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<!DOCTYPE HTML>
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<title>Chariots For Apollo, ch12-3</title>
<meta http-equiv=Content-Type content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
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<BODY BGCOLOR="#FFFFFF">
<p>
<h2>A Double Workload</h2>
<p>
Apollo 9 gave the Kennedy launch preparations team its first opportunity
to simulate the launch of a lunar landing mission all the way through
liftoff. (<cite>Apollo 8,</cite> with only the command and service
modules aboard, represented just half the spacecraft preparation task.)
This time - in addition to checking, stacking, and rechecking the
multistage Saturn V - the team had to get two spacecraft ready for
flight and launch them. The beehive of activities, employing thousands
of persons, grew more frenzied as hardware for several missions began
arriving regularly from the factories. For example, before <cite>Apollo
8</cite> left its launch pad on 21 December 1968, all the pieces of
Apollo 9 and some of the parts for Apollo 10 were already in Florida.<p>
LM-3 arrived from Bethpage in June 1968. By the end of September four
altitude chamber tests of the ascent stage had been run, to check the
environmental control system and the operation of many components under
simulated vacuum conditions of space. During this time, engineers and
technicians examining the descent stage found dimples (small depressions
formed during welding) in the oxidizer lines. Since the dents were
within accepted limits, they caused no problems. Elsewhere, other
workers were stacking the S-II stage on top of the S-IC in the huge
Vehicle Assembly Building.<a href = "#source11"><b>11</b></a><p>
The ascent and descent stages of the lander were then joined, tested,
and taken apart again. When inspectors found cracks in the ascent stage
engine, a heavier engine was substituted. The command module and the
service module arrived from Downey the first week in October, and the
North American Cape team, even with all its experience, had trouble
fitting them together. When the attitude-control-thruster quad sets were
attached to the service module, a cracked quad was found. While that was
being evaluated, the command module and the lunar module were brought
together for a docking test. The command module was then moved to the
altitude chamber for tests similar to those the lunar module had
undergone, and the lander was hauled into a hangar for the installation
of such components as the rendezvous radar, antennas, and pyrotechnics.
From time to time, the command and service modules, the lunar module, or
the launch vehicle were either a few days ahead of or behind the
schedule. In mid-December, however, Mueller told Paine that all vehicles
were on time.<a href = "#source12"><b>12</b></a><p>
On 3 January, the big stacked vehicle lumbered on its carrier out of the
assembly building and crawled toward Launch Complex 39. While flight
simulations, linked with the control center in Houston, and all the
normal jobs at the pad - cabin leak checks, electrical power tests, and
component operations, among others - were going on, some engineers were
working on technical problems that had cropped up during previous
missions. One was the fogging spacecraft windows, particularly the round
one in the hatch door. Samples of contaminants from CSM-101 and CSM-103
were studied, and the hatch window from 101 was tested by subjecting it
to the hot and cold extremes met in space. Some thought a better method
for curing the glass might eliminate the fogging, but others, analyzing
the residue from thruster firings, were not at all sure that the space
environment was the problem. If firings from the reaction control
thrusters (which steered the spacecraft) were smudging the windows,
there might never be a solution.<a href = "#source13"><b>13</b></a><p>
As the work progressed, the accumulated information was fed into the
management reviews. The certification review, which covered all flight
hardware (including suits), was held at NASA Headquarters on 7 January.
Flight readiness reviews were later conducted for each of the vehicles -
command and service modules, lunar module, and Saturn V - and then
confirmed before Apollo Director Phillips. On 28 February, all hardware
problems had been solved, all questions answered. Everything was ready
for flight - except the pilots. All three astronauts had head colds.<a
href = "#explanation1"><b>*</b></a> <a href = "#source14"><b>14</b></a>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "explanation1"><b>*</b></a> And this despite elaborate
precautions taken to isolate the crewmen and protect them from whatever
virus might be making the rounds during the last few days before launch.
This launch was the first to be delayed by crew illness. Since the
mission simulators had been able to provide training for only the prime
crew the last month before Apollo 9 was scheduled for launch, the backup
crew was not ready to fly on 28 February.
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "source11"><b>11</b>.</a> Mueller Report, 7 Oct. 1968; Low
TWXs to KSC, Attn.: Roderick O. Middleton, "LM-3 Descent and Ascent
Engine Inspection," 23 Sept. 1968, and "LM-3 Descent Engine
Propellant Line Inspection for Cracks and Dimples," 26 Sept. 1968;
Clarence C. Gay, Jr., Weekly Activity Report for 25 Sept.–1 Oct.
1968.<p>
<a name = "source12"><b>12</b>.</a> Mueller Reports, 14 and 28 Oct., 18
Nov., and 16 Dec. 1968.<p>
<a name = "source13"><b>13</b>.</a> Seaton, Weekly Status Reports, 3 and
24 Jan. 1969; Owen E. Maynard to Mgr., ASPO, "Spacecraft window
fogging," 29 Jan. 1969.<p>
<a name = "source14"><b>14</b>.</a> Seaton, Weekly Status Reports, 10
Jan. and 28 Feb. 1969; Phillips letter, "Apollo 9 Mission Delta
Design Certification Review," 10 Jan. 1969; Brendle, minutes of
meeting, CSM 104 FRR Board, 24 Jan. 1969; Phillips to Apollo 9 FRR
Board, "Confirmation of Flight Readiness for the Apollo 9
Mission," 2 March 1969; Williard. R. Hawkins et al.,
"Biomedical Evaluation of the Apollo 9 Mission," MSC Internal
Note 70-DD-03, December 1970, pp. 1-1, 9-1, 10-1; Mueller to Gilruth, 23
Dec. 1968, with enc., OMSF policy statement, "Control of
Communicable Disease and Injury in Flight Crews"; MSC, "Apollo
9 Crew Technical Debriefing," 20 March 1969, pp. 12-5, 12-6.
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