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docs: fix some typos #7393

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merged 3 commits into from
Oct 7, 2024
Merged

docs: fix some typos #7393

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baffdcd
fix typo
odyslaeth Oct 3, 2024
cedc205
fix more typos
odyslaeth Oct 3, 2024
36fc37a
Merge branch 'main' into fixt
colin-axner Oct 7, 2024
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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion docs/docs/03-light-clients/05-tendermint/01-overview.md
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Expand Up @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ The Tendermint client consists of two important structs that keep track of the s

Each Tendermint Client is composed of a single `ClientState` keyed on the client ID, and multiple consensus states which are keyed on both the clientID and header height. Relayers can use the consensus states to verify merkle proofs of packet commitments, acknowledgements, and receipts against the `AppHash` of the counterparty chain in order to enable verified packet flow.

If a counterparty chain violates the CometBFT protocol in a way that is detectable to off-chain light clients, this misbehaviour can also be submitted to an IBC client by any off-chain actor. Upon verification of this misbehaviour, the Tendermint IBC Client will freeze, preventing any further packet flow from this malicious chain from occuring. Governance or some other out-of-band protocol may then be used to unwind any damage that has already occurred.
If a counterparty chain violates the CometBFT protocol in a way that is detectable to off-chain light clients, this misbehaviour can also be submitted to an IBC client by any off-chain actor. Upon verification of this misbehaviour, the Tendermint IBC Client will freeze, preventing any further packet flow from this malicious chain from occurring. Governance or some other out-of-band protocol may then be used to unwind any damage that has already occurred.

## Initialization

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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion docs/tutorials/02-channel-upgrades/05-upgrade-channel.md
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Expand Up @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ proposals:

Now we wait for the relayer to complete the upgrade handshake.

## Check ugprade completed
## Check upgrade completed

Once the handshake has completed we verify that the channel has successfully upgraded:

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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion docs/versioned_docs/version-v9.0.x/03-light-clients/05-tendermint/01-overview.md
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ The Tendermint client consists of two important structs that keep track of the s

Each Tendermint Client is composed of a single `ClientState` keyed on the client ID, and multiple consensus states which are keyed on both the clientID and header height. Relayers can use the consensus states to verify merkle proofs of packet commitments, acknowledgements, and receipts against the `AppHash` of the counterparty chain in order to enable verified packet flow.

If a counterparty chain violates the CometBFT protocol in a way that is detectable to off-chain light clients, this misbehaviour can also be submitted to an IBC client by any off-chain actor. Upon verification of this misbehaviour, the Tendermint IBC Client will freeze, preventing any further packet flow from this malicious chain from occuring. Governance or some other out-of-band protocol may then be used to unwind any damage that has already occurred.
If a counterparty chain violates the CometBFT protocol in a way that is detectable to off-chain light clients, this misbehaviour can also be submitted to an IBC client by any off-chain actor. Upon verification of this misbehaviour, the Tendermint IBC Client will freeze, preventing any further packet flow from this malicious chain from occurring. Governance or some other out-of-band protocol may then be used to unwind any damage that has already occurred.

## Initialization

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