Last Updated: 2026-01-29 Version: 2.1 (January 2026 Review)
- Security Overview
- Critical Security Fixes
- Authentication & Authorization
- Session Management
- CSRF Protection
- Input Validation & Sanitization
- Content Security Policy
- CORS Configuration
- Deployment Security
- Security Best Practices
This application implements defense-in-depth security with multiple layers of protection:
- ✅ HTTPOnly session cookies - Protects against XSS token theft
- ✅ CSRF tokens - Prevents cross-site request forgery
- ✅ Invite-only signup - Prevents unauthorized account creation
- ✅ Content Security Policy - Mitigates XSS and injection attacks
- ✅ Strict CORS - Prevents unauthorized cross-origin requests
- ✅ PBKDF2 password hashing - 100,000 iterations with SHA-256
- ✅ Role-based access control - Admin, Editor, Viewer roles
- ✅ Comprehensive audit logging - All actions tracked
- ✅ Rate limiting - Prevents brute force attacks
Problem: Public signup endpoint allowed unlimited account creation.
Solution: Implemented invite code system requiring valid, unexpired invite codes for all signups.
Files Changed:
database/migration-invite-codes.sql- Invite codes tablefunctions/api/admin/invite-codes.js- Admin invite managementfunctions/api/admin/auth/signup.js- Invite code validation
Usage:
# Create invite code
node scripts/create-admin-invite.js --prod
# Insert into database
wrangler d1 execute settimes-db --command="INSERT INTO invite_codes..."
# Use during signup
POST /api/admin/auth/signup
{
"email": "user@example.com",
"password": "<your-strong-password>",
"name": "User Name",
"inviteCode": "generated-uuid-here"
}Problem: Default admin credentials were hardcoded in migration files and docs.
Solution: Removed plaintext credentials. Demo passwords are now set locally via environment variables during setup.
Files Changed:
database/migration-rbac-sprint-1-1.sql- Removed default adminscripts/create-admin-invite.js- Helper script for first-time setup
Problem: Session tokens stored in sessionStorage, vulnerable to XSS attacks.
Solution: Migrated to HTTPOnly cookies with double-submit CSRF token pattern.
Files Changed:
functions/utils/cookies.js- Cookie utilitiesfunctions/utils/csrf.js- CSRF token generation/validationfunctions/api/admin/auth/login.js- Set HTTPOnly cookiefunctions/api/admin/auth/signup.js- Set HTTPOnly cookiefunctions/api/admin/auth/logout.js- Clear cookiesfunctions/api/admin/_middleware.js- Read cookie, validate CSRFfrontend/src/utils/adminApi.js- Use cookies instead of sessionStorage
Flow:
- Login/signup returns CSRF token in JSON and sets HTTPOnly session cookie
- Client stores CSRF token in memory
- Client sends CSRF token in
X-CSRF-Tokenheader with state-changing requests - Server validates: cookie token exists AND matches header token
- Logout clears both cookies
Problem: CSP disabled, leaving app vulnerable to XSS and injection attacks.
Solution: Enabled strict CSP with minimal unsafe directives.
Files Changed:
backend/server.js- Helmet CSP configuration
CSP Directives:
{
defaultSrc: ["'self'"],
scriptSrc: ["'self'"],
styleSrc: ["'self'", "'unsafe-inline'"], // Tailwind needs inline
imgSrc: ["'self'", "data:", "https:"],
fontSrc: ["'self'", "data:"],
connectSrc: ["'self'"],
objectSrc: ["'none'"],
frameSrc: ["'none'"],
baseUri: ["'self'"],
formAction: ["'self'"],
frameAncestors: ["'none'"],
upgradeInsecureRequests: []
}Problem: CORS middleware set Access-Control-Allow-Origin even for invalid origins.
Solution: Strict origin validation - only allowed origins receive CORS headers.
Files Changed:
functions/_middleware.js- Validate origin before setting headers
Allowed Origins:
- Production:
https://settimes.ca,https://www.settimes.ca - Preview:
https://dev.settimes.pages.dev,https://settimes.pages.dev - Local:
http://localhost:5173,http://localhost:3000,http://localhost:8788
Problem: Service worker cached sensitive admin API responses.
Solution: Exclude all /api/admin/ routes from caching.
Files Changed:
frontend/public/sw.js- Never cache admin routes
| Role | Permissions |
|---|---|
| admin | Full access: manage users, all CRUD operations, view audit logs |
| editor | Create/edit events, bands, venues; cannot manage users |
| viewer | Read-only access to admin panel |
admin (level 3) > editor (level 2) > viewer (level 1)
Higher roles inherit lower role permissions.
All admin endpoints use checkPermission() middleware:
const permCheck = await checkPermission(request, env, "editor");
if (permCheck.error) {
return permCheck.response; // 401 or 403
}- Name:
session_token - HTTPOnly: Yes (not accessible to JavaScript)
- Secure: Yes (HTTPS only)
- SameSite: Strict (prevents CSRF)
- Max-Age: 1800 seconds (30 minutes)
- Creation: Login/signup generates UUID session token
- Storage: Token stored in
sessionstable with expiry - Transmission: Browser sends cookie automatically
- Validation: Middleware checks cookie + database
- Activity:
last_activity_atupdated on each request (future enhancement) - Expiration: Sessions auto-expire after 30 minutes
- Logout: Token deleted from database, cookie cleared
- Server generates CSRF token on login/signup
- Server sends token in JSON response AND sets
csrf_tokencookie (NOT HttpOnly) - Client stores token in memory
- Client sends token in
X-CSRF-Tokenheader with requests - Server validates: cookie value === header value
- Required for: POST, PUT, DELETE, PATCH
- Skipped for: GET, HEAD, OPTIONS, auth endpoints
- Failure: 403 Forbidden
// Server: Generate and send
const csrfToken = generateCSRFToken();
headers.append("Set-Cookie", setCSRFCookie(csrfToken));
return { ...response, csrfToken };
// Client: Send with requests
headers: {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'X-CSRF-Token': csrfToken
}
// Server: Validate
const valid = validateCSRFToken(request);
if (!valid) return 403;File: frontend/src/utils/validation.js
Note: Current sanitization is insufficient (see P0-5 in code review).
Recommended:
- Install DOMPurify for HTML sanitization
- Always validate/sanitize server-side
- Use parameterized queries (already implemented ✅)
- Escape output at render time (React does this automatically ✅)
All endpoints validate:
- Email format (
/^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/) - Password length (8+ characters)
- Required fields
- Data types
- Length limits (future enhancement)
- Prevent XSS attacks
- Block inline script execution
- Restrict resource loading
- Prevent clickjacking
Location: frontend/public/_headers (Cloudflare Pages)
helmet({
contentSecurityPolicy: {
directives: {
defaultSrc: ["'self'"],
scriptSrc: ["'self'"],
styleSrc: ["'self'", "'unsafe-inline'"], // Tailwind CSS
imgSrc: ["'self'", "data:", "https:"],
fontSrc: ["'self'", "data:"],
connectSrc: ["'self'"],
objectSrc: ["'none'"],
frameSrc: ["'none'"],
baseUri: ["'self'"],
formAction: ["'self'"],
frameAncestors: ["'none'"]
}
}
})'unsafe-inline'for styles: Required by Tailwind CSS- Consider using nonces for inline scripts if needed
- Test thoroughly after any CSP changes
Configured in: functions/_middleware.js
Production:
https://settimes.cahttps://www.settimes.ca
Preview/Staging:
https://dev.settimes.pages.devhttps://settimes.pages.dev
Local Development:
http://localhost:5173(Vite)http://localhost:3000(Express)http://localhost:8788(Wrangler)http://127.0.0.1:*(all above)
CORS requests with credentials (credentials: 'include') only allowed from approved origins.
Required in Cloudflare Pages:
# DO NOT commit these values to Git!
ADMIN_PASSWORD=<use-password-manager>
MASTER_PASSWORD=<use-password-manager>
DEVELOPER_CONTACT=555-123-4567-
Create D1 database:
wrangler d1 create settimes-db
-
Run migrations:
wrangler d1 execute settimes-db --file=database/schema.sql wrangler d1 execute settimes-db --file=database/migration-rbac-sprint-1-1.sql wrangler d1 execute settimes-db --file=database/migration-invite-codes.sql
-
Create first admin invite:
node scripts/create-admin-invite.js --prod wrangler d1 execute settimes-db --command="INSERT INTO invite_codes (code, role, expires_at, is_active) VALUES ('UUID-HERE', 'admin', datetime('now', '+7 days'), 1);" -
Sign up with invite code at your production URL
wrangler r2 bucket create settimes-band-photosBind in Cloudflare Pages dashboard: Settings > Functions > R2 bucket bindings
- Never commit secrets - Use
.env,.dev.vars(gitignored) - Use parameterized queries - Already implemented ✅
- Validate all inputs - Server-side validation required
- Sanitize outputs - Use DOMPurify or React's built-in escaping
- Review pull requests - Security-focused code review
- Run security tests - OWASP ZAP, penetration testing
- Update dependencies -
npm audit, Dependabot - Follow principle of least privilege - Minimal permissions
- Log security events - Audit log already implemented ✅
- Test authentication flows - Automated and manual testing
- Use strong passwords - 16+ characters, password manager
- Enable 2FA - When implemented (future)
- Rotate passwords - Every 3-6 months
- Review audit logs - Monthly security review
- Limit admin accounts - Only trusted personnel
- Revoke access immediately - When someone leaves
- Monitor failed logins - Check
auth_attemptstable - Secure invite codes - Never share via email/SMS
- Use HTTPS always - Never access admin panel over HTTP
- Keep backups - Regular D1 database backups
-
Immediate Actions:
- Disable affected accounts
- Rotate all passwords
- Revoke all sessions
- Review audit logs
-
Investigation:
- Check
auth_attemptstable - Review
audit_logtable - Analyze access patterns
- Identify attack vector
- Check
-
Remediation:
- Patch vulnerabilities
- Update dependencies
- Strengthen affected controls
- Deploy fixes
-
Post-Incident:
- Document incident
- Update security procedures
- Train team
- Notify affected users (if required)
- All P0 security fixes applied
- Environment variables set in Cloudflare Pages
- Database migrations run
- First admin account created via invite code
- HTTPS enforced (automatic with Cloudflare)
- CSP enabled and tested
- CORS restricted to production domains
- Session cookies HTTPOnly
- CSRF protection enabled
- Audit logging working
- Rate limiting configured
- Dependencies updated
- Security testing completed
- Backup strategy implemented
- Incident response plan documented
- Implement email verification
- Add 2FA/TOTP support
- Sliding session expiration
- Account lockout after failed logins
- Password complexity requirements (12+ chars, mixed case, numbers, symbols)
- DOMPurify for HTML sanitization
- Server-side input length limits
- Generic error messages (prevent email enumeration)
- Complete audit logging (all operations)
- API rate limiting per endpoint
- WebAuthn/Passkey support
- Security headers review
- Automated security scanning in CI/CD
- Penetration testing
- Bug bounty program
Security Issues: Report to [security@settimes.ca] or create a private security advisory on GitHub.
General Questions: Create an issue on GitHub with the security label.
Remember: Security is a continuous process, not a one-time fix. Regularly review and update security measures.