Fix typos

Signed-off-by: lovesh <[email protected]>

equality_across_groups/Cargo.toml

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ edition.workspace = true
 authors.workspace = true
 license.workspace = true
 repository.workspace = true
+description = "Protocols for proving equality of committed values across groups"
 
 [dependencies]
 ark-serialize.workspace = true

equality_across_groups/src/pok_ecdsa_pubkey.rs

@@ -302,6 +302,7 @@ mod tests {
         let comm_key_tom = PedersenCommitmentKey::<Tom256Affine>::new::<Blake2b512>(b"test2");
         let comm_key_bls = PedersenCommitmentKey::<BlsG1Affine>::new::<Blake2b512>(b"test3");
 
+        // Bulletproofs++ setup
         let base = 2;
         let mut bpp_setup_params = BppSetupParams::<Tom256Affine>::new_for_perfect_range_proof::<
             Blake2b512,
@@ -311,14 +312,16 @@ mod tests {
         bpp_setup_params.G = comm_key_tom.g;
         bpp_setup_params.H_vec[0] = comm_key_tom.h;
 
+        // ECDSA public key setup
         let sk = Fr::rand(&mut rng);
         let pk = (SECP_GEN * sk).into_affine();
 
+        // Commit to ECDSA public key on Tom-256 curve
         let comm_pk = PointCommitmentWithOpening::new(&mut rng, &pk, &comm_key_tom).unwrap();
 
+        // Commit to ECDSA public key on BLS12-381 curve
         let pk_x = from_base_field_to_scalar_field::<Fq, BlsFr>(pk.x().unwrap());
         let pk_y = from_base_field_to_scalar_field::<Fq, BlsFr>(pk.y().unwrap());
-
         let bls_comm_pk_rx = BlsFr::rand(&mut rng);
         let bls_comm_pk_ry = BlsFr::rand(&mut rng);
         let bls_comm_pk_x = comm_key_bls.commit(&pk_x, &bls_comm_pk_rx);
@@ -375,7 +378,7 @@ mod tests {
             )
             .unwrap();
 
-            // Proof that x coordinate is same in both Tom-256 and BLS12-381 commitments
+            // Proof that y coordinate is same in both Tom-256 and BLS12-381 commitments
             let proof_eq_pk_y = ProofLargeWitness::<
                 Tom256Affine,
                 BlsG1Affine,

schnorr_pok/README.md

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Also implements the proof of **inequality of discrete log** when only one of the
 the prover. i.e. given `y = g * x` and `z = h * k`, prover and verifier know `g`, `h`, `y` and `z` and
 prover additionally knows `x` but not `k`.
 
-Also implements the following sigma protocols:
+Also implements the following sigma protocols in [`Product`]:
 - Proving product relation among values committed in a Pedersen commitment
 - Proving square relation among values committed in a Pedersen commitment
 - Proving inverse relation among values committed in a Pedersen commitment
@@ -70,5 +70,6 @@ So even though the crate's name is `schnorr_pok`, it implements other protocols
 
 [`Inequality`]: https://docs.rs/schnorr_pok/latest/schnorr_pok/inequality/
 [`discrete_log_pairing`]: https://docs.rs/schnorr_pok/latest/schnorr_pok/discrete_log_pairing/
+[`Product`]: https://docs.rs/schnorr_pok/latest/schnorr_pok/product_relations/
 
 <!-- cargo-rdme end -->

schnorr_pok/src/lib.rs

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
 //! the prover. i.e. given `y = g * x` and `z = h * k`, prover and verifier know `g`, `h`, `y` and `z` and
 //! prover additionally knows `x` but not `k`.
 //!
-//! Also implements the following sigma protocols:
+//! Also implements the following sigma protocols in [`Product`]:
 //! - Proving product relation among values committed in a Pedersen commitment
 //! - Proving square relation among values committed in a Pedersen commitment
 //! - Proving inverse relation among values committed in a Pedersen commitment
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
 //!
 //! [`Inequality`]: crate::inequality
 //! [`discrete_log_pairing`]: crate::discrete_log_pairing
+//! [`Product`]: crate::product_relations
 
 use crate::error::SchnorrError;
 use ark_ec::{AffineRepr, CurveGroup, VariableBaseMSM};

schnorr_pok/src/product_relations.rs

@@ -12,11 +12,11 @@
 //!  - `v_a, v_b, v_c, r_a, r_b, r_c`
 //!
 //! The prover proves knowledge of `v_a, v_b, v_c, r_a, r_b, r_c` using the usual sigma protocol (Schnorr) while
-//! proving that `c = a * v_b + h * r` where `r = r_c - (r_a * r_b)`
+//! proving that `c = a * v_b + h * r` where `r = r_c - (r_a * v_b)`
 //!
 //! For proving the inverse relation `v_a * v_a_inv = 1`, the above protocol can be used but a more efficient way is to prove
-//! given commitments `a = g * v_a + h * r_a`, `a_inv = g * v_a_inv + h * r_a_inv` that `g = a * v_a_inv + h * r`. This saves
-//! some commitments and responses.
+//! given commitments `a = g * v_a + h * r_a`, `a_inv = g * v_a_inv + h * r_a_inv` that `g = a * v_a_inv + h * r` where
+//! `r = -(r_a * v_a_inv)`. This saves some commitments and responses.
 //!
 //! Similarly, for proving the square relation `v_a * v_a = v_a_sqr`, the above product protocol can be used but that will
 //! have duplicate commitments and responses for `v_a` so a dedicated protocol is used.