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BunsDev merged 2 commits into from
Aug 9, 2026
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docs: clarify AFS macOS consent result #52

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docs: clarify AFS macOS consent result
BunsDev Aug 9, 2026
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docs: refine macOS consent roadmap wording
BunsDev Aug 9, 2026
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6 changes: 4 additions & 2 deletions content/docs/daemon/security.mdx
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Expand Up @@ -83,8 +83,10 @@ export. Operating-system policy can still restrict a particular client's
mounted-volume operations.

Do not treat the NFS spike as a sandbox or an access-control boundary. A mounted
view does not stop a process from writing outside that view, and the macOS
agent-process read/write confirmation is still outstanding. Loopback exposure,
view does not stop a process from writing outside that view. A human-operated
macOS Terminal pass confirmed loopback read/write behavior for one consented
client, but the macOS privacy policy remains process-specific and other client
processes may still be denied without explicit consent. Loopback exposure,
access control, platform sandboxing, and recovery must be validated before a
mount becomes a supported default.

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18 changes: 10 additions & 8 deletions content/docs/guide/agent-filesystem.mdx
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Expand Up @@ -41,12 +41,14 @@ or elevated privileges. In its measured write workloads, WAL brought the
storage engine to 0.81–1.29x the host filesystem's elapsed time (lower is
better); the package-tree write shape was faster than the host baseline.

It is not ready for agent workflows. The benchmark environment could mount and
inspect the export, but an agent-process shell received a macOS privacy/TCC
denial when opening files. A Terminal with Full Disk Access must confirm
read/write behavior before mount-dependent work can proceed. Linux/FUSE has not
been evaluated, the NFS export serializes requests through one SQLite
connection, and loopback NFS access control is unresolved.
It is not ready for agent workflows. On 2026-08-09, a human-operated,
consent-enabled macOS Terminal confirmed the loopback NFS path by mounting the
export, creating a directory, writing a file, and reading back `written`. That
pass validates the experimental path for that consent-enabled client only; an
automated agent or other client process may still need explicit macOS
network-volume or privacy consent before opening files. Linux/FUSE has not been
evaluated, the NFS export serializes requests through one SQLite connection,
and loopback NFS access control is unresolved.

## What it is for

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -87,8 +89,8 @@ explicit safety and operational gates before it becomes a supported feature.
| Phase | Status | Scope and gate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Storage foundation | Shipped experimental | `coven-afs` provides the SPEC-compatible schema, filesystem operations, and copy-on-write overlay. |
| macOS NFS and performance spike | Shipped experimental | A feature-gated NFSv3 export and benchmark show a conditional storage-engine GO with WAL. Agent-process confirmation, concurrent-client evaluation, and Linux/FUSE remain open. |
| Mount safety decision | Planned after spike | Resolve loopback access control, default-off behavior, copy-up limits, base-ingest filters, platform-specific recovery, and the macOS privacy confirmation before enabling any mount by default. |
| macOS NFS and performance spike | Shipped experimental | A feature-gated NFSv3 export and benchmark show a conditional storage-engine GO with WAL. Human Terminal validation passed; the result requires a client-/harness-specific macOS privacy or network-volume access assessment, while concurrent-client evaluation and Linux/FUSE remain open. |
| Mount safety decision | Planned after spike | Resolve loopback access control, default-off behavior, copy-up limits, base-ingest filters, platform-specific recovery, and the remaining per-process privacy consent requirement before enabling any mount by default. |
| Daemon session integration | Planned | Add an additive local API for creating, inspecting, diffing, committing, and discarding AFS sessions. SDK-only operation remains viable if no mount backend is available. |
| Provenance and review | Planned | Connect file operations to Coven sessions and tool calls, then expose explicit diff, timeline, and materialization views to local clients. |
| Broader platform support | Later | Evaluate a Windows-native path separately; no Windows mount backend is promised. |
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5 changes: 3 additions & 2 deletions content/docs/guide/architecture.mdx
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Expand Up @@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ is no supported Coven mount workflow, sandbox, or replacement for the current
project-root and Git/worktree safeguards.

Read [Agent filesystem](/docs/guide/agent-filesystem) for the implemented
storage and mount boundary, the outstanding macOS privacy confirmation, and
the phased roadmap for safety, daemon, and review work.
storage and mount boundary, the passed human Terminal validation, the remaining
per-process macOS privacy consent requirement, and the phased roadmap for
safety, daemon, and review work.

For the operating model, read [Daemon](/docs/daemon). For integration details, read the [local API](/docs/reference/api).