node/cn: verify a blob tx sidecar only once - #1012
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A replayed blob transaction is decoded into a fresh sidecar object, so the sidecar's own validation cache never hits and the handler verified its KZG proofs again on every copy. One single-blob v1 sidecar measures ~15.5ms, and a 12MiB TxMsg fits about 90 of them, so a captured transaction could be resent indefinitely at no cost to the sender. The handler now keeps a bounded set of blob tx hashes it already verified and skips the verification for those. Constraint: the tx pool verifies the sidecar independently before admitting a transaction, so skipping the early check cannot let a bad sidecar through Rejected: reject duplicate hashes within one message | subsumed, the set already skips the repeats inside a single batch Rejected: global KZG semaphore or per-peer token buckets | the repeated verification is what made a small message expensive, and bounding concurrency would also delay legitimate propagation Confidence: high Scope-risk: narrow Not-tested: a rotating set of distinct captured blob txs still costs one verification each, which is bandwidth-bound Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ian0371
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Aug 10, 2026
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| // The tx hash does not cover the sidecar, so the replay carries a broken proof | ||
| // under the same hash and passes only because the verification is skipped. | ||
| blobTx.BlobTxSidecar().Proofs[0][0] ^= 0xFF |
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The cache key doesn't cover the sidecar, so this happens. Is this ok?
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Changed to keccak(blobHashes ‖ Version ‖ Blobs ‖ Proofs)
2dvorak
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Aug 11, 2026
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tx.Hash()as the key is bypassable at zero cost. The expensive work is per-sidecar, but the key is per-transaction, and the attacker controls that mapping: one precomputed sidecar attaches to unlimited distinct transactions by bumping a nonce — identical sidecar bytes, different tx hashes — so every one of them misses the set and pays a full verification.- Reject blob txs with zero blob hashes.
ValidateWithBlobHashespasses vacuously when there are no blobs so a 113-byte blob tx with an empty sidecar validates. The pool rejects these unconditionally (tx_pool.go:1071), so the handler accepts and forwards a transaction that can never be valid and never disconnects the peer for it. It also mints a cache entry per tx, cheap enough to flush the whole set for ~113 KiB — though that part goes away once the key changes per (1).
The set was keyed by transaction hash, which does not cover the sidecar. A sender could bump the nonce to replay one sidecar under unlimited distinct hashes, so every copy missed the set and paid a full verification, and a sidecar swapped under an already verified hash hit the set and skipped verification entirely. Key the set by what the verification consumes instead: the blob hashes, the sidecar version, its blobs and its proofs. Commitments are excluded because each blob hash is the sha256 of one, so the hashes already pin them. Also reject a blob transaction that declares no blob hashes. Every length check in the verification compares against the declared hashes, so it passes vacuously, while the pool rejects such a transaction unconditionally - the handler forwarded something that could never be valid and left the sender connected. Constraint: the key has to cover the blobs, not only the proofs, since the proofs are verified against them Rejected: keep the transaction hash and add a sidecar fingerprint | any key that omits the blobs is bypassable the same way Confidence: high Scope-risk: narrow Not-tested: a rotating set of distinct captured blob txs still costs one verification each, which is bandwidth-bound Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@2dvorak The key now covers what the verification consumes, and rejects blobless tx earlier before the veficiation runs. |
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Proposed changes
A replayed blob transaction is decoded into a fresh sidecar object, so the sidecar's own validation cache never hits and the handler verified its KZG proofs again on every copy. The handler now skips verification for blob tx hashes it already verified; the tx pool still verifies the sidecar independently before admitting the transaction.
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