contracts/oracle/src/lib.rs::submit_price accepts any u64 price with no sanity ceiling. A price submission that's orders of magnitude too large (fat-fingered or malicious admin key) would corrupt the TWAP window until enough correct observations roll it out. A configurable max-deviation-from-last-price check (or an absolute ceiling in OracleConfig) would catch this at submission time instead of propagating into get_twap_price/calculate_fiat_stream_payout.
contracts/oracle/src/lib.rs::submit_priceaccepts anyu64price with no sanity ceiling. A price submission that's orders of magnitude too large (fat-fingered or malicious admin key) would corrupt the TWAP window until enough correct observations roll it out. A configurable max-deviation-from-last-price check (or an absolute ceiling inOracleConfig) would catch this at submission time instead of propagating intoget_twap_price/calculate_fiat_stream_payout.