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+## Fail-closed sandbox egress, and an egress proxy the deploy contract provisions
+
+We're deploying QM v0.1.4 on the Fly target with the Sprites sandbox
+backend, in the security posture where the portal is the only public
+surface and agent workloads are expected to run under egress control.
+
+**What we observe at v0.1.4:** with `SANDBOX_BACKEND=sprites` and no
+`SPRITES_EGRESS_PROXY_URL`, core logs a startup warning that sandboxes will
+run with **no egress enforcement** — and then continues. The Fly deploy
+contract does not provision an egress proxy service, derive a URL for one,
+or surface the omission in `check`/`doctor`. So the out-of-the-box native
+deployment quietly runs agent sandboxes fail-open, in a system whose
+security model elsewhere (command policy floor, broker, postures) is
+conspicuously fail-closed. A careful operator catches the warning in logs;
+an ordinary operator ships it.
+
+There's also a topology wrinkle: the Sprites backend needs the proxy to be
+reachable from Sprites' infrastructure, i.e. publicly addressable — which
+changes the "portal is the only public surface" story that the default
+deployment otherwise supports, and adds an always-on service the operator
+never priced.
+
+**What we'd like:**
+
+1. **Fail closed by default.** If the configured sandbox backend supports
+   egress enforcement and no enforcement is configured, refuse to create
+   sandboxes (not refuse to boot — the rest of the org is fine). An
+   explicit `sandbox.egress = "unenforced"` config opt-out can preserve the
+   current behavior for people who genuinely want it, and gives audits one
+   greppable line.
+2. **`check`/`doctor` coverage.** Preflight should fail the same way it
+   fails for missing secrets: "sprites backend configured, no egress proxy,
+   no explicit opt-out."
+3. **A provisioned proxy in the Fly contract.** The deploy contract already
+   materializes multiple services; an `egress-proxy` service (authenticated,
+   deny-by-default, allowlist from config, minimal machine) with its URL
+   derived and injected as `SPRITES_EGRESS_PROXY_URL` would make the secure
+   topology the default topology. Documenting its public-reachability
+   requirement and rough cost alongside the other services would let
+   operators price it honestly.
+4. **Documented allowlist semantics.** Whatever the proxy enforces, the
+   operator needs to read back what a sandbox can reach — ideally the same
+   place the command policy is read back.
+
+We're happy to test a contract change on a live Fly deployment and
+contribute the preflight checks.