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154 changes: 154 additions & 0 deletions ACPs/236-continuous-staking/README.md
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| ACP | 236 |
|:--------------|:------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Title** | Continuous Staking |
| **Author(s)** | Razvan Angheluta ([@rrazvan1](https://github.com/rrazvan1)) |
| **Status** | Proposed |
| **Track** | Standards |

## Abstract

This proposal introduces continuous staking for validators on the Avalanche P-Chain. Validators can stake their tokens
continuously, allowing their stake to compound over time, accruing rewards once per specified cycle.

## Motivation

The current staking system on the Avalanche P-Chain restricts flexibility for stakers, limiting their ability to respond
to changing market conditions or liquidity needs. Managing a large number of nodes is also challenging, as re-staking at
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respond to changing market conditions or liquidity needs

If the minimum period length is the same as the current minimum staking duration, does this impact/improve the market condition response ability at all?

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@rrazvan1 rrazvan1 Nov 4, 2025

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I would inverse the perspective: based on the expected duration (because it is not fixed anymore) of staking, and how flexible validator would like to be, he can choose a period granular enough for their preference.

So yes, even if the minimum period length is the same as the current minimum staking duration, it still provides flexibility.

Note: there is an exception: if validator is willing to stake for [2weeks, 4weeks), there isn't much he can do. Or as a rule: [MinStakeDuration, 2 * MinStakeDuration)

the end of each period is labor-intensive, time-consuming, and poses security risks due to
the required transaction signing. Additionally, tokens can remain idle at the end of a staking period
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Are many users managing a large number of nodes? The staking limit is up to 3M AVAX

until stakers initiate the necessary transactions to stake them again.

## Specification

Continuous staking introduces a mechanism that allows validators to remain staked indefinitely, without having to
manually submit new staking transactions at the end of each period.

Instead of committing to a fixed end time upfront, validators specify a cycle duration (period) when they submit an
AddContinuousValidatorTx. At the end of each cycle, the validator is automatically re-staked for a new cycle of the same
duration, unless the validator has submitted a StopContinuousValidatorTx. If a validator submits a
StopContinuousValidatorTx during a cycle, the validator will continue validating until the end of the current cycle, at
which point the validator exits and funds unlock. The minimum and maximum cycle lengths follow the same protocol
parameters as before (`MinStakeDuration` and `MaxStakeDuration`).

Delegators interact with continuous validators in the same way as with fixed-period validators, and the same constraints
apply: a delegation period must fit entirely within the validator’s cycle. Delegators cannot delegate across multiple
cycles, since there is no guarantee that a validator will continue validating after the current cycle.

Rewards accrue once per cycle, and they are automatically added to principal in subsequent cycles, both for validator
rewards and for delegation rewards. If the updated stake weight (previous stake + staking rewards + delegatee rewards)
exceeds the maximum stake limit defined in the network configuration, the excess amount is automatically withdrawn and
sent to `ValidatorRewardsOwner` and `DelegatorRewardsOwner`.
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This paragraph seems to contradict the previous: are delegation rewards
a. paid out at the end of the cycle to the delegator and said delegator essentially dropped from the validator? or
b. added to the existing delegation stake and included in the next cycle of validation?

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This is from validator POV.
It is probably confusing because it should've been delegatee rewards (rewards that are earned from delegators).


Because of the way `RewardValidatorTx` is structured, multiple instances cannot be issued without resulting in identical
transaction IDs. To resolve this, a new transaction type has been introduced for both rewarding and stopping continuous
validators: `RewardContinuousValidatorTx`. Along with the validator’s creation transaction ID, it also includes a
timestamp. For simplicity and consistency, any stake exceeding the maximum limit is withdrawn from the validator, and
the resulting UTXOs are tied to the `RewardContinuousValidatorTx` ID.

Note: Submitting an `AddContinuousValidatorTx` immediately followed by a `StopContinuousValidatorTx` replicates
the behavior of the current staking system.

### New P-Chain Transaction Types

The following new transaction types are introduced on the P-Chain to support this functionality:

#### AddContinuousValidatorTx

```golang
type AddContinuousValidatorTx struct {
// Metadata, inputs and outputs
BaseTx `serialize:"true"`

// Node ID of the validator
ValidatorNodeID ids.NodeID `serialize:"true" json:"nodeID"`

// Period (in seconds).
Period uint64 `serialize:"true" json:"period"`

// [Signer] is the BLS key for this validator.
Signer signer.Signer `serialize:"true" json:"signer"`

// Where to send staked tokens when done validating
StakeOuts []*avax.TransferableOutput `serialize:"true" json:"stake"`

// Where to send validation rewards when done validating
ValidatorRewardsOwner fx.Owner `serialize:"true" json:"validationRewardsOwner"`

// Where to send delegation rewards when done validating
DelegatorRewardsOwner fx.Owner `serialize:"true" json:"delegationRewardsOwner"`

// Fee this validator charges delegators as a percentage, times 10,000
// For example, if this validator has DelegationShares=300,000 then they
// take 30% of rewards from delegators
DelegationShares uint32 `serialize:"true" json:"shares"`

// Weight of this validator used when sampling
Wght uint64 `serialize:"true" json:"weight"`
}

```

#### StopContinuousValidatorTx

```golang
type StopContinuousValidatorTx struct {
// Metadata, inputs and outputs
BaseTx `serialize:"true"`

// ID of the tx that created the continuous validator.
TxID ids.ID `serialize:"true" json:"txID"`

// Authorizes this validator to be stopped.
// It is a BLS Proof of Possession signature of the TxID using validator key.
StopSignature [bls.SignatureLen]byte `serialize:"true" json:"stopSignature"`
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Are there any alternatives for avoiding using a BLS signature from the node's key here?

Given the way that many nodes are managed, I think it'd be relatively high friction to get signatures for many potential users of this. For instance, many times I'd imagine that teams managing validator infrastructure are not the ones managing staking transactions to those nodes.

If there are no viable alternatives, we should probably add a section on how this could be easily implemented potentially via private admin RPC endpoints or something.

The only alternative I can think of would be requiring a signature from the ValidatorRewardsOwner, but not sure how feasible that is.

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I don’t think we should use ValidatorRewardsOwner as the authority to stop the validator.

If we want to avoid using a BLS signature, we can add a new field called StopOwner for clarity. People can still set it to the same value as ValidatorRewardsOwner if they want.

We should keep in mind that adding the StopOwner field allows using the same stop authority for many validators, which can be risky. If that key gets compromised, someone could stop several validators at once and reduce the total stake.
Thus, more convenience always means less security.

}
```

`StopSignature` is the BLS Proof of Possession signature of the tx ID of `AddContinuousValidatorTx` using the validator
key.

#### RewardContinuousValidatorTx

```golang
type RewardContinuousValidatorTx struct {
// ID of the tx that created the validator being removed/rewarded
TxID ids.ID `serialize:"true" json:"txID"`

// End time of the validator.
Timestamp uint64 `serialize:"true" json:"timestamp"`

unsignedBytes []byte // Unsigned byte representation of this data
}

```

## Backwards Compatibility

This change requires a network upgrade to make sure that all validators are able to verify and execute the new
introduced transactions.

## Considerations

Continuous staking makes it easier for users to keep their funds staked longer than with fixed-period staking, since it
involves fewer transactions, lower friction, and reduced risks.
Greater staking participation leads to stronger overall network security.

Validators benefit by not having to manually restart at the end of each cycle, which reduces transaction volume and the
risk of network congestion.

However, the risk per cycle slightly increases depending on cycle length and validator performance. For example, missing
five days in a one-year cycle may still yield rewards, whereas missing five days in a two-week cycle may affect rewards.

## Open Questions

- Should rewards be automatically restaked into the validator's active stake?

- Should the `AddContinuousValidatorTx` transaction allow specifying a reward withdrawal frequency?

- If auto-restaking causes the total stake to exceed the maximum allowed limit, should all accumulated rewards (from the
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I'd personally lead to simplicity and correctness here, so I'm in favor of the entire rewards being withdrawn instead of only the excess amount.

Also, to question number 1, given that we'll need to support the logic for potentially distributing/withdrawing rewards as part of the RewardContinuousValidatorTx execution in the case the where the validation hasn't been stopped anyways, I personally be in favor of adding an AutoCompoundRewards option to AddContinuousValidatorTx. In the execution of RewardContinuousValidatorTx, rewards are credited to the reward owner if AutoCompoundRewards is false or if the rewards + the initial stake weight would exceed the maximum stake limit. Otherwise the rewards are auto-compounded into the stake amount for the next validation cycle period.

last cycle) be withdrawn instead of only the excess amount? This approach favors simplicity and results in a less
error-prone implementation.

## Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).