feat: Plan out eacn talk

Author: koraa

2024-09-20-eacn/readme.md

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+# Computational, Authenticated Key Distribution
+
+Encryption, the old-fashioned way
+
+## Value statement
+
+- Computational cryptography secures communication using modest computational resources
+- It is deployed on a vast share of the worlds computational resources
+- From a practical standpoint, computational cryptography is superior to QKD in all use cases without exception
+- There are some features, computational cryptography can only provide by incorporating QKD
+
+Handshake graphic
+
+- Introduce the methods used in cryptography
+- Identify the value statement QKD can provide given the above constraints
+- Contrast QKD and computational cryptography 
+
+## About me
+
+My picture
+
+- Karolin Varner
+- Spent a decade as a Software Engineer in industry working for Startups and Corporate Behemoths
+- Started a cryptography research project in 2021
+- Researcher Engineer at Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy
+- Research interests: Key exchange protocols, computer-aided proofs of security, decryption despite error
+- Main founder of Rosenpass e.V.; founded to support interdisciplinary work
+
+## Rosenpass
+
+… Rosenpass slide
++ Interdisciplinary
+
+## Cryptography Science Workflow
+
+:::info
+
+@mullana
+
+This might be to complex as it is here in writing.
+I can create a template graphic for you.
+
+
+Swirls
+
+- Identify goals colloquially "Secure communication"
+- Operationalize goals "Authenticity, Secrecy"
+(Philosophical)
+
+- Formalize security notions "IND-CCA2, forward secrecy"
+- Compare contrast and compose "eCK-PFS-PSK"
+(Mathematical)
+
+- Develop mathematical construction (e.g. Noise-IK)
+- Create security proof 
+(Mathematical)
+
+- Implement concrete protocol (e.g. WireGuard)
+- Optimize concrete protocol
+- Find & Attack implementation flaws
+(Computer science)
+
+- Analyze practical security concerns (e.g. side-channel attacks)
+- Analyze usability of implementation
+(Computer science, Electrical Engineering, Physics, etc.)
+
+- Disseminate
+- Deploy
+- Analyze practical security aspects 
+- Improve usability
+(Operations, Psychology, Social sciences, Human interface design)
+
+- Analyze social impact
+(Social sciences)
+
+Lots of circles in one bigger circle spiraling out.
+Each subcirle has an arrow going out "novel attacks"
+
+:::
+
+## Math proofs are fundamental to cryptography
+
+Reduction to mathematical problem:
+
+1. Assume attacker (stateful function) against cryptographic system
+2. Construct algorithm that solves mathematical problem using assumed attacker
+
+Information theoretic.
+
+1. Formulate cryptosystems as a function where
+    * K – key material –  represents any secret information held by all parties
+    * D – protected information – represents any information to be protected
+    * C – leaked information –  represents any information known to the attacker after execution of the cryptosystem
+
+    $F : K \times D \to C$ 
+
+2. Show that every every possible value of the leaked information, every possible protected information is equally likely
+
+    $\forall c : C, d_1 : D, d_2 : D; |{ k \in K | F(k, d_1) = c }| = |{ k \in K | F(k, d_1) = c }|$
+
+Functional correctness of implementations:
+
+1. Using formal methods from computer science to show that a cryptographic implementation is equivalent to its specification
+
+Implementation security:
+
+1. Using mechanized verification to show that an implementation fulfills security properties such as
+    - Timing side-channel resistance (certain assembly operations are forbidden)
+    - Memory-safety (utilize advanced programming languages such as Rust to avoid buffer overflow and other memory safety errors)
+
+Efficiency of implementation:
+
+2. Using complexity analysis to show that an implementation's resource usage is efficient-enough
+
+## Practical Security essential in cryptography
+
+- Protection against timing side-channels
+- Power side-channels
+- Hardware bugs such as Rowhammer, Meltdown or Spectre are analyzed
+- User error through analysis of how cryptography is used (usable security)
+
+- => Its odd when QKD considers itself to be outside of cryptography; the field is quite comprehensive
+
+## Open-source & Open-Science: Secure cryptography as a community process
+
+1. Cryptography is ultimately about creating trust
+2. Efficient, incremental peer review of implementations is essential
+3. Review of cryptographic proofs is essential
+4. Its not enough to say "I made this, this is secure"
+
+:::info
+
+@mullana Comic strip style illustration of cryptography as a community process
+
+Panel:
+- Single person saying: "Trust me, I built this, this is secure"
+- Other person saying: "Can I see it"; single person: "No, its a secret!"; "but what if you made a mistake"
+- Single person saying: "Just trust me already!"
+- (Narration: Its not enough for a single person to just build something)
+
+GAP
+
+- Cryptographer saying: "Don't trust me, please review my code. I might have made a mistake."
+- Big choir of cryptographers saying, single cryptographer: "Lets build it together to catch all our mistakes"
+- (Narration: All cryptographers make mistakes. The best ones are those who trust their work the least and who work together to build better code)
+
+:::
+
+## CAKD: Computational, Authenticated Key Distribution
+
+graphic representing TLS.
+
+Usually called a "key exchange".
+
+- Cheap
+- Fast
+- Secure
+- Extremely well analyzed
+
+## Key exchange – Security against quantum computers
+
+Graphic representing Rosenpass.
+
+- Most contemporary cryptography is not secure against quantum attacks
+- Migration is possible, Rosenpass is an example
+- Modest increase in resource usage
+
+## Security properties: Active vs passive
+
+:::info
+
+@mullana Two strip-style graphics to represent passive and active security.
+
+Passive – eavesdropping: Graphic of alice and bob communicating; attacker trying to listen in
+
+Active – man in the middle: Graphic of alice communicating with attacker; attacker communicating with bob
+
+:::
+
+## Security properties: Secrecy & Authenticity
+
+:::info
+
+@mullana Two strip-style graphics
+
+Secrecy: Panel of attacker trying to pry into a delivery package. 
+
+Authenticity: Panel of attacker glueing a patch over the package address, but package contains a certificate when bob takes it out.
+
+:::
+
+## Security properties: Identity hiding, deniability
+
+:::info
+
+@mullana Three strip-style graphics
+
+Identity hiding: Panels of klandestine package-dropoff, delivery. Panel of empty address field. Panel of secret service delivery man being asked who is communicating: "I could tell you but I would have to kill you".
+
+Deniability: Panel of Bob going to a judge: "Alice sent me this". Panel of judge looking at package (with a spyglass?) "I can see no fingerprings. Guess you can't prove it".
+
+Non-repudiation:  Panel of Bob going to a judge: "Alice sent me this". Panel of judge looking at a certificate: "This is clearly Alice's seal!"
+
+:::
+
+## Security properties: Forward secrecy
+
+:::info
+
+@mullana Three strip-style graphics
+
+Forward secrecy: Panel of package being received; panel of it being destroyed; panel of burglers not finding the package
+
+Forward secrecy provides no security against active attacks: Panel of burglars stealing the package during delivery.
+
+Forward secrecy can be broken when a cryptographic scheme itself is broken: Picture of burglars analyzing the remains of the destroyed package in a lab.
+
+:::
+
+## Everlasting secrecy: QKD improves on forward secrecy
+
+:::info
+
+@mullana One strip style illustration; one comic-style scientific illustration.
+
+Everlasting secrecy: Picture of destroying the package using some quantum device. Picture of attacker dissapointed at the remains being quantum. "Damn, these are quantum ashes."
+
+Comic style scientific illustration: 
+A computer network of machines (feel free to represent as dots or circles),
+alice & bob communicating through multiple nodes on that network.
+The path through that network is marked one color; annotated "Software encryption".
+The path through that network is also marked in another color, but this path is interrupted at each node. Labeled "QKD".
+One of the nodes contains a graphic representing the attacker.
+
+Subtitle: Software encryption is end-to-end, but QKD is not. What if an attacker manages to take over a node.
+
+:::
+
+- We can not get end-to-end everlasting secrecy, so the forward secrecy that software provides probably still does more for practical security.
+
+## Limitations of QKD
+
+- Usually not open-source
+- Usually not open-hardware
+- Usually not peer-reviewed
+- Expensive
+- Inefficient
+
+| Security property | QKD | Software encryption |
+| --- | --- | --- | 
+| Post-Quantum | check Green | Possibly Green | 
+| Attacker-mode | passive RED | Active Green
+| Forward-secrecy | Pairwise Yellow | Green |
+| Everlasting-Secrecy | Pairwise Yellow | No Red |
+| Authenticity | cross Red | check Green |
+| Deniability | cross Red | check Green |
+| Non-repudiation | cross Red | check Green |
+| Identity hiding | cross Red | check Green | 
+
+## QKD as a measure of hardware security
+
+:::info
+
+@mullana Once comic-strip style illustration
+
+Strip: Physical data cable connecting alice and bob across multiple nodes (computers).
+The entire cable and all nodes are protected by a wall and some guards. At some point the wall ends;
+instead each node – computer – now connects to an adjacent QKD device. The now QKD-protected cable (maybe with a glow
+in the previous qkd color) now exits the wall and enters another wall where it is terminated by a qkd device.
+Panel with engineer: "We managed to cut some costs by switching to QKD devices instead of guarding the entire length of the cable".
+
+:::
+
+## Hybrid QKD & Cryptography
+
+:::info
+
+@mullana Once comic-strip style illustration
+
+Graphic/strip: The aforementioned cable being attacked by burglars; they overwhelm the guards and hack the devices.
+Panel with engineer: "Our cable was attacked! Good thing we also used cryptography to protect the data."
+
+:::
+
+| Security property | QKD | Software encryption | Hybrid | 
+| --- | --- | --- | 
+| Post-Quantum | check Green | Supported Green | Supposed Green | 
+| Attacker-mode | passive RED | Active Green | Active Green | 
+| Forward-secrecy | Pairwise Yellow | Green | check green
+| Everlasting-Secrecy | Pairwise Yellow | No Red | Pairwise Yellow | 
+| Authenticity | cross Red | check Green | check green | 
+| Deniability | cross Red | check Green | check green | 
+| Non-repudiation | cross Red | check Green | check Green | 
+| Identity hiding | cross Red | check Green | check Green | 
+
+
+- Expensive
+- Inefficient
+- Even if QKD devices are not well-reviewed, no security is lost by using them.