diff --git a/02-peer-protocol.md b/02-peer-protocol.md
index f61bd3cca..4d057e682 100644
--- a/02-peer-protocol.md
+++ b/02-peer-protocol.md
@@ -797,6 +797,52 @@ A fulfilling node:
   transaction, AND is past this fulfillment deadline:
     - MUST fail the channel.
 
+### Bounding exposure to trimmed in-flight HTLCs: `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
+
+When an HTLC in a channel is below the "trimmed" threshold in [BOLT3 #3](03-transactions.md),
+the HTLC cannot be claimed on-chain, instead being turned into additional miner
+fees if either party unilaterally closes the channel. Because the threshold is
+per-HTLC, the total exposure to such HTLCs may be substantial if there are many
+dust HTLCs committed when the channel is force-closed.
+
+This can be exploited in griefing attacks or even in miner-extractable-value attacks,
+if the malicious entity wins <sup>[mining capabilities](https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-May/002714.html)</sup>.
+
+The total exposure is given by the following back-of-the-envelope computation:
+
+	remote `max_accepted_htlcs` * (`HTLC-success-kiloweight` * `feerate_per_kw` + remote `dust_limit_satoshis`)
+		+ local `max_accepted_htlcs` * (`HTLC-timeout-kiloweight` * `feerate_per_kw` + remote `dust_limit_satoshis`)
+
+To mitigate this scenario, a `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat` threshold can be
+applied when sending, forwarding and receiving HTLCs.
+
+A node:
+  - when receiving an HTLC:
+    - if the HTLC's `amount_msat` is smaller than the remote `dust_limit_satoshis` plus the HTLC-timeout fee at `feerate_per_kw`:
+      - if the `amount_msat` plus the dust balance of the remote transaction is greater than `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`:
+        - SHOULD fail this HTLC once it's committed
+        - SHOULD NOT reveal a preimage for this HTLC
+    - if the HTLC's `amount_msat` is smaller than the local `dust_limit_satoshis` plus the HTLC-success fee at `feerate_per_kw`:
+      - if the `amount_msat` plus the dust balance of the local transaction is greater than `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`:
+        - SHOULD fail this HTLC once it's committed
+        - SHOULD NOT reveal a preimage for this HTLC
+  - when offering an HTLC:
+    - if the HTLC's `amount_msat` is smaller than the remote `dust_limit_satoshis` plus the HTLC-success fee at `feerate_per_kw`:
+      - if the `amount_msat` plus the dust balance of the remote transaction is greater than `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`:
+        - SHOULD NOT send this HTLC
+        - SHOULD fail the corresponding incoming HTLC (if any)
+    - if the HTLC's `amount_msat` is inferior to the holder's `dust_limit_satoshis` plus the HTLC-timeout fee at the `feerate_per_kw`:
+      - if the `amount_msat` plus the dust balance of the local transaction is greater than `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`:
+        - SHOULD NOT send this HTLC
+        - SHOULD fail the corresponding incoming HTLC (if any)
+
+The `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat` is an upper bound on the trimmed balance from
+dust exposure. The exact value used is a matter of node policy.
+
+For channels that don't use `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, an increase of
+the `feerate_per_kw` may trim multiple htlcs from commitment transactions,
+which could create a large increase in dust exposure.
+
 ### Adding an HTLC: `update_add_htlc`
 
 Either node can send `update_add_htlc` to offer an HTLC to the other,
@@ -1118,6 +1164,16 @@ The node _responsible_ for paying the Bitcoin fee:
 The node _not responsible_ for paying the Bitcoin fee:
   - MUST NOT send `update_fee`.
 
+A sending node:
+  - if `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` was not negotiated:
+    - if the `update_fee` increases `feerate_per_kw`:
+      - if the dust balance of the remote transaction at the updated `feerate_per_kw` is greater than `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`:
+        - MAY NOT send `update_fee`
+        - MAY fail the channel
+      - if the dust balance of the local transaction at the updated `feerate_per_kw` is greater than `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`:
+        - MAY NOT send `update_fee`
+        - MAY fail the channel
+
 A receiving node:
   - if the `update_fee` is too low for timely processing, OR is unreasonably large:
     - SHOULD fail the channel.
@@ -1127,6 +1183,12 @@ A receiving node:
   current commitment transaction:
     - SHOULD fail the channel,
       - but MAY delay this check until the `update_fee` is committed.
+    - if `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` was not negotiated:
+      - if the `update_fee` increases `feerate_per_kw`:
+        - if the dust balance of the remote transaction at the updated `feerate_per_kw` is greater then `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`:
+          - MAY fail the channel
+      - if the dust balance of the local transaction at the updated `feerate_per_kw` is greater than `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`:
+          - MAY fail the channel
 
 #### Rationale
 
@@ -1150,6 +1212,11 @@ it's simplest to only allow it to set fee levels; however, as the same
 fee rate applies to HTLC transactions, the receiving node must also
 care about the reasonableness of the fee.
 
+If on-chain fees increase while commitments contain many HTLCs that will
+be trimmed at the updated feerate, this could overflow the configured
+`max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`. Whether to close the channel preemptively
+or not is left as a matter of node policy.
+
 ## Message Retransmission
 
 Because communication transports are unreliable, and may need to be