ci: pin GitHub Actions to commit SHAs (#5br) - #525
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Replace every uses: foo/bar@vN reference with uses: foo/bar@<40-char-sha> # vN in the three workflow files. This prevents a malicious tag overwrite on any action (actions/checkout, dtolnay/rust-toolchain, codecov/codecov-action, gitleaks/gitleaks-action, etc.) from silently injecting code into our CI. Tag comments preserved so reviewers and dependabot can still see the intended major version at a glance.
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Summary
Every
uses: foo/bar@vNreference across the three workflow files is now pinned to a full 40-char commit SHA, with the original tag preserved as a trailing# vNcomment. Borrowed from Zero's rocicorp/mono#5998.Why
GitHub tags are mutable. A compromised maintainer account, a leaked publish token, or a typo-squatted action can silently re-point
v4at malicious code, and our CI would pick it up on the next run with no visible diff. SHAs are immutable: pinning means an attacker who overwrites the tag can't change what our workflows actually execute. The cost is small (lose automatic minor-version updates) and dependabot covers the maintenance gap.If you have dependabot enabled on the repo, add a
.github/dependabot.ymlconfig forpackage-ecosystem: github-actionsso it opens PRs whenever a pinned action publishes a new SHA under its tag. That keeps us patched without giving the supply chain a free hand.What's in the diff
.github/workflows/rust.yml- pinnedactions/checkout@v5,actions/setup-python@v5,taiki-e/install-action@v2,codecov/codecov-action@v6.github/workflows/release.yml- pinnedactions/checkout@v4,dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable,actions/upload-artifact@v4,actions/download-artifact@v4,actions/setup-node@v4,softprops/action-gh-release@v2,gitleaks/gitleaks-action@v2.github/workflows/sync-next.yml- pinnedactions/checkout@v4,peter-evans/create-pull-request@v612 unique action references resolved via
gh api repos/<owner>/<repo>/git/refs/tags/<tag>(annotated tags followed to their target commit). YAML re-parses cleanly.Test plan
Rust / lintworkflow passes (uses the new pinnedactions/checkout@93cb6e...,actions/setup-python@a26af6...)Rust / skill-validatepassesRust / buildpasses (taiki-e/install-action@65851e...,codecov/codecov-action@e79a69...)Rust / coveragepassesFollow-ups
.github/dependabot.ymlwith agithub-actionsecosystem block so dependabot opens PRs for SHA bumps as new versions land. Tracking separately to keep this PR purely about pinning.