[Aikido] AI Fix for Potential file inclusion attack via reading file#22
[Aikido] AI Fix for Potential file inclusion attack via reading file#22aikido-autofix[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
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| const target = path.resolve(base, key + '.info.yml') | ||
| const relative = path.relative(base, target) | ||
| if (!relative.startsWith('..') && !path.isAbsolute(relative) && fs.existsSync(target)) { | ||
| const codingChallengeInfos = yaml.load(fs.readFileSync(target, 'utf8')) |
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Unsafe yaml load can lead to remote code execution - medium severity
js-yaml has the ability to construct an arbitrary JS object. This is dangerous if you receive a YAML document from an untrusted source.
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Remediation: Ignore this issue only if you will always load YAML documents from trusted origins. If possible, use JSON.
Reply @AikidoSec ignore: [REASON] to ignore this issue.
More info
| const target = path.resolve(base, key + '.info.yml') | ||
| const relative = path.relative(base, target) | ||
| if (!relative.startsWith('..') && !path.isAbsolute(relative) && fs.existsSync(target)) { | ||
| const codingChallengeInfos = yaml.load(fs.readFileSync(target, 'utf8')) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Unsafe yaml load can lead to remote code execution - medium severity
js-yaml has the ability to construct an arbitrary JS object. This is dangerous if you receive a YAML document from an untrusted source.
Show fix
Remediation: Ignore this issue only if you will always load YAML documents from trusted origins. If possible, use JSON.
Reply @AikidoSec ignore: [REASON] to ignore this issue.
More info
| ) | ||
| const base = path.resolve(currPath) | ||
| const resolvedFiles = files.map(file => { | ||
| const target = path.resolve(base, file) |
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Potential file inclusion attack via reading file - medium severity
If an attacker can control the input leading into the ReadFile function, they might be able to read sensitive files and launch further attacks with that information.
Show fix
Remediation: Ignore this issue only after you've verified or sanitized the input going into this function. This issue is only relevant in the backend, not in the frontend!
Reply @AikidoSec ignore: [REASON] to ignore this issue.
More info
| async function seePatch (file: string) { | ||
| const fileData = fs.readFileSync(fixesPath + '/' + file).toString() | ||
| const resolvedBase = path.resolve(fixesPath) | ||
| const resolvedTarget = path.resolve(resolvedBase, file) |
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Potential file inclusion attack via reading file - medium severity
If an attacker can control the input leading into the ReadFile function, they might be able to read sensitive files and launch further attacks with that information.
Show fix
Remediation: Ignore this issue only after you've verified or sanitized the input going into this function. This issue is only relevant in the backend, not in the frontend!
Reply @AikidoSec ignore: [REASON] to ignore this issue.
More info
This patch mitigates potential file inclusion attacks via path traversal across multiple modules by implementing path validation that resolves target file paths against their intended base directories, verifies that relative paths do not escape using parent directory references or absolute path components, and rejects requests that attempt directory traversal before performing file operations in 'datacreator.ts', 'codingChallenges.ts', 'dataErasure.ts', 'fileUpload.ts', 'keyServer.ts', 'logfileServer.ts', 'quarantineServer.ts', 'vulnCodeFixes.ts', 'vulnCodeSnippet.ts', and 'rsnUtil.ts'.
Aikido used AI to generate this PR.
Medium confidence: Aikido has validated similar fixes and observed positive outcomes. Validation is required.