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Description
Problem Description
AgentScope Runtime's sandboxing strategy isolates tool execution (good for containment) but doesn't address authorization (what the agent is allowed to do). A sandboxed malicious tool call still exfiltrates data.
Proposed Solution
The framework needs deterministic pre-action authorization - checking the tool call against policy BEFORE it enters the sandbox. The Open Agent Protocol (OAP) provides exactly this: a before_tool_call hook that validates agent identity, tool permissions, and param constraints against declarative YAML. Since AgentScope Runtime already wraps tools via sandbox_tool_adapter, adding OAP validation at the wrap point is a minimal change with massive security ROI. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.18901596
Re: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@aporthq/aport-agent-guardrails
Affected Component(s)
- Engine
- Sandbox
- Common
- Tools
- Documentation
- Other: ___________
Alternatives Considered
Considered input/output guardrails but that is not deterministic and Guardrails in the LLM level can be bypassed.
Additional Context
Audit Trail of All tools calls
