fix: resolve privilege escalation vulnerability via mass assignment (#1851) - #1868
fix: resolve privilege escalation vulnerability via mass assignment (#1851)#1868atul-upadhyay-7 wants to merge 1 commit into
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Summary
This PR fixes the Privilege Escalation via Mass Assignment vulnerability described in #1851. The fix ensures that standard users cannot escalate their roles by injecting privileged fields (e.g., "is_admin": true` via the Supabase client to grant themselves administrative privileges, bypassing all authorization checks.
Changes
Database Layer (RLS Hardening)
20260727000000_fix_mass_assignment_privilege_escalation.sql):prevent_privilege_escalation) that unconditionally blocks direct modification of and columnsBackend Layer (Server-Side Validation)
backend/validation/schemas.js):backend/routes/users.js):Frontend Layer (Defense-in-Depth)
src/pages/EditProfile.tsx: Uses new secure backend endpoint instead of direct Supabase clientsrc/pages/Profile.tsx: Uses new secure backend endpoint instead of direct Supabase clientSecurity Architecture
The fix implements defense-in-depth across three layers:
Testing
Fixes #1851