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8337536: AArch64: Enable BTI branch protection for runtime part
This patch enables BTI branch protection for runtime part on Linux/aarch64 platform. Motivation 1. Since Fedora 33, glibc+kernel are PAC/BTI enabled by default. User-level packages can gain additional hardening by compiling with the GCC/Clang flag `-mbranch-protection=flag`. See [1]. 2. In JDK-8277204 [2], `--enable-branch-protection` was introduced as one VM configure flag, which would pass `-mbranch-protection=standard` compilation flags to all c/c++ files. Note that `standard` turns on both `pac-ret` and `bti` branch protections. For more details about code reuse attacks and hardware-assisted branch protections on AArch64, see [3]. However, we checked the `.note.gnu.property` section of all the shared libraries under `jdk/lib` on Fedora 40, and found that only libjvm.so didn't set these two target feature bits: ``` GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_PAC ``` Note-1: BTI is an all or nothing property for a link unit [4]. That is, libjvm.so is not BTI-enabled. Note-2: PAC bit in `.note.gnu.property` section is used to protect `.got.plt` table. It's independent of whether the relocatable objects use PAC or not. Goal Hence, this patch aims to set PAC/BTI feature bits of the `.note.gnu.property` section for libjvm.so. Implementation Task-1: find out the problematic input objects From [5], "Static linkers processing ELF relocatable objects must set the feature bit in the output object or image only if all the input objects have the corresponding feature bit set." Hence we suspect that the root cause is probably that the PAC/BTI feature bits are not set only for some input objects of libjvm.so. In order to find out these inputs, we passed `--force-bti` linker flag [4] in my local test. This linker flag would warn if any input object does not have GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI. We got the following list: ``` src/hotspot/os_cpu/linux_aarch64/atomic_linux_aarch64.S src/hotspot/os_cpu/linux_aarch64/copy_linux_aarch64.S src/hotspot/os_cpu/linux_aarch64/safefetch_linux_aarch64.S src/hotspot/os_cpu/linux_aarch64/threadLS_linux_aarch64.S ``` Task-2: add `.note.gnu.property` section for these assembly files As mentioned in Motivation-2 part, `-mbranch-protection=standard` is passed to compile c/c++ files but these assembly files are missed. In this patch, we also pass `-mbranch-protection=standard` flag to assembler (See the update in flags-cflags.m4 and flags-other.m4), and add `.note.gnu.property` section at the end of these assembler files. With this change, we can see PAC/BTI feature bits in the final libjvm.so. Task-3: add BTI landing pads for hand written assembly In the local test on Fedora 40 with PAC/BTI-capable hardware, we got `SIGILL` error, which is one typical BTI error (branch target exception). The root cause is that we should add the missing BTI landing pads for hand written assembly in hotspot. File-1 copy_aarch64.hpp: It's a switch-case statement and we add `bti j` for these indirect jumps. File-2 atomic_linux_aarch64.S: We add landings pads `bti c` at the function entries. File-3 copy_linux_aarch64.S: There is no need to add `bti c` at the function entries since they are called via `bl`. And we should handle the indirect jumps. File-4 safefetch_linux_aarch64.S: Similar to file-3, there is no need to handle these function entries. File-5 threadLS_linux_aarch64.S: No need to handle the function entry because `paciasp` can act as the landing pad. Evaluation 1. jtreg test We ran tier 1-3 jtreg tests on Fedora 40 + GCC 14 + the following AArch64 hardware and all tests passed. ``` 1. w/o PAC and w/o BTI 2. w/ PAC and w/o BTI 3. w/ PAC and w/ BTI ``` We also ran the jtreg tests on Fedora 40 + Clang 18 + hardware w/ PAC and w/ BTI. The test passed too. 2. code size We got about 2% code size increase before and after `--enbale-branch-protection` is used. This code size change looks reasonable. See the evaluation on glibc [6]. [1] https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Aarch64_PointerAuthentication [2] https://bugs.openjdk.org/browse/JDK-8277204 [3] https://community.arm.com/arm-community-blogs/b/tools-software-ides-blog/posts/code-reuse-attacks-the-compiler-story [4] https://reviews.llvm.org/D62609 [5] https://github.com/ARM-software/abi-aa/blob/2a70c42d62e9c3eb5887fa50b71257f20daca6f9/aaelf64/aaelf64.rst#program-property [6] https://developer.arm.com/documentation/102433/0100/Applying-these-techniques-to-real-code
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