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<!DOCTYPE HTML>
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<title>Chariots For Apollo, ch13-4</title>
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<p>
<h2>Affairs for the Public</h2>
<p>
The coming flight of Apollo 11 captured more worldwide attention than
any previous mission. Countless numbers of persons tried to identify
with, seek a meaning for, and fashion or obtain some keepsake of
mankind's first visit to a celestial neighbor. These desires were
expressed in poetry, in prose, in symbolic articles, and in pictorial
evidence. Whole issues of journals, sections of newspapers, brochures,
television and radio specials, books, bric-a-brac, stamps, medallions,
photographs, pieces of clothing, record albums, and magnetic tape
records commemorated the occasion. Some persons made suggestions, some
bluntly demanded a piece of the moon, and some sought to get as close as
possible to the launch and flight control sites. Most of the millions
relied on radio, television, and newspapers for a firsthand account of
the manned lunar landing experience.<p>
NASA officials moved carefully and deliberately in meeting the demands
brought on by Apollo 11. Early in 1969, Julian Scheer, Assistant
Administrator for Public Affairs in Washington, wrote Gilruth, stressing
past policy and operational philosophy. The agency, Scheer said, did
"not seek coverage of space but [would] break our backs making our
facilities and our people available," with "no free rides, no
free meals, no glad-handing."<p>
The crux of Scheer's letter was his determination to get Gilruth's
Public Affairs Officer, Paul Haney, out of a dual role as full-time
mission commentator and as supervisor of the whole range of public
affairs activities in Houston. When Scheer first came to NASA in 1963,
he found that John A. Powers appeared to be favoring the television
industry in the coverage of Mercury events; Scheer also disliked the
identification of Powers as the "Voice of Mercury Control."
The Headquarters leader sent Haney to Houston to replace Powers. In the
ensuing years, although he trained a team of mission commentators, Haney
seemed to be emulating Powers, becoming known as the "Voice of
Gemini" and then moving into a similar role for Apollo. Scheer then
gave the Houston public affairs leader the choice of remaining as
mission commentator or confining himself to his duties as head of the
Public Affairs Office. When Haney chose the former, Scheer changed his
mind. He asked Gilruth to transfer Haney to Washington. Instead, Haney
resigned. Scheer then sent Brian M. Duff from Headquarters to run the
Houston activities. Duff did not talk from "Apollo Control" at
all. The new voice became voices - John E. McLeaish, Terry White, John
E. Riley, and Douglas K. Ward - from the public information section of
Houston's Public Affairs Office.<a href = "#source34"><b>34</b></a><p>
Scheer then turned to another objective - making the Apollo 11
astronauts more available to the news media than past crews had been. He
wanted the public to see the pilots as human beings, to foster a better
understanding of their training and goals. In a letter to Slayton,
Scheer warned that there would be changes. The practice of allowing one
stilted crew press conference with each network, for a limited time and
in sparse surroundings, had presented the astronauts as stereotypes.
Scheer wanted each crew member to spend at least a full day with each of
the networks, with the wire services participating, in backgrounds
selected by the media. If, for example, they wanted the commander in
Ohio, his home state, then he should go to Ohio and give the reporters a
more intimate glimpse of Armstrong, the man, rather than Armstrong, the
space flight technician. Scheer asked for more time with the astronauts
for still and motion pictures. He also suggested that the wives of the
Apollo 11 crews might attend a tea given for the women of the press
corps. Scheer reminded Slayton that the networks, on occasion, would
cover the mission for 24 hours at a stretch and would need many human
interest stories as fillers. The public would be better able to share in
the ventures of these men on the moon if it knew who they were, why they
were there, and what they were doing, a knowledge that could be achieved
only through more time with the men and better training documentation,
films, and taped reports of the progress to the launch.<a href =
"#source35"><b>35</b></a><p>
Slayton gave in on a few points - some parts of training, for example -
but dug in his heels on the other demands. "Homes and wives are
personal," he snapped, "and landing on the moon does not
change that." Slayton remarked that he did not think any "hard
sell" was necessary for Apollo 11, adding that "one rose does
not make a summer (or something like that)." He went on, "This
is just another mission which <em>may</em> land on the moon first, but
definitely will not go anywhere on schedule if we cannot keep the crew
working instead of entertaining the press."<p>
Scheer did not give up, however. Low wrote Gilruth that 30 members of
the press would attend a rehearsal of the lunar surface extravehicular
demonstration requested by Headquarters on 18 April; but there would be
no news coverage of the formal session four days later. Scheer fought
that decision and won. Phillips notified Low that Mueller and Scheer had
agreed to let a five-man news media pool watch the formal session. In
May, Slayton and Duff worked out an understanding for more extensive
reporting of various phases of training. And on 5 July, only 11 days
before launch, the crew talked with the press about the mission.
Armstrong, Collins, and Aldrin were shielded from other than visual
contact by a plastic booth, to preserve the integrity of their prelaunch
quarantine, but the "armor" had been pierced.<a href =
"#source36"><b>36</b></a><p>
Scheer also suggested that top-level officials from both Headquarters
and the field elements - most of whom were more used to writing
memoranda, notes, and papers for technically oriented audiences -
participate in drafting articles directed at the public for a <cite>New
York Times</cite> project. In April, he asked these managers to make out
invitation lists for the next two launches and to choose a cross-section
of guests who had no direct connection with aerospace activities and who
had never seen a launch.<a href = "#source37"><b>37</b></a> With the
approach of Apollo 11, Scheer assumed a stronger, more aggressive role
in NASA's public affairs, and he used the pressures of the mission as a
lever to get the agency to accept his thinking.<p>
One item of worldwide public impact - television - raised no issues
whatsoever on this flight. Slayton even urged the need for some kind of
erectable antenna. The crewmen could not, after all, be expected to wait
patiently in the lander until the earth moved Goldstone, California, and
its 64-meter radar dish into line with the spacecraft - before they
climbed out onto the surface. There was also some question whether the
Goldstone facility would be available, since it was needed for a Mariner
flyby of Mars in July. At a management council meeting in March, the
prospect of doing without the big California dish, as well as a similar
one at Parkes, Australia, forced agreement on a contingency plan for a
portable antenna. Eventually, both Goldstone and Parkes were free to
cover Apollo 11, but proper alignment with Goldstone was still a
problem. Low decided to delay the lunar module's descent by one
revolution to make sure "that we will have Goldstone
coverage." If the launch was delayed and if Parkes was better
situated to pick up the signals, the relay would travel from the lunar
module to Parkes, to Sydney by microwave, across the Pacific Ocean via
synchronous satellite <cite>Intelsat III,</cite> to the control center
in Houston, to the television networks, and thence to television sets
throughout most of the world. Goldstone would shorten that route.<a href
= "#source38"><b>38</b></a><p>
Some Apollo managers were worrying about the quality of the pictures
they could expect. Looking at a photograph of a simulation, Phillips
observed to Low that the first step onto the lunar surface might be in
the shadows. And the light might be too bright in the stowage area, as
the astronauts unloaded the experiments package. Phillips asked Low to
see about this, since "sharing with the world our historical first
steps onto the moon warrants our efforts to maximize this return."
Low did not believe the results would be as bad as Phillips feared, but
Houston set up scale models under various lighting conditions to make
sure of good coverage of the crewman as he descended to the lunar
surface. Before he left Houston, Paul Haney had suggested that the
surface camera be set up to photograph the liftoff from the moon. The
idea was exciting, but it was too late to arrange it for Apollo 11. It
would have to wait for a future mission.<a href =
"#source39"><b>39</b></a><p>
Color television was so effective on <cite>Apollo 10</cite> that it was
adopted for the following mission, but only in the command module. Faget
was more than mildly upset when he learned that so much of the
television, motion, and still photography planned for Apollo 11 would be
in black and white. To him, it was "almost unbelievable" that
the culmination of a $20-billion program "is to be recorded in such
a stingy manner." Low explained that some of the scientists
insisted on black and white film, because it had a higher resolution
than color film. Furthermore, with no atmosphere to absorb the solar
energy in the ultraviolet, color film might not turn out well on the
lunar surface.<a href = "#source40"><b>40</b></a><p>
In January 1969, NASA began work on plans to commemorate Apollo 11
symbolically. Phillips wrote Gilruth, Wernher von Braun, and Kurt Debus
that ideas discussed at Headquarters included planting United Nations
and United States flags, putting decal flags of U.N. member states on
the lunar module descent stage, and leaving a capsule on the surface
with information about the Apollo program and personnel and copies of
international agreements. Gilruth asked Johnston to canvass the top
Houston staff for suggestions. The consensus was that the American flag
should be raised in a simple ceremony. This proposal was supported by
private citizens from East Coast to West. Slayton said the pilots would
probably carry personal items, as had been done in the past, but most of
these would be brought back. All they intended to leave on the lunar
surface, besides the descent stage, would be such things as the
experiments, backpack, and lunar overshoes. Slayton added that he had no
objection to anything that might be decided on as a symbol of the
mission, but it must meet weight and stowage requirements and place no
additional training demands on the crew.<a href =
"#source41"><b>41</b></a><p>
Paine assigned Associate Deputy Administrator Willis Shapley as chairman
of a committee<a href = "#explanation1"><b>*</b></a> to draft
recommendations. Shapley's group met for the first time on 1 April and
considered three categories: articles to be left by the astronauts (flag
or flags, commemorative plaque), articles to be attached to the descent
stage (inscriptions, documents, microfilm), and articles to be taken to
the moon and brought back (photographs, flags, stamp dies, tokens). The
chairman reported that Scheer and Assistant Administrator for
International Affairs Arnold W. Frutkin were working out words for a
plaque. Shapley also said that suggestions were being solicited from the
Smithsonian Institution, the Library of Congress, the Archivist of the
United States, the NASA Historical Advisory Committee, the Space
Council, and congressional committees. The flag proposal was the most
persistent. There were also discussions about carrying miniature flags
of all the United Nations in a metal box shaped like a pyramid (but not
the official flag of the United Nations or any other organization). The
aim of the whole committee was to make it clear that, regardless of the
symbol chosen, the United States had landed on the moon first.<a href =
"#source42"><b>42</b></a><p>
Shapley's committee released its decisions on 2 July. Only the flag of
the United States would be unfurled and left on the moon. Miniature
flags of all the United Nations, the United States, its 50 states, its
territories, and the District of Columbia would be stowed in the lunar
module and returned to the earth. Other items to be brought back
included a stamp die, a stamped envelope (to be canceled en route by the
crew), and two full-sized United States flags that had flown over the
two houses of Congress (to be carried in the command module). Personal
items would be carried by the pilots in their kit bags, after approval
by Slayton.
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c331.jpg" width=394 height=587 ALT="Apollo 11 plaque"><p>
<cite>Plaque on the landing gear of the Apollo 11 lunar module. The
descent stage would remain on the moon, a permanent commemoration of the
first visit at the landing site.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
Two important items besides the flag were to be left on the moon. One
was a microminiaturized photoprint of letters of good will from
representatives of other nations. The other was a plaque affixed to the
descent stage as a permanent monument, to be unveiled by the crew. It
would depict the earth's two hemispheres, their continents and oceans,
but no national boundaries. Bearing the words "Here men from the
planet earth first set foot upon the moon. We came in peace for all
mankind," it would be inscribed with the signatures of the three
astronauts and the President of the United States. To forestall any
charges that the United States was attempting to establish sovereignty
over the moon, Robert F. Allnutt, NASA's Assistant Administrator for
Legislative Affairs, prepared a statement containing the gist of a 1967
treaty governing all space exploration. The United States, one of the 89
signatories, had no intention of claiming the moon.<a href =
"#source43"><b>43</b></a><p>
Suggestions for honoring the landing, on both the moon and on the earth,
came from throughout the country. One person thought the plaque should
be inscribed with the names of the astronauts who had lost their lives
during the program, one argued that the carrier <cite>John F.
Kennedy</cite> should recover the crew after the journey, one suggested
that a complete Apollo-Saturn stack be erected in the style of the
Washington monument in the nation's capital, and one recommended that
the ashes of recently deceased space author Willy Ley be placed on the
moon.<a href = "#source44"><b>44</b></a><p>
Collins mentions in his book that two of their "non-technical
chores [were] thinking up names for our spacecraft and designing a
mission emblem." Scheer had cast a jaundiced eye on the call signs
selected by the crews of McDivitt and Thomas Stafford. He urged Low to
make sure those chosen for the lunar landing, "to be witnessed by
all mankind," were more appropriate. Low and Armstrong agreed that
the names should not be frivolous. At the end of May, Slayton submitted
a patch, which Headquarters turned down. It depicted an eagle (an
obvious name for the lander) carrying an olive branch in its beak and
descending to a lunar landscape, with "Apollo 11" at the top
of the emblem. Headquarters thought the eagle's extended talons looked
menacing. Although shifting the olive branch from the beak to the claws
presented a more reassuring aspect (and won Headquarters approval),
Collins facetiously wrote that he hoped the eagle dropped that branch
before he touched down. Collins had his own problems in choosing a name
for the command module. He was still wrestling with the task in
mid-June. He credits Scheer with suggesting the name
"Columbia."<a href = "#source45"><b>45</b></a> So the
ceremonies and symbols of Apollo 11 were finally set.<p>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "explanation1"><b>*</b></a> The committee comprised Homer
Newell, Mueller, Lieutenant General Frank A. Bogart (alternate),
Phillips, Thomas E. Jenkins (alternate), Gilruth, Johnston (alternate),
von Braun, Debus, Paul G. Dembling, Scheer, Arnold W. Frutkin, and James
L. Daniels, Jr. (secretary).<p>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "source34"><b>34</b>.</a> Julian Scheer to Gilruth, 3 Jan.
1969; MSC news release 69-38, 22 April 1969; Perry Michael Whye to James
M. Grimwood, 3 Oct. 1977, with encs., especially questions, Whye to Lt.
Col. John A. Powers and Powers to Whye, 16 Dec. 1976, with enc.; Paul P.
Haney to Whye, 17 Oct. 1977, with encs., Gilruth to Haney, 21 April
1969, and Whye, "Heroes, Not of Their Own Accord (An examination of
the publicity concerning the United States astronauts from 1959 to
1972)" (Master's thesis, Iowa State University, 1977), pp. 309-10,
with Haney's remarks.<p>
<a name = "source35"><b>35</b>.</a> Scheer to Slayton, 31 March 1969.<p>
<a name = "source36"><b>36</b>.</a> Slayton to Scheer, 15 April 1969;
Low to Gilruth, "Public Affairs activities in connection with the
lunar surface demonstration," 17 April 1969; John Noble Wilford,
"Astronauts Simulate Their Moon Activity, <cite>New York
Times,</cite> 19 April 1969; Low to Gilruth, More on Public Affairs
activities in connection with the lunar surface demonstration," 18
April 1969; Slayton to Public Affairs Officer, "Public Affairs
access to Apollo 11/12 crews," 29 May 1969; "Crew reveals
mission 'firsts' in conference," MSC <cite>Roundup,</cite> 11 July
1969.<p>
<a name = "source37"><b>37</b>.</a> Scheer to Homer E. Newell, Phillips,
Wernher von Braun, Robert Jastrow, Low, Charles A. Berry, and Rocco A.
Petrone, 18 April 1969; Scheer memo, "Invitations for Apollo 10 and
11," 3 April 1969; Duff memo, "Apollo 11 invitation
list," 30 April 1969; Scheer memo, "Invitations for Apollo
11," ca. 7 May 1969; note, John O. Annexstad to Grimwood, with
manuscript pages of this volume, annotated, n.d.<p>
<a name = "source38"><b>38</b>.</a> Slayton to Mgr., ASPO, "Lunar
surface TV," 15 Oct. 1968; Phillips to Dir., Planetary Prog.,
"Goldstone (DSS-14) 210 foot [64-meter] diameter antenna," 15
Jan. 1969; Phillips to Assoc. Admin., OMSF, "LM Steerable Antenna
versus Erectable Antenna," 7 April 1969, with enc., George H. Hage
to Dir., Apollo Prog., Subj. as above, 7 April 1969; D. R. Anselmo memo
for Bellcomm files, "Goldstone and Parkes Visibility Of Lunar
Landing Sites - Case 310," 1 April 1969, with enc., "Apollo TV
Uses on Lunar Surface"; Low to Phillips, 4 June 1969; Stevenson to
Gerald M. Truszynski, "Parkes 210′ Antenna Support for Apollo
11," 18 April 1969; NASA, "Australian 210 Antenna," news
release 69-72, 13 May 1969; Holcomb to Apollo Mission Dir., "'G'
Mission Lunar Surface EVA Coverage by 210-Foot Dishes," 29 May
1969.<p>
<a name = "source39"><b>39</b>.</a> Phillips to Low, "Lunar Surface
Television," 10 April 1969; Low to NASA Hq., Attn.: Phillips,
"Lunar surface television," 18 April 1969; OMSF Weekly Report,
2 June 1969; Phillips to MSC, Attn.: Low, "Apollo On-Board Color
TV," 13 June 1969; Haney to Dir., E&D "Lunar surface
television proposal," 14 March 1969; Faget to Public Affairs
Officer, "LM ascent TV analysis," 20 March 1969; Low to Faget,
"Proposed lunar ascent TV package," 26 April 1969.<p>
<a name = "source40"><b>40</b>.</a> Faget to Chief, Mission Ops. Br.,
"Comments on 'Preliminary Lunar Landing Phase Photographic
Operations Plan,'" 27 Feb. 1969; Noel T. Lamar to Chief, Photo.
Tech. Lab., "Apollo 11 lunar surface color photography," 10
June 1969; Low to Phillips, 20 June 1969.<p>
<a name = "source41"><b>41</b>.</a> Phillips TWX to MSC, KSC, MSFC,
Attn.: Gilruth, Kurt H. Debus, von Braun, 31 Jan. 1969; Johnston memo,
"Symbolic articles to be carried on first manned lunar
landing," 11 March 1969; Gilruth to Phillips, 13 March 1969;
Gilruth to Luella Goodridge, 18 June 1969; Gilruth to Mr. and Mrs.
Stanley A. Jacques, 18 June 1969; Slayton to Spec. Asst. to Dir., MSC,
"First lunar landing mementos," 28 March 1969.<p>
<a name = "source42"><b>42</b>.</a> Thomas O. Paine to Assoc. and Asst.
Admins. and Center Dirs., "Symbolic Articles to Be Carried on First
Manned Lunar Landing," 25 Feb. 1969; Willis H. Shapley memo for
record, "Meeting of the Committee on Symbolic Articles Related to
the First Lunar Landing, April 1, 1969," 3 April 1969; Shapley to
Mueller, "Symbolic Items for the First Lunar Landing," 19
April 1969.<p>
<a name = "source43"><b>43</b>.</a> Shapley to Mueller, "Symbolic
Activities for Apollo 11," 2 July 1969; Alfred P. Alibrando memo,
"Claims of sovereignty over the Moon," 11 June 1969.<p>
<a name = "source44"><b>44</b>.</a> Slayton to Ira Gallen, 1 April 1969;
Low to Kraft, "Recovery of Apollo 11," 5 April 1969; Jack A.
Kinzler to Dir., MSC, "Permanent booster spacecraft Apollo 11
memorial," 6 June 1969, with enc.; Gilruth to Mrs. Harold Bennett,
16 July 1969.<p>
<a name = "source45"><b>45</b>.</a> Scheer to Low, 18 April 1969; Low to
NASA Hq., Attn.: Scheer, "Communications call signs for Apollo 11
spacecraft," 25 April 1969; Slayton to Dir., MSC, "Proposed Apollo XI
patch," 28 May 1969, with enc.; Slayton to Jeffrey L. Barron, 18 June
1969; "Key Events in Apollo," in Cortright, ed., <cite>Apollo
Expeditions,</cite> p. 306; Collins, <cite>Carrying the Fire,</cite> pp.
332-35.
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