This document summarizes the security audit conducted on the multibase crate and provides guidance for users regarding security considerations.
Last comprehensive security audit: 2025-10-08
The codebase has been thoroughly reviewed for common security issues and no critical vulnerabilities were identified.
-
Integer Overflow ✓ SAFE
- All size calculations use Rust's default checked arithmetic in debug mode
- Capacity calculations for String/Vec use addition that would fail allocation before overflow
- Risk: Low - would require near-
usize::MAX
inputs, which would fail memory allocation first
-
Buffer Overflow/Underflow ✓ SAFE
- All string slicing uses
char::len_utf8()
for correct UTF-8 boundary detection - No unsafe code or manual pointer arithmetic
- Rust's bounds checking prevents buffer overflows
- Risk: None - protected by Rust's safety guarantees
- All string slicing uses
-
Panic Conditions (DoS Vectors) ✓ SAFE
- Identity encoding uses
String::from_utf8_lossy
(no panic on invalid UTF-8) - All decoding operations return
Result
types - Empty inputs handled with
Error::EmptyInput
- Invalid base codes return
Error::UnknownBase
- One documented
.expect()
inencode_to_validated()
that cannot fail - Risk: Minimal - library functions do not panic on arbitrary inputs
- Identity encoding uses
-
Resource Exhaustion Attacks
⚠️ CONSIDER- No hard limits on input size
- Large inputs (e.g., gigabytes) will consume proportional memory
- Memory allocation failures are handled by Rust's allocator
- Risk: Medium - applications should implement their own size limits if needed
- Recommendation: Applications processing untrusted input should enforce maximum size limits
-
Input Validation ✓ COMPREHENSIVE
- Empty strings: Validated with
Error::EmptyInput
- Invalid base codes: Validated with
Error::UnknownBase
- Malformed encoded data: Validated by base-specific decoders
- All validation through
Result
types - Risk: None - comprehensive input validation
- Empty strings: Validated with
For applications processing untrusted input, consider enforcing maximum size limits:
const MAX_INPUT_SIZE: usize = 10 * 1024 * 1024; // 10 MB
fn safe_decode(input: &str) -> Result<(Base, Vec<u8>), Error> {
if input.len() > MAX_INPUT_SIZE {
return Err(Error::InvalidBaseString); // or custom error
}
multibase::decode(input, true)
}
Always handle errors properly and avoid exposing detailed error messages to untrusted parties:
match multibase::decode(untrusted_input, true) {
Ok((base, data)) => {
// Process data
}
Err(_) => {
// Log error internally, return generic error to user
eprintln!("Invalid multibase input");
}
}
The Identity encoding (\0
prefix) uses lossy UTF-8 conversion:
- Invalid UTF-8 bytes are replaced with the Unicode replacement character (U+FFFD)
- This prevents panics but means invalid UTF-8 won't round-trip perfectly
- For binary data that must round-trip exactly, use a different base encoding (e.g., Base64)
// For exact binary data preservation, use Base64 or Base58
let encoded = multibase::encode(Base::Base64, binary_data);
// Identity is only appropriate for UTF-8 text
let text_encoded = multibase::encode(Base::Identity, "valid utf-8 text".as_bytes());
Use strict decoding (true
) for untrusted input to ensure stricter validation:
// For untrusted input, always use strict mode
let (base, data) = multibase::decode(untrusted, true)?;
// Permissive mode allows case-insensitive decoding for some bases
let (base, data) = multibase::decode(trusted, false)?;
The crate includes comprehensive security tests covering:
- 17 security-focused tests in
tests/security.rs
- Large input handling (up to 1 MB tested)
- Malformed and malicious input patterns
- Buffer reuse safety
- Concurrent operation safety
- Resource exhaustion resistance
- Integer overflow safety
- Invalid UTF-8 handling
- Empty and truncated input handling
Run security tests with:
cargo test --test security
The crate can be fuzzed using cargo-fuzz
. Fuzzing targets are recommended for:
- Decoding arbitrary strings - Ensures no panics on any input
- Encoding arbitrary bytes - Ensures no panics on any binary data
- Round-trip operations - Verifies encode/decode consistency
# Install cargo-fuzz
cargo install cargo-fuzz
# Initialize fuzzing (if not already done)
cargo fuzz init
# Run fuzz tests
cargo fuzz run fuzz_decode # Fuzz decoding operations
cargo fuzz run fuzz_encode # Fuzz encoding operations
cargo fuzz run fuzz_roundtrip # Fuzz full round-trips
The crate depends on well-maintained libraries:
base-x
(0.2.7) - Variable-radix base encodingbase256emoji
(1.0.2) - Base256Emoji encodingdata-encoding
(2.3.1) - Standard base encodingsthiserror
(2.0) - Error handling
All dependencies are actively maintained and widely used in the Rust ecosystem.
If you discover a security vulnerability in the multibase crate, please report it privately:
- Do not open a public GitHub issue
- Contact the maintainers via email (check Cargo.toml for contact information)
- Provide detailed information about the vulnerability
- Allow reasonable time for a fix before public disclosure
- ✅ No panics on arbitrary untrusted input
- ✅ Memory safety (no unsafe code used)
- ✅ Comprehensive input validation
- ✅ Thread-safe operations (all types are Send + Sync where appropriate)
- ✅ Error information without exposing internal state
- ❌ Protection against resource exhaustion (application responsibility)
- ❌ Constant-time operations (not designed for cryptographic use)
- ❌ Perfect round-tripping of invalid UTF-8 in Identity encoding
- Fixed Identity encoding panic risk (now uses lossy UTF-8 conversion)
- Migrated to thiserror for better error handling
- Added 17 security-focused tests
- Conducted comprehensive security audit
- Added this SECURITY.md document
- Initial release with basic security considerations
Security audits and improvements were guided by:
- The Definitive Guide to Rust Error Handling
- Rust security best practices
- OWASP guidelines for input validation
- Industry-standard secure coding practices
2025-10-08