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security: CWE-494: Download without integrity check — VC-53690#1
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SahilWikhe-sw wants to merge 1 commit into
Open
security: CWE-494: Download without integrity check — VC-53690#1SahilWikhe-sw wants to merge 1 commit into
SahilWikhe-sw wants to merge 1 commit into
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Summary
This PR addresses CWE-494 (Download of Code Without Integrity Check), CWE-345 (Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity), and CWE-1269 (Product Released in Non-Release Configuration) by applying minimal transport hardening and removing a misleading security control.
Finding
CVSS: 8.9 (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N)
The action declared a
verifyinput (lines 22-25) that promised cosign verification of downloaded archives, but this setting was never read anywhere in the composite action'sruns:block. The download step (line 122) usedcurl -sLwithout:--failflag absent)--protoor TLS version constraints)As a result, consumers who explicitly set
verify: truebelieving they were enabling cryptographic verification received identical behavior toverify: false. A compromised or replaced release asset would be downloaded, extracted, made executable, and prepended to$GITHUB_PATHwith no validation.Remediation
Applied the minimal viable fix as recommended in the security assessment:
Removed the dead
verifyinput (CWE-1269)Hardened curl transport (partial CWE-494 mitigation)
curl -sLtocurl --fail --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSL--fail: Enables proper HTTP error detection (4xx/5xx responses cause non-zero exit)--proto '=https': Restricts to HTTPS protocol only--tlsv1.2: Enforces minimum TLS 1.2Note: Full CWE-494 closure via cosign signature verification or SHA256SUMS checking is deferred to maintainer discretion. This PR implements the transport layer hardening only.
Verification