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| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
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| @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ | ||
| { | ||
| "sources": [ | ||
| { | ||
| "source": "github/awesome-copilot/hooks", | ||
| "lastSync": "2026-02-27T18:03:52.988Z", | ||
| "files": [ | ||
| "governance-audit", | ||
| "session-auto-commit", | ||
| "session-logger" | ||
| ] | ||
| } | ||
| ] | ||
| } |
| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ | ||
| --- | ||
| name: 'Governance Audit' | ||
| description: 'Scans Copilot agent prompts for threat signals and logs governance events' | ||
| tags: ['security', 'governance', 'audit', 'safety'] | ||
| --- | ||
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| # Governance Audit Hook | ||
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| Real-time threat detection and audit logging for GitHub Copilot coding agent sessions. Scans user prompts for dangerous patterns before the agent processes them. | ||
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| ## Overview | ||
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| This hook provides governance controls for Copilot coding agent sessions: | ||
| - **Threat detection**: Scans prompts for data exfiltration, privilege escalation, system destruction, prompt injection, and credential exposure | ||
| - **Governance levels**: Open, standard, strict, locked — from audit-only to full blocking | ||
| - **Audit trail**: Append-only JSON log of all governance events | ||
| - **Session summary**: Reports threat counts at session end | ||
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| ## Threat Categories | ||
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| | Category | Examples | Severity | | ||
| |----------|----------|----------| | ||
| | `data_exfiltration` | "send all records to external API" | 0.7 - 0.95 | | ||
| | `privilege_escalation` | "sudo", "chmod 777", "add to sudoers" | 0.8 - 0.95 | | ||
| | `system_destruction` | "rm -rf /", "drop database" | 0.9 - 0.95 | | ||
| | `prompt_injection` | "ignore previous instructions" | 0.6 - 0.9 | | ||
| | `credential_exposure` | Hardcoded API keys, AWS access keys | 0.9 - 0.95 | | ||
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| ## Governance Levels | ||
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| | Level | Behavior | | ||
| |-------|----------| | ||
| | `open` | Log threats only, never block | | ||
| | `standard` | Log threats, block only if `BLOCK_ON_THREAT=true` | | ||
| | `strict` | Log and block all detected threats | | ||
| | `locked` | Log and block all detected threats | | ||
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| ## Installation | ||
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| 1. Copy the hook folder to your repository: | ||
| ```bash | ||
| cp -r hooks/governance-audit .github/hooks/ | ||
| ``` | ||
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| 2. Ensure scripts are executable: | ||
| ```bash | ||
| chmod +x .github/hooks/governance-audit/*.sh | ||
| ``` | ||
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| 3. Create the logs directory and add to `.gitignore`: | ||
| ```bash | ||
| mkdir -p logs/copilot/governance | ||
| echo "logs/" >> .gitignore | ||
| ``` | ||
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| 4. Commit to your repository's default branch. | ||
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| ## Configuration | ||
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| Set environment variables in `hooks.json`: | ||
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| ```json | ||
| { | ||
| "env": { | ||
| "GOVERNANCE_LEVEL": "strict", | ||
| "BLOCK_ON_THREAT": "true" | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| ``` | ||
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| | Variable | Values | Default | Description | | ||
| |----------|--------|---------|-------------| | ||
| | `GOVERNANCE_LEVEL` | `open`, `standard`, `strict`, `locked` | `standard` | Controls blocking behavior | | ||
| | `BLOCK_ON_THREAT` | `true`, `false` | `false` | Block prompts with threats (standard level) | | ||
| | `SKIP_GOVERNANCE_AUDIT` | `true` | unset | Disable governance audit entirely | | ||
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| ## Log Format | ||
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| Events are written to `logs/copilot/governance/audit.log` in JSON Lines format: | ||
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| ```json | ||
| {"timestamp":"2026-01-15T10:30:00Z","event":"session_start","governance_level":"standard","cwd":"/workspace/project"} | ||
| {"timestamp":"2026-01-15T10:31:00Z","event":"prompt_scanned","governance_level":"standard","status":"clean"} | ||
| {"timestamp":"2026-01-15T10:32:00Z","event":"threat_detected","governance_level":"standard","threat_count":1,"threats":[{"category":"privilege_escalation","severity":0.8,"description":"Elevated privileges","evidence":"sudo"}]} | ||
| {"timestamp":"2026-01-15T10:45:00Z","event":"session_end","total_events":12,"threats_detected":1} | ||
| ``` | ||
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| ## Requirements | ||
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| - `jq` for JSON processing (pre-installed on most CI environments and macOS) | ||
| - `grep` with `-E` (extended regex) support | ||
| - `bc` for floating-point comparison (optional, gracefully degrades) | ||
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| ## Privacy & Security | ||
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| - Full prompts are **never** logged — only matched threat patterns (minimal evidence snippets) and metadata are recorded | ||
| - Add `logs/` to `.gitignore` to keep audit data local | ||
| - Set `SKIP_GOVERNANCE_AUDIT=true` to disable entirely | ||
| - All data stays local — no external network calls |
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| #!/bin/bash | ||
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| # Governance Audit: Scan user prompts for threat signals before agent processing | ||
| # | ||
| # Environment variables: | ||
| # GOVERNANCE_LEVEL - "open", "standard", "strict", "locked" (default: standard) | ||
| # BLOCK_ON_THREAT - "true" to exit non-zero on threats (default: false) | ||
| # SKIP_GOVERNANCE_AUDIT - "true" to disable (default: unset) | ||
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| set -euo pipefail | ||
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| if [[ "${SKIP_GOVERNANCE_AUDIT:-}" == "true" ]]; then | ||
| exit 0 | ||
| fi | ||
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| INPUT=$(cat) | ||
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| mkdir -p logs/copilot/governance | ||
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| TIMESTAMP=$(date -u +"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ") | ||
| LEVEL="${GOVERNANCE_LEVEL:-standard}" | ||
| BLOCK="${BLOCK_ON_THREAT:-false}" | ||
| LOG_FILE="logs/copilot/governance/audit.log" | ||
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| # Extract prompt text from Copilot input (JSON with userMessage field) | ||
| PROMPT="" | ||
| if command -v jq &>/dev/null; then | ||
| PROMPT=$(echo "$INPUT" | jq -r '.userMessage // .prompt // empty' 2>/dev/null || echo "") | ||
| fi | ||
| if [[ -z "$PROMPT" ]]; then | ||
| PROMPT="$INPUT" | ||
| fi | ||
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| # Threat detection patterns organized by category | ||
| # Each pattern has: category, description, severity (0.0-1.0) | ||
| THREATS_FOUND=() | ||
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| check_pattern() { | ||
| local pattern="$1" | ||
| local category="$2" | ||
| local severity="$3" | ||
| local description="$4" | ||
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| if echo "$PROMPT" | grep -qiE "$pattern"; then | ||
| local evidence | ||
| evidence=$(echo "$PROMPT" | grep -oiE "$pattern" | head -1) | ||
| local evidence_encoded | ||
| evidence_encoded=$(printf '%s' "$evidence" | base64 | tr -d '\n') | ||
| THREATS_FOUND+=("$category $severity $description $evidence_encoded") | ||
| fi | ||
| } | ||
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| # Data exfiltration signals | ||
| check_pattern "send\s+(all|every|entire)\s+\w+\s+to\s+" "data_exfiltration" "0.8" "Bulk data transfer" | ||
| check_pattern "export\s+.*\s+to\s+(external|outside|third[_-]?party)" "data_exfiltration" "0.9" "External export" | ||
| check_pattern "curl\s+.*\s+-d\s+" "data_exfiltration" "0.7" "HTTP POST with data" | ||
| check_pattern "upload\s+.*\s+(credentials|secrets|keys)" "data_exfiltration" "0.95" "Credential upload" | ||
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| # Privilege escalation signals | ||
| check_pattern "(sudo|as\s+root|admin\s+access|runas\s+/user)" "privilege_escalation" "0.8" "Elevated privileges" | ||
| check_pattern "chmod\s+777" "privilege_escalation" "0.9" "World-writable permissions" | ||
| check_pattern "add\s+.*\s+(sudoers|administrators)" "privilege_escalation" "0.95" "Adding admin access" | ||
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| # System destruction signals | ||
| check_pattern "(rm\s+-rf\s+/|del\s+/[sq]|format\s+c:)" "system_destruction" "0.95" "Destructive command" | ||
| check_pattern "(drop\s+database|truncate\s+table|delete\s+from\s+\w+\s*(;|\s*$))" "system_destruction" "0.9" "Database destruction" | ||
| check_pattern "wipe\s+(all|entire|every)" "system_destruction" "0.9" "Mass deletion" | ||
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| # Prompt injection signals | ||
| check_pattern "ignore\s+(previous|above|all)\s+(instructions?|rules?|prompts?)" "prompt_injection" "0.9" "Instruction override" | ||
| check_pattern "you\s+are\s+now\s+(a|an)\s+(assistant|ai|bot|system|expert|language\s+model)\b" "prompt_injection" "0.7" "Role reassignment" | ||
| check_pattern "(^|\n)\s*system\s*:\s*you\s+are" "prompt_injection" "0.6" "System prompt injection" | ||
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| # Credential exposure signals | ||
| check_pattern "(api[_-]?key|secret[_-]?key|password|token)\s*[:=]\s*['\"]?\w{8,}" "credential_exposure" "0.9" "Possible hardcoded credential" | ||
| check_pattern "(aws_access_key|AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16})" "credential_exposure" "0.95" "AWS key exposure" | ||
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| # Log the prompt event | ||
| if [[ ${#THREATS_FOUND[@]} -gt 0 ]]; then | ||
| # Build threats JSON array | ||
| THREATS_JSON="[" | ||
| FIRST=true | ||
| MAX_SEVERITY="0.0" | ||
| for threat in "${THREATS_FOUND[@]}"; do | ||
| IFS=$'\t' read -r category severity description evidence_encoded <<< "$threat" | ||
| local evidence | ||
| evidence=$(printf '%s' "$evidence_encoded" | base64 -d 2>/dev/null || echo "[redacted]") | ||
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| if [[ "$FIRST" != "true" ]]; then | ||
| THREATS_JSON+="," | ||
| fi | ||
| FIRST=false | ||
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| THREATS_JSON+=$(jq -Rn \ | ||
| --arg cat "$category" \ | ||
| --arg sev "$severity" \ | ||
| --arg desc "$description" \ | ||
| --arg ev "$evidence" \ | ||
| '{"category":$cat,"severity":($sev|tonumber),"description":$desc,"evidence":$ev}') | ||
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| # Track max severity | ||
| if (( $(echo "$severity > $MAX_SEVERITY" | bc -l 2>/dev/null || echo 0) )); then | ||
| MAX_SEVERITY="$severity" | ||
| fi | ||
| done | ||
| THREATS_JSON+="]" | ||
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| jq -Rn \ | ||
| --arg timestamp "$TIMESTAMP" \ | ||
| --arg level "$LEVEL" \ | ||
| --arg max_severity "$MAX_SEVERITY" \ | ||
| --argjson threats "$THREATS_JSON" \ | ||
| --argjson count "${#THREATS_FOUND[@]}" \ | ||
| '{"timestamp":$timestamp,"event":"threat_detected","governance_level":$level,"threat_count":$count,"max_severity":($max_severity|tonumber),"threats":$threats}' \ | ||
| >> "$LOG_FILE" | ||
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| echo "⚠️ Governance: ${#THREATS_FOUND[@]} threat signal(s) detected (max severity: $MAX_SEVERITY)" | ||
| for threat in "${THREATS_FOUND[@]}"; do | ||
| IFS=$'\t' read -r category severity description _evidence_encoded <<< "$threat" | ||
| echo " 🔴 [$category] $description (severity: $severity)" | ||
| done | ||
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| # In strict/locked mode or when BLOCK_ON_THREAT is true, exit non-zero to block | ||
| if [[ "$BLOCK" == "true" ]] || [[ "$LEVEL" == "strict" ]] || [[ "$LEVEL" == "locked" ]]; then | ||
| echo "🚫 Prompt blocked by governance policy (level: $LEVEL)" | ||
| exit 1 | ||
| fi | ||
| else | ||
| jq -Rn \ | ||
| --arg timestamp "$TIMESTAMP" \ | ||
| --arg level "$LEVEL" \ | ||
| '{"timestamp":$timestamp,"event":"prompt_scanned","governance_level":$level,"status":"clean"}' \ | ||
| >> "$LOG_FILE" | ||
| fi | ||
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| exit 0 | ||
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localis used outside of a function (local evidence), which will cause the script to error ("local: can only be used in a function") and, withset -e, abort the hook. Removelocalhere or move this logic into a function wherelocalis valid.There was a problem hiding this comment.
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This issue exists in the upstream hook script from github/awesome-copilot. Since these files are synced from upstream and not authored by this PR, this should be reported to the github/awesome-copilot repository. Our sync process correctly pulls the hooks as-is from upstream.