Update dependency org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client to v2.15.0 [SECURITY] (main)

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This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Adoption	Passing	Confidence
org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client	2.12.1 → 2.15.0

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Warning

Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the warning logs for more information.

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AsyncHttpClient (AHC) library's CookieStore replaces explicitly defined Cookies

CVE-2024-53990 / GHSA-mfj5-cf8g-g2fv

More information

Details

Summary

When making any HTTP request, the automatically enabled and self-managed CookieStore (aka cookie jar) will silently replace explicitly defined Cookies with any that have the same name from the cookie jar. For services that operate with multiple users, this can result in one user's Cookie being used for another user's requests.

Details

This issue is described without security warnings here:

https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/issues/1964

A PR to fix this issue has been made:

https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/pull/2033

PoC

1. Add an auth Cookie to the CookieStore
   • This is identical to receiving an HTTP response that uses Set-Cookie, as shown in issue #​1964 above.
2. Handle a different user's request where the same Cookie is provided as a passthrough, like a JWT, and attempt to use it by explicitly providing it.
3. Observe that the user's cookie in step 2 is passed as the Cookie in step 1.

Impact

This is generally going to be a problem for developers of backend services that implement third party auth features and use other features like token refresh. The moment a third party service responds by setting a cookie in the response, the CookieStore will effectively break almost every follow-up request (hopefully by being rejected, but possibly by revealing a different user's information).

If your service sets cookies based on the response that happens here, it's possible to lead to even greater levels of exposure.

Workaroud

You can avoid this issue by disabling the CookieStore during client creation:

DefaultAsyncHttpClientConfig.Builder clientBuilder = Dsl.config()
 .setCookieStore(null)
 // other configuration
 ;

Severity

• CVSS Score: 9.2 / 10 (Critical)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/security/advisories/GHSA-mfj5-cf8g-g2fv
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-53990
• https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/issues/1964
• https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/pull/2033
• https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/commit/d5a83362f7aed81b93ebca559746ac9be0f95425
• https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client
• https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/blob/main/CHANGES.md#from-20-to-21

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

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AsyncHttpClient leaks authorization credentials to untrusted domains on cross-origin redirects

CVE-2026-40490 / GHSA-cmxv-58fp-fm3g

More information

Details

Impact

When redirect following is enabled (followRedirect(true)), AsyncHttpClient forwards Authorization and Proxy-Authorization headers along with Realm credentials to arbitrary redirect targets regardless of domain, scheme, or port changes. This leaks credentials on cross-domain redirects and HTTPS-to-HTTP downgrades.

Additionally, even when stripAuthorizationOnRedirect is set to true, the Realm object containing plaintext credentials is still propagated to the redirect request, causing credential re-generation for Basic and Digest authentication schemes via NettyRequestFactory.

An attacker who controls a redirect target (via open redirect, DNS rebinding, or MITM on HTTP) can capture Bearer tokens, Basic auth credentials, or any other Authorization header value.

Patches

Fixed in version 3.0.9 or 2.14.5. Users should upgrade immediately.

The fix automatically strips Authorization and Proxy-Authorization headers and clears Realm credentials whenever a redirect crosses origin boundaries (different scheme, host, or port) or downgrades from HTTPS to HTTP.

Workarounds

For users unable to upgrade, set (stripAuthorizationOnRedirect(true)) in the client config and avoid using Realm-based authentication with redirect following enabled. Note that (stripAuthorizationOnRedirect(true)) alone is insufficient on versions prior to 3.0.9 or 2.14.5 because the Realm bypass still re-generates credentials.

Alternatively, disable redirect following (followRedirect(false)) and handle redirects manually with origin validation.

References

• Fix commit: AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client@6b2fbb7f8

Severity

• CVSS Score: 6.8 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

References

• https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/security/advisories/GHSA-cmxv-58fp-fm3g
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40490
• https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/commit/6b2fbb7f8
• https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/commit/ae557ad35246721c09dafb2976609cd0004e78ae
• https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client
• https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/releases/tag/async-http-client-project-2.14.5
• https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/releases/tag/async-http-client-project-3.0.9

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

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async-http-client: Cookie header not stripped on cross-origin redirect

CVE-2026-45300 / GHSA-fmxf-pm6p-7xgm

More information

Details

Summary

async-http-client leaks Cookie headers to cross-origin redirect targets. When following a redirect across a security boundary (different origin, or HTTPS→HTTP downgrade), the propagatedHeaders() method in Redirect30xInterceptor.java strips Authorization and Proxy-Authorization headers but does not strip Cookie, so session cookies and other sensitive cookie values are forwarded to the redirect target — which may be attacker-controlled.

Details

The vulnerability is in client/src/main/java/org/asynchttpclient/netty/handler/intercept/Redirect30xInterceptor.java.

The caller computes stripAuth on each redirect:

boolean sameBase    = request.getUri().isSameBase(newUri);
boolean stripAuth   = !sameBase || schemeDowngrade || stripAuthorizationOnRedirect;
// ...
requestBuilder.setHeaders(propagatedHeaders(request, realm, keepBody, stripAuth));

stripAuth is true whenever the redirect crosses an origin, downgrades the scheme, or the caller opted in via AsyncHttpClientConfig#isStripAuthorizationOnRedirect().

In the vulnerable version, propagatedHeaders() only removes Authorization and Proxy-Authorization in that branch — Cookie is left untouched:

private static HttpHeaders propagatedHeaders(Request request, Realm realm, boolean keepBody, boolean stripAuthorization) {
    HttpHeaders headers = request.getHeaders()
            .remove(HOST)
            .remove(CONTENT_LENGTH);

    if (!keepBody) {
        headers.remove(CONTENT_TYPE);
    }

    if (stripAuthorization || (realm != null && (realm.getScheme() == AuthScheme.NTLM
            || realm.getScheme() == AuthScheme.SCRAM_SHA_256))) {
        headers.remove(AUTHORIZATION)
                .remove(PROXY_AUTHORIZATION);
        // BUG: COOKIE is not removed here, so cookies leak across the security boundary.
    }
    return headers;
}

The companion test class RedirectCredentialSecurityTest covers Authorization / Proxy-Authorization stripping on cross-origin redirects and scheme downgrades, but has no coverage for Cookie, which is why the regression went unnoticed.

Proof of concept

import org.asynchttpclient.*;

AsyncHttpClient client = asyncHttpClient();

// trusted-api.com responds 302 -> https://evil.com
Request request = new RequestBuilder("GET")
        .setUrl("https://trusted-api.com/endpoint")
        .setHeader("Cookie", "session=abc123; csrf=xyz789; api_key=secret")
        .setHeader("Authorization", "Bearer token123")
        .build();

client.executeRequest(request).get();

// Request seen by evil.com after the redirect:
//   Authorization: <stripped>
//   Cookie:        session=abc123; csrf=xyz789; api_key=secret   <-- leaked

Impact

• Session hijacking — leaked session cookies allow impersonation.
• CSRF token theft — CSRF tokens carried in cookies are disclosed.
• API key theft — API keys stored in cookies are disclosed.
• Privacy — tracking identifiers leak to third-party origins.

Realistic attack paths:

• Open-redirect in a trusted API endpoint.
• Compromised CDN or API gateway injecting redirects.
• MITM on a plaintext hop in the redirect chain.

Fix

Add COOKIE to the headers removed alongside AUTHORIZATION / PROXY_AUTHORIZATION on the security-boundary branch:

if (stripAuthorization) {
    headers.remove(AUTHORIZATION)
            .remove(PROXY_AUTHORIZATION)
            .remove(COOKIE);
} else if (realm != null && (realm.getScheme() == AuthScheme.NTLM
        || realm.getScheme() == AuthScheme.SCRAM_SHA_256)) {
    headers.remove(AUTHORIZATION)
            .remove(PROXY_AUTHORIZATION);
}

Note that the URI-scoped CookieStore will re-add any cookies that legitimately match the new target after propagatedHeaders returns, so legitimate cross-origin sessions tracked by the client are not broken.

Fixed in 3.0.10 and 2.15.0 by commit 3b0e3e9e.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.4 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

References

• https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/security/advisories/GHSA-fmxf-pm6p-7xgm
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45300
• https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/commit/3b0e3e9e
• https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client
• https://github.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/releases/tag/async-http-client-project-3.0.10

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

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