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Post-hackathon changes #1

Merged
merged 13 commits into from
Mar 7, 2024
Merged

Post-hackathon changes #1

merged 13 commits into from
Mar 7, 2024

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merklejerk
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Now that the comp has wrapped up, here's a couple things I've been wanting to add/change.

  • The biggest feature change is the addition of a payment verification function verifyBountyCanPay(), which is a sandbox around payment alone. Because the system is non-custodial, the only way to check if a bounty can pay is to actually simulate it in a sandbox.
    • Lots of refactoring has been done to accommodate this.
  • Operators can also update all fields of their bounty to make it easier/cheaper to adjust bounties as a project evolves.
  • Loads more tests to get up to 97% line coverage.

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For Ethereum applications that can be exploited in a single transaction, this adds another form of proactive defense that can supplement traditional (off-chain) bug bounties and monitoring.
For Ethereum protocols that can be exploited in a single transaction (which are often the case), this offers a novel form of proactive defense that can complement traditional (off-chain) bug bounties, threat monitoring, and in-protocol circuit breakers.
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Suggested change
For Ethereum protocols that can be exploited in a single transaction (which are often the case), this offers a novel form of proactive defense that can complement traditional (off-chain) bug bounties, threat monitoring, and in-protocol circuit breakers.
For Ethereum protocols that can be exploited in a single transaction (which are often the case), this offers a novel form of defense that can complement traditional (off-chain) bug bounties, threat monitoring, and in-protocol circuit breakers.

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y u hate proactive

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@justinschuldt justinschuldt left a comment

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LG. Most of my suggestions are nits, feel free to dismiss

merklejerk and others added 9 commits March 7, 2024 09:44
Co-authored-by: Justin Schuldt <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Justin Schuldt <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Justin Schuldt <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Justin Schuldt <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Justin Schuldt <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Justin Schuldt <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Justin Schuldt <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Justin Schuldt <[email protected]>
@merklejerk merklejerk marked this pull request as ready for review March 7, 2024 15:01
@merklejerk merklejerk merged commit ebd03b4 into main Mar 7, 2024
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3 participants