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<!DOCTYPE HTML>
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<title>Chariots For Apollo, ch2-7</title>
<meta http-equiv=Content-Type content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
</head>
<BODY BGCOLOR="#FFFFFF">
<p>
<h2>Help from the Department of Defense</h2>
<p>
Top-flight officials both in NASA and the Kennedy administration, when
they recommended a moon landing program as the focus of America's space
effort, saw Apollo as a central element of a broad national space
program. The United States needed not only to develop more powerful
boosters, to match Russia's, but to plan that development with a minimum
of unnecessary duplication among agencies.<a href =
"#source40">40</a><p>
Early in July 1961, Seamans and John H. Rubel, Assistant Secretary of
Defense and Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering, agreed
on the need for joint NASA-Defense planning. Seamans informed Webb that
the two agencies would try to determine what boosters would best meet
the requirements of both the Department of Defense (DoD) and NASA. The
civilian agency's central concern, of course, was a launch vehicle for
Apollo.<a href = "#source41">41</a><p>
With the approval of both Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and
Administrator Webb,<a href = "#source42">42</a> Rubel and Seamans set up
a DoD-NASA Large Launch Vehicle Planning Group on 20 July. Although
Nicholas Golovin, an applied mathematician and Seamans' Technical
Assistant, shared the chair with Lawrence Kavanau, a missile expert from
the Defense Department, the group soon became known as the Golovin
Committee.<a href = "#explanation1">*</a><p>
This committee, like all the others, found that, for Apollo, vehicle
selection and mode were inseparable. At first the planners considered
only direct ascent and earth-orbital rendezvous, but they soon broadened
their study to include other kinds of rendezvous.<a href =
"#source43">43</a> When it became apparent that the committee intended
to delve deeply into the mode issue, Harvey Hall (of NASA's Office of
Launch Vehicle Programs) asked that Marshall, Langley, and the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory each study one particular kind of rendezvous -
earth-orbit, lunar-orbit, or lunar-surface - and prepare a report for
the Golovin group. Hall's own office would study direct ascent.<a href =
"#source44">44</a><p>
Worried that this latest in the series of Headquarters committees
established to select a launch vehicle for Apollo would also get bogged
down in the mode issue, Gilruth wrote Golovin about the degree to which
rendezvous had pervaded recent thinking. "I feel that it is highly
desirable," he said, "to develop a launch vehicle with
sufficient performance and reliability to carry out the lunar landing
mission using the direct approach. . . . I am concerned that rendezvous
schemes may be used as a crutch to achieve early planned dates for
launch vehicle availability, and to avoid the difficulty of developing a
reliable NOVA class launch vehicle."<a href = "#source45">45</a><p>
Just as Gilruth had feared, Golovin's group did get mired in the mode
issue, leaving the choice of an Apollo launch vehicle still unsettled.
On 18 September, one committee member said the group preferred
rendezvous rather than direct flight, because smaller vehicles would be
available earlier than the large boosters. Preliminary conclusions
indicated that the manned lunar landing might be made with the C-4 more
safely than with the Nova. Moreover, the C-4 would be more useful to
other NASA and Defense Department long-range needs.<a href =
"#source46">46</a><p>
Golovin himself disagreed with the majority of his group, insisting that
direct flight was the safest and best way to go. He and those of his
team who shared his belief talked to Seamans and Rubel about
solid-fueled versus liquid-fueled rocket engines for Nova, the concept
of modules (or building blocks) to achieve a variety of launch vehicles,
and an S-IVB stage, which could be powered by a single J-2 engine.<p>
Seamans, observing that some kind of advanced Saturn seemed to be
inevitable, asked Golovin how many F-1 engines should be in the
vehicle's first stage. Golovin replied, "Four - anything [less] is
a waste of time." Golovin also recommended that the advanced Saturn
be engineered so it could become most of the Nova as well.<a href =
"#source47">47</a><p>
At the committee's general sessions on 23 and 24 October, debates grew
hotter over solid- versus liquid-fueled engines for the Nova, the size
of the huge booster, and the merits of five rather than four F-1 engines
in the advanced Saturn's first stage. Heinrich Weigand and Matthew
Collins objected strongly to any assumption that rendezvous in space
would be easy. Weigand contended that his fellow committeemen were
underestimating the difficulty of rendezvous and docking. He wanted a
Nova with large solidfueled rocket engines in its first stage. Collins
also urged that direct ascent be given first priority.<p>
Cochairman Kavanau warned that "lunar orbit rendezvous or direct is
the only way to beat the Russians," adding that he believed the C-4
could do the job either way. Golovin countered that "competition
with the Russians is a permanent thing." He insisted that both
orbital operations and the development of large boosters would have to
be studied for at least two years before any mode choice was
possible.<p>
After listening to the cochairmen express opposing views, Collins asked
bluntly: "Are we going to recommend rendezvous or direct?"
Reminded that this was not in their charter - they were supposed to be
selecting a launch vehicle to support either rendezvous or direct flight
- the group returned to the arguments over four versus five engines for
the advanced Saturn's first stage and the Nova's configuration.<a href =
"#source48">48</a><p>
And there the issues lay. Once again nothing was settled, although the
October sessions wound up the Golovin Committee meetings. The group's
greatest value had been as a forum for discussions on vehicle models and
possible configurations for Apollo. The committee's conclusions - or
lack of them - reflected compromises and conflicting opinions. After
three months' intensive study of numerous vehicle combinations and
mission approaches, the question of a launch vehicle for Apollo was
still unresolved.<a href = "#source49">49</a><p>
On 16 November, Webb and McNamara reviewed the areas explored by
Golovin's group and made several policy decisions. They agreed to halt
the development of large solid rocket motors (6.1 meters or larger) as a
backup for the F-1 liquid engine, although the Defense Department would
"continue to carry out advanced state-of-the-art technical
development in the solid field." And they decided that the Saturn
C-4 should be developed for the rendezvous approach to Apollo.<a href =
"#source50">50</a>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "explanation1">*</a> The Golovin Committee originally
comprised 14 member and alternate positions, equally divided between DoD
and NASA. By the end of the study, these had expanded to 18 and included
personnel from Aerospace Corp. (acting as advisers to DoD). The final
roster listed Golovin (chairman), Eldon Hall, Harvey Hall, Milton W.
Rosen, Kurt R. Stehling, and William W. Wolman (NASA Headquarters);
Laurence Kavanau (cochairman and Director of Office of Defense); Warren
Amster and Edward J. Barlow (Aerospace); Aleck C. Bond (Space Task
Group); Seymour C. Himmel (Lewis); Wilson B. Schramm and Francis L.
Williams (Marshall); Colonel Mathew R. Collins (Army); Rear Admiral
Levering Smith and Captain Lewis J. Stecher, Jr. (Navy); and Colonel
Otto J. Glasser, Lieutenant Colonel David L. Garter, and Heinrich J.
Weigand (Air Force). James F. Chalmers, Aerospace, was secretary.
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "source40"><b>40</b>.</a> Logsdon, "NASA's Implementation,"
p. 27.<p>
<a name = "source41"><b>41</b>.</a> Seamans to Admin., NASA, "Planning of
a DOD-NASA Program for Development of Large Launch Vehicles," 7
July 1961; Seamans to John H. Rubel, 3 Aug. 1961.<p>
<a name = "source42"><b>42</b>.</a> Webb to Robert S. McNamara and McNamara to
Webb, 7 July 1961.<p>
<a name = "source43"><b>43</b>.</a> [Nicholas E. Golovin], draft report of
DoD-NASA Large Launch Vehicle Planning Group (LLVPG), 3 vols., [November
1961]; James F. Chalmers, minutes of special LLVPG meeting with
Silverstein, 18 Aug. 1961; Golovin and Lawrence L. Kavanau to Launch
Vehicle Panel, Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board,
"Report of the DOD-NASA Large Launch Vehicle Planning Group (LLVPG)
as of August 31, 1961," 31 Aug. 1961.<p>
<a name = "source44"><b>44</b>.</a> Harvey Hall TWX to Dirs., MSFC, LRC, and
JPL, 24 Aug. 1961; Hall to Asst. Dir., Vehicles, "Comparative
Evaluation of Various Rendezvous Operations," 24 Aug. 1961; Hall
TWX to John W. Small, Jr., et al., 14 Sept. 1961; Hall to LLVPG staff,
"Comparison of Mission Alternatives (Rendezvous versus direct
flight)," 14 Sept. 1961.<p>
<a name = "source45"><b>45</b>.</a> Gilruth to Golovin, 12 Sept. 1961.<p>
<a name = "source46"><b>46</b>.</a> Warren Amster to LLVPG staff, "A
'Federated' Launch Vehicle Program," 18 Sept. 1961. For more on the
role of Amster's parent company, see [Walter T. Bonney], <cite>The
Aerospace Corporation, 1960–1970: Serving America</cite> (El Segundo:
Aerospace Corp., 1971).<p>
<a name = "source47"><b>47</b>.</a> Chalmers, minutes of LLVPG special meeting
with Seamans: progress report, 29 Sept. 1961; idem, minutes of special
LLVPG meeting with Seamans, 6 Oct. 1961.<p>
<a name = "source48"><b>48</b>.</a> Chalmers, minutes of LLVPG general
meetings, 23 and 24 Oct. 1961.<p>
<a name = "source49"><b>49</b>.</a> "Final Report, NASA-DOD Large Launch
vehicle Planning Group," NASA-DOD LLVPG 105 [Golovin Committee], 3
vols., 1 Feb. 1962.<p>
<a name = "source50"><b>50</b>.</a> McNamara to Webb, 17 Nov. 1961; Webb to
McNamara, 28 Nov. 1961.
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