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6.858.txt
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//6.858
http://css.csail.mit.edu/6.858/2012/schedule.html
http://css.csail.mit.edu/6.858/2012/quiz.html
LEC 1: Introduction, threat models
Assigned: Lab 1: Buffer overflows
介绍缓冲区溢出几种。基本知识，预备知识。
LEC 2: Control hijacking attacks
Preparation: Read Baggy bounds checking + errata (Question)//paper
接着LEC1，介绍如何劫持控制流。预备知识。
LEC 3: Privilege separation
Preparation: Read OKWS (Question)
权限分离，说明如何初步建立一个安全的web服务器。
LEC 4: Evolving OS isolation mechanisms
Preparation: Read Capsicum (Question)
DAC MAC
http://css.csail.mit.edu/6.858/2012/readings/capsicum.pdf
常见的几种访问控制模型介绍，和如果我们自己编写的话，要使用哪种。
LEC 5: Guest lecture:
Paul Youn from iSEC Partners//Where do security bugs come from? GOOD! http://css.csail.mit.edu/6.858/2012/lec/isec-guest-lecture.pdf
Assigned: Lab 2: Privilege separation//http://css.csail.mit.edu/6.858/2012/labs/lab2.html
客座教授：（详细，赞！）
信息安全漏洞的来源和哪些人会找漏洞，等，详细的入门级介绍，未来职位方向推荐等。
LEC 6: Network protocols
Preparation: Read Kerberos (Question)
已Kerberos为模型，介绍安全架构
LEC 7: Web application security
Preparation: Read Browser Security Handbook, Part 2 and skim OWASP Top 10 (Question)
介绍现代web安全架构，包含同源策略等
LEC 8: Finding bugs in server-side code
Preparation: Read Static Detection of Scripting Vulnerabilities (notation) (Question)
静态分析，发现服务器段程序代码的漏洞（PHP等）
LEC 9: Javascript sandboxing
Preparation: Read Run-Time Enforcement for Javascript (Question)
Assigned: Lab 3: Server-side sandboxing
The paper is one route, taken by Facebook's FBJS and Yahoo's AdSafe.
Google's Caja project is similar in some ways, although it tends to give
acecss to virtualized objects instead of giving access to real objects.
怎样构建一个安全的javascript的sandbox，介绍常见的javascript策略
实验：熟悉PyPy sandbox
LEC 10: SSL and HTTPS
Preparation: Read ForceHTTPS (Question)
http和引入https的好处和缺点和区别和方法
LEC 11: Sandboxing native code
Preparation: Read Native Client (Question)
介绍了native client的架构和实现（一个很好的安全的沙盘解决方案，从而可以允许运行native程序，赞！）
LEC 12: User authentication
Preparation: Read The Quest to Replace Passwords (Question)
介绍用户认证的常见方式和比较评价//http://css.csail.mit.edu/6.858/2012/readings/passwords.pdf
LEC 13: Single signon
Preparation: Read Empirical Analysis of OAuth (Question)
Assigned: Lab 5: Browser security// Cookie Theft Cross-Site Request Forgery Side Channels and Phishing Profile Worm
Assigned: Lab 7: Final project//3-4人的实验，赞往年方案！ http://css.csail.mit.edu/6.858/2012/labs/lab7.html
介绍单点登录(OAuth)。他与其他方案的区别
扩展阅读//http://css.csail.mit.edu/6.858/2012/readings/oauth-sso.pdf The Devil is in the (Implementation) Details:An Empirical Analysis of OAuth SSO Systems
LEC 14: Mobile phone security
Preparation: Read Understanding Android Security + errata (Question)
Overall plan:
First understand how Android applications look like and work.
Then discuss security mechanisms and policies.
介绍安卓的安全和架构 扩展阅读//http://css.csail.mit.edu/6.858/2012/readings/android.pdf
LEC 15: Platform-enforced privacy
Preparation: Read Koi + errata (Question)
What problem is this paper trying to address?
User location information is potentially sensitive.
Applications may need to access to user's location information.
An application could inappropriately disclose user's location.
How to build applications where this is less likely to happen?
介绍权限泄漏问题和解决方案。
LEC 16: Anonymous communication
Preparation: Read Tor (Question)
Assigned: Lab 6: Javascript sandboxing
What's the goal of the paper (or Tor)?
Anonymity for clients, which want to connect to servers on the internet.
Anonymity for servers, which want to service requests from users.
What is anonymity?
Adversary cannot tell which users are communicating with which servers.
Adversary (most likely) knows that users, servers are communicating via Tor.
That is, Tor not designed to prevent adversary from finding Tor users.
介绍匿名网络
赞LAB6
LEC 17: Side-channel attacks
Preparation: Read Remote timing attacks (Question)
介绍Side-channel attacks on RSA
LEC 18: File system encryption
Preparation: Read BitLocker (Question)
What's the problem this paper is trying to solve?
Prevent data from being stolen if an attacker physically steals a laptop.
Effectively, want some form of disk encryption.
介绍文件系统加密
扩展阅读//http://css.csail.mit.edu/6.858/2012/readings/bitlocker.pdf AES-CBC + Elephant diffuser A Disk Encryption Algorithm for Windows Vista
LEC 19: Trusted hardware
Preparation: Read TrInc + errata (Question)
What's the problem this paper is trying to solve?
Scenario: suppose we don't trust most parts of some computer system.
Controlled by potentially malicious user.
Typically distributed system communicating over the Internet.
Client machines could be ~arbitrary.
Still want to have that system participate in a network protocol.
Many examples: BitTorrent clients, DNS servers, shared git repository,
online game participants, ...
How can we trust what some system (either client or server) is telling us?
介绍什么是Trusted hardware，同时介绍一种解决方案
扩展阅读//http://css.csail.mit.edu/6.858/2012/readings/trinc.pdf TrInc: Small Trusted Hardware for Large Distributed Systems
LEC 20: Intrusion detection and analysis
Preparation: Read Backtracker (Question)
入侵检测和分析
扩展阅读//http://css.csail.mit.edu/6.858/2012/readings/backtracking.pdf Backtracking Intrusions
LEC 21: Security economics
Preparation: Read Click Trajectories (Question)
从经济学的角度讨论信息安全（赞！）
扩展阅读//http://css.csail.mit.edu/6.858/2012/readings/trajectories.pdf Click Trajectories: End-to-End Analysis of the Spam Value Chain
LEC 22: Project presentations
DUE: Final project presentation
Last day of classes