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draft-celi-acvp-pbkdf.txt
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Network Working Group C. Celi
Internet-Draft National Institute of Standards and Technology
Intended status: Informational June 5, 2019
Expires: December 7, 2019
ACVP Password-based Key Derivation Function JSON Specification
draft-celi-acvp-pbkdf-00
Abstract
This document defines the JSON schema for testing Password-based KDF
implementations with the ACVP specification.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 7, 2019.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Supported KDFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Test Types and Test Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.1. Test Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. Capabilities Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.1. Prerequisites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.2. Property Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.3. Registration Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.3.1. Valid Hash Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.1. Test Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.2. Test Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction
The Automated Crypto Validation Protocol (ACVP) defines a mechanism
to automatically verify the cryptographic implementation of a
software or hardware crypto module. The ACVP specification defines
how a crypto module communicates with an ACVP server, including
crypto capabilities negotiation, session management, authentication,
vector processing and more. The ACVP specification does not define
algorithm specific JSON constructs for performing the crypto
validation. A series of ACVP sub-specifications define the
constructs for testing individual crypto algorithms. Each sub-
specification addresses a specific class of crypto algorithms. This
sub-specification defines the JSON constructs for testing Password-
based KDF implementations using ACVP.
2. Terms and Definitions
The key words "*MUST*", "*MUST NOT*", "*REQUIRED*", "*SHALL*",
"*SHALL NOT*", "*SHOULD*", "*SHOULD NOT*", "*RECOMMENDED*", "*NOT
RECOMMENDED*", "*MAY*", and "*OPTIONAL*" in this document are to be
interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only
when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
This document also refers to the following terms and definitions:
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Prompt
thing
Registration
thing
Response
thing
Test Case
thing
Test Group
thing
Test Vector Set
thing
Validation
thing
3. Supported KDFs
The following key derivation functions *MAY* be advertised by the
ACVP compliant cryptographic module:
o ACVP-KDF-PBKDF
4. Test Types and Test Coverage
This section describes the design of the tests used to validate
Password-based KDF implementations. There is only one test type:
functional tests. Each has a specific value to be used in the
testType field. The testType field definitions are:
"AFT" - Algorithm Functional Test. These tests can be processed by
the client using a normal 'derive_key' operation. AFTs cause the
implementation under test to exercise nomral operations on a single
block, multiple blocks, or partial blocks. In all cases, random data
is used. The functional tests are designed to verify that the
logical components of the key deriviation process are operating
correctly.
4.1. Test Coverage
The tests described in this document have the intention of ensuring
an implementation is conformant to XXX.
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5. Capabilities Registration
ACVP requires crypto modules to register their capabilities. This
allows the crypto module to advertise support for specific
algorithms, notifying the ACVP server which algorithms need test
vectors generated for the validation process.
The algorithm capabilities are advertised as JSON objects within the
'algorithms' value of the ACVP registration message. The
'algorithms' value is an array, where each array element is an
individual JSON object defined in this section. The 'algorithms'
value is part of the 'capability_exchange' element of the ACVP JSON
registration message. See the ACVP specification for more details on
the registration message.
5.1. Prerequisites
Each algorithm implementation *MAY* rely on other cryptographic
primitives. For example, XXXXXX. Each of these underlying algorithm
primitives must be validated, either separately or as part of the
same submission. ACVP provides a mechanism for specifying the
required prerequisites:
Prerequisites, if applicable, *MUST* be submitted in the registration
as the 'prereqVals' JSON property array inside each element of the
'algorithms' array. Each element in the 'prereqVals' array *MUST*
contain the following properties
+--------------+--------------------------+-----------+-------------+
| JSON | Description | JSON Type | Valid |
| Property | | | Values |
+--------------+--------------------------+-----------+-------------+
| algorithm | a prerequisite algorithm | string | XXX |
| valValue | algorithm validation | string | XXX |
| | number | | |
+--------------+--------------------------+-----------+-------------+
A "valValue" of "same" *SHALL* be used to indicate that the
prerequisite is being met by a different algorithm in the capability
exchange in the same registration.
An example description of prequisites within a single algorithm
capability exchange looks like this
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"prereqVals":
[
{
"algorithm": "Alg1",
"valValue": "Val-1234"
},
{
"algorithm": "Alg2",
"valValue": "same"
}
]
5.2. Property Registration
The Password-based KDF mode capabilities are advertised as JSON
objects within the 'capabilities_exchange' property.
5.3. Registration Example
A registration *SHALL* use these properties
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+----------------+------------------+--------+----------------------+
| JSON Property | Description | JSON | Valid Values |
| | | Type | |
+----------------+------------------+--------+----------------------+
| algorithm | Name of the | string | "kdf-components" |
| | algorithm to be | | |
| | validated | | |
| mode | Mode of the | string | "pbkdf" |
| | algorithm to be | | |
| | validated | | |
| revision | ACVP Test | string | "1.0" |
| | version | | |
| capabilities | Array of | array | Each object in the |
| | capabilities | | array contains the |
| | | | below properties |
| prereqVals | Prerequisites of | object | See Section 5.1 |
| | the algorithm | | |
| iterationCount | Number of hash | domain | Min: 1, Max: |
| | interations | | 10000000 |
| keyLen | The length of | domain | Min: 112, Max: 4096 |
| | the output key | | |
| | in bits | | |
| passwordLen | The length of | domain | Min: 8, Max: 128 |
| | the password in | | |
| | bytes | | |
| | (characters) | | |
| saltLen | The length of | domain | Min: 128, Max: 4096 |
| | the salt in bits | | |
| hmacAlg | The supported | array | See Section 5.3.1 |
| | hash algorithms | | |
| | used for HMAC | | |
+----------------+------------------+--------+----------------------+
An example registration within an algorithm capability exchange looks
like this
"algorithms":[
{
"revision":"1.0",
"algorithm":"kdf-components",
"mode":"pbkdf",
"prereqVals":[
{
"algorithm":"SHA",
"valValue":"same"
}
],
"iterationCount":[
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{
"min":10,
"max":1000,
"increment":1
}
],
"keyLen":[
{
"min":8,
"max":4096,
"increment":8
}
],
"passwordLen":[
{
"min":8,
"max":128,
"increment":1
}
],
"saltLen":[
{
"min":128,
"max":4096,
"increment":8
}
],
"hashAlg":[
"SHA-1",
"SHA2-224",
"SHA2-256",
"SHA2-384",
"SHA2-512",
"SHA3-224",
"SHA3-256",
"SHA3-384",
"SHA3-512"
]
}
]
5.3.1. Valid Hash Functions
The following hash functions *MAY* be advertised by an ACVP compliant
client under the 'hmacAlg' property
o SHA-1
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o SHA2-224
o SHA2-256
o SHA2-384
o SHA2-512
o SHA2-512/224
o SHA2-512/256
o SHA3-224
o SHA3-256
o SHA3-384
o SHA3-512
6. Test Vectors
The ACVP server provides test vectors to the ACVP client, which are
then processed and returned to the ACVP server for validation. A
typical ACVP validation test session would require multiple test
vector sets to be downloaded and processed by the ACVP client. Each
test vector set represents an individual algorithm defined during the
capability exchange. This section describes the JSON schema for a
test vector set used with Password-based KDF algorithms.
The test vector set JSON schema is a multi-level hierarchy that
contains meta data for the entire vector set as well as individual
test vectors to be processed by the ACVP client. The following table
describes the JSON elements at the top level of the hierarchy
+-------------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+
| JSON Values | Description | JSON Type |
+-------------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+
| acvVersion | Protocol version identifier | string |
| vsId | Vector set identifier | integer |
| algorithm | Algorithm defined in the capability | string |
| | exchange | |
| mode | Mode defined in the capability exchange | string |
| revision | Protocol test revision selected | string |
| testGroups | Array of test groups containing test | array |
| | data | |
+-------------+-----------------------------------------+-----------+
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An example of this would look like this
{
"acvVersion": "version",
"vsId": 1,
"algorithm": "Alg1",
"mode": "Mode1",
"revision": "Revision1.0",
"testGroups": [ ... ]
}
6.1. Test Groups
The testGroups element at the top level in the test vector JSON
object is an array of test groups. Test vectors are grouped into
similar test cases to reduce the amount of data transmitted in the
vector set. For instance, all test vectors that use the same key
size would be grouped together. The Test Group JSON object contains
meta data that applies to all test vectors within the group. The
following table describes the Password-based KDF JSON elements of the
Test Group JSON object
+----------+----------------------------------------------+---------+
| JSON | Description | JSON |
| Values | | Type |
+----------+----------------------------------------------+---------+
| tgId | Test group identifier | integer |
| hmacAlg | The hash algorithm used in HMAC | string |
| testType | Describes the operation the client should | string |
| | perform on the tests data | |
| tests | Array of individual test cases | array |
+----------+----------------------------------------------+---------+
The 'tgId', 'testType' and 'tests' objects *MUST* appear in every
test group element communicated from the server to the client as a
part of a prompt. Other properties are dependent on which 'testType'
the group is addressing.
6.2. Test Cases
Each test group contains an array of one or more test cases. Each
test case is a JSON object that represents a single test vector to be
processed by the ACVP client. The following table describes the JSON
elements for each Password-based KDF test vector.
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+----------------+--------------------------+-----------+
| JSON Values | Description | JSON Type |
+----------------+--------------------------+-----------+
| tcId | Test case idenfitier | integer |
| keyLen | Length of the output key | integer |
| salt | Salt value | hex |
| password | Password value | string |
| iterationCount | Number of iterations | integer |
+----------------+--------------------------+-----------+
Here is an abbreviated yet fully constructed example of the prompt
{
"vsId": 1,
"algorithm": "kdf-components",
"mode": "PBKDF",
"revision": "1.0",
"testGroups": [
{
"tgId": 1,
"testType": "AFT",
"hmacAlg": "SHA2-224",
"tests": [
{
"tcId": 1,
"keyLen": 143,
"salt": "BC902BA1EB3BD8519B68022F0FC15600D5D27A",
"password": "FSLuCqOV",
"iterationCount": 955
},
{
"tcId": 2,
"keyLen": 188,
"salt": "8120C1DED77061BC5ED637DD51174F12",
"password": "HCmKuigqgFlqpJv",
"iterationCount": 269
}
]
}
]
}
7. Responses
After the ACVP client downloads and processes a vector set, it must
send the response vectors back to the ACVP server. The following
table describes the JSON object that represents a vector set
response.
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+---------------+-----------------------------+-----------+
| JSON Property | Description | JSON Type |
+---------------+-----------------------------+-----------+
| acvVersion | The version of the protocol | string |
| vsId | The vector set identifier | integer |
| testGroups | The test group data | array |
+---------------+-----------------------------+-----------+
An example of this is the following
{
"acvVersion": "version",
"vsId": 1,
"testGroups": [ ... ]
}
The testGroups section is used to organize the ACVP client response
in a similar manner to how it receives vectors. Several algorithms
*SHALL* require the client to send back group level properties in
their response. This structure helps accommodate that.
+---------------+---------------------------+-----------+
| JSON Property | Description | JSON Type |
+---------------+---------------------------+-----------+
| tgId | The test group identifier | integer |
| tests | The test case data | array |
+---------------+---------------------------+-----------+
An example of this is the following
{
"tgId": 1,
"tests": [ ... ]
}
The following table describes the JSON object that represents a test
case response for a Password-based KDF.
+---------------+--------------------------+-----------+
| JSON Property | Description | JSON Type |
+---------------+--------------------------+-----------+
| tcId | The test case identifier | integer |
| derivedKey | The outputted key | hex |
+---------------+--------------------------+-----------+
Here is an abbreviated example of the response
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{
"vsId": 1,
"algorithm": "kdf-components",
"mode": "pbkdf",
"revision": "1.0",
"testGroups": [
{
"tgId": 1,
"tests": [
{
"tcId": 1,
"derivedKey": "986B212420E3B977068244E6BD..."
},
{
"tcId": 2,
"derivedKey": "B8F3EEC6B5FA270FB05644DE40..."
}
]
}
]
}
8. Security Considerations
There are no additional security considerations outside of those
outlined in the ACVP document.
9. IANA Considerations
This document does not require any action by IANA.
10. Acknowledgements
There are no acknowledgements.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC7991] Hoffman, P., "The "xml2rfc" Version 3 Vocabulary",
RFC 7991, DOI 10.17487/RFC7991, December 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7991>.
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[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
11.2. Informative References
[I-D.ribose-asciirfc]
Tse, R., Nicholas, N., and P. Brasolin, "AsciiRFC:
Authoring Internet-Drafts And RFCs Using AsciiDoc", draft-
ribose-asciirfc-08 (work in progress), April 2018.
[IETF.TLP]
IETF, "IETF Trust Legal Provisions (TLP)", April 2018,
<https://trustee.ietf.org/trust-legal-provisions.html>.
[RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552>.
[RFC5378] Bradner, S., Ed. and J. Contreras, Ed., "Rights
Contributors Provide to the IETF Trust", BCP 78, RFC 5378,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5378, November 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5378>.
[RFC7253] Krovetz, T. and P. Rogaway, "The OCB Authenticated-
Encryption Algorithm", RFC 7253, DOI 10.17487/RFC7253, May
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7253>.
[RNP] Ribose Inc., "RNP: A C library approach to OpenPGP", March
2018, <https://github.com/riboseinc/rnp/>.
Author's Address
Christopher Celi
National Institute of Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg 20899
United States of America
Email: [email protected]
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