Skip to content

fix: keep a crank's store work inside one transaction - #1021

Open
sirtimid wants to merge 39 commits into
mainfrom
sirtimid/crank-rollback-integrity
Open

sirtimid wants to merge 39 commits into
mainfrom
sirtimid/crank-rollback-integrity

Conversation

@sirtimid

@sirtimid sirtimid commented Aug 13, 2026

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor

#1020 has merged; this is rebased onto main and stands alone. Replaces #1012, #1018 and #1011, which are closed.

Four PRs were editing the same rollbackCrank lines. This one owns all of the kernel's crank-rollback, savepoint and transaction-boundary semantics, so nothing else has to.

Closes #1016 — a throw out of deliver now rolls the delivery back instead of committing the partial crank.

Why these had to merge

#1012 rewrote rollbackCrank's finally into a try/catch that truncates the savepoint stack and rethrows. #1010 changed ctx.savepoints from string[] to {name, maybeFreeKrefs}[] and added a cache/GC-candidate restore further down the same function. Composed naively the rethrow fires before the restore, so a failed rollback leaves stale in-memory GC candidates and stale cached stored values behind. Neither PR could see that from inside itself.

A second one surfaced while assembling this branch, and is the sharper argument: #1020's audit and #1012's flush reorder are silently incompatible. The audit reads the run queue as ground truth, but a buffered item's refcounts are incremented at enqueueSend/enqueueNotify time, so auditing before the flush reports every buffered item as a leak. assertRefCountsIfAuditing now runs after the flush.

What's fixed

Carried from #1012:

  1. releaseSavepoint is hardened the way rollbackSavepoint was. A RELEASE that threw left the savepoint on the stack and the transaction open with nothing that would ever commit or abort it, so every later write on the connection joined it, reported success, and vanished on close(). Both drivers now discard the transaction; the release failure still propagates. releaseAllSavepoints gets the companion case.
  2. A crank's store work stays inside one transaction. A crank takes crank and delivery savepoints and the run loop rolls back only delivery. Rolling back the outermost one ended the transaction, so the work an aborted crank still owes — terminating the vat, collecting garbage — was autocommitting a statement at a time.
  3. The wasm driver can no longer believe it is in a transaction it isn't. _inTx is cleared before the abort is attempted, because the abort can throw.

Fixing the four defects #1018 pinned as failing repros — its tests are carried here unmodified, with Ryan's authorship, and the fixes land as later commits so the branch reads test-then-fix:

  1. RemoteHandle reports the release failure, not a missing savepoint. It released inside its try and rolled back in the catch; now that a failed RELEASE discards the stack, that rollback threw No such savepoint in place of the real error. RemoteManager had the identical shape at its peerIncarnation_* savepoint with zero coverage — test: failing repros for four defects found reviewing #1012 #1018 flagged it and it is fixed and covered here. The savepoint-stack model is shared (test/savepoint-stack.ts), so a fix applied to one and forgotten in the other can't leave a green suite.
  2. endCrank no longer buries the error that killed the run loop. #runLoop called it from a bare finally. The in-flight error is boxed rather than compared against undefined, so a crank that threw undefined stays distinguishable from one that didn't throw.
  3. The kernel store gets a logger. No production call site passed one to makeSQLKernelDatabase, making four logger?.error calls dead code. Fixed for both the nodejs path and kernel-browser-runtime's kernel-worker.ts, so both drivers' calls are live.
  4. commitIfNeeded clears _inTx before the COMMIT, the ordering rollbackIfNeeded was already corrected for. A throwing COMMIT wedged _inTx true and beginIfNeeded became a permanent no-op.

And the composition bug above:

  1. The in-memory revert runs on the failed-rollback path too. Extracted as revertStateBeneathRollback() and called from both sites. A failed ROLLBACK TO makes the driver discard the whole transaction, so the database has moved back at least as far as a successful rollback would have taken it — the caches are at least as stale, and that is precisely where a lost GC action does the most damage. If the revert itself throws while a rollback error is in flight, the rollback error is preserved as cause.

Note for the reviewer

refreshCachedValues() refreshes gcActions, and it now runs on both rollback paths. The GC-delivery hardening PR stacked after this one depends on that: a DB rollback restores the gcActions row but not the cached closure over it, so without this the audit builds its exemption set from a stale cache and kills the run loop. Verified against a real SQLite store.

Testing

yarn lint clean, yarn build 31/31, four changelog:validate runs clean. kernel-store, ocap-kernel, kernel-node-runtime, kernel-browser-runtime and kernel-test all green.

Every fix mutation-verified — revert the production hunk and the named test fails for the stated reason.

@ocap/kernel-test is intermittently flaky, on this branch and on its base. Roughly two failures in twelve runs, always garbage-collection › survives until both importers let go or supervisor › initializes vat with powers, each passing in isolation and in five consecutive clean runs after. Both are GC/timing-dependent and untouched by crank, savepoint or logger code. The first is what the vat-lifecycle PR further up this stack targets, via makeGCAndFinalize draining the queues before gc(). Not introduced here, and not claimed green.

Not done

  • No test pins the kernel-worker.ts logger wiring; kernel-browser-runtime has no test module for it and standing up the browser mock surface is disproportionate for a one-line change. The nodejs equivalent is pinned by test: failing repros for four defects found reviewing #1012 #1018's own repro.
  • kernel-node-runtime/test/helpers/remote-comms.ts and kernel-test-local/src/lms-chat.ts still call makeSQLKernelDatabase without a logger — test harnesses, not production call sites.

Follow-ups filed

Checklist

  • I've updated the test suite for new or updated code as appropriate
  • I've updated documentation (JSDoc, README.md, CHANGELOG.md) as appropriate

Note

High Risk
Changes core persistence, crank commit/rollback boundaries, and remote message handling; misbehavior could corrupt kernel state or strand the run loop, though coverage is extensive.

Overview
Hardens kernel persistence and crank semantics so aborted deliveries, failed savepoints, and wedged SQLite transactions cannot silently lose writes or commit partial cranks.

SQLite drivers (kernel-store) — Node and wasm now share transaction recovery: failed RELEASE/ROLLBACK TO/COMMIT discards the open transaction, retries abort before new work, and refuses further writes when abort cannot complete. Wasm uses sqlite3_get_autocommit instead of a cached _inTx flag. Node drops better-sqlite3 verbose (per-statement logging of sensitive rows). Runtimes pass a kernel-store sub-logger into makeSQLKernelDatabase.

Run loop (KernelQueue) — Each crank opens crank + delivery savepoints; only delivery rolls back on failure so post-abort termination/GC stays in the crank transaction. Buffered vat outputs flush after termination/GC (not before), and refcount audit runs after endCrank, so callers are not answered from state that a rollback would undo. The loop yields while outOfCrankWorkPending() so remote/incarnation savepoints never nest inside a crank.

KernelStorewithStoreOutOfCrank(work) replaces beginOutOfCrank/endOutOfCrank (sync-only). createSavepoint is refused during a crank; rollbackCrank also reverts cached KV closures and GC candidate state beneath the savepoint. Remote redeemURL decodes before opening its savepoint.

OtherKernel.stop logs and continues if lastActiveTime cannot be written; GC integration tests use condition-based reaping instead of fixed crank counts.

Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit 6f9e29d. Bugbot is set up for automated code reviews on this repo. Configure here.

@github-actions

github-actions Bot commented Aug 13, 2026

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor

Coverage Report

Status Category Percentage Covered / Total
🔵 Lines 72.62%
⬆️ +0.08%
9736 / 13406
🔵 Statements 72.47%
⬆️ +0.07%
9899 / 13658
🔵 Functions 73.03%
⬆️ +0.04%
2281 / 3123
🔵 Branches 66.91%
⬆️ +0.02%
3994 / 5969
File Coverage
File Stmts Branches Functions Lines Uncovered Lines
Changed Files
packages/kernel-browser-runtime/src/kernel-worker/kernel-worker.ts 0%
🟰 ±0%
0%
🟰 ±0%
0%
🟰 ±0%
0%
🟰 ±0%
26-128
packages/kernel-node-runtime/src/kernel/make-kernel.ts 100%
🟰 ±0%
88.88%
🟰 ±0%
100%
🟰 ±0%
100%
🟰 ±0%
packages/kernel-store/src/sqlite/nodejs.ts 99.07%
⬆️ +0.07%
93.33%
🟰 ±0%
100%
🟰 ±0%
99.07%
⬆️ +0.07%
82
packages/kernel-store/src/sqlite/wasm.ts 98.19%
⬆️ +0.16%
89.47%
🟰 ±0%
100%
🟰 ±0%
98.18%
⬆️ +0.16%
252-255
packages/ocap-kernel/src/KernelQueue.ts 98%
⬇️ -0.56%
89.47%
⬇️ -0.80%
100%
🟰 ±0%
98%
⬇️ -0.56%
149, 196, 544
packages/ocap-kernel/src/remotes/kernel/RemoteHandle.ts 95.91%
⬆️ +0.03%
89.47%
🟰 ±0%
98.03%
🟰 ±0%
95.88%
⬆️ +0.03%
389, 396-401, 447, 526, 569, 579-581, 641-644, 993, 1070-1072, 1123
packages/ocap-kernel/src/remotes/kernel/RemoteManager.ts 99.07%
⬆️ +0.02%
100%
🟰 ±0%
95.65%
🟰 ±0%
99.07%
⬆️ +0.02%
442-444
packages/ocap-kernel/src/store/index.ts 98.83%
⬇️ -0.07%
95.23%
🟰 ±0%
100%
🟰 ±0%
98.82%
⬇️ -0.06%
396
packages/ocap-kernel/src/store/types.ts 100%
🟰 ±0%
100%
🟰 ±0%
100%
🟰 ±0%
100%
🟰 ±0%
packages/ocap-kernel/src/store/methods/crank.ts 97.87%
⬇️ -2.13%
88.88%
⬇️ -4.87%
100%
🟰 ±0%
97.87%
⬇️ -2.13%
80
Generated in workflow #4699 for commit e75a20d by the Vitest Coverage Report Action

@sirtimid
sirtimid force-pushed the sirtimid/crank-rollback-integrity branch from 3311d5c to 0892784 Compare August 17, 2026 10:08
sirtimid added a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 17, 2026
The crank-transaction and rollback work landed here rather than in #1012,
which is closed and replaced. #1021 is a placeholder until the PR exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

@cursor cursor Bot left a comment

Copy link
Copy Markdown

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

Stale Bugbot comment from a previous run.

Comment thread packages/kernel-store/src/sqlite/wasm.ts
Base automatically changed from sirtimid/clist-refcount-symmetry to main August 20, 2026 13:45
@sirtimid
sirtimid force-pushed the sirtimid/crank-rollback-integrity branch from 0892784 to 65bd467 Compare August 20, 2026 13:59
sirtimid added a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 20, 2026
The crank-transaction and rollback work landed here rather than in #1012,
which is closed and replaced. #1021 is a placeholder until the PR exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
@sirtimid
sirtimid force-pushed the sirtimid/crank-rollback-integrity branch from 913524a to 05b273d Compare August 27, 2026 11:27
sirtimid added a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 27, 2026
The crank-transaction and rollback work landed here rather than in #1012,
which is closed and replaced. #1021 is a placeholder until the PR exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
@sirtimid
sirtimid requested a review from a team September 7, 2026 23:06

@cursor cursor Bot left a comment

Copy link
Copy Markdown

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

Stale Bugbot comment from a previous run.

Comment thread packages/ocap-kernel/src/KernelQueue.ts
Comment thread packages/ocap-kernel/src/remotes/kernel/RemoteHandle.ts Outdated
grypez and others added 10 commits September 8, 2026 01:17
Eight tests, all currently failing, for three defects that landed with
#1005. They change no production code: each one states the invariant the
fix has to restore, so the diff that repairs them is the specification
being met rather than a claim about it.

`releaseSavepoint` was never hardened the way `rollbackSavepoint` was in
that PR. A RELEASE that throws leaves the savepoint on the stack and the
transaction open with nothing that will ever commit or abort it, so every
later write on the connection joins it, reports success, and vanishes on
close — verbatim the failure mode #1005 documents for the other door. The
driver tests sit beside their rollback counterparts so the asymmetry is
visible in place. `endCrank` gets the companion case: it now settles its
waiters in a `finally`, which is right, but it also leaves the savepoint
listed, so the next crank numbers its savepoint `t1` against a database
that still has `t0`.

`#processCrankResult` does fallible work after the crank's transactional
boundary has already been crossed. On the success path `#flushCrankBuffer`
settles the promise `enqueueMessage` handed an external caller, and only
then can `#terminateVat` throw and have the new catch roll the crank back
— so the caller keeps an answer computed from state the store discarded,
and a restart delivers the message again. On the abort path the rollback
ends the transaction, so `#terminateVat` and `collectGarbage` autocommit
piecemeal and the second rollback the flag correctly suppresses would
have had nothing left to undo either way. The invariant is stated as "the
rollback is the last thing the crank asks of the store", which leaves the
choice of remedy open.

The wasm driver tracks `_inTx` itself rather than reading it from SQLite,
so a failed abort inside the new catch is the one case that can leave it
disagreeing with the database. Left true, `beginIfNeeded` is a no-op from
then on and the next `createSavepoint` runs in autocommit mode, where the
matching RELEASE commits (Agoric/agoric-sdk#8423, already cited two lines
above the code) and no rollback can undo the delivery. The second test
runs that next `createSavepoint` and asserts the BEGIN, so the corruption
path is observable instead of argued.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three transaction-integrity defects, all in the same family: a store call
fails, and the layer above goes on as though its bookkeeping still matched
the database.

- `releaseSavepoint` (both SQLite drivers) discards the enclosing
  transaction when `RELEASE` fails, as `rollbackSavepoint` already does
  when `ROLLBACK TO` fails. Left as it was, the savepoint stayed on the
  stack and the transaction open with nothing to ever commit or abort it,
  so every later write on the connection joined it, reported success, and
  vanished on `close()`.
- `releaseAllSavepoints` forgets its savepoints even if the release
  throws, as `rollbackCrank` already does. A savepoint left listed had the
  next crank number its savepoint `t1` while the database still had `t0`,
  from which point every release and rollback aimed one crank past the one
  it meant to end.
- The wasm driver stops believing it is in a transaction when an abort
  fails. `_inTx` is tracked in the driver rather than read from SQLite, and
  an abort usually fails because SQLite already rolled back on its own.
  Left true, `beginIfNeeded` was a no-op from then on and the next
  `createSavepoint` ran in autocommit mode, where its `RELEASE` commits
  (Agoric/agoric-sdk#8423) and no later rollback could undo the delivery.

And the crank boundary itself, in two parts:

- A crank now takes two savepoints. Rolling back to the outermost one
  discards the enclosing transaction, so the work an aborted crank still
  owes — terminating the vat whose delivery failed, collecting garbage —
  was autocommitting statement by statement, beyond the reach of any later
  rollback. That work has to follow the rollback, since the worker is gone
  and the store must not go on believing the vat is alive, so it is the
  rollback that spares the transaction. Releasing the outer savepoint in
  `endCrank` is now a crank's one commit point.
- `#flushCrankBuffer` runs last, after everything that can still fail.
  It settles the promise `enqueueMessage` handed an external caller,
  reading the result out of the store; rolling the crank back after that
  left the caller holding an answer computed from state the store had
  discarded, and a restart would deliver the message again.

Tests for the first three defects are Ryan's, from #1011. The two crank
tests there specify the remedy as "the rollback is the last thing the
crank asks of the store", which reordering the fallible work before it
would satisfy — but that rollback would then undo the vat termination.
They are restated here as the invariant the fix does hold.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`should trigger GC syscalls through bringOutYourDead` scheduled one reap
and then ran three cranks. `scheduleReap` dedupes, so that bought one
`bringOutYourDead`, not three — and an import is only reported as dropped
once the engine has collected the vat's presence and run its finalizer,
which the forced GC pass inside `bringOutYourDead` cannot guarantee on the
first attempt. When it hadn't, no further reap was ever scheduled and the
refcount stayed where it was: `expected 2 to be 1`, as on main in
31081630878.

Each attempt now schedules its own reap and stops as soon as the kernel's
bookkeeping catches up, so the common case is one crank rather than three.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A failed `ROLLBACK TO` discards the whole transaction, taking every
savepoint with it — not just the one rolled back to. `rollbackCrank`
truncated `ctx.savepoints` to the rolled-back ordinal regardless, which
was correct while a crank took one savepoint at ordinal 0 and cleared the
list, but leaves `['crank']` listed now that the delivery sits at ordinal
1.

`endCrank` then releases a `t0` the database no longer has, and throws
"No such savepoint: t0" from the run loop's `finally` — replacing the
failure that actually killed the kernel, with no `cause`. That is the
masking this branch's own error-preservation exists to prevent.

Clear the list on the throwing path, truncate to the ordinal only on
success.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…tion

Both drivers recover from a failed savepoint operation by discarding the
enclosing transaction, and swallow any error from that abort so the
savepoint failure stays the one reported. That part is right, but it left
the abandoned transaction entirely silent: on the nodejs driver, where
`inTransaction` is read from SQLite, the next crank's `beginIfNeeded`
sees the transaction still open, skips its `BEGIN`, and commits the dead
crank's writes alongside the new crank's.

Nothing here can repair that, so at least record it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Moving `#invokeKernelSubscription` out of the enqueue loop and after it
was the one production change on this branch with no test: reverting
`#flushCrankBuffer` to its interleaved form left all 2412 ocap-kernel
tests passing.

Same hazard as the crank-level ordering a few tests up, one level down —
`#enqueueRun` is store work and can fail part-way, so answering the first
caller while the second enqueue is still ahead hands out a result the
crank's rollback then discards.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Five comments on this branch asserted more than the code holds:

- `wasm.ts` claimed a stale `_inTx` meant "no later rollback can undo the
  delivery". False: a savepoint created in autocommit mode does open a
  transaction, and an inner savepoint still rolls back. The real cost is
  that writes outside a savepoint autocommit one statement at a time, and
  the outermost `RELEASE` commits. The "an abort typically fails because
  SQLite already rolled back" premise was unsupported and isn't the
  reason for the reorder — the reason is simply that the abort can throw.
- `#processCrankResult` said "the worker is already gone" ahead of the
  call that kills the worker.
- The flush was described as running "once nothing fallible remains".
  It doesn't: `#terminateVat` resolves the dying vat's promises through
  `resolvePromises`, which defaults to `immediate` and invokes their
  kernel subscriptions before `collectGarbage`. Reachable without an
  abort, via a clean `exitVat`. Recorded rather than fixed — closing it
  changes termination semantics, not crank ordering.
- "Only `delivery` is ever rolled back" is true of the run loop but not
  of the tests. Scoped, and the ordinal coupling it depends on is now
  stated: `endCrank` releases `t0` by position, so `crank` must stay
  first.
- `reapImporterUntil` credited `scheduleReap` deduping for the old
  one-BOYD behaviour; it was `nextReapAction` shifting the single entry
  off, leaving the later cranks nothing to do.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Comment the non-obvious why, in the shortest form that carries it. The
two-savepoint rationale was re-argued in full in four places; the tests
now point at `#runLoop` and `#processCrankResult` instead of restating
them, and the hazard block duplicated across both driver test files is a
line. No reasoning removed, only the retelling.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…lback

A database rollback cannot reach two pieces of state, so `rollbackCrank`
now reverts both itself.

Every `provideCachedStoredValue` answers reads from a closure and only
writes through to kv. Reverting the database therefore left the closure
holding the abandoned crank's value, and the next `set` persisted it.
`processGCActionSet` takes an action out of the set before delivering it,
so an aborted delivery lost the action outright rather than retrying it.
`reapQueue` was exposed the same way.

`maybeFreeKrefs` lives in RAM, so nothing reverted it either. Its entries
are collection candidates only because of the decrements the rollback
undid, and a later `collectGarbage` threw outright on a promise the
rollback had deleted, killing the run loop.

No live bug either way: every `abort` `#deliverGCAction` returns is paired
with a `terminate`, which is what made losing the action harmless. The
comment there claimed the rollback restored the action, which is the thing
a future reader would trust when adding an abort path that isn't paired
with a termination; it now states the real causality.

The cached values are declared once so that initialization and the
refresher cannot disagree about which ones exist.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
sirtimid and others added 3 commits September 8, 2026 01:17
…rlapping

Savepoints taken through `KernelStore.createSavepoint` bypass `ctx.savepoints`
and so are invisible to `createCrankSavepoint`'s ordinal naming. One held open
across a crank left `releaseAllSavepoints` releasing `t0` into it rather than to
a commit, so the holder's later rollback discarded the whole crank. One opened
inside a crank was cancelled by a delivery rollback it had nothing to do with,
or committed by a release beneath it — in both cases after the peer had been
told the message was durably received.

Both directions are now refused. `createSavepoint` throws inside a crank,
`startCrank` throws while a caller holds the store, and the two production
callers take their turn through `beginOutOfCrank`/`endOutOfCrank`, which the run
loop consults via `outOfCrankWorkPending` before each crank. The run loop
re-checks that gate rather than awaiting it once: a caller registers
synchronously, so one arriving in a microtask queued ahead of the loop's
resumption would otherwise meet `startCrank`'s refusal and kill the kernel over
ordinary concurrent remote traffic.

`handleRemoteMessage` decodes an incoming `redeemURL` before opening its
savepoint rather than awaiting inside it. `redeemLocalOcapURL` only parses and
decrypts, so the message stays atomic, and the window is now synchronous — which
is the rule the whole arrangement rests on, since awaiting while holding the
store would park the run loop for the duration.

Trade-off: an inbound remote message or a peer handshake arriving mid-crank now
waits for that crank to end, so its latency is bounded by the slowest crank
rather than independent of it. Routing inbound messages through the run queue,
as SwingSet's comms vat does, would remove that coupling and is the better
long-term shape.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…e times

57bf771 replaced a fixed reap count with polling for `reapImporterUntil` and
left `reapAndSettle` on three attempts. Three was enough on an idle machine and
not under a loaded one: the whole suite in parallel failed
`survives until both importers let go` about once in seven runs, on `main` as
well as here.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
@sirtimid
sirtimid force-pushed the sirtimid/crank-rollback-integrity branch from fc0ed30 to 9b4717f Compare September 7, 2026 23:28

@cursor cursor Bot left a comment

Copy link
Copy Markdown

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

Stale Bugbot comment from a previous run.

Comment thread packages/kernel-store/src/sqlite/nodejs.ts
sirtimid and others added 2 commits September 8, 2026 10:40
…d, not just the ones that begin or commit

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…es its timestamp

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
sirtimid added a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 8, 2026
`RefCountViolation` gained its `kind` discriminant here, so the expectations
#1021 wrote against the old shape needed it. The audit also moved out of the
crank and runs after it commits, and `utils.ts` grew hooks that fail a test
whose run loop died — so the case that kills the loop on purpose now claims
that death as its result.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The repo moved to Consensys-Incorporated. Only the links this branch adds
are rewritten; entries for PRs that really did live at MetaMask/ocap-kernel
keep naming it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
@sirtimid
sirtimid requested a review from a team as a code owner September 11, 2026 13:05
sirtimid added a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 11, 2026
`RefCountViolation` gained its `kind` discriminant here, so the expectations
#1021 wrote against the old shape needed it. The audit also moved out of the
crank and runs after it commits, and `utils.ts` grew hooks that fail a test
whose run loop died — so the case that kills the loop on purpose now claims
that death as its result.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
sirtimid and others added 2 commits September 14, 2026 16:35
…han caching it

SQLite ends a transaction itself after SQLITE_FULL, SQLITE_IOERR and
SQLITE_BUSY. The wasm driver's `ROLLBACK` was refused as a result, it read
that refusal as a transaction it could not end, and latched `txAbandoned` —
refusing every write for the life of the worker, on a healthy database. That
driver is the browser extension's kernel store.

It now reads `sqlite3_get_autocommit` the way the nodejs driver reads
`db.inTransaction`, which leaves the two with the same algorithm. Also drops
better-sqlite3's `verbose`, which #1021 switched on by accident when it began
passing a logger from the production runtimes.

The wasm driver's savepoint semantics are now tested against the real wasm
build; the mocked files keep the cases that need injected I/O failures, with
their mocks tracking the transaction the way SQLite does.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…e the gate's own gaps

Three changes to the crank layer, all of which #1021 either introduced or
left open:

`rollbackCrank` restores `maybeFreeKrefs` to the savepoint's snapshot rather
than emptying it. That set is not per-crank — only `collectGarbage` empties
it — so a candidate produced outside a crank, as a peer restart abandoning a
remote's exports does, was dropped by an unrelated crank's rollback and the
objects leaked with nothing left to notice them. The reference count audit
cannot see it either: an orphan with no holders and a count of zero looks
consistent. Guard adopted from #1039.

`RemoteManager` snapshots the restarting peer's promises inside its turn at
the store rather than before waiting for one. The wait spans a whole crank,
so a promise that crank made the peer decider of was never rejected and the
sending vat waited on it forever. This one was #1021's own regression.

`beginOutOfCrank`/`endOutOfCrank` are replaced by `withStoreOutOfCrank`. A
turn that was never given back left the run loop waiting on a promise nothing
resolves — no failure, no log, no timeout — and the callback's type now says
the held section has to be synchronous.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
sirtimid added a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 14, 2026
`RefCountViolation` gained its `kind` discriminant here, so the expectations
#1021 wrote against the old shape needed it. The audit also moved out of the
crank and runs after it commits, and `utils.ts` grew hooks that fail a test
whose run loop died — so the case that kills the loop on purpose now claims
that death as its result.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

@cursor cursor Bot left a comment

Copy link
Copy Markdown

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

Stale Bugbot comment from a previous run.

Comment thread packages/ocap-kernel/src/store/methods/crank.ts
`withStoreOutOfCrank` gives the turn back from its `finally` the moment
`work()` returns. An async callback returns a promise there, so the store
went back to the run loop with the callback still between its savepoint and
the release — the interleaving the turn exists to prevent. `() => Result`
did not forbid it, though the JSDoc and changelog said the type did.

The type now refuses a callback whose return type is thenable, and a
thenable that reaches the call through inference is thrown on instead of
being handed the turn back mid-flight.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

@cursor cursor Bot left a comment

Copy link
Copy Markdown

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

Cursor Bugbot has reviewed your changes using high effort and found 1 potential issue.

Fix All in Cursor

❌ Bugbot Autofix is OFF. To automatically fix reported issues with cloud agents, enable autofix in the Cursor dashboard.

Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit 6f9e29d. Configure here.

// Thrown from inside the `try`, so the `finally` still gives the turn
// back rather than parking the run loop on top of the mistake.
!isPromiseLike(result) ||
Fail`withStoreOutOfCrank given work that is not synchronous`;

Copy link
Copy Markdown

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

Abandoned thenable can reject unhandled

Low Severity

The new guard calls work(), then throws if the result is thenable, without settling that thenable. An async callback that throws, or a returned promise that later rejects, becomes an unhandled rejection and can take down the Node process. The same package already contains this case in the run-loop failure handler.

Fix in Cursor Fix in Web

Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit 6f9e29d. Configure here.

Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

Labels

None yet

Projects

None yet

Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

A throw inside a crank commits the partial crank instead of rolling it back

2 participants