diff --git a/Cargo.toml b/Cargo.toml index add69f35afa..6362bddadbd 100644 --- a/Cargo.toml +++ b/Cargo.toml @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ members = [ "lightning-rapid-gossip-sync", "lightning-custom-message", "lightning-transaction-sync", + "mutual-message-exchange", "possiblyrandom", ] diff --git a/ci/ci-tests.sh b/ci/ci-tests.sh index ed2efbaad2d..1256d6b9f4c 100755 --- a/ci/ci-tests.sh +++ b/ci/ci-tests.sh @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ WORKSPACE_MEMBERS=( lightning-rapid-gossip-sync lightning-custom-message lightning-transaction-sync + mutual-message-exchange possiblyrandom ) diff --git a/mutual-message-exchange/Cargo.toml b/mutual-message-exchange/Cargo.toml new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..30d4731440f --- /dev/null +++ b/mutual-message-exchange/Cargo.toml @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +[package] +name = "mutual-message-exchange" +version = "0.1.0" +authors = ["Matt Corallo"] +license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0" +repository = "https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/" +description = """ +An implementation of a trivial mutual authentication scheme where a message can be exchanged iff two parties mutually trust each other (out of individual trusted-keys lists). +""" +edition = "2021" + +[package.metadata.docs.rs] +rustdoc-args = ["--cfg", "docsrs"] + +[features] + +[dependencies] +bitcoin_hashes = { version = "^0.12.0", default-features = false } +secp256k1 = { version = "^0.27.0", default-features = false, features = ["alloc"] } + +[dev-dependencies] diff --git a/mutual-message-exchange/src/chacha20.rs b/mutual-message-exchange/src/chacha20.rs new file mode 120000 index 00000000000..8e71927e1dd --- /dev/null +++ b/mutual-message-exchange/src/chacha20.rs @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +../../lightning/src/crypto/chacha20.rs \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/mutual-message-exchange/src/chacha20poly1305rfc.rs b/mutual-message-exchange/src/chacha20poly1305rfc.rs new file mode 120000 index 00000000000..a236c6980bc --- /dev/null +++ b/mutual-message-exchange/src/chacha20poly1305rfc.rs @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +../../lightning/src/crypto/chacha20poly1305rfc.rs \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/mutual-message-exchange/src/lib.rs b/mutual-message-exchange/src/lib.rs new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..67d7affa0e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/mutual-message-exchange/src/lib.rs @@ -0,0 +1,549 @@ +//#![cfg_attr(not(test), no_std)] +#![cfg_attr(not(test), deny(missing_docs))] +#![forbid(unsafe_code)] +#![deny(rustdoc::broken_intra_doc_links)] +#![deny(rustdoc::private_intra_doc_links)] + +//! A simple mutual-authentication protocol which allows two parties to maintain a set of public +//! keys which they're willing to exchange messages with and exchange a message with an extra +//! half-round-trip. +//! +//! The protocol contains one party wishing to send a message to another. The message recipient is +//! the `initiator` in the protocol, and speaks first. Most of the CPU cost is born by the message +//! sender. +//! +//! Both parties first create a [`TrustedSet`] listing the public keys which they are willing to +//! exchange messages with. +//! +//! In order to exchange a message, the message recipient calls [`get_init_bytes`] and sends the +//! resulting message bytes to the message sender. That message sender then uses +//! [`respond_with_message`] to determine if both sides are mutually in each others' [`TrustedSet`] +//! and encrypt the message if so. Finally, the initiator uses [`decode_msg`] +//! +//! If the message sender is in the initiator's trusted set and the message sender has the public +//! key for the initiator, the message sender will learn who the initiator is upon receipt of the +//! init message (without any response). The initiator will only learn who the message sender is +//! (and the message sender will only respond) if both sides are mutually-trusting. +//! +//! In any other case, neither party learns anything about the other, apart from a rough estimate +//! of the trusted set size of the initiator. + +extern crate alloc; + +use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq; + +#[allow(dead_code)] +mod chacha20; +#[allow(dead_code)] +mod chacha20poly1305rfc; +#[allow(dead_code)] +mod poly1305; + +use alloc::vec; +use alloc::vec::Vec; + +use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret; +use secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey}; + +use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; +use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine}; + +use chacha20::ChaCha20; +use chacha20poly1305rfc::ChaCha20Poly1305RFC; + +/// The maximum number of trusted counterparties which is allowed to be in a single [`TrustedSet`]. +pub const MAX_TRUSTED_KEYS: usize = 1024; + +/// A `TrustedSet` stores the set of peers which we are willing to talk to. +pub struct TrustedSet { + trusted_ecdhs: Vec<[u8; 32]>, + state_key: [u8; 32], +} + +impl TrustedSet { + /// Constructs a new [`TrustedSet`] given a list of trusted counterparties. The keys are not + /// stored, only ECDH results are. + /// + /// `trusted_counterparties` must not exceed [`MAX_TRUSTED_KEYS`] entries or the construction + /// will fail. In all other cases construction succeeds. + pub fn new(our_key: &SecretKey, trusted_counterparties: &[PublicKey]) -> Result { + if trusted_counterparties.len() > MAX_TRUSTED_KEYS { + return Err(()); + } + + let mut trusted_ecdhs = Vec::with_capacity(trusted_counterparties.len()); + for counterparty in trusted_counterparties.iter() { + let mut ecdh_hash = Sha256::engine(); + ecdh_hash.input(b"Mutual Message Exchange ECDH Result"); + ecdh_hash.input(&SharedSecret::new(counterparty, &our_key).secret_bytes()); + trusted_ecdhs.push(Sha256::from_engine(ecdh_hash).to_byte_array()); + } + let mut state_key_hash = Sha256::engine(); + state_key_hash.input(b"Mutual Private Auth State Key Generation"); + state_key_hash.input(&Sha256::hash(&our_key[..]).to_byte_array()); + let state_key = Sha256::from_engine(state_key_hash).to_byte_array(); + + Ok(Self { trusted_ecdhs, state_key }) + } + + fn get_cover_trusted_count(&self) -> usize { + // In order to avoid giving away exactly how many keys we trust, we include some fake + // entries in our message. To avoid too much overhead we only round the trusted set up a + // bit. + debug_assert!(self.trusted_ecdhs.len() <= MAX_TRUSTED_KEYS); + match self.trusted_ecdhs.len() { + 0..=16 => 16, + 17..=32 => 32, + 33..=128 => 128, + 129..=512 => 512, + _ => MAX_TRUSTED_KEYS, + } + } +} + +/// The per-trusted-peer length in the intitial bytes. +/// +/// Fixed by the protocol. +const PER_PEER_LEN: usize = 32 + 16; +/// The length of the repeated data we sent in the init bytes and expect to be repeated in the +/// response. This is floating in the protocol, but we fix it for ourselves. +const OUR_REPEATED_DATA_LEN: usize = 64 + 32 + 8 + 16; + +/// In order to avoid a message recipient having any guess as to the size our trusted set is, we +/// shuffle the entries in our init deterministically, using the permutation calculated here. +fn get_idx_permutation(cover_trusted_set_len: usize, rng_seed: &[u8]) -> [u16; MAX_TRUSTED_KEYS] { + debug_assert!(cover_trusted_set_len <= MAX_TRUSTED_KEYS); + debug_assert!(MAX_TRUSTED_KEYS <= u16::MAX.into()); + debug_assert_eq!(rng_seed.len(), 32); + + let mut perm = [0; MAX_TRUSTED_KEYS]; + for i in 0..MAX_TRUSTED_KEYS { + perm[i] = i as u16; + } + let mut rng = ChaCha20::new(rng_seed, b"MPA PERM RNG"); + for i in 0..cover_trusted_set_len { + let mut pos; + let max_pos = (cover_trusted_set_len - i) as u64; + loop { + let mut rand = [0; 8]; + rng.process_in_place(&mut rand); + pos = u64::from_le_bytes(rand); + if pos < u64::MAX / max_pos * max_pos { + pos %= max_pos; + break; + } + } + perm.swap(i, pos as usize); + } + perm +} + +/// Gets the initial bytes this initiator should send to a (potential) message sender. +/// +/// It requires 64 secure random bytes, a reference to a [`TrustedSet`], and a `salt` and `aad`. +/// +/// The `salt` should uniquely describe this protocol the protocol being built using this mutual +/// authentication handshake. The `aad` should describe the particular message type being sent +/// (which the sender expects). +pub fn get_init_bytes( + secure_random_nonce: [u8; 64], trusted_set: &TrustedSet, salt: [u8; 8], aad: &[u8], +) -> Vec { + let mut local_nonce = [0; 32]; + local_nonce.copy_from_slice(&secure_random_nonce[..32]); + + let mut chacha_salt = [0; 12]; + chacha_salt[4..].copy_from_slice(&salt); + + let mut rng = ChaCha20::new(&secure_random_nonce[32..], b"MPA INIT RNG"); + + // Init message format is + // 2 byte handshake count + // PER_PEER_LEN * handshake count: + // 32-byte encrypted initiator nonce + // 16-byte poly1305 tag + // 2 byte repeated data len + // repeated data len bytes of data to be repeated + // any further bytes uninterpreted (for extensibility) + // + // Our repeated data is a 40 byte IV (XOR'd into `state_key` and "NONCE KY" to form the ChaCha + // key and nonce to encrypt remaining bytes), followed by 64 bytes containing the + // ChaCha-encrypted `secure_random_nonce` and the 16 byte Poly1305 MAC tag for the same. + + let vec_cnt = trusted_set.get_cover_trusted_count(); + let repeated_data_offs = 2 + vec_cnt * PER_PEER_LEN; + let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(repeated_data_offs + 2 + OUR_REPEATED_DATA_LEN); + res.resize(2 + vec_cnt * PER_PEER_LEN + 2 + OUR_REPEATED_DATA_LEN, 0); + res[..2].copy_from_slice(&(vec_cnt as u16).to_be_bytes()); + + // First fill in the encrypted slots for our trusted peers and fill remaining slots with noise. + let idx_permutation = get_idx_permutation(vec_cnt, &secure_random_nonce[32..]); + for (pos, idx) in idx_permutation.iter().take(vec_cnt).enumerate() { + let idx_slice = &mut res[2 + pos * PER_PEER_LEN..8 + (pos + 1) * PER_PEER_LEN]; + if *idx as usize >= trusted_set.trusted_ecdhs.len() { + rng.process_in_place(idx_slice); + } else { + let ecdh = &trusted_set.trusted_ecdhs[*idx as usize]; + let mut cryptoor = ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::new(ecdh, &chacha_salt, aad); + let (crypted, tag) = idx_slice.split_at_mut(32); + cryptoor.encrypt(&local_nonce, crypted, tag); + } + } + + // Pick a random nonce to XOR into the ChaCha key and nonce. Note that we reuse the `state_key` + // here repeatedly, so need the IV here to make the ChaCha pad unique. + let mut repeated_data_key_mask = [0; 32 + 8]; + rng.process_in_place(&mut repeated_data_key_mask); + let mut repeated_data_key = [0; 32]; + for i in 0..32 { + repeated_data_key[i] = trusted_set.state_key[i] ^ repeated_data_key_mask[i]; + } + let mut repeated_data_nonce = [0; 12]; + for i in 0..8 { + repeated_data_nonce[4 + i] = b"NONCE KY"[i] ^ repeated_data_key_mask[32 + i]; + } + + res[repeated_data_offs..repeated_data_offs + 2] + .copy_from_slice(&(OUR_REPEATED_DATA_LEN as u16).to_be_bytes()); + res[repeated_data_offs + 2..repeated_data_offs + 2 + 32 + 8] + .copy_from_slice(&repeated_data_key_mask); + + let (crypted_nonce, tag) = res[repeated_data_offs + 2 + 32 + 8..].split_at_mut(64); + let mut state_store = ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::new(&repeated_data_key, &repeated_data_nonce, &[]); + state_store.encrypt(&secure_random_nonce, crypted_nonce, tag); + res +} + +/// Decode the message our counterparty sent us. The `salt` and `aad` provided must match the one +/// set in [`get_init_bytes`] and the one used by the message sender in [`respond_with_message`]. +/// +/// Returns both the message sent to us by the counterparty (if any) and a shared key which can be +/// used to en/decrypt future messages with the message-sender. +pub fn decode_msg( + trusted_set: &TrustedSet, salt: [u8; 8], aad: &[u8], wire_msg: &[u8], +) -> Result<(Vec, [u8; 32]), ()> { + // Message format is: + // 2 byte selected challenge index + // 32 + 16 byte encrypted + MAC'd nonce + // 2 byte repeated data len + // repeated data len bytes of repeated data + // 2 byte message length (not counting mac) + // message length of encrypted message data + // 16 byte poly1305 message MAC + // + // Our repeated data is a 40 byte IV (XOR'd into `state_key` and "NONCE KY" to form the ChaCha + // key and nonce to encrypt remaining bytes), followed by 64 bytes containing the + // ChaCha-encrypted `secure_random_nonce` and the 16 byte Poly1305 MAC tag for the same. + const REPEATED_DATA_OFFS: usize = 2 + 32 + 16; + const CONST_OVERHEAD: usize = 2 + 32 + 16 + 2 + 2 + 16; + + let mut chacha_salt = [0; 12]; + chacha_salt[4..].copy_from_slice(&salt); + for b in chacha_salt.iter_mut().skip(4) { + *b ^= 0xff; + } + if wire_msg.len() < CONST_OVERHEAD { + return Err(()); + } + + // Read our state storage (i.e. the "secure_random_nonce" parameter from `get_init_bytes`. + let mut secure_random_nonce = [0; 64]; + let repeated_part_len; + let msg_offs: usize; + { + let mut repeated_part_len_bytes = [0; 2]; + repeated_part_len_bytes + .copy_from_slice(&wire_msg[REPEATED_DATA_OFFS..REPEATED_DATA_OFFS + 2]); + repeated_part_len = u16::from_be_bytes(repeated_part_len_bytes); + + if repeated_part_len as usize != OUR_REPEATED_DATA_LEN { + return Err(()); + } + if wire_msg.len() < CONST_OVERHEAD + OUR_REPEATED_DATA_LEN { + return Err(()); + } + msg_offs = REPEATED_DATA_OFFS + 2 + OUR_REPEATED_DATA_LEN; + + let mut repeated_data_key = [0; 32]; + for i in 0..32 { + repeated_data_key[i] = trusted_set.state_key[i] ^ wire_msg[REPEATED_DATA_OFFS + 2 + i]; + } + let mut repeated_data_nonce = [0; 12]; + for i in 0..8 { + repeated_data_nonce[4 + i] = b"NONCE KY"[i] ^ wire_msg[REPEATED_DATA_OFFS + 2 + 32 + i]; + } + + let mut state_store = + ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::new(&repeated_data_key, &repeated_data_nonce, &[]); + let ciphertext = &wire_msg + [REPEATED_DATA_OFFS + 2 + 32 + 8..REPEATED_DATA_OFFS + 2 + OUR_REPEATED_DATA_LEN - 16]; + let mac = &wire_msg[REPEATED_DATA_OFFS + 2 + OUR_REPEATED_DATA_LEN - 16 + ..REPEATED_DATA_OFFS + 2 + OUR_REPEATED_DATA_LEN]; + // The message sender (presumably) knows if they modified the repeated data, so there's no + // need to be constant-time wrt failures here (and thus we also return early). + state_store.variable_time_decrypt(ciphertext, &mut secure_random_nonce, mac)?; + } + + let mut local_nonce = [0; 32]; + local_nonce.copy_from_slice(&secure_random_nonce[..32]); + + let mut remote_nonce = [0; 32]; + + // Decrypt and validate the remote nonce + { + let mut peer_idx_bytes = [0; 2]; + peer_idx_bytes.copy_from_slice(&wire_msg[..2]); + let peer_idx = u16::from_be_bytes(peer_idx_bytes); + let idx_permutation = + get_idx_permutation(trusted_set.get_cover_trusted_count(), &secure_random_nonce[32..]); + + // The message sender has already learned if they're in our trusted peer list and if we're + // in theirs. Same goes for any third-party observers who would detect the same by the fact + // that some response was made. Thus, there's no need to worry about timing differences + // giving that away here - if the idx is bogus we can simply return and we can do a + // variable time decryption (and early return if it fails). + let ecdh_idx = idx_permutation.get(peer_idx as usize).ok_or(())?; + let ecdh = trusted_set.trusted_ecdhs.get(*ecdh_idx as usize).ok_or(())?; + + let mut remote_nonce_key = Sha256::engine(); + remote_nonce_key.input(ecdh); + remote_nonce_key.input(&local_nonce); + + let mut cryptoor = + ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::new(&Sha256::from_engine(remote_nonce_key)[..], &chacha_salt, aad); + let ciphertext = &wire_msg[2..2 + 32]; + let tag = &wire_msg[2 + 32..2 + 32 + 16]; + cryptoor.variable_time_decrypt(ciphertext, &mut remote_nonce, tag)?; + } + + for b in chacha_salt.iter_mut().skip(4) { + *b ^= 0x0f; + } + + let mut msg_key = local_nonce; + for (out, remote) in msg_key.iter_mut().zip(remote_nonce.iter()) { + *out ^= *remote; + } + + let separated_msg_keys = ChaCha20::get_single_block(&msg_key, b"INLINE KEY STRCH"); + let mut oob_msg_key = [0; 32]; + oob_msg_key.copy_from_slice(&separated_msg_keys[32..]); + + let mut msg_len_bytes = [0; 2]; + msg_len_bytes.copy_from_slice(&wire_msg[msg_offs..msg_offs + 2]); + let msg_len = u16::from_be_bytes(msg_len_bytes); + + let mut res = Vec::new(); + if msg_len != 0 { + if msg_len < 16 { + return Err(()); + } + if wire_msg.len() < msg_offs + msg_len as usize { + return Err(()); + } + res = vec![0; msg_len as usize - 16]; + let ciphertext = &wire_msg[msg_offs + 2..msg_offs + 2 + msg_len as usize - 16]; + let mac = &wire_msg[msg_offs + 2 + msg_len as usize - 16..msg_offs + 2 + msg_len as usize]; + + let mut msg_cryptoor = + ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::new(&separated_msg_keys[..32], &chacha_salt, aad); + if msg_cryptoor.variable_time_decrypt(ciphertext, &mut res, mac).is_err() { + return Err(()); + } + } + + Ok((res, oob_msg_key)) +} + +/// Processes the initial message sent by the initiator and generates an encrypted response, +/// containing the given `msg`. Also returns a negotiated shared key which can be used to encrypt +/// further messages to the initiator. +/// +/// Requires a random 64 bytes, a [`TrustedSet`] of peers, the `peer_init` message sent to us by +/// the initiator (via [`get_init_bytes`]), and a `salt` and `aad` which match those used by the +/// initiator. +/// +/// The `salt` should uniquely describe this protocol the protocol being built using this mutual +/// authentication handshake. The `aad` should describe the particular message type being sent +/// (which the recipient expects). +pub fn respond_with_message( + secure_random_nonce: [u8; 64], trusted_set: &TrustedSet, peer_init: &[u8], salt: &[u8; 8], + aad: &[u8], msg: &[u8], +) -> Result<(Vec, [u8; 32]), ()> { + // Init message format is + // 2 byte handshake count + // PER_PEER_LEN * handshake count: + // 32-byte encrypted initiator nonce + // 16-byte poly1305 tag + // 2 byte repeated data len + // repeated data len bytes of data to be repeated + // any further bytes uninterpreted (for extensibility) + + if peer_init.len() < 4 { + return Err(()); + } + + let mut handshake_count_bytes = [0; 2]; + handshake_count_bytes.copy_from_slice(&peer_init[..2]); + let handshake_count = u16::from_be_bytes(handshake_count_bytes); + if peer_init.len() < 4 + handshake_count as usize * PER_PEER_LEN { + return Err(()); + } + + let mut repeated_data_len_bytes = [0; 2]; + repeated_data_len_bytes.copy_from_slice( + &peer_init[2 + handshake_count as usize * PER_PEER_LEN + ..2 + handshake_count as usize * PER_PEER_LEN + 2], + ); + let repeated_data_len = u16::from_be_bytes(repeated_data_len_bytes); + if peer_init.len() < 4 + handshake_count as usize * PER_PEER_LEN + repeated_data_len as usize { + return Err(()); + } + + let mut chacha_salt = [0; 12]; + chacha_salt[4..].copy_from_slice(salt); + + let mut local_nonce = [0; 32]; + local_nonce.copy_from_slice(&secure_random_nonce[..32]); + let mut rng = ChaCha20::new(&secure_random_nonce[32..], b"MPA Key Salt"); + + let mut default_peer_bytes = [0; 8]; + rng.process_in_place(&mut default_peer_bytes); + let mut peer_match_idx = (u64::from_le_bytes(default_peer_bytes) as usize) + % core::cmp::max(trusted_set.trusted_ecdhs.len(), 1); + let mut remote_nonce = [0; 32]; + rng.process_in_place(&mut remote_nonce); + let mut peer_ecdh = &remote_nonce; + + let enc_bytes = &peer_init[2..2 + handshake_count as usize * PER_PEER_LEN]; + 'match_search: for (idx, peer_enc) in enc_bytes.chunks(PER_PEER_LEN).enumerate() { + for ecdh in trusted_set.trusted_ecdhs.iter() { + let mut cryptoor = ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::new(ecdh, &chacha_salt, aad); + + let mut peer_nonce = [0; 32]; + // Because the sender (should have) randomized the order of their trusted-peers list, + // the time taken to find a matching ECDH entry shouldn't give away who they were to a + // third-party observer. Thus, variable-time decryption (and an early return) should be + // fine. + let decrypt_res = + cryptoor.variable_time_decrypt(&peer_enc[..32], &mut peer_nonce, &peer_enc[32..]); + if decrypt_res.is_ok() { + peer_ecdh = ecdh; + remote_nonce = peer_nonce; + peer_match_idx = idx; + break 'match_search; + } + } + } + + for b in chacha_salt.iter_mut().skip(4) { + *b ^= 0xff; + } + + // Message format is: + // 2 byte selected challenge index + // 32 + 16 byte encrypted + MAC'd nonce + // 2 byte repeated data len + // repeated data len bytes of repeated data + // 2 byte message length (not counting mac) + // message length of encrypted message data + // 16 byte poly1305 message MAC + + let mut res = + Vec::with_capacity(2 + 32 + 16 + 2 + repeated_data_len as usize + 2 + msg.len() + 16); + res.resize(2 + 32 + 16 + 2 + repeated_data_len as usize + 2 + msg.len() + 16, 0); + res[0..2].copy_from_slice(&(peer_match_idx as u16).to_be_bytes()); + let mut res_write_pos = 2; + + let mut noise = [0; 32]; + rng.process_in_place(&mut noise); + + let mut local_nonce_key = Sha256::engine(); + local_nonce_key.input(peer_ecdh); + local_nonce_key.input(&remote_nonce); + { + let mut cryptoor = + ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::new(&Sha256::from_engine(local_nonce_key)[..], &chacha_salt, aad); + let (crypted, tag) = res.split_at_mut(res_write_pos + 32); + cryptoor.encrypt(&local_nonce, &mut crypted[res_write_pos..], &mut tag[..16]); + res_write_pos += 32 + 16; + } + + res[res_write_pos..res_write_pos + 2].copy_from_slice(&repeated_data_len_bytes); + res_write_pos += 2; + res[res_write_pos..res_write_pos + repeated_data_len as usize].copy_from_slice( + &peer_init[2 + handshake_count as usize * PER_PEER_LEN + 2 + ..2 + handshake_count as usize * PER_PEER_LEN + 2 + repeated_data_len as usize], + ); + res_write_pos += repeated_data_len as usize; + + for b in chacha_salt.iter_mut().skip(4) { + *b ^= 0x0f; + } + + let mut msg_key = local_nonce; + for (out, remote) in msg_key.iter_mut().zip(remote_nonce.iter()) { + *out ^= *remote; + } + + let separated_msg_keys = ChaCha20::get_single_block(&msg_key, b"INLINE KEY STRCH"); + let mut oob_msg_key = [0; 32]; + oob_msg_key.copy_from_slice(&separated_msg_keys[32..]); + + let proto_msg_len = if msg.is_empty() { 0 } else { msg.len() as u16 + 16 }; + res[res_write_pos..res_write_pos + 2].copy_from_slice(&proto_msg_len.to_be_bytes()); + res_write_pos += 2; + + let mut msg_cryptoor = ChaCha20Poly1305RFC::new(&separated_msg_keys[0..32], &chacha_salt, aad); + let (crypted, tag) = res.split_at_mut(res_write_pos + msg.len()); + debug_assert_eq!(tag.len(), 16); + msg_cryptoor.encrypt(msg, &mut crypted[res_write_pos..], tag); + res_write_pos += msg.len() + 16; + debug_assert_eq!(res_write_pos, res.len()); + + Ok((res, oob_msg_key)) +} + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + use secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey}; + + use std::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher}; + + fn rand_bytes() -> [u8; 32] { + let random_number = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish(); + [random_number as u8; 32] + } + fn rand_64_bytes() -> [u8; 64] { + let mut res = [0; 64]; + res[..32].copy_from_slice(&rand_bytes()); + res[32..].copy_from_slice(&rand_bytes()); + res + } + + #[test] + fn simple_test() { + let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); + + let initiator_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&rand_bytes()).unwrap(); + let initiator_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &initiator_key); + let receiver_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&rand_bytes()).unwrap(); + let receiver_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &receiver_key); + + let initiator_state = TrustedSet::new(&initiator_key, &[receiver_pk]).unwrap(); + const SALT: &[u8; 8] = b"SALTSALT"; + let init_msg = get_init_bytes(rand_64_bytes(), &initiator_state, *SALT, b"42"); + + let receiver_state = TrustedSet::new(&receiver_key, &[initiator_pk]).unwrap(); + let msg = b"Hello Initiator!"; + let (receiver_wire, receiver_shared_key) = + respond_with_message(rand_64_bytes(), &receiver_state, &init_msg, SALT, b"42", msg) + .unwrap(); + + let (initiator_msg, initiator_shared_key) = + decode_msg(&initiator_state, *b"SALTSALT", b"42", &receiver_wire).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(&initiator_msg[..], msg); + assert_eq!(receiver_shared_key, initiator_shared_key); + } +} diff --git a/mutual-message-exchange/src/poly1305.rs b/mutual-message-exchange/src/poly1305.rs new file mode 120000 index 00000000000..13a05435f7a --- /dev/null +++ b/mutual-message-exchange/src/poly1305.rs @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +../../lightning/src/crypto/poly1305.rs \ No newline at end of file