feat(nodes): add tool_gohighlevel CRM tool node

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
 
 ### Added
 
+- **`tool_gohighlevel` node**: exposes the GoHighLevel (LeadConnector) v2 REST API to agents as 101 tools across 17 groups (contacts, notes, tasks, opportunities, pipelines, conversations, messages, calendars, appointments, custom fields, custom values, tags, businesses, locations, users), plus a generic `request` escape hatch. Authenticates with a sub-account Private Integration Token, publishes a 74-tool default group set, and can hide every write tool in read-only mode (#1676)
 - **`tool_pipedrive` node**: exposes the Pipedrive CRM REST API v1 to agents — deals, persons, organizations, activities, pipelines, stages, notes, leads, products, fields, files, users, roles, permission sets, teams, goals, filters, webhooks, subscriptions, mail threads, call logs and projects. 256 tools across 24 resource groups, plus a generic `request` tool that reaches any remaining v1 endpoint through the same auth, rate-limit and read-only layer. Because the full surface is larger than an LLM can choose between reliably, `pipedrive.toolGroups` controls which groups are published (default: the eight core CRM groups, 108 tools; `all` publishes everything). Supports personal API tokens and OAuth bearer tokens, company-domain base URLs, offset and cursor pagination, custom fields via an `extra` passthrough, and read-only mode (#1675)
 
 ## [3.3.0] - 2026-06-08

docs/README-nodes.md

@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ channel; they have no data lanes and **bind to an agent** (see
 | `tool_oura`         | Oura Ring health data (sleep, readiness, activity, heart rate), read-only |
 | `tool_xtrace_memory`| Long-term shared agent memory, backed by xTrace Memory Manager   |
 | `tool_mem0`         | Long-term shared agent memory, backed by the hosted Mem0 Platform |
+| `tool_gohighlevel`  | GoHighLevel (LeadConnector) v2 sub-account operations: contacts, opportunities, conversations, calendars |
 
 ### Embeddings
 

nodes/src/nodes/tool_gohighlevel/IGlobal.py

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# RocketRide Engine
+# =============================================================================
+# MIT License
+# Copyright (c) 2026 Aparavi Software AG
+#
+# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+# in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+# to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+# copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+#
+# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
+# all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+#
+# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+# IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+# FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+# AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+# LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+# OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+# SOFTWARE.
+# =============================================================================
+
+"""
+GoHighLevel tool node - global (shared) state.
+
+Reads the sub-account Private Integration Token, the location id it is scoped to,
+the read-only flag, the published tool groups, and the raw-request switch from config.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from ai.common.config import Config
+from rocketlib import IGlobalBase, OPEN_MODE, warning
+
+from .tool_groups import DEFAULT_GROUPS, normalize_groups, unknown_groups
+
+#: Every Private Integration Token observed so far carries this prefix. It is not a
+#: documented guarantee, so a token without it is warned about and still used.
+TOKEN_PREFIX = 'pit-'
+
+
+class IGlobal(IGlobalBase):
+    """Global state for tool_gohighlevel."""
+
+    token: str = ''
+    location_id: str = ''
+    read_only: bool = False
+    tool_groups: frozenset = DEFAULT_GROUPS
+    allow_raw_request: bool = True
+
+    def beginGlobal(self) -> None:
+        """Read the node config and fail early when the node cannot reach an account.
+
+        Raises:
+            Exception: If the token or the location id is missing. Both are required:
+                the token is opaque, so the location cannot be derived from it, and
+                without a location id GoHighLevel answers 403 with a message that
+                blames the token rather than the missing parameter.
+        """
+        if self.IEndpoint.endpoint.openMode == OPEN_MODE.CONFIG:
+            return
+
+        from depends import load_depends
+
+        load_depends(__file__)
+
+        cfg = Config.getNodeConfig(self.glb.logicalType, self.glb.connConfig)
+        self.token = str((cfg.get('privateIntegrationToken') or '')).strip()
+        self.location_id = str((cfg.get('locationId') or '')).strip()
+        self.read_only = bool(cfg.get('readOnly', False))
+        self.tool_groups = normalize_groups(cfg.get('toolGroups'))
+        self.allow_raw_request = bool(cfg.get('allowRawRequest', True))
+
+        if not self.token:
+            raise Exception('tool_gohighlevel: privateIntegrationToken is required')
+        if not self.location_id:
+            raise Exception('tool_gohighlevel: locationId is required (the sub-account this token is scoped to)')
+
+    def validateConfig(self) -> None:
+        """Surface config problems in the editor without starting the backend."""
+        try:
+            cfg = Config.getNodeConfig(self.glb.logicalType, self.glb.connConfig)
+            token = str((cfg.get('privateIntegrationToken') or '')).strip()
+            if not token:
+                warning('privateIntegrationToken is required')
+            elif not token.startswith(TOKEN_PREFIX):
+                warning(
+                    'privateIntegrationToken does not start with "pit-": agency tokens, OAuth access tokens '
+                    'and v1 API keys are not accepted by this node'
+                )
+            if not str((cfg.get('locationId') or '')).strip():
+                warning('locationId is required (the sub-account this Private Integration Token is scoped to)')
+            unknown = unknown_groups(cfg.get('toolGroups'))
+            if unknown:
+                warning(f'unknown tool group(s): {", ".join(unknown)}')
+        except Exception as e:
+            warning(str(e))
+
+    def endGlobal(self) -> None:
+        """Release shared state, wiping the credential."""
+        self.token = ''
+        self.location_id = ''
+        self.read_only = False
+        self.tool_groups = DEFAULT_GROUPS
+        self.allow_raw_request = True

nodes/src/nodes/tool_gohighlevel/IInstance.py

@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+# =============================================================================
+# RocketRide Engine
+# =============================================================================
+# MIT License
+# Copyright (c) 2026 Aparavi Software AG
+#
+# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+# in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+# to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+# copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+#
+# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
+# all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+#
+# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+# IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+# FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+# AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+# LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+# OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+# SOFTWARE.
+# =============================================================================
+
+"""
+GoHighLevel tool node instance.
+
+Composes one mixin per GoHighLevel resource group, publishes only the tools the
+operator enabled, and adds the generic ``request`` escape hatch that reaches any
+v2 endpoint the typed tools do not model.
+
+Publication is filtered twice here, in one pass. The group stamp decides which
+resource areas an agent sees at all, and the write stamp removes the tools a
+read-only node could never run. Both are stamped by ``@gohighlevel_tool``, so
+there is no registry to keep in sync with the tool definitions.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Callable
+
+from rocketlib import IInstanceBase, tool_function
+
+from ai.common.utils import require_str
+
+from .gohighlevel_client import redact_payload
+from .IGlobal import IGlobal
+from .tool_groups import RAW_REQUEST_TOOL
+from .tools import (
+    AppointmentNotesMixin,
+    AppointmentsMixin,
+    BusinessesMixin,
+    CalendarGroupsMixin,
+    CalendarsMixin,
+    ContactNotesMixin,
+    ContactTasksMixin,
+    ContactsMixin,
+    ConversationsMixin,
+    CustomFieldsMixin,
+    CustomValuesMixin,
+    LocationTagsMixin,
+    LocationsMixin,
+    MessagesMixin,
+    OpportunitiesMixin,
+    PipelinesMixin,
+    UsersMixin,
+)
+
+#: Methods the ``request`` tool accepts without write permission.
+#:
+#: GET only, deliberately narrower than the conventional safe set. The read-only config
+#: field tells the operator that the request tool accepts GET in that mode, and HEAD is
+#: not documented on a single GoHighLevel operation, so there is nothing to gain by
+#: quietly widening the promise.
+_SAFE_METHODS = {'GET'}
+_ALLOWED_METHODS = {'GET', 'HEAD', 'POST', 'PUT', 'PATCH', 'DELETE'}
+
+
+class IInstance(
+    AppointmentNotesMixin,
+    AppointmentsMixin,
+    BusinessesMixin,
+    CalendarGroupsMixin,
+    CalendarsMixin,
+    ContactNotesMixin,
+    ContactTasksMixin,
+    ContactsMixin,
+    ConversationsMixin,
+    CustomFieldsMixin,
+    CustomValuesMixin,
+    LocationTagsMixin,
+    LocationsMixin,
+    MessagesMixin,
+    OpportunitiesMixin,
+    PipelinesMixin,
+    UsersMixin,
+    IInstanceBase,
+):
+    IGlobal: IGlobal
+
+    # -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+    # Tool publication
+    # -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+    def _collect_tool_methods(self) -> dict[str, Callable]:
+        """Publish only the tools this node's configuration allows an agent to run.
+
+        The base implementation returns every ``@tool_function`` on the class, which for
+        full GoHighLevel coverage is far more than an agent can choose between. Two filters
+        run here, and both cover ``tool.query`` (the agent never sees the tool) as well as
+        ``tool.invoke`` (calling it anyway is refused):
+
+        1. The resource group, against ``gohighlevel.toolGroups``.
+        2. The write stamp, when ``gohighlevel.readOnly`` is on. This is a deliberate
+           deviation from tool_pipedrive, which publishes its write tools in read-only mode
+           and refuses them at invoke time. An agent cannot tell in advance that a published
+           tool is blocked, so it spends a turn finding out, and roughly 40 tools it can only
+           ever fail on are 40 tools' worth of wasted context.
+           ``GoHighLevelToolsBase._require_write`` still guards invoke, both as defence in
+           depth and because the raw ``request`` tool carries no stamp at all.
+        """
+        methods = super()._collect_tool_methods()
+        enabled = self.IGlobal.tool_groups
+        allow_raw = self.IGlobal.allow_raw_request
+        read_only = self.IGlobal.read_only
+
+        published: dict[str, Callable] = {}
+        for name, method in methods.items():
+            if name == RAW_REQUEST_TOOL:
+                # Gated by its own config switch rather than by a group. It stays published
+                # in read-only mode because it is still a working read tool there.
+                if allow_raw:
+                    published[name] = method
+                continue
+            declared = getattr(type(self), name, None)
+            group = getattr(declared, '__gohighlevel_group__', None)
+            if group is not None and group not in enabled:
+                continue
+            if read_only and getattr(declared, '__gohighlevel_writes__', False):
+                continue
+            published[name] = method
+        return published
+
+    # -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+    # Escape hatch
+    # -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+    @tool_function(
+        input_schema={
+            'type': 'object',
+            'required': ['method', 'path'],
+            'properties': {
+                'method': {
+                    'type': 'string',
+                    'enum': sorted(_ALLOWED_METHODS),
+                    'description': 'HTTP method. In read-only mode only GET is permitted.',
+                },
+                'path': {
+                    'type': 'string',
+                    'description': (
+                        'Path relative to the API root, starting with a slash: for example "/contacts/", '
+                        '"/opportunities/pipelines" or "/locations/<locationId>/customValues". Do not include '
+                        'the host. A trailing slash is load-bearing on several endpoints, and so is casing: '
+                        'GoHighLevel answers a mis-cased path with 401 rather than 404, so copy the path from '
+                        'the API reference exactly.'
+                    ),
+                },
+                'params': {
+                    'type': 'object',
+                    'description': (
+                        'Query-string parameters. The sub-account id is not added for you here: most endpoints '
+                        'want it as locationId, and GET /opportunities/search spells it location_id.'
+                    ),
+                },
+                'body': {
+                    'type': 'object',
+                    'description': (
+                        'JSON request body for POST, PUT and PATCH, and for the few DELETE endpoints that require one.'
+                    ),
+                },
+                'version': {
+                    'type': 'string',
+                    'description': (
+                        'Value for the Version header, which every GoHighLevel operation requires. It defaults '
+                        'to the value derived from the path, which is 2021-04-15 for /calendars and '
+                        '/conversations and 2021-07-28 for everything else. Set it only when the endpoint you '
+                        'are calling documents a different value.'
+                    ),
+                },
+            },
+        },
+        description=(
+            'Call any GoHighLevel v2 endpoint at https://services.leadconnectorhq.com directly, by method and '
+            'path. Use this only for endpoints that have no dedicated tool here: the typed tools validate their '
+            'input, put the sub-account id wherever the endpoint wants it and return a compact result, while '
+            'this one sends what you give it and returns the raw response body. The Authorization and Version '
+            'headers are added automatically, so do not pass them. Rate-limit retries and read-only enforcement '
+            'apply here too.'
+        ),
+    )
+    def request(self, args):
+        """Call any GoHighLevel v2 endpoint directly."""
+        args = self._args(args, 'request')
+        method = require_str(args, 'method', tool_name='request').upper()
+        path = require_str(args, 'path', tool_name='request')
+
+        if method not in _ALLOWED_METHODS:
+            raise ValueError(f'request: method must be one of {", ".join(sorted(_ALLOWED_METHODS))}')
+        if method not in _SAFE_METHODS:
+            self._require_write()
+
+        if '://' in path:
+            raise ValueError('request: "path" must be a path such as "/contacts/", not a full URL')
+
+        params = args.get('params')
+        body = args.get('body')
+        version = args.get('version')
+        if params is not None and not isinstance(params, dict):
+            raise ValueError('request: "params" must be an object')
+        if body is not None and not isinstance(body, dict):
+            raise ValueError('request: "body" must be an object')
+        if version is not None and not isinstance(version, str):
+            raise ValueError('request: "version" must be a string such as "2021-07-28"')
+
+        payload = self._call_envelope(method, path, params=params, body=body, version=version or None)
+        # The only tool that returns a response this node has not projected through a key
+        # allowlist, so it is the one place a payload could echo the credential back.
+        return redact_payload(payload, self._token())