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This repository contains the following:
- ATT&CK™ Data Model: a relational data model for ATT&CK™.
- ATT&CK™ View: an adversary emulation planning tool.
- Release Notes
- Overview
- The ATT&CK™ Data Model
- Accessing ATT&CK™ Data with SQL
- Additional Resources
- License
- attack_view_db_structure and attack_view_db_data SQL script used to build the SQLite database structure
- enterprise-attack.xml is an XML version of MITRE™ ATT&CK™ JSON
- ics-attack.xml is an XML version of MITRE™ ICS ATT&CK™ JSON
- mobile-attack.xml is an XML version of MITRE™ Mobile ATT&CK™ JSON
ATT&CK™ View is a planning tool that help defenders in designing an adversary emulation plans based on MITRE™ ATT&CK™ framework in a structured approach. As a demonstration, ATT&CK™ View comes bundled with a full adversary emulation plan for APT3 developed by MITRE™ (SOURCE : https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Adversary_Emulation_Plans).
There are many use cases for ATT&CK™ framework, many of which depend on existing tools being ATT&CK™-enabled, to make this process easier, the database in this repository can help in getting up to speed with integrating existing tools with ATT&CK™, build your own tooling or fuse ATT&CK™ with other existing frameworks.
The database is based on SQLite for simplicity and portability, however, it is better to think of terms of a data model instead of the underlying technology used in implementation, this is very important, as it enables exploring other useful models and applications and then narrow down to technology.
The following is a conceptual model that can be implemented using any database technology (The attack_view_db_structure.sql is a good starting point).
To have a better understanding about the database structure, following is a list of sample SQL queries used to read ATT&CK™. To run the following SQL queries, you will need a SQLite management tool, there are many free and paid tools available supporting Windows, macOS and Linux (https://www.sqlite.org/cvstrac/wiki?p=ManagementTools)
Some output truncated for brevity
SQL
SELECT name FROM sdos_object WHERE type IS "attack-pattern";
OUTPUT
name |
---|
.bash_profile and .bashrc |
Access Token Manipulation |
Accessibility Features |
Account Discovery |
Account Manipulation |
... |
SQL
SELECT id, name FROM sdos_object WHERE type IS "attack-pattern";
OUTPUT
id | name |
---|---|
attack-pattern--01df3350-ce05-4bdf-bdf8-0a919a66d4a8 | .bash_profile and .bashrc |
attack-pattern--dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48 | Access Token Manipulation |
attack-pattern--9b99b83a-1aac-4e29-b975-b374950551a3 | Accessibility Features |
attack-pattern--72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08 | Account Discovery |
attack-pattern--a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27 | Account Manipulation |
... |
The id field is a unique key that will be used frequently in many SQL queries
The external references are stored in external_references table, since one ATT&CK™ technique can have one or more references, the link between the two tables is the technique identifier (check previous query), I will list multiple ways to access the external references
SQL
SELECT name, external_id
FROM sdos_object INNER JOIN external_references ON
sdos_object.id = external_references.fk_object_id
WHERE
sdos_object.type IS "attack-pattern"
AND
external_references.source_name IS "mitre-attack";
OUTPUT
name | external_id |
---|---|
.bash_profile and .bashrc | T1156 |
Access Token Manipulation | T1134 |
Accessibility Features | T1015 |
Account Discovery | T1087 |
Account Manipulation | T1098 |
... |
SQL
SELECT name, external_id
FROM sdos_object INNER JOIN external_references ON
sdos_object.id = external_references.fk_object_id
WHERE
sdos_object.type IS "attack-pattern" AND
x_mitre_platforms_windows IS "true" AND
external_references.source_name IS "mitre-attack";
OUTPUT
name | external_id |
---|---|
Access Token Manipulation | T1134 |
Accessibility Features | T1015 |
Account Discovery | T1087 |
Account Manipulation | T1098 |
AppCert DLLs | T1182 |
... |
SQL
SELECT name, description FROM sdos_object
WHERE type IS "malware";
OUTPUT
name | description |
---|---|
3PARA RAT | 3PARA RAT is a remote access tool (RAT) programmed in C++ that has been used by Putter Panda. (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda) Aliases: 3PARA RAT |
4H RAT | 4H RAT is malware that has been used by Putter Panda since at least 2007. (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda) Aliases: 4H RAT |
ADVSTORESHELL | ADVSTORESHELL is a spying backdoor that has been used by APT28 from at least 2012 to 2016. It is generally used for long-term espionage and is deployed on targets deemed interesting after a reconnaissance phase. (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) Aliases: ADVSTORESHELL, NETUI, EVILTOSS, AZZY, Sedreco |
ASPXSpy | ASPXSpy is a Web shell. It has been modified by Threat Group-3390 actors to create the ASPXTool version. (Citation: Dell TG-3390) Aliases: ASPXSpy, ASPXTool |
Agent.btz | Agent.btz is a worm that primarily spreads itself via removable devices such as USB drives. It reportedly infected U.S. military networks in 2008. (Citation: Securelist Agent.btz) Aliases: Agent.btz |
... |
SQL
SELECT name, description FROM sdos_object
WHERE type IS "intrusion-set";
OUTPUT
name | description |
---|---|
APT1 | APT1 is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398. (Citation: Mandiant APT1) |
APT12 | APT12 is a threat group that has been attributed to China. (Citation: Meyers Numbered Panda) |
APT16 | APT16 is a China-based threat group that has launched spearphishing campaigns targeting Japanese and Taiwanese organizations. (Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2) |
APT17 | APT17 is a China-based threat group that has conducted network intrusions against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations. (Citation: FireEye APT17) |
APT18 | APT18 is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has targeted a range of industries, including technology, manufacturing, human rights groups, government, and medical. (Citation: Dell Lateral Movement) |
... |
All STIX 2.0 Domain Objects (SDO) relations are stored in "relationship" table. The following query is a nested query used to get the tools/malware used by APT3:
SQL
SELECT name, description
FROM sdos_object
WHERE (type IS "malware" OR type IS "tool") -- Query for tools or malware
AND id IN (SELECT target_ref -- filter tools/malware associated with APT3
FROM relationship
WHERE relationship_type IS "uses" -- Source "uses" Target
AND source_ref IS -- Source is APT3 identifier
"intrusion-set--0bbdf25b-30ff-4894-a1cd-49260d0dd2d9");
OUTPUT
name | description |
---|---|
OSInfo | OSInfo is a custom tool used by APT3 to do internal discovery on a victim's computer and network. (Citation: Symantec Buckeye) Aliases: OSInfo |
PlugX | PlugX is a remote access tool (RAT) that uses modular plugins. (Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis) It has been used by multiple threat groups. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2) (Citation: New DragonOK) (Citation: Dell TG-3390) Aliases: PlugX, Sogu, Kaba, Korplug |
RemoteCMD | RemoteCMD is a custom tool used by APT3 to execute commands on a remote system similar to SysInternal's PSEXEC functionality. (Citation: Symantec Buckeye) Aliases: RemoteCMD |
SHOTPUT | SHOTPUT is a custom backdoor used by APT3. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) Aliases: SHOTPUT, Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter, Pirpi |
schtasks | schtasks is used to schedule execution of programs or scripts on a Windows system to run at a specific date and time. (Citation: TechNet Schtasks) Aliases: schtasks, schtasks.exe |
... |
ATOMIC™ Tests are stored in three tables
- atomic_test table, this table simply maps ATOMIC™ tests to ATT&CK™ techniques. Each atomic_test record has one or more atomic_attack_test records that contains the actual test details
- atomic_attack_test, this tables holds the actual ATOMIC™ test details, each test has one or more input arguments represented with an atomic_input_arguments record
- atomic_input_arguments, holds tests input arguments details
The following SQL statement retrieves the ATOMIC™ test(s) associated with ATT&CK™ technique "T1031"
SQL
SELECT name, description, executor_name, executor_command
FROM atomic_attack_test
WHERE fk_atomic_attack_id IN
(SELECT id FROM atomic_attack
WHERE fk_attack_external_id IS "T1031");
OUTPUT
name | description | executor_name | executor_command |
---|---|---|---|
Modify Fax service to run PowerShell | This test will temporarily modify the service Fax by changing the binPath to PowerShell and will then revert the binPath change, restoring Fax to its original state. | command_prompt | sc config Fax binPath= "C:\windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -noexit -c \"write-host 'T1031 Test'\"" sc start Fax sc config Fax binPath= "C:\WINDOWS\system32\fxssvc.exe" |
For support and to report and issues, you may either file an issue at Github or email directly to [email protected]
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ATT&CK™ TOOLS CAN BE COPIED AND/OR DISTRIBUTED WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS PERMISSION OF NADER SHALLABI.
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