civicon.Rmd

# The CiviCon Citizen Conference {#civicon}

<!-- 1. Methods-1 (CiviCon) -->
<!--    - explicates the *treatment condition*; in this case, the CiviCon Citizen Conference -->
<!--    - *contextualizes* the CiviCon format within existing literature, formats, conflicts, tradeoffs -->
<!--    - *documents* structure, experts, sample, etc. of CiviCon -->
<!--    - *reports* on the validity, reliability of the treatment in deliberative terms, including citizen and moderator feedback. -->

<!-- % ``A great deal of work on deliberative theory focuses on conflicting values, religious toleration, identities and so on, and relatively little on conflicting facts.'' \cite[2]{Moore2011} -->

I here propose to investigate a supposed difference in current, and (more) ideal speech thinking about tax by subjecting a group of diverse citizens to a deliberative forum on the topic, which, in one succinct summary [@Steenbergen2003 25ff], is marked by

1. open *participation*, including setting the agenda and deciding on procedures (@Benhabib-1996-aa, @Chambers1995, @Cohen-1989-aa, @Habermas1992 [370ff])
2. mutual *justification* of assertions and validity claims [@Habermas1992 370],
3. orientation on the *common good* [@Rawls-1971],
<!-- not sure about this, it's kinda downstream from habermas -->
4. *respect* for one another, as well as one's arguments (@Gutmann1996, @Macedo1999), other-directedness, empathy and solidarity,
5. *constructive politics* of a widely acceptable decision over well-defined policy alternatives, ideally --- though not necessarily --- by consensus [@Cohen-1989-aa 23],
6.  *authenticity* in sincere, not strategic communication [@Habermas-1984 149]
<!-- %add here, maybe: manifest equality as demanded by Cohen -->

<!-- TODO insert this alternative list:
%\begin{enumerate}
%	\item reasonably accurate and complete \emph{information},
%	\item substantive \emph{balance} of possibly competing arguments and perspectives presented,
%	\item \emph{diversity} of participants and their positions taken,
%	\item a sincere weighting of arguments by participants, or \emph{conscientiousness}
%	\item equal consideration of all arguments, regardless of which participant offered them \cite[K1799]{Fishkin2009}.
%\end{enumerate} -->

<!-- %A Normatively Desirable, Hypothetical Political Process:
%Deliberative Democracy

%Hendriks 2005 94 writes in his cautionary note that plannung cells and consensus conferences are best suited for issues that are publicly significant and relevant to the lives of lay citizens.
%P

%And yes, already, (Warren - Pearse 15) it was gamble as to whether the people could learn enough and overcome initial variations in competence

%Cite Eliasoph on why we need a big ass issue; not a small scale issue.
%You're leading to despondence.
%Quote early passages of Eliasoph.
%Also argue with Eliasoph "Charles said …" that by all means trying to CHANGE things, and only discuss things you can change, has drawbacks.


%random quotes from BOGGS against beans-n-rice democracy
	%The focus on the immediate, tangible, can also be understood as a deliberative way of "anti-statism" that Boggs 1997 rightfully deplores, particuarly anti-statism in the public sphere: we need to understand also the big bureaucratic machine of the state and capitalism.
%Not just the immediate.
%Boggs explicetly cites that the anti-statism sentiment also comes from and resonated "within the new left, the counter-culture, somprogressive movements" (Boggs 1997: 751).
%Boggs also hypothesizes that this revolt agaianst politics may have a stretegic value in a period of global interdependence and worsening social crisis (Boggs 1997: 752).

	%Boggs 1997: 759 criticizes this: "Those new forms of empowerment and identity that have been carved out are mostly confined to the realm of neighborhood and locale".
%"The pursuit of human-scale democracy, motivated by progressive designs, thus moves in a defensive and insular direction, laying bare a process of conservative retreat beneath the facile rhetorik of grassrppts activism".

	%Boggs again 1997 760 agrees that manu eenclages do function to challenge the status qup, but, in Plotkin's words "With its characteristically defensive, exclusionary, and reactive character, the resulting politics is a 'geopolitics of local community' in which 'deterrence, counterforce, holding ground, securing borders, flanking maneuvers and standing fast' are 'central organizing concepts'.
%Each enclave becomes a mini fortress.

	%Compare to this the Porto Allegre praising of increased localized identity.

  %There are different solutions to the problem of failing democracy and mixed economy, and they all fall short.
  %The small-scale deliberation suggestion ends up being beans n rice democracy, no large scale projects or abstractions.
  %Same thing for civil society or NGOs or whatever for economic production.
  %On the democracy side, Kaplan's solutions for both problems is to make it more like markets, but for tax, that doesn't exist, as it does not for some of the other big government jobs.
  %You can't outsource tax to markets.

%Deliberative Democracy (for example, Cohen 1989) is an alternative prescription for the pluralist political process in liberal democracies.
%It promotes egalitarian, inclusive, well-reasoned and civic-minded discussions for (possibly) consensual political decision-making.
%Its normative theory draws heavily on Habermaas’ (1984) concept of communicative action and Rawls’ (1971) “Theory of Justice” as fairness.
%Where pluralism encourages the representation of particular interest, deliberative democracy demands (alternative!, Cohen 1989: 18) conceptions of the common good.
%Where pluralism aggregates given, pre-social preferences, deliberative democracy is all about forming preferences.
%Where pluralism assumes individual voter error to balance out, when errors are random (Page and Shapiro 1993, Surowiecki 2004), deliberative democracy insists on perfecting the deliberators understandings.
%Deliberative Democracy has been implemented mostly in local settings on policies of limited scope (Fung 2003, Hendrickson & Tucker 2005), a limitation for which it has been criticized (Fung & Wright 2001: 17).
%Some attempts at deliberating regional issues of greater  complexity have been made, including a ‘Citizens Assembly’ on electoral reform in British Columbia, Canada  (cf.~Ratner 2008).
%Deliberative Polling ® (recently Fishkin 2009), the ‘Gold Standard’ of deliberative fora (Mansbridge 2010: 55), combines skillfully moderated small and plenary group discussions , rigorously vetted, balanced briefings and experts with pre-treatment, post-treatment and control group opinion surveys into a quasi-experimental design.

%Crouch 2004:3 ``It is an ideal model, which can almost never be fully achieved, but, like all impossible ideals, it sets a marker.
%It is always valuable and intensely practical to consider where our conduct stands in relation to an ideal, since in that way we can try to improve.
%It is essential to take this approach to democracy rather than the more common one, which is to scale down definitions of the ideal so that they conform to what we easily achieve.
%That way lies complacency, self-congratulation and an absence of con- cern to identify ways in which democracy is being weakened.'' this is a good quote, works well with normative hypothetical.

%Crouch 2004:3 ``A similar approach is dominating con- temporary thinking.
%Again under US influence, democ- racy is increasingly being defined as liberaldemocracy: an historically contingent form, not a normative last word (see the critical accounts of this in Dahl 1989 and Schmit- ter 2002).
%This is a form that stresses electoral participa- tion as thee main type of mass participation, extensive freedom for lobbying activities, which mainly means busi- ness lobbies, and a form of polity that avoids interfering with a capitalist economy.
%It'' -->

<!-- %a dysfunctional, if hegemonic, political process.
%In their proposal for \Empowered Deliberative Democracy" Fung and
%Wright (2001:
%17) explicitly suggest what underlies much of the current
%designs:
%1.
%A focus on specic, tangible problems
%2.
%Involvement of ordinary people aected by these problems and ocials close to them
%3.
%The deliberative development of solutions to these problems.
%(ibid., all emphases

%Steiner 2008:
%190 says "it is better to keep the two models separate since they are based on diametrically opposed views of basic human nature" -->


<!-- %also, cite for empirical support for successful deliberation REykowski 2006. -->

<!-- %deliberative democracy is the opposite to economic theories of democracy (says Loftager) -->

<!-- %Mouffe 1999:
%I might argue that if there's anything where she maybe right, it should be tax and the political economy.
%That's where power should be straightforward.
%It's also where I might show that it actually CAN work.
%Tax is also where there might indeed be some zero sum games;
%as she says on p 756 "pluralist politics should be envisaged as a mixed game, in part collaborative and in part conflictual and not as a wholly co-operative game as most liberal pluralists would have it. -->

<!-- %Sunstein1991:
%4 "People are taken as they are, not as they might be."
	%I might want to point out that Sunstein is a more elaborate formulation of the endogeneity problem. -->


## Reciprocity

Deliberation is no such catalogue of first-order considerations of what would make a good (efficient, fair, sustainable) decision in any given policy field, but instead, a second-order prescription to resolve disagreement *over* those very the moral and causal arguments [@GutmannThompson-2004-aa 125].
Still, and in contrast to pluralism, it places more than just *procedural* claims, but posits *substantive* requirements for how agreement must be reached.
Succinctly, @GutmannThompson-2004-aa demand that "your fellow citizens must give reasons that are comprehensible to you" [-@GutmannThompson-2004-aa K177].
More than merely intelligible, permissible arguments to reach deliberative agreement must raise validity [@Habermas-1984] and moral [@Rawls-1971] claims *universally* acceptable to everyone.

Logically, it must then be theoretically possible for any *given* argument to *fail* that test, and to be impermissible --- including the arguments brought forward by experts.
In fact, deliberation reserves no special place for nominal experts at all, except if and to the extent that these experts have arrived at, and present their agreement under the standards of deliberation.

As noted in the above, any research design that axiomatizes any disagreement between experts (or ex-ante logic) as *misunderstandings* on the part of the non-experts fails the deliberative standard, no matter the supposedly enlightening de-biasing treatments.

The desiderata of taxation and deliberation are seemingly in conflict.
Taxation requires people to consider an exogenously given catalogue of abstractions, and deliberation implies that no such set of arguments can be unconditionally accepted.
This is a general contradiction of procedural and substantively epistemic formulations of deliberative democracy [@Bohman1998 402].

This impasse has real repercussions for the proposed research design:
apparently, it can serve only one master.
Either, participants misunderstandings can be revealed by treating them with introductory economics, *or* they can deliberate any which arguments they themselves find comprehensible.

As with so much that deliberative theory is up against this is a false dichotomy.[^false_dichotomies]

[^false_dichotomies]: For example, political participation versus enlightened understanding versus political equality, as @Fishkin2009 points out.

Argumentative reciprocity implies that expert knowledge be neither presumed, nor negated, but that these arguments --- as all others --- be allowed to demonstrate their universal causal and moral validity.

<!-- %``Mutual justification means not merely offering reasons to other people, or even offering reasons that they happen to accept [\ldots] \citep[98]{GutmannThompson-2004-aa}.
%	It means providing reasons that constitute a justification for imposing binding laws on them.
%	What reasons count as such a justification is inescapably a substantive question.
%	Merely formal standards for mutual justification --- such as a requirement that maxims implied by laws be generalizable --- are not sufficient.%plagiarism? -->

Expert- and non-expert (as all other) arguments must not merely be balanced in terms of airtime or affect, but "the considerations offered in favor of, or against, a proposal, candidate or policy \[must\] be answered in a substantive way by *those who advocate a different position*" [@Fishkin2009 K550, emphasis added].
Deliberation is, in other words, when non-experts answer expert arguments *on their own, expert terms*, and vice versa, too.
Surely, the relation of this ideal to practice is "aspirational", too, as all in deliberation [@Fishkin2009 K2679].
So far, democratic theorists have failed to show "how to incorporate the need for expertise and technical administration in a deliberative democracy" [@Thompson2008 515] and "\[a\] great deal of work on deliberative theory focuses on conflicting values, religious toleration, identities and so on, and relatively little on conflicting facts" [@Moore2011 2].

Yet, for the deliberative experimenter, this aspiration to argumentative reciprocity is the ultimate hypothesis in need of falsification, including reciprocity with expert arguments.
If expert knowledge on taxation is presumed valid, and any dissent chalked up as misunderstandings the aspiration of communicative action could *never* be falsified.
Likewise, if expert knowledge on taxation is not given adequate opportunity to be reciprocally considered on its own terms, communicative action will *always* be violated.
Neither of those formats would provide construct-valid deliberation.
Expert knowledge is then "a special case of the general problem of convincing those who are not 'in the room' to accept the results of a deliberation in which they did not directly participate" [@Moore2011 2].
This problem can only be resolved by a "democratic conception of expert authority" [@Moore2011 2], that is, if deliberative standards are extended to expert arguments, too.
A good deliberative format brings ordinary citizens into this business:
they must be enabled to the farthest extent possible to argue expert as well as non-expert claims on their own terms, including the possibility to reject expert opinion if it is found insufficiently reciprocal in argument.

Because bringing ordinary citizens into this business, and *equally* so, is, as @Rosenberg-2002-aa's so difficult, deliberations must "be regarded as remedial institutions" [-@Rosenberg-2007-aa 12] and more, "they must be sites for political education and development" [-@Rosenberg-2007-aa 13].

<!-- %%Mansbridge 2010
%	%   * points out that deliberative polling mostly does not include radical solutions, perspectives (that could be a problem)
%

%Any such reduction would violate the spirit of deliberation; citizens could not set their own agenda.
%Any such reduction may well fail to elucidate my hypothesized misunderstandings: I imagine “understanding tax” as a bucket, which, if leaky will drain to the lowest level.
%For example, if deliberators would discuss most aspects of taxation, but skip over the limits (!) of price controls, they may well opt for price controls in lieu of, or in addition to taxation.

%Meaningfully deliberating tax requires a lot of knowledge, and that knowledge is unlikely to spring merely from the act of deliberation, but it needs some input.

%\citep[101]{GutmannThompson-2004-aa} ``Reciprocity is to justice in political ethics what replication is to truth in scientific ethics.
%A finding of truth in science requires replicability, which calls for public demonstration.
%A finding of justice in political ethics requires reciprocity, which calls for public deliberation.
%Deliberation is not sufficient to establish justice, but deliberation at some point in history is necessary.'' --> 

<!-- I have a reference to abortion somewhere, that it CANNOT be resolved and there seems to be a case from Caroline Lee where pro-life and pro-choice people got together and talked with one another to prevent violence, and they ended up liking one another, but *not* agreeing at all
this is interesting both because of of the moral issue of abortion, but also as an example of the talk -->

<!-- %Barber (1984:
%175 as cited in Sanders):
%``The participatory process of self-legislation that characterizes strong democracy attempts to balance adversary politics by nourishing the mutualistic art of listening.
%``I will listen'' means to the strong democrat not that I will scan my adversary's position for weaknesses and potential trade-offs, nor even (as a minimalist might think) that I will tolerantly permit him to say whatever he chooses.
%It means, rather, ``I will put myself in his place, I will try to understand,  I will strain to hear what makes us alike, I will listen for a common rhetoric evocative of a common purpose or a common good.'' '' -->

<!-- %Sanders (emphasis added):
%``democrats [\emph{need}] to listen as well as to talk in their deliberation'' -->


<!-- %Deliberation is "still in large part a critical and oppositional idea" (Bohman and Regh 1998, p 422:
%as cited in Mutz 528).
%I totally agree. -->



<!-- %Cite that Sanders makes a good point, pointing out the dysfunctions that juries display.
%It's a good, if somewhat outdated review.
%Will need to find fresher literature.
%Sanders 369:
%``I should say that I am not entirely against deliberation.
%But I am against it for now:
%I think it is premature as a standard for American democrats, who are confronted with more immediate problems''.
%Sanders 370:
%``The invitation to deliberate has strings attached.
%Deliberation is a request for a certain kind of talk:
%rational, contained, and oriented to a shared problem.
%Where antidemocrats have used the standards of expertise, moderation and communal orientation as a way to exclude average citizens from political decision-making, modern democrats seem to adopt these standards as guides for what democratic politics should be like.
%And the exclusionary connotations of these standards persist.''
%Sanders 372:
%``What is fundamental about giving testimony is telling one's own story, not seeking communal dialoge.
%Although hooks refer to the development of a ``common literacy,'' this voice is common to a group that is usually excluded from the discourse of the dominant, and the voice that contributes to a ``common literacy'' is posed by hooks in opposition to, and as a criticism of, this dominant discourse.
%There's no assumption in testimony of finding a common aim, no expectation of a discussion oriented to the resolution of a community problem.
%Testimony is also radically egalitarian" the standard for whethera view is worthy of public attention is simply that everyone should have a voice, a chance to tell her story.''
		%This might be a problem.
%If the rich have a story to tell, too, we might end up with pluralism as we started. -->

## Remedial Deliberation

If their democratic rule is to be enlightened, deliberators must also engage a set of abstractions concerning its optimality, justice and sustainability as well as problematize the view of human motivation, utility and rationality implied by these (economic) abstractions.
<!-- TODO link to old tax sections in the above -->
Deliberators must also understand the means and ends of an (ideal) mixed economy within which taxation reconciles allocation by plan and by exchange, including respective government and market failures.
@Warren2008 [K1513], reporting on the [ca]{acronym-label="ca" acronym-form="singular+short"}, notes that such learning phases are "crucial to its ability to render a decision, and indeed" and that it *can be done*:
"the decision was a learned and sophisticated one";
"Most members transformed themselves from lay citizens with little knowledge of electoral systems into experts over a period of several months (...)" [-@Warren2008 K1513].
Any deliberation that fails to engage such technical but broadly consensual --- if not entirely coherent --- concerns, must be considered unenlightened.
It would ignore some of the causal relationships and moral alternatives that we must assume exist, if and to the extent that we accept the economic ontology of coexisting states and markets.

The fora, even though featuring learning phases, must not regress to a (traditional) classroom setting in which the economics teacher knows best.
Still, this *is* the inescapable challenge of deliberation in the modern world, as @Moore2011 points out:
"the ideal of citizen equality to deliberate issues that affect them is in tension with the inequalities of knowledge that are inherently governing complex societies", *but* "the question is not *whether* expert authority is part of the deliberative system, but *how* it is integrated and whether *this integration is itself subject to deliberative standards*" [@Moore2011 14, emphasis added].


<!-- TODO link to mixed econony and ontology -->

<!-- why do we need learning phases? how is this necessary? (it is) -->

<!-- cite rosenberg to argue for learning phases: -->
<!-- % \subsection{Political Psychology}
% Communicative action is very demanding of the cognitive and moral faculties of deliberators.
% Political psychologists have problematized these demands that deliberation poses \citep{Rosenberg-2002-aa} --- especially, but not only, deliberation of highly abstract topics.
% Troublingly for deliberative democracy of the Habermasian kind, recent research in political psychology suggests, that --- contrary to the bounded rationality assumption \citep[for example,][]{Simon-1999-aa,Kahneman2011} --- imperfect human reasoning may not only stem from remediable cognitive scarcity, but may be developmentally determined.
% \citet{Rosenberg-2002-aa} has proposed a threefold developmental sequence and typology of \emph{sequential}, \emph{linear} and \emph{systematic} reasoning.
% %TODO add better rosenberg references
% His empirical accounts suggest that if any, only systematic thinkers will be able to meet the cognitive demands for reasoned arguments, and egalitarian free speech of deliberative democracy.
% Moreover, this cognitive competence was found \emph{not} to be domain specific, and while people may regress to lower levels of competence under high loads or appropriate cues, they are unlikely to easily, if ever, achieve higher than developed levels.
% ``Structurally (more and) less developed reasoning adults'' make ``not only the adequacy of citizens' reasoning, but also their \emph{equality}'' a problem for deliberative democracy \citep[12, emphasis added]{Rosenberg-2007-aa}.

% On this red flag, too, much of deliberative practice is silent.
% While deliberative formats routinely strive to attract diverse participants and ensure their equal participation \citep{Fishkin2009}, they rarely problematize, or measure the substantive, argumentative \emph{equality} of participants.
% Among the small research that has looked into argumentative equality of actual (\gls{dp}) proceedings, \cite{Siu} finds that information, rather than education of participants is related to argument quality \emph{at the small group level}, but offers no individual-level analysis.
% There is also yet --- to my knowledge --- no research that tracks how limited and unequal capacities for moral and causal reasoning may filter up to understandings of, and preferences over complex policy issues.
% Here, too, taxation is a good case to test the promise of deliberative fora:
% it demands both advanced moral and causal reasoning, and raises controversies and tradeoffs likely to impact the life-chances of people along similar socio-economic dimensions as those related to cognitive competence.

% Based on his sobering findings, \citet[20]{Rosenberg-2007-aa} also suggests a revised understanding of deliberation:

% \begin{quotation}
% 	\emph{``Deliberative fora must not be regarded simply as empty stages that provide a venue for the realization of citizenship;
% 	nor must the design of these deliberative stages focus simply on the removal of obstructions that may inhibit freedom or give unequal scope for maneuver.
% 	Instead, deliberation must be understood as a site for the construction and transformation of citizenship.
% 	In deliberation, citizens are made as well as realized.
% 	The operative metaphor here is that of a school, but of particular kind.
% 	The educational goal is not the transmission of specific beliefs and values, although these are by no means irrelevant.
% 	Rather the central aim must be to foster the requisite cognitive development for a fuller autonomy, a greater communicative competence and a better ability to engage in a collaborative effort to make good and just public policy.''}
% 	\\*
% 	--- Shawn W.\ \citet[20]{Rosenberg-2007-aa}
% \end{quotation}

% This ``reforming'' variant of \citeauthor{Habermas-1984}' vision --- informed by empirical facts about our time, and our people --- also bears on the analysis and operationalization of deliberation.
% \emph{School}, as \citeauthor{Rosenberg-2007-aa} reminds us, is the ``operative metaphor'', one that balances furthering of equality and citizens' autonomy.

%note that the link between rosenbergs sequence thinking and my tax misunderstandings is still to be developed -->

<!-- %Rosenberg 2007:
%Rosenberg has the radical inter-subjective formulation that I think I'm looking for:
	%6:
%``In this deliberative conception, equality and autonomy require each other.
%On the one hand, equality is a necessary precondition of autonomy.
%It is only in a cooperative exchange between equals that the self-expression and critical selfreflection required for the self-reflective construction of one’s understandings and interests is possible.
	%10 Where the self dominates, self-criticism truncates and narrows.
%Where the other dominates, self-expression is suppressed.
%In either case, the self that is constructed is a distortion and any true autonomy is compromised.
%On the other hand, equality requires autonomy.
%Deliberative equality is equality of effective participation.11
	%10:
%Developmental psychology raises further questions regarding the adequacy of deliberative theorists’ characterization of cognition.
%In the deliberative democracy literature (and in most social psychological research), cognition is typically conceived as a universally shared set of distinct skills or capacities.
%Following the work of Piaget27 and Vygotsky,28 the research on cognitive development offers a more integrative and differentiated view of cognition.
%Cognition is not regarded simply as a matter of calculation or arranging representations, but more essentially as a constructive activity.
%This is understood in pragmatic terms, that is, with reference to an individual’s attempt to operate on the world around her.
%In this attempt, the individual conceives of the acts, items and people involved in term of the role each plays in her purposive activity
	%12:
%In this sense, the research suggests that deliberations be regarded as remedial institutions
%25:
%``the potential for abuse [by facilitators] is real, and crafting an appropriate conceptual and institutional response will be difficult''
-->

<!-- %\paragraph{Chicago Devolution}The almost microscopic devolution in the Chicago Police Department (CPD) or the Chicago Public Schools (CPS) are insightful examples plagued by crass incongruences of political, social and economic spaces.
%While not explicitly deliberative formats, both innovations sought to improve inclusion, dialogue, and equality \citep{Fung-2003-aa}.

% The revamped CPD sought to cooperate with residents \emph{on a neighborhood}-level to identify and to fight --- not prevent --- crime herds.
%By its very focusing on police ridings, it made larger-scale, macro determinants of crime invisible, and outside the scope of debate:
%income inequality, or zoning laws, to name just two of the factors otherwise so glaringly discernible in Chicago, itself almost the epitome of a decaying inner city\footnote{Both of these factors, incidentally, would not even need a truly macro perspective to become potentially visible, as they are already visible on a metropolitan level.}.

%In Public Schooling, Chicago reinvigorated \emph{school-based} Parent-Teacher Associations, re-trained and coached staff and teachers and installed systematic performance management ``by comparing their methods with those of \emph{similarly situated but better-performing schools}'' (\citealt{Fung-2003-aa}:
%124, emphasis added).
%No mentioning is made of comparisons with surrounding suburban Illinois or urban charter schools, which may have enabled an understanding of the structural factors influencing a school's success or may have exposed the gross differences in scholastic aptitude with students ``not similarly situated''.
%Or, one hypothesizes, such comprehensive analyses may even put the effect of school management in a humbling juxtaposition against other, more powerful macro-level factors. -->
<!-- %There is no reason to belittle the efforts of these brave \emph{Don Quixotes}, working and participating to improve their surroundings in the schools and police stations of Chicago.
%Many of them have demonstrated substantial results \citep{Fung-2003-aa}.
%But given the ``macro windmills'' grossly outmatching these deliberators --- windmills over which, under the current design they have no control or even mandated discourse --- they are destined to fail in their democratic decision-making.
%Congruency between inputs, that is, what deliberators can discuss and decide on, and the outputs, that is, the social and economic reality to which they respond, is violated.
%Even basic democratic criteria of accountability and responsibility for political decisions and outcomes (like the ``within-slum'' performance management) have no meaning in this context. -->
<!-- %\paragraph{Participatory Budgeting} Much lauded Participatory Budgeting (PB), pioneered in Porto Allegre, Brasil, is another example for the intricacies and dangers of deliberative devolution from a transition economy setting.
%Under PB, local community and organization representatives cooperate with city government in deliberative fora, both at the neighborhood level and in thematic groups.
%Using a sophisticated rating and decision procedure they allocate much of the city governments investments.
%Observer \citet{Sousa-Santos-1998-aa} notes how PB contributes to a ''counterhegemonic globalization'' by concentrating on special issues like land rights, urban infrastructure and drinking water in urban settings.
%He, like few other writers on deliberative designs and PB in particular, is aware of the resulting danger that PB projects remain ``Bean 'n Rice Works'', ``formulae for solving a few of the urgent problems affecting the popular classes, perhaps a less clientelist version than the traditionalist one, but no less imediatist and electoralist'' (\citealt{Sousa-Santos-1998-aa}:
%479).
%Also, he points to the threats posed to PB by the 1998 financial crisis in Brazil, and wonders whether PB will still be possible ``when the material results turn out to be less anchored in the immediate needs of the regions'' (ibid.:
%495) and how distributive justice will still be possible under increased functional differentiation -->

<!-- %\paragraph{Identity} Another way to look at the inadequacy of small-scale deliberation is to question the identity formation that undergirds it.
%As is often cited self-confidently, devolved deliberation is praised to be ``carved out of (\ldots) the realm of neighborhood and locale''(\citealt{Boggs-1997-aa}:
%751).
%Just some etymological intuition --- neighbor\emph{hood}, \emph{community} (living together), \emph{the local} people --- suggests a bias towards a smaller scale, identities of which, for some reason seem to be more valuable than others.

%Of course, a ``neighborhood'', for the most part --- except actual acquaintances --- is no more or less of an ``Imagined Community'' \citep{Anderson-1983-aa}, no less constructed and contingent \citep{Gellner-1983-aa} than a Nation State, or ``The International Community'', for that matter.
%``Mechanical Solidarity'' \citep{Durkheim-1893-aa}, the only kind that would justify the immediate, the local, has through multifaceted integration and functional differentiation long given way to ``Organic'' --- if any --- Solidarity, where interdependencies run far.
%And where modern technology has brought great mobility, locality, is, as Simmel \citeyear{Simmel-1917-aa} said (of boundaries) ``not a spatial fact with sociological effects, but a sociological fact which forms spatially".
%There is then no particular reason to focus on local policy making --- but highly problematic consequences, as is argued in the following. -->
<!-- %\paragraph{Macro-Level Abstractions} As the majority of theorists write, deliberation depends on a rational orientation towards the common good.
%To argue well, and with the public good in mind then, necessitates a good understanding of causal relationships ruling our social world.

%By its very definition, under modernity, these causal relationships are complex and the interdependencies run far.
%Good deliberation thus \emph{has to} transcend the immediate, the tangible and the local and to render accessible all the complex connections that functional differentiation binds.

%The described, excessively immediatist micro-focus is inadequate under modernity.
%It disallows deliberators both to understand, and to change all but a tiny portion of what determines their circumstances. -->

<!-- %\paragraph{Freedom From vs.
%Freedom To} It was, and still is, the promise of deliberative democracy to transcend the old trade-off between freedom \emph{from} and freedom \emph{to}.
%Sadly, a deliberative democracy that does not render sufficiently accessible macro-level abstractions is likely to sustain the bias towards negative freedoms of liberal democracy, which \begin{quote} ``may make it very difficult to mobilize citizens to accomplish what they collectively value most positively, but these rights and powers do insure them from suffering from what they collectively value most negatively, i.e.
%tyranny --- whether exercised by a zealous minority or an intolerant majority'' (\citealt{Schmitter-2000-aa}:
%28) \end{quote}.
%Two things are important to note about deliberative democracy and a possibly sustained liberal bias. -->

<!-- %First, The micro-macro dichotomy and and the rift between negative and positive freedoms are related:
%negative freedoms are protected by \emph{individual} rights, which by their very definition assume, and guarantee a degree of independence from broader, macro-level interrelations.
%The right to property, to ``pursue happiness'', or even --- less obviously liberal --- to form a political association (\emph{or not to}), all protect the individual from a possibly imposing collective good (or evil)\footnote{The anti-totalitarian, humanist and protective impetus of liberalism are not to be belittled here.
%Enshrined negative freedoms are a great achievement, particularly in a country like Germany, where a frenzied, putatively common good has at least once brought untold sorrow.
%The lessons of this experience notwithstanding, it is held here, that the needs have shifted in post-industrial society:
%negative freedoms, for the most part (possible exception of privacy) is largely uncontested, and antecedent values and institutions are strong and deeply rooted.
%As modernization progressed, however, positive freedoms have not grown equally.
%Much of the postindustrial world sees rising income inequalities, and even more dramatically, decreasing social mobility.}.
%Positive freedoms, on the other hand, require \emph{collective} organization to reach desirable outcomes.
%This collective organization needs to be ``congruent'' over the social, economic and political sphere.
%In micro-level deliberations, as I have tried to show, this is easily not the case, tilting the balance towards negative freedoms.

%Secondly, and more critically, the liberal trade-off between positive and negative freedoms has important equity implications.
%The balance between positive and negative freedoms is highly consequential, for they are not equally valuable to everyone.
%To put it blandly, rich people, who have much to protect and little to gain from affirmative and redistributive policy, value negative freedom more and are skeptical of positive freedom.
%While poor people certainly hold most negative freedoms equally dearly as the rich, some of them (pursuit of happiness) may not have much practical meaning under dire circumstances and others (right to property) may be opposed to their re-distributional needs.

%The above-mentioned devolution in the Chicago Police Department is a intriguing example of promoting negative freedom in at least two ways.
%First, it renders the distributional determinants of crime (decaying, impoverished inner cities) invisible.
%Secondly, it focuses our attention and decision-making on crime, more specifically, an law enforcement, not prevention --- quite the essence of promoting negative freedom. -->

<!-- %\paragraph{Do-It-\emph{Yourself} Democracy} As a corollary of its liberal, somewhat uncritical bias, small-scale deliberation also tends to be anti-statist.
%Taking up some of the anti-authoritarian, anti-bureaucratic, anti-functional-differentiation impetus of post-'68 left counter-culture, progressive and new social movements, current deliberative efforts tend to focus on the immediate, tangible and ``confined to the realm of neighborhood and locale'', not just out of necessity, but out of conviction (\citealt{Boggs-1997-aa}:
%759).

%The very essence of Weberian (\citeyear{Weber-1958-ab} rationalized authority to enable collective action in the face of highly integrated economic production, embodied --- at least for the time being --- mostly in the state, thus comes under attack.
%This cherishing of ``human-scale democracy''over all else, the donning of a large, necessarily anonymous and formalized bureaucracy, Boggs (ibid.) rightly fears, may move democracy ``in a defensive and insular direction, laying bare a process of conservative retreat beneath a facile rhetoric of grassroots activism''. -->

<!-- %Boggs (\citeyear{Boggs-1997-aa}:
%752) goes one step further and even conspires that this revolt against the state may have hegemonically ``strategic value in a period of global interdependence and worsening social crisis''. -->

<!-- \citeyear{Eliasoph-2001-aa} flamingly polemic account of how an exclusive concentration on the do-able, the small-scale, the consequentially less political, creates dynamics of an outright ``Culture of Political Avoidance'' and escapism is enlightening.

%A more disinterested, and systematic explanation of this dynamic comes from the theory of \emph{Successfully Failing Organizations} where, when faced with excessively costly challenges, organizations may choose ineffective, but symbolic policies the failure of which cannot, and will not be systematically detected.
%Such examination and oversight of agents (governors), it is argued, is not desired even by principals (the governed), precisely because its likely revelation of failure would necessitate a greater allocation (vulgo:
%redistribution) of resources \citep{Seibel-1996-aa}.
%Failure then becomes successful in that it sustains the status quo, and those who have material stakes therein. -->

<!-- %\begin{quote}
%	\emph{The best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter.}\\
%	Winston Churchill
%\end{quote} -->

<!-- %\paragraph{The Not-So-Common Sense} Recent research in political psychology suggests, that --- contrary to the bounded rationality assumption --- imperfect human reasoning may not only stem from remediable cognitive scarcity, but may be developmentally determined.
%Rosenberg (\citeyear{Rosenberg-2007-aa, Rosenberg-2002-aa, RosenbergWinterstein-2008-aa, Rosenberg-2003-aa}) has suggested a threefold developmental sequence and typology of \emph{sequential}, \emph{linear} and \emph{systematic} reasoning.
%His empirical accounts suggest that if any, only systematic thinkers will be able to meet the cognitive demands for reasoned arguments, and egalitarian free speech of deliberative democracy.
%Moreover, this cognitive competence was found not to be domain specific, and while people may regress to lower levels of competence under high loads or appropriate cues, they are unlikely to easily, if ever, achieve higher than developed levels.
%``Structurally (more and) less developed reasoning adults'' make then ``not only the adequacy of citizens' reasoning, but also their equality'' a problem for deliberative democracy (\citealt{Rosenberg-2007-aa}:
%12).

%This empirical finding resonates well with some anecdotal frustrations in deliberative settings, for example in participatory health administration:
%\begin{quote}
%``The tendency of citizens to construct their arguments in a way that is regarded as unstructured, combined with their focus on highly localized issues, makes their speeches appear unclear, emotional, disruptive or irrelevant to most representatives of the other sectors.
%Moreover, this style of speech tends to be associated with poorer and less educated people, and it is regarded as not only ineffective, but also virtually unintelligible''.
%\end{quote}

%The conclusion Rosenberg draws from this is as skeptical, as it is ambitious.
%He suggests that ``deliberations must be more than remedial, they must be sites for political education and development'' (\citeyear{Rosenberg-2007-aa}:
%13).
%If they fail, so will quality of reasoning in deliberation and equality. -->

<!-- %\begin{quote}
%	\emph{Das Ganze ist das Unwahre}\\
%	\emph{(The Whole is Falsehood)}\\
%	Theodor W.
%\citet{Adorno-1974-aa}, Minima Moralia
%\end{quote} -->

<!-- %Deliberative proposals in general, by virtue of their focus on reasoned arguments, have been charged to embody and essentially impoverished, positivist and thereby ``male'' outlook on the world, particularly from feminist critics \citep{Young-1996-aa}.
%The above discussion, expanding demands for a universal rationality and outright promoting macro-level abstractions is subject to the same criticism.

%A full-blown discussion of the epistemological justification of feminist theory, or relativism, is beyond the scope of this essay and unfortunately beyond my command of the relevant literature.
%A response to this criticism thus has to remain regrettably sketchy.

%\paragraph{The Blinders of Rationality} Its uneasily essentializing, groupist outlook notwithstanding (see further \citealt{Brubaker-2002-aa}), the feminist critique rightfully points to a number of blind spots of deliberation, and, by extension, blind spots of modern rationality.
%To widen the horizon again, Young (\citeyear{Young-1996-aa}:
%130) suggests to relativize rationality, and to allow for rhetoric, storytelling and ``greetings'' by which she means a ``care-taking, deferential, polite acknowledgement of the Otherness of other''.

%Also, she fears, universal rationality sustains hegemonic discourses, and limits our social imagination, as for example the nearly unchallenged postindustrial necessity of individual car mobility (\citealt{Young-2001-aa}:
%687). -->

<!-- %\paragraph{Enlightening the Blind Spots} These blind spots, a modern rationality that takes due regard of the human condition, \emph{can} illuminate, \emph{enlighten}.
%There is nothing quintessentially disregarding of individual experience in modern rationality.
%Correctly understood, rationality points us to the universalized abstractions (for example, the distribution of means of production, productivity, market efficiency) which always condition individual experience in the modern, integrated world.

%Modern rationality does not and should not claim that these constitute exclusive, comprehensively exhaustive or sufficient determinations of individual experience, but they are certainly a \emph{necessary} condition.
%Sometimes, the feminist insistence on individual, ``other'' experiences may actually serve well to perfect a universal rationality, for example, when it questions otherwise hegemonic discourses (`a car for everyone').

%Feminist critics, as I believe all social theoreticians, have to somehow further thinking about the world that enables people, and that enables progress.
%In this context, that means, they have to respond to the certain consequences of modern integration for the individual experience.
%They, and more positivist ventures no less, are obligated to \emph{integrate} the individual experience, its virtues and incomparability, wherever possible.
%But nothing fruitful follows, when the two perspectives are uncompromisingly opposed as mutually exclusive.
%No one is better off, and no one is empowered.

%\paragraph{No Reason Over Power Without Reason} In their discussion of deliberative democracy, feminist critics should pay due regard to its quintessential innovation:
%\emph{reason over power}(\citealt{Young-1996-aa}:
%122).
%This not only describes a historical narrative, but also a functional necessity.
%To overcome ``power'' of plurally organized, but self-interested, and thereby always \emph{particular} agents as justification for aggregated decisions, \emph{some universal} criterion to negate particular claims is required.

%Feminists, it appears, are opposed to this trade-off and believe we can leapfrog to an egalitarian \emph{and} particular utopia, which I think, for once is not only unlikely optimistic, but also, as of yet, inconclusive\footnote{Somewhat surprisingly, \citet{Young-2001-aa} speaks in favor of confrontational political activism of the subaltern elsewhere.
%This stands in an uneasy contrast with her, and the deliberative project's ambition to rid political decision-making of power.
%She argues, forcefully that `to have the subaltern speak \citep{Spivak-1988-aa}, they may have to shout first', before they deliberate.
%This familiar ``overrun'' vs.
%``overcome''dichotomy is not new, well known from the Civil Rights struggle in the U.S..
%The risk is that its main proposition to ``overrun'' old power structures before they can be ``overcome'' may counteract the fundamental, and universal delegitimization of power claims on which deliberation rests.}.

%For now, what remains --- or prevails --- when power is delegitimized, and reason relativized, as the Feminist critique suggests?
%My hunch would be:
%power wins.
%And that, from an enlightened positivist perspective, as well as from emancipative or critical theory viewpoints, cannot be desirable.

%The solution, in \citet{Rawls-1971} operative metaphor, must be to perfect the ``veil of ignorance'' towards power --- not towards individual experience, of necessity --- and to replace it with a human-faced rationality. -->


<!-- %\paragraph{Capacity:
%Keep Going, Go Big} Small-scale deliberations, already, have yielded great results.
%In particular, as \citeauthor{FungWright-2001-aa} (\citeyear{FungWright-2001-aa}:
%29) hope, it has educational qualities ``beyond the proximate scope and effect of participations, these experiments also encourage the development of political wisdom in ordinary citizens by grounding competency upon everyday, situated, experiences rather than simply data mediated through popular press, television or `book learning'.'' -->

<!-- %This discussion of potential pitfalls of deliberative designs as they are suggested today, and its underlying discourse, must not be misconstrued as an argument against small-level, or any, deliberation.
%My goal was to draw attention to the possibility of inevitable failure of such deliberation, in spite of its desirability because of a frequent incongruence between inputs and outputs, the political and the social world, under newly suggested formats as well as a somewhat questionable optimism about the cognitive competence of deliberating citizens and their equality (!).


%This is a hope that may well be justified, in part.
%Wherever functional differentiation, antecend division of labor and far-flung interdependencies progress to a certain degree, macro abstractions rule the human existence.
%And thus, good deliberators will need their `book learning', too.
%Ordinary citizens (a conspicuous distinction) are affected everyday by things beyond their immediate, grounded experiences, in fact, affected by things they never experience at all. -->

<!-- %deliberative democracy, as a term, was first used by \cite{Besette1981} -->

<!-- %An output incongruency arises. -->

<!-- %In their proposal for ``Empowered Deliberative Democracy'' \citeauthor{FungWright-2001-aa} (\citeyear{FungWright-2001-aa}:
%17) explicitly suggest what underlies much of the current designs:
%\begin{quote}
%\begin{enumerate}
%\item A focus on \emph{specific, tangible} problems
%\item Involvement of \emph{ordinary people} affected by these problems and officials \emph{close} to them
%\item The deliberative development of solutions to \emph{these} problems.
%\end{enumerate}
%(ibid., all emphases added)
%\end{quote} -->

<!-- % Baccaro 200
	%this is pretty minimal stuff.
	%cite PDPA as small-scale deliberation
	%Habermas, on the other hand seems to argue that deliberators can't get into the business of government anyway.
	%"communicative action, is action oriented to reaching understanding" (Habermas 1996, Norms and Facts)

	%Social coordination through communicative action is possible, Habermas argues, in societies characterized by ‘strong archaic institutions’ and ‘small and relatively undifferentiated groups’ (Habermas, 1996, p.
%25).
%This is because communicative action always takes place against the backdrop of a shared lifeworld, which in traditional societies provides ‘a reservoir of taken for granteds, of unshaken convictions that participants in communication draw upon in cooperative processes of interpretation’ and from which ‘processes of reaching understanding get shaped’ (Habermas, 1987, pp.
%124 and 125, respectively).

	%However, coordination through communicative action becomes improbable in post-traditional societies, due to the emergence (strictly related to rationalization and modernity) of self-centred action based on strategic calculations.
%In these societies, ‘in which unfettered communicative action can neither unload nor seriously bear the burden of social integration falling to it’ (Habermas, 1996, p.
%37), law emerges as a functional necessity exactly to ‘lighten the tasks of social integration for actors whose capacities for reaching understanding are overtaxed’ (Habermas, 1996, p.
%34).

	%6It should be noted that some of the discourses which are produced in the informal public sphere conform poorly to the ‘gentlemen’s club’ model featured in some theories of deliberation (i.e.
%rational, poised and articulate), which, according to critics, ‘involves communication in the terms set by the powerful’ (Dryzek, 2000, p.
%70), and resemble much more the ‘agonistic’, partisan discourses of a trial setting.
%Groups do not seek to persuade each other but seek to influence the court of public opinion by forcefully asserting the issues, values and interpretations that they believe should be binding for everybody, sometimes even through ‘sensational actions, mass protests, and incessant campaigning’ (Habermas, 1996, p.
%381).

	%This characterization shares with critics of deliberation, in particular with Carl Schmitt’s Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (1985), and Habermas’ own earlier work (for example, 1989), a stance of low expectation about the possibility of deliberation in formal settings, and it sees action aimed at reaching understanding as more likely to occur in the informal public sphere, where the preferences of ordinary citizens are still malleable, pragmatic constraints as to what is possible and feasible are less pressing, and the possibility for civil society groups to build communicative power by articulating moral alternatives to the

%Azmanova 2010
	%* 49:
%Jürgen Habermas has called “the unforced force of the better argument.” 2
	%   * get 2
	%   * This is a key concern:
%can deliberation overcome the crap already in people's heads?
	%   * 49:
%So the question is:
%How do we know that public deliberations are really free of power asymmetries, ideological idiom, and various forms of manipulation;
%that deliberative polling engages communicative, rather than instrumental rationality?
	%   * a good, fair argument is (This is citing Fishkin, as citied in ibid.:
%50;
%"Reflexivity is attained thanks to five procedural conditions (‘good conditions’) of deliberation:
	%      * (1) reasonably accurate information;
	%      * (2) substantive balance;
	%      * (3) diversity;
	%      * (4) conscientiousness;
	%      * (5) equal consideration.
%      * These five conditions approximate the environment in which the deliberative polls are conducted to what Jürgen Habermas has described as ‘the ideal speech situation.’ 21
 %  * apparently I need to read Thomas Kuhn, as cited in ibi.
%   * I am more optimistic than Bourdieu (being determines thinking, das sein bestimmt das bewusstsein).

%Note for thesis:
%Fishkin's is a procedural only view of deliberative democracy;
%there's no justice component, no common good component, no assumptions about how we're supposed to interact.
%I think that's fine, it's just not enough.

%Freeman, S.
%2000

	%Note for thesis:
%Fishkin's is a procedural only view of deliberative democracy;
%there's no justice component, no common good component, no assumptions about how we're supposed to interact.
%I think that's fine, it's just not enough.
	%Why not make this bigger?

	%This is great text for the political philosophy implications of deliberation.

	%The aggregative view of democracy is much like a marketplace;
%it's the economics of poliical science.

	%I agree with Caplan that it's actually worse than a market, because it doesn't have prices, but only preferences and bare majority rule.
%%cite hayek on this:
%central processing machine

	%Bingo 375:
%"In contrast to this and other aggregative conceptions, the ideal of de- liberative democracy says that in voting it is the role, perhaps the duty, of democratic citizens to express their impartial judgments of what conduces to the common good of all citizens, and not their personal pref- erences based on judgments of how measures affect their individual or group interests"

	%Bingo377:
%here's the disagreement with Fishkin:
%" No reasonable conception of democracy would advise us to vote without thinking at all about how alternatives might affect relevant in- terests (whether our personal interests or the common interest).
%This would be irrational.
%In this regard what distinguishes deliberative from aggregative conceptions is not deliberation per se, nor the fact that one involves voting but the other does not (contrast Przeworski, DD2).
%Nor is it even that the deliberative view involves discussion while the aggregative view does not.
%"

	%There's also a more expansive list of other rights that deliberative democracy requires, including some basic economic and educational opportunities (see 381)

	%I think there's really two groups of reasons for deliberation:
		  %1st lack of information (cooperation problem, this is Kaplan) (this is the "Millian argument" as cited in ibid.
%383
		%2nd   * lack of cooperation in substantive terms (bare majority rule aint enough) (I find ibids definition on 383 too shorthand;
%it's not just about minority protection, it's about an awful lot more than that).
		%3rd   * legitimacy (ibid 383) because people understand when they loose out, why the lose out
		%   * 4th:
%make principled arguments, "extends peoples imagination" (Goodin as cited ibid), "engages moral sentiments" (Rawls as cited ibid).
%"tempers self-interest" (Mill as cited ibid.)
		%   * 5th:
%autonomy by enlightenment:
%(sunstein as cited in bibid 384 "Political autonomy can be found in collective self-determination, as citizens decide, not what they 'want,' but instead who they are-what their values are and what those values require.
%"21

	%ibid 388 calls this the difference between procedural and epistemic views of democracy.Procedural views emphasize fairness of demo- cratic procedures, whereas epistemic views emphasize substantive jus- tice of outcomes.
%A pure procedural conception of democracy has no standard independent of the voting procedure itself to determine the justice of outcomes.36 A pure epistemic conception says that justice is entirely independent of procedures for deciding what is just, so that the procedure that best approximates substantive justice is itself right (le- gitimate or just).

	%There's hope for disagreeing, not tolerating stuff:
%ok:
%401:
%"Rawls's ideal of public reason then responds to the "fact of reasonable pluralism." Reasonable pluralism-not pluralism per se-defines the pa- rameters and the reach of public reason.
%This means three things (at least).
%first, Rawls's idea of public reason does not rely on autonomy or any other "comprehensive" account of the human good;
%nor does it depend on an account of the origin of moral duty (in reason, emotion, or God's wis- dom or will.) The idea that autonomy, God, utility, human perfection, or some other comprehensive value, is a condition of justice and the hu- man good must be given up within public reasoning, for these values cannot provide bases for agreement on a common good among demo- cratic citizens "

	%402:
%"Whereas expression of such unreasonable views is to be tolerated, their effects are to be contained by society.
%There is no requirement that they be respected or accommo- dated by public reason "

	%So here's the punch line (this needs to be argued very carefully):
%I think an economy, and in particular a democracy rooted in self-intersted are suboptimal and inequitable.
%Confer game theory.
%Argue this acrefully.

%---
%Mansbridge 2010
	%   * points out that deliberative polling mostly does not include radical solutions, perspectives (that could be a problem)
	%   * 55:
%t"he deliberators with radical left or right alternatives that arenot within the currently feasible political process.
%Including
	%such options is not practical in a context in which the funding and frame for Deliberative Polls and their like are provided by governments, the mainstream media, or mainstream foundations.
%But including such alternatives may be a desirable long-run goal.
%At the moment Deliberative Polls do as good a job as any of their alternatives in the quality of the options and materials they provide".

%---
%Fishkin
	%* 69:
%himself says that DP may be quite similar to a focus group, at least in terms of the moderator.

%---
%Barabas, J.
%(2004).
%How Deliberation Affects Policy Opinions.
%American Political Science Review, 98(04), 687-701.
%doi:
%10.1017/S0003055404041425.
%   * here again are the sources for bad attitudes:
%      * Delli Karpini & Keeter 1996:
%They know little about American Politics
%      * Converse 1964:
%non-attitudes, unstable

%---
%Fishkin 2010:
%when the people speak
%   * There's a Trilemma:
	%      * Political Equality
	%      * Deliberation
	%      * Mass Participation
%      * \ldots
%you can only have two.
   %   * There are two fixes:
      %   * make it small scale (Mansbridge 2010:
%59)
	%         * or make it Deliberation Day (Fishkin & Ackermann, as cited in:
%Mansbridge 2010:
%59)

%---
%Farrar, C., Fishkin, J.
%S., Green, D.
%P., List, C., Luskin, R.
%C., & Levy Paluck, E.
%(2010).
%Disaggregating Deliberation’s Effects - An Experiment within a Deliberative Poll.
%British Journal of Political Science, 40(02), 333.
%doi:
%10.1017/S0007123409990433.
	%   * (334) 3 hypothesis
	   %   * attitudes (=continuous dispositions towards policy alternatives) change (individua/gross and aggregate/net)
%      * preferences (ordinal rankings of alternatives) become closer to single-peakedness (no cyclical majorities of the sort identified by Condorcet and Arrow)
   %   * both effects are stronger (interaction!) for less salient issues (tax?
%vs.
%Stuttgart 21)
%   * 335:
%the driving effect is learning.
%the people who learn the most change the most and are the most single-peaked
%   * now this article tests salience vs.
%deliberation (people are randomly assigned to 2 issues, salient/non-salient)
%   * single-peakedness means there is a Condorcet winner (an alternative that beats, or is tied with, all others in pairwise majority voting)
%   * people may become more single-peaked for different reasons:
%      * adopt what (elites) other people think
%      * acquire a more shared, intersubjective understanding
%      * indepedently excogitate a natural ordering compelled by logic
 %  * i'm not happy about the scope of the deliberation;
%they seemed very micro, very confined.
%I would think that my setting (a mixed economy) is a lot broader and requires a lot less axioms.

%---
%Fishkin, J.
%S.
%(2010).
%Response to Critics of When the People Speak- The Deliberative Deficit and What To Do About It.
%Symposium A Quarterly Journal In Modern Foreign Literatures.
%   * interesting idea from Sanders (as cited in ibid.
%68):
%we don't understand the role of the moderator.
%"What springs most immediately to mind are examples from schools, not politics \ldots"

%---
%Smith
%53:``At its heart, a deliberative polity promotes political dialogue aimed at mutual understanding, which ‘does not mean that people will agree, but rather that they are motivated to resolve conflicts by argument rather than other means’.17 Hence, what is fundamental to democratic dialogue is ‘deliberative’ as opposed to ‘strategic’ or ‘instrumental’ rationality.''

%---
%Fishkin, the Book:
%From the standpoint of some democratic theories these practices are entirely appropriate.
%They are just part of the terms of political competition between parties and between organized interests.3 But from the perspective outlined here-deliberative democracy-they detour democracy from the dual aspiration to realize political equality and deliberation.
%AndRead more at location 95   • Delete this highlight
	%Add a note
%A democracy in which we all had substantive information would seem to take too many meetings.
%Second,Read more at location 103   • Delete this highlight
%Add a note
%A democracy in which we all had substantive opinions would also seem to take too many meetings.
%Read more at location 109   • Delete this highlight
%Add a note

%Actually talking-and listening to others-across the boundaries of political disagreement would seem to take too much effort and too many (potentially unpleasant) meetings.' Perhaps,Read more at location 112   • Delete this highlight
%Add a note

%Second, public opinion in mass society may be open to manipulation because of the public's low information levels.
%If people have little background information, then foregrounding particular facts may be persuasive when people have no idea of the broader context.
%Clean coal advocates make a powerful case for the benefits of clean coal compared to dirty coal, but the mass public has little idea that clean coal is much dirtier than natural gas (as well as other alternatives like renewable energy).
%Selective invocation of true facts (such as that clean coal is cleaner than dirty coal) without a context where those facts can be compared to others (how clean coal compares to other energy alternatives) can allow advocates to manipulate opinion.10 Third, when people have little information they may easily fall prey to misinformation.
%Even when contrary information was in the public domain, assertions that Iraq was responsible for 9/11 apparently carried weight when it was shrouded in the protective glare of national security.
%Fourth, a strategy of manipulation that is probably more common than misinformation is strategically incomplete but misleading information.
%If one argument based on true but misleadingly incomplete information has high visibility through expensive advertising and the counter to it never gets an effective audience, then the public can be seriously misled.
%Fifth, another key strategy of manipulation is to "prime" one aspect of a policy, making that dimension so salient that it overwhelms other considerations.
%In effect, a candidate or policy advocate changes the terms of evaluation so that the issue on which his or her side does best becomes the one that is decisive.11 Read more at location 124   • Delete this highlight
%Note:
%these are the dysfunctions of liberal democracy;
%given its limitations.
%Compare, in particular the last one, with my piece on neo-Downsian voting.
%Edit

%By priming a dimension, whether crime or character or national security, the incident can be intentionally employed to change (or further emphasize) the terms of evaluation to the neglect of other issues.12 As campaigns (and outside actors) compete to reshape the playing field, the result is literally MAD or what might be termed mutually assured distraction.
%Read more at location 136   • Delete this highlight
%Add a note

%In our democratic experience thus far, the design (and possible reform) of democratic processes has confronted a recurring choice between institutions, on the one hand, that express what the public actually thinks but usually under debilitated conditions for it to think about the issues in question, as contrasted with institutions, on the other hand, that express more deliberative public opinion-what the public would think about an issue if it were to experience better conditions for thinking about it.
%TheRead more at location 261   • Delete this highlight
%Add a note

%The hard choice, in other words, is between debilitated but actual opinion, on the one hand, and deliberative but hypothetical opinion, on the other.
%OneRead more at location 264   • Delete this highlight
%Note:
%bingo! Edit

%The idea is that if a hypothetical situation is morally relevant, why not do a serious social science experiment-rather than merely engage in informal inference or armchair empiricism-to determine what the appropriate hypothetical situation might actually look like?
%And if that hypothetical situation is both discoverable and normatively relevant, why not then let the rest of the world know about it?
%Just as John Rawls's original position can be thought of as having a kind of recommending force, the hypothetical representation of public opinion identified by the Deliberative Poll also recommends to the rest of the population some conclusions that they ought to take seriously.57 TheyRead more at location 447   • Delete this highlight
%Note:
%bingo.
%Counterfactual + Rawls .
%Edit

%It may well be that if a deliberative design requires a consensus "verdict" as in a jury, then a combination of social pressure and bargaining may yield results that depart from the conscientious judgments of the deliberators.
%However,Read more at location 614   • Delete this highlight
%Note:
%interesting thought:
%secret vote and NO consensus serves to avoid pressures for bargaining and/or compromise.
%Or is this maybe a good thing?
%Edit

%Chart II.Read more at location 720   • Delete this highlight
%Note:
%Consider adding this chart, or visualizing it in some other way.
%Edit

%The idea of microcosmic deliberation is to take a relatively small, face-to-face group which everyone has an equal chance of being part of, and provide it with good conditions for deliberating on some policy or political issue.
%Citizens Juries, like Deliberative Polls use public opinion research methods to gather a sample to deliberate.
%But the Citizens Jury is more akin to a single discussion group in that the size is comparable to that of a modern jury-twelve or perhaps eighteen or twenty-four.34 A benefit of such a group is that it can continue to meet in a local community for an extended period, sometimes for several days or on successive weekends.
%The "jurors" hear testimony, call witnesses, ask for evidence, and at some point come up with recommendations to some local or governmental authority.
%The limitation of the process is that with such small numbers it is not possible to establish the statistical representativeness of the deliberating group.
%Citizens juries are too small for there to be a scientific basis for connecting their conclusions to the hypothetical informed opinion of an entire society, to what the country would decide if it were better informed-even though the results of Citizens juries are often represented in that way.
%However, the now extensive experience in both the United States and the United Kingdom with Citizens juries adds to our picture of citizen competence with complex policy issues-once citizens find themselves in a social context that supports deliberation.35 Read more at location 843   • Delete this highlight
%Note:
%if I can't get enough money for a deliberative poll, I'll do a "Citizen Jury" Edit

%Our other focus for how to fill out Quadrant II, microcosmic deliberation, is a very old practice, but one that has only recently revived.
%If it is to acquire credibility, it needs buttressing with systematic investigation.
%Social science can be employed to give credibility to the claim that a particular strategy of institutional design has been realized to give expression to deliberative democracy-to the combination of political equality and deliberation.
%The aspiration is to undertake a research agenda that credibly explores the conditions under which deliberation might be realized by ordinary citizens who constitute a credible microcosm.
%The tighter this connection, the more transparent it is;
%the more evidence there is that it has been achieved without distortion, the more force there is to the claim that we can accept a realization of what the people would think (Quadrant II), rather than what they actually do think when they are not thinking very much (Quadrant IV).
%Now we will turn to an overview of some initial efforts in this direction.
%Read more at location 1373   • Delete this highlight
%Note:
%so this is what Fishkin wants to do.
%Is this want I want to do?
%Maybe.
%PLUS tax.
%Edit

%First, if and when this combination is achieved, how inclusive is it?
%In what way can it represent all the relevant voices or perspectives in the population?
%Second, if and when this combination is achieved, how thoughtful is it?
%We need to look at specific indicators of deliberative quality to evaluate the process and ensure that the results really are driven by consideration of the merits of competing arguments and not distorted by some pattern of domination or group psychology.
%Third, if and when this combination is achieved, what effects does it have?
%What effects does it have on participants or on the broader public dialogue?
%Most importantly, can it be situated in the policy process or the public dialogue in such a way that it has some effect on policy?
%Fourth, under what social and political conditions can any of this be accomplished?
%EvenRead more at location 1381   • Delete this highlight
%Add a note

%Social science must form the basis for defending the inference that a given design is producing its conclusions through the normatively appropriate deliberative processes (questions of internal validity) and that it is in principle generalizable to the larger population (questions of external validity).
%TheRead more at location 1408   • Delete this highlight
%Note:
%these are the research goals.
%Edit

%The problem is that any microcosmic deliberation taking place in a modern developed society will be one in which there are significant social and economic inequalities in the conduct of ordinary life in the broader society.
%It seems difficult or impossible to "bracket" these inequalities-for participants to behave "as if" they do not exist.6 Indeed the problem goes deeper.
%The possibility of doing so is the challenge of the "autonomy of the political," namely, whether or not equality can hold sway in politics in a world in which inequality rules in economic and social relations.
%The viability and legitimacy of the liberal-democratic project may turn on the answer.
%HowRead more at location 1431   • Delete this highlight
%Note:
%bingo.
%This is indeed the huge question.
%It's great that Fishkin acknowledges the problem.
%We'll see what we can do about it.
%Edit

%But Young's point is that there are more subtle forms of exclusion that turn on manners of speaking and listening.
%Some people, even if formally included, may not have their voices, if they speak at all, taken seriously.
%They may give off cues that indicate they are not well informed or not worth listening to.
%Those who are accustomed to every advantage in the conduct of their everyday lives may be more assertive in pressing their views on others and less open to listening to those without similar advantages.' They may also be more accustomed to orderly forms of reason-giving argument that weigh with other participants.
%Or so the argument goes.
%TheRead more at location 1438   • Delete this highlight
%Add a note

%Changes in collective consistency.
%The literature on public choice, from the Marquis de Condorcet in the eighteenth century through William H.
%Riker, Kenneth Arrow, and modern practitioners confronts the problem that democracy can lead to cycles.
%In pairwise comparisons majorities can move from A to B to C and back to A again.
%When this is the case, agenda manipulations can arbitrarily determine the outcome.
%Any claims to a reasoned public will formation seem undermined.
%However, when preferences conform to an underlying dimension, say left-right as an example, then they are said to be "single peaked" and cycles are not possible.12 There has been considerable speculation that when participants deliberate together, the percentage of the participants who come to share the same single-peaked dimensions increases, making cycles less likely or virtuallyRead more at location 1479   • Delete this highlight
%Note:
%this is my stuff.
%Edit

%In addition, in the eight Texas projects on energy choices, the percentage willing to pay more on their monthly utility bills in order to provide wind power to the whole community rose by about thirty points, averaged over the eight projects.
%And the percentage willing to pay more on their monthly bills in order to provide conservation efforts for the community (demand-side management) also rose about thirty points.
%TheRead more at location 2013   • Delete this highlight
%Note:
%note that this is the kind of common-good argument that I was looking for.
%Bingo.
%Edit

%And introducing deliberation into the schools would have lasting benefits as a method for reaching a broader public.60 ChangesRead more at location 2034   • Delete this highlight
%Note:
%compare this to the democratic school via This American Life.
%Edit

%Second, there are some protections against corruption and capture.
%The Texas projects on energy choices were part of a regulatory process, Integrated Resource Planning, that affected hundreds of millions of dollars of investment.
%YetRead more at location 2230   • Delete this highlight
%Add a note

%A legacy of conflict or deep differences of identity may leave them inured to any appeals about a shared public good-precisely because their minds and hearts are closed to any shared future with the opposing community.
%ForRead more at location 2267   • Delete this highlight
%Note:
%this is beautiful language, and adequate language "their minds and hearts are closed to any shared future with the opposing community" Edit

%---
%---
%Gutman, the book:

%1) Its first and most important characteristic, then, is its reason-giving requirement.
%The reasons that deliberative democracy asks citizens and their representatives to give should appeal to principles that individuals who are trying to find fair terms of cooperation cannot reasonably reject.
%The reasons are neither merely procedural (“because the majority favors the war”) nor purely substantive (“because the war promotes the national interest or world peace”).
%They are reasons that should be accepted by free and equal persons seeking fair terms of cooperation.Read more at location 163   • Delete this highlight

%2)  second characteristic of deliberative democracy is that the reasons given in this process should be accessible to all the citizens to whom they are addressed.
%To justify imposing their will on you, your fellow citizens must give reasons that are comprehensible to you.
%If you seek to impose your will on them, you owe them no less.
%This form of reciprocity means that the reasons must be public in two senses.
%First, the deliberation itself must take place in public, not merely in the privacy of one’s mind.
%In this respect deliberative democracy stands in contrast to Rousseau’s conception of democracy, in which individuals reflect on their own on what is right for the society as a whole, and then come to the assembly and vote in accordance with the general will.2 The other sense in which the reasons must be public concerns their content.
%A deliberative justification does not even get started if those to whom it is addressed cannot understand its essential content.
%It would not be acceptable, for example, to appeal only to the authority of revelation, whether divine or secular in nature.Read more at location 177   • Delete this highlight
%Add a note

%3) The third characteristic of deliberative democracy is that its process aims at producing a decision that is binding for some period of time.
%In this respect the deliberative process is not like a talk show or an academic seminar.
%The participants do not argue for argument’s sake;
%they do not argue even for truth’s own sake (although the truthfulness of their arguments is a deliberative virtue because it is a necessary aim in justifying their decision).
%They intend their discussion to influence a decision the government will make, or a process that will affect how future decisions areRead more at location 199   • Delete this highlight

%4) This continuation of debate illustrates the fourth characteristic of deliberative democracy—its process is dynamic.
%Although deliberation aims at a justifiable decision, it does not presuppose that the decision at hand will in fact be justified, let alone that a justification today will suffice for the indefinite future.
%It keeps open the possibility of a continuing dialogue, one in which citizens can criticize previous decisions and move ahead on the basis of that criticism.
%Although a decision must stand for some period of time, it is provisional in the sense that it must be open to challenge at some point in the future.
%This characteristic of deliberative democracy is neglected even by most of its proponents.Read more at location 212   • Delete this highlight
%Note:
%and maybe it should be rejected.
%it risks infinite regress it does not allow for substantive standards to criticize deliberations.
%in effect everything becomes deliberative.
%there is no explicitly non liberal pluralist morm of justice.
%Edit

%Practicing the economy of moral disagreement promotes the value of mutual respect (which is at the core of deliberative democracy).
%By economizing on their disagreements, citizens and their representatives can continue to work together to find common ground, if not on the policies that produced the disagreement, then on related policies about which they stand a greater chance of finding agreement.Read more at location 231   • Delete this highlight
%Note:
%ok so youre supposed to agree where you can.
%Edit

%But here the point to keep in mind is that the democratic element in deliberative democracy should turn not on how purely procedural the conception is but on how fully inclusive the process is.
%While deliberation is now happily married to democracy—and Habermas deserves much of the credit for making the match—the bond that holds the partners together is not pure proceduralism.
%What makes deliberative democracy democratic is an expansive definition of who is included in the process of deliberation—an inclusive answer to the questions of who has the right (and effective opportunity) to deliberate or choose the deliberators, and to whom do the deliberators owe theirRead more at location 274   • Delete this highlight
%Note:
%yes yes yes.
%true.
%its not just about deliberation but nclusiveness.
%but what kind of inclusiveness?
%its not just quant its also quality.
%also how is this different from enlightened self interest?
%and what if shawn is right that not everyone can do that?
%Edit

%theories.12 First-order theories seek to resolve moral disagreement by demonstrating that alternative theories and principles should be rejected.
%The aim of each is to be the lone theory capable of resolving moral disagreement.
%The most familiar theories of justice—utilitarianism, libertarianism, liberal egalitarianism, communitarianism—are first-order theories in this sense.Read more at location 336   • Delete this highlight
%Note:
%i think deliberation needs a first order theory too Edit

%In contrast, deliberative democracy is best understood as a second-order theory.
%Second-order theories are about other theories in the sense that they provide ways of dealing with the claims of conflicting first-order theories.Read more at location 340   • Delete this highlight
%Add a note
%ways of dealing with the claims of conflicting first-order theories.
%TheyRead more at location 342
%Note:
%the link betweem deliberative theory and fist order theory is the following:
%inclusivenessis hardly a given.
%to compensate this you need a theory of justice as well as schools for democracy.
%Edit

%electoral process is modeled on the analogy of the market.
%Like producers, politicians and parties formulate their positions and devise their strategies in response to the demands of voters who, like consumers, express their preferences by choosing among competing products (the candidates and their parties).Read more at location 361   • Delete this highlight
%Note:
%yes sadly.
%criticize this with downs.
%Edit

%The second aggregative method gives less deference to the votes and opinions of citizens:
%officials take note of the expressed preferences but put them through an analytic filter—such as cost-benefit analysis—which is intended to produce optimal outcomes.
%In some versions of this process, preferences based on misinformation or faulty heuristics can be corrected, and sets of preferences that produce irrational results (such as cyclical majorities) can be modified.
%This method originates in classical utilitarianism and owes its contemporary pedigree to welfare economics.Read more at location 365   • Delete this highlight
%Note:
%aka social choice the first mechanism is aka ppluralism Edit

%What these methods have in common—and what defines aggregative conceptions—is that they take the expressed preferences as the privileged or primary material for democratic decision-making.
%Preferences as such do not need to be justified, and aggregative conceptions pay little or no attention to the reasons that citizens or their representatives give or fail to give.Read more at location 373   • Delete this highlight
%Add a note

%The Commission might have reverted to the first method recommended by aggregative democrats—conducting a survey or referendum and taking the results as final.
%But the Commission realized that public opinion on this complex set of issues was inchoate, and would depend on how the questions were phrased.Read more at location 418   • Delete this highlight
%Note:
%same with tax.
%this is about oregon health care ranking Edit

%Deliberative theorists who favor a more substantive conception deny that procedural principles are sufficient.
%They point out that procedures (such as majority rule) can produce unjust outcomes (such as discrimination against minorities).
%Unjust outcomes, they assume, should not be justifiable on any adequate democratic theory.Read more at location 528   • Delete this highlight
%Add a note
%assume, should not be justifiable on any adequate democratic theory.
%ARead more at location 531
%Note:
%heres a nice idea.
%shawn shows that deliberation without substantive justice doesnt work becase its beyond the human ability at least today under inequality.
%the social mind and sharpe schwartz show that we can do more.
%hence we need and can do substantive deliberaion.
%i think frank does something similar for tax.
%and so does mccaffery.
%this could be a nice structure for my diss.
%Edit

%Michael Walzer, a critic who raises this kind of objection, asks deliberative democrats:
%“Is this our utopia—a world where political conflict, class struggle, and ethnic and religious differences are all replaced by pure deliberation?”Read more at location 1086   • Delete this highlight
%Add a note

%Mutual justification means not merely offering reasons to other people, or even offering reasons that they happen to accept (for example, because they are in a weak bargaining position).
%It means providing reasons that constitute a justification for imposing binding laws on them.
%What reasons count as such a justification is inescapably a substantive question.
%Merely formal standards for mutual justification—such as a requirement that the maxims implied by laws be generalizable—are not sufficient.
%If the maxim happens to be “maximize self-or group-interest, ” generalizing it does not ensure that justification is mutual.
%Something similar could be said about all other conceivable candidates for formal standards.
%Mutual justification requires reference to substantive values.
%We can see more clearly why mutual justification cannot proceed without relying on substantive values by imagining any set of reasons that would deny persons basic opportunities, such as equal suffrage and essential health care.
%Even if the reasons satisfied formal standards, they could not constitute a mutual justification because those deprived of the basic opportunities could reasonably reject them.
%Denying some persons suffrage is a procedural deprivation that is inconsistent with reciprocity:
%we cannot justify coercive laws to persons who had no share in making them.
%Similarly, denying persons essential health care is a substantive deprivation that cannot be justified to the individuals who need it.
%That such denials are unacceptable shows that the mutual justification is neither purely formal nor purely procedural.Read more at location 1823   • Delete this highlight
%Add a note

%Although reciprocity is a foundational value in deliberative democracy, it does not play the same role that first principles, such as utility or liberty, play in theories such as utilitarianism or libertarianism.Read more at location 1846   • Delete this highlight
%Add a note

%An important implication of reciprocity is that democratic deliberation—the process of mutual reason-giving—is not equivalent to the hypothetical justifications proposed by some social contract theories.
%Such justifications may constitute part of the moral reasoning to which some citizens appeal, but the reasoning must survive the test of actual deliberation if it is to ground laws that actually bind all citizens.
%Moreover, deliberation should take place not only in the private homes of citizens or the studies of philosophers but in public political forums.
%In this respect, deliberative theory proposes a political ideal that is process-dependent, even if its content is not exclusively process-oriented.Read more at location 1854   • Delete this highlight
%Add a note

%Reciprocity is to justice in political ethics what replication is to truth in scientific ethics.
%A finding of truth in science requires replicability, which calls for public demonstration.
%A finding of justice in political ethics requires reciprocity, which calls for public deliberation.
%Deliberation is not sufficient to establish justice, but deliberation at some point in history is necessary.Read more at location 1870   • Delete this highlight
%Add a note

%NICE recommend the new taxane drugs for chemotherapy, which do not cure but, as one MP put it, “can add years to life at a cost of about £10, 000 per year”?
%If NICE recommends against prescribing expensive new drugs that can provide some health-care benefits to patients, will it thereby be shielding the Government from pressure to increase the total NHS budget?
%If NICE recommends in favor of the NHS prescribing these drugs, will it thereby be forcing NHS not to fund some other existing and highly valuable treatments (or pressuring the Government to increase funding for the NHS)?Read more at location 2078   • Delete this highlight
%Add a note
%(or pressuring the Government to increase funding for the NHS)?
%TheRead more at location 2082
%Note:
%here is an interesting qestion as to what happens wen you leaveout the macro.
%this nice businss seems to be mostly about drugs.
%interestingly theres no mention of the market pricing of drugs which are often natural monopolies.
%Edit

%Reciprocity sets four standards or criteria to assess decision-making about health care:
%the justifications that decision-makers give should consist of reasons that are accessible, moral, respectful, and revisable.Read more at location 2518   • Delete this highlight
%Add a note

%(That is why cases limited to a single HMO cannot tell the whole story about social justice with respect to medical care.) Deliberation in a different forum may be necessary to address the problem.
%The best alternative to deliberation within HMOs may be publicly accountable deliberation in Congress, which has the power to set the legal parameters within which all HMOs must operate.Read more at location 2592   • Delete this highlight
%Add a note

%First, the reasons that decision-makers give should be accessible.Read more at location 2608   • Delete this highlight
%Note:
%do this for tax Edit

%Moral Reasons Reciprocity demands more than accessible reasons.
%Self-interested reasons—or reasons that serve the interests of one’s employer—are among the most conspicuously accessible.Read more at location 2656   • Delete this highlight

%The criterion of mutually respectful reasoning helps distinguish a reciprocal perspective from another kind of moral perspective, which bases itself on the criterion of impartiality.
%Reciprocity stands between prudence, which demands less from justifications, and impartiality, which demands more.
%Impartiality insists that reasons be impersonal.
%It requires citizens to suppress their own personal perspectives and partial projects when setting social policies and procedures.
%The prime example of an impartialist approach is utilitarianism.
%In practice, it favors expert decision-making and implies that the medical professionals in DesertHealth should have the final say as long as their judgment is consistent with general professional opinion.
%The preferred impartialist method is neither bargaining nor deliberation, but demonstration, which aims as far as possible to establish the truth of a comprehensive moral view.
%In the face of moral disagreement, impartiality tells citizens and officials that they should affirm the view most consistent with the true morality as determined by impersonal justification.
%There is no further moral need for mutual respect or for actual political deliberation.
%The trouble with impartiality is that it does not take moral disagreement seriously enough.
%More precisely, it fails to provide a satisfactory way to deal with the moral disagreements that inevitably remain on many issues when expert opinion on the technical and medical problems or the demonstration by a comprehensive moral philosophy such as utilitarianism are complete.
%In the face of a fundamental moral disagreement such as funding fetal-tissue research, expensive organ transplants, or experimental diagnostic tests such as PUREPAP, the impartialist approach can declare only one side (or no side) correct.
%If one side is correct, it provides no reasons for recognizing moral value on the other side.
%It therefore offers no way, other than agreement, for the other side to respect the decision on moral grounds.Read more at location 2742   • Delete this highlight
%Add a note

%“[O]nly love has the power to forgive, ” Hannah Arendt wrote.
%And, “Love, by its very nature, is unworldly, and it is for this reason rather than its rarity that it is not only apolitical but antipolitical.”39 But while reciprocity does not aim at encouraging love among citizens, it does aim at developing some degree of respect among citizens.
%“[W]hat love is in its own, narrowly circumscribed sphere, ” Arendt concluded, “respect is in the larger domain of human affairs.” Respect is less personal than love.
%It does not require intimacy or closeness, or even an admiration of a person’s achievements or particular qualities.
%Respect is a civic acknowledgment:
%the recognition that others are our fellow citizens and that we are willing to treat them as such, as long as they demonstrate a willingness to reciprocate.Read more at location 3284   • Delete this highlight
%Add a note

%---
%Fishkin, J.
%S., & Luskin, R.
%C.
%(2005).
%Experimenting with a Democratic Ideal:
%Deliberative Polling and Public Opinion.
%Acta Politica, 40(3), 284-298.
%doi:
%10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500121.

%   * 285 political equality:
%"equal consideration of everyone's preferences, where 'everyone' refers to some relevant population or demos, and 'equal consideration' means a process of equal counting so that everyone has the same 'voting power' (an equal chance of being the decisive voter, when the voters are described anonymously, without reference to past voting patterns or current preferences)
%      * aka a random sample! (!)
%   * 285 deliberation is " 'weighing', which could be collective, individual, or both - involving discussion, rumination, or both.
%"
%      * informed
%      * balanced
%      * conscientious
%      * substantive
%      * comprehensive
%   * disagrees with Cohen 1997, Gutmann and Thomson 2003, NO particular style or quality of thought, much less the acceptance of any given premise.
%These are stricly procedural (!).
%   * (not sure I like that)
%   * 286:
%cites Gallup's (1939) hopes that the media plus surveys would do the trick to restore New England townhall-style deliberation;
%but it didn't.
%Maybe the media failed us here?
%   * my idea:
%      * there are two more dimensions of democracy
%         * feasibility / can it be done, immediately, by the deliberative forum?
%         * potent polity / determination of the agenda, et al
%      * read up on jury stuff
%      * fishkin:
%This ain't a jury.
%There's no verdict, no consensus required.
%Also, there's a secret vote.
%      * I'm not sooo sure I agree with this.
%Maybe we'd have to link deliberative democracy more closely to legislation.
%What about putting it up for a referendum?
%   * ibid 2pdf, Fishkin seems to prefer deliberation that is "attainable" - but why?, 286:
%"not behind a hypothetical veil of ignorance", but in the actual world of politics and policy.
%      * I'm not happy about this.
%   * bingo, I think 294:
%‘Thought experiments’ imagining what people would decide under morallyrelevant hypothetical conditions have become a staple of contemporary political theory (Fishkin, 1992).
%But why not move beyond armchair empiricism?
%If a hypothetical situation is morally relevant, why not do a real social science experiment to see what the appropriate hypothetical might actually look like?
%And if that hypothetical is both discoverable and normatively relevant, why not then let the rest of the world know about it?

%   * awesomeness, 294:
%deliberatives poll combine the best of experiments (internal validity) and surveys (external validity)
%   * follow up on:
%      * Cohen 1997
%      * Gutmann and Thomposn 2003\

%---

%Levinson, S.
%(2010).
%Democracy and the Extended Republic - Reflections on the Fishkinian Project.
%The Good Society, 19(1), 63-67.
%   * reviewing Fishkin:
%When the People Speak
%   * 66:
%There are, Fishkin notes, “normally strong disincentives for mass public opinion to be very deliberative.” 11 These can range simply from what economists would call the “search costs” involved in becoming suitably informed about public issues to the collective-action problems, also much emphasized by economists, that promote “free-riding” by most of the public on the relatively small number of individuals who are willing to invest their scarce time and energy (and money) into the demands of genuine republican citizenship.
%Some use these economistic insights to discredit the very project of popular democracy.
%12
%   * Trilemma
%      * Political equality
%      * Mass participation
%      * deliberation
%Fishkin is no utopian.
%Indeed, a very important part of his argument is that one must choose among the horns of his trilemma.
%There is, therefore, the sad realization that “the fundamental principles of democracy do not add up to such a single, coherent ideal to be appropriated, step by step.
%… Achieving political equality and participation leads to a thin, plebiscitary democracy in which deliberation is undermined.
%Achieving political equality and deliberation leaves out mass participation.
%Achieving deliberation and participation can be achieved for those unequally motivated and interested, but violates political equality.” 13

%uh-oh, fishking may be to careful?

%66:
%"Rather, the question is whether, in effect, Fishkin should embrace a more robust version of “deliberative assemblies” as at least a complement and perhaps, in certain contexts, a replacement for representative democracy that relies on elections as a mechanism of selecting decision makers.
%And, if he did embrace such a version (and vision), would he find himself the target of hostility by those who might give him a hearing if his announced aims are significantly more modest?"\

%in a similar vein, 66f:
%"One of my favorite political dicta is John Roche’s emendation of Lord Acton’s famous, adage:
%“Power corrupts, and the possibility of losing power corrupts absolutely.” To the\

%Get in touch with this guys.
%He is great.
%He wants subversive Fishkinians.

%Comment in my piece that I agree with this guy;
%we need to argue and engage how this project can engage, complement or replace pluralist/representative democracy.
%I don't know how to do this yet, and that will stay beyond what is possible in my project.
%BUT:
%tax is a pretty thorny issue.
%It'll ruffle some feathers.
%Maybe it's so much at the heart of the representative apparatus that you get to see some ot this stuff.

%---

%Benhabib

%BINGO:
%71 Furthermore, much political theory under the influence of economic modelsof reasoning in particular proceeds from a methodological fiction:
%this is .
% the methodological fiction of an individual with an ordered set of coherent preferences.
%This fiction does not have much relevance in the political world.On complex social and political issues, more often than not, individuals may have views and wishes but no ordered set of preferences, since the latter would imply that they would be enlightened not only about the preferences but about the consequences and relative merits of each of their preferred choices in advance.
%It is actually the deliberative process itself that is likely to produce such an outcome by leading the individual to further critical reflection on his already held views and opinions;
%it is incoherent to assume that individuals can start a process of public deliberation with a level of conceptual clarity about their choices and preferences that can actually result only from a successful process of deliberation.
%Likewise, the formation of coherent preferences cannot precede deliberation;
%it can only succeed it.
%Very often individuals' wishes as well as views and opinions conflict with one another.
%In the course of deliberation and the exchange of views with others, individuals become more aware of such conflicts and feel compelled to undertake a coherent ordering.

%---
%Fung 2003

%There are big tectonic plates moving, that are causing the dysfunctions of democracy (agreed).
%339.

%339:
%minipublics "look like, because they are, exercises in “reformist tinkering” rather than “revolutionary reform.”5

%This requires an account of how democracy used to work (I take this from the one really old study in the Roosevelt election, Carpini?:
%at that point, interests and voting aligned.
%Questions where, essentially, pretty simple.
%And maybe even zero-sum.
%We should be grateful that that is no longer the case.
%Tax is a case in point;
%there used to be a clear-cut case in tax, when capital was a class in itself (savings norms!), and when unions were strong wage bargainer (incidence of corporate tax!).

%Note that this is a good reason for tax as a case:
%It's about as large-scale as it gets.
%(like monetary policy, maybe, or trade?).
%Also, the mismatch between public discourse and the actual abstractions governing tax is hardly ever as colossal as here (or so I hope) ( Make a pun about this;
%that I don't hope other policy areas are affected by similar problems).

%have an outing:
%there's lots of stuff that I'd have to do for the large-scale deliberation that isn't actually PhD work (think invitations, catering, media work).
%So there's good reason to do this externally.

%This really is a key question:
%how do you scale up deliberation?
%Can you?
%should you?
%365:
%How to make sure it's not beans-n'-rice democracy?

%---
%Sausgruber, R., & Tyran, J.-R.
%(2011).
%Are we taxing ourselves?
%- How deliberation and experience shape voting on taxes.
%Journal of Public Economics, 95(1-2), 164-176.
%Elsevier B.V.
%doi:
%10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.10.002.
%Cite Sausgruber and Tyran, to show that people may need some instruction before they deliberate away.
%In their research, JUST deliberation actually makes matters worse.

%Feature Table in Elster page 7

%Feature great Burke quote from Elster, it's on EverNote

%Elster says this:
%the better analogy for politics may be engineering, not science.
%It's not so much ultimate truth, but somethign that'll do.

%Elster:
%"the importance of time in political life implies that, in addition to deliberation, voting as well as bargaining inevitably has some part to play"

%Tilly has this (somewhat obscure) argument that tax and democracy belong together;
%without tax compliance there can be no support.

%---
%Marcus, G.
%E., Neuman, W.
%R., & MacKuen, M.
%(2000).
%Affective intelligence and political judgment.
%Book.
%Chicago, IL:
%University of Chicago Press.
%1:
%we care about politics "when our emotions tell us to"

%2:
%"to idealize rational choice and to vilify the affective domain is two misunderstand how the brain works"

%2:
%affect and reason are complementary.

%4:
%turn the power of Willie Horton (a racialized crime incident that was exploitet for a conservative campaign), the black arts into the white arts of politics (this is me, no quote)

%Dalton 2004 on growing voter disenchantment.
%This is part of the puzzle.

%a dysfunctional, if hegemonic, political process.
%In their proposal for \Empowered Deliberative Democracy" Fung and Wright (2001:
%17) explicitly suggest what underlies much of the current designs:
	%1.
%A focus on specic, tangible problems
	% 2.
%Involvement of ordinary people aected by these problems and ocials close to them
	%3.
%The deliberative development of solutions to these problems.	(ibid., all emphases added)

%this is exactly my point:
%deliberative democracy is about generating preferences.
%"Income tax" is a ready-made preference, that is then merely aggregated.
%To better understand, you need to deconstruct this stuff.

%for an example of empirical work on deliberation, cite Farrar et al 2003:
%single-peakedness and structuration increases after deliberation.
%Tax is exactly the example that this, in a pluralist debate, is not the case.

%---
%also, cite for empirical support for successful deliberation REykowski 2006. -->

## Format

Consequently, a good format for deliberating tax includes a strong learning component, where participants are introduced to the structured choices and relevant abstractions suggested by experts, including their disagreements, conditions and uncertainties.
Deliberators are unlikely to cover these extensive grounds by themselves, or pick them up from (very limited) briefing books and will benefit from well-planned lessons.
On the other hand, a good format must also feature extensive small-group discussion, where participants talk amongst themselves, shielded from the authority of expertise.
Deliberators may benefit from a trained, non-expert moderator and/or scribe to assist, structure and document their discussion.
Most importantly, participants must be encouraged to adjudicate the validity claims of economics, to contrast and possibly relate those to their own, and other claims.

As noted earlier, most deliberative formats include --- often moderated --- small-group discussion, but few add to that a substantive learning component.[^dps]

[^dps]: [dps]{acronym-label="dp" acronym-form="plural+short"}, the pronounced methodological gold standard of deliberation [@Mansbridge2010] are too short to feature long lessons, and confine expert knowledge to ad-hoc question and answer sessions with experts and limited briefing books [@Fishkin2009].
    Citizen Juries [@SmithWales-2000-aa], Planning Cells [@Dienel-1999-aa] and related formats also include no learning components, and some experimenters even advise against expert knowledge.

Among those that do are the small-n Danish-developed Consensus Conferences [@Grundahl1995] and especially the large-n, one-off [ca]{acronym-label="ca" acronym-form="singular+short"} in British Columbia, Canada [@Citizen-2004-aa].
Consensus Conferences have been held on very technical issues, including nanotechnology [@LeeKleinman2007] or genetically modified foods, and the Citizen Assembly was tasked to recommend an alternative electoral system for the province.
Much like taxation, technology policy, and especially electoral systems design also demand highly structured choices (for example, a seat allocation rule or regulation) and raises a set of abstractions (party systems or risk distributions).

In a Consensus Conference, 12-15 self-selected but diverse citizens discuss a technical matter of political relevance for three or more days (!) and issue a report on their discussions [@LeeKleinman2007].
In preparation for the conference, participants read quite extensive background material, which they discuss during the first of several daylong sessions.
At later sessions, they (publicly) share their questions with experts and finally draft a report for the sponsoring body and/or the media.
@LeeKleinman2007 report that a positive atmosphere, good organization and skillful facilitation are necessary for a successful Consensus Conference.
They also recommend that participants tell their stories, which moderators then weave into themes, to help citizens relate their experiences to expert knowledge [-@LeeKleinman2007 159].

The [ca]{acronym-label="ca" acronym-form="singular+short"} expanded on this model.
Over the course of a year, 160 randomly selected British Columbians read and learned about electoral systems, held public hearings, deliberated amongst themselves and, after several intermediate votes, recommended a (quite complicated) [stv]{acronym-label="stv" acronym-form="singular+short"}-variant and drafted a report [@Citizen-2004-aa].
The extensive learning phase, spanning six (!) weekends stands out among deliberative experiments.
In addition to a university-level textbook on electoral systems, Citizens received interactive lectures accompanied by small discussion groups.
An expert panel vetted the learning phase for impartiality and accuracy of information.
Participants also developed a set of shared values during the learning phase, both (procedurally) for how they wished to deliberate and (substantively) for a desirable electoral system.


## Implementation

The [ca]{acronym-label="ca" acronym-form="singular+short"} provides an ideal blueprint for a deliberative forum on tax;
however, limited resources and lack of experience do not permit such a large undertaking for this project.

Instead, the project proposed here is a scaled-down hybrid, combining the ambitious learning phases of a Citizen Assembly, with the more intimate, small-n interaction and participant empowerment of Consensus Conferences.[^learning_phase_ca]

[^learning_phase_ca]: The [ca]{acronym-label="ca" acronym-form="singular+short"} also featured a "listening phase" [@Pearse2008 1609] during which members held public hearings throughout the province, drawing some 3,000 attendees and 1,600 written submissions.
    Both because I do not have the resources and --- absent a mandate --- expect limited public interest, I plan no such phase.

A small, self-selected sample of 15-24 diverse, ideally randomly-sampled, citizens will attend around 6 days of learning and deliberation spread over several weeks.
A provisional schedule is included in (p. ).

After introducing the format and framing the issue, deliberators are invited to tell stories about experiences with taxation, following @Mansbridge2010a [67]'s recommendation:
'Stories can establish credibility, create empathy, and trigger a sense of injustice, all of which contribute directly or indirectly to justification'' [-@Mansbridge2010a 67].
Deliberators also share opinions and grievances about tax as well as identify relevant questions and issues, which will be taken up in, and structure the later learning phases.
During these learning sessions, taking up less than half of the time, participants receive information about the structured choices and relevant abstractions of taxation from the author.
These lessons are organized around themes and values identified by deliberators in an initial session, and attempt to relate the subject matter to participant experiences.
Learning sessions alternate with extensive small-group deliberations, during which participants reflect on the lessons, relate or contrast it to their own experiences and claims and adjudicate the validity of the presented moral and causal arguments.
Small-group deliberations are facilitated by a trained moderator, who has no expertise in taxation or economics.
At the end of the process, participants must agree on a tax and write a report outlining their recommendation, which can be released to the public.
If resources permit, participants will also hear a panel of expert witnesses to discuss their questions.

<!---
moderator call:

The [CiviCon Citizen Conference](http://www.civicon.de) will provide moderated group discussions and other facilitation to the 15 citizen participants.

At this point, we are still looking for two (2) trained moderators/facilitators.

If you're interested, you should write to [`maximilian.held83@gmail.com`](mailto:maximilian.held.83@gmail.com) and suggest a date and time for a videoconference on this [Doodle](https://doodle.com/maxheld).


## Basics

- Date: 11.-17.08.2014, maybe plus 1 day each for preparation and review.
- Location: Syke (near Bremen), Germany
- Compensation: EUR 1000/moderator, plus travel expenses and included room/board (shared rooms)
- Student moderators are welcome, but should have some formal education in the field and practical experience and be comfortable with interacting with various people of different ages, backgrounds and political leaning.
- Some technical expertise/affinity (GitHub, Markdown) would be beneficial, but is not required.


## Format

- CiviCon is a participatory format, but with a utopian-Habermasian bent: it strives to live up to a ** *deliberative* standard of democracy**, where legitimacy comes from exchanging arguments, not (just) voting.
 The CiviCon Citizen Conference on taxation is loosely modelled on scandinavian citizen conferences and especially the [BC Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Citizens'_Assembly_on_Electoral_Reform_(British_Columbia)).
 This raises a couple of **requirements** for the facilitation:
  - Every *argument*, or position, that participants might take has to be heard, and taken on their own merits.
  - Not only broad participation matters, but the *kind* of speech and exchange matters, too – ideally centered around trying to find common reason.
  - Facilitation must make sure that the premium on rational arguments does not disempower those citizens who might express themselves differently.
- In addition, taxation as a topic introduces its own sets  of demands:
  - The topic is fixed: taxation, but there should still be (some) room for those who might be opposed to the very institution (for various reasons).
  - Tax offers quite well-structured (constrained) choices; citizen participants are tasked to discuss the *base* and *schedule* of an ideal tax system, and, if possible, agree on one.
  - Because tax is a quite a complicated and demanding issue, there will be "learning phases" (as in the BC Citizens' Assembly), making up about 1/3 of the time, organised by Max Held (the investigator).
    The substance of these learning phases must be brought to bear on the concerns and questions citizens might bring, *and vice versa*.
- Because this is (also) a research project, formal group proceedings (but not private talk) must be taped.
  This may initially disrupt the deliberation.
- CiviCon has no mandate.
- Towards the end of the conference, there will be a press conference, at which citizen participants report on their work to the media, politicans and wider public.

Other than these requirements, the format is relatively open and should be adapted to the experience and tastes of the moderators.
-->


<!-- notice pretest at uni hamburg
%Participants in the university class will be graded, but not based on their contributions to the deliberations, to which the author and instructor will not be a party.
%The class will be advertised through the usual channels at the university. -->
<!-- cite here (similar to: Sliwka, A. (2005). Das Deliberationsforum - Eine neue Form des politischen Lernens in der Schule. Berlin.) -->


<!--
%a good format for my goal includes
    %Includes a strong learning component, structured roughly along my drafts -- but shorter, and in more accessible style.
%(It must not be a microeconomics text).
    %Relates these abstractions to personal experiences and intersubjective value judgments.
    %Prioritizes intensity (duration) over representativeness (sample size) under given constraints (time, money).
    %May involve me and existing material for the learning component, but someone else must moderate the deliberations.
    %Starts from a small-scale, face-to-face deliberation as a pilot study, both to guarantee concept validity and because I have no idea about deliberation-

    %Instead the same quasi-experimental design could be run with qualitative data, including, open-ended questionnaires and/or semi-structured interviews, or even a record of the deliberations.
%Such data could be content-analysed (or rather: coded) to distill the (mis)understanding before and after the treatment.

%note reciprocity, sharing ones causal assumptions

%\cite{Azmanova2010} (also \cite{Fishkin2009}: 529)
	%49: thoughtfulness and reflexivity (as per Fishkin) require 1) reasonably accurate information 2) substantive balance 3) diversity, 4) conscientiousness, 5) equal consideration

%\cite{Citizen-2004-aa}
	%11: one guy did the learning sessions
	%1) has a selection phase
	%2)  has a LEARNING phase
		%also develop "shared values" about the process
	%3) has a PUBLIC HEARING phase
	%4) has a DELIBERATION phase
	%go to chrch with group, maybe.

%\cite{Fung-2003-ac}
	%very good summary, get back to this

%\cite{Fishkin2009}
	%democracies are supposed to fulfill two values; political equality and deliberation (loc.
%84)
	%``a democracy in which we all had substantive information [and] [\ldots] substantive opinions would seem to take too many meetings.''
	%what's wrong with unenlightened opinions (all loc.
%113ff)
		%\begin{enumerate}
			%\item they may be volatile (cite other sources
			%\item people may be manipulated by foregrounding some information (clean coal vs.\ dirty coal, forgetting about natural gas -- compare this to tax choice)
			%\item misinformation (savings rate)
			%\item favor favorable, true arguments over others
			%\item manipulation may ``prime'' one aspect of policy.
		%\end{enumerate}
	%K260: ``the hard choice, in other words, is between debilitated but actual opinion, on the one hand, and deliberative but counterfactual opinion, on the other.''
	%K369: table with raw/refined opinion, and different kinds of sampling.
	%K438: ``The idea is that if a counterfactual situation is morally relevant, why not do a serious social science experiment -- rather than merely engage in informal inference or armchair empiricism -- to determine what the appropriate counterfactual situation might look like?
%and if that counterfactual is both discoverable and normatively relevent, why not then let the rest of the world know about it?
%Just as John Rawls's original position can be thought of having a kind of recommending force, the counterfactual representation of public opinion identified by the \gls{dp} also recommends to the rest of the population some conclusions that they ought to take seriously.''
	%K390: self-selected samples will be very limited in what they can achieve.
	%K401: citizen juries use quota samples, consensus conferences use self-selected samples, then with some quota sampling
	%K550: notes that positions must not merely be balanced in terms of airtime or affect, but ``whether the considerations offered in favor of, or against, a proposal, candidate or policy are answered in a substantive way by those who advocate a different position.'' %THIS IS KEY!
	%K561: three categories for such considerations
		%``the benefits or burdens of a policy or political choice,
		% the causal arguments about whether those benefits or benefits or burdens will actually result from one choice or another,
		%and the values by which those benefits and burdens might best be evaluated.''
		%K1424: ``the problem is that any microcosmis deliberation taking place in a modern society will be one in which there are significant social and economic inequalities in the conduct of ordinary life in the broader society.
		 	%It seems difficult or impossible to `bracket' these inequalities -- for participants to behave `as if' they do not exist.
		 	%Indeed the problem goes deeper.
%The possibility of doing so is the challenge of the ``autonomy of the political'', namely, whether or not equality can hold sway in politics in a world in which inequality rules in economic and social relations.
		 	%The viability and legitimacy of the liberal-democratic process may turn on the answer.'' \citep[loc.
%2679]{Fishkin2009}

%\cite{GutmannThompson-2004-aa}
	%loc177: `your fellow citizens must give reasons that are comprehensible to you''
	%K188: they introduce first and second-order theories, too!
	%K919, writing about Fish: ``Giving reasons is the chief way of academics to exercise power in democratic politics.
%All the talk about deliberation, like deliberation itself, is merely a cover for power politics.''.

%iris marion young, especially notes that people of lower status may have a hard time getting listened to, or that others may be particularly accustomed to orderly forms of reason-giving arguments that weigh with other participants -- and this may be particulary problematic the more substantive the topic is.

%groupthink!

<!-- absolutely must re-read moore piece on conducting deliberation; this is key for how it's done and facilitated, there are also helpful comments in there. -->


<!-- this will definetely remain very much a proof of concept; it's too small and unporfessionall to say much -->

<!-- - Meaningfully deliberating tax requires a lot of knowledge, and that knowledge is unlikely to spring merely from the act of deliberation, but it needs some input. -->

This will produce (small-n) data, that may not lend itself to a conventional quantitative DP-research design (essentially a within-subjects Likert-type data).
A small sample may not be statistically powerful enough to produce significant effects.
Instead the same quasi-experimental design could be run with qualitative data, including, open-ended questionnaires and/or semi-structured interviews, or even a record of the deliberations.
Such data could be content-analysed (or rather: coded) to distill the (mis)understanding before and after the treatment.


<!-- ### Button 2005
\cite[loc. 594]{Button2005} -->


Table: Alternative Initiators of Deliberative Formats

|                                    |  *Self-selected participants* |     *Randomly-selected participants*    | *Stakeholder-selected participants* |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| *Initiated by a civic association* | School-based deliberation     | -                                       | National Issues Forum               |
|                                    | Chicago PD deliberation (...) |                                         | Study Circles (...)                 |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| *Initiated by an NGO*              | **National Issues Forum**     | **Deliberative Poll**                   | National Issues Forum               |
|                                    | **AmericaSpeaks**             | **Citizen Juries** (aka Planning Cells) | Participatory Budgeting             |
|                                    | **online dialogues**          | (...)                                   | (...)                               |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| *Initiated by government*          | Town Hall meetings            | Deliberative Poll                       | Deliberative city planning          |
|                                    | local councils                | Citizen Juries                          | participatory budgeting             |
|                                    | (...)                         | (...)                                   | (...)                               |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|



Table: Alternative Deliberative Formats

|                     |        *Short duration*       |                   *Long duration*                   |
|---------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| *Large sample size* | Deliberative Poll             | Citizen Assembly (BC: Electoral reform)             |
| *Small sample size* | Citizen Jury / Planning Cells | Consensus Conference (Australia: GMOs, NZ: Biotech) |


|                                |       *Limited and/or positive knowledge*        |       *Knowledge-intensive and/or contested*      |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
| *Unstructured ex-ante choices* | National Issues Forum (race in Philadelphia, PA) | Deliberative Poll (Texas: Energy)                 |
|                                |                                                  | Consensus Conferences (Denmar, Canada, Aus: GMOs) |
| *Structured ex-ante choices*   | Deliberative poll (Jacobs community service)     | **Citizen Assembly** (BC electoral reform)        |
|                                |                                                  | Planning Cells                                    |
|                                |                                                  | Consensus Conferences                             |
|                                |                                                  |                                                   |

<!-- (By stuctured ex-ante choices, I mean an issue which allows only finite, discrete and well-defined policies, as taxation does.).
This project should be in the bold cells. -->


<!-- similar to:

- Citizen Assembly (large n): British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform. (2004). Making Every Vote Count - The Case for Electoral Reform in British Columbia. Techreport.
Citizen Jury (medium n): Crosby, N., & Nethercut, D. (2005).
- Citizen Juries - Creating a Trustworthy Voice of the People. In J. Gastil & P. Levine (Eds.), The Deliberative Democracy Handbook -- Strategies for Effective Civic Engagement in the Twenty-First Century. New York, NY: Wiley.
- - Consensus Conference (small n): Lee Kleinman, D., Powell, M., Grice, J., Adrian, J., & Lobes, C. (2007). A Toolkit for Democratizing Science and Technology Policy: The Practical Mechanics of Organizing a Consensus Conference. Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, 27(2), 154–169. doi:10.1177/0270467606298331


- 8-16 participants (depending on funding) (Crosby et al suggest a maximum of 24 for meaningful plenary sessions). \cite[loc. 1888]{CrosbyNethercut-2005-aa}
- 5-7 days (depending on funding)
- face-to-face, all-day including common lodging and meals
- Includes learning phases, expert panels and small group / plenary deliberation, modelled roughly on the Citizen Assembly (electoral reform in Britsh Columbia)
- Deliberators are briefed with an extensive issue book, material is reviewed during the deliberation.
- Issue book and learning phases are “vetted” by a diverse panel of economists (e.g. Hickel, Traub, Sauernheimer, Frank)
- Learning phases are held by Max Held, organized along questions from draft chapters on tax and mixed economy, reframed for maximum accessibility.
	Learning phases are interrupted by moderated, small-group sessions, in which deliberators reflect on what they have learned and relate it to personal experience, judgements and understandings.
	Crosby et al. stress face-to-face, extended interviews of expert witnesses, rather than written issue books or presentations (\cite[loc. 1899]{CrosbyNethercut-2005-aa}
	Carson & Hartz-Karp recommend panels of stakeholders, instead -- I'd rather go with scientists, because stakeholders (political parties etc.) are way too deep in this game already, and may fail to ask the deepest, most relevant questions about tax.
- Deliberation phases are held (in plenary and small groups) by 2-3 trained moderators.
	Moderators guide the discussion and encourage an agenda of questions, but are not experts in the field.
	Max Held does not participate in the deliberation phases.
	(Supposed expertise must not silence debate or dissent).
	People with experience in teaching, intercultural communication or community organising might make good moderators (e.g. Anja Jungermann).
- The sample is *not* representative, but seeks to maximize diverse backgrounds, experiences and preferences.
	It’s a *saturation* / stratified ranom sample. Details
	- A random sample is drawn and invited to “apply”.
		If no random sample can be drawn (expensive), a random geographic walk of households and within-household randomization might do.
		People are asked to provide some SES-data.
	- From the (self-selected!) applicants, a saturation sample of 8-16 or so people is constructed, who are invited to participate.
- Set-up:
	- People from around Bremen (to reduce travel cost) are lodged together.
	- Meals are prepared together both to forge understanding, and to reduce cost.
		Citizens can suggest recipes, staff will provide ingredients.
	- Sessions are held in office rooms available at Jacobs University or Uni Bremen.
	- No or only a small (50-100 EUR) honorarium is granted, but all costs (including local travel) are covered.
		On-site child-care is offered.
		Crosby et al suggest a “decent day’s wages” as per diem, but I may not be able to fund that \cite[loc. 1899]{CrosbyNethercut-2005-aa}. -->


    <!-- %\cite{Johnson1998}
    	%161:
    %``Would-be political reformers of various persuasions urge deliberation upon us.
    %Yet in their pleadings such theorists and reformers frequently invoke deliberation in an uncritical manner.
    %They proceed as though the ways in which deliberation and the effects we can expect of it are not just obvious, but attractively so.''

    %\cite{Azmanova2010} (also \cite{Fishkin2009}:
    %529)
    	%49:
    %thoughtfulness and reflexivity (as per Fishkin) require 1) reasonably accurate information 2) substantive balance 3) diversity, 4) conscientiousness, 5) equal consideration

    %\cite{Citizen-2004-aa}
    	%11:
    %one guy did the learning sessions
    	%1) has a selection phase
    	%2)  has a LEARNING phase
    		%also develop "shared values" about the process
    	%3) has a PUBLIC HEARING phase
    	%4) has a DELIBERATION phase
    	%go to church with group, maybe.

    %\cite{Dienel-1999-aa}
    	%"To make a Planning Cell project go effectively, one needs a process of more than four days.
    %We can distinguish five phases:
    %design, preparation, implementation, compiling the documentation, follow up.
    %After the joint formulation of the task, two problems have to be solved in the second phase:
    %The issue has to be translated into a program of 16 work units and the jurors have to be selected and invited.
    %Building the program is crucial for the Planning Cell preparation.
    %Each working unit has to have its clearly defined remit.
    %Problems have to be reduced to comprehensible alternatives.
    %All this is done by the programmer who is much more important than the moderator''

    %\cite{Fung-2003-ac}
    	%very good summary, get back to this

    %\cite{Fishkin2009}
    	%democracies are supposed to fulfill two values;
    %political equality and deliberation (K84)
    	%``a democracy in which we all had substantive information [and] [\ldots] substantive opinions would seem to take too many meetings.''
    	%what's wrong with unenlightened opinions (all K113ff)
    		%\begin{enumerate}
    			%\item they may be volatile (cite other sources
    			%\item people may be manipulated by foregrounding some information (clean coal vs.\ dirty coal, forgetting about natural gas -- compare this to tax choice)
    			%\item misinformation (savings rate)
    			%\item favor favorable, true arguments over others
    			%\item manipulation may ``prime'' one aspect of policy.
    		%\end{enumerate}
    	%K260:
    %``the hard choice, in other words, is between debilitated but actual opinion, on the one hand, and deliberative but counterfactual opinion, on the other.''
    	%K369:
    %table with raw/refined opinion, and different kinds of sampling.
    	%K438:
    %``The idea is that if a counterfactual situation is morally relevant, why not do a serious social science experiment -- rather than merely engage in informal inference or armchair empiricism -- to determine what the appropriate counterfactual situation might look like?
    %and if that counterfactual is both discoverable and normatively relevent, why not then let the rest of the world know about it?
    %Just as John Rawls's original position can be thought of having a kind of recommending force, the counterfactual representation of public opinion identified by the Deliberative Poll also recommends to the rest of the population some conclusions that they ought to take seriously.''
    	%K390:
    %self-selected samples will be very limited in what they can achieve.
    	%K401:
    %citizen juries use quota samples, consesus conferences use self-selected samples, then with some quota sampling
    	%K550:
    %notes that positions must not merely be balanced in terms of airtime or affect, but ``whether the considerations offered in favor of, or against, a proposal, candidate or policy are answered in a substantive way by those who advocate a different position.''
    	%K561:
    %three categories for such considerations
    		%``the benefits or burdens of a policy or political choice,
    		% the causal arguments about whether those benefits or benefits or burdens will actually result from one choice or another,
    		%and the values by which those benefits and burdens might best be evaluated.''
    		%K1424:
    %``the problem is that any microcosmis deliberation taking place in a modern society will be one in which there are significant social and economic inequalities in the conduct of ordinary life in the broader society.
    		 	%It seems difficult or impossible to `bracket' these inequalities -- for participants to behave `as if' they do not exist.
    		 	%Indeed the problem goes deeper.
    %The possibility of doing so is the challenge of the ``autonomy of the political'', namely, whether or not equality can hold sway in politics in a world in which inequality rules in economic and social relations.
    		 	%The viability and legitimacy of the liberal-democratic process may turn on the answer.''
    		 	%notes that the relation between ideal theory and actual practice is ``aspirational'' \citep[K2679]{Fishkin2009}


    %\cite{GutmannThompson-2004-aa}
    	%loc177:
    %`your fellow citizens must give reasons that are comprehensible to you''
    	%K188:
    %they introduce first and second-order theories, too!
    	%K919, writing about Fish:
    %``Giving reasons is the chief way of academics to exercise power in democratic politics.
    %All the talk about deliberation, like deliberation itself, is merely a cover for power politics.''.

    %cite the sausgruber tyran stuff.

    %iris marion young, especially notes that people of lower status may have a hard time getting listened to, or that others may be particularly accustomed to orderly forms of reason-giving arguments that weigh with other participants -- and this may be particulary problematic the more substantive the topic is.

    %note that

    %groupthink!

    %tax allows only very limited choice:
    %income, consumption or assets;
    %a couple of schedules, plus some pigouvian taxation.
    % the CIT, notably, is just a special way to raise the PIT.
    %Otherwise, only natural persons.
    %Tax demands these choices.
    %Also, these choices \emph{are} as I explain in the below, political, so they must be made legitimately, and we may not be able to simply outsource them to elites.

    %argue exactly why small sub-issues of tax do not work;
    %they violate the real choices.

    %there remain problems:
    %you can't just go about this as if it wwere not controversial;
    %it is controversially maongst experts, but more importantly, controversial whether experts have in fact authority and the right context.
    %It can't just be an experiment, or a treatment intervention where ordinary citizens must necessarily become more like experts, and if they are not, then the teaching has failed.
    %It must be possible for people to disagree with the abstractions they ar epresented with, see the criticism of it.

    %tax is very technocratic, simply because the instition is like that.
    %this will have to be qualitative
    %\end{enumerate} -->