export_keys = f_export_keys; - conf->p_export_keys = p_export_keys; -} -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_ext_t *f_export_keys_ext, - void *p_export_keys) -{ - conf->f_export_keys_ext = f_export_keys_ext; - conf->p_export_keys = p_export_keys; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_ECDSA_ANY_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + /* explicit void pointer cast for buggy MS compiler */ + mbedtls_free((void *) handshake->curves_tls_id); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) -void mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb( - mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t *f_async_sign, - mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t *f_async_decrypt, - mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t *f_async_resume, - mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t *f_async_cancel, - void *async_config_data) -{ - conf->f_async_sign_start = f_async_sign; - conf->f_async_decrypt_start = f_async_decrypt; - conf->f_async_resume = f_async_resume; - conf->f_async_cancel = f_async_cancel; - conf->p_async_config_data = async_config_data; -} - -void *mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_async_config_data(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) -{ - return conf->p_async_config_data; -} - -void *mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - if (ssl->handshake == NULL) { - return NULL; - } else { - return ssl->handshake->user_async_ctx; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque)) { + /* The maintenance of the external PSK key slot is the + * user's responsibility. */ + if (ssl->handshake->psk_opaque_is_internal) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque); + ssl->handshake->psk_opaque_is_internal = 0; + } + ssl->handshake->psk_opaque = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; } -} - -void mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - void *ctx) -{ - if (ssl->handshake != NULL) { - ssl->handshake->user_async_ctx = ctx; +#else + if (handshake->psk != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(handshake->psk, handshake->psk_len); } -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */ -/* - * SSL get accessors - */ -uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - if (ssl->session != NULL) { - return ssl->session->verify_result; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + /* + * Free only the linked list wrapper, not the keys themselves + * since the belong to the SNI callback + */ + ssl_key_cert_free(handshake->sni_key_cert); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ - if (ssl->session_negotiate != NULL) { - return ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free(&handshake->ecrs_ctx); + if (handshake->ecrs_peer_cert != NULL) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(handshake->ecrs_peer_cert); + mbedtls_free(handshake->ecrs_peer_cert); } +#endif - return 0xFFFFFFFF; -} - -const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - if (ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL) { - return NULL; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + mbedtls_pk_free(&handshake->peer_pubkey); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - return mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name(ssl->session->ciphersuite); -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)) + mbedtls_free(handshake->cookie); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 ) */ -const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_version(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - switch (ssl->minor_ver) { - case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2: - return "DTLSv1.0"; - - case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3: - return "DTLSv1.2"; + mbedtls_ssl_flight_free(handshake->flight); + mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free(ssl); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - default: - return "unknown (DTLS)"; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_PSA_ANY_ENABLED) + if (handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external == 0) { + psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); } -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_PSA_ANY_ENABLED */ - switch (ssl->minor_ver) { - case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0: - return "SSLv3.0"; - - case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1: - return "TLSv1.0"; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(handshake->transform_handshake); + mbedtls_free(handshake->transform_handshake); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(handshake->transform_earlydata); + mbedtls_free(handshake->transform_earlydata); +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ - case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2: - return "TLSv1.1"; - case MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3: - return "TLSv1.2"; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + /* If the buffers are too big - reallocate. Because of the way Mbed TLS + * processes datagrams and the fact that a datagram is allowed to have + * several records in it, it is possible that the I/O buffers are not + * empty at this stage */ + handle_buffer_resizing(ssl, 1, mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen(ssl), + mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen(ssl)); +#endif - default: - return "unknown"; - } + /* mbedtls_platform_zeroize MUST be last one in this function */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(handshake, + sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params)); } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) -size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +void mbedtls_ssl_session_free(mbedtls_ssl_session *session) { - size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN; - size_t read_mfl; - - /* Use the configured MFL for the client if we're past SERVER_HELLO_DONE */ - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && - ssl->state >= MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) { - return ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->conf->mfl_code); + if (session == NULL) { + return; } - /* Check if a smaller max length was negotiated */ - if (ssl->session_out != NULL) { - read_mfl = ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->session_out->mfl_code); - if (read_mfl < max_len) { - max_len = read_mfl; - } - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + ssl_clear_peer_cert(session); +#endif - // During a handshake, use the value being negotiated - if (ssl->session_negotiate != NULL) { - read_mfl = ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code); - if (read_mfl < max_len) { - max_len = read_mfl; - } - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + mbedtls_free(session->hostname); +#endif + mbedtls_free(session->ticket); +#endif - return max_len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + mbedtls_free(session->ticket_alpn); +#endif + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(session, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)); } -size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - size_t max_len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) - /* - * Assume mfl_code is correct since it was checked when set - */ - max_len = ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->conf->mfl_code); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID 1u +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID 0u +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ - /* Check if a smaller max length was negotiated */ - if (ssl->session_out != NULL && - ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->session_out->mfl_code) < max_len) { - max_len = ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->session_out->mfl_code); - } +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT 1u - /* During a handshake, use the value being negotiated */ - if (ssl->session_negotiate != NULL && - ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code) < max_len) { - max_len = ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code); - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY 1u +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY 0u +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ - return max_len; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN 1u +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN 0u +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) -size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(ssl); -} -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_BIT 0 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT_BIT 1 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY_BIT 2 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT 3 -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - /* Return unlimited mtu for client hello messages to avoid fragmentation. */ - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && - (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO || - ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO)) { - return 0; - } - - if (ssl->handshake == NULL || ssl->handshake->mtu == 0) { - return ssl->mtu; - } - - if (ssl->mtu == 0) { - return ssl->handshake->mtu; - } +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG \ + ((uint32_t) ( \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID << \ + SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT << \ + SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY << \ + SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN << SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT) | \ + 0u)) - return ssl->mtu < ssl->handshake->mtu ? - ssl->mtu : ssl->handshake->mtu; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ +static const unsigned char ssl_serialized_context_header[] = { + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR, + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR, + MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH, + MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG), + MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG), + MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG), + MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG), + MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG), +}; -int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +/* + * Serialize a full SSL context + * + * The format of the serialized data is: + * (in the presentation language of TLS, RFC 8446 section 3) + * + * // header + * opaque mbedtls_version[3]; // major, minor, patch + * opaque context_format[5]; // version-specific field determining + * // the format of the remaining + * // serialized data. + * Note: When updating the format, remember to keep these + * version+format bytes. (We may make their size part of the API.) + * + * // session sub-structure + * opaque session<1..2^32-1>; // see mbedtls_ssl_session_save() + * // transform sub-structure + * uint8 random[64]; // ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random + * uint8 in_cid<0..2^8-1> // Connection ID: expected incoming value + * uint8 out_cid<0..2^8-1> // Connection ID: outgoing value to use + * // fields from ssl_context + * uint32 badmac_seen; // DTLS: number of records with failing MAC + * uint64 in_window_top; // DTLS: last validated record seq_num + * uint64 in_window; // DTLS: bitmask for replay protection + * uint8 disable_datagram_packing; // DTLS: only one record per datagram + * uint64 cur_out_ctr; // Record layer: outgoing sequence number + * uint16 mtu; // DTLS: path mtu (max outgoing fragment size) + * uint8 alpn_chosen<0..2^8-1> // ALPN: negotiated application protocol + * + * Note that many fields of the ssl_context or sub-structures are not + * serialized, as they fall in one of the following categories: + * + * 1. forced value (eg in_left must be 0) + * 2. pointer to dynamically-allocated memory (eg session, transform) + * 3. value can be re-derived from other data (eg session keys from MS) + * 4. value was temporary (eg content of input buffer) + * 5. value will be provided by the user again (eg I/O callbacks and context) + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_context_save(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen) { - size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t used = 0; + size_t session_len; + int ret = 0; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - (void) ssl; + /* + * Enforce usage restrictions, see "return BAD_INPUT_DATA" in + * this function's documentation. + * + * These are due to assumptions/limitations in the implementation. Some of + * them are likely to stay (no handshake in progress) some might go away + * (only DTLS) but are currently used to simplify the implementation. + */ + /* The initial handshake must be over */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Initial handshake isn't over")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if (ssl->handshake != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Handshake isn't completed")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + /* Double-check that sub-structures are indeed ready */ + if (ssl->transform == NULL || ssl->session == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Serialised structures aren't ready")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + /* There must be no pending incoming or outgoing data */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_check_pending(ssl) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("There is pending incoming data")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if (ssl->out_left != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("There is pending outgoing data")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + /* Protocol must be DTLS, not TLS */ + if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Only DTLS is supported")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + /* Version must be 1.2 */ + if (ssl->tls_version != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Only version 1.2 supported")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + /* We must be using an AEAD ciphersuite */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_transform_uses_aead(ssl->transform) != 1) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Only AEAD ciphersuites supported")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + /* Renegotiation must not be enabled */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if (ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Renegotiation must not be enabled")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) - const size_t mfl = mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(ssl); + /* + * Version and format identifier + */ + used += sizeof(ssl_serialized_context_header); - if (max_len > mfl) { - max_len = mfl; + if (used <= buf_len) { + memcpy(p, ssl_serialized_context_header, + sizeof(ssl_serialized_context_header)); + p += sizeof(ssl_serialized_context_header); } -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu(ssl) != 0) { - const size_t mtu = mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu(ssl); - const int ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion(ssl); - const size_t overhead = (size_t) ret; + /* + * Session (length + data) + */ + ret = ssl_session_save(ssl->session, 1, NULL, 0, &session_len); + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { + return ret; + } - if (ret < 0) { + used += 4 + session_len; + if (used <= buf_len) { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(session_len, p, 0); + p += 4; + + ret = ssl_session_save(ssl->session, 1, + p, session_len, &session_len); + if (ret != 0) { return ret; } - if (mtu <= overhead) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("MTU too low for record expansion")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - } + p += session_len; + } - if (max_len > mtu - overhead) { - max_len = mtu - overhead; - } + /* + * Transform + */ + used += sizeof(ssl->transform->randbytes); + if (used <= buf_len) { + memcpy(p, ssl->transform->randbytes, + sizeof(ssl->transform->randbytes)); + p += sizeof(ssl->transform->randbytes); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - ((void) ssl); -#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + used += 2U + ssl->transform->in_cid_len + ssl->transform->out_cid_len; + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = ssl->transform->in_cid_len; + memcpy(p, ssl->transform->in_cid, ssl->transform->in_cid_len); + p += ssl->transform->in_cid_len; - return (int) max_len; -} + *p++ = ssl->transform->out_cid_len; + memcpy(p, ssl->transform->out_cid, ssl->transform->out_cid_len); + p += ssl->transform->out_cid_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -const mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - if (ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL) { - return NULL; + /* + * Saved fields from top-level ssl_context structure + */ + used += 4; + if (used <= buf_len) { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ssl->badmac_seen, p, 0); + p += 4; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - return ssl->session->peer_cert; -#else - return NULL; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + used += 16; + if (used <= buf_len) { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(ssl->in_window_top, p, 0); + p += 8; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) -int mbedtls_ssl_get_session(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_ssl_session *dst) -{ - if (ssl == NULL || - dst == NULL || - ssl->session == NULL || - ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(ssl->in_window, p, 0); + p += 8; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ - return mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(dst, ssl->session); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + used += 1; + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = ssl->disable_datagram_packing; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ -const mbedtls_ssl_session *mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - if (ssl == NULL) { - return NULL; + used += MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN; + if (used <= buf_len) { + memcpy(p, ssl->cur_out_ctr, MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN); + p += MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN; } - return ssl->session; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + used += 2; + if (used <= buf_len) { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ssl->mtu, p, 0); + p += 2; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ -/* - * Define ticket header determining Mbed TLS version - * and structure of the ticket. - */ - -/* - * Define bitflag determining compile-time settings influencing - * structure of serialized SSL sessions. - */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME 1 -#else -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME 0 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT 1 -#else -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT 0 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET 1 -#else -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET 0 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL 1 -#else -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL 0 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + { + const uint8_t alpn_len = ssl->alpn_chosen + ? (uint8_t) strlen(ssl->alpn_chosen) + : 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC 1 -#else -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC 0 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ + used += 1 + alpn_len; + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = alpn_len; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM 1 -#else -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM 0 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + if (ssl->alpn_chosen != NULL) { + memcpy(p, ssl->alpn_chosen, alpn_len); + p += alpn_len; + } + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET 1 -#else -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET 0 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + /* + * Done + */ + *olen = used; -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME_BIT 0 -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT_BIT 1 -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET_BIT 2 -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL_BIT 3 -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC_BIT 4 -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM_BIT 5 -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET_BIT 6 + if (used > buf_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG \ - ((uint16_t) ( \ - (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME_BIT) | \ - (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT_BIT) | \ - (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET << \ - SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET_BIT) | \ - (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL_BIT) | \ - (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC << \ - SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TRUNC_HMAC_BIT) | \ - (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM_BIT) | \ - (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET_BIT))) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "saved context", buf, used); -static unsigned char ssl_serialized_session_header[] = { - MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR, - MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR, - MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH, - MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG), - MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG), -}; + return mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int(ssl, 0); +} /* - * Serialize a session in the following format: - * (in the presentation language of TLS, RFC 8446 section 3) - * - * opaque mbedtls_version[3]; // major, minor, patch - * opaque session_format[2]; // version-specific 16-bit field determining - * // the format of the remaining - * // serialized data. - * - * Note: When updating the format, remember to keep - * these version+format bytes. - * - * // In this version, `session_format` determines - * // the setting of those compile-time - * // configuration options which influence - * // the structure of mbedtls_ssl_session. - * uint64 start_time; - * uint8 ciphersuite[2]; // defined by the standard - * uint8 compression; // 0 or 1 - * uint8 session_id_len; // at most 32 - * opaque session_id[32]; - * opaque master[48]; // fixed length in the standard - * uint32 verify_result; - * opaque peer_cert<0..2^24-1>; // length 0 means no peer cert - * opaque ticket<0..2^24-1>; // length 0 means no ticket - * uint32 ticket_lifetime; - * uint8 mfl_code; // up to 255 according to standard - * uint8 trunc_hmac; // 0 or 1 - * uint8 encrypt_then_mac; // 0 or 1 + * Deserialize context, see mbedtls_ssl_context_save() for format. * - * The order is the same as in the definition of the structure, except - * verify_result is put before peer_cert so that all mandatory fields come - * together in one block. + * This internal version is wrapped by a public function that cleans up in + * case of error. */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_session_save(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, - unsigned char omit_header, - unsigned char *buf, - size_t buf_len, - size_t *olen) +static int ssl_context_load(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) { - unsigned char *p = buf; - size_t used = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - uint64_t start; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char * const end = buf + len; + size_t session_len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + tls_prf_fn prf_func = NULL; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - size_t cert_len; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - - - if (!omit_header) { - /* - * Add version identifier - */ - - used += sizeof(ssl_serialized_session_header); - - if (used <= buf_len) { - memcpy(p, ssl_serialized_session_header, - sizeof(ssl_serialized_session_header)); - p += sizeof(ssl_serialized_session_header); - } - } /* - * Time + * The context should have been freshly setup or reset. + * Give the user an error in case of obvious misuse. + * (Checking session is useful because it won't be NULL if we're + * renegotiating, or if the user mistakenly loaded a session first.) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - used += 8; - - if (used <= buf_len) { - start = (uint64_t) session->start; - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(start, p, 0); - p += 8; + if (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST || + ssl->session != NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ /* - * Basic mandatory fields + * We can't check that the config matches the initial one, but we can at + * least check it matches the requirements for serializing. */ - used += 2 /* ciphersuite */ - + 1 /* compression */ - + 1 /* id_len */ - + sizeof(session->id) - + sizeof(session->master) - + 4; /* verify_result */ - - if (used <= buf_len) { - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(session->ciphersuite, p, 0); - p += 2; - - *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(session->compression); + if ( +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED || +#endif + ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM || + ssl->conf->max_tls_version < MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 || + ssl->conf->min_tls_version > MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 + ) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(session->id_len); - memcpy(p, session->id, 32); - p += 32; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "context to load", buf, len); - memcpy(p, session->master, 48); - p += 48; + /* + * Check version identifier + */ + if ((size_t) (end - p) < sizeof(ssl_serialized_context_header)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(session->verify_result, p, 0); - p += 4; + if (memcmp(p, ssl_serialized_context_header, + sizeof(ssl_serialized_context_header)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH; } + p += sizeof(ssl_serialized_context_header); /* - * Peer's end-entity certificate + * Session */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - if (session->peer_cert == NULL) { - cert_len = 0; - } else { - cert_len = session->peer_cert->raw.len; + if ((size_t) (end - p) < 4) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - used += 3 + cert_len; + session_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0); + p += 4; - if (used <= buf_len) { - *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(cert_len); - *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(cert_len); - *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(cert_len); + /* This has been allocated by ssl_handshake_init(), called by + * by either mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int() or mbedtls_ssl_setup(). */ + ssl->session = ssl->session_negotiate; + ssl->session_in = ssl->session; + ssl->session_out = ssl->session; + ssl->session_negotiate = NULL; - if (session->peer_cert != NULL) { - memcpy(p, session->peer_cert->raw.p, cert_len); - p += cert_len; - } + if ((size_t) (end - p) < session_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - if (session->peer_cert_digest != NULL) { - used += 1 /* type */ + 1 /* length */ + session->peer_cert_digest_len; - if (used <= buf_len) { - *p++ = (unsigned char) session->peer_cert_digest_type; - *p++ = (unsigned char) session->peer_cert_digest_len; - memcpy(p, session->peer_cert_digest, - session->peer_cert_digest_len); - p += session->peer_cert_digest_len; - } - } else { - used += 2; - if (used <= buf_len) { - *p++ = (unsigned char) MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; - *p++ = 0; - } + + ret = ssl_session_load(ssl->session, 1, p, session_len); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session); + return ret; } -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + + p += session_len; /* - * Session ticket if any, plus associated data + * Transform */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - used += 3 + session->ticket_len + 4; /* len + ticket + lifetime */ - - if (used <= buf_len) { - *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(session->ticket_len); - *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(session->ticket_len); - *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(session->ticket_len); - if (session->ticket != NULL) { - memcpy(p, session->ticket, session->ticket_len); - p += session->ticket_len; - } + /* This has been allocated by ssl_handshake_init(), called by + * by either mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int() or mbedtls_ssl_setup(). */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + ssl->transform = ssl->transform_negotiate; + ssl->transform_in = ssl->transform; + ssl->transform_out = ssl->transform; + ssl->transform_negotiate = NULL; +#endif - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(session->ticket_lifetime, p, 0); - p += 4; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + prf_func = ssl_tls12prf_from_cs(ssl->session->ciphersuite); + if (prf_func == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ - - /* - * Misc extension-related info - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) - used += 1; - if (used <= buf_len) { - *p++ = session->mfl_code; + /* Read random bytes and populate structure */ + if ((size_t) (end - p) < sizeof(ssl->transform->randbytes)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - used += 1; - if (used <= buf_len) { - *p++ = (unsigned char) ((session->trunc_hmac) & 0xFF); + ret = ssl_tls12_populate_transform(ssl->transform, + ssl->session->ciphersuite, + ssl->session->master, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + ssl->session->encrypt_then_mac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */ + prf_func, + p, /* currently pointing to randbytes */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, /* (D)TLS 1.2 is forced */ + ssl->conf->endpoint, + ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; } -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - used += 1; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + p += sizeof(ssl->transform->randbytes); - if (used <= buf_len) { - *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(session->encrypt_then_mac); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* Read connection IDs and store them */ + if ((size_t) (end - p) < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#endif - /* Done */ - *olen = used; + ssl->transform->in_cid_len = *p++; - if (used > buf_len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + if ((size_t) (end - p) < ssl->transform->in_cid_len + 1u) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - return 0; -} - -/* - * Public wrapper for ssl_session_save() - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_session_save(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, - unsigned char *buf, - size_t buf_len, - size_t *olen) -{ - return ssl_session_save(session, 0, buf, buf_len, olen); -} - -/* - * Deserialize session, see mbedtls_ssl_session_save() for format. - * - * This internal version is wrapped by a public function that cleans up in - * case of error, and has an extra option omit_header. - */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_session_load(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, - unsigned char omit_header, - const unsigned char *buf, - size_t len) -{ - const unsigned char *p = buf; - const unsigned char * const end = buf + len; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - uint64_t start; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - size_t cert_len; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ - - if (!omit_header) { - /* - * Check version identifier - */ + memcpy(ssl->transform->in_cid, p, ssl->transform->in_cid_len); + p += ssl->transform->in_cid_len; - if ((size_t) (end - p) < sizeof(ssl_serialized_session_header)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } + ssl->transform->out_cid_len = *p++; - if (memcmp(p, ssl_serialized_session_header, - sizeof(ssl_serialized_session_header)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH; - } - p += sizeof(ssl_serialized_session_header); + if ((size_t) (end - p) < ssl->transform->out_cid_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } + memcpy(ssl->transform->out_cid, p, ssl->transform->out_cid_len); + p += ssl->transform->out_cid_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + /* - * Time + * Saved fields from top-level ssl_context structure */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - if (8 > (size_t) (end - p)) { + if ((size_t) (end - p) < 4) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - start = ((uint64_t) p[0] << 56) | - ((uint64_t) p[1] << 48) | - ((uint64_t) p[2] << 40) | - ((uint64_t) p[3] << 32) | - ((uint64_t) p[4] << 24) | - ((uint64_t) p[5] << 16) | - ((uint64_t) p[6] << 8) | - ((uint64_t) p[7]); - p += 8; - - session->start = (time_t) start; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + ssl->badmac_seen = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0); + p += 4; - /* - * Basic mandatory fields - */ - if (2 + 1 + 1 + 32 + 48 + 4 > (size_t) (end - p)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + if ((size_t) (end - p) < 16) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - session->ciphersuite = (p[0] << 8) | p[1]; - p += 2; - - session->compression = *p++; + ssl->in_window_top = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(p, 0); + p += 8; - session->id_len = *p++; - memcpy(session->id, p, 32); - p += 32; + ssl->in_window = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(p, 0); + p += 8; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ - memcpy(session->master, p, 48); - p += 48; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if ((size_t) (end - p) < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - session->verify_result = ((uint32_t) p[0] << 24) | - ((uint32_t) p[1] << 16) | - ((uint32_t) p[2] << 8) | - ((uint32_t) p[3]); - p += 4; + ssl->disable_datagram_packing = *p++; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - /* Immediately clear invalid pointer values that have been read, in case - * we exit early before we replaced them with valid ones. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - session->peer_cert = NULL; -#else - session->peer_cert_digest = NULL; -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - session->ticket = NULL; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + if ((size_t) (end - p) < sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + memcpy(ssl->cur_out_ctr, p, sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr)); + p += sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr); - /* - * Peer certificate - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - /* Deserialize CRT from the end of the ticket. */ - if (3 > (size_t) (end - p)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if ((size_t) (end - p) < 2) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - cert_len = (p[0] << 16) | (p[1] << 8) | p[2]; - p += 3; + ssl->mtu = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - if (cert_len != 0) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + { + uint8_t alpn_len; + const char **cur; - if (cert_len > (size_t) (end - p)) { + if ((size_t) (end - p) < 1) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - session->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt)); + alpn_len = *p++; - if (session->peer_cert == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + if (alpn_len != 0 && ssl->conf->alpn_list != NULL) { + /* alpn_chosen should point to an item in the configured list */ + for (cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++) { + if (strlen(*cur) == alpn_len && + memcmp(p, *cur, alpn_len) == 0) { + ssl->alpn_chosen = *cur; + break; + } + } } - mbedtls_x509_crt_init(session->peer_cert); - - if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(session->peer_cert, - p, cert_len)) != 0) { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free(session->peer_cert); - mbedtls_free(session->peer_cert); - session->peer_cert = NULL; - return ret; + /* can only happen on conf mismatch */ + if (alpn_len != 0 && ssl->alpn_chosen == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - p += cert_len; - } -#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - /* Deserialize CRT digest from the end of the ticket. */ - if (2 > (size_t) (end - p)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + p += alpn_len; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ - session->peer_cert_digest_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) *p++; - session->peer_cert_digest_len = (size_t) *p++; - - if (session->peer_cert_digest_len != 0) { - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = - mbedtls_md_info_from_type(session->peer_cert_digest_type); - if (md_info == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - if (session->peer_cert_digest_len != mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } + /* + * Forced fields from top-level ssl_context structure + * + * Most of them already set to the correct value by mbedtls_ssl_init() and + * mbedtls_ssl_reset(), so we only need to set the remaining ones. + */ + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER; + ssl->tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; - if (session->peer_cert_digest_len > (size_t) (end - p)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } + /* Adjust pointers for header fields of outgoing records to + * the given transform, accounting for explicit IV and CID. */ + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(ssl, ssl->transform); - session->peer_cert_digest = - mbedtls_calloc(1, session->peer_cert_digest_len); - if (session->peer_cert_digest == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + ssl->in_epoch = 1; +#endif - memcpy(session->peer_cert_digest, p, - session->peer_cert_digest_len); - p += session->peer_cert_digest_len; + /* mbedtls_ssl_reset() leaves the handshake sub-structure allocated, + * which we don't want - otherwise we'd end up freeing the wrong transform + * by calling mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform() + * inappropriately. */ + if (ssl->handshake != NULL) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(ssl); + mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake); + ssl->handshake = NULL; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ /* - * Session ticket and associated data + * Done - should have consumed entire buffer */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if (3 > (size_t) (end - p)) { + if (p != end) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - session->ticket_len = (p[0] << 16) | (p[1] << 8) | p[2]; - p += 3; - - if (session->ticket_len != 0) { - if (session->ticket_len > (size_t) (end - p)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - session->ticket = mbedtls_calloc(1, session->ticket_len); - if (session->ticket == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - } + return 0; +} - memcpy(session->ticket, p, session->ticket_len); - p += session->ticket_len; - } +/* + * Deserialize context: public wrapper for error cleaning + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_context_load(mbedtls_ssl_context *context, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ + int ret = ssl_context_load(context, buf, len); - if (4 > (size_t) (end - p)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_ssl_free(context); } - session->ticket_lifetime = ((uint32_t) p[0] << 24) | - ((uint32_t) p[1] << 16) | - ((uint32_t) p[2] << 8) | - ((uint32_t) p[3]); - p += 4; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ - /* - * Misc extension-related info - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) - if (1 > (size_t) (end - p)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +/* + * Free an SSL context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + if (ssl == NULL) { + return; } - session->mfl_code = *p++; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> free")); + + if (ssl->out_buf != NULL) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; +#else + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - if (1 > (size_t) (end - p)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ssl->out_buf, out_buf_len); + ssl->out_buf = NULL; } - session->trunc_hmac = *p++; + if (ssl->in_buf != NULL) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; +#else + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - if (1 > (size_t) (end - p)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ssl->in_buf, in_buf_len); + ssl->in_buf = NULL; } - session->encrypt_then_mac = *p++; -#endif - - /* Done, should have consumed entire buffer */ - if (p != end) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + if (ssl->transform) { + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform); + mbedtls_free(ssl->transform); } - return 0; -} + if (ssl->handshake) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(ssl); + mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake); -/* - * Deserialize session: public wrapper for error cleaning - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_session_load(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, - const unsigned char *buf, - size_t len) -{ - int ret = ssl_session_load(session, 0, buf, len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform_negotiate); + mbedtls_free(ssl->transform_negotiate); +#endif - if (ret != 0) { - mbedtls_ssl_session_free(session); + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session_negotiate); + mbedtls_free(ssl->session_negotiate); } - return ret; -} - -/* - * Perform a single step of the SSL handshake - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform_application); + mbedtls_free(ssl->transform_application); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ - if (ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + if (ssl->session) { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session); + mbedtls_free(ssl->session); } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { - ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step(ssl); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + if (ssl->hostname != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ssl->hostname, strlen(ssl->hostname)); } #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { - ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step(ssl); - } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + mbedtls_free(ssl->cli_id); #endif - return ret; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= free")); + + /* Actually clear after last debug message */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_context)); } /* - * Perform the SSL handshake + * Initialize mbedtls_ssl_config */ -int mbedtls_ssl_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +void mbedtls_ssl_config_init(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) { - int ret = 0; + memset(conf, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_config)); +} - /* Sanity checks */ +/* The selection should be the same as mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default in + * x509_crt.c, plus Montgomery curves for ECDHE. Here, the order matters: + * curves with a lower resource usage come first. + * See the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves() for what we promise + * about this list. + */ +static const uint16_t ssl_preset_default_groups[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE448) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP521R1) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP256R1) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP256R1, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP384R1) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP384R1, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP512R1) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP512R1, +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE2048, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE3072, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE4096, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE6144, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192, +#endif + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NONE +}; - if (ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } +static const int ssl_preset_suiteb_ciphersuites[] = { + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + 0 +}; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - (ssl->f_set_timer == NULL || ssl->f_get_timer == NULL)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("You must use " - "mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb() for DTLS")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> handshake")); +/* NOTICE: + * For ssl_preset_*_sig_algs and ssl_tls12_preset_*_sig_algs, the following + * rules SHOULD be upheld. + * - No duplicate entries. + * - But if there is a good reason, do not change the order of the algorithms. + * - ssl_tls12_preset* is for TLS 1.2 use only. + * - ssl_preset_* is for TLS 1.3 only or hybrid TLS 1.3/1.2 handshakes. + */ +static const uint16_t ssl_preset_default_sig_algs[] = { - /* Main handshake loop */ - while (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) { - ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(ssl); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) && \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256, + // == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256) +#endif - if (ret != 0) { - break; - } - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) && \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384, + // == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384) +#endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= handshake")); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) && \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512, + // == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512) +#endif - return ret; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512, +#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) -/* - * Write HelloRequest to request renegotiation on server - */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_hello_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384, +#endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write hello request")); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256, +#endif - ssl->out_msglen = 4; - ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; - ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); - return ret; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write hello request")); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE +}; -/* - * Actually renegotiate current connection, triggered by either: - * - any side: calling mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate(), - * - client: receiving a HelloRequest during mbedtls_ssl_read(), - * - server: receiving any handshake message on server during mbedtls_ssl_read() after - * the initial handshake is completed. - * If the handshake doesn't complete due to waiting for I/O, it will continue - * during the next calls to mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate() or mbedtls_ssl_read() respectively. - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +/* NOTICE: see above */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +static uint16_t ssl_tls12_preset_default_sig_algs[] = { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> renegotiate")); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512), +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512), +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 */ - if ((ret = ssl_handshake_init(ssl)) != 0) { - return ret; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384), +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384), +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ - /* RFC 6347 4.2.2: "[...] the HelloRequest will have message_seq = 0 and - * the ServerHello will have message_seq = 1" */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING) { - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { - ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq = 1; - } else { - ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq = 1; - } - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256), +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256), #endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ - ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST; - ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS; + MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret); - return ret; - } +/* NOTICE: see above */ +static const uint16_t ssl_preset_suiteb_sig_algs[] = { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= renegotiate")); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256, + // == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256) +#endif - return 0; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384, + // == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384) +#endif -/* - * Renegotiate current connection on client, - * or request renegotiation on server - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE +}; - if (ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } +/* NOTICE: see above */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +static uint16_t ssl_tls12_preset_suiteb_sig_algs[] = { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - /* On server, just send the request */ - if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { - if (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256), +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ - ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384), +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ - /* Did we already try/start sending HelloRequest? */ - if (ssl->out_left != 0) { - return mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl); - } + MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - return ssl_write_hello_request(ssl); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - /* - * On client, either start the renegotiation process or, - * if already in progress, continue the handshake - */ - if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) { - if (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } +static const uint16_t ssl_preset_suiteb_groups[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1, +#endif + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NONE +}; - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation", ret); - return ret; - } - } else { - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret); - return ret; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/* Function for checking `ssl_preset_*_sig_algs` and `ssl_tls12_preset_*_sig_algs` + * to make sure there are no duplicated signature algorithm entries. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_no_sig_alg_duplication(const uint16_t *sig_algs) +{ + size_t i, j; + int ret = 0; + + for (i = 0; sig_algs[i] != MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { + if (sig_algs[i] != sig_algs[j]) { + continue; + } + mbedtls_printf(" entry(%04x,%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ") is duplicated at %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET "\n", + sig_algs[i], j, i); + ret = -1; } } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ - return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -static void ssl_key_cert_free(mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Load default in mbedtls_ssl_config + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int endpoint, int transport, int preset) { - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur = key_cert, *next; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#endif - while (cur != NULL) { - next = cur->next; - mbedtls_free(cur); - cur = next; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + if (ssl_check_no_sig_alg_duplication(ssl_preset_suiteb_sig_algs)) { + mbedtls_printf("ssl_preset_suiteb_sig_algs has duplicated entries\n"); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; } -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ -void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + if (ssl_check_no_sig_alg_duplication(ssl_preset_default_sig_algs)) { + mbedtls_printf("ssl_preset_default_sig_algs has duplicated entries\n"); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } - if (handshake == NULL) { - return; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (ssl_check_no_sig_alg_duplication(ssl_tls12_preset_suiteb_sig_algs)) { + mbedtls_printf("ssl_tls12_preset_suiteb_sig_algs has duplicated entries\n"); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) - if (ssl->conf->f_async_cancel != NULL && handshake->async_in_progress != 0) { - ssl->conf->f_async_cancel(ssl); - handshake->async_in_progress = 0; + if (ssl_check_no_sig_alg_duplication(ssl_tls12_preset_default_sig_algs)) { + mbedtls_printf("ssl_tls12_preset_default_sig_algs has duplicated entries\n"); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - mbedtls_md5_free(&handshake->fin_md5); - mbedtls_sha1_free(&handshake->fin_sha1); -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_hash_abort(&handshake->fin_sha256_psa); -#else - mbedtls_sha256_free(&handshake->fin_sha256); + /* Use the functions here so that they are covered in tests, + * but otherwise access member directly for efficiency */ + mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint(conf, endpoint); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport(conf, transport); + + /* + * Things that are common to all presets + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + conf->authmode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + conf->session_tickets = MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED; #endif + } #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_hash_abort(&handshake->fin_sha384_psa); -#else - mbedtls_sha512_free(&handshake->fin_sha512); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + conf->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED; #endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + conf->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED; #endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) - mbedtls_dhm_free(&handshake->dhm_ctx); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + conf->f_cookie_write = ssl_cookie_write_dummy; + conf->f_cookie_check = ssl_cookie_check_dummy; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) - mbedtls_ecdh_free(&handshake->ecdh_ctx); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + conf->anti_replay = MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - mbedtls_ecjpake_free(&handshake->ecjpake_ctx); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - mbedtls_free(handshake->ecjpake_cache); - handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL; - handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + conf->cert_req_ca_list = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED; + conf->respect_cli_pref = MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_SERVER; #endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + conf->hs_timeout_min = MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN; + conf->hs_timeout_max = MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - /* explicit void pointer cast for buggy MS compiler */ - mbedtls_free((void *) handshake->curves); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + conf->renego_max_records = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGO_MAX_RECORDS_DEFAULT; + memset(conf->renego_period, 0x00, 2); + memset(conf->renego_period + 2, 0xFF, 6); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) - if (handshake->psk != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(handshake->psk, handshake->psk_len); - mbedtls_free(handshake->psk); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + const unsigned char dhm_p[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P_BIN; + const unsigned char dhm_g[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G_BIN; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin(conf, + dhm_p, sizeof(dhm_p), + dhm_g, sizeof(dhm_g))) != 0) { + return ret; + } } #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_early_data_size(conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE); +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_new_session_tickets( + conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_DEFAULT_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS); +#endif /* - * Free only the linked list wrapper, not the keys themselves - * since the belong to the SNI callback + * Allow all TLS 1.3 key exchange modes by default. */ - if (handshake->sni_key_cert != NULL) { - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur = handshake->sni_key_cert, *next; + conf->tls13_kex_modes = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_ALL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ - while (cur != NULL) { - next = cur->next; - mbedtls_free(cur); - cur = next; - } + if (transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + conf->min_tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; + conf->max_tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; +#else + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#endif + } else { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + conf->min_tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; + conf->max_tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + conf->min_tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; + conf->max_tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + conf->min_tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; + conf->max_tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; +#else + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#endif } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free(&handshake->ecrs_ctx); - if (handshake->ecrs_peer_cert != NULL) { - mbedtls_x509_crt_free(handshake->ecrs_peer_cert); - mbedtls_free(handshake->ecrs_peer_cert); - } + /* + * Preset-specific defaults + */ + switch (preset) { + /* + * NSA Suite B + */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_SUITEB: + + conf->ciphersuite_list = ssl_preset_suiteb_ciphersuites; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + conf->cert_profile = &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - mbedtls_pk_free(&handshake->peer_pubkey); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_only(conf)) { + conf->sig_algs = ssl_tls12_preset_suiteb_sig_algs; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + conf->sig_algs = ssl_preset_suiteb_sig_algs; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - mbedtls_free(handshake->verify_cookie); - mbedtls_ssl_flight_free(handshake->flight); - mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free(ssl); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + conf->curve_list = NULL; #endif + conf->group_list = ssl_preset_suiteb_groups; + break; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_destroy_key(handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C && MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + /* + * Default + */ + default: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(handshake, - sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params)); + conf->ciphersuite_list = mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) - /* If the buffers are too big - reallocate. Because of the way Mbed TLS - * processes datagrams and the fact that a datagram is allowed to have - * several records in it, it is possible that the I/O buffers are not - * empty at this stage */ - handle_buffer_resizing(ssl, 1, mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen(ssl), - mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen(ssl)); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + conf->cert_profile = &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default; #endif -} -void mbedtls_ssl_session_free(mbedtls_ssl_session *session) -{ - if (session == NULL) { - return; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_only(conf)) { + conf->sig_algs = ssl_tls12_preset_default_sig_algs; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + conf->sig_algs = ssl_preset_default_sig_algs; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - ssl_clear_peer_cert(session); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + conf->curve_list = NULL; #endif + conf->group_list = ssl_preset_default_groups; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - mbedtls_free(session->ticket); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + conf->dhm_min_bitlen = 1024; #endif + } - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(session, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)); + return 0; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) +/* + * Free mbedtls_ssl_config + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_config_free(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_P); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_G); +#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID 1u -#else -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID 0u -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(conf->psk_opaque)) { + conf->psk_opaque = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if (conf->psk != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(conf->psk, conf->psk_len); + conf->psk = NULL; + conf->psk_len = 0; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT 1u -#else -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT 0u -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ + if (conf->psk_identity != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(conf->psk_identity, conf->psk_identity_len); + conf->psk_identity = NULL; + conf->psk_identity_len = 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY 1u -#else -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY 0u -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + ssl_key_cert_free(conf->key_cert); +#endif + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(conf, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_config)); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED)) +/* + * Convert between MBEDTLS_PK_XXX and SSL_SIG_XXX + */ +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk(mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if (mbedtls_pk_can_do(pk, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA)) { + return MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_pk_can_do(pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA)) { + return MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA; + } +#endif + return MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON; +} + +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) +{ + switch (type) { + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA; + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA; + default: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON; + } +} + +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig(unsigned char sig) +{ + switch (sig) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA: + return MBEDTLS_PK_RSA; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA: + return MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; +#endif + default: + return MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C && + ( MBEDTLS_RSA_C || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED ) */ + +/* + * Convert from MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_XXX to MBEDTLS_MD_XXX + */ +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(unsigned char hash) +{ + switch (hash) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5: + return MBEDTLS_MD_MD5; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1: + return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224: + return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256: + return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384: + return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512: + return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512; +#endif + default: + return MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + } +} + +/* + * Convert from MBEDTLS_MD_XXX to MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_XXX + */ +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(int md) +{ + switch (md) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512; +#endif + default: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE; + } +} + +/* + * Check if a curve proposed by the peer is in our list. + * Return 0 if we're willing to use it, -1 otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t tls_id) +{ + const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups(ssl); + + if (group_list == NULL) { + return -1; + } + + for (; *group_list != 0; group_list++) { + if (*group_list == tls_id) { + return 0; + } + } + + return -1; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +/* + * Same as mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id() but with a mbedtls_ecp_group_id. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id) +{ + uint16_t tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id(grp_id); + + if (tls_id == 0) { + return -1; + } + + return mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id(ssl, tls_id); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +static const struct { + uint16_t tls_id; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id ecp_group_id; + psa_ecc_family_t psa_family; + uint16_t bits; +} tls_id_match_table[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP521R1) + { 25, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 521 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP512R1) + { 28, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1, 512 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1) + { 24, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 384 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP384R1) + { 27, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1, 384 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1) + { 23, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256K1) + { 22, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1, 256 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP256R1) + { 26, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1, 256 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224R1) + { 21, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 224 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224K1) + { 20, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1, 224 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192R1) + { 19, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 192 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192K1) + { 18, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1, 192 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519) + { 29, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 255 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE448) + { 30, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 448 }, +#endif + { 0, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, 0, 0 }, +}; + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(uint16_t tls_id, + psa_key_type_t *type, + size_t *bits) +{ + for (int i = 0; tls_id_match_table[i].tls_id != 0; i++) { + if (tls_id_match_table[i].tls_id == tls_id) { + if (type != NULL) { + *type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(tls_id_match_table[i].psa_family); + } + if (bits != NULL) { + *bits = tls_id_match_table[i].bits; + } + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + } + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +} + +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(uint16_t tls_id) +{ + for (int i = 0; tls_id_match_table[i].tls_id != 0; i++) { + if (tls_id_match_table[i].tls_id == tls_id) { + return tls_id_match_table[i].ecp_group_id; + } + } + + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; +} + +uint16_t mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id) +{ + for (int i = 0; tls_id_match_table[i].ecp_group_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + i++) { + if (tls_id_match_table[i].ecp_group_id == grp_id) { + return tls_id_match_table[i].tls_id; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) +static const struct { + uint16_t tls_id; + const char *name; +} tls_id_curve_name_table[] = +{ + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1, "secp521r1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP512R1, "brainpoolP512r1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1, "secp384r1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP384R1, "brainpoolP384r1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1, "secp256r1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256K1, "secp256k1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP256R1, "brainpoolP256r1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224R1, "secp224r1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224K1, "secp224k1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192R1, "secp192r1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192K1, "secp192k1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519, "x25519" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448, "x448" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_curve_name_from_tls_id(uint16_t tls_id) +{ + for (int i = 0; tls_id_curve_name_table[i].tls_id != 0; i++) { + if (tls_id_curve_name_table[i].tls_id == tls_id) { + return tls_id_curve_name_table[i].name; + } + } + + return NULL; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite, + int cert_endpoint, + uint32_t *flags) +{ + int ret = 0; + unsigned int usage = 0; + const char *ext_oid; + size_t ext_len; + + if (cert_endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + /* Server part of the key exchange */ + switch (ciphersuite->key_exchange) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT; + break; + + /* Don't use default: we want warnings when adding new values */ + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE: + usage = 0; + } + } else { + /* Client auth: we only implement rsa_sign and mbedtls_ecdsa_sign for now */ + usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; + } + + if (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(cert, usage) != 0) { + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE; + ret = -1; + } + + if (cert_endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH; + ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH); + } else { + ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH; + ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH); + } + + if (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage(cert, ext_oid, ext_len) != 0) { + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE; + ret = -1; + } + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +int mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_md_type_t md, + unsigned char *dst, + size_t dst_len, + size_t *olen) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_hash_operation_t *hash_operation_to_clone; + psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation = psa_hash_operation_init(); + + *olen = 0; + + switch (md) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + hash_operation_to_clone = &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa; + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + hash_operation_to_clone = &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa; + break; +#endif + + default: + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_clone(hash_operation_to_clone, &hash_operation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish(&hash_operation, dst, dst_len, olen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + (void) ssl; +#endif + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_get_handshake_transcript_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *dst, + size_t dst_len, + size_t *olen) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_md_context_t sha384; + + if (dst_len < 48) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + mbedtls_md_init(&sha384); + ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&sha384, mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384), 0); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_clone(&sha384, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&sha384, dst)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_md_finish", ret); + goto exit; + } + + *olen = 48; + +exit: + + mbedtls_md_free(&sha384); + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_get_handshake_transcript_sha256(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *dst, + size_t dst_len, + size_t *olen) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_md_context_t sha256; + + if (dst_len < 32) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + mbedtls_md_init(&sha256); + ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&sha256, mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256), 0); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_clone(&sha256, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&sha256, dst)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_md_finish", ret); + goto exit; + } + + *olen = 32; + +exit: + + mbedtls_md_free(&sha256); + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_md_type_t md, + unsigned char *dst, + size_t dst_len, + size_t *olen) +{ + switch (md) { + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return ssl_get_handshake_transcript_sha384(ssl, dst, dst_len, olen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384*/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return ssl_get_handshake_transcript_sha256(ssl, dst, dst_len, olen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256*/ + + default: +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + (void) ssl; + (void) dst; + (void) dst_len; + (void) olen; +#endif + break; + } + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/* mbedtls_ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext() + * + * The `extension_data` field of signature algorithm contains a `SignatureSchemeList` + * value (TLS 1.3 RFC8446): + * enum { + * .... + * ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256( 0x0403 ), + * ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384( 0x0503 ), + * ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512( 0x0603 ), + * .... + * } SignatureScheme; + * + * struct { + * SignatureScheme supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; + * } SignatureSchemeList; + * + * The `extension_data` field of signature algorithm contains a `SignatureAndHashAlgorithm` + * value (TLS 1.2 RFC5246): + * enum { + * none(0), md5(1), sha1(2), sha224(3), sha256(4), sha384(5), + * sha512(6), (255) + * } HashAlgorithm; + * + * enum { anonymous(0), rsa(1), dsa(2), ecdsa(3), (255) } + * SignatureAlgorithm; + * + * struct { + * HashAlgorithm hash; + * SignatureAlgorithm signature; + * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; + * + * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm + * supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; + * + * The TLS 1.3 signature algorithm extension was defined to be a compatible + * generalization of the TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension. + * `SignatureAndHashAlgorithm` field of TLS 1.2 can be represented by + * `SignatureScheme` field of TLS 1.3 + * + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t supported_sig_algs_len = 0; + const unsigned char *supported_sig_algs_end; + uint16_t sig_alg; + uint32_t common_idx = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + supported_sig_algs_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + memset(ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs, 0, + sizeof(ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, supported_sig_algs_len); + supported_sig_algs_end = p + supported_sig_algs_len; + while (p < supported_sig_algs_end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, supported_sig_algs_end, 2); + sig_alg = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("received signature algorithm: 0x%x %s", + sig_alg, + mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str(sig_alg))); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 && + (!(mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported(ssl, sig_alg) && + mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered(ssl, sig_alg)))) { + continue; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("valid signature algorithm: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str(sig_alg))); + + if (common_idx + 1 < MBEDTLS_RECEIVED_SIG_ALGS_SIZE) { + ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs[common_idx] = sig_alg; + common_idx += 1; + } + } + /* Check that we consumed all the message. */ + if (p != end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("Signature algorithms extension length misaligned")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + if (common_idx == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("no signature algorithm in common")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs[common_idx] = MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + +static psa_status_t setup_psa_key_derivation(psa_key_derivation_operation_t *derivation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const unsigned char *raw_psk, size_t raw_psk_length, + const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_length, + const unsigned char *label, size_t label_length, + const unsigned char *other_secret, + size_t other_secret_length, + size_t capacity) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + status = psa_key_derivation_setup(derivation, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(alg)) { + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(derivation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED, + seed, seed_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + if (other_secret != NULL) { + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(derivation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET, + other_secret, other_secret_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + } + + if (mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(key)) { + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( + derivation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + raw_psk, raw_psk_length); + } else { + status = psa_key_derivation_input_key( + derivation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, key); + } + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(derivation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL, + label, label_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + } else { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_set_capacity(derivation, capacity); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int tls_prf_generic(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t master_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t derivation = + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + + if (md_type == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + } else { + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + } + + /* Normally a "secret" should be long enough to be impossible to + * find by brute force, and in particular should not be empty. But + * this PRF is also used to derive an IV, in particular in EAP-TLS, + * and for this use case it makes sense to have a 0-length "secret". + * Since the key API doesn't allow importing a key of length 0, + * keep master_key=0, which setup_psa_key_derivation() understands + * to mean a 0-length "secret" input. */ + if (slen != 0) { + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, alg); + psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE); + + status = psa_import_key(&key_attributes, secret, slen, &master_key); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + } + + status = setup_psa_key_derivation(&derivation, + master_key, alg, + NULL, 0, + random, rlen, + (unsigned char const *) label, + (size_t) strlen(label), + NULL, 0, + dlen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); + psa_destroy_key(master_key); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(&derivation, dstbuf, dlen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); + psa_destroy_key(master_key); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_destroy_key(master_key); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(master_key)) { + status = psa_destroy_key(master_key); + } + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 || PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int tls_prf_generic(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen) +{ + size_t nb; + size_t i, j, k, md_len; + unsigned char *tmp; + size_t tmp_len = 0; + unsigned char h_i[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); + + if ((md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_type)) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); + + tmp_len = md_len + strlen(label) + rlen; + tmp = mbedtls_calloc(1, tmp_len); + if (tmp == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + + nb = strlen(label); + memcpy(tmp + md_len, label, nb); + memcpy(tmp + md_len + nb, random, rlen); + nb += rlen; + + /* + * Compute P_(secret, label + random)[0..dlen] + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 1)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&md_ctx, secret, slen); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&md_ctx, tmp + md_len, nb); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&md_ctx, tmp); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + for (i = 0; i < dlen; i += md_len) { + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&md_ctx); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&md_ctx, tmp, md_len + nb); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&md_ctx, h_i); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&md_ctx); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&md_ctx, tmp, md_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&md_ctx, tmp); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + k = (i + md_len > dlen) ? dlen % md_len : md_len; + + for (j = 0; j < k; j++) { + dstbuf[i + j] = h_i[j]; + } + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); + + if (tmp != NULL) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, tmp_len); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(h_i, sizeof(h_i)); + + mbedtls_free(tmp); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C && ( MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 || MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 ) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int tls_prf_sha256(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen) +{ + return tls_prf_generic(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, secret, slen, + label, random, rlen, dstbuf, dlen); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256*/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int tls_prf_sha384(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen) +{ + return tls_prf_generic(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, secret, slen, + label, random, rlen, dstbuf, dlen); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384*/ + +/* + * Set appropriate PRF function and other SSL / TLS1.2 functions + * + * Inputs: + * - hash associated with the ciphersuite (only used by TLS 1.2) + * + * Outputs: + * - the tls_prf, calc_verify and calc_finished members of handshake structure + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_set_handshake_prfs(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake, + mbedtls_md_type_t hash) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + if (hash == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { + handshake->tls_prf = tls_prf_sha384; + handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384; + handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384; + } else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { + (void) hash; + handshake->tls_prf = tls_prf_sha256; + handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256; + handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256; + } +#else + { + (void) handshake; + (void) hash; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } +#endif + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Compute master secret if needed + * + * Parameters: + * [in/out] handshake + * [in] resume, premaster, extended_ms, calc_verify, tls_prf + * (PSA-PSK) ciphersuite_info, psk_opaque + * [out] premaster (cleared) + * [out] master + * [in] ssl: optionally used for debugging, EMS and PSA-PSK + * debug: conf->f_dbg, conf->p_dbg + * EMS: passed to calc_verify (debug + session_negotiate) + * PSA-PSA: conf + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_compute_master(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake, + unsigned char *master, + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* cf. RFC 5246, Section 8.1: + * "The master secret is always exactly 48 bytes in length." */ + size_t const master_secret_len = 48; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + unsigned char session_hash[48]; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + + /* The label for the KDF used for key expansion. + * This is either "master secret" or "extended master secret" + * depending on whether the Extended Master Secret extension + * is used. */ + char const *lbl = "master secret"; + + /* The seed for the KDF used for key expansion. + * - If the Extended Master Secret extension is not used, + * this is ClientHello.Random + ServerHello.Random + * (see Sect. 8.1 in RFC 5246). + * - If the Extended Master Secret extension is used, + * this is the transcript of the handshake so far. + * (see Sect. 4 in RFC 7627). */ + unsigned char const *seed = handshake->randbytes; + size_t seed_len = 64; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) && \ + !(defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)) + ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for those cases */ + (void) ssl; +#endif + + if (handshake->resume != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("no premaster (session resumed)")); + return 0; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + if (handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED) { + lbl = "extended master secret"; + seed = session_hash; + ret = handshake->calc_verify(ssl, session_hash, &seed_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "calc_verify", ret); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "session hash for extended master secret", + session_hash, seed_len); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(handshake->ciphersuite_info) == 1) { + /* Perform PSK-to-MS expansion in a single step. */ + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psk; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t derivation = + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg = (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("perform PSA-based PSK-to-MS expansion")); + + psk = mbedtls_ssl_get_opaque_psk(ssl); + + if (hash_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + } else { + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + } + + size_t other_secret_len = 0; + unsigned char *other_secret = NULL; + + switch (handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange) { + /* Provide other secret. + * Other secret is stored in premaster, where first 2 bytes hold the + * length of the other key. + */ + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + /* For RSA-PSK other key length is always 48 bytes. */ + other_secret_len = 48; + other_secret = handshake->premaster + 2; + break; + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: + other_secret_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(handshake->premaster, 0); + other_secret = handshake->premaster + 2; + break; + default: + break; + } + + status = setup_psa_key_derivation(&derivation, psk, alg, + ssl->conf->psk, ssl->conf->psk_len, + seed, seed_len, + (unsigned char const *) lbl, + (size_t) strlen(lbl), + other_secret, other_secret_len, + master_secret_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(&derivation, + master, + master_secret_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + } else +#endif + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if (handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) { + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t derivation = + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("perform PSA-based PMS KDF for ECJPAKE")); + + handshake->pmslen = PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_DATA_SIZE; + + status = psa_key_derivation_setup(&derivation, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_set_capacity(&derivation, + PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_DATA_SIZE); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_pake_get_implicit_key(&handshake->psa_pake_ctx, + &derivation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(&derivation, + handshake->premaster, + handshake->pmslen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + } +#endif + ret = handshake->tls_prf(handshake->premaster, handshake->pmslen, + lbl, seed, seed_len, + master, + master_secret_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "prf", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "premaster secret", + handshake->premaster, + handshake->pmslen); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(handshake->premaster, + sizeof(handshake->premaster)); + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * const ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> derive keys")); + + /* Set PRF, calc_verify and calc_finished function pointers */ + ret = ssl_set_handshake_prfs(ssl->handshake, + (mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_set_handshake_prfs", ret); + return ret; + } + + /* Compute master secret if needed */ + ret = ssl_compute_master(ssl->handshake, + ssl->session_negotiate->master, + ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_compute_master", ret); + return ret; + } + + /* Swap the client and server random values: + * - MS derivation wanted client+server (RFC 5246 8.1) + * - key derivation wants server+client (RFC 5246 6.3) */ + { + unsigned char tmp[64]; + memcpy(tmp, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64); + memcpy(ssl->handshake->randbytes, tmp + 32, 32); + memcpy(ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, tmp, 32); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + } + + /* Populate transform structure */ + ret = ssl_tls12_populate_transform(ssl->transform_negotiate, + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite, + ssl->session_negotiate->master, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */ + ssl->handshake->tls_prf, + ssl->handshake->randbytes, + ssl->tls_version, + ssl->conf->endpoint, + ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls12_populate_transform", ret); + return ret; + } + + /* We no longer need Server/ClientHello.random values */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->handshake->randbytes, + sizeof(ssl->handshake->randbytes)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= derive keys")); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int md) +{ + switch (md) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384: + ssl->handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256: + ssl->handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256; + break; +#endif + default: + return -1; + } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + (void) ssl; +#endif + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static int ssl_calc_verify_tls_psa(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const psa_hash_operation_t *hs_op, + size_t buffer_size, + unsigned char *hash, + size_t *hlen) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_hash_operation_t cloned_op = psa_hash_operation_init(); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + (void) ssl; +#endif + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> PSA calc verify")); + status = psa_hash_clone(hs_op, &cloned_op); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish(&cloned_op, hash, buffer_size, hlen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "PSA calculated verify result", hash, *hlen); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= PSA calc verify")); + +exit: + psa_hash_abort(&cloned_op); + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); +} +#else +static int ssl_calc_verify_tls_legacy(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_md_context_t *hs_ctx, + unsigned char *hash, + size_t *hlen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md_context_t cloned_ctx; + + mbedtls_md_init(&cloned_ctx); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + (void) ssl; +#endif + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc verify")); + + ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&cloned_ctx, mbedtls_md_info_from_ctx(hs_ctx), 0); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_clone(&cloned_ctx, hs_ctx); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&cloned_ctx, hash); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + *hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(mbedtls_md_info_from_ctx(hs_ctx)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc verify")); + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free(&cloned_ctx); + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +int ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, + size_t *hlen) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + return ssl_calc_verify_tls_psa(ssl, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, 32, + hash, hlen); +#else + return ssl_calc_verify_tls_legacy(ssl, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, + hash, hlen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +int ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, + size_t *hlen) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + return ssl_calc_verify_tls_psa(ssl, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, 48, + hash, hlen); +#else + return ssl_calc_verify_tls_legacy(ssl, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384, + hash, hlen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_ex) +{ + unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->premaster; + unsigned char *end = p + sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster); + const unsigned char *psk = NULL; + size_t psk_len = 0; + int psk_ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_psk(ssl, &psk, &psk_len); + + if (psk_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED) { + /* + * This should never happen because the existence of a PSK is always + * checked before calling this function. + * + * The exception is opaque DHE-PSK. For DHE-PSK fill premaster with + * the shared secret without PSK. + */ + if (key_ex != MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + } + + /* + * PMS = struct { + * opaque other_secret<0..2^16-1>; + * opaque psk<0..2^16-1>; + * }; + * with "other_secret" depending on the particular key exchange + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + if (key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK) { + if (end - p < 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(psk_len, p, 0); + p += 2; + + if (end < p || (size_t) (end - p) < psk_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + memset(p, 0, psk_len); + p += psk_len; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + if (key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK) { + /* + * other_secret already set by the ClientKeyExchange message, + * and is 48 bytes long + */ + if (end - p < 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = 48; + p += 48; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if (key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + /* Write length only when we know the actual value */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + p + 2, (size_t) (end - (p + 2)), &len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret); + return ret; + } + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(len, p, 0); + p += 2 + len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if (key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t zlen; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &zlen, + p + 2, (size_t) (end - (p + 2)), + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(zlen, p, 0); + p += 2 + zlen; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* opaque psk<0..2^16-1>; */ + if (end - p < 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(psk_len, p, 0); + p += 2; + + if (end < p || (size_t) (end - p) < psk_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + memcpy(p, psk, psk_len); + p += psk_len; + + ssl->handshake->pmslen = (size_t) (p - ssl->handshake->premaster); + + return 0; +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_hello_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +int mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + /* If renegotiation is not enforced, retransmit until we would reach max + * timeout if we were using the usual handshake doubling scheme */ + if (ssl->conf->renego_max_records < 0) { + uint32_t ratio = ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max / ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min + 1; + unsigned char doublings = 1; + + while (ratio != 0) { + ++doublings; + ratio >>= 1; + } + + if (++ssl->renego_records_seen > doublings) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("no longer retransmitting hello request")); + return 0; + } + } + + return ssl_write_hello_request(ssl); +} +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +/* + * Handshake functions + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/* No certificate support -> dummy functions */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate")); + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert(ciphersuite_info)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate")); + ssl->state++; + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate")); + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert(ciphersuite_info)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate")); + ssl->state++; + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; +} + +#else /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ +/* Some certificate support -> implement write and parse */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + size_t i, n; + const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate")); + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert(ciphersuite_info)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate")); + ssl->state++; + return 0; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + if (ssl->handshake->client_auth == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate")); + ssl->state++; + return 0; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl) == NULL) { + /* Should never happen because we shouldn't have picked the + * ciphersuite if we don't have a certificate. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + } +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "own certificate", mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl)); + + /* + * 0 . 0 handshake type + * 1 . 3 handshake length + * 4 . 6 length of all certs + * 7 . 9 length of cert. 1 + * 10 . n-1 peer certificate + * n . n+2 length of cert. 2 + * n+3 . ... upper level cert, etc. + */ + i = 7; + crt = mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl); + + while (crt != NULL) { + n = crt->raw.len; + if (n > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 3 - i) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("certificate too large, %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + i + 3 + n, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + ssl->out_msg[i] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(n); + ssl->out_msg[i + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(n); + ssl->out_msg[i + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(n); + + i += 3; memcpy(ssl->out_msg + i, crt->raw.p, n); + i += n; crt = crt->next; + } + + ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(i - 7); + ssl->out_msg[5] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(i - 7); + ssl->out_msg[6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(i - 7); + + ssl->out_msglen = i; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE; + + ssl->state++; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write certificate")); + + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *crt_buf, + size_t crt_buf_len) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt const * const peer_crt = ssl->session->peer_cert; + + if (peer_crt == NULL) { + return -1; + } + + if (peer_crt->raw.len != crt_buf_len) { + return -1; + } + + return memcmp(peer_crt->raw.p, crt_buf, peer_crt->raw.len); +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *crt_buf, + size_t crt_buf_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char const * const peer_cert_digest = + ssl->session->peer_cert_digest; + mbedtls_md_type_t const peer_cert_digest_type = + ssl->session->peer_cert_digest_type; + mbedtls_md_info_t const * const digest_info = + mbedtls_md_info_from_type(peer_cert_digest_type); + unsigned char tmp_digest[MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN]; + size_t digest_len; + + if (peer_cert_digest == NULL || digest_info == NULL) { + return -1; + } + + digest_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(digest_info); + if (digest_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN) { + return -1; + } + + ret = mbedtls_md(digest_info, crt_buf, crt_buf_len, tmp_digest); + if (ret != 0) { + return -1; + } + + return memcmp(tmp_digest, peer_cert_digest, digest_len); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +/* + * Once the certificate message is read, parse it into a cert chain and + * perform basic checks, but leave actual verification to the caller + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_certificate_chain(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_x509_crt *chain) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + int crt_cnt = 0; +#endif + size_t i, n; + uint8_t alert; + + if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } + + if (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE) { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } + + if (ssl->in_hslen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 3 + 3) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + i = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); + + /* + * Same message structure as in mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate() + */ + n = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_msg, i + 1); + + if (ssl->in_msg[i] != 0 || + ssl->in_hslen != n + 3 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* Make &ssl->in_msg[i] point to the beginning of the CRT chain. */ + i += 3; + + /* Iterate through and parse the CRTs in the provided chain. */ + while (i < ssl->in_hslen) { + /* Check that there's room for the next CRT's length fields. */ + if (i + 3 > ssl->in_hslen) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + /* In theory, the CRT can be up to 2**24 Bytes, but we don't support + * anything beyond 2**16 ~ 64K. */ + if (ssl->in_msg[i] != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE; + } + + /* Read length of the next CRT in the chain. */ + n = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_msg, i + 1); + i += 3; + + if (n < 128 || i + n > ssl->in_hslen) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* Check if we're handling the first CRT in the chain. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (crt_cnt++ == 0 && + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) { + /* During client-side renegotiation, check that the server's + * end-CRTs hasn't changed compared to the initial handshake, + * mitigating the triple handshake attack. On success, reuse + * the original end-CRT instead of parsing it again. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Check that peer CRT hasn't changed during renegotiation")); + if (ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged(ssl, + &ssl->in_msg[i], + n) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("new server cert during renegotiation")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE; + } + + /* Now we can safely free the original chain. */ + ssl_clear_peer_cert(ssl->session); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + /* Parse the next certificate in the chain. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(chain, ssl->in_msg + i, n); +#else + /* If we don't need to store the CRT chain permanently, parse + * it in-place from the input buffer instead of making a copy. */ + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy(chain, ssl->in_msg + i, n); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + switch (ret) { + case 0: /*ok*/ + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND: + /* Ignore certificate with an unknown algorithm: maybe a + prior certificate was already trusted. */ + break; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED: + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto crt_parse_der_failed; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION: + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + goto crt_parse_der_failed; + + default: + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT; +crt_parse_der_failed: + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, alert); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret); + return ret; + } + + i += n; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "peer certificate", chain); + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_srv_check_client_no_crt_notification(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + return -1; + } + + if (ssl->in_hslen == 3 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) && + ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE && + memcmp(ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl), "\0\0\0", 3) == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("peer has no certificate")); + return 0; + } + return -1; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +/* Check if a certificate message is expected. + * Return either + * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED, or + * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP + * indicating whether a Certificate message is expected or not. + */ +#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED 0 +#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP 1 +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_certificate_coordinate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int authmode) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert(ciphersuite_info)) { + return SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK) { + return SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP; + } + + if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE) { + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = + MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY; + return SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP; + } + } +#else + ((void) authmode); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + + return SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int authmode, + mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + void *rs_ctx) +{ + int ret = 0; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + int have_ca_chain = 0; + + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *); + void *p_vrfy; + + if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE) { + return 0; + } + + if (ssl->f_vrfy != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Use context-specific verification callback")); + f_vrfy = ssl->f_vrfy; + p_vrfy = ssl->p_vrfy; + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Use configuration-specific verification callback")); + f_vrfy = ssl->conf->f_vrfy; + p_vrfy = ssl->conf->p_vrfy; + } + + /* + * Main check: verify certificate + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + if (ssl->conf->f_ca_cb != NULL) { + ((void) rs_ctx); + have_ca_chain = 1; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification")); + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb( + chain, + ssl->conf->f_ca_cb, + ssl->conf->p_ca_cb, + ssl->conf->cert_profile, + ssl->hostname, + &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + { + mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain; + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if (ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL) { + ca_chain = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain; + ca_crl = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl; + } else +#endif + { + ca_chain = ssl->conf->ca_chain; + ca_crl = ssl->conf->ca_crl; + } + + if (ca_chain != NULL) { + have_ca_chain = 1; + } + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( + chain, + ca_chain, ca_crl, + ssl->conf->cert_profile, + ssl->hostname, + &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy, rs_ctx); + } + + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "x509_verify_cert", ret); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; + } +#endif + + /* + * Secondary checks: always done, but change 'ret' only if it was 0 + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + { + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk = &chain->pk; + + /* If certificate uses an EC key, make sure the curve is OK. + * This is a public key, so it can't be opaque, so can_do() is a good + * enough check to ensure pk_ec() is safe to use here. */ + if (mbedtls_pk_can_do(pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)) { + /* and in the unlikely case the above assumption no longer holds + * we are making sure that pk_ec() here does not return a NULL + */ + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk); + if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid group ID")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + if (mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(ssl, grp_id) != 0) { + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result |= + MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate (EC key curve)")); + if (ret == 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE; + } + } + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + + if (mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(chain, + ciphersuite_info, + !ssl->conf->endpoint, + &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate (usage extensions)")); + if (ret == 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE; + } + } + + /* mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile is supposed to report a + * verification failure through MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED, + * with details encoded in the verification flags. All other kinds + * of error codes, including those from the user provided f_vrfy + * functions, are treated as fatal and lead to a failure of + * ssl_parse_certificate even if verification was optional. */ + if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL && + (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE)) { + ret = 0; + } + + if (have_ca_chain == 0 && authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no CA chain")); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED; + } + + if (ret != 0) { + uint8_t alert; + + /* The certificate may have been rejected for several reasons. + Pick one and send the corresponding alert. Which alert to send + may be a subject of debate in some cases. */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER) { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED; + } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH) { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT; + } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE) { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE) { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE) { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK) { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY) { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED) { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED; + } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED) { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED; + } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED) { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA; + } else { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN; + } + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + alert); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("! Certificate verification flags %08x", + (unsigned int) ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result)); + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Certificate verification flags clear")); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ + + return ret; +} -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN 1u -#else -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN 0u -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_remember_peer_crt_digest(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *start, size_t len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + /* Remember digest of the peer's end-CRT. */ + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest = + mbedtls_calloc(1, MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN); + if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc(%d bytes) failed", + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN)); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR); -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_BIT 0 -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT_BIT 1 -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY_BIT 2 -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT 3 + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } -#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG \ - ((uint32_t) ( \ - (SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID << \ - SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_BIT) | \ - (SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT << \ - SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT_BIT) | \ - (SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY << \ - SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY_BIT) | \ - (SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN << SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT) | \ - 0u)) + ret = mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type( + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE), + start, len, + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest); -static unsigned char ssl_serialized_context_header[] = { - MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR, - MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR, - MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH, - MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG), - MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG), - MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG), - MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG), - MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG), -}; + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest_type = + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE; + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest_len = + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN; -/* - * Serialize a full SSL context - * - * The format of the serialized data is: - * (in the presentation language of TLS, RFC 8446 section 3) - * - * // header - * opaque mbedtls_version[3]; // major, minor, patch - * opaque context_format[5]; // version-specific field determining - * // the format of the remaining - * // serialized data. - * Note: When updating the format, remember to keep these - * version+format bytes. (We may make their size part of the API.) - * - * // session sub-structure - * opaque session<1..2^32-1>; // see mbedtls_ssl_session_save() - * // transform sub-structure - * uint8 random[64]; // ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random - * uint8 in_cid<0..2^8-1> // Connection ID: expected incoming value - * uint8 out_cid<0..2^8-1> // Connection ID: outgoing value to use - * // fields from ssl_context - * uint32 badmac_seen; // DTLS: number of records with failing MAC - * uint64 in_window_top; // DTLS: last validated record seq_num - * uint64 in_window; // DTLS: bitmask for replay protection - * uint8 disable_datagram_packing; // DTLS: only one record per datagram - * uint64 cur_out_ctr; // Record layer: outgoing sequence number - * uint16 mtu; // DTLS: path mtu (max outgoing fragment size) - * uint8 alpn_chosen<0..2^8-1> // ALPN: negotiated application protocol - * - * Note that many fields of the ssl_context or sub-structures are not - * serialized, as they fall in one of the following categories: - * - * 1. forced value (eg in_left must be 0) - * 2. pointer to dynamically-allocated memory (eg session, transform) - * 3. value can be re-derived from other data (eg session keys from MS) - * 4. value was temporary (eg content of input buffer) - * 5. value will be provided by the user again (eg I/O callbacks and context) - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_context_save(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - size_t buf_len, - size_t *olen) + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_remember_peer_pubkey(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *start, size_t len) { - unsigned char *p = buf; - size_t used = 0; - size_t session_len; - int ret = 0; + unsigned char *end = start + len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - /* - * Enforce usage restrictions, see "return BAD_INPUT_DATA" in - * this function's documentation. - * - * These are due to assumptions/limitations in the implementation. Some of - * them are likely to stay (no handshake in progress) some might go away - * (only DTLS) but are currently used to simplify the implementation. - */ - /* The initial handshake must be over */ - if (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Initial handshake isn't over")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - if (ssl->handshake != NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Handshake isn't completed")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + /* Make a copy of the peer's raw public key. */ + mbedtls_pk_init(&ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey); + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(&start, end, + &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey); + if (ret != 0) { + /* We should have parsed the public key before. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } - /* Double-check that sub-structures are indeed ready */ - if (ssl->transform == NULL || ssl->session == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Serialised structures aren't ready")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = 0; + int crt_expected; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + const int authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET + ? ssl->handshake->sni_authmode + : ssl->conf->authmode; +#else + const int authmode = ssl->conf->authmode; +#endif + void *rs_ctx = NULL; + mbedtls_x509_crt *chain = NULL; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate")); + + crt_expected = ssl_parse_certificate_coordinate(ssl, authmode); + if (crt_expected == SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate")); + goto exit; } - /* There must be no pending incoming or outgoing data */ - if (mbedtls_ssl_check_pending(ssl) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("There is pending incoming data")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled && + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_crt_verify) { + chain = ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert; + ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert = NULL; + goto crt_verify; } - if (ssl->out_left != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("There is pending outgoing data")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +#endif + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) { + /* mbedtls_ssl_read_record may have sent an alert already. We + let it decide whether to alert. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); + goto exit; } - /* Protocol must be DTLS, not TLS */ - if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Only DTLS is supported")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (ssl_srv_check_client_no_crt_notification(ssl) == 0) { + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING; + + if (authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE; + } + + goto exit; } - /* Version must be 1.2 */ - if (ssl->major_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Only version 1.2 supported")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + + /* Clear existing peer CRT structure in case we tried to + * reuse a session but it failed, and allocate a new one. */ + ssl_clear_peer_cert(ssl->session_negotiate); + + chain = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt)); + if (chain == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes) failed", + sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt))); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR); + + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; } - if (ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Only version 1.2 supported")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + mbedtls_x509_crt_init(chain); + + ret = ssl_parse_certificate_chain(ssl, chain); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; } - /* We must be using an AEAD ciphersuite */ - if (mbedtls_ssl_transform_uses_aead(ssl->transform) != 1) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Only AEAD ciphersuites supported")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) { + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_crt_verify; } - /* Renegotiation must not be enabled */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - if (ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Renegotiation must not be enabled")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + +crt_verify: + if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) { + rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx; } #endif - /* - * Version and format identifier - */ - used += sizeof(ssl_serialized_context_header); - - if (used <= buf_len) { - memcpy(p, ssl_serialized_context_header, - sizeof(ssl_serialized_context_header)); - p += sizeof(ssl_serialized_context_header); + ret = ssl_parse_certificate_verify(ssl, authmode, + chain, rs_ctx); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; } - /* - * Session (length + data) - */ - ret = ssl_session_save(ssl->session, 1, NULL, 0, &session_len); - if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { - return ret; - } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + { + unsigned char *crt_start, *pk_start; + size_t crt_len, pk_len; + + /* We parse the CRT chain without copying, so + * these pointers point into the input buffer, + * and are hence still valid after freeing the + * CRT chain. */ + + crt_start = chain->raw.p; + crt_len = chain->raw.len; - used += 4 + session_len; - if (used <= buf_len) { - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(session_len, p, 0); - p += 4; + pk_start = chain->pk_raw.p; + pk_len = chain->pk_raw.len; - ret = ssl_session_save(ssl->session, 1, - p, session_len, &session_len); + /* Free the CRT structures before computing + * digest and copying the peer's public key. */ + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(chain); + mbedtls_free(chain); + chain = NULL; + + ret = ssl_remember_peer_crt_digest(ssl, crt_start, crt_len); if (ret != 0) { - return ret; + goto exit; } - p += session_len; + ret = ssl_remember_peer_pubkey(ssl, pk_start, pk_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } } +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + /* Pass ownership to session structure. */ + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert = chain; + chain = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - /* - * Transform - */ - used += sizeof(ssl->transform->randbytes); - if (used <= buf_len) { - memcpy(p, ssl->transform->randbytes, - sizeof(ssl->transform->randbytes)); - p += sizeof(ssl->transform->randbytes); - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse certificate")); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - used += 2 + ssl->transform->in_cid_len + ssl->transform->out_cid_len; - if (used <= buf_len) { - *p++ = ssl->transform->in_cid_len; - memcpy(p, ssl->transform->in_cid, ssl->transform->in_cid_len); - p += ssl->transform->in_cid_len; +exit: - *p++ = ssl->transform->out_cid_len; - memcpy(p, ssl->transform->out_cid, ssl->transform->out_cid_len); - p += ssl->transform->out_cid_len; + if (ret == 0) { + ssl->state++; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ - /* - * Saved fields from top-level ssl_context structure - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) - used += 4; - if (used <= buf_len) { - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ssl->badmac_seen, p, 0); - p += 4; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS) { + ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert = chain; + chain = NULL; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) - used += 16; - if (used <= buf_len) { - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(ssl->in_window_top, p, 0); - p += 8; +#endif - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(ssl->in_window, p, 0); - p += 8; + if (chain != NULL) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(chain); + mbedtls_free(chain); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - used += 1; - if (used <= buf_len) { - *p++ = ssl->disable_datagram_packing; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ - used += 8; - if (used <= buf_len) { - memcpy(p, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8); - p += 8; +static int ssl_calc_finished_tls_generic(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, void *ctx, + unsigned char *padbuf, size_t hlen, + unsigned char *buf, int from) +{ + unsigned int len = 12; + const char *sender; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status; + psa_hash_operation_t *hs_op = ctx; + psa_hash_operation_t cloned_op = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t hash_size; +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md_context_t *hs_ctx = ctx; + mbedtls_md_context_t cloned_ctx; + mbedtls_md_init(&cloned_ctx); +#endif + + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; + if (!session) { + session = ssl->session; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - used += 2; - if (used <= buf_len) { - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ssl->mtu, p, 0); - p += 2; + sender = (from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) + ? "client finished" + : "server finished"; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc PSA finished tls")); + + status = psa_hash_clone(hs_op, &cloned_op); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) - { - const uint8_t alpn_len = ssl->alpn_chosen - ? (uint8_t) strlen(ssl->alpn_chosen) - : 0; + status = psa_hash_finish(&cloned_op, padbuf, hlen, &hash_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "PSA calculated padbuf", padbuf, hlen); +#else + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc finished tls")); - used += 1 + alpn_len; - if (used <= buf_len) { - *p++ = alpn_len; + ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&cloned_ctx, mbedtls_md_info_from_ctx(hs_ctx), 0); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_clone(&cloned_ctx, hs_ctx); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } - if (ssl->alpn_chosen != NULL) { - memcpy(p, ssl->alpn_chosen, alpn_len); - p += alpn_len; - } - } + ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&cloned_ctx, padbuf); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "finished output", padbuf, hlen); /* - * Done + * TLSv1.2: + * hash = PRF( master, finished_label, + * Hash( handshake ) )[0.11] */ - *olen = used; + ssl->handshake->tls_prf(session->master, 48, sender, + padbuf, hlen, buf, len); - if (used > buf_len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "calc finished result", buf, len); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "saved context", buf, used); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(padbuf, hlen); - return mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int(ssl, 0); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc finished")); + +exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_abort(&cloned_op); + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); +#else + mbedtls_md_free(&cloned_ctx); + return ret; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } -/* - * Helper to get TLS 1.2 PRF from ciphersuite - * (Duplicates bits of logic from ssl_set_handshake_prfs().) - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)) -typedef int (*tls_prf_fn)(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const char *label, - const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, - unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen); -static tls_prf_fn ssl_tls12prf_from_cs(int ciphersuite_id) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +static int ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from) { - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * const ciphersuite_info = - mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ciphersuite_id); - - if (ciphersuite_info == NULL) { - return NULL; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - if (ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { - return tls_prf_sha384; - } else -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - { - if (ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256) { - return tls_prf_sha256; - } - } -#endif -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && \ - (!defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384)) - (void) ciphersuite_info; + unsigned char padbuf[32]; + return ssl_calc_finished_tls_generic(ssl, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, +#else + &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, #endif - return NULL; + padbuf, sizeof(padbuf), + buf, from); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256*/ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C || - (MBEDTLS_SHA512_C && !MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) */ -/* - * Deserialize context, see mbedtls_ssl_context_save() for format. - * - * This internal version is wrapped by a public function that cleans up in - * case of error. - */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_context_load(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, - size_t len) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +static int ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from) { - const unsigned char *p = buf; - const unsigned char * const end = buf + len; - size_t session_len; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - tls_prf_fn prf_func = NULL; - - /* - * The context should have been freshly setup or reset. - * Give the user an error in case of obvious misuse. - * (Checking session is useful because it won't be NULL if we're - * renegotiating, or if the user mistakenly loaded a session first.) - */ - if (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST || - ssl->session != NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - /* - * We can't check that the config matches the initial one, but we can at - * least check it matches the requirements for serializing. - */ - if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM || - ssl->conf->max_major_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 || - ssl->conf->min_major_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 || - ssl->conf->max_minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 || - ssl->conf->min_minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 || -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED || + unsigned char padbuf[48]; + return ssl_calc_finished_tls_generic(ssl, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, +#else + &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384, #endif - 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } + padbuf, sizeof(padbuf), + buf, from); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384*/ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "context to load", buf, len); +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("=> handshake wrapup: final free")); /* - * Check version identifier + * Free our handshake params */ - if ((size_t) (end - p) < sizeof(ssl_serialized_context_header)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - if (memcmp(p, ssl_serialized_context_header, - sizeof(ssl_serialized_context_header)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH; - } - p += sizeof(ssl_serialized_context_header); + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(ssl); + mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake); + ssl->handshake = NULL; /* - * Session + * Free the previous transform and switch in the current one */ - if ((size_t) (end - p) < 4) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + if (ssl->transform) { + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform); + mbedtls_free(ssl->transform); } + ssl->transform = ssl->transform_negotiate; + ssl->transform_negotiate = NULL; - session_len = ((size_t) p[0] << 24) | - ((size_t) p[1] << 16) | - ((size_t) p[2] << 8) | - ((size_t) p[3]); - p += 4; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("<= handshake wrapup: final free")); +} - /* This has been allocated by ssl_handshake_init(), called by - * by either mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int() or mbedtls_ssl_setup(). */ - ssl->session = ssl->session_negotiate; - ssl->session_in = ssl->session; - ssl->session_out = ssl->session; - ssl->session_negotiate = NULL; +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int resume = ssl->handshake->resume; - if ((size_t) (end - p) < session_len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("=> handshake wrapup")); - ret = ssl_session_load(ssl->session, 1, p, session_len); - if (ret != 0) { - mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session); - return ret; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) { + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE; + ssl->renego_records_seen = 0; } - - p += session_len; +#endif /* - * Transform + * Free the previous session and switch in the current one */ + if (ssl->session) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + /* RFC 7366 3.1: keep the EtM state */ + ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = + ssl->session->encrypt_then_mac; +#endif - /* This has been allocated by ssl_handshake_init(), called by - * by either mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int() or mbedtls_ssl_setup(). */ - ssl->transform = ssl->transform_negotiate; - ssl->transform_in = ssl->transform; - ssl->transform_out = ssl->transform; - ssl->transform_negotiate = NULL; - - prf_func = ssl_tls12prf_from_cs(ssl->session->ciphersuite); - if (prf_func == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session); + mbedtls_free(ssl->session); } + ssl->session = ssl->session_negotiate; + ssl->session_negotiate = NULL; - /* Read random bytes and populate structure */ - if ((size_t) (end - p) < sizeof(ssl->transform->randbytes)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + /* + * Add cache entry + */ + if (ssl->conf->f_set_cache != NULL && + ssl->session->id_len != 0 && + resume == 0) { + if (ssl->conf->f_set_cache(ssl->conf->p_cache, + ssl->session->id, + ssl->session->id_len, + ssl->session) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("cache did not store session")); + } } - ret = ssl_populate_transform(ssl->transform, - ssl->session->ciphersuite, - ssl->session->master, -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - ssl->session->encrypt_then_mac, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - ssl->session->trunc_hmac, -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - ssl->session->compression, -#endif - prf_func, - p, /* currently pointing to randbytes */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, /* (D)TLS 1.2 is forced */ - ssl->conf->endpoint, - ssl); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->handshake->flight != NULL) { + /* Cancel handshake timer */ + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, 0); - p += sizeof(ssl->transform->randbytes); + /* Keep last flight around in case we need to resend it: + * we need the handshake and transform structures for that */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("skip freeing handshake and transform")); + } else +#endif + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform(ssl); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - /* Read connection IDs and store them */ - if ((size_t) (end - p) < 1) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER; - ssl->transform->in_cid_len = *p++; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("<= handshake wrapup")); +} - if ((size_t) (end - p) < ssl->transform->in_cid_len + 1u) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } +int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + unsigned int hash_len; - memcpy(ssl->transform->in_cid, p, ssl->transform->in_cid_len); - p += ssl->transform->in_cid_len; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write finished")); - ssl->transform->out_cid_len = *p++; + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(ssl, ssl->transform_negotiate); - if ((size_t) (end - p) < ssl->transform->out_cid_len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + ret = ssl->handshake->calc_finished(ssl, ssl->out_msg + 4, ssl->conf->endpoint); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "calc_finished", ret); } - memcpy(ssl->transform->out_cid, p, ssl->transform->out_cid_len); - p += ssl->transform->out_cid_len; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ - /* - * Saved fields from top-level ssl_context structure + * RFC 5246 7.4.9 (Page 63) says 12 is the default length and ciphersuites + * may define some other value. Currently (early 2016), no defined + * ciphersuite does this (and this is unlikely to change as activity has + * moved to TLS 1.3 now) so we can keep the hardcoded 12 here. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) - if ((size_t) (end - p) < 4) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - ssl->badmac_seen = ((uint32_t) p[0] << 24) | - ((uint32_t) p[1] << 16) | - ((uint32_t) p[2] << 8) | - ((uint32_t) p[3]); - p += 4; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) - if ((size_t) (end - p) < 16) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - ssl->in_window_top = ((uint64_t) p[0] << 56) | - ((uint64_t) p[1] << 48) | - ((uint64_t) p[2] << 40) | - ((uint64_t) p[3] << 32) | - ((uint64_t) p[4] << 24) | - ((uint64_t) p[5] << 16) | - ((uint64_t) p[6] << 8) | - ((uint64_t) p[7]); - p += 8; - - ssl->in_window = ((uint64_t) p[0] << 56) | - ((uint64_t) p[1] << 48) | - ((uint64_t) p[2] << 40) | - ((uint64_t) p[3] << 32) | - ((uint64_t) p[4] << 24) | - ((uint64_t) p[5] << 16) | - ((uint64_t) p[6] << 8) | - ((uint64_t) p[7]); - p += 8; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ + hash_len = 12; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if ((size_t) (end - p) < 1) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->verify_data_len = hash_len; + memcpy(ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->out_msg + 4, hash_len); +#endif - ssl->disable_datagram_packing = *p++; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + ssl->out_msglen = 4 + hash_len; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED; - if ((size_t) (end - p) < 8) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + /* + * In case of session resuming, invert the client and server + * ChangeCipherSpec messages order. + */ + if (ssl->handshake->resume != 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + } +#endif + } else { + ssl->state++; } - memcpy(ssl->cur_out_ctr, p, 8); - p += 8; + /* + * Switch to our negotiated transform and session parameters for outbound + * data. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("switching to new transform spec for outbound data")); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if ((size_t) (end - p) < 2) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - ssl->mtu = (p[0] << 8) | p[1]; - p += 2; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + unsigned char i; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) - { - uint8_t alpn_len; - const char **cur; + /* Remember current epoch settings for resending */ + ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = ssl->transform_out; + memcpy(ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, + sizeof(ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr)); - if ((size_t) (end - p) < 1) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } + /* Set sequence_number to zero */ + memset(&ssl->cur_out_ctr[2], 0, sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr) - 2); - alpn_len = *p++; - if (alpn_len != 0 && ssl->conf->alpn_list != NULL) { - /* alpn_chosen should point to an item in the configured list */ - for (cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++) { - if (strlen(*cur) == alpn_len && - memcmp(p, cur, alpn_len) == 0) { - ssl->alpn_chosen = *cur; - break; - } + /* Increment epoch */ + for (i = 2; i > 0; i--) { + if (++ssl->cur_out_ctr[i - 1] != 0) { + break; } } - /* can only happen on conf mismatch */ - if (alpn_len != 0 && ssl->alpn_chosen == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + /* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */ + if (i == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("DTLS epoch would wrap")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING; } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + memset(ssl->cur_out_ctr, 0, sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr)); - p += alpn_len; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ - - /* - * Forced fields from top-level ssl_context structure - * - * Most of them already set to the correct value by mbedtls_ssl_init() and - * mbedtls_ssl_reset(), so we only need to set the remaining ones. - */ - ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER; - - ssl->major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3; - ssl->minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3; - - /* Adjust pointers for header fields of outgoing records to - * the given transform, accounting for explicit IV and CID. */ - mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(ssl, ssl->transform); + ssl->transform_out = ssl->transform_negotiate; + ssl->session_out = ssl->session_negotiate; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - ssl->in_epoch = 1; + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(ssl); + } #endif - /* mbedtls_ssl_reset() leaves the handshake sub-structure allocated, - * which we don't want - otherwise we'd end up freeing the wrong transform - * by calling mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform() - * inappropriately. */ - if (ssl->handshake != NULL) { - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(ssl); - mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake); - ssl->handshake = NULL; + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + (ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret); + return ret; } +#endif - /* - * Done - should have consumed entire buffer - */ - if (p != end) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write finished")); return 0; } -/* - * Deserialize context: public wrapper for error cleaning - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_context_load(mbedtls_ssl_context *context, - const unsigned char *buf, - size_t len) -{ - int ret = ssl_context_load(context, buf, len); - - if (ret != 0) { - mbedtls_ssl_free(context); - } - - return ret; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ +#define SSL_MAX_HASH_LEN 12 -/* - * Free an SSL context - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { - if (ssl == NULL) { - return; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> free")); + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned int hash_len = 12; + unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_HASH_LEN]; - if (ssl->out_buf != NULL) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) - size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; -#else - size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; -#endif + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse finished")); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->out_buf, out_buf_len); - mbedtls_free(ssl->out_buf); - ssl->out_buf = NULL; + ret = ssl->handshake->calc_finished(ssl, buf, ssl->conf->endpoint ^ 1); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "calc_finished", ret); } - if (ssl->in_buf != NULL) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) - size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; -#else - size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; -#endif - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->in_buf, in_buf_len); - mbedtls_free(ssl->in_buf); - ssl->in_buf = NULL; + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); + goto exit; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - if (ssl->compress_buf != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->compress_buf, MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN); - mbedtls_free(ssl->compress_buf); + if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad finished message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + goto exit; } -#endif - if (ssl->transform) { - mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform); - mbedtls_free(ssl->transform); + if (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED) { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + goto exit; } - if (ssl->handshake) { - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(ssl); - mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform_negotiate); - mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session_negotiate); - - mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake); - mbedtls_free(ssl->transform_negotiate); - mbedtls_free(ssl->session_negotiate); + if (ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + hash_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad finished message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + goto exit; } - if (ssl->session) { - mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session); - mbedtls_free(ssl->session); + if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl), + buf, hash_len) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad finished message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + goto exit; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - if (ssl->hostname != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->hostname, strlen(ssl->hostname)); - mbedtls_free(ssl->hostname); - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->verify_data_len = hash_len; + memcpy(ssl->peer_verify_data, buf, hash_len); #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - if (mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish != NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish()")); - mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish(ssl); - } + if (ssl->handshake->resume != 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + } #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP; + } +#endif + } else { + ssl->state++; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - mbedtls_free(ssl->cli_id); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(ssl); + } #endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= free")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse finished")); - /* Actually clear after last debug message */ - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_context)); +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, hash_len); + return ret; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) /* - * Initialize mbedtls_ssl_config + * Helper to get TLS 1.2 PRF from ciphersuite + * (Duplicates bits of logic from ssl_set_handshake_prfs().) */ -void mbedtls_ssl_config_init(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +static tls_prf_fn ssl_tls12prf_from_cs(int ciphersuite_id) { - memset(conf, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_config)); -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) -static int ssl_preset_default_hashes[] = { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * const ciphersuite_info = + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ciphersuite_id); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + if (ciphersuite_info != NULL && ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { + return tls_prf_sha384; + } else #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE) - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { + if (ciphersuite_info != NULL && ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256) { + return tls_prf_sha256; + } + } #endif - MBEDTLS_MD_NONE -}; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + (void) ciphersuite_info; #endif -static int ssl_preset_suiteb_ciphersuites[] = { - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, - MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, - 0 -}; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) -static int ssl_preset_suiteb_hashes[] = { - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, - MBEDTLS_MD_NONE -}; -#endif + return NULL; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -static mbedtls_ecp_group_id ssl_preset_suiteb_curves[] = { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) - MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) - MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, +static mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_get_type(mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf) +{ + ((void) tls_prf); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + if (tls_prf == tls_prf_sha384) { + return MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384; + } else #endif - MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE -}; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + if (tls_prf == tls_prf_sha256) { + return MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256; + } else #endif + return MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE; +} /* - * Load default in mbedtls_ssl_config + * Populate a transform structure with session keys and all the other + * necessary information. + * + * Parameters: + * - [in/out]: transform: structure to populate + * [in] must be just initialised with mbedtls_ssl_transform_init() + * [out] fully populated, ready for use by mbedtls_ssl_{en,de}crypt_buf() + * - [in] ciphersuite + * - [in] master + * - [in] encrypt_then_mac + * - [in] tls_prf: pointer to PRF to use for key derivation + * - [in] randbytes: buffer holding ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random + * - [in] tls_version: TLS version + * - [in] endpoint: client or server + * - [in] ssl: used for: + * - ssl->conf->{f,p}_export_keys + * [in] optionally used for: + * - MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C: ssl->conf->{f,p}_dbg */ -int mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, - int endpoint, int transport, int preset) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls12_populate_transform(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + int ciphersuite, + const unsigned char master[48], +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + int encrypt_then_mac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */ + ssl_tls_prf_t tls_prf, + const unsigned char randbytes[64], + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version, + unsigned endpoint, + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; -#endif - - /* Use the functions here so that they are covered in tests, - * but otherwise access member directly for efficiency */ - mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint(conf, endpoint); - mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport(conf, transport); - - /* - * Things that are common to all presets - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { - conf->authmode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) - conf->session_tickets = MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED; -#endif - } -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - conf->arc4_disabled = MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - conf->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) - conf->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) - conf->cbc_record_splitting = MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - conf->f_cookie_write = ssl_cookie_write_dummy; - conf->f_cookie_check = ssl_cookie_check_dummy; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) - conf->anti_replay = MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - conf->cert_req_ca_list = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - conf->hs_timeout_min = MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN; - conf->hs_timeout_max = MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX; -#endif + int ret = 0; + unsigned char keyblk[256]; + unsigned char *key1; + unsigned char *key2; + unsigned char *mac_enc; + unsigned char *mac_dec; + size_t mac_key_len = 0; + size_t iv_copy_len; + size_t keylen; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + mbedtls_ssl_mode_t ssl_mode; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - conf->renego_max_records = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGO_MAX_RECORDS_DEFAULT; - memset(conf->renego_period, 0x00, 2); - memset(conf->renego_period + 2, 0xFF, 6); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_type_t key_type; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_algorithm_t mac_alg = 0; + size_t key_bits; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { - const unsigned char dhm_p[] = - MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P_BIN; - const unsigned char dhm_g[] = - MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G_BIN; + /* + * Some data just needs copying into the structure + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + transform->encrypt_then_mac = encrypt_then_mac; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */ + transform->tls_version = tls_version; - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin(conf, - dhm_p, sizeof(dhm_p), - dhm_g, sizeof(dhm_g))) != 0) { - return ret; - } - } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + memcpy(transform->randbytes, randbytes, sizeof(transform->randbytes)); #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + /* At the moment, we keep TLS <= 1.2 and TLS 1.3 transform + * generation separate. This should never happen. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + /* - * Preset-specific defaults + * Get various info structures */ - switch (preset) { - /* - * NSA Suite B - */ - case MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_SUITEB: - conf->min_major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3; - conf->min_minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3; /* TLS 1.2 */ - conf->max_major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION; - conf->max_minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION; + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ciphersuite); + if (ciphersuite_info == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ciphersuite info for %d not found", + ciphersuite)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0] = - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1] = - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2] = - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3] = - ssl_preset_suiteb_ciphersuites; + ssl_mode = mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_ciphersuite( +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + encrypt_then_mac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */ + ciphersuite_info); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - conf->cert_profile = &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb; -#endif + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_AEAD) { + transform->taglen = + ciphersuite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG ? 8 : 16; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) - conf->sig_hashes = ssl_preset_suiteb_hashes; -#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if ((status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ciphersuite_info->cipher, + transform->taglen, + &alg, + &key_type, + &key_bits)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa", ret); + goto end; + } +#else + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ciphersuite_info->cipher); + if (cipher_info == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("cipher info for %u not found", + ciphersuite_info->cipher)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - conf->curve_list = ssl_preset_suiteb_curves; -#endif - break; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + mac_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac); + if (mac_alg == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type for %u not found", + (unsigned) ciphersuite_info->mac)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#else + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac); + if (md_info == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("mbedtls_md info for %u not found", + (unsigned) ciphersuite_info->mac)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - /* - * Default - */ - default: - conf->min_major_ver = (MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION > - MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MAJOR_VERSION) ? - MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION : - MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MAJOR_VERSION; - conf->min_minor_ver = (MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION > - MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MINOR_VERSION) ? - MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION : - MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MINOR_VERSION; - conf->max_major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION; - conf->max_minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* Copy own and peer's CID if the use of the CID + * extension has been negotiated. */ + if (ssl->handshake->cid_in_use == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Copy CIDs into SSL transform")); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - conf->min_minor_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2; - } -#endif + transform->in_cid_len = ssl->own_cid_len; + memcpy(transform->in_cid, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Incoming CID", transform->in_cid, + transform->in_cid_len); - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0] = - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1] = - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2] = - conf->ciphersuite_list[MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3] = - mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(); + transform->out_cid_len = ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len; + memcpy(transform->out_cid, ssl->handshake->peer_cid, + ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Outgoing CID", transform->out_cid, + transform->out_cid_len); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - conf->cert_profile = &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default; -#endif + /* + * Compute key block using the PRF + */ + ret = tls_prf(master, 48, "key expansion", randbytes, 64, keyblk, 256); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "prf", ret); + return ret; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) - conf->sig_hashes = ssl_preset_default_hashes; -#endif + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite = %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name(ciphersuite))); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "master secret", master, 48); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "random bytes", randbytes, 64); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "key block", keyblk, 256); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - conf->curve_list = mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list(); -#endif + /* + * Determine the appropriate key, IV and MAC length. + */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - conf->dhm_min_bitlen = 1024; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + keylen = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits); +#else + keylen = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info) / 8; #endif - } - return 0; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD) + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_AEAD) { + size_t explicit_ivlen; -/* - * Free mbedtls_ssl_config - */ -void mbedtls_ssl_config_free(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) - mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_P); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_G); -#endif + transform->maclen = 0; + mac_key_len = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) - if (conf->psk != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(conf->psk, conf->psk_len); - mbedtls_free(conf->psk); - conf->psk = NULL; - conf->psk_len = 0; - } + /* All modes haves 96-bit IVs, but the length of the static parts vary + * with mode and version: + * - For GCM and CCM in TLS 1.2, there's a static IV of 4 Bytes + * (to be concatenated with a dynamically chosen IV of 8 Bytes) + * - For ChaChaPoly in TLS 1.2, and all modes in TLS 1.3, there's + * a static IV of 12 Bytes (to be XOR'ed with the 8 Byte record + * sequence number). + */ + transform->ivlen = 12; - if (conf->psk_identity != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(conf->psk_identity, conf->psk_identity_len); - mbedtls_free(conf->psk_identity); - conf->psk_identity = NULL; - conf->psk_identity_len = 0; - } -#endif + int is_chachapoly = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + is_chachapoly = (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20); +#else + is_chachapoly = (mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode(cipher_info) + == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - ssl_key_cert_free(conf->key_cert); -#endif + if (is_chachapoly) { + transform->fixed_ivlen = 12; + } else { + transform->fixed_ivlen = 4; + } - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(conf, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_config)); -} + /* Minimum length of encrypted record */ + explicit_ivlen = transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen; + transform->minlen = explicit_ivlen + transform->taglen; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_STREAM || + ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC || + ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC_ETM) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + size_t block_size = PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type); +#else + size_t block_size = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(cipher_info); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) && \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)) -/* - * Convert between MBEDTLS_PK_XXX and SSL_SIG_XXX - */ -unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk(mbedtls_pk_context *pk) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - if (mbedtls_pk_can_do(pk, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA)) { - return MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA; - } -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - if (mbedtls_pk_can_do(pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA)) { - return MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA; - } -#endif - return MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON; -} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Get MAC length */ + mac_key_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(mac_alg); +#else + /* Initialize HMAC contexts */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&transform->md_ctx_enc, md_info, 1)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&transform->md_ctx_dec, md_info, 1)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_md_setup", ret); + goto end; + } -unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) -{ - switch (type) { - case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: - return MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA; - case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: - case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: - return MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA; - default: - return MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON; - } -} + /* Get MAC length */ + mac_key_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + transform->maclen = mac_key_len; -mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig(unsigned char sig) -{ - switch (sig) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA: - return MBEDTLS_PK_RSA; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA: - return MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; -#endif - default: - return MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; - } -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C && ( MBEDTLS_RSA_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C ) */ + /* IV length */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + transform->ivlen = PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(key_type, alg); +#else + transform->ivlen = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size(cipher_info); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + /* Minimum length */ + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_STREAM) { + transform->minlen = transform->maclen; + } else { + /* + * GenericBlockCipher: + * 1. if EtM is in use: one block plus MAC + * otherwise: * first multiple of blocklen greater than maclen + * 2. IV + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC_ETM) { + transform->minlen = transform->maclen + + block_size; + } else +#endif + { + transform->minlen = transform->maclen + + block_size + - transform->maclen % block_size; + } -/* Find an entry in a signature-hash set matching a given hash algorithm. */ -mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find(mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, - mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg) -{ - switch (sig_alg) { - case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: - return set->rsa; - case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: - return set->ecdsa; - default: - return MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + if (tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + transform->minlen += transform->ivlen; + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto end; + } + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } -} -/* Add a signature-hash-pair to a signature-hash set */ -void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add(mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, - mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg) -{ - switch (sig_alg) { - case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: - if (set->rsa == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { - set->rsa = md_alg; - } - break; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("keylen: %u, minlen: %u, ivlen: %u, maclen: %u", + (unsigned) keylen, + (unsigned) transform->minlen, + (unsigned) transform->ivlen, + (unsigned) transform->maclen)); - case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: - if (set->ecdsa == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { - set->ecdsa = md_alg; - } - break; + /* + * Finally setup the cipher contexts, IVs and MAC secrets. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + key1 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2; + key2 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2 + keylen; - default: - break; - } -} + mac_enc = keyblk; + mac_dec = keyblk + mac_key_len; -/* Allow exactly one hash algorithm for each signature. */ -void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash(mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg) -{ - set->rsa = md_alg; - set->ecdsa = md_alg; -} + iv_copy_len = (transform->fixed_ivlen) ? + transform->fixed_ivlen : transform->ivlen; + memcpy(transform->iv_enc, key2 + keylen, iv_copy_len); + memcpy(transform->iv_dec, key2 + keylen + iv_copy_len, + iv_copy_len); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + key1 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2 + keylen; + key2 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + mac_enc = keyblk + mac_key_len; + mac_dec = keyblk; -/* - * Convert from MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_XXX to MBEDTLS_MD_XXX - */ -mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(unsigned char hash) -{ - switch (hash) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5: - return MBEDTLS_MD_MD5; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1: - return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224: - return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224; - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256: - return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384: - return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512: - return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512; -#endif - default: - return MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + iv_copy_len = (transform->fixed_ivlen) ? + transform->fixed_ivlen : transform->ivlen; + memcpy(transform->iv_dec, key1 + keylen, iv_copy_len); + memcpy(transform->iv_enc, key1 + keylen + iv_copy_len, + iv_copy_len); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto end; } -} -/* - * Convert from MBEDTLS_MD_XXX to MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_XXX - */ -unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(int md) -{ - switch (md) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: - return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: - return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: - return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224; - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: - return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: - return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: - return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512; -#endif - default: - return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE; + if (ssl->f_export_keys != NULL) { + ssl->f_export_keys(ssl->p_export_keys, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS12_MASTER_SECRET, + master, 48, + randbytes + 32, + randbytes, + tls_prf_get_type(tls_prf)); } -} -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) -/* - * Check if a curve proposed by the peer is in our list. - * Return 0 if we're willing to use it, -1 otherwise. - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id) -{ - const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *gid; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + transform->psa_alg = alg; + + if (alg != MBEDTLS_SSL_NULL_CIPHER) { + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, alg); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, key_type); + + if ((status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + key1, + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits), + &transform->psa_key_enc)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(3, "psa_import_key", (int) status); + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_import_key", ret); + goto end; + } - if (ssl->conf->curve_list == NULL) { - return -1; - } + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT); - for (gid = ssl->conf->curve_list; *gid != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; gid++) { - if (*gid == grp_id) { - return 0; + if ((status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + key2, + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits), + &transform->psa_key_dec)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_import_key", ret); + goto end; } } - - return -1; -} - -/* - * Same as mbedtls_ssl_check_curve() but takes a TLS ID for the curve. - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t tls_id) -{ - const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info = - mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id(tls_id); - if (curve_info == NULL) { - return -1; +#else + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + cipher_info)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret); + goto end; } - return mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(ssl, curve_info->grp_id); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) -/* - * Check if a hash proposed by the peer is in our list. - * Return 0 if we're willing to use it, -1 otherwise. - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - mbedtls_md_type_t md) -{ - const int *cur; - if (ssl->conf->sig_hashes == NULL) { - return -1; + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + cipher_info)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret); + goto end; } - for (cur = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; *cur != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; cur++) { - if (*cur == (int) md) { - return 0; - } + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, key1, + (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info), + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret); + goto end; } - return -1; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, key2, + (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info), + MBEDTLS_DECRYPT)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret); + goto end; + } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) -int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite, - int cert_endpoint, - uint32_t *flags) -{ - int ret = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) - int usage = 0; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) - const char *ext_oid; - size_t ext_len; -#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + if (mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode(cipher_info) == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode", ret); + goto end; + } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) - ((void) cert); - ((void) cert_endpoint); - ((void) flags); -#endif + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode", ret); + goto end; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) - if (cert_endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { - /* Server part of the key exchange */ - switch (ciphersuite->key_exchange) { - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: - usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT; - break; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + /* For HMAC-based ciphersuites, initialize the HMAC transforms. + For AEAD-based ciphersuites, there is nothing to do here. */ + if (mac_key_len != 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + transform->psa_mac_alg = PSA_ALG_HMAC(mac_alg); - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: - usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; - break; + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_ALG_HMAC(mac_alg)); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC); - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: - usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT; - break; + if ((status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + mac_enc, mac_key_len, + &transform->psa_mac_enc)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_import_mac_key", ret); + goto end; + } - /* Don't use default: we want warnings when adding new values */ - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE: - usage = 0; + if ((transform->psa_alg == MBEDTLS_SSL_NULL_CIPHER) || + ((transform->psa_alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + && (transform->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED) +#endif + )) { + /* mbedtls_ct_hmac() requires the key to be exportable */ + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH); + } else { + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH); } - } else { - /* Client auth: we only implement rsa_sign and mbedtls_ecdsa_sign for now */ - usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; - } - if (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(cert, usage) != 0) { - *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE; - ret = -1; - } + if ((status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + mac_dec, mac_key_len, + &transform->psa_mac_dec)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_import_mac_key", ret); + goto end; + } #else - ((void) ciphersuite); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) - if (cert_endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { - ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH; - ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH); - } else { - ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH; - ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH); + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&transform->md_ctx_enc, mac_enc, mac_key_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto end; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&transform->md_ctx_dec, mac_dec, mac_key_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto end; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ - if (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage(cert, ext_oid, ext_len) != 0) { - *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE; - ret = -1; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE */ + ((void) mac_dec); + ((void) mac_enc); +end: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(keyblk, sizeof(keyblk)); return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ -int mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int md) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +int mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round( + psa_pake_operation_t *pake_ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, mbedtls_ecjpake_rounds_t round) +{ + psa_status_t status; + size_t input_offset = 0; + /* + * At round one repeat the KEY_SHARE, ZK_PUBLIC & ZF_PROOF twice + * At round two perform a single cycle + */ + unsigned int remaining_steps = (round == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE) ? 2 : 1; + + for (; remaining_steps > 0; remaining_steps--) { + for (psa_pake_step_t step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE; + step <= PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF; + ++step) { + /* Length is stored at the first byte */ + size_t length = buf[input_offset]; + input_offset += 1; + + if (input_offset + length > len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + status = psa_pake_input(pake_ctx, step, + buf + input_offset, length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + input_offset += length; + } } - switch (md) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5: - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1: - ssl->handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls; - break; -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384: - ssl->handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384; - break; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256: - ssl->handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256; - break; -#endif - default: - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH; + if (input_offset != len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } return 0; -#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - (void) ssl; - (void) md; - - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) -int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *output, - unsigned char *data, size_t data_len) +int mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round( + psa_pake_operation_t *pake_ctx, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, size_t *olen, + mbedtls_ecjpake_rounds_t round) { - int ret = 0; - mbedtls_md5_context mbedtls_md5; - mbedtls_sha1_context mbedtls_sha1; - - mbedtls_md5_init(&mbedtls_md5); - mbedtls_sha1_init(&mbedtls_sha1); - + psa_status_t status; + size_t output_offset = 0; + size_t output_len; /* - * digitally-signed struct { - * opaque md5_hash[16]; - * opaque sha_hash[20]; - * }; - * - * md5_hash - * MD5(ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random - * + ServerParams); - * sha_hash - * SHA(ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random - * + ServerParams); + * At round one repeat the KEY_SHARE, ZK_PUBLIC & ZF_PROOF twice + * At round two perform a single cycle */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_starts_ret(&mbedtls_md5)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_md5_starts_ret", ret); - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&mbedtls_md5, - ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_md5_update_ret", ret); - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_update_ret(&mbedtls_md5, data, data_len)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_md5_update_ret", ret); - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_finish_ret(&mbedtls_md5, output)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_md5_finish_ret", ret); - goto exit; - } + unsigned int remaining_steps = (round == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE) ? 2 : 1; - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret(&mbedtls_sha1)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret", ret); - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&mbedtls_sha1, - ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_sha1_update_ret", ret); - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_update_ret(&mbedtls_sha1, data, - data_len)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_sha1_update_ret", ret); - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret(&mbedtls_sha1, - output + 16)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret", ret); - goto exit; - } + for (; remaining_steps > 0; remaining_steps--) { + for (psa_pake_step_t step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE; + step <= PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF; + ++step) { + /* + * For each step, prepend 1 byte with the length of the data as + * given by psa_pake_output(). + */ + status = psa_pake_output(pake_ctx, step, + buf + output_offset + 1, + len - output_offset - 1, + &output_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } -exit: - mbedtls_md5_free(&mbedtls_md5); - mbedtls_sha1_free(&mbedtls_sha1); + *(buf + output_offset) = (uint8_t) output_len; - if (ret != 0) { - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR); + output_offset += output_len + 1; + } } - return ret; + *olen = output_offset; + return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#endif //MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED && MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, @@ -7513,7 +9331,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, { psa_status_t status; psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; - psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_md(md_alg); + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Perform PSA-based computation of digest of ServerKeyExchange")); @@ -7554,7 +9372,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY: return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED; default: - return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } } return 0; @@ -7616,7 +9434,489 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + +/* Find the preferred hash for a given signature algorithm. */ +unsigned int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned int sig_alg) +{ + unsigned int i; + uint16_t *received_sig_algs = ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs; + + if (sig_alg == MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON) { + return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE; + } + + for (i = 0; received_sig_algs[i] != MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; i++) { + unsigned int hash_alg_received = + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_HASH_ALG_FROM_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG( + received_sig_algs[i]); + unsigned int sig_alg_received = + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_ALG_FROM_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG( + received_sig_algs[i]); + + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = + mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash((unsigned char) hash_alg_received); + if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { + continue; + } + + if (sig_alg == sig_alg_received) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (ssl->handshake->key_cert && ssl->handshake->key_cert->key) { + psa_algorithm_t psa_hash_alg = + mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg); + + if (sig_alg_received == MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA && + !mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(ssl->handshake->key_cert->key, + PSA_ALG_ECDSA(psa_hash_alg), + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH)) { + continue; + } + + if (sig_alg_received == MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA && + !mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(ssl->handshake->key_cert->key, + PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( + psa_hash_alg), + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH)) { + continue; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + return hash_alg_received; + } + } + + return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_validate_ciphersuite( + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info, + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version min_tls_version, + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version max_tls_version) +{ + (void) ssl; + + if (suite_info == NULL) { + return -1; + } + + if ((suite_info->min_tls_version > max_tls_version) || + (suite_info->max_tls_version < min_tls_version)) { + return -1; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE && + ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx_is_ok != 1) +#else + if (suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE && + mbedtls_ecjpake_check(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx) != 0) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + { + return -1; + } +#endif + + /* Don't suggest PSK-based ciphersuite if no PSK is available. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(suite_info) && + mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf) == 0) { + return -1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/* + * Function for writing a signature algorithm extension. + * + * The `extension_data` field of signature algorithm contains a `SignatureSchemeList` + * value (TLS 1.3 RFC8446): + * enum { + * .... + * ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256( 0x0403 ), + * ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384( 0x0503 ), + * ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512( 0x0603 ), + * .... + * } SignatureScheme; + * + * struct { + * SignatureScheme supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; + * } SignatureSchemeList; + * + * The `extension_data` field of signature algorithm contains a `SignatureAndHashAlgorithm` + * value (TLS 1.2 RFC5246): + * enum { + * none(0), md5(1), sha1(2), sha224(3), sha256(4), sha384(5), + * sha512(6), (255) + * } HashAlgorithm; + * + * enum { anonymous(0), rsa(1), dsa(2), ecdsa(3), (255) } + * SignatureAlgorithm; + * + * struct { + * HashAlgorithm hash; + * SignatureAlgorithm signature; + * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; + * + * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm + * supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; + * + * The TLS 1.3 signature algorithm extension was defined to be a compatible + * generalization of the TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension. + * `SignatureAndHashAlgorithm` field of TLS 1.2 can be represented by + * `SignatureScheme` field of TLS 1.3 + * + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write_sig_alg_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + unsigned char *supported_sig_alg; /* Start of supported_signature_algorithms */ + size_t supported_sig_alg_len = 0; /* Length of supported_signature_algorithms */ + + *out_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("adding signature_algorithms extension")); + + /* Check if we have space for header and length field: + * - extension_type (2 bytes) + * - extension_data_length (2 bytes) + * - supported_signature_algorithms_length (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6); + p += 6; + + /* + * Write supported_signature_algorithms + */ + supported_sig_alg = p; + const uint16_t *sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_sig_algs(ssl); + if (sig_alg == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; + } + + for (; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("got signature scheme [%x] %s", + *sig_alg, + mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str(*sig_alg))); + if (!mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported(ssl, *sig_alg)) { + continue; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*sig_alg, p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("sent signature scheme [%x] %s", + *sig_alg, + mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str(*sig_alg))); + } + + /* Length of supported_signature_algorithms */ + supported_sig_alg_len = (size_t) (p - supported_sig_alg); + if (supported_sig_alg_len == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("No signature algorithms defined.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG, buf, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(supported_sig_alg_len + 2, buf, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(supported_sig_alg_len, buf, 4); + + *out_len = (size_t) (p - buf); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +/* + * mbedtls_ssl_parse_server_name_ext + * + * Structure of server_name extension: + * + * enum { + * host_name(0), (255) + * } NameType; + * opaque HostName<1..2^16-1>; + * + * struct { + * NameType name_type; + * select (name_type) { + * case host_name: HostName; + * } name; + * } ServerName; + * struct { + * ServerName server_name_list<1..2^16-1> + * } ServerNameList; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_server_name_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t server_name_list_len, hostname_len; + const unsigned char *server_name_list_end; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("parse ServerName extension")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + server_name_list_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, server_name_list_len); + server_name_list_end = p + server_name_list_len; + while (p < server_name_list_end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, server_name_list_end, 3); + hostname_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 1); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, server_name_list_end, + hostname_len + 3); + + if (p[0] == MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME) { + /* sni_name is intended to be used only during the parsing of the + * ClientHello message (it is reset to NULL before the end of + * the message parsing). Thus it is ok to just point to the + * reception buffer and not make a copy of it. + */ + ssl->handshake->sni_name = p + 3; + ssl->handshake->sni_name_len = hostname_len; + if (ssl->conf->f_sni == NULL) { + return 0; + } + ret = ssl->conf->f_sni(ssl->conf->p_sni, + ssl, p + 3, hostname_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_sni_wrapper", ret); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + } + return 0; + } + + p += hostname_len + 3; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t protocol_name_list_len; + const unsigned char *protocol_name_list; + const unsigned char *protocol_name_list_end; + size_t protocol_name_len; + + /* If ALPN not configured, just ignore the extension */ + if (ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + /* + * RFC7301, section 3.1 + * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; + * + * struct { + * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> + * } ProtocolNameList; + */ + + /* + * protocol_name_list_len 2 bytes + * protocol_name_len 1 bytes + * protocol_name >=1 byte + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 4); + + protocol_name_list_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, protocol_name_list_len); + protocol_name_list = p; + protocol_name_list_end = p + protocol_name_list_len; + + /* Validate peer's list (lengths) */ + while (p < protocol_name_list_end) { + protocol_name_len = *p++; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, protocol_name_list_end, + protocol_name_len); + if (protocol_name_len == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + p += protocol_name_len; + } + + /* Use our order of preference */ + for (const char **alpn = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *alpn != NULL; alpn++) { + size_t const alpn_len = strlen(*alpn); + p = protocol_name_list; + while (p < protocol_name_list_end) { + protocol_name_len = *p++; + if (protocol_name_len == alpn_len && + memcmp(p, *alpn, alpn_len) == 0) { + ssl->alpn_chosen = *alpn; + return 0; + } + + p += protocol_name_len; + } + } + + /* If we get here, no match was found */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_write_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t protocol_name_len; + *out_len = 0; + + if (ssl->alpn_chosen == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + protocol_name_len = strlen(ssl->alpn_chosen); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 7 + protocol_name_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server side, adding alpn extension")); + /* + * 0 . 1 ext identifier + * 2 . 3 ext length + * 4 . 5 protocol list length + * 6 . 6 protocol name length + * 7 . 7+n protocol name + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN, p, 0); + + *out_len = 7 + protocol_name_len; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(protocol_name_len + 3, p, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(protocol_name_len + 1, p, 4); + /* Note: the length of the chosen protocol has been checked to be less + * than 255 bytes in `mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols`. + */ + p[6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(protocol_name_len); + + memcpy(p + 7, ssl->alpn_chosen, protocol_name_len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN); +#endif + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_session_set_hostname(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const char *hostname) +{ + /* Initialize to suppress unnecessary compiler warning */ + size_t hostname_len = 0; + + /* Check if new hostname is valid before + * making any change to current one */ + if (hostname != NULL) { + hostname_len = strlen(hostname); + + if (hostname_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } + + /* Now it's clear that we will overwrite the old hostname, + * so we can free it safely */ + if (session->hostname != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(session->hostname, + strlen(session->hostname)); + } + + /* Passing NULL as hostname shall clear the old one */ + if (hostname == NULL) { + session->hostname = NULL; + } else { + session->hostname = mbedtls_calloc(1, hostname_len + 1); + if (session->hostname == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + memcpy(session->hostname, hostname, hostname_len); + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && + MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION && + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +int mbedtls_ssl_session_set_ticket_alpn(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const char *alpn) +{ + size_t alpn_len = 0; + + if (alpn != NULL) { + alpn_len = strlen(alpn); + + if (alpn_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_NAME_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } + + if (session->ticket_alpn != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(session->ticket_alpn, + strlen(session->ticket_alpn)); + session->ticket_alpn = NULL; + } + + if (alpn != NULL) { + session->ticket_alpn = mbedtls_calloc(alpn_len + 1, 1); + if (session->ticket_alpn == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + memcpy(session->ticket_alpn, alpn, alpn_len); + } + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls12_client.c similarity index 65% rename from vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c rename to vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls12_client.c index b693d53031..eac6a3aadd 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls12_client.c @@ -1,37 +1,37 @@ /* - * SSLv3/TLSv1 client-side functions + * TLS client-side functions * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" -#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" -#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "ssl_client.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "debug_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" #include "psa/crypto.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) +/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #include @@ -46,119 +46,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_conf_has_static_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf) -{ - if (conf->psk_identity == NULL || - conf->psk_identity_len == 0) { - return 0; - } - - if (conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0) { - return 1; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(conf->psk_opaque)) { - return 1; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - - return 0; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf) -{ - if (conf->psk_identity == NULL || - conf->psk_identity_len == 0) { - return 0; - } - - if (conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0) { - return 1; - } - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_hostname_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - const unsigned char *end, - size_t *olen) -{ - unsigned char *p = buf; - size_t hostname_len; - - *olen = 0; - - if (ssl->hostname == NULL) { - return 0; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("client hello, adding server name extension: %s", - ssl->hostname)); - - hostname_len = strlen(ssl->hostname); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, hostname_len + 9); - - /* - * Sect. 3, RFC 6066 (TLS Extensions Definitions) - * - * In order to provide any of the server names, clients MAY include an - * extension of type "server_name" in the (extended) client hello. The - * "extension_data" field of this extension SHALL contain - * "ServerNameList" where: - * - * struct { - * NameType name_type; - * select (name_type) { - * case host_name: HostName; - * } name; - * } ServerName; - * - * enum { - * host_name(0), (255) - * } NameType; - * - * opaque HostName<1..2^16-1>; - * - * struct { - * ServerName server_name_list<1..2^16-1> - * } ServerNameList; - * - */ - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME, p, 0); - p += 2; - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(hostname_len + 5, p, 0); - p += 2; - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(hostname_len + 3, p, 0); - p += 2; - - *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME); - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(hostname_len, p, 0); - p += 2; - - memcpy(p, ssl->hostname, hostname_len); - - *olen = hostname_len + 9; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_write_renegotiation_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, @@ -200,179 +87,9 @@ static int ssl_write_renegotiation_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ -/* - * Only if we handle at least one key exchange that needs signatures. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - const unsigned char *end, - size_t *olen) -{ - unsigned char *p = buf; - size_t sig_alg_len = 0; - const int *md; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - unsigned char *sig_alg_list = buf + 6; -#endif - - *olen = 0; - - if (ssl->conf->max_minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - return 0; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("client hello, adding signature_algorithms extension")); - - if (ssl->conf->sig_hashes == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; - } - - for (md = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; *md != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; md++) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - sig_alg_len += 2; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - sig_alg_len += 2; -#endif - if (sig_alg_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_HASH_ALG_LIST_LEN) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("length in bytes of sig-hash-alg extension too big")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; - } - } - - /* Empty signature algorithms list, this is a configuration error. */ - if (sig_alg_len == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, sig_alg_len + 6); - - /* - * Prepare signature_algorithms extension (TLS 1.2) - */ - sig_alg_len = 0; - - for (md = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; *md != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; md++) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(*md); - sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(*md); - sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA; -#endif - } - - /* - * enum { - * none(0), md5(1), sha1(2), sha224(3), sha256(4), sha384(5), - * sha512(6), (255) - * } HashAlgorithm; - * - * enum { anonymous(0), rsa(1), dsa(2), ecdsa(3), (255) } - * SignatureAlgorithm; - * - * struct { - * HashAlgorithm hash; - * SignatureAlgorithm signature; - * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; - * - * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm - * supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; - */ - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG, p, 0); - p += 2; - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(sig_alg_len + 2, p, 0); - p += 2; - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(sig_alg_len, p, 0); - p += 2; - - *olen = 6 + sig_alg_len; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - const unsigned char *end, - size_t *olen) -{ - unsigned char *p = buf; - unsigned char *elliptic_curve_list = p + 6; - size_t elliptic_curve_len = 0; - const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *info; - const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id; - - *olen = 0; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("client hello, adding supported_elliptic_curves extension")); - - if (ssl->conf->curve_list == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; - } - - for (grp_id = ssl->conf->curve_list; - *grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; - grp_id++) { - info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(*grp_id); - if (info == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("invalid curve in ssl configuration")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; - } - elliptic_curve_len += 2; - - if (elliptic_curve_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CURVE_LIST_LEN) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("malformed supported_elliptic_curves extension in config")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; - } - } - - /* Empty elliptic curve list, this is a configuration error. */ - if (elliptic_curve_len == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6 + elliptic_curve_len); - - elliptic_curve_len = 0; - - for (grp_id = ssl->conf->curve_list; - *grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; - grp_id++) { - info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(*grp_id); - elliptic_curve_list[elliptic_curve_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(info->tls_id); - elliptic_curve_list[elliptic_curve_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(info->tls_id); - } - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES, p, 0); - p += 2; - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(elliptic_curve_len + 2, p, 0); - p += 2; - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(elliptic_curve_len, p, 0); - p += 2; - - *olen = 6 + elliptic_curve_len; - - return 0; -} MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, @@ -402,7 +119,8 @@ static int ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) @@ -414,14 +132,20 @@ static int ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p = buf; - size_t kkpp_len; + size_t kkpp_len = 0; *olen = 0; /* Skip costly extension if we can't use EC J-PAKE anyway */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx_is_ok != 1) { + return 0; + } +#else if (mbedtls_ecjpake_check(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx) != 0) { return 0; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, adding ecjpake_kkpp extension")); @@ -440,6 +164,17 @@ static int ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len == 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("generating new ecjpake parameters")); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, + p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len, + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE); + if (ret != 0) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_output", ret); + return ret; + } +#else ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); @@ -448,6 +183,7 @@ static int ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret); return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache = mbedtls_calloc(1, kkpp_len); if (ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache == NULL) { @@ -486,9 +222,6 @@ static int ssl_write_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t ext_len; /* - * Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 - * * struct { * opaque cid<0..2^8-1>; * } ConnectionId; @@ -555,38 +288,6 @@ static int ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - const unsigned char *end, - size_t *olen) -{ - unsigned char *p = buf; - - *olen = 0; - - if (ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED) { - return 0; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("client hello, adding truncated_hmac extension")); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 4); - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC, p, 0); - p += 2; - - *p++ = 0x00; - *p++ = 0x00; - - *olen = 4; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, @@ -598,8 +299,7 @@ static int ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *olen = 0; - if (ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED || - ssl->conf->max_minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { + if (ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED) { return 0; } @@ -631,8 +331,7 @@ static int ssl_write_extended_ms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *olen = 0; - if (ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED || - ssl->conf->max_minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { + if (ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED) { return 0; } @@ -698,67 +397,6 @@ static int ssl_write_session_ticket_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - const unsigned char *end, - size_t *olen) -{ - unsigned char *p = buf; - size_t alpnlen = 0; - const char **cur; - - *olen = 0; - - if (ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL) { - return 0; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, adding alpn extension")); - - for (cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++) { - alpnlen += strlen(*cur) + 1; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6 + alpnlen); - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN, p, 0); - p += 2; - - /* - * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; - * - * struct { - * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> - * } ProtocolNameList; - */ - - /* Skip writing extension and list length for now */ - p += 4; - - for (cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++) { - /* - * mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_alpn_protocols() checked that the length of - * protocol names is less than 255. - */ - *p = (unsigned char) strlen(*cur); - memcpy(p + 1, *cur, *p); - p += 1 + *p; - } - - *olen = p - buf; - - /* List length = olen - 2 (ext_type) - 2 (ext_len) - 2 (list_len) */ - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*olen - 6, buf, 4); - - /* Extension length = olen - 2 (ext_type) - 2 (ext_len) */ - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*olen - 4, buf, 2); - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_write_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, @@ -871,567 +509,105 @@ static int ssl_write_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ -/* - * Generate random bytes for ClientHello - */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_generate_random(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_write_client_hello_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + int uses_ec, + size_t *out_len) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->randbytes; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - mbedtls_time_t t; -#endif - - /* - * When responding to a verify request, MUST reuse random (RFC 6347 4.2.1) - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie != NULL) { - return 0; - } -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - t = mbedtls_time(NULL); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(t, p, 0); - p += 4; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, current time: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG, - (long long) t)); -#else - if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 4)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - p += 4; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ - - if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 28)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - return 0; -} + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t ext_len = 0; -/** - * \brief Validate cipher suite against config in SSL context. - * - * \param suite_info cipher suite to validate - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param min_minor_ver Minimal minor version to accept a cipher suite - * \param max_minor_ver Maximal minor version to accept a cipher suite - * - * \return 0 if valid, else 1 - */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_validate_ciphersuite( - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info, - const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - int min_minor_ver, int max_minor_ver) -{ (void) ssl; - if (suite_info == NULL) { - return 1; - } - - if (suite_info->min_minor_ver > max_minor_ver || - suite_info->max_minor_ver < min_minor_ver) { - return 1; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - (suite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS)) { - return 1; - } -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - if (ssl->conf->arc4_disabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED && - suite_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128) { - return 1; - } -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - if (suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE && - mbedtls_ecjpake_check(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx) != 0) { - return 1; - } -#endif - - /* Don't suggest PSK-based ciphersuite if no PSK is available. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) - if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(suite_info) && - ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf) == 0) { - return 1; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ - - return 0; -} - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t i, n, olen, ext_len = 0; - - unsigned char *buf; - unsigned char *p, *q; - const unsigned char *end; - - unsigned char offer_compress; - const int *ciphersuites; - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - int uses_ec = 0; -#endif - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write client hello")); - - if (ssl->conf->f_rng == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no RNG provided")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG; - } - - int renegotiating = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { - renegotiating = 1; - } -#endif - if (!renegotiating) { - ssl->major_ver = ssl->conf->min_major_ver; - ssl->minor_ver = ssl->conf->min_minor_ver; - } - - if (ssl->conf->max_major_ver == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ( - "configured max major version is invalid, consider using mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults()")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - buf = ssl->out_msg; - end = buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; - - /* - * Check if there's enough space for the first part of the ClientHello - * consisting of the 38 bytes described below, the session identifier (at - * most 32 bytes) and its length (1 byte). - * - * Use static upper bounds instead of the actual values - * to allow the compiler to optimize this away. - */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(buf, end, 38 + 1 + 32); - - /* - * The 38 first bytes of the ClientHello: - * 0 . 0 handshake type (written later) - * 1 . 3 handshake length (written later) - * 4 . 5 highest version supported - * 6 . 9 current UNIX time - * 10 . 37 random bytes - * - * The current UNIX time (4 bytes) and following 28 random bytes are written - * by ssl_generate_random() into ssl->handshake->randbytes buffer and then - * copied from there into the output buffer. - */ - - p = buf + 4; - mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ssl->conf->max_major_ver, - ssl->conf->max_minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, p); - p += 2; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, max version: [%d:%d]", - buf[4], buf[5])); - - if ((ret = ssl_generate_random(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_generate_random", ret); - return ret; - } - - memcpy(p, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 32); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, random bytes", p, 32); - p += 32; - - /* - * 38 . 38 session id length - * 39 . 39+n session id - * 39+n . 39+n DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte) - * 40+n . .. DTLS only: cookie - * .. . .. ciphersuitelist length (2 bytes) - * .. . .. ciphersuitelist - * .. . .. compression methods length (1 byte) - * .. . .. compression methods - * .. . .. extensions length (2 bytes) - * .. . .. extensions - */ - n = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; - - if (n < 16 || n > 32 || -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE || -#endif - ssl->handshake->resume == 0) { - n = 0; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) - /* - * RFC 5077 section 3.4: "When presenting a ticket, the client MAY - * generate and include a Session ID in the TLS ClientHello." - */ - if (!renegotiating) { - if (ssl->session_negotiate->ticket != NULL && - ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len != 0) { - ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, - ssl->session_negotiate->id, 32); - - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - - ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 32; - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ - - /* - * The first check of the output buffer size above ( - * MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( buf, end, 38 + 1 + 32 );) - * has checked that there is enough space in the output buffer for the - * session identifier length byte and the session identifier (n <= 32). - */ - *p++ = (unsigned char) n; - - for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { - *p++ = ssl->session_negotiate->id[i]; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n)); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, session id", buf + 39, n); - - /* - * With 'n' being the length of the session identifier - * - * 39+n . 39+n DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte) - * 40+n . .. DTLS only: cookie - * .. . .. ciphersuitelist length (2 bytes) - * .. . .. ciphersuitelist - * .. . .. compression methods length (1 byte) - * .. . .. compression methods - * .. . .. extensions length (2 bytes) - * .. . .. extensions - */ - - /* - * DTLS cookie - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 1); - - if (ssl->handshake->verify_cookie == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("no verify cookie to send")); - *p++ = 0; - } else { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, cookie", - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie, - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len); + (void) end; + (void) uses_ec; + (void) ret; + (void) ext_len; - *p++ = ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len); - memcpy(p, ssl->handshake->verify_cookie, - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len); - p += ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len; - } - } -#endif - - /* - * Ciphersuite list - */ - ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver]; - - /* Skip writing ciphersuite length for now */ - n = 0; - q = p; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); - p += 2; - - for (i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++) { - ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ciphersuites[i]); - - if (ssl_validate_ciphersuite(ciphersuite_info, ssl, - ssl->conf->min_minor_ver, - ssl->conf->max_minor_ver) != 0) { - continue; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, add ciphersuite: %#04x (%s)", - (unsigned int) ciphersuites[i], ciphersuite_info->name)); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - uses_ec |= mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(ciphersuite_info); -#endif - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); - - n++; - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ciphersuites[i], p, 0); - p += 2; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("client hello, got %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET - " ciphersuites (excluding SCSVs)", n)); - - /* - * Add TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV - */ - if (!renegotiating) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("adding EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV")); - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, p, 0); - p += 2; - n++; - } - - /* Some versions of OpenSSL don't handle it correctly if not at end */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) - if (ssl->conf->fallback == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("adding FALLBACK_SCSV")); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE, p, 0); - p += 2; - n++; - } -#endif - - *q++ = (unsigned char) (n >> 7); - *q++ = (unsigned char) (n << 1); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - offer_compress = 1; -#else - offer_compress = 0; -#endif - - /* - * We don't support compression with DTLS right now: if many records come - * in the same datagram, uncompressing one could overwrite the next one. - * We don't want to add complexity for handling that case unless there is - * an actual need for it. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - offer_compress = 0; - } -#endif - - if (offer_compress) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, compress len.: %d", 2)); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, compress alg.: %d %d", - MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE, - MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL)); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 3); - *p++ = 2; - *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE; - *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; - } else { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, compress len.: %d", 1)); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, compress alg.: %d", - MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL)); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); - *p++ = 1; - *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; - } - - /* First write extensions, then the total length */ - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - if ((ret = ssl_write_hostname_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_hostname_ext", ret); - return ret; - } - ext_len += olen; -#endif + *out_len = 0; /* Note that TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV is always added * even if MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION is not defined. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - if ((ret = ssl_write_renegotiation_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = ssl_write_renegotiation_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_renegotiation_ext", ret); return ret; } - ext_len += olen; + p += ext_len; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) - if ((ret = ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext", ret); - return ret; - } - ext_len += olen; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) if (uses_ec) { - if ((ret = ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext", ret); - return ret; - } - ext_len += olen; - - if ((ret = ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(ssl, p, end, + &ext_len)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext", ret); return ret; } - ext_len += olen; + p += ext_len; } #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - if ((ret = ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext", ret); return ret; } - ext_len += olen; + p += ext_len; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - if ((ret = ssl_write_cid_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, end, &olen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = ssl_write_cid_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_cid_ext", ret); return ret; } - ext_len += olen; + p += ext_len; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) - if ((ret = ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext(ssl, p, end, + &ext_len)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext", ret); return ret; } - ext_len += olen; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - if ((ret = ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext", ret); - return ret; - } - ext_len += olen; + p += ext_len; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - if ((ret = ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext", ret); return ret; } - ext_len += olen; + p += ext_len; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) - if ((ret = ssl_write_extended_ms_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = ssl_write_extended_ms_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_extended_ms_ext", ret); return ret; } - ext_len += olen; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) - if ((ret = ssl_write_alpn_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_alpn_ext", ret); - return ret; - } - ext_len += olen; + p += ext_len; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) - if ((ret = ssl_write_use_srtp_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = ssl_write_use_srtp_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_use_srtp_ext", ret); return ret; } - ext_len += olen; + p += ext_len; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) - if ((ret = ssl_write_session_ticket_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = ssl_write_session_ticket_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_session_ticket_ext", ret); return ret; } - ext_len += olen; + p += ext_len; #endif - /* olen unused if all extensions are disabled */ - ((void) olen); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, - ext_len)); - - if (ext_len > 0) { - /* No need to check for space here, because the extension - * writing functions already took care of that. */ - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ext_len, p, 0); - p += 2 + ext_len; - } - - ssl->out_msglen = p - buf; - ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; - ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - - ssl->state++; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(ssl); - } -#endif - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); - return ret; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - (ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret); - return ret; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write client hello")); + *out_len = (size_t) (p - buf); return 0; } @@ -1455,7 +631,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ @@ -1467,7 +643,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; @@ -1495,38 +671,13 @@ static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } return 0; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, - size_t len) -{ - if (ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED || - len != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("non-matching truncated HMAC extension")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - - ((void) buf); - - ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, @@ -1542,14 +693,14 @@ static int ssl_parse_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("CID extension unexpected")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; } if (len == 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("CID extension invalid")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } peer_cid_len = *buf++; @@ -1558,15 +709,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (peer_cid_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("CID extension invalid")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } if (len != peer_cid_len) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("CID extension invalid")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } ssl->handshake->cid_in_use = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; @@ -1587,7 +738,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t len) { if (ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED || - ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 || len != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("non-matching encrypt-then-MAC extension")); @@ -1595,7 +745,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; } ((void) buf); @@ -1613,7 +763,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t len) { if (ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED || - ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 || len != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("non-matching extended master secret extension")); @@ -1621,7 +770,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; } ((void) buf); @@ -1646,7 +795,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; } ((void) buf); @@ -1657,7 +806,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, @@ -1671,20 +821,23 @@ static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } list_size = buf[0]; p = buf + 1; while (list_size > 0) { if (p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED || - p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0]; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx.point_format = p[0]; -#endif + p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED) { +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) + ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0]; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ecjpake_set_point_format(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + p[0]); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("point format selected: %d", p[0])); return 0; } @@ -1696,9 +849,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no point format in common")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) @@ -1720,6 +874,23 @@ static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL; ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if ((ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round( + &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, buf, len, + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE)) != 0) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_input round one", ret); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return ret; + } + + return 0; +#else if ((ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, buf, len)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret); @@ -1731,6 +902,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } return 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ @@ -1749,7 +921,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; } /* @@ -1766,21 +938,21 @@ static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (len < 4) { mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } - list_len = (buf[0] << 8) | buf[1]; + list_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, 0); if (list_len != len - 2) { mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } name_len = buf[2]; if (name_len != list_len - 1) { mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* Check that the server chosen protocol was in our list and save it */ @@ -1795,7 +967,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ALPN extension: no matching protocol")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ @@ -1838,7 +1010,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * and optional srtp_mki */ if ((len < 5) || (len != (buf[4] + 5u))) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* @@ -1850,7 +1022,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * one protection profile in server Hello */ if ((buf[0] != 0) || (buf[1] != 2)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } server_protection_profile_value = (buf[2] << 8) | buf[3]; @@ -1881,7 +1053,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) { mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } /* If server does not use mki in its reply, make sure the client won't keep @@ -1900,7 +1072,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, (memcmp(ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, &buf[5], mki_len)))) { mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) if (len > 5) { @@ -1919,9 +1091,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; const unsigned char *p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); - int major_ver, minor_ver; - unsigned char cookie_len; + uint16_t dtls_legacy_version; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + uint8_t cookie_len; +#else + uint16_t cookie_len; +#endif MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse hello verify request")); @@ -1934,7 +1112,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ("incoming HelloVerifyRequest message is too short")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* @@ -1944,23 +1122,21 @@ static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * } HelloVerifyRequest; */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server version", p, 2); - mbedtls_ssl_read_version(&major_ver, &minor_ver, ssl->conf->transport, p); + dtls_legacy_version = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); p += 2; /* - * Since the RFC is not clear on this point, accept DTLS 1.0 (TLS 1.1) - * even is lower than our min version. + * Since the RFC is not clear on this point, accept DTLS 1.0 (0xfeff) + * The DTLS 1.3 (current draft) renames ProtocolVersion server_version to + * legacy_version and locks the value of legacy_version to 0xfefd (DTLS 1.2) */ - if (major_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 || - minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 || - major_ver > ssl->conf->max_major_ver || - minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver) { + if (dtls_legacy_version != 0xfefd && dtls_legacy_version != 0xfeff) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server version")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; } cookie_len = *p++; @@ -1969,24 +1145,28 @@ static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ("cookie length does not match incoming message size")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "cookie", p, cookie_len); - mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake->verify_cookie); + mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake->cookie); - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie = mbedtls_calloc(1, cookie_len); - if (ssl->handshake->verify_cookie == NULL) { + ssl->handshake->cookie = mbedtls_calloc(1, cookie_len); + if (ssl->handshake->cookie == NULL) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc failed (%d bytes)", cookie_len)); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; } - memcpy(ssl->handshake->verify_cookie, p, cookie_len); - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = cookie_len; + memcpy(ssl->handshake->cookie, p, cookie_len); + ssl->handshake->cookie_len = cookie_len; /* Start over at ClientHello */ ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO; - mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(ssl); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(ssl); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum"), ret); + return ret; + } mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(ssl); @@ -1996,33 +1176,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ -static int is_compression_bad(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char comp) -{ - int bad_comp = 0; - - /* Suppress warnings in some configurations */ - (void) ssl; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - /* See comments in ssl_write_client_hello() */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL) { - bad_comp = 1; - } -#endif - - if (comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL && - comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE) { - bad_comp = 1; - } -#else /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ - if (comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL) { - bad_comp = 1; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ - return bad_comp; -} - MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { @@ -2083,9 +1236,9 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return ssl_parse_hello_verify_request(ssl); } else { /* We made it through the verification process */ - mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake->verify_cookie); - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie = NULL; - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = 0; + mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake->cookie); + ssl->handshake->cookie = NULL; + ssl->handshake->cookie_len = 0; } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ @@ -2095,7 +1248,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* @@ -2111,27 +1264,25 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) */ buf += mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, version", buf + 0, 2); - mbedtls_ssl_read_version(&ssl->major_ver, &ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, buf + 0); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, version", buf, 2); + ssl->tls_version = (mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version) mbedtls_ssl_read_version(buf, + ssl->conf->transport); + ssl->session_negotiate->tls_version = ssl->tls_version; + ssl->session_negotiate->endpoint = ssl->conf->endpoint; - if (ssl->major_ver < ssl->conf->min_major_ver || - ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->min_minor_ver || - ssl->major_ver > ssl->conf->max_major_ver || - ssl->minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver) { + if (ssl->tls_version < ssl->conf->min_tls_version || + ssl->tls_version > ssl->conf->max_tls_version) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ( - "server version out of bounds - min: [%d:%d], server: [%d:%d], max: [%d:%d]", - ssl->conf->min_major_ver, - ssl->conf->min_minor_ver, - ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->max_major_ver, - ssl->conf->max_minor_ver)); + "server version out of bounds - min: [0x%x], server: [0x%x], max: [0x%x]", + (unsigned) ssl->conf->min_tls_version, + (unsigned) ssl->tls_version, + (unsigned) ssl->conf->max_tls_version)); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, current time: %lu", @@ -2150,12 +1301,11 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } if (ssl->in_hslen > mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 39 + n) { - ext_len = ((buf[38 + n] << 8) - | (buf[39 + n])); + ext_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, 38 + n); if ((ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4) || ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 40 + n + ext_len) { @@ -2164,7 +1314,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } } else if (ssl->in_hslen == mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 38 + n) { ext_len = 0; @@ -2172,18 +1322,18 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* ciphersuite (used later) */ - i = (buf[35 + n] << 8) | buf[36 + n]; + i = (int) MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, n + 35); /* * Read and check compression */ comp = buf[37 + n]; - if (is_compression_bad(ssl, comp)) { + if (comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("server hello, bad compression: %d", comp)); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( @@ -2218,7 +1368,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE || #endif ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite != i || - ssl->session_negotiate->compression != comp || ssl->session_negotiate->id_len != n || memcmp(ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, n) != 0) { ssl->state++; @@ -2227,7 +1376,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time(NULL); #endif ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = i; - ssl->session_negotiate->compression = comp; ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n; memcpy(ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, n); } else { @@ -2246,16 +1394,16 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) */ i = 0; while (1) { - if (ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver][i] == 0) { + if (ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[i] == 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } - if (ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver][i++] == + if (ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[i++] == ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite) { break; } @@ -2263,14 +1411,14 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite); - if (ssl_validate_ciphersuite(suite_info, ssl, ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->minor_ver) != 0) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_validate_ciphersuite(ssl, suite_info, ssl->tls_version, + ssl->tls_version) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, @@ -2278,24 +1426,19 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) if (suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA && - ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { + ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled = 1; } #endif - if (comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - && comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE -#endif - ) { + if (comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } - ssl->session_negotiate->compression = comp; ext = buf + 40 + n; @@ -2304,17 +1447,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ext_len)); while (ext_len) { - unsigned int ext_id = ((ext[0] << 8) - | (ext[1])); - unsigned int ext_size = ((ext[2] << 8) - | (ext[3])); + unsigned int ext_id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ext, 0); + unsigned int ext_size = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ext, 2); if (ext_size + 4 > ext_len) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } switch (ext_id) { @@ -2344,18 +1485,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found truncated_hmac extension")); - - if ((ret = ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext(ssl, - ext + 4, ext_size)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found CID extension")); @@ -2406,7 +1535,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, @@ -2418,7 +1548,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) @@ -2465,7 +1596,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) if (ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } } @@ -2522,7 +1653,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse server hello")); @@ -2555,12 +1686,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_dh_params(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return ret; } - dhm_actual_bitlen = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P); + dhm_actual_bitlen = mbedtls_dhm_get_bitlen(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx); if (dhm_actual_bitlen < ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("DHM prime too short: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " < %u", dhm_actual_bitlen, ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen)); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: P ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P); @@ -2572,125 +1703,125 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_dh_params(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_check_server_ecdh_params(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; - mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) - grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.id; -#else - grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp_id; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT */ - - curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(grp_id); - if (curve_info == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("ECDH curve: %s", curve_info->name)); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - if (mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(ssl, grp_id) != 0) { - return -1; - } -#else - if (ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.nbits < 163 || - ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.nbits > 521) { - return -1; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, - MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP); - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params_psa(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char **p, - unsigned char *end) +static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *end) { uint16_t tls_id; - size_t ecdh_bits = 0; - uint8_t ecpoint_len; + size_t ecpoint_len; mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + psa_key_type_t key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE; + size_t ec_bits = 0; /* - * Parse ECC group + * struct { + * ECParameters curve_params; + * ECPoint public; + * } ServerECDHParams; + * + * 1 curve_type (must be "named_curve") + * 2..3 NamedCurve + * 4 ECPoint.len + * 5+ ECPoint contents */ - if (end - *p < 4) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* First byte is curve_type; only named_curve is handled */ if (*(*p)++ != MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } /* Next two bytes are the namedcurve value */ - tls_id = *(*p)++; - tls_id <<= 8; - tls_id |= *(*p)++; + tls_id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(*p, 0); + *p += 2; /* Check it's a curve we offered */ if (mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id(ssl, tls_id) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, + ("bad server key exchange message (ECDHE curve): %u", + (unsigned) tls_id)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } - /* Convert EC group to PSA key type. */ - if ((handshake->ecdh_psa_type = - mbedtls_psa_parse_tls_ecc_group(tls_id, &ecdh_bits)) == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - if (ecdh_bits > 0xffff) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + /* Convert EC's TLS ID to PSA key type. */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(tls_id, &key_type, + &ec_bits) == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } - handshake->ecdh_bits = (uint16_t) ecdh_bits; - - /* - * Put peer's ECDH public key in the format understood by PSA. - */ + handshake->xxdh_psa_type = key_type; + handshake->xxdh_psa_bits = ec_bits; + /* Keep a copy of the peer's public key */ ecpoint_len = *(*p)++; if ((size_t) (end - *p) < ecpoint_len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } - if (mbedtls_psa_tls_ecpoint_to_psa_ec( - *p, ecpoint_len, - handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey, - sizeof(handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey), - &handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + if (ecpoint_len > sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } + memcpy(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, *p, ecpoint_len); + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = ecpoint_len; *p += ecpoint_len; + return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && - ( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_server_ecdh_params(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + uint16_t tls_id; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.id; +#else + grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp_id; +#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id(grp_id); + if (tls_id == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("ECDH curve: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_curve_name_from_tls_id(tls_id))); + + if (mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(ssl, grp_id) != 0) { + return -1; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP); + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p, @@ -2720,15 +1851,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (ssl_check_server_ecdh_params(ssl) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server key exchange message (ECDHE curve)")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ - +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || \ + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED || \ + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, @@ -2747,15 +1878,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (end - (*p) < 2) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server key exchange message (psk_identity_hint length)")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } - len = (*p)[0] << 8 | (*p)[1]; + len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(*p, 0); *p += 2; if (end - (*p) < len) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server key exchange message (psk_identity_hint length)")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* @@ -2781,7 +1912,7 @@ static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t pms_offset) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t len_bytes = ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ? 0 : 2; + size_t len_bytes = 2; unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset; mbedtls_pk_context *peer_pk; @@ -2797,9 +1928,8 @@ static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * opaque random[46]; * } PreMasterSecret; */ - mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ssl->conf->max_major_ver, - ssl->conf->max_minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, p); + mbedtls_ssl_write_version(p, ssl->conf->transport, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2); if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p + 2, 46)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_rng", ret); @@ -2836,13 +1966,10 @@ static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return ret; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) if (len_bytes == 2) { MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*olen, ssl->out_msg, offset); *olen += 2; } -#endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it. */ @@ -2853,79 +1980,12 @@ static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_signature_algorithm(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char **p, - unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, - mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg) -{ - ((void) ssl); - *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; - *pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; - - /* Only in TLS 1.2 */ - if (ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - return 0; - } - - if ((*p) + 2 > end) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - - /* - * Get hash algorithm - */ - if ((*md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash((*p)[0])) - == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("Server used unsupported HashAlgorithm %d", *(p)[0])); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - - /* - * Get signature algorithm - */ - if ((*pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig((*p)[1])) - == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("server used unsupported SignatureAlgorithm %d", (*p)[1])); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - - /* - * Check if the hash is acceptable - */ - if (mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash(ssl, *md_alg) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("server used HashAlgorithm %d that was not offered", *(p)[0])); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Server used SignatureAlgorithm %d", - (*p)[1])); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Server used HashAlgorithm %d", - (*p)[0])); - *p += 2; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *peer_key; mbedtls_pk_context *peer_pk; #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) @@ -2946,8 +2006,53 @@ static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; } - peer_key = mbedtls_pk_ec(*peer_pk); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *peer_key = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*peer_pk); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + uint16_t tls_id = 0; + psa_key_type_t key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(peer_pk); + + if (mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(ssl, grp_id) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server certificate (ECDH curve)")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE; + } + + tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id(grp_id); + if (tls_id == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ECC group %u not suported", + grp_id)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + /* If the above conversion to TLS ID was fine, then also this one will be, + so there is no need to check the return value here */ + mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(tls_id, &key_type, + &ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits); + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_type = key_type; + + /* Store peer's public key in psa format. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + memcpy(ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, peer_pk->pub_raw, peer_pk->pub_raw_len); + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = peer_pk->pub_raw_len; + ret = 0; +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + size_t olen = 0; + ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&peer_key->grp, &peer_key->Q, + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, &olen, + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, + sizeof(ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)); + + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary"), ret); + return ret; + } + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = olen; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, peer_key, MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ecdh_get_params"), ret); @@ -2956,9 +2061,9 @@ static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) if (ssl_check_server_ecdh_params(ssl) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server certificate (ECDH curve)")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE; } - +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it, * so that more RAM is available for upcoming expensive @@ -3066,7 +2171,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #endif p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server key exchange", p, end - p); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server key exchange", p, (size_t) (end - p)); #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || @@ -3078,8 +2183,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } } /* FALLTHROUGH */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ @@ -3102,30 +2207,13 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)) - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA) { - if (ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params_psa(ssl, &p, end) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server key exchange message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && - ( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || @@ -3136,7 +2224,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || @@ -3144,6 +2232,44 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* + * The first 3 bytes are: + * [0] MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE + * [1, 2] elliptic curve's TLS ID + * + * However since we only support secp256r1 for now, we check only + * that TLS ID here + */ + uint16_t read_tls_id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 1); + uint16_t exp_tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id( + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1); + + if (exp_tls_id == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + if ((*p != MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE) || + (read_tls_id != exp_tls_id)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + p += 3; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round( + &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, p, end - p, + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO)) != 0) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_input round two", ret); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } +#else ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, p, end - p); if (ret != 0) { @@ -3151,9 +2277,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ { @@ -3164,61 +2291,55 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature(ciphersuite_info)) { size_t sig_len, hashlen; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - unsigned char hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; -#else unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; -#endif + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; unsigned char *params = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); - size_t params_len = p - params; + size_t params_len = (size_t) (p - params); void *rs_ctx = NULL; + uint16_t sig_alg; mbedtls_pk_context *peer_pk; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey; +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL) { + /* Should never happen */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + /* * Handle the digitally-signed structure */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - if (ssl_parse_signature_algorithm(ssl, &p, end, - &md_alg, &pk_alg) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("bad server key exchange message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - - if (pk_alg != - mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(ciphersuite_info)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("bad server key exchange message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if (ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(ciphersuite_info); - - /* Default hash for ECDSA is SHA-1 */ - if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA && md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { - md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; - } - } else -#endif - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + sig_alg = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_pk_type_and_md_alg_from_sig_alg( + sig_alg, &pk_alg, &md_alg) != 0 && + !mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered(ssl, sig_alg) && + !mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported(ssl, sig_alg)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("bad server key exchange message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + p += 2; + + if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(peer_pk, pk_alg)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("bad server key exchange message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } /* @@ -3231,9 +2352,9 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } - sig_len = (p[0] << 8) | p[1]; + sig_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); p += 2; if (p != end - sig_len) { @@ -3242,7 +2363,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "signature", p, sig_len); @@ -3250,20 +2371,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) /* * Compute the hash that has been signed */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { - hashlen = 36; - ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls(ssl, hash, params, - params_len); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2(ssl, hash, &hashlen, params, params_len, @@ -3271,27 +2378,13 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) if (ret != 0) { return ret; } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - { + } else { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey; -#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL) { - /* Should never happen */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - /* * Verify signature */ @@ -3308,21 +2401,44 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) { rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED */ +#endif - if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable(peer_pk, - md_alg, hash, hashlen, p, sig_len, rs_ctx)) != 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS) { + mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options rsassa_pss_options; + rsassa_pss_options.mgf1_hash_id = md_alg; + rsassa_pss_options.expected_salt_len = + mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_alg); + if (rsassa_pss_options.expected_salt_len == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(pk_alg, &rsassa_pss_options, + peer_pk, + md_alg, hash, hashlen, + p, sig_len); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */ + ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable(peer_pk, + md_alg, hash, hashlen, p, sig_len, rs_ctx); + + if (ret != 0) { + int send_alert_msg = 1; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; + send_alert_msg = (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS); +#endif + if (send_alert_msg) { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED */ - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; + } +#endif return ret; } @@ -3371,6 +2487,11 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) size_t cert_type_len = 0, dn_len = 0; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + size_t sig_alg_len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + unsigned char *sig_alg; + unsigned char *dn; +#endif MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate request")); @@ -3395,12 +2516,13 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } ssl->state++; - ssl->client_auth = (ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST); + ssl->handshake->client_auth = + (ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("got %s certificate request", - ssl->client_auth ? "a" : "no")); + ssl->handshake->client_auth ? "a" : "no")); - if (ssl->client_auth == 0) { + if (ssl->handshake->client_auth == 0) { /* Current message is probably the ServerHelloDone */ ssl->keep_current_message = 1; goto exit; @@ -3437,7 +2559,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate request message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } cert_type_len = buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl)]; n = cert_type_len; @@ -3456,66 +2578,81 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate request message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* supported_signature_algorithms */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - size_t sig_alg_len = - ((buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 1 + n] << 8) - | (buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 2 + n])); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) - unsigned char *sig_alg; - size_t i; -#endif + sig_alg_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 1 + n); - /* - * The furthest access in buf is in the loop few lines below: - * sig_alg[i + 1], - * where: - * sig_alg = buf + ...hdr_len + 3 + n, - * max(i) = sig_alg_len - 1. - * Therefore the furthest access is: - * buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len - 1 + 1], - * which reduces to: - * buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len], - * which is one less than we need the buf to be. - */ - if (ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) - + 3 + n + sig_alg_len) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate request message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; - } + /* + * The furthest access in buf is in the loop few lines below: + * sig_alg[i + 1], + * where: + * sig_alg = buf + ...hdr_len + 3 + n, + * max(i) = sig_alg_len - 1. + * Therefore the furthest access is: + * buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len - 1 + 1], + * which reduces to: + * buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len], + * which is one less than we need the buf to be. + */ + if (ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 3 + n + sig_alg_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate request message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) - sig_alg = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 3 + n; - for (i = 0; i < sig_alg_len; i += 2) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("Supported Signature Algorithm found: %d,%d", - sig_alg[i], sig_alg[i + 1])); - } + sig_alg = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 3 + n; + for (size_t i = 0; i < sig_alg_len; i += 2) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("Supported Signature Algorithm found: %02x %02x", + sig_alg[i], sig_alg[i + 1])); + } #endif - n += 2 + sig_alg_len; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + n += 2 + sig_alg_len; /* certificate_authorities */ - dn_len = ((buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 1 + n] << 8) - | (buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 2 + n])); + dn_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 1 + n); n += dn_len; if (ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 3 + n) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate request message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + dn = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 3 + n - dn_len; + for (size_t i = 0, dni_len = 0; i < dn_len; i += 2 + dni_len) { + unsigned char *p = dn + i + 2; + mbedtls_x509_name name; + size_t asn1_len; + char s[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE]; + memset(&name, 0, sizeof(name)); + dni_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(dn + i, 0); + if (dni_len > dn_len - i - 2 || + mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, p + dni_len, &asn1_len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) != 0 || + mbedtls_x509_get_name(&p, p + asn1_len, &name) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate request message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("DN hint: %.*s", + mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(s, sizeof(s), &name), s)); + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(name.next); } +#endif exit: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse certificate request")); @@ -3546,7 +2683,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello_done(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello done message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } ssl->state++; @@ -3579,13 +2716,13 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) /* * DHM key exchange -- send G^X mod P */ - content_len = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len; + content_len = mbedtls_dhm_get_len(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx); MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(content_len, ssl->out_msg, 4); header_len = 6; ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, - (int) mbedtls_mpi_size(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P), + (int) mbedtls_dhm_get_len(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx), &ssl->out_msg[header_len], content_len, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); if (ret != 0) { @@ -3608,22 +2745,21 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA) { + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes; mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; - unsigned char own_pubkey[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; - size_t own_pubkey_len; - unsigned char *own_pubkey_ecpoint; - size_t own_pubkey_ecpoint_len; - header_len = 4; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Perform PSA-based ECDH computation.")); @@ -3642,71 +2778,54 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH); - psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_psa_type); - psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_bits); + psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_type); + psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_bits); /* Generate ECDH private key. */ status = psa_generate_key(&key_attributes, - &handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey); + &handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } - /* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA - * and convert it to ECPoint format used in ClientKeyExchange. */ - status = psa_export_public_key(handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey, - own_pubkey, sizeof(own_pubkey), + /* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA. + * The export format is an ECPoint structure as expected by TLS, + * but we just need to add a length byte before that. */ + unsigned char *own_pubkey = ssl->out_msg + header_len + 1; + unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + size_t own_pubkey_max_len = (size_t) (end - own_pubkey); + size_t own_pubkey_len; + + status = psa_export_public_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, + own_pubkey, own_pubkey_max_len, &own_pubkey_len); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - psa_destroy_key(handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey); - handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } - - if (mbedtls_psa_tls_psa_ec_to_ecpoint(own_pubkey, - own_pubkey_len, - &own_pubkey_ecpoint, - &own_pubkey_ecpoint_len) != 0) { - psa_destroy_key(handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey); - handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } - /* Copy ECPoint structure to outgoing message buffer. */ - ssl->out_msg[header_len] = (unsigned char) own_pubkey_ecpoint_len; - memcpy(ssl->out_msg + header_len + 1, - own_pubkey_ecpoint, own_pubkey_ecpoint_len); - content_len = own_pubkey_ecpoint_len + 1; + ssl->out_msg[header_len] = (unsigned char) own_pubkey_len; + content_len = own_pubkey_len + 1; /* The ECDH secret is the premaster secret used for key derivation. */ /* Compute ECDH shared secret. */ status = psa_raw_key_agreement(PSA_ALG_ECDH, - handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey, - handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey, - handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len, + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len, ssl->handshake->premaster, sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster), &ssl->handshake->pmslen); - destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey); - handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; if (status != PSA_SUCCESS || destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && - ( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA) { +#else /* * ECDH key exchange -- send client public value */ @@ -3766,17 +2885,144 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) { + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes; + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + /* + * opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>; + */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf) == 0) { + /* We don't offer PSK suites if we don't have a PSK, + * and we check that the server's choice is among the + * ciphersuites we offered, so this should never happen. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* uint16 to store content length */ + const size_t content_len_size = 2; + + header_len = 4; + + if (header_len + content_len_size + ssl->conf->psk_identity_len + > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("psk identity too long or SSL buffer too short")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + unsigned char *p = ssl->out_msg + header_len; + + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(ssl->conf->psk_identity_len); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(ssl->conf->psk_identity_len); + header_len += content_len_size; + + memcpy(p, ssl->conf->psk_identity, + ssl->conf->psk_identity_len); + p += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len; + + header_len += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Perform PSA-based ECDH computation.")); + + /* + * Generate EC private key for ECDHE exchange. + */ + + /* The master secret is obtained from the shared ECDH secret by + * applying the TLS 1.2 PRF with a specific salt and label. While + * the PSA Crypto API encourages combining key agreement schemes + * such as ECDH with fixed KDFs such as TLS 1.2 PRF, it does not + * yet support the provisioning of salt + label to the KDF. + * For the time being, we therefore need to split the computation + * of the ECDH secret and the application of the TLS 1.2 PRF. */ + key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH); + psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_type); + psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_bits); + + /* Generate ECDH private key. */ + status = psa_generate_key(&key_attributes, + &handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + /* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA. + * The export format is an ECPoint structure as expected by TLS, + * but we just need to add a length byte before that. */ + unsigned char *own_pubkey = p + 1; + unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + size_t own_pubkey_max_len = (size_t) (end - own_pubkey); + size_t own_pubkey_len = 0; + + status = psa_export_public_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, + own_pubkey, own_pubkey_max_len, + &own_pubkey_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + *p = (unsigned char) own_pubkey_len; + content_len = own_pubkey_len + 1; + + /* As RFC 5489 section 2, the premaster secret is formed as follows: + * - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the ECDH computation + * - the octet string produced by the ECDH computation + * - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the PSK + * - the PSK itself + */ + unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster; + const unsigned char * const pms_end = pms + + sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster); + /* uint16 to store length (in octets) of the ECDH computation */ + const size_t zlen_size = 2; + size_t zlen = 0; + + /* Perform ECDH computation after the uint16 reserved for the length */ + status = psa_raw_key_agreement(PSA_ALG_ECDH, + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len, + pms + zlen_size, + pms_end - (pms + zlen_size), + &zlen); + + destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } else if (destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(destruction_status); + } + + /* Write the ECDH computation length before the ECDH computation */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(zlen, pms, 0); + pms += zlen_size + zlen; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(ciphersuite_info)) { /* * opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>; */ - if (ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf) == 0) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf) == 0) { /* We don't offer PSK suites if we don't have a PSK, * and we check that the server's choice is among the * ciphersuites we offered, so this should never happen. */ @@ -3807,14 +3053,6 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */ - if (ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk(ssl->conf) == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("opaque PSK not supported with RSA-PSK")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - if ((ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms(ssl, header_len, &content_len, 2)) != 0) { return ret; @@ -3823,18 +3061,10 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */ - if (ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk(ssl->conf) == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("opaque PSK not supported with DHE-PSK")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - /* * ClientDiffieHellmanPublic public (DHM send G^X mod P) */ - content_len = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len; + content_len = mbedtls_dhm_get_len(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx); if (header_len + 2 + content_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) { @@ -3847,25 +3077,36 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(content_len); ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, - (int) mbedtls_mpi_size(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P), + (int) mbedtls_dhm_get_len(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx), &ssl->out_msg[header_len], content_len, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); if (ret != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_public", ret); return ret; } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) { + #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */ - if (ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk(ssl->conf) == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("opaque PSK not supported with ECDHE-PSK")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster; + unsigned char *pms_end = pms + sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster); + size_t pms_len; + + /* Write length only when we know the actual value */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + pms + 2, pms_end - (pms + 2), &pms_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret); + return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(pms_len, pms, 0); + pms += 2 + pms_len; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K); +#endif + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) { /* * ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic public; */ @@ -3882,28 +3123,21 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q); } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK && - ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 && - ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk(ssl->conf) == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("skip PMS generation for opaque PSK")); - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl, - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange)) != 0) { + (mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t) ciphersuite_info-> + key_exchange)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret); return ret; } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) @@ -3919,6 +3153,20 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) { header_len = 4; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + unsigned char *out_p = ssl->out_msg + header_len; + unsigned char *end_p = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - + header_len; + ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, + out_p, end_p - out_p, &content_len, + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO); + if (ret != 0) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_output", ret); + return ret; + } +#else ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, ssl->out_msg + header_len, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - header_len, @@ -3936,6 +3184,7 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret", ret); return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ { @@ -3997,6 +3246,11 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; size_t hashlen; void *rs_ctx = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len - (size_t) (ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf); +#else + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN - (size_t) (ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf); +#endif MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate verify")); @@ -4018,7 +3272,8 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return 0; } - if (ssl->client_auth == 0 || mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl) == NULL) { + if (ssl->handshake->client_auth == 0 || + mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl) == NULL) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate verify")); ssl->state++; return 0; @@ -4040,72 +3295,40 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) sign: #endif - ssl->handshake->calc_verify(ssl, hash, &hashlen); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if (ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - /* - * digitally-signed struct { - * opaque md5_hash[16]; - * opaque sha_hash[20]; - * }; - * - * md5_hash - * MD5(handshake_messages); - * - * sha_hash - * SHA(handshake_messages); - */ - md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; - - /* - * For ECDSA, default hash is SHA-1 only - */ - if (mbedtls_pk_can_do(mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl), MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA)) { - hash_start += 16; - hashlen -= 16; - md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - /* - * digitally-signed struct { - * opaque handshake_messages[handshake_messages_length]; - * }; - * - * Taking shortcut here. We assume that the server always allows the - * PRF Hash function and has sent it in the allowed signature - * algorithms list received in the Certificate Request message. - * - * Until we encounter a server that does not, we will take this - * shortcut. - * - * Reason: Otherwise we should have running hashes for SHA512 and - * SHA224 in order to satisfy 'weird' needs from the server - * side. - */ - if (ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { - md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384; - ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384; - } else { - md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256; - ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256; - } - ssl->out_msg[5] = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk(mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl)); + ret = ssl->handshake->calc_verify(ssl, hash, &hashlen); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("calc_verify"), ret); + return ret; + } - /* Info from md_alg will be used instead */ - hashlen = 0; - offset = 2; - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + /* + * digitally-signed struct { + * opaque handshake_messages[handshake_messages_length]; + * }; + * + * Taking shortcut here. We assume that the server always allows the + * PRF Hash function and has sent it in the allowed signature + * algorithms list received in the Certificate Request message. + * + * Until we encounter a server that does not, we will take this + * shortcut. + * + * Reason: Otherwise we should have running hashes for SHA512 and + * SHA224 in order to satisfy 'weird' needs from the server + * side. + */ + if (ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { + md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384; + ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384; + } else { + md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256; + ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256; } + ssl->out_msg[5] = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk(mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl)); + + /* Info from md_alg will be used instead */ + hashlen = 0; + offset = 2; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) { @@ -4115,7 +3338,9 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable(mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl), md_alg, hash_start, hashlen, - ssl->out_msg + 6 + offset, &n, + ssl->out_msg + 6 + offset, + out_buf_len - 6 - offset, + &n, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng, rs_ctx)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_pk_sign", ret); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) @@ -4186,21 +3411,20 @@ static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad new session ticket message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } msg = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); - lifetime = (((uint32_t) msg[0]) << 24) | (msg[1] << 16) | - (msg[2] << 8) | (msg[3]); + lifetime = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(msg, 0); - ticket_len = (msg[4] << 8) | (msg[5]); + ticket_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(msg, 4); if (ticket_len + 6 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) != ssl->in_hslen) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad new session ticket message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, ticket_len)); @@ -4218,16 +3442,14 @@ static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } if (ssl->session != NULL && ssl->session->ticket != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->session->ticket, + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ssl->session->ticket, ssl->session->ticket_len); - mbedtls_free(ssl->session->ticket); ssl->session->ticket = NULL; ssl->session->ticket_len = 0; } - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->session_negotiate->ticket, + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ssl->session_negotiate->ticket, ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len); - mbedtls_free(ssl->session_negotiate->ticket); ssl->session_negotiate->ticket = NULL; ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len = 0; @@ -4265,31 +3487,12 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { int ret = 0; - if (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER || ssl->handshake == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("client state: %d", ssl->state)); - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - /* Change state now, so that it is right in mbedtls_ssl_read_record(), used * by DTLS for dropping out-of-sequence ChangeCipherSpec records */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) if (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0) { - ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET; + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET; } #endif @@ -4302,7 +3505,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * ==> ClientHello */ case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO: - ret = ssl_write_client_hello(ssl); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_client_hello(ssl); break; /* @@ -4365,7 +3568,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * Finished */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET: + case MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET: ret = ssl_parse_new_session_ticket(ssl); break; #endif @@ -4394,4 +3597,5 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_srv.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls12_server.c similarity index 68% rename from vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_srv.c rename to vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls12_server.c index 994661a44c..b49a8ae6a6 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_srv.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls12_server.c @@ -1,31 +1,19 @@ /* - * SSLv3/TLSv1 server-side functions + * TLS server-side functions * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" -#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" -#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "debug_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "constant_time_internal.h" @@ -33,6 +21,21 @@ #include +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) +#endif +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" #endif @@ -73,69 +76,6 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_servername_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, - size_t len) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t servername_list_size, hostname_len; - const unsigned char *p; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("parse ServerName extension")); - - if (len < 2) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - servername_list_size = ((buf[0] << 8) | (buf[1])); - if (servername_list_size + 2 != len) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - p = buf + 2; - while (servername_list_size > 2) { - hostname_len = ((p[1] << 8) | p[2]); - if (hostname_len + 3 > servername_list_size) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - if (p[0] == MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME) { - ret = ssl->conf->f_sni(ssl->conf->p_sni, - ssl, p + 3, hostname_len); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_sni_wrapper", ret); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - return 0; - } - - servername_list_size -= hostname_len + 3; - p += hostname_len + 3; - } - - if (servername_list_size != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf) @@ -148,9 +88,6 @@ static int ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf) return 0; } - if (conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0) { - return 1; - } #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(conf->psk_opaque)) { @@ -158,31 +95,12 @@ static int ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - return 0; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_use_opaque_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl) -{ - if (ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL) { - /* If we've used a callback to select the PSK, - * the static configuration is irrelevant. */ - - if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque)) { - return 1; - } - - return 0; - } - - if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->conf->psk_opaque)) { + if (conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0) { return 1; } return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL @@ -200,7 +118,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("non-matching renegotiation info")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ @@ -209,7 +127,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("non-zero length renegotiation info")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; @@ -218,123 +136,77 @@ static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return 0; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) - +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) /* - * Status of the implementation of signature-algorithms extension: + * Function for parsing a supported groups (TLS 1.3) or supported elliptic + * curves (TLS 1.2) extension. + * + * The "extension_data" field of a supported groups extension contains a + * "NamedGroupList" value (TLS 1.3 RFC8446): + * enum { + * secp256r1(0x0017), secp384r1(0x0018), secp521r1(0x0019), + * x25519(0x001D), x448(0x001E), + * ffdhe2048(0x0100), ffdhe3072(0x0101), ffdhe4096(0x0102), + * ffdhe6144(0x0103), ffdhe8192(0x0104), + * ffdhe_private_use(0x01FC..0x01FF), + * ecdhe_private_use(0xFE00..0xFEFF), + * (0xFFFF) + * } NamedGroup; + * struct { + * NamedGroup named_group_list<2..2^16-1>; + * } NamedGroupList; * - * Currently, we are only considering the signature-algorithm extension - * to pick a ciphersuite which allows us to send the ServerKeyExchange - * message with a signature-hash combination that the user allows. + * The "extension_data" field of a supported elliptic curves extension contains + * a "NamedCurveList" value (TLS 1.2 RFC 8422): + * enum { + * deprecated(1..22), + * secp256r1 (23), secp384r1 (24), secp521r1 (25), + * x25519(29), x448(30), + * reserved (0xFE00..0xFEFF), + * deprecated(0xFF01..0xFF02), + * (0xFFFF) + * } NamedCurve; + * struct { + * NamedCurve named_curve_list<2..2^16-1> + * } NamedCurveList; * - * We do *not* check whether all certificates in our certificate - * chain are signed with an allowed signature-hash pair. - * This needs to be done at a later stage. + * The TLS 1.3 supported groups extension was defined to be a compatible + * generalization of the TLS 1.2 supported elliptic curves extension. They both + * share the same extension identifier. * */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_signature_algorithms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, - size_t len) -{ - size_t sig_alg_list_size; - - const unsigned char *p; - const unsigned char *end = buf + len; - - mbedtls_md_type_t md_cur; - mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_cur; - - if (len < 2) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - sig_alg_list_size = ((buf[0] << 8) | (buf[1])); - if (sig_alg_list_size + 2 != len || - sig_alg_list_size % 2 != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - /* Currently we only guarantee signing the ServerKeyExchange message according - * to the constraints specified in this extension (see above), so it suffices - * to remember only one suitable hash for each possible signature algorithm. - * - * This will change when we also consider certificate signatures, - * in which case we will need to remember the whole signature-hash - * pair list from the extension. - */ - - for (p = buf + 2; p < end; p += 2) { - /* Silently ignore unknown signature or hash algorithms. */ - - if ((sig_cur = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig(p[1])) == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext" - " unknown sig alg encoding %d", p[1])); - continue; - } - - /* Check if we support the hash the user proposes */ - md_cur = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(p[0]); - if (md_cur == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext:" - " unknown hash alg encoding %d", p[0])); - continue; - } - - if (mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash(ssl, md_cur) == 0) { - mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add(&ssl->handshake->hash_algs, sig_cur, md_cur); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext:" - " match sig %u and hash %u", - (unsigned) sig_cur, (unsigned) md_cur)); - } else { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: " - "hash alg %u not supported", (unsigned) md_cur)); - } - } - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_supported_elliptic_curves(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, - size_t len) +static int ssl_parse_supported_groups_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) { size_t list_size, our_size; const unsigned char *p; - const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info, **curves; + uint16_t *curves_tls_id; if (len < 2) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } - list_size = ((buf[0] << 8) | (buf[1])); + list_size = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, 0); if (list_size + 2 != len || list_size % 2 != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* Should never happen unless client duplicates the extension */ - if (ssl->handshake->curves != NULL) { + if (ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id != NULL) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } /* Don't allow our peer to make us allocate too much memory, @@ -344,20 +216,22 @@ static int ssl_parse_supported_elliptic_curves(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, our_size = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX; } - if ((curves = mbedtls_calloc(our_size, sizeof(*curves))) == NULL) { + if ((curves_tls_id = mbedtls_calloc(our_size, + sizeof(*curves_tls_id))) == NULL) { mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; } - ssl->handshake->curves = curves; + ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id = curves_tls_id; p = buf + 2; while (list_size > 0 && our_size > 1) { - curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id((p[0] << 8) | p[1]); + uint16_t curr_tls_id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); - if (curve_info != NULL) { - *curves++ = curve_info; + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(curr_tls_id) != + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { + *curves_tls_id++ = curr_tls_id; our_size--; } @@ -380,7 +254,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } list_size = buf[0]; @@ -388,12 +262,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, while (list_size > 0) { if (p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED || p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0]; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx.point_format = p[0]; -#endif +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ecjpake_set_point_format(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + p[0]); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("point format selected: %d", p[0])); return 0; } @@ -404,7 +281,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) @@ -415,11 +293,32 @@ static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - if (mbedtls_ecjpake_check(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx) != 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx_is_ok != 1) +#else + if (mbedtls_ecjpake_check(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx) != 0) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("skip ecjpake kkpp extension")); return 0; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if ((ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round( + &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, buf, len, + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE)) != 0) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_input round one", ret); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + + return ret; + } +#else if ((ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, buf, len)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret); @@ -427,6 +326,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /* Only mark the extension as OK when we're sure it is */ ssl->handshake->cli_exts |= MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK; @@ -445,7 +345,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code = buf[0]; @@ -467,13 +367,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } /* - * Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 - * * struct { * opaque cid<0..2^8-1>; * } ConnectionId; @@ -482,8 +379,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (len < 1) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } peer_cid_len = *buf++; @@ -492,8 +389,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (len != peer_cid_len) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* Ignore CID if the user has disabled its use. */ @@ -508,7 +405,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } ssl->handshake->cid_in_use = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; @@ -522,29 +419,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, - size_t len) -{ - if (len != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - ((void) buf); - - if (ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED) { - ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED; - } - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, @@ -555,13 +429,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } ((void) buf); - if (ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED && - ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { + if (ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED) { ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED; } @@ -579,13 +452,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } ((void) buf); - if (ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED && - ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { + if (ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED) { ssl->handshake->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED; } @@ -667,88 +539,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) -{ - size_t list_len, cur_len, ours_len; - const unsigned char *theirs, *start, *end; - const char **ours; - - /* If ALPN not configured, just ignore the extension */ - if (ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL) { - return 0; - } - - /* - * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; - * - * struct { - * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> - * } ProtocolNameList; - */ - - /* Min length is 2 (list_len) + 1 (name_len) + 1 (name) */ - if (len < 4) { - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - list_len = (buf[0] << 8) | buf[1]; - if (list_len != len - 2) { - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - /* - * Validate peer's list (lengths) - */ - start = buf + 2; - end = buf + len; - for (theirs = start; theirs != end; theirs += cur_len) { - cur_len = *theirs++; - - /* Current identifier must fit in list */ - if (cur_len > (size_t) (end - theirs)) { - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - /* Empty strings MUST NOT be included */ - if (cur_len == 0) { - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - } - - /* - * Use our order of preference - */ - for (ours = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *ours != NULL; ours++) { - ours_len = strlen(*ours); - for (theirs = start; theirs != end; theirs += cur_len) { - cur_len = *theirs++; - - if (cur_len == ours_len && - memcmp(theirs, *ours, cur_len) == 0) { - ssl->alpn_chosen = *ours; - return 0; - } - } - } - - /* If we get there, no match was found */ - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, @@ -788,8 +578,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, */ if (len < size_of_lengths) { mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; @@ -802,8 +592,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (profile_length > len - size_of_lengths || profile_length % 2 != 0) { /* profiles are 2 bytes long, so the length must be even */ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* * parse the extension list values are defined in @@ -841,8 +631,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (mki_length > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH || mki_length + profile_length + size_of_lengths != len) { mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* Parse the mki only if present and mki is supported locally */ @@ -868,24 +658,26 @@ static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* * Return 0 if the given key uses one of the acceptable curves, -1 otherwise */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_check_key_curve(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, - const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curves) + uint16_t *curves_tls_id) { - const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **crv = curves; - mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk)->grp.id; + uint16_t *curr_tls_id = curves_tls_id; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk); + mbedtls_ecp_group_id curr_grp_id; - while (*crv != NULL) { - if ((*crv)->grp_id == grp_id) { + while (*curr_tls_id != 0) { + curr_grp_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(*curr_tls_id); + if (curr_grp_id == grp_id) { return 0; } - crv++; + curr_tls_id++; } return -1; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ /* * Try picking a certificate for this ciphersuite, @@ -895,9 +687,16 @@ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_pick_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info) { - mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur, *list, *fallback = NULL; + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur, *list; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_algorithm_t pk_alg = + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_alg(ciphersuite_info); + psa_key_usage_t pk_usage = + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_usage(ciphersuite_info); +#else mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(ciphersuite_info); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ uint32_t flags; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) @@ -907,7 +706,13 @@ static int ssl_pick_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #endif list = ssl->conf->key_cert; - if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) { + int pk_alg_is_none = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + pk_alg_is_none = (pk_alg == PSA_ALG_NONE); +#else + pk_alg_is_none = (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if (pk_alg_is_none) { return 0; } @@ -923,7 +728,21 @@ static int ssl_pick_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "candidate certificate chain, certificate", cur->cert); - if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(&cur->cert->pk, pk_alg)) { + int key_type_matches = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + key_type_matches = ((ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start != NULL || + ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start != NULL || + mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(cur->key, pk_alg, pk_usage)) && + mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(&cur->cert->pk, pk_alg, pk_usage)); +#else + key_type_matches = ( + mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(cur->key, pk_alg, pk_usage)); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ +#else + key_type_matches = mbedtls_pk_can_do(&cur->cert->pk, pk_alg); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if (!key_type_matches) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("certificate mismatch: key type")); continue; } @@ -943,39 +762,19 @@ static int ssl_pick_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, continue; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA && - ssl_check_key_curve(&cur->cert->pk, ssl->handshake->curves) != 0) { + ssl_check_key_curve(&cur->cert->pk, + ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("certificate mismatch: elliptic curve")); continue; } #endif - /* - * Try to select a SHA-1 certificate for pre-1.2 clients, but still - * present them a SHA-higher cert rather than failing if it's the only - * one we got that satisfies the other conditions. - */ - if (ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 && - cur->cert->sig_md != MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1) { - if (fallback == NULL) { - fallback = cur; - } - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("certificate not preferred: " - "sha-2 with pre-TLS 1.2 client")); - continue; - } - } - /* If we get there, we got a winner */ break; } - if (cur == NULL) { - cur = fallback; - } - /* Do not update ssl->handshake->key_cert unless there is a match */ if (cur != NULL) { ssl->handshake->key_cert = cur; @@ -998,8 +797,7 @@ static int ssl_ciphersuite_match(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, { const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_type; #endif @@ -1012,27 +810,12 @@ static int ssl_ciphersuite_match(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("trying ciphersuite: %#04x (%s)", (unsigned int) suite_id, suite_info->name)); - if (suite_info->min_minor_ver > ssl->minor_ver || - suite_info->max_minor_ver < ssl->minor_ver) { + if (suite_info->min_tls_version > ssl->tls_version || + suite_info->max_tls_version < ssl->tls_version) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: version")); return 0; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - (suite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS)) { - return 0; - } -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - if (ssl->conf->arc4_disabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED && - suite_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: rc4")); - return 0; - } -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) if (suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE && (ssl->handshake->cli_exts & MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK) == 0) { @@ -1043,10 +826,11 @@ static int ssl_ciphersuite_match(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(suite_info) && - (ssl->handshake->curves == NULL || - ssl->handshake->curves[0] == NULL)) { + (ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id == NULL || + ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id[0] == 0)) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: " "no common elliptic curve")); return 0; @@ -1063,24 +847,6 @@ static int ssl_ciphersuite_match(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, } #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) - /* If the ciphersuite requires signing, check whether - * a suitable hash algorithm is present. */ - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - sig_type = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(suite_info); - if (sig_type != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE && - mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find(&ssl->handshake->hash_algs, - sig_type) == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: no suitable hash algorithm " - "for signature algorithm %u", (unsigned) sig_type)); - return 0; - } - } - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /* * Final check: if ciphersuite requires us to have a @@ -1096,272 +862,23 @@ static int ssl_ciphersuite_match(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, } #endif - *ciphersuite_info = suite_info; - return 0; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_client_hello_v2(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - int ret, got_common_suite; - unsigned int i, j; - size_t n; - unsigned int ciph_len, sess_len, chal_len; - unsigned char *buf, *p; - const int *ciphersuites; - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse client hello v2")); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("client hello v2 illegal for renegotiation")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ - - buf = ssl->in_hdr; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "record header", buf, 5); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v2, message type: %d", - buf[2])); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v2, message len.: %d", - ((buf[0] & 0x7F) << 8) | buf[1])); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v2, max. version: [%d:%d]", - buf[3], buf[4])); - - /* - * SSLv2 Client Hello - * - * Record layer: - * 0 . 1 message length - * - * SSL layer: - * 2 . 2 message type - * 3 . 4 protocol version - */ - if (buf[2] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO || - buf[3] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - n = ((buf[0] << 8) | buf[1]) & 0x7FFF; - - if (n < 17 || n > 512) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - ssl->major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3; - ssl->minor_ver = (buf[4] <= ssl->conf->max_minor_ver) - ? buf[4] : ssl->conf->max_minor_ver; - - if (ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->min_minor_ver) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("client only supports ssl smaller than minimum" - " [%d:%d] < [%d:%d]", - ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->min_major_ver, ssl->conf->min_minor_ver)); - - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - } - - ssl->handshake->max_major_ver = buf[3]; - ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver = buf[4]; - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(ssl, 2 + n)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret); - return ret; - } - - ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf + 2, n); - - buf = ssl->in_msg; - n = ssl->in_left - 5; - - /* - * 0 . 1 ciphersuitelist length - * 2 . 3 session id length - * 4 . 5 challenge length - * 6 . .. ciphersuitelist - * .. . .. session id - * .. . .. challenge - */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "record contents", buf, n); - - ciph_len = (buf[0] << 8) | buf[1]; - sess_len = (buf[2] << 8) | buf[3]; - chal_len = (buf[4] << 8) | buf[5]; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciph_len: %u, sess_len: %u, chal_len: %u", - ciph_len, sess_len, chal_len)); - - /* - * Make sure each parameter length is valid - */ - if (ciph_len < 3 || (ciph_len % 3) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - if (sess_len > 32) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - if (chal_len < 8 || chal_len > 32) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - if (n != 6 + ciph_len + sess_len + chal_len) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, ciphersuitelist", - buf + 6, ciph_len); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, session id", - buf + 6 + ciph_len, sess_len); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, challenge", - buf + 6 + ciph_len + sess_len, chal_len); - - p = buf + 6 + ciph_len; - ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = sess_len; - memset(ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0, - sizeof(ssl->session_negotiate->id)); - memcpy(ssl->session_negotiate->id, p, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len); - - p += sess_len; - memset(ssl->handshake->randbytes, 0, 64); - memcpy(ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32 - chal_len, p, chal_len); - - /* - * Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV - */ - for (i = 0, p = buf + 6; i < ciph_len; i += 3, p += 3) { - if (p[0] == 0 && p[1] == 0 && p[2] == MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO ")); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("received RENEGOTIATION SCSV " - "during renegotiation")); - - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ - ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; - break; - } - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) - for (i = 0, p = buf + 6; i < ciph_len; i += 3, p += 3) { - if (p[0] == 0 && - MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 1) != MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("received FALLBACK_SCSV")); - - if (ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->max_minor_ver) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("inapropriate fallback")); - - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); - - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - break; - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV */ - - got_common_suite = 0; - ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver]; - ciphersuite_info = NULL; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE) - for (j = 0, p = buf + 6; j < ciph_len; j += 3, p += 3) { - for (i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++) { - if (p[0] != 0 || - MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 1) != ciphersuites[i]) { - continue; - } - - got_common_suite = 1; - - if ((ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match(ssl, ciphersuites[i], - &ciphersuite_info)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - if (ciphersuite_info != NULL) { - goto have_ciphersuite_v2; - } - } - } -#else - for (i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++) { - for (j = 0, p = buf + 6; j < ciph_len; j += 3, p += 3) { - if (p[0] != 0 || - MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 1) != ciphersuites[i]) { - continue; - } - - got_common_suite = 1; - - if ((ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match(ssl, ciphersuites[i], - &ciphersuite_info)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - if (ciphersuite_info != NULL) { - goto have_ciphersuite_v2; - } - } - } -#endif - - if (got_common_suite) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got ciphersuites in common, " - "but none of them usable")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE; - } else { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no ciphersuites in common")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN; - } - -have_ciphersuite_v2: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("selected ciphersuite: %s", ciphersuite_info->name)); - - ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = ciphersuites[i]; - ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info; - - /* - * SSLv2 Client Hello relevant renegotiation security checks - */ - if (ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && - ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + /* If the ciphersuite requires signing, check whether + * a suitable hash algorithm is present. */ + sig_type = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(suite_info); + if (sig_type != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE && + mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg( + ssl, mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_type)) == MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: no suitable hash algorithm " + "for signature algorithm %u", (unsigned) sig_type)); + return 0; } - ssl->in_left = 0; - ssl->state++; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse client hello v2")); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + *ciphersuite_info = suite_info; return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO */ /* This function doesn't alert on errors that happen early during ClientHello parsing because they might indicate that the client is @@ -1383,20 +900,18 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) int handshake_failure = 0; const int *ciphersuites; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; - int major, minor; /* If there is no signature-algorithm extension present, * we need to fall back to the default values for allowed * signature-hash pairs. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) int sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 0; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse client hello")); - int renegotiating = 0; + int renegotiating; + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) read_record_header: #endif @@ -1404,13 +919,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * If renegotiating, then the input was read with mbedtls_ssl_read_record(), * otherwise read it ourselves manually in order to support SSLv2 * ClientHello, which doesn't use the same record layer format. + * Otherwise in a scenario of TLS 1.3/TLS 1.2 version negotiation, the + * ClientHello has been already fully fetched by the TLS 1.3 code and the + * flag ssl->keep_current_message is raised. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { - renegotiating = 1; - } + renegotiating = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + renegotiating = (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE); #endif - if (!renegotiating) { + if (!renegotiating && !ssl->keep_current_message) { if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(ssl, 5)) != 0) { /* No alert on a read error. */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret); @@ -1420,24 +937,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) buf = ssl->in_hdr; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) - int is_dtls = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - is_dtls = 1; - } -#endif - if (!is_dtls) { - if ((buf[0] & 0x80) != 0) { - return ssl_parse_client_hello_v2(ssl); - } - } -#endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "record header", buf, mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl)); /* - * SSLv3/TLS Client Hello + * TLS Client Hello * * Record layer: * 0 . 0 message type @@ -1445,31 +948,20 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * 3 . 11 DTLS: epoch + record sequence number * 3 . 4 message length */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, message type: %d", + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, message type: %d", buf[0])); if (buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, message len.: %d", - (ssl->in_len[0] << 8) | ssl->in_len[1])); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, message len.: %d", + MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_len, 0))); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, protocol version: [%d:%d]", + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, protocol version: [%d:%d]", buf[1], buf[2])); - mbedtls_ssl_read_version(&major, &minor, ssl->conf->transport, buf + 1); - - /* According to RFC 5246 Appendix E.1, the version here is typically - * "{03,00}, the lowest version number supported by the client, [or] the - * value of ClientHello.client_version", so the only meaningful check here - * is the major version shouldn't be less than 3 */ - if (major < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - /* For DTLS if this is the initial handshake, remember the client sequence * number to use it in our next message (RFC 6347 4.2.1) */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) @@ -1481,10 +973,11 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) /* Epoch should be 0 for initial handshakes */ if (ssl->in_ctr[0] != 0 || ssl->in_ctr[1] != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } - memcpy(ssl->cur_out_ctr + 2, ssl->in_ctr + 2, 6); + memcpy(&ssl->cur_out_ctr[2], ssl->in_ctr + 2, + sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr) - 2); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) if (mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check(ssl) != 0) { @@ -1500,7 +993,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - msg_len = (ssl->in_len[0] << 8) | ssl->in_len[1]; + msg_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_len, 0); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { @@ -1509,31 +1002,39 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } else #endif { - if (msg_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } + if (ssl->keep_current_message) { + ssl->keep_current_message = 0; + } else { + if (msg_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(ssl, - mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl) + msg_len)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret); - return ret; - } + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl) + msg_len)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret); + return ret; + } - /* Done reading this record, get ready for the next one */ + /* Done reading this record, get ready for the next one */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - ssl->next_record_offset = msg_len + mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl); - } else + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + ssl->next_record_offset = msg_len + mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl); + } else #endif - ssl->in_left = 0; + ssl->in_left = 0; + } } buf = ssl->in_msg; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "record contents", buf, msg_len); - ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf, msg_len); + ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf, msg_len); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("update_checksum"), ret); + return ret; + } /* * Handshake layer: @@ -1545,31 +1046,36 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) */ if (msg_len < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl)) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, handshake type: %d", buf[0])); if (buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; } + { + size_t handshake_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(buf, 1); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, handshake len.: %u", + (unsigned) handshake_len)); + + /* The record layer has a record size limit of 2^14 - 1 and + * fragmentation is not supported, so buf[1] should be zero. */ + if (buf[1] != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message: %u != 0", + (unsigned) buf[1])); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, handshake len.: %d", - (buf[1] << 16) | (buf[2] << 8) | buf[3])); - - if (buf[1] != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message: %u != 0", - (unsigned) buf[1])); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - /* We don't support fragmentation of ClientHello (yet?) */ - if (msg_len != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + ((buf[2] << 8) | buf[3])) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message: %u != %u + %u", - (unsigned) msg_len, - (unsigned) mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl), - (unsigned) (buf[2] << 8) | buf[3])); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + /* We don't support fragmentation of ClientHello (yet?) */ + if (msg_len != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + handshake_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message: %u != %u + %u", + (unsigned) msg_len, + (unsigned) mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl), + (unsigned) handshake_len)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) @@ -1581,39 +1087,39 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) { /* This couldn't be done in ssl_prepare_handshake_record() */ - unsigned int cli_msg_seq = (ssl->in_msg[4] << 8) | - ssl->in_msg[5]; - + unsigned int cli_msg_seq = (unsigned int) MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_msg, 4); if (cli_msg_seq != ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message_seq: " "%u (expected %u)", cli_msg_seq, ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq)); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq++; } else #endif { - unsigned int cli_msg_seq = (ssl->in_msg[4] << 8) | - ssl->in_msg[5]; + unsigned int cli_msg_seq = (unsigned int) MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_msg, 4); ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq = cli_msg_seq; ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq = cli_msg_seq + 1; } - - /* - * For now we don't support fragmentation, so make sure - * fragment_offset == 0 and fragment_length == length - */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( - 4, ("fragment_offset=%u fragment_length=%u length=%u", - (unsigned) (ssl->in_msg[6] << 16 | ssl->in_msg[7] << 8 | ssl->in_msg[8]), - (unsigned) (ssl->in_msg[9] << 16 | ssl->in_msg[10] << 8 | ssl->in_msg[11]), - (unsigned) (ssl->in_msg[1] << 16 | ssl->in_msg[2] << 8 | ssl->in_msg[3]))); - if (ssl->in_msg[6] != 0 || ssl->in_msg[7] != 0 || ssl->in_msg[8] != 0 || - memcmp(ssl->in_msg + 1, ssl->in_msg + 9, 3) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ClientHello fragmentation not supported")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + { + /* + * For now we don't support fragmentation, so make sure + * fragment_offset == 0 and fragment_length == length + */ + size_t fragment_offset, fragment_length, length; + fragment_offset = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(ssl->in_msg, 6); + fragment_length = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(ssl->in_msg, 9); + length = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(ssl->in_msg, 1); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 4, ("fragment_offset=%u fragment_length=%u length=%u", + (unsigned) fragment_offset, (unsigned) fragment_length, + (unsigned) length)); + if (fragment_offset != 0 || length != fragment_length) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ClientHello fragmentation not supported")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ @@ -1622,11 +1128,11 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) msg_len -= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); /* - * ClientHello layer: + * ClientHello layout: * 0 . 1 protocol version * 2 . 33 random bytes (starting with 4 bytes of Unix time) - * 34 . 35 session id length (1 byte) - * 35 . 34+x session id + * 34 . 34 session id length (1 byte) + * 35 . 34+x session id, where x = session id length from byte 34 * 35+x . 35+x DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte) * 36+x . .. DTLS only: cookie * .. . .. ciphersuite list length (2 bytes) @@ -1644,7 +1150,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) */ if (msg_len < 38) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* @@ -1652,28 +1158,16 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, version", buf, 2); - mbedtls_ssl_read_version(&ssl->major_ver, &ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, buf); + ssl->tls_version = (mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version) mbedtls_ssl_read_version(buf, + ssl->conf->transport); + ssl->session_negotiate->tls_version = ssl->tls_version; + ssl->session_negotiate->endpoint = ssl->conf->endpoint; - ssl->handshake->max_major_ver = ssl->major_ver; - ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver = ssl->minor_ver; - - if (ssl->major_ver < ssl->conf->min_major_ver || - ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->min_minor_ver) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("client only supports ssl smaller than minimum" - " [%d:%d] < [%d:%d]", - ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->min_major_ver, ssl->conf->min_minor_ver)); + if (ssl->tls_version != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("server only supports TLS 1.2")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - } - - if (ssl->major_ver > ssl->conf->max_major_ver) { - ssl->major_ver = ssl->conf->max_major_ver; - ssl->minor_ver = ssl->conf->max_minor_ver; - } else if (ssl->minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver) { - ssl->minor_ver = ssl->conf->max_minor_ver; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; } /* @@ -1693,7 +1187,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, session id", buf + 35, sess_len); @@ -1715,8 +1209,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) if (cookie_offset + 1 + cookie_len + 2 > msg_len) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, cookie", @@ -1732,10 +1226,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) buf + cookie_offset + 1, cookie_len, ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("cookie verification failed")); - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = 1; + ssl->handshake->cookie_verify_result = 1; } else { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("cookie verification passed")); - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = 0; + ssl->handshake->cookie_verify_result = 0; } } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ @@ -1744,7 +1238,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) if (cookie_len != 0) { /* This may be an attacker's probe, so don't send an alert */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("cookie verification skipped")); @@ -1758,8 +1252,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ ciph_offset = 35 + sess_len; - ciph_len = (buf[ciph_offset + 0] << 8) - | (buf[ciph_offset + 1]); + ciph_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, ciph_offset); if (ciph_len < 2 || ciph_len + 2 + ciph_offset + 1 > msg_len || /* 1 for comp. alg. len */ @@ -1767,14 +1260,17 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, ciphersuitelist", buf + ciph_offset + 2, ciph_len); /* - * Check the compression algorithms length and pick one + * Check the compression algorithm's length. + * The list contents are ignored because implementing + * MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL is mandatory and is the only + * option supported by Mbed TLS. */ comp_offset = ciph_offset + 2 + ciph_len; @@ -1786,33 +1282,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, compression", buf + comp_offset + 1, comp_len); - ssl->session_negotiate->compression = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - for (i = 0; i < comp_len; ++i) { - if (buf[comp_offset + 1 + i] == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE) { - ssl->session_negotiate->compression = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE; - break; - } - } -#endif - - /* See comments in ssl_write_client_hello() */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - ssl->session_negotiate->compression = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; - } -#endif - - /* Do not parse the extensions if the protocol is SSLv3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if ((ssl->major_ver != 3) || (ssl->minor_ver != 0)) { -#endif /* * Check the extension length */ @@ -1822,17 +1297,16 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } - ext_len = (buf[ext_offset + 0] << 8) - | (buf[ext_offset + 1]); + ext_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, ext_offset); if (msg_len != ext_offset + 2 + ext_len) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } } else { ext_len = 0; @@ -1848,26 +1322,23 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } - ext_id = ((ext[0] << 8) | (ext[1])); - ext_size = ((ext[2] << 8) | (ext[3])); + ext_id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ext, 0); + ext_size = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ext, 2); if (ext_size + 4 > ext_len) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } switch (ext_id) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found ServerName extension")); - if (ssl->conf->f_sni == NULL) { - break; - } - - ret = ssl_parse_servername_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_server_name_ext(ssl, ext + 4, + ext + 4 + ext_size); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } @@ -1886,27 +1357,26 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } break; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found signature_algorithms extension")); - ret = ssl_parse_signature_algorithms_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext + 4 + ext_size); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 1; break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES: + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found supported elliptic curves extension")); - ret = ssl_parse_supported_elliptic_curves(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); + ret = ssl_parse_supported_groups_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } @@ -1921,7 +1391,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return ret; } break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED || \ + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) @@ -1946,17 +1417,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found truncated hmac extension")); - - ret = ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found CID extension")); @@ -1966,7 +1426,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return ret; } break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC: @@ -2005,7 +1465,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found alpn extension")); - ret = ssl_parse_alpn_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_alpn_ext(ssl, ext + 4, + ext + 4 + ext_size); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } @@ -2031,48 +1492,35 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ext_len -= 4 + ext_size; ext += 4 + ext_size; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -} -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) - for (i = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; i < ciph_len; i += 2, p += 2) { - if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0) == MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("received FALLBACK_SCSV")); - - if (ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->max_minor_ver) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("inapropriate fallback")); - - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); - - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - } - - break; - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) /* * Try to fall back to default hash SHA1 if the client * hasn't provided any preferred signature-hash combinations. */ - if (sig_hash_alg_ext_present == 0) { - mbedtls_md_type_t md_default = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; + if (!sig_hash_alg_ext_present) { + uint16_t *received_sig_algs = ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs; + const uint16_t default_sig_algs[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1), +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1), +#endif + MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE + }; - if (mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash(ssl, md_default) != 0) { - md_default = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; - } + MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(default_sig_algs) / sizeof(default_sig_algs[0]) + <= MBEDTLS_RECEIVED_SIG_ALGS_SIZE, + "default_sig_algs is too big"); - mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash(&ssl->handshake->hash_algs, md_default); + memcpy(received_sig_algs, default_sig_algs, sizeof(default_sig_algs)); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ /* * Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV @@ -2086,7 +1534,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) "during renegotiation")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } #endif ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; @@ -2124,68 +1572,82 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) if (handshake_failure == 1) { mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + /* + * Server certification selection (after processing TLS extensions) + */ + if (ssl->conf->f_cert_cb && (ret = ssl->conf->f_cert_cb(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_cert_cb", ret); + return ret; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + ssl->handshake->sni_name = NULL; + ssl->handshake->sni_name_len = 0; +#endif /* * Search for a matching ciphersuite * (At the end because we need information from the EC-based extensions - * and certificate from the SNI callback triggered by the SNI extension.) + * and certificate from the SNI callback triggered by the SNI extension + * or certificate from server certificate selection callback.) */ got_common_suite = 0; - ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver]; + ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list; ciphersuite_info = NULL; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE) - for (j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2) { - for (i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++) { - if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0) != ciphersuites[i]) { - continue; - } - got_common_suite = 1; + if (ssl->conf->respect_cli_pref == MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_CLIENT) { + for (j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2) { + for (i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++) { + if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0) != ciphersuites[i]) { + continue; + } - if ((ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match(ssl, ciphersuites[i], - &ciphersuite_info)) != 0) { - return ret; - } + got_common_suite = 1; - if (ciphersuite_info != NULL) { - goto have_ciphersuite; + if ((ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match(ssl, ciphersuites[i], + &ciphersuite_info)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (ciphersuite_info != NULL) { + goto have_ciphersuite; + } } } - } -#else - for (i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++) { - for (j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2) { - if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0) != ciphersuites[i]) { - continue; - } + } else { + for (i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++) { + for (j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2) { + if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0) != ciphersuites[i]) { + continue; + } - got_common_suite = 1; + got_common_suite = 1; - if ((ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match(ssl, ciphersuites[i], - &ciphersuite_info)) != 0) { - return ret; - } + if ((ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match(ssl, ciphersuites[i], + &ciphersuite_info)) != 0) { + return ret; + } - if (ciphersuite_info != NULL) { - goto have_ciphersuite; + if (ciphersuite_info != NULL) { + goto have_ciphersuite; + } } } } -#endif if (got_common_suite) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got ciphersuites in common, " "but none of them usable")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } else { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no ciphersuites in common")); mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } have_ciphersuite: @@ -2204,19 +1666,16 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) /* Debugging-only output for testsuite */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(ciphersuite_info); - if (sig_alg != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) { - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find(&ssl->handshake->hash_algs, - sig_alg); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: %d", - mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(md_alg))); - } else { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("no hash algorithm for signature algorithm " - "%u - should not happen", (unsigned) sig_alg)); - } + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(ciphersuite_info); + if (sig_alg != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) { + unsigned int sig_hash = mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg( + ssl, mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_alg)); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: %u", + sig_hash)); + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("no hash algorithm for signature algorithm " + "%u - should not happen", (unsigned) sig_alg)); } #endif @@ -2225,30 +1684,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return 0; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) -static void ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - size_t *olen) -{ - unsigned char *p = buf; - - if (ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED) { - *olen = 0; - return; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding truncated hmac extension")); - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC, p, 0); - p += 2; - - *p++ = 0x00; - *p++ = 0x00; - - *olen = 4; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) static void ssl_write_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, @@ -2276,9 +1711,6 @@ static void ssl_write_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding CID extension")); /* - * Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 - * * struct { * opaque cid<0..2^8-1>; * } ConnectionId; @@ -2296,18 +1728,13 @@ static void ssl_write_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) static void ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen) { unsigned char *p = buf; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite = NULL; - const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher = NULL; - - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { - ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED; - } /* * RFC 7366: "If a server receives an encrypt-then-MAC request extension @@ -2315,11 +1742,19 @@ static void ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * with Associated Data (AEAD) ciphersuite, it MUST NOT send an * encrypt-then-MAC response extension back to the client." */ - if ((suite = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( - ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite)) == NULL || - (cipher = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(suite->cipher)) == NULL || - cipher->mode != MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC) { + suite = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite); + if (suite == NULL) { ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED; + } else { + mbedtls_ssl_mode_t ssl_mode = + mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_ciphersuite( + ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac, + suite); + + if (ssl_mode != MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC_ETM) { + ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED; + } } if (ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED) { @@ -2337,7 +1772,7 @@ static void ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *olen = 4; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) static void ssl_write_extended_ms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, @@ -2346,8 +1781,7 @@ static void ssl_write_extended_ms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, { unsigned char *p = buf; - if (ssl->handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED || - ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { + if (ssl->handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED) { *olen = 0; return; } @@ -2423,7 +1857,7 @@ static void ssl_write_renegotiation_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *p++ = 0x00; } - *olen = p - buf; + *olen = (size_t) (p - buf); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) @@ -2452,7 +1886,8 @@ static void ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) static void ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, @@ -2480,7 +1915,9 @@ static void ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *olen = 6; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, @@ -2510,13 +1947,25 @@ static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP, p, 0); p += 2; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, + p + 2, (size_t) (end - p - 2), &kkpp_len, + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE); + if (ret != 0) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_output", ret); + return; + } +#else ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, - p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len, + p + 2, (size_t) (end - p - 2), &kkpp_len, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); if (ret != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret); return; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(kkpp_len, p, 0); p += 2; @@ -2525,38 +1974,6 @@ static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) -static void ssl_write_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen) -{ - if (ssl->alpn_chosen == NULL) { - *olen = 0; - return; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding alpn extension")); - - /* - * 0 . 1 ext identifier - * 2 . 3 ext length - * 4 . 5 protocol list length - * 6 . 6 protocol name length - * 7 . 7+n protocol name - */ - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN, buf, 0); - - *olen = 7 + strlen(ssl->alpn_chosen); - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*olen - 4, buf, 2); - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*olen - 6, buf, 4); - - buf[6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(*olen - 7); - - memcpy(buf + 7, ssl->alpn_chosen, *olen - 7); -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) static void ssl_write_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, @@ -2639,8 +2056,7 @@ static int ssl_write_hello_verify_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) /* The RFC is not clear on this point, but sending the actual negotiated * version looks like the most interoperable thing to do. */ - mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, p); + mbedtls_ssl_write_version(p, ssl->conf->transport, ssl->tls_version); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server version", p, 2); p += 2; @@ -2664,7 +2080,7 @@ static int ssl_write_hello_verify_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "cookie sent", cookie_len_byte + 1, *cookie_len_byte); - ssl->out_msglen = p - ssl->out_msg; + ssl->out_msglen = (size_t) (p - ssl->out_msg); ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; @@ -2714,17 +2130,15 @@ static void ssl_handle_id_based_session_resumption(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) mbedtls_ssl_session_init(&session_tmp); - session_tmp.id_len = session->id_len; - memcpy(session_tmp.id, session->id, session->id_len); - ret = ssl->conf->f_get_cache(ssl->conf->p_cache, + session->id, + session->id_len, &session_tmp); if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } - if (session->ciphersuite != session_tmp.ciphersuite || - session->compression != session_tmp.compression) { + if (session->ciphersuite != session_tmp.ciphersuite) { /* Mismatch between cached and negotiated session */ goto exit; } @@ -2756,7 +2170,7 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len != 0) { + ssl->handshake->cookie_verify_result != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("client hello was not authenticated")); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server hello")); @@ -2764,11 +2178,6 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ - if (ssl->conf->f_rng == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no RNG provided")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG; - } - /* * 0 . 0 handshake type * 1 . 3 handshake length @@ -2779,8 +2188,7 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) buf = ssl->out_msg; p = buf + 4; - mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, p); + mbedtls_ssl_write_version(p, ssl->conf->transport, ssl->tls_version); p += 2; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, chosen version: [%d:%d]", @@ -2801,11 +2209,37 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) p += 4; #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ - if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 28)) != 0) { + if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 20)) != 0) { return ret; } + p += 20; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + /* + * RFC 8446 + * TLS 1.3 has a downgrade protection mechanism embedded in the server's + * random value. TLS 1.3 servers which negotiate TLS 1.2 or below in + * response to a ClientHello MUST set the last 8 bytes of their Random + * value specially in their ServerHello. + */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls13_enabled(ssl->conf)) { + static const unsigned char magic_tls12_downgrade_string[] = + { 'D', 'O', 'W', 'N', 'G', 'R', 'D', 1 }; - p += 28; + MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT( + sizeof(magic_tls12_downgrade_string) == 8, + "magic_tls12_downgrade_string does not have the expected size"); + + memcpy(p, magic_tls12_downgrade_string, + sizeof(magic_tls12_downgrade_string)); + } else +#endif + { + if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 8)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + p += 8; memcpy(ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 6, 32); @@ -2869,17 +2303,12 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite, p, 0); p += 2; - *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(ssl->session_negotiate->compression); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s", mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name(ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite))); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, compress alg.: 0x%02X", - (unsigned int) ssl->session_negotiate->compression)); - - /* Do not write the extensions if the protocol is SSLv3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - if ((ssl->major_ver != 3) || (ssl->minor_ver != 0)) { -#endif + (unsigned int) MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL)); /* * First write extensions, then the total length @@ -2892,17 +2321,12 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ext_len += olen; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); - ext_len += olen; -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) ssl_write_cid_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); ext_len += olen; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); ext_len += olen; #endif @@ -2917,10 +2341,12 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ext_len += olen; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec( - mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite))) { + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite = + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite); + if (suite != NULL && mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(suite)) { ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); ext_len += olen; } @@ -2932,7 +2358,12 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) - ssl_write_alpn_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); + unsigned char *end = buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 4; + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_alpn_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, end, &olen)) + != 0) { + return ret; + } + ext_len += olen; #endif @@ -2949,11 +2380,7 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) p += 2 + ext_len; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) -} -#endif - - ssl->out_msglen = p - buf; + ssl->out_msglen = (size_t) (p - buf); ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO; @@ -3039,7 +2466,7 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) p[1 + ct_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN; #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) p[1 + ct_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN; #endif @@ -3047,7 +2474,7 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) p += ct_len; sa_len = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* * Add signature_algorithms for verify (TLS 1.2) * @@ -3061,34 +2488,33 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * enum { (255) } HashAlgorithm; * enum { (255) } SignatureAlgorithm; */ - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - const int *cur; - - /* - * Supported signature algorithms - */ - for (cur = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; *cur != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; cur++) { - unsigned char hash = mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(*cur); + const uint16_t *sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_sig_algs(ssl); + if (sig_alg == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; + } - if (MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE == hash || mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(ssl, hash)) { - continue; - } + for (; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++) { + unsigned char hash = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(*sig_alg); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - p[2 + sa_len++] = hash; - p[2 + sa_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - p[2 + sa_len++] = hash; - p[2 + sa_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA; -#endif + if (mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(ssl, hash)) { + continue; + } + if (!mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported(ssl, *sig_alg)) { + continue; } - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(sa_len, p, 0); + /* Write elements at offsets starting from 1 (offset 0 is for the + * length). Thus the offset of each element is the length of the + * partial list including that element. */ sa_len += 2; - p += sa_len; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*sig_alg, p, sa_len); + } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + /* Fill in list length. */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(sa_len, p, 0); + sa_len += 2; + p += sa_len; /* * DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>; @@ -3104,6 +2530,16 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()`, then the * CertificateRequest is currently left empty. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if (ssl->handshake->dn_hints != NULL) { + crt = ssl->handshake->dn_hints; + } else +#endif + if (ssl->conf->dn_hints != NULL) { + crt = ssl->conf->dn_hints; + } else +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) if (ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL) { crt = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain; @@ -3121,49 +2557,194 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) break; } - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(dn_size, p, 0); - p += 2; - memcpy(p, crt->subject_raw.p, dn_size); - p += dn_size; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(dn_size, p, 0); + p += 2; + memcpy(p, crt->subject_raw.p, dn_size); + p += dn_size; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "requested DN", p - dn_size, dn_size); + + total_dn_size += (unsigned short) (2 + dn_size); + crt = crt->next; + } + } + + ssl->out_msglen = (size_t) (p - buf); + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(total_dn_size, ssl->out_msg, 4 + ct_len + sa_len); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write certificate request")); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_pk_context *pk; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + unsigned char buf[PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)]; + size_t key_len; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + uint16_t tls_id = 0; + psa_key_type_t key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + + pk = mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl); + + if (pk == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk); + + switch (pk_type) { + case MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + + /* Get the attributes of the key previously parsed by PK module in + * order to extract its type and length (in bits). */ + status = psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &key_attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_type = psa_get_key_type(&key_attributes); + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&key_attributes); + + if (pk_type == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + /* Opaque key is created by the user (externally from Mbed TLS) + * so we assume it already has the right algorithm and flags + * set. Just copy its ID as reference. */ + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = pk->priv_id; + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external = 1; + } else { + /* PK_ECKEY[_DH] and PK_ECDSA instead as parsed from the PK + * module and only have ECDSA capabilities. Since we need + * them for ECDH later, we export and then re-import them with + * proper flags and algorithm. Of course We also set key's type + * and bits that we just got above. */ + key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH); + psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_type)); + psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits); + + status = psa_export_key(pk->priv_id, buf, sizeof(buf), &key_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + status = psa_import_key(&key_attributes, buf, key_len, + &ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + /* Set this key as owned by the TLS library: it will be its duty + * to clear it exit. */ + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external = 0; + } + + ret = 0; + break; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + key = mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pk); + grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk); + if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id(grp_id); + if (tls_id == 0) { + /* This elliptic curve is not supported */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + /* If the above conversion to TLS ID was fine, then also this one will + be, so there is no need to check the return value here */ + mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(tls_id, &key_type, + &ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits); + + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_type = key_type; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "requested DN", p - dn_size, dn_size); + key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH); + psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_type)); + psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits); - total_dn_size += 2 + dn_size; - crt = crt->next; - } - } + ret = mbedtls_ecp_write_key_ext(key, &key_len, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); + break; + } - ssl->out_msglen = p - buf; - ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; - ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(total_dn_size, ssl->out_msg, 4 + ct_len + sa_len); + status = psa_import_key(&key_attributes, buf, key_len, + &ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); + break; + } - ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); + ret = 0; + break; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + default: + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write certificate request")); +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attributes); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_pk_context *own_key = mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl); - /* Check if the key is a transparent ECDH key. - * This also ensures that it is safe to call mbedtls_pk_ec(). */ - if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(own_key) != MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY && - mbedtls_pk_get_type(own_key) != MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH) { + const mbedtls_pk_context *private_key = mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl); + if (private_key == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no server private key")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED; + } + + if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(private_key, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("server key not ECDH capable")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; } if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, - mbedtls_pk_ec(*own_key), + mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl)), MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ecdh_get_params"), ret); return ret; @@ -3171,6 +2752,7 @@ static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return 0; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ @@ -3221,6 +2803,14 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, (void) signature_len; #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len - (size_t) (ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf); +#else + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN - (size_t) (ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf); +#endif +#endif + ssl->out_msglen = 4; /* header (type:1, length:3) to be written later */ /* @@ -3235,6 +2825,44 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + unsigned char *out_p = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen; + unsigned char *end_p = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - + ssl->out_msglen; + size_t output_offset = 0; + size_t output_len = 0; + + /* + * The first 3 bytes are: + * [0] MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE + * [1, 2] elliptic curve's TLS ID + * + * However since we only support secp256r1 for now, we hardcode its + * TLS ID here + */ + uint16_t tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id( + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1); + if (tls_id == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + *out_p = MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(tls_id, out_p, 1); + output_offset += 3; + + ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, + out_p + output_offset, + end_p - out_p - output_offset, &output_len, + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO); + if (ret != 0) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_output", ret); + return ret; + } + + output_offset += output_len; + ssl->out_msglen += output_offset; +#else size_t len = 0; ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( @@ -3248,6 +2876,7 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } ssl->out_msglen += len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ @@ -3297,7 +2926,7 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_params( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, - (int) mbedtls_mpi_size(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P), + (int) mbedtls_dhm_get_len(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx), ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, &len, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_params", ret); @@ -3330,30 +2959,121 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * ECPoint public; * } ServerECDHParams; */ - const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curve = NULL; - const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *gid; + uint16_t *curr_tls_id = ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id; + const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups(ssl); int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; /* Match our preference list against the offered curves */ - for (gid = ssl->conf->curve_list; *gid != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; gid++) { - for (curve = ssl->handshake->curves; *curve != NULL; curve++) { - if ((*curve)->grp_id == *gid) { + if ((group_list == NULL) || (curr_tls_id == NULL)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; + } + for (; *group_list != 0; group_list++) { + for (curr_tls_id = ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id; + *curr_tls_id != 0; curr_tls_id++) { + if (*curr_tls_id == *group_list) { goto curve_matching_done; } } } curve_matching_done: - if (curve == NULL || *curve == NULL) { + if (*curr_tls_id == 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no matching curve for ECDHE")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("ECDHE curve: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_curve_name_from_tls_id(*curr_tls_id))); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + uint8_t *p = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen; + const size_t header_size = 4; // curve_type(1), namedcurve(2), + // data length(1) + const size_t data_length_size = 1; + psa_key_type_t key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE; + size_t ec_bits = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Perform PSA-based ECDH computation.")); + + /* Convert EC's TLS ID to PSA key type. */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(*curr_tls_id, + &key_type, + &ec_bits) == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid ecc group parse.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + handshake->xxdh_psa_type = key_type; + handshake->xxdh_psa_bits = ec_bits; + + key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH); + psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_type); + psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_bits); + + /* + * ECParameters curve_params + * + * First byte is curve_type, always named_curve + */ + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE; + + /* + * Next two bytes are the namedcurve value + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*curr_tls_id, p, 0); + p += 2; + + /* Generate ECDH private key. */ + status = psa_generate_key(&key_attributes, + &handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_generate_key", ret); + return ret; } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("ECDHE curve: %s", (*curve)->name)); + /* + * ECPoint public + * + * First byte is data length. + * It will be filled later. p holds now the data length location. + */ + + /* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA. + * Make one byte space for the length. + */ + unsigned char *own_pubkey = p + data_length_size; + + size_t own_pubkey_max_len = (size_t) (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + - (own_pubkey - ssl->out_msg)); + + status = psa_export_public_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, + own_pubkey, own_pubkey_max_len, + &len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_export_public_key", ret); + (void) psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + return ret; + } + + /* Store the length of the exported public key. */ + *p = (uint8_t) len; + + /* Determine full message length. */ + len += header_size; +#else + mbedtls_ecp_group_id curr_grp_id = + mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(*curr_tls_id); if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_setup(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, - (*curve)->grp_id)) != 0) { + curr_grp_id)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecp_group_load", ret); return ret; } @@ -3367,14 +3087,15 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return ret; } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) dig_signed = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen; #endif ssl->out_msglen += len; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, - MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED */ @@ -3386,53 +3107,39 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature(ciphersuite_info)) { - size_t dig_signed_len = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen - dig_signed; + if (dig_signed == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + size_t dig_signed_len = (size_t) (ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen - dig_signed); size_t hashlen = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - unsigned char hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; -#else unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; -#endif + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; /* * 2.1: Choose hash algorithm: - * A: For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension - * to choose appropriate hash. - * B: For SSL3, TLS1.0, TLS1.1 and ECDHE_ECDSA, use SHA1 - * (RFC 4492, Sec. 5.4) - * C: Otherwise, use MD5 + SHA1 (RFC 4346, Sec. 7.4.3) + * For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension + * to choose appropriate hash. */ - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(ciphersuite_info); - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - /* A: For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension - * (RFC 5246, Sec. 7.4.1.4.1). */ - if (sig_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE || - (md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find(&ssl->handshake->hash_algs, - sig_alg)) == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - /* (... because we choose a cipher suite - * only if there is a matching hash.) */ - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA) { - /* B: Default hash SHA1 */ - md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ - { - /* C: MD5 + SHA1 */ - md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + + unsigned char sig_hash = + (unsigned char) mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg( + ssl, mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_alg)); + + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(sig_hash); + + /* For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension + * (RFC 5246, Sec. 7.4.1.4.1). */ + if (sig_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE || md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + /* (... because we choose a cipher suite + * only if there is a matching hash.) */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("pick hash algorithm %u for signing", (unsigned) md_alg)); @@ -3440,21 +3147,6 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* * 2.2: Compute the hash to be signed */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { - hashlen = 36; - ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls(ssl, hash, - dig_signed, - dig_signed_len); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2(ssl, hash, &hashlen, dig_signed, @@ -3463,10 +3155,7 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (ret != 0) { return ret; } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - { + } else { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } @@ -3476,30 +3165,24 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* * 2.3: Compute and add the signature */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - /* - * For TLS 1.2, we need to specify signature and hash algorithm - * explicitly through a prefix to the signature. - * - * struct { - * HashAlgorithm hash; - * SignatureAlgorithm signature; - * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; - * - * struct { - * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm; - * opaque signature<0..2^16-1>; - * } DigitallySigned; - * - */ + /* + * We need to specify signature and hash algorithm explicitly through + * a prefix to the signature. + * + * struct { + * HashAlgorithm hash; + * SignatureAlgorithm signature; + * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; + * + * struct { + * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm; + * opaque signature<0..2^16-1>; + * } DigitallySigned; + * + */ - ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = - mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(md_alg); - ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = - mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_alg); - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(md_alg); + ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_alg); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) if (ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start != NULL) { @@ -3536,6 +3219,7 @@ static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_sign(mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl), md_alg, hash, hashlen, ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen + 2, + out_buf_len - ssl->out_msglen - 2, signature_len, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { @@ -3699,20 +3383,20 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_dh_public(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char ** */ if (*p + 2 > end) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } - n = ((*p)[0] << 8) | (*p)[1]; + n = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(*p, 0); *p += 2; if (*p + n > end) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_public(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, *p, n)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_read_public", ret); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } *p += n; @@ -3777,24 +3461,19 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* * Prepare to decrypt the premaster using own private RSA key */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { - if (p + 2 > end) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - if (*p++ != MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(len) || - *p++ != MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(len)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } + if (p + 2 > end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + if (*p++ != MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(len) || + *p++ != MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(len)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } -#endif if (p + len != end) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* @@ -3846,9 +3525,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset; unsigned char ver[2]; unsigned char fake_pms[48], peer_pms[48]; - unsigned char mask; - size_t i, peer_pmslen; - unsigned int diff; + size_t peer_pmslen; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t diff; /* In case of a failure in decryption, the decryption may write less than * 2 bytes of output, but we always read the first two bytes. It doesn't @@ -3871,20 +3549,16 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ - mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ssl->handshake->max_major_ver, - ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, ver); + mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ver, ssl->conf->transport, + ssl->session_negotiate->tls_version); /* Avoid data-dependent branches while checking for invalid * padding, to protect against timing-based Bleichenbacher-type * attacks. */ - diff = (unsigned int) ret; - diff |= peer_pmslen ^ 48; - diff |= peer_pms[0] ^ ver[0]; - diff |= peer_pms[1] ^ ver[1]; - - /* mask = diff ? 0xff : 0x00 using bit operations to avoid branches */ - mask = mbedtls_ct_uint_mask(diff); + diff = mbedtls_ct_bool(ret); + diff = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(diff, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(peer_pmslen, 48)); + diff = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(diff, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(peer_pms[0], ver[0])); + diff = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(diff, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(peer_pms[1], ver[1])); /* * Protection against Bleichenbacher's attack: invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding @@ -3903,7 +3577,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) - if (diff != 0) { + if (diff != MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); } #endif @@ -3917,9 +3591,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, /* Set pms to either the true or the fake PMS, without * data-dependent branches. */ - for (i = 0; i < ssl->handshake->pmslen; i++) { - pms[i] = (mask & fake_pms[i]) | ((~mask) & peer_pms[i]); - } + mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(diff, pms, fake_pms, peer_pms, ssl->handshake->pmslen); return 0; } @@ -3944,15 +3616,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char */ if (end - *p < 2) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } - n = ((*p)[0] << 8) | (*p)[1]; + n = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(*p, 0); *p += 2; if (n == 0 || n > end - *p) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } if (ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL) { @@ -4014,12 +3686,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; } if (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; } #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) @@ -4031,7 +3703,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) if (p != end) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, @@ -4040,7 +3712,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) &ssl->handshake->pmslen, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K); @@ -4054,10 +3726,72 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA || ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA || ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + size_t data_len = (size_t) (*p++); + size_t buf_len = (size_t) (end - p); + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Read the peer's public key.")); + + /* + * We must have at least two bytes (1 for length, at least 1 for data) + */ + if (buf_len < 2) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid buffer length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + buf_len)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + if (data_len < 1 || data_len > buf_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid data length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + data_len, buf_len)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + /* Store peer's ECDH public key. */ + if (data_len > sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid public key length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + data_len, + sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey))); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + memcpy(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, p, data_len); + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = data_len; + + /* Compute ECDH shared secret. */ + status = psa_raw_key_agreement( + PSA_ALG_ECDH, handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len, + handshake->premaster, sizeof(handshake->premaster), + &handshake->pmslen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_raw_key_agreement", ret); + if (handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external == 0) { + (void) psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + } + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + return ret; + } + + if (handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external == 0) { + status = psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_destroy_key", ret); + return ret; + } + } + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +#else if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, - p, end - p)) != 0) { + p, (size_t) (end - p))) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, @@ -4069,11 +3803,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || @@ -4088,21 +3823,17 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) if (p != end) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - /* For opaque PSKs, we perform the PSK-to-MS derivation automatically - * and skip the intermediate PMS. */ - if (ssl_use_opaque_psk(ssl) == 1) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("skip PMS generation for opaque PSK")); - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl, - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange)) != 0) { + (mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t) ciphersuite_info-> + key_exchange)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret); return ret; } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) @@ -4123,24 +3854,19 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return ret; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */ - if (ssl_use_opaque_psk(ssl) == 1) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("opaque PSK not supported with RSA-PSK")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - } -#endif - if ((ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms(ssl, p, end, 2)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_encrypted_pms"), ret); return ret; } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl, - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange)) != 0) { + (mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t) ciphersuite_info-> + key_exchange)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret); return ret; } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) @@ -4154,55 +3880,143 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return ret; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */ - if (ssl_use_opaque_psk(ssl) == 1) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("opaque PSK not supported with DHE-PSK")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - } -#endif - if (p != end) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster; + unsigned char *pms_end = pms + sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster); + size_t pms_len; + + /* Write length only when we know the actual value */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + pms + 2, pms_end - (pms + 2), &pms_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret); + return ret; } + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(pms_len, pms, 0); + pms += 2 + pms_len; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K); +#else if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl, - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange)) != 0) { + (mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t) ciphersuite_info-> + key_exchange)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret); return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint8_t ecpoint_len; + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret); + psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; return ret; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, - p, end - p)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP; + /* Keep a copy of the peer's public key */ + if (p >= end) { + psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only. */ - if (ssl_use_opaque_psk(ssl) == 1) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("opaque PSK not supported with ECDHE-PSK")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + ecpoint_len = *(p++); + if ((size_t) (end - p) < ecpoint_len) { + psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* When FFDH is enabled, the array handshake->xxdh_psa_peer_key size takes into account + the sizes of the FFDH keys which are at least 2048 bits. + The size of the array is thus greater than 256 bytes which is greater than any + possible value of ecpoint_len (type uint8_t) and the check below can be skipped.*/ +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + if (ecpoint_len > sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)) { + psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; } +#else + MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey) >= UINT8_MAX, + "peer key buffer too small"); #endif + memcpy(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, p, ecpoint_len); + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = ecpoint_len; + p += ecpoint_len; + + /* As RFC 5489 section 2, the premaster secret is formed as follows: + * - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the ECDH computation + * - the octet string produced by the ECDH computation + * - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the PSK + * - the PSK itself + */ + unsigned char *psm = ssl->handshake->premaster; + const unsigned char * const psm_end = + psm + sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster); + /* uint16 to store length (in octets) of the ECDH computation */ + const size_t zlen_size = 2; + size_t zlen = 0; + + /* Compute ECDH shared secret. */ + status = psa_raw_key_agreement(PSA_ALG_ECDH, + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len, + psm + zlen_size, + psm_end - (psm + zlen_size), + &zlen); + + destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } else if (destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(destruction_status); + } + + /* Write the ECDH computation length before the ECDH computation */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(zlen, psm, 0); + psm += zlen_size + zlen; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret); + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + p, (size_t) (end - p))) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP); if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl, - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange)) != 0) { + (mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t) ciphersuite_info-> + key_exchange)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret); return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) @@ -4215,11 +4029,22 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if ((ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round( + &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, p, (size_t) (end - p), + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO)) != 0) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_input round two", ret); + return ret; + } +#else ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, - p, end - p); + p, (size_t) (end - p)); if (ret != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, @@ -4229,6 +4054,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret", ret); return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ { @@ -4275,9 +4101,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) unsigned char hash[48]; unsigned char *hash_start = hash; size_t hashlen; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; -#endif mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; @@ -4318,7 +4142,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE || ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; } i = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); @@ -4339,93 +4163,74 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * opaque signature<0..2^16-1>; * } DigitallySigned; */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if (ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; - hashlen = 36; - - /* For ECDSA, use SHA-1, not MD-5 + SHA-1 */ - if (mbedtls_pk_can_do(peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA)) { - hash_start += 16; - hashlen -= 16; - md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - if (i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; - } + if (i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } - /* - * Hash - */ - md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(ssl->in_msg[i]); + /* + * Hash + */ + md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(ssl->in_msg[i]); - if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(ssl, ssl->in_msg[i])) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("peer not adhering to requested sig_alg" - " for verify message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; - } + if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(ssl, ssl->in_msg[i])) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("peer not adhering to requested sig_alg" + " for verify message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } #if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1) - if (MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 == md_alg) { - hash_start += 16; - } + if (MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 == md_alg) { + hash_start += 16; + } #endif - /* Info from md_alg will be used instead */ - hashlen = 0; - - i++; + /* Info from md_alg will be used instead */ + hashlen = 0; - /* - * Signature - */ - if ((pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig(ssl->in_msg[i])) - == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("peer not adhering to requested sig_alg" - " for verify message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; - } + i++; - /* - * Check the certificate's key type matches the signature alg - */ - if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(peer_pk, pk_alg)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("sig_alg doesn't match cert key")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; - } + /* + * Signature + */ + if ((pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig(ssl->in_msg[i])) + == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("peer not adhering to requested sig_alg" + " for verify message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } - i++; - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + /* + * Check the certificate's key type matches the signature alg + */ + if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(peer_pk, pk_alg)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("sig_alg doesn't match cert key")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } + i++; + if (i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } - sig_len = (ssl->in_msg[i] << 8) | ssl->in_msg[i+1]; + sig_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_msg, i); i += 2; if (i + sig_len != ssl->in_hslen) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; } /* Calculate hash and verify signature */ { size_t dummy_hlen; - ssl->handshake->calc_verify(ssl, hash, &dummy_hlen); + ret = ssl->handshake->calc_verify(ssl, hash, &dummy_hlen); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("calc_verify"), ret); + return ret; + } } if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_verify(peer_pk, @@ -4435,7 +4240,11 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return ret; } - mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(ssl); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(ssl); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status"), ret); + return ret; + } MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse certificate verify")); @@ -4467,6 +4276,9 @@ static int ssl_write_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * 10 . 9+n ticket content */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_creation_time = mbedtls_ms_time(); +#endif if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_write(ssl->conf->p_ticket, ssl->session_negotiate, ssl->out_msg + 10, @@ -4504,25 +4316,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { int ret = 0; - if (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER || ssl->handshake == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("server state: %d", ssl->state)); - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - switch (ssl->state) { case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST: ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO; @@ -4628,4 +4423,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_preference_order(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int order) +{ + conf->respect_cli_pref = order; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_client.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_client.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7fcc394319 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_client.c @@ -0,0 +1,3181 @@ +/* + * TLS 1.3 client-side functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + +#include + +#include "debug_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "ssl_client.h" +#include "ssl_tls13_keys.h" +#include "ssl_debug_helpers.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) +#endif + +/* Write extensions */ + +/* + * ssl_tls13_write_supported_versions_ext(): + * + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion versions<2..254>; + * } SupportedVersions; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_supported_versions_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + unsigned char versions_len = (ssl->handshake->min_tls_version <= + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) ? 4 : 2; + + *out_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, adding supported versions extension")); + + /* Check if we have space to write the extension: + * - extension_type (2 bytes) + * - extension_data_length (2 bytes) + * - versions_length (1 byte ) + * - versions (2 or 4 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 5 + versions_len); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, p, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(versions_len + 1, p, 2); + p += 4; + + /* Length of versions */ + *p++ = versions_len; + + /* Write values of supported versions. + * They are defined by the configuration. + * Currently, we advertise only TLS 1.3 or both TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2. + */ + mbedtls_ssl_write_version(p, MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("supported version: [3:4]")); + + + if (ssl->handshake->min_tls_version <= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + mbedtls_ssl_write_version(p + 2, MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("supported version: [3:3]")); + } + + *out_len = 5 + versions_len; + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask( + ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS); + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_supported_versions_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + ((void) ssl); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(buf, end, 2); + if (mbedtls_ssl_read_version(buf, ssl->conf->transport) != + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("unexpected version")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + if (&buf[2] != end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("supported_versions ext data length incorrect")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *end = buf + len; + size_t protocol_name_list_len, protocol_name_len; + const unsigned char *protocol_name_list_end; + + /* If we didn't send it, the server shouldn't send it */ + if (ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; + * + * struct { + * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> + * } ProtocolNameList; + * + * the "ProtocolNameList" MUST contain exactly one "ProtocolName" + */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + protocol_name_list_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, protocol_name_list_len); + protocol_name_list_end = p + protocol_name_list_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, protocol_name_list_end, 1); + protocol_name_len = *p++; + + /* Check that the server chosen protocol was in our list and save it */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, protocol_name_list_end, protocol_name_len); + for (const char **alpn = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *alpn != NULL; alpn++) { + if (protocol_name_len == strlen(*alpn) && + memcmp(p, *alpn, protocol_name_len) == 0) { + ssl->alpn_chosen = *alpn; + return 0; + } + } + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_reset_key_share(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + uint16_t group_id = ssl->handshake->offered_group_id; + + if (group_id == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(group_id) || + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(group_id)) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Destroy generated private key. */ + status = psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_destroy_key", ret); + return ret; + } + + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + return 0; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + if (0 /* other KEMs? */) { + /* Do something */ + } + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; +} + +/* + * Functions for writing key_share extension. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_get_default_group_id(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint16_t *group_id) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups(ssl); + /* Pick first available ECDHE group compatible with TLS 1.3 */ + if (group_list == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; + } + + for (; *group_list != 0; group_list++) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) + if ((mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id( + *group_list, NULL, NULL) == PSA_SUCCESS) && + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(*group_list)) { + *group_id = *group_list; + return 0; + } +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(*group_list)) { + *group_id = *group_list; + return 0; + } +#endif + } +#else + ((void) ssl); + ((void) group_id); +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ + + return ret; +} + +/* + * ssl_tls13_write_key_share_ext + * + * Structure of key_share extension in ClientHello: + * + * struct { + * NamedGroup group; + * opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>; + * } KeyShareEntry; + * struct { + * KeyShareEntry client_shares<0..2^16-1>; + * } KeyShareClientHello; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_key_share_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + unsigned char *client_shares; /* Start of client_shares */ + size_t client_shares_len; /* Length of client_shares */ + uint16_t group_id; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + + *out_len = 0; + + /* Check if we have space for header and length fields: + * - extension_type (2 bytes) + * - extension_data_length (2 bytes) + * - client_shares_length (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6); + p += 6; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello: adding key share extension")); + + /* HRR could already have requested something else. */ + group_id = ssl->handshake->offered_group_id; + if (!mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(group_id) && + !mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(group_id)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_get_default_group_id(ssl, + &group_id)); + } + + /* + * Dispatch to type-specific key generation function. + * + * So far, we're only supporting ECDHE. With the introduction + * of PQC KEMs, we'll want to have multiple branches, one per + * type of KEM, and dispatch to the corresponding crypto. And + * only one key share entry is allowed. + */ + client_shares = p; +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(group_id) || + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(group_id)) { + /* Pointer to group */ + unsigned char *group = p; + /* Length of key_exchange */ + size_t key_exchange_len = 0; + + /* Check there is space for header of KeyShareEntry + * - group (2 bytes) + * - key_exchange_length (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 4); + p += 4; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_and_write_xxdh_key_exchange( + ssl, group_id, p, end, &key_exchange_len); + p += key_exchange_len; + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Write group */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(group_id, group, 0); + /* Write key_exchange_length */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(key_exchange_len, group, 2); + } else +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ + if (0 /* other KEMs? */) { + /* Do something */ + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* Length of client_shares */ + client_shares_len = p - client_shares; + if (client_shares_len == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("No key share defined.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + /* Write extension_type */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE, buf, 0); + /* Write extension_data_length */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(client_shares_len + 2, buf, 2); + /* Write client_shares_length */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(client_shares_len, buf, 4); + + /* Update offered_group_id field */ + ssl->handshake->offered_group_id = group_id; + + /* Output the total length of key_share extension. */ + *out_len = p - buf; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( + 3, "client hello, key_share extension", buf, *out_len); + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE); + +cleanup: + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +/* + * ssl_tls13_parse_hrr_key_share_ext() + * Parse key_share extension in Hello Retry Request + * + * struct { + * NamedGroup selected_group; + * } KeyShareHelloRetryRequest; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_hrr_key_share_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + const unsigned char *p = buf; + int selected_group; + int found = 0; + + const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups(ssl); + if (group_list == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "key_share extension", p, end - buf); + + /* Read selected_group */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + selected_group = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("selected_group ( %d )", selected_group)); + + /* Upon receipt of this extension in a HelloRetryRequest, the client + * MUST first verify that the selected_group field corresponds to a + * group which was provided in the "supported_groups" extension in the + * original ClientHello. + * The supported_group was based on the info in ssl->conf->group_list. + * + * If the server provided a key share that was not sent in the ClientHello + * then the client MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert. + */ + for (; *group_list != 0; group_list++) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(*group_list)) { + if ((mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id( + *group_list, NULL, NULL) == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) || + *group_list != selected_group) { + found = 1; + break; + } + } +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(*group_list)) { + found = 1; + break; + } +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ + } + + /* Client MUST verify that the selected_group field does not + * correspond to a group which was provided in the "key_share" + * extension in the original ClientHello. If the server sent an + * HRR message with a key share already provided in the + * ClientHello then the client MUST abort the handshake with + * an "illegal_parameter" alert. + */ + if (found == 0 || selected_group == ssl->handshake->offered_group_id) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid key share in HRR")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + /* Remember server's preference for next ClientHello */ + ssl->handshake->offered_group_id = selected_group; + + return 0; +#else /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ + (void) ssl; + (void) buf; + (void) end; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ +} + +/* + * ssl_tls13_parse_key_share_ext() + * Parse key_share extension in Server Hello + * + * struct { + * KeyShareEntry server_share; + * } KeyShareServerHello; + * struct { + * NamedGroup group; + * opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>; + * } KeyShareEntry; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_key_share_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + uint16_t group, offered_group; + + /* ... + * NamedGroup group; (2 bytes) + * ... + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + group = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + /* Check that the chosen group matches the one we offered. */ + offered_group = ssl->handshake->offered_group_id; + if (offered_group != group) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Invalid server key share, our group %u, their group %u", + (unsigned) offered_group, (unsigned) group)); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(group) || + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(group)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, + ("DHE group name: %s", mbedtls_ssl_named_group_to_str(group))); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_read_public_xxdhe_share(ssl, p, end - p); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + if (0 /* other KEMs? */) { + /* Do something */ + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + return ret; +} + +/* + * ssl_tls13_parse_cookie_ext() + * Parse cookie extension in Hello Retry Request + * + * struct { + * opaque cookie<1..2^16-1>; + * } Cookie; + * + * When sending a HelloRetryRequest, the server MAY provide a "cookie" + * extension to the client (this is an exception to the usual rule that + * the only extensions that may be sent are those that appear in the + * ClientHello). When sending the new ClientHello, the client MUST copy + * the contents of the extension received in the HelloRetryRequest into + * a "cookie" extension in the new ClientHello. Clients MUST NOT use + * cookies in their initial ClientHello in subsequent connections. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_cookie_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + uint16_t cookie_len; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + /* Retrieve length field of cookie */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + cookie_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, cookie_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "cookie extension", p, cookie_len); + + mbedtls_free(handshake->cookie); + handshake->cookie_len = 0; + handshake->cookie = mbedtls_calloc(1, cookie_len); + if (handshake->cookie == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("alloc failed ( %ud bytes )", + cookie_len)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + memcpy(handshake->cookie, p, cookie_len); + handshake->cookie_len = cookie_len; + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_cookie_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + *out_len = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + if (handshake->cookie == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("no cookie to send; skip extension")); + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, cookie", + handshake->cookie, + handshake->cookie_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, handshake->cookie_len + 6); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, adding cookie extension")); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_COOKIE, p, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(handshake->cookie_len + 2, p, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(handshake->cookie_len, p, 4); + p += 6; + + /* Cookie */ + memcpy(p, handshake->cookie, handshake->cookie_len); + + *out_len = handshake->cookie_len + 6; + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_COOKIE); + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +/* + * ssl_tls13_write_psk_key_exchange_modes_ext() structure: + * + * enum { psk_ke( 0 ), psk_dhe_ke( 1 ), ( 255 ) } PskKeyExchangeMode; + * + * struct { + * PskKeyExchangeMode ke_modes<1..255>; + * } PskKeyExchangeModes; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_psk_key_exchange_modes_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + int ke_modes_len = 0; + + ((void) ke_modes_len); + *out_len = 0; + + /* Skip writing extension if no PSK key exchange mode + * is enabled in the config. + */ + if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_psk_enabled(ssl)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("skip psk_key_exchange_modes extension")); + return 0; + } + + /* Require 7 bytes of data, otherwise fail, + * even if extension might be shorter. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 7); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("client hello, adding psk_key_exchange_modes extension")); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES, p, 0); + + /* Skip extension length (2 bytes) and + * ke_modes length (1 byte) for now. + */ + p += 5; + + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_psk_ephemeral_enabled(ssl)) { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_MODE_ECDHE; + ke_modes_len++; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Adding PSK-ECDHE key exchange mode")); + } + + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_psk_enabled(ssl)) { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_MODE_PURE; + ke_modes_len++; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Adding pure PSK key exchange mode")); + } + + /* Now write the extension and ke_modes length */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ke_modes_len + 1, buf, 2); + buf[4] = ke_modes_len; + + *out_len = p - buf; + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask( + ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES); + + return 0; +} + +static psa_algorithm_t ssl_tls13_get_ciphersuite_hash_alg(int ciphersuite) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = NULL; + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ciphersuite); + + if (ciphersuite_info != NULL) { + return mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac); + } + + return PSA_ALG_NONE; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +static int ssl_tls13_has_configured_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; + return ssl->handshake->resume && + session != NULL && session->ticket != NULL && + mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_kex_mode_enabled( + ssl, mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_get_ticket_flags( + session, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL)); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +static int ssl_tls13_early_data_has_valid_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; + return ssl->handshake->resume && + session->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 && + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_allow_early_data(session) && + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_cipher_suite_is_offered(ssl, session->ciphersuite); +} +#endif + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_ticket_get_identity(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + psa_algorithm_t *hash_alg, + const unsigned char **identity, + size_t *identity_len) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; + + if (!ssl_tls13_has_configured_ticket(ssl)) { + return -1; + } + + *hash_alg = ssl_tls13_get_ciphersuite_hash_alg(session->ciphersuite); + *identity = session->ticket; + *identity_len = session->ticket_len; + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_ticket_get_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + psa_algorithm_t *hash_alg, + const unsigned char **psk, + size_t *psk_len) +{ + + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; + + if (!ssl_tls13_has_configured_ticket(ssl)) { + return -1; + } + + *hash_alg = ssl_tls13_get_ciphersuite_hash_alg(session->ciphersuite); + *psk = session->resumption_key; + *psk_len = session->resumption_key_len; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_psk_get_identity(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + psa_algorithm_t *hash_alg, + const unsigned char **identity, + size_t *identity_len) +{ + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf)) { + return -1; + } + + *hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SHA_256; + *identity = ssl->conf->psk_identity; + *identity_len = ssl->conf->psk_identity_len; + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_psk_get_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + psa_algorithm_t *hash_alg, + const unsigned char **psk, + size_t *psk_len) +{ + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf)) { + return -1; + } + + *hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SHA_256; + *psk = ssl->conf->psk; + *psk_len = ssl->conf->psk_len; + return 0; +} + +static int ssl_tls13_get_configured_psk_count(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int configured_psk_count = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + if (ssl_tls13_has_configured_ticket(ssl)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Ticket is configured")); + configured_psk_count++; + } +#endif + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("PSK is configured")); + configured_psk_count++; + } + return configured_psk_count; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_identity(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + const unsigned char *identity, + size_t identity_len, + uint32_t obfuscated_ticket_age, + size_t *out_len) +{ + ((void) ssl); + *out_len = 0; + + /* + * - identity_len (2 bytes) + * - identity (psk_identity_len bytes) + * - obfuscated_ticket_age (4 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(buf, end, 6 + identity_len); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(identity_len, buf, 0); + memcpy(buf + 2, identity, identity_len); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(obfuscated_ticket_age, buf, 2 + identity_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "write identity", buf, 6 + identity_len); + + *out_len = 6 + identity_len; + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_binder(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + int psk_type, + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *psk, + size_t psk_len, + size_t *out_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char binder_len; + unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t transcript_len = 0; + + *out_len = 0; + + binder_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + /* + * - binder_len (1 bytes) + * - binder (binder_len bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(buf, end, 1 + binder_len); + + buf[0] = binder_len; + + /* Get current state of handshake transcript. */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript( + ssl, mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(hash_alg), + transcript, sizeof(transcript), &transcript_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_create_psk_binder(ssl, hash_alg, + psk, psk_len, psk_type, + transcript, buf + 1); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_create_psk_binder", ret); + return ret; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "write binder", buf, 1 + binder_len); + + *out_len = 1 + binder_len; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_identities_of_pre_shared_key_ext() structure: + * + * struct { + * opaque identity<1..2^16-1>; + * uint32 obfuscated_ticket_age; + * } PskIdentity; + * + * opaque PskBinderEntry<32..255>; + * + * struct { + * PskIdentity identities<7..2^16-1>; + * PskBinderEntry binders<33..2^16-1>; + * } OfferedPsks; + * + * struct { + * select (Handshake.msg_type) { + * case client_hello: OfferedPsks; + * ... + * }; + * } PreSharedKeyExtension; + * + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_identities_of_pre_shared_key_ext( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len, size_t *binders_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int configured_psk_count = 0; + unsigned char *p = buf; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_NONE; + const unsigned char *identity; + size_t identity_len; + size_t l_binders_len = 0; + size_t output_len; + + *out_len = 0; + *binders_len = 0; + + /* Check if we have any PSKs to offer. If no, skip pre_shared_key */ + configured_psk_count = ssl_tls13_get_configured_psk_count(ssl); + if (configured_psk_count == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("skip pre_shared_key extensions")); + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Pre-configured PSK number = %d", + configured_psk_count)); + + /* Check if we have space to write the extension, binders included. + * - extension_type (2 bytes) + * - extension_data_len (2 bytes) + * - identities_len (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6); + p += 6; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + if (ssl_tls13_ticket_get_identity( + ssl, &hash_alg, &identity, &identity_len) == 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + mbedtls_ms_time_t now = mbedtls_ms_time(); + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; + /* The ticket age has been checked to be smaller than the + * `ticket_lifetime` in ssl_prepare_client_hello() which is smaller than + * 7 days (enforced in ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket()) . Thus the + * cast to `uint32_t` of the ticket age is safe. */ + uint32_t obfuscated_ticket_age = + (uint32_t) (now - session->ticket_reception_time); + obfuscated_ticket_age += session->ticket_age_add; + + ret = ssl_tls13_write_identity(ssl, p, end, + identity, identity_len, + obfuscated_ticket_age, + &output_len); +#else + ret = ssl_tls13_write_identity(ssl, p, end, identity, identity_len, + 0, &output_len); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + p += output_len; + l_binders_len += 1 + PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + + if (ssl_tls13_psk_get_identity( + ssl, &hash_alg, &identity, &identity_len) == 0) { + + ret = ssl_tls13_write_identity(ssl, p, end, identity, identity_len, 0, + &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + p += output_len; + l_binders_len += 1 + PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("client hello, adding pre_shared_key extension, " + "omitting PSK binder list")); + + /* Take into account the two bytes for the length of the binders. */ + l_binders_len += 2; + /* Check if there is enough space for binders */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, l_binders_len); + + /* + * - extension_type (2 bytes) + * - extension_data_len (2 bytes) + * - identities_len (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY, buf, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(p - buf - 4 + l_binders_len, buf, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(p - buf - 6, buf, 4); + + *out_len = (p - buf) + l_binders_len; + *binders_len = l_binders_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "pre_shared_key identities", buf, p - buf); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_binders_of_pre_shared_key_ext( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_NONE; + const unsigned char *psk; + size_t psk_len; + size_t output_len; + + /* Check if we have space to write binders_len. + * - binders_len (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + p += 2; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + if (ssl_tls13_ticket_get_psk(ssl, &hash_alg, &psk, &psk_len) == 0) { + + ret = ssl_tls13_write_binder(ssl, p, end, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION, + hash_alg, psk, psk_len, + &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + + if (ssl_tls13_psk_get_psk(ssl, &hash_alg, &psk, &psk_len) == 0) { + + ret = ssl_tls13_write_binder(ssl, p, end, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_EXTERNAL, + hash_alg, psk, psk_len, + &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, adding PSK binder list.")); + + /* + * - binders_len (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(p - buf - 2, buf, 0); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "pre_shared_key binders", buf, p - buf); + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask( + ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * struct { + * opaque identity<1..2^16-1>; + * uint32 obfuscated_ticket_age; + * } PskIdentity; + * + * opaque PskBinderEntry<32..255>; + * + * struct { + * + * select (Handshake.msg_type) { + * ... + * case server_hello: uint16 selected_identity; + * }; + * + * } PreSharedKeyExtension; + * + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_server_pre_shared_key_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int selected_identity; + const unsigned char *psk; + size_t psk_len; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(buf, end, 2); + selected_identity = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, 0); + ssl->handshake->selected_identity = (uint16_t) selected_identity; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("selected_identity = %d", selected_identity)); + + if (selected_identity >= ssl_tls13_get_configured_psk_count(ssl)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid PSK identity.")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + if (selected_identity == 0 && ssl_tls13_has_configured_ticket(ssl)) { + ret = ssl_tls13_ticket_get_psk(ssl, &hash_alg, &psk, &psk_len); + } else +#endif + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf)) { + ret = ssl_tls13_psk_get_psk(ssl, &hash_alg, &psk, &psk_len); + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac) + != hash_alg) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Invalid ciphersuite for external psk.")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(ssl, psk, psk_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk", ret); + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_client_hello_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t ext_len; + + *out_len = 0; + + /* Write supported_versions extension + * + * Supported Versions Extension is mandatory with TLS 1.3. + */ + ret = ssl_tls13_write_supported_versions_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += ext_len; + + /* Echo the cookie if the server provided one in its preceding + * HelloRetryRequest message. + */ + ret = ssl_tls13_write_cookie_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += ext_len; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_record_size_limit_ext( + ssl, p, end, &ext_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += ext_len; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_ephemeral_enabled(ssl)) { + ret = ssl_tls13_write_key_share_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += ext_len; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + /* In the first ClientHello, write the early data indication extension if + * necessary and update the early data state. + * If an HRR has been received and thus we are currently writing the + * second ClientHello, the second ClientHello must not contain an early + * data extension and the early data state must stay as it is: + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NO_IND_SENT or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED. + */ + if (!ssl->handshake->hello_retry_request_flag) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_psk_enabled(ssl) && + ssl_tls13_early_data_has_valid_ticket(ssl) && + ssl->conf->early_data_enabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext( + ssl, 0, p, end, &ext_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += ext_len; + + ssl->early_data_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IND_SENT; + } else { + ssl->early_data_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NO_IND_SENT; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + /* For PSK-based key exchange we need the pre_shared_key extension + * and the psk_key_exchange_modes extension. + * + * The pre_shared_key extension MUST be the last extension in the + * ClientHello. Servers MUST check that it is the last extension and + * otherwise fail the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert. + * + * Add the psk_key_exchange_modes extension. + */ + ret = ssl_tls13_write_psk_key_exchange_modes_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += ext_len; +#endif + + *out_len = p - buf; + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + ((void) ssl); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_NONE; + const unsigned char *psk; + size_t psk_len; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + + if (ssl->early_data_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IND_SENT) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Set hs psk for early data when writing the first psk")); + + ret = ssl_tls13_ticket_get_psk(ssl, &hash_alg, &psk, &psk_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "ssl_tls13_ticket_get_psk", ret); + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(ssl, psk, psk_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk", ret); + return ret; + } + + /* + * Early data are going to be encrypted using the ciphersuite + * associated with the pre-shared key used for the handshake. + * Note that if the server rejects early data, the handshake + * based on the pre-shared key may complete successfully + * with a selected ciphersuite different from the ciphersuite + * associated with the pre-shared key. Only the hashes of the + * two ciphersuites have to be the same. In that case, the + * encrypted handshake data and application data are + * encrypted using a different ciphersuite than the one used for + * the rejected early data. + */ + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite); + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info; + + /* Enable psk and psk_ephemeral to make stage early happy */ + ssl->handshake->key_exchange_mode = + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL; + + /* Start the TLS 1.3 key schedule: + * Set the PSK and derive early secret. + */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early", ret); + return ret; + } + + /* Derive early data key material */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform", ret); + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO); +#else + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Switch to early data keys for outbound traffic")); + mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform( + ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_earlydata); + ssl->early_data_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_CAN_WRITE; +#endif + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + return 0; +} +/* + * Functions for parsing and processing Server Hello + */ + +/** + * \brief Detect if the ServerHello contains a supported_versions extension + * or not. + * + * \param[in] ssl SSL context + * \param[in] buf Buffer containing the ServerHello message + * \param[in] end End of the buffer containing the ServerHello message + * + * \return 0 if the ServerHello does not contain a supported_versions extension + * \return 1 if the ServerHello contains a supported_versions extension + * \return A negative value if an error occurred while parsing the ServerHello. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_is_supported_versions_ext_present( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t legacy_session_id_echo_len; + const unsigned char *supported_versions_data; + const unsigned char *supported_versions_data_end; + + /* + * Check there is enough data to access the legacy_session_id_echo vector + * length: + * - legacy_version 2 bytes + * - random MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN bytes + * - legacy_session_id_echo length 1 byte + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + 3); + p += MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + 2; + legacy_session_id_echo_len = *p; + + /* + * Jump to the extensions, jumping over: + * - legacy_session_id_echo (legacy_session_id_echo_len + 1) bytes + * - cipher_suite 2 bytes + * - legacy_compression_method 1 byte + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, legacy_session_id_echo_len + 4); + p += legacy_session_id_echo_len + 4; + + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_supported_versions_ext_present_in_exts( + ssl, p, end, + &supported_versions_data, &supported_versions_data_end); +} + +/* Returns a negative value on failure, and otherwise + * - 1 if the last eight bytes of the ServerHello random bytes indicate that + * the server is TLS 1.3 capable but negotiating TLS 1.2 or below. + * - 0 otherwise + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_is_downgrade_negotiation(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + /* First seven bytes of the magic downgrade strings, see RFC 8446 4.1.3 */ + static const unsigned char magic_downgrade_string[] = + { 0x44, 0x4F, 0x57, 0x4E, 0x47, 0x52, 0x44 }; + const unsigned char *last_eight_bytes_of_random; + unsigned char last_byte_of_random; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(buf, end, MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + 2); + last_eight_bytes_of_random = buf + 2 + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN - 8; + + if (memcmp(last_eight_bytes_of_random, + magic_downgrade_string, + sizeof(magic_downgrade_string)) == 0) { + last_byte_of_random = last_eight_bytes_of_random[7]; + return last_byte_of_random == 0 || + last_byte_of_random == 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Returns a negative value on failure, and otherwise + * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO or + * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO_HRR + * to indicate which message is expected and to be parsed next. + */ +#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO 0 +#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO_HRR 1 +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_server_hello_is_hrr(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + + /* Check whether this message is a HelloRetryRequest ( HRR ) message. + * + * Server Hello and HRR are only distinguished by Random set to the + * special value of the SHA-256 of "HelloRetryRequest". + * + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; + * Random random; + * opaque legacy_session_id_echo<0..32>; + * CipherSuite cipher_suite; + * uint8 legacy_compression_method = 0; + * Extension extensions<6..2^16-1>; + * } ServerHello; + * + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( + buf, end, 2 + sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic)); + + if (memcmp(buf + 2, mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic, + sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic)) == 0) { + return SSL_SERVER_HELLO_HRR; + } + + return SSL_SERVER_HELLO; +} + +/* + * Returns a negative value on failure, and otherwise + * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO or + * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO_HRR or + * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO_TLS1_2 + */ +#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO_TLS1_2 2 +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_preprocess_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG(ssl_tls13_is_supported_versions_ext_present( + ssl, buf, end)); + + if (ret == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG( + ssl_tls13_is_downgrade_negotiation(ssl, buf, end)); + + /* If the server is negotiating TLS 1.2 or below and: + * . we did not propose TLS 1.2 or + * . the server responded it is TLS 1.3 capable but negotiating a lower + * version of the protocol and thus we are under downgrade attack + * abort the handshake with an "illegal parameter" alert. + */ + if (handshake->min_tls_version > MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 || ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + /* + * Version 1.2 of the protocol has been negotiated, set the + * ssl->keep_current_message flag for the ServerHello to be kept and + * parsed as a TLS 1.2 ServerHello. We also change ssl->tls_version to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 thus from now on mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step() + * will dispatch to the TLS 1.2 state machine. + */ + ssl->keep_current_message = 1; + ssl->tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, + buf, (size_t) (end - buf))); + + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_ephemeral_enabled(ssl)) { + ret = ssl_tls13_reset_key_share(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + return SSL_SERVER_HELLO_TLS1_2; + } + + ssl->session_negotiate->tls_version = ssl->tls_version; + ssl->session_negotiate->endpoint = ssl->conf->endpoint; + + handshake->received_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE; + + ret = ssl_server_hello_is_hrr(ssl, buf, end); + switch (ret) { + case SSL_SERVER_HELLO: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("received ServerHello message")); + break; + case SSL_SERVER_HELLO_HRR: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("received HelloRetryRequest message")); + /* If a client receives a second HelloRetryRequest in the same + * connection (i.e., where the ClientHello was itself in response + * to a HelloRetryRequest), it MUST abort the handshake with an + * "unexpected_message" alert. + */ + if (handshake->hello_retry_request_flag) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Multiple HRRs received")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } + /* + * Clients must abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" + * alert if the HelloRetryRequest would not result in any change + * in the ClientHello. + * In a PSK only key exchange that what we expect. + */ + if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_ephemeral_enabled(ssl)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("Unexpected HRR in pure PSK key exchange.")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + handshake->hello_retry_request_flag = 1; + + break; + } + +cleanup: + + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_check_server_hello_session_id_echo(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char **buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + const unsigned char *p = *buf; + size_t legacy_session_id_echo_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 1); + legacy_session_id_echo_len = *p++; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, legacy_session_id_echo_len); + + /* legacy_session_id_echo */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate->id_len != legacy_session_id_echo_len || + memcmp(ssl->session_negotiate->id, p, legacy_session_id_echo_len) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Expected Session ID", + ssl->session_negotiate->id, + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Received Session ID", p, + legacy_session_id_echo_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + p += legacy_session_id_echo_len; + *buf = p; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Session ID", ssl->session_negotiate->id, + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len); + return 0; +} + +/* Parse ServerHello message and configure context + * + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; // TLS 1.2 + * Random random; + * opaque legacy_session_id_echo<0..32>; + * CipherSuite cipher_suite; + * uint8 legacy_compression_method = 0; + * Extension extensions<6..2^16-1>; + * } ServerHello; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + int is_hrr) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + size_t extensions_len; + const unsigned char *extensions_end; + uint16_t cipher_suite; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + int fatal_alert = 0; + uint32_t allowed_extensions_mask; + int hs_msg_type = is_hrr ? MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_HS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST : + MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + + /* + * Check there is space for minimal fields + * + * - legacy_version ( 2 bytes) + * - random (MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN bytes) + * - legacy_session_id_echo ( 1 byte ), minimum size + * - cipher_suite ( 2 bytes) + * - legacy_compression_method ( 1 byte ) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + 6); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "server hello", p, end - p); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, version", p, 2); + + /* ... + * ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; // TLS 1.2 + * ... + * with ProtocolVersion defined as: + * uint16 ProtocolVersion; + */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_read_version(p, ssl->conf->transport) != + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Unsupported version of TLS.")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + goto cleanup; + } + p += 2; + + /* ... + * Random random; + * ... + * with Random defined as: + * opaque Random[MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN]; + */ + if (!is_hrr) { + memcpy(&handshake->randbytes[MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN], p, + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, random bytes", + p, MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + } + p += MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN; + + /* ... + * opaque legacy_session_id_echo<0..32>; + * ... + */ + if (ssl_tls13_check_server_hello_session_id_echo(ssl, &p, end) != 0) { + fatal_alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* ... + * CipherSuite cipher_suite; + * ... + * with CipherSuite defined as: + * uint8 CipherSuite[2]; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + cipher_suite = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(cipher_suite); + /* + * Check whether this ciphersuite is valid and offered. + */ + if ((mbedtls_ssl_validate_ciphersuite(ssl, ciphersuite_info, + ssl->tls_version, + ssl->tls_version) != 0) || + !mbedtls_ssl_tls13_cipher_suite_is_offered(ssl, cipher_suite)) { + fatal_alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + /* + * If we received an HRR before and that the proposed selected + * ciphersuite in this server hello is not the same as the one + * proposed in the HRR, we abort the handshake and send an + * "illegal_parameter" alert. + */ + else if ((!is_hrr) && handshake->hello_retry_request_flag && + (cipher_suite != ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite)) { + fatal_alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + if (fatal_alert == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid ciphersuite(%04x) parameter", + cipher_suite)); + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Configure ciphersuites */ + mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum(ssl, ciphersuite_info); + + handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, chosen ciphersuite: ( %04x ) - %s", + cipher_suite, ciphersuite_info->name)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time(NULL); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + /* ... + * uint8 legacy_compression_method = 0; + * ... + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 1); + if (p[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad legacy compression method")); + fatal_alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + goto cleanup; + } + p++; + + /* ... + * Extension extensions<6..2^16-1>; + * ... + * struct { + * ExtensionType extension_type; (2 bytes) + * opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>; + * } Extension; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + /* Check extensions do not go beyond the buffer of data. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, extensions_len); + extensions_end = p + extensions_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello extensions", p, extensions_len); + + handshake->received_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE; + allowed_extensions_mask = is_hrr ? + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_HRR : + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_SH; + + while (p < extensions_end) { + unsigned int extension_type; + size_t extension_data_len; + const unsigned char *extension_data_end; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, 4); + extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 2); + p += 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, extension_data_len); + extension_data_end = p + extension_data_len; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension( + ssl, hs_msg_type, extension_type, allowed_extensions_mask); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + switch (extension_type) { + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_COOKIE: + + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_cookie_ext(ssl, + p, extension_data_end); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "ssl_tls13_parse_cookie_ext", + ret); + goto cleanup; + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS: + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_supported_versions_ext(ssl, + p, + extension_data_end); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found pre_shared_key extension")); + + if ((ret = ssl_tls13_parse_server_pre_shared_key_ext( + ssl, p, extension_data_end)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, ("ssl_tls13_parse_server_pre_shared_key_ext"), ret); + return ret; + } + break; +#endif + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found key_shares extension")); + if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_ephemeral_enabled(ssl)) { + fatal_alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (is_hrr) { + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_hrr_key_share_ext(ssl, + p, extension_data_end); + } else { + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_key_share_ext(ssl, + p, extension_data_end); + } + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "ssl_tls13_parse_key_share_ext", + ret); + goto cleanup; + } + break; + + default: + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto cleanup; + } + + p += extension_data_len; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(3, hs_msg_type, handshake->received_extensions); + +cleanup: + + if (fatal_alert == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; + } else if (fatal_alert == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) +static const char *ssl_tls13_get_kex_mode_str(int mode) +{ + switch (mode) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK: + return "psk"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL: + return "ephemeral"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL: + return "psk_ephemeral"; + default: + return "unknown mode"; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + /* Determine the key exchange mode: + * 1) If both the pre_shared_key and key_share extensions were received + * then the key exchange mode is PSK with EPHEMERAL. + * 2) If only the pre_shared_key extension was received then the key + * exchange mode is PSK-only. + * 3) If only the key_share extension was received then the key + * exchange mode is EPHEMERAL-only. + */ + switch (handshake->received_extensions & + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY) | + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE))) { + /* Only the pre_shared_key extension was received */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY): + handshake->key_exchange_mode = + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK; + break; + + /* Only the key_share extension was received */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE): + handshake->key_exchange_mode = + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL; + break; + + /* Both the pre_shared_key and key_share extensions were received */ + case (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY) | + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE)): + handshake->key_exchange_mode = + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL; + break; + + /* Neither pre_shared_key nor key_share extension was received */ + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Unknown key exchange.")); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_kex_mode_enabled( + ssl, handshake->key_exchange_mode)) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 2, ("Key exchange mode(%s) is not supported.", + ssl_tls13_get_kex_mode_str(handshake->key_exchange_mode))); + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("Selected key exchange mode: %s", + ssl_tls13_get_kex_mode_str(handshake->key_exchange_mode))); + + /* Start the TLS 1.3 key scheduling if not already done. + * + * If we proposed early data then we have already derived an + * early secret using the selected PSK and its associated hash. + * It means that if the negotiated key exchange mode is psk or + * psk_ephemeral, we have already correctly computed the + * early secret and thus we do not do it again. In all other + * cases we compute it here. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (ssl->early_data_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NO_IND_SENT || + handshake->key_exchange_mode == + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL) +#endif + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_handshake_transform(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_handshake_transform", + ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform(ssl, handshake->transform_handshake); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Switch to handshake keys for inbound traffic")); + ssl->session_in = ssl->session_negotiate; + +cleanup: + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + } + + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_hrr(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_msg_layer(ssl, 0); + + /* + * We are going to re-generate a shared secret corresponding to the group + * selected by the server, which is different from the group for which we + * generated a shared secret in the first client hello. + * Thus, reset the shared secret. + */ + ret = ssl_tls13_reset_key_share(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->id; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (ssl->early_data_state != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NO_IND_SENT) { + ssl->early_data_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED; + } +#endif + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Wait and parse ServerHello handshake message. + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_process_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + size_t buf_len = 0; + int is_hrr = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> %s", __func__)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, &buf, &buf_len)); + + ret = ssl_tls13_preprocess_server_hello(ssl, buf, buf + buf_len); + if (ret < 0) { + goto cleanup; + } else { + is_hrr = (ret == SSL_SERVER_HELLO_HRR); + } + + if (ret == SSL_SERVER_HELLO_TLS1_2) { + ret = 0; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_parse_server_hello(ssl, buf, + buf + buf_len, + is_hrr)); + if (is_hrr) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_reset_transcript_for_hrr(ssl)); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, buf, buf_len)); + + if (is_hrr) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_postprocess_hrr(ssl)); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + /* If not offering early data, the client sends a dummy CCS record + * immediately before its second flight. This may either be before + * its second ClientHello or before its encrypted handshake flight. + */ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_BEFORE_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO); +#else + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_postprocess_server_hello(ssl)); + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS); + } + +cleanup: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= %s ( %s )", __func__, + is_hrr ? "HelloRetryRequest" : "ServerHello")); + return ret; +} + +/* + * + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS + * + * The EncryptedExtensions message contains any extensions which + * should be protected, i.e., any which are not needed to establish + * the cryptographic context. + */ + +/* Parse EncryptedExtensions message + * struct { + * Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>; + * } EncryptedExtensions; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_encrypted_extensions(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t extensions_len; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *extensions_end; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, extensions_len); + extensions_end = p + extensions_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "encrypted extensions", p, extensions_len); + + handshake->received_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE; + + while (p < extensions_end) { + unsigned int extension_type; + size_t extension_data_len; + + /* + * struct { + * ExtensionType extension_type; (2 bytes) + * opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>; + * } Extension; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, 4); + extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 2); + p += 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, extension_data_len); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, extension_type, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_EE); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + switch (extension_type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found alpn extension")); + + if ((ret = ssl_tls13_parse_alpn_ext( + ssl, p, (size_t) extension_data_len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EARLY_DATA: + + if (extension_data_len != 0) { + /* The message must be empty. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found record_size_limit extension")); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_record_size_limit_ext( + ssl, p, p + extension_data_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, ("mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_record_size_limit_ext"), ret); + return ret; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT( + 3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + extension_type, "( ignored )"); + break; + } + + p += extension_data_len; + } + + if ((handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT)) && + (handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH))) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ( + "Record size limit extension cannot be used with max fragment length extension")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + handshake->received_extensions); + + /* Check that we consumed all the message. */ + if (p != end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("EncryptedExtension lengths misaligned")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_process_encrypted_extensions(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse encrypted extensions")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + /* Process the message contents */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( + ssl_tls13_parse_encrypted_extensions(ssl, buf, buf + buf_len)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA)) { + /* RFC8446 4.2.11 + * If the server supplies an "early_data" extension, the + * client MUST verify that the server's selected_identity + * is 0. If any other value is returned, the client MUST + * abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert. + * + * RFC 8446 4.2.10 + * In order to accept early data, the server MUST have accepted a PSK + * cipher suite and selected the first key offered in the client's + * "pre_shared_key" extension. In addition, it MUST verify that the + * following values are the same as those associated with the + * selected PSK: + * - The TLS version number + * - The selected cipher suite + * - The selected ALPN [RFC7301] protocol, if any + * + * The server has sent an early data extension in its Encrypted + * Extension message thus accepted to receive early data. We + * check here that the additional constraints on the handshake + * parameters, when early data are exchanged, are met, + * namely: + * - a PSK has been selected for the handshake + * - the selected PSK for the handshake was the first one proposed + * by the client. + * - the selected ciphersuite for the handshake is the ciphersuite + * associated with the selected PSK. + */ + if ((!mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_psk(ssl)) || + handshake->selected_identity != 0 || + handshake->ciphersuite_info->id != + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite) { + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + ssl->early_data_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTED; + } else if (ssl->early_data_state != + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NO_IND_SENT) { + ssl->early_data_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED; + } +#endif + + /* + * In case the client has proposed a PSK associated with a ticket, + * `ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite` still contains at this point the + * identifier of the ciphersuite associated with the ticket. This is that + * way because, if an exchange of early data is agreed upon, we need + * it to check that the ciphersuite selected for the handshake is the + * ticket ciphersuite (see above). This information is not needed + * anymore thus we can now set it to the identifier of the ciphersuite + * used in this session under negotiation. + */ + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = handshake->ciphersuite_info->id; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + buf, buf_len)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_psk(ssl)) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED); + } else { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST); + } +#else + ((void) ssl); + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED); +#endif + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse encrypted extensions")); + return ret; + +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA + * + * RFC 8446 section 4.5 + * + * struct {} EndOfEarlyData; + * + * If the server sent an "early_data" extension in EncryptedExtensions, the + * client MUST send an EndOfEarlyData message after receiving the server + * Finished. Otherwise, the client MUST NOT send an EndOfEarlyData message. + */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_end_of_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + size_t buf_len; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write EndOfEarlyData")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, 0)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( + mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(ssl, buf_len, 0)); + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE); + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write EndOfEarlyData")); + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_early_data_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + if ((ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) || + (!mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl))) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + switch (ssl->early_data_state) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NO_IND_SENT: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_INDICATED; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED; + break; + + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +/* + * STATE HANDLING: CertificateRequest + * + */ +#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_EXPECT_REQUEST 0 +#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP 1 +/* Coordination: + * Deals with the ambiguity of not knowing if a CertificateRequest + * will be sent. Returns a negative code on failure, or + * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_EXPECT_REQUEST + * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP + * indicating if a Certificate Request is expected or not. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_certificate_request_coordinate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 0)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); + return ret; + } + ssl->keep_current_message = 1; + + if ((ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) && + (ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("got a certificate request")); + return SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_EXPECT_REQUEST; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("got no certificate request")); + + return SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP; +} + +/* + * ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_request() + * Parse certificate request + * struct { + * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; + * Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>; + * } CertificateRequest; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t certificate_request_context_len = 0; + size_t extensions_len = 0; + const unsigned char *extensions_end; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + /* ... + * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1> + * ... + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 1); + certificate_request_context_len = (size_t) p[0]; + p += 1; + + if (certificate_request_context_len > 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, certificate_request_context_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Certificate Request Context", + p, certificate_request_context_len); + + handshake->certificate_request_context = + mbedtls_calloc(1, certificate_request_context_len); + if (handshake->certificate_request_context == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("buffer too small")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + memcpy(handshake->certificate_request_context, p, + certificate_request_context_len); + p += certificate_request_context_len; + } + + /* ... + * Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>; + * ... + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, extensions_len); + extensions_end = p + extensions_len; + + handshake->received_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE; + + while (p < extensions_end) { + unsigned int extension_type; + size_t extension_data_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, 4); + extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 2); + p += 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, extension_data_len); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, extension_type, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CR); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + switch (extension_type) { + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("found signature algorithms extension")); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext(ssl, p, + p + extension_data_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + break; + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT( + 3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + extension_type, "( ignored )"); + break; + } + + p += extension_data_len; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + handshake->received_extensions); + + /* Check that we consumed all the message. */ + if (p != end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("CertificateRequest misaligned")); + goto decode_error; + } + + /* RFC 8446 section 4.3.2 + * + * The "signature_algorithms" extension MUST be specified + */ + if ((handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG)) == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("no signature algorithms extension found")); + goto decode_error; + } + + ssl->handshake->client_auth = 1; + return 0; + +decode_error: + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_process_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate request")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG(ssl_tls13_certificate_request_coordinate(ssl)); + + if (ret == SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_EXPECT_REQUEST) { + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_request( + ssl, buf, buf + buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + buf, buf_len)); + } else if (ret == SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP) { + ret = 0; + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto cleanup; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE); + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse certificate request")); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_process_server_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED); + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_process_server_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_finished_message(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_application_transform(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (ssl->early_data_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTED) { + ssl->early_data_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED); +#else + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_client_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int non_empty_certificate_msg = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("Switch to handshake traffic keys for outbound traffic")); + mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform(ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_handshake); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + if (ssl->handshake->client_auth) { + int ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl) != NULL) { + non_empty_certificate_msg = 1; + } + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("skip write certificate")); + } +#endif + + if (non_empty_certificate_msg) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY); + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("skip write certificate verify")); + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED); + } + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_client_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify(ssl); + + if (ret == 0) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED); + } + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_client_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_finished_message(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret ", ret); + return ret; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_flush_buffers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("handshake: done")); + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup(ssl); + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER); + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +/* From RFC 8446 section 4.2.10 + * + * struct { + * select (Handshake.msg_type) { + * case new_session_ticket: uint32 max_early_data_size; + * ... + * }; + * } EarlyDataIndication; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket_early_data_ext( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(buf, end, 4); + + session->max_early_data_size = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(buf, 0); + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_set_ticket_flags( + session, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_EARLY_DATA); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("received max_early_data_size: %u", + (unsigned int) session->max_early_data_size)); + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + + + handshake->received_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE; + + while (p < end) { + unsigned int extension_type; + size_t extension_data_len; + int ret; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 4); + extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 2); + p += 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, extension_data_len); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, extension_type, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_NST); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + switch (extension_type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EARLY_DATA: + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket_early_data_ext( + ssl, p, p + extension_data_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket_early_data_ext", + ret); + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT( + 3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + extension_type, "( ignored )"); + break; + } + + p += extension_data_len; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + handshake->received_extensions); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * From RFC8446, page 74 + * + * struct { + * uint32 ticket_lifetime; + * uint32 ticket_age_add; + * opaque ticket_nonce<0..255>; + * opaque ticket<1..2^16-1>; + * Extension extensions<0..2^16-2>; + * } NewSessionTicket; + * + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + unsigned char **ticket_nonce, + size_t *ticket_nonce_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session; + size_t ticket_len; + unsigned char *ticket; + size_t extensions_len; + + *ticket_nonce = NULL; + *ticket_nonce_len = 0; + /* + * ticket_lifetime 4 bytes + * ticket_age_add 4 bytes + * ticket_nonce_len 1 byte + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 9); + + session->ticket_lifetime = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("ticket_lifetime: %u", + (unsigned int) session->ticket_lifetime)); + if (session->ticket_lifetime > + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_MAX_ALLOWED_TICKET_LIFETIME) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket_lifetime exceeds 7 days.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + session->ticket_age_add = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 4); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("ticket_age_add: %u", + (unsigned int) session->ticket_age_add)); + + *ticket_nonce_len = p[8]; + p += 9; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, *ticket_nonce_len); + *ticket_nonce = p; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "ticket_nonce:", *ticket_nonce, *ticket_nonce_len); + p += *ticket_nonce_len; + + /* Ticket */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + ticket_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, ticket_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "received ticket", p, ticket_len); + + /* Check if we previously received a ticket already. */ + if (session->ticket != NULL || session->ticket_len > 0) { + mbedtls_free(session->ticket); + session->ticket = NULL; + session->ticket_len = 0; + } + + if ((ticket = mbedtls_calloc(1, ticket_len)) == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ticket alloc failed")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + memcpy(ticket, p, ticket_len); + p += ticket_len; + session->ticket = ticket; + session->ticket_len = ticket_len; + + /* Clear all flags in ticket_flags */ + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_clear_ticket_flags( + session, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, extensions_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "ticket extension", p, extensions_len); + + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket_exts(ssl, p, p + extensions_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket_exts", + ret); + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Non negative return values for ssl_tls13_postprocess_new_session_ticket(). + * - POSTPROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_SIGNAL, all good, we have to signal the + * application that a valid ticket has been received. + * - POSTPROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_DISCARD, no fatal error, we keep the + * connection alive but we do not signal the ticket to the application. + */ +#define POSTPROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_SIGNAL 0 +#define POSTPROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_DISCARD 1 +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *ticket_nonce, + size_t ticket_nonce_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + psa_algorithm_t psa_hash_alg; + int hash_length; + + if (session->ticket_lifetime == 0) { + return POSTPROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_DISCARD; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + /* Store ticket creation time */ + session->ticket_reception_time = mbedtls_ms_time(); +#endif + + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(session->ciphersuite); + if (ciphersuite_info == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + psa_hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac); + hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(psa_hash_alg); + if (hash_length == -1 || + (size_t) hash_length > sizeof(session->resumption_key)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "resumption_master_secret", + session->app_secrets.resumption_master_secret, + hash_length); + + /* Compute resumption key + * + * HKDF-Expand-Label( resumption_master_secret, + * "resumption", ticket_nonce, Hash.length ) + */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label( + psa_hash_alg, + session->app_secrets.resumption_master_secret, + hash_length, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(resumption), + ticket_nonce, + ticket_nonce_len, + session->resumption_key, + hash_length); + + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, + "Creating the ticket-resumed PSK failed", + ret); + return ret; + } + + session->resumption_key_len = hash_length; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Ticket-resumed PSK", + session->resumption_key, + session->resumption_key_len); + + /* Set ticket_flags depends on the selected key exchange modes */ + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_set_ticket_flags( + session, ssl->conf->tls13_kex_modes); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_TICKET_FLAGS(4, session->ticket_flags); + + return POSTPROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_SIGNAL; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_process_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len; + unsigned char *ticket_nonce; + size_t ticket_nonce_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse new session ticket")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + /* + * We are about to update (maybe only partially) ticket data thus block + * any session export for the time being. + */ + ssl->session->exported = 1; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket( + ssl, buf, buf + buf_len, + &ticket_nonce, &ticket_nonce_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG(ssl_tls13_postprocess_new_session_ticket( + ssl, ticket_nonce, ticket_nonce_len)); + + switch (ret) { + case POSTPROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_SIGNAL: + /* + * All good, we have received a new valid ticket, session data can + * be exported now and we signal the ticket to the application. + */ + ssl->session->exported = 0; + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET; + break; + + case POSTPROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_DISCARD: + ret = 0; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Discard new session ticket")); + break; + + default: + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER); + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse new session ticket")); + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = 0; + + switch (ssl->state) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST: + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_client_hello(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO: + ret = ssl_tls13_process_server_hello(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: + ret = ssl_tls13_process_encrypted_extensions(ssl); + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: + ret = ssl_tls13_process_certificate_request(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE: + ret = ssl_tls13_process_server_certificate(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: + ret = ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify(ssl); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED: + ret = ssl_tls13_process_server_finished(ssl); + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_end_of_early_data(ssl); + break; +#endif + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_client_certificate(ssl); + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_client_certificate_verify(ssl); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_client_finished(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS: + ret = ssl_tls13_flush_buffers(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP: + ret = ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup(ssl); + break; + + /* + * Injection of dummy-CCS's for middlebox compatibility + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_BEFORE_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + break; + } + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + break; + } + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE); + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl); + if (ret == 0) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Switch to early data keys for outbound traffic")); + mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform( + ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_earlydata); + ssl->early_data_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_CAN_WRITE; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET: + ret = ssl_tls13_process_new_session_ticket(ssl); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid state %d", ssl->state)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d448a054a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c @@ -0,0 +1,1853 @@ +/* + * TLS 1.3 functionality shared between client and server + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "debug_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" + +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "ssl_tls13_invasive.h" +#include "ssl_tls13_keys.h" +#include "ssl_debug_helpers.h" + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) +#endif + +const uint8_t mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic[ + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN] = +{ 0xCF, 0x21, 0xAD, 0x74, 0xE5, 0x9A, 0x61, 0x11, + 0xBE, 0x1D, 0x8C, 0x02, 0x1E, 0x65, 0xB8, 0x91, + 0xC2, 0xA2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7A, 0xBB, 0x8C, 0x5E, + 0x07, 0x9E, 0x09, 0xE2, 0xC8, 0xA8, 0x33, 0x9C }; + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned hs_type, + unsigned char **buf, + size_t *buf_len) +{ + int ret; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 0)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE || + ssl->in_msg[0] != hs_type) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Receive unexpected handshake message.")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Jump handshake header (4 bytes, see Section 4 of RFC 8446). + * ... + * HandshakeType msg_type; + * uint24 length; + * ... + */ + *buf = ssl->in_msg + 4; + *buf_len = ssl->in_hslen - 4; + +cleanup: + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_supported_versions_ext_present_in_exts( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *end, + const unsigned char **supported_versions_data, + const unsigned char **supported_versions_data_end) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t extensions_len; + const unsigned char *extensions_end; + + *supported_versions_data = NULL; + *supported_versions_data_end = NULL; + + /* Case of no extension */ + if (p == end) { + return 0; + } + + /* ... + * Extension extensions; + * ... + * struct { + * ExtensionType extension_type; (2 bytes) + * opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>; + * } Extension; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + /* Check extensions do not go beyond the buffer of data. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, extensions_len); + extensions_end = p + extensions_len; + + while (p < extensions_end) { + unsigned int extension_type; + size_t extension_data_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, 4); + extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 2); + p += 4; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, extension_data_len); + + if (extension_type == MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS) { + *supported_versions_data = p; + *supported_versions_data_end = p + extension_data_len; + return 1; + } + p += extension_data_len; + } + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +/* + * STATE HANDLING: Read CertificateVerify + */ +/* Macro to express the maximum length of the verify structure. + * + * The structure is computed per TLS 1.3 specification as: + * - 64 bytes of octet 32, + * - 33 bytes for the context string + * (which is either "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify" + * or "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"), + * - 1 byte for the octet 0x0, which serves as a separator, + * - 32 or 48 bytes for the Transcript-Hash(Handshake Context, Certificate) + * (depending on the size of the transcript_hash) + * + * This results in a total size of + * - 130 bytes for a SHA256-based transcript hash, or + * (64 + 33 + 1 + 32 bytes) + * - 146 bytes for a SHA384-based transcript hash. + * (64 + 33 + 1 + 48 bytes) + * + */ +#define SSL_VERIFY_STRUCT_MAX_SIZE (64 + \ + 33 + \ + 1 + \ + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE \ + ) + +/* + * The ssl_tls13_create_verify_structure() creates the verify structure. + * As input, it requires the transcript hash. + * + * The caller has to ensure that the buffer has size at least + * SSL_VERIFY_STRUCT_MAX_SIZE bytes. + */ +static void ssl_tls13_create_verify_structure(const unsigned char *transcript_hash, + size_t transcript_hash_len, + unsigned char *verify_buffer, + size_t *verify_buffer_len, + int from) +{ + size_t idx; + + /* RFC 8446, Section 4.4.3: + * + * The digital signature [in the CertificateVerify message] is then + * computed over the concatenation of: + * - A string that consists of octet 32 (0x20) repeated 64 times + * - The context string + * - A single 0 byte which serves as the separator + * - The content to be signed + */ + memset(verify_buffer, 0x20, 64); + idx = 64; + + if (from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + memcpy(verify_buffer + idx, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(client_cv)); + idx += MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_LEN(client_cv); + } else { /* from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER */ + memcpy(verify_buffer + idx, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(server_cv)); + idx += MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_LEN(server_cv); + } + + verify_buffer[idx++] = 0x0; + + memcpy(verify_buffer + idx, transcript_hash, transcript_hash_len); + idx += transcript_hash_len; + + *verify_buffer_len = idx; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + const unsigned char *verify_buffer, + size_t verify_buffer_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + uint16_t algorithm; + size_t signature_len; + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_NONE; + unsigned char verify_hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t verify_hash_len; + + void const *options = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options rsassa_pss_options; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */ + + /* + * struct { + * SignatureScheme algorithm; + * opaque signature<0..2^16-1>; + * } CertificateVerify; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + algorithm = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + /* RFC 8446 section 4.4.3 + * + * If the CertificateVerify message is sent by a server, the signature + * algorithm MUST be one offered in the client's "signature_algorithms" + * extension unless no valid certificate chain can be produced without + * unsupported algorithms + * + * RFC 8446 section 4.4.2.2 + * + * If the client cannot construct an acceptable chain using the provided + * certificates and decides to abort the handshake, then it MUST abort the + * handshake with an appropriate certificate-related alert + * (by default, "unsupported_certificate"). + * + * Check if algorithm is an offered signature algorithm. + */ + if (!mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered(ssl, algorithm)) { + /* algorithm not in offered signature algorithms list */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Received signature algorithm(%04x) is not " + "offered.", + (unsigned int) algorithm)); + goto error; + } + + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_pk_type_and_md_alg_from_sig_alg( + algorithm, &sig_alg, &md_alg) != 0) { + goto error; + } + + hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg); + if (hash_alg == 0) { + goto error; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Certificate Verify: Signature algorithm ( %04x )", + (unsigned int) algorithm)); + + /* + * Check the certificate's key type matches the signature alg + */ + if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(&ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, sig_alg)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("signature algorithm doesn't match cert key")); + goto error; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + signature_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, signature_len); + + status = psa_hash_compute(hash_alg, + verify_buffer, + verify_buffer_len, + verify_hash, + sizeof(verify_hash), + &verify_hash_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "hash computation PSA error", status); + goto error; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "verify hash", verify_hash, verify_hash_len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + if (sig_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS) { + rsassa_pss_options.mgf1_hash_id = md_alg; + + rsassa_pss_options.expected_salt_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + options = (const void *) &rsassa_pss_options; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */ + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(sig_alg, options, + &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, + md_alg, verify_hash, verify_hash_len, + p, signature_len)) == 0) { + return 0; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_pk_verify_ext", ret); + +error: + /* RFC 8446 section 4.4.3 + * + * If the verification fails, the receiver MUST terminate the handshake + * with a "decrypt_error" alert. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char verify_buffer[SSL_VERIFY_STRUCT_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t verify_buffer_len; + unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t transcript_len; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate verify")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, &buf, &buf_len)); + + /* Need to calculate the hash of the transcript first + * before reading the message since otherwise it gets + * included in the transcript + */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript( + ssl, + (mbedtls_md_type_t) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac, + transcript, sizeof(transcript), + &transcript_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "handshake hash", transcript, transcript_len); + + /* Create verify structure */ + ssl_tls13_create_verify_structure(transcript, + transcript_len, + verify_buffer, + &verify_buffer_len, + (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) ? + MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER : + MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT); + + /* Process the message contents */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_verify( + ssl, buf, buf + buf_len, + verify_buffer, verify_buffer_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, + buf, buf_len)); + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse certificate verify")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify", ret); + return ret; +#else + ((void) ssl); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ +} + +/* + * + * STATE HANDLING: Incoming Certificate. + * + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) +/* + * Structure of Certificate message: + * + * enum { + * X509(0), + * RawPublicKey(2), + * (255) + * } CertificateType; + * + * struct { + * select (certificate_type) { + * case RawPublicKey: + * * From RFC 7250 ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo * + * opaque ASN1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>; + * case X509: + * opaque cert_data<1..2^24-1>; + * }; + * Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>; + * } CertificateEntry; + * + * struct { + * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; + * CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>; + * } Certificate; + * + */ + +/* Parse certificate chain send by the server. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t certificate_request_context_len = 0; + size_t certificate_list_len = 0; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *certificate_list_end; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 4); + certificate_request_context_len = p[0]; + certificate_list_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(p, 1); + p += 4; + + /* In theory, the certificate list can be up to 2^24 Bytes, but we don't + * support anything beyond 2^16 = 64K. + */ + if ((certificate_request_context_len != 0) || + (certificate_list_len >= 0x10000)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* In case we tried to reuse a session but it failed */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert != NULL) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert); + mbedtls_free(ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert); + } + + if (certificate_list_len == 0) { + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert = NULL; + ret = 0; + goto exit; + } + + if ((ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert = + mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt))) == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc( %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes ) failed", + sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt))); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init(ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, certificate_list_len); + certificate_list_end = p + certificate_list_len; + while (p < certificate_list_end) { + size_t cert_data_len, extensions_len; + const unsigned char *extensions_end; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, certificate_list_end, 3); + cert_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(p, 0); + p += 3; + + /* In theory, the CRT can be up to 2^24 Bytes, but we don't support + * anything beyond 2^16 = 64K. Otherwise as in the TLS 1.2 code, + * check that we have a minimum of 128 bytes of data, this is not + * clear why we need that though. + */ + if ((cert_data_len < 128) || (cert_data_len >= 0x10000)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad Certificate message")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, certificate_list_end, cert_data_len); + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert, + p, cert_data_len); + + switch (ret) { + case 0: /*ok*/ + break; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND: + /* Ignore certificate with an unknown algorithm: maybe a + prior certificate was already trusted. */ + break; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED: + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret); + return ret; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION: + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret); + return ret; + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT, + ret); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret); + return ret; + } + + p += cert_data_len; + + /* Certificate extensions length */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, certificate_list_end, 2); + extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, certificate_list_end, extensions_len); + + extensions_end = p + extensions_len; + handshake->received_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE; + + while (p < extensions_end) { + unsigned int extension_type; + size_t extension_data_len; + + /* + * struct { + * ExtensionType extension_type; (2 bytes) + * opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>; + * } Extension; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, 4); + extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 2); + p += 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, extension_data_len); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE, extension_type, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CT); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + switch (extension_type) { + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT( + 3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE, + extension_type, "( ignored )"); + break; + } + + p += extension_data_len; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE, + handshake->received_extensions); + } + +exit: + /* Check that all the message is consumed. */ + if (p != end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad Certificate message")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "peer certificate", + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert); + + return ret; +} +#else +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + ((void) ssl); + ((void) buf); + ((void) end); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) +/* Validate certificate chain sent by the server. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_validate_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = 0; + int authmode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED; + mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain; + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl; + const char *ext_oid; + size_t ext_len; + uint32_t verify_result = 0; + + /* If SNI was used, overwrite authentication mode + * from the configuration. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if (ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET) { + authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode; + } else +#endif + authmode = ssl->conf->authmode; + } +#endif + + /* + * If the peer hasn't sent a certificate ( i.e. it sent + * an empty certificate chain ), this is reflected in the peer CRT + * structure being unset. + * Check for that and handle it depending on the + * authentication mode. + */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("peer has no certificate")); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + /* The client was asked for a certificate but didn't send + * one. The client should know what's going on, so we + * don't send an alert. + */ + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING; + if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL) { + return 0; + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if (ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL) { + ca_chain = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain; + ca_crl = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + { + ca_chain = ssl->conf->ca_chain; + ca_crl = ssl->conf->ca_crl; + } + + /* + * Main check: verify certificate + */ + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert, + ca_chain, ca_crl, + ssl->conf->cert_profile, + ssl->hostname, + &verify_result, + ssl->conf->f_vrfy, ssl->conf->p_vrfy); + + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "x509_verify_cert", ret); + } + + /* + * Secondary checks: always done, but change 'ret' only if it was 0 + */ + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH; + ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH); + } else { + ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH; + ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH); + } + + if ((mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert, + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) != 0) || + (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage( + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert, + ext_oid, ext_len) != 0)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate (usage extensions)")); + if (ret == 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE; + } + } + + /* mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile is supposed to report a + * verification failure through MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED, + * with details encoded in the verification flags. All other kinds + * of error codes, including those from the user provided f_vrfy + * functions, are treated as fatal and lead to a failure of + * mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_certificate even if verification was optional. + */ + if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL && + (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE)) { + ret = 0; + } + + if (ca_chain == NULL && authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no CA chain")); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED; + } + + if (ret != 0) { + /* The certificate may have been rejected for several reasons. + Pick one and send the corresponding alert. Which alert to send + may be a subject of debate in some cases. */ + if (verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED, ret); + } else if (verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT, ret); + } else if (verify_result & (MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE | + MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE | + MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE | + MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK | + MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT, ret); + } else if (verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED, ret); + } else if (verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED, ret); + } else if (verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA, ret); + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN, ret); + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + if (verify_result != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("! Certificate verification flags %08x", + (unsigned int) verify_result)); + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Certificate verification flags clear")); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ + + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = verify_result; + return ret; +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_validate_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + ((void) ssl); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate")); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + /* Parse the certificate chain sent by the peer. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_certificate(ssl, buf, + buf + buf_len)); + /* Validate the certificate chain and set the verification results. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_validate_certificate(ssl)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE, buf, buf_len)); + +cleanup: +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + (void) ssl; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse certificate")); + return ret; +} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +/* + * enum { + * X509(0), + * RawPublicKey(2), + * (255) + * } CertificateType; + * + * struct { + * select (certificate_type) { + * case RawPublicKey: + * // From RFC 7250 ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo + * opaque ASN1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>; + * + * case X509: + * opaque cert_data<1..2^24-1>; + * }; + * Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>; + * } CertificateEntry; + * + * struct { + * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; + * CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>; + * } Certificate; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_certificate_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt = mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl); + unsigned char *p = buf; + unsigned char *certificate_request_context = + ssl->handshake->certificate_request_context; + unsigned char certificate_request_context_len = + ssl->handshake->certificate_request_context_len; + unsigned char *p_certificate_list_len; + + + /* ... + * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; + * ... + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, certificate_request_context_len + 1); + *p++ = certificate_request_context_len; + if (certificate_request_context_len > 0) { + memcpy(p, certificate_request_context, certificate_request_context_len); + p += certificate_request_context_len; + } + + /* ... + * CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>; + * ... + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 3); + p_certificate_list_len = p; + p += 3; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "own certificate", crt); + + while (crt != NULL) { + size_t cert_data_len = crt->raw.len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, cert_data_len + 3 + 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT24_BE(cert_data_len, p, 0); + p += 3; + + memcpy(p, crt->raw.p, cert_data_len); + p += cert_data_len; + crt = crt->next; + + /* Currently, we don't have any certificate extensions defined. + * Hence, we are sending an empty extension with length zero. + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(0, p, 0); + p += 2; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT24_BE(p - p_certificate_list_len - 3, + p_certificate_list_len, 0); + + *out_len = p - buf; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS( + 3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE, ssl->handshake->sent_extensions); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len, msg_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE, &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_certificate_body(ssl, + buf, + buf + buf_len, + &msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE, buf, msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg( + ssl, buf_len, msg_len)); +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write certificate")); + return ret; +} + +/* + * STATE HANDLING: Output Certificate Verify + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_sig_alg_cert_key_match(uint16_t sig_alg, + mbedtls_pk_context *key) +{ + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type = (mbedtls_pk_type_t) mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk(key); + size_t key_size = mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(key); + + switch (pk_type) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA: + switch (key_size) { + case 256: + return + sig_alg == MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256; + + case 384: + return + sig_alg == MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384; + + case 521: + return + sig_alg == MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512; + default: + break; + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA: + switch (sig_alg) { + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256: /* Intentional fallthrough */ + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384: /* Intentional fallthrough */ + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512: + return 1; + + default: + break; + } + break; + + default: + break; + } + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + mbedtls_pk_context *own_key; + + unsigned char handshake_hash[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t handshake_hash_len; + unsigned char verify_buffer[SSL_VERIFY_STRUCT_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t verify_buffer_len; + + uint16_t *sig_alg = ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs; + size_t signature_len = 0; + + *out_len = 0; + + own_key = mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl); + if (own_key == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript( + ssl, (mbedtls_md_type_t) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac, + handshake_hash, sizeof(handshake_hash), &handshake_hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "handshake hash", + handshake_hash, + handshake_hash_len); + + ssl_tls13_create_verify_structure(handshake_hash, handshake_hash_len, + verify_buffer, &verify_buffer_len, + ssl->conf->endpoint); + + /* + * struct { + * SignatureScheme algorithm; + * opaque signature<0..2^16-1>; + * } CertificateVerify; + */ + /* Check there is space for the algorithm identifier (2 bytes) and the + * signature length (2 bytes). + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 4); + + for (; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++) { + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + psa_algorithm_t psa_algorithm = PSA_ALG_NONE; + unsigned char verify_hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t verify_hash_len; + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered(ssl, *sig_alg)) { + continue; + } + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_for_cert_verify_is_supported(*sig_alg)) { + continue; + } + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_sig_alg_cert_key_match(*sig_alg, own_key)) { + continue; + } + + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_pk_type_and_md_alg_from_sig_alg( + *sig_alg, &pk_type, &md_alg) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* Hash verify buffer with indicated hash function */ + psa_algorithm = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg); + status = psa_hash_compute(psa_algorithm, + verify_buffer, + verify_buffer_len, + verify_hash, sizeof(verify_hash), + &verify_hash_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "verify hash", verify_hash, verify_hash_len); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_sign_ext(pk_type, own_key, + md_alg, verify_hash, verify_hash_len, + p + 4, (size_t) (end - (p + 4)), &signature_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("CertificateVerify signature failed with %s", + mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str(*sig_alg))); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, "mbedtls_pk_sign_ext", ret); + + /* The signature failed. This is possible if the private key + * was not suitable for the signature operation as purposely we + * did not check its suitability completely. Let's try with + * another signature algorithm. + */ + continue; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("CertificateVerify signature with %s", + mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str(*sig_alg))); + + break; + } + + if (*sig_alg == MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no suitable signature algorithm")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*sig_alg, p, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(signature_len, p, 2); + + *out_len = 4 + signature_len; + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = 0; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len, msg_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate verify")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify_body( + ssl, buf, buf + buf_len, &msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, + buf, msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg( + ssl, buf_len, msg_len)); + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write certificate verify")); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +/* + * + * STATE HANDLING: Incoming Finished message. + */ +/* + * Implementation + */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_preprocess_finished_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data( + ssl, + ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_in.digest, + sizeof(ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_in.digest), + &ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_in.digest_len, + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ? + MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER : MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data", ret); + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_finished_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + /* + * struct { + * opaque verify_data[Hash.length]; + * } Finished; + */ + const unsigned char *expected_verify_data = + ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_in.digest; + size_t expected_verify_data_len = + ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_in.digest_len; + /* Structural validation */ + if ((size_t) (end - buf) != expected_verify_data_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad finished message")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "verify_data (self-computed):", + expected_verify_data, + expected_verify_data_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "verify_data (received message):", buf, + expected_verify_data_len); + + /* Semantic validation */ + if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(buf, + expected_verify_data, + expected_verify_data_len) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad finished message")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_finished_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse finished message")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED, &buf, &buf_len)); + + /* Preprocessing step: Compute handshake digest */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_preprocess_finished_message(ssl)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_parse_finished_message( + ssl, buf, buf + buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED, buf, buf_len)); + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse finished message")); + return ret; +} + +/* + * + * STATE HANDLING: Write and send Finished message. + * + */ +/* + * Implement + */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_prepare_finished_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + + /* Compute transcript of handshake up to now. */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data(ssl, + ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_out.digest, + sizeof(ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_out. + digest), + &ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_out.digest_len, + ssl->conf->endpoint); + + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "calculate_verify_data failed", ret); + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_finished_message_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + size_t verify_data_len = ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_out.digest_len; + /* + * struct { + * opaque verify_data[Hash.length]; + * } Finished; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(buf, end, verify_data_len); + + memcpy(buf, ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_out.digest, + verify_data_len); + + *out_len = verify_data_len; + return 0; +} + +/* Main entry point: orchestrates the other functions */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_finished_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len, msg_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write finished message")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_prepare_finished_message(ssl)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED, &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_finished_message_body( + ssl, buf, buf + buf_len, &msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED, buf, msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg( + ssl, buf_len, msg_len)); +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write finished message")); + return ret; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("=> handshake wrapup")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Switch to application keys for inbound traffic")); + mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform(ssl, ssl->transform_application); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Switch to application keys for outbound traffic")); + mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform(ssl, ssl->transform_application); + + /* + * Free the previous session and switch to the current one. + */ + if (ssl->session) { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session); + mbedtls_free(ssl->session); + } + ssl->session = ssl->session_negotiate; + ssl->session_negotiate = NULL; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("<= handshake wrapup")); +} + +/* + * + * STATE HANDLING: Write ChangeCipherSpec + * + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen) +{ + ((void) ssl); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(buf, end, 1); + buf[0] = 1; + *olen = 1; + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write change cipher spec")); + + /* Only one CCS to send. */ + if (ssl->handshake->ccs_sent) { + ret = 0; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Write CCS message */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec_body( + ssl, ssl->out_msg, + ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, + &ssl->out_msglen)); + + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + + /* Dispatch message */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_write_record(ssl, 0)); + + ssl->handshake->ccs_sent = 1; + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write change cipher spec")); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ + +/* Early Data Indication Extension + * + * struct { + * select ( Handshake.msg_type ) { + * case new_session_ticket: uint32 max_early_data_size; + * case client_hello: Empty; + * case encrypted_extensions: Empty; + * }; + * } EarlyDataIndication; + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int in_new_session_ticket, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + const size_t needed = in_new_session_ticket ? 8 : 4; +#else + const size_t needed = 4; + ((void) in_new_session_ticket); +#endif + + *out_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, needed); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EARLY_DATA, p, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(needed - 4, p, 2); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (in_new_session_ticket) { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ssl->conf->max_early_data_size, p, 4); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 4, ("Sent max_early_data_size=%u", + (unsigned int) ssl->conf->max_early_data_size)); + } +#endif + + *out_len = needed; + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EARLY_DATA); + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_early_data_len(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t early_data_len) +{ + /* + * This function should be called only while an handshake is in progress + * and thus a session under negotiation. Add a sanity check to detect a + * misuse. + */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* RFC 8446 section 4.6.1 + * + * A server receiving more than max_early_data_size bytes of 0-RTT data + * SHOULD terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert. + * Note that if it is still possible to send early_data_len bytes of early + * data, it means that early_data_len is smaller than max_early_data_size + * (type uint32_t) and can fit in an uint32_t. We use this further + * down. + */ + if (early_data_len > + (ssl->session_negotiate->max_early_data_size - + ssl->total_early_data_size)) { + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 2, ("EarlyData: Too much early data received, %u + %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " > %u", + ssl->total_early_data_size, early_data_len, + ssl->session_negotiate->max_early_data_size)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } + + /* + * early_data_len has been checked to be less than max_early_data_size + * that is uint32_t. Its cast to an uint32_t below is thus safe. We need + * the cast to appease some compilers. + */ + ssl->total_early_data_size += (uint32_t) early_data_len; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +/* Reset SSL context and update hash for handling HRR. + * + * Replace Transcript-Hash(X) by + * Transcript-Hash( message_hash || + * 00 00 Hash.length || + * X ) + * A few states of the handshake are preserved, including: + * - session ID + * - session ticket + * - negotiated ciphersuite + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_reset_transcript_for_hrr(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char hash_transcript[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE + 4]; + size_t hash_len; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Reset SSL session for HRR")); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, (mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac, + hash_transcript + 4, + PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE, + &hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript", ret); + return ret; + } + + hash_transcript[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_MESSAGE_HASH; + hash_transcript[1] = 0; + hash_transcript[2] = 0; + hash_transcript[3] = (unsigned char) hash_len; + + hash_len += 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Truncated handshake transcript", + hash_transcript, hash_len); + + /* Reset running hash and replace it with a hash of the transcript */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum", ret); + return ret; + } + ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, hash_transcript, hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "update_checksum", ret); + return ret; + } + + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_read_public_xxdhe_share(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len) +{ + uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *) buf; + const uint8_t *end = buf + buf_len; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + /* Get size of the TLS opaque key_exchange field of the KeyShareEntry struct. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + uint16_t peerkey_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + /* Check if key size is consistent with given buffer length. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, peerkey_len); + + /* Store peer's ECDH/FFDH public key. */ + if (peerkey_len > sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid public key length: %u > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + (unsigned) peerkey_len, + sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey))); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + memcpy(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, p, peerkey_len); + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = peerkey_len; + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) +static psa_status_t mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_ffdh_info_from_tls_id( + uint16_t tls_id, size_t *bits, psa_key_type_t *key_type) +{ + switch (tls_id) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE2048: + *bits = 2048; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919); + return PSA_SUCCESS; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE3072: + *bits = 3072; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919); + return PSA_SUCCESS; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE4096: + *bits = 4096; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919); + return PSA_SUCCESS; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE6144: + *bits = 6144; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919); + return PSA_SUCCESS; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192: + *bits = 8192; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919); + return PSA_SUCCESS; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 */ + default: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } +} +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_and_write_xxdh_key_exchange( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint16_t named_group, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes; + size_t own_pubkey_len; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + size_t bits = 0; + psa_key_type_t key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE; + psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_NONE; + size_t buf_size = (size_t) (end - buf); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Perform PSA-based ECDH/FFDH computation.")); + + /* Convert EC's TLS ID to PSA key type. */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id( + named_group, &key_type, &bits) == PSA_SUCCESS) { + alg = PSA_ALG_ECDH; + } +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_ffdh_info_from_tls_id(named_group, &bits, + &key_type) == PSA_SUCCESS) { + alg = PSA_ALG_FFDH; + } +#endif + + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + if (buf_size < PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + handshake->xxdh_psa_type = key_type; + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits = bits; + + key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, alg); + psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_type); + psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_bits); + + /* Generate ECDH/FFDH private key. */ + status = psa_generate_key(&key_attributes, + &handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_generate_key", ret); + return ret; + + } + + /* Export the public part of the ECDH/FFDH private key from PSA. */ + status = psa_export_public_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, + buf, buf_size, + &own_pubkey_len); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_export_public_key", ret); + return ret; + } + + *out_len = own_pubkey_len; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2 + * + * If an implementation receives an extension which it recognizes and which is + * not specified for the message in which it appears, it MUST abort the handshake + * with an "illegal_parameter" alert. + * + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int hs_msg_type, + unsigned int received_extension_type, + uint32_t hs_msg_allowed_extensions_mask) +{ + uint32_t extension_mask = mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_mask( + received_extension_type); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT( + 3, hs_msg_type, received_extension_type, "received"); + + if ((extension_mask & hs_msg_allowed_extensions_mask) == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT( + 3, hs_msg_type, received_extension_type, "is illegal"); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + ssl->handshake->received_extensions |= extension_mask; + /* + * If it is a message containing extension responses, check that we + * previously sent the extension. + */ + switch (hs_msg_type) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO: + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_HS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE: + /* Check if the received extension is sent by peer message.*/ + if ((ssl->handshake->sent_extensions & extension_mask) != 0) { + return 0; + } + break; + default: + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT( + 3, hs_msg_type, received_extension_type, "is unsupported"); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + +/* RFC 8449, section 4: + * + * The ExtensionData of the "record_size_limit" extension is + * RecordSizeLimit: + * uint16 RecordSizeLimit; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_record_size_limit_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + uint16_t record_size_limit; + const size_t extension_data_len = end - buf; + + if (extension_data_len != + MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_EXTENSION_DATA_LENGTH) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, + ("record_size_limit extension has invalid length: %" + MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " Bytes", + extension_data_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + record_size_limit = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("RecordSizeLimit: %u Bytes", record_size_limit)); + + /* RFC 8449, section 4: + * + * Endpoints MUST NOT send a "record_size_limit" extension with a value + * smaller than 64. An endpoint MUST treat receipt of a smaller value + * as a fatal error and generate an "illegal_parameter" alert. + */ + if (record_size_limit < MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_MIN) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid record size limit : %u Bytes", + record_size_limit)); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + ssl->session_negotiate->record_size_limit = record_size_limit; + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_record_size_limit_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + *out_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN >= MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_MIN, + "MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN is less than the " + "minimum record size limit"); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT, p, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_EXTENSION_DATA_LENGTH, + p, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN, p, 4); + + *out_len = 6; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Sent RecordSizeLimit: %d Bytes", + MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN)); + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT); + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_invasive.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_invasive.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b4506f71c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_invasive.h @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_INVASIVE_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_INVASIVE_H + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_INVASIVE_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c index 675414885f..739414ea2f 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c @@ -2,40 +2,42 @@ * TLS 1.3 key schedule * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 ( the "License" ); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + +#include +#include #include "mbedtls/hkdf.h" -#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" +#include "debug_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "ssl_misc.h" #include "ssl_tls13_keys.h" -#include "psa/crypto_sizes.h" +#include "ssl_tls13_invasive.h" -#include -#include +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" + +/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(name, string) \ .name = string, -#define TLS1_3_EVOLVE_INPUT_SIZE (PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE > PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE) ? \ - PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE : PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE - -struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_struct const mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels = +struct mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels_struct const mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels = { /* This seems to work in C, despite the string literal being one * character too long due to the 0-termination. */ @@ -62,24 +64,24 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_struct const mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels = * 255 Bytes, so we require `desired_length` to be at most * 255. This allows us to save a few Bytes of code by * hardcoding the writing of the high bytes. - * - (label, llen): label + label length, without "tls13 " prefix - * The label length MUST be less than or equal to - * MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN - * It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this. - * All (label, label length) pairs used in TLS 1.3 - * can be obtained via MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(). - * - (ctx, clen): context + context length - * The context length MUST be less than or equal to - * MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN - * It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this. + * - (label, label_len): label + label length, without "tls13 " prefix + * The label length MUST be less than or equal to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN + * It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this. + * All (label, label length) pairs used in TLS 1.3 + * can be obtained via MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(). + * - (ctx, ctx_len): context + context length + * The context length MUST be less than or equal to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN + * It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this. * - dst: Target buffer for HkdfLabel structure, * This MUST be a writable buffer of size * at least SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN Bytes. - * - dlen: Pointer at which to store the actual length of - * the HkdfLabel structure on success. + * - dst_len: Pointer at which to store the actual length of + * the HkdfLabel structure on success. */ -static const char tls1_3_label_prefix[6] = "tls13 "; +static const char tls13_label_prefix[6] = "tls13 "; #define SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN(label_len, context_len) \ (2 /* expansion length */ \ @@ -90,20 +92,20 @@ static const char tls1_3_label_prefix[6] = "tls13 "; #define SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN \ SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN( \ - sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix) + \ + sizeof(tls13_label_prefix) + \ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN, \ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN) -static void ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label( +static void ssl_tls13_hkdf_encode_label( size_t desired_length, - const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, - const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, - unsigned char *dst, size_t *dlen) + const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t ctx_len, + unsigned char *dst, size_t *dst_len) { size_t total_label_len = - sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix) + llen; + sizeof(tls13_label_prefix) + label_len; size_t total_hkdf_lbl_len = - SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN(total_label_len, clen); + SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN(total_label_len, ctx_len); unsigned char *p = dst; @@ -111,7 +113,7 @@ static void ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label( * We're hardcoding the high byte to 0 here assuming that we never use * TLS 1.3 HKDF key expansion to more than 255 Bytes. */ #if MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN > 255 -#error "The implementation of ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label() is not fit for the \ +#error "The implementation of ssl_tls13_hkdf_encode_label() is not fit for the \ value of MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN" #endif @@ -120,64 +122,127 @@ static void ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label( /* Add label incl. prefix */ *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(total_label_len); - memcpy(p, tls1_3_label_prefix, sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix)); - p += sizeof(tls1_3_label_prefix); - memcpy(p, label, llen); - p += llen; + memcpy(p, tls13_label_prefix, sizeof(tls13_label_prefix)); + p += sizeof(tls13_label_prefix); + memcpy(p, label, label_len); + p += label_len; /* Add context value */ - *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(clen); - if (clen != 0) { - memcpy(p, ctx, clen); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(ctx_len); + if (ctx_len != 0) { + memcpy(p, ctx, ctx_len); } /* Return total length to the caller. */ - *dlen = total_hkdf_lbl_len; + *dst_len = total_hkdf_lbl_len; } -int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( - mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, - const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, - const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, - unsigned char *buf, size_t blen) +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, + const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t ctx_len, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len) { - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md; unsigned char hkdf_label[SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN]; - size_t hkdf_label_len; + size_t hkdf_label_len = 0; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; - if (llen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN) { + if (label_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN) { /* Should never happen since this is an internal * function, and we know statically which labels * are allowed. */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } - if (clen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN) { + if (ctx_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN) { /* Should not happen, as above. */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } - if (blen > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN) { + if (buf_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN) { /* Should not happen, as above. */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } - md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(hash_alg); - if (md == NULL) { + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label(blen, - label, llen, - ctx, clen, - hkdf_label, - &hkdf_label_len); + ssl_tls13_hkdf_encode_label(buf_len, + label, label_len, + ctx, ctx_len, + hkdf_label, + &hkdf_label_len); + + status = psa_key_derivation_setup(&operation, PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(hash_alg)); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(&operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + secret, + secret_len); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(&operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO, + hkdf_label, + hkdf_label_len); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(&operation, + buf, + buf_len); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + abort_status = psa_key_derivation_abort(&operation); + status = (status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(hkdf_label, hkdf_label_len); + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_make_traffic_key( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, + unsigned char *key, size_t key_len, + unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label( + hash_alg, + secret, secret_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(key), + NULL, 0, + key, key_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } - return mbedtls_hkdf_expand(md, - secret, slen, - hkdf_label, hkdf_label_len, - buf, blen); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label( + hash_alg, + secret, secret_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(iv), + NULL, 0, + iv, iv_len); + return ret; } /* @@ -196,47 +261,27 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( * by the function caller. Note that we generate server and client side * keys in a single function call. */ -int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys( - mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, const unsigned char *client_secret, - const unsigned char *server_secret, - size_t slen, size_t key_len, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *server_secret, size_t secret_len, + size_t key_len, size_t iv_len, mbedtls_ssl_key_set *keys) { int ret = 0; - ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label(hash_alg, - client_secret, slen, - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(key), - NULL, 0, - keys->client_write_key, key_len); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - - ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label(hash_alg, - server_secret, slen, - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(key), - NULL, 0, - keys->server_write_key, key_len); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - - ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label(hash_alg, - client_secret, slen, - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(iv), - NULL, 0, - keys->client_write_iv, iv_len); + ret = ssl_tls13_make_traffic_key( + hash_alg, client_secret, secret_len, + keys->client_write_key, key_len, + keys->client_write_iv, iv_len); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } - ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label(hash_alg, - server_secret, slen, - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(iv), - NULL, 0, - keys->server_write_iv, iv_len); + ret = ssl_tls13_make_traffic_key( + hash_alg, server_secret, secret_len, + keys->server_write_key, key_len, + keys->server_write_iv, iv_len); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } @@ -247,31 +292,27 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys( return 0; } -int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( - mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, - const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, - const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, + const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t ctx_len, int ctx_hashed, - unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t buflen) + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dstbuf_len) { int ret; - unsigned char hashed_context[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md; - md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(hash_alg); - if (md == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - + unsigned char hashed_context[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; if (ctx_hashed == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED) { - ret = mbedtls_md(md, ctx, clen, hashed_context); - if (ret != 0) { + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + status = psa_hash_compute(hash_alg, ctx, ctx_len, hashed_context, + PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg), &ctx_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); return ret; } - clen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md); } else { - if (clen > sizeof(hashed_context)) { + if (ctx_len > sizeof(hashed_context)) { /* This should never happen since this function is internal * and the code sets `ctx_hashed` correctly. * Let's double-check nonetheless to not run at the risk @@ -279,39 +320,45 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } - memcpy(hashed_context, ctx, clen); + memcpy(hashed_context, ctx, ctx_len); } - return mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label(hash_alg, - secret, slen, - label, llen, - hashed_context, clen, - dstbuf, buflen); + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label(hash_alg, + secret, secret_len, + label, label_len, + hashed_context, ctx_len, + dstbuf, dstbuf_len); + } -int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_evolve_secret( - mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, const unsigned char *secret_old, const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, unsigned char *secret_new) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - size_t hlen, ilen; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t hlen; unsigned char tmp_secret[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE] = { 0 }; - unsigned char tmp_input[TLS1_3_EVOLVE_INPUT_SIZE] = { 0 }; + const unsigned char all_zeroes_input[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE] = { 0 }; + const unsigned char *l_input = NULL; + size_t l_input_len; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md; - md = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(hash_alg); - if (md == NULL) { + psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md); + hlen = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); /* For non-initial runs, call Derive-Secret( ., "derived", "") * on the old secret. */ if (secret_old != NULL) { - ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( hash_alg, secret_old, hlen, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(derived), @@ -323,31 +370,1516 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_evolve_secret( } } - if (input != NULL) { - memcpy(tmp_input, input, input_len); - ilen = input_len; + ret = 0; + + if (input != NULL && input_len != 0) { + l_input = input; + l_input_len = input_len; } else { - ilen = hlen; + l_input = all_zeroes_input; + l_input_len = hlen; } - /* HKDF-Extract takes a salt and input key material. - * The salt is the old secret, and the input key material - * is the input secret (PSK / ECDHE). */ - ret = mbedtls_hkdf_extract(md, - tmp_secret, hlen, - tmp_input, ilen, - secret_new); - if (ret != 0) { + status = psa_key_derivation_setup(&operation, + PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(hash_alg)); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { goto cleanup; } - ret = 0; + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(&operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT, + tmp_secret, + hlen); -cleanup: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(&operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + l_input, l_input_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(&operation, + secret_new, + PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg)); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + abort_status = psa_key_derivation_abort(&operation); + status = (status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status); + ret = (ret == 0 ? PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) : ret); mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_secret, sizeof(tmp_secret)); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_input, sizeof(tmp_input)); return ret; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_early_secrets( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *early_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_early_secrets *derived) +{ + int ret; + size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + /* We should never call this function with an unknown hash, + * but add an assertion anyway. */ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* + * 0 + * | + * v + * PSK -> HKDF-Extract = Early Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "c e traffic", ClientHello) + * | = client_early_traffic_secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "e exp master", ClientHello) + * | = early_exporter_master_secret + * v + */ + + /* Create client_early_traffic_secret */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + early_secret, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(c_e_traffic), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->client_early_traffic_secret, + hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Create early exporter */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + early_secret, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(e_exp_master), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->early_exporter_master_secret, + hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_handshake_secrets( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *handshake_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets *derived) +{ + int ret; + size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + /* We should never call this function with an unknown hash, + * but add an assertion anyway. */ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* + * + * Handshake Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "c hs traffic", + * | ClientHello...ServerHello ) + * | = client_handshake_traffic_secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "s hs traffic", + * | ClientHello...ServerHello ) + * | = server_handshake_traffic_secret + * + */ + + /* + * Compute client_handshake_traffic_secret with + * Derive-Secret( ., "c hs traffic", ClientHello...ServerHello ) + */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + handshake_secret, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(c_hs_traffic), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->client_handshake_traffic_secret, + hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* + * Compute server_handshake_traffic_secret with + * Derive-Secret( ., "s hs traffic", ClientHello...ServerHello ) + */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + handshake_secret, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(s_hs_traffic), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->server_handshake_traffic_secret, + hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_application_secrets( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *application_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets *derived) +{ + int ret; + size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + /* We should never call this function with an unknown hash, + * but add an assertion anyway. */ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* Generate {client,server}_application_traffic_secret_0 + * + * Master Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "c ap traffic", + * | ClientHello...server Finished ) + * | = client_application_traffic_secret_0 + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "s ap traffic", + * | ClientHello...Server Finished ) + * | = server_application_traffic_secret_0 + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "exp master", + * | ClientHello...server Finished) + * | = exporter_master_secret + * + */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + application_secret, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(c_ap_traffic), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->client_application_traffic_secret_N, + hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + application_secret, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(s_ap_traffic), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->server_application_traffic_secret_N, + hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + application_secret, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(exp_master), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->exporter_master_secret, + hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Generate resumption_master_secret for use with the ticket exchange. + * + * This is not integrated with mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_application_secrets() + * because it uses the transcript hash up to and including ClientFinished. */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_resumption_master_secret( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *application_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets *derived) +{ + int ret; + size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + /* We should never call this function with an unknown hash, + * but add an assertion anyway. */ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + application_secret, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(res_master), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->resumption_master_secret, + hash_len); + + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * \brief Transition into application stage of TLS 1.3 key schedule. + * + * The TLS 1.3 key schedule can be viewed as a simple state machine + * with states Initial -> Early -> Handshake -> Application, and + * this function represents the Handshake -> Application transition. + * + * In the handshake stage, ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys() + * can be used to derive the handshake traffic keys. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in key schedule + * stage \c Handshake. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + psa_algorithm_t const hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type( + (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac); + + /* + * Compute MasterSecret + */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret( + hash_alg, + handshake->tls13_master_secrets.handshake, + NULL, 0, + handshake->tls13_master_secrets.app); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( + 4, "Master secret", + handshake->tls13_master_secrets.app, PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg)); + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_calc_finished_core(psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *base_key, + unsigned char const *transcript, + unsigned char *dst, + size_t *dst_len) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + unsigned char finished_key[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE]; + int ret; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + + /* We should never call this function with an unknown hash, + * but add an assertion anyway. */ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* TLS 1.3 Finished message + * + * struct { + * opaque verify_data[Hash.length]; + * } Finished; + * + * verify_data = + * HMAC( finished_key, + * Hash( Handshake Context + + * Certificate* + + * CertificateVerify* ) + * ) + * + * finished_key = + * HKDF-Expand-Label( BaseKey, "finished", "", Hash.length ) + */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label( + hash_alg, base_key, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(finished), + NULL, 0, + finished_key, hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + alg = PSA_ALG_HMAC(hash_alg); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, alg); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC); + + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, finished_key, hash_len, &key); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_mac_compute(key, alg, transcript, hash_len, + dst, hash_len, dst_len); + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + +exit: + + status = psa_destroy_key(key); + if (ret == 0) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(finished_key, sizeof(finished_key)); + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *dst, + size_t dst_len, + size_t *actual_len, + int from) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t transcript_len; + + unsigned char *base_key = NULL; + size_t base_key_len = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets *tls13_hs_secrets = + &ssl->handshake->tls13_hs_secrets; + + mbedtls_md_type_t const md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac; + + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type( + (mbedtls_md_type_t) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac); + size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data")); + + if (from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + base_key = tls13_hs_secrets->client_handshake_traffic_secret; + base_key_len = sizeof(tls13_hs_secrets->client_handshake_traffic_secret); + } else { + base_key = tls13_hs_secrets->server_handshake_traffic_secret; + base_key_len = sizeof(tls13_hs_secrets->server_handshake_traffic_secret); + } + + if (dst_len < hash_len) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type, + transcript, sizeof(transcript), + &transcript_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript", ret); + goto exit; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "handshake hash", transcript, transcript_len); + + ret = ssl_tls13_calc_finished_core(hash_alg, base_key, + transcript, dst, actual_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "verify_data for finished message", dst, hash_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data")); + +exit: + /* Erase handshake secrets */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(base_key, base_key_len); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(transcript, sizeof(transcript)); + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_create_psk_binder(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *psk, size_t psk_len, + int psk_type, + unsigned char const *transcript, + unsigned char *result) +{ + int ret = 0; + unsigned char binder_key[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char early_secret[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + size_t actual_len; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for debug */ + ((void) ssl); +#endif + + /* We should never call this function with an unknown hash, + * but add an assertion anyway. */ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* + * 0 + * | + * v + * PSK -> HKDF-Extract = Early Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "ext binder" | "res binder", "") + * | = binder_key + * v + */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret(hash_alg, + NULL, /* Old secret */ + psk, psk_len, /* Input */ + early_secret); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret", ret); + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_create_psk_binder", + early_secret, hash_len); + + if (psk_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + early_secret, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(res_binder), + NULL, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED, + binder_key, hash_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Derive Early Secret with 'res binder'")); + } else { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + early_secret, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(ext_binder), + NULL, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED, + binder_key, hash_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Derive Early Secret with 'ext binder'")); + } + + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret", ret); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * The binding_value is computed in the same way as the Finished message + * but with the BaseKey being the binder_key. + */ + + ret = ssl_tls13_calc_finished_core(hash_alg, binder_key, transcript, + result, &actual_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "psk binder", result, actual_len); + +exit: + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(early_secret, sizeof(early_secret)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(binder_key, sizeof(binder_key)); + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform( + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + int endpoint, int ciphersuite, + mbedtls_ssl_key_set const *traffic_keys, + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl /* DEBUG ONLY */) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + int ret; + mbedtls_cipher_info_t const *cipher_info; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + unsigned char const *key_enc; + unsigned char const *iv_enc; + unsigned char const *key_dec; + unsigned char const *iv_dec; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_type_t key_type; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + size_t key_bits; + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for those cases */ + (void) ssl; +#endif + + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ciphersuite); + if (ciphersuite_info == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ciphersuite info for %d not found", + ciphersuite)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(ciphersuite_info->cipher); + if (cipher_info == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("cipher info for %u not found", + ciphersuite_info->cipher)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * Setup cipher contexts in target transform + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + cipher_info)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret); + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + cipher_info)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret); + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + key_enc = traffic_keys->server_write_key; + key_dec = traffic_keys->client_write_key; + iv_enc = traffic_keys->server_write_iv; + iv_dec = traffic_keys->client_write_iv; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + key_enc = traffic_keys->client_write_key; + key_dec = traffic_keys->server_write_key; + iv_enc = traffic_keys->client_write_iv; + iv_dec = traffic_keys->server_write_iv; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + { + /* should not happen */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + memcpy(transform->iv_enc, iv_enc, traffic_keys->iv_len); + memcpy(transform->iv_dec, iv_dec, traffic_keys->iv_len); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + key_enc, (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info), + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret); + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + key_dec, (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info), + MBEDTLS_DECRYPT)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret); + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + /* + * Setup other fields in SSL transform + */ + + if ((ciphersuite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG) != 0) { + transform->taglen = 8; + } else { + transform->taglen = 16; + } + + transform->ivlen = traffic_keys->iv_len; + transform->maclen = 0; + transform->fixed_ivlen = transform->ivlen; + transform->tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; + + /* We add the true record content type (1 Byte) to the plaintext and + * then pad to the configured granularity. The minimum length of the + * type-extended and padded plaintext is therefore the padding + * granularity. */ + transform->minlen = + transform->taglen + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* + * Setup psa keys and alg + */ + if ((status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ciphersuite_info->cipher, + transform->taglen, + &alg, + &key_type, + &key_bits)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa", PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status)); + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + transform->psa_alg = alg; + + if (alg != MBEDTLS_SSL_NULL_CIPHER) { + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, alg); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, key_type); + + if ((status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + key_enc, + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits), + &transform->psa_key_enc)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "psa_import_key", PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status)); + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT); + + if ((status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + key_dec, + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits), + &transform->psa_key_dec)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "psa_import_key", PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status)); + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info( + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info, + size_t *key_len, size_t *iv_len) +{ + psa_key_type_t key_type; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + size_t taglen; + size_t key_bits; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (ciphersuite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG) { + taglen = 8; + } else { + taglen = 16; + } + + status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ciphersuite_info->cipher, taglen, + &alg, &key_type, &key_bits); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + *key_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits); + + /* TLS 1.3 only have AEAD ciphers, IV length is unconditionally 12 bytes */ + *iv_len = 12; + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +/* + * ssl_tls13_generate_early_key() generates the key necessary for protecting + * the early application data and handshake messages as described in section 7 + * of RFC 8446. + * + * NOTE: Only one key is generated, the key for the traffic from the client to + * the server. The TLS 1.3 specification does not define a secret and thus + * a key for server early traffic. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_generate_early_key(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_key_set *traffic_keys) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg; + size_t hash_len; + unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t transcript_len; + size_t key_len = 0; + size_t iv_len = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_early_secrets tls13_early_secrets; + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> ssl_tls13_generate_early_key")); + + ret = ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info(ciphersuite_info, &key_len, &iv_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac; + + hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac); + hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type, + transcript, + sizeof(transcript), + &transcript_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript", + ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_early_secrets( + hash_alg, handshake->tls13_master_secrets.early, + transcript, transcript_len, &tls13_early_secrets); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_early_secrets", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( + 4, "Client early traffic secret", + tls13_early_secrets.client_early_traffic_secret, hash_len); + + /* + * Export client handshake traffic secret + */ + if (ssl->f_export_keys != NULL) { + ssl->f_export_keys( + ssl->p_export_keys, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_EARLY_SECRET, + tls13_early_secrets.client_early_traffic_secret, + hash_len, + handshake->randbytes, + handshake->randbytes + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE /* TODO: FIX! */); + } + + ret = ssl_tls13_make_traffic_key( + hash_alg, + tls13_early_secrets.client_early_traffic_secret, + hash_len, traffic_keys->client_write_key, key_len, + traffic_keys->client_write_iv, iv_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_make_traffic_key", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + traffic_keys->key_len = key_len; + traffic_keys->iv_len = iv_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "client early write_key", + traffic_keys->client_write_key, + traffic_keys->key_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "client early write_iv", + traffic_keys->client_write_iv, + traffic_keys->iv_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= ssl_tls13_generate_early_key")); + +cleanup: + /* Erase early secrets and transcript */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( + &tls13_early_secrets, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_early_secrets)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(transcript, sizeof(transcript)); + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_key_set traffic_keys; + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_earlydata = NULL; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + /* Next evolution in key schedule: Establish early_data secret and + * key material. */ + ret = ssl_tls13_generate_early_key(ssl, &traffic_keys); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_generate_early_key", + ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + transform_earlydata = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform)); + if (transform_earlydata == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform( + transform_earlydata, + ssl->conf->endpoint, + handshake->ciphersuite_info->id, + &traffic_keys, + ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + handshake->transform_earlydata = transform_earlydata; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&traffic_keys, sizeof(traffic_keys)); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_free(transform_earlydata); + } + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + unsigned char *psk = NULL; + size_t psk_len = 0; + + if (handshake->ciphersuite_info == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("cipher suite info not found")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_psk(ssl)) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_export_handshake_psk(ssl, &psk, &psk_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_export_handshake_psk", + ret); + return ret; + } + } +#endif + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret(hash_alg, NULL, psk, psk_len, + handshake->tls13_master_secrets.early); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + mbedtls_free((void *) psk); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early", + handshake->tls13_master_secrets.early, + PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg)); + return 0; +} + +/** + * \brief Compute TLS 1.3 handshake traffic keys. + * + * ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys() generates keys necessary for + * protecting the handshake messages, as described in Section 7 of + * RFC 8446. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in + * key schedule stage \c Handshake, see + * ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_handshake(). + * \param traffic_keys The address at which to store the handshake traffic + * keys. This must be writable but may be uninitialized. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_key_set *traffic_keys) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg; + size_t hash_len; + unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t transcript_len; + size_t key_len = 0; + size_t iv_len = 0; + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + handshake->ciphersuite_info; + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets *tls13_hs_secrets = + &handshake->tls13_hs_secrets; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys")); + + ret = ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info(ciphersuite_info, &key_len, &iv_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info", ret); + return ret; + } + + md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac; + + hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac); + hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type, + transcript, + sizeof(transcript), + &transcript_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript", + ret); + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_handshake_secrets( + hash_alg, handshake->tls13_master_secrets.handshake, + transcript, transcript_len, tls13_hs_secrets); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_handshake_secrets", + ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Client handshake traffic secret", + tls13_hs_secrets->client_handshake_traffic_secret, + hash_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Server handshake traffic secret", + tls13_hs_secrets->server_handshake_traffic_secret, + hash_len); + + /* + * Export client handshake traffic secret + */ + if (ssl->f_export_keys != NULL) { + ssl->f_export_keys( + ssl->p_export_keys, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET, + tls13_hs_secrets->client_handshake_traffic_secret, + hash_len, + handshake->randbytes, + handshake->randbytes + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE /* TODO: FIX! */); + + ssl->f_export_keys( + ssl->p_export_keys, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET, + tls13_hs_secrets->server_handshake_traffic_secret, + hash_len, + handshake->randbytes, + handshake->randbytes + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE /* TODO: FIX! */); + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys( + hash_alg, + tls13_hs_secrets->client_handshake_traffic_secret, + tls13_hs_secrets->server_handshake_traffic_secret, + hash_len, key_len, iv_len, traffic_keys); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys", ret); + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "client_handshake write_key", + traffic_keys->client_write_key, + traffic_keys->key_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "server_handshake write_key", + traffic_keys->server_write_key, + traffic_keys->key_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "client_handshake write_iv", + traffic_keys->client_write_iv, + traffic_keys->iv_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "server_handshake write_iv", + traffic_keys->server_write_iv, + traffic_keys->iv_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys")); + +exit: + + return ret; +} + +/** + * \brief Transition into handshake stage of TLS 1.3 key schedule. + * + * The TLS 1.3 key schedule can be viewed as a simple state machine + * with states Initial -> Early -> Handshake -> Application, and + * this function represents the Early -> Handshake transition. + * + * In the handshake stage, ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys() + * can be used to derive the handshake traffic keys. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in key schedule + * stage \c Early. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + psa_algorithm_t const hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type( + (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac); + unsigned char *shared_secret = NULL; + size_t shared_secret_len = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + /* + * Compute ECDHE secret used to compute the handshake secret from which + * client_handshake_traffic_secret and server_handshake_traffic_secret + * are derived in the handshake secret derivation stage. + */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_ephemeral(ssl)) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(handshake->offered_group_id) || + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(handshake->offered_group_id)) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + psa_algorithm_t alg = + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(handshake->offered_group_id) ? + PSA_ALG_ECDH : PSA_ALG_FFDH; + + /* Compute ECDH shared secret. */ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + status = psa_get_key_attributes(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, + &key_attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + shared_secret_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( + psa_get_key_bits(&key_attributes)); + shared_secret = mbedtls_calloc(1, shared_secret_len); + if (shared_secret == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_raw_key_agreement( + alg, handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len, + shared_secret, shared_secret_len, &shared_secret_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_raw_key_agreement", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_destroy_key", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Group not supported.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + + /* + * Compute the Handshake Secret + */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret( + hash_alg, handshake->tls13_master_secrets.early, + shared_secret, shared_secret_len, + handshake->tls13_master_secrets.handshake); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Handshake secret", + handshake->tls13_master_secrets.handshake, + PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg)); + +cleanup: + if (shared_secret != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(shared_secret, shared_secret_len); + } + + return ret; +} + +/** + * \brief Compute TLS 1.3 application traffic keys. + * + * ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys() generates application traffic + * keys, since any record following a 1-RTT Finished message MUST be + * encrypted under the application traffic key. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in + * key schedule stage \c Application, see + * ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application(). + * \param traffic_keys The address at which to store the application traffic + * keys. This must be writable but may be uninitialized. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_key_set *traffic_keys) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + /* Address at which to store the application secrets */ + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets * const app_secrets = + &ssl->session_negotiate->app_secrets; + + /* Holding the transcript up to and including the ServerFinished */ + unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t transcript_len; + + /* Variables relating to the hash for the chosen ciphersuite. */ + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type; + + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg; + size_t hash_len; + + /* Variables relating to the cipher for the chosen ciphersuite. */ + size_t key_len = 0, iv_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> derive application traffic keys")); + + /* Extract basic information about hash and ciphersuite */ + + ret = ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info(handshake->ciphersuite_info, + &key_len, &iv_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac; + + hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac); + hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + /* Compute current handshake transcript. It's the caller's responsibility + * to call this at the right time, that is, after the ServerFinished. */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type, + transcript, sizeof(transcript), + &transcript_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Compute application secrets from master secret and transcript hash. */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_application_secrets( + hash_alg, handshake->tls13_master_secrets.app, + transcript, transcript_len, app_secrets); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_application_secrets", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Derive first epoch of IV + Key for application traffic. */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys( + hash_alg, + app_secrets->client_application_traffic_secret_N, + app_secrets->server_application_traffic_secret_N, + hash_len, key_len, iv_len, traffic_keys); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Client application traffic secret", + app_secrets->client_application_traffic_secret_N, + hash_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Server application traffic secret", + app_secrets->server_application_traffic_secret_N, + hash_len); + + /* + * Export client/server application traffic secret 0 + */ + if (ssl->f_export_keys != NULL) { + ssl->f_export_keys( + ssl->p_export_keys, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET, + app_secrets->client_application_traffic_secret_N, hash_len, + handshake->randbytes, + handshake->randbytes + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE /* TODO: this should be replaced by + a new constant for TLS 1.3! */); + + ssl->f_export_keys( + ssl->p_export_keys, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET, + app_secrets->server_application_traffic_secret_N, hash_len, + handshake->randbytes, + handshake->randbytes + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE /* TODO: this should be replaced by + a new constant for TLS 1.3! */); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "client application_write_key:", + traffic_keys->client_write_key, key_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "server application write key", + traffic_keys->server_write_key, key_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "client application write IV", + traffic_keys->client_write_iv, iv_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "server application write IV", + traffic_keys->server_write_iv, iv_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= derive application traffic keys")); + +cleanup: + /* randbytes is not used again */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->handshake->randbytes, + sizeof(ssl->handshake->randbytes)); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(transcript, sizeof(transcript)); + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_handshake_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_key_set traffic_keys; + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_handshake = NULL; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + /* Compute handshake secret */ + ret = ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_handshake(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_master_secret", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Next evolution in key schedule: Establish handshake secret and + * key material. */ + ret = ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys(ssl, &traffic_keys); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys", + ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + transform_handshake = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform)); + if (transform_handshake == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform( + transform_handshake, + ssl->conf->endpoint, + handshake->ciphersuite_info->id, + &traffic_keys, + ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + handshake->transform_handshake = transform_handshake; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&traffic_keys, sizeof(traffic_keys)); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_free(transform_handshake); + } + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t transcript_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 2, ("=> mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret")); + + md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type, + transcript, sizeof(transcript), + &transcript_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_resumption_master_secret( + mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_type), + handshake->tls13_master_secrets.app, + transcript, transcript_len, + &ssl->session_negotiate->app_secrets); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Erase master secrets */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&handshake->tls13_master_secrets, + sizeof(handshake->tls13_master_secrets)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( + 4, "Resumption master secret", + ssl->session_negotiate->app_secrets.resumption_master_secret, + PSA_HASH_LENGTH(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_type))); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 2, ("<= mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret")); + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_application_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_key_set traffic_keys; + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_application = NULL; + + ret = ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys(ssl, &traffic_keys); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + transform_application = + mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform)); + if (transform_application == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform( + transform_application, + ssl->conf->endpoint, + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->id, + &traffic_keys, + ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + ssl->transform_application = transform_application; + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&traffic_keys, sizeof(traffic_keys)); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_free(transform_application); + } + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_export_handshake_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char **psk, + size_t *psk_len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + *psk_len = 0; + *psk = NULL; + + if (mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + status = psa_get_key_attributes(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque, &key_attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + *psk_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(psa_get_key_bits(&key_attributes)); + *psk = mbedtls_calloc(1, *psk_len); + if (*psk == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_export_key(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque, + (uint8_t *) *psk, *psk_len, psk_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + mbedtls_free((void *) *psk); + *psk = NULL; + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + return 0; +#else + *psk = ssl->handshake->psk; + *psk_len = ssl->handshake->psk_len; + if (*psk == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + return 0; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h index 4c3b252fa2..d3a4c6c992 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h @@ -2,27 +2,15 @@ * TLS 1.3 key schedule * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 ( the "License" ); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEYS_H) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEYS_H /* This requires MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( idx, name, string ) to be defined at - * the point of use. See e.g. the definition of mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_union + * the point of use. See e.g. the definition of mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels_union * below. */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST \ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST \ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(finished, "finished") \ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(resumption, "resumption") \ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(traffic_upd, "traffic upd") \ @@ -40,76 +28,92 @@ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(exp_master, "exp master") \ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(ext_binder, "ext binder") \ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(res_binder, "res binder") \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(derived, "derived") + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(derived, "derived") \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(client_cv, "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify") \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(server_cv, "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify") + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED 1 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_EXTERNAL 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION 1 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(name, string) \ const unsigned char name [sizeof(string) - 1]; -union mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_union { +union mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels_union { MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST }; -struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_struct { +struct mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels_struct { MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST }; #undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL -extern const struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_struct mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels; +extern const struct mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels_struct mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels; + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_LEN(LABEL) \ + sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels.LABEL) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(LABEL) \ - mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels.LABEL, \ - sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels.LABEL) + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels.LABEL, \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_LEN(LABEL) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN \ - sizeof(union mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_labels_union) + sizeof(union mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels_union) /* The maximum length of HKDF contexts used in the TLS 1.3 standard. * Since contexts are always hashes of message transcripts, this can * be approximated from above by the maximum hash size. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN \ - MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE + PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE /* Maximum desired length for expanded key material generated * by HKDF-Expand-Label. * * Warning: If this ever needs to be increased, the implementation - * ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_encode_label() in ssl_tls13_keys.c needs to be + * ssl_tls13_hkdf_encode_label() in ssl_tls13_keys.c needs to be * adjusted since it currently assumes that HKDF key expansion * is never used with more than 255 Bytes of output. */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN 255 /** - * \brief The \c HKDF-Expand-Label function from - * the TLS 1.3 standard RFC 8446. + * \brief The \c HKDF-Expand-Label function from + * the TLS 1.3 standard RFC 8446. * * - * HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, Label, Context, Length ) = + * HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, Label, Context, Length ) = * HKDF-Expand( Secret, HkdfLabel, Length ) * * - * \param hash_alg The identifier for the hash algorithm to use. - * \param secret The \c Secret argument to \c HKDF-Expand-Label. - * This must be a readable buffer of length \p slen Bytes. - * \param slen The length of \p secret in Bytes. - * \param label The \c Label argument to \c HKDF-Expand-Label. - * This must be a readable buffer of length \p llen Bytes. - * \param llen The length of \p label in Bytes. - * \param ctx The \c Context argument to \c HKDF-Expand-Label. - * This must be a readable buffer of length \p clen Bytes. - * \param clen The length of \p context in Bytes. - * \param buf The destination buffer to hold the expanded secret. - * This must be a writable buffer of length \p blen Bytes. - * \param blen The desired size of the expanded secret in Bytes. - * - * \returns \c 0 on success. - * \return A negative error code on failure. + * \param hash_alg The identifier for the hash algorithm to use. + * \param secret The \c Secret argument to \c HKDF-Expand-Label. + * This must be a readable buffer of length + * \p secret_len Bytes. + * \param secret_len The length of \p secret in Bytes. + * \param label The \c Label argument to \c HKDF-Expand-Label. + * This must be a readable buffer of length + * \p label_len Bytes. + * \param label_len The length of \p label in Bytes. + * \param ctx The \c Context argument to \c HKDF-Expand-Label. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p ctx_len Bytes. + * \param ctx_len The length of \p context in Bytes. + * \param buf The destination buffer to hold the expanded secret. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \p buf_len Bytes. + * \param buf_len The desired size of the expanded secret in Bytes. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( - mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, - const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, - const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, - unsigned char *buf, size_t blen); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, + const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t ctx_len, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len); /** * \brief This function is part of the TLS 1.3 key schedule. @@ -126,10 +130,12 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( * \param hash_alg The identifier for the hash algorithm to be used * for the HKDF-based expansion of the secret. * \param client_secret The client traffic secret. - * This must be a readable buffer of size \p slen Bytes + * This must be a readable buffer of size + * \p secret_len Bytes * \param server_secret The server traffic secret. - * This must be a readable buffer of size \p slen Bytes - * \param slen Length of the secrets \p client_secret and + * This must be a readable buffer of size + * \p secret_len Bytes + * \param secret_len Length of the secrets \p client_secret and * \p server_secret in Bytes. * \param key_len The desired length of the key to be extracted in Bytes. * \param iv_len The desired length of the IV to be extracted in Bytes. @@ -140,17 +146,14 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_hkdf_expand_label( * \returns A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys( - mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, const unsigned char *client_secret, - const unsigned char *server_secret, - size_t slen, size_t key_len, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *server_secret, size_t secret_len, + size_t key_len, size_t iv_len, mbedtls_ssl_key_set *keys); - -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED 0 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED 1 - /** * \brief The \c Derive-Secret function from the TLS 1.3 standard RFC 8446. * @@ -164,15 +167,17 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys( * \param hash_alg The identifier for the hash function used for the * applications of HKDF. * \param secret The \c Secret argument to the \c Derive-Secret function. - * This must be a readable buffer of length \p slen Bytes. - * \param slen The length of \p secret in Bytes. + * This must be a readable buffer of length + * \p secret_len Bytes. + * \param secret_len The length of \p secret in Bytes. * \param label The \c Label argument to the \c Derive-Secret function. - * This must be a readable buffer of length \p llen Bytes. - * \param llen The length of \p label in Bytes. + * This must be a readable buffer of length + * \p label_len Bytes. + * \param label_len The length of \p label in Bytes. * \param ctx The hash of the \c Messages argument to the * \c Derive-Secret function, or the \c Messages argument - * itself, depending on \p context_already_hashed. - * \param clen The length of \p hash. + * itself, depending on \p ctx_hashed. + * \param ctx_len The length of \p ctx in Bytes. * \param ctx_hashed This indicates whether the \p ctx contains the hash of * the \c Messages argument in the application of the * \c Derive-Secret function @@ -182,19 +187,197 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys( * (value MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED). * \param dstbuf The target buffer to write the output of * \c Derive-Secret to. This must be a writable buffer of - * size \p buflen Bytes. - * \param buflen The length of \p dstbuf in Bytes. + * size \p dtsbuf_len Bytes. + * \param dstbuf_len The length of \p dstbuf in Bytes. * * \returns \c 0 on success. * \returns A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( - mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, - const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, - const unsigned char *label, size_t llen, - const unsigned char *ctx, size_t clen, +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, + const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t ctx_len, int ctx_hashed, - unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t buflen); + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dstbuf_len); + +/** + * \brief Derive TLS 1.3 early data key material from early secret. + * + * This is a small wrapper invoking mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret() + * with the appropriate labels. + * + * + * Early Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "c e traffic", ClientHello) + * | = client_early_traffic_secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "e exp master", ClientHello) + * . = early_exporter_master_secret + * . + * . + * + * + * \note To obtain the actual key and IV for the early data traffic, + * the client secret derived by this function need to be + * further processed by mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys(). + * + * \note The binder key, which is also generated from the early secret, + * is omitted here. Its calculation is part of the separate routine + * mbedtls_ssl_tls13_create_psk_binder(). + * + * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm associated with the PSK for which + * early data key material is being derived. + * \param early_secret The early secret from which the early data key material + * should be derived. This must be a readable buffer whose + * length is the digest size of the hash algorithm + * represented by \p md_size. + * \param transcript The transcript of the handshake so far, calculated with + * respect to \p hash_alg. This must be a readable buffer + * whose length is the digest size of the hash algorithm + * represented by \p md_size. + * \param derived The address of the structure in which to store + * the early data key material. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_early_secrets( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *early_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_early_secrets *derived); + +/** + * \brief Derive TLS 1.3 handshake key material from the handshake secret. + * + * This is a small wrapper invoking mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret() + * with the appropriate labels from the standard. + * + * + * Handshake Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "c hs traffic", + * | ClientHello...ServerHello ) + * | = client_handshake_traffic_secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "s hs traffic", + * . ClientHello...ServerHello ) + * . = server_handshake_traffic_secret + * . + * + * + * \note To obtain the actual key and IV for the encrypted handshake traffic, + * the client and server secret derived by this function need to be + * further processed by mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys(). + * + * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm associated with the ciphersuite + * that's being used for the connection. + * \param handshake_secret The handshake secret from which the handshake key + * material should be derived. This must be a readable + * buffer whose length is the digest size of the hash + * algorithm represented by \p md_size. + * \param transcript The transcript of the handshake so far, calculated + * with respect to \p hash_alg. This must be a readable + * buffer whose length is the digest size of the hash + * algorithm represented by \p md_size. + * \param derived The address of the structure in which to + * store the handshake key material. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_handshake_secrets( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *handshake_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets *derived); + +/** + * \brief Derive TLS 1.3 application key material from the master secret. + * + * This is a small wrapper invoking mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret() + * with the appropriate labels from the standard. + * + * + * Master Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "c ap traffic", + * | ClientHello...server Finished ) + * | = client_application_traffic_secret_0 + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "s ap traffic", + * | ClientHello...Server Finished ) + * | = server_application_traffic_secret_0 + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "exp master", + * . ClientHello...server Finished) + * . = exporter_master_secret + * . + * + * + * \note To obtain the actual key and IV for the (0-th) application traffic, + * the client and server secret derived by this function need to be + * further processed by mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys(). + * + * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm associated with the ciphersuite + * that's being used for the connection. + * \param master_secret The master secret from which the application key + * material should be derived. This must be a readable + * buffer whose length is the digest size of the hash + * algorithm represented by \p md_size. + * \param transcript The transcript of the handshake up to and including + * the ServerFinished message, calculated with respect + * to \p hash_alg. This must be a readable buffer whose + * length is the digest size of the hash algorithm + * represented by \p hash_alg. + * \param derived The address of the structure in which to + * store the application key material. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_application_secrets( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *master_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets *derived); + +/** + * \brief Derive TLS 1.3 resumption master secret from the master secret. + * + * This is a small wrapper invoking mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret() + * with the appropriate labels from the standard. + * + * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm used in the application for which + * key material is being derived. + * \param application_secret The application secret from which the resumption master + * secret should be derived. This must be a readable + * buffer whose length is the digest size of the hash + * algorithm represented by \p md_size. + * \param transcript The transcript of the handshake up to and including + * the ClientFinished message, calculated with respect + * to \p hash_alg. This must be a readable buffer whose + * length is the digest size of the hash algorithm + * represented by \p hash_alg. + * \param transcript_len The length of \p transcript in Bytes. + * \param derived The address of the structure in which to + * store the resumption master secret. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_resumption_master_secret( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *application_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets *derived); /** * \brief Compute the next secret in the TLS 1.3 key schedule @@ -226,7 +409,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( * * Each of the three secrets in turn is the basis for further * key derivations, such as the derivation of traffic keys and IVs; - * see e.g. mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_make_traffic_keys(). + * see e.g. mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys(). * * This function implements one step in this evolution of secrets: * @@ -263,10 +446,206 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_derive_secret( * \returns A negative error code on failure. */ -int mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_evolve_secret( - mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg, +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, const unsigned char *secret_old, const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, unsigned char *secret_new); +/** + * \brief Calculate a TLS 1.3 PSK binder. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context. This is used for debugging only and may + * be \c NULL if MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C is disabled. + * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm associated to the PSK \p psk. + * \param psk The buffer holding the PSK for which to create a binder. + * \param psk_len The size of \p psk in bytes. + * \param psk_type This indicates whether the PSK \p psk is externally + * provisioned (#MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_EXTERNAL) or a + * resumption PSK (#MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION). + * \param transcript The handshake transcript up to the point where the + * PSK binder calculation happens. This must be readable, + * and its size must be equal to the digest size of + * the hash algorithm represented by \p hash_alg. + * \param result The address at which to store the PSK binder on success. + * This must be writable, and its size must be equal to the + * digest size of the hash algorithm represented by + * \p hash_alg. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_create_psk_binder(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *psk, size_t psk_len, + int psk_type, + unsigned char const *transcript, + unsigned char *result); + +/** + * \bref Setup an SSL transform structure representing the + * record protection mechanism used by TLS 1.3 + * + * \param transform The SSL transform structure to be created. This must have + * been initialized through mbedtls_ssl_transform_init() and + * not used in any other way prior to calling this function. + * In particular, this function does not clean up the + * transform structure prior to installing the new keys. + * \param endpoint Indicates whether the transform is for the client + * (value #MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) or the server + * (value #MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER). + * \param ciphersuite The numerical identifier for the ciphersuite to use. + * This must be one of the identifiers listed in + * ssl_ciphersuites.h. + * \param traffic_keys The key material to use. No reference is stored in + * the SSL transform being generated, and the caller + * should destroy the key material afterwards. + * \param ssl (Debug-only) The SSL context to use for debug output + * in case of failure. This parameter is only needed if + * #MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C is set, and is ignored otherwise. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. In this case, \p transform is ready to + * be used with mbedtls_ssl_transform_decrypt() and + * mbedtls_ssl_transform_encrypt(). + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + int endpoint, + int ciphersuite, + mbedtls_ssl_key_set const *traffic_keys, + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/* + * TLS 1.3 key schedule evolutions + * + * Early -> Handshake -> Application + * + * Small wrappers around mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret(). + */ + +/** + * \brief Begin TLS 1.3 key schedule by calculating early secret. + * + * The TLS 1.3 key schedule can be viewed as a simple state machine + * with states Initial -> Early -> Handshake -> Application, and + * this function represents the Initial -> Early transition. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/** + * \brief Compute TLS 1.3 resumption master secret. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in + * key schedule stage \c Application, see + * mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application(). + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/** + * \brief Calculate the verify_data value for the client or server TLS 1.3 + * Finished message. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in + * key schedule stage \c Handshake, see + * mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application(). + * \param dst The address at which to write the verify_data value. + * \param dst_len The size of \p dst in bytes. + * \param actual_len The address at which to store the amount of data + * actually written to \p dst upon success. + * \param which The message to calculate the `verify_data` for: + * - #MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT for the Client's Finished message + * - #MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER for the Server's Finished message + * + * \note Both client and server call this function twice, once to + * generate their own Finished message, and once to verify the + * peer's Finished message. + + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *dst, + size_t dst_len, + size_t *actual_len, + int which); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +/** + * \brief Compute TLS 1.3 early transform + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + * + * \warning The function does not compute the early master secret. Call + * mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early() before to + * call this function to generate the early master secret. + * \note For a client/server endpoint, the function computes only the + * encryption/decryption part of the transform as the decryption/ + * encryption part is not defined by the specification (no early + * traffic from the server to the client). + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +/** + * \brief Compute TLS 1.3 handshake transform + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. The early secret must have been + * computed. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_handshake_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/** + * \brief Compute TLS 1.3 application transform + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. The early secret must have been + * computed. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_application_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +/** + * \brief Export TLS 1.3 PSK from handshake context + * + * \param[in] ssl The SSL context to operate on. + * \param[out] psk PSK output pointer. + * \param[out] psk_len Length of PSK. + * + * \returns \c 0 if there is a configured PSK and it was exported + * successfully. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_export_handshake_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char **psk, + size_t *psk_len); +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEYS_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_server.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2760d76a5d --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls13_server.c @@ -0,0 +1,3599 @@ +/* + * TLS 1.3 server-side functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + +#include "debug_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" + +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "ssl_tls13_keys.h" +#include "ssl_debug_helpers.h" + + +static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ssl_tls13_validate_peer_ciphersuite( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned int cipher_suite) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + if (!mbedtls_ssl_tls13_cipher_suite_is_offered(ssl, cipher_suite)) { + return NULL; + } + + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(cipher_suite); + if ((mbedtls_ssl_validate_ciphersuite(ssl, ciphersuite_info, + ssl->tls_version, + ssl->tls_version) != 0)) { + return NULL; + } + return ciphersuite_info; +} + +static void ssl_tls13_select_ciphersuite( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *cipher_suites, + const unsigned char *cipher_suites_end, + int psk_ciphersuite_id, + psa_algorithm_t psk_hash_alg, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t **selected_ciphersuite_info) +{ + *selected_ciphersuite_info = NULL; + + /* + * In a compliant ClientHello the byte-length of the list of ciphersuites + * is even and this function relies on this fact. This should have been + * checked in the main ClientHello parsing function. Double check here. + */ + if ((cipher_suites_end - cipher_suites) & 1) { + return; + } + + for (const unsigned char *p = cipher_suites; + p < cipher_suites_end; p += 2) { + /* + * "cipher_suites_end - p is even" is an invariant of the loop. As + * cipher_suites_end - p > 0, we have cipher_suites_end - p >= 2 and it + * is thus safe to read two bytes. + */ + uint16_t id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info = + ssl_tls13_validate_peer_ciphersuite(ssl, id); + if (info == NULL) { + continue; + } + + /* + * If a valid PSK ciphersuite identifier has been passed in, we want + * an exact match. + */ + if (psk_ciphersuite_id != 0) { + if (id != psk_ciphersuite_id) { + continue; + } + } else if (psk_hash_alg != PSA_ALG_NONE) { + if (mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) info->mac) != + psk_hash_alg) { + continue; + } + } + + *selected_ciphersuite_info = info; + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("No matched ciphersuite, psk_ciphersuite_id=%x, psk_hash_alg=%x", + (unsigned) psk_ciphersuite_id, psk_hash_alg)); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +/* From RFC 8446: + * + * enum { psk_ke(0), psk_dhe_ke(1), (255) } PskKeyExchangeMode; + * struct { + * PskKeyExchangeMode ke_modes<1..255>; + * } PskKeyExchangeModes; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_key_exchange_modes_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t ke_modes_len; + int ke_modes = 0; + + /* Read ke_modes length (1 Byte) */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 1); + ke_modes_len = *p++; + /* Currently, there are only two PSK modes, so even without looking + * at the content, something's wrong if the list has more than 2 items. */ + if (ke_modes_len > 2) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, ke_modes_len); + + while (ke_modes_len-- != 0) { + switch (*p++) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_MODE_PURE: + ke_modes |= MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Found PSK KEX MODE")); + break; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_MODE_ECDHE: + ke_modes |= MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE")); + break; + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + } + + ssl->handshake->tls13_kex_modes = ke_modes; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Non-error return values of + * ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_identity_match_ticket() and + * ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_identity_match(). They are positive to + * not collide with error codes that are negative. Zero + * (SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH) in case of success as it may be propagated + * up by the callers of this function as a generic success condition. + * + * The return value SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH_BUT_PSK_NOT_USABLE means + * that the pre-shared-key identity matches that of a ticket or an externally- + * provisioned pre-shared-key. We have thus been able to retrieve the + * attributes of the pre-shared-key but at least one of them does not meet + * some criteria and the pre-shared-key cannot be used. For example, a ticket + * is expired or its version is not TLS 1.3. Note eventually that the return + * value SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH_BUT_PSK_NOT_USABLE does not have + * anything to do with binder check. A binder check is done only when a + * suitable pre-shared-key has been selected and only for that selected + * pre-shared-key: if the binder check fails, we fail the handshake and we do + * not try to find another pre-shared-key for which the binder check would + * succeed as recommended by the specification. + */ +#define SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_DOES_NOT_MATCH 2 +#define SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH_BUT_PSK_NOT_USABLE 1 +#define SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH 0 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_psk_available(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_psk_ephemeral_available(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_identity_match_ticket( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *identity, + size_t identity_len, + uint32_t obfuscated_ticket_age, + mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *ticket_buffer; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + mbedtls_ms_time_t now; + mbedtls_ms_time_t server_age; + uint32_t client_age; + mbedtls_ms_time_t age_diff; +#endif + + ((void) obfuscated_ticket_age); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> check_identity_match_ticket")); + + /* Ticket parser is not configured, Skip */ + if (ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse == NULL || identity_len == 0) { + return SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_DOES_NOT_MATCH; + } + + /* We create a copy of the encrypted ticket since the ticket parsing + * function is allowed to use its input buffer as an output buffer + * (in-place decryption). We do, however, need the original buffer for + * computing the PSK binder value. + */ + ticket_buffer = mbedtls_calloc(1, identity_len); + if (ticket_buffer == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + memcpy(ticket_buffer, identity, identity_len); + + ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse(ssl->conf->p_ticket, + session, + ticket_buffer, identity_len); + switch (ret) { + case 0: + ret = SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket is expired")); + ret = SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH_BUT_PSK_NOT_USABLE; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket is not authentic")); + ret = SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_DOES_NOT_MATCH; + break; + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ticket_parse", ret); + ret = SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_DOES_NOT_MATCH; + } + + /* We delete the temporary buffer */ + mbedtls_free(ticket_buffer); + + if (ret != SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH) { + goto exit; + } + + /* + * The identity matches that of a ticket. Now check that it has suitable + * attributes and bet it will not be the case. + */ + ret = SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH_BUT_PSK_NOT_USABLE; + + if (session->tls_version != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Ticket TLS version is not 1.3.")); + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + now = mbedtls_ms_time(); + + if (now < session->ticket_creation_time) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("Invalid ticket creation time ( now = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_MS_TIME + ", creation_time = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_MS_TIME " )", + now, session->ticket_creation_time)); + goto exit; + } + + server_age = now - session->ticket_creation_time; + + /* RFC 8446 section 4.6.1 + * + * Servers MUST NOT use any value greater than 604800 seconds (7 days). + * + * RFC 8446 section 4.2.11.1 + * + * Clients MUST NOT attempt to use tickets which have ages greater than + * the "ticket_lifetime" value which was provided with the ticket. + * + */ + if (server_age > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_MAX_ALLOWED_TICKET_LIFETIME * 1000) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("Ticket age exceeds limitation ticket_age = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_MS_TIME, + server_age)); + goto exit; + } + + /* RFC 8446 section 4.2.10 + * + * For PSKs provisioned via NewSessionTicket, a server MUST validate that + * the ticket age for the selected PSK identity (computed by subtracting + * ticket_age_add from PskIdentity.obfuscated_ticket_age modulo 2^32) is + * within a small tolerance of the time since the ticket was issued. + * + * NOTE: The typical accuracy of an RTC crystal is ±100 to ±20 parts per + * million (360 to 72 milliseconds per hour). Default tolerance + * window is 6s, thus in the worst case clients and servers must + * sync up their system time every 6000/360/2~=8 hours. + */ + client_age = obfuscated_ticket_age - session->ticket_age_add; + age_diff = server_age - (mbedtls_ms_time_t) client_age; + if (age_diff < -MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_AGE_TOLERANCE || + age_diff > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_AGE_TOLERANCE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("Ticket age outside tolerance window ( diff = %" + MBEDTLS_PRINTF_MS_TIME ")", + age_diff)); + goto exit; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + /* + * All good, we have found a suitable ticket. + */ + ret = SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH; + +exit: + if (ret != SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH) { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(session); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= check_identity_match_ticket")); + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_identity_match( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *identity, + size_t identity_len, + uint32_t obfuscated_ticket_age, + int *psk_type, + mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ((void) session); + ((void) obfuscated_ticket_age); + *psk_type = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_EXTERNAL; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "identity", identity, identity_len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + ret = ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_identity_match_ticket( + ssl, identity, identity_len, obfuscated_ticket_age, session); + if (ret == SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH) { + *psk_type = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(ssl, + session->resumption_key, + session->resumption_key_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Ticket-resumed PSK:", + session->resumption_key, + session->resumption_key_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("ticket: obfuscated_ticket_age: %u", + (unsigned) obfuscated_ticket_age)); + return SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH; + } else if (ret == SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH_BUT_PSK_NOT_USABLE) { + return SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH_BUT_PSK_NOT_USABLE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + + /* Check identity with external configured function */ + if (ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL) { + if (ssl->conf->f_psk( + ssl->conf->p_psk, ssl, identity, identity_len) == 0) { + return SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH; + } + return SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_DOES_NOT_MATCH; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(5, "identity", identity, identity_len); + /* Check identity with pre-configured psk */ + if (ssl->conf->psk_identity != NULL && + identity_len == ssl->conf->psk_identity_len && + mbedtls_ct_memcmp(ssl->conf->psk_identity, + identity, identity_len) == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(ssl, ssl->conf->psk, ssl->conf->psk_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk", ret); + return ret; + } + return SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH; + } + + return SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_DOES_NOT_MATCH; +} + +/* + * Non-error return values of ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_binder_match(). + * They are positive to not collide with error codes that are negative. Zero + * (SSL_TLS1_3_BINDER_MATCH) in case of success as it may be propagated up + * by the callers of this function as a generic success condition. + */ +#define SSL_TLS1_3_BINDER_DOES_NOT_MATCH 1 +#define SSL_TLS1_3_BINDER_MATCH 0 +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_binder_match( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *binder, size_t binder_len, + int psk_type, psa_algorithm_t psk_hash_alg) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + unsigned char transcript[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t transcript_len; + unsigned char *psk; + size_t psk_len; + unsigned char server_computed_binder[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + + if (binder_len != PSA_HASH_LENGTH(psk_hash_alg)) { + return SSL_TLS1_3_BINDER_DOES_NOT_MATCH; + } + + /* Get current state of handshake transcript. */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript( + ssl, mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psk_hash_alg), + transcript, sizeof(transcript), &transcript_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_export_handshake_psk(ssl, &psk, &psk_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_create_psk_binder(ssl, psk_hash_alg, + psk, psk_len, psk_type, + transcript, + server_computed_binder); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + mbedtls_free((void *) psk); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("PSK binder calculation failed.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "psk binder ( computed ): ", + server_computed_binder, transcript_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "psk binder ( received ): ", binder, binder_len); + + if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(server_computed_binder, + binder, + PSA_HASH_LENGTH(psk_hash_alg)) == 0) { + return SSL_TLS1_3_BINDER_MATCH; + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(server_computed_binder, + sizeof(server_computed_binder)); + return SSL_TLS1_3_BINDER_DOES_NOT_MATCH; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_session_copy_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, + const mbedtls_ssl_session *src) +{ + dst->ticket_age_add = src->ticket_age_add; + dst->ticket_flags = src->ticket_flags; + dst->resumption_key_len = src->resumption_key_len; + if (src->resumption_key_len == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + memcpy(dst->resumption_key, src->resumption_key, src->resumption_key_len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + dst->max_early_data_size = src->max_early_data_size; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + int ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_set_ticket_alpn(dst, src->ticket_alpn); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA*/ + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +struct psk_attributes { + int type; + int key_exchange_mode; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; +}; +#define PSK_ATTRIBUTES_INIT { 0, 0, NULL } + +/* Parser for pre_shared_key extension in client hello + * struct { + * opaque identity<1..2^16-1>; + * uint32 obfuscated_ticket_age; + * } PskIdentity; + * + * opaque PskBinderEntry<32..255>; + * + * struct { + * PskIdentity identities<7..2^16-1>; + * PskBinderEntry binders<33..2^16-1>; + * } OfferedPsks; + * + * struct { + * select (Handshake.msg_type) { + * case client_hello: OfferedPsks; + * .... + * }; + * } PreSharedKeyExtension; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_pre_shared_key_ext( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *pre_shared_key_ext, + const unsigned char *pre_shared_key_ext_end, + const unsigned char *ciphersuites, + const unsigned char *ciphersuites_end, + struct psk_attributes *psk) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *identities = pre_shared_key_ext; + const unsigned char *p_identity_len; + size_t identities_len; + const unsigned char *identities_end; + const unsigned char *binders; + const unsigned char *p_binder_len; + size_t binders_len; + const unsigned char *binders_end; + int matched_identity = -1; + int identity_id = -1; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "pre_shared_key extension", + pre_shared_key_ext, + pre_shared_key_ext_end - pre_shared_key_ext); + + /* identities_len 2 bytes + * identities_data >= 7 bytes + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(identities, pre_shared_key_ext_end, 7 + 2); + identities_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(identities, 0); + p_identity_len = identities + 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p_identity_len, pre_shared_key_ext_end, + identities_len); + identities_end = p_identity_len + identities_len; + + /* binders_len 2 bytes + * binders >= 33 bytes + */ + binders = identities_end; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(binders, pre_shared_key_ext_end, 33 + 2); + binders_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(binders, 0); + p_binder_len = binders + 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p_binder_len, pre_shared_key_ext_end, binders_len); + binders_end = p_binder_len + binders_len; + + ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, pre_shared_key_ext, + identities_end - pre_shared_key_ext); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("update_checksum"), ret); + return ret; + } + + while (p_identity_len < identities_end && p_binder_len < binders_end) { + const unsigned char *identity; + size_t identity_len; + uint32_t obfuscated_ticket_age; + const unsigned char *binder; + size_t binder_len; + int psk_ciphersuite_id; + psa_algorithm_t psk_hash_alg; + int allowed_key_exchange_modes; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + mbedtls_ssl_session session; + mbedtls_ssl_session_init(&session); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p_identity_len, identities_end, 2 + 1 + 4); + identity_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p_identity_len, 0); + identity = p_identity_len + 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(identity, identities_end, identity_len + 4); + obfuscated_ticket_age = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(identity, identity_len); + p_identity_len += identity_len + 6; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p_binder_len, binders_end, 1 + 32); + binder_len = *p_binder_len; + binder = p_binder_len + 1; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(binder, binders_end, binder_len); + p_binder_len += binder_len + 1; + + identity_id++; + if (matched_identity != -1) { + continue; + } + + ret = ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_identity_match( + ssl, identity, identity_len, obfuscated_ticket_age, + &psk->type, &session); + if (ret != SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH) { + continue; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("found matched identity")); + + switch (psk->type) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_EXTERNAL: + psk_ciphersuite_id = 0; + psk_hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SHA_256; + allowed_key_exchange_modes = + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL; + break; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION: + psk_ciphersuite_id = session.ciphersuite; + psk_hash_alg = PSA_ALG_NONE; + ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_flags = session.ticket_flags; + allowed_key_exchange_modes = + session.ticket_flags & + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL; + break; +#endif + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + psk->key_exchange_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_NONE; + + if ((allowed_key_exchange_modes & + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL) && + ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_psk_ephemeral_available(ssl)) { + psk->key_exchange_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL; + } else if ((allowed_key_exchange_modes & + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK) && + ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_psk_available(ssl)) { + psk->key_exchange_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK; + } + + if (psk->key_exchange_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_NONE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("No suitable PSK key exchange mode")); + continue; + } + + ssl_tls13_select_ciphersuite(ssl, ciphersuites, ciphersuites_end, + psk_ciphersuite_id, psk_hash_alg, + &psk->ciphersuite_info); + + if (psk->ciphersuite_info == NULL) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&session); +#endif + /* + * We consider finding a ciphersuite suitable for the PSK as part + * of the validation of its binder. Thus if we do not find one, we + * abort the handshake with a decrypt_error alert. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + ret = ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_binder_match( + ssl, binder, binder_len, psk->type, + mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) psk->ciphersuite_info->mac)); + if (ret != SSL_TLS1_3_BINDER_MATCH) { + /* For security reasons, the handshake should be aborted when we + * fail to validate a binder value. See RFC 8446 section 4.2.11.2 + * and appendix E.6. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&session); +#endif + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Invalid binder.")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_binder_match", ret); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return ret; + } + + matched_identity = identity_id; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + if (psk->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION) { + ret = ssl_tls13_session_copy_ticket(ssl->session_negotiate, + &session); + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&session); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + } + + if (p_identity_len != identities_end || p_binder_len != binders_end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("pre_shared_key extension decode error")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* Update the handshake transcript with the binder list. */ + ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum( + ssl, identities_end, (size_t) (binders_end - identities_end)); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("update_checksum"), ret); + return ret; + } + if (matched_identity == -1) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("No usable PSK or ticket.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY; + } + + ssl->handshake->selected_identity = (uint16_t) matched_identity; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Pre shared key found")); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * struct { + * select ( Handshake.msg_type ) { + * .... + * case server_hello: + * uint16 selected_identity; + * } + * } PreSharedKeyExtension; + */ +static int ssl_tls13_write_server_pre_shared_key_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen) +{ + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) buf; + + *olen = 0; + + int not_using_psk = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + not_using_psk = (mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque)); +#else + not_using_psk = (ssl->handshake->psk == NULL); +#endif + if (not_using_psk) { + /* We shouldn't have called this extension writer unless we've + * chosen to use a PSK. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding pre_shared_key extension")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY, p, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(2, p, 2); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ssl->handshake->selected_identity, p, 4); + + *olen = 6; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("sent selected_identity: %u", + ssl->handshake->selected_identity)); + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY); + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +/* From RFC 8446: + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion versions<2..254>; + * } SupportedVersions; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_supported_versions_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t versions_len; + const unsigned char *versions_end; + uint16_t tls_version; + int found_supported_version = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 1); + versions_len = p[0]; + p += 1; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, versions_len); + versions_end = p + versions_len; + while (p < versions_end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, versions_end, 2); + tls_version = mbedtls_ssl_read_version(p, ssl->conf->transport); + p += 2; + + if (MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 == tls_version) { + found_supported_version = 1; + break; + } + + if ((MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 == tls_version) && + mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_enabled(ssl->conf)) { + found_supported_version = 1; + break; + } + } + + if (!found_supported_version) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("No supported version found.")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Negotiated version: [%04x]", + (unsigned int) tls_version)); + + return (int) tls_version; +} + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) +/* + * + * From RFC 8446: + * enum { + * ... (0xFFFF) + * } NamedGroup; + * struct { + * NamedGroup named_group_list<2..2^16-1>; + * } NamedGroupList; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_supported_groups_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t named_group_list_len; + const unsigned char *named_group_list_end; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "supported_groups extension", p, end - buf); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + named_group_list_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, named_group_list_len); + named_group_list_end = p + named_group_list_len; + ssl->handshake->hrr_selected_group = 0; + + while (p < named_group_list_end) { + uint16_t named_group; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, named_group_list_end, 2); + named_group = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, + ("got named group: %s(%04x)", + mbedtls_ssl_named_group_to_str(named_group), + named_group)); + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_named_group_is_offered(ssl, named_group) || + !mbedtls_ssl_named_group_is_supported(named_group) || + ssl->handshake->hrr_selected_group != 0) { + continue; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, + ("add named group %s(%04x) into received list.", + mbedtls_ssl_named_group_to_str(named_group), + named_group)); + + ssl->handshake->hrr_selected_group = named_group; + } + + return 0; + +} +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ + +#define SSL_TLS1_3_PARSE_KEY_SHARES_EXT_NO_MATCH 1 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +/* + * ssl_tls13_parse_key_shares_ext() verifies whether the information in the + * extension is correct and stores the first acceptable key share and its + * associated group. + * + * Possible return values are: + * - 0: Successful processing of the client provided key share extension. + * - SSL_TLS1_3_PARSE_KEY_SHARES_EXT_NO_MATCH: The key shares provided by + * the client does not match a group supported by the server. A + * HelloRetryRequest will be needed. + * - A negative value for fatal errors. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_key_shares_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char const *p = buf; + unsigned char const *client_shares_end; + size_t client_shares_len; + + /* From RFC 8446: + * + * struct { + * KeyShareEntry client_shares<0..2^16-1>; + * } KeyShareClientHello; + * + */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + client_shares_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, client_shares_len); + + ssl->handshake->offered_group_id = 0; + client_shares_end = p + client_shares_len; + + /* We try to find a suitable key share entry and copy it to the + * handshake context. Later, we have to find out whether we can do + * something with the provided key share or whether we have to + * dismiss it and send a HelloRetryRequest message. + */ + + while (p < client_shares_end) { + uint16_t group; + size_t key_exchange_len; + const unsigned char *key_exchange; + + /* + * struct { + * NamedGroup group; + * opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>; + * } KeyShareEntry; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, client_shares_end, 4); + group = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + key_exchange_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 2); + p += 4; + key_exchange = p; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, client_shares_end, key_exchange_len); + p += key_exchange_len; + + /* Continue parsing even if we have already found a match, + * for input validation purposes. + */ + if (!mbedtls_ssl_named_group_is_offered(ssl, group) || + !mbedtls_ssl_named_group_is_supported(group) || + ssl->handshake->offered_group_id != 0) { + continue; + } + + /* + * ECDHE and FFDHE groups are supported + */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(group) || + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(group)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("ECDH/FFDH group: %s (%04x)", + mbedtls_ssl_named_group_to_str(group), + group)); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_read_public_xxdhe_share( + ssl, key_exchange - 2, key_exchange_len + 2); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Unrecognized NamedGroup %u", + (unsigned) group)); + continue; + } + + ssl->handshake->offered_group_id = group; + } + + + if (ssl->handshake->offered_group_id == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no matching key share")); + return SSL_TLS1_3_PARSE_KEY_SHARES_EXT_NO_MATCH; + } + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int exts_mask) +{ + int masked = ssl->handshake->received_extensions & exts_mask; + return masked == exts_mask; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts_for_ephemeral_key_exchange( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_GROUPS) | + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE) | + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG)); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts_for_psk_key_exchange( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY) | + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES)); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts_for_psk_ephemeral_key_exchange( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_GROUPS) | + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE) | + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY) | + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES)); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_psk_available(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED) + return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_psk_enabled(ssl) && + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_psk_supported(ssl) && + ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts_for_psk_key_exchange(ssl); +#else + ((void) ssl); + return 0; +#endif +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_psk_ephemeral_available(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_psk_ephemeral_enabled(ssl) && + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_psk_ephemeral_supported(ssl) && + ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts_for_psk_ephemeral_key_exchange(ssl); +#else + ((void) ssl); + return 0; +#endif +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_ephemeral_available(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_ephemeral_enabled(ssl) && + ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts_for_ephemeral_key_exchange(ssl); +#else + ((void) ssl); + return 0; +#endif +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static psa_algorithm_t ssl_tls13_iana_sig_alg_to_psa_alg(uint16_t sig_alg) +{ + switch (sig_alg) { + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256: + return PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384: + return PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512: + return PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512); + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256: + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384: + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512: + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512); + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256: + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384: + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512: + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512); + default: + return PSA_ALG_NONE; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +/* + * Pick best ( private key, certificate chain ) pair based on the signature + * algorithms supported by the client. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert, *key_cert_list; + const uint16_t *sig_alg = ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if (ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert != NULL) { + key_cert_list = ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + key_cert_list = ssl->conf->key_cert; + + if (key_cert_list == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server has no certificate")); + return -1; + } + + for (; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++) { + if (!mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered(ssl, *sig_alg)) { + continue; + } + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_for_cert_verify_is_supported(*sig_alg)) { + continue; + } + + for (key_cert = key_cert_list; key_cert != NULL; + key_cert = key_cert->next) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_algorithm_t psa_alg = PSA_ALG_NONE; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "certificate (chain) candidate", + key_cert->cert); + + /* + * This avoids sending the client a cert it'll reject based on + * keyUsage or other extensions. + */ + if (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( + key_cert->cert, MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) != 0 || + mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage( + key_cert->cert, MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("certificate mismatch: " + "(extended) key usage extension")); + continue; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:" + "check signature algorithm %s [%04x]", + mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str(*sig_alg), + *sig_alg)); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_alg = ssl_tls13_iana_sig_alg_to_psa_alg(*sig_alg); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_sig_alg_cert_key_match( + *sig_alg, &key_cert->cert->pk) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + && psa_alg != PSA_ALG_NONE && + mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(&key_cert->cert->pk, psa_alg, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH) == 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + ) { + ssl->handshake->key_cert = key_cert; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:" + "selected signature algorithm" + " %s [%04x]", + mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str(*sig_alg), + *sig_alg)); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( + 3, "selected certificate (chain)", + ssl->handshake->key_cert->cert); + return 0; + } + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:" + "no suitable certificate found")); + return -1; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +/* + * + * STATE HANDLING: ClientHello + * + * There are three possible classes of outcomes when parsing the ClientHello: + * + * 1) The ClientHello was well-formed and matched the server's configuration. + * + * In this case, the server progresses to sending its ServerHello. + * + * 2) The ClientHello was well-formed but didn't match the server's + * configuration. + * + * For example, the client might not have offered a key share which + * the server supports, or the server might require a cookie. + * + * In this case, the server sends a HelloRetryRequest. + * + * 3) The ClientHello was ill-formed + * + * In this case, we abort the handshake. + * + */ + +/* + * Structure of this message: + * + * uint16 ProtocolVersion; + * opaque Random[32]; + * uint8 CipherSuite[2]; // Cryptographic suite selector + * + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; // TLS v1.2 + * Random random; + * opaque legacy_session_id<0..32>; + * CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>; + * opaque legacy_compression_methods<1..2^8-1>; + * Extension extensions<8..2^16-1>; + * } ClientHello; + */ + +#define SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_OK 0 +#define SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_HRR_REQUIRED 1 +#define SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_TLS1_2 2 + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *random; + size_t legacy_session_id_len; + const unsigned char *legacy_session_id; + size_t cipher_suites_len; + const unsigned char *cipher_suites; + const unsigned char *cipher_suites_end; + size_t extensions_len; + const unsigned char *extensions_end; + const unsigned char *supported_versions_data; + const unsigned char *supported_versions_data_end; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + int hrr_required = 0; + int no_usable_share_for_key_agreement = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + int got_psk = 0; + struct psk_attributes psk = PSK_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + const unsigned char *pre_shared_key_ext = NULL; + const unsigned char *pre_shared_key_ext_end = NULL; +#endif + + /* + * ClientHello layout: + * 0 . 1 protocol version + * 2 . 33 random bytes + * 34 . 34 session id length ( 1 byte ) + * 35 . 34+x session id + * .. . .. ciphersuite list length ( 2 bytes ) + * .. . .. ciphersuite list + * .. . .. compression alg. list length ( 1 byte ) + * .. . .. compression alg. list + * .. . .. extensions length ( 2 bytes, optional ) + * .. . .. extensions ( optional ) + */ + + /* + * Minimal length ( with everything empty and extensions omitted ) is + * 2 + 32 + 1 + 2 + 1 = 38 bytes. Check that first, so that we can + * read at least up to session id length without worrying. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 38); + + /* ... + * ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; // TLS 1.2 + * ... + * with ProtocolVersion defined as: + * uint16 ProtocolVersion; + */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_read_version(p, ssl->conf->transport) != + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Unsupported version of TLS.")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + } + p += 2; + + /* ... + * Random random; + * ... + * with Random defined as: + * opaque Random[32]; + */ + random = p; + p += MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN; + + /* ... + * opaque legacy_session_id<0..32>; + * ... + */ + legacy_session_id_len = *(p++); + legacy_session_id = p; + + /* + * Check we have enough data for the legacy session identifier + * and the ciphersuite list length. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, legacy_session_id_len + 2); + p += legacy_session_id_len; + + /* ... + * CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>; + * ... + * with CipherSuite defined as: + * uint8 CipherSuite[2]; + */ + cipher_suites_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + cipher_suites = p; + + /* + * The length of the ciphersuite list has to be even. + */ + if (cipher_suites_len & 1) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* Check we have enough data for the ciphersuite list, the legacy + * compression methods and the length of the extensions. + * + * cipher_suites cipher_suites_len bytes + * legacy_compression_methods 2 bytes + * extensions_len 2 bytes + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, cipher_suites_len + 2 + 2); + p += cipher_suites_len; + cipher_suites_end = p; + + /* + * Search for the supported versions extension and parse it to determine + * if the client supports TLS 1.3. + */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_supported_versions_ext_present_in_exts( + ssl, p + 2, end, + &supported_versions_data, &supported_versions_data_end); + if (ret < 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + ("mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_supported_versions_ext_present_in_exts"), ret); + return ret; + } + + if (ret == 0) { + return SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_TLS1_2; + } + + if (ret == 1) { + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_supported_versions_ext(ssl, + supported_versions_data, + supported_versions_data_end); + if (ret < 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + ("ssl_tls13_parse_supported_versions_ext"), ret); + return ret; + } + + /* + * The supported versions extension was parsed successfully as the + * value returned by ssl_tls13_parse_supported_versions_ext() is + * positive. The return value is then equal to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 or MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3, defining + * the TLS version to negotiate. + */ + if (MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 == ret) { + return SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_TLS1_2; + } + } + + /* + * We negotiate TLS 1.3. + */ + ssl->tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; + ssl->session_negotiate->tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; + ssl->session_negotiate->endpoint = ssl->conf->endpoint; + + /* + * We are negotiating the version 1.3 of the protocol. Do what we have + * postponed: copy of the client random bytes, copy of the legacy session + * identifier and selection of the TLS 1.3 cipher suite. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, random bytes", + random, MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + memcpy(&handshake->randbytes[0], random, MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + + if (legacy_session_id_len > sizeof(ssl->session_negotiate->id)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = legacy_session_id_len; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, session id", + legacy_session_id, legacy_session_id_len); + memcpy(&ssl->session_negotiate->id[0], + legacy_session_id, legacy_session_id_len); + + /* + * Search for a matching ciphersuite + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, list of cipher suites", + cipher_suites, cipher_suites_len); + + ssl_tls13_select_ciphersuite(ssl, cipher_suites, cipher_suites_end, + 0, PSA_ALG_NONE, &handshake->ciphersuite_info); + + if (handshake->ciphersuite_info == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = handshake->ciphersuite_info->id; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("selected ciphersuite: %04x - %s", + ((unsigned) handshake->ciphersuite_info->id), + handshake->ciphersuite_info->name)); + + /* ... + * opaque legacy_compression_methods<1..2^8-1>; + * ... + */ + if (p[0] != 1 || p[1] != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad legacy compression method")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + p += 2; + + /* ... + * Extension extensions<8..2^16-1>; + * ... + * with Extension defined as: + * struct { + * ExtensionType extension_type; + * opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>; + * } Extension; + */ + extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, extensions_len); + extensions_end = p + extensions_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello extensions", p, extensions_len); + handshake->received_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE; + + while (p < extensions_end) { + unsigned int extension_type; + size_t extension_data_len; + const unsigned char *extension_data_end; + uint32_t allowed_exts = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CH; + + if (ssl->handshake->hello_retry_request_flag) { + /* Do not accept early data extension in 2nd ClientHello */ + allowed_exts &= ~MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA); + } + + /* RFC 8446, section 4.2.11 + * + * The "pre_shared_key" extension MUST be the last extension in the + * ClientHello (this facilitates implementation as described below). + * Servers MUST check that it is the last extension and otherwise fail + * the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert. + */ + if (handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("pre_shared_key is not last extension.")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, 4); + extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 2); + p += 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, extension_data_len); + extension_data_end = p + extension_data_len; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO, extension_type, + allowed_exts); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + switch (extension_type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found ServerName extension")); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_server_name_ext(ssl, p, + extension_data_end); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_parse_servername_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found supported group extension")); + + /* Supported Groups Extension + * + * When sent by the client, the "supported_groups" extension + * indicates the named groups which the client supports, + * ordered from most preferred to least preferred. + */ + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_supported_groups_ext( + ssl, p, extension_data_end); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "ssl_tls13_parse_supported_groups_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH*/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found key share extension")); + + /* + * Key Share Extension + * + * When sent by the client, the "key_share" extension + * contains the endpoint's cryptographic parameters for + * ECDHE/DHE key establishment methods. + */ + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_key_shares_ext( + ssl, p, extension_data_end); + if (ret == SSL_TLS1_3_PARSE_KEY_SHARES_EXT_NO_MATCH) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("No usable share for key agreement.")); + no_usable_share_for_key_agreement = 1; + } + + if (ret < 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "ssl_tls13_parse_key_shares_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS: + /* Already parsed */ + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("found psk key exchange modes extension")); + + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_key_exchange_modes_ext( + ssl, p, extension_data_end); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "ssl_tls13_parse_key_exchange_modes_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + + break; +#endif + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found pre_shared_key extension")); + if ((handshake->received_extensions & + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES)) == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + /* Delay processing of the PSK identity once we have + * found out which algorithms to use. We keep a pointer + * to the buffer and the size for later processing. + */ + pre_shared_key_ext = p; + pre_shared_key_ext_end = extension_data_end; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found alpn extension")); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_alpn_ext(ssl, p, extension_data_end); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, ("mbedtls_ssl_parse_alpn_ext"), ret); + return ret; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found signature_algorithms extension")); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext( + ssl, p, extension_data_end); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found record_size_limit extension")); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_record_size_limit_ext( + ssl, p, extension_data_end); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, ("mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_record_size_limit_ext"), ret); + return ret; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT( + 3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO, + extension_type, "( ignored )"); + break; + } + + p += extension_data_len; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO, + handshake->received_extensions); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO, + p - buf); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum"), ret); + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + /* Update checksum with either + * - The entire content of the CH message, if no PSK extension is present + * - The content up to but excluding the PSK extension, if present. + * Always parse the pre-shared-key extension when present in the + * ClientHello even if some pre-requisites for PSK key exchange modes are + * not met. That way we always validate the syntax of the extension. + */ + if (handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY)) { + ret = handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf, + pre_shared_key_ext - buf); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("update_checksum"), ret); + return ret; + } + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_pre_shared_key_ext(ssl, + pre_shared_key_ext, + pre_shared_key_ext_end, + cipher_suites, + cipher_suites_end, + &psk); + if (ret == 0) { + got_psk = 1; + } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "ssl_tls13_parse_pre_shared_key_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + { + ret = handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf, p - buf); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("update_checksum"), ret); + return ret; + } + } + + /* + * Determine the key exchange algorithm to use. + * There are three types of key exchanges supported in TLS 1.3: + * - (EC)DH with ECDSA, + * - (EC)DH with PSK, + * - plain PSK. + * + * The PSK-based key exchanges may additionally be used with 0-RTT. + * + * Our built-in order of preference is + * 1 ) (EC)DHE-PSK Mode ( psk_ephemeral ) + * 2 ) Certificate Mode ( ephemeral ) + * 3 ) Plain PSK Mode ( psk ) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if (got_psk && (psk.key_exchange_mode == + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL)) { + handshake->key_exchange_mode = + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral")); + + } else +#endif + if (ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_ephemeral_available(ssl)) { + handshake->key_exchange_mode = + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("key exchange mode: ephemeral")); + + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + else if (got_psk && (psk.key_exchange_mode == + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK)) { + handshake->key_exchange_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("key exchange mode: psk")); + } +#endif + else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, + ("ClientHello message misses mandatory extensions.")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_MISSING_EXTENSION, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if (handshake->key_exchange_mode & + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL) { + handshake->ciphersuite_info = psk.ciphersuite_info; + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = psk.ciphersuite_info->id; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Select PSK ciphersuite: %04x - %s", + ((unsigned) psk.ciphersuite_info->id), + psk.ciphersuite_info->name)); + + if (psk.type == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION) { + handshake->resume = 1; + } + } +#endif + + if (handshake->key_exchange_mode != + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK) { + hrr_required = (no_usable_share_for_key_agreement != 0); + } + + mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum(ssl, handshake->ciphersuite_info); + + return hrr_required ? SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_HRR_REQUIRED : SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_OK; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +static int ssl_tls13_check_early_data_requirements(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + if (ssl->conf->early_data_enabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, + ("EarlyData: rejected, feature disabled in server configuration.")); + return -1; + } + + if (!handshake->resume) { + /* We currently support early data only in the case of PSKs established + via a NewSessionTicket message thus in the case of a session + resumption. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("EarlyData: rejected, not a session resumption.")); + return -1; + } + + /* RFC 8446 4.2.10 + * + * In order to accept early data, the server MUST have accepted a PSK cipher + * suite and selected the first key offered in the client's "pre_shared_key" + * extension. In addition, it MUST verify that the following values are the + * same as those associated with the selected PSK: + * - The TLS version number + * - The selected cipher suite + * - The selected ALPN [RFC7301] protocol, if any + * + * NOTE: + * - The TLS version number is checked in + * ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_identity_match_ticket(). + */ + + if (handshake->selected_identity != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("EarlyData: rejected, the selected key in " + "`pre_shared_key` is not the first one.")); + return -1; + } + + if (handshake->ciphersuite_info->id != + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("EarlyData: rejected, the selected ciphersuite is not the one " + "of the selected pre-shared key.")); + return -1; + + } + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_allow_early_data(ssl->session_negotiate)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, + ("EarlyData: rejected, early_data not allowed in ticket " + "permission bits.")); + return -1; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + const char *alpn = mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol(ssl); + size_t alpn_len; + + if (alpn == NULL && ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_alpn == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + if (alpn != NULL) { + alpn_len = strlen(alpn); + } + + if (alpn == NULL || + ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_alpn == NULL || + alpn_len != strlen(ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_alpn) || + (memcmp(alpn, ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_alpn, alpn_len) != 0)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("EarlyData: rejected, the selected ALPN is different " + "from the one associated with the pre-shared key.")); + return -1; + } +#endif + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +/* Update the handshake state machine */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int hrr_required) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* + * Server certificate selection + */ + if (ssl->conf->f_cert_cb && (ret = ssl->conf->f_cert_cb(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_cert_cb", ret); + return ret; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + ssl->handshake->sni_name = NULL; + ssl->handshake->sni_name_len = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_key_schedule_stage_early", ret); + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (ssl->handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA)) { + ssl->handshake->early_data_accepted = + (!hrr_required) && (ssl_tls13_check_early_data_requirements(ssl) == 0); + + if (ssl->handshake->early_data_accepted) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform", ret); + return ret; + } + } else { + ssl->discard_early_data_record = + hrr_required ? + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD : + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD; + } + } +#else + ((void) hrr_required); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Main entry point from the state machine; orchestrates the otherfunctions. + */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_process_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + size_t buflen = 0; + int parse_client_hello_ret; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse client hello")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO, + &buf, &buflen)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG(ssl_tls13_parse_client_hello(ssl, buf, + buf + buflen)); + parse_client_hello_ret = ret; /* Store positive return value of + * parse_client_hello, + * as negative error codes are handled + * by MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG. */ + + /* + * Version 1.2 of the protocol has to be used for the handshake. + * If TLS 1.2 is not supported, abort the handshake. Otherwise, set the + * ssl->keep_current_message flag for the ClientHello to be kept and parsed + * as a TLS 1.2 ClientHello. We also change ssl->tls_version to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 thus from now on mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step() + * will dispatch to the TLS 1.2 state machine. + */ + if (SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_TLS1_2 == parse_client_hello_ret) { + /* Check if server supports TLS 1.2 */ + if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_enabled(ssl->conf)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("TLS 1.2 not supported.")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + } + ssl->keep_current_message = 1; + ssl->tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( + ssl_tls13_postprocess_client_hello(ssl, parse_client_hello_ret == + SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_HRR_REQUIRED)); + + if (SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_OK == parse_client_hello_ret) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO); + } else { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST); + } + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse client hello")); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_prepare_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *server_randbytes = + ssl->handshake->randbytes + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN; + + if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, server_randbytes, + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_rng", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, random bytes", server_randbytes, + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time(NULL); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + return ret; +} + +/* + * ssl_tls13_write_server_hello_supported_versions_ext (): + * + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion selected_version; + * } SupportedVersions; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_server_hello_supported_versions_ext( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + *out_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, write selected version")); + + /* Check if we have space to write the extension: + * - extension_type (2 bytes) + * - extension_data_length (2 bytes) + * - selected_version (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(buf, end, 6); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, buf, 0); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(2, buf, 2); + + mbedtls_ssl_write_version(buf + 4, + ssl->conf->transport, + ssl->tls_version); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("supported version: [%04x]", + ssl->tls_version)); + + *out_len = 6; + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask( + ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS); + + return 0; +} + + + +/* Generate and export a single key share. For hybrid KEMs, this can + * be called multiple times with the different components of the hybrid. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_generate_and_write_key_share(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint16_t named_group, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + *out_len = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(named_group) || + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(named_group)) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_and_write_xxdh_key_exchange( + ssl, named_group, buf, end, out_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_and_write_xxdh_key_exchange", + ret); + return ret; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + if (0 /* Other kinds of KEMs */) { + } else { + ((void) ssl); + ((void) named_group); + ((void) buf); + ((void) end); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + return ret; +} + +/* + * ssl_tls13_write_key_share_ext + * + * Structure of key_share extension in ServerHello: + * + * struct { + * NamedGroup group; + * opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>; + * } KeyShareEntry; + * struct { + * KeyShareEntry server_share; + * } KeyShareServerHello; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_key_share_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + uint16_t group = ssl->handshake->offered_group_id; + unsigned char *server_share = buf + 4; + size_t key_exchange_length; + + *out_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding key share extension")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("server hello, write selected_group: %s (%04x)", + mbedtls_ssl_named_group_to_str(group), + group)); + + /* Check if we have space for header and length fields: + * - extension_type (2 bytes) + * - extension_data_length (2 bytes) + * - group (2 bytes) + * - key_exchange_length (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 8); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE, p, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(group, server_share, 0); + p += 8; + + /* When we introduce PQC-ECDHE hybrids, we'll want to call this + * function multiple times. */ + ret = ssl_tls13_generate_and_write_key_share( + ssl, group, server_share + 4, end, &key_exchange_length); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += key_exchange_length; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(key_exchange_length, server_share + 2, 0); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(p - server_share, buf, 2); + + *out_len = p - buf; + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE); + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_hrr_key_share_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + uint16_t selected_group = ssl->handshake->hrr_selected_group; + /* key_share Extension + * + * struct { + * select (Handshake.msg_type) { + * ... + * case hello_retry_request: + * NamedGroup selected_group; + * ... + * }; + * } KeyShare; + */ + + *out_len = 0; + + /* + * For a pure PSK key exchange, there is no group to agree upon. The purpose + * of the HRR is then to transmit a cookie to force the client to demonstrate + * reachability at their apparent network address (primarily useful for DTLS). + */ + if (!mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_ephemeral(ssl)) { + return 0; + } + + /* We should only send the key_share extension if the client's initial + * key share was not acceptable. */ + if (ssl->handshake->offered_group_id != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Skip key_share extension in HRR")); + return 0; + } + + if (selected_group == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no matching named group found")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + /* Check if we have enough space: + * - extension_type (2 bytes) + * - extension_data_length (2 bytes) + * - selected_group (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(buf, end, 6); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE, buf, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(2, buf, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(selected_group, buf, 4); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("HRR selected_group: %s (%x)", + mbedtls_ssl_named_group_to_str(selected_group), + selected_group)); + + *out_len = 6; + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Structure of ServerHello message: + * + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; // TLS v1.2 + * Random random; + * opaque legacy_session_id_echo<0..32>; + * CipherSuite cipher_suite; + * uint8 legacy_compression_method = 0; + * Extension extensions<6..2^16-1>; + * } ServerHello; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_server_hello_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len, + int is_hrr) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + unsigned char *p_extensions_len; + size_t output_len; + + *out_len = 0; + ssl->handshake->sent_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE; + + /* ... + * ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; // TLS 1.2 + * ... + * with ProtocolVersion defined as: + * uint16 ProtocolVersion; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(0x0303, p, 0); + p += 2; + + /* ... + * Random random; + * ... + * with Random defined as: + * opaque Random[MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN]; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + if (is_hrr) { + memcpy(p, mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic, + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + } else { + memcpy(p, &ssl->handshake->randbytes[MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN], + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, random bytes", + p, MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + p += MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN; + + /* ... + * opaque legacy_session_id_echo<0..32>; + * ... + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 1 + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len); + *p++ = (unsigned char) ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; + if (ssl->session_negotiate->id_len > 0) { + memcpy(p, &ssl->session_negotiate->id[0], + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len); + p += ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "session id", ssl->session_negotiate->id, + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len); + } + + /* ... + * CipherSuite cipher_suite; + * ... + * with CipherSuite defined as: + * uint8 CipherSuite[2]; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite, p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s ( id=%d )", + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite), + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite)); + + /* ... + * uint8 legacy_compression_method = 0; + * ... + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 1); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; + + /* ... + * Extension extensions<6..2^16-1>; + * ... + * struct { + * ExtensionType extension_type; (2 bytes) + * opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>; + * } Extension; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + p_extensions_len = p; + p += 2; + + if ((ret = ssl_tls13_write_server_hello_supported_versions_ext( + ssl, p, end, &output_len)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "ssl_tls13_write_server_hello_supported_versions_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_ephemeral(ssl)) { + if (is_hrr) { + ret = ssl_tls13_write_hrr_key_share_ext(ssl, p, end, &output_len); + } else { + ret = ssl_tls13_write_key_share_ext(ssl, p, end, &output_len); + } + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if (!is_hrr && mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_psk(ssl)) { + ret = ssl_tls13_write_server_pre_shared_key_ext(ssl, p, end, &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_write_server_pre_shared_key_ext", + ret); + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } +#endif + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(p - p_extensions_len - 2, p_extensions_len, 0); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "server hello extensions", + p_extensions_len, p - p_extensions_len); + + *out_len = p - buf; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello", buf, *out_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS( + 3, is_hrr ? MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_HS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST : + MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, + ssl->handshake->sent_extensions); + + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_finalize_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_handshake_transform(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_handshake_transform", + ret); + return ret; + } + + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len, msg_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write server hello")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_prepare_server_hello(ssl)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_server_hello_body(ssl, buf, + buf + buf_len, + &msg_len, + 0)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, buf, msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg( + ssl, buf_len, msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_finalize_server_hello(ssl)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + /* The server sends a dummy change_cipher_spec record immediately + * after its first handshake message. This may either be after + * a ServerHello or a HelloRetryRequest. + */ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO); +#else + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server hello")); + return ret; +} + + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_prepare_hello_retry_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + if (ssl->handshake->hello_retry_request_flag) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Too many HRRs")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + /* + * Create stateless transcript hash for HRR + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Reset transcript for HRR")); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_reset_transcript_for_hrr(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_reset_transcript_for_hrr", ret); + return ret; + } + mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_msg_layer(ssl, 0); + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_hello_retry_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len, msg_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write hello retry request")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_prepare_hello_retry_request(ssl)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_server_hello_body(ssl, buf, + buf + buf_len, + &msg_len, + 1)); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, buf, msg_len)); + + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(ssl, buf_len, + msg_len)); + + ssl->handshake->hello_retry_request_flag = 1; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + /* The server sends a dummy change_cipher_spec record immediately + * after its first handshake message. This may either be after + * a ServerHello or a HelloRetryRequest. + */ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST); +#else + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ + +cleanup: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write hello retry request")); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS + */ + +/* + * struct { + * Extension extensions<0..2 ^ 16 - 1>; + * } EncryptedExtensions; + * + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_encrypted_extensions_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t extensions_len = 0; + unsigned char *p_extensions_len; + size_t output_len; + + *out_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + p_extensions_len = p; + p += 2; + + ((void) ssl); + ((void) ret); + ((void) output_len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_alpn_ext(ssl, p, end, &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (ssl->handshake->early_data_accepted) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext( + ssl, 0, p, end, &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + if (ssl->handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT)) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_record_size_limit_ext( + ssl, p, end, &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } +#endif + + extensions_len = (p - p_extensions_len) - 2; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(extensions_len, p_extensions_len, 0); + + *out_len = p - buf; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "encrypted extensions", buf, *out_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS( + 3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, ssl->handshake->sent_extensions); + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_encrypted_extensions(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len, msg_len; + + mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform(ssl, + ssl->handshake->transform_handshake); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("switching to handshake transform for outbound data")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write encrypted extensions")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_encrypted_extensions_body( + ssl, buf, buf + buf_len, &msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + buf, msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg( + ssl, buf_len, msg_len)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_psk(ssl)) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED); + } else { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST); + } +#else + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED); +#endif + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write encrypted extensions")); + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SEND_REQUEST 0 +#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP 1 +/* Coordination: + * Check whether a CertificateRequest message should be written. + * Returns a negative code on failure, or + * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SEND_REQUEST + * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP + * indicating if the writing of the CertificateRequest + * should be skipped or not. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_certificate_request_coordinate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int authmode; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if (ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET) { + authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode; + } else +#endif + authmode = ssl->conf->authmode; + + if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE) { + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY; + return SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP; + } + + ssl->handshake->certificate_request_sent = 1; + + return SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SEND_REQUEST; +} + +/* + * struct { + * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; + * Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>; + * } CertificateRequest; + * + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_certificate_request_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t output_len = 0; + unsigned char *p_extensions_len; + + *out_len = 0; + + /* Check if we have enough space: + * - certificate_request_context (1 byte) + * - extensions length (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 3); + + /* + * Write certificate_request_context + */ + /* + * We use a zero length context for the normal handshake + * messages. For post-authentication handshake messages + * this request context would be set to a non-zero value. + */ + *p++ = 0x0; + + /* + * Write extensions + */ + /* The extensions must contain the signature_algorithms. */ + p_extensions_len = p; + p += 2; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_sig_alg_ext(ssl, p, end, &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + p += output_len; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(p - p_extensions_len - 2, p_extensions_len, 0); + + *out_len = p - buf; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS( + 3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ssl->handshake->sent_extensions); + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate request")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG(ssl_tls13_certificate_request_coordinate(ssl)); + + if (ret == SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SEND_REQUEST) { + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len, msg_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_certificate_request_body( + ssl, buf, buf + buf_len, &msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + buf, msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg( + ssl, buf_len, msg_len)); + } else if (ret == SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate request")); + ret = 0; + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto cleanup; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE); +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write certificate request")); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_server_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + if ((ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert(ssl) != 0) || + mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl) == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("No certificate available.")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED); + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +/* + * RFC 8446 section A.2 + * + * | Send ServerHello + * | K_send = handshake + * | Send EncryptedExtensions + * | [Send CertificateRequest] + * Can send | [Send Certificate + CertificateVerify] + * app data | Send Finished + * after --> | K_send = application + * here +--------+--------+ + * No 0-RTT | | 0-RTT + * | | + * K_recv = handshake | | K_recv = early data + * [Skip decrypt errors] | +------> WAIT_EOED -+ + * | | Recv | | Recv EndOfEarlyData + * | | early data | | K_recv = handshake + * | +------------+ | + * | | + * +> WAIT_FLIGHT2 <--------+ + * | + * +--------+--------+ + * No auth | | Client auth + * | | + * | v + * | WAIT_CERT + * | Recv | | Recv Certificate + * | empty | v + * | Certificate | WAIT_CV + * | | | Recv + * | v | CertificateVerify + * +-> WAIT_FINISHED <---+ + * | Recv Finished + * + * + * The following function handles the state changes after WAIT_FLIGHT2 in the + * above diagram. We are not going to receive early data related messages + * anymore, prepare to receive the first handshake message of the client + * second flight. + */ +static void ssl_tls13_prepare_for_handshake_second_flight( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + if (ssl->handshake->certificate_request_sent) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE); + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("skip parse certificate")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("skip parse certificate verify")); + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED); + } +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_server_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_finished_message(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_application_transform(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (ssl->handshake->early_data_accepted) { + /* See RFC 8446 section A.2 for more information */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Switch to early keys for inbound traffic. " + "( K_recv = early data )")); + mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform( + ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_earlydata); + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA); + return 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Switch to handshake keys for inbound traffic " + "( K_recv = handshake )")); + mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform(ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_handshake); + + ssl_tls13_prepare_for_handshake_second_flight(ssl); + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA + */ +#define SSL_GOT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA 0 +#define SSL_GOT_EARLY_DATA 1 +/* Coordination: + * Deals with the ambiguity of not knowing if the next message is an + * EndOfEarlyData message or an application message containing early data. + * Returns a negative code on failure, or + * - SSL_GOT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA + * - SSL_GOT_EARLY_DATA + * indicating which message is received. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_end_of_early_data_coordinate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 0)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); + return ret; + } + ssl->keep_current_message = 1; + + if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Received an end_of_early_data message.")); + return SSL_GOT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; + } + + if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA) { + if (ssl->in_offt == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Received early data")); + /* Set the reading pointer */ + ssl->in_offt = ssl->in_msg; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_early_data_len(ssl, ssl->in_msglen); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + return SSL_GOT_EARLY_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_end_of_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + /* RFC 8446 section 4.5 + * + * struct {} EndOfEarlyData; + */ + if (buf != end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * RFC 8446 section A.2 + * + * | Send ServerHello + * | K_send = handshake + * | Send EncryptedExtensions + * | [Send CertificateRequest] + * Can send | [Send Certificate + CertificateVerify] + * app data | Send Finished + * after --> | K_send = application + * here +--------+--------+ + * No 0-RTT | | 0-RTT + * | | + * K_recv = handshake | | K_recv = early data + * [Skip decrypt errors] | +------> WAIT_EOED -+ + * | | Recv | | Recv EndOfEarlyData + * | | early data | | K_recv = handshake + * | +------------+ | + * | | + * +> WAIT_FLIGHT2 <--------+ + * | + * +--------+--------+ + * No auth | | Client auth + * | | + * | v + * | WAIT_CERT + * | Recv | | Recv Certificate + * | empty | v + * | Certificate | WAIT_CV + * | | | Recv + * | v | CertificateVerify + * +-> WAIT_FINISHED <---+ + * | Recv Finished + * + * The function handles actions and state changes from 0-RTT to WAIT_FLIGHT2 in + * the above diagram. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_process_end_of_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> ssl_tls13_process_end_of_early_data")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG(ssl_tls13_end_of_early_data_coordinate(ssl)); + + if (ret == SSL_GOT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) { + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_parse_end_of_early_data( + ssl, buf, buf + buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Switch to handshake keys for inbound traffic" + "( K_recv = handshake )")); + mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform( + ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_handshake); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, + buf, buf_len)); + + ssl_tls13_prepare_for_handshake_second_flight(ssl); + + } else if (ret == SSL_GOT_EARLY_DATA) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= ssl_tls13_process_end_of_early_data")); + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_process_client_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_finished_message(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret", ret); + } + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("handshake: done")); + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup(ssl); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +/* TODO: Remove the check of SOME_PSK_ENABLED since SESSION_TICKETS requires + * SOME_PSK_ENABLED to be enabled. Here is just to make CI happy. It is + * expected to be resolved with issue#6395. + */ + /* Sent NewSessionTicket message only when client supports PSK */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_some_psk_supported(ssl)) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + } else +#endif + { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER); + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET + */ +#define SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_SKIP 0 +#define SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_WRITE 1 +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_new_session_ticket_coordinate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + /* Check whether the use of session tickets is enabled */ + if (ssl->conf->f_ticket_write == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("NewSessionTicket: disabled," + " callback is not set")); + return SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_SKIP; + } + if (ssl->conf->new_session_tickets_count == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("NewSessionTicket: disabled," + " configured count is zero")); + return SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_SKIP; + } + + if (ssl->handshake->new_session_tickets_count == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("NewSessionTicket: all tickets have " + "been sent.")); + return SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_SKIP; + } + + return SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_WRITE; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_prepare_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *ticket_nonce, + size_t ticket_nonce_size) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session; + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + psa_algorithm_t psa_hash_alg; + int hash_length; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> prepare NewSessionTicket msg")); + + /* Set ticket_flags depends on the advertised psk key exchange mode */ + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_clear_ticket_flags( + session, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_set_ticket_flags( + session, ssl->handshake->tls13_kex_modes); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (ssl->conf->early_data_enabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED && + ssl->conf->max_early_data_size > 0) { + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_set_ticket_flags( + session, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_EARLY_DATA); + session->max_early_data_size = ssl->conf->max_early_data_size; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_TICKET_FLAGS(4, session->ticket_flags); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + if (session->ticket_alpn == NULL) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_set_ticket_alpn(session, ssl->alpn_chosen); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } +#endif + + /* Generate ticket_age_add */ + if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, + (unsigned char *) &session->ticket_age_add, + sizeof(session->ticket_age_add)) != 0)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "generate_ticket_age_add", ret); + return ret; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket_age_add: %u", + (unsigned int) session->ticket_age_add)); + + /* Generate ticket_nonce */ + ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, ticket_nonce, ticket_nonce_size); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "generate_ticket_nonce", ret); + return ret; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "ticket_nonce:", + ticket_nonce, ticket_nonce_size); + + ciphersuite_info = + (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + psa_hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac); + hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(psa_hash_alg); + if (hash_length == -1 || + (size_t) hash_length > sizeof(session->resumption_key)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* In this code the psk key length equals the length of the hash */ + session->resumption_key_len = hash_length; + session->ciphersuite = ciphersuite_info->id; + + /* Compute resumption key + * + * HKDF-Expand-Label( resumption_master_secret, + * "resumption", ticket_nonce, Hash.length ) + */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label( + psa_hash_alg, + session->app_secrets.resumption_master_secret, + hash_length, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(resumption), + ticket_nonce, + ticket_nonce_size, + session->resumption_key, + hash_length); + + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, + "Creating the ticket-resumed PSK failed", + ret); + return ret; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Ticket-resumed PSK", + session->resumption_key, + session->resumption_key_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "resumption_master_secret", + session->app_secrets.resumption_master_secret, + hash_length); + + return 0; +} + +/* This function creates a NewSessionTicket message in the following format: + * + * struct { + * uint32 ticket_lifetime; + * uint32 ticket_age_add; + * opaque ticket_nonce<0..255>; + * opaque ticket<1..2^16-1>; + * Extension extensions<0..2^16-2>; + * } NewSessionTicket; + * + * The ticket inside the NewSessionTicket message is an encrypted container + * carrying the necessary information so that the server is later able to + * re-start the communication. + * + * The following fields are placed inside the ticket by the + * f_ticket_write() function: + * + * - creation time (ticket_creation_time) + * - flags (ticket_flags) + * - age add (ticket_age_add) + * - key (resumption_key) + * - key length (resumption_key_len) + * - ciphersuite (ciphersuite) + * - max_early_data_size (max_early_data_size) + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_new_session_ticket_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len, + unsigned char *ticket_nonce, + size_t ticket_nonce_size) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session; + size_t ticket_len; + uint32_t ticket_lifetime; + unsigned char *p_extensions_len; + + *out_len = 0; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write NewSessionTicket msg")); + + /* + * ticket_lifetime 4 bytes + * ticket_age_add 4 bytes + * ticket_nonce 1 + ticket_nonce_size bytes + * ticket >=2 bytes + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 4 + 4 + 1 + ticket_nonce_size + 2); + + /* Generate ticket and ticket_lifetime */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + session->ticket_creation_time = mbedtls_ms_time(); +#endif + ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_write(ssl->conf->p_ticket, + session, + p + 9 + ticket_nonce_size + 2, + end, + &ticket_len, + &ticket_lifetime); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "write_ticket", ret); + return ret; + } + + /* RFC 8446 section 4.6.1 + * + * ticket_lifetime: Indicates the lifetime in seconds as a 32-bit + * unsigned integer in network byte order from the time of ticket + * issuance. Servers MUST NOT use any value greater than + * 604800 seconds (7 days) ... + */ + if (ticket_lifetime > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_MAX_ALLOWED_TICKET_LIFETIME) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Ticket lifetime (%u) is greater than 7 days.", + (unsigned int) ticket_lifetime)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ticket_lifetime, p, 0); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket_lifetime: %u", + (unsigned int) ticket_lifetime)); + + /* Write ticket_age_add */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(session->ticket_age_add, p, 4); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket_age_add: %u", + (unsigned int) session->ticket_age_add)); + + /* Write ticket_nonce */ + p[8] = (unsigned char) ticket_nonce_size; + if (ticket_nonce_size > 0) { + memcpy(p + 9, ticket_nonce, ticket_nonce_size); + } + p += 9 + ticket_nonce_size; + + /* Write ticket */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ticket_len, p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "ticket", p, ticket_len); + p += ticket_len; + + /* Ticket Extensions + * + * Extension extensions<0..2^16-2>; + */ + ssl->handshake->sent_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + p_extensions_len = p; + p += 2; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_allow_early_data(session)) { + size_t output_len; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext( + ssl, 1, p, end, &output_len)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 4, ("early_data not allowed, " + "skip early_data extension in NewSessionTicket")); + } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(p - p_extensions_len - 2, p_extensions_len, 0); + + *out_len = p - buf; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "ticket", buf, *out_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write new session ticket")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS( + 3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ssl->handshake->sent_extensions); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET + */ +static int ssl_tls13_write_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG(ssl_tls13_write_new_session_ticket_coordinate(ssl)); + + if (ret == SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_WRITE) { + unsigned char ticket_nonce[MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_NONCE_LENGTH]; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len, msg_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_prepare_new_session_ticket( + ssl, ticket_nonce, sizeof(ticket_nonce))); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_new_session_ticket_body( + ssl, buf, buf + buf_len, &msg_len, + ticket_nonce, sizeof(ticket_nonce))); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg( + ssl, buf_len, msg_len)); + + /* Limit session tickets count to one when resumption connection. + * + * See document of mbedtls_ssl_conf_new_session_tickets. + */ + if (ssl->handshake->resume == 1) { + ssl->handshake->new_session_tickets_count = 0; + } else { + ssl->handshake->new_session_tickets_count--; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH); + } else { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER); + } + +cleanup: + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +/* + * TLS 1.3 State Machine -- server side + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_server_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER || ssl->handshake == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("tls13 server state: %s(%d)", + mbedtls_ssl_states_str((mbedtls_ssl_states) ssl->state), + ssl->state)); + + switch (ssl->state) { + /* start state */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST: + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO); + ret = 0; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO: + ret = ssl_tls13_process_client_hello(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_process_client_hello", ret); + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_hello_retry_request(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_write_hello_retry_request", ret); + return ret; + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_server_hello(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_encrypted_extensions(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_write_encrypted_extensions", ret); + return ret; + } + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_certificate_request(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_server_certificate(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify(ssl); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + + /* + * Injection of dummy-CCS's for middlebox compatibility + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl); + if (ret == 0) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO); + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + break; + } + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_server_finished(ssl); + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: + ret = ssl_tls13_process_end_of_early_data(ssl); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED: + ret = ssl_tls13_process_client_finished(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP: + ret = ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup(ssl); + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate(ssl); + if (ret == 0) { + if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert != NULL) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY); + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("skip parse certificate verify")); + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED); + } + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify(ssl); + if (ret == 0) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED); + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_new_session_ticket(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "ssl_tls13_write_new_session_ticket ", + ret); + } + break; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH: + /* This state is necessary to do the flush of the New Session + * Ticket message written in MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET + * as part of ssl_prepare_handshake_step. + */ + ret = 0; + + if (ssl->handshake->new_session_tickets_count == 0) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER); + } else { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + } + break; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid state %d", ssl->state)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/threading.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/threading.c index 0542f33f1a..85db243f21 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/threading.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/threading.c @@ -2,24 +2,12 @@ * Threading abstraction layer * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * Ensure gmtime_r is available even with -std=c99; must be defined before - * config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h. Harmless on other platforms. + * mbedtls_config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h. Harmless on other platforms. */ #if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) #define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L @@ -68,28 +56,27 @@ static void threading_mutex_init_pthread(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex) return; } - /* A nonzero value of is_valid indicates a successfully initialized - * mutex. This is a workaround for not being able to return an error - * code for this function. The lock/unlock functions return an error - * if is_valid is nonzero. The Mbed TLS unit test code uses this field - * to distinguish more states of the mutex; see - * tests/src/threading_helpers for details. */ - mutex->is_valid = pthread_mutex_init(&mutex->mutex, NULL) == 0; + /* One problem here is that calling lock on a pthread mutex without first + * having initialised it is undefined behaviour. Obviously we cannot check + * this here in a thread safe manner without a significant performance + * hit, so state transitions are checked in tests only via the state + * variable. Please make sure any new mutex that gets added is exercised in + * tests; see tests/src/threading_helpers.c for more details. */ + (void) pthread_mutex_init(&mutex->mutex, NULL); } static void threading_mutex_free_pthread(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex) { - if (mutex == NULL || !mutex->is_valid) { + if (mutex == NULL) { return; } (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(&mutex->mutex); - mutex->is_valid = 0; } static int threading_mutex_lock_pthread(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex) { - if (mutex == NULL || !mutex->is_valid) { + if (mutex == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -102,7 +89,7 @@ static int threading_mutex_lock_pthread(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex) static int threading_mutex_unlock_pthread(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex) { - if (mutex == NULL || !mutex->is_valid) { + if (mutex == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -161,6 +148,11 @@ void mbedtls_threading_set_alt(void (*mutex_init)(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *), #if defined(THREADING_USE_GMTIME) mbedtls_mutex_init(&mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex); #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init(&mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex); + mbedtls_mutex_init(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); + mbedtls_mutex_init(&mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex); +#endif } /* @@ -174,6 +166,11 @@ void mbedtls_threading_free_alt(void) #if defined(THREADING_USE_GMTIME) mbedtls_mutex_free(&mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex); #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_mutex_free(&mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex); + mbedtls_mutex_free(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); + mbedtls_mutex_free(&mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex); +#endif } #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT */ @@ -189,5 +186,10 @@ mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex MUTEX_INIT; #if defined(THREADING_USE_GMTIME) mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex MUTEX_INIT; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex MUTEX_INIT; +mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex MUTEX_INIT; +mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex MUTEX_INIT; +#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/timing.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/timing.c index 94b55b3715..58f1c1ec2e 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/timing.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/timing.c @@ -2,27 +2,11 @@ * Portable interface to the CPU cycle counter * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ -#include - #include "common.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" - #if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) #include "mbedtls/timing.h" @@ -32,15 +16,9 @@ #if !defined(unix) && !defined(__unix__) && !defined(__unix) && \ !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__QNXNTO__) && \ !defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__) -#error "This module only works on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_TIMING_C in config.h" +#error "This module only works on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_TIMING_C in mbedtls_config.h" #endif -/* *INDENT-OFF* */ -#ifndef asm -#define asm __asm -#endif -/* *INDENT-ON* */ - #if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) #include @@ -64,260 +42,64 @@ struct _hr_time { }; #endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ -#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ - (defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_IX86)) || defined(__WATCOMC__) - -#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock(void) -{ - unsigned long tsc; - __asm rdtsc - __asm mov[tsc], eax - return tsc; -} -#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && - ( _MSC_VER && _M_IX86 ) || __WATCOMC__ */ - -/* some versions of mingw-64 have 32-bit longs even on x84_64 */ -#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ - defined(__GNUC__) && (defined(__i386__) || ( \ - (defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__)) && __SIZEOF_LONG__ == 4)) - -#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock(void) -{ - unsigned long lo, hi; - asm volatile ("rdtsc" : "=a" (lo), "=d" (hi)); - return lo; -} -#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && - __GNUC__ && __i386__ */ - -#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ - defined(__GNUC__) && (defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__)) - -#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock(void) -{ - unsigned long lo, hi; - asm volatile ("rdtsc" : "=a" (lo), "=d" (hi)); - return lo | (hi << 32); -} -#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && - __GNUC__ && ( __amd64__ || __x86_64__ ) */ - -#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ - defined(__GNUC__) && (defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__ppc__)) - -#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock(void) -{ - unsigned long tbl, tbu0, tbu1; - - do { - asm volatile ("mftbu %0" : "=r" (tbu0)); - asm volatile ("mftb %0" : "=r" (tbl)); - asm volatile ("mftbu %0" : "=r" (tbu1)); - } while (tbu0 != tbu1); - - return tbl; -} -#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && - __GNUC__ && ( __powerpc__ || __ppc__ ) */ - -#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ - defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__sparc64__) - -#if defined(__OpenBSD__) -#warning OpenBSD does not allow access to tick register using software version instead -#else -#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock(void) -{ - unsigned long tick; - asm volatile ("rdpr %%tick, %0;" : "=&r" (tick)); - return tick; -} -#endif /* __OpenBSD__ */ -#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && - __GNUC__ && __sparc64__ */ - -#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ - defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__sparc__) && !defined(__sparc64__) - -#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock(void) -{ - unsigned long tick; - asm volatile (".byte 0x83, 0x41, 0x00, 0x00"); - asm volatile ("mov %%g1, %0" : "=r" (tick)); - return tick; -} -#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && - __GNUC__ && __sparc__ && !__sparc64__ */ - -#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ - defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__alpha__) - -#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock(void) -{ - unsigned long cc; - asm volatile ("rpcc %0" : "=r" (cc)); - return cc & 0xFFFFFFFF; -} -#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && - __GNUC__ && __alpha__ */ - -#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ - defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__ia64__) - -#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock(void) -{ - unsigned long itc; - asm volatile ("mov %0 = ar.itc" : "=r" (itc)); - return itc; -} -#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && - __GNUC__ && __ia64__ */ - -#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) && defined(_MSC_VER) && \ - !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) - -#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock(void) -{ - LARGE_INTEGER offset; - - QueryPerformanceCounter(&offset); - - return (unsigned long) (offset.QuadPart); -} -#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK && _MSC_VER && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ - -#if !defined(HAVE_HARDCLOCK) - -#define HAVE_HARDCLOCK - -static int hardclock_init = 0; -static struct timeval tv_init; - -unsigned long mbedtls_timing_hardclock(void) -{ - struct timeval tv_cur; - - if (hardclock_init == 0) { - gettimeofday(&tv_init, NULL); - hardclock_init = 1; - } - - gettimeofday(&tv_cur, NULL); - return (tv_cur.tv_sec - tv_init.tv_sec) * 1000000U - + (tv_cur.tv_usec - tv_init.tv_usec); -} -#endif /* !HAVE_HARDCLOCK */ - -volatile int mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 0; - +/** + * \brief Return the elapsed time in milliseconds + * + * \warning May change without notice + * + * \param val points to a timer structure + * \param reset If 0, query the elapsed time. Otherwise (re)start the timer. + * + * \return Elapsed time since the previous reset in ms. When + * restarting, this is always 0. + * + * \note To initialize a timer, call this function with reset=1. + * + * Determining the elapsed time and resetting the timer is not + * atomic on all platforms, so after the sequence + * `{ get_timer(1); ...; time1 = get_timer(1); ...; time2 = + * get_timer(0) }` the value time1+time2 is only approximately + * the delay since the first reset. + */ #if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) unsigned long mbedtls_timing_get_timer(struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time *val, int reset) { - struct _hr_time t; + struct _hr_time *t = (struct _hr_time *) val; if (reset) { - QueryPerformanceCounter(&t.start); - memcpy(val, &t, sizeof(struct _hr_time)); + QueryPerformanceCounter(&t->start); return 0; } else { unsigned long delta; LARGE_INTEGER now, hfreq; - /* We can't safely cast val because it may not be aligned, so use memcpy */ - memcpy(&t, val, sizeof(struct _hr_time)); QueryPerformanceCounter(&now); QueryPerformanceFrequency(&hfreq); - delta = (unsigned long) ((now.QuadPart - t.start.QuadPart) * 1000ul + delta = (unsigned long) ((now.QuadPart - t->start.QuadPart) * 1000ul / hfreq.QuadPart); return delta; } } -/* It's OK to use a global because alarm() is supposed to be global anyway */ -static DWORD alarmMs; - -static void TimerProc(void *TimerContext) -{ - (void) TimerContext; - Sleep(alarmMs); - mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 1; - /* _endthread will be called implicitly on return - * That ensures execution of thread function's epilogue */ -} - -void mbedtls_set_alarm(int seconds) -{ - if (seconds == 0) { - /* No need to create a thread for this simple case. - * Also, this shorcut is more reliable at least on MinGW32 */ - mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 1; - return; - } - - mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 0; - alarmMs = seconds * 1000; - (void) _beginthread(TimerProc, 0, NULL); -} - #else /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ unsigned long mbedtls_timing_get_timer(struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time *val, int reset) { - struct _hr_time t; + struct _hr_time *t = (struct _hr_time *) val; if (reset) { - gettimeofday(&t.start, NULL); - memcpy(val, &t, sizeof(struct _hr_time)); + gettimeofday(&t->start, NULL); return 0; } else { unsigned long delta; struct timeval now; - /* We can't safely cast val because it may not be aligned, so use memcpy */ - memcpy(&t, val, sizeof(struct _hr_time)); gettimeofday(&now, NULL); - delta = (now.tv_sec - t.start.tv_sec) * 1000ul - + (now.tv_usec - t.start.tv_usec) / 1000; + delta = (now.tv_sec - t->start.tv_sec) * 1000ul + + (now.tv_usec - t->start.tv_usec) / 1000; return delta; } } -static void sighandler(int signum) -{ - mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 1; - signal(signum, sighandler); -} - -void mbedtls_set_alarm(int seconds) -{ - mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 0; - signal(SIGALRM, sighandler); - alarm(seconds); - if (seconds == 0) { - /* alarm(0) cancelled any previous pending alarm, but the - handler won't fire, so raise the flag straight away. */ - mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 1; - } -} - #endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ /* @@ -360,177 +142,13 @@ int mbedtls_timing_get_delay(void *data) return 0; } -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -/* - * Busy-waits for the given number of milliseconds. - * Used for testing mbedtls_timing_hardclock. - */ -static void busy_msleep(unsigned long msec) -{ - struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time hires; - unsigned long i = 0; /* for busy-waiting */ - volatile unsigned long j; /* to prevent optimisation */ - - (void) mbedtls_timing_get_timer(&hires, 1); - - while (mbedtls_timing_get_timer(&hires, 0) < msec) { - i++; - } - - j = i; - (void) j; -} - -#define FAIL do \ - { \ - if (verbose != 0) \ - { \ - mbedtls_printf("failed at line %d\n", __LINE__); \ - mbedtls_printf(" cycles=%lu ratio=%lu millisecs=%lu secs=%lu hardfail=%d a=%lu b=%lu\n", \ - cycles, ratio, millisecs, secs, hardfail, \ - (unsigned long) a, (unsigned long) b); \ - mbedtls_printf(" elapsed(hires)=%lu status(ctx)=%d\n", \ - mbedtls_timing_get_timer(&hires, 0), \ - mbedtls_timing_get_delay(&ctx)); \ - } \ - return 1; \ - } while (0) - /* - * Checkup routine - * - * Warning: this is work in progress, some tests may not be reliable enough - * yet! False positives may happen. + * Get the final delay. */ -int mbedtls_timing_self_test(int verbose) +uint32_t mbedtls_timing_get_final_delay( + const mbedtls_timing_delay_context *data) { - unsigned long cycles = 0, ratio = 0; - unsigned long millisecs = 0, secs = 0; - int hardfail = 0; - struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time hires; - uint32_t a = 0, b = 0; - mbedtls_timing_delay_context ctx; - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" TIMING tests note: will take some time!\n"); - } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" TIMING test #1 (set_alarm / get_timer): "); - } - - { - secs = 1; - - (void) mbedtls_timing_get_timer(&hires, 1); - - mbedtls_set_alarm((int) secs); - while (!mbedtls_timing_alarmed) { - ; - } - - millisecs = mbedtls_timing_get_timer(&hires, 0); - - /* For some reason on Windows it looks like alarm has an extra delay - * (maybe related to creating a new thread). Allow some room here. */ - if (millisecs < 800 * secs || millisecs > 1200 * secs + 300) { - FAIL; - } - } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); - } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" TIMING test #2 (set/get_delay ): "); - } - - { - a = 800; - b = 400; - mbedtls_timing_set_delay(&ctx, a, a + b); /* T = 0 */ - - busy_msleep(a - a / 4); /* T = a - a/4 */ - if (mbedtls_timing_get_delay(&ctx) != 0) { - FAIL; - } - - busy_msleep(a / 4 + b / 4); /* T = a + b/4 */ - if (mbedtls_timing_get_delay(&ctx) != 1) { - FAIL; - } - - busy_msleep(b); /* T = a + b + b/4 */ - if (mbedtls_timing_get_delay(&ctx) != 2) { - FAIL; - } - } - - mbedtls_timing_set_delay(&ctx, 0, 0); - busy_msleep(200); - if (mbedtls_timing_get_delay(&ctx) != -1) { - FAIL; - } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); - } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" TIMING test #3 (hardclock / get_timer): "); - } - - /* - * Allow one failure for possible counter wrapping. - * On a 4Ghz 32-bit machine the cycle counter wraps about once per second; - * since the whole test is about 10ms, it shouldn't happen twice in a row. - */ - -hard_test: - if (hardfail > 1) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("failed (ignored)\n"); - } - - goto hard_test_done; - } - - /* Get a reference ratio cycles/ms */ - millisecs = 1; - cycles = mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); - busy_msleep(millisecs); - cycles = mbedtls_timing_hardclock() - cycles; - ratio = cycles / millisecs; - - /* Check that the ratio is mostly constant */ - for (millisecs = 2; millisecs <= 4; millisecs++) { - cycles = mbedtls_timing_hardclock(); - busy_msleep(millisecs); - cycles = mbedtls_timing_hardclock() - cycles; - - /* Allow variation up to 20% */ - if (cycles / millisecs < ratio - ratio / 5 || - cycles / millisecs > ratio + ratio / 5) { - hardfail++; - goto hard_test; - } - } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); - } - -hard_test_done: - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("\n"); - } - - return 0; + return data->fin_ms; } - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/version.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/version.c index 4f78c9cb12..04397332bb 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/version.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/version.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * Version information * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/version_features.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/version_features.c index ad8a357149..406161d4c7 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/version_features.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/version_features.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * Version feature information * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" @@ -28,836 +16,797 @@ static const char * const features[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES) #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) - "MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM", + "HAVE_ASM", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION) - "MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION", + "NO_UDBL_DIVISION", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION) - "MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION", + "NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2) - "MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2", + "HAVE_SSE2", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - "MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME", + "HAVE_TIME", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) - "MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE", + "HAVE_TIME_DATE", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY", + "PLATFORM_MEMORY", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS", + "PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT) + "PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT", + "PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT", + "PLATFORM_TIME_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT", + "PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT", + "PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT", + "PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT", + "PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT", + "PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT", + "PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT) + "PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT", + "PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT", + "PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) - "MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING", + "DEPRECATED_WARNING", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) - "MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED", + "DEPRECATED_REMOVED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS) - "MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT) - "MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS_ASSERT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT", + "TIMING_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_AES_ALT", + "AES_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT", + "ARIA_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT", + "CAMELLIA_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT", + "CCM_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT", + "CHACHA20_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT", + "CHACHAPOLY_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT", + "CMAC_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_DES_ALT", + "DES_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT", + "DHM_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT", + "ECJPAKE_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT", + "GCM_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT", + "NIST_KW_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT", + "MD5_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT", + "POLY1305_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT", + "RIPEMD160_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT", + "RSA_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT", + "SHA1_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT", + "SHA256_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT", + "SHA512_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT", + "ECP_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT", + "MD5_PROCESS_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT", + "RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT", + "SHA1_PROCESS_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT", + "SHA256_PROCESS_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT", + "SHA512_PROCESS_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT", + "DES_SETKEY_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT", + "DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT", + "DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT", + "AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT", + "AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT", + "AES_ENCRYPT_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT", + "AES_DECRYPT_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT", + "ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT", + "ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT", + "ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT", + "ECDSA_SIGN_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT", + "ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT", + "ECP_INTERNAL_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK", + "ECP_NO_FALLBACK", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT", + "ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT", + "ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT", + "ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT", + "ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT", + "ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT", + "ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT", + "ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT", + "ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY) - "MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT", + "ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES) - "MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES", + "AES_ROM_TABLES", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) - "MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES", + "AES_FEWER_TABLES", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + "AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) + "AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY) - "MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY", + "CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING) - "MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING", + "CHECK_RETURN_WARNING", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC", + "CIPHER_MODE_CBC", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB", + "CIPHER_MODE_CFB", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR", + "CIPHER_MODE_CTR", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB", + "CIPHER_MODE_OFB", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS", + "CIPHER_MODE_XTS", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER", + "CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7", + "CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS", + "CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN", + "CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS", + "CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) - "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY", + "CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES) - "MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENABLE_WEAK_CIPHERSUITES */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES) - "MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES) - "MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_REMOVE_3DES_CIPHERSUITES */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED", + "ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED", + "ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED", + "ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED", + "ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED", + "ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED", + "ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED", + "ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED", + "ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED", + "ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED", + "ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED", + "ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED", + "ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED", + "ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED", + "ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM", + "ECP_NIST_OPTIM", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE", + "ECP_RESTARTABLE", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) - "MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT) + "ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) - "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC", + "ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED", + "KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED", + "KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED", + "KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED", + "KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED", + "KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED", + "KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED", + "KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED", + "KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED", + "KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED", + "KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED", + "KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED) - "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED", + "PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED) + "PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY) - "MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY", + "ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) - "MBEDTLS_GENPRIME", + "GENPRIME", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) - "MBEDTLS_FS_IO", + "FS_IO", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) - "MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES", + "NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) - "MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY", + "NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) - "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256", + "ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) - "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED", + "ENTROPY_NV_SEED", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) - "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER", + "PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) - "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG", + "MEMORY_DEBUG", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) - "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE", + "MEMORY_BACKTRACE", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) - "MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT", + "PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) - "MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15", + "PKCS1_V15", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) - "MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21", + "PKCS1_V21", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) - "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS", + "PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) - "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT", + "PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS) - "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVERS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) - "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG", + "PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM) - "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM", + "PSA_CRYPTO_SPM", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) + "PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) - "MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY", + "PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) + "PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - "MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT", + "RSA_NO_CRT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - "MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST", + "SELF_TEST", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER) - "MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER", + "SHA256_SMALLER", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER) - "MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER", + "SHA512_SMALLER", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384) - "MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_NO_SHA384 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES", + "SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID", + "SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT) + "SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE", + "SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION", + "SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL", + "SSL_DEBUG_ALL", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC", + "SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET", + "SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE", + "SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION", + "SSL_RENEGOTIATION", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH", + "SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + "SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2", + "SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + "SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + "SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED) + "SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + "SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + "SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + "SSL_EARLY_DATA", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS", + "SSL_PROTO_DTLS", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN", + "SSL_ALPN", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY", + "SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY", + "SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP", + "SSL_DTLS_SRTP", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE", + "SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS", + "SSL_SESSION_TICKETS", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION", + "SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH", + "SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE) - "MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN) - "MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN", + "TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND) - "MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND", + "TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) - "MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS", + "TEST_HOOKS", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT) - "MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT", + "THREADING_ALT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) - "MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD", + "THREADING_PTHREAD", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - "MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO", + "USE_PSA_CRYPTO", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) - "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG", + "PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES) - "MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES", + "VERSION_FEATURES", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3) - "MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION) - "MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) - "MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK", + "X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) - "MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) - "MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) + "X509_REMOVE_INFO", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) - "MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT", + "X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - "MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) - "MBEDTLS_AESNI_C", + "AESNI_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) + "AESCE_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESCE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) - "MBEDTLS_AES_C", + "AES_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - "MBEDTLS_ARC4_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) - "MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C", + "ASN1_PARSE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) - "MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C", + "ASN1_WRITE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) - "MBEDTLS_BASE64_C", + "BASE64_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + "BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) - "MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C", + "BIGNUM_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C) - "MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) - "MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C", + "CAMELLIA_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) - "MBEDTLS_ARIA_C", + "ARIA_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) - "MBEDTLS_CCM_C", + "CCM_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) - "MBEDTLS_CERTS_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CERTS_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) - "MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C", + "CHACHA20_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) - "MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C", + "CHACHAPOLY_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) - "MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C", + "CIPHER_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) - "MBEDTLS_CMAC_C", + "CMAC_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) - "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C", + "CTR_DRBG_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) - "MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C", + "DEBUG_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) - "MBEDTLS_DES_C", + "DES_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) - "MBEDTLS_DHM_C", + "DHM_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) - "MBEDTLS_ECDH_C", + "ECDH_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C", + "ECDSA_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) - "MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C", + "ECJPAKE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - "MBEDTLS_ECP_C", + "ECP_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) - "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C", + "ENTROPY_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) - "MBEDTLS_ERROR_C", + "ERROR_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) - "MBEDTLS_GCM_C", + "GCM_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) - "MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE) + "GCM_LARGE_TABLE", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) - "MBEDTLS_HKDF_C", + "HKDF_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_HKDF_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) - "MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C", + "HMAC_DRBG_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) + "LMS_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_LMS_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) + "LMS_PRIVATE", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) - "MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C", + "NIST_KW_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) - "MBEDTLS_MD_C", + "MD_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD2_C) - "MBEDTLS_MD2_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD2_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD4_C) - "MBEDTLS_MD4_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD4_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) - "MBEDTLS_MD5_C", + "MD5_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) - "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C", + "MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) - "MBEDTLS_NET_C", + "NET_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_NET_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) - "MBEDTLS_OID_C", + "OID_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_OID_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) - "MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C", + "PADLOCK_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) - "MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C", + "PEM_PARSE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) - "MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C", + "PEM_WRITE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) - "MBEDTLS_PK_C", + "PK_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) - "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C", + "PK_PARSE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) - "MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C", + "PK_WRITE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) - "MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C", + "PKCS5_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C) - "MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS11_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C) + "PKCS7_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) - "MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C", + "PKCS12_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) - "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C", + "PLATFORM_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) - "MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C", + "POLY1305_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) - "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C", + "PSA_CRYPTO_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) - "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C", + "PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) - "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C", + "PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) - "MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C", + "PSA_ITS_FILE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) - "MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C", + "RIPEMD160_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - "MBEDTLS_RSA_C", + "RSA_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) - "MBEDTLS_SHA1_C", + "SHA1_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + "SHA224_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA224_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - "MBEDTLS_SHA256_C", + "SHA256_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) + "SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) + "SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY) + "SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) + "SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + "SHA384_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) - "MBEDTLS_SHA512_C", + "SHA512_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) + "SHA3_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA3_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) + "SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) + "SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C", + "SSL_CACHE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C", + "SSL_COOKIE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C", + "SSL_TICKET_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C", + "SSL_CLI_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C", + "SSL_SRV_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) - "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C", + "SSL_TLS_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - "MBEDTLS_THREADING_C", + "THREADING_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) - "MBEDTLS_TIMING_C", + "TIMING_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) - "MBEDTLS_VERSION_C", + "VERSION_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) - "MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C", + "X509_USE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) - "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C", + "X509_CRT_PARSE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) - "MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C", + "X509_CRL_PARSE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) - "MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C", + "X509_CSR_PARSE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) - "MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C", + "X509_CREATE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C) - "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C", + "X509_CRT_WRITE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) - "MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C", + "X509_CSR_WRITE_C", //no-check-names #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_C) - "MBEDTLS_XTEA_C", -#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES */ NULL }; @@ -874,6 +823,12 @@ int mbedtls_version_check_feature(const char *feature) return -1; } + if (strncmp(feature, "MBEDTLS_", 8)) { + return -1; + } + + feature += 8; + while (*idx != NULL) { if (!strcmp(*idx, feature)) { return 0; diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509.c index d61ef4a279..f97fb44589 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * X.509 common functions for parsing and verification * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI. @@ -31,7 +19,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) -#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" @@ -43,6 +31,8 @@ #include "mbedtls/pem.h" #endif +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" + #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) @@ -131,6 +121,51 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_alg(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, return 0; } +/* + * Convert md type to string + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) && defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + +static inline const char *md_type_to_string(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg) +{ + switch (md_alg) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return "MD5"; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return "SHA1"; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return "SHA224"; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return "SHA256"; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return "SHA384"; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return "SHA512"; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return "RIPEMD160"; +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_NONE: + return NULL; + default: + return NULL; + } +} + +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) && defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) /* * HashAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier @@ -467,7 +502,6 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_name(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, size_t set_len; const unsigned char *end_set; mbedtls_x509_name *head = cur; - mbedtls_x509_name *prev, *allocated; /* don't use recursion, we'd risk stack overflow if not optimized */ while (1) { @@ -523,132 +557,88 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_name(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, error: /* Skip the first element as we did not allocate it */ - allocated = head->next; - - while (allocated != NULL) { - prev = allocated; - allocated = allocated->next; - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(prev, sizeof(*prev)); - mbedtls_free(prev); - } - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(head, sizeof(*head)); + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(head->next); + head->next = NULL; return ret; } -static int x509_parse_int(unsigned char **p, size_t n, int *res) -{ - *res = 0; - - for (; n > 0; --n) { - if ((**p < '0') || (**p > '9')) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE; - } - - *res *= 10; - *res += (*(*p)++ - '0'); - } - - return 0; -} - static int x509_date_is_valid(const mbedtls_x509_time *t) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE; - int month_len; - - CHECK_RANGE(0, 9999, t->year); - CHECK_RANGE(0, 23, t->hour); - CHECK_RANGE(0, 59, t->min); - CHECK_RANGE(0, 59, t->sec); - + unsigned int month_days; + unsigned int year; switch (t->mon) { case 1: case 3: case 5: case 7: case 8: case 10: case 12: - month_len = 31; + month_days = 31; break; case 4: case 6: case 9: case 11: - month_len = 30; + month_days = 30; break; case 2: - if ((!(t->year % 4) && t->year % 100) || - !(t->year % 400)) { - month_len = 29; - } else { - month_len = 28; - } + year = (unsigned int) t->year; + month_days = ((year & 3) || (!(year % 100) + && (year % 400))) + ? 28 : 29; break; default: - return ret; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE; + } + + if ((unsigned int) (t->day - 1) >= month_days || /* (1 - days in month) */ + /* (unsigned int) (t->mon - 1) >= 12 || */ /* (1 - 12) checked above */ + (unsigned int) t->year > 9999 || /* (0 - 9999) */ + (unsigned int) t->hour > 23 || /* (0 - 23) */ + (unsigned int) t->min > 59 || /* (0 - 59) */ + (unsigned int) t->sec > 59) { /* (0 - 59) */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE; } - CHECK_RANGE(1, month_len, t->day); return 0; } +static int x509_parse2_int(const unsigned char *p) +{ + uint32_t d1 = p[0] - '0'; + uint32_t d2 = p[1] - '0'; + return (d1 < 10 && d2 < 10) ? (int) (d1 * 10 + d2) : -1; +} + /* * Parse an ASN1_UTC_TIME (yearlen=2) or ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME (yearlen=4) * field. */ -static int x509_parse_time(unsigned char **p, size_t len, size_t yearlen, - mbedtls_x509_time *tm) +static int x509_parse_time(const unsigned char *p, mbedtls_x509_time *tm, + size_t yearlen) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int x; /* - * Minimum length is 10 or 12 depending on yearlen + * Parse year, month, day, hour, minute, second */ - if (len < yearlen + 8) { + tm->year = x509_parse2_int(p); + if (tm->year < 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE; } - len -= yearlen + 8; - /* - * Parse year, month, day, hour, minute - */ - CHECK(x509_parse_int(p, yearlen, &tm->year)); - if (2 == yearlen) { - if (tm->year < 50) { - tm->year += 100; + if (4 == yearlen) { + x = tm->year * 100; + p += 2; + tm->year = x509_parse2_int(p); + if (tm->year < 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE; } - - tm->year += 1900; - } - - CHECK(x509_parse_int(p, 2, &tm->mon)); - CHECK(x509_parse_int(p, 2, &tm->day)); - CHECK(x509_parse_int(p, 2, &tm->hour)); - CHECK(x509_parse_int(p, 2, &tm->min)); - - /* - * Parse seconds if present - */ - if (len >= 2) { - CHECK(x509_parse_int(p, 2, &tm->sec)); - len -= 2; } else { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE; + x = (tm->year < 50) ? 2000 : 1900; } + tm->year += x; - /* - * Parse trailing 'Z' if present - */ - if (1 == len && 'Z' == **p) { - (*p)++; - len--; - } + tm->mon = x509_parse2_int(p + 2); + tm->day = x509_parse2_int(p + 4); + tm->hour = x509_parse2_int(p + 6); + tm->min = x509_parse2_int(p + 8); + tm->sec = x509_parse2_int(p + 10); - /* - * We should have parsed all characters at this point - */ - if (0 != len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE; - } - - CHECK(x509_date_is_valid(tm)); - - return 0; + return x509_date_is_valid(tm); } /* @@ -686,7 +676,14 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_time(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, ret); } - return x509_parse_time(p, len, year_len, tm); + /* len is 12 or 14 depending on year_len, plus optional trailing 'Z' */ + if (len != year_len + 10 && + !(len == year_len + 11 && (*p)[(len - 1)] == 'Z')) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE; + } + + (*p) += len; + return x509_parse_time(*p - len, tm, year_len); } int mbedtls_x509_get_sig(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *sig) @@ -803,6 +800,11 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_ext(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, return 0; } +static char nibble_to_hex_digit(int i) +{ + return (i < 10) ? (i + '0') : (i - 10 + 'A'); +} + /* * Store the name in printable form into buf; no more * than size characters will be written @@ -810,11 +812,16 @@ int mbedtls_x509_get_ext(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, int mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_name *dn) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t i, j, n; + size_t i, j, n, asn1_len_size, asn1_tag_size, asn1_tag_len_buf_start; + /* 6 is enough as our asn1 write functions only write one byte for the tag and at most five bytes for the length*/ + unsigned char asn1_tag_len_buf[6]; + unsigned char *asn1_len_p; unsigned char c, merge = 0; const mbedtls_x509_name *name; const char *short_name = NULL; + char lowbits, highbits; char s[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE], *p; + int print_hexstring; memset(s, 0, sizeof(s)); @@ -833,32 +840,91 @@ int mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_name *dn) MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; } - ret = mbedtls_oid_get_attr_short_name(&name->oid, &short_name); + print_hexstring = (name->val.tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING) && + (name->val.tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING) && + (name->val.tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING); - if (ret == 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_oid_get_attr_short_name(&name->oid, &short_name)) == 0) { ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s=", short_name); } else { - ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\?\?="); + if ((ret = mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string(p, n, &name->oid)) > 0) { + n -= ret; + p += ret; + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "="); + print_hexstring = 1; + } else if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } else { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\?\?="); + } } MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - for (i = 0, j = 0; i < name->val.len; i++, j++) { - if (j >= sizeof(s) - 1) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; - } + if (print_hexstring) { + s[0] = '#'; - c = name->val.p[i]; - // Special characters requiring escaping, RFC 1779 - if (c && strchr(",=+<>#;\"\\", c)) { + asn1_len_p = asn1_tag_len_buf + sizeof(asn1_tag_len_buf); + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&asn1_len_p, asn1_tag_len_buf, name->val.len)) < 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + asn1_len_size = ret; + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&asn1_len_p, asn1_tag_len_buf, name->val.tag)) < 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + asn1_tag_size = ret; + asn1_tag_len_buf_start = sizeof(asn1_tag_len_buf) - asn1_len_size - asn1_tag_size; + for (i = 0, j = 1; i < asn1_len_size + asn1_tag_size; i++) { if (j + 1 >= sizeof(s) - 1) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; } - s[j++] = '\\'; + c = asn1_tag_len_buf[asn1_tag_len_buf_start+i]; + lowbits = (c & 0x0F); + highbits = c >> 4; + s[j++] = nibble_to_hex_digit(highbits); + s[j++] = nibble_to_hex_digit(lowbits); } - if (c < 32 || c >= 127) { - s[j] = '?'; - } else { - s[j] = c; + for (i = 0; i < name->val.len; i++) { + if (j + 1 >= sizeof(s) - 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + c = name->val.p[i]; + lowbits = (c & 0x0F); + highbits = c >> 4; + s[j++] = nibble_to_hex_digit(highbits); + s[j++] = nibble_to_hex_digit(lowbits); + } + } else { + for (i = 0, j = 0; i < name->val.len; i++, j++) { + if (j >= sizeof(s) - 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + c = name->val.p[i]; + // Special characters requiring escaping, RFC 4514 Section 2.4 + if (c == '\0') { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + } else { + if (strchr(",=+<>;\"\\", c) || + ((i == 0) && strchr("# ", c)) || + ((i == name->val.len-1) && (c == ' '))) { + if (j + 1 >= sizeof(s) - 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + s[j++] = '\\'; + } + } + if (c < 32 || c >= 127) { + if (j + 3 >= sizeof(s) - 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + s[j++] = '\\'; + lowbits = (c & 0x0F); + highbits = c >> 4; + s[j++] = nibble_to_hex_digit(highbits); + s[j] = nibble_to_hex_digit(lowbits); + } else { + s[j] = c; + } } } s[j] = '\0'; @@ -906,6 +972,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_serial_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *ser return (int) (size - n); } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) /* * Helper for writing signature algorithms */ @@ -929,16 +996,15 @@ int mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *si #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS) { const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *pss_opts; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, *mgf_md_info; pss_opts = (const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *) sig_opts; - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); - mgf_md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(pss_opts->mgf1_hash_id); + const char *name = md_type_to_string(md_alg); + const char *mgf_name = md_type_to_string(pss_opts->mgf1_hash_id); ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, " (%s, MGF1-%s, 0x%02X)", - md_info ? mbedtls_md_get_name(md_info) : "???", - mgf_md_info ? mbedtls_md_get_name(mgf_md_info) : "???", + name ? name : "???", + mgf_name ? mgf_name : "???", (unsigned int) pss_opts->expected_salt_len); MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; } @@ -950,6 +1016,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *si return (int) (size - n); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ /* * Helper for writing "RSA key size", "EC key size", etc @@ -966,81 +1033,45 @@ int mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper(char *buf, size_t buf_size, const char *name) return 0; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) -/* - * Set the time structure to the current time. - * Return 0 on success, non-zero on failure. - */ -static int x509_get_current_time(mbedtls_x509_time *now) +int mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(const mbedtls_x509_time *t1, + const mbedtls_x509_time *t2) { - struct tm *lt, tm_buf; - mbedtls_time_t tt; - int ret = 0; - - tt = mbedtls_time(NULL); - lt = mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r(&tt, &tm_buf); + int x; - if (lt == NULL) { - ret = -1; - } else { - now->year = lt->tm_year + 1900; - now->mon = lt->tm_mon + 1; - now->day = lt->tm_mday; - now->hour = lt->tm_hour; - now->min = lt->tm_min; - now->sec = lt->tm_sec; + x = (((t1->year << 9) | (t1->mon << 5) | (t1->day)) - + ((t2->year << 9) | (t2->mon << 5) | (t2->day))); + if (x != 0) { + return x; } - return ret; + x = (((t1->hour << 12) | (t1->min << 6) | (t1->sec)) - + ((t2->hour << 12) | (t2->min << 6) | (t2->sec))); + return x; } -/* - * Return 0 if before <= after, 1 otherwise - */ -static int x509_check_time(const mbedtls_x509_time *before, const mbedtls_x509_time *after) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) +int mbedtls_x509_time_gmtime(mbedtls_time_t tt, mbedtls_x509_time *now) { - if (before->year > after->year) { - return 1; - } + struct tm tm; - if (before->year == after->year && - before->mon > after->mon) { - return 1; - } - - if (before->year == after->year && - before->mon == after->mon && - before->day > after->day) { - return 1; - } - - if (before->year == after->year && - before->mon == after->mon && - before->day == after->day && - before->hour > after->hour) { - return 1; - } - - if (before->year == after->year && - before->mon == after->mon && - before->day == after->day && - before->hour == after->hour && - before->min > after->min) { - return 1; - } - - if (before->year == after->year && - before->mon == after->mon && - before->day == after->day && - before->hour == after->hour && - before->min == after->min && - before->sec > after->sec) { - return 1; + if (mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r(&tt, &tm) == NULL) { + return -1; } + now->year = tm.tm_year + 1900; + now->mon = tm.tm_mon + 1; + now->day = tm.tm_mday; + now->hour = tm.tm_hour; + now->min = tm.tm_min; + now->sec = tm.tm_sec; return 0; } +static int x509_get_current_time(mbedtls_x509_time *now) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_time_gmtime(mbedtls_time(NULL), now); +} + int mbedtls_x509_time_is_past(const mbedtls_x509_time *to) { mbedtls_x509_time now; @@ -1049,7 +1080,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_time_is_past(const mbedtls_x509_time *to) return 1; } - return x509_check_time(&now, to); + return mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(to, &now) < 0; } int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future(const mbedtls_x509_time *from) @@ -1060,7 +1091,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future(const mbedtls_x509_time *from) return 1; } - return x509_check_time(from, &now); + return mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(from, &now) > 0; } #else /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ @@ -1078,75 +1109,668 @@ int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future(const mbedtls_x509_time *from) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - -#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" -#include "mbedtls/certs.h" - +/* Common functions for parsing CRT and CSR. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) /* - * Checkup routine + * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { + * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } + * + * HardwareModuleName ::= SEQUENCE { + * hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * hwSerialNum OCTET STRING } + * + * NOTE: we currently only parse and use otherName of type HwModuleName, + * as defined in RFC 4108. */ -int mbedtls_x509_self_test(int verbose) +static int x509_get_other_name(const mbedtls_x509_buf *subject_alt_name, + mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *other_name) { int ret = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) - uint32_t flags; - mbedtls_x509_crt cacert; - mbedtls_x509_crt clicert; + size_t len; + unsigned char *p = subject_alt_name->p; + const unsigned char *end = p + subject_alt_name->len; + mbedtls_x509_buf cur_oid; - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" X.509 certificate load: "); + if ((subject_alt_name->tag & + (MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK | MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK)) != + (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME)) { + /* + * The given subject alternative name is not of type "othername". + */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - mbedtls_x509_crt_init(&cacert); - mbedtls_x509_crt_init(&clicert); + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } - ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(&clicert, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cli_crt, - mbedtls_test_cli_crt_len); - if (ret != 0) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); - } + cur_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + cur_oid.p = p; + cur_oid.len = len; - goto cleanup; + /* + * Only HwModuleName is currently supported. + */ + if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME, &cur_oid) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } + other_name->type_id = cur_oid; - ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(&cacert, (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_ca_crt, - mbedtls_test_ca_crt_len); - if (ret != 0) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + p += len; + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC)) != + 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + if (end != p + len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + if (end != p + len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.p = p; + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.len = len; + + p += len; + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.p = p; + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len = len; + p += len; + if (p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + return 0; +} + +/* Check mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name for detailed description. + * + * In some cases while parsing subject alternative names the sequence tag is optional + * (e.g. CertSerialNumber). This function is designed to handle such case. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name_ext(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t tag_len; + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name; + + while (*p < end) { + mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name tmp_san_name; + mbedtls_x509_buf tmp_san_buf; + memset(&tmp_san_name, 0, sizeof(tmp_san_name)); + + tmp_san_buf.tag = **p; + (*p)++; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len(p, end, &tag_len)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); } - goto cleanup; + tmp_san_buf.p = *p; + tmp_san_buf.len = tag_len; + + if ((tmp_san_buf.tag & MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK) != + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG); + } + + /* + * Check that the SAN is structured correctly by parsing it. + * The SAN structure is discarded afterwards. + */ + ret = mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(&tmp_san_buf, &tmp_san_name); + /* + * In case the extension is malformed, return an error, + * and clear the allocated sequences. + */ + if (ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) { + mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(subject_alt_name->next); + subject_alt_name->next = NULL; + return ret; + } + + mbedtls_x509_free_subject_alt_name(&tmp_san_name); + /* Allocate and assign next pointer */ + if (cur->buf.p != NULL) { + if (cur->next != NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS; + } + + cur->next = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_sequence)); + + if (cur->next == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED); + } + + cur = cur->next; + } + + cur->buf = tmp_san_buf; + *p += tmp_san_buf.len; } - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("passed\n X.509 signature verify: "); + /* Set final sequence entry's next pointer to NULL */ + cur->next = NULL; + + if (*p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); } - ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(&clicert, &cacert, NULL, NULL, &flags, NULL, NULL); - if (ret != 0) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + return 0; +} + +/* + * SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames + * + * GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName + * + * GeneralName ::= CHOICE { + * otherName [0] OtherName, + * rfc822Name [1] IA5String, + * dNSName [2] IA5String, + * x400Address [3] ORAddress, + * directoryName [4] Name, + * ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName, + * uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String, + * iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING, + * registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER } + * + * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { + * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } + * + * EDIPartyName ::= SEQUENCE { + * nameAssigner [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL, + * partyName [1] DirectoryString } + * + * We list all types, but use the following GeneralName types from RFC 5280: + * "dnsName", "uniformResourceIdentifier" and "hardware_module_name" + * of type "otherName", as defined in RFC 4108. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + /* Get main sequence tag */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + if (*p + len != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name_ext(p, end, subject_alt_name); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_get_ns_cert_type(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned char *ns_cert_type) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL }; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring(p, end, &bs)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + /* A bitstring with no flags set is still technically valid, as it will mean + that the certificate has no designated purpose at the time of creation. */ + if (bs.len == 0) { + *ns_cert_type = 0; + return 0; + } + + if (bs.len != 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH); + } + + /* Get actual bitstring */ + *ns_cert_type = *bs.p; + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_x509_get_key_usage(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned int *key_usage) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL }; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring(p, end, &bs)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + /* A bitstring with no flags set is still technically valid, as it will mean + that the certificate has no designated purpose at the time of creation. */ + if (bs.len == 0) { + *key_usage = 0; + return 0; + } + + /* Get actual bitstring */ + *key_usage = 0; + for (i = 0; i < bs.len && i < sizeof(unsigned int); i++) { + *key_usage |= (unsigned int) bs.p[i] << (8*i); + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf, + mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + switch (san_buf->tag & + (MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK)) { + /* + * otherName + */ + case (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME): + { + mbedtls_x509_san_other_name other_name; + + ret = x509_get_other_name(san_buf, &other_name); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + memset(san, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name)); + san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME; + memcpy(&san->san.other_name, + &other_name, sizeof(other_name)); + + } + break; + /* + * uniformResourceIdentifier + */ + case (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER): + { + memset(san, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name)); + san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER; + + memcpy(&san->san.unstructured_name, + san_buf, sizeof(*san_buf)); + } + break; + /* + * dNSName + */ + case (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME): + { + memset(san, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name)); + san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME; - goto cleanup; + memcpy(&san->san.unstructured_name, + san_buf, sizeof(*san_buf)); + } + break; + /* + * IP address + */ + case (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS): + { + memset(san, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name)); + san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS; + // Only IPv6 (16 bytes) and IPv4 (4 bytes) types are supported + if (san_buf->len == 4 || san_buf->len == 16) { + memcpy(&san->san.unstructured_name, + san_buf, sizeof(*san_buf)); + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } + break; + /* + * rfc822Name + */ + case (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_RFC822_NAME): + { + memset(san, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name)); + san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_RFC822_NAME; + memcpy(&san->san.unstructured_name, san_buf, sizeof(*san_buf)); + } + break; + /* + * directoryName + */ + case (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DIRECTORY_NAME): + { + size_t name_len; + unsigned char *p = san_buf->p; + memset(san, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name)); + san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DIRECTORY_NAME; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, p + san_buf->len, &name_len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name(&p, p + name_len, + &san->san.directory_name)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + break; + /* + * Type not supported + */ + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } + return 0; +} - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("passed\n\n"); +void mbedtls_x509_free_subject_alt_name(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san) +{ + if (san->type == MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DIRECTORY_NAME) { + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(san->san.directory_name.next); } +} -cleanup: - mbedtls_x509_crt_free(&cacert); - mbedtls_x509_crt_free(&clicert); -#else - ((void) verbose); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CERTS_C && MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ - return ret; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) +int mbedtls_x509_info_subject_alt_name(char **buf, size_t *size, + const mbedtls_x509_sequence + *subject_alt_name, + const char *prefix) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + size_t n = *size; + char *p = *buf; + const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name; + mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name san; + int parse_ret; + + while (cur != NULL) { + memset(&san, 0, sizeof(san)); + parse_ret = mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(&cur->buf, &san); + if (parse_ret != 0) { + if (parse_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } else { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + cur = cur->next; + continue; + } + + switch (san.type) { + /* + * otherName + */ + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME: + { + mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *other_name = &san.san.other_name; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s otherName :", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME, + &other_name->type_id) == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s hardware module name :", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + ret = + mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s hardware type : ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string(p, + n, + &other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = + mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s hardware serial number : ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + for (i = 0; i < other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len; i++) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, + n, + "%02X", + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.p[i]); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + }/* MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME */ + } + break; + /* + * uniformResourceIdentifier + */ + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER: + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s uniformResourceIdentifier : ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + if (san.san.unstructured_name.len >= n) { + if (n > 0) { + *p = '\0'; + } + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + memcpy(p, san.san.unstructured_name.p, san.san.unstructured_name.len); + p += san.san.unstructured_name.len; + n -= san.san.unstructured_name.len; + } + break; + /* + * dNSName + * RFC822 Name + */ + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME: + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_RFC822_NAME: + { + const char *dns_name = "dNSName"; + const char *rfc822_name = "rfc822Name"; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, + "\n%s %s : ", + prefix, + san.type == + MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME ? dns_name : rfc822_name); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + if (san.san.unstructured_name.len >= n) { + if (n > 0) { + *p = '\0'; + } + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + memcpy(p, san.san.unstructured_name.p, san.san.unstructured_name.len); + p += san.san.unstructured_name.len; + n -= san.san.unstructured_name.len; + } + break; + /* + * iPAddress + */ + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS: + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s %s : ", + prefix, "iPAddress"); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + if (san.san.unstructured_name.len >= n) { + if (n > 0) { + *p = '\0'; + } + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + unsigned char *ip = san.san.unstructured_name.p; + // Only IPv6 (16 bytes) and IPv4 (4 bytes) types are supported + if (san.san.unstructured_name.len == 4) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%u.%u.%u.%u", ip[0], ip[1], ip[2], ip[3]); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } else if (san.san.unstructured_name.len == 16) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, + "%X%X:%X%X:%X%X:%X%X:%X%X:%X%X:%X%X:%X%X", + ip[0], ip[1], ip[2], ip[3], ip[4], ip[5], ip[6], + ip[7], ip[8], ip[9], ip[10], ip[11], ip[12], ip[13], + ip[14], ip[15]); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } else { + if (n > 0) { + *p = '\0'; + } + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } + break; + /* + * directoryName + */ + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DIRECTORY_NAME: + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s directoryName : ", prefix); + if (ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= n) { + mbedtls_x509_free_subject_alt_name(&san); + } + + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(p, n, &san.san.directory_name); + + if (ret < 0) { + mbedtls_x509_free_subject_alt_name(&san); + if (n > 0) { + *p = '\0'; + } + return ret; + } + + p += ret; + n -= ret; + } + break; + /* + * Type not supported, skip item. + */ + default: + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + break; + } + + /* So far memory is freed only in the case of directoryName + * parsing succeeding, as mbedtls_x509_get_name allocates memory. */ + mbedtls_x509_free_subject_alt_name(&san); + cur = cur->next; + } + + *p = '\0'; + + *size = n; + *buf = p; + + return 0; +} + +#define PRINT_ITEM(i) \ + do { \ + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s" i, sep); \ + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; \ + sep = ", "; \ + } while (0) + +#define CERT_TYPE(type, name) \ + do { \ + if (ns_cert_type & (type)) { \ + PRINT_ITEM(name); \ + } \ + } while (0) + +int mbedtls_x509_info_cert_type(char **buf, size_t *size, + unsigned char ns_cert_type) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n = *size; + char *p = *buf; + const char *sep = ""; + + CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT, "SSL Client"); + CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER, "SSL Server"); + CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL, "Email"); + CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING, "Object Signing"); + CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED, "Reserved"); + CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA, "SSL CA"); + CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA, "Email CA"); + CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA, "Object Signing CA"); + + *size = n; + *buf = p; + + return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +#define KEY_USAGE(code, name) \ + do { \ + if ((key_usage) & (code)) { \ + PRINT_ITEM(name); \ + } \ + } while (0) +int mbedtls_x509_info_key_usage(char **buf, size_t *size, + unsigned int key_usage) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n = *size; + char *p = *buf; + const char *sep = ""; + + KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE, "Digital Signature"); + KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION, "Non Repudiation"); + KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT, "Key Encipherment"); + KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT, "Data Encipherment"); + KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT, "Key Agreement"); + KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN, "Key Cert Sign"); + KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN, "CRL Sign"); + KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY, "Encipher Only"); + KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY, "Decipher Only"); + + *size = n; + *buf = p; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509_create.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509_create.c index bd772d3ac7..839b5df226 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509_create.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509_create.c @@ -2,32 +2,24 @@ * X.509 base functions for creating certificates / CSRs * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ #include "common.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) -#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" + /* Structure linking OIDs for X.509 DN AttributeTypes to their * string representations and default string encodings used by Mbed TLS. */ typedef struct { @@ -35,7 +27,8 @@ typedef struct { * "CN" or "emailAddress". */ size_t name_len; /* Length of 'name', without trailing 0 byte. */ const char *oid; /* String representation of OID of AttributeType, - * as per RFC 5280, Appendix A.1. */ + * as per RFC 5280, Appendix A.1. encoded as per + * X.690 */ int default_tag; /* The default character encoding used for the * given attribute type, e.g. * MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING for UTF-8. */ @@ -123,79 +116,261 @@ static const x509_attr_descriptor_t *x509_attr_descr_from_name(const char *name, return cur; } +static int hex_to_int(char c) +{ + return ('0' <= c && c <= '9') ? (c - '0') : + ('a' <= c && c <= 'f') ? (c - 'a' + 10) : + ('A' <= c && c <= 'F') ? (c - 'A' + 10) : -1; +} + +static int hexpair_to_int(const char *hexpair) +{ + int n1 = hex_to_int(*hexpair); + int n2 = hex_to_int(*(hexpair + 1)); + + if (n1 != -1 && n2 != -1) { + return (n1 << 4) | n2; + } else { + return -1; + } +} + +static int parse_attribute_value_string(const char *s, + int len, + unsigned char *data, + size_t *data_len) +{ + const char *c; + const char *end = s + len; + unsigned char *d = data; + int n; + + for (c = s; c < end; c++) { + if (*c == '\\') { + c++; + + /* Check for valid escaped characters as per RFC 4514 Section 3 */ + if (c + 1 < end && (n = hexpair_to_int(c)) != -1) { + if (n == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + } + *(d++) = n; + c++; + } else if (c < end && strchr(" ,=+<>#;\"\\", *c)) { + *(d++) = *c; + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + } + } else { + *(d++) = *c; + } + + if (d - data == MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + } + } + *data_len = (size_t) (d - data); + return 0; +} + +/** Parse a hexstring containing a DER-encoded string. + * + * \param s A string of \p len bytes hexadecimal digits. + * \param len Number of bytes to read from \p s. + * \param data Output buffer of size \p data_size. + * On success, it contains the payload that's DER-encoded + * in the input (content without the tag and length). + * If the DER tag is a string tag, the payload is guaranteed + * not to contain null bytes. + * \param data_size Length of the \p data buffer. + * \param data_len On success, the length of the parsed string. + * It is guaranteed to be less than + * #MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE. + * \param tag The ASN.1 tag that the payload in \p data is encoded in. + * + * \retval 0 on success. + * \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME if \p s does not contain + * a valid hexstring, + * or if the decoded hexstring is not valid DER, + * or if the payload does not fit in \p data, + * or if the payload is more than + * #MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE bytes, + * of if \p *tag is an ASN.1 string tag and the payload + * contains a null byte. + * \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED on low memory. + */ +static int parse_attribute_value_hex_der_encoded(const char *s, + size_t len, + unsigned char *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_len, + int *tag) +{ + /* Step 1: preliminary length checks. */ + /* Each byte is encoded by exactly two hexadecimal digits. */ + if (len % 2 != 0) { + /* Odd number of hex digits */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + } + size_t const der_length = len / 2; + if (der_length > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE + 4) { + /* The payload would be more than MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE + * (after subtracting the ASN.1 tag and length). Reject this early + * to avoid allocating a large intermediate buffer. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + } + if (der_length < 1) { + /* Avoid empty-buffer shenanigans. A valid DER encoding is never + * empty. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + } + + /* Step 2: Decode the hex string into an intermediate buffer. */ + unsigned char *der = mbedtls_calloc(1, der_length); + if (der == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + /* Beyond this point, der needs to be freed on exit. */ + for (size_t i = 0; i < der_length; i++) { + int c = hexpair_to_int(s + 2 * i); + if (c < 0) { + goto error; + } + der[i] = c; + } + + /* Step 3: decode the DER. */ + /* We've checked that der_length >= 1 above. */ + *tag = der[0]; + { + unsigned char *p = der + 1; + if (mbedtls_asn1_get_len(&p, der + der_length, data_len) != 0) { + goto error; + } + /* Now p points to the first byte of the payload inside der, + * and *data_len is the length of the payload. */ + + /* Step 4: payload validation */ + if (*data_len > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE) { + goto error; + } + /* Strings must not contain null bytes. */ + if (MBEDTLS_ASN1_IS_STRING_TAG(*tag)) { + for (size_t i = 0; i < *data_len; i++) { + if (p[i] == 0) { + goto error; + } + } + } + + /* Step 5: output the payload. */ + if (*data_len > data_size) { + goto error; + } + memcpy(data, p, *data_len); + } + mbedtls_free(der); + + return 0; + +error: + mbedtls_free(der); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; +} + int mbedtls_x509_string_to_names(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *name) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + int parse_ret = 0; const char *s = name, *c = s; const char *end = s + strlen(s); - const char *oid = NULL; + mbedtls_asn1_buf oid = { .p = NULL, .len = 0, .tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL }; const x509_attr_descriptor_t *attr_descr = NULL; - int in_tag = 1; - char data[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE]; - char *d = data; + int in_attr_type = 1; + int tag; + int numericoid = 0; + unsigned char data[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE]; + size_t data_len = 0; /* Clear existing chain if present */ mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list(head); while (c <= end) { - if (in_tag && *c == '=') { - if ((attr_descr = x509_attr_descr_from_name(s, c - s)) == NULL) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID; - goto exit; + if (in_attr_type && *c == '=') { + if ((attr_descr = x509_attr_descr_from_name(s, (size_t) (c - s))) == NULL) { + if ((mbedtls_oid_from_numeric_string(&oid, s, (size_t) (c - s))) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + } else { + numericoid = 1; + } + } else { + oid.len = strlen(attr_descr->oid); + oid.p = mbedtls_calloc(1, oid.len); + memcpy(oid.p, attr_descr->oid, oid.len); + numericoid = 0; } - oid = attr_descr->oid; s = c + 1; - in_tag = 0; - d = data; + in_attr_type = 0; } - if (!in_tag && *c == '\\' && c != end) { - c++; - - /* Check for valid escaped characters */ - if (c == end || *c != ',') { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; - goto exit; + if (!in_attr_type && ((*c == ',' && *(c-1) != '\\') || c == end)) { + if (s == c) { + mbedtls_free(oid.p); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + } else if (*s == '#') { + /* We know that c >= s (loop invariant) and c != s (in this + * else branch), hence c - s - 1 >= 0. */ + parse_ret = parse_attribute_value_hex_der_encoded( + s + 1, (size_t) (c - s) - 1, + data, sizeof(data), &data_len, &tag); + if (parse_ret != 0) { + mbedtls_free(oid.p); + return parse_ret; + } + } else { + if (numericoid) { + mbedtls_free(oid.p); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + } else { + if ((parse_ret = + parse_attribute_value_string(s, (int) (c - s), data, + &data_len)) != 0) { + mbedtls_free(oid.p); + return parse_ret; + } + tag = attr_descr->default_tag; + } } - } else if (!in_tag && (*c == ',' || c == end)) { + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur = - mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data(head, oid, strlen(oid), + mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data(head, (char *) oid.p, oid.len, (unsigned char *) data, - d - data); - + data_len); + mbedtls_free(oid.p); + oid.p = NULL; if (cur == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED; } // set tagType - cur->val.tag = attr_descr->default_tag; + cur->val.tag = tag; while (c < end && *(c + 1) == ' ') { c++; } s = c + 1; - in_tag = 1; + in_attr_type = 1; /* Successfully parsed one name, update ret to success */ ret = 0; } - - if (!in_tag && s != c + 1) { - *(d++) = *c; - - if (d - data == MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; - goto exit; - } - } - c++; } - -exit: - + if (oid.p != NULL) { + mbedtls_free(oid.p); + } return ret; } @@ -207,6 +382,10 @@ int mbedtls_x509_set_extension(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *oid, { mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur; + if (val_len > (SIZE_MAX - 1)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if ((cur = mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data(head, oid, oid_len, NULL, val_len + 1)) == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED; diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509_crl.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509_crl.c index d5357ea4e8..7901992e20 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509_crl.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509_crl.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * X.509 Certificate Revocation List (CRL) parsing * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI. @@ -32,6 +20,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) #include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" @@ -379,7 +368,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der(mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, } end = p + len; - crl->tbs.len = end - crl->tbs.p; + crl->tbs.len = (size_t) (end - crl->tbs.p); /* * Version ::= INTEGER OPTIONAL { v1(0), v2(1) } @@ -423,7 +412,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der(mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, return ret; } - crl->issuer_raw.len = p - crl->issuer_raw.p; + crl->issuer_raw.len = (size_t) (p - crl->issuer_raw.p); /* * thisUpdate Time @@ -587,13 +576,13 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file(mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const char *path) ret = mbedtls_x509_crl_parse(chain, buf, n); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, n); - mbedtls_free(buf); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, n); return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) /* * Return an informational string about the certificate. */ @@ -672,6 +661,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crl_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, return (int) (size - n); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ /* * Initialize a CRL chain @@ -688,47 +678,28 @@ void mbedtls_x509_crl_free(mbedtls_x509_crl *crl) { mbedtls_x509_crl *crl_cur = crl; mbedtls_x509_crl *crl_prv; - mbedtls_x509_name *name_cur; - mbedtls_x509_name *name_prv; mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *entry_cur; mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *entry_prv; - if (crl == NULL) { - return; - } - - do { + while (crl_cur != NULL) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) mbedtls_free(crl_cur->sig_opts); #endif - name_cur = crl_cur->issuer.next; - while (name_cur != NULL) { - name_prv = name_cur; - name_cur = name_cur->next; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(name_prv, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_name)); - mbedtls_free(name_prv); - } + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(crl_cur->issuer.next); entry_cur = crl_cur->entry.next; while (entry_cur != NULL) { entry_prv = entry_cur; entry_cur = entry_cur->next; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(entry_prv, + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(entry_prv, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crl_entry)); - mbedtls_free(entry_prv); } if (crl_cur->raw.p != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(crl_cur->raw.p, crl_cur->raw.len); - mbedtls_free(crl_cur->raw.p); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(crl_cur->raw.p, crl_cur->raw.len); } - crl_cur = crl_cur->next; - } while (crl_cur != NULL); - - crl_cur = crl; - do { crl_prv = crl_cur; crl_cur = crl_cur->next; @@ -736,7 +707,7 @@ void mbedtls_x509_crl_free(mbedtls_x509_crl *crl) if (crl_prv != crl) { mbedtls_free(crl_prv); } - } while (crl_cur != NULL); + } } #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c index 0e91bd83b2..2fd56fbd79 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * X.509 certificate parsing and verification * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI. @@ -34,6 +22,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) #include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" @@ -46,8 +35,10 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#include "pk_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/platform.h" @@ -57,6 +48,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) #if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) +#define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN #include #else #include @@ -68,7 +60,11 @@ #if !defined(_WIN32) || defined(EFIX64) || defined(EFI32) #include #include +#if defined(__MBED__) +#include +#else #include +#endif /* __MBED__ */ #include #endif /* !_WIN32 || EFIX64 || EFI32 */ #endif @@ -90,28 +86,39 @@ typedef struct { * concerns. */ const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default = { - /* Only SHA-2 hashes */ - MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224) | + /* Hashes from SHA-256 and above. Note that this selection + * should be aligned with ssl_preset_default_hashes in ssl_tls.c. */ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256) | MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) | MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512), 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg */ - 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any curve */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + /* Curves at or above 128-bit security level. Note that this selection + * should be aligned with ssl_preset_default_curves in ssl_tls.c. */ + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1) | + 0, +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + 0, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ 2048, }; -/* - * Next-default profile - */ +/* Next-generation profile. Currently identical to the default, but may + * be tightened at any time. */ const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next = { - /* Hashes from SHA-256 and above */ + /* Hashes from SHA-256 and above. */ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256) | MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) | MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512), 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - /* Curves at or above 128-bit security level */ + /* Curves at or above 128-bit security level. */ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1) | MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1) | MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1) | @@ -136,14 +143,25 @@ const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb = /* Only ECDSA */ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA) | MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY), -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) /* Only NIST P-256 and P-384 */ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1) | MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1), -#else +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + 0, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + 0, +}; + +/* + * Empty / all-forbidden profile + */ +const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_none = +{ 0, -#endif 0, + 0, + (uint32_t) -1, }; /* @@ -199,13 +217,13 @@ static int x509_profile_check_key(const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, return -1; } -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA || pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH) { - const mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid = mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk)->grp.id; + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk); if (gid == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { return -1; @@ -217,7 +235,7 @@ static int x509_profile_check_key(const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, return -1; } -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ return -1; } @@ -535,113 +553,75 @@ static int x509_get_basic_constraints(unsigned char **p, return 0; } -static int x509_get_ns_cert_type(unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - unsigned char *ns_cert_type) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL }; - - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring(p, end, &bs)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); - } - - if (bs.len != 1) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH); - } - - /* Get actual bitstring */ - *ns_cert_type = *bs.p; - return 0; -} - -static int x509_get_key_usage(unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - unsigned int *key_usage) +/* + * ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId + * + * KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER + */ +static int x509_get_ext_key_usage(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_sequence *ext_key_usage) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t i; - mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL }; - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring(p, end, &bs)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of(p, end, ext_key_usage, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); } - if (bs.len < 1) { + /* Sequence length must be >= 1 */ + if (ext_key_usage->buf.p == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH); } - /* Get actual bitstring */ - *key_usage = 0; - for (i = 0; i < bs.len && i < sizeof(unsigned int); i++) { - *key_usage |= (unsigned int) bs.p[i] << (8*i); - } - return 0; } /* - * ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId + * SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= KeyIdentifier * - * KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER + * KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING */ -static int x509_get_ext_key_usage(unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_sequence *ext_key_usage) +static int x509_get_subject_key_id(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *subject_key_id) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0u; - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of(p, end, ext_key_usage, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); } - /* Sequence length must be >= 1 */ - if (ext_key_usage->buf.p == NULL) { + subject_key_id->len = len; + subject_key_id->tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; + subject_key_id->p = *p; + *p += len; + + if (*p != end) { return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH); + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); } return 0; } /* - * SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames + * AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { + * keyIdentifier [0] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, + * authorityCertIssuer [1] GeneralNames OPTIONAL, + * authorityCertSerialNumber [2] CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL } * - * GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName - * - * GeneralName ::= CHOICE { - * otherName [0] OtherName, - * rfc822Name [1] IA5String, - * dNSName [2] IA5String, - * x400Address [3] ORAddress, - * directoryName [4] Name, - * ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName, - * uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String, - * iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING, - * registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER } - * - * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { - * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, - * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } - * - * EDIPartyName ::= SEQUENCE { - * nameAssigner [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL, - * partyName [1] DirectoryString } - * - * NOTE: we list all types, but only use dNSName and otherName - * of type HwModuleName, as defined in RFC 4108, at this point. + * KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING */ -static int x509_get_subject_alt_name(unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name) +static int x509_get_authority_key_id(unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_authority *authority_key_id) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t len, tag_len; - mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name; + size_t len = 0u; - /* Get main sequence tag */ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); @@ -652,75 +632,54 @@ static int x509_get_subject_alt_name(unsigned char **p, MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); } - while (*p < end) { - mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name dummy_san_buf; - mbedtls_x509_buf tmp_san_buf; - memset(&dummy_san_buf, 0, sizeof(dummy_san_buf)); - - tmp_san_buf.tag = **p; - (*p)++; + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC); - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len(p, end, &tag_len)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); - } + /* KeyIdentifier is an OPTIONAL field */ + if (ret == 0) { + authority_key_id->keyIdentifier.len = len; + authority_key_id->keyIdentifier.p = *p; + /* Setting tag of the keyIdentfier intentionally to 0x04. + * Although the .keyIdentfier field is CONTEXT_SPECIFIC ([0] OPTIONAL), + * its tag with the content is the payload of on OCTET STRING primitive */ + authority_key_id->keyIdentifier.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; - tmp_san_buf.p = *p; - tmp_san_buf.len = tag_len; + *p += len; + } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } - if ((tmp_san_buf.tag & MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK) != - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG); + if (*p < end) { + /* Getting authorityCertIssuer using the required specific class tag [1] */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + 1)) != 0) { + /* authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerialNumber MUST both + be present or both be absent. At this point we expect to have both. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); } - - /* - * Check that the SAN is structured correctly. - */ - ret = mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(&tmp_san_buf, &dummy_san_buf); - /* - * In case the extension is malformed, return an error, - * and clear the allocated sequences. - */ - if (ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) { - mbedtls_x509_sequence *seq_cur = subject_alt_name->next; - mbedtls_x509_sequence *seq_prv; - while (seq_cur != NULL) { - seq_prv = seq_cur; - seq_cur = seq_cur->next; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(seq_prv, - sizeof(mbedtls_x509_sequence)); - mbedtls_free(seq_prv); - } - subject_alt_name->next = NULL; + /* "end" also includes the CertSerialNumber field so "len" shall be used */ + ret = mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name_ext(p, + (*p+len), + &authority_key_id->authorityCertIssuer); + if (ret != 0) { return ret; } - /* Allocate and assign next pointer */ - if (cur->buf.p != NULL) { - if (cur->next != NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS; - } - - cur->next = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_sequence)); - - if (cur->next == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED); - } - - cur = cur->next; + /* Getting authorityCertSerialNumber using the required specific class tag [2] */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 2)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); } - - cur->buf = tmp_san_buf; - *p += tmp_san_buf.len; + authority_key_id->authorityCertSerialNumber.len = len; + authority_key_id->authorityCertSerialNumber.p = *p; + authority_key_id->authorityCertSerialNumber.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER; + *p += len; } - /* Set final sequence entry's next pointer to NULL */ - cur->next = NULL; - if (*p != end) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; } return 0; @@ -833,8 +792,7 @@ static int x509_get_certificate_policies(unsigned char **p, if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_POLICY, &policy_oid) != 0) { /* * Set the parsing return code but continue parsing, in case this - * extension is critical and MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION - * is configured. + * extension is critical. */ parse_ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; } @@ -985,13 +943,11 @@ static int x509_get_crt_ext(unsigned char **p, /* No parser found, skip extension */ *p = end_ext_octet; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION) if (is_critical) { /* Data is marked as critical: fail */ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG); } -#endif continue; } @@ -1013,8 +969,8 @@ static int x509_get_crt_ext(unsigned char **p, case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE: /* Parse key usage */ - if ((ret = x509_get_key_usage(p, end_ext_octet, - &crt->key_usage)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_key_usage(p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->key_usage)) != 0) { return ret; } break; @@ -1027,18 +983,35 @@ static int x509_get_crt_ext(unsigned char **p, } break; + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER: + /* Parse subject key identifier */ + if ((ret = x509_get_subject_key_id(p, end_ext_data, + &crt->subject_key_id)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER: + /* Parse authority key identifier */ + if ((ret = x509_get_authority_key_id(p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->authority_key_id)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME: - /* Parse subject alt name */ - if ((ret = x509_get_subject_alt_name(p, end_ext_octet, - &crt->subject_alt_names)) != 0) { + /* Parse subject alt name + * SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name(p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->subject_alt_names)) != 0) { return ret; } break; case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE: /* Parse netscape certificate type */ - if ((ret = x509_get_ns_cert_type(p, end_ext_octet, - &crt->ns_cert_type)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_ns_cert_type(p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->ns_cert_type)) != 0) { return ret; } break; @@ -1055,11 +1028,9 @@ static int x509_get_crt_ext(unsigned char **p, break; } -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION) if (is_critical) { return ret; } else -#endif /* * If MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is returned, then we * cannot interpret or enforce the policy. However, it is up to @@ -1078,12 +1049,11 @@ static int x509_get_crt_ext(unsigned char **p, * supports, but there isn't an x509 parser for it, * skip the extension. */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION) if (is_critical) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - } else -#endif - *p = end_ext_octet; + } else { + *p = end_ext_octet; + } } } @@ -1139,7 +1109,7 @@ static int x509_crt_parse_der_core(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, } end = crt_end = p + len; - crt->raw.len = crt_end - buf; + crt->raw.len = (size_t) (crt_end - buf); if (make_copy != 0) { /* Create and populate a new buffer for the raw field. */ crt->raw.p = p = mbedtls_calloc(1, crt->raw.len); @@ -1169,7 +1139,7 @@ static int x509_crt_parse_der_core(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, } end = p + len; - crt->tbs.len = end - crt->tbs.p; + crt->tbs.len = (size_t) (end - crt->tbs.p); /* * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } @@ -1216,7 +1186,7 @@ static int x509_crt_parse_der_core(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, return ret; } - crt->issuer_raw.len = p - crt->issuer_raw.p; + crt->issuer_raw.len = (size_t) (p - crt->issuer_raw.p); /* * Validity ::= SEQUENCE { @@ -1246,7 +1216,7 @@ static int x509_crt_parse_der_core(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, return ret; } - crt->subject_raw.len = p - crt->subject_raw.p; + crt->subject_raw.len = (size_t) (p - crt->subject_raw.p); /* * SubjectPublicKeyInfo @@ -1256,7 +1226,7 @@ static int x509_crt_parse_der_core(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); return ret; } - crt->pk_raw.len = p - crt->pk_raw.p; + crt->pk_raw.len = (size_t) (p - crt->pk_raw.p); /* * issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, @@ -1282,13 +1252,7 @@ static int x509_crt_parse_der_core(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, } } - int extensions_allowed = 1; -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3) - if (crt->version != 3) { - extensions_allowed = 0; - } -#endif - if (extensions_allowed) { + if (crt->version == 3) { ret = x509_get_crt_ext(&p, end, crt, cb, p_ctx); if (ret != 0) { mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); @@ -1551,8 +1515,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path) ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(chain, buf, n); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, n); - mbedtls_free(buf); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, n); return ret; } @@ -1581,6 +1544,11 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path) p = filename + len; filename[len++] = '*'; + /* + * Note this function uses the code page CP_ACP which is the system default + * ANSI codepage. The input string is always described in BYTES and the + * output length is described in WCHARs. + */ w_ret = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, filename, (int) len, szDir, MAX_PATH - 3); if (w_ret == 0) { @@ -1599,11 +1567,8 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path) if (file_data.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) { continue; } - w_ret = WideCharToMultiByte(CP_ACP, 0, file_data.cFileName, - -1, - p, (int) len, - NULL, NULL); + -1, p, (int) len, NULL, NULL); if (w_ret == 0) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR; goto cleanup; @@ -1696,323 +1661,28 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ -/* - * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { - * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, - * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } - * - * HardwareModuleName ::= SEQUENCE { - * hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, - * hwSerialNum OCTET STRING } - * - * NOTE: we currently only parse and use otherName of type HwModuleName, - * as defined in RFC 4108. - */ -static int x509_get_other_name(const mbedtls_x509_buf *subject_alt_name, - mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *other_name) -{ - int ret = 0; - size_t len; - unsigned char *p = subject_alt_name->p; - const unsigned char *end = p + subject_alt_name->len; - mbedtls_x509_buf cur_oid; - - if ((subject_alt_name->tag & - (MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK | MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK)) != - (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME)) { - /* - * The given subject alternative name is not of type "othername". - */ - return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); - } - - cur_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; - cur_oid.p = p; - cur_oid.len = len; - - /* - * Only HwModuleName is currently supported. - */ - if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME, &cur_oid) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - } - other_name->type_id = cur_oid; - - p += len; - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC)) != - 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); - } - - if (end != p + len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); - } - - if (end != p + len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); - } - - other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; - other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.p = p; - other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.len = len; - - p += len; - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); - } - - other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; - other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.p = p; - other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len = len; - p += len; - if (p != end) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - } - return 0; -} - -static int x509_info_subject_alt_name(char **buf, size_t *size, - const mbedtls_x509_sequence - *subject_alt_name, - const char *prefix) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t i; - size_t n = *size; - char *p = *buf; - const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name; - mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name san; - int parse_ret; - - while (cur != NULL) { - memset(&san, 0, sizeof(san)); - parse_ret = mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(&cur->buf, &san); - if (parse_ret != 0) { - if (parse_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) { - ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s ", prefix); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - } else { - ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s ", prefix); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - } - cur = cur->next; - continue; - } - - switch (san.type) { - /* - * otherName - */ - case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME: - { - mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *other_name = &san.san.other_name; - - ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s otherName :", prefix); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - - if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME, - &other_name->type_id) == 0) { - ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s hardware module name :", prefix); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - ret = - mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s hardware type : ", prefix); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - - ret = mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string(p, - n, - &other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - - ret = - mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s hardware serial number : ", prefix); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - - for (i = 0; i < other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len; i++) { - ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, - n, - "%02X", - other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.p[i]); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - } - }/* MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME */ - } - break; - - /* - * dNSName - */ - case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME: - { - ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s dNSName : ", prefix); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - if (san.san.unstructured_name.len >= n) { - *p = '\0'; - return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; - } - - memcpy(p, san.san.unstructured_name.p, san.san.unstructured_name.len); - p += san.san.unstructured_name.len; - n -= san.san.unstructured_name.len; - } - break; - - /* - * Type not supported, skip item. - */ - default: - ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s ", prefix); - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - break; - } - - cur = cur->next; - } - - *p = '\0'; - - *size = n; - *buf = p; - - return 0; -} - -int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf, - mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - switch (san_buf->tag & - (MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK)) { - /* - * otherName - */ - case (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME): - { - mbedtls_x509_san_other_name other_name; - - ret = x509_get_other_name(san_buf, &other_name); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - - memset(san, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name)); - san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME; - memcpy(&san->san.other_name, - &other_name, sizeof(other_name)); - - } - break; - - /* - * dNSName - */ - case (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME): - { - memset(san, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name)); - san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME; - - memcpy(&san->san.unstructured_name, - san_buf, sizeof(*san_buf)); - - } - break; - - /* - * Type not supported - */ - default: - return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - } - return 0; -} - -#define PRINT_ITEM(i) \ - do { \ - ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s" i, sep); \ - MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; \ - sep = ", "; \ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) +#define PRINT_ITEM(i) \ + do { \ + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s" i, sep); \ + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; \ + sep = ", "; \ } while (0) -#define CERT_TYPE(type, name) \ - do { \ - if (ns_cert_type & (type)) { \ - PRINT_ITEM(name); \ - } \ +#define CERT_TYPE(type, name) \ + do { \ + if (ns_cert_type & (type)) { \ + PRINT_ITEM(name); \ + } \ } while (0) -static int x509_info_cert_type(char **buf, size_t *size, - unsigned char ns_cert_type) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t n = *size; - char *p = *buf; - const char *sep = ""; - - CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT, "SSL Client"); - CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER, "SSL Server"); - CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL, "Email"); - CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING, "Object Signing"); - CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED, "Reserved"); - CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA, "SSL CA"); - CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA, "Email CA"); - CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA, "Object Signing CA"); - - *size = n; - *buf = p; - - return 0; -} - -#define KEY_USAGE(code, name) \ - do { \ - if (key_usage & (code)) { \ - PRINT_ITEM(name); \ - } \ +#define KEY_USAGE(code, name) \ + do { \ + if (key_usage & (code)) { \ + PRINT_ITEM(name); \ + } \ } while (0) -static int x509_info_key_usage(char **buf, size_t *size, - unsigned int key_usage) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t n = *size; - char *p = *buf; - const char *sep = ""; - - KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE, "Digital Signature"); - KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION, "Non Repudiation"); - KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT, "Key Encipherment"); - KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT, "Data Encipherment"); - KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT, "Key Agreement"); - KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN, "Key Cert Sign"); - KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN, "CRL Sign"); - KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY, "Encipher Only"); - KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY, "Decipher Only"); - - *size = n; - *buf = p; - - return 0; -} - static int x509_info_ext_key_usage(char **buf, size_t *size, const mbedtls_x509_sequence *extended_key_usage) { @@ -2164,9 +1834,9 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%ssubject alt name :", prefix); MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - if ((ret = x509_info_subject_alt_name(&p, &n, - &crt->subject_alt_names, - prefix)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_subject_alt_name(&p, &n, + &crt->subject_alt_names, + prefix)) != 0) { return ret; } } @@ -2175,7 +1845,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%scert. type : ", prefix); MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - if ((ret = x509_info_cert_type(&p, &n, crt->ns_cert_type)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_cert_type(&p, &n, crt->ns_cert_type)) != 0) { return ret; } } @@ -2184,7 +1854,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%skey usage : ", prefix); MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; - if ((ret = x509_info_key_usage(&p, &n, crt->key_usage)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_key_usage(&p, &n, crt->key_usage)) != 0) { return ret; } } @@ -2220,35 +1890,12 @@ struct x509_crt_verify_string { const char *string; }; +#define X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(err, err_str, info) { err, info }, static const struct x509_crt_verify_string x509_crt_verify_strings[] = { - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED, "The certificate validity has expired" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED, "The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL)" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH, - "The certificate Common Name (CN) does not match with the expected CN" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED, - "The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED, "The CRL is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED, "The CRL is expired" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING, "Certificate was missing" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY, "Certificate verification was skipped" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER, "Other reason (can be used by verify callback)" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE, "The certificate validity starts in the future" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE, "The CRL is from the future" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE, "Usage does not match the keyUsage extension" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE, "Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE, "Usage does not match the nsCertType extension" }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD, "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable hash." }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK, - "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA)." }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY, - "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short)." }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD, "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable hash." }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK, - "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA)." }, - { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_KEY, - "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short)." }, + MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO_LIST { 0, NULL } }; +#undef X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, uint32_t flags) @@ -2276,8 +1923,8 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, return (int) (size - n); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, unsigned int usage) { @@ -2303,9 +1950,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, return 0; } -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const char *usage_oid, size_t usage_len) @@ -2335,7 +1980,6 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) /* @@ -2363,11 +2007,17 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const mbedtls_x509_ */ static int x509_crt_verifycrl(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca, mbedtls_x509_crl *crl_list, - const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile) + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const mbedtls_x509_time *now) { int flags = 0; unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_algorithm_t psa_algorithm; +#else const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + size_t hash_length; if (ca == NULL) { return flags; @@ -2383,13 +2033,11 @@ static int x509_crt_verifycrl(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca, /* * Check if the CA is configured to sign CRLs */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) if (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(ca, MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN) != 0) { flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; break; } -#endif /* * Check if CRL is correctly signed by the trusted CA @@ -2402,34 +2050,56 @@ static int x509_crt_verifycrl(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca, flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_algorithm = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(crl_list->sig_md); + if (psa_hash_compute(psa_algorithm, + crl_list->tbs.p, + crl_list->tbs.len, + hash, + sizeof(hash), + &hash_length) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + /* Note: this can't happen except after an internal error */ + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; + break; + } +#else md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(crl_list->sig_md); - if (mbedtls_md(md_info, crl_list->tbs.p, crl_list->tbs.len, hash) != 0) { + hash_length = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); + if (mbedtls_md(md_info, + crl_list->tbs.p, + crl_list->tbs.len, + hash) != 0) { /* Note: this can't happen except after an internal error */ flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; break; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ if (x509_profile_check_key(profile, &ca->pk) != 0) { flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; } if (mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(crl_list->sig_pk, crl_list->sig_opts, &ca->pk, - crl_list->sig_md, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info), + crl_list->sig_md, hash, hash_length, crl_list->sig.p, crl_list->sig.len) != 0) { flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; break; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) /* * Check for validity of CRL (Do not drop out) */ - if (mbedtls_x509_time_is_past(&crl_list->next_update)) { + if (mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&crl_list->next_update, now) < 0) { flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED; } - if (mbedtls_x509_time_is_future(&crl_list->this_update)) { + if (mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&crl_list->this_update, now) > 0) { flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE; } +#else + ((void) now); +#endif /* * Check if certificate is revoked @@ -2453,8 +2123,8 @@ static int x509_crt_check_signature(const mbedtls_x509_crt *child, mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) { - unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; size_t hash_len; + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; #if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(child->sig_md); @@ -2465,22 +2135,19 @@ static int x509_crt_check_signature(const mbedtls_x509_crt *child, return -1; } #else - psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; - psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_md(child->sig_md); + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(child->sig_md); + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - if (psa_hash_setup(&hash_operation, hash_alg) != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return -1; + status = psa_hash_compute(hash_alg, + child->tbs.p, + child->tbs.len, + hash, + sizeof(hash), + &hash_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } - if (psa_hash_update(&hash_operation, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len) - != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return -1; - } - - if (psa_hash_finish(&hash_operation, hash, sizeof(hash), &hash_len) - != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return -1; - } #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /* Skip expensive computation on obvious mismatch */ if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(&parent->pk, child->sig_pk)) { @@ -2531,12 +2198,10 @@ static int x509_crt_check_parent(const mbedtls_x509_crt *child, return -1; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) if (need_ca_bit && mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(parent, MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) != 0) { return -1; } -#endif return 0; } @@ -2592,7 +2257,8 @@ static int x509_crt_find_parent_in( int top, unsigned path_cnt, unsigned self_cnt, - mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx, + const mbedtls_x509_time *now) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, *fallback_parent; @@ -2655,9 +2321,10 @@ static int x509_crt_find_parent_in( continue; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) /* optional time check */ - if (mbedtls_x509_time_is_past(&parent->valid_to) || - mbedtls_x509_time_is_future(&parent->valid_from)) { + if (mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&parent->valid_to, now) < 0 || /* past */ + mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&parent->valid_from, now) > 0) { /* future */ if (fallback_parent == NULL) { fallback_parent = parent; fallback_signature_is_good = signature_is_good; @@ -2665,6 +2332,9 @@ static int x509_crt_find_parent_in( continue; } +#else + ((void) now); +#endif *r_parent = parent; *r_signature_is_good = signature_is_good; @@ -2710,7 +2380,8 @@ static int x509_crt_find_parent( int *signature_is_good, unsigned path_cnt, unsigned self_cnt, - mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx, + const mbedtls_x509_time *now) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_x509_crt *search_list; @@ -2731,7 +2402,7 @@ static int x509_crt_find_parent( ret = x509_crt_find_parent_in(child, search_list, parent, signature_is_good, *parent_is_trusted, - path_cnt, self_cnt, rs_ctx); + path_cnt, self_cnt, rs_ctx, now); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) if (rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { @@ -2852,6 +2523,13 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain( int signature_is_good; unsigned self_cnt; mbedtls_x509_crt *cur_trust_ca = NULL; + mbedtls_x509_time now; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) + if (mbedtls_x509_time_gmtime(mbedtls_time(NULL), &now) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR; + } +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) /* resume if we had an operation in progress */ @@ -2882,14 +2560,16 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain( ver_chain->len++; flags = &cur->flags; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) /* Check time-validity (all certificates) */ - if (mbedtls_x509_time_is_past(&child->valid_to)) { + if (mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&child->valid_to, &now) < 0) { *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED; } - if (mbedtls_x509_time_is_future(&child->valid_from)) { + if (mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&child->valid_from, &now) > 0) { *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE; } +#endif /* Stop here for trusted roots (but not for trusted EE certs) */ if (child_is_trusted) { @@ -2940,7 +2620,8 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain( /* Look for a parent in trusted CAs or up the chain */ ret = x509_crt_find_parent(child, cur_trust_ca, &parent, &parent_is_trusted, &signature_is_good, - ver_chain->len - 1, self_cnt, rs_ctx); + ver_chain->len - 1, self_cnt, rs_ctx, + &now); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) if (rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { @@ -2989,7 +2670,7 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain( #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) /* Check trusted CA's CRL for the given crt */ - *flags |= x509_crt_verifycrl(child, parent, ca_crl, profile); + *flags |= x509_crt_verifycrl(child, parent, ca_crl, profile, &now); #else (void) ca_crl; #endif @@ -3002,6 +2683,202 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain( } } +#ifdef _WIN32 +#ifdef _MSC_VER +#pragma comment(lib, "ws2_32.lib") +#include +#include +#elif (defined(__MINGW32__) || defined(__MINGW64__)) && _WIN32_WINNT >= 0x0600 +#include +#include +#else +/* inet_pton() is not supported, fallback to software version */ +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_SW_INET_PTON +#endif +#elif defined(__sun) +/* Solaris requires -lsocket -lnsl for inet_pton() */ +#elif defined(__has_include) +#if __has_include() +#include +#endif +#if __has_include() +#include +#endif +#endif + +/* Use whether or not AF_INET6 is defined to indicate whether or not to use + * the platform inet_pton() or a local implementation (below). The local + * implementation may be used even in cases where the platform provides + * inet_pton(), e.g. when there are different includes required and/or the + * platform implementation requires dependencies on additional libraries. + * Specifically, Windows requires custom includes and additional link + * dependencies, and Solaris requires additional link dependencies. + * Also, as a coarse heuristic, use the local implementation if the compiler + * does not support __has_include(), or if the definition of AF_INET6 is not + * provided by headers included (or not) via __has_include() above. + * MBEDTLS_TEST_SW_INET_PTON is a bypass define to force testing of this code //no-check-names + * despite having a platform that has inet_pton. */ +#if !defined(AF_INET6) || defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_SW_INET_PTON) //no-check-names +/* Definition located further below to possibly reduce compiler inlining */ +static int x509_inet_pton_ipv4(const char *src, void *dst); + +#define li_cton(c, n) \ + (((n) = (c) - '0') <= 9 || (((n) = ((c)&0xdf) - 'A') <= 5 ? ((n) += 10) : 0)) + +static int x509_inet_pton_ipv6(const char *src, void *dst) +{ + const unsigned char *p = (const unsigned char *) src; + int nonzero_groups = 0, num_digits, zero_group_start = -1; + uint16_t addr[8]; + do { + /* note: allows excess leading 0's, e.g. 1:0002:3:... */ + uint16_t group = num_digits = 0; + for (uint8_t digit; num_digits < 4; num_digits++) { + if (li_cton(*p, digit) == 0) { + break; + } + group = (group << 4) | digit; + p++; + } + if (num_digits != 0) { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(group, addr, nonzero_groups); + nonzero_groups++; + if (*p == '\0') { + break; + } else if (*p == '.') { + /* Don't accept IPv4 too early or late */ + if ((nonzero_groups == 0 && zero_group_start == -1) || + nonzero_groups >= 7) { + break; + } + + /* Walk back to prior ':', then parse as IPv4-mapped */ + int steps = 4; + do { + p--; + steps--; + } while (*p != ':' && steps > 0); + + if (*p != ':') { + break; + } + p++; + nonzero_groups--; + if (x509_inet_pton_ipv4((const char *) p, + addr + nonzero_groups) != 0) { + break; + } + + nonzero_groups += 2; + p = (const unsigned char *) ""; + break; + } else if (*p != ':') { + return -1; + } + } else { + /* Don't accept a second zero group or an invalid delimiter */ + if (zero_group_start != -1 || *p != ':') { + return -1; + } + zero_group_start = nonzero_groups; + + /* Accept a zero group at start, but it has to be a double colon */ + if (zero_group_start == 0 && *++p != ':') { + return -1; + } + + if (p[1] == '\0') { + ++p; + break; + } + } + ++p; + } while (nonzero_groups < 8); + + if (*p != '\0') { + return -1; + } + + if (zero_group_start != -1) { + if (nonzero_groups > 6) { + return -1; + } + int zero_groups = 8 - nonzero_groups; + int groups_after_zero = nonzero_groups - zero_group_start; + + /* Move the non-zero part to after the zeroes */ + if (groups_after_zero) { + memmove(addr + zero_group_start + zero_groups, + addr + zero_group_start, + groups_after_zero * sizeof(*addr)); + } + memset(addr + zero_group_start, 0, zero_groups * sizeof(*addr)); + } else { + if (nonzero_groups != 8) { + return -1; + } + } + memcpy(dst, addr, sizeof(addr)); + return 0; +} + +static int x509_inet_pton_ipv4(const char *src, void *dst) +{ + const unsigned char *p = (const unsigned char *) src; + uint8_t *res = (uint8_t *) dst; + uint8_t digit, num_digits = 0; + uint8_t num_octets = 0; + uint16_t octet; + + do { + octet = num_digits = 0; + do { + digit = *p - '0'; + if (digit > 9) { + break; + } + + /* Don't allow leading zeroes. These might mean octal format, + * which this implementation does not support. */ + if (octet == 0 && num_digits > 0) { + return -1; + } + + octet = octet * 10 + digit; + num_digits++; + p++; + } while (num_digits < 3); + + if (octet >= 256 || num_digits > 3 || num_digits == 0) { + return -1; + } + *res++ = (uint8_t) octet; + num_octets++; + } while (num_octets < 4 && *p++ == '.'); + return num_octets == 4 && *p == '\0' ? 0 : -1; +} + +#else + +static int x509_inet_pton_ipv6(const char *src, void *dst) +{ + return inet_pton(AF_INET6, src, dst) == 1 ? 0 : -1; +} + +static int x509_inet_pton_ipv4(const char *src, void *dst) +{ + return inet_pton(AF_INET, src, dst) == 1 ? 0 : -1; +} + +#endif /* !AF_INET6 || MBEDTLS_TEST_SW_INET_PTON */ //no-check-names + +size_t mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_cn_inet_pton(const char *cn, void *dst) +{ + return strchr(cn, ':') == NULL + ? x509_inet_pton_ipv4(cn, dst) == 0 ? 4 : 0 + : x509_inet_pton_ipv6(cn, dst) == 0 ? 16 : 0; +} + /* * Check for CN match */ @@ -3022,23 +2899,80 @@ static int x509_crt_check_cn(const mbedtls_x509_buf *name, return -1; } +static int x509_crt_check_san_ip(const mbedtls_x509_sequence *san, + const char *cn, size_t cn_len) +{ + uint32_t ip[4]; + cn_len = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_cn_inet_pton(cn, ip); + if (cn_len == 0) { + return -1; + } + + for (const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = san; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { + const unsigned char san_type = (unsigned char) cur->buf.tag & + MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK; + if (san_type == MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS && + cur->buf.len == cn_len && memcmp(cur->buf.p, ip, cn_len) == 0) { + return 0; + } + } + + return -1; +} + +static int x509_crt_check_san_uri(const mbedtls_x509_sequence *san, + const char *cn, size_t cn_len) +{ + for (const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = san; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { + const unsigned char san_type = (unsigned char) cur->buf.tag & + MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK; + if (san_type == MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER && + cur->buf.len == cn_len && memcmp(cur->buf.p, cn, cn_len) == 0) { + return 0; + } + } + + return -1; +} + /* * Check for SAN match, see RFC 5280 Section 4.2.1.6 */ -static int x509_crt_check_san(const mbedtls_x509_buf *name, +static int x509_crt_check_san(const mbedtls_x509_sequence *san, const char *cn, size_t cn_len) { - const unsigned char san_type = (unsigned char) name->tag & - MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK; - - /* dNSName */ - if (san_type == MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME) { - return x509_crt_check_cn(name, cn, cn_len); + int san_ip = 0; + int san_uri = 0; + /* Prioritize DNS name over other subtypes due to popularity */ + for (const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = san; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { + switch ((unsigned char) cur->buf.tag & MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK) { + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME: + if (x509_crt_check_cn(&cur->buf, cn, cn_len) == 0) { + return 0; + } + break; + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS: + san_ip = 1; + break; + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER: + san_uri = 1; + break; + /* (We may handle other types here later.) */ + default: /* Unrecognized type */ + break; + } + } + if (san_ip) { + if (x509_crt_check_san_ip(san, cn, cn_len) == 0) { + return 0; + } + } + if (san_uri) { + if (x509_crt_check_san_uri(san, cn, cn_len) == 0) { + return 0; + } } - /* (We may handle other types here later.) */ - - /* Unrecognized type */ return -1; } @@ -3050,31 +2984,23 @@ static void x509_crt_verify_name(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, uint32_t *flags) { const mbedtls_x509_name *name; - const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur; size_t cn_len = strlen(cn); if (crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME) { - for (cur = &crt->subject_alt_names; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { - if (x509_crt_check_san(&cur->buf, cn, cn_len) == 0) { - break; - } - } - - if (cur == NULL) { - *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH; + if (x509_crt_check_san(&crt->subject_alt_names, cn, cn_len) == 0) { + return; } } else { for (name = &crt->subject; name != NULL; name = name->next) { if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, &name->oid) == 0 && x509_crt_check_cn(&name->val, cn, cn_len) == 0) { - break; + return; } } - if (name == NULL) { - *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH; - } } + + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH; } /* @@ -3302,75 +3228,25 @@ void mbedtls_x509_crt_free(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt) { mbedtls_x509_crt *cert_cur = crt; mbedtls_x509_crt *cert_prv; - mbedtls_x509_name *name_cur; - mbedtls_x509_name *name_prv; - mbedtls_x509_sequence *seq_cur; - mbedtls_x509_sequence *seq_prv; - if (crt == NULL) { - return; - } - - do { + while (cert_cur != NULL) { mbedtls_pk_free(&cert_cur->pk); #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) mbedtls_free(cert_cur->sig_opts); #endif - name_cur = cert_cur->issuer.next; - while (name_cur != NULL) { - name_prv = name_cur; - name_cur = name_cur->next; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(name_prv, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_name)); - mbedtls_free(name_prv); - } - - name_cur = cert_cur->subject.next; - while (name_cur != NULL) { - name_prv = name_cur; - name_cur = name_cur->next; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(name_prv, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_name)); - mbedtls_free(name_prv); - } - - seq_cur = cert_cur->ext_key_usage.next; - while (seq_cur != NULL) { - seq_prv = seq_cur; - seq_cur = seq_cur->next; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(seq_prv, - sizeof(mbedtls_x509_sequence)); - mbedtls_free(seq_prv); - } - - seq_cur = cert_cur->subject_alt_names.next; - while (seq_cur != NULL) { - seq_prv = seq_cur; - seq_cur = seq_cur->next; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(seq_prv, - sizeof(mbedtls_x509_sequence)); - mbedtls_free(seq_prv); - } - - seq_cur = cert_cur->certificate_policies.next; - while (seq_cur != NULL) { - seq_prv = seq_cur; - seq_cur = seq_cur->next; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(seq_prv, - sizeof(mbedtls_x509_sequence)); - mbedtls_free(seq_prv); - } + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(cert_cur->issuer.next); + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(cert_cur->subject.next); + mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(cert_cur->ext_key_usage.next); + mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(cert_cur->subject_alt_names.next); + mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(cert_cur->certificate_policies.next); + mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(cert_cur->authority_key_id.authorityCertIssuer.next); if (cert_cur->raw.p != NULL && cert_cur->own_buffer) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(cert_cur->raw.p, cert_cur->raw.len); - mbedtls_free(cert_cur->raw.p); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(cert_cur->raw.p, cert_cur->raw.len); } - cert_cur = cert_cur->next; - } while (cert_cur != NULL); - - cert_cur = crt; - do { cert_prv = cert_cur; cert_cur = cert_cur->next; @@ -3378,7 +3254,7 @@ void mbedtls_x509_crt_free(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt) if (cert_prv != crt) { mbedtls_free(cert_prv); } - } while (cert_cur != NULL); + } } #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) @@ -3414,4 +3290,12 @@ void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free(mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_get_ca_istrue(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt) +{ + if ((crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS) != 0) { + return crt->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ca_istrue); + } + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS; +} + #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509_csr.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509_csr.c index 89344d183b..813d64466c 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509_csr.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509_csr.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * X.509 Certificate Signing Request (CSR) parsing * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI. @@ -32,6 +20,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) #include "mbedtls/x509_csr.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" @@ -69,11 +58,214 @@ static int x509_csr_get_version(unsigned char **p, return 0; } +/* + * Parse CSR extension requests in DER format + */ +static int x509_csr_parse_extensions(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, + unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_csr_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + unsigned char *end_ext_data, *end_ext_octet; + + while (*p < end) { + mbedtls_x509_buf extn_oid = { 0, 0, NULL }; + int is_critical = 0; /* DEFAULT FALSE */ + int ext_type = 0; + + /* Read sequence tag */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + end_ext_data = *p + len; + + /* Get extension ID */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_ext_data, &extn_oid.len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + extn_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + extn_oid.p = *p; + *p += extn_oid.len; + + /* Get optional critical */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool(p, end_ext_data, &is_critical)) != 0 && + (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + /* Data should be octet string type */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_ext_data, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + end_ext_octet = *p + len; + + if (end_ext_octet != end_ext_data) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + /* + * Detect supported extensions and skip unsupported extensions + */ + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type(&extn_oid, &ext_type); + + if (ret != 0) { + /* Give the callback (if any) a chance to handle the extension */ + if (cb != NULL) { + ret = cb(p_ctx, csr, &extn_oid, is_critical, *p, end_ext_octet); + if (ret != 0 && is_critical) { + return ret; + } + *p = end_ext_octet; + continue; + } + + /* No parser found, skip extension */ + *p = end_ext_octet; + + if (is_critical) { + /* Data is marked as critical: fail */ + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG); + } + continue; + } + + /* Forbid repeated extensions */ + if ((csr->ext_types & ext_type) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA); + } + + csr->ext_types |= ext_type; + + switch (ext_type) { + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE: + /* Parse key usage */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_key_usage(p, end_ext_data, + &csr->key_usage)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME: + /* Parse subject alt name */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name(p, end_ext_data, + &csr->subject_alt_names)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE: + /* Parse netscape certificate type */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_ns_cert_type(p, end_ext_data, + &csr->ns_cert_type)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; + default: + /* + * If this is a non-critical extension, which the oid layer + * supports, but there isn't an x509 parser for it, + * skip the extension. + */ + if (is_critical) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } else { + *p = end_ext_octet; + } + } + } + + if (*p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Parse CSR attributes in DER format + */ +static int x509_csr_parse_attributes(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, + const unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_csr_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx) +{ + int ret; + size_t len; + unsigned char *end_attr_data; + unsigned char **p = (unsigned char **) &start; + + while (*p < end) { + mbedtls_x509_buf attr_oid = { 0, 0, NULL }; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + end_attr_data = *p + len; + + /* Get attribute ID */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_attr_data, &attr_oid.len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + attr_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + attr_oid.p = *p; + *p += attr_oid.len; + + /* Check that this is an extension-request attribute */ + if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ, &attr_oid) == 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != + 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + if ((ret = x509_csr_parse_extensions(csr, p, *p + len, cb, p_ctx)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (*p != end_attr_data) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + } + + *p = end_attr_data; + } + + if (*p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return 0; +} + /* * Parse a CSR in DER format */ -int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) +static int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der_internal(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, + mbedtls_x509_csr_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; @@ -137,7 +329,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, } end = p + len; - csr->cri.len = end - csr->cri.p; + csr->cri.len = (size_t) (end - csr->cri.p); /* * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) } @@ -170,7 +362,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, return ret; } - csr->subject_raw.len = p - csr->subject_raw.p; + csr->subject_raw.len = (size_t) (p - csr->subject_raw.p); /* * subjectPKInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo @@ -197,6 +389,11 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); } + if ((ret = x509_csr_parse_attributes(csr, p, p + len, cb, p_ctx)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free(csr); + return ret; + } + p += len; end = csr->raw.p + csr->raw.len; @@ -231,6 +428,26 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, return 0; } +/* + * Parse a CSR in DER format + */ +int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der_internal(csr, buf, buflen, NULL, NULL); +} + +/* + * Parse a CSR in DER format with callback for unknown extensions + */ +int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der_with_ext_cb(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, + mbedtls_x509_csr_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der_internal(csr, buf, buflen, cb, p_ctx); +} + /* * Parse a CSR, allowing for PEM or raw DER encoding */ @@ -296,13 +513,13 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const char *path) ret = mbedtls_x509_csr_parse(csr, buf, n); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, n); - mbedtls_free(buf); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, n); return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) #define BEFORE_COLON 14 #define BC "14" /* @@ -344,8 +561,47 @@ int mbedtls_x509_csr_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, (int) mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(&csr->pk)); MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + /* + * Optional extensions + */ + + if (csr->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%ssubject alt name :", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_subject_alt_name(&p, &n, + &csr->subject_alt_names, + prefix)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + if (csr->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%scert. type : ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_cert_type(&p, &n, csr->ns_cert_type)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + if (csr->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%skey usage : ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_key_usage(&p, &n, csr->key_usage)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + if (csr->ext_types != 0) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n"); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + return (int) (size - n); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ /* * Initialize a CSR @@ -360,9 +616,6 @@ void mbedtls_x509_csr_init(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr) */ void mbedtls_x509_csr_free(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr) { - mbedtls_x509_name *name_cur; - mbedtls_x509_name *name_prv; - if (csr == NULL) { return; } @@ -373,17 +626,11 @@ void mbedtls_x509_csr_free(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr) mbedtls_free(csr->sig_opts); #endif - name_cur = csr->subject.next; - while (name_cur != NULL) { - name_prv = name_cur; - name_cur = name_cur->next; - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(name_prv, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_name)); - mbedtls_free(name_prv); - } + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(csr->subject.next); + mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(csr->subject_alt_names.next); if (csr->raw.p != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(csr->raw.p, csr->raw.len); - mbedtls_free(csr->raw.p); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(csr->raw.p, csr->raw.len); } mbedtls_platform_zeroize(csr, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_csr)); diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509_internal.h b/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8a2d2ed007 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +/** + * \file x509.h + * + * \brief Internal part of the public "x509.h". + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_X509_INTERNAL_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "pk_internal.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#endif + +int mbedtls_x509_get_name(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_name *cur); +int mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *alg); +int mbedtls_x509_get_alg(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *alg, mbedtls_x509_buf *params); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) +int mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params(const mbedtls_x509_buf *params, + mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t *mgf_md, + int *salt_len); +#endif +int mbedtls_x509_get_sig(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *sig); +int mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg(const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_params, + mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg, + void **sig_opts); +int mbedtls_x509_get_time(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_time *t); +int mbedtls_x509_get_serial(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *serial); +int mbedtls_x509_get_ext(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *ext, int tag); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) +int mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const void *sig_opts); +#endif +int mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper(char *buf, size_t buf_size, const char *name); +int mbedtls_x509_set_extension(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + int critical, const unsigned char *val, + size_t val_len); +int mbedtls_x509_write_extensions(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first); +int mbedtls_x509_write_names(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first); +int mbedtls_x509_write_sig(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t size, + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg); +int mbedtls_x509_get_ns_cert_type(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned char *ns_cert_type); +int mbedtls_x509_get_key_usage(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned int *key_usage); +int mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name); +int mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name_ext(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name); +int mbedtls_x509_info_subject_alt_name(char **buf, size_t *size, + const mbedtls_x509_sequence + *subject_alt_name, + const char *prefix); +int mbedtls_x509_info_cert_type(char **buf, size_t *size, + unsigned char ns_cert_type); +int mbedtls_x509_info_key_usage(char **buf, size_t *size, + unsigned int key_usage); + +int mbedtls_x509_write_set_san_common(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **extensions, + const mbedtls_x509_san_list *san_list); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509write.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509write.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4704900d38 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509write.c @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +/* + * X.509 internal, common functions for writing + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#include "common.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "md_psa.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#define CHECK_OVERFLOW_ADD(a, b) \ + do \ + { \ + if (a > SIZE_MAX - (b)) \ + { \ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; \ + } \ + a += b; \ + } while (0) + +int mbedtls_x509_write_set_san_common(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **extensions, + const mbedtls_x509_san_list *san_list) +{ + int ret = 0; + const mbedtls_x509_san_list *cur; + unsigned char *buf; + unsigned char *p; + size_t len; + size_t buflen = 0; + + /* Determine the maximum size of the SubjectAltName list */ + for (cur = san_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { + /* Calculate size of the required buffer */ + switch (cur->node.type) { + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME: + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER: + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS: + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_RFC822_NAME: + /* length of value for each name entry, + * maximum 4 bytes for the length field, + * 1 byte for the tag/type. + */ + CHECK_OVERFLOW_ADD(buflen, cur->node.san.unstructured_name.len); + CHECK_OVERFLOW_ADD(buflen, 4 + 1); + break; + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DIRECTORY_NAME: + { + const mbedtls_asn1_named_data *chunk = &cur->node.san.directory_name; + while (chunk != NULL) { + // Max 4 bytes for length, +1 for tag, + // additional 4 max for length, +1 for tag. + // See x509_write_name for more information. + CHECK_OVERFLOW_ADD(buflen, 4 + 1 + 4 + 1); + CHECK_OVERFLOW_ADD(buflen, chunk->oid.len); + CHECK_OVERFLOW_ADD(buflen, chunk->val.len); + chunk = chunk->next; + } + CHECK_OVERFLOW_ADD(buflen, 4 + 1); + break; + } + default: + /* Not supported - return. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + } + + /* Add the extra length field and tag */ + CHECK_OVERFLOW_ADD(buflen, 4 + 1); + + /* Allocate buffer */ + buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, buflen); + if (buf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + p = buf + buflen; + + /* Write ASN.1-based structure */ + cur = san_list; + len = 0; + while (cur != NULL) { + size_t single_san_len = 0; + switch (cur->node.type) { + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME: + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_RFC822_NAME: + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER: + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS: + { + const unsigned char *unstructured_name = + (const unsigned char *) cur->node.san.unstructured_name.p; + size_t unstructured_name_len = cur->node.san.unstructured_name.len; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_CLEANUP_ADD(single_san_len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( + &p, buf, + unstructured_name, unstructured_name_len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_CLEANUP_ADD(single_san_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( + &p, buf, unstructured_name_len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_CLEANUP_ADD(single_san_len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( + &p, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | cur->node.type)); + } + break; + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DIRECTORY_NAME: + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_CLEANUP_ADD(single_san_len, + mbedtls_x509_write_names(&p, buf, + (mbedtls_asn1_named_data *) & + cur->node + .san.directory_name)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_CLEANUP_ADD(single_san_len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&p, buf, single_san_len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_CLEANUP_ADD(single_san_len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&p, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DIRECTORY_NAME)); + break; + default: + /* Error out on an unsupported SAN */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + goto cleanup; + } + cur = cur->next; + /* check for overflow */ + if (len > SIZE_MAX - single_san_len) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + len += single_san_len; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_CLEANUP_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&p, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_CLEANUP_ADD(len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&p, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + ret = mbedtls_x509_set_extension(extensions, + MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME), + 0, + buf + buflen - len, len); + + /* If we exceeded the allocated buffer it means that maximum size of the SubjectAltName list + * was incorrectly calculated and memory is corrupted. */ + if (p < buf) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } +cleanup: + mbedtls_free(buf); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509write_crt.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509write_crt.c index e9944110e7..72f5a10a17 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509write_crt.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509write_crt.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * X.509 certificate writing * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * References: @@ -28,30 +16,36 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C) #include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" -#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" #include +#include #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) #include "mbedtls/pem.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + void mbedtls_x509write_crt_init(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx) { memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509write_cert)); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&ctx->serial); ctx->version = MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3; } void mbedtls_x509write_crt_free(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx) { - mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->serial); - mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list(&ctx->subject); mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list(&ctx->issuer); mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list(&ctx->extensions); @@ -95,21 +89,42 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_name(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, return mbedtls_x509_string_to_names(&ctx->issuer, issuer_name); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *serial) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int ret; + size_t tmp_len; - if (mbedtls_mpi_size(serial) > MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN) { + /* Ensure that the MPI value fits into the buffer */ + tmp_len = mbedtls_mpi_size(serial); + if (tmp_len > MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->serial, serial)) != 0) { + ctx->serial_len = tmp_len; + + ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(serial, ctx->serial, tmp_len); + if (ret < 0) { return ret; } return 0; } +#endif // MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial_raw(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + unsigned char *serial, size_t serial_len) +{ + if (serial_len > MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ctx->serial_len = serial_len; + memcpy(ctx->serial, serial, serial_len); + + return 0; +} int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_validity(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const char *not_before, @@ -127,6 +142,13 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_validity(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, return 0; } +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_alternative_name(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const mbedtls_x509_san_list *san_list) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_write_set_san_common(&ctx->extensions, san_list); +} + + int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, int critical, @@ -169,71 +191,92 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, is_ca, buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len); } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) -int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) +static int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_identifier(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + int is_ca, + unsigned char tag) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE * 2 + 20]; /* tag, length + 2xMPI */ unsigned char *c = buf + sizeof(buf); size_t len = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t hash_length; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, - mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(&c, buf, ctx->subject_key)); - - ret = mbedtls_sha1_ret(buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len, - buf + sizeof(buf) - 20); + mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(&c, + buf, + is_ca ? + ctx->issuer_key : + ctx->subject_key)); + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_hash_compute(PSA_ALG_SHA_1, + buf + sizeof(buf) - len, + len, + buf + sizeof(buf) - 20, + 20, + &hash_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } +#else + ret = mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1), + buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len, + buf + sizeof(buf) - 20); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + c = buf + sizeof(buf) - 20; len = 20; MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, - mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)); - - return mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension(ctx, - MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER, - MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER), - 0, buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len); -} - -int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE * 2 + 20]; /* tag, length + 2xMPI */ - unsigned char *c = buf + sizeof(buf); - size_t len = 0; - - memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, - mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(&c, buf, ctx->issuer_key)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, tag)); - ret = mbedtls_sha1_ret(buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len, - buf + sizeof(buf) - 20); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; + if (is_ca) { // writes AuthorityKeyIdentifier sequence + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, + buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); } - c = buf + sizeof(buf) - 20; - len = 20; - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, - mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0)); + if (is_ca) { + return mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension(ctx, + MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( + MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER), + 0, buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len); + } else { + return mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension(ctx, + MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( + MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER), + 0, buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len); + } +} - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, - mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx) +{ + return mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_identifier(ctx, + 0, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING); +} - return mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension( - ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER, - MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER), - 0, buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len); +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx) +{ + return mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_identifier(ctx, + 1, + (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0)); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned int key_usage) @@ -276,6 +319,47 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, return 0; } +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ext_key_usage(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const mbedtls_asn1_sequence *exts) +{ + unsigned char buf[256]; + unsigned char *c = buf + sizeof(buf); + int ret; + size_t len = 0; + const mbedtls_asn1_sequence *last_ext = NULL; + const mbedtls_asn1_sequence *ext; + + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + + /* We need at least one extension: SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId */ + if (exts == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Iterate over exts backwards, so we write them out in the requested order */ + while (last_ext != exts) { + for (ext = exts; ext->next != last_ext; ext = ext->next) { + } + if (ext->buf.tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(&c, buf, ext->buf.p, ext->buf.len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, ext->buf.len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)); + last_ext = ext; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + return mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension(ctx, + MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE), + 1, c, len); +} + int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char ns_cert_type) { @@ -337,8 +421,14 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const char *sig_oid; size_t sig_oid_len = 0; unsigned char *c, *c2; - unsigned char hash[64]; unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t hash_length = 0; + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_algorithm_t psa_algorithm; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + size_t sub_len = 0, pub_len = 0, sig_and_oid_len = 0, sig_len; size_t len = 0; mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; @@ -392,7 +482,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, */ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(ctx->subject_key, - buf, c - buf)); + buf, (size_t) (c - buf))); c -= pub_len; len += pub_len; @@ -451,9 +541,29 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, /* * Serial ::= INTEGER + * + * Written data is: + * - "ctx->serial_len" bytes for the raw serial buffer + * - if MSb of "serial" is 1, then prepend an extra 0x00 byte + * - 1 byte for the length + * - 1 byte for the TAG */ - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(&c, buf, - &ctx->serial)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(&c, buf, + ctx->serial, ctx->serial_len)); + if (*c & 0x80) { + if (c - buf < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + *(--c) = 0x0; + len++; + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, + ctx->serial_len + 1)); + } else { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, + ctx->serial_len)); + } + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)); /* * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } @@ -483,13 +593,28 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, */ /* Compute hash of CRT. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_algorithm = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(ctx->md_alg); + + status = psa_hash_compute(psa_algorithm, + c, + len, + hash, + sizeof(hash), + &hash_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } +#else if ((ret = mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(ctx->md_alg), c, len, hash)) != 0) { return ret; } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_sign(ctx->issuer_key, ctx->md_alg, - hash, 0, sig, &sig_len, + hash, hash_length, sig, sizeof(sig), &sig_len, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { return ret; } diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509write_csr.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509write_csr.c index 178b166df1..d3ddbcc03d 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509write_csr.c +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/library/x509write_csr.c @@ -2,19 +2,7 @@ * X.509 Certificate Signing Request writing * * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * References: @@ -26,6 +14,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) +#include "x509_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/x509_csr.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" @@ -34,8 +23,9 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #include #include @@ -77,10 +67,17 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_name(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + int critical, const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len) { return mbedtls_x509_set_extension(&ctx->extensions, oid, oid_len, - 0, val, val_len); + critical, val, val_len); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_alternative_name(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, + const mbedtls_x509_san_list *san_list) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_write_set_san_common(&ctx->extensions, san_list); } int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char key_usage) @@ -98,7 +95,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned cha ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension(ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE, MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE), - c, (size_t) ret); + 0, c, (size_t) ret); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } @@ -122,7 +119,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension(ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE, MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE), - c, (size_t) ret); + 0, c, (size_t) ret); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } @@ -133,7 +130,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, static int x509write_csr_der_internal(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, - unsigned char *sig, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) { @@ -141,14 +138,13 @@ static int x509write_csr_der_internal(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, const char *sig_oid; size_t sig_oid_len = 0; unsigned char *c, *c2; - unsigned char hash[64]; + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; size_t pub_len = 0, sig_and_oid_len = 0, sig_len; size_t len = 0; mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; size_t hash_len; - psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_md(ctx->md_alg); + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(ctx->md_alg); #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /* Write the CSR backwards starting from the end of buf */ @@ -189,7 +185,7 @@ static int x509write_csr_der_internal(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC)); MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(ctx->key, - buf, c - buf)); + buf, (size_t) (c - buf))); c -= pub_len; len += pub_len; @@ -215,17 +211,13 @@ static int x509write_csr_der_internal(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, * Note: hash errors can happen only after an internal error */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - if (psa_hash_setup(&hash_operation, hash_alg) != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR; - } - - if (psa_hash_update(&hash_operation, c, len) != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR; - } - - if (psa_hash_finish(&hash_operation, hash, sizeof(hash), &hash_len) - != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR; + if (psa_hash_compute(hash_alg, + c, + len, + hash, + sizeof(hash), + &hash_len) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; } #else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ ret = mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(ctx->md_alg), c, len, hash); @@ -233,7 +225,8 @@ static int x509write_csr_der_internal(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, return ret; } #endif - if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_sign(ctx->key, ctx->md_alg, hash, 0, sig, &sig_len, + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_sign(ctx->key, ctx->md_alg, hash, 0, + sig, sig_size, &sig_len, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { return ret; } @@ -283,7 +276,7 @@ static int x509write_csr_der_internal(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); /* Zero the unused bytes at the start of buf */ - memset(buf, 0, c2 - buf); + memset(buf, 0, (size_t) (c2 - buf)); return (int) len; } @@ -300,7 +293,9 @@ int mbedtls_x509write_csr_der(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED; } - ret = x509write_csr_der_internal(ctx, buf, size, sig, f_rng, p_rng); + ret = x509write_csr_der_internal(ctx, buf, size, + sig, MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE, + f_rng, p_rng); mbedtls_free(sig); diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/library/xtea.c b/vendor/mbedtls/library/xtea.c deleted file mode 100644 index 27651cc0e5..0000000000 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/library/xtea.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,236 +0,0 @@ -/* - * A 32-bit implementation of the XTEA algorithm - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 - * - * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may - * not use this file except in compliance with the License. - * You may obtain a copy of the License at - * - * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 - * - * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software - * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT - * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. - * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and - * limitations under the License. - */ - -#include "common.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_C) - -#include "mbedtls/xtea.h" -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" - -#include - -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT) - -void mbedtls_xtea_init(mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx) -{ - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_xtea_context)); -} - -void mbedtls_xtea_free(mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx) -{ - if (ctx == NULL) { - return; - } - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_xtea_context)); -} - -/* - * XTEA key schedule - */ -void mbedtls_xtea_setup(mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[16]) -{ - int i; - - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_xtea_context)); - - for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { - ctx->k[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(key, i << 2); - } -} - -/* - * XTEA encrypt function - */ -int mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, int mode, - const unsigned char input[8], unsigned char output[8]) -{ - uint32_t *k, v0, v1, i; - - k = ctx->k; - - v0 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(input, 0); - v1 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(input, 4); - - if (mode == MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT) { - uint32_t sum = 0, delta = 0x9E3779B9; - - for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { - v0 += (((v1 << 4) ^ (v1 >> 5)) + v1) ^ (sum + k[sum & 3]); - sum += delta; - v1 += (((v0 << 4) ^ (v0 >> 5)) + v0) ^ (sum + k[(sum>>11) & 3]); - } - } else { /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT */ - uint32_t delta = 0x9E3779B9, sum = delta * 32; - - for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { - v1 -= (((v0 << 4) ^ (v0 >> 5)) + v0) ^ (sum + k[(sum>>11) & 3]); - sum -= delta; - v0 -= (((v1 << 4) ^ (v1 >> 5)) + v1) ^ (sum + k[sum & 3]); - } - } - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(v0, output, 0); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(v1, output, 4); - - return 0; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) -/* - * XTEA-CBC buffer encryption/decryption - */ -int mbedtls_xtea_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_xtea_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, - unsigned char iv[8], const unsigned char *input, - unsigned char *output) -{ - int i; - unsigned char temp[8]; - - if (length % 8) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH; - } - - if (mode == MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT) { - while (length > 0) { - memcpy(temp, input, 8); - mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb(ctx, mode, input, output); - - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - output[i] = (unsigned char) (output[i] ^ iv[i]); - } - - memcpy(iv, temp, 8); - - input += 8; - output += 8; - length -= 8; - } - } else { - while (length > 0) { - for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { - output[i] = (unsigned char) (input[i] ^ iv[i]); - } - - mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb(ctx, mode, output, output); - memcpy(iv, output, 8); - - input += 8; - output += 8; - length -= 8; - } - } - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_XTEA_ALT */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) - -/* - * XTEA tests vectors (non-official) - */ - -static const unsigned char xtea_test_key[6][16] = -{ - { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, - 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f }, - { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, - 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f }, - { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, - 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f }, - { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, - { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, - { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } -}; - -static const unsigned char xtea_test_pt[6][8] = -{ - { 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48 }, - { 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41 }, - { 0x5a, 0x5b, 0x6e, 0x27, 0x89, 0x48, 0xd7, 0x7f }, - { 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48 }, - { 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41 }, - { 0x70, 0xe1, 0x22, 0x5d, 0x6e, 0x4e, 0x76, 0x55 } -}; - -static const unsigned char xtea_test_ct[6][8] = -{ - { 0x49, 0x7d, 0xf3, 0xd0, 0x72, 0x61, 0x2c, 0xb5 }, - { 0xe7, 0x8f, 0x2d, 0x13, 0x74, 0x43, 0x41, 0xd8 }, - { 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41 }, - { 0xa0, 0x39, 0x05, 0x89, 0xf8, 0xb8, 0xef, 0xa5 }, - { 0xed, 0x23, 0x37, 0x5a, 0x82, 0x1a, 0x8c, 0x2d }, - { 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41, 0x41 } -}; - -/* - * Checkup routine - */ -int mbedtls_xtea_self_test(int verbose) -{ - int i, ret = 0; - unsigned char buf[8]; - mbedtls_xtea_context ctx; - - mbedtls_xtea_init(&ctx); - for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" XTEA test #%d: ", i + 1); - } - - memcpy(buf, xtea_test_pt[i], 8); - - mbedtls_xtea_setup(&ctx, xtea_test_key[i]); - mbedtls_xtea_crypt_ecb(&ctx, MBEDTLS_XTEA_ENCRYPT, buf, buf); - - if (memcmp(buf, xtea_test_ct[i], 8) != 0) { - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); - } - - ret = 1; - goto exit; - } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); - } - } - - if (verbose != 0) { - mbedtls_printf("\n"); - } - -exit: - mbedtls_xtea_free(&ctx); - - return ret; -} - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_XTEA_C */ diff --git a/vendor/mbedtls/premake5.lua b/vendor/mbedtls/premake5.lua index a50c5121d4..167f777fbc 100644 --- a/vendor/mbedtls/premake5.lua +++ b/vendor/mbedtls/premake5.lua @@ -32,35 +32,40 @@ project "mbedtls" "3rdparty/everest/library/kremlib/FStar_UInt128_extracted.c", "3rdparty/everest/library/kremlib/FStar_UInt64_FStar_UInt32_FStar_UInt16_FStar_UInt8.c", "3rdparty/everest/library/legacy/Hacl_Curve25519.c", + "3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m/p256-m.c", + "3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m/p256-m.h", + "3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m_driver_entrypoints.c", + "3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m_driver_entrypoints.h", "configs/config-ccm-psk-dtls1_2.h", "configs/config-ccm-psk-tls1_2.h", - "configs/config-mini-tls1_1.h", + "configs/config-ccm-aes-sha256.h", "configs/config-no-entropy.h", "configs/config-suite-b.h", "configs/config-symmetric-only.h", - "configs/config-thread.h", + "configs/config-tfm.h", "include/mbedtls/aes.h", - "include/mbedtls/aesni.h", - "include/mbedtls/arc4.h", "include/mbedtls/aria.h", "include/mbedtls/asn1.h", "include/mbedtls/asn1write.h", "include/mbedtls/base64.h", "include/mbedtls/bignum.h", - "include/mbedtls/blowfish.h", - "include/mbedtls/bn_mul.h", + "include/mbedtls/block_cipher.h", + "include/mbedtls/build_info.h", "include/mbedtls/camellia.h", "include/mbedtls/ccm.h", - "include/mbedtls/certs.h", "include/mbedtls/chacha20.h", "include/mbedtls/chachapoly.h", "include/mbedtls/check_config.h", "include/mbedtls/cipher.h", - "include/mbedtls/cipher_internal.h", "include/mbedtls/cmac.h", - "include/mbedtls/compat-1.3.h", - "include/mbedtls/config.h", + "include/mbedtls/compat-2.x.h", "include/mbedtls/config_psa.h", + "include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h", + "include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h", + "include/mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_from_legacy.h", + "include/mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_superset_legacy.h", + "include/mbedtls/config_adjust_ssl.h", + "include/mbedtls/config_adjust_x509.h", "include/mbedtls/constant_time.h", "include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h", "include/mbedtls/debug.h", @@ -70,47 +75,40 @@ project "mbedtls" "include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h", "include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h", "include/mbedtls/ecp.h", - "include/mbedtls/ecp_internal.h", "include/mbedtls/entropy.h", - "include/mbedtls/entropy_poll.h", "include/mbedtls/error.h", "include/mbedtls/gcm.h", - "include/mbedtls/havege.h", "include/mbedtls/hkdf.h", "include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h", + "include/mbedtls/lms.h", + "include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h", "include/mbedtls/md.h", - "include/mbedtls/md2.h", - "include/mbedtls/md4.h", "include/mbedtls/md5.h", - "include/mbedtls/md_internal.h", "include/mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h", - "include/mbedtls/net.h", "include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h", "include/mbedtls/nist_kw.h", "include/mbedtls/oid.h", - "include/mbedtls/padlock.h", "include/mbedtls/pem.h", "include/mbedtls/pk.h", - "include/mbedtls/pkcs11.h", "include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h", + "include/mbedtls/pkcs7.h", "include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h", - "include/mbedtls/pk_internal.h", "include/mbedtls/platform.h", "include/mbedtls/platform_time.h", "include/mbedtls/platform_util.h", "include/mbedtls/poly1305.h", + "include/mbedtls/private_access.h", "include/mbedtls/psa_util.h", "include/mbedtls/ripemd160.h", "include/mbedtls/rsa.h", - "include/mbedtls/rsa_internal.h", "include/mbedtls/sha1.h", + "include/mbedtls/sha3.h", "include/mbedtls/sha256.h", "include/mbedtls/sha512.h", "include/mbedtls/ssl.h", "include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h", "include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h", "include/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h", - "include/mbedtls/ssl_internal.h", "include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h", "include/mbedtls/threading.h", "include/mbedtls/timing.h", @@ -119,8 +117,13 @@ project "mbedtls" "include/mbedtls/x509_crl.h", "include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h", "include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h", - "include/mbedtls/xtea.h", + "include/psa/build_info.h", "include/psa/crypto.h", + "include/psa/crypto_adjust_auto_enabled.h", + "include/psa/crypto_adjust_config_key_pair_types.h", + "include/psa/crypto_adjust_config_synonyms.h", + "include/psa/crypto_builtin_key_derivation.h", + "include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_key_derivation.h", "include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h", "include/psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h", "include/psa/crypto_compat.h", @@ -129,6 +132,7 @@ project "mbedtls" "include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h", "include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h", "include/psa/crypto_extra.h", + "include/psa/crypto_legacy.h", "include/psa/crypto_platform.h", "include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h", "include/psa/crypto_sizes.h", @@ -136,47 +140,66 @@ project "mbedtls" "include/psa/crypto_types.h", "include/psa/crypto_values.h", "library/aes.c", + "library/aesce.c", + "library/aesce.h", "library/aesni.c", - "library/arc4.c", + "library/aesni.h", + "library/alignment.h", "library/aria.c", "library/asn1parse.c", "library/asn1write.c", "library/base64.c", + "library/base64_internal.h", "library/bignum.c", - "library/blowfish.c", + "library/bignum_core.c", + "library/bignum_core.h", + "library/bignum_mod.c", + "library/bignum_mod.h", + "library/bignum_mod_raw.c", + "library/bignum_mod_raw.h", + "library/bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h", + "library/block_cipher.c", + "library/block_cipher_internal.h", "library/camellia.c", "library/ccm.c", - "library/certs.c", "library/chacha20.c", "library/chachapoly.c", "library/check_crypto_config.h", "library/cipher.c", "library/cipher_wrap.c", + "library/cipher_wrap.h", "library/cmac.c", "library/common.h", "library/constant_time.c", + "library/constant_time_impl.h", "library/constant_time_internal.h", - "library/constant_time_invasive.h", + "library/ctr.h", "library/ctr_drbg.c", "library/debug.c", + "library/debug_internal.h", "library/des.c", "library/dhm.c", "library/ecdh.c", "library/ecdsa.c", "library/ecjpake.c", "library/ecp.c", + "library/ecp_curves_new.c", + "library/ecp_internal_alt.h", "library/ecp_curves.c", "library/ecp_invasive.h", "library/entropy.c", "library/entropy_poll.c", + "library/entropy_poll.h", "library/error.c", "library/gcm.c", - "library/havege.c", "library/hkdf.c", "library/hmac_drbg.c", + "library/lmots.c", + "library/lmots.h", + "library/lms.c", "library/md.c", - "library/md2.c", - "library/md4.c", + "library/md_psa.h", + "library/md_wrap.h", "library/md5.c", "library/memory_buffer_alloc.c", "library/mps_common.h", @@ -189,14 +212,19 @@ project "mbedtls" "library/nist_kw.c", "library/oid.c", "library/padlock.c", + "library/padlock.h", "library/pem.c", "library/pk.c", - "library/pkcs11.c", "library/pkcs12.c", + "library/pkcs7.c", "library/pkcs5.c", "library/pkparse.c", "library/pkwrite.c", + "library/pkwrite.h", "library/pk_wrap.c", + "library/pk_ecc.c", + "library/pk_ecc.h", + "library/pk_internal.h", "library/platform.c", "library/platform_util.c", "library/poly1305.c", @@ -207,16 +235,22 @@ project "mbedtls" "library/psa_crypto_cipher.h", "library/psa_crypto_client.c", "library/psa_crypto_core.h", - "library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.c", + "library/psa_crypto_core_common.h", "library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h", + "library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c", + "library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.h", "library/psa_crypto_ecp.c", "library/psa_crypto_ecp.h", + "library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c", + "library/psa_crypto_ffdh.h", "library/psa_crypto_hash.c", "library/psa_crypto_hash.h", "library/psa_crypto_invasive.h", "library/psa_crypto_its.h", "library/psa_crypto_mac.c", "library/psa_crypto_mac.h", + "library/psa_crypto_pake.c", + "library/psa_crypto_pake.h", "library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h", "library/psa_crypto_rsa.c", "library/psa_crypto_rsa.h", @@ -227,34 +261,49 @@ project "mbedtls" "library/psa_crypto_storage.c", "library/psa_crypto_storage.h", "library/psa_its_file.c", + "library/psa_util.c", + "library/psa_util_internal.h", "library/ripemd160.c", "library/rsa.c", - "library/rsa_internal.c", + "library/rsa_alt_helpers.c", + "library/rsa_alt_helpers.h", + "library/rsa_internal.h", "library/sha1.c", + "library/sha3.c", "library/sha256.c", "library/sha512.c", "library/ssl_cache.c", "library/ssl_ciphersuites.c", - "library/ssl_cli.c", + "library/ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h", + "library/ssl_client.c", + "library/ssl_client.h", "library/ssl_cookie.c", + "library/ssl_debug_helpers.h", + "library/ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c", + "library/ssl_misc.h", "library/ssl_msg.c", - "library/ssl_srv.c", - "library/ssl_ticket.c", "library/ssl_tls.c", + "library/ssl_tls12_client.c", + "library/ssl_tls12_server.c", + "library/ssl_tls13_client.c", + "library/ssl_tls13_generic.c", + "library/ssl_tls13_invasive.h", "library/ssl_tls13_keys.c", "library/ssl_tls13_keys.h", + "library/ssl_tls13_server.c", "library/threading.c", "library/timing.c", "library/version.c", "library/version_features.c", "library/x509.c", + "library/x509write.c", + "library/x509_internal.h", "library/x509write_crt.c", "library/x509write_csr.c", "library/x509_create.c", "library/x509_crl.c", "library/x509_crt.c", "library/x509_csr.c", - "library/xtea.c", } defines {