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<!DOCTYPE HTML>
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<title>Chariots For Apollo, ch2-6</title>
<meta http-equiv=Content-Type content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
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<BODY BGCOLOR="#FFFFFF">
<p>
<h2>Influences on Booster Determination</h2>
<p>
Concurrently with the agreement that Gilruth should get started on the
spacecraft development contract, Associate Administrator Seamans
realized that it was time to decide what the rest of the Apollo stack
should comprise. The method chosen for the lunar trip - rendezvous or
direct ascent - would affect Apollo's costs and schedules, as well as
the launch vehicle configuration.<p>
A launch vehicle to support the moon landing was a big question mark
when the President issued his challenge in May 1961. The Space Task
Group wanted to get its opinions on the record - not really sure how big
a vehicle would be needed but rather hoping that NASA would develop the
Nova. Marshall wanted to build a big liquid-fueled rocket but was a
little chary about tackling a vehicle the size of Nova. One aspect that
caused the Huntsville center to hold back was the high cost projected
for the F-1 engines. When he learned of Huntsville's misgivings, Max
Faget suggested that solid-fueled rockets be used for the first
stage.<p>
Faget thought the first stage should consist of four solid-fueled
engines, 6.6 meters in diameter; these could certainly accomplish
whatever mission was required of either the Saturn or Nova, whichever
was chosen, at a reasonable cost. It made good sense, he said, to use
cheap solid fuels for expendable rockets and more expensive liquid fuels
for reusable engines. "We called the individual solid rocket 'the
Tiger' because we figured it would be a noisy animal and would roar like
a tiger," Faget remembered. But he and his group could not sell
their idea. Liquids were preferred by both Headquarters and Marshall,
who insisted that the solids were too heavy to move from the casting pit
to the launch pad. They also argued, he said, that solids had poor
burning characteristics and were unstable. So the launch vehicle
question dragged on, although pressure to make some sort of decision did
not lessen.<a href = "#source33">33</a><p>
After the Fleming and Lundin Committee study reports had been
distributed, Seamans met with several Headquarters program directors to
discuss whether the advanced Saturn, called the C-3, recommended by
Lundin's team could make the voyage to the moon if the earth-orbital
rendezvous approach were chosen. Silverstein warned that the vehicle's
upper stages were simply not well enough defined as yet.<a href =
"#source34">34</a> Seamans agreed. On 20 June 1961, he asked Colonel
Donald H. Heaton to head a task force<a href = "#explanation1">*</a> to
study the C-3 and its possible employment in a manned lunar landing
mission using rendezvous techniques.<a href = "#source35">35</a><p>
Heaton's group followed Fleming's lead in narrowing the scope of its
investigations to a single mode - in this case, earth-orbital rendezvous
- as the way to go. Most of the members agreed that this mode offered
the earliest chance for a landing. Either the C-3 or its next larger
version, a C-4, could be used. But the team urged that NASA begin work
on the C-4, because it "should offer a higher probability of an
earlier successful manned lunar landing than the C-3." Moreover, a
rendezvous capability would enable the C-4 to cope with future payload
increases that the direct-ascent, Nova-class booster, with its fixed
thrust, would be unable to handle.<a href = "#source36">36</a><p>
On 22 June 1961, Webb and Dryden met with several of their top
lieutenants to see what useful items could be gleaned from the reports
of all these committees for charting Apollo's strategy. Abraham Hyatt,
the new chief of Plans and Programs, criticized any plan that required
development of two launch vehicles, one for circumlunar missions and
another for direct flight. Hyatt suggested that NASA either build a huge
launch vehicle with as many as eight F-1 engines in the first stage for
both circumlunar flight and lunar landing or cluster half that number of
these engines in a somewhat smaller vehicle and use rendezvous
techniques.<a href = "#source37">37</a><p>
This meeting did produce several significant program decisions. Most
important was the order for Marshall to stop work on the C-2, begin
preliminary design on the C-3, and continue studies of a much larger
vehicle for lunar landing missions. (By this time, what constituted a
Saturn, in any of its versions, or a Nova was becoming hard to
understand. For some clarification of the confusion, see the
accompanying list.)<a href = "#source38">38</a><p>
Early in July, Seamans appointed a Lunar Landing Steering Committee,<a
href = "#explanation2">**</a> with himself as chairman, to meet every
Monday afternoon until an impending Headquarters reorganization was
completed. During its three meetings in July, the committee considered
the facilities and organization needed to manage Apollo and then turned
its attention to launch vehicles. But nothing tangible emerged from
these discussions, either, certainly no hardbound decision on a launch
vehicle for Apollo.<a href = "#source39">39</a>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<h2>Apollo Launch Vehicles</h2>
<p>
<h3>Saturn C-1 (renamed Saturn I).*</h3>
<p>
Configuration: S-I booster (eight H-1 engines, clustered, with
6.7-million-newton [1.5-million-pound] combined thrust), S-IV second
stage (four engines using liquid-hydrogen and liquid-oxygen propellants,
with 355,800-newton [80,000-pound] total thrust), and S-V third stage
(two engines like those in the S-IV stage, with 177,900-newton
[40,000-pound] total). In March 1961, NASA approved a change in the S-IV
stage to six engines that, though less powerful individually, delivered
400,300-newtons (90,000-pound thrust) collectively. On 1 June 1961, the
S-V was dropped from the configuration.<p>
<h3>Saturn C-1B (renamed Saturn IB).*</h3>
<p>
Configuration: S-IB booster (eight clustered uprated H-1 engines with
7.1-million-newton [1.6-million-pound] total thrust) and S-IVB second
stage (one J-2 engine with 889,600 newtons [200,000 pounds]). On 11 July
1962, NASA announced that the C-IB would launch unmanned and manned
Apollo spacecraft into earth orbit.<p>
<h3>Saturn C-2.</h3>
<p>
Four-stage configuration: S-I booster, S-II second stage (not defined),
S-IV third stage, and S-V fourth stage.<p>
Three-stage configuration: S-I booster, S-II second stage (not defined),
and S-IV third stage. Plans for the C-2 were canceled in June 1961 in
favor of the proposed C-3.<p>
<h3>Saturn C-3.</h3>
<p>
Configuration: booster stage (two F-1 engines with a combined thrust of
13.3 million newtons [3 million pounds]), second stage (four J-2 engines
with a 3.6-million-newton total [800,000 pounds]), and S-IV third stage.
Plans for the C-3 were canceled for a more powerful launch vehicle.<p>
<h3>Saturn C-4.</h3>
<p>
Configuration: booster stage (four clustered F-1 engines with
26.7-million-newton [6-million-pound] combined thrust) and a second
stage (four J-2 engines with combined thrust of 3.6 million newtons
[800,000 pounds]). The C-4 was briefly considered but rejected for the
C-5.<p>
<h3>Saturn C-5 (renamed Saturn V).*</h3>
<p>
Configuration: S-IC booster (five F-1 engines, clustered, with total
thrust of 33.4 million newtons [7.5 million pounds]), S-II second stage
(five J-2 engines with total of 4.5 million newtons [1 million pounds]),
and S-IVB third stage.<p>
<h3>Saturn C-8.</h3>
<p>
Configuration: First stage (eight F-1 engines, clustered, with a
combined 53.4 million newtons [12-million-pound thrust]), second stage
(eight J-2 engines with total of 7.1 million newtons [1.6 million
pounds]), and third stage (one J-2 engine with 889,600 newtons [200,000
pounds]).<p>
<h3>Nova.</h3>
<p>
Configuration: several proposed, all using F-1 engines in the first
stage. One typical configuration consisted of a first stage (eight F-1
engines, clustered, with 53.4-million-newton [12-million-pound] total
thrust), a second stage (four liquid-hydrogen M-1 engines with combined
thrust of 21.4 million newtons [4.8 million pounds]), and a third stage
(one J-2 engine with 889,600 newtons [200,000 pounds]). Nuclear upper
stages were also proposed.<p>
*Only the three vehicles indicated by an asterisk were actually
developed and flown in the Apollo program.
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "explanation1">*</a> Heaton's committee was made up of
Commander L. E. Baird (Navy); Richard B. Canright, Norman Rafel, Joseph
E. McGolrick, L. H. Glassman, John L. Hammersmith, Robert D. Briskman,
James Nolan, Warren North, and William H. Woodward (NASA Headquarters);
Wilson B. Schramm, R. Voss, Paul J. DeFries, Heinz Koelle, and Harry
Ruppe (Marshall); William H. Phillips and John Houbolt (Langley); Hubert
M. Drake (Flight Research Center); and J. Yolles (Air Force Systems
Command).<p>
<a name = "explanation2">**</a> The steering committee attendance was
flexible; the only members who met regularly were Seamans, Don
Ostrander, Ray Romatowski, and Fleming (committee secretary). Less
frequent attendees were Silverstein, Ira Abbott, Hyatt, DeMarquis D.
Wyatt, Nicholas E. Golovin, Alfred Mayo, G. Dale Smith, John D. Young,
Charles H. Roadman, Low, Milton W. Rosen, and Wesley Hjornevik (all of
Headquarters); Eberhard F. M. Rees and Hans H. Mans (of Marshall); and
Gilruth (STG).
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "source33"><b>33</b>.</a> Faget, interview, comments on draft edition
of this volume, Houston, 22 Nov. 1976.<p>
<a name = "source34"><b>34</b>.</a> DeMarquis D. Wyatt memo for record,
"Discussions with the Associate Administrator on June 15,
1961," 20 June 1961.<p>
<a name = "source35"><b>35</b>.</a> Seamans to Dirs., Launch Vehicle Prog., et
al., "Establishment of Ad Hoc Task Group for Manned Lunar Landing
by Rendezvous Techniques," 20 June 1961.<p>
<a name = "source36"><b>36</b>.</a> NASA, "Earth Orbital Rendezvous for an
Early Manned Lunar Landing," pt. I, "Summary Report of Ad Hoc
Task Group Study" [Heaton Report], August 1961.<p>
<a name = "source37"><b>37</b>.</a> Abraham Hyatt, "Proposed Items for
Discussion at Meeting on 22 June 1961," 20 June 1961; Hyatt to
Seamans, "Comments on Arthur Kantrowitz's paper very glamorously
titled 'Space Strategy for America,'" 20 June 1961.<p>
<a name = "source38"><b>38</b>.</a> "Composite Notes on June 22, 1961
Meeting"; MSFC, "Saturn Project Fact Sheet," 1 June 1961;
David S. Akens, <cite>Saturn Illustrated Chronology: Saturn's First
Eleven Years, April 1957 through April 1968</cite>, 5th ed., MHR-5
(Huntsville, Ala.: MSFC, 20 Jan. 1971), p. 4; James E. Webb memo for
record, "Selection of Contractors to Participate in Second Phase of
SATURN S-II Stage Competition," 8 June 1961; Ertel and Morse,
<cite>Apollo Spacecraft Chronology,</cite> I: 234-35.<p>
<a name = "source39"><b>39</b>.</a> Seamans to Admin., NASA, "Proposed
Interim Procedures for Implementing the Lunar Landing Program," 7
July 1964; Maj. Gen. Don R. Ostrander memo, "Manned Lunar Landing
Program," 10 July 1961, with enc.; William A. Fleming, secy.,
"Discussion Notes: First Meeting of Manned Lunar Landing Steering
Committee," 6 July, "Second Meeting," 17 July, and
"Third Meeting," 31 July 1961; Low to Dir., Space Flight
Prog., "Meeting of Manned Lunar Landing Coordination Group," 8
July 1961.
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