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<!DOCTYPE HTML>
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<title>Chariots For Apollo, ch3-4</title>
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<BODY BGCOLOR="#FFFFFF">
<h2>Early Reaction to LOR</h2>
<p>
When the special NASA committees in 1961 (see <a href = "ch2-1.html">Chapter
2</a>) were trying to get the Apollo program defined, Houbolt made the
rounds, making certain that everyone knew of Langley's lunar-orbit
rendezvous studies. At a meeting of the Space Exploration Program
Council on 5 and 6 January, his arguments for lunar rendezvous were lost
in the attention being given to direct flight and earth-orbit
rendezvous.<a href = "#source26"><b>26</b></a> In Washington on 27 and
28 February, when Headquarters sponsored an intercenter rendezvous
meeting, Houbolt again summarized Langley's recent efforts. But both the
Gilruth and von Braun teams stood solidly behind their respective
positions, direct flight and earth-orbit rendezvous. Houbolt later
recalled his frustration when it seemed lunar-orbit rendezvous
"just wouldn't catch on."<a href =
"#source27"><b>27</b></a><p>
On 19 May, Houbolt bypassed the chain of command and wrote directly to
Seamans to express his belief that rendezvous was not receiving due
consideration. He pointed out that the American booster development
program was in poor shape and that NASA appeared to have no firm plans
beyond the initial version of the Saturn, the C-1. Houbolt was equally
critical of NASA's failure to recognize the need for developing
rendezvous techniques. Because of the lag in launch vehicle development,
he said, it seemed obvious that the only mode available to NASA in the
next few years would be rendezvous.<a href =
"#source28"><b>28</b></a><p>
In June Houbolt, a member of Bruce Lundin's group - the first team
specifically authorized to examine anything except direct flight -
talked to the group about his concept. Although the Lundin Committee
initially seemed interested in Houbolt's description of lunar-orbit
rendezvous, only lunar-surface rendezvous scored lower in its final
report.<a href = "#source29"><b>29</b></a><p>
During July and August, Houbolt had almost the same reaction from Donald
Heaton's committee. Although this group had been instructed to study
rendezvous, the members interpreted that mandate as limiting them to the
earth-orbit mode. Houbolt, himself a member of the committee, pleaded
with the others to include lunar-orbit rendezvous; but, he later
recalled, time after time he was told, "No, no, no. Our charter
[applies only to] Earth orbit rendezvous." Some of the members,
seeing how deeply he felt about the mode question, told him to write his
own report to Seamans, explaining his convictions in detail.<p>
Growing discouraged at the lack of interest, Houbolt and his Langley
colleagues began to see themselves as sole champions of the technique.
They decided to change their tactics. "The only way to do it,"
Houbolt said later, was "to go out on our own, present our own
documents and our own findings, and make our case sufficiently strong
that people [would] have to consider it."<a href =
"#source30"><b>30</b></a><p>
Houbolt felt that things were looking up when the Space Task Group asked
him to prepare a paper on rendezvous for the Apollo Technical Conference
in mid-July 1961. At the dry run, however, when he and the other
speakers presented their papers for final review, Houbolt was told to
confine himself to rendezvous in general and to "throw out all
[that] LOR."<a href = "#source31"><b>31</b></a><p>
The next opportunity Houbolt had to fight for his cause came when
Seamans and John Rubel established the Golovin Committee. Nicholas
Golovin and his team were supposed to recommend a set of boosters for
the national space program, but they found this an impossible task
unless they knew how the launch vehicles would be used. This group was
one of the first to display serious interest in Langley's rendezvous
scheme. At a session on 29 August, when Houbolt was asked, "In what
areas have you received the most violent criticism of these ideas?"
he replied:
<blockquote><p>Everyone says that it is hard enough to perform a rendezvous
in the earth orbit, how can you even think of doing a lunar rendezvous?
My answer is that rendezvous in lunar orbit is quite simple - no worries
about weather or air friction. In any case, I would rather bring down
7,000 pounds [3,200 kilograms] to the lunar surface than 150,000 pounds
[68,000 kilograms]. This is the strongest point in my argument.<a href =
"#source32"><b>32</b></a></blockquote><p>
Realizing that he at last had his chance to present his plan to a group
that was really listening, Houbolt called John Bird and Arthur Vogeley,
asking them to hurry to Washington to help him brief the Golovin
Committee. Afterward the trio returned to Langley and compiled a
two-volume report, describing the concept and outlining in detail a
program based on the lunar-orbit mode. Langley's report was submitted to
Golovin on 11 October 1961. After it had been thoroughly reviewed, its
highlights were discussed, favorably, in the Golovin report.<a href =
"#source33"><b>33</b></a><p>
Instead of resting after his labors with the Golovin Committee, Houbolt
went back to Langley and the task of getting out his minority report on
the Heaton group's findings. He submitted it to Seamans in mid November,
with a cover note that said, in part, "I am convinced that man will
first set foot on the moon through the use of ideas akin to those
expressed herein."<a href = "#source34"><b>34</b></a> His report to
Seamans, a nine-page indictment of the planning for America's lunar
program to date, was a vigorous plea for consideration of Langley's
approach.<p>
"Somewhat as a voice in the wilderness," he began, "I
would like to pass on a few thoughts on matters that have been of deep
concern to me over the recent months." Houbolt explained to Seamans
that he was skipping the proper channels because the issues were
crucial. After recounting his attempts to draw the attention of others
in NASA to the lunar-orbit rendezvous scheme, Houbolt noted that,
"regrettably, there was little interest shown in the idea."<p>
He went on to ask, <cite>"Do we want to get to the moon or
not?"</cite> If so, why not develop a lunar landing program to meet
a given booster capability instead of building vehicles to carry out a
preconceived plan? "Why is NOVA, with its ponderous [size] simply
just accepted, and why is a much less grandiose scheme involving
rendezvous ostracized or put on the defensive?" Noting that it was
the small Saturn C-3 that was the pacing item in the lunar rendezvous
approach, he added, parenthetically, "I would not be surprised to
have the plan criticized on the basis that it is not grandiose
enough."<p>
A principal charge leveled at lunar-orbit rendezvous, Houbolt said, was
the absence of an abort capability, lowering the safety factor for the
crew. Actually, he argued, the direct opposite was true. The
lunar-rendezvous method offered a degree of safety and reliability far
greater than that possible by the direct approach, he said. But "it
is one thing to gripe, another to offer constructive criticism,"
Houbolt conceded. He then recommended that NASA use the Mark II Mercury
in a manned rendezvous experiment program and the C-3 and lunar
rendezvous to accomplish the manned lunar landing.<a href =
"#source35"><b>35</b></a><p>
Seamans replied to Houbolt early in December. "I agree that you
touched upon facets of the technical approach to manned lunar landing
which deserve serious consideration," Seamans wrote. He also
commended Houbolt for his vigorous pursuit of his ideas. "It would
be extremely harmful to our organization and to the country if our
qualified staff were unduly limited by restrictive guidelines." The
Associate Administrator added that he believed all views on the best way
to carry out the manned lunar landing were being carefully weighed and
that lunar-orbit rendezvous would be given the same impartial
consideration as any other approach.<a href = "#source36"><b>36</b></a>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "source26"><b>26</b>.</a> Minutes, Space Exploration Program
Council meeting, 5–6 Jan. 1961.<p>
<a name = "source27"><b>27</b>.</a> Floyd L. Thompson to NASA Hq.,
Attn.: Bernard Maggin, "Forthcoming Inter-NASA Meeting on
Rendezvous," 4 Jan. 1961, with enc.; E. J. Manganiello to NASA Hq.,
"Agenda for Orbital Rendezvous Discussions," 5 Jan. 1961, with
enc.; Bird and David F. Thomas, Jr., "Material for Meeting of
Centers on Rendezvous, February 27–28, 1961: Studies Relating to the
Accuracy of Arrival at a Rendezvous Point," n.d.; agenda, NASA
Inter-Center Rendezvous Discussions, General Meeting - 27–28 Feb. 1961;
Bird, "Short History," p. 3; Houbolt interview.<p>
<a name = "source28"><b>28</b>.</a> Houbolt to Seamans, 19 May 1961.<p>
<a name = "source29"><b>29</b>.</a> Bruce T. Lundin et al., "A
Survey of Various Vehicle Systems for the Manned Lunar Mission," 10
June 1961; Houbolt interview.<p>
<a name = "source30"><b>30</b>.</a> "Earth Orbital Rendezvous for
an Early Manned Lunar Landing," pt. 1, Summary Report of Ad Hoc
Task Group [Heaton Committee] Study, August 1961; Houbolt interview.<p>
<a name = "source31"><b>31</b>.</a> Gilruth to General Dynamics
Astronautics, Attn.: William F. Rector III, 27 June 1961, with enc.,
"Proposed Agenda, NASA-Industry Apollo Technical Conference, . . .
July 18, 1961"; Thompson to STG, Attn.: Purser, "Rehearsal
schedule for the NASA-Industry Apollo Technical Conference," 3 July
1961, with enc.; John C. Houbolt, "Considerations of Space
Rendezvous," in "NASA-Industry Apollo Technical Conference
July 18, 19, 20, 1961: A Compilation of the Papers Presented," pt.
1, pp. 73, 79; Houbolt interview.<p>
<a name = "source32"><b>32</b>.</a> Minutes of presentation to LLVPG by
Houbolt, 29 Aug. 1961.<p>
<a name = "source33"><b>33</b>.</a> Ibid.; [John C. Houbolt et al.],
"Manned Lunar Landing through use of Lunar-Orbit Rendezvous,"
2 vols., LaRC, 31 Oct. 1961, p. i; Mike Weeks to LLVPG staff, no subj.,
2 Oct. 1961, with encs.; Bird interview; Bird, "Short
History," p. 3.<p>
<a name = "source34"><b>34</b>.</a> Houbolt to Seamans, no subj., [ca.
15 Nov. 1961].<p>
<a name = "source35"><b>35</b>.</a> Houbolt to Seamans, 15 Nov. 1961
(emphasis in original).<p>
<a name = "source36"><b>36</b>.</a> Seamans to Houbolt, 4 Dec. 1961.
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