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``` | ||
bLIP: 14 | ||
Title: Sender authentication | ||
Status: Draft | ||
Author: Joost Jager <[email protected]> | ||
Created: 2022-02-04 | ||
License: CC0 | ||
``` | ||
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## Abstract | ||
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By default, the lightning protocol protects the sender identity by means of | ||
ephemeral keys and onion routing. There are however use cases that ask for | ||
inclusion of the sender identity with a payment. | ||
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This bLIP serves to document a way to authenticate the sender of a payment via a | ||
custom TLV record. | ||
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## Copyright | ||
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This bLIP is licensed under the CC0 license. | ||
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## Specification | ||
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Sender: | ||
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* MUST include a TLV record keyed by type `83231` with the following value: | ||
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* [`33*byte`:`sender_pubkey`] | ||
* [`8*byte`:`timestamp`] | ||
* [`var length`:`signature`] | ||
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`sender_pubkey` is the public key of the sender. Note that `sender_pubkey` doesn't | ||
need to be the sender's node public key. It can also be a more general | ||
identity. | ||
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`timestamp` is the payment initiation time in nano seconds since unix epoch | ||
(big endian encoded). | ||
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`signature` is a DER-encoded ECDSA signature calculated using `sender_pubkey` | ||
over a message that is a concatenation of the following fields: | ||
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* `timestamp` (8 bytes) | ||
* `recipient_pubkey` (33 bytes) | ||
* `payment_hash` (32 bytes) | ||
* `payment_secret` (32 bytes) | ||
* `amount_msat` (8 bytes, big endian) | ||
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For multi-part payments, `amount_msat` is the total amount of the set. The | ||
value of the TLV record MUST be identical for all parts. | ||
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Receiver: | ||
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* MUST verify that `signature` is valid and produced using `sender_pubkey`. | ||
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* SHOULD verify that `timestamp` is not unreasonably long ago. Suggested cut-off is | ||
one hour. | ||
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* If verification fails, SHOULD error with | ||
`PERM|15 incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details`. | ||
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## Motivation | ||
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Example use cases: | ||
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* A donation payment where the donor wants to make themselves known. | ||
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* Regulated custodial wallets that can offer higher receive limits for payments | ||
originating from specific sources. | ||
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* Lightning deposits to an exchange where the exchange automatically credits the | ||
correct account based on the sender identity. | ||
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There are many ways to authenticate the sender of a payment in Lightning. This | ||
documentation is an attempt to prevent the emergence of too many variants that | ||
all do more or less the same thing. | ||
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## Rationale | ||
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* The TLV record key is an odd number, meaning that the record is ignored by | ||
receivers that do not support sender authentication. No feature bit is needed. | ||
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* It is possible to recover the public key from an ECDSA signature, so strictly | ||
speaking `sender_pubkey` is redundant. Note that with Schnorr signatures, recovery is no | ||
longer possible. | ||
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* It is undesired that a signature can be reused in any way. Therefore all of | ||
the identifying payment properties are covered by the signature. | ||
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## Test vectors | ||
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TBD |