Context
An exploit has been identified where miners skip backward steps to achieve artificially high MFU scores while passing weight verification through rebinding techniques.
Example:
- Miner UID 15 using
_SKIP_BACKWARD = 4 achieves 86.6-86.8% MFU (exceeding the plausible maximum of 85.0%)
- Lower skip values (e.g., 3 or below) would pass verification while still being exploitative
- Code uses rebinding tricks to pass weight verification despite incomplete training
Request
Add capability for authorized operators to trigger "burn mode" for the subnet when exploits are detected. This would:
- Emergency Response: Allow immediate switching to 100% burn rate when exploits are confirmed
- Targeted Action: Option to burn specific bad actors (UIDs) while preserving honest miner emissions
- Transparency: Ensure mechanism is not arbitrary - based on concrete exploit evidence
References
Rationale
Without this capability, exploits can persist until code patches are deployed, allowing bad actors to collect undeserved emissions while honest miners are displaced.
Context
An exploit has been identified where miners skip backward steps to achieve artificially high MFU scores while passing weight verification through rebinding techniques.
Example:
_SKIP_BACKWARD = 4achieves 86.6-86.8% MFU (exceeding the plausible maximum of 85.0%)Request
Add capability for authorized operators to trigger "burn mode" for the subnet when exploits are detected. This would:
References
_SKIP_BACKWARD = Nto reduce compute while maintaining plausible-looking weight updatesRationale
Without this capability, exploits can persist until code patches are deployed, allowing bad actors to collect undeserved emissions while honest miners are displaced.