Kryos is on a fast-moving release cadence. Only the latest minor version
on the master branch receives security fixes.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 2.2.x | ✅ |
| < 2.2 | ❌ |
If you believe you have found a security vulnerability in Kryos —
including the compiler, runtime (kryos-rt), or any standard-library
crate — please report it privately so we can fix it before public
disclosure.
Preferred channel: email info@northtek.io
with the subject line [kryos security] <short description>.
When reporting, please include:
- A clear description of the issue and its potential impact.
- A minimal reproduction (a
.kryprogram, a compile command, or a Rust unit test that exercises the bug). - The Kryos version (
kryos --version), host OS, and toolchain. - Whether the issue is exploitable in a sandboxed (WASM) context, in
the native AOT build, in the JIT (
kryos run), or in all of the above.
You will receive an acknowledgement within 72 hours. We aim to ship a fix or a documented mitigation within 14 days for confirmed high-severity issues. Lower-severity findings are folded into the regular release cadence.
In scope:
- Memory safety violations in the runtime or compiler-emitted code that are reachable from safe Kryos source.
- Capability-system escapes: code that obtains a capability it was never
granted (e.g. unrestricted file or network access from a
@purefunction). - Type-checker soundness bugs that allow well-typed Kryos programs to corrupt memory.
- Sandbox escapes in the WASM target.
Out of scope:
- Crashes or panics from clearly malformed input that do not affect memory safety or capability boundaries.
- Issues that require an attacker to already have arbitrary code execution on the host.
- Performance regressions, unless they enable a denial-of-service path
on the JIT (
kryos run) that a hostile input could exploit.
Once a fix is shipped, we will publish a brief advisory in the CHANGELOG and credit the reporter unless they prefer to remain anonymous.