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<!DOCTYPE HTML>
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<title>Chariots For Apollo, ch2-5</title>
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<p>
<h2>Contracting for the Command Module</h2>
<p>
The attention devoted to guidance and navigation did not halt
preparations for a contract on the command module. Data from the
feasibility studies and from Space Task Group's in-house work were used
to prepare a statement of work, detailing the contractor's
responsibilities and the scope of his obligations in designing,
building, and testing the spacecraft.<a href = "#source23">23</a><p>
Project Apollo would have three phases: earth-orbital, circumlunar and
lunar-orbital, and lunar landing. The prime spacecraft contractor would
develop and build the command module, service propulsion module, adapter
(to fit the spacecraft to a space laboratory for earth-orbital flights
and to the lunar landing propulsion section for lunar missions), and
ground support equipment. Although the prime spacecraft contractor would
not build the lunar landing module, he would integrate that system into
the complete spacecraft stack and ensure compatibility of the spacecraft
with the launch vehicle.<a href = "#source24">24</a><p>
Just before leaving NASA early in 1961, Administrator Keith Glennan had
revised the procedures for the establishment and operation of source
evaluation boards. For any NASA contract expected to exceed $1 million,
all proposals would have to be evaluated by such a board; for any
contract that might cost over $5 million, all proposals would be judged
by a special source evaluation board appointed by the Associate
Administrator. The board's findings would then be passed to the
Administrator himself for final selection. On 28 July 1961, Seamans
approved the overall plan for Apollo spacecraft procurement, appointed
the source evaluation board members, and delegated authority for
establishing assessment teams to assist the board. Then the Space Task
Group issued its request for proposal to 14 aerospace companies.<a href
= "#explanation1">*</a> <a href = "#source25">25</a><p>
Working arrangements for the development contract followed very closely
those evolved for the feasibility studies. The deadline for the
submission of proposals was set for 9 October 1961, giving prospective
bidders more than ten weeks to work out their proposals. A conference
was held on 14 August so NASA could explain the guidelines for the
contract in detail. Almost 400 questions were asked at the meeting and
answered; the answers were recorded and distributed. Seamans then
appointed an 11-man Source Evaluation Board, headed by Faget and
including one nonvoting member from Headquarters (James T. Koppenhaver,
a reliability expert). The board consisted of six voting members from
the Space Task Group (Robert Piland, Wesley Hjornevik, Kenneth S.
Kleinknecht, Charles W. Mathews, James A. Chamberlin, and Dave W. Lang),
one from Marshall (Oswald H. Lange), and two from Headquarters (George
Low and Albert A. Clagett). Faget's board directed the technical
assessment teams and a business subcommittee to work out and submit a
numerical scoring system for comparative analyses of the proposals.<a
href = "#source26">26</a><p>
On 9 October 1961, five hopeful giants<a href = "#explanation2">**</a>
of the aerospace industry brought their proposals to the Chamberlain
Hotel, Old Point Comfort, Virginia. During the first two days of a
three-day meeting, these documents were distributed among the members of
the NASA assessment teams. The massive technical proposals, separated
from those on business management and cost, were scrutinized and
evaluated by more than a hundred specialists. Each group of bidders was
then called in on the third day to make an oral presentation and answer
questions. Gilruth persistently asked the proposal leaders, "What
single problem do your people identify as <cite>the</cite> most
difficult task in getting man to the moon?"<a href =
"#source27">27</a> The industrialists' answers to this question
generally stressed the balance between performance, cost, and schedule
controls for so complex an undertaking.<p>
Several weeks of intensive study followed, as the assessment teams made
their rankings of the proposals. Submitted on 24 November 1961, the
report of the Source Evaluation Board summarized the scoring by the
assessors and evaluators:<p>
<table>
<caption>SEB Ratings of Apollo Spacecraft Proposals by Major Area (Marks out of 10)</caption>
<tr>
<th> </th>
<th>Technical<br>Approach<br>(30%)</th>
<th>Technical<br>Qualification<br>(30%)</th>
<th>Business<br>(40%)</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Co.</td>
<td>5.58</td>
<td>6.63</td>
<td>8.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Dynamics Astronautics</td>
<td>5.27</td>
<td>5.35</td>
<td>8.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North American Aviation</td>
<td>5.09</td>
<td>6.66</td>
<td>7.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Electric Co.</td>
<td>5.16</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>7.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McDonnell Aircraft Corp.</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>7.62</td>
</tr>
</table>
<p>
This step led to a summary rating, with Martin scoring 6.9, General
Dynamics tied with North American at 6.6, and General Electric matched
with McDonnell at 6.4 for final grades. The board was unequivocal in its
final recommendation:
<blockquote><p>The Martin Company is considered the outstanding source for
the Apollo prime contractor. Martin not only rated first in Technical
Approach, a very close second in Technical Qualification, and second in
Business Management, but also stood up well under further scrutiny of
the board.</blockquote><p>
If Martin were not selected, however, the board suggested North American
as the most desirable alternative.
<blockquote><p>North American Aviation [NAA] . . . rated highest of all
proposers in the major area of Technical Qualifications. North
American's pertinent experience consisting of the X-15, Navajo, and
Hound Dog coupled with an outstanding performance in the development of
manned aircraft (F-100 and F-86) resulted in it[s] being the highest
rated in this area. The lead personnel proposed showed a strong
background in development projects and were judged to be the best of any
proposed. Like Martin, NAA proposed a project managed by a single prime
contractor with subsystems obtained by subcontracting, which also had
the good features described for the Martin proposal. Their project
organization, however, did not enjoy quite as strong a position within
the corporate structure as Martin's did. The high Technical
Qualification rating resulting from these features of the proposal was
therefore high enough to give North American a rating of second in the
total Technical Evaluation although its detailed Technical Approach was
assessed as the weakest submitted. This relative weakness might be
attributed to the advantage of the McDonnell Aircraft Corporation's
Mercury experience, and the other three proposers' experience on the
Apollo study contracts. The Source Evaluation Board is convinced that
NAA is well qualified to carry out the assignment of Apollo prime
contractor and that the shortcomings in its proposal could be rectified
through further design effort on their part. North American submitted a
low cost estimate which, however, contained a number of discrepancies.
North American's cost history was evaluated as the best.<a href =
"#source28">28</a></blockquote><p>
Word leaked out prematurely to Martin that it had scored highest in the
evaluations. After two years of planning and five weeks of waiting, the
Martin employees were informed over the public address system on 27
November 1961 that they had won the contest to build the moonship. The
next day they learned the truth.<a href = "#source29">29</a><p>
North American won the spacecraft development sweepstakes. Webb, Dryden,
and Seamans apparently chose the company with the longest record of
close association with NACA-NASA and the most straightforward advance
into space flight. The decision would have to be defended before
Congress and would be the cause of some anguish later.<a href =
"#source30">30</a> When it was announced on 28 November, shouts of joy
rang through the plant at Downey, California, as John W. Paup broke the
news over the "squawk box."<a href = "#source31">31</a> <p>
During December 1961, Space Task Group (renamed Manned Spacecraft Center
on 1 November) and North American program directors and engineers met in
Williamsburg, Virginia, to lay the technical groundwork for the
spacecraft development program and begin contract negotiations.<a href =
"#source32">32</a> The spacecraft portion of Apollo had entered the
hardware phase, although the launch vehicle (or vehicles) and the lunar
lander had not.
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "explanation1">*</a> The 14 firms were Boeing, Chance Vought,
Douglas, Astronautics Division of General Dynamics, General Electric,
Goodyear Aircraft, Grumman, Lockheed Missiles & Space Company,
Martin, McDonnell, North American, Radio Corporation of America,
Republic Aviation, and Space Technology Laboratories (STL).<p>
<a name = "explanation2">**</a> General Dynamics Astronautics with Avco;
General Electric, with Douglas, Grumman, and STL; McDonnell, with
Lockheed Aircraft, Hughes Aircraft, and Chance Vought; Martin; and North
American.
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "source23"><b>23</b>.</a> [Robert O. Piland], "Apollo Spacecraft
Chronology," n.d., [pp. 9-10].<p>
<a name = "source24"><b>24</b>.</a> STG, "Project Apollo Spacecraft
Development, Statement of Work, Phase A," 28 July 1961, pp. I-1
through I-3, III-2; [Disher], "Preliminary Project Development Plan
for Project Apollo Spacecraft," 9 Aug. 1961, pp. 19-20.<p>
<a name = "source25"><b>25</b>.</a> NASA, "Establishment of Source
Evaluation Boards," General Management Instruction 2-4-3, 1 Feb.
1961; NASA, "Project Apollo Spacecraft Procurement Plan,"
n.d., approved by Seamans, 28 July 1961, with encs.; Bailey to
PneumoDynamics Corp., Attn.: G. W. Rice, 3 Aug. 1961.<p>
<a name = "source26"><b>26</b>.</a> Seamans to STG, Attn.: Gilruth,
"Appointment of Source Evaluation Board," 7 July 1961 (signed
by Seamans, 28 July 1961); Gilruth, memo for staff, "Pre-proposal
Briefing Attendance List," 7 Aug. 1961; agenda, Pre-proposal
Conference, Project Apollo Spacecraft, 14 and 15 Aug. 1961; Johnson to
Allen L. Grandfield et al., "NASA written response to questions
submitted by prospective Contractors on REP 9-150," 15 Aug. 1961;
NASA, "Project Apollo RFP No. 9-150: Technical Evaluation of
Contractors Proposals," 9 Oct. 1961; Seamans to STG,
"Redesignation of Source Evaluation Board Members," 2 Nov.
1961; NASA/MSC, "Source Evaluation Board Report: Apollo
Spacecraft," NASA RFP 9-150, 24 Nov. 1961.<p>
<a name = "source27"><b>27</b>.</a> NASA/MSC, "Source Evaluation Board
Report," pp. 7-10, 13, 14; John W. Paup, interview, Downey, Calif.,
7 June 1966.<p>
<a name = "source28"><b>28</b>.</a> NASA/MSC, "Source Evaluation Board
Report," pp. 10, 13, 14.<p>
<a name = "source29"><b>29</b>.</a> William B. Bergen, interview, El Segundo,
Calif., 21 June 1971; E. E. Clark and John DeNike, interviews, Seal
Beach, Calif., 24 June 1971; John P. Healey, interviews, Downey, 16 and
21 July 1970.<p>
<a name = "source30"><b>30</b>.</a> North American news release, 28 Nov. 1961;
"Apollo Contract Is Awarded to North American Aviation," MSC
<cite>Space News Roundup,</cite> 13 Dec. 1961; NASA, "Apollo
Contractor Selected," news release 61-263, 28 Nov. 1961; Seamans
memo for file, "The selection of North American Aviation, Inc. as
the prime contractor for the command and service module," 9 June
1967.<p>
<a name = "source31"><b>31</b>.</a> Paup interview; Harrison A. Storms, Jr.,
interview, El Segundo, 16 July 1970.<p>
<a name = "source32"><b>32</b>.</a> Minutes of Technical Panel Meetings for
negotiation of spacecraft development, 12–15 Dec. 1961.
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