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Minor abstract edits and simplifications. Still too long for a single…
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rwatson committed Aug 7, 2023
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11 changes: 5 additions & 6 deletions abstract.tex
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Expand Up @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ \section*{Abstract}
CHERI-x86-64.
It enables software
to efficiently implement fine-grained memory protection and scalable software
compartmentalization, by providing strong, non-probabilistic, efficient
compartmentalization, by providing strong, deterministic, efficient
mechanisms to support the principles of least privilege and intentional use
in the execution of software at multiple levels of abstraction, preventing and
mitigating vulnerabilities.
Expand All @@ -26,10 +26,9 @@ \section*{Abstract}
CHERI blends traditional paged virtual memory with an
in-address-space capability model that includes capability values in registers,
capability instructions, and tagged memory to enforce capability integrity.
This hybrid approach, inspired by the Capsicum security model, addresses the performance and robustness issues that arise
when trying to express more secure programming models, minimising
privilege, above conventional architectures that provide only
MMU-based protection.
This hybrid approach addresses the performance and robustness issues that arise
when trying to express more secure, privilege minimising programming models,
above conventional architectures that provide only MMU-based protection.
CHERI builds on the C-language fat-pointer literature: its capabilities can
describe fine-grained regions of memory, and can be substituted for data or
code pointers in generated code, protecting data and improving
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only controlled interaction.
Potential early deployment scenarios include low-level software Trusted Computing
Bases (TCBs) such as separation kernels, hypervisors, and operating-system
kernels, userspace TCBs such as language runtimes and web browsers,
kernels, userspace TCBs such as language runtimes and web browsers,
and particularly high-risk
software libraries such as data compression, protocol parsing, and image
processing (which are concentrations of both complex and historically
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