Skip to content
New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

Sign up for GitHub

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account

gh-123726: Document caveats of zipfile.Path around name sanitization #130537

Open
wants to merge 2 commits into
base: main
Choose a base branch
from
+8 −0
Open

gh-123726: Document caveats of zipfile.Path around name sanitization #130537

Changes from all commits
Commits
Show all changes
2 commits
Select commit Hold shift + click to select a range
67a0709
gh-123726: Document caveats of zipfile.Path around name sanitization
AffanShaikhsurab Feb 25, 2025
cfa4461
Merge branch 'python:main' into main
AffanShaikhsurab Feb 25, 2025
File filter

Filter by extension

Filter by extension
Conversations
Failed to load comments.
Loading
Jump to
Jump to file
Failed to load files.
Loading
Diff view
Diff view
8 changes: 8 additions & 0 deletions Doc/library/zipfile.rst
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -554,6 +554,14 @@ Path Objects
e.g. 'dir/file.txt', 'dir/', or ''. Defaults to the empty string,
indicating the root.

.. note::
The :class:`Path` class does not sanitize filenames within the ZIP archive. Unlike
the :meth:`ZipFile.extract` and :meth:`ZipFile.extractall` methods, it is the
caller's responsibility to validate or sanitize filenames to prevent path traversal
vulnerabilities (e.g., filenames containing ".." or absolute paths). When handling
untrusted archives, consider resolving filenames using :func:`os.path.abspath`
and checking against the target directory with :func:`os.path.commonpath`.

Path objects expose the following features of :mod:`pathlib.Path`
objects:

Expand Down
Loading