feat(rvm): security audit remediation, TEE cryptographic verification, performance hardening

Complete security audit remediation across all 14 RVM hypervisor crates:

Security (87 findings fixed — 11 critical, 23 high, 30 medium, 23 low):
- HAL: SPSR_EL2 sanitization before ERET, per-partition VMID with TLB flush,
  2MB mapping alignment enforcement, UART TX timeout
- Proof: Real P3 verification replacing stubs (Hash/Witness/ZK tiers),
  SecurityGate self-verifies P3 (no caller-trusted boolean)
- Witness: SHA-256 chain hashing (ADR-142), strict signing default,
  NullSigner test-gated, XOR-fold hash truncation
- IPC: Kernel-enforced sender identity, channel authorization
- Cap: GRANT_ONCE consumption, delegation depth overflow protection,
  owner verification, derivation tree slot leak rollback
- Types: PartitionId validation (reject 0/hypervisor, >4096)
- WASM: Target/length validation on send(), module size limit, quota dedup
- Scheduler: Binary heap run queue, epoch wrapping_add, SMP cpu_count enforcement
- All integer overflow paths use wrapping_add/saturating_add/checked_add

TEE implementation (ADR-142, all 4 phases):
- Phase 1: SHA-256 replaces FNV-1a in witness chain, attestation, measured boot
- Phase 2: WitnessSigner trait with SignatureError enum, HmacSha256WitnessSigner,
  Ed25519WitnessSigner (verify_strict), DualHmacSigner, constant_time.rs
- Phase 3: SoftwareTeeProvider/Verifier, TeeWitnessSigner<P,V> pipeline
- Phase 4: SignedSecurityGate, WitnessLog::signed_append, CryptoSignerAdapter,
  ProofEngine::verify_p3_signed, KeyBundle derivation infrastructure
- subtle crate integration for ConstantTimeEq

Performance (26 optimizations):
- O(1) lookups: IPC channel, partition, coherence node, nonce replay
- Binary max-heap scheduler queue (O(log n) enqueue/dequeue)
- Coherence adjacency matrix + cached per-node weights
- BuddyAllocator trailing_zeros bitmap scan + precomputed bit_offset LUT
- Cache-line aligned SwitchContext (hot fields first) and PerCpuScheduler
- DerivationTree O(1) parent_index, combined region overlap+free scan
- #[inline] on 11+ hot-path functions, FNV-1a 8x loop unroll
- CapSlot packing (generation sentinel), RunQueueEntry sentinel, MessageQueue bitmask

Documentation:
- ADR-142: TEE-Backed Cryptographic Verification (with 6 reviewer amendments)
- ADR-135 addendum: P3 no longer deferred
- ADR-132 addendum: DC-3 deferral resolved
- ADR-134 addendum: SHA-256 + HMAC signatures

752 tests, 0 failures across 11 library crates + integration suite.

Co-Authored-By: claude-flow <ruv@ruv.net>

Author: Reuven

crates/rvm/Cargo.lock

@@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ rvm-kernel = { path = "crates/rvm-kernel" }
 
 # External dependencies
 lz4_flex = { version = "0.11", default-features = false }
+hmac = { version = "0.12", default-features = false }
+sha2 = { version = "0.10", default-features = false }
+subtle = { version = "2.6", default-features = false }
 spin = { version = "0.9", default-features = false }
 bitflags = { version = "2", default-features = false }
 

crates/rvm/Cargo.toml

@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ Layer 0: Machine Entry (assembly, <500 LoC)
 | `rvm-hal` | Platform-agnostic hardware abstraction traits (MMU, timer, interrupts) |
 | `rvm-cap` | Capability-based access control with derivation trees and three-tier proof |
 | `rvm-witness` | Append-only witness trail with hash-chain integrity |
-| `rvm-proof` | Proof-gated state transitions (P1/P2/P3 tiers) |
+| `rvm-proof` | Proof-gated state transitions (P1/P2/P3 tiers), TEE pipeline, cryptographic signers (Ed25519, HMAC-SHA256) |
 | `rvm-partition` | Partition lifecycle, split/merge, capability tables, communication edges |
 | `rvm-sched` | Coherence-weighted 2-signal scheduler (deadline urgency + cut pressure) |
 | `rvm-memory` | Guest physical address space management with tiered placement |
@@ -266,15 +266,15 @@ Run `cargo bench` for full criterion results with HTML reports.
 | `rvm-types` | ~40 types | 64-byte `WitnessRecord` (compile-time asserted), ~40 `ActionKind` variants, 34 error variants |
 | `rvm-hal` | 16 | AArch64 EL2: stage-2 page tables, PL011 UART, GICv2, ARM generic timer |
 | `rvm-cap` | 40 | Constant-time P1, nonce ring (4096 + watermark), P3 derivation chain verification, epoch revocation |
-| `rvm-witness` | 29 | FNV-1a hash chain, 16MB ring buffer, `StrictSigner`, RLE-compressed replay |
-| `rvm-proof` | 45 | Proof engine, context builder, constant-time P2 (all 6 rules), P3 chain delegation |
+| `rvm-witness` | 29 | SHA-256 hash chain (FNV-1a fallback), HMAC-SHA256 signing, 16MB ring buffer, `StrictSigner`, RLE-compressed replay |
+| `rvm-proof` | 45 | Proof engine, context builder, constant-time P2 (all 6 rules), P3 deep verification (SHA-256 + Merkle + WitnessSigner), TEE pipeline, Ed25519/HMAC-SHA256/DualHmac signers |
 | `rvm-partition` | 86 | Lifecycle state machine, IPC message queues, device leases, scored split/merge, `remove()` |
 | `rvm-sched` | 49 | 2-signal priority, SMP coordinator, VMID-aware switch, `SwitchContext::init()`, degraded fallback |
 | `rvm-memory` | 110 | Buddy allocator with coalescing, 4-tier management, LZ4-style RLE compression, reconstruction |
 | `rvm-coherence` | 59 | Unified coherence engine, pluggable MinCut/Coherence backends, edge decay, bridge to ruvector |
 | `rvm-boot` | 26 | 7-phase measured boot, attestation digest, HAL init, entry point |
 | `rvm-wasm` | 33 | 7-state agent lifecycle, `HostContext` trait, section parser (13 section types), migration |
-| `rvm-security` | 45 | Unified security gate (P1/P2/P3), input validation, attestation chain, DMA budget |
+| `rvm-security` | 45 | Unified security gate (P1/P2/P3), `SignedSecurityGate` with per-link signature verification, input validation, attestation chain, DMA budget |
 | `rvm-kernel` | 62 | Full integration: IPC→coherence, scheduler, split/merge, security gates, degraded mode, device leases, tier mgmt |
 | **Integration** | 48 | 17 e2e scenarios: agent lifecycle, split pressure, memory tiers, cap chain, boot timing |
 | **Benchmarks** | 21 | Criterion benchmarks for all performance-critical paths |
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ RVM explicitly rejects demand paging. Dormant memory is stored as `witness check
 Every state mutation requires a valid proof token verified through a three-tier system: P1 capability (<1µs), P2 policy (<100µs), P3 deep derivation chain verification (walks tree to root, validates ancestor integrity + epoch monotonicity).
 
 ### 4. Witness-Native OS
-Every privileged action emits a fixed 64-byte, FNV-1a hash-chained record. Tamper-evident by construction. Full deterministic replay from any checkpoint.
+Every privileged action emits a fixed 64-byte, SHA-256 hash-chained record with HMAC-SHA256 signatures. Tamper-evident by construction. Full deterministic replay from any checkpoint.
 
 ### 5. Live Partition Split/Merge
 Partitions split along graph-theoretic cut boundaries and merge when coherence rises. Capabilities follow ownership (DC-8), regions use weighted scoring (DC-9), merges require 7 preconditions (DC-11).
@@ -420,6 +420,7 @@ Capability-based isolation, proof-gated execution, and witness attestation on mi
 | ADR-139 | Appliance deployment model |
 | ADR-140 | Agent runtime adapter |
 | ADR-141 | Coherence engine kernel integration and runtime pipeline |
+| ADR-142 | TEE-backed cryptographic verification (SHA-256, Ed25519, HMAC-SHA256, TEE pipeline) |
 
 </details>
 

crates/rvm/README.md

@@ -400,6 +400,9 @@ fn bench_security_gate(c: &mut Criterion) {
                 required_type: CapType::Partition,
                 required_rights: CapRights::READ,
                 proof_commitment: None,
+                require_p3: false,
+                p3_chain_valid: false,
+                p3_witness_data: None,
                 action: ActionKind::PartitionCreate,
                 target_object_id: 1,
                 timestamp_ns: 1000,
@@ -425,6 +428,9 @@ fn bench_security_gate(c: &mut Criterion) {
                 required_type: CapType::Region,
                 required_rights: CapRights::WRITE,
                 proof_commitment: Some(commitment),
+                require_p3: false,
+                p3_chain_valid: false,
+                p3_witness_data: None,
                 action: ActionKind::RegionCreate,
                 target_object_id: 100,
                 timestamp_ns: 5000,

crates/rvm/benches/benches/rvm_bench.rs

@@ -20,9 +20,11 @@ rvm-partition = { workspace = true }
 rvm-witness = { workspace = true }
 rvm-sched = { workspace = true }
 rvm-memory = { workspace = true }
+sha2 = { workspace = true, optional = true }
+subtle = { workspace = true }
 
 [features]
-default = []
+default = ["crypto-sha256"]
 std = [
     "rvm-types/std",
     "rvm-hal/std",
@@ -39,3 +41,4 @@ alloc = [
     "rvm-sched/alloc",
     "rvm-memory/alloc",
 ]
+crypto-sha256 = ["sha2"]