🔒 Fix path traversal vulnerability in folder creation and object handlers#64
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Co-authored-by: damacus <40786+damacus@users.noreply.github.com>
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🎯 What: This PR fixes a path traversal vulnerability in
CreateFolderwhere thefolderNameargument was concatenated directly withprefixwithout proper sanitization. It also extends this protection to other object operations likeUploadObject,DeleteObject, andDownloadObjectfor robust defense-in-depth against malicious directory traversal payloads.../../sequences in thefolderNameorprefixfields. Since these map directly to the S3 object keys created in MinIO, an attacker could traverse and place/delete arbitrary object keys outside the intended namespace, potentially overwriting legitimate files or escaping expected logical boundaries.🛡️ Solution: Added a strict helper function
isValidObjectKeythat explicitly blocks inputs containing directory traversal (..) or absolute paths (leading/). This is enforced across multiple relevant handlers (CreateFolder,UploadObject,DeleteObject,DownloadObject), returning an HTTP 400 Bad Request error upon violation. Included tests to verify this prevention logic works as intended.PR created automatically by Jules for task 10173848129759502010 started by @damacus