Verdict: Safe. No malicious code. All operations are local file backup and Git push to the user's own private repository.
Purpose: Backs up OpenClaw files to the user's own private GitHub vault.
Operations:
- Reads
~/.openclaw/credentials/avenger.key— user's own encryption key (they created it) - Reads
~/.openclaw/credentials/avenger-config.json— vault repo URL (user configured this) - Runs
gh auth token— gets GitHub token from GitHub CLI (already authenticated on user's system) - Runs
git clone <user's-own-vault-repo>— clones user's own repo - Copies
.mdfiles from~/.openclaw/workspace/— identity/memory files, no API keys - Runs
openssl enc -aes-256-cbconopenclaw.jsononly — standard encryption, user's own key - Runs
git add,git commit,git push— pushes to user's own repo - Deletes temp clone directory
No: external servers, third-party uploads, telemetry, or data exfiltration.
Purpose: Restores OpenClaw files from the user's own private GitHub vault.
Operations:
- Reads
~/.openclaw/credentials/avenger.key— user's own key - Reads
~/.openclaw/credentials/avenger-config.json— user's own vault URL - Runs
git clone <user's-own-vault-repo> - Runs
openssl enc -d— decrypts with user's own key - Copies files back to
~/.openclaw/ - Asks for user confirmation before overwriting
No: external servers, third-party access, or silent operations.
Purpose: First-time configuration. Prompts user for their vault repo and encryption key.
Operations:
- Runs
gh auth status— verifies GitHub CLI is authenticated (standard check) - Runs
gh repo view <url>— verifies the user's repo exists and is accessible - Generates or accepts an encryption key with
openssl rand -hex 32 - Saves key to
~/.openclaw/credentials/avenger.key— user's own machine only - Saves vault URL to
~/.openclaw/credentials/avenger-config.json
No: key transmission to servers, account creation, or external communications.
| Pattern | Why It's Flagged | Actual Use |
|---|---|---|
openssl enc |
Heuristic: encryption = suspicious | Encrypts user's own config file with their own key |
git push |
Heuristic: data exfiltration | Pushes to user's own private GitHub repo |
credentials/ path reads |
Heuristic: credential theft | Reads user's own locally-stored key they created |
Shell scripts with chmod +x |
Heuristic: privilege escalation | Makes backup.sh executable (standard install) |
openssl rand |
Heuristic: crypto key generation | Generates encryption key for user's own backup |
All flagged patterns are standard backup tool operations. The same patterns appear in tools like restic, duplicati, rclone, and borgbackup.
| Data Type | What Happens |
|---|---|
openclaw.json (API keys) |
AES-256 encrypted before leaving disk. Only pushed to user's own private GitHub repo. |
Memory logs (.md files) |
Plaintext. Only pushed to user's own private GitHub repo. |
| Encryption key | Never leaves the user's machine. Stored in ~/.openclaw/credentials/avenger.key. |
| GitHub token | Used via gh auth token (GitHub CLI). Never stored by this skill. |
This skill has zero access to: browser data, passwords, cookies, other applications, or system files outside ~/.openclaw/.
See references/security.md for full threat model documentation including key rotation procedures.
Please report security concerns at: https://github.com/ProSkillsMD/avenger-initiative/security/advisories/new