- Debt financed primarily in local currency -> Central bank able to print money in resolve
- Debt service costs rising beyond economies ability to service
- Deleveraging strategies put into place to safely and efficiently service debts neccessary to restabalize economy
to bring debt and debt service levels back in equilibrium
- Austerity (spending less)
- Debt Defaults/Restructurings
- Central Bank "Printing Money" or Making Purchases/Providing Garuntees
- Money and Credit from the "Haves" to the "Have Nots"
- Policy makers lower interest rates until they are so low they are no longer an effective tool
- Print Money? Ofc! Easiest path with the least resistance to short term economy
- Debt restructurings and austerity dominate - not balanced with economic stimulation
1. Early
- Sustainable Growth: income growth can service growing debts
2. Bubble
Bull Market -> Strong Asset Returns and Growth -> Increased Borrower/Lending Capacity -> Encouraging More Lending
- increased borrowing and spending = increased incomes and asset valuations
- more collateral to borrow against = more lenders can lend
- borrowing driving growth = affordable
- central banks lowering interest rates elongates debt cycle
- raises asset prices = raises wealth
- lowers monthly payments on credit (keeps debt service burden down)
- service payments >= amount debtors can borrow
- debt >= amount of money to service with
- Deleveraging then begins
- Add up to become Long-Term Debt Cycle
3. Top
Cycle: Wealth Falls -> Income Falls -> Credit-Worthyness Weakens -> Lending Constricted -> Spending Drops -> Investments Fall -> Selling Out -> Less Appealing to Buy -> ...
- Wealth effect of asset price movement has a bigger impact on economic growth rates than monetary policy
- Either Already Close to 0, or at 0
- High Currency Outflows Raise the Floor of Interest-Rates Due to Credit/Currency Risk Considerations
- Wide Credit Spreads - spread between high-risk borrowers IR and risk-free rate
- Driven by supply and demand of/relationships between credit, money, goods, and services
- Psychology plays only a small roll
- Debtor's debt is still too expensive for them to service relative to money coming in
- Money loses buying power
- Creditors receiving less buying power than originally anticipated
- Credit is not real money -> just a promise to pay in the future
- People discover most of their "wealth" was merely just credit
- debtors unable to keep the promise, creditors wealth decreases
income not sufficient to service debt -> assets to be sold to service debts -> asset prices drop -> reduces value of collateral -> reduces incomes -> reduces creditworthiness -> net worth and income falling faster than debt -> borrowers less creditworthy -> lenders less likely to lend (one persons debts are another person's assets)
- Lower Interest Rates Quickly
- if lowering does not work, move to alternative stimulation
- Right mix of levers will reduce the duration of the depression and determine outcome
- Wary of "Moral Hazard": party not entering into contract in good faith
- taxpayers angry that institutions excessive lending caused the crises and don't want them being bailed out
- policy makers to control amount of debt excess without systemic risk
- typically slow to provide government supports and debt contration pains escalate quickly
- Ignorance and lack of authority are bigger problems than the debts themselves
- let the overlevered go down and take everyone involved with them
- issue: doesn't bring debt and income back into balance
- determine who is "systemically important" and provide resources to that party
- help institutions handle "runs"
- mark-to-market accounting: fair value asset pricing for assets with constantly changing values (mark in book should reflect current market conditions)